**ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND**

**STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY REVIEW**

1. In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the Government undertook to publish an

annual report on the implementation of the National Security Strategy and of the
Strategic Defence and Security Review for the Joint Parliamentary Committee on
the National Security Strategy. This is the third Annual Report.

2. This report outlines the developing global context, including security risks that

have emerged over the last year. It summarises significant progress against the
National Security Tasks and on related issues including defence transformation.
Finally, it notes wider issues and offers initial reflections on lessons identified to
date. In taking this approach, the report seeks to respond to JCNSS comments
on the 2012 Annual Report.

3. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review recommended a wide-ranging

package of work to improve our national security and better protect the interests
of the UK at home and overseas. It set out a complex and challenging set of
commitments, in many cases requiring early investment to deliver the benefits.
Overseen by the National Security Council, which drives both long-term strategy
and operational delivery, implementation is overall on track: good progress has
been made on over 90% of those commitments and many are now fully
implemented. The Government is committed to maintaining its focus to ensure
that progress is maintained and all of the commitments delivered.

**A. Global context of security challenges since November 2012.**

4. Over the past year, domestic and international security challenges facing the UK

have continued to evolve. Regional conflict and instability in the Middle East and
North Africa have persisted. Syria, despite the deal on removal of chemical
weapons, remains riven by conflict, with implications for wider peace and stability
in the region and beyond. Al Qa‟ida and associated terrorists have also exploited
areas of Yemen, Mali and other regions lacking effective governance and
extending into sub-Saharan Africa. But we have also seen the first significant
breakthrough on the Iran nuclear dossier for a decade.

5. The 2010 National Security Strategy identified a number of major risks, classified

into three tiers, which the adaptable posture of the Strategic Defence and
Security Review was designed to address. This section provides a brief overview
of the extent to which these risks have materialised during the past year.

6. While some risks remain as they were (the threat of a conventional attack on the

UK by another state remains low), others have seen a shift in their overall nature
(the threat from international terrorism has evolved and regionalised); and some
continue to grow (unconventional threats from state and non-state actors, in
areas such as cyber and organised crime). Economic factors - lack of growth in
Europe, uncertainty in the Euro-zone and the EU‟s neighbourhood - have
continued to provide context for our national security interests.

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**Tier one**
****

**International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests, including a**

**chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack by terrorists; and / or a**
**significant increase in the levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland.**

The threat in the UK from international terrorism remains “Substantial”. The threat
from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism remains at “Severe” in Northern Ireland and
“Moderate” in Great Britain.

**Hostile attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cyber-**

**crime.**

Cyber attacks continue to cost the UK economy billions of pounds per annum and
pose a significant national security threat. In response, a sustained National Cyber
Security Programme, now in its delivery phase, is transforming our understanding of
the cyber threat and improving the UK‟s cyber defences in parallel with greater
investment from the private sector. Furthermore, as previously announced, the
Ministry of Defence is investing in offensive cyber capabilities to broaden options in
dealing with the cyber threat.

**A major accident or natural hazard which requires a national response,**

**such as severe coastal flooding affecting three or more regions of the UK,**
**or an influenza pandemic.**

Government continues to support the cross-government pandemic influenza
programme, and closely monitors cases of influenza and other infectious diseases
across the globe. There have been no recent incidents of avian influenza on the UK
mainland; variants of the virus have, however, been recorded in other areas of the
world including cases of the highly pathogenic H7N9 in China. At this stage the virus
is not transmissible between mammals; however, another milder variant, H7N7,
recently detected in Italy, is transmissible. A virus which is both highly transmissible
and potentially fatal to humans remains possible.

The year ended with the most serious coastal flooding for over 60 years. Between 4[th]
and 7[th] December 2013, we saw a combination of a deep depression and strong
winds driving a storm surge, large waves and high tides leading to record sea levels
along many parts of the coast, some of which were higher than those seen during
the devastating floods of January 1953. Over 2,800 kilometres of flood defences
were put to the test by the coastal surge and over 160,000 homes and businesses
received a flood warning. Initial estimates suggest that more than 800,000 properties
would have flooded were they not protected by flood defences. However, around
1,400 properties were flooded - some which were undefended and others where
flood defences failed - but there were no major impacts on critical national
infrastructure. For very high risks such as flooding, the Government ensures that
bespoke arrangements and capabilities are in place. The success of this strategy
has been demonstrated in the response to this East Coast flooding, where national
monitoring rapidly identified the impending flood and communicated the risk to local
responders. This early warning enabled mobilisation at the local level, preparations

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in line with their emergency plans, and orderly evacuations to take place where
necessary. The arrangements appear to have worked very well, but we will be
looking closely to identify lessons; and where more needs to be done we will make
improvements.

**An international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK, and its**

**allies as well as other states and non-state actors.**

The last 12 months have seen continuing crises within states, for example in Mali
and Syria. In the case of Syria, the risk remains that the crisis may spread beyond
Syria‟s borders in a manner that could result in an international crisis between
states.

**Tier two**
****

**An attack on the UK or its Overseas Territories by another state or proxy**

**using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons.**

None.

**Risk of major instability, insurgency or civil war overseas which creates an**

**environment that terrorists can exploit to threaten the UK.**

Over the year, we have seen continuing instability and conflict overseas, which have
the potential to lead to the development of a terrorist threat to the UK or its interests.
In particular, the risk of a terrorist threat to the UK emerging from the conflict in Syria
is a serious concern. This is in addition to the risks we face from instability or conflict
in other areas of the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel and South Asia.

**A significant increase in the level of organised crime affecting the UK.**

The UK continues to be targeted by organised crime, with law enforcement
estimating that there are around 5,500 active organised crime groups operating
against the UK, comprising about 37,000 people. A recent Home Office study
provides the most accurate estimate to date of the social and economic costs of
organised crime in this country at a minimum of £24 billion a year[1], lying within the
previous estimate of £20-40 billion per year. These figures represent a more
accurate judgement of the threat from organised crime than ever before.
****

**Severe disruption to information received, transmitted or collected by**

**satellites, possibly as the result of a deliberate attack by another state.**

None.

1 Understanding Organised Crime: Estimating the scale and the social and economic costs – October
2013.

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**Tier three**
****

**A large scale conventional military attack on the UK by another state (not**

**involving the use of CBRN weapons) resulting in fatalities and damage to**
**infrastructure within the UK.**

None.

****

**A significant increase in the level of terrorists, organised criminals, illegal**

**immigrants and illicit goods trying to cross the UK border to enter the UK.**

Since 2012, we have seen evidence that the level of both illegal immigrants and illicit
goods trying to cross the UK border has increased in certain areas. This includes the
number of clandestine entrants claiming to be Syrian and Albanian, the increased
detection of fraudulent documents and goods, and the increased marketing of new
psychoactive drugs. Regional conflict (including in Syria and Egypt) has increased
the potential threat to the security of our borders. Continued international capacitybuilding as well as improvements to pre-departure checks work to mitigate wider
threats as a result of regional conflict. In light of the increased threats to the border,
the Government has tightened security by undertaking 100% checks for all
individuals crossing the border; increasing vigilance at the border to detect trafficking
and protect vulnerable people; implementing new technology to detect clandestines
attempting to enter the UK; and by better profiling and targeting to intercept
illegitimate and dangerous goods.

**Disruption to oil or gas supplies to the UK, or price instability, as a result of**

**war, accident, major political upheaval or deliberate manipulation of supply**
**by producers.**

Over the last year, we have seen some volatility of oil price, but not such as to lead
to release of International Energy Agency oil stocks.

**A major release of radioactive material from a civil nuclear site within the**

**UK which affects one or more regions.**

None.

**A conventional attack by a state on another NATO or EU member to which**

**the UK would have to respond.**

None.

****

**An attack on a UK overseas territory as the result of a sovereignty dispute**

**or a wider regional conflict.**

Although Argentina has continued to challenge UK sovereignty of the Falkland
Islands through diplomatic activity and measures designed to isolate the Islands and
cause them economic damage, HMG continues to safeguard the rights of the

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Islanders to self-determination; and there has been no military escalation, nor any
change to the defensive posture we have maintained on the Falklands since the
conflict in 1982.

**Short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources (e.g.**

**food, minerals) essential to the UK.**

None.

**B. Overall progress with national security tasks and transformation.**

7. The 2010 National Security Strategy set out the major goals of ensuring a secure

and resilient UK and of shaping a stable world, along with ways to achieve these.
The Strategic Defence and Security Review detailed the various means through
which we planned to deliver these goals. Since 2010, we have been
systematically tracking our progress against the commitments in this plan.

8. Chart 1 illustrates the trends in implementation of all 220 commitments made in

the Strategic Defence and Security Review as assessed at six monthly intervals
since 2010. This uses a simple colour-coded “traffic-light” system ranging from
blue denoting “completed / delivered” through to black meaning “extremely
problematic”.

9. Over the past three years, the Government has steadily implemented the

commitments made. Over 90% of our commitments are on track: 28% are
completed, 33% fully on track, 33% satisfactory, and 6% problematic.

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**Number of commitments**

**March 2012**

**October 2012**

**March 2013**

**0**

**October 2013**

**Extremely**


**Chart 1: Progress in implementation of Strategic Defence and Security Review**
commitments as assessed at six-monthly intervals since October 2010.


