# NATIONAL ## SECURITY ### STRATEGY **OFTHE** **UNITED STATES** **THE WHITE HOUSE** JANUARY 1987 , _LLh-:CcJ_ S-t)... ·~l-'-.,- _\)iC',r_ _[l],(";,-!_ (1 q?, I.· :q'r.; '-7 _QC(?{(C'_ '} "Freedom, peace and prosperity ... that's what America is all about. .. for ourselves, our friends, and those people across the globe struggling for democracy~' ----- **Contents** **I. An American Perspective ••. 1** **IV. U.S. Defense Policy ... 19** _INTRODUCTION .. . 19_ **II. Fundamentals of U.S. National** _TAKING ADVANTAGE OF U.S. STRENGTHS AND_ **Security Strategy** **... 3** _SOVIET WEAKNESSES . .. 20_ _MAINTENANCE OF A STRATEGIC DETERRENT. .. 21_ _u.s. SECURITY IN A COMPLEX AND CHANGING_ _WORLD ... 3_ _ARMS CONTROL . .. 23_ _U.S. INTERESTS ... 4_ _MAINTENANCE OF A CONVENTIONAL_ _DETERRENT . .. 26_ _MAJOR OBJECTIVES IN SUPPORT OF u.s._ _INTERESTS . .. 4_ _SPACE SUPPORT OF NATIONAL SECURITY . .. 31_ _PRINCIPAL THREATS TO u.s. INTERESTS ... 6_ _INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF NATIONAL_ _SECURITY_ _... 31_ **III. U.S. Foreign Policy** **... 9** _LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT . .. 32_ _CONTINUITY OF BASIC GOALS .• . 9_ _INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY_ 9 **V. Executing the Strategy** **... 35** _INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY_ _11_ _FOREIGN POLICY CAPABILITIES . .. 35_ _POLITICAL AND INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS OF_ _DEFENSE CAPABILITIES . .. 36_ _NATIONAL POWER_ 13 _INTEGRATING NATIONAL SE(URITY_ _REGIONAL POLICIES_ 13 _CAPABILITIES . . . 40_ Western Hemisphere .•. 13 Western Europe ... 14 **VI. Looking Forward to the** East Asia and Pacific ... 15 **1990's** **... 41** Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ... 16 Middle East and South Asia ... 17 Africa ... 18 **iii** ----- **I. An American Perspective** not acted alone. During that war and in the succeeding In the early days of this Administration we laid the four decades, our strategy has been based on foundation for a more constructive and positive partnership with those nations that share our common American role in world affairs by clarifying the goals. essential elements of U.S. foreign and defense policy. As the world has changed over the years, the Over the intervening years, we have looked objectively differences between nations striving to develop at our policies and performance on the world scene to democratic institutions and those following the ensure they reflect the dynamics of a complex and totalitarian banner have come into sharp focus. As ever-changing world. Where course adjustments have future changes take place in human rights, advanced been required, I have directed changes. But we have technology, quality of life, and the global economy, our not veered and will not veer from the broad aims that example will continue to exert tremendous influence guide America's leadership role in today's world: . on mankind. The United States is on the right side of this historic struggle and we have tried to build a - Commitment to the goals of world freedom, peace lasting framework for promoting this positive change. and prosperity; This National Security Strategy Report builds on the - Strong and close relationships with our Alliance efforts of the Administration, Congress, and the partners around the world; American people over the past six years. But any - Active assistance to those who are struggling for strategy document is only a guide. To be effective, it their own self-determination, freedom, and a must be firmly rooted in broad national interests and reasonable standard of living and development; objectives, supported by an adequate commitment of resources, and integrate all relevant facets of national - Willingness to be realistic about the Soviet Union, power to achieve our national objectives. It must to define publicly the crucial moral distinctions provide a framework within which more specific and between totalitarianism and democracy; and detailed objectives can be identified by those executive branch agencies charged with stewardship over various - Seeking meaningful ways of working with the elements of the nation's power. And it must guide the Soviet leaders to prevent war and make the world a creation of specific plans for attainment of those more more peaceful place. detailed objectives. The foundation of a sound National Security Strategy, For this reason, the annual presentations to the laid in the early days of this Administration, has held Congress by the Secretary of State and Secretary of firm and served us well. Our economic, political and Defense playa key role in supporting the objectives military power is resurgent. The Western democracies outlined in this report. In their respective areas of are revitalized, and across the world nations are turning Foreign and Defense Policy, they develop detailed to democratic ideas and the principles of the free plans of action to sustain our National Strategy, market. In all of this, the United States continues to advance U.S. interests and most importantly, reduce the encourage those who seek the benefits of our risk to our nation and our allies. democratic way of life. What follows is this Administration's effort to articulate the National Security Strategy of the United States-a While the United States has been the leader of the free blueprint for future freedom, peace, and prosperity. world since the end of the Second World War, we have 1 ----- **II. Fundamentals of** **National** #### u.s. **Security Strategy** _u.s. SECURITY IN A_ Western Europe·and Japan.leadership in establishing and managing It also required the U.S. international monetary system, and encouraging _COMPLEX AND_ _CHANGING WORLD_ regional and global free-trade agreements. The third element, U.s. policy toward the Third World, included both economic and security assistance. It also In the years following World War II, the United States had a profound political component: decolonization, faced, for the first time, an inescapable responsibility self-determination, and support for the evolution toward for world affairs. No longer protected by nearly perfect democracy. The Soviet Union opposed us in the Third fortresses of oceans, allied with countries devastated by World with a policy of "wars of national liberation;' war, and presented with irrefutable evidence of Soviet through which they sought to exploit the instability of expansionist aspirations, the United States shouldered emerging nations to establish Marxist-Leninist regimes the dual burden of facilitating the restoration of a world based on the Soviet model. economic order and arresting the spread of the Soviet Union's peculiar brand of totalitarianism and The three postwar decades witnessed important **communism.** successes for our National Strategy. World war was avoided. Europe and Japan regained their prosperity, The United States responded to the threats posed by with the help of massive U.s. assistance, and most of Moscow with a policy of containment. Containment, as the Third World was decolonized. Containment, a strategy for world peace, entailed three distinct however, was an expensive policy. But because the elements. United States had the lion's share of the developed world's economic power, we could carry the burden. The first element, U.S. defense policy, involved forward deployment of military forces as necessary to deter and The postwar era came to an end during the 1970s. The contain Soviet military expansion. In practice, this causes of its demise were threefold. First, the success of meant keeping, for the first time in our history, large U.s. economic policies in Europe and East Asia military formations on the soil of allies in Western dramatically changed the distribution of wealth and Europe and East Asia. As Soviet nuclear weapons power within our alliance systems. The United States delivery systems grew, it also required a large strategic no longer had an overwhelming economic position vis- force, to augment the deterrence provided by the a-vis Western Europe and the East Asia rimland. And conventional forces of the United States and its allies. our success in deterring Soviet military aggression in Thus our military security system rested primarily on these two strategic zones created growing public belief two strategic zones, Europe and East Asia, backed by that direct Soviet aggression in these two regions had our nuclear deterrent forces. become less likely. The second element, u.s. international economic Second, the Soviet military buildup and the projection policy, involved economic recovery programs for of Soviet power into C~ba, Nicaragua, the Middle East, 3 ----- Southeast and Southwest Asia, and Africa required **_MAJOR OBJECTIVES_** changespolicy. Particularly significant was the Soviet Union's in strategy for implementing our containment **_IN SUPPORT OF_** attainment of strategic nuclear parity with the United **_U.s. INTERESTS_** States. U.s. national security objectives are statements of Third, the political awakening in the Third World broad goals which support and advance national created civil wars and regional conflicts that threatened interests. As such, they are not intended to be applied to draw the United States and the Soviet Union into mechanically or automatically, but constitute a general direct military confrontations. And economic guide for policy development in specific situations developments, particularly in the energy area, which call for the coordinated use of national power. contributed to political instability and caused destabilizing effects in the international monetary The principal objectives which support our national system. **interests are:** In such a significantly different world, the foundations 1. To maintain the security of our nation and our allies. of strategic planning had to be reconsidered. U.S. The United States, in cooperation with its allies, must military superiority in strategic forces no longer exists seek to deter any aggression that could threaten that and the continued growth of Soviet military capabilities security, and, should deterrence fail, must be prepared applicable to Europe, the Persian Gulf, and other to repel or defeat any military attack and end the important areas, pose a continuing threat to regional conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its security. interests, and its allies. Today it is more important than ever before that our Specifically: National Security Strategy be based on a solid o To deter hostile attack of the United States, its understanding of U.S. interests and objectives and a citizens, military forces, or allies and to defeat attack realistic approach to dealing with the Soviet Union and if deterrence fails. other threats to U.s. security. o To maintain the strength and vitality of u.s. alliance relationships. **_u.s. INTERESTS_** o To deal effectively with threats to the security of the United States and its citizens short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism. U.S. National Security Strategy reflects our national o To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. interests and presents a broad plan for achieving the o To reduce over the long term our reliance on nuclear national objectives that support those interests. The key weapons by strengthening our conventional forces, national interests which our strategy seeks to assure pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control and protect include: agreements, and developing technologies for 1. The survival of the United States as a free and strategic defense. independent nation, with its fundamental values and o To assure unimpeded U.S. access to the oceans and institutions intact. space. o To prevent the domination of the Eurasian landmass 2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy. by the USSR (or any other hostile power, or 3. The growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and coalition of powers). free market economies throughout the world, linked o To force the Soviet Union to bear the brunt of its by a fair and open international trading system. domestic economic shortcomings in order to discourage excessive Soviet military expenditures 4. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to and global adventurism. U.s. interests. o To foster closer relations with the People's Republic 5. The health and vigor of U.S. alliance relationships. of China. 4 ----- 2. To respond to the challenges of the global economy. 4. To resolve peacefully disputes which affect U.S. Economic interdependence has brought tremendous interests in troubled regions of the world. Regional benefits to the United States, but also presents new conflicts which involve allies or friends of the United policy problems which must be resolved. Since our States may threaten U.S. interests, and freguently carry resource dependence has grown, the potential the risk of escalation to a wider conflict. Conflicts, or vulnerability of our supply lines is an issue of concern. attempts to subvert friendly governments, which are Although continuing U.s. economic growth is helping instigated or supported by the Soviets and their client states, represent a particularly serious threat to U.S. lift the world out of recession, economic slowdown continues in many countries. We must devote interests. attention to critical global problems, which if Specifically: unresolved or unattended, may affect U.S. interests in the future. Many of these problems such as Third o To maintain stable global and regional military World debt, the international narcotics trade, and balances vis-a-vis the USSR and states aligned with it. growing protectionism are currently having an impact o To aid threatened states in resisting Soviet or Soviet- on U.S. interests. sponsored subversion or aggression. o To eliminate, where possible, the root causes of Specifically: regional instabilities which create the risk of o To promote a strong, prosperous and competitive major war. U.s. economy, in the context of a stable and growing o To neutralize the efforts of the Soviet Union to world economy. increase its influence in the world and weaken the o To ensure U.S. access to foreign markets, and to links between the USSR and its client states in the ensure the United States and its allies and friends Third World. access to foreign energy and mineral resources. o To aid in combatting threats to the stability of o To promote a well-functioning international friendly governments and institutions from economic system with minimal distortions to trade insurgencies, state-sponsored terrorism and the and investment, stable currencies, and broadly international trafficking of illicit drugs. agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving differences. 5. To build effective and favorable relationships with all nations with whom there is a basis of shared concern. 3. To defend and advance the cause of democracy, In the world today, there are over 150 nations. Not one freedom, and human rights throughout the world. A of them is the equal of the United States in total power foreign policy that ignored the fate of millions around or wealth, but each is sovereign, and most, if not all, the world who seek freedom would be a betrayal of touch U.s. interests directly or indirectly. our national heritage. Our own freedom, and that of our allies, could never be secure in a world where Specifically: freedom was threatened everywhere else. o To support the formation of associations of states friendly to U.S. interests using the full range of Specifically: diplomatic, political, economic, and informational o To promote the growth of national independence efforts. and free institutions throughout the world. o To make major international institutions more o To encourage and support aid, trade, and effective in promoting peace, world order and investment programs that promote economic political, economic and social progress. development and the growth of free a·nd humane o To explore the possibility of improved relations with social and political orders in the Third World. those nations hostile to us in order to reduce the chance of future conflict. o To encourage liberalizing tendencies within the - To strengthen U.S. influence throughout the world. Soviet Union and its client states. 