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**FTH**
**UNI ED STA**

**THE WHITE HOUSE**
**JANUARY 1988**


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**NAVALPOSTGRAOUATESCHOOL**
**MONTEREY CA 9394~51 01**

**Contents**

**Preface . .. iv** Arms Reductions ... 15

Maintaining Conventional Deterrence ... 18

**I. Historical Dimensions of U.S.** Maintaining a ational Mobilization Base ... 21
**National Security Strategy . .. 1**

_SUPPORTING POLICIES . .. 22_

u.s. National Space Policy ... 22

**II.** **u damentals of U.S.** **ational** u.S. Intelligence Policy ... 23
**Security Strat gy ... 3**

_THE FRAMEWORK-VALUES, INTERESTS, AND_ **IV. Integrating Elements of Power into**
_NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES . .. 3_ **National Security Strategy . .. 25**

_PRINCIPAL THREATS TO US. INTERESTS . .. 5_

_STRATEGY FOR THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE . .. 25_

_STRATEGY FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN_
_EUROPE . .. 26_

**III. Power, Policy and Strategy . .. 7**

_STRATEGY FOR WESTERN EUROPE AND_

_ELEMENTS OF US. 'NATIONAL POWER . .. 7_ _NATO ... 27_

A PERIOD OF TRANSITION . .. 8 _STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH_

_ASIA .. . 29_

_US. DIPLOMATIC POLICY . .. 9_

_STRATEGY FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC . .. 30_

Policies to Move America Forward ... 9

_STRATEGY FOR AFRICA . .. 32_

Informational Support to Diplomatic Power ... 10

_STRATEGY FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT . .. 34_

_US. ECONOMIC POLICY . .. 11_

International Economic Policy ... 11

**V. Executing the Strategy . .. 37**

_US. DEFENSE POLICY . .. 13_

A Policy of Deterrence ... 13 _RESOURCE SUPPORT . .. 37_

Maintaining Strategic Deterrence ... 14 _BIPARTISAN COOPERATION . .. 40_

iii


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**Preface**

This statement of America's ational Security Strategy report therefore parallels that of last year, with changes
builds on my initial report to the Congress and the as necessary to reflect significant developments in the
American people last year. In the twelve months since, interim. These include:
the strategy outlined in that first report has served the
nation well in protecting our interests and advancing -  Our persistence and adherence to principle have
our security objectives around the world. borne fruit in the historic agreement to eliminate

intermediate-range nuclear forces (I NFl - the fi rst of

In last year's report I noted that, at the outset of this the nuclear era to achieve meaningful reductions in
Administration, I had set forth four broad objectives U.s. and Soviet arsenals. This treaty is a victory for
that underpinned our ational Security Strategy. They the Atlantic Alliance as well, reflecting the firmness
were: that all allies showed. We have also made further

progress toward a START agreement that could cut

-  Fi rst, to restore ou r nation's mil itary strength after a u.s. and Soviet strategic offensive arms by 50
period of decline in which the Soviet Union percent.
overtook us in many critical categories of military
power; -  Our SOl program is making great progress, moving

us toward the prospect of a safer world - one wh ich

-  Second, to restore our nation's economic strength depends for its security on strategic defense, rather
and reinvigorate the world economic system; than on the threat of mutual nuclear retaliation.

-  Thi rd, to restore the nation's international prestige -  In the Persian Gulf we have augmented our
as a world leader; and traditional military presence to prevent Iran from

interfering with U.s.-flag shipping and to support

-  Fourth, to restore pride among all Americans and our diplomatic efforts to bring an end to the tragic
carry our message to the world that individuals and Iran-Iraq war. Our allies' contributions to the safe
not governments should control their economic, navigation of the Gulf by non-belligerent shipping
spiritual and political destinies. are welcomed, and underline the importance which

the Free World ascribes to this strategically and

Our National Security Strategy continues to be aimed economica Ily pivota I region of the world.
at reinforcing the gains we have achieved in each of
these areas, while employing all the elements of our -  Critical imbalances remain in the international
national power-political, economic and military-in a economy which could portend problems ahead
coordinated way to advance the full range of national unless they are addressed in a forthright and
security interests outlined elsewhere in this report. effective manner by the governments of the

industrialized nations. The major world economies,

The fundamentals of our strategy change little from including our own, are sound and can provide the
year to year; our interests and objectives are derived basis for continued growth and prosperity, provided
from enduring values. Much of the discussion in this we and our partners deal with important fiscal,

IV


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trade and budgetary issues insensible and -  At home, however, the reluctance on the part of the
cooperative ways. Congress to provide the financial resources

necessary to support our National Security Strategy

-  In the Soviet Union we hear talk of "new thinking" is a cause for rising concern. Our assessment of
and of basic changes in Soviet policies at home risks to important U.s. interests has increased, and
and abroad. We will welcome real changes, but we some of the recent gains in redressing the military
have yet to see any slackening of the growth of and geopolitical balance are in jeopardy. The im-

plications of this adverse trend, now in its third

Soviet military power, or abandonment of expan-

year, are discussed in more detail in the final

sioni st aspi rations. As we work to find areas for fu r-

chapter of th is report.

ther cooperation, we will continue to judge the
Soviets by thei r actions, rather than thei r words, and

I forward this report with the confidence that it will

to found our National Security Strategy on a

help the Congress and the American people better

realistic view of Soviet aims and capabilities.

understand our ational Securi ty Strategy and con-
tribute to the consensus needed to enable us to fulfill

-  On many continents, efforts by the Soviet Union

our responsibilities as leader of the world's

and its clients to impose or maintain Leninist democracies.
regimes by force of arms are meeting increasing
resistance. In Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and As I said in last year's report, we must never forget
Cambodia, anti-Com mu nist insurgencies are raising that freedom is never really free; it is the most costly
the cost of aggression and offering hope of just thing in the world. And freedom is never paid for in a
political solutions. Our strong support for Freedom lump sum. Installments come due in every generation.
Fighters, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, is a vital All any of us can do is offer the generations that
insurance policy for peace with freedom. We are follow a chance for freedom. In the final analysis, this

is the assurance that our National Security Strategy

encouraging the broader democratic trend in the

seeks to provide. I commend its reading to all

world-from Latin America to the Philippines, to the

Americans.

Republic of Korea.

Q~~

January 1988

v


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**I. Hi tor·c** **ime** **sions of**
**U.S.** **ational Security** **trategy**

This is my second report to the Congress on our is the conviction that the United States' most basic na-
National Security Strategy. Its focus is on how the tional security interests would be endangered if a
principal elements of national power-diplomatic and hostile state or group of states were to dominate the
informational, economic and military-can be Eurasian landmass-that area of the globe often re-
employed to support our national interests and pro- ferred to as the world's heartland. We fought two
mote the objectives of peace, security, and freedom. It world wars to prevent this from occurring. And, since
analyzes the major political, economic, and military 1945, we have sought to prevent the Soviet Union
threats to our interests, and discusses the strategies from capitalizing on its geostrategic advantage to
that we believe most appropriate to respond to those dominate its neighbors in Western Europe, Asia, and
threats and to help shape the future in accordance the Middle East, and thereby fundamentally alter the
with our positive goals and ideals. It also discusses global balance of power to our disadvantage.
some of the dilemmas, tradeoffs and risks that
America faces, because we realize that our knowledge The national strategy to achieve this objective has
of our adversaries is never certain and that all been containment, in the broadest sense of that term.
resources, including our national will, are finite. Administrations have differed over which instruments

of national power-diplomatic and informational,

Walter Lippmann once wrote: economic or military-should receive the most atten-

. . . the behavior of nations over a long period of tion at any particular time. But, in the final analysis,
time is the most reliable, though not the only index every Administration since World War II has endorsed
of their national interests. For though their interests the concept that the United States, in partnership with
are not eternal, they are remarkably persis- its allies, must prevent the Soviet Union from domi-
tent ... There is no great mystery why this should nating those great concentrations of industrial power
be: the facts of geography are permanent . . . thus and human capacity that are Western Europe and East
successive generations of men tend to face the same Asia. Thus, shortly after World War II, the United
recurrent problems and to react to them in more or States helped rebuild, through the Marshall Plan, the
less habitual ways. war-ravaged economies of Europe, limiting Soviet op-

portunities to exploit Europe's economic distress. In

Lippmann's observation is particularly apt. While it is addition, America deployed military forces forward, as
commonplace to hear that u.s. National Security necessary, to help deter and contain Soviet military
Strategy changes erratically every four to eight years as expansion. As Soviet capabilities grew, our security
a result of a new Administration taking office, in reali- also required a large strategic nuclear force to aug-
ty there is a remarkable consistency over time when ment the forward-deployed conventional deterrent and
our policies are viewed in historical perspective. The to reinforce our deterrence of both nuclear and con-
core interests and objectives of this Nation have ventional attacks on ourselves or our allies.
changed little since World War II.

The advent of nuclear weapons and intercontinental

The first historical dimension of our strategy is delivery systems added another dimension to our
relatively simple, clear-cut, and immensely sensible. It thi nking about ational Secu rity Strategy: these

1


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weapons became the primary threat to our national The United States has long recognized that, even as
survival. Thus, for over forty years, the deterrence of we have taken up a major role of world leadership,
nuclear war and the reduction of its threat have been our interests and political values call for a deepening
major objectives of U.S. National Security Strategy. We partnership with like-minded nations to advance the
have pursued these objectives with renewed vigor, and cause of peace and freedom. Thus, an abiding com-
heartening results, during this Administration. mitment to strong alliances has been a consistent and

vital component of American strategy since the Se-

Similarly, the economic element of our national power cond World War. Even if we could afford, economi-
has long been an important component of our Na- cally and militarily, to chart our ational Security
tional Security Strategy. This Administration's strong Strategy without allies-which we cannot-we would
support for an open and expanding world economy not want to do so. "Fortress America" is an obsolete
and trading system reflects a fundamental national in- concept. Such a policy would be dangerously mis-
terest. The industrial democracies have long been im- guided and self-defeating. Solidarity with our allies
portant trading nations. An open world of enterprise

multiplies the strength of all. It permits a sharing of

and the free movement of people, goods, and ideas

responsibilities and it reminds us that the cause of

are not only the keys to our prosperity, but basic

democracies is, after all, one of our most fundamental

moral principles. We see an expanding global pros-

goals.

perity as enhancing our own. The global economy is
clearly even more interdependent now than early in

As with all Administrations, during our stewardship we

this century when America first endorsed these prin-

have faced unique security challenges-and oppor-

ciples; and our need for access to markets and raw

tunities- presented by a dynamic world and America's

materials has increased. As a result, our commitment

own needs. This has given our ational Security

to free and fair trade among nations is greater today

Strategy two additional emphases worth noting. The

than ever.

first is realism. We have sought to deal with the world
as it is, not as we might wish it to be. A strategy

The facts of geography, as Lippmann pointed out,

without illusions, based on observable facts, has been

dictate basic dimensions of our National Security

our goal. We attempt to deal with both friends and

Strategy. Since the early 19th century we have not

adversaries on a basis that recognizes that acts are

feared invasion of the American mainland; and even

more important than words, and that frankness is the

to this day, our national territory remains relatively

foundation of productive and enduring relationships

secure against conventional attack, protected by

among nations. At the same time, we have emphasiz-

oceans on the east and west and friendly nations to

ed our willingness to dialogue-to engage our adver-

our immediate north and south. However, nuclear

saries, in particular, in negotiations aimed at finding

weapons and the means to deliver those weapons over

areas of common interest, reducing sources of tension,

great distances can now threaten our national survival.

and rendering our relations more stable and predic-

And most of our friends and allies-as well as the

table. By emphasizing realism and a willingness to

markets and resources that are integrated with our
economy-are physically distant from the continental talk, we have been able to place our arms reduction
United States. negotiations with the Soviets on a more solid basis,

culminating in the first agreement between the super-

To help protect our friends and allies, and other U.s. powers to achieve significant reductions in nuclear
interests abroad, we must not only possess national arsenals.
strength, but we must be able to project this power-
diplomatic and informational, economic, and This list of historical dimensions of u.s. ational
military-across great sea and air distances. In the Security Strategy could be extended. Academics and
military sphere, we must maintain the capability to practitioners have debated the issue for years. But the
secure our worldwide lines of communication; to pro- fundamental point should be clear: there has been im-
ject military power quickly; to sustain forces at great pressive continuity in U.s. National Security Strategy,
distances for extended periods of time; and to pose a reflecting the fact that the strategy is grounded in un-
credible deterrent to those who might contemplate changing geographic considerations, and designed to
aggression against our allies and friends. preserve the fundamental values of our democracy.

2


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**II. Fundamen a s of** **a ona•**
**u.s.**
**Security Strategy**

**_THE FRAMEWORK-VALUES,_** dependent nation, with its fundamental values intact1. The survival of the United States as a free and in-

and its institutions and people secure.

**_INTERESTS, AND NATIONAL_**
**_SECURITY OBJECTIVES_** 2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to provide

opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource
base for our national endeavors.

Traditionally national security has been viewed as pro-
tection from external allack, thought of largely in

3. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to

terms of military defenses against military threats. But

u.s. interests.

that is clearly too narrow a conception. A nation's
security today involves much more than the procure-

4. The growth of human freedom, democratic institu-

ment and application of military forces.

tions, and free market economies throughout the
world, linked by a fair and open international trading

National Security Strategy must start with the values

system.

that we as a nation prize. Last year, in observing the
200th anniversary of our Constitution, we celebrated

5. Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships.

these values with a sense of rededication-values such
as human dignity, personal freedom, individual rights,
the pursuit of happiness, peace and prosperity. These **Major Objectives**
are the values that lead us to seek an international
order that encourages self-determ ination, democratic **in Support of**
institutions, economic development, and human rights. **U.S. Interests**
The ultimate purpose of our National Security Strategy
is to protect and advance those values. But, if they are

U.s. national security objectives are broad goals

to serve as the basis of a National Security Strategy,

refined from our national interests. They provide a

these values must be translated into the more concrete

general guide for strategy in specific situations which

terms of national interests and objectives.

call for the coordinated use of national power. Our
principal national security objectives are:

**U.S. Interests**

1. To maintain the security of our nation and our
allies. The United States, in cooperation with its allies,

Our National Security.5trategy reflects our national in-

must seek to deter any aggression that could threaten

terests and presents a broad plan for achieving the na-

that security and, should deterrence fail, must be

tional objectives that support those interests. The key

prepared to repel or defeat any military attack and

national interests which our strategy seeks to assure end the conflict on terms favorable to the United
and protect include: States, its interests, and its allies.

3


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Specifically: 3. To defend and advance the cause of democracy,

-  To d ter hostile attack on the United State, it fr edom, and human rights throughout the world. To
citizens, military forces, or allies and to defeat ignore the fate 0 millions around the world wh seek
attack if deterr nee fails. fre dom betrays our national heritage and over time

would endanger our own freedom and that of our

-  To deal ffeetively with threat to the se urity of the

allies.

United States and its citizens sho of armed con-
flict, including the threat of international terrorism.

Specifically:

-  To preven the domination of the Eurasi n landmass

-  To promote national independence and the growth

by the Soviet Union, or any other hostile power or

of free institutio s worldwide.

coalition of po ers.

-  To ncourag and support aid, trade, and invest-

-  To prevent transfer of milit rily critical technologie

ment programs Ihat promote economic develop-

and resources to the Soviet bloc and ho til coun-

ment and the growth of free and humane social

tries or groups. and political orders in the Third World.

-  To reduce our reliance on nu lear eapons by -  0 encourage lib ralizing tendencies within the
strengthenin our conventional forces, pursuing Soviet Un ion and its client states.
equitable and verifiable arms control agreements
and dev loping technologies for trate ic defense. 4. To resolve peacefully disputes which affect u.s. in-

terest in troubled regions of th orld. Regional con-

-  To assure unimpeded u.s. acce s to th oce ns and

flict which involve allies or friends of the United

space.

States may threaten u.s. interests, and frequently pose

-  To foster closer relations with the People's Republic

the risk of escalation to wider confla ration. Conflicts,

of China.

or attempts to subvert friendly governments, which are

-  To pr ent the spread of nuclear weap ns.

instigated or supported by the Soviets and their client
state, represent particu larly erious threat to the in-

2. To respond to the challenges of the global co-

ternational sy t m and th y to u.s. interests.

nomy. Our n tional security and economic strength
are indivisibl . As lhe lobal economy evolves in in- Specifically:
cr asingly interdependent ways, we mu t b aware of -  To addr s, where possible, the root causes of
economic factors that may affect our national security, regional instabilities which create the risk of war.
n w or in the future. Since our d pendence on for- -  To maint in ta I regional military balances
ign sourc of supply has grown in many itical vis- -vis th Soviet Union and tates aligned with it.

-  To neutral ize the efforts of the Soviet Union to in-

ar a, the potential vulnerability of our supply lines is

crease its influence in the world, and to weaken the

a matt r of con ern. Additionally, the threat of a

Iinks etwe n the Soviets and thei r cl ient states in

global spiral of protectionism mu t be combatted, and

the Third World.

the probl m of debt in the developing world is a

-  To aid in combatting threats to the stability of

burden on international prosperity.

friendly governments and in titutions from insurgen-
cies, subversion, sta e- ponsored terrorism and the

Spe ifically:

international traffickin of illicit drugs.