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|National Security Strategy core objectives: To ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and way of life from all major risks that can affect us directly; and to shape a stable world by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or British interests overseas, and applying our instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment.|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Extremely problematic|Very problematic|Problematic|Satisfactory|Fully on track|Completed||
|Task 1: To identify and monitor national security risks and opportunities.|||3|5|3|1|12|
|1a. A coordinated approach to early warning and horizon scanning||||1|1||2|
|1b. Strategic intelligence on potential threats to national security and opportunities for the UK to act||||1|||1|
|1c. Coordinated analysis and assessment of the highest priorities||||1|2|1|4|
|1d. Investment in technologies to support the gathering of communications data vital for national security and law enforcement|||1||||1|
|1e. Intelligence assets to support the core military, diplomatic and domestic security and resilience requirements set out below, and our economic prosperity|||2|2|||4|
|||||||||
|Task 2: Tackle at root the causes of instability.|||0|1|4|4|9|
|2a. An effective international development programme making the optimal contribution to national security within its overall objective of poverty reduction, with the Department for International Development focusing significantly more effort on priority national security and fragile states|||||1||1|
|2b. Civilian and military stabilisation capabilities that can be deployed early together to help countries avoid crisis or deal with conflict||||1|3|1|5|
|2c. Targeted programmes in the UK, and in countries posing the greatest threat to the UK, to stop people becoming terrorists||||||3|3|
|||||||||
|Task 3: Exert influence to exploit opportunities and manage risks.|||0|8|6|4|18|
|3a. A Diplomatic Service that supports our key multilateral and bilateral relationships and the obligations that come from our status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a leading member of NATO, the EU and other international organisations||||4|1||5|
|3b. A Foreign and Commonwealth Office-led global overseas network that focuses on safeguarding the UK‟s national security, building its prosperity, and supporting UK nationals around the world||||2|1|1|4|
|3c. Coordinated cross-government effort overseas to build the capacity of priority national security and fragile states to take increasing responsibility for their own stability||||||1|1|
|3d. Strategic military power projection to enhance security, deter or contain potential threats, and support diplomacy||||2|4|2|8|
|||||||||
|Task 4: Enforce domestic law and strengthen international norms to help tackle those who threaten the UK and our interests, including maintenance of underpinning technical expertise in key areas.|||0|10|3|6|19|
|4a. Law enforcement capability to investigate and where possible bring to justice terrorists and the most seriously harmful organised criminal groups impacting on the UK||||6|2|4|12|
|4b. Continuous development of the rules-based international system||||2||1|3|
|4c. Stronger multilateral approaches for countering proliferation and securing fissile material and expertise from malicious use||||1|1|1|3|
|4d. Retention of our chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear science and technology capabilities that contribute to counter-proliferation and our response to the potential use of such materials by terrorist or state actors||||1|||1|
|||||||||
|Task 5: Protect the UK and our interests at home, at our border and internationally, to address physical and electronic threats from state and non-state actors.|||3|11|7|13|34|
|5a. A minimum effective nuclear deterrent||||1|2|1|4|
|5b. Secure borders|||3|3|1|2|9|
|5c. Security and intelligence services and police counter-terrorism capability to disrupt life-threatening terrorist threats to the UK||||||2|2|
|5d. Military capabilities to help protect the UK from major terrorist attack||||2||1|3|
|5e. An independent ability to defend the Overseas Territories militarily||||||1|1|
|5f. Investment in new and flexible capabilities such as cyber to meet emerging risks and threats||||5|4|6|15|
|||||||||
|Task 6: Help resolve conflicts and contribute to stability. Where necessary, intervene overseas, including the legal use of coercive force in support of the UK’s vital interests, and to protect our overseas territories and people.|||0|3|6|6|15|
|6a. An integrated approach to building stability overseas, bringing together better diplomatic, development, military and other national security tools||||1|2|1|4|
|6b. Armed forces capable of both stabilisation and intervention operations||||2|4|4|10|
|6c. A civilian response scaled to support concurrency and scale of military operations||||||1|1|
|6d. The military ability to help evacuate UK citizens from crises overseas|||||||0|
|||||||||
|Task 7: Provide resilience for the UK by being prepared for all kinds of emergencies, able to recover from shocks and to maintain essential services.|||3|6|5|6|20|
|7a. Security and resilience of the infrastructure most critical to keeping the country running (including nuclear facilities) against attack, damage or destruction||||||1|1|
|7b. Crisis management capabilities able to anticipate and respond to a variety of major domestic emergencies and maintain the business of government|||1|2|||3|
|7c. Resilient supply and distribution systems for essential services|||2|4|1|4|11|
|7d. Effective, well organised local response to emergencies in the UK, building on the capabilities of local responders, businesses and communities|||||3|1|4|
|7e. Enhanced central government and Armed Forces planning, coordination and capabilities to help deal with the most serious emergencies|||||1||1|
|||||||||
|Task 8: Work in alliances and partnerships wherever possible to generate stronger responses.|||4|14|9|1|28|
|8a. Collective security through NATO as the basis for territorial defence of the UK, and stability of our European neighbourhood, as well as an outward-facing EU that promotes security and prosperity.|||3|4|4||11|
|8b. Our contribution to international military coalitions to focus on areas of comparative national advantage valued by key allies, especially the United States, such as our intelligence capabilities and highly capable elite forces||||5|3||8|
|8c. Greater sharing of military capabilities, technologies and programmes, and potentially more specialisation, working with key allies, including France, and based on appropriate formal guarantees where necessary|||1|5|2||8|
|8d. A Defence Industrial and Technology policy that seeks to secure the independence of action we need for our Armed Forces, while allowing for increased numbers of off-the-shelf purchases and greater promotion of defence exports||||||1|1|
|Defence transformation 1 12 21 11 45||||||||
|Defence transformation|||||||45|
|SDSR implementation oversight, reporting and revision 2 9 9 20||||||||
|SDSR implementation oversight, reporting and revision|||||||20|
|Overall Red/Amber/Green progress status figures 0 0 14 72 73 61 220||||||||


**Table 1: Progress with National Security Tasks and related planning guidelines,**
defence transformation, and Strategic Defence and Security Review
implementation oversight: total number of Strategic Defence and Security Review
commitments in progress status categories as assessed in October 2013.

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10. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review set

out eight cross-cutting National Security Tasks supported by planning guidelines.
These reflect the risks and related challenges facing the country, and specify the
ways of achieving our goals. The Strategic Defence and Security Review detailed
the means of delivery.

11. For October 2013, Table 1 shows progress towards the eight National Security

Tasks along with defence transformation measures and the processes introduced
for Strategic Defence and Security Review implementation oversight. The Table
shows the total number of commitments in each progress category, colour-coded
as in Chart 1. Some Tasks are essentially on track in that more commitments
are judged either fully on track or completed than otherwise. This is the case for
tackling the root causes of instability, exerting influence to exploit opportunities
and manage risks, protecting the UK and our interests, helping to resolve
conflicts and contribute to stability, and providing resilience for the UK. It is also
the case for defence transformation and SDSR implementation oversight.

12. The picture for other tasks is more mixed in that a number of commitments have

elements requiring action. This is the case for identifying and monitoring national
security risks and opportunities, enforcing domestic law and strengthening
international norms, and working in alliances and partnerships. In many of these
cases, our progress is constrained by factors impossible for the UK to control
directly, for example international macro-economic, political and commercial
developments.

13. The following sub-sections provide further detail on progress with the

Government‟s priority commitments for each National Security Task and for
defence transformation. Progress with Tasks is rated as either essentially “on
track” or more “mixed” as defined above.

**i.** **Identify and monitor national security risks and opportunities**

14. HMG is committed to reviewing the National Security Risk Assessment

(NSRA) every two years. The next NSRA is due at the end of 2014. It will in turn
inform the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security
Review. The aim of the NSRA will remain: to identify, assess and prioritise all
major disruptive risks which seriously threaten UK national security interests, at
home and abroad, in the next 5 to 20 years, which are of a scale or impact
sufficient to require action from Government.

15. In preparation for the 2014 exercise, work has already begun to capture the

lessons from the production of the 2010 and 2012 NSRA, and to conduct a
thorough review of the methods to ensure that the NSRA remains a robust
evidence-base to inform the National Security Strategy, including the use of
expertise from outside Government.

16. It has been a Government priority to introduce a programme to preserve the

ability of the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to have the

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access they require to communications data. Communications data have
played a role in 95 per cent of all serious organised crime investigations and
every major Security Service counter-terrorism operation over the past decade.
The Communications Capabilities Development Programme continues to
provide essential capabilities under existing legislative frameworks, ensuring that
the police and other public authorities have the capacity to detect, prevent,
disrupt and investigate crime. As communications technologies and services
continue to evolve, we need to ensure that the communications data needed by
the police and others continue to be available. Changes to the existing legislative
framework may be required to maintain these vital capabilities.

17. The overall rating for this Task, taking account of all commitments, is “mixed” as

defined in paragraph 12.

**ii.** **Tackle at root the causes of instability**

18. Failed or fragile states provide an environment conducive to terrorism; therefore

HMG‟s priorities for this task cover both Building Stability Overseas and CounterTerrorism.

19. There are two priorities under the Building Stability Overseas **Strategy**

(BSOS). The first has been to move Government‟s efforts to up-stream conflict
prevention. To achieve this, Government has improved its Early Warning
Analysis, created an Early Action Facility (EAF) of £20 million per annum, and
increased the number of Conflict Pool projects that look to deliver outcomes that
support up-stream conflict prevention. Over the last year, the Government has
reviewed both the risks and the conflict mitigation strategies for a number of
countries. In Financial Years 2012/13 and 2013/14, we have so far spent or
committed some £29 million in rapid response work in Syria, Libya, Lebanon,
Somalia and Mali. We continue to provide multi-year funding for Conflict Pool
programmes, as effective conflict prevention strategies sometimes take longer to
deliver results.

20. The other BSOS commitment is to increase to 30% the proportion of UK Official

Development Assistance (ODA) that supports fragile and conflict-affected states
by 2014/15, doubling the amount we spend on such activities by the end of the
Spending Review period. The Autumn Statement confirmed that the government
will meet its commitment to spend 0.7% of the UK‟s Gross National Income (GNI)
on ODA for the first time in 2013, and meet our promise to the world‟s poorest.
We will be the first G8 country to reach the 0.7% target.

21. DFID‟s allocation process, following the Bilateral Aid Review, will ensure that the

Spending Review commitment for 30% of ODA to be directed to conflict-affected
and fragile states by 2014/15 will be met. Scenario planning, and the ability to
respond flexibly to changing circumstances, in terms of the choice of partners,
instruments and objectives, will be critical. Circumstances on the ground,
particularly in the most difficult contexts, will be constantly monitored by DFID
Ministers.

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22. With clear strategic guidance from the National Security Council, a new £1 billion

**Conflict, Stability and Security Fund will build on the success of the existing**
Conflict Pool by bringing together more resources for these activities. This will
ensure a strong cross-government approach that draws on the most effective
combination of defence, diplomacy, development and security assistance to
tackle the causes and manifestations of conflict and instability abroad, as set out
in the National Security and Building Stability Overseas Strategies.