5 ----- Our National Security Strategy must be resolute in engaged in conduct in violation of international supporting U.S. interests and objectives. It must also agreements. take into account the many threats and instabilities of today's complex and changing world. The Soviets have undertaken an unprecedented military buildup that poses a continuing threat to the United States and our allies. The Soviet leadership clearly **_PRINCIPAL THREATS TO_** attaches the greatest importance to its military strength, which has been the most significant source of the **_U.s. INTERESTS_** USSR's influence on the international scene. For decades the Soviet Union has allocated a disproportionate percentage of national income to the The most significant threat to U.S. security and national buildup of its military forces. It now has a uniformed interests is the global challenge posed by the Soviet military of more than five million (excluding more than Union. While only a handful of people in the Politburo one million border guards and other security forces). It can claim with any confidence to know the Kremlin's is estimated that military expenditures currently absorb precise near-term, tactical plans, the long-term strategic 15-17 percent of the total Soviet GNP. direction of Soviet foreign policy is clearer. Motivated by the demands of a political system held together and dominated by Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviet military power permits Moscow to provide a political party which represents it, Moscow seeks to strong defense of the homeland while facilitating direct alter the existing international system and establish and indirect participation in regional conflicts beyond Soviet global hegemony. These long-range Soviet Soviet borders. Furthermore, Soviet military resources objectives constitute the overall conceptual framework increasingly are used to influence and broker the of Soviet foreign and defense policy. policies of other countries and to promote instability. Fundamental differences in economic, social, and The evidence of the relationship between the Soviet political beliefs and objectives lead to an essentially Union and the growth of worldwide terrorism is now adversarial relationship between the United States and conclusive. Even though the Soviet Union does not the Soviet Union. The two sides nevertheless share the have direct control over most of the terrorist groups, it common goal of avoiding direct confrontation and supplies massive amounts of arms, money, and reducing the threat of nuclear war. The real challenge advisory assistance to revolutionary forces engaged in for American statecraft is how best to realize this terrorist activities. The Soviets attempt to disguise such commonality of interests, so as to preserve peace, support by using middle men-radical governments without jeopardizing our national security or such as Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Syria, and abandoning our commitment 1:0 the cause of freedom Libya, which deal directly with radical terrorists and and justice. insurgents. Whether Moscow is providing support directly or indirectly, the ultimate targets of radical To execute its'expansionist policies, the USSR has terrorism are the United States, Western Europe, Japan, perpetuated a domestic political system of centralized and other moderate, proWestern governments. totalitarian control and mobili:zed and organized this system to support its international objectives. The Soviet Union in recent years has become much Internationally, the Soviets have continued to assist more sophisticated in wielding the instruments of groups waging so-called wars of "national liberation:, national power. Despite significant weaknesses in the sponsor with arms and militarv training international Soviet economy, the Politburo actively employs terrorist groups, promote and ,~xploit regional economic instruments in its global strategy. It uses instabilities and conduct an aggressive and illegal war trade with the West to obtain economic leverage, in Afghanistan. In numerous other places around the technology, and foreign exchange. The acquisition of globe, Soviet advisors and combat troops have also military-related advanced technology through legal and 6 ----- illegal means, is especially important to the Soviets, to While we remain properly concerned with the Soviet shorten weapon development times, reduce costs, and threat, we must not neglect other destabilizing to compensate for the weakness of the Soviet economy. international threats and problems which can seriously Acquisition of production technology is equally damage U.s. interests if not properly addressed. These important to the Soviets, to improve the efficiency of include non-communist nations with oppressive their defense industry. Access to Western manufacturing governments and ideologies opposed to ours; equipment, processes, and know-how has enabled international economic concerns of massive world Soviet defense plants to introduce some advanced debt, trade imbalances, and shifts in comparative weapons into production up to five years earlier than advantage in our interdependent global economic would have been otherwise possible. The Soviets also system; the global population explosion and related attempt to obtain long-term economic agreements food, water, and poverty problems; the proliferation of which build relationships of dependency on the USSR nuclear weapons; drug trafficking; and human rights (e.g., those relating to the supply of energy resources to violations, to name only a few. Western Europe). An additional, threat, which is particularly insidious in In addition, the Soviets have established a massive nature and growing in scope, is international political influence apparatus. This apparatus includes terrorism-a worldwide phenomenon that is becoming the world's largest propaganda machine, incorporating increasingly frequent, indiscriminate, and state- overt and clandestine activities in all types of media; supported. Terrorism is likely to be a prominent feature funding and 'support of foreign communist parties and of the international landscape for the remainder of this front organizations; political and ideological century. It directly attacks our democratic values, indoctrination of foreign students, government officials, undermines our diplomatic efforts for peaceful terrorists, and military personnel; and perceptions solutions to conflicts, and erodes the foundations of management of foreign visitors to the USSR. It includes civilized societies. Effectively countering terrorism is a separate efforts to conduct "active measures;' including major national security objective of the United States. disinformation, forgeries, the use of political agents of influence, and other deceptive operations. A solid understanding of our national interests and While the Soviets cannot be branded as instigators of objectives, against the backdrop of major threats to all revolutionary movements, their strategy clearly is to those interests, is essential to devising sound strategies. exploit domestic vulnerabilities in foreign countries to The next two chapters will discuss the principal promote the emergence of regimes under Soviet elements of our foreign and defense policies, and the influence or control. All this is accomplished under the ways in which they contribute to the achievement of rubric of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States national security objectives. The effective integration of and the West, defined as a continuing contest in which our foreign and defense policies provides the all forms of struggle are permissible short of all-out war. foundation for our National Security Strategy. 7 ----- **III. U.S. Foreign Policy** _CONTINUITY OF_ European democratic parties significantly aided the successful drives of democratic movements in _BASIC GOALS_ Spain and Portugal. Our foreign policy reflects the basic thrust of our We are interested in assisting constructive change National Security Strategy-the promotion of our which can lead to greater political stability, social democratic way of life. History has shown us justice, and economic progress. Change must come repeatedly that only in democracies is there inherent from within, following a path dictated by national and respect for individual liberties and rights. In the local traditions. 'In some instances, assistance and postwar world, democracies have also exhibited guidance is better provided by other democracies or extraordinary economic vitality. With their more multilaterally. Patience, respect for different cultures flexible economies, democracies have continued to and recognition of our own limitations must guide our demonstrate the efficiency and dynamism necessary to effort. maintain strength in a complex and difficult international economic environment. If we are to achieve the kind of world we all hope to _INSTRUMENTS OF_ see, democracy must continue to prosper and expand. _FOREIGN POLICY_ Today, in a number of countries in varying stages of economic development, democracy is growing The United States has an exceptionally diverse array of stronger. The United States must be a beacon for tools for protecting its international interests and for democracy. Unfortunately, many in the world are supporting the drive toward democracy across the prevented from seeing our beacon. For many more, it globe. It is possible that no other nation has ever been has been distorted; and still others, who are able to see comparably endowed. These instruments are normally it and are inspired by it, need help in the form of most effective when used in concert with others. All of practical assistance. them must be adapted to changing situations. The We have provided assistance before-in postwar resurgence of our national strength in this decade has Western Europe and Asia-and we must again. What been broadly based. It will endure into the next decade we helped achieve in those areas constitutes one of the only if we protect this base and ensure that the tools most remarkable, positive chapters of recent history. available to us are properly sustained and effectively Our support for democracy should not be hidden; it used. The separate, but interrelated tools on which the must be active and visible. Active support of success of our foreign policy depends are: democratic forces in the past two decades has demonstrated the value of this legitimate and important Moral and political example. American spirit and activity. The substantial support provided .by West prosperity represents a critical challenge to the 9 ----- ideology and the practical record of our adversaries: American assistance. Adherence to the principles of an free, pluralist societies work. This power of example open and fair world trading order ensures that represents a potent advantage of American society, but countries acquire the economic strength to stand on we should not leave its expression to chance. It is in their own feet, and contributes to our own well-being our interest to spread this message in an organized through mutually beneficial trade. Security w~. considerations Will sometimes require restrained trade and allied cooperation to prevent enhancing the Military strength and economic vitality. A strong U.S. military capabilities of our adversaries. military capability is essential to maintaining the stable, secure environment in which diplomacy can be Science and Technology Cooperation. For most effective and our adversaries are deterred. America's countries, access to advanced scientific and economic power sustains this strength and fortifies our technological resources is critical to prosperity and relations with the other countries that share our interest long-term economic growth. U.S. world leadership and in a free and open international order. vast resources in science and technology constitute important strategic assets to strengthen existing ties Alliance relationships. The pursuit of American goals with friends and allies, and promote positive depends on cooperation with like-minded international relationships with emerging nations. partners. This relationship enhances our strength and mitigates the understandable reluctance of the Private investment in developing economies. The free American people to shou Ider secu rity burdens alone. flow of international investment is as central to global The predictable difficulties that arise from time to time economic growth as an open trading order. U.S. private in all alliance relationships must be measured against investment in less developed countries contributes the enormous value that these ties bring us and our significantly to their economic growth and promotes friends. social stability. At a time when developing countries are striving to meet their debt-servicing obligations and Security assistance. By helping friends, allies, and the resources of our national budget are under those targeted by our adversaries acquire the means to pressure, the contribution of private-sector investment defend themselves, we limit the potential of our own assumes increased importance. involvement in dangerous conflicts. Security assistance abroad is productive investment in our own security. It Diplomatic mediation. In regions where conflict aids deterrence, promotes regional stability, helps to threatens our interests and those of our friends, ensure access to vital overseas military facilities, and political efforts are essential to ending Violence, lessens our own military requirements. Resolute use of promoting freedom and national self-determination, this valuable foreign policy tool directly promotes our and laying the foundations for future stability. The security interests. initiatives of American diplomacy take their strength Economic assistance. In the decades since World War II, from effective and integrated use of the other tools America has contributed nearly $200 billion to the already discussed, and from the ability of U.s. economic development of other countries. These representatives to act credibly as mediators of disputes. financial resources have played a vital role in ensuring Making clear the firmness of our commitments to critical U.S. objectives are met. A well structured friends and allies will, in fact, increase the incentives of economic assistance program provides essential their adversaries to negotiate seriously. support for our world leadership position. International Organizations. Multilateral diplomacy Trade policy. The impact of economic assistance is and participation in international organizations provide maximized when it is matched by a sound trade policy an opportunity to address common global problems that facilitates the best use of our assistance. Moreover, and share the task of solving them. Skillful U.s. a trade policy that aggravates the economic difficuIties diplomacy within these organizations has served to of others may only increase the need for future enhance our overall goals on issues such as **10** ----- peacekeeping, promotion of human rights, and It is important to understand why we stress private encouraging the development of free economic and enterprise as the basis of our international economic political systems. policy. This is one of the prime areas in which the United States-and the free world generally-differ in **Support for Freedom Fighters. The tools of foreign** all respects from the communist world. The Soviet policy must encompass the special needs of those who economic model is characterized by the ineffectiveness resist the Soviet-style regimes implanted in Third World of the centralized command economy, the failure of countries in the 1970's and 1980's. America has a long collective enterprises, and the inability to provide history of private and government support to groups adequate standards of living for the mass of Soviet seeking national independence and freedom. This is a citizens. The Soviet model of economic organization vital and important effort, as aggressive Marxist-leninist _does not work and will not work._ regimes clearly threaten international peace and stability. We seek to advance the cause of freedom and Under the leadership of General Secretary Gorbachev, democracy, and to demonstrate to the Soviets that their the Soviet Union has announced that it is attempting actions aimed at spreading Marxist-leninist fundamental reforms in the management of economic totalitarianism will bring them no enduring gain. policy. Recently, Gorbachev invited the Western private sector, and U.S. business leaders in particular, to **_INTERNATIONAL_** develop a long-term stakeeconomy. In light of this Soviet initiative, we need to in the future of the Soviet ask ourselves what kind of Soviet Union we wish to see **_ECONOMIC POLICY_** in the next twenty or thirty years. Clearly, we can affect The United States supports market-oriented policies the outcome only at the margin. But we should not that foster economic growth, both domestically and ignore new opportunities for increasing economic internationally. The economic growth of the United interaction between our two societies. Greater States is the cornerstone that ensures our strength and economic freedom for the Soviet people is in the permits human potential to flourish. Our policies of interest of the West as long as it does not foster greater economic growth have provided the underlying base of Soviet investment in military capability. support for the most important element in our National Security Strategy in the past six years-the revitalization But we must approach such interaction with a sense of of U.S. military power. The dynamic growth of the u.s. realism. There are some areas where it would clearly economy is the envy of much of the world. We are not serve constructive purposes. Soviet membership in now working in this country to rebuild American the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAD), for productivity, sustain our scientific and technological example, would not be in the best interests of the West leadership, make the most of our human potential, and at present. In addition to the danger of GAD move into the 21st century with an even more efficient, politicization, the USSR's state-direeted trading system capable and competitive American economy. Our is fundamentally incompatible with the free-market nation will achieve these goals with hard work, orientation of the GAD international trading system. determination, and a commitment to the revitalization Suggestions by Soviet officials about possible USSR of American industry. membership in the World Bank or International Monetary Fund should be treated with caution for The United States places reliance on private enterprise similar reasons. \/lie would oppose such membership and initiative. This philosophy leads to higher living under present circumstances. standards and concern for the economic advancement of the individual. Our National Security Strategy in the The USSR's effort to broaden its foreign economic international economic area seeks to support and relations forms an integral part of Soviet national promote market-oriented economic policies which will security strategy. In addition to aiding the Soviet maximize economic opportunity and individual economy, it is designed to exploit dependence of welfare. trading partners and enhance Soviet power and **11** ----- influence generally. Trade with the West can also We have encouraged market-based energy policies and provide access to advanced technology which more open energy trade within the International Energy facilitates the Soviet military buildup. Non-communist Agency. We have been the prime movers in laying the governments need to display greater discipline in groundwork for a new round of negotiations in the weaving security considerations into the fabric of East- GAIT that will open markets for our exports of goods West commercial relations. and services and stimulate greater growth, efficiency and worldwide job opportunities. We have forged Specifically: stronger ties with our Asian partners by emphasizing the future role of U.s.