-  To promote a strong, prosperous and comp titive
U.S. eco my, in the context of a table and grow- 5. To build effe tive and friendly relation hips with all
ing world econ my. nati n with whom th r is a ba is of shared concern.

-  To ensure access to foreign markets, energy, and In the world today, there are over 150 nations. Not
mineral re ources by the United State nd it allies ne of them is the equal of the United States in total
and friends. power or wealth, ut each is sovereign, and most, if

-  To promote a well-functioning international eco- not all, tou h u.s. interests directly or indirectly.
nomic system with minimal istor ions to t de nd

Spe ifically:

inve ment, with stable urr n ies, and broadly

-  To make m jor int rnational institutions more effec-

agreed and respect d rules for managing and

tive in promoting p ac , wo Id order and political,

resolving diff r nees.

economic nd social progress.

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-  To seek opportunities to improve relations with the Although the Soviet Union still poses the primary
Soviet Union on a realistic and reciprocal basis. security threat, we and our allies and friends also face

-  To improve relations with other nations hostile to us a diversity of other serious security hallenges:
in order to red uce the chan e of future confl ict. regional and low-intensity conflicts; the potential for

-  To strengthen U.s. influence throughout the world. nuclear proliferation; international terrorism; narcotics

trafficking; radical politico-religi us movements; and
problems of instability, succession, and econ mic

**_PRINCIPAL THREATS TO U.S._** development in countries that are important friends

and allies.

**_INTERESTS_**

In Europe, the principal threat to Am ric's interests,

The most significant threat to U.s. security interests re- and to those of our allies, continues to be that posed
mains the global challenge posed by the Soviet by the ongoing buildup of Warsaw Pact military capa-
Union. Despite reforms that the leadership of the So- bilities. For decade the Soviet Union has allo ated a
viet Un ion has recently undertaken - the si gnificance disproportionately high share of its national income to
and durability of which remain unclear-Soviet mili- mil itary expend itu res and has created technologically
tary power and active diplomacy continue forcefully to sophisticated forces far in exce s of any plausible need
challenge our vital interests in many parts of the for self-defense. Equally threatening, but much more
world. The Soviet Union places a high priority on subtle, is the continuous political wart re against
creating and exploiting divisions within and among Western cohesion through propaganda, particularly
the Western allies. In key developing countries it sup- focused on the younger generations of Western Euro-
ports communist parties, insurgent movements, and peans. Through such means the Soviet Union is
other elements that seek to undermine governments attempting to affect public opinion in allied countries
allied with or friendly to the United States and to re- to weaken relations with the United States, erode the
place them with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. commitment to defense, and encourage support for

Soviet policies and proposal. Ultimately, the Soviet

In other developing countries, modernizing forces

Union still seeks to separate West rn Europe

struggling to create or consolidate democratic and free

politically and militarily from the United States,

market societies are actively opposed by groups sup-

thereby altering the global balance of power in the

ported or inspired by the Soviet Union and its allies.

most fundamental way.

As a result of changes in leadership style, the Soviet

Beyond the challenges in Europe, other areas give

Union has succeeded in projecting a more favorable

cause for concern. Free World interests in the Middle

international image. Proposed domestic reforms and

East are seriously th reatened by the protracted war

foreign policy initiatives have given rise, in some

between Iran and Iraq, and by Iran's drive to become

cases, to hopes for fundamental changes in Soviet

the dominant power in the region. Tehran's threats to

behavior. The new style of Soviet policy has its

friendly Gulf States and to international shipping in

political impact. Moscow is moving in new directions,

the Persian Gulf have caused the Uni d States and

offering an array of initiatives, putting old assumptions

several of its allies to provide naval protection for their

in doubt, attracting new support internationally, and

own shipping, and to assist certain of the Gulf States.

sometimes placing Western governments on the defen-

The aggressive radical regime in Iran persists in

sive. This poses a new, continuing, and more

threatening its neighbors which are friends of the

sophisticated challenge to Western policy. Whether re-

United States with military force, and through ter-

cent changes constitute a reat opportunity for more rorism and subversion. Its terrorist surrogates in Leba-
fundamental improvements in relations with the Soviet non fuel the anarchy in that stricken country, wh iIe
Union remains to be seen. We are open-minded on Iran advertises its willingness to use terrorism against
this score. While recognizing the competitive and United States personnel and facilities in the Middle
predominantly adversarial character of our relation- East and elsewh reo Whatever Iran's mistrust of th
ship, we shall maintain a dialogue with the Soviet Soviet Union, Iran's policies undermine Western
Union in order to seize opportunities for more con- friends and Western relationships in the Middle East
structive relations. and objectively benefit the Soviet Union globally.

5


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Fragile democratic governments in Central and South debtor states have been unable to achieve sustained
America are being confronted by myriad social and and significant economic growth since the early 1980s
economic problems. At the same time, radical and in- and have experienced high rates of unemployment
surgent groups supported by the Soviets, the San- and inflation, and extended periods of unpopular
dinista regime in icaragua, and by Cuba are a austerity. Many of these countries are also adversely
source of political destabilization. Prospects for an en- affected by low commodity prices in the international
during peace in Central America will be bleak as long market, capital flight, excessive government spending,
as the Sandinista leaders betray their promises of gen- narcotics production and trafficking, and other in-
uinely democratic government and support insurgent digenous and externally imposed problems that will
forces attempting to subvert their neighbors. not be easily remedied. The longer the economies of

the major debtor states fail to rebound from these

Other regional tensions and conflicts-such as those conditions, the greater are the possibi Iities that ir-
on the Korean peninsula, in Indochina, in Southern responsible elements will gain local support for na-
Africa, and between Israel and its Arab neighbors- tionalistic responses that could damage important LJ.5.
threaten both international peace and the internal interests.
stability of friendly states. In the Philippines, for exam-
ple, the fledging democratic government is besieged In addition, rising pressure in some major trading na-
by a variety of extremist forces some of which wish to tions for greater protection from foreign competition
impose authoritarian regimes. could place powerful new downward pressure on

these national economies. Potentially, this could result

Low intensity conflicts, the increasing linkages be- in a spiral of protectionist measures that would en-
tween internationa I terrorists and narcotics traffickers, danger the international trading system.
as well as racial, sectarian, and other tensions con-
tinue to challenge u.s. interests and our hopes for Finally, the prospects for world peace and prosper-
human betterment. Refugees from these conflicts can ity-and thus for U.S. interest in a just and progressive
place powerful burdens on the economies and international order-will be influenced by other pro-
societies of host countries, and requi re substantial blems in certain parts of the world. Critical shortages
quantities of international relief. of food, a lack of health services, and inabilities to

meet other basic needs will keep millions of people,

The spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations particularly in Africa, in peril. The dangerous deple-
threatens to exacerbate regional conflicts and could tion or contamination of the natural endowments of
conceivably involve the United States and the Soviet some nations-soil, forests, water, air-will add to their
Union in nuclear conflicts. This proliferation could environmental and health problems, and increasingly
ultimately make nuclear deterrence less stable. At this to those of the global community. These problems
time, the most difficuIt regional nuclear rival ry in- cannot be resolved simply through outside assistance,
volves India and Pakistan, but other areas of the for many of them will require policy changes and
world, including the Middle East, Africa, and Latin leadership by governments and elites in the countries
America could be subject to similar dangers in the themselves. But all create potential threats to the
future. peace and prosperity that are in our national interest,

as well as the interests of the affected nations.

Although in recent years the international economic
and financial system has proved to be remarkably In summary, this broad range of threats to our national
resilient, sudden, unexpected shocks can pose major interests provides the backdrop against which we for-
new challenges to U.s. interests. The hard currency mulate our ational Security Strategy. As we seek
debts of many developing nations-including several ways to promote our national interests and objectives,
that are neighbors and important friends and allies of a careful understanding of these evolving threats is
the United States- have had severe and destabilizing essential to proper strategy formulation.
consequences within their societies. Most of the

6


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**1I.** **ower,** **o ·cy, a d St ategy**

**_ELEMENTS OF u.S._** -  Moralprosperity represent a critical challenge to the and political example. American spirit and

ideology and the practical record of our adversaries:

**_NATIONAL POWER_**

free, pluralist societies work. Since the days of our
Founding Fathers, this power of example has

Having described our national security interests, ob-

represented a potent leverage in international rela-

jectives, and the range of threats that we face, it is tions. But we should not leave its expression and
appropriate next to turn to the national means understanding to chance. It is in our interest to
available to achieve our objectives, and to the strat- spread this message in an organized and effective
egies that relate means to ends. way.

-  Military strength. A strong military capability is

The means avai lable are the elements of national essential for a stable, secure environment in which
power that the United States possesses-diplomatic our adversaries are deterred and diplomacy can be
and informational, economic and military-and which effective.
we employ to influence the behavior of other nations. -  Economic vitality. America's economic strength sus-

Power, it is often said, is the quintessence of strategy. tains our other elements of power and fortifies our
Unfortunately, America's national power is sometimes relations with the countries that share our interest
thought of only in coercive or military terms. I believe, in a free and open international economy.
however, that national power is also derived from a -  Alliance relationships. The pursuit of American
nation's moral legitimacy and leadership, as we ex- security objectives depends on cooperation with
emplified by the Marshall Plan after World War II-an like-minded international partners. These relation-
act of strengthening allies, of enlightened self-interest. sh ips enhance our strength and mitigate the under-

standable reluctance of the American people to

Today, nations understand that the effective use of na-

shoulder security burdens alone. The predictable

tional power is something more than the simple use

difficulties that arise from time to time in all

of force; and we seek to follow a ational Security

alliance relationships must be measured against the

Strategy that ensures we can relate to other nations on

enormous benefits that these ties bring us and our

the basis of credibility rather than simple capability.

friends.

-  Public diplomacy. This is a key instrument-one

We have an exceptionally diverse array of instruments

with an impact both strong and subtle on interna-

for employing the various elements of national power.

tional political events and how people perceive

Exercised by the Executive Departments and Agencies,

them. Through our public diplomacy activities, we

these tools are most effective when integrated, tailored

seek to explain to foreign audiences our policies

to the specific situation, and guided by a common and actions in ways that are clear, credible, and
strategy for their implementation. These instruments Iikely to el icit support for our interests and
include: objectives.

7


-----

-  quirSecuri~the mean a i t nc .to d f By helping frien nd them Ives, weand comple- allies ac- A PERIOD OF TRANSITION
ment the rebuilding of our 0 n military trength
and increase the human and material resources We are living in times that historians will characterize
avai lable for the defense of free world interests. In

as a period of transition in international secu rity

the proc ss, we reduce the likelihood of dir ct

affairs. As noted in my first ational Security Strategy

Am rican involvement in potential onflicts. Secu-

R port, thi transition really began in the late 1970s

ri y a si tan e i a key in trument in our national

when our policies to rebuild our allies' economies

ecurity strategie , a productive and highly lever-

had long since su ceeded, and America no longer

ag d inve tm nt that promotes our security interests

held an overwhelmingly predominant economic posi-

at bal'gain prices.

tion vis-a-vis Western Europe and East Asia. Th is

-  Dev lopment assistance. It is in our national interest

realignment of economic strength is likely to continue

to support efforts of friendly dev loping countries to

into the next decade with the further evolution of East

provide for the basic need f their people.

Asia's industrial economies, particularly that of China.

D velopmen assistance plays a vital role in encour-
aging mark t-oriented approaches with the potential

This transition period has also been marked by the So-

to increa income levels in r ipient countries. A

viet Union's rna sive military buildup-consuming as

well structured and financed development

much as 15-17 percent of annual GNP. This large, un-

aSSI tance program enhance our world leadership

matched investment provided the Soviets by the 1980s

and influ nce.

a position of strategic nuclear parity, quantitati ve con-

-  Science nd technology cooperation. For many

ventional force superiority arou nd the Eu rasian

countries, a cess to dvan e scien ific and techno-

rirnland, and a modern, globally deployed navy. The

I gic I resources is ritical to prosp rity and long-

buildup has also supported the projection of Soviet in-

term economic growth. U.S. w Id I adership and

fluence into many ar as of the world-particularly the

ur vast resources in science and technology are

unstable Third World regions of Southeast and

important strategic assets to str ngthen existing ties

Southwest Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The

with friends and alii s, and promote positive rela-

buildup's consequences will c ntinue to present a ma-

tionships with key dev loping nations.

jor threat to our security and that of our allies for

-  International organizations. ultilateral diplomacy

years 0 c m .

and participation in international organizations such
as the United Nations and the International M ne-

Two other major trend characterize this period of

tary Fund provide oppor unitie to addr ss common

transition in international security affairs. The first is

global problems and hare the task of solving them.

the revolution in military technology that is already

Skillful diplomacy wi hin these and other multi-

well underway. New survei t lance and targeti ng sys-

lateral organizations can serve to enhance our

tems, new means of d struction, and low observable

overall goals on issues su h as peacekeeping, pro-
motion of human rights, and encouraging the de- (stealth) technology will soon provide military
velopment of free conomic and political systems. apabi Iiti previously thought wholly infeasi ble.

Similarly, rapid advances in micro lectronics will

-  Di 10m tic mediation. In regions where onflict

allow the command, control and communications in-

thr aten our interests r tho e of our friends
political elf rts can playa major role in endi~g tegrated with intelligenc sources, to provide the'

necessary stra egic and tactical direction of such

violence, promoting freedom and national self-

advanced military opel' tions.

determination, and laying the foundations for future
stability. The initiativ s of American diplomacy take
th ir strength from effective and integrated use of Our military leaders, as well as those of our adver-
the tools already di cus d, and from the ability of sari s, are now rethinking military doctrines and force
u.s. r r S ntativ to act cr di bly as mediators of structures as a result of these and other applications of
disput s. Making clear the firmness of our com- ad anced t chnology to military power. As this trend
mitments to fri nds and allies increa es the incen- continu 5, military competition is likely to focus in-
tives to negotiate seriously. cr a ingly on non-nu lear weapons, where the

8


-----

combinations of stealth and extreme accuracy at long In a similar manner, our diplomatic policie are
ranges will reop n the possibility of non-nuclear stra- designed to pi y to the strength of our alliance rela-
tegic attack. Space will also become a more promi- tionships. In Europe, we and our NATO allies are part-
nent area of activity, not the least becau e of its grow- ner in a voluntary oalition of sovereign, equal
ing importance for air, ground, and naval warfare. We nations-in stark contrast to the Warsaw Pact and he
expect th this revolution in military technology will Eastern European countries still dominated by Soviet
continue w II into the next decade and necessitate the military power. In this period of transition we have
adaptation both of military doctrines and of national new opportunities as our allies display an increasing

willingness to s ek a larger role in providing for West-

security strategies. In this regard, the recent report of

ern European defense. e welcome thi trend, know-

the bipartisan Commi sion on Integrated long-Term

ing we ar working from the strength of an abiding

Strategy helps bring into ocus the essentiality of

allianc partnership, and that increasing allied con-

maintaining our technological superiority through

tributions are important to assuring the Alliance's long-

coherent military res arch and development program

term ffectiveness and viability.

aimed at e ploiting emerging strategic opportunitie .

But the period of transition is not over; and ad-

The last major tr nd of this transition period is the dif-

ministrations after mine will continue t adapt strate-

fusion of conomic power and advanced technology

gic concepts and policies to the realiti s of an olv-

to the Third World. This combination of economic

ing world-one in which America must alway playa

growth and technologi al maturation has already pro-

leadin role, to help hape a positive future for

vided several countrie with an independent capability

ourselves and our alii .

to produ e large numbers of advanced weapon
systems, both for their own use and or export. Thus,

The remainder of this section di cusses th fundamen-

countries dependent on neither th Unit d States nor

tal policies-diplomatic, economic and defense-that

the Sovie Union could in the not too distant future guide our use of the elements of national pow r as we
pas s the capability to conduct a major war, either formula e strate y. These policy guidelines provide
against ea h other or against a world power. The oherence and consistency among the et of inte-
arsenal t the dispo al of these sovereign countries grated trategie which are discu ed in the chapter
are lik Iy to include chemical weapons, and may that follow.
eventually include nuc ear weapons and space systems
for target location. A this trend continues, the poten-
tial for mid- and high-inten ity conflid increase ;n _U.S. DIPLOMATIC POLICY_
many regions of th world, some of whicl are already
suffering from various types of low inten ity conflict.

**Policies to Move America**

In res onding to he e emerging features of the trate-
gic land cape, w have formulated our strategie to **Forward**
play to our strengths and to exploit our adv rsaries'
weaknesses. For xample, our defense policies stress

A I hay stated on many occasion, our diplomacy

that the United State and its allies must continue to

ha aim d at ensuring, in the nuclear age, both peace

enjoy t chnologi al superiority over t e Soviet U ion.