23. The Fund will be accompanied by real changes to decision-making structures

and the analysis that underpins these, including by refining the Countries at Risk
of Instability Index. We aim to put new governance arrangements in place before
2015/16.

24. The Counter-Terrorism priority under this task has been to review our most

sensitive and controversial counter-terrorism and security powers. The
Government review of counter-terrorism and security powers was published in
January 2011 and resulted in changes to counter-terrorism legislation. In
December 2011, control orders were abolished and replaced with Terrorism
Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). When we cannot prosecute or
deport, a range of disruptions are available, including TPIMs which give the
Security Service and police powerful measures to help manage the risk posed by
such individuals.

25. The review of counter-terrorism powers also recommended that the limit on pre
charge detention should be reduced from 28 to 14 days. This change was
introduced through the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, which received Royal
Assent on 1[st] May 2012. The review also led to new stop and search powers
under section 47A of the Terrorism Act. To date there has been no use of these
powers.

26. Powers contained in Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 enable the police to

stop, search and question people at the border and at ports. The Government
has completed a review of the operation of Schedule 7 and a public consultation
on proposals to amend how the powers might operate in future. We have
published the Government‟s response to that consultation; and proposals to
amend the legislation have been included in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime
and Policing Bill currently before Parliament.

27. The killing of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich earlier this year was the impetus

for the Prime Minister to set up the Extremism Task Force (ETF) to identify those
areas where our current approach to tackling extremism and radicalisation was
lacking. The ETF reported on 4[th] December and set out a range of practical steps
to tackle all forms of extremism. One of the conclusions of the Task Force was
that we have been too reticent about challenging extreme Islamist ideologies in
the past, in part because of a misplaced concern that attacking Islamist
extremism equates to an attack on Islam itself.

28. Overseas, the Government has continued to work closely with international

partners to mitigate the threat posed by terrorist groups, in particular Al Qa‟ida

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and its affiliates. Much of this work has focused on building security and justice
capacity within those countries seeking to contain a terrorist threat, including
through the establishment of justice and human rights partnerships, as set out by
the Foreign Secretary in his February 2013 speech on Countering Terrorism
Overseas. It also includes activity to counter extremist influences which originate
overseas and can radicalise individuals in the UK and elsewhere. This work is
supported by the FCO‟s Counter-Terrorism Programme fund and coordinated
with action undertaken through the EU, UN and the Global Counter-Terrorism
Forum (GCTF). Defence continues to play a pivotal role, principally through
capacity-building projects in other countries across a spectrum of military
competences. The FCO coordinated efforts to resolve terrorist kidnaps of British
nationals, cooperating closely with the MOD when the use of military assets was
required, and worked with the travel industry to raise awareness of areas where
the risk of kidnap is high. At Lough Erne, Leaders focused on the issues of
terrorism in North West Africa and agreed for the first time unequivocally to reject
ransom payments to terrorists. G8 Counter-Terrorism Advisers have
subsequently recommended a focus on: how States could collaborate on
preventing kidnaps before they take place, through training and the sharing of
travel advice; support for the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum as the mechanism
to coordinate counter-terrorism support in North and West Africa; and how
respective state‟s crisis machinery could benefit from each other‟s shared
experience.

29. HMG reviewed the National Security Risks Assessment at the end of 2012 and

concluded that terrorism remained a Tier One risk for national security.

30. The overall rating for this Task, taking account of all commitments, is “on track”

as defined in paragraph 11.

**iii.** **Exert influence to exploit opportunities and manage risks**

31. HMG‟s priorities under this heading lie in regional / country strategies (which also

concern structural reform and implementation) and in defence.

32. Our diplomatic network is the essential infrastructure of Britain‟s influence in the

world. To support the UK in the global race for growth we are significantly
strengthening our network, deploying more staff to the fastest growing regions,
up-grading existing posts and opening new ones. In total, we are opening or upgrading up to 20 new Embassies, consulates or trade offices, including offices
which are now open in El Salvador, Liberia, Haiti, Laos and South Sudan, and
deploying around 300 extra staff in more than 20 countries. The work we have in
hand at the FCO is designed to ensure that Britain‟s influence in the world is
expanding, not shrinking, that we are connected to the fastest growing parts of
the globe, and that we retain a global leadership role on the greatest challenges
of our time.

33. We have now opened or up-graded fourteen posts: Port-au-Prince (Haiti),

Mogadishu (Somalia), Juba (South Sudan), Abidjan (Cote d‟Ivoire), Bishkek
(Kyrgyzstan), San Salvador (El Salvador), Antananarivo (Madagascar), Vientiane

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(Laos), Calgary (Canada), Recife (Brazil), Seattle (USA), Monrovia (Liberia),
Hyderabad (India), and Asunción (Paraguay).

34. Work is underway on opening a new Deputy High Commission in Chandigarh

(India) early next year, where our new Deputy High Commissioner is already in
place. We are seeking approval from the Indian authorities to open further offices
around India. We are in discussion with the Chinese authorities about the future
opening of a Consulate General in Wuhan.

35. Commercial Diplomacy is an important component of the wider Prosperity

agenda, which brings together all the actions that the Government takes
internationally to support the UK economy. Work by the FCO aligns the UK's
foreign policy goals with the domestic policy priority of returning the UK to strong
economic growth, by using diplomacy to help create and promote the conditions
for that growth through trade and investment. Lord Livingstone‟s role as Minister
of State for Trade and Investment in both FCO and BIS leads this effort and
ensures that the individual efforts of FCO, UKTI and BIS are fully co-ordinated to
realise the maximum dividend for the UK economy.

36. FCO staff skills in commercial diplomacy have continued to improve. Since June

2011, FCO has trained 800 staff in the skills of commercial diplomacy and now
has a network of 900 staff engaged in Prosperity work overseas, integrated in
teams alongside colleagues from UK Trade and Investment. A new toolkit has
been launched to help smaller posts assist UK businesses in their local markets;
and FCO is working with UKTI to ensure that any new opportunities identified are
effectively followed up.

37. Further progress has been made in establishing a closer working relationship

between FCO and UKTI, identifying work that may be carried out as a set of
common tasks, for example, inward investment, high-value opportunities, and
support to ministers and trade envoys. These common tasks will become a
means of managing FCO / UKTI dependencies and resources, and directing joint
strategy, policy and operational work.

38. The National Security Strategy set out our goal to bring together and use all the

instruments of national power in a coordinated and coherent manner, and so
ensure that the sum of our efforts is greater than its component parts. The
Government‟s International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES) was
published on 7[th] February 2013 and recognises the contribution that our defence
assets and capabilities can make in support of the National Security Council‟s
priorities. Looking out over a 20 year horizon, it identifies both the major risks that
we will face and opportunities that we will have, and sets in place the means by
which we can best use our Defence Engagement, together with other tools. The
strategy is guiding the global allocation of defence assets and activities so that
we can develop the relationships we need with existing and new defence
partners. In launching the IDES, a number of immediate deliverables were
announced, including new and enhanced overseas Defence Sections within our
Embassies and High Commissions, and additional resources.

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39. The overall rating for this Task, taking account of all commitments, is “on track”

as defined in paragraph 11.

**iv.** **Enforce domestic law and strengthen international norms to help tackle**
**those who threaten the UK and our interests, including maintenance of**
**underpinning technical expertise in key areas**

40. HMG‟s priorities for this task lie in serious organised crime, and in counter
proliferation and arms control.

41. On Organised Crime, the Home Secretary published a new Serious and

Organised Crime Strategy on 7[th] October. This new strategy will refocus efforts to
protect the UK from the corrosive effects of organised crime, based around the
Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare model applied in CONTEST, the UK‟s
Counter-Terrorism strategy. The National Crime Agency (NCA) was also
launched on 7[th] October. The highest priority for the NCA is to identify, disrupt
and cut serious and organised crime, including by investigating and enabling the
prosecution of those responsible. The NCA:
      
is a powerful body of operational crime fighters. It has a stronger mandate to

tackle serious and organised crime nationally than any organisation has had
before. This includes the power directly to task other organisations, aligning
and directing the UK‟s collective response to the most dangerous individuals
and criminal groups;
           
is leading and supporting operations across four operational commands:

organised crime; economic crime; child sexual exploitation and on-line
protection; and border policing, focusing on cross-border and overseas
threats. It also has a new National Cyber-crime Unit, which is a national
centre of expertise on cyber-crime, focusing on the organised crime groups
operating on-line that affect the UK;

      
is for the first time bringing together a single strategic intelligence picture of

serious and organised crime threats to the UK, equipping the whole law
enforcement community to better identify, and respond to, threats and
vulnerabilities;

      
has officers designated with „triple‟ powers: policing, customs, and

immigration. Every officer in the NCA - over 4,000 people - has a legal duty to
safeguard children and promote child welfare;

      
will be visible to the public and accountable to the Home Secretary. It will fight

crime in close collaboration with a large number of partners, including local
police forces, the Border Force, police and crime commissioners, HMRC, the
private sector and the voluntary sector; and

      
has an extensive crime-fighting reach. It will offer support to local

organisations when they need a national response or specialist capabilities,

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will bring greater coordination and more focused targeting to investigations at
our borders, and will have officers stationed in 40 countries around the world
so we make sure our international partners are working alongside us.

42. The Home Office is also investing an additional £10 million in up-grading the

capabilities of the Regional Organised Crime Units, in order to better tackle
organised crime at a regional level and to work effectively with the NCA.

43. We have strengthened national capabilities to tackle cyber-crime by bringing

together the cyber unit of the Serious Organised Crime Agency and the
Metropolitan Police Service‟s Police Central eCrime Unit to form the new National
Cyber-crime Unit within the National Crime Agency.

44. We have combined the development of these specialist capabilities with a focus

on mainstreaming the skills necessary to tackle on-line crimes and criminals' use
of technologies within all levels of law enforcement. We have established eight
regional cyber policing hubs to deliver policing capabilities with the technical skills
to tackle technologically advanced criminals outside London. We will also train
5,000 police officers across England and Wales in cyber skills by 2015.