-Pacific economic relations. - As recognized in the Helsinki Accords, government- to-government cooperation in the economic sphere should be dependent on progress in other areas of The industrial nations of the West have become East-West relations, including Eastern observance of increasingly interdependent. None of these countries human rights. acting alone can effectively resolve long-term economic - COCOM controls on strategic technologies should problems. The United States and its allies must work be maintained, streamlined and enforced to restrain together if we, and the rest of the world, are to prosper the ability of the Soviet Union and its allies to match and grow. or overtake Western defense capabilities. - The International Energy Agency (lEA) should Enhancing world economic growth, opening markets, continue its efforts to reduce dependence among and ameliorating the developing country debt situation member countries on insecure energy supplies. are long-term goals that can be met only through sound economic policies, prudent lending, and direct Early in our Administration, we laid the international investment and aid strategies that will elicit the broad economic groundwork for greater cooperation with our economic development and growing markets needed to allies. We have attempted to foster the view that the sustain long-term prosperity. Significant contributions of future belongs to those who allow free enterprise to capital and know-how through aid, investment, guide economic decisions and not to those regimes technology transfer and training are as much an which allow bureaucratic functionaries to set the ingredient of regional peace and collective security as course of economic development. Throughout these six years, we have witnessed these principles move from are deterrent forces and defense alliances. This concept into reality. In France, economic liberalization redefinition of the traditional concept of is steadily progressing. In Japan, slowly but surely, trade "burdensharing" is in keeping with the capabilities of and capital markets are being opened. In Germany and the United States and our allies and the evolving the United Kingdom, new economic courses are being responsibilities of shared leadership. set to sustain growth with low inflation. In short, our international economic policy is built We believe that market-oriented policies are key to around the belief that economic freedom is not the greater growth in America and throughout the world sole possession of a chosen few, but the universal right over the long-term. We have worked diligently to resist of all people. We will use our economic power and protectionist tendencies both at home and abroad, since protectionism will harm all free nations. _ political will to preserve and nurture our vision of the Immediate as well as long term costs would more than world's economic future, which belongs to free people, offset any short-term benefits which might be gained. free governments and free economic enterprises. **12** ----- _POLITICAL AND_ deception and propaganda program, using a wide range of techniques aimed not only at the Third World, _INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS_ but also at our alliance partners. The current Soviet regime has increased the range and intensity of Soviet _OF NATIONAL POWER_ public diplomacy and propaganda efforts. We must actively counter Soviet propaganda and active We are faced with a profound challenge to our national measures using the full range of U.S. informational security in the political field. This challenge is to fight programs, the war of ideas and to help support the political Our political and informational strategy must also infrastructure of world democracies. To accomplish this reach to the peoples of denied areas, particularly the we must be as committed to the maintenance of our USSR and Eastern Europe-to encourage hope for political defense as we are to our military defense. change and to educate publics on the benefits of free institutions. This is achieved through the electronic Public opinion polls consistently find that two-thirds of media, written materials, and the increased contact and the American electorate normally take no interest in exchange of ideas that come from such contact. The foreign policy. Moreover, only a bare majority today process of gradual change will take place inside, but believes that this country needs to play an active part the stimulant and the vision of "how things could be" in world affairs-and that majority is eroding. There is must come from outside in a closed society. This is the no natural domestic constituency for foreign policy- vision of a nation which believes that a world of we must build one. democracies is a safer world, and one where the respect for the dignity of all men has a better chance to The instruments to implement such an approach be realized. include a number of traditional foreign policy agencies such as the Departments of State and Defense, Agency for International Development (AID), and u.s. _REGIONAL POLICIES_ Information Agency (USIA), plus several less traditional participants including the Departments of Commerce Western Hemisphere. The defense of North America is and Treasury, and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). the nation's most fundamental security concern. Since the Second World War this has entailed a hemispheric Another actor in the field of political, informational security system, composed of a strong u.s. nuclear and communications activity is the private sector. deterrent, greater cooperation with Canada, and the During the past six years, th'e private sector has been promotion of collective security arrangements with energized as a key element in the projection of U.S. latin America. New threats and new opportunities for foreign policy goals. leading private citizens and democracy in the Western Hemisphere require that this groups are taking steps to identify and organize the traditional approach be revitalized by building on the interests we share with our democratic Caribbean, many local forces throughout the United States that North, Central and South American neighbors. have a direct stake in the nation's relations with the rest of the world. The private voluntary organizations in Aggressive Marxist regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua world affairs are doing an indispensible job of public have made the Western Hemisphere, once considered education. They have our strongest encouragement and indisputably secure for the United States, an area of support. strategic opportunity for the Soviet Union. The fragility of social and political arrangements in latin America While we focus on the needs of an effective political and the presence of these two Soviet client states, with and informational policy, we must keep in mind that their support for guerrilla movements in other latin the Soviet Union has a most aggressive public nations and their ties to international terrorism, **13** ----- promise continued instability and conflict in the necessary to defend our vital interests with a readiness region. This situation is compounded by continuing to work toward improved relations through a realistic economic and debt-servicing problems, the ongoing dialogue with the Soviet Union. problem of the drug trade and the growing political strength of the drug traffickers who-often in collusion The Alliance has been measurably strengthened in with local guerrilla groups-have begun to pose serious recent years. The United States has devoted special challenges for the reborn Latin democracies. attention to rebuilding its Alliance relationships, and our efforts to reinvigorate the American economy have provided a major impetus for growth in Western U.S. national security policy for the Western Europe. Other milestones include the Spanish entry Hemisphere seeks to address these problems within the into NATO in 1982 and last year's Spanish referendum broader framework of the promotion of democracy, in support of continued membership. Through its 1983 fostering economic development, strengthening and subsequent Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) dialogue and diplomacy within and among area deployments, the Alliance demonstrated its resolve to countries, and contributing to defensive capabilities protect its basic interests in the face of Soviet that allow progress without debilitating external intimidation. In 1984, the Allies launched a program to interference. Many of the current challenges for the improve conventional defense capabilities, and more United States fall outside of the formal collective recently have focused increased attention on security arrangements created in previous decades. Our armaments cooperation. In 1985-86, Allied firmness national security requires an emphasis on political and and solidarity helped to bring the Soviets back to the economic support for the hemisphere's democracies negotiating table in Geneva and to promote progress in and diplomatic initiatives to strengthen alliances. the talks themselves. Western Europe. The security of Western Europe Despite the basic vigor and strength of the Atlantic constitutes a vital interest of the United States. Shared Alliance, NATO relationships have come under strain values, the Soviet threat, and U.S.-European economic from several quarters. The challenges include, for interdependence underscore the importance of example, protectionism and trade deficits, different collective defense epitomized by NATO. methods of dealing with terrorism;burdensharing, and at times, differing assessments of the Soviet threat. The two greatest dangers to Western Europe's security Moreover, the foreign policy priorities of Western today are the proximity of massive Soviet conventional .European governments with respect to developments in and nuclear forces, and the vulnerability of Western Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America do not Europe's oil supply, some 60 percent of which moves always coincide with U.S. priorities, in part because the by sea from the Persian Gulf. United States must adopt a global outlook. The cohesion of the NATO Alliance remains strong in Doubts have sometimes been expressed, especially in the face of these challenges, and is reinforced by an the late 1970's, over the continued validity of the U.S. intensive process of consultation on the full range of commitment to Europe's defense. The successful security issues. Over the past twelve months, there have implementation of NATO's 1979 INF dual-track decision been almost thirty high-level consultations at NATO. thwarted the most recent Soviet attempt to decouple This intense process, to which we remain fully the u.s. security guarantee from the defense of Europe, committed, has contributed to the fundament and has served as a major incentive for the Soviets to Alliance consensus on its approach to East-West engage in serious negotiations for real reductions in relations on issues ranging from arms control to human intermediate-range nuclear forces. Whatever the rights. The common Alliance approach, set forth in outcome of the INF negotiations, flexible response will recent NATO Ministerial communiques, require the continuing pre.sence of U.S. nuclear combines a commitment to preserving the strength weapons in Europe. Nonetheless, NATO has **14** ----- consistently worked to keep its nuclear arsenal at the same time, Japanese economic relations have become minimum level necessary for deterrence and is a source of political tension. The Japanese trade proceeding with the reductions in its stockpile surplus is the biggest in history. This surplus cannot be mandated by the 1983 Montebello decision. sustained and must be brought into better balance. We are working together on many fronts to do this. The challenge before us is to maintain the momentum we have achieved and continue to manage the Our alliance with the Republic of Korea remains of inevitable strains in our Alliance relationships. With a exceptional importance. North Korea still has armed common commitment to the values and interests forces that far exceed those of the South in quantity, are which constitute the bedrock of the Alliance, newly strengthened by additional Soviet weapons, and imagination, and political courage, the United States are in the hands of a government whose aggressive and its Allies will succeed in building an even stronger demeanor and tendency to act unexpectedly is well bulwark against Soviet aggression and intimidation. known. Our own military presence in the Republic of Korea is of importance, both for regional stability and East Asia and Pacific. The United States is a Pacific for local security, which is essential to that country's power and a proud member of the area of the globe remarkable economic development. It now faces a that has led the world's economies in growth. Soviet critical period of political development as well, as it military power in Asia and the Pacific has grown moves toward a first-ever peaceful change of dramatically, but the U.S. response goes far beyond government when President Chun's term will be technical issues of relative military power. The goal is completed in 1988. In this process, the United States to strengthen our natural political and economic hopes to use its influence to encourage Koreans in this associations, while proceeding steadily with necessary democratic change. We do so, however, in careful ways modernization of our military forces deployed in the that respect Korean traditions and political realities, and area. are mindful of the constant security threat. Cooperation with Japan is basic to u.s. relationships in China's importance speaks for itself. Its attainment of the region. The U.s.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty rapid economic growth, while simultaneously making formalizes our defense ties, proViding a security basic economic, social and political changes, is foundation for the broad spectrum of economic, social another great achievement in its remarkable history. and political associations which join us. The United States seeks a close, friendly, and cooperative relationship with the People's Republic of In the security area, Japan's recent redefinition of its China, outside any alliance, and without any illusions self-defense goals-especially as they relate to sea lane that one is a political or strategic "card" for the other. protection- is of particular importance. Japanese forces Simply put, both of us recognize the importance of are developing capabilities that can make a significant each to the other in the many shared areas of contribution to deterrence. At the same time, Japan's agreement, even as we appreciate the diversity of our defense spending remains small as a share of its huge political systems. economy, and more rapid progress is needed toward Japan's defense goals. But the constant and substantial In the Philippines, the new government faces major growth of that spending over the last fifteen years, and and inherited political, security and economic particularly over the last five years, is significant. Japan's challenges. Through all of the tools available to us, we recent decision to spend more than one percent of its are det, ""1ined to help this key Pacific ally to overcome GNP on defense is especially noteworthy. these problems so it can once again achieve economic growth, counter the threat of a serious insurgency and Japan is now the world's second greatest economic strengthen democratic government. power. This development is reflected in increased Japanese expenditures on foreign assistance, which it Our second treaty ally in Southeast Asia, Thailand, is continues to target on key strategic countries. At the the ASEAN frontline state bordering Cambodia, now **15** ----- occupied by the Vietnamese and the site of an active foundation for future friendship and cooperation. We Cambodian resistance coalition struggling to gain self- believe that the package of U.S. assistance that is linked determination for the Khmer people. In support of to the treaty will encourage development of the island Thailand, which also shoulders the major refugee economies. We also were recently able to celebrate the burden in Southeast Asia, we will continue our close creation of a new U.S. Commonwealth-The Northern security cooperation to deter any potential aggression Marianas-and two new freely associated states, the and maintain our support of eligible refugees. We will Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the also continue our cooperative effort with Thailand to Marshalls. We welcome these new participants to the suppress narcotic trafficking. Pacific Ocean community. The United States views the continued occupation of **The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As mentioned** Cambodia by Vietnamese forces as unacceptable as it earlier, the most significant threat to u.s. security and undermines regional efforts towards development, national interests is the global challenge posed by the peace and stability. We also oppose the return of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that Moscow aspires Khmer Rouge to power in Cambodia. We will continue to alter the existing international system and establish our strong support of ASEAN's quest for a peaceful Soviet global hegemony. These Soviet long-range political solution and for the non-Communist elements objectives are underwritten by Soviet concepts of of the resistance coalition. Under our initiative on foreign and defense policy. Our policy for dealing with regional problems at the United Nations, we are the Soviets rests on three guiding principles: prepared to playa constructive role in the context of a Cambodian settlement. - Realism, which means that we must recognize the nature of the Soviet system and deal frankly and Despite acute and serious differences with Vietnam, forthrightly with problems in our relationship. through bilateral discussions we have made more - Strength, which is more than military power, but progress in accounting for our missing servicemen in includes political determination, the strength of the past two years than at any time since the end of the alliances, and economic health as well. The Soviet war. Similarly, our bilateral discussions on the Union respects strength and takes advantage of humanitarian question of refugees, reeducation of weakness. internees and Amerasians will continue with the objective of a humane solution to these complex - Dialogue, which means that we are prepared to questions. We will not, however, resume normalization discuss all the issues that divide us, and are ready of relations with Vietnam until Hanoi agrees to a to work for practical and fair solutions on a basis Cambodian settlement involving withdrawal of its compatible with our own fundamental interests. occupation forces. Consistent with this approach, we are engaged in We have seen a modest but welcome improvement in dialogues with the Soviets on four basic elements of relations between Laos and the United States. Our our relationship: human rights; the reduction of primary measure of their sincerity to improve relations regional conflicts; areas of mutually beneficial is further, accelerated, cooperative efforts to account for cooperation; and arms control. In all areas, progress is our servicemen still missing. slow. In the South Pacific, our longstanding alliance with At the same time, through coordinated employment of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty remains the keystone many elements of our national power, we seek to deter of our foreign policy in the area. The United States has further Soviet direct and indirect aggression, and been especially aware of the needs of the South Pacific .achieve a lessened Soviet reliance on the use or threat independent states. We recently reached agreement on of force. We will continue to counter Soviet the key elements of an historic fisheries treaty. We are expansionism worldWide.. No additional country has pleased with this agreement which creates a solid fallen to Soviet aggression since 1981, and the Soviets **16** ----- have been more cautious in undertaking new military The Middle East and South Asia. Our principal adventures in recent years, though they and their interests in the Middle East include maintaining proxies remain active in such areas as Afghanistan, regional stability, containing and reducing Soviet Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. influence, preserving the security of Israel and our other friends in the area, retaining access to oil on reasonable terms for ourselves and our allies, and In short, we have put in place a policy designed for curbing state-sponsored terrorism. Those interests are long-term management of U.SrSoviet relations in order to pursue our interests without the rapid fluctuations or threatened by the continuation of the Iran-Iraq conflict, unrealistic illusions which characterized some periods the existence of deep-seated Arab-Israeli tensions, the in the past. The fundamental fact is that the u.s.