_and freedom. Working with our alii s and friends, we_

The West's pirit of inquiry and the free flow of infor-

have sought to push beyond the stalemates of the

mation permit technology and innovation to flourish postwar era and dir tly confront two transcendent
o a far greater degree tha in a closed. ociety. Our issues affecting our national se urity-the danger of
advantages in areas such as precision guid d muni- nuclear warfa e and the continuing xpan ion of totali-
tions, ste Ith technology, submarine quieting, and tarian rule.
super-comput r t chnology are important trategic
assets and w intend to exploit th m, and to protect In dealing with the nuclear threat, we have gone
them from Soviet attempts to acquir th m- ither by beyond traditional arms control and, together with our
purcha e or theft. NATO allies, have sought verifiable reduction in

9


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nuclear arsenals. At the same time, we have launched political infrastructure of world democracies. To ac-
a new program of research into ways to defend our- complish this we must be as committed to the use of
selves against ballistic missile attack. In doing so, we the informational aspects of our diplomatic power as
seek to maintain deterrence while moving away from to the other elements which comprise it.
reliance on retaliation, and toward a situation in

Here in the United States, public opinion polls con-

which ballistic missiles will ultimately be rendered

sistently find that, depending on the issue, up to

obsolete.

tvvo-thirds of the American electorate normally take no
interest in foreign policy. Moreover, only a slight ma-

While we have sought arms reductions and greater

jority of Americans today believe that this country

reliance on defensive measures, we have never lost

needs to play an active part in world affairs. There is

sight of the fact that nations do not disagree because

no natural domestic constituency for America's foreign

they are armed; they are armed because they disagree

policy-we must build one.

on very important matters of human Jife and liberty.
The fundamental differences between totalitarian and The agencies which we use to implement such an ap-
democratic rule remain. We cannot gloss them over, proach include the Departments of State and Defense,
nor can we be content with accepted spheres of in- Agency for International Development (AID), and ·U.s.
fluence, a world only half free. Thus, we have sought Information Agency (USIA), as well as several less
to advance the cause of freedom where opportunities traditional participants, including the Departments of
exist to do so. Sometimes this means support for Commerce and Treasury, and the U.S. Trade Repre-
liberalization; sometimes Support for liberation. sentative (USTR). All contribute to our Public

Diplomacy and related informational programs.

In regional conflicts, for example, we have elaborated

Another important way of achieving this is through the

a policy of helping anti-Communist insurgents in their

private sectOr. During the past seven years, we have

battle to bring self-determination, independence, and

encouraged the American private sectOr to become a

human rights to their own countries. This doctrine was

key element in the projection of U.s. foreign policy

first reflected in our decision to assist the people of

goals. Leading private citizens and groups have taken

Afghanistan in their fight against Soviet invasion and

steps to identify and organize the many local forces

occupation. It was an important part of our decision

throughout America that have a direct stake in our na-

to assist the people of Nicaragua in their battle to

tion's relations with the rest of the world. These

restore the integrity of their 1979 revolution and make

private voluntary organizations are doing an indispen-

the Sandinista government keep its promise of

sable job of public education. They have our strongest

democratic rule. Our current efforts in Angola in sup-

encouragement and support.

port of freedom fighters constitute the most recent ex-
tension of this policy. While we focus on the needs of an effective

diplomatic and informational policy, we must keep in

Undergirding all of this is our continuing commitment mind that the Soviet Union is pursuing a very ag-
to public candor about the nature of totalitarian rule gressive public deception and propaganda program,
and the ultimate objectives of U.s. foreign policy: using a wide range of techniques aimed not only at
peace, yes, but world freedom as well. We refuse to the Third World, but also at us and Our alliance part-
believe that it is somehCM' an act of hostility to pro- ners. The challenge is to counter Soviet propaganda
claim publicly the crucial moral distinctions between and so-called "active measures" using the full range of
democracy and totalitarianism. Our informational programs to tell the truth about

American values, interests, and policies.

Our political and informational power must also reach

Informational Support to to the peoples of denied areas, particularly the USSR
Diplomatic Power and Eastern Europe-to encourage hope for change

and to educate publics on the benefits of free institu-
tions. We undertake this through the electronic media,

We are faced with a profound challenge to our na- written materials, increased contacts and the exchange
tional security in the political field. This challenge is of ideas that come from such contacts. Any process of
to fight the war of ideas and to help support the change must find its roots within a closed

10


-----

society, but knowledge of the world at large may be a in all economic sectors. Market economies are in-
stimulant; and the free flow of ideas and information terdependent. Since 1945, we have pursued a vigorous
is, in itself, one of the goals of those who seek policy, first, of helping rebuild the European and
democratic change. For our part, we proceed from our

Pacific economies devastated by war; and second, of

fundamental belief that a world composed of free,

supporting economic cooperation and development

sovereign democracies will be a safer, more stable

among all Free World economies. We strongly be-

world-one where respect for the dignity of all people

lieved then-as we do n()'N-that national economic

has a better chance to be realized.

strength is a shared strength. For example, we support
European efforts at economic integration through the

_u.s. ECONOMIC POLICY_ strong European economyEuropean Community because will be we better able to con- believe that a

tribute the resources necessary for a strong Alliance
defense. Likewise, the Free Trade Area Agreement

International Economic Policy recently negotiated with our largest trading partner,

Canada, directly and positively contributes to our col-
lective security in North America. Just as our defense

u.s. national power rests on the strength of our

depends on the cooperation and participation of our

domestic economy. A growing, resilient and techno--

allies, so does our economic prosperity. Thus our

logically vigorous economy is vital to our national

economic objectives in support of our security

security. In peacetime it is the fundamental underpin-

policies are necessarily global. However, one central

ning of our national defense capabilities. In a crisis or

consequence of our interdependence is that we can-

during wartime it provides the ability to respond

not dictate economic policy but must consult and

rapidly with skilled personnel, expanded production

negotiate, recognizing the realities of mutual

capacity, and supplies of critical materials. World Wars

dependence.

I and II demonstrated the vital importance of a strong
domestic economy able to produce quickly and

As the world's leading economic power, we have a

efficiently the goods needed to defend ourselves and

responsibility by our actions at home to help sustain

our allies.

and extend the global economic recovery. The un-
precedented peacetime expansion of the American

Our economic strength has domestic and international

economy since 1982 provides a vivid demonstration of

dimensions, although the distinctions are neither easy

the power and creativity that free enterprise can

nor rigid. Domestically, it is in our national security

unleash. However, the United States has not ac-

interest to maintain a dynamic research and develop-

complished this alone. International flows of people,

ment capability which enables us 10 be in the fore-

capital and goods have enabled us to improve our

front of technological advance. Our manufacturing

standard of living far beyond that which would have

sector must remain competitive with those in other

resulted from a closed economy. In return, American

leading industrial countries. Our financial and service

technology, capital and goods have enabled other

industries must provide up-to-date tools for the con- countries to improve their economies. Our success
tinued growth of our economy. Other sectors of the also provides constructive examples of the benefits of
economy, such as energy and transport, need to be of open societies and economies. At home we must im-
sufficient size and diversity to provide a critical nu- plement economic policies that continue to promote
cleus should we need to respond to an emergency. growth, while holding down inflation and reducing
Finally, our labor force is-and will remain-a key ele- the federal deficit by controlled government spending.
ment of our economic strength. An innovative, adap- The budget compromise which we reached late last
tive and educated labor force remains essential to the year with the leaders of the Congress is an important
development of new technologies, the continued step toward those ends. Limiting the cost of central
gr()'Nth of our econom~ and the production of com- government will allow resources to be more produc-
petitive goods. tively used by the private sector. By reducing the

federal deficit and promoting private saving, we can

While mindful of the need for a strong domestic reduce undue dependence on inflows of foreign capi-
economy, we do not-and should not-strive for tal and playa stronger role in providing capital to
domestic economic self-suffiCiency or" for dominance support growth in the global economy.

11


-----

A natural consequence of societies' striving to grow are never imposed without careful consideration, as
and be competitive in the world economy is periodic they inevitably impose costs on American business as
tension manifested in trade disputes and other bi- \vell as foreign clients. For that reason our policy will
lateral economic difficulties. The United States, as the continue to be to use them sparingly, and only con-
leading proponent of an open international trading tinue them when their need and effectiveness can be
system, has led in the construction of the present clearly demonstrated.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
system, which has promoted over the years a vigorous Energy is an important underpinning to our economic,
expansion of trade to the benefit of all. We are now industrial and military strength, and thus to our na-
seeking to strengthen that system and bring it up to tional security. Over the long term, our national
date. We strongly support the Uruguay Round of energy policy is aimed at ensuring adequate supplies
multilateral trade negotiations which aims further to of energy at reasonable prices by strengthening
reduce barriers to global trade. For the first time, domestic energy industries, diversifying energy
agriculture, intellectual property rights, trade in ser- sources, and improving energy efficiency. We are

vice (such as banking, insurance and transportation), working through the International Energy Agency to
and investment will be the focus of serious assist our allies to develop complementary strategies.
negotiation. More immediate objectives are to reduce the nation's

vulnerability to disruptions in foreign energy supplies

History has shown that free, open economies with

and to lessen the impact on the civil economy if

unrestricted trade are strong economies, which grow

disruptions should occur. This includes plans for in-

faster and have the resources with which to defend

creasing the size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve,

themselves. Open trade and cooperation among na-

promoting international cooperation with allies and

tions also help to cement alliances which in turn

partners in the International Energy Agency, and en-

bolsters our coalition defense efforts. The challenge to

couraging research into economically viable tech-

the United States now is to avoid letting tensions and

nologies that increase energy efficiency or that make

disputes over trade issues undermine domestic sup-

use of alternative sources of power.

port for free trade, or become a catalyst fOf policies
which only serve to reduce overall economic growth,

Internationally, we have led in the coordination of

and thus work in opposition to our security objectives.

economic policy among the major industrialized

In this regard, we must actively resist the temptation

countries. In addition, we will continue to assist

to impose protectionist measures in order to cope

developing countries to realize sustained, non-

with trade imbalances, while responding to the

inflationary growth, since we understand that this is in

legitimate concerns of U.s. industry about the unfair

our mutual economic and security interest. We will

trade practices of other countries. Protectionist trade

encourage an effective adjustment process for debtor

legislation would be a major threat to our economic

nations, supported by adequate private and public

health, to economic and political relations with our

financing. To help debtor countries, we have expressed

allies, and to our collective economic and military

our willingness to negotiate additional resources for

strength.

the World Bank. The United States has welcomed a
proposed enlargement of the IMF's Structural Adjust-

There are times, however, when we must restrict

ment Facility. We also have proposed a broadened

economic relations between the United States and

IMF facility to provide a financial cushion for

other countries not only for reasons of national securi-

vulnerable developing countries dealing with the

ty, but to protest odious national behavior. By restric-

vicissitudes of external economic forces.

ting economic relations, vve seek vigorously to
persuade the target country that its behavior is unac-

As noted earlier, our nation's defense edge is based on

ceptable. For example, U.s. economic leverage is

technological, rather than numerical superiority. If we

employed against nations that threaten regional stabili-

lose this edge, we also lose an essential element

ty or support international terrorism, such as Cuba,

of our military deterrent. There is concern that the

libya and Nicaragua. Hovvever, economic sanctions

12


-----

dustries could placeloss of advanced production capabilities in critical in- our defense manufacturing base _u.s. DEFENSE POLICY_
in jeopardy. We must avoid situations where increased
reliance on other countries for advances in critical A Policy of Deterrence
technologies could, over the long term, turn into

The third element of U.s. national power is military. In

vulnerabilities.

some cases, the integrated use of the other elements
of national pov.ter will be insufficient to meet the

Furthermore, the fruits of the free-market economy

threats to our security interests. we therefore must

must not strengthen the military capability of our

be-and are-ready to employ military power in coor-

adversaries. We, as well as our allies, must continue to

dination with the other elements. However, the ulti-

ensure that economic relationships with the Soviet

mate goal when applying military force, or projecting

bloc do not weaken our national security. For exam-

military power, is to encourage political solutions.

ple, we have reached agreement on eliminating pref-

War is the least desirable alternative, but only by

erential credit terms to the Soviet Union. Working

being prepared to wage war successfully can we deter

through the International Energy Agency, we and our

it.

allies have reduced the substantial risk of Western
European dependence on Soviet energy. Acting with America's defense policy throughout the postwar
our allies through the Coordinating Committee for period has been aimed at deterring aggression against
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), we are making the United States and its allies. Deterrence works by
progress toward ensuring that militarily-sensitive persuading potential adversaries that the costs of their
technology does not flow to the Soviet Union and that aggression will exceed any probable gains. Deterrence
competitor firms in COCOM member nations bear the is the basis of our military strategy against conven-
same export restrictions as U.S. firms. We will con- tional as well as nuclear aggression. Because any con-

flict carries the risk of escalation, our goal is to

tinue to improve the COCOM review process, to har-

dissuade aggression of any kind.

monize and tighten national licensing and
enforcement procedures, and to encourage greater

We seek also to prevent coercion of the United States,

cooperation with allies and friends. The dual objec-

its allies, and friends. Successful coercion could give a

tives of protecting and sharing militarily significant hostile power the benefits of victory without the cost
technologies JXlse a challenge, one made more dif- of war. As discussed earlier, the Soviet threat manifests
ficult by rapid technological changes. But it is a itself not only in the danger of an actual attack, but in
challenge we muSt meet. the form of propaganda, intimidation and coercion as

well. The Soviets still seek to dominate Western

We Willingly offer our philosophy of free-market econ- Europe and Japan without having to fire a shot-a
omies to centrally planned regimes. Indeed, it is only coercive threat which must and will be deterred by
by adopting market mechanisms that these regimes our political determination, our defense capabilities,
can satisfy the economic needs and desires of their and our alliance relationships.
peoples. However, market economies only flourish

To deter the Soviet Union, we must make clear to its

where freedom and individual rights are encouraged.

leaders that we have the means and the will to res-

The IMF, GATT and other international economic in-

pond effectively to coercion or aggression against our

stitutions are mainly concerned with imprCNing rela-

security interests. While emphasizing our resolve to

tions among free individuals, businesses and financial

respond, our policy is to avoid specifying exactly what

institutions. While we note recent Soviet policy

our response will be. This is the essense of our

statements regarding "reconstruction" and economic

strategic doctrine of "flexible response;' which has

reform, the Soviet economic system remains at this been United States policy since 1961 and NATO
point fundamentally incompatible with participation in strategy since 1967. Specifically, our forces deter a
free-world institutions. Policy statements must be potential aggressor by confronting him with three
translated into positive actions before such participa- types of possible responses from which we would
tion can be considered. choose at the appropriate time:

13


-----

-  Direct Defense: To confront an adversary with the essential to our strategic force structure and critical to
possibility that his aggression will be stopped with-. the credibility of our strategic deterrent.
out our resorting to actions which escalate the con-
flict. Th is is someti mes referred to as "deterrence Our strategic forces and the associated targeting policy
through denial:' Defeating a nonnuclear attack with must, by any calculation, be perceived as making nu-
conventional forces only would be an example of clear warfare a totally unacceptable and unrewarding
direct defense. proposition for the Soviet leadersh ip. Accordi ngly, ou r

targeting policy:

-  The Threat of Escalation: To warn an adversary that
his aggression could start hostilities that might not -  Denies the Soviets the ability to achieve essential
be confined in the manner he hopes or envisions military objectives by holding at risk Soviet war-
and that escalation could exact far greater costs making capabilities, including both the full range of
than he anticipates, or could bear. In this regard,

Soviet military forces and the war-supporting in-

ATO's deterrence of a Soviet conventional attack is

dustry which provides the foundation for Soviet

enhanced by our ability and resolve to use nuclear

military power and supports its capability to con-

weapons, if necessary, to halt aggression.

duct a protracted conflict; and

-  The Threat of Retaliation: To raise the prospect that -  Places at risk those political entities the Soviet
an attack will trigger a retaliatory attack on the ag-

leadership values most: the mechanisms for ensur-

gressor's homeland, causing his losses far to exceed

ing survival of the Communist Party and its leader-

any possible gains. Our deterrence of a Soviet nu-

ship cadres, and for retention of the Party's control

clear attack on the United States is based on our

over the Soviet and Soviet-bloc peoples.

resolve to retaliate directly against the Soviet
Union. This basic policy of targeting those assets which are

essential to Soviet warmaking capability and political
control has been an integral part of U.S. strategy for

**Maintaining Strategic** many years. In implementing this policy, the United
**Deterrence** States does not target population as an objective in

itself and seeks to minimize collateral damage through
more accurate, lower yield weapons.

Wh iIe deterrence requires capabi Iities across the entire
spectrum of conflict, its essential foundation is pro-

Hold ing at risk the full range of Soviet assets is

vided by our strategic nuclear forces and the doctrine

necessary for an effective deterrent, but is not suffi-

which supports them. Nuclear deterrence, like any

cient. As President, I cannot be limited to the options

form of deterrence, requi res us to consider not what

of capitulation or massive mutual destruction in re-

would deter us, but what would deter a potential at-

sponse to aggression. We must have flexibility in the

tacker, particularly one whose perceptions of the

employment of our strategic forces. For ou r deterrent

world and value system are substantially different from

to be credible, it must be clear to the Soviets that the

our own. Since we can never be entirely certain of

United States has military options appropriate to a

Soviet percepti ns, we must ensure that both the

broad range of plausible situations.

effectiveness of our strategic forces and ou r wi II to use
them, if necessary, are never in dO!Jbt. Finally, the United States requires sufficient residual

capability to provide leverage for early war termina-

In the interest of ensuring deterrence, the United

tion, and to avoid coercion in a post-conflict world.