45. Work on counter-proliferation and arms control has been supported by a

funding mechanism that brings together a number of departmental level
programme budgets and other resources allocated to counter-proliferation
activities. The Cabinet Office and Counter-Proliferation Implementation
Committee continue to monitor this closely.

46. Following intensive negotiations in July 2012 and March 2013, the UN General

Assembly adopted a strong Arms Trade Treaty on 2[nd] April. It will require
governments to block transfers of weapons that pose unacceptable risks (for
example to human rights, humanitarian law, terrorism or trans-national crime) and
to take strong steps to prevent weapons being diverted into the illegal market. At
the same time, the legitimate trade in arms will be protected. We are now
working for early UK ratification and for rapid entry-into-force by lobbying states
to sign and ratify the Treaty, and by providing technical assistance to help states
establish appropriate legislation and processes.

47. As part of our 2013 G8 Presidency, the UK has the Chair of the 27-member

Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction. It channels around $2 billion per year to programmes to counter
proliferation risks. The UK focused its three working group meetings of 2013 on
the following priorities: nuclear security, bio-security, scientist engagement / dual
use research, and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The
UK has also chaired the Non-Proliferation Directors Group, as part of its G8
Presidency, adopting a statement which set out the G8‟s continuing commitment
to counter proliferation threats around the world. The statement is available at
**[http://tinyurl.com/p97uq25.](http://tinyurl.com/p97uq25)**

48. The overall rating for this Task, taking account of all commitments, is “mixed” as

defined in paragraph 12.

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**v.** **Protect the UK and our interests at home, at our border and**
**internationally, to address physical and electronic threats from state and**
**non-state actors**

49. HMG‟s priorities for this task lie in several fields.

50. In Counter-Terrorism, a key priority (in addition to those noted above in

paragraphs 24-28) has been to improve the UK‟s response to an attack by
terrorists using firearms. Following the attacks in Mumbai in 2008, the
Government set up a major programme to improve the UK‟s ability to respond to
this type of incident. Overall we have delivered significant improvements in the
police‟s firearms capability, the speed of the military response and the ability of
specialists in the emergency services to save lives under higher risk conditions.
The police now have well-established procedures in place to deal with this type of
incident, and have tried and tested arrangements for the provision of military
support. Firearms officers have access to higher calibre weapons, with new
tactics and training to deal with this kind of incident. There is additional police
firearms capacity in major cities; and there are procedures to provide rapid backup from neighbouring areas. Additionally, all unarmed police officers are now
trained to identify and respond to the initial stages of a possible terrorist attack
involving firearms. We have also improved joint working between the emergency
services to help them deal with the particular challenges of this type of
incident. Specialist joint police, ambulance and fire teams are now in place in key
areas across England, with equivalents in Scotland and Wales, trained and
equipped to manage casualties in the event of a marauding gun attack.

51. This year in particular, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism led a series

of training events for over 500 delegates at operational, tactical and strategic
grades from the emergency services, control rooms, local authorities, NHS
Trusts, and Government. Many of those trained were trainers themselves, and
will now further deliver and embed our training locally. We have exercised the full
national response to this kind of attack in three major exercises since 2009, as
well as in numerous local multi-agency exercises. International incidents, such as
the recent attack in Kenya, demonstrate the willingness of terrorists to use
marauding firearms attacks to create the maximum amount of impact on innocent
lives. We are not complacent: it is important that we continue to learn lessons
from these incidents so that these inform and strengthen our procedures.

52. As part of the work under the Prepare strand of CONTEST, the emergency

services set up a programme in 2012 to improve their joint response to any major
or complex incident. The primary objective is to save as many lives as possible
and reduce harm. We reported last year on the progress of this work, known as
the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Programme. This programme of
work continues. It is focused on developing joint police, fire and ambulance
guidance for co-operating at the scene of an incident, delivering joint training and
exercising, and improving communications.

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53. Another priority has been to maintain core capabilities in counter-terrorism

policing while improving value for money and assessing performance. We have
made some efficiency savings that have not affected our capabilities, and have
also protected the ring-fenced funding (£563 million for 2013/14) for counterterrorism policing capabilities. Counter-terrorism policing has continued to meet
key operational challenges. The Counter-Terrorism Futures programme, being
led by the police, is reviewing the balance of resources across the network of
policing to make certain that resources are being used to best effect to tackle
both current and future risks, threats and potential vulnerabilities.

54. We are continuing to develop our strategic approach to tackling the threat

from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT), in accord with our Strategic
Defence and Security Review commitment. The threat from NIRT remains at
“severe” in Northern Ireland and at “moderate” in Great Britain. Tackling the
threat from NIRT remains a priority for the Government. The last year has been
an historic one for Northern Ireland, which hosted the G8 summit in June
and the World Police and Fire Games in August. Effective co-operation between
the Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI), Security Service and An Garda
Síochána was crucial in ensuring the safety and success of both. There have
also been a number of notable disruptions: in March, PSNI successfully
intercepted a mortar attack in Londonderry moments before it was deployed,
which undoubtedly saved many lives. We remain committed to building on our
successes to date and to continuing our strategic approach to tackling the threat
in Northern Ireland. We continue to offer our full support to the PSNI so that they
have the capability they need to tackle the threat; and they will receive an
additional £31 million of funding in 2015/16 to support their efforts.

55. In the past year, we have made important changes to roles and responsibilities in

**border security. Following the creation of Border Force (primarily responsible for**
protecting the physical border), the UK Border Agency was abolished in April
2013 and replaced by two commands with distinct remits and cultures sitting in
the Home Office and reporting to Ministers: UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI),
and Immigration Enforcement (IE). UKVI is a high-volume service that makes
high-quality decisions about who comes to the UK; and IE is an organisation that
has immigration law enforcement at its heart. Added to this, the Border Policing
Command (BPC), one of the four operational commands within the new National
Crime Agency, is delivering a new strategic response to border policing and
enabling us to better address the security threats from serious and organised
crime. The BPC will also better coordinate intelligence and operational activity
through co-location with Border Force intelligence officers, Special Branch and
other intelligence agencies in Joint Border Intelligence Units.

56. A priority for border security continues to be adopting a stronger and more

focused cross-departmental approach to improving aviation security overseas.
This is delivering targeted investment in international capacity-building to
strengthen aviation and border security capabilities in key countries overseas. It
includes work between our regional aviation security liaison officers and local
aviation officials to increase aviation security capacity. For example, it provides
explosive trace detection equipment and associated training. Complementing

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this, we continue to extend our no-fly arrangements in line with the commitment
to strengthen pre-departure checks and prevent people who pose a terrorist
threat from flying to or from the UK.

57. Our border security depends on having accurate data regarding people who are

intending to travel to this country, notably by air. We now obtain Advance
**Passenger Information (API) for the majority of flights into the UK. API consists**
of the biographical information contained in a passport when it is provided in
advance of travel. It includes the passenger‟s name, date and place of birth,
nationality and document number. The Government remains committed to
maximising the collection of passenger information on flights to the UK, within the
legal parameters, and is engaging on this with EU Member States and their
national Data Protection Authorities.

58. Passenger Name Records (PNR) are recorded when a travel booking is made

(such as telephone numbers and means of payment).They provide valuable
additional information about people entering and leaving this country. The
proposed EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive would provide a basis for
the collection, storage and use of PNR by Member States to combat serious
crime and immigration offences. The Government remains committed to working
with Member States, the Commission, and the European Parliament to secure a
Directive that will provide for the acquisition of PNR data on targeted flights
between Member States, and on flights to and from Member States originating
outside the EU.

59. On September 4[th], the National Audit Office (NAO) published its value for money

study of the Border Force after its separation from UKBA. The report reinforces
the point that the Border Force plays a crucial front line role in delivering the
Home Office aims of controlling immigration and reducing net migration; cutting
crime; protecting the UK from the threat of terrorism; and contributing to the
nation‟s growth and prosperity. The report commended Border Force for
implementing full passenger checks while also reducing queuing time: 99% of
sampled passengers from outside Europe cleared passport control within 45
minutes between May 2012 and April 2013 compared with 81% in April 2012.
Border Force is meeting and exceeding targets for seizures of some of the most
dangerous and harmful materials that criminals attempt to bring into the country.
Border Force has recruited more Border Force staff, established command
centres to deploy staff more flexibly and effectively, and is reforming its working
practices. The report did, however, question whether Border Force was
sufficiently resourced to deliver against its priorities – in particular, whether it
could manage passenger checks, queuing times and customs checks. It also
observed that there was poor morale amongst officers.

60. HMG has accepted the report itself in full. Recent analysis shows that the split of

resources between primary and secondary controls is 56%-44%; and a similar
split will continue throughout 2013/14. Border Force checks 100% of passengers
at the Primary Control Point (PCP) in line with its Operating Mandate, and in
future will increase the speed of ePassport Gate rollout, introduce a new PCP
deployment model, and strengthen its workforce planning process. Border

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Force‟s Freight Strategy will ensure that its freight control processes provide the
best possible value for money, and that the right interventions are made at the
right time, whilst facilitating the flow of legitimate trade. And on morale, a set of
Border Force values are in development; and its leadership development strategy
will provide a range of interventions to change Border Force culture.

61. In the field of cyber, a priority has been to introduce a transformative National

Cyber Security Programme (NCSP), supported by £860 million of investment to
2016, in support of the National Cyber Security Strategy published in November
2011. Significant progress has been made in this area; and key achievements,
and future plans for the coming year, were highlighted in a statement to
Parliament on the 12[th] December.

62. The NCSP has begun to deliver real transformation in the UK‟s cyber security

capabilities. A particular emphasis has been placed on partnership with industry
to improve awareness of, and provide a coordinated response to, growing cyber
threats. For example, the Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CISP)
was launched on 27[th] March 2013 to facilitate the sharing of information on cyber
threats in order to make UK businesses more secure in cyber space. The CISP
introduces a secure, virtual “collaboration environment” where Government and
industry partners can exchange information on threats and vulnerabilities in real
time. In addition, amalgamated guidance from the security services and BIS on
cyber security was published for both large and small enterprises; and a national
CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) is being established to
coordinate more effectively the response to national cyber incidents, and to act
as a focal point for international engagement.

63. HMG is developing the future cyber security workforce by granting 11 UK

universities the status of Academic Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security
Research, sponsoring doctoral students and promoting the study of science,
technology, engineering and maths in schools.