-Soviet growth of anti-Western political movements in the relationship is essentially adversarial, and will remain region, and the use of terrorism as an instrument of so for the foreseeable future. But both sides agree that state policy, particularly by Libya, Syria, and Iran. Our we have a responsibility to ensure that this relationship strategy in the region aims to safeguard our interests remains peaceful. We are ready for the long effort and from those threats; to hasten negotiated settlements of steady course required to pursue our national interests the Palestinian problem and the Iran-Iraq war; to in this fashion. bolster the security and economic well-being of Israel and moderate Arab regimes; to help our friends in the Gulf protect themselves and international shipping The United States has important political and lanes; and to isolate and deter state sponsors of economic interests in Eastern Europe. We have never terrorism. recognized .the division of Europe as either lawful or permanent. There was no agreement at Yalta to divide Europe into "spheres of influence:' Rather, the Soviet The U.s. Initiative of September 1982 remains the Union pledged itself to grant full independence to cornerstone of our approach to the Arab-Israeli peace Poland and to other states in Eastern Europe and to process. Our immediate goal is direct negotiations hold free elections. Soviet failure to honor these between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, commitments is one of the primary causes of East-West as part of a general effort to broaden the Egyptian- tensions today. Our policy toward Eastern Europe seeks Israeli peace and bring about a just and lasting to promote a positive role for Eastern European states resolution of the Palestinian problem. We remain firmly in preserving European stability and exercising a committed to a prompt and honorable negotiated moderating influence on the Soviet Union. settlement of the Iran-Iraq war. Current Iranian behavior poses a serious threat to our interests and those of our friends in the region. Until Iran ceases its efforts to We believe the United States should deal with the East prolong the senseless war with Iraq, we will work European countries on an individual basis and vary our actively to block the flow of arms and military material policies depending upon our assessment of the to Iran. conditions in each nation. In keeping with this principle, we differentiate our policies toward Eastern Europe to achieve a variety of objectives. These include Despite severe budgetary constraints, economic and the encouragement of domestic liberalization and security assistance, together with a prudent but more autonomous foreign policies; promotion of responsive policy of arms sales within the region, security through enhanced economic and political remains an essential part of our efforts to strengthen cooperation; and the fostering of genuine and long- Israel and moderate Arab regimes. We cannot afford to lasting improvement in human rights. Concurrently, we neglect the real needs of our friends. At the same time, seek to promote increased dialogue through cultural we will continue to try to isolate and build interna- and scientific exchanges, international forums, high- tional pressure against state sponsors of terrorism. Our level visits, bilateral councils and people-ta-people recent actions against Libya were designed to contacts. demonstrate the political, military and economic **17** ----- because of the continent's extensive natural resources; costsof supporting terrorism. While we have no its growing role in international forums; the threat illusions about eradicating this menace easily or quickly, we remain determined to combat it vigorously posed to regional security by the escalating racial conflict in South Africa; and Soviet, Libyan, East . in close cooperation with our friends and allies. European and Cuban adventurism throughout the U.S. objectives. in South Asia include reduction of region. The challenges to democracy are especially regional tensions; development of cooperative strong in Africa, and we remain concerned about the relationships between South Asian countries; widespread denial of basic human rights, whether by prevention of nuclear proliferation; and restoration of Marxist-Leninst clients of the Soviet Union or through the freedom of the Afghan people. apartheid in South Africa. The sources of conflict within Africa are many: extreme poverty, great U.S. policy also seeks a general improvement in disparities of wealth, ethnic frictions, unsettled borders, bilateral relations with all countries of the and religion. subcontinent. Important elements have been improved India-U.S. relations and u.s. encouragement of better U.s. policy must strive to encourage economic relations between India and Pakistan. A new six-year development and political stability in Africa. African assistance plan of $4 billion for Pakistan has been leaders have started to recognize that statist solutions proposed by this Administration and is vital to that are not the answer and are beginning to reform their country's ability to withstand strong pressures economies. We must work with other donor countries generated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. and the multilateral institutions to reinforce this trend Pakistan is hosting nearly three million Afghan refugees toward economic policy reform and private sector on its soil. The United States remains the largest donor development. of humanitarian assistance to the refugees. Economic growth will contribute to, but also requires, For the first time, the United States has established political stability. We must continue to encourage the substantially improved relations with both India and peaceful resolution of conflicts without foreign Pakistan. This enables us to help support the regional intervention. Deteriorating economic conditions and desire for peace, despite periodic crises in Indo- political instability have encouraged intervention by the Pakistani relations. Soviets, their surrogates, the Cubans, and maverick Africa. African issues demand increasing attention troublemakers like Libya. **18** ----- **IV. U.S. Defense Policy** The full range of u.s. military capabilities must be **_INTRODUCTION_** suitably balanced among combat and support elements, and contain an appropriate mix of active The Defense Policy of the United States requires duty and reserve components. The United States must military forces that are organized, manned, trained, and have specialized forces-ranging from those required equipped to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression for nuclear deterrence to forces configured to deal with across the entire spectrum of potential conflict. Our terrorism; and must also have general purpose forces National Security Strategy, global objectives, and the capable of sustaining high intensity conflict, while nature of the threat require that we be prepared to maintaining an effective capability for lesser defend our interests as far from North America as contingencies and special operations. At the same time, possible. Accordingly, our strategy relies heavily on we must balance defense priorities among the forward deployment of combat-ready forces, rei nforced competing needs of readiness, sustainability, by strong alliance relationships. In 'support of those modernization, and force expansion. relationships, we will continue to maintain in peacetime major forward deployments of land, naval, U.S. military forces also must be supported by plans, and air forces in Europe, the Atlantic and the Pacific; doctrines, and command relationships which provide and other deployments in the Western Hemisphere and for effective integration and employment of all facets of Indian Ocean. The overall size and composition of our our military power. While the possible use of nuclear armed forces are strongly influenced by these weapons must remain an element in our overall requirements, military strategy, nuclear forces should never be viewed as simply a lower-cost alternative to conventional The challenge we face is dynamic and complex. There forces. U.S. forces must be capable of rapid deployment remains a significant imbalance of forces favoring the to deter wider crises or conflicts. They must also Soviet Union in several important contingencies. In possess the capability, should deterrence fail, to expand addition, Third World states are increasingly armed the scope and intensity of combat operations, as with modern and sophisticated military equipment. necessary, to terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Comprehensive and imaginative integration of U.S. and allied military capabilities is required to reduce risks to The United States must maintain effective and robust our national security. Since our political and social Reserve and National Guard forces, trained and heritage militates against raising and supporting large equipped at levels commensurate with their wartime forces in peacetime, we are impelled to seek security missions, as well as Coast Guard and other capabilities in America's national genius for technological which support the national security establishment. The innovation; the breadth and diversity of our national United States must also continue to enhance its economy; and alliance cooperation. The United States capabilities to surge or mobilize manpower and key must pursue strategies for competition with the Soviets industrial resources, planning for the most effective use which emphasize our comparative advantages in these of available strategic warning in the event of crisis or areas. **war.** **19** ----- _TAKING ADVANTAGE OF U.s._ technology. Thus a vital element of our defense policymassive effort to acquire and exploit Western _STRENGTHS AND SOVIET_ is to control technology transfer and protect classified _WEAKNESSES_ information relating to military technologies. With this in mind, we have undertaken a major effort to enhance our National Counter-intelligence and Security Countermeasures plans and capabilities, as I outlined One of the central tenets of our defense policy is that in my November 1986 report to Congress. the United States will not seek to match the Soviet Union weapon for weapon. Rather, we will work to Competitive Strategies. Competitive strategies are overcome Soviet numerical superiority by taking aimed at exploiting our technological advantages in maximum advantage of the inherent strengths of thoughtful and systematic ways to cause the Soviets to alliances composed of democratic, industrialized, free compete less efficiently or less effectively in areas of economy nations. military application. Such strategies seek to make portions of the tremendous Soviet military machine Technology. The United States and its allies continue to obsolete and force the Soviets to divert resources in enjoy technological superiority over the Soviet Bloc in ways they may not prefer, and in a manner that may not most areas of military application. This technological necessarily threaten our own forces. Low observable advantage derives from the fundamental nature of the (stealth) technology, for example, can render much of two societies. The spirit of inquiry and the free flow of the Soviet investment in air defense obsolete and information which characterize the West will inevitably requires the Soviets to divert resources from offensive permit technology and innovation to flourish to a forces to defensive forces. The contribution which new greater degree than it will in a closed society. The technologies can make to our competitive strategies is United States and its allies enjoy an intrinsic advantage an explicit consideration in making defense not only in the creation, but in the practical exploitation of advanced technologies. Competitive, procurement decisions. free-enterprise societies consistently out-perform Alliances. A third area of U.S. strength and Soviet centrally planned economies in fostering innovation, weakness is alliance relationships. While the Soviet growth, and the application of new technology to a Union presides over an empire that has seen several wide variety of fields. armed rebellions in the past forty years, the United States is the leader of a voluntary coalition of equal Technology affects our national security in two ways. nations. U.S. allies, particularly our NATO partners, First, the ability to exploit and adapt technology contribute a major share of the West's total military contributes to the overall economic health of the strength. Recognizing this contribution, our defense United States and its allies, which is a key element of polity is based on the fundamental premise that we national power. Second, the exploitation of a will not seek to offset Soviet power alone, but in technological advantage directly enhances defense. conjunction with our allies throughout the globe, on a Precision guided munitions, for example, help offset basis of equitable burdensharing. the large Soviet edge in tank forces. Stealth technology helps counter the massive Soviet investment in air In NATO, this means continuing our strong support for defense. Advances in anti-submarine warfare Alliance efforts to improve the overall Western technologies and in submarine quieting help preserve conventional balance, including appropriate economic maritime superiority despite the Soviet Navy's and military assistance to allies on NATO's critical numerical advantages. Perhaps most significantly, the southern flank. It means integrating the contribution of U.S. edge in computer technology and software has our NATO partners into our strategy-indeed, the military relevance across the entire spectrum of United States has no separate military strategy for the warfare. defense of Europe, but is a partner in the NATO The Soviets are, of course, conscious of the Western alliance strategy of deterrence and defense. Outside of technological advantage and have undertaken a Europe, the United States seeks strong ties with nations **20** ----- strategic capabilities-and our will to use them, if throughout the globe, assisting Iriendly and allied necessary-never be in doubt. countries in improving their military capabilities while encouraging them to assume a greater role in their own defense. In the interest of ensuring deterrence, the United States maintains diversified strategic forces to hedge against a **The Strength of the Individual. One of our greatest** disarming first strike, complicate Soviet attack plans, advantages in competing with the Soviet Union is the and guard against technological surprise which might character of our people. Western societies, with their threaten one element of our strategic forces. To this stress on the importance of the individual, stand in end, we maintain a variety of basing modes, launch sharp contrast to the repressive nature of the Soviet platforms, and attack vehicles, achieving diversity state. The initiative, enterprise, and motivation of free through a triad of SLBMs, ICBMs and bombers. people is a source of great strength when individuals Adequate and survivable command and control is an are put to the supreme test of combat. While essential element of strategic force structure, and is intangible, these qualities are an important asset, which critical to the credibility of our strategic deterrent. the Soviets cannot match. Defense policy recognizes this by stressing unit integrity and leadership, while our Our strategic forces and the associated targeting policy training and tactics place great value on individual must, by any calculation, be perceived as making initiative, and aggressive exploitation of opportunities. nuclear warfare a totally unacceptable and unrewarding proposition for the Soviet leadership. Accordingly, our strategy: **_MAINTENANCE OF A_** **_STRATEGIC DETERRENT_** - Denies the Soviets the ability to achieve essential military objectives by holding at risk Soviet warmaking capabilities. This includes the entire Deterrence is the most fundamental element of our range of Soviet military forces, as well as the war defense policy and the cornerstone of our alliance supporting industry which provides the foundation relationships. Deterrence must not only prevent for Soviet military power, and supports its capability conventional and nuclear attack on the United States, to conduct a protracted conflict. but must extend such protection to our allies. Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture - Places at risk those political entities the Soviet makes the assessment of war outcome by the Soviets, leadership values most: the mechanisms for ensuring or any other adversary, so dangerous and uncertain as survival of the Communist Party and its leadership to remove any possible incentive for initiating conflict. cadres, and for retention of the Party's control over Deterrence depends both on nuclear and conventional the Soviet and Soviet Bloc peoples. capabilities, and on evidence of a strong will to use military force, if necessary, to defend our vital interests. This basic strategy of targeting those assets which are essential to Soviet warmaking capability and political While deterrence requires capabilities across the entire control has been U.S. policy for many years. In spectrum of conflict, its essential foundation is implementing this strategy, the United States does not provided by our strategic nuclear forces and the target population as an objective in itself and seeks to doctrine which supports them. Nuclear deterrence, like .minimize collateral damage through more accurate, any form of deterrence, requires us to consider not lower yield weapons. what would deter us, but what would deter the Soviets, whose perceptions of the world and value system are We cannot permit any President to be faced with a substantially different from our own. Since we can situation in which the only available responses to never be entirely certain of Soviet perceptions, it is of aggression are capitulation or massive destruction. the utmost importance that the effectiveness of our **21** ----- Thus, in addition to holding at risk the full range of enhance deterrence by injecting great uncertainties into assets important to the Soviet leadership, the United Soviet estimates of their ability to achieve their States also requires flexibility in the employment of its essential military objectives in a first strike. "Leak proof" strategic forces. It is essential that we have response defenses would not be reqUired initially in order to options appropriate to the broad range of plausible deny the Soviets confidence that they could achieve situations. This flexible response capability bolsters the meaningful military goals. Even less than perfect credibility of our deterrent by making clear to the defenses could significantly increase stability by Soviets that the United States has a variety of military eliminating plausible incentives for a Soviet first strike. options with which to respond to aggression. In judging the suitability of systems for possible deployment, we will continue to be guided by the Finally, the United States also requires sufficient criteria of military effectiveness, survivability, and cost- residual capability to provide leverage for early war effectiveness at the margin. termination, and to avoid coercion in a post-conflict By reducing the military value of ballistic missiles, and world. For this reason, we maintain a nuclear reserve ultimately rendering them obsolete, strategic defenses force as an integral part of our strategic forces. We also would also provide incentives for Soviet acceptance of maintain Continuity of Government programs as an significant arms reduction agreements. In a world with essential element of deterrence to assure the Soviets fewer ballistic missiles, however, Soviet incentives to they cannot escape retaliation by a qUick, cheat would be greater. Strategic defenses can "decapitating" attack aimed at incapacitating U.S. effectively negate these incentiV!!s by eliminating the political and military leadership. military utility of covertly stockpiled missiles. Thus, they offer the prospect of a safer, more stable world in These capabilities do not imply the United States seeks which deep reductions in strategic offensive arms are to fight a nuclear war. I have repeatedly emphasized both negotiable and enforceable. that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. But we seek to deter an adversary with a very In short, the pursuit of strategic defenses has the different strategic outlook from our own -an outlook potential to bring about the most significant change in which places great stress on nuclear warfighting U.s. National Security Strategy since the end of World capability. It is essential the Soviets understand that War II. By allowing us to move away from reliance on they cannot gain their objectives through nuclear the threat of massive destruction to deter aggression, warfare under any cqnceivable circumstances. To strategic defenses would change the entire U.S.-Soviet achieve this we must ensure that they clearly perceive strategic relationship in a positive way, increasing the that the United States has the capability to respond safety and security of the peoples of both nations and appropriately to any Soviet attempt to wage a nuclear their allies. We will continue to try to persuade the war, and that we have the means to do this in ways Soviets to join with us in working out a stable transition to this sensible and attainable goal. which will defeat Soviet military objectives without necessarily triggering a massive nuclear exchange. U.S. Strategic Modernization Program. Continuing U.S. strategic modernization is essential to assure reliable Strategic Defenses. Our policy of flexible response and deterrence, enhance stability, and provide motivation deterrence through the threat of offensive retaliation for the Soviets to negotiate broad, deep, equitable and has preserved the security of the United States and its verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms. While allies for decades. At the same time, the Soviet strategic we are firmly committed to using arms control as one force buildup has threatened the foundation on which component of our policy for enhancing U.S. and allied deterrence has long rested. Looking to the future, the security, it would be exceptionally dangerous to U.s. Strategic Defense Initiative offers an opportunity to _anticipate success in arms control. Indeed, neglecting_ shift deterrence to a safer and more stable basis strategic modernization in expectation of arms through greater reliance on strategic defenses. Such reduction agreements would have the perverse effect of defenses, which threaten no one, could substantially decreasing the likelihood of such agreements by **22** ----- reducing one of the principal Soviet incentives to To this end, in 1981 we undertook the Strategic agreement Modernization Program in order to maintain the essential survivability and effectiveness of our own History shows that a demonstrated will to maintain a forces in the face of the continuing qualitative and military balance with the Soviets and not allow them to quantitative upgrade in the Soviet threat. Current gain a significant strategic advantage is an essential elements of that program, which remains our highest foundation for serious arms control negotiations. It was defense priority, include: U.s. action to rectify imbalances which brought the Soviets to consider the major force reductions - Improved strategic command, control and discussed at Reykjavik. Even if we are successful in communications, to ensure timely warning of attack achieving the agreements we seek, however, the United and an assured means of passing retaliatory orders to States will continue to require modernized, mission- our strategic forces. effective, and survivable nuclear forces to provide - ICBM modernization, centered on the PEACEKEEPER deterrence, promote stability, and hedge against Soviet (MX) and Small ICBM, both of which will have cheating or abrogation during the transition to new, enhanced survivability through mobility. lower force levels. - SLBM modernization, including deployment of the For their part, the Soviets continue to invest heavily in TRIDENT submarine and development and strategic modernization, with emphasis on accurate, deployment of the TRIDENT II missile. fast-flying ballistic missiles which can destroy hard - Bomber and cruise missile upgrades, including targets. Their goal has been, and remains, attainment of deployment of the 8-1B, and the exploitation of the an effective disarming first-strike capability. They have important U.S. lead in low-observable technology by always sought to enhance their ICBM survivability development of the Advanced Technology Bomber through silo hardening. Recently they have also sought and the Advanced Cruise Missile. to do so through mobility, including continued deployment of the road-mobile S5-25, and preparation - Strategic Defense programs, including SDI and the for deployment of the rail-based 55-X-24. Air Defense Initiative, to redress the long-standing neglect of defensive programs generally, and to At the same time, the Soviets continue to invest roughly capitalize on the potential which modern the same amount in their strategic defense programs as technology offers for radically transforming the basis in their offensive force modernization. They are for deterrence and laying the foundation for a far expanding and improving the world's only deployed more safe and stable strategic relationship with the ABM system. They continue to violate the ABM Treaty Soviet Union. with their radar at Krasnoyarsk, enhancing their ability to break out of the Treaty through rapid deployment of a nation-wide ABM system. Their extensive civil **_ARMS CONTROL_** defense program includes a vast and growing network of deep underground leadership shelters aimed at Arms control is not an end in itself but an integral part ensuring the survival of Communist Party control over of our overall National Security Strategy. It must be the Soviet nation, economy, and military forces in war. viewed as only one of several tools to enhance our Their strategic communications are highly redundant, national security and to promote our fundamental survivable, and hardened against nuclear effects. Their national interest in the survival of the United States as active and passive defenses, their unrelenting buildup a free and independent nation. Our arms control of offensive forces, and their published doctrine all objectives are fully integrated with our defense and provide evidence of the Soviet nuclear warfighting foreign policies to enhance deterrence, reduce risk, mentality, and underline the absolute essentiality of support alliance relationships, and ensure the Soviets maintaining the effectiveness of the U.S. strategic do not gain significant unilateral advantage over the deterrent. United States. **23** ----- unverifiable in important provisions, it was inimical to Based on this view of arms control as a complement to the security interests of the United States and its allies, a strong national defense posture, u.s. arms control and to the stabi Iity of the U.S.-Soviet strategic policy, since the beginning of this Administration, has been guided by several fundamental principles: relationship. Imperfect as these earlier arms control agreements - The United States seeks only those agreements which contribute to our security and that of our were, their faults have been compounded by the Soviets' failure to abide by key provisions-a failure allies. which persists today. They encrypt telemetry associated - The United States seeks agreements which reduce with ballistic missile testing in a manner which arms, not simply codify their increase. impedes verification. They have deployed a prohibited - Achieving agreements on broad, deep and equitable second new type of ICBM, the S5-25, and exceeded the **reductions in offensive nuclear arms is the highest** numerical limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. arms control priority of the United States. The Soviets have also violated the SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972; and with respect to the ABM Treaty, - Within the category of offensive nuclear arms, the as noted earlier, the Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear . United States gives priority to reducing the most destabilizing weapons: fast-flying, non-recallable violation. ballistic missiles. As a result of both U.S. concerns with the SALT - The United States also seeks equitable arms control structure and the poor Soviet compliance record, I measures in the area of nuclear testing, chemical determined in May 1986 that, in the future, the United weapons and conventional forces. States would base decisions regarding its strategic force - The United States insists on agreements that can be structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat effectively verified and fully complied with. Arms posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards control agreements without effective verification contained in a flawed, unratified, and expired treaty measures are worse than no agreements at all as which has been repeatedly violated by the Soviet they create the possibility of Soviet unilateral Union. At the same time I indicated that-assuming no advantage, and can affect U.S. and allied planning significant change in the threat we face-the United with a false sense of confidence. States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, or more strategic ballistic missile warheads, These principles contrast sharply with the Soviet arms than does the Soviet Union. Thus, while ensuring an control approach. The Soviets have historically sought adequate strategic deterrent, the United States will to exploit the arms control process to gain unilateral continue to exercise the utmost restraint, in order to advantage by shifting the military balance in their favor. foster the necessary atmosphere for obtaining Soviet At the same time, they have pursued additional agreement to significant reductions. advantage by failing to comply with important provisions of existing arms control agreements, secure in the knowledge that the United States does not cheat While the United States' priority objective in arms and can be relied on for full compliance with control is deep reductions in strategic offensive arms, agreements in force. we are also engaged in a wide variety of negotiations and discussions on other subjects. The U.s. approach This approach has proven at least partially successful to all of these areas is consistent. We seek only those for the Soviets in the past. The arms control agreements agreements which are equitable, verifiable, and will of the 1970s largely legitimized the planned Soviet enhance our security and that of our allies. strategic buildup, while constraining our own force modernization by reducing public support for essential Specifically: strategic programs. Typical of the defects of the past - In the area of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces was the SALT II Treaty of 1979, a fundamentally flawed (INF), we seek the complete elimination of an entire agreement which was never ratified. Unequal and **24** ----- class of weapons: land-based longer-range INF Substantial progress toward the achievement of U.s. (LRINF) missiles. As an interim goal, we seek a arms control goals was made at the October 1986 global agreement limiting the U.s. and USSR to 100 meeting in Iceland between General Secretary LRINF missile warheads each, to be deployed in Gorbachev and myself. At that meeting we agreed on Soviet Asia and the United States, with none of either the outlines of a 50 percent reduction in strategic side in Europe. offensive forces and a dramatic global reduction in INF missiles. In the near-term, our primary focus will be to - Consistent with our belief that strategic defenses may work toward agreement in these areas. Consistent with offer a safer, more stable basis for deterrence, we our priority on radically reducing the most seek Soviet agreement for an orderly transition to a destabilizing strategic systems-and in response to the more defense-reliant world. Soviet desire for a ten-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty-we proposed to accept - We have proposed an effectively verifiable global such a commitment through 1996, during which time ban on chemical weapons. research, development and testing, which is permitted - We seek alliance-ta-alliance negotiations to establish by the ABM Treaty, wou Id continue. At the same time, a more stable balance in conventional forces from the proposed agreement provided for: the Atlantic to the Urals, at lower levels. Such reductions must be effectively verifiable and must - A fifty percent reduction in strategic offensive forces recognize the geographic asymmetries between the of the United States and Soviet Union during the first two sides. five years of the ten year period. - In the area of nuclear testing, we seek essential - Elimination of all U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic verification improvements to permit ratification of missiles of whatever range or armament during the existing treaties: the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and second five years. the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Once our - Agreement that either side could deploy advanced verification concerns have been satisfied and the strategic defenses after the ten-year period, unless ratification process is complete, we would be both agreed not to do so. prepared immediately to engage in negotiations with the Soviets on ways to implement a step-by-step program to limit and ultimately end nuclear testing, It is too soon to foresee the future course of arms in association with a program to reduce and control following Reykjavik. Much depends on the ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons. attitude of the Soviet Union. The United States has tabled proposals in the Geneva negotiations reflecting - Finally, we seek to improve stability through the areas agreed on in Iceland; the Soviet Union has improved measures which could prevent tabled proposals that only partially reflect the misunderstanding during periods of crisis. We have achievements of Reykjavik. If the Soviets maintain their made progress on such measures at the recently current attempt to hold all progress hostage to U.s. concluded Stockholm conference. agreement to kill the Strategic Defense Initiative, prospects for progress are dim. On the other hand, if In all of these areas we consider effective verification to they are willing to implement the agreements reached be equally as important as specific negotiated limits; in Reykjavik, we can move now to achieve greater they should be negotiated concurrently. We cannot stability and a safer world. In moving to that world, I accept obligations that limit our military programs will maintain my commitment to broad, deep, un less we can effectively verify Soviet compliance with equitable, and verifiable reductions, focused especially those same obligations. This is particularly important in on ballistic missiles, and my equally strong light of the continuing pattern of Soviet violations commitment to the Strategic Defense Initiative as a documented in the several reports which I have basis for moving to a safer, more stable form of submitted to the Congress on Soviet non-compliance. deterrence. **25** ----- Finally, I should emphasize that the measure of success U.S. Contribution to NATO. The United States in arms control is not the number of meetings held or contributes to this NATO deterrent in several ways. agreements signed. Rather it is whether those Most visible is the peacetime stationing of over agreements which are signed contribute to U.s. and 300,000 military personnel in the European theater. allied security and advance the cause of peace and Although our allies contribute the majority of the stability. Because of