States maintains diversified strategic retaliatory forces

For this reason, we maintain a nuclear reserve force as

to hedge against a disarming first strike, to complicate

an integral part of our strategic forces. In addition, we

Soviet attack plans, and to guard against technological
surprise. To this end we maintain a variety of basing maintain Continuity of Government programs to en-
modes, launch platforms, and attack vehicles, achiev- sure the Soviets cannot escape retaliation by initiating
ing diversity through a triad of submarine launched a quick, "decapitating" attack aimed at incapacitating
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intercontinental ballistic our political and military leadership. Our civil defense
missiles (ICBMs) and bombers. Adequate and sur- program also contributes to the Nation's preparedness
vivable command, control and communications are in the event of an attack.

**14**


-----

These capabilities do not imply that we seek the modern, effective, survivable nuclear forces to provide
ability to fight a nuclear war. I have repeatedly em- deterrence, promote stability, and hedge against Soviet
phasized that a nuclear war cannot be won and must cheating or abrogation. Nor does it eliminate the need
never be fought. But we must deter an adversary who for a nuclear weapons produdion complex capable of
has a very different strategic outlook from our ~'Vn­ supporting such weapons in the future. Neglecting
an outlook which continues to place great stress on modernization in expectation of arms reduction
nuclear warfighting capability. It is essential the agreements would actually decrease the likelihood of
$oIiets understand that they cannot gain their objec- such agreements by reducing Soviet incentives to
tives through nuclear warfare, or nuclear coercion, negotiate.
under any conceivable circumstances.

For their part, the Soviets continue to invest heavily in

Our policy of flexible response and deterrence accurate, fast-flying ballistic missiles which can destrC1)l
through the threat of offensive retaliation has hard targets. Their goal has been, and remains, an ef-
preserved the security of the United States and its fective disarming first-strike capability. Moreover, they
allies for decades. Looking to the future, the Strategic are continuing to enhance their ICBM survivability
Defense Initiative offers an opportunity to shift deter- through silo hardening and mobility, including deploy-
rence to a safer and more stable basis through greater ment of the road-mobile S5-25 and the rail-based
reliance on strategic defenses. Such defenses, which S5-24. At the same time, they invest roughly the same
threaten no one, would enhance deterrence by inject- amount in their strategic defense programs as in their
ing greater uncertainties into Soviet estimates of their offensive force modernization. They are expanding
ability to achieve their military objectives should they and imprc:wing the world's only deployed anti-ballistic
attempt a first strike. Even less than perfect defense missile (ABM) system, violating the ABM Treaty with

construction of their radar at Krasnoyarsk and other

could increase stability by denying the Soviets con-

radar deployments, and increasing their capability to

fidence that they could achieve meaningful military

deplOy a territorial ABM defense. Their vast growing

goals, thereby eliminating incentives for a Soviet first

network of deep underground leadership shelters is

strike. In judging the suitability of systems for possible

aimed at ensuring the survival of Communist Party

deployment, we will continue to be guided by the cri-

control over the Soviet nalion, economy, and military

teria of military effectiveness, survivability, and cost-

forces in war. Their strategic communications are

effectiveness at the margin.

highly redundant, survivable, and hardened against

By reducing the military value of ballistic missiles, nuclear effects.
strategic defenses would facilitate Soviet acceptance of
significant arms reduction agreements. In a world with In response to the buildup of Soviet capabilities, the
fewer ballistic missiles, however, Soviet incentives to United States is continuing the Strategic Moderniza-
not abide by such agreements would be greater. tion Program in order to maintain the essential sur-
Strategic defense can effectively negate such incentives vivability and mission-effectiveness of our O'>Nn forces.
by eliminating the utility of covertly stockpiled The Soviets' active and passive defenses, their buildup
missiles. Thus enhanced strategic defenses offer the of offensive forces, and their published doctrine all

continue to provide evidence of Soviet nuclear war-

prospect of a safer, more stable world in which deep

fighting mentality, and underline the essentiality of

reductions in strategic offensive arms are both

maintaining an effective US deterrent through support

negotiable and enforceable. We will continue to try to

for this highest priority defense program.

persuade the Soviets to join with us in working out a
stable transition to this desirable goal.

Arms Reductions

Continuing the modernization of our strategic forces is
essential to assure reliable deterrence, enhance stabili- Arms control is not an end in itself, but only one of
ty, and provide motivation for the Soviets to negotiate several tools to enhance our national security. Our
broad, deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in arms reductions objectj~s are fully integrated with
strategic offensive arms. While "'e are firmly commit- our national security policies to enhance deterrence,
ted to using arms reductions as one component of our reduce risk, support alliance relationships, and ensure
policy for enhancing U.S. and allied security, success the Soviets do not gain significant unilateral
in arms negotiations does not alter the need for advantage.

15


-----

Based on this view of arms control as a complement be eliminated are high priority targets for Soviet con-
to a strong national defense posture, we have been ventional attack. Finally, the Sovie.t systems eliminated,
guided since the beginning of this Administration by particularly the shorter-range INF missiles, have
several fundamental principles: chemical and conventional as well as nuclear

capabilities, and could be employed against NATO

-  The United States seeks only those agreements bases and forces during non-nuclear phases of a

which contribute to our security and that of our NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.
allies.

The military benefits of the INF Treaty will be even

-  The United Stales seeks agreements which reduce

greater if we succeed in negotiating a treaty on strate-

arms, not simply limit their increase.

gic arms reductions. An agreement which significantly

-  Achieving verifiable agreements on broad, deep reduces strategic systems will lessen Soviet capability
and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms for a first strike, inhibit their ability to use intercon-
is the highest arms control priority of the United tinental weapons against theater targets, and substan-
States. tially increase the Soviets' uncertainty of

accomplishing their political ends through military

-  Within the category of offensive nuclear arms, the

means.

United Stales gives priority 10 reducing the most
destabilizing weapons: fast-flying, non-recallable

While reducing the Soviet threat, the INF treaty does

ballistic missiles.

not alter NATO's basic approach to deterrence. NATO's

-  The United States also seeks equitable arms control strategy of flexible response continues to demand a
measures in the area of nuclear testing, chemical strong allied nuclear capability. Fears that an INF
weapons and conventional forces. agreement will somehow decouple the defense of

Europe from the u.s. nuclear arsenal are based on

-  The United States insists on agreements that can be

fundamental misunderstandings of the US commit-

effectively verified and fully complied with. Arms

ment and capability to participate in the defense of

control agreements without effective verification

Europe. The United States retains substantial nuclear

measures are worse than no agreements at all, as

capabilities in Europe to counter Warsaw Pact conven-

they create the possibility of Soviet unilateral ad-

tional superiority, and to serve as a link to U.S.

vantage, and can affect u.s. and allied planning

strategic nuclear forces. NATO aircraft will continue to

with a false sense of confidence.

have the capability to hold at risk a broad range of

Our perseverance in adhering to these principles paid targets, including those within the Soviet homeland. In
off on December 8, 1987, when Soviet General addition, U.s. sea-based forces assigned to NATO will
Secretary Gorbachev and I signed a treaty on continue to provide Alliance authorities with a com-
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces {INFl eliminating parable targeting capability. Thus, the 'Soviets can be
all U.s. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and under no illusion that they could attack NATO without
cruise missiles and their launchers, with ranges placing their own territory at risk.
between sao and 5,500 kilometers. The INF agree-
ment is an important tribute to NATO solidarity, per- Eliminating an entire class of ground-launched
sistence, and political courage. missiles, while an achievement of historical propor~

tions, does not remove the large Soviet conventional

The Soviet Union, because of its massive buildup, is and chemical threat to Europe. The next NATO prior-
required by the treaty to eliminate an INF missile ity for arms control, therefore, is to redress existing
force capable of carrying four times as many warheads imbalances in conventional and chemical warfare
as the United States. Thus, the treaty establishes the capabilities which favor the Soviet Union. Recogniz-
important principle of asymmetry in arms reduction ing this, the Alliance Foreign Ministers meeting in
agreements, to compensate for large Soviet quan- Reykjavik, Iceland in June 1987 called for a coherent
titative advantages. It is noteworthy that the systems and comprehensive concept of arms control which
the Soviets must eliminate are primarily based within reduces remaining European-based nuclear forces only
the Soviet Union, where they are not particularly in conjunction with the establishment of a conven-
vulnerable to conventional attack in a possible NATO- tional balance, and the global elimination of chemical
Warsaw Pact conflict. In contrast, the U.s. systems to weapons. I fully support this approach.

16


-----

The most important unfinished arms control task is to toward the long-term goals of increased security and
achieve deep reductions in strategic offensive arms. stability.
Both we and the Soviets have introduced draft texts for
strategic arms reduction treaties (START). Our ap- -  In the area of nuclear testing, on N vember 9, 1987,
proach provides for specific restrictions on the most we began formal negotiations with the Soviets on
destabilizing systems-fast-flying ballistic missiles, essential verification improvements to permit
especially heavy Soviet ICBMs. We are pursuing a ratification of existing treaties: the Threshold Test
goal first agreed to in October 1986 and reaffirmed Ban Treaty, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
during the December 1987 Summit: a 50 percent Treaty. Once our verification concerns have been
reduction in strategic offensive forces to a total of satisfied and the treaties ratified, we would be
6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles. We are prepared immediately to engage in negotiations
negotiating seriously; if the Soviets are willing to with the Soviets on ways to implement a step-by-
match our seriousness, agreement is possible. At the step program to limit and ultimately end nuclear
same time, a bad agreement is worse than no agree- testing, in association with a program to reduce and
ment, and we will not accept any agreement which ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons. Until that
does not enhance our security. ultimate stage has been reached, however, th

United States must continue testing to maintain a

We are also engaged in a wide variety of arms safe and reliable deterrent.
negotiations and discussions on other subjects. The
U.s. approach to all of these areas is consistent; we -  Finally, we seek to enhance stability through im-
seek only those agreements which are equitable, proved measures which c uld prevent misunder-
verifiable, and will enhance our security and that of standing. To this end, we signed an agreement with
our allies. the Soviets on S ptember 15, 1987, to e tablish

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in each national

Specifically: capital as a mechanism to avoid incidents resulting

from accident or miscalculation during peri ds of

-  Consistent with our belief that strategic defenses

tension.

may offer a safer, more stable basis for deterrence,
we seek Soviet agreement for an orderly transition

In all of these areas we consider effective verification

to a more defense-reliant world.

provisions to be as important as specific negoti ted
limits; they must be negotiated concurrently. We can-

-  We seek an effective and verifiable global ban on

not accept obligations that limit our military programs

chemical weapons.

unless we can effectively verify Soviet compliance

-  We seek all iance-to-all iance negoti ations to with those same obligations. This is particularly im-
establish a more secure and stable balance in con- portant in light of the continuing pattern of Soviet
ventional forces at lower levels from the Atlantic to violations documented in the several r ports whi h I
the Urals. Any steps ultimately taken in this area have submitted to the Congress on Soviet non-
must be effectively verifiable and must recognize compliance.
the geographic and force asymmetries between the
two sides. Alliance policy in this regard, which we We have made solid progress in the area of arms
fully support, is quite clear-increased security and reductions. Sound agreements-tho e that enhance our
stabi Iity, not reductions per se, are the objectives of security and that of our Allies-require patience, firm-
Western conventional arms control efforts. Given ness and strength. If we continue to display these
the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority in cer- qualities, and if the Soviets are willing to build on the
tain key areas-particularly those important for of- progress we have made, arms reductions can help
fensive operations-even modest reductions in keep us on the path toward greater sta ility and a
NATO forces, in the "absence of larger reductions safer world. In moving to that world, I will maintain
from the Warsaw Pact, would reduce NATO's my commitment to broad, deep, equitable, and
security and would not promote stability. The verifiable arms reductions, focused e pecially on
challenge is to synchronize NATO's force improve- ballistic missiles, and my equally strong commitment
ment plans and conventional arms control efforts to the Strategic Defense In itiative.

**17**


-----

**Maintaining Conventional** asmake we as and great a contribution to the common defense they would wish; and we encourage the
**Deterrence** more affluent Alliance members to'do so as well.

Such assistance serves as an important force
multiplier-increasing both the political solidarity and

Modern strategic nuclear capabilities are essential for

the military effectiveness of ATO.

deterrence, but they alone are obviously not enough.
The United States and its allies require robust

Under ATO military strategy, the land-based forces of

conv ntional forces, backed by adequate theater nu-

the Alliance nations, including the United States,

clear capabilities, as an integral part of our overall

would have primary responsibility for blunting a

deterrent. As noted earl ier, u.s. ational Security

Warsaw Pact attack and defending Allied territory,

Strategy has historically been based on the concepts

while simultaneously disrupting and destroying the

of forward defense and alliance solidarity. Consistent

follow-on forces which Soviet strategy relies upon to

with that strategy, we maintain large, forward

exploit any initial successes. Allied ground forces,

deployed forces at sea and on the territory of our
ATO and Asian allies in time of peace. The overall supported by tactical air power, require the capability
size, capabilities, and characteristics of U.s. Armed to halt a Pact attack and restore the integrity of
Forces are strongly influenced by the need to Alliance territory if NATO political and military
maintain such presence, which is essential to deter objectives are to be achieved. Absent such capability,
aggression. Alliance strategy becomes heavily dependent on the

threat of resorting to nuclear weapons to achieve

The most demanding threat with which those forces essential deterrence and warfighting objectives.
must deal is, of course, the Soviet Union. Soviet forces
will always outnumber our own in any presently The capability needed to halt such a Warsaw Pact
for seeable conflict-parti ularly when viewed in attack, without risking an early transition to nuclear
terms of active forces and major items of combat war, is the principal determinant of the size and
equipment. For this reason we must continue to give composition of the more than 300,000 military
the most careful a ention to ensuring our forces' personnel we currently have forward deployed in
technological superiority and high readiness to Europe. In collaboration with our allies, U.s. military
accomplish their deterrent and warfighting missions. planners consider the Pact's capabi Iities, the battle

terrain, allied capabilities, and ATO strategy when

An additional premi e of American defense policy is

determining the size, composition, and location of our

that the United State does not seek to deal with the

contribution of forward deployed forces along the 720

threat from the Soviet Union unaided. A system of vig-

kilometer Central front, and on the flanks and

orous alliances is essential to deterrence; and the

adjoining seas.

most important of these is NATO. The United States
contributes to the NATO deterrent in several ways.

In addition, certain U.s. forces perform functions for

Most visible is the peacetime stationing of over

the theater that are not withi n the capabil ity of our

300,000 military personnel in the Alliance area. This

allies, such as certain types of reconnaissance and

signifi an presence of U.S. forces makes it clear that it

intelligence missions; or they provide the capability to

is not ossible to attack a NATO ally without

receive and rapidly deploy reinforcements and

simultaneously engaging the full military might of the

resupply received from the United States. While

United States. The proximity of major Warsaw Pact

marginal changes may be feasible in the future, with

ground, air and naval forces to Alliance territory, the

adjustments in the U.s.-allied division of labor, the

speed with which modern conflict can unfold, the

basic U.s. contribution has been carefully planned to

Pact's significant numerical advantages, and the
Soviets' strong doctrinal emphasis on surprise, all assure that the strategy for the defense of Western
argue for the continuation of substantial, qualitatiyely Europe, and the U.S. contribution to it, are militarily
advanced U.S. and allied conventional forces in effective, and are seen by our adversaries to be so.
Europe.

In addition to the right numbers and mix of units, U.s.

In addition to the direct provision of forces, the and allied forces require constant upgrading and
Un ited States provides security assistance to those modernization to retain a qualitative edge in the face
NATO allies whose economies do not permit them to of the Pact's superior numbers and rapidly improving

**18**


-----

technologies. Our policies relating to force moder- dependent on a stockpile of obsolescent chemical
nization and retention of our technological edge em- weapons ill-suite to modern delivery systems. This
phasize cooperation among the Allies on research, places undue r liance on Alliance nuclear capabilities
development, and production. This approach reduces to deter Soviet first of chemical weapons-an ob-
duplication of R&D resources, shares the best viously undesirable and risky situation.
avai lable allied technology, promotes interoperable
equipment, and provides incentives for our Alii s to U.s. strategy recogniz s that the Soviet Union is
increase their contribution to Alliance capabilities. capable of simultan ous aggression in more than one
Congressional initiatives aimed at stimulating region. Should aggression occur in s eral areas
cooperative R&D have aided materially in advancing simultaneously, U.s. responses ould be governed by

existing commitments, general strategic priorities, the

these programs.

specific dr umstances at hand, and the availability of

ATO's strategy of flexible response requires a forces. Our strategy is not to try to fight "everywhere
capability for Allian e reaction appropriate to the at on :' We would do what is strategically sensible
nature of Soviet provocation. In addition to conven- and perationally achievable under the circumstances.
tional forces, this strategy must be upported by effec- Our capability to respond would be enhanc d by the
tive and substantial theater nuclear forces. In contrast flexibility we have built into our ~ rce structure, in-
to the policy of the Soviet Union, it is ATO's policy cluding capabilities for global strategi mobility and
to maintain theater nuclear forces at the low st level power proj ction. This visible capability to respond ef-
capable of deterring the threat. In pursuit of this fectively in distant theaters reduces the risk that we
policy, the Alliance decided in October 1983 to will ever have to m et such attacks.
reduce the number of warheads in Europe. These
reductions, taken independently of any arms reduction ATO is not our only alliance. The United States has
agreement, decreased NATO's nuclear stockpile in bilateral or multilateral security commitments with
Europe to the lowest level in over 20 year. This some 43 n tions r und th globe, including impor-
makes it essential that the remaining stockpile be tant treati s with J p n, the Republic of Korea, and
modern, survivable, and ffective. Australia.