64. Interdependence in cyber space makes international engagement a key priority.

In November, the UK established the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre at
Oxford University. The Centre helps international partners develop the
capabilities to identify and counter the same threats that the UK faces. We also
engage bilaterally and multilaterally in support of the multi-stakeholder approach
to internet governance, aiming to maintain a safe and resilient cyber space which
enables the free flow of commerce and protects freedom of expression.

65. In response to the growing cyber threat, the MOD is developing a full-spectrum

military cyber capability, including a strike capability, to enhance the UK's range
of military capabilities, expanding the range of options available to MOD in
dealing with the cyber threat.

66. The overall rating for this Task, taking account of all commitments, is “on track”

as defined in paragraph 11.

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**vi.** **Help resolve conflicts and contribute to stability; where necessary,**
**intervene overseas, including the legal use of coercive force in support**
**of the UK’s vital interests, and to protect our overseas territories and**
**people**

67. HMG‟s priorities for this task centre on building stability overseas and on defence.

68. The Building Stability Overseas Strategy was published on the 19[th] July 2011

under a joint Ministerial statement by the Foreign Secretary, together with the
International Development and Defence Secretaries. This was the first published
cross-Government strategy to address conflict issues. The year 2013 has seen
continuing joint work by FCO, MOD and DFID to implement the strategy (see
above paragraphs 19-23).

69. The UK‟s long-term commitment to Afghanistan was set out in the Enduring

Strategic Partnership Document signed on 28[th] January 2012. This will last well
beyond 2014. At the NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012, the international
community reaffirmed its commitment to support Afghanistan‟s security forces
after 2014. The UK announced our contribution of £70 million. In addition, UK
troops will support the development of the Afghan National Security Forces by
providing training at the new Afghan National Army Officer Academy. At the
Tokyo Conference in July 2012, the international community agreed continuing
development support for the next five years, in return for strong commitments
from the Afghan Government to continue reforms. $16 billion in total was pledged
until 2015; and there was also agreement to sustain support through to 2017 at or
near levels of the past decade. The UK will maintain our current development
assistance of £178 million per year until 2017 to help Afghans tackle extreme
poverty, create jobs and achieve sustainable economic growth.

70. The UK is committed to supporting the Afghan Government to tackle the

narcotics trade as well as relentlessly pursuing networks involved in the
trafficking of opiates, as emphasised in the UK‟s new Serious and Organised
Crime Strategy, published on 7[th] October 2013. The UK will provide law
enforcement mentoring to the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and build
capacity in the Ministry of Counter Narcotics and Ministry of Interior.

71. The groundwork for transition, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) training,

and work to improve governance and development in Afghanistan are in many
areas coming to fruition. President Karzai announced the fifth and final tranche of
security transition in June 2013. As a result, the ANSF took lead security
responsibility across the entire country. Transition is on track to be achieved by
the end of 2014. Though challenges remain, the ANSF continue to grow in
capability, confidence, and capacity.


72. The E3+3 and Iran reached agreement on Joint Plan of Action in Geneva on

Sunday 24[th] November. The first step agreement in the plan goes a long way to
address our key proliferation concerns: it suspends 20% enrichment, eradicates
the existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium, caps the production and use of
all centrifuges including more advanced models, and halts progress at Arak and

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increases our visibility of the programme. These steps halt the progress of Iran‟s
nuclear programme, and in some areas roll it back. In return, Iran will receive
limited but meaningful sanctions relief, although the bulk of sanctions, including
core oil and finance, remain intact and robustly enforced. This is important in
order to give Iran the strongest incentive to live up to its side of the bargain and
negotiate seriously towards a comprehensive settlement. Experts from the E3+3
and Iran met in Vienna on 9[th]-12[th] December to discuss implementation of the
Geneva agreement. Negotiations on the technical detail of the first step deal are
complex and important. Both sides need time to reflect in capitals. We expect
talks to resume very soon. A huge amount of work remains to be done before we
reach a final, comprehensive settlement that gives the world full confidence that
Iran‟s nuclear programme is for purely peaceful purposes.

73. The latest IAEA report of 14[th] November showed that Iran‟s stockpile of near 20%

enriched uranium had continued to grow, and its stockpile of near 20% UF6 had
increased to approximately 196kg, an increase of approximately 10kg from the
August report. Iran had installed 4 additional centrifuges since its August report,
though no additional more advanced centrifuges (IR-2m) have been installed at
the Natanz facility since August; and none of the IR-2m centrifuges already
installed there have been fed with UF6. The report notes that Iran had not
installed any major additional components in the IR-40 Heavy Water Research
Reactor at Arak, although the reactor vessel had been connected to the cooling
and moderator piping.

74. We also welcome the signature of a Joint Statement on a Framework for

Cooperation between Iran and the IAEA. We are pleased to see that Iran has
finally agreed to cooperate with the Agency to resolve all present and past
issues. We are pleased that Iran has agreed practical steps to enhance its
present cooperation with the IAEA by providing greater access and information.
This is a step in the right direction. However, Iran has still to address the
substance of the Agency‟s concern over the possible military dimensions to Iran‟s
nuclear programme. Both the Director General and the Board of Governors have
stated that it is essential and urgent for Iran to do so. Resolution will be essential
to establish the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran‟s nuclear programme.

75. The UK‟s priority is to end the Syrian conflict through a political settlement,

thereby helping to create a more secure, stable Syria that meets the needs and
aspirations of its people. As part of this strategy, we are working with our
international partners to help establish a peace process. UN Secretary General
Ban Ki Moon announced on 25[th] November that the Geneva II process, which
would bring together the Syrian regime and opposition to negotiate a political
settlement, would begin on 22[nd] January. The National Coalition (the main, and
moderate, opposition group) and the Syrian regime have agreed to attend without
preconditions. We are working closely with the National Coalition to ensure it is
fully prepared to negotiate effectively. The UK was deeply appalled by the Asad
regime‟s latest use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people on 21[st]
August in Ghouta. We made the case internationally for a robust response, and
fully support the international agreement that is seeing the regime‟s chemical
weapons programme placed under international control and destroyed. Syria is

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also now the top destination for jihadists anywhere in the world; and we are
working to identify and disrupt potential threats from returning extremists.

76. The UK has worked closely with the National Coalition and welcomed the election

of President al-Jarba in July and interim Prime Minister, Ahmed Tomeh, in
September 2013. Our programme of non-lethal support has grown during the
course of the year: we are equipping Syrian teams to carry out search and rescue
and fire-fighting in opposition-held areas, helping to build up the capacity of the
Coalition to deliver services and meet needs in Syria, developing independent
media in Syria, helping to document human rights abuses, and supporting local
civil society, among other activities. The violence in Syria has escalated to an
unprecedented level and the UK has been at the forefront in alleviating the
effects of the humanitarian crisis. We announced an extra £100 million pledge to
help get essentials such as food, water and medicine to the Syrian people in dire
need. The UK‟s total humanitarian funding for Syria and the region is now £500
million, the largest sum the UK has ever contributed to a single humanitarian
crisis.

77. Since the fall of the Qadhafi regime two years ago, the situation in Libya has

changed significantly. Prime Minister Zeidan‟s democratically elected
Government, and the transitional government before it, have made progress in
rebuilding government Ministries, registering revolutionary fighters, and restarting
oil and gas production. However, the legacy of 42 years of Qadhafi rule means
that Libya still faces significant challenges and is now at a critical stage in its
transition. In recent months, the security situation has deteriorated, political
progress has slowed, and oil output has fallen dramatically.

78. Libya held national elections in July 2012. The political transition has, however,

slipped significantly against the original timetable, with elections for the
Constitutional Drafting Committee unlikely to take place until early 2014. A
National Dialogue, announced by Prime Minister Zeidan, could help to address
outstanding issues between the various competing interest groups in Libya; yet it
is uncertain whether this and the constitution will provide a unifying political vision
for the longer-term future of the country. The Libyan Government does not have a
monopoly over the use of force; and there is a complex web of conflicting political
and tribal groups, many with their own armed militias. The threat of violence or
direct action, such as the cutting of oil, gas or water pipelines, is frequently used
to affect political goals; and inter-militia violence and assassinations worsen the
security picture. There have been several attacks against western officials. The
security challenges in Libya could pose a threat to wider regional stability,
exacerbated by the widespread availability of Qadhafi era weapons and
ammunition which primarily sit outside the control of the Libyan Government.

79. A stable, open and democratic Libya contributing to wider regional stability and

security is in the UK‟s interest. We are working closely with our international
partners, including the United States, France, Italy, regional countries and the EU
to lead the broader international effort, coordinated by the UN Support Mission in
Libya (UNSMIL), to support Libya‟s democratic transition and the Libyan
authorities‟ efforts to make visible improvements in public security in Libya. At the

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G8 meeting in Lough Erne, the UK led efforts, with the United States, France,
Italy and Germany, to agree a Security Compact with Libya. This includes an
offer to train more than 7,000 Libyan troops to help the Libyan Government and
improve the security and stability of the country. The UK has offered to train up to
2,000 Libyan Armed Forces personnel in basic infantry skills and leadership. This
builds on the UK‟s support to Libya on security, human rights, justice structures,
transparent and effective financial management, private sector development and
economic governance systems.

80. The security, economic and humanitarian situations in Yemen remain fragile. A

political dialogue and transition process, unique in the region, has come a long
way. It continues to make progress but is behind schedule. Since his election in
February 2012, President Hadi has demonstrated a commitment to re-establish
security by tackling violent extremism. There have been advances in Yemeni
security capabilities; but the main security Ministries lack capacity, and ability to
carry out much-needed wholesale reform, especially during the turbulent
transitional period. Yemen-based Al Qa‟ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
continues to threaten UK interests both at home and overseas, as the increased
alert status in August 2013 demonstrated. Tackling the threat from AQAP in
Yemen remains a top priority. Their intent and capability to carry out attacks are
clear. Threats to aviation remain of particular concern to us, as demonstrated by
the most recent foiled aviation bomb plot in May 2012. AQAP also poses a
significant threat to stability in Yemen and the wider region. The UK continues to
work closely with the Government of Yemen to tackle terrorism, and has provided
a range of support to Yemeni security forces, in concert with other donors, to
increase Yemeni capability to disrupt AQAP in Yemen. The UK is also supporting
the Government of Yemen in its efforts to achieve political, economic and
development reform. We co-chair the Friends of Yemen group, and are providing
approximately £200 million over three years to support the transition, including
£70 million for humanitarian assistance over the next two years. In Yemen, 58%
of the population are in humanitarian need.