tnis, while the United States will conventional forces in Europe, and would continue to remain both creative and patient, it will continue to do so in crisis and mobilization, the presence of U.S. forces makes it clear that it is not possible to attack a reject calls for agreements which do not enhance u.s. NATO ally without simultaneously engaging the full and allied security and contribute to global stability military might of the United States. In addition to the direct provision of forces, the United States provides security assistance to those NATO allies _MAINTENANCE OF A_ _CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT_ whose economies do not permit them to make as great a contribution to the common defense as they and we would wish. Such assistance serves as an important Forward Deployed Conventional Defense Capability. and cost-effective force multiplier, increasing both the Strategic nuclear capabilities are essential for political solidarity and the military effectiveness of deterrence, but they alone are obviously not enough. NATO, Finally, the United States provides the main The United States and its allies require robust contribution to the nuclear umbrella over NATO which conventional forces as an integral part of our overall has been one of the pillars of NATO's strategy for decades. deterrent. The U.s. National Security Strategy is built on the concepts of forward defense and alliance The Strategy of Flexible Response. NATO's deterrent solidarity. Consistent with this strategy, we maintain strategy requires a capability for flexible response, large, forward deployed forces at sea and on the appropriate to the nature of Soviet provocation. In territory of our NATO and Asian allies in time of peace. addition to robust U.S. and allied conventional forces, The overall size and capabilities of u.s. armed services backed by the strategic nuclear capability of the United are heavily influenced by the need to maintain such States, this strategy must be supported by effective and presence, which is essential to deter aggression. substantial non-strategic nuclear forces as well. The United States contributes to all legs of the "NATO The most demanding threat with which those forces Triad": conventional forces, non-strategic nuclear forces, must be prepared to deal is, of course, the Soviet and strategic forces. NATO's 1979 decision to threat. Soviet forces may always outnumber our own- modernize its nuclear forces through deployment of even when allied forces are thrown into the balance. Ground Launched Cruise Missiles and Pershing II For this reason, we must give the most careful attention ballistic missiles helped to redress the imbalance to maintaining our forces' qualitative superiority at the created by the Soviet deployment of 55-20 missiles level necessary to accomplish their deterrent and targeted against NATO territory. It also signalled NATO warfighting missions. resolve to maintain the effectiveness and integrity of its deterrent capabilities, and helped lay the foundation for effective arms control negotiations aimed at reducing An additional premise of American defense policy is the ballistic missile threat to NATO. that the United States does not seek to deal with the threat from the Soviet Union unaided. A system of In clear contrast to the Soviet Union, it is NATO's vigorous alliances is the only effective way to deter the policy to maintain non-strategic nuclear forces at the Soviets. The most important of these alliances is NATO, lowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pact which for over a generation has preserved peace and threat. In pursuance of this policy, the Alliance decided security in Europe. While no single NATO partner can in October 1983 to reduce the number of warheads in match the massive Soviet conventional forces, together Europe by 1,400, in addition to the 1,000 warhead we are capable of fielding a powerful deterrent. reduction completed in 1980. These reductions, taken 26 ----- independently of any arms control agreement, will Thus, our strategy recognizes that a variety of factors reduce NATO's nuclear stockpile in Europe to the would affect the nature, locations, and intensity of our lowest level in over 20 years. This makes it essential military actions in a conflict with the Soviet union. Our that the remaining stockpile be survivable, responsive, strategy is not to try to fight "every where at once:' We and effective. would do what is strategically sensible and Deterrence of Chemical Warfare. While neither NATO operationally achievable under the circumstances. But nor the United States seeks to match the Soviets we do need the capability for credible responses to weapon for weapon, deterrence would be weakened if major threats worldwide, so we can ensure that our the Soviets were allowed to field a capability which weakness does not tempt our adversaries. was completely unmatched by a countervailing NATO Other U.S. Commitments. NATO is not our only capability. This premise, which underlies NATO's alliance. The United States has bilateral or multilateral decision to modernize its theater nuclear forces, is **security commitments with some 43 nations** equally relevant to our own determination to throughout the globe. modernize U.S. chemical weapons capability through development of modern, safe, binary munitions. This In support of those commitments, and to deter Soviet modernization will provide us the capability to deter and Soviet client state adventurism, the United States Soviet first use of chemical weapons. In the absence of maintains forward deployed forces in many regions of such capability, we will remain dependent on an aging strategic importance. In addition to our fleet in the stockpile of unitary chemical weapons ill-suited to Mediterranean, the United States maintains a large modern delivery systems, and alliance nuclear naval presence in the Western Pacific. A smaller capabilities, to deter such Soviet use-an obviously presence in the Indian Ocean serves to support our undesirable and risk-prone situation. interests in Southwest Asia. U.S. Air Forces deployed The Scope and Intensity of Conflict. Our strategy throughout the Pacific assist in meeting our security recognizes that the Soviet Union, together with allied commitments to such nations as Japan and the forces, is capable of simultaneous aggression in more Philippines. Substantial ground and air forces are than one region of the world. Should aggression occur deployed in Korea to complement forces of the in several regions simultaneously, U.s. military Republic of Korea in deterring aggression from the responses would be governed by existing commitments, North. general strategic priorities, the specific circumstances at hand, and the availability of forces. This capability to Our global forward deployed forces serve several respond would be enhanced by the flexibility we have functions. They are essential to the creation of regional built into our forces, including our capabilities for power balances which deter Soviet aggression and global strategic mobility and power projection. This promote overall regional stability; they support the capability to respond effectively in distant theaters political independence of nations on the Soviet reduces the risk that we will ever have to meet such periphery and hence are key to the fundamental u.s. attacks. strategic objective of avoiding Soviet domination of the If we must respond to such an attack, our overall Eurasian land mass; and finally, they provide an objective would be to terminate the war as soon as immediately available capability to deal with lesser possible, at the lowest level of violence consistent with military contingencies. the restoration 'of peace on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Should our initial attempts Although the Soviet Union represents the greatest to defeat aggression fail, however, U.S. strategy provides threat to the United States and its allies, as mentioned for the flexible and sufficient application of force for as earlier, it is not the only threat. Forward deployed long as combat continues to ensure that no area of forces can also discourage local aggression, contribute vital interest is lost. Should escalation occur, despite to regional stability, and serve as visible symbols of our best efforts to contain the intensity of the conflict, United States' will and capability to protect its interests. we would attempt to employ our forces in a manner For military contingencies not involving the Soviet which would discourage further escalation while Union, however, the United States looks primarily to achieving our national objectives. the nations involved to provide for their own defense. 27 ----- Direct involvement of U.S. military forces is a last contingencies in Southwest Asia, where we have no resort, to be undertaken only when clear political military bases or permanently stationed military forces. objectives have been established, our political will is clear, and appropriate military capabilities are available. Consistent with our alliance approach to security, U.s. If U.s. combat forces are committed, the United States allies make critical contributions to the effectiveness of would seek to limit the scope and level of the conflict, our mobility capabilities. Not only do our allies avoid the involvement of the Soviet Union, and achieve contribute airfield and port facilities, they also augment U.S. objectives as quickly as possible. our airlift and provide the bulk of our sealift capability. Finally, allied cooperation is an obvious prerequisite for In the past six years we have made substantial progress prepositioning. in improving the capability of our forward deployed forces to protect U.S. interests, execute our National When this decade began, we faced severe difficulties in Strategy, and support alliance commitments. We remain moving large forces quickly enough to deter Soviet firmly committed to continued improvement in our aggression, deploying forces to two or more theaters deployed capabilities in support of our forward-defense, alliance-based strategy. The following paragraphs will simultaneously, or moving material effectively into less- discuss selected capabilities which provide essential developed regions. Since 1981, with the support of foundations for that strategy. Congress, we have made great progress in redressing these deficiencies, adding substantially to our airlift Maintenance of Global Support and Mobility and sealift capability and prepositioning additional Capabilities. The ability to reinforce and resupply large quantities of material abroad. Not all of our forward deployed forces is essential to the execution of objectives have been accomplished, however. In the U.S. strategy of forward defense and alliance particular, the continuing decline of the U.S. merchant solidarity. Rapid reinforcement of NATO during times of marine and U.S.-flag commercial shipping assets is a tension, for example, is critical to effective deterrence. matter of concern. This problem is compounded by the decline of the U.S.-flag fleet which results in a The Soviets have a natural geographic advantage with reduction of the seagoing workforce to man all our respect to countries on the Eurasian rim, and growing capability to launch simultaneous offensives in Europe, U.S.-flag vessels-as well as ships of the Ready Reserve Southwest Asia and the Far East. Capitalizing on Force, the National Defense Reserve Fleet and any interior lines of communication, they can redeploy and effective U.S. controlled ships which might need resupply forces over a broad geographic range. Recent recrewing. The lack of merchant mariners in the near Soviet efforts have significantly improved military term could impede our ability adequately to project access, by rail and road, to strategically important areas and sustain forces by strategic sealift. along the USSR's southern frontiers. Maintenance of an Adequate Logistics Base. To Our global support and mobility capabilities, including maintain a strong conventional deterrent it is vital that airlift, sealift, and prepositioning are therefore essential we provide adequate logistic support for u.s. forces. A to allow us to meet military challenges around the robust logistics infrastructure strengthens deterrence by periphery of the Eurasian continent, which remains the demonstrating our preparations for hostilities at any primary locus of Soviet expansionist interests. level of intensity, and for the length of time necessary Prepositioning ashore or at sea can sharply reduce our to defend U.S. interests. Adequate, sustained support response times. Airlift, the quickest and most flexible of helps raise the nuclear threshold, strengthens our mobility assets, would deliver initial reinforcements deterrence, and improves prospects for early success in in most contingencies; but sealift will inevitably carry conflict. Adversaries must not conclude that U.S. and the bulk of our reinforcement and resupply material, as allied capabilities would erode if confronted with a it has in past crises. To reduce response times, the complex or prolonged military campaign. United States combines prepositioning with airlift and sealift in an integrated fashion. Mobility capabilities are We have made substantial progress over the past six especially critical to our strategies for dealing with years in improving our military logistics base, and in 28 ----- the process provided stronger support for our arms. In the case of our land-based forces committed to deterrence strategy. With the support of Congress, we Europe, this requires constant upgrading and will seek continued improvement in this unglamorous, modernization to retain a qualitative edge in the face of but essential component of military power. the Pac(s superior numbers. Concurrently, we will continue to emphasize to our allies the impOrtance of improving the logistics base of While NATO requirements properly occupy much of their own forces to ensure that their endurance in our ground forces' concern, the global nature of combat will be parallel to that of our forces. potential threats to U.S. interests requires maintenance of flexible and diverse ground forces capable of rapid **Maintenance of Adequate Active Forces. Support of** deployment to, and effective operations in, areas of our conventional deterrent requires that we maintain strategic importance. This has led the Army to establish balanced and effective active forces sufficient in quality five rapidly deployable light divisions, while continuing and quantity to make our National Military Strategy efforts have gone into the enhancement of Marine credible. In the context of our alliance relationships, Corps capabilities. These ground forces, with deterring and, if necessary, defeating the Soviet threat appropriate tactical air support, prOVide essential requires a carefully structured mix of u.s. and allied elements of our capability to deal with worldwide land and sea-based forces capable of executing the contingency requirements. agreed strategy until reinforced from the respective countries' mobilization bases. In the case of NATO, the Tactical airpower supports the achievement of ground proximity of major Warsaw Pact ground, air and naval force goals by maintaining battlefield air superiority, forces to Alliance territory, the speed with which providing responsive and effective firepower for Army modern conflict can unfold, the Pads significant maneuver units, and conducting deep interdiction of numerical advantages, and the Soviets' strong doctrinal enemy forces, command and control capabilities, and emphasis on surprise, all argue for substantial, .sources of logistic support. In addition, it plays a qualitatively advanced, and flexible u.S. and allied critical role in assuring the essential reinforcement and conventional forces. resupply of U.S. forward deployed forces by protecting port facilities, aerial ports of debarkation, and lines of The land-based forces of the United States and its allies communication from attack and disruption. The would have primary responsibility for blunting a Soviet capability of air forces to deploy rapidly in crises adds attack and defending allied territory, while to our ability to deter threats to our interests in distant simultaneously disrupting and destroying the follow-on areas, and to bring effective military power to bear forces which Soviet strategy relies on to exploit any should deterrence fail. initial successes. U.S. and allied ground forces, supported by tactical air power, require the capability Maritime forces playa unique role in supporting our to halt a Pact attack and restore the integrity of Alliance military strategy. Given the realities of our geostrategic territory if NATO political and military objectives are to position, fronting on two oceans, maritime superiority be achieved. Absent such capability, Alliance strategy is vital to support our alliance relationships and our becomes heavily dependent on the threat of resorting forward deployed forces. While maritime superiority to nuclear weapons to achieve essential deterrence and depends predominantly on the capabilities of our naval warfighting objectives. forces, land-based air forces also contribute to its maintenance in important ways, including early For decades it has been a fundamental U.s. objective to warning of enemy air threats, long-range aerial tanker reduce· the risk of nuclear warfare by maintainfng the support for sea-based tactical aircraft, and the laying of nuclear threshold at a high level. Achievement of this anti-submarine mines. goal requires that, wherever we confront Soviet forces, the forces of the United States and its allies have the Maritime superiority enables us to capitalize on Soviet capability to achieve their missions with conventional geographic vulnerabilities and to pose a global threat **29** ----- to the Soviers interests. It plays a key role in plans for Maintenance of Effective Reserve Forces and National the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It Mobilization Base. The effective mobilization of also permits the United States to tie down Soviet naval manpower and industrial resources in the event of forces in defensive posture protecting Soviet ballistic conflict would provide essential support for our military missile submarines and the seaward approaches to the capabilities. With approximately 6 percent of GNP Soviet homeland, and thereby to minimize the wartime devoted to defense, our peacetime economy focuses on threat to the reinforcement and resupply of Europe by the needs of the civilian marketplace, not on the sea. nation's defense requirements. We rely on the inherent size and strength of the U.S. economy as our ultimate The mobile nature of maritime forces allows them line of defense, tapping into civilian production to a directly to influence land campaigns through the greater or lesser extent only as the situation may application of sea-based tactical air power; and by the require. use of amphibious forces to seize strategically important territory, reinforce allies accessible from the As a result, we require an ability to surge our industrial sea, or threaten the seaward flanks of enemy ground base to produce the additional wartime materiel forces. needed during conflict. The health of the industrial base, therefore, has clear military and strategic significance. Accordingly, the u.s. Government This capability to project power far from our shores is continues to promote initiatives which support of particular importance, given the central position of improvements in industrial productiVity and the Soviet Union in the Eurasian land mass, the fact modernization. that many of the United States' most important allies are located on the Eurasian periphery and offshore Additionally, through its procurement procedures, the islands, and the volatility of many Third World areas in government seeks to provide incentives for increased which there is no U.s. military presence. Our naval productiVity, improved manufacturing technologies, and power projection capabilities would play an essential to increase U.s. competitiveness in the international role in any Southwest Asia conti ngency. marketplace. Essential to our wartime strategy, maritime superiority To complement our industrial mobilization programs, plays equally vital roles in peacetime. Mobile maritime the United States has maintained for over thirty years a forces, easily deployed in time of crisis, are a traditional stockpile program to ensure a supply of critical raw symbol of our nation's will and capability to defend its materials to support defense and essential civilian vital interests. They have proven to be an indispensable needs during an emergency. It is important that we tool of crisis management for every U.S. president since continue to modernize our stockpile program to keep the end of World War II. Finally, by permitting the pace with current requirements, changes in industrial rapid application of U.S. power, maritime superiority capacity and new manufacturing and technological developments. Since fundamental disagreements on contributes to regional stability, whether in the Indian stockpile policies exist with the Congress, we must Ocean, Central America, the Middle East, or other renew efforts to resolve our differences and develop areas of strategic concern. realistic goals and policies which will produce a modernized stockpile for the future. The trends in the maritime area are generally favorable. We are steadily building back toward our goal of a 600 On the manpower side, the Total Force policy ship, 15 carrier battle group Navy. With continued established in the early 1970s places increased strong Congressional support, the programs of this responsibilities on the reserve component of U.S. Administration should ensure our essential maritime forces. Today, fully 50 percent of the combat units for superiority for the remainder of this century. land warfare are in reserve components. Reserve units **30** ----- perform important missions and support functions on a procurement of a medium-sized ElV. This will daily basis. Their priority for manning, training, and complement the Shuttle, and existing small and large equipment 'modernization is not based on their ElVs. In addition, selected government satellites will be peacetime status as forces "in reserve;' but on the basis designed for dual compatibility with either the Shuttle of their direct integration into the nation's operational or ElVs. plans and missions. In many cases, the sequence of In view of the increasing reliance of U.S. and allied deployment in the event of conflict would place reserve forces on space-based support, we must be prepared to component units side-by-side, and sometimes ahead of protect our space assets against hostile interference. active duty forces. Accordingly, other facets of the national security space program include development of concepts and To maximize the cost effectiveness of the Total Force techniques that allow systems to survive in crisis, and policy, we must continue to balance the combat and the development of an anti-satellite capability to deter support elements of our active and reserve force threats to U.S. space systems, and to deny an adversary structure, their costs, and attendant levels of risk. While the use of his space-based resources in war, correcting there are specific mission areas in which the role of a serious asymmetry in U.S. and Soviet space reserve components can be expanded, we must capabilities. The Soviets introduced their anti-satellite exercise care to avoid making demands on our (ASAT) system over a decade ago. Today it is the world's personnel that would fundamentally alter the nature of only operational ASAT system. The Congressionally service in the reserves. Our peacetime operational imposed ban on testing of our developmental ASAT tempo, forward deployments, and our general strategy system against targets in space leaves the Soviets with a of deterrence all require a substantial, balanced, and monopoly in ASAT capability and should be removed. ready active duty military establishment. Overall, Soviet space programs are strong and growing. Their well-publicized manned space programs, their **_SPACE SUPPORT OF_** their impending heavy-lift space launch capabilitiesambitious space scientific exploration programs, and will pose strong challenges to U.S. space leadership in **_NATIONAL SECURITY_** the near-term. In addition, these capabilities provide the base for rapid development and deployment of military space assets, in crises or war. The United States uses space systems to conduct a variety of activities that are essential to our national An emerging technology that has important security, as security, including command, control, and well as civil and commercial applications, is the communications, navigation, environmental National Aerospace Plane. The design of this plane monitoring, warning, surveillance, and treaty incorporates advanced air and space flight technologies monitoring. Support of these important activities to yield an aircraft that can function in both the requires assured U.S. access to space, supported by an atmosphere of earth and the vacuum of space. The first efficient and predictable launch capability. Therefore, flight of an experimental aerospace craft, which late last year I directed that U.S. national space launch capitalizes on important U.s. technological advantages, capability be based on a balanced mix of launchers could take place by the mid-1990s. . consisting of the Space Transportation System and Expendable Launch Vehicles (ElVs). The elements of this mix support the mission needs of the national **_INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF_** security, 'civil government, and commercial sectors ofu.s. space activities. **_NATIONAL SECURITY_** To support this approach, the Department of Defense Development and execution of a sound National has undertaken an effort to achieve the design and ' Security Strategy requires effective intelligence **31** ----- capabilities to provide thorough and accurate the severity of the threat. As part of our intelligence appreciations of actual or potential threats to our strategy we have taken a number of steps in recent national security. Early warning of developments which years to strengthen our security and counter- could place at risk key U.S. interests is vital if we are to intelligence capabilities. These efforts will continue as employ the relevant elements of national power in a a matter of high national priority. timely way, and deal with threats before they become unmanageable, or entail the risk of major conflict. **_LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT_** Our deterrence strategy relies heavily on reliable intelligence concerning potential adversaries' strategies, Conflict in the Third World can pose serious threats to forces, doctrine, strengths, weaknesses, and probable U.S. security interests. Low Intensity Conflicts, which courses of action. Intelligence also provides essential take place at levels below conventional war but above insights into how we are viewed by those adversaries. the routine, peaceful competition among states, can be An appreciation of their perceptions of our capabilities, particularly troublesome. They often involve a political will, national interests, and likely reaction to protracted struggle of competing principles and hostile provocation, provides an important measure of ideologies. low Intensity Conflicts may be waged by a the effectiveness of our deterrence. Intelligence also combination of means, including the use of political, improves our ability to detect violations of arms control economic, informational, and military instruments. They are often localized, but can have significant agreements and potential technological breakthroughs regional and global security implications. which could adversely affect the strength of our strategic or conventional deterrents. Intelligence allows Major causes of low Intensity Conflict are instability us to plan our strategies and forces to take advantage of and lack of political and economic development in the our adversaries' weaknesses, correct our own, and Third W:>rld (though Low Intensity Conflict can occur capitalize more effectively on areas of relative in areas outside the Third World as well). These advantage. conditions provide fertile ground for unrest and for The ability to conduct covert operations is an essential groups and nations wishing to exploit unrest for their own purposes. The resulting conflicts are of concern to adjunct of our intelligence capability, and allows us to the United States when they assault U.S. national deal effectively with developing threats to our security interests and the security, values, or political before they require the employment of u.s. military foundations of the United States, our friends, and allies. power or other actions entailing higher costs or risks. Low Intensity Conflict can gradually isolate the United States, its allies, and major trading partners from the The capability to deal with the hostile intelligence Third W:>rld and from each other. This isolation can be threat to the United States provides equally important manifest in economic, political, and military terms. support for our National Security Strategy. The Specifically, Low Intensity Conflict can lead to: extremely large and active intelligence services of the Soviet Union, its clients and surrogates, conduct highly - Interruption of Western access to vital resources. sophisticated collection and analysis operations - Gradual loss of U.S. military basing and access targeted against us, our allies, and friends. The Soviets rights. rely heavily on espionage, and the illegal acquisition of - Expanded threats to key sea lines of communication. Western military technology, to achieve broad strategic aims and aid materially in shifting the global - Gradual shifting of allies and trading partners "correlation of forces" to Soviet advantage. The away from the United States into positions of accommodation with hostile interests. apprehension over the past few years orspies conducting very damaging espionage operations - Expanded opportunities for Soviet political and against the United States has dramaticaly underlined military gains. **32** ----- An effective U.s. response to this form of warfare U.s. and Western interests. Therefore, we will requires the national will to sustain long-term encourage expansion of free trade, the development of commitments. The United States has addressed the private enterprise, and the expansion and manifestations of Low Intensity Conflict through a independence of local economies. U.S. development tough counter-terrorism policy; support for democratic assistance and economic aid programs facilitate these resistance movements; and political, economic, and policies. In addition, we will encourage private military assistance to developing nations to help them investment in the Third World when that investment prevent or combat low intensity challenges. supports balanced economic growth. Informational Policy and Low Intensity Conflict. Low U.S. policy for dealing with Low Intensity Conflict Intensity Conflict.is a political struggle in which ideas situations may be summarized as follows: When it is in may be as important as arms. We hold significant _u.s. interest to do 50, the United States:_ advantages over our adversaries in this area. In contrast - Will take measures to strengthen friendly nations to our adversaries, we have an open political system facing internal or external threats to their that thrives on communication and truth. We must independence and stability by systematically ensure, however, that accurate information concerning employing, in coordination with friends and allies, American ideals and objectives is available throughout the full range of political, economic, informational, the Third World; and that the resources needed to and military instruments of power. Where possible, accomplish this are available. action will be taken before instability leads to violence. Political Instruments and low Intensity Conflict. We recognize that other nations may not necessarily - Will work to ameliorate the underlying causes of develop along democratic lines identical to ours. instability and conflict in the Third World by Nevertheless, we seek to encourage the development of pursuing foreign assistance, trade, and investment political systems that protect the rights of the individual programs that promote economic development and and provide for representative government, free the growth of democratic social and political orders. institutions, and an environment in which human - May support selected resistance movements acting in dignity can flourish. We do this partially by example, opposition to regimes working against U.s. interests. and by defending our own ideals when they are Such support will be coordinated with friends and challenged. We can also promote development of allies and may contain political, informational, humane social orders by helping eliminate security economic, and military elements. threats and the underlying economic causes of unrest and instability. - Will take steps to discourage Soviet and other state- sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs to Military Instruments in low Intensity Conflict. The those who use proxies or terrorist and subversive fundamental tenet of u.s. strategy for dealing with low forces to exploit instability in the Third World. Intensity Conflict directed against our friends and allies is that military institutions in threatened states must The low Intensity Conflict strategies that support these become able to provide security for their citizens and policies must coordinate the use of a variety of policy governments. U.S. low Intensity Conflict policy, instruments among U.s. Government agencies and therefore, recognizes that indirect-rather than direct- internationally. Responses may draw on economic, applications of U.S. military power are the most political, and informational tools, as well as military appropriate and cost effective ways to achieve national assistance. goals. The principal military instrument in Low Intensity Conflict, therefore, is security assistance. Economic Policy and low Intensity Conflict. U.S. policy for low Intensity Conflict recognizes that long The primary role for U.S. armed forces in Low Intensity term political and economic development will reduce Conflict is to support and facilitate the security the underlying causes of instability of the Third World, assistance program. The"military services must also help undermine the attractiveness of totalitarian stand ready to provide more direct forms of military regimes, and eventually lead to conditions favorable to assistance when called upon. Usually, this assistance 33 ----- significant steps to define and implement policies to will consist of technical training and logistical support. counter international terrorism. These policies focus on The services and the Unified Commands must also be deterring, pre-empting and effectively reacting to prepared for the effective execution of contingency and international terrorist incidents. low Intensity Conflict peacekeeping operations when such operations are policy goes beyond this, however, and deals with the required to protect national interests. U.S. combat broader problem of supporting groups and forces will be introduced into low Intensity Conflict governments against which terrorism is being used as a situations only as a last resort and when vital national subversive weapon. interests cannot otherwise be adequately protected. We must realize that low Intensity Conflicts are Narcotics Trafficking and Low Intensity Conflict. frequently protracted struggles. In addition, most of the Narcotics trafficking can breed violence, fuel instability instruments of power that we can bring to bear on and threaten governing institutions wherever it is found. them work indirectly and over a long period of time. The vast revenues produced by illegal narcotics sales, Therefore, we must be patient in such struggles. It is and concomitant use of international financial networks important that we prevail, but especially important that to launder the proceeds of these transactions, can we recognize that we often cannot do so easily or promote the type of instability that becomes a breeding quickly. On the other hand, we do hold important ground for low Intensity Conflict. For these reasons, advantages. We represent a model of political and our policies for dealing with drug trafficking provide economic development that promises freedom from important support for our efforts to deal with low political domination and economic privation. If we can protect our own security, and maintain an environment Intensity Conflict. of reasonable stability and open trade and communication throughout the Third World, political, Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict. Under some economic, and social forces will eventually work to our circumstances, terrorism can be an important aspect of low Intensity Conflict. This Administration has taken advantage. 34 ----- **Executing the Strategy** ##### v. This portion of the report discusses U.S. capabilities to can influence growth in positive directions. The overall execute the National Security Strategy discussed in goal of our efforts is to create a more stable world in preceding chapters with particular emphasis on those which humane social and political orders can flourish areas where resource shortfalls impede effective and which can support balanced economic growth. In achievement of important national strategy objectives. short, our foreign operations programs are intended to support the types of positive change that will protect our national interests over the long term. A stable **_FOREIGN POLICY_** world whose nations can meet the economic needs oftheir citizens and respect individual rights is a world that is safer for the United States and its friends. **_CAPABILITIES_** We spend only about two percent of our annual federal The United States depends on foreign assistance and budget on the various foreign assistance programs. This other foreign operations programs to protect national is indisputably money well spent. The good we do, the security, promote its interests, and communicate its problems we help solve, and the threats we counter values and principles throughout the world. Our through our assistance programs far outweigh the costs. foreign operations programs include economic and They represent a highly leveraged investment. military assistance, food aid, development assistance, Nevertheless, our foreign assistance programs do not international education and communication programs, receive the support they deserve from the Congress. In the overseas operations of the State Department, and the last few years, Administration foreign operations many other important functions. budget requests have been severely cut by the Congress. Although all programs must bear the burden These programs convert our foreign policy into positive, of reducing the budget deficit, the cuts in foreign visible actions which provide assistance to people who assistance have often been grossly disproportionate face severe economic privation, and promote the when compared with other programs. economic and political development so important to support free and democratic societies. The programs This is penny wise and pound foolish. We cannot also help governments seeking to defend themselves dismiss foreign assistance as a "give-away" program that from internal and external threats. By helping our wastes money which could better be spent on friends enhance their security, we can help create the Americans. In the first place, such a characterization is necessary preconditions for economic and political factually wrong. Much of the money we spend in development. foreign assistance programs goes to purchase goods and services produced here in the United States. Our Equally important, our programs tell people about food aid programs are one of the best examples, but American ideals and values. By building greater other programs, such as foreign military sales, also understanding of what the United States stands for, we directly increase U.S. exports. **35** ----- Furthermore, our assistance programs work to solve Congress cut our request to $13.6 billion. The effect of problems, relieve hardships, and ameliorate conflicts this cut is devastating. After we meet our commitment that, if neglected, could degenerate into crises to the Middle East peace process, we have grossly adversely affecting U.S. interests. Unless we can be an inadequate funds left to meet other requirements. As a active participant in encouraging the type of world result, we are unable to fulfill our commitments to order we desire, we may find ourselves compelled to countries that provide us with strategically important defend our interests with more direct, costly, and basing and access rights. Indeed, some programs will painful means. have to be cut over SO percent this year. We face the danger of falling behind in programs that are designed We face a foreign assistance funding crisis under the to help key regions beset with severe economic and FY1987 budget voted by Congress. In that budget, we security problems. We also can do little to help Third sought $16.2 billion for Foreign Economic and Military World debtors get back on thei r feet. Assistance. That assistance was carefully calculated to support a broad'variety of important U.S. national The cuts signal a policy of retreat. Clearly, in the next security objectives. few months the Congress and the Executive Branch must work together to find solutions to these funding Specifically: problems so that we can resume our positive role. These programs are a key part of our first line of - Thirty-four percent of that budget was to go to Israel defense in protecting American freedoms, and must and Egypt, reinforcing our vital search for lasting enjoy full bipartisan support to be effective. I solicit peace in that region. such support for the FY 1987 supplemental - Twenty-six percent was intended for military access appropriations request which has been submitted to states and countries hosting U.S. military forces such Congress. as the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Greece and Turkey. - Eleven percent would have gone to Central America and the Caribbean. **_DEFENSE CAPABILITIES_** - Seventeen percent was for countries which share our democratic values and need our help to advance Defense resources. The successful execution of any them, such as Thailand and Colombia; where new National Security Strategy depends on the availability democracies have emerged, such as Bolivia and of adequate resources. Strategies which depend on Uruguay; and where fundamental economic reforms unrealistic or unachievable assumptions about resource are taking place, such as Ecuador and Senegal. availability are doomed to failure. At the same time, recent history has taught us that the time between the - All other country programs accounted for on Iy three onset of a crisis and the need for a national security percent of the total foreign aid request. Some are response has dWindled over the years. The days when poverty-stricken African states to which we are nations could respond to crises by raising, training, and directing our humanitarian and technical assistance equipping new forces are gone. This fact of life, programs. Others, such as Burma, are active partners coupled with the sober knowledge that crisis situations with us in the war against international narcotics can burst upon the world with startling suddenness, trafficking. means that we must be able to deter aggression and - The remaining nine percent of our assistance was to infringement of our vital interes~s at any moment, and go to international organizations, multilateral at places far removed from the United States. development banks, the Peace Corps, refugee assistance, narcotics control efforts, and AID non- In practical terms, this means that the Administration country programs. must not adopt strategies that our country cannot afford, **36** ----- adequacy. We and our allies must have credible and that our military leaders cannot and must not base military responses, the prospects of which convince our their plans on resources that are beyond the nation's adversaries that aggression would entail unacceptably capability to provide. It also means that Congress, high costs for them. How much military power is operating from a shared view of U.S. national interests, required to deter is inevitably a subjective question, and the objectives which support them, must provide involving our sense of how others view our military the Executive with the resources necessary to capabilities and our political will to use them, if implement a realistic, prudent and effective strategy. necessary. In this respect, our forces must not only be adequate, but must be unmistakably perceived as Providing for the common defense is the most adequate to defend our interests, execute our strategy, important responsibility of the federal government- and preserve our alliance relationships. shared equally by the Executive and Legislative branches. Partnership is the key to its successful Without question, the defense program required to execution. In that spirit, in the early 1980's-for the support our strategy is affordable. In fact, in the past third time since World War II-Congress and the seven years, Americans have devoted an average of onIy Executive joined together in a concerted effort to 6.1 percent of GNP to defense-well under rates in the rebuild and strengthen our military capabilities. 19S0s and 1960s, which ranged from 7 percent to 9.2 However, unlike past build-ups, which were percent. Likewise, at about 27 percent of federal characterized by high rates of consumption to support outlays, defense spending falls well below the combat operations in Asian conflicts, we focused this peacetime average of 38 percent during the postwar time on investment. There were important manpower era. In both instances, the increases of the early 1980s and readiness problems to be overcome as well, but it seem large only because the spending of the late 1970s was clear that only an increase in investment would was so severely depressed. produce the necessary positive, sustained impact on the military balance. In the FY88-89 Defense Budget, I have not asked the Congress to approve defense increases similar to those This action was essential to redress the serious of the early 1980s. At the same time, the Congress must imbalances between u.s. and Soviet capabilities which act positively to protect the gains that we together have had emerged during the 1970's-a period of achieved. We must not continue on the path of real unprecedented military investment by the Soviets, decline in defense investment established during the aimed at shifting the global "correlation of forces" past two years. The time has come for us to join decisively in their favor. Had we not arrested this together in supporting moderate, sustainable increases dangerous trend, the damage to our most fundamental in our defense budget, consistent with the economic national interests would have been profound. growth we expect for the nation as a whole, and with Fortunately, the Congress and the American people the long-term challenge which the Soviet Union recognized the essentiality of rebuilding the country's presents to the free world. Together, as a nation, we defenses. As a result, we have achieved great progress. must break the pattern of costly and inefficient ups and Our level of investment roughly matches that of the downs in defense spending, and support the path of Soviets'. However, the legacy of a decade in which sustained, reasonable growth, at a rate which will Soviet investment far exceeded our own remains, and allow the continuing modernization of our strategic must be corrected. ~nd conventional forces, while maintaining adequate levels of military readiness, sustainability, and force Judgments about the adequacy of our defense program structure. ultimately come down to questions of risk. Put in its Military Forces. Earlier in this report I set forth our starkest form, the issue is: how much risk to the strategy for the maintenance of deterrence against survival of this country and its free institutions are we strategic nuclear or conventional attack on the United willing to accept? Military forces which are unsuccessful in deterring major war fail the first test of States or its all ies. **37** ----- The execution of our strategy to maintain a credible combined-arms capability that will enable our nuclear deterrent through the modernization of our divisions to maintain a qualitative edge over the strategic forces has been successfuI to date. Major much larger Soviet forces. elements of the Strategic Modernization Program have - Ongoing modernization programs for our tactical air been approved by the Congress and ouf strategic forces forces supplement these ground force programs. The are becoming more sUlvivable and effective each day. ability of our tactical air forces to maintain local air We are improving the capability and credibility of our diversified strategic force mix and will continue to do superiority and support ground forces requires so well into the next century. continuing improvement. - The program to revitalize our special operations As we look forward to the future, we are examining forces is being fully implemented as one of our options that wi II allow us to capitalize on the progress highest priorities. This program will ensure that we made in the Strategic Defense Initiative to render have highly trained forces immediately available to ballistic missiles obsolete and place deterrence on a respond to a broad range of crises and Low Intensity more stable long-term foundation. Strong support for Conflict situations, when our interests so require. this program, which exploits our strengths in advanced technology, advances both our deterrence and our - Improvements in c'l are of continuing high priority arms control goals. Full funding of the FYBB-B9 budget in order to strengthen the ability to employ our request for SOl is essential to sustain the important conventional forces to their full capability. progress made to date and allow the program to proceed at an efficient pace. - New short and long range mobility forces are improving our capability to transport and support The survivability of our land-based ICBM forces will our forward units, and to deploy forces in increase dramatically in the years ahead. as we move contingencies. The ability to build up military power from older, fixed basing modes to new mobile basing rapidly in strategically important areas on the modes that contribute to stability through increased Eurasian periphery is essential for deterrence, and for survivability. The new concepts for mobile basing of neutralizing the geographical advantages of the the Peacekeeper and the Small ICBM will revitalize the Soviet Union. ICBM leg of the strategic triad, significantly improve - The warfighting capability of our naval forces is deterrence, and allow implementation of the Scowcroft improving markedly with the increase in the quantity Commission recommendations in a manner consistent with earlier Congressional gUidance. and quality of ships and aircraft. This long-term program to assure our ability to use the world's As we continue to improve our strategic deterrent oceans in peace and war requires continuing forces, we must be mindful of the fact that our support. conventional forces are the first line of deterrence, and an essential means of supporting U.S. interests in crises The full impact of these major modernization programs short of general war. With the emergence of rough will be felt over the decade ahead. Accomplishment of nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet our objectives will greatly increase our conventional Union, conventional forces have become even more deterrent capability. The net improvement in our important to maintaining a secure deterrent. Our defense posture will not be marginal; it will be current conventional force modernization program fundamental. Full support of these programs is contributes to a strong forward defense posture. essential to avoid deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet conventional force balance, and assure that we have Key elements include: conventional forces capable of conducting forward - The Army's modernization program, which is based defense of our interests without recourse to nuclear on the new Air Land Battle doctrine, and provides a weapons. **38** ----- strategy, military requirements, and our acquisition As we pursue the qualitative upgrading of our forces, programs; and ensure that we realize maximum we must continue to refine our plans and concepts for military benefit for every defense dollar. employing them. Our military strategy is complex. To accomplish their tasks the Services have developed Important organizational changes have occurred; others appropriate doctrines, organizations and tactics. are impending. New Unified Commands for Ensuring that these are melded into a coherent Transportation and Special Operations Forces will National Military Strategy presents a challenge in the become operational this year, and we will shortly continuously changing international environment. This establish the newly authorized position of Assistant problem is magnified by the diversity of potential Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low contingencies within the spectrum of conventional Intensity Conflict, concurrently activating the conflict. At the theater level, regional strategies have Congressionally-mandated Board for Low Intensity been developed by the Unified Commanders. These Conflict within the National Security Council strategies, together with other considerations global in organization. The authority of the Chairman, Joint character, or which cross CINCS' lines of authority, are Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commanders, has been integrated into the National Military Strategy. That strengthened; and the new position of Vice Chairman, strategy provides an effective basis for the employment Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been established. of our military capabilities worldwide, in a In 1986, the Congress approved my proposal to create coordinated, mutually supporting fashion. That strategy an Under Secretary of Defense for AcqUisition. This undergoes periodic reviews to revalidate and update its appointment has led to a reorganization of essential elements. The results will not only improve procurement functions within the Department of our capability for employment of military forces, but Defense. These changes are intended to achieve a provide stronger conceptual support for development of major reduction in the time required to field new our conventional force R&D and procurement technology and equipment, to involve the professional programs. In doing so, we are always mindful of the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more directly in relationship between nuclear and conventional the identification and validation of military deterrence. Our long-term objective of reducing our requirements, and to improve the efficiency of the reliance on nuclear weapons, if successful, demands acqUisition process generally. To promote technological special attention to maintaining both the effectiveness innovation, the role of the Defense Advanced Research of our conventional deterrent and strong ·alliance Projects Agency in prototyping and other advanced relationships. development work on joint programs has been expanded. Improving Efficiency. An important part of the activity To aid our understanding of future requirements, last aimed at supporting our National Security Strategy fall we established.