With the prospective removal of our INF for e in In support of tho commitments, and to deter adven-
Europe, it will be particularly important that our re- turi m by the Soviets and their client states, we main-
maining theater nu lear forces b fully capable of tain forward deployed forces in other regions of
supporting the Allian e's flexibl response strategy. We strategic importan . Our naval forces deployed in the
have examined the military implications of the treaty Pa ific and Indian Oc ans assist in protecting our
from that standpoint and are confident that the gr wing strategic and econ mic interests, and suppor-
resulting force structure will provide the n cessary ting allies and fri nds, in Asia and the Pacific.
military capability, provided that necessary force Substantial ground and air force are depl yed in
modernization continues and that we effectively Korea to complement forces of the Republic of Korea
capitalize on available nuclear w apons delivery in deterring aggression from the North. Naval and
platforms. tactical air forces deployed throughout the Pacific

assist in me ting our security commitments to such

While neither NATO nor the United tates seeks to nations as Japan and the Philippines.
match the Soviets weapon for weapon, deterrence
would be dangerously weakened if the Soviets were These global forward d ployed forces serve several
allowed to field a major capability hich was com- functions. They are essential to the creation of
pletely unmatched by a countervailing NAT regional power balan which deter Soviet aggres-
capability. This premise underlies our determination sion and promote overall regional stability. They sup-
to modernize U.s. chemical weapons capability port th political indep ndence of nations on the
through development of modern, safe, binary muni- Soviet periphery, hence are key to the fundamental
tions. This modernization will provide us the capabili- u.s. security objective of avoiding Soviet domination
ty needed to deter Soviet first use of chemical of the Eurasian landmass. Finally, they provide an
weapons. Absent such capability, we will remain immediately available capability to deal with lesser

**19**


-----

military contingencies. However, for military con- -  Maintenance of an Adequate L~gistics Base.
tingencies not involving the Soviet Union, we look
primarily to the nations involved to provide for their li maintain a strong conventional deterrent, it is vital
own defense. that we provide adequate logistic support for U.s.

forces. A robus logistics infrastructure strengthens

In th past seven years we have made substantial pro- deterrence by demonstra ing our preparations for
gress in improving the cap bility of our forward hostilities at any level of intensity, and for the I ngth

of time necessary to defend U.S. interests. Adequate,

deployed forces to protect U.S. interests, execute our

sustained support helps raise the nuclear threshold

military strategy, and support alliance commitments.

and improves prospects for early success in conflict.

We remain firmly committed to continued improve-

Adversaries must not conclude that u.s. and allied

ment in our deployed capabilities in support of our

capabilities would be exhausted if confronted with a

forward-defense, alliance-based strategy. The following

complex or prolonged military campaign. With the

paragraphs will discuss selected capabilities which

support of Congress we will seek continued improve-

provide essential foundations for that strategy.

ment in this unglamorous but essential component of
military power. Concurr ntly, we w'n continue to

-  Maintenance of Global Support and Mobility

emphasize to our allies that the sustainment of their

Capa i1ities.

forces in combat must parallel that of our own.

The ability to reinforce and resupply forward deployed

-  Maintenance of Adequate Active Forces.

forces is essential to the execution of U.S. military
strategy. A credible U.s. capability to reinforce ATO Support of our conventional deterr nt requires that we
rapidly during times of tension, for example, is critical maintain balanc d and effective active duty forces
to effective deterrence. sufficien in quality an quantity to make our national

military strategy credible. In the context of our

The Soviets have a natural geographic advantage in alliance relationships, deterring and, if necessary
military operation on the Eurasian rim, a d growing def ating, the Sovi threat requires a carefully
capabilities to launch simultane us offensives in structur d mix of u.s. and allied land and sea-based
Europe, Southwest Asia and the Far East. Capitalizing forces capable of executi ng the agreed strategy unti I
on interior lines of communication, they can redeploy reinforced from the re pective national mobilization
and resupply forces ov r a broad geographic range. ases.
Recent Soviet effort have significantly improved
military access by rail and road to strategically While N JO requirements are the primary fo us of

our ground forces' concern, the global nature of

important areas along the USSR's southern frontiers.

pot ntiaJ threats to u.s. interests requires maintenance
of flexible and diverse ground forces capable of rapid

Our global support and mobility capabilities, in-

deployment to, and sustained operations in, other

cluding airlift, sealift, and prepositioning, are therefore

areas of strategic importance as well. This has led the

essential to allow us to meet military challenges

Army to establish rapidly deployable light divisions,

around the periphery of the Eurasian continent, which

while continuing efforts have gone into the enhance-

remains the primary locus of Soviet expansionist in-

ment of Marine Corps capabilities and amphibious lift.

terests. Prepositioning ashore or at sea can sharply
reduce our response times. Airlift, the quickest and

U.s. tactical airpower su ports the achievement of

most flexible of our mobility assets, would deliver in-

theater campaign goals by maintaining battlefield air

itial reinforcements in most contingencies, but sealift

uperiority, providing responsive and effective

will inevitably carry the bulk of our reinforcement and

firepower for ground combat units, and conducting

resupply, as it has in past crises. Mobility capabilities deep interdiction of enemy forces, command and con-
are especially critical to our strategy for dealing with trol facilities, and sources of logistics support. In addi-
contingencies in Southwest Asia, where we have no tion, in the European theater, it plays a critical role in
military bases or permanently stationed military assuring the essential reinforcement and resupply of
forces. u.s. forward deployed forces by protecting port
**20**


-----

faci Iities, aeria I ports of debarkation, prepositioned of this capability supports deterrence and provides the
equipment and munitions, and lines of communica- ability for a timely and flexible response to the full
tion. The capability of air forces to deploy rapidly in range of plausible threats.
crises adds to our ability to bring effective military
power to bear in distant regions in contingencies. Defense industrial mobilization policies focus on steps

that industry and government can take during

Maritime forces also playa unique role in supporting peacetime and in the early stages of a crisis to acquire
our national military strategy. Given the realities of our long-lead time items and to prepare for surge
geostrategic position, fronting on two oceans, production. Examples of current mobilization plans
maritime superiority over any potential adversary is include those providing for surge production of
essential to support our alliance relationships and for- precision-guided munitions; for the adaptation of new
ward deployed forces. The capability of Navy and production technologies such as flexible
Marine Corps forces to project and sustain military manufacturing systems; and for the expand d
power in areas distant from our shores is of particular production of machine tools.
importance, given the central position of the Soviet
Union on the Eurasian land mass and the fact that To ensure that our industrial base can respond in an
many of the United States' most important allies are adequate and timely fashion to a broad range of
located on the Eurasian periphery, accessible from the potential emergencies, we are testing a new concept
sea. of industrial mobilization responses linked to early

warning indicators. Under this concept, the readiness

Our naval power projection forces would also playa of our industrial base would be progressively
major role in any Southwest Asia contingency. T eir increased as intelligence suggested an increasing
current presence in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, probabi lity of hostile actions directed against U.S.
together with Army and Air Force units, is providing interests. To support this concept, in peacetime
essential support for several important national securi- planners will identify and catalog relevant industrial
ty objectives. base capabilities, prepare sp cific response options,

and create a series of graduated responses to e
implemented within exi ting capabilities at a time of

**Maintaining a National** crisis.
**Mobilization Base** Such mobilization planning cannot be done on a

purely unilateral basis. In the NATO context,
international collaboration to improve national

The effective mobilization of manpower and industrial mobilization capabilities is important to increase
resources in the event of a conflict would provide Alliance-wide efficiency and the capability to support
essential support for our military capabilities. Realistic war plans. For example, the United States through its
mobilization plans also provide a clear means for the representation on the NATO Industrial Planning
United States to communicate its resolve to our Committee, works closely with its allies to ensure that
potential adversaries in eriods of tension or crisis. member nations are prepared to support the Allian e

strategy with a coordinated and effective industrial

On the industrial side, the maintenance of a broad, mobilization response.
technologically superior mobilization base is a
fundamental element of u.s. defense policy. As I With regard to manpower, our mobilization plans
noted when discussing the economic elements of emphasize achievable increases in defense manpower
power, we rely on the size and strength of the U.S. at a pace consistent with military needs. Under
economy as our ultimate line of defense. And, as existing plans, active forces-depending on their
nuclear weapons red~ctions are negotiated, the location-would either maintain their forward
capability of the u.s. and allied mobilization bases deployment or rapidly reinforce such deployments
rapidly to generate additional conventional military from the United States. Reserve forces would
forces and the supplies and equipment to sustain mobilize, some military retirees would be recalled,
them, becomes increasingly important. Maintenance and civilian manpower would be expanded to support

**21**


-----

uch necessary defense functions as logistics, com- -  Expanding human presence and activity beyond
munications, and health services. Earth orbit into the solar system.

Our plans for military manpower m bilization are bas-

The use of space systems to satisfy many critical na-

ed upon the Total Force policy, establ ished in the ear-

tional security requirements is an expanding and vital

ly 1970s, which places increased responsibilities on

element of U.s. national power. Functions important to

the reserve component of U.S. forces. With fully 50

our national security strategy such as communications,

percent of the combat units for land warfare in the

navigation, environmental monitoring, early warning,

reserve compon nts, their importance to our conven-

surveillance, and treaty verification are increasingly

tional deterrent cannot be overstated. Their priority for

performed by space systems. In many cases, the

manning, training and equipment mobilization is

worldwide access provided by the space systems

based on time-phasing of their use in operational

makes them the only available means for ac-

plans. In many cases, the sequence of deployment

complishing these important functions. Absent the

would place reserve component units ide by side

assured use of space, our nation's security would be

with, and sometimes even ahead of, the active duty

seriously jeopardized.

forces. While there are pecific mission areas in which
the role for reserve components can be expanded, we

Our military policy for space encompasses five

need to exercise care to avoid fundamentally altering

el ments.

the nature of service in the reserves, or imbalance the
reserve/active force mix. While not reserves in the

First, we recognize that deterrence-at all levels of

conventional sense of the term, in time of war Coast

potential conflict-cannot be accomplished without

Guard forces would provide an important augmenta-

space-based assets, so we seek to ensure that critical

tion to our worldwide naval capabilities.

space systems will be available to commanders, com-
mensurate with their need.

**_SUPPORTING POLICIES_**

Second, we seek to ensure free access to space for all
nations, in a manner analogous to the way that free

**U.S. National Space Policy**

access to the earth's oceans is maintained.

I recently approved a new national space policy
which updates and expands guidelines for the con-

Third, we encourage interaction among national

duct of U.s. national security, civil, and commercial

security, civil government and, where appropriate,

efforts in space. The p !icy recognizes that a fun-

commercial space programs to share critical

damental objective guiding U.S. activities continues to

technologies and avoid unnecessary duplication of ac-

be space leadership, which requires preeminence in

tivities.

key areas critical to achieving our broad goals. These
goals include:

Fourth, our policies provide for improved defensive
capabilities in the future, deterring or, if necessary,

-  Strengthening the security of the United States.

defending against enemy attacks on our space systems.

-  Obtaining economic, technological and scientific
benefits that improve the quality of life on earth, Finally, we will continue to improve those space
through space-related activities. systems that directly support our military forces by

enhanci ng thei r effectiveness.

-  Encouraging U.S. private sector investment in space
and space-related activities.

Our civil space activities contribute to the nation's
scientific, technological, and economic well-being in

-  Promoting international cooperative activiti€s, taking

addition to making a major contribution to America's

into account U.s. national security, foreign policy,

prestige and leadership in the world. Our civil space

scientific, and economic interests.

goals are:

-  Cooperating with other nations in maintaining
freedom of space for activities that enhance the -  To advance scientific knowledge of the planet Earth,
security and welfare of mankind. the solar system, and the universe beyond.

**22**


-----

-  To preserve our preeminence in critical aspects of are to employ the relevant elements of national power
space science, space applications, space technology, in a timely way and deal with threats before they
and manned spaceflight. become unmanageable, or entail the risk of conflict.

The primary goal of U.S. intelligence activities is to

.. -  To open new opportunities for use of the space en-

provide appropriate agencies of government with the

vironment.

best available information on which to base decisions

-  To develop selected civil applications of space

concerning the development and conduct of foreign,

technology.

economic and defense policy.

-  To engage in international cooperative efforts that
further U.S. space goals. It is axiomatic that our National Security Strategy must

be strongly supported by reliable intelligence

-  To establish a permanently manned presence in

concerni ng potential adversaries' national capabil ities

space.

and probable courses of action. Intelligence also
provides essential insights into how we are viewed by

u.s. leadershi p in civi lian space programs has been

those adversaries. Their perceptions of our capabilities,

taken for granted since the late 1960s. That leadership,
however, is being increasingly challenged both by our political will, national interests, and likely reaction to
friends and allies abroad, and by the Soviet Union. hostile provocation, provide an important measure of
The ambitious program of space exploration and the effectiveness of our strategy. The collection of such
research that the Soviets are pursuing, centered upon information is a priority objective of our intelligence
a high level of launch capacity and the Mir Space activities. It must be pursued in a vigorous, innovative,
Station, have eroded traditional areas of U.s. space and responsible manner that is consistent with
leadership. Initiatives-such as efforts to improve our applicable law and respectful of the principles upon
space transportation systems, develop and deploy the which this nation was founded.
Space Station, and develop the technologies to
support a range of futu re solar system exploration The capability to deal with the hostile intelligence
options-are intended to ensure U.S. preeminence in threat to the United States is equally important. The
areas critical to our national interests. large and active intelligen e services of the Soviet

Union, its clients and surrogates, conduct

The Uni ted States is first among nations in its efforts

sophisticated collection and analysis operations

to foster a purely commercial, market-driven space in-

targeted against us, our allies, and friends. The Soviets

dustry without direct government subsidies. We

rely heavily on espionage and an elaborate apparatus

bel ieve that private sector space initiatives will have

for illegal acquisition of Western military technology

positive effects on the U.s. balance of trade, work

to further thei r strategic ai ms. The apprehension over

force skills, and the development of unique manufac-

the past few years of spies conducting highly damag-

turing methods and products. These initiatives also
promise lower costs to the taxpayer and enhanced ing espionage operations against the United States has
security to our nation. We are confident that tradi- dramatically underli ned the severity of the threat. I
tional American ingenuity will yield innovative space have directed that the U.s. intelligence community
technology applications comparable to, or exceeding, _give special emphasis to detecting and countering es-_
those achieved in aviation earl ier th is centu ry. pionage and other threats from foreign intelligence

services.

**U.S. Intelligence Policy** International terrorism and narcotics trafficking, par-

ticularly when state-supported, can threaten the

Development and execution of sound national security security of the U.s. and our citizens. Intelligence
policies, and the strategies applicable to specific situa- plays a critical role in our efforts to control and
tions, requires timely, accurate, and thorough informa- reduce these threats. Intell igence collection and
tion regarding actual or potential threats to our special operations by agencies of the u.s. government
national security. Early warning of developments to protect against international terrorism and interna-
which could place at risk u.s. interests is vital if we tional narcotics activities will remain a high priority.

**23**


-----

The ability to conduct covert action operations is an new covert action operations to ensure that such
essential elemen of our national security capability. operations receive appropriate interagency review, and
In selected circumstanc s such operations provide a are consistent with applicable law. Additionally, we
means to deal with developing threats to our security have instituted stricter accountability of access to
before the employment of u.s. military power or protect confidentiality, and have established "sunset
other actions entailing higher costs and risks are re- provisions" that require annual review of all covert
quired. Over the past year, we have reviewed all ex- action programs, and their continuation only by
isting covert action programs to ensure that they are Presidential approval. We wi II conti nue to employ
in accordance with applicable law and consistent with such covert action operations in support of national
U.s. policy. We have also put into place procedures security objectives, and ensure that they are con-
for approval, review and congressional notification of sistently supportive of national policy.

**24**


-----

I~
**Integrating Elements of Power**
**into National Security Strategy**

_STRATEGY FOR THE_ counter the threatand economic progress. of Soviet expansionist policies not To achieve these, we must
_WESTERN HEMISPHERE_ only from Cuba, but now from Nicaragua. Critical

national security interests in latin America are based
on long-standing U.S. policy that there be no Soviet,

Our own territorial security is inextricably linked with Cuban, or other Communist bloc beachhead on the
the security of our hemispheric neighbors, north and mainland of the Western Hemisphere, or any country
south; the defense of North America is the nation's that upsets the regional balance and poses a serious
most fundamental security concern. We sometimes fail military threat to its neighbors. Representative
fully to appreciate the great strategic importance of democracy in Nicaragua is a key goal in our strategy
the Latin American and Caribbean regions, in spite of to achieve lasting peace and our other interdependent
their proximity to our borders and importance to our security objectives for the hemisphere.
national security. The significance of these regions has
n01 been lost to Soviet planners, however, who refer to We support the Guatemala Peace Accords and
Latin America and the Caribbean as our "strategic welcome the initial steps taken by the Sandinistas in
rear:" The USSR has, since the early 19605, the direction of a freer, more democratic and
increasingly sought to expand its influence in these pluralistic Nicaragua, as agreed to in the Accords. Yet
areas to the detriment of our (MIn security. Our we have reason to remain skeptical. It is too soon to
national interests, as well as our political principles, tell if the Sandinista leaders will comply with the
have led us to promote democracy and economic pledges they have made. The Sandinistas have made
progress throughout the hemisphere. In the past, we similar promises in the past-including in 1979 to the
have relied on a hemispheric security system Organization of American States-which were broken.
composed of a strong U.s. deterrent, broadly-based It is important to keep in mind, however, that even if
cooperation with Canada, and collective security the Nicaraguan government should live up to its
arrangements with latin America. More recently we obligations under the Guatemala Peace Accords in full
have built on this foundation a policy aimed at and credible fashion, security concerns affecting
strengthening the ability of our Central American and important U.s. interests would remain. They include
Caribbean neighbors to resist outside aggression and the Soviet and Cuban military presence in Nicaragua,
subversion, and facilitating the transition to democracy and the rapid growth of the Nicaraguan military
in the region. Today 28 of 33 countries in latin capability which threatens the military balance of the
America and the Caribbean, with over 90 percent of region as well as Nicaragua's democratic neighbors.
the population, are democratic. As we work for further
consolidation of democr~cy, we continue to promote To encourage the Sandinistas to implement the agreed
economic cooperation whh our Hemispheric reforms in good faith, and to advance U.s. security
neighbors. interests in Central America, we have engaged in

extensive and close consultation with the Central

We remain deeply committed to the interdependent, America democracies and the Nicaraguan Resistance.
regional objectives of democracy and freedom, peace, One key element of our diplomatic strategy is the

25


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pressure exertedaraguan Resistance. on We the Sandinista regime will continue funding the by the Nic- Re- **_STRATEGY FOR THE SOVIET_**
sistance until we see viden e that democratization in

**_UNION AND EASTERN_**

Nicaragua is r al and irreversible. Accordingly, the
Administration will request r newed assistance for the **_EUROPE_**
Freedom Fighters early this year. Economic and trade

As mentioned earlier, the most significant threat to

sanctions are other key elements of our coordinated
strategy. u.s. national interests remai ns that posed by the So-

viet Union. Despite some improvement in U.S.-Soviet
relations over the past year, the long-term threat has

Currently we are deeply involved in th struggle

not perceptibly diminished.

throughout Latin America against the menace of drug
production and trafficking, which pose thre ts not

The differences between the United States and the

only to the integrity and stability of gov rnments to

Soviet Union are fundamental in nature, given the

our South, but to the social fabric of the United States

great disparities in our political, economic and social

itself. Working bilaterally, and wh rever possible on a

systems, and our divergent geostrategic interests.

regional basis, we ar supplying resource and

While the much-publicized reforms of the new Soviet

expertise to the governments wishing to engage with

leadership have raised expectations of more benign

us in this priority effort.

Soviet policies, there is as yet no evidence that the
Soviets have abandon d their long-term objectives.

Increased trade among the Western Hemisph re

This means that U.s. strategy to counter these

countries is also an important element of our national

objectives must also remain consistent and aimed at

security strategy. Such trade will aid deb or countries the long-term. We must remain sufficiently flexible to
in the region in mana ing their obligation in a seize the initiative and explore positive shifts in Soviet
responsible manner while contributing to their policy whi h may strengthen U.s. security; but we
economic growth. In addition, th United States must not delude our Ives into believing that the
supports providing additional resources for the World Soviet threat has yet been fundamentally altered, or
Bank and the In ernational Monetary Fund (IMF) to that our vigilance can be reduc d.
assist these countries in adjusting to the consequences
of external economic forces, such as the d cline of Consis ent with this approach, our overall strategy to-
world oil and oth r commodity prices. ward the Soviet Union remains to contain Soviet

expansionism, and to encourage political democracy

Our close relationship with Canada derives from our and basic human rights within the Soviet Union and
long historical and cultur I associati n, as well as the countries under its hegemony. These have been

the national security objectives of successive U.s.

geopolitical and economic factors-our physical

administrations, though the manner of their

proximity, the openness of our more than 3,000 mile

implementation has varied. Continued emphasis on

border, and our important military cooperation, both

the principles of strength, dialogue and realism in our

bilaterally and under the ATO aegis. Economically,

strategy may eventually alter Soviet behavior in

Canada is by far our largest trading partner. Our

fundamental w ys to create a more stable and

primary objective with respect to Canada, a close

peaceful world.

friend and ally, is to protect and strengthen the
already excellent relations we enjoy. In the near-term,

The maintenanc of adequate strength to deter Soviet

our goal can be best achieved by securing approval by

aggression anywhere in the world that our strategic

the U.s. Congress and Canadian Parliament of the

interests require is central to our strategy. Such

recently negotiated United States-Canada Free Trade strength must encompass not only military power, but
Area agreement. This agreement will benefit both also the political determination, vitality of alliances
countries by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers to and the ec nomic health essential to meet our global
trade in goods and services and by facilitating cross- responsibi Iities. In areas where the Soviets are
border investment by the private sectors of both currently engaged in military expansionism, such as
countries. Afghanistan, the United States is demonstrating its

**26**


-----

willingness to support local resistance forces to the community of nations. At the same time, the
degree necessary to frustrate Soviet ambitions. In economic utility of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union
general, our goals are to convince the Soviet Union is declining.
that the use of military force does not pay, and that
the build-up of military forces beyond levels necessary These factors combine to give the United States an
for legitimate national defense will not provide opportunity to improve its relations with Eastern
uni lateral advantage. European countries. Our objectives in the region are

to encourage liberalization and more autonomous

ational strength must be complemented by foreign policies, and to foster genuine, long-term
constructive dialogue. We have established a four part human rights improvements. Our strategy is to
agenda for discussion with the Soviet Union: arms differentiate our policies toward these countries
reduction, human rights, resolution of regional according to their conduct, and to develop relations
conflicts, and bilateral exchanges. We have made clear with each based on individual merit.
that substantial progress in all areas is necessary to
allow a truly qualitative improvement of u.s.-Soviet The United States and its NATO Allies also are
relations. Our emphasis on human rights is directly working jointly to overcome the artificial division of
relevant to our security strategy because we believe Europe which occurred after World War II and to
that the manner in which a government treats its own promote closer ties between Eastern and Western
people reflects upon its behavior in the international Europe. This takes place primarily through the
community of nations. 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe, which serves to maintain pressure on the So-

Although progress in U.s.-Soviet relations has viet Union and Eastern European governments to
historically been difficult to predict, present improve human rights performance and increases
indications are that the Soviet leadership recognizes contact and communication between East and West.
that some of the country's past policies must be
altered to prevent further domestic economic and
technological obsolescence. In this regard, the policies
of the current leadership have a marked strategic cast

**_STRATEGY FOR WESTERN_**

to them, to the extent that they aim at placing the
Soviets in a more competitive position vis-a-vis the **_EUROPE AND NATO_**
United States over the long term. At the same time,
should the Soviets demonstrate that they genuinely The security of Western Europe is a vital component
wish to improve the U.s.-Soviet relationship by of U.S. National Security Strategy. We share a
reducing military expenditures and force structure, by common heritage and democratic values with Western
terminating Third World subversion and expansion, European countries, have a compelling mutual interest
and by focusing on their internal problems, they will in containing Soviet expansion, and benefit from
find the United States welcoming their more interdependent economic relations.
responsible behavior on the international scene.

Overall, our objectives in Western Europe are to help

While acknowledging that most of the countries of maintain the region's security and independence from
Eastern Europe are members of the Warsaw Pact, we Soviet intimidation, to promote its political and
have never recognized Soviet hegemony in the region economic health, to consult with European
as legitimate or healthy because it is based on governments on effective policies toward the Soviet
military power and dictatorship, not democratic Union and the Warsaw Pact, and to work with West-
consent. We wish to develop our relations with each ern Europeans toward overcoming the East-West
country of the region on an individual basis. Many division of the European continent.
East European countries at present face severe
economic difficulties as a result of forced emulation of The North Atlantic Alliance embodies the u.s.
Soviet economic models. The populations of these commitment to Western Europe as well as the
countries are significantly pro-Western in outlook and members' commitment to defend each other. AlO
would like to strengthen ties with the Western has preserved peace in Europe for almost 40 years, by

**27**


-----

far the longest period of peace on the continent in -  Maintenance of the credibility of NATO's nuclear
this century. Through the Alliance, NATO members deterrent. We will work toward full implementation
engage in collective defense to deter Soviet aggression of the Montebello agreement, including the
and enhance security. NATO is, however, both a provisions on nuclear modernization, as well as
political and military entity. Through NATO, the some restructuring of NATO's nuclear forces.
United States also consults with its Western European

-  Maintenance of a credible conventional deterrent

Allies on a wide range of issues.

with emphasis on further execution of Alliance
approved conventional defense improvements,

The cohesion and unity of NATO are essential to a

including provisions for air defense and increased

successful security strategy relative to the Soviet

suslainability stocks.

Union. The repeated and unsuccessful Soviet efforts to
drive wedges between the United States and Western

-  More effective use of resources available for

Europe testify to the strength of Alliance unity. These

deterrent capabilities Ihrough national defense

Soviet efforts have been thwarted through close and

budgets. We are just beginning to realize a return

frequent high-level consultations among allies, to

on initial efforts in armaments cooperation, and will

maintain our solidarity and our common strategy on

work closely with our allies to bring to fruition

crucial issues. The most recent success story of the

other programs recently initiated with

Alliance has been the conclusion of an Intermediate- Congressionally reserved funds for cooperative re-
Range Nuclear Forces (lNF) Treaty between the United search and development. We will also continue to
States and the Soviet Union. This agreement search for new opportunities to enhance
vindicates NATO's 1979 dual-track decision which, conventional defense capabilities in resource-
through commitment both to negotiate and to deploy effective ways, such as improved crisis management
intermediate-range nuclear forces, gave the Soviet procedures and rationalization of roles and missions
Union incentive eventually to agree to the total with our allies.
elimination of this category of weapons. The cohesion
of the Alliance and the courage of Allied governments -  Improvement of the military use of technology,
which deployed INf missiles despite sometimes while strengthening NATO's industrial base,
significant domestic resistance has paid off, and particularly in some countries on NATO's southern
resulted in the first agreement in history which will flank.
actually reduce nuclear arsenals.

Narrowing the gap in conventional capabilities can
enhance deterrence, raise the nuclear threshold and

The United States, working closely with NATO allies,

reduce the risk of Soviet miscalculation. If also offers

hopes to reach other successful arms agreements with

the best hope of inducing the Soviets to negotiate

the Soviet Union; but we have made clear that the

seriously toward a stable conventional equilibrium at

strategy of flexible response will require the

lower fOiCe levels.

continuing presence of US. nuclear weapons, and
strong conventional forces, in Europe. This is

NATO also provides a forum for Western consultation

particularly true in view of the great disparity in

on such political processes as the Conference on

conventional forces on the continent which directly

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), where

threatens 'v\'estern Europe. The pronounced our goal is 10 ensure full Soviet and Eastern European
conventional force imbalance has been a matter of

implementation of the commitments undertaken in the

concern for many years. In 1985, the Alliance adopted Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.
an ambitious plan of action designed to remedy Of special interest are the CSCE provisions on human
NATO's most critical conventional deficiencies. rights and the freer flow of peoples and information
Progress in some areas-such as the provision of across the East-West divide. CSCE represents a crucial
aircraft shelters and the filling of critical munition means by which the United States and its Allies are
shortfalls-has been encouraging, but much more working to reduce the repression and the artificial
remains to be accomplished. Within the context of barriers which have existed since the Soviet Union
these ongoing efforts, the United States will work in imposed its wilt on neighboring countries after World
close consultation with our allies toward: War II.
28


-----

Although the NATO Alliance remains strong and In the Persian Gulf region, we also pursue an
vigorous, aspects of our relationship with Western inte rated approach to secure our four long tanding
Europe transcend ATO concerns. These include objectives: maintaining freedom of navigation;
issues such as trade and protectionism, methods of strengthening the moderate Arab states; reducing the
dealing with terrorism, and poli toward regions influence of anti-Western powers, such as the Soviet
outside of the NATO geographic area. We seek to Union and Iran; and assuring access to oil on
work closely with Western European governments on reasonable term for ourselves and our allies. Iran's
these matters, though there are sometimes differing continuation and escalation of the Iran-Iraq War,
viewpoints as is natural among sovereign, democratic including its att mpts to intimidate non-belligerent
governments. Gulf Arab states, pose the most serious, immediate

threat to our interests, and provide the Soviet Union
the opportunity to a vance it regional agenda.

In responding to these threats diplomatically we work

**_STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE_**
**_EAST AND SOUTH ASIA_** persistentlyOperation Stanch, to end the to ce war, se both unilaterally-as with the flow of war materiel to

Iran -and through multilateral forum, such as the

De pite the multitude of hanges in the Middl East

United Nations ecurity Council. The current chal-

over the past everal decade, u.s. obj ctives have

lenge is to get Iran to join Iraq in accepting a

held remarkably constant. In harm ny with the pre-

comprehensive settlement.

dominant aspirati n of th peoples of the region, we
remain d eply committed to helping forge a just an Sinc 1 49, our diplomatic commitment to regional
lasting peace between Israel and its neighbor. Our stability and undisrupted commerce has been
regional goals also include limiting Soviet influen e, supported by our military policy of maintaining a
fostering the security an prosperity of Israel and our permanent naval presence in the Persian Gul . That
Arab friends, and urbing state-sponsor d terrorism. To pr sen e is currently expanded to allow us to ter
achieve these aims, we must hurdle some erious Iranian attempts to intimidate m derate stat 5 in the
obst c1es including continuing, de p-seated Arab- region, and to play our traditional role of protecting
Israeli tensions, the emotionally-charged Palestinian U.s.-flag shipping in the face of increased Iranian
probl m, radical anti-Western political nd religious aggressiveness. Five other ATO governments have
movements, the use of terrori m a an instrument of also made deci ions to deploy naval v ssels to the
state policy, and Soviet polici s which have supported Gulf where they assist in prote ting freedom of
the forces of extremism rather than the forces of navigation. A prudent but responsive policy of arms
moderation. sales for the self-def nse of our friends in the region is

aIso an integral part of ou r strategy, as those nati s

In working to overcome these obstacles we pursue a as ume gre t r responsibility for their own defense.
strategy which integrates diplomatic, econ mic and
military instruments. With regard to the Arab-Israeli In South Asia, we aim to reduce regional tensions,
peace process, the u.s. initiative of September 1, 1982 especially those bet een India and Pakist n; to restore
remains the cornerstone f our approach. While fr edom in Afghanistan; to promote democra ic
working diplomatic lIy t narrow tl e gap and make political institutions and economi dev I pment; to
direct negotiation possible, we also provide military end narcotics producti n and trafficking; and to
and economic assistance to our friends in the r gion discourage nu I ar proliferation. These objectives are
to bolster their security in the fa e of continuing threatened primarily by the Soviet occupation of
threats. Moderate regimes must be secure if they are Afghanistan, the continuing antagonism between India
to run the risks of making peace. At the same time, an Pakist n, and the refusal of those two states to re-
we remain willing to confront nd build international strain sensitive a pects f their nuclear programs.
pressure against those states, such as Libya and Iran,
which sponsor terrorism and promote ubversion In dealing with the pr lem of nuclear proliferation in
against friendly governments. S uth A i I we have followed a two-track ap roach.

**29**


-----

stanFi rst, that our provision of security assistance requires we have made clear to the government of Paki- **_STRATEGY FOR EAST.,_** **_ASIA_**
Pakistani nuclear restraint. At the same time, provision

**_AND THE PACIFIC_**

of u.s. military and economic assistance helps Paki-
stan meet legitimate security needs without resorting As a Pacific power the United States faces formidable
to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Secondly, challenges in projecting its strength across that broad
recogn izing that there is a regional context for the region. Our security objectives, as elsewhere, are
Pakistani nuclear program, we have encouraged India aimed at helping our allies and friends in the region
and Pakistan toward an agreement on confidence to develop economically and politically as they defend
building measures. We are encouraged that the themselves from encroachment. We are meeting with
leadership in both countries is actively looking for success in most areas. The free nations of East Asia
ways to improve their relations with each other. and the Pacific now lead the world in demonstrating

an economic and political dynamism that stands in

We remain unequivocally opposed to the Soviet stark contrast with conditions in other nations in the
military presence in Afghanistan. In the absence of a regions such as Vietnam and North Korea. Our Asian
political settlement which provides for a prompt and allies and friends also stood together with us in the

years of effort required to achieve the INF Treaty,

complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, restoration of

which removes a threat from Asia, as well as from

Afghanistan to its independent non-aIigned status, and

Western Europe.

self-determination for the Afghan people, we will
continue our firm support for the Afghan cause. We

Soviet military power in Asia and the Pacific continues

al so work to bolster the security of Pakistan, the

its steady qualitative improvement, but the u.s.

frontline state hosting nearly three million Afghan

response is not confined to technical issues of relative

refugees, with a second six-year assistance plan. By

military strength. Our basic aims are to strengthen the

expanding our ties with India as well as Pakistan, we

natural political and economic ties that link us with

hope to foster stability in South Asia. Recent advances

regional states, to evoke greater participation by our

in technological and scientific cooperation between allies and friends in their own defense, and to
the United States and India, in both civilian and proceed steadily with necessary modernization of our
military areas, with prospects for further growth, have military forces deployed to the area.
been important in improving relations between our
two countries. We also provide development assistance Cooperation with Japan remains basic to u.s.
th roughout the region and support the work of the relationships in the region. The United States-Japan
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to Treaty of Cooperation and Security formalizes our

defense ties, providing a security foundation for the

promote stability by fostering regional economic

broad spectrum of economic and political associations

growth.

which uniquely join us.

The sharp reduction in US economic and military

During the past ten years, a consensus has emerged in

assistance funding, plus Congressional opposition to

Japan that Japan should undertake the primary

the sale of modern defense weapons to a number of

responsi bi Iity to defend its homeland, territorial seas

states, has had a negative impact on U.s. security

and skies, and its sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical

interests in both the Middle East and South Asia. miles. In 1985 the government of Japan incorporated
These cutbacks in security assistance have been all the that concept into its current Five Year Defense Plan.
more damaging because threats to friendly states have Japan's defense spending has increased more than five
increased thei r need for security assistance and percent per year in real terms for the past five years,
weapons. At the same time, the Soviet Union has and we have encouraged Japan to continue
become more aggressive in offering weapons to modernizing its forces in order to carry out its
countries unable to obtain them from the United legitimate defense responsibilities. In addition to
States. The Soviets have also become more active in providing for its own defense forces, Japan contributes
using economic instruments such as debt rescheduling over $2 billion per year to support U.S. forces
to enhance their own political influence. stationed in Japan.

**30**


-----

The economic dimension of our relationship with this basis, we have continued to increase our trade,
Japan, as well as with other key nations in the region, people-ta-people contacts, and even limited, defensive
is so prominent that it must be considered an integral military cooperation. Differences persist over some
part of our national security strategy. The massive issues, but we have continued to develop a mature
trade surplus of Japan with the United States is relationship that clearly benefits both countries.
unsustainable and a source of political tension, as are
the lesser surpluses of other regional nations. Such Through assiduous management of the United States-
economic imbalances must be reduced through a China relationship, we expect to cooperate when our
combination of measures including support for U.s. interests and China's are parallel, such as in
initiatives for multilateral trade liberalization in the Afghanistan, and in maintaining stability in East Asia.
GATT. We are confident a level-headed national consensus

on how to conduct relations with China wi I! remain

In view of the globalization of financial markets, the foundation for additional growth and interaction in
cooperation with Japan on economic policy will be

the relationship.

key to maintaining confidence on world stock and
currency markets. A recent positive development is Ja-

The Philippine government has made progress

pan's significantly increased expenditures on foreign

restoring democracy and laying the foundation for

assistance. Japan continues to target assistance on

economic growth. The Aquino government, however,

countries of strategic importance, and is giving more

continues to face major political, security and

of its aid in "untied" form than in the past.

economic challenges. Through all of the tools
available to us, we are determined to help this

Our alliance with the Republic of Korea remains vital

important Pacific ally to overcome these problems so

to regional stability. North Korea maintains forces that

it can sustain economic growth, counter the threat of

far exceed those of the South in quantity, are

a virulent internal communist insurgency, and

continuously strengthened by additional Soviet

strengthen democratic government.

weapons, and are in the hands of a government
whose aggressive demeanor and tendency to act

Thailand, another Association of Southeast Nations

unexpectedly are well known. Our military presence

(ASEAN) member, and our treaty arty, borders

in the Republic of Korea underpins regional stability

Cambodia, which is now occupied by the Vietnamese

and builds confidence, which is essential to that

and the site of an active Cambodian resistance effort

country's remarkable economic development and

struggling to regain self-determination for the Khmer

political evolution. Sound security, politics, and

people. In support of Thailand, which also shoulders

economics are indivisible. In this process, the United

the major refugee burden in Southeast Asia, we will

States has used its influence to encourage Koreans to-

continue our dose security cooperation to deter any

ward democratic change. We have done so, hQ\.'1ever,

potential aggression and maintain our support of

with respect for Korean traditions and political

eligible refugees. We will also continue our

realities; and we are mindful of the constant security
threat. The Republic of Korea ;s our seventh largest cooperative effort with Thailand to suppress narcotic
trading partner; significant market and investment trafficking.
opportunities for U.s. firms exist. Market access
barriers are coming down, but not fast enough, and We view the continued occupation of Cambodia by
much more remains to be done. Vietnamese forces as an unacceptable violation of

international law that undermines regional efforts to-

Both the People's Republic of China and the United wards development, peace and stability. We also
States have cultivated good relations based on realistic oppose the return of the Khmer Rouge to power in
calculations of each country's best interests. For our Cambodia. We will continue our strong endorsement
part, we continue to believe that a strong, secure, and of ASEAN's quest for a political solution and support
modernizing China is in our interest. Although our for the non-Communist elements of the Cambodian
economic, social, and political systems differ, we share resistance coalition. Under our initiative on regional
a common perception of the requirement for stability problems at the United Nations, we are prepared to
in the region and for resistance to expansionism. On playa constructive role in efforts to achieve a

31


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Cambodian settlement. In the context of a selliement foundation for creation of a third freely associated
involving the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese state and for closing our UN. trusteeship in the
troops, we are prepared to enter into normalization Pacific [slands. This act of self-determination promotes
talks with Vietnam. our belief in stability through democracy; and the

Compact of Free Association helps accomplish our

Despite our serious differences with Vietnam, through goal of preventing these Pacific states from becoming
bilateral discussions we have achieved progress in caught up in superpower rivalry.
accounting for our missing servicemen, and in release
of reeducation internees and Amerasians. We have Soviet interest in East Asia and the Pacific remains on
also seen a modest but welcome improvement in the upswing, however, as Moscow's increasingly
relations between laos and the United States. Our pri- skillful propagandists seek to erode the concept of
mary measure of Laotian sincerity in improving deterrence and promote seemingly benign
relations with the u.s. is accelerated efforts to account disarmament schemes. The United States and the
for our servicemen still missing. people of the region naturally seek a reduction of

tensions. But this should begin at the real points of

As Australia enters its bicentennial year, close bilateral tenSion-North Korea and Vietnamese-occupied
bonds and security relationships continue to be the Cambodia, for example. We will not be lured into
keystone of our policy in the region. But regrettably, proposals designed to weaken relations with our allies
New Zealand has now written into law the policies or unilaterally impair our ability to protect U.S.
that caused us to suspend our ANZUS Treaty interests in East Asia and the Pacific region.
obligations to Wellington. This has dimmed the pros-
pect of New Zealand's resuming its place in the
Alliance.

The South Pacific more broadly is passing through a _STRATEGY FOR AFRICA_
generational change and the stresses of economic and
demographic shifts. The island nations of the South The diversity of Africa embodies a broad range of
Pacific have joined the legion of commodity-exporting national security interests and presents numerous
countries whose efforts to develop a stable economic challenges far the United States. We maintain military
base have been undermined by persistently low world ?('~ess or U.s. facilities in several countries in support
commodity prices. At the same time, the positive of our strategic interests in the region and beyond
effects of improved health care have produced rapid (such as in Southvvest Asia and the Persian Gulf).
increases in population. Memories of U.s. cooperation Africa is an important source of strategic minerals and
with the islanders during World War [I are ,~;mming. a potential growth market for U.s. exports. Its shores
Resource constraints have prevented I;: from assisting adjoin some of the most important international sea
as much as we would wish, but we expect Congress lanes. It represents a significant voting group in the
to approve expeditiously authorization for $10 million United Nations and other international organizations.
annually over the 5-year life of the new fisheries treaty
with the region's islands states. This should help offset A number of domestic and external pressures pose
some of the irritants that have troubled our traditional threats to our interests in African security. The Soviet
good relations in the region and have invited Soviet Union and its surrogates have made the Horn of
probes. Africa an arena for East-West competition. They have

sustained a costly civil war in Angola which has

In Fiji this past year, we have sorrowfully witnessed a shattered the country's economy and seriously
prolonged struggle within that nation's ethnic degraded the quality of life for innocent civilians. The
communities over their future. We remain committed Soviet Union has viewed southern Africa as an
to encouraging a broadly based resolution of Fiji's opportune area for its expansionist policies. And it has
political troubles. been the preeminent military supplier for Libya's

Muammar Qaddhafi, whose southward aggression

The decision of the people of Palau last year to threatens Chad and other sub-Saharan African
accede to the Compact of Free Association lays the countries. Apartheid will not only continue to breed
32


-----

conflict within South A rica, but is a primary cause of as Somalia, and to countries facilitating access in
instability in all of southern Africa. support of our strategies in Southwest Asia and the

Persian Gulf.

Perhaps as in no other region, economic concerns are
closely interrelated with olitical stability in Africa. u.s. military training programs are an invaluable
After more than two decades of misguided statist instrument for promoting professionalism and respect
policies which produced economic deterioration, for human rights. The exposure to Western values that
many African countries are now recognizing that comes from such programs may foster a respect for
market-orien ed economic reform is critical for the United States and democratic institutions among
renewed growth and development. Pu lie reaction to individuals who playa key role in determining the
the stringent reforms which are now needed will pose level of freedom and stabi lity in African countries.
another kind of threat to political stability, at least in Many of these programs also contribute to economic
the near term. Moreov r; Africa's heavy debt burden

security. The African Coastal Security Program, for

has stymied he abilities of governments to move

example, provides training to West African countries to

beyond economic reform to economic growth.

enable them to protect their coastal fish stocks from
unauthorized foreign fishing fleets.

An effective U.S. strategy toward Africa integrates
political, military, and economic elements. We must

The U.s. assistance program in South Africa for

continue to sustain relationship with our military

victims of apartheid, enacted into law by Congress,

partn rs and support regimes threatened by Soviet and

helps prepare disenfran hised citizens for participation

Libyan aspirations. We will work for national

in constitutional democracy and a free enterprise

reconciliation and the peaceful resolution of conflicts

economy in post-apartheid South Africa. Our new

in Angola, Namibia, and elsewhere. We will continue

program for regional trade and transport development

to promote peaceful progress toward non-racial

in the southern African states furthers our mutual

representative democracy in South Africa, and peace

political interests and enables these countries to

between South Africa and its neighbors. We support

develop alternatives to total dependence on South

regional economic cooperation among the countries

Africa.

of southern Africa and will assist collaborative efforts
to achieve economic development. e must

As African countries struggle to liberalize and expand

encourage governments to stay the politically risky

their economies, market economics are on trial. Our

course of e onomic reform.

challenge is to be able to provide enough resources to
permit new economic policies to bear fruit and

In a region as underdeveloped as Africa, which has

enable African countries to become fully integrated

relatively little access to private sources of capital, our

into the existing world trading and financial system. A

ability to achieve our objectives depends in very

promising start has been made with the President's

significant measure on effective economic and security

Initiative to End Hunger in Africa, the African

assistance programs. Too often security assistance is
portrayed as a tradeoff against support for Economic Policy Reform Program, the Baker Plan
development. In Africa, this distinction is particularly providing assistance on debt, and the Food for
ill-founded. Our security assistance programs promote Progress program. We must ensure that our assistance
a stable political and economic environment that programs and those of other donor countries and
permits the exercise of individual choice and the institutions give impetus to further progress.
development of human talent. Without that
environment, sustained development is not possible. As part of that effort, we will continue to work with

our Western and Japanese partners to find creative

u.s. military assistance programs in Africa have always solutions to the debt problem of countries
been modest, but recently funding has been almost implementing reforms. Our budgetary restrictions limit
eliminated by Congress. It is in our national interest to what we can do directly, but much is at stake. Al-
provide a reasonable level of support to moderate, though the aggregate debt is sma II com pared to that
friendly countries such as Kenya and zaire, to regimes of Latin America, it has prevented the growth benefits
on the front lines of Soviet-supported aggression such of economic reform from being realized.

**33**


-----

_STRATEGY FOR LOW_ intensity conflictsimportant U.s. national security interests. Many low have no direct relevance to those

interests, while others may affect them in the most

_INTENSITY CONFLICT_

fundamental ways. When a U.s. response is called for,

While high intensity conflict has been successfully _vve take care to ensure that it is developed in_
deterred in most regions of primary strategic interest accordance with the principles of international and
10 the United States, low intensity conflicts continue domestic law, which affirm the inherent right of states
to pose a variety of threats to the achievement of to use force in individual or collective self-defense
important U.s. objectives. As described in last year's against armed anack; and to assist one another in
report, tOYl intensity conflict typically manifests itself maintaining internal order against insurgency,
as political-military confrontation below the level of terrorism, illicit narcotics traffic, and other
conventional war, frequently involving protracted characteristic forms of low intensity conflict.
struggles of competing principles and ideologies, and
ranging from subversion to the direct use of military Consistent with our strategies for dealing with low
force. These conflicts, generally in the Third World, intensity conflict, when it is in u.s. interest to do so,
can have both regional and global implications for our the United States will:
national security interests. For example:

-  Work to ameliorate the underlying causes of

-  Military basing. access and transit rights in the conflict in the Third World by promoting economic
Philippines, key to u.s. power projection development and the growth of democratic political
capabilities in the Western Pacific and Indian institutions.
Oceans, are presently threatened by the communist
insurgency being waged against the Philippine

-  Support selected resistance movements opposing

Government.

oppressive regimes working against U.s. interests.
Such support will be coordinated with friends and

-  In mineral-rich southern Africa, insurgencies,

allies.

economic instability and apartheid, as well as
ethnic tribal conflicts, pose potential threats to the

-  Take measures to strengthen friendly nations facing

extraction of essential raw materials and their export

internal or external threats to their independence

to industries in the West and Japan. The conflicts

and stability by employing appropriate instruments

endemic to the region are exacerbated by the

of U.s. power. Where possible, action will be taken

activity of the Soviet Union and its surrogates.

early~before instability leads to widespread
violence; and emphasis will be placed on those

-  Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan support for

measures which strengthen the threatened regime's

insurgencies in El Salvador and else-.vhere in latin

long-term capability to deal with threats to its

America threaten nascent democracies in the region

freedom and stability.

which are already struggling with chronic poverty,
economic underdevelopment, and the growing

-  Take steps to discourage Soviet and other state-

influence of narcotics cartels.

sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs to

-  libya has used the threat of restricting or denying those who use proxies or terrorist and subversive
oil shipments to blunt West European response to forces to exploit instability.
state-sponsored terrorism, while Simultaneously
training terrorists on libyan soil. Freedom of action -  Assist other countries in the interdiction and
for some U.s. allies can be limited by economic eradication of illicit narcotics production and traffic.
ties. Measures which have proven particularly effective

include aid to expand and improve the affected

Our strategies for dealing with low intensity conflict country's law enforcement capabilities, to preserve
recognize that U.S. responses in such situations must the independence and integrity of its judicial
be realistic, often discreet, and founded on a clear system, and to provide for the sharing of
relationship bet\veen the conflict's outcome and intelligence and investigative capabilities.
34


-----

Our own military forces have demonstrated low intensity conflicts. But in the final analysis, the
capabilities to engage in low intensity conflict, and roo Is we have at our disposal are of little use without
these capabilities have improved substantially in the the support of the American people, and their
last several years. But the most appropriate application willingness to stay the course in what can be
of u.s. military power is usually indirect through protracted struggles. We cannot prevail if there is a
security assistance-training, advisory help, logistics sharp asymmetry of wills-if our adversaries'
support, and the supply of essential military determination is greater than our own. At the same
equipment. Recipients of such assistance bear the pri- time we do hold important advantages. We represent a
mary responsibility for promoting their own security model of political and economic development that
interests with the U.s. aid provided. Our program of promises freedom from political oppression and
assistance to EI Salvador illustrates a successful economic privation. If we can protect our own
indirect application of U.S. military power. security, and maintain an environment of reasonable

stability and open trade and communication

The balanced application of the various elements of throughout the Third World, political, economic, and
national power is necessary to protect U.s. interests in social forces should eventually work to our advantage.

,

35


-----

~
**xecuting the St ategy**

The legislation requiring this annual report wisely communicate our values and principles throughout
emphasized the importance of discussing not only the world. These programs convert our regional
what our strategy is, but how well it is supported, and strategies into positive, visible actions which provide
whether any significant impediments to its execution assistance to people facing severe economic privation,
exist. In a sense, this portion of the report is the most and promote the economic and political development
important, for it brings into focus the fundamental so important to help struggling societies evolve in
issue of whether ou r strategy and resources are in bal- constructive ways. They also help governments seeking
ance; and, if they are not, whether we should resolve to defend themselves from internal and external
the imbalance by changing the strategy, by supporting

threats. By helping our friends enhance their security,

it more effectively, or by consciously accepting a

we aid in creating the necessary preconditions for

higher level of risk to our national security interests.

economic and political development. In short, our
foreign assistance programs support the types of

The following paragraphs will discuss u.s. capabilities

positive change that will protect our national interests

to execute the ational Security Strategy presented in

over the long-term.

precedi ng chapters, with particular attention to those
areas where resource shortfalls adversely affect our

We currently spend less than two percent of our

ability to execute the strategy in efficient and effective

annual federal budget on foreign assistance. This is

ways.

indisputably money well spent. The good we do, the
problems we help solve, and the threats we counter

**_RESOURCE SUPPORT_** through our assistance programs far outweigh the

costs. They represent a highly leveraged investment,
with large payoffs for relatively small outlays.

The successfu I execution of any strategy depends

Nevertheless, our foreign assistance programs do not

upon the avai labi Iity of adequate resources. This

receive the support they deserve from the Congress or

means that we must not adopt strategies that our

from the American people. In the last few years, the

country cannot afford; and our diplomats and military

Admi nistration's foreign assistance budget requests

leaders must not base their plans on resources that are

have been severely cut by the Congress. Although all

beyond the nation's capability to provide. It also
means that Congress, operating from a shared view of programs must bear the burden of reducing the
u.s. national security interests and objectives, must budget deficit, the cuts in foreign assistance have often
provide the Executive with the resources necessary to been grossly disproportionate. While the federal
implement a realistic, prudent, and effective National budget has been growing overall, foreign assistance
Security Strategy. Recelltly, however, the Congressional was reduced by 29 percent in FY86, an additional 11
response has been inadequate. percent in FY87, and faces another reduction in FY88.

The security assistance account now falls significantly

For example, U.S. foreign assistance, including a below the level needed to maintain, with no
balanced mix of military and economic assistance, expansion, programs critical to our national security
promotes important national interests and helps interests.

**37**


-----

The problem of inadequate funding for foreign could degenerate into crises adversely affecting U.s.
assistance is compounded by Congressionally interests. Unless we are willing to be an active
mandated earmarks and restrictions that take an ever participant in promoting the type of world order we
larger piece of a shrinking pie. In recent years, desire, we may find ourselves compelled to defend
Congressional action has earmarked as much as 90 our interests with more direct, costly, and painful
percent of certain foreign assistance accounts to means. Congressional action to shore up support for
specific countries. These and other restrictions force this weakened link in our capability for strategy
us to conduct foreign policy with our hands tied. vVe execution should receive high priority attention.
are losing the ability to allocate resources according
to our strategic priorities, and we have virtually no Adequate and sustained resource support is also
leeway to respond to emergencies with reallocations needed for our defense programs. Providing for the
of funds. The effects of earmarking on the developing common defense is the most important responsibility
countries is particularly damaging. These smaller of the federal government-shared equally by the
programs bear a disproportionate share of the burden Executive and Legislative branches. Partnership is the
when funds earmarked for large programs are key to its successful execution. In that spirit, in the
maintained at a constant level while the overall early 1980s-for the third time since World War 11-
assistance program is cut. Congress and the Executive joined in a concerted

effort to rebuild and strengthen our military

The adverse effects of funding cuts are not limited to capabilities. It was clear at that time that only an
our foreign development and security assistance increase in defense investment would produce the
programs. To properly coordinate these instruments necessary sustained impact on the military balance,
and to carry out our policies, we rely on our and redress the serious disparities between U.S. and
diplomatic missions abroad. No foreign policy, no Soviet capabilities which had emerged during the
matter how conceptually brilliant, can succeed unless 1970s-a period of unprecedented military investment
it is based on accurate information about, and correct by the Soviets aimed at shifting the global "correlation
interpretation of, the developments in countries we are of forces" in a decisive and irreversible way.
attempting to influence. We need to be able to Fortunately, the Congress and the American people
persuade others that our goals are worth supporting recognized the criticality of rebuilding the country's
and that our means are appropriate. The essential defenses, and we made impressive progress. Having
tasks of information, analysis and communication are arrested the adverse trend, however, the challenge
the primary responsibility of our embassies and then became not to lose the momentum gained-
consulates. always a difficult task in a democracy. Unfortunately,

we have not done as well in that regard.

Funds available for operating the Department of State
and our embassies and consulates overseas have been When I submitted the FY88 Budget a year ago, r did
cut to an unprecedented point. What that means in not ask the Congress to approve Defense funding
real terms is fewer people to work on formulating and increases of the magnitude that characterized those of
implementing the nation's foreign policy at all levels. It the early 1980s. At the same time, I did emphasize
means fewer diplomatic and consular posts-posts that Congress must act positively to protect the gains
which are the eyes and ears of the U.s. Government that we together had achieved. In particular, I stressed
abroad. It means not providing the country with the that we must not continue on the path of decline in
level of services, reporting, analysis, or the real defense spending established during the
representation and protection of global U.s. interests preceding two years. With lack of perspective, we had
that we have come to expect. begun a process of reversing the improvements in the

U.S.-Soviet balance achieved during the early 1980s,

It cannot be stressed too strongly that our diplomatic Regrettably, this process continued with the legislative
establishment and our foreign assistance programs are action on the FY88 budget.
an essential part of our political and economic
elements of power. We cannot support our National While the Defense figures coming out of the "budget
Security Strategy without them. They work to resolve summit" were significantly less damaging than would
tensions and ameliorate conflicts that, if ignored, have been the case had sequestration occurred, they

38


-----

continued the downward trend of the Defense Budget, those which promise real gains in military
in real terms, for the third year in a row. Soviet effectiveness; but we should be under no illUSions that
spending, on the other hand, maintained its historical there are quick fixes which can fundamentally reduce
pattern of real growth on the order of 3.5 percent our current military requirements.
annually during this period of U.s. decline. The
unfortunate consequence is that sometime in the In this regard, it is noteworthy that-pursuant to
future the American people will again be asked to recommendations of the 1986 Blue Ribbon Panel on
support defense capabilities for which they thought Defense Management-the Joint Chiefs of Staff over
they had once paid. In the meantime, the inefficient the past year have conducted a global net assessment
procurement rates associated with instability and of U.S. and Soviet capabilities and reviewed the
reduced budgetary resources exacerbate the impact of national military strategy to examine whether
the Defense Budget cuts. alternative approaches could improve our overall

military capability at a given budget level. They

The FY88 cuts, coming on top of two prior years of concluded that none of the particular alternatives ex-
decline, have confronted us with a situation in which

amined was as effective as the capabilities generated

we must now either reduce the readiness of our

under current plans and strategy.

forces, or lower investment and eliminate force
structure in order to allow our remaining military units

That is not surprising, given the fact that our military

to function at an acceptable level of combat

strategy and supporting force structure are based on

capability. Either way, risk will grow, and deterrence

certain fundamental conditions which change slowly,

will be reduced.

if at all. These include the immutables of geography;
the division of labor entailed in our alliance

The strategic implication of this continuing decline is

relationships; our advantage in certain advanced

that u.s. forces will confront additional risk in regions

technologies; the large capital investment we have in

where the potential exists fOf high-intensity conflict,

existing forces; and the evolution of the threat. We

and particularly in their ability to conduct high-

will continue to review our military strategy to

intensity operations in more than one theater

revalidate and update its essential elements. But in our

simultaneously. In global conflict this could require us

deliberations we need to distinguish between soundly

to forego opportunities to bring the conflict to early

analyzed recommendations for improvements in U.S.

termination by exerting military pressures on the

or allied strategy-which can be helpful-and those

Soviets from several directions. It increases the

that simply call for a strategy which costs less, without

likelihood that force limitations will require us to

regard to the range of security interests it can assure.

conduct sequential operations in successive theaters,
with the risk and uncertainty which that approach

Another way sometimes suggested to compensate for

entails.

reduced resource levels is to scale back U.S.

Some will argue that the cuts do not really injure our commitments. But commitments are not an end in
defense capability; that with greater imagination and a themselves; they are simply ways of protecting U.s.
willingness to innovate, we can do more with less in interests and achieving the objectives of our National
the defense area. In this viev.-, more thoughtful military Security Strategy.
strategy, improved tactics, or changed emphasis in
force structure, can compensate for reduced resource While details of those interests and objectives may
levels. In fact, our commanders work continuously to vary over time, as noted in the first chapter of this re-
find better ways to use the forces we have. With our port their core elements have changed little since the
allies, we constantly strive to improve force 1950s. No one seriously advocates abrogation of our
effectiveness, to capitalize on Soviet vulnerabilities, treaty relationships with the NATO nations, Japan, the
and to employ competitive strategies which exploit Philippines, Thailand, Australia, or our Hemispheric
our technological, geographic or other advantages to neighbors. Nor do responsible voices argue against
stress the Soviets' system and require them to make our strategic relationship with Israel, our friendly ties
disadvantageous investments. We seek out new ideas with Egypt, or our cooperative relations with other
on military strategy and force employment, and adopt moderate Arab states. The regional strategy sections of

39


-----

this report illustrate how our diplomatic, economic, seem large only because the spending of the late
and milital)' relationships with these and other key 1970s, which averaged less than 5 percent of GNP,
countries interact to support fundamental U.s. interests was so severely depressed. The resources needed to
and objectives. While there may be room for support our national strategy, at a prudent level of
adjustments at the margin in our contributions to risk, are within our ability to pay. failure to provide
regional security, none of our current commitments these resources simply defers to future budgets the
are plausible candidates for major reduction, given the task of regaining lost ground, while increasing risks to
scope of our global interests, the threats to those our security in the near-term.
interests, and the increasingly interdependent nature of
free world political, economic, and security
relationships. Both Congress and the Executive Branch
should continue to review our commitments _BIPARTISAN COOPERATION_
worldwide, but I see no prudent way to reduce those
commitments while remaining true to our values, The continued development and successful execution
maintaining essential and mutually beneficial alliance of U.s. National Security Strategy is a major
relationships, and safeguarding our future. responsibility of the Executive Branch. But, as the

foregoing discussion has emphasized, we cannot

This does not imply that the United States is accomplish this alone. Supporting a security strategy
necessarily satisfied with the contributions which our that provides a sound vision for the future and a
allies and friends make to the common defense in realistic guide to action must be a cooperative
those regions where we have major milital)' endeavor of the Administration and the Congress.
commitments. In Europe in particular, our NATO allies
can and should do more to enhance Alliance In this regard, I believe both branches need to review
conventional defense capabilities. We will continue to their constitutional roles and the relationship between
press them for more appropriate levels of defense them in the national security area. There are
investment and improved efficiency in the use of important powers here; some that are best shared,
Alliance resources, while rejecting the self-defeating some that are Presidential responsibilities. After seven
argument that the failure of some allies to meet years in office, I am convinced that the numerous
agreed goals should prompt us to reduce our own consultative arrangements established between the two
contribution to Alliance capabilities. We are in Europe branches in areas such as arms negotiations,
because it is in our interest to be there; and, within intelligence, and milital)' contingency operations
the limits of Congressional funding, we will continue generally represent the best way to coordinate our
to contribute those forces which we believe are views and resolve our differences. We should continue
essential to the support of our national security to look for ways to improve these arrangements; but
interests and objectives. At the same time we expect they are far superior to more rigid structural
our allies to show an equal interest in the common alternatives that, in response to a specific set of
defense, and to recognize the need to take on an circumstances, would attempt to define in law the
increasing share of the burden as we work together to precise constitutional boundaries of Executive and
improve NATO's conventional defense capability and Legislative authority which the founding fathers
the plans for employing it. purposely left in broad terms.

Finally, I should note that the defense program Equally detrimental is the increasing tendency of the
required to support our strategy is eminently Congress to act in a directive manner with regard to
affordable. In fact, in the past seven years, Americans details of foreign, defense, and arms control policy,
_have devoted an average of only 6.1 percent of gross_ limiting the flexibility of the Executive Branch by
national product (GNP) to national defense-well enacting into law positions on which the President
under rates in the 1950s and 1960s, which averaged should be allowed reasonable discretion. This trend
about 10 percent. Similarly, at about 28 percent of diminishes our ability to conduct rational and
federal outlays, defense spending falls \'o/€II belO\\I the coherent policies on the world scene; reduces our
peacetime average of 41 percent during the postwar leverage in critical negotiations; and impedes the
era. In both instances, the increases of the early 1980s integrated use of U.s. power to achieve important
40


-----

national security objectives. It causes others to view limitations, in order to support our national security
us as unreliable, and diminishes our influence and international affairs programs more efficiently and
generally. effectively. While some progress has been made,

particularly with the recent adoption by the Congress

In addition, I would suggest that the Congress of a partial two-year defense authorization bi II, much
reconsider how it can best organize itself for fulfiling more can and should be done. In this regard, it is
its Constitutional role. Over the past twenty years, important to recall the conclusion of the Blue Ribbon
power and authority have effectively drifted away from Commission on Defense Management that, in the
experienced leadership and committee chairmen, and future, significant efficiencies in the defense budget
toward individual members and special interest are more likely to be achieved through greater
coalitions. From a Congressional perspective, Cabinet program stability than through specific management
Secretaries and White House advisers may present di- improvements by the Department of Defense.
verse points of view while policy is in the formative
state; but the President speaks with authority once Above all, we must both work harder to rebu iId a
policy decisions are made. The President, however, bipartisan public consensus on our National Security
faces a far different situation in dealing with Congress. Strategy and the resources needed to execute it. The
In approaching the Congress as a partne.r in the fundamental policies and strategies we have pursued
formulation of national security policy, the President are similar to, and consistent with, those pursued by
must have confidence that the Legislative branch previous generations of American leaders. Renewed
leadership is capable of implementing any consensus consensus will be forged on the anvil of public
that is reached, without being second-guessed or debate-among responsible officials in government,
undercut by autonomous members or interest groups. between the Congress and the Executive, in

consultations with our allies and friends, and among

This suggests the need for other legislative reforms. I the larger community of interested and concerned
have often emphasized that restoring and maintaining American citizens. We look forward to that debate and
an adequate military balance, and fulfilling our to working with the Congress to achieve increased
international obligations, requires a long view and understanding of, and broad support for, our ational
fiscal stability. This is not accomplished in a repetitive Security Strategy. There can be no endeavor more
and topsy-turvy annual budget cycle. We must face important for the long-term well-being of the
squarely the need for multi-year authorizations and American people; and I solicit the Congress' closest
appropriations, consistent with constitutional collaboration in achieving it.

**41**


-----

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_Africa_ ew Guinea Isla!

Angola '"1 Mlawl Comoros

Zambla,...,A.

-.......- -r,;::abwe Mozambique
amob a _I_ Madagascar _Ind'80_

r'80I$W.?..../

_Dc_ _an_

_U_

"-.,..JSoulh

Africa elOtho

CAR. -Centra' Afflcan Republic
F.R.G. -  Federal Republic of Germ.ny
G.D.R. -German Democrallc Republic
P.D.R.Y. -People's Democratic Republic 01 Yemen
U.A.E. -UnIted Arab EmITatos
Y.A.R. -  Yemen Arab Republic

Th~ Ul'llied Stales Go.... rnm.nl ha. nOl recogfllZed
tn - •/'lCC'PO/UIO" of Eston~. l'l~la lind l.thu.,t"I.I
,nlO lhl!' SO""fl UnlOll SOU"d.lt"f lept.S• .nl~ll()n
I" 1\01 n.Ii:.....flly .lufhcfll,atnl'

# I


-----

_ArctIc_ _Ocean_

Soviet Union

u. S. S. R.

Mongolia

rkey

s. 'KOrea _North_

SYlliJ China

Iraq Iran Afghanistan J a pan _Pacl!_ C

JorOIlll"

Pakistan _Ocean_

Bill".,"

Q.tlllr

Saudi Arabia U.A.E.

Oman India .' "Hong Kong IU K I

ac.au
(Perl,

'("'4.R. _Middle East-_

UI Villi...... ' P O.I:t,Y.

l$l'l'l'I'ItII"" _South Asia_ Philippines

()~bouil

S,I
L..an1l.a

Somalia Bruntl

_East Asia-Pacific_

Malaysia Fedetlted 5tl!lles ot MICfOrU:l5Ja

_·s_ ."

I<IlIbaU

Solomon

SiIt-',ICl'l.lllos Islands

~ Cornaf01i

I~,.mbique Vant.l.eh.. "1

Madagascar _I nd I_ Tonga

_Ocean_

nca.n Re pu bile New

,public 01 Ge,many Zealand

emoc'atic Republic

)emocrallc Repubhc of Yemen
lb Emnates

b Republic

I ~.!I; 1101 rKogn'll!lld

Inoll ",nd I.IIPlv..nloll

J r.,,'.silnllihofl


-----