81. The UK‟s objectives for Somalia are to help it become a stable and secure

country and to reduce threats to the UK. HMG is working to increase security,
political and economic stability and to reduce poverty. In May 2013, the UK
hosted a second Somalia Conference in London. This galvanised international
support behind the Somali Government‟s plans for security, political process,
public financial management and justice. It was also an opportunity for Somali
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to set out his political vision and commitment
to elections in 2016. The international community pledged $350 million of new
financial support. Of this, over £30 million was pledged by the UK. In September
2013, the EU hosted a conference at which a New Deal Compact for Somalia
was announced. This sets out a framework for funding and aid coordination,
aligned with the Somali Government‟s priorities, organised under five Peace and
State-building Goals: inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations,
and revenue and services. At the Brussels Conference an additional £1.5 billion
was pledged, including a further £50 million from the UK, £25 million of which will
go to a World Bank fund which will tackle youth unemployment and stimulate

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business growth. The rest of the funding will include support for programmes
which help boost the heath and financial sectors.

82. There is much progress to be made to overcome insecurity, instability and

violence in Somalia. The 28[th] August agreement between the Federal
Government and Jubaland was a positive step, but challenges remain with its
implementation. Challenges also remain around the Somali Government‟s
relationship with Puntland and Somaliland. The UK is encouraging the Federal
Government to extend its outreach to the regions and make progress towards a
federal solution to stabilise the country. On a positive note, the number of
successful piracy attacks in Somalia is at an historic low: the seven attacks in
2013 have all been unsuccessful. Despite the significant advances made by
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces over last year, Al Shabaab
continues to be a terrorist threat across Somalia and in the wider region, as
shown by the recent attack on the Westgate Shopping Centre in Nairobi in
September 2013. This attack underlines the need to continue to support
AMISOM. On 12[th] November the Security Council approved an uplift in AMISOM
troops, as recommended in the joint AU-UN review, to resume the offensive
against Al Shabaab. In parallel, the UK will continue to look for ways to increase
the capacity of the Somali National Forces. The UK gives £80 million annually to
Somalia in development assistance. Projects have led to the creation of 45,000
long-term jobs, 15,000 for women. DFID‟s work will also help up to 500,000
people each year until 2015 (more than half of them women) resist malnutrition
and life-threatening diseases.

83. The presence in Mali of Al Qa‟ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQ-M) and other AQ
inspired terrorist groups poses a long-term strategic threat to the EU and to the
UK. The conflict in Mali has exacerbated chronic food shortages affecting nearly
20 million people in the Sahel. The UK worked closely with France to facilitate the
deployment of French forces in Operation Serval, aimed at dismantling the
extremist networks that had seized control of much of northern Mali. As well as
logistical support by means of C-17 aircraft and roll-on roll-off ferry capacity, the
UK provided the French with reconnaissance / battlefield surveillance by means
of Sentinel aircraft operating from Dakar. In partnership with EU Member States
and Institutions (see also paragraph 101), the UK provided 37 military (including
six Irish soldiers) and one civilian to the new EU Training Mission in Mali. With
the deployment of the African stabilisation force AFISMA, the UK also provided
logistical support to troop-contributing countries; and the UK has gone on to
provide HQ staff to the successor UN Mission in Mali, MINUSMA, which was
launched on 1[st] July 2013.

84. The Government is working to focus on the threats of terrorism and crime to and

from the Sahel and the wider North and West Africa region. Through a
developing North and West Africa Strategic Framework, we are addressing these
security threats and the root causes of instability and fragility in partnership with
allies, international organisations and regional partners.

85. The overall rating for this Task, taking account of all commitments, is “on track”

as defined in paragraph 11.

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**vii.** **Provide resilience for the UK by being prepared for all kinds of**
**emergencies, able to recover from shocks and to maintain essential**
**services**

86. HMG‟s priorities for this task concerned civil emergencies, energy security, and

space security.

87. Work on civil emergences continued to look at measures for dealing with the top

risks as well as planning for the consequences of a wide range of lesser risks, so
that we are ready to respond to the range of emergencies the UK could face. This
has led to activity, including work to up-date planning for pandemic influenza and
flooding, efforts to develop community resilience, enhanced crisis response
capabilities, and a dedicated programme to improve blue light interoperability.
The need to provide individuals caught up in an emergency with official advice
quickly is a challenge for the emergency responder community. Government has
therefore trialled a number of different approaches to using mobile phone
technology to send a targeted message to members of the public during an
emergency. These trials will also prove important in informing decisions on any
future roll-out.

88. On energy security, the Energy Security Strategy, published in November 2012,

set out for the first time HMG‟s overarching strategy for energy security. This
found that the UK currently enjoys a high level of energy security rooted in our
commitment to competitive energy markets combined with effective regulation. It
faces particular challenges, however, arising from closure of around 20% of our
electricity generating capacity over the coming decade; decline in North Sea
production (increasing our import dependence); and the need radically to decarbonise our energy sector. These challenges also highlight the increasing
importance of international energy dialogues to achieve the imports, investments
and shared knowledge we will require.

89. There remain significant challenges in delivering oil and gas price stability and

mitigating transit disruptions, given the extent to which these issues remain
beyond UK influence. Oil prices remain high, fluctuating between $100 and $117
in the last six months, driven by structural factors (high demand in emerging
economies and limited options to increase supply), and high levels of uncertainty
(tensions in the Middle East, poor economic outlook).

90. HMG continues to take a range of actions to improve energy security by

mitigating the risks posed by developments in international energy markets by:
promoting low carbon technologies and energy efficiency through sharing best
practice and supporting international fora like the International Renewable Energy
Agency; continuing strong international bilateral engagement with key energy
partners such as Norway, Japan and Russia; and working to improve oil price
stability by continuing to support international fora such as the International
Energy Forum and International Energy Agency (IEA), for example working
closely with the IEA on their „Association‟ proposal to broaden their reach.

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91. On space security, the National Space Policy, which identifies and promotes

commercial opportunities within the Space Industry for the UK, is to be published
in due course, and will cover both the UK Civil Space Strategy and the National
Space Security Policy. Part of this work will include management of security risks
and vulnerabilities through a coherent policy. The UK continues to promote
international space security through such fora as the UN Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, by taking part in the UN Group of Governmental
Experts reporting on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer
Space, and by helping to drive forward the EU-led initiative for an International
Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities. The UK also plays a key role in the
security of the European Galileo system.

92. Taking account of all commitments under this Task, progress is assessed to be

“on track” as defined in paragraph 11.

**viii.** **Work in alliances and partnerships wherever possible to generate**
**stronger responses**

93. HMG is clear that NATO is the bedrock of our national defence. It is, and will

remain, the cornerstone of UK‟s security and the ultimate guarantor of our
defence. Allies continue to make progress on implementing decisions made at
the Chicago Summit in May 2012, including a number of agreements aimed at
developing the capabilities that NATO needs to meet its core remit, in a time of
austerity. HMG will continue to seek efficiency and effectiveness in NATO
capability development as a priority. The Chicago Summit also saw a meeting
between Allied Heads of State and Government and NATO‟s key partners who
make significant contributions to Alliance operations. HMG will continue to
support NATO‟s work with key partners and others as a way of fostering
dialogue, sharing expertise and improving its ability to operate with those outside
the Alliance.

94. Since that time, the Alliance has continued to focus on pertinent issues facing our

collective security. The North Atlantic Council has discussed continuing issues in
the Middle East and North Africa, including at Ministerial level and with partners
such as Russia. On 22[nd] August, the Secretary General released a NATO
statement which condemned the 21[st] August chemical weapons attacks in Syria
following discussion in the North Atlantic Council. More widely, NATO continues
to uphold the security of its members, including through assistance to Turkey.

95. The UK will host the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales on 4[th]–5[th] September. The

Summit will be an important opportunity to look to the future: to ensure the
Alliance is equipped and has the right tools to continue its role as the bedrock of
our global defence capability. It will also be an opportunity to mark transition of
our effort in Afghanistan. By hosting the Summit, the UK will underline both our
own and our Allies‟ commitment to our collective security. The Summit will
reinforce NATO‟s role in global security, through which we engage and work with
partners to safeguard our interests and confront challenges to UK security
wherever they occur.

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96. The UK / United States defence relationship has for decades been one of the

key foundations of the bilateral relationship. Our strategies, policies and plans
have been well aligned. The Middle East and North Africa region represents a
significant focus for cooperation in the foreign policy sphere, with coordination on
Syria, Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and Egypt. We have worked closely
with the Americans on both political and humanitarian aspects of the Syria crisis
and we welcome the strong drive given to the MEPP by President Obama and
Secretary Kerry. But the threats we face today require a cross-Departmental
security relationship. Central to protecting the people of our countries is our
unique and indispensable relationship with the United States in the fields of
intelligence, cyber, and counter-terrorism. 2013 has seen the Prime Minister,
Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Chancellor, Defence Secretary and
Home Secretary all meet their American counterparts in Washington during the
course of the year, with discussions across all these areas.

97. Intensifying our security and defence relationship with France continues to be a

priority, with good progress across the agenda. Following the February 2012 UKFrance Summit, regular high-level meetings have advanced a number of
initiatives, including development of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force
(with a successful exercise in October 2012). Progress on some collaborative
defence equipment programmes has been delayed by work on the French Livre
Blanc (White Paper on Defence and National Security), although the pro-active
decision to work with the UK on the Future Air-to-Surface Guided Weapon missile
sent a strong signal of political commitment. A further Summit is expected in the
near future. The UK and France have worked closely on Mali, with the UK
providing operational and political support to the French intervention in January.
The French White Paper, published in June, highlights the close alignment of our
strategic security and defence priorities.

98. The UN Security Council has been very active over the past 12 months and

played a vital part in ensuring an effective multilateral response to continuing
crises, with the UK taking a leading role. On Syria, the Council unanimously
adopted a resolution providing a legally binding framework for the destruction of
Syria‟s chemical weapons, ending a 17-month stalemate in the Council. The UK
has also taken a leading role within the Council to help resolve the continuing
Syrian humanitarian crisis. A sustained UK lobbying effort in the build-up to the
UN General Assembly ensured that members provided $716 million, of which the
UK contributed $160 million. A Syrian Humanitarian Presidential Statement was
adopted, including strong language on lifting bureaucratic obstacles, granting
visas and permits, and cross-line or cross-border deliveries.

99. HMG continues to work through the Organisation for Security and Co
**operation in Europe (OSCE) as a forum for comprehensive dialogue and**
political agreements on all areas of security across three „dimensions‟ linking
work on political-military issues and arms control with human rights and
democracy, governance and the rule of law, and environment / energy
issues. The UK supported adoption of Decisions at the OSCE Kyiv Ministerial
Council (December 2013) in all three dimensions, including on combating the
proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons; up-dating of the OSCE‟s non
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proliferation principles; the first internationally recognised confidence-building
measures in the field of cyber security; updating the OSCE Action Plan on
trafficking in human beings; statements on the Transnistrian and NagornoKarabakh conflicts; and a continuation of the „Helsinki + 40‟ process, tasking the
next two OSCE Chairmanships to develop new approaches to realising a
„security community‟ well equipped to respond to the evolving threats.

100. HMG has successfully worked in partnership with European partners and the

**EU to address a number of crises and security challenges during this period. The**
UK plays a leading role in EU action on Iran (see paragraphs 72-74), has been at
the forefront of securing a strong EU response to the crisis in Syria (see
paragraphs 75-76), and has worked closely with France in northern Mali (see
paragraphs 83 and 101).

101. The EU‟s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) contributes to

conflict prevention, crisis management and stabilisation. HMG plays an active
role in shaping and encouraging a more efficient and coordinated response with
NATO and other actors. HMG has contributed civilian and military personnel to
CSDP missions and operations in this period, including hosting the headquarters
element of Operation ATALANTA at Northwood. Three new CSDP Missions have
been launched since November 2012: the EU Training Mission in Mali to increase
the capacity of the armed forces; the new mandate for the EU Training Mission in
Somalia; and the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya.

102. HMG continues strongly to support international criminal justice and

accountability. We have done this both through continuing financial, political and
practical support to the international courts and tribunals, and also through our
work to challenge impunity and press for accountability for the most serious of
international crimes. In July the Foreign Secretary launched the UK Strategy on
[the International Criminal Court https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-launches-international-criminal-court-icc-strategy-paper)
[office-launches-international-criminal-court-icc-strategy-paper.](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-launches-international-criminal-court-icc-strategy-paper)

103. The overall rating for this Task, taking account of all commitments, is “mixed”

as defined in paragraph 12.

**ix. Defence Transformation**

104. The Strategic Defence and Security Review set out a challenging programme

of Defence Transformation covering force structures, equipment, personnel,
bases, efficiency and reform. We have continued to make good progress
delivering this, including implementation of the recommendations made by Lord
Levene in his 2011 Defence Reform review of the department. The MOD Head
Office has reduced by some 500 posts (over 20%). The changes needed to
delegate capability planning and financial responsibility to the Commands are in
place, with further reforms scheduled by April 2014. The new Joint Force
Command achieved Full Operating Capability in April 2013. The £38 billion
budget excess has been eliminated and new mechanisms are in place to hold
Top Level Budget holders and other senior responsibility holders formally to

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account against their plans. As Lord Levene acknowledged in his recent review of
implementation his recommendations, “the MOD is viewed as a more
professional and responsible organisation” and there is “a strong foundation on
which to proceed with the next stage of Defence Reform”. During the year we
have also announced the new Army basing plan, published the Defence
Equipment Plan and a long term strategic vision for defence industry, published
the International Defence Engagement Strategy, announced the way forward on
the Reserves and on Defence acquisition, and launched the new Armed Forces
Corporate Covenant. Overall these changes mean we have now put in place the
main organisational building blocks envisaged in the Strategic Defence and
Security Review and the Defence Reform Review; and these have enabled us to
reduce the defence civilian workforce by over 20,000 so far.

Equipment capability

i. Good progress continues to be made in the procurement of high-quality new

equipment for our Forces. On 6[th] November, the Defence Secretary
announced that the MOD had renegotiated the last Government‟s flawed
contract and agreed new Heads of Terms for the aircraft carrier programme
(to build two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers) with the Aircraft Carrier
Alliance, under which the total capital cost to Defence of procuring the carriers
will be £6.2 billion, with any variation above or below that price shared on a
50:50 basis between the Government and the Alliance. Work is progressing
well to build the carriers: the final section of the flight deck of HMS Queen
Elizabeth was fitted in November 2013; and we expect flying from HMS
Queen Elizabeth to begin in 2018, after her sea trials are complete.

ii. HMS Ambush, the second of seven ASTUTE class submarines, was

commissioned into the Royal Navy in March 2013.

iii. The Successor Deterrent Assessment Phase was approved in Spring 2011,
at a cost of £3 billion. This approval covers a programme of work to Main
Gate in 2016 including the design of the submarine platform, where £700
million has been invested to date. The Successor programme remains within
the 2006 White Paper cost and is on track to deliver the future Deterrent
Capability in 2028. Additionally, a £1 billion investment has been made in a
new facility to build reactor cores for our future submarine fleet.

iv. In July, the Government published an unclassified version of the Trident
**Alternatives Review, a Cabinet Office-led study into alternative Deterrent**
systems and postures. The Review demonstrated that no alternative system
is as capable, or as cost effective, as a Trident-based deterrent. The
Government remains committed to its policy on the Successor set out in the
Strategic Defence and Security Review.

v. Four Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) tankers are on track
to enter service from 2016.

vi. **HMS Illustrious is on track for decommissioning in 2014.**

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vii. Five of the next-generation anti-submarine maritime patrol Merlin Mk2
helicopters have been delivered to the Royal Navy.

viii. The MOD announced plans to commission three new offshore patrol
**vessels, to be built by BAE Systems on the Clyde.**

ix. In June 2013, MOD announced that UK warships are to benefit from a new
surveillance capability as part of a £30 million contract for the ScanEagle
**maritime unmanned air system.**

x. **RAF developments include the delivery of our third Lightning II test and**
evaluation aircraft in January 2013. The aircraft will be used by the team of
RAF and Royal Navy personnel based in the United States, where pilot and
maintainer training has started as part of the collaborative Joint Strike Fighter
test and evaluation programme. We expect the first production aircraft to be
delivered to us in 2016. In March 2013, RAF Marham was announced as the
main operating base for Lightning II. We are also investing in Typhoon
synthetic training so that we can operate the aircraft as efficiently as possible.

xi. This is a significant period for the transition from legacy to new Air Transport
or Air-to-Air Refuelling Aircraft. Two BAe-146 aircraft entered service in
February 2013 to bolster the Afghanistan Air Transport requirement. Five
A330 Voyager aircraft have been accepted into military service. Voyager
continues to operate in the Air Transport role and started the refuelling task on
Tornado and Typhoon earlier this year. The first A400M Atlas are due into
service in 2014; and we are planning to accelerate the delivery of aircraft next
year. Tristar draw-down remains on track, with the aircraft due to go out of
service in March 2014. The VC10 went out of service in September 2013. The
fleet of C130K Hercules aircraft was retired at the end of October 2013.

xii. In addition, we have purchased further advanced air-borne target designation
pods and invested in improvements to the defensive aids suites for both
**Tornado GR4 and Hercules C130J aircraft.**

xiii. Over the last year, two existing Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadrons were
re-launched in new roles and three new squadrons were stood up ahead of
schedule.

xiv. The RAF has begun training on the Puma Mk2 helicopter following a £260
million up-grade.

xv. A £35 million contract was awarded to MBDA in November 2013 to sustain
the RAF‟s stockpile of Brimstone weapons.

xvi. The first of 3 Rivet joint signals intelligence aircraft was delivered to the MOD
in November ahead of its entry into service with the RAF in 2014.

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xvii. The MOD ordered 200 extra Starstreak missiles as part of a multi-million
pound deal. They are due to be delivered by Summer 2014.

xviii. In September, the MOD announced it was to buy a further 24 Foxhound
vehicles for the British Army, taking the total fleet to 400 vehicles.

xix. In June, the British Army took delivery of Terrier, its newest and most
advanced engineering vehicle.

xx. In January 2013, the MOD announced it had signed a £9 million contract to
provide the Armed Forces with more than 25,000 new Glock sidearms.

Personnel

xxi. In terms of personnel, the MOD continues to rebuild the Armed Forces
**Covenant. The Covenant is the mechanism which aims to reinforce the bond**
of trust and mutual respect between the Armed Forces and society. By
working to ensure that no serving or former Armed Forces personnel, or their
families, are disadvantaged for the enormous sacrifices they make for their
country, it ensures that they are recognised as valuable members of society
and are able to go from strength to strength in the vital and often dangerous
role they undertake on behalf of the country. The second statutory report was
published on 16[th] December 2013. The Covenant is a cross-Government
endeavour; and work is also being taken forward at a local level and through
the Devolved Administrations, through commitments such as the UK Border
Agency Review of Fees for Armed Forces Dependants and the work with
NHS Reform England to take account of the needs of Service families.
Specific measures over the period include:
             
the Chancellor announced in the Autumn Statement that another £100

million of LIBOR fines is being made available to support a range of good
causes, including further funding for the Armed Forces Community and
Service charities;

  
funding for the Covenant will be enduring, with a further £10 million per

year to be made available from 2015/16;
                  
we have made around £200 million available for the Forces Help to Buy

scheme, to help members of the Armed Forces get on the property ladder;

  
over 700 additional, high-quality properties have been purchased for use

as Service Family Accommodation; and

  
397 local authorities (98% of those in Great Britain) have signed the

Community Covenant and are working to bring Service and local
communities closer together.

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xxii. Work is underway to develop a New Employment Model which provides updated Terms and Conditions of Service for Service Personnel. The Defence
Board considered proposals on remuneration and home purchase incentives
in April 2013. Consultation with Service Personnel commenced in June 2013,
and the output will shape policy. Detailed policy design will be endorsed by
the Defence Board in early 2014. The programme is on-track to begin phased
implementation from April 2015 onwards.

xxiii. The MOD remains on track to reduce the numbers of military and civilian
**personnel by 2015.**
             
The Strategic Defence and Security Review announced a reduction of

17,000 posts from the Regular Armed Forces (5,000 each RN and RAF,
and 7,000 Army). Whilst reduced recruiting and fewer extensions of
service will account for some of the reductions, a redundancy programme
is needed to ensure that the right balance of skills is maintained across the
rank structures. A further reduction of 12,000 to the Army was
subsequently announced as a result of the Three-Month Exercise (3ME).
The three Services have significantly reduced numbers of personnel and
expect to meet agreed departures fully by 2015. Around 6,600 Armed
Forces personnel had left MOD by 30[th] June 2013 under Armed Forces
Redundancy Programme Tranches 1 and 2, including planned reductions
in regular RAF manpower. Tranche 3 is under way; and in June 2013, a
further 4,450 were notified for redundancy. Achieving the combined
Strategic Defence and Security Review and 3ME reductions is likely to
require a further tranche for Armed Forces personnel in 2014.

                
The Strategic Defence and Security Review announced a reduction of

25,000 civilian personnel and to date this baseline has reduced by 20,210.
In the reporting period, some 3,400 left under Tranche 2. In addition, a
further 1,806 personnel are anticipated to leave the Department over the
period July 2013 to April 2014.

xxiv. The MOD remains on track to achieve the structure by 2016 necessary to
deliver Future Force 2020 and has already delegated manpower planning to
the Top Level Budgets (TLBs) as recommended by Levene. This delegation
empowers TLBs to manage resources to deliver outputs leaving the head
office to give strategic direction. This is a key activity to delivering the Whole
Force Concept (WFC)[2].

xxv. Work since the publication in July 2011 of the report of the Independent
Commission to Review the United Kingdom‟s Reserve Forces, led to the
publication on 3[rd] July 2013 of the White Paper Reserves in the Future Force

2 WFC is a term used to describe an approach to delivering a balanced, resilient and fully integrated
force structure, comprising Service Personnel (Regular and Reserve) and civilians (MOD Civil
Servants and contractors), optimised to deliver the people (Human Capability) component of
Defence„s Operational Capability, at declared readiness and defined risk, in the most cost-effective
and affordable manner.

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2020: Valued and Valuable. This set out detailed proposals for the future
relationships required with society, employers, Reservists and their families in
order to deliver and sustain the Reserve Forces required[3]. Implementation
has now begun with legislation, equipment, employer engagement and
training changes all making significant progress. Rapid action has been taken
to address teething problems with the recruitment process; and, although
challenging, we are confident that the increase in Reserves is achievable.

Bases

xxvi. In terms of bases, the Regular Army Basing Plan, with Army rebasing from
Germany at its core, was announced by the Defence Secretary on 5[th] March
2013. The Army will restructure and concurrently concentrate in the UK in a
series of centres of gravity and specialisation. This will see a third brigade
based on Salisbury Plain and the further development of Catterick, Kendrew
Barracks, RAF Leuchars and Stafford as major Army bases. Initial Germany
rebasing moves took advantage of spare capacity at sites being vacated by
the RAF to return units from Cyprus and Germany, at Cottesmore in the East
Midlands, and Kinloss in Scotland, thereby enabling the beginning of the
closure of German facilities. We remain on target to return 100% of our
personnel in Germany by 2020 and to exceed the original target of 50%
returning by 2015. Finalising this number depends on several other MOD
change programmes; and the concurrent return of manpower and materiel
from Afghanistan exacerbates the challenge. The Defence Board is
monitoring progress closely. The return of the British Army from Germany is
expected to generate cost savings of some £240 million per annum. The
Regular Army Basing Plan also represents a £1.8 billion infrastructure
investment in the UK over the construction delivery period from late 2013 until
late 2019.

xxvii. Since the Ministerial announcement, the Basing plan has been constituted in
MOD as one of its key change Programmes – the Army Basing Programme
– with CE Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) as the Senior
Responsible Officer (SRO). A joint Army-DIO delivery team is being formed
drawing upon industry support. Infrastructure-related work is under way to
deliver ecological surveys, planning work, site-level assessment and options
studies.

xxviii. The DIO has worked with single Services to develop the Future Reserves
**2020 Basing Plan to enable growth in Reserves capability, support**
sustainable recruiting and deliver a degree of estate rationalisation[4]. The key
basing elements will see infrastructure investment in a number of sites. Thirtyeight sites have been deemed surplus to Reserve requirements (35 Army and
three Royal Navy Reserve / Royal Marine Reserves sites). Work will now
commence to determine the longer term future of these sites and develop

3 For the purposes of Table 1 assessing progress against National Security Tasks, the defence
transformation commitment on the Future Reserves 2020 is noted under item 6(c) on a civilian
response scaled to support military operations.
4 Announced by the Secretary of State on 3rd July 2013.

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plans for meeting the requirements of affected lodger units and cadets on
those sites. The DIO is working with the Department to assess how we can
best deliver a cohesive, resilient estate of the right size that is well used and
aligns with the operational needs beyond Future Force 2020.

xxix. The rollout of Defence Infrastructure Organisation‟s new Operating Model
(OM) began in April 2013. This included the implementation of its Information
Management Solution through a series of phased capability releases
throughout 2013/14. Capability release 1 was rolled out in April 2013. The OM
is expected to be at full operating capability by March 2014.

Efficiency and reform

xxx. In terms of efficiency and reform, the Materiel Strategy is designed to deliver
options for the future delivery of defence equipment acquisition and support.
Reforming the acquisition system, delivering lasting improvement in the
management of the MOD's ten-year £160 billion equipment and support
programme, is a core element of the Transforming Defence programme. An
assessment phase, which began in April, sought to make a comparison
between two possible futures for Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S).
One option was 'DE&S+', an improved internal solution. The alternative was a
Government-Owned Contractor-Operated (GOCO) organisation, a ring-fenced
entity run with private sector expertise. The Defence Secretary recently
announced to Parliament that, following the withdrawal of a second
consortium, the Government would not proceed with the competition, and that
DE&S would become a bespoke central government trading entity from April
2014 as an intermediate step towards any future GOCO competition. It will be
supported by private sector resources in the form of business partners which
will be found through competition begun in early 2014. The Better Defence
Acquisition White Paper also set out proposals for strengthening the
arrangements governing the procurement of equipment where the MOD is
unable to meet its requirement through open competition (Single Source
Procurement). These reforms will represent a real change to how the MOD
conducts its business, delivering a more effective way of providing the
equipment and capabilities the Armed Forces need to keep the United
Kingdom secure.

xxxi. Plans to deliver savings of £900 million by 2020/21 under the Submarine
**Enterprise Performance Programme (SEPP) are being taken forward. Two**
of the three bilateral Foundation Contracts have been signed with Industry
Partners: Rolls-Royce in February 2013, and BAE Systems in July 2013. The
remaining Foundation Contract, with Babcock Marine, will be delivered
through a combination of the current Terms of Business Agreement (TOBA)
and the Maritime Support Delivery Framework (MSDF) contract for which
signature is expected later in the year. These Foundation Contracts commit
each of the Submarine Enterprise Industry Partners to the delivery of their
proportion of the SEPP benefits.

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xxxii. Work is under way to deliver non-front line savings of at least £4.3 billion
over the 2010 Spending Review period. A mixed progress rating reflects the
complexity in calculating savings across the Department. Several mitigation
measures have been put in place: the MOD Finance Director has been
appointed as Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) and a supporting Governance
Board has been set up. SROs have been allocated for each of the savings
measures; and a tracking process has been developed to mitigate risk of
savings erosion.

xxxiii. The rationalisation of the Defence Estate continues, including the sale of
surplus land and buildings, with the aspiration to achieve £350 million of
running cost savings per year. The Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO)
is developing an overall approach to the estate (Footprint Strategy) aimed at
ensuring that Defence makes the most effective use of the current estate. A
number of Regional Studies will be commissioned to understand how the
Defence Estate can be optimised and, where appropriate, to invest in larger
but fewer sites whilst divesting ourselves of sites which attract higher running
costs. Identifying sites with higher disposal values will enable increased
investment in the better remaining sites.

xxxiv. Additionally, following the 2013 Spending Review, the MOD will make
approximately £875 million of efficiency savings in 2015/16. This includes
around £300 million through a ground-breaking deal with the Cabinet Office to
hand responsibility for procurement of a range of non-military goods and
services to the Government Procurement Service, and £350 million from
efficiencies in the equipment support budget, including the renegotiation of
contracts.

105. The overall rating for this Task, taking account of all commitments, is “on

track” as defined in paragraph 11.

**C. Wider issues.**

Operational coordination and implementation

106. The Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) provide a mechanism for co
ordinating decision-making and emergency response across Government. They
have been used extensively in this crisis response role in a range of international
and domestic incidents throughout the year. Government has continued to
enhance and strengthen crisis response arrangements in the light of key lessons
arising from exercises and operations. A programme of work has begun to upgrade the UK‟s crisis management facilities. This includes a Memorandum of
Understanding with Ordnance Survey to provide mapping and imaging
capabilities, thus ensuring that the UK continues to make best use of technology.
COBR has also been used as the central point for co-ordination of Government‟s
support for events of national importance, such a Lady Thatcher‟s funeral and the
G8.

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Scotland

107. The UK Government‟s position is clear: Scotland and the rest of the UK derive

mutual benefit from an integrated approach to security, cyber, justice and
policing, as well as from security exports and our international alliances and
relationships. The Scotland analysis programme aims to set out evidence and
analysis on Scotland‟s place in the UK, and considers the implications of
independence, so people in Scotland can make an informed decision in the
referendum. It is for those advocating independence to explain the security
implications of the establishment of an independent Scottish state. The UK
Government is supporting its position with evidence and analysis.

Horizon scanning

108. In the Civil Service Reform Plan, the Government committed to a cross
government review of horizon scanning capability. The Cabinet Secretary
commissioned the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Jon Day, to
consider how departments make use of horizon scanning, to assess the
capabilities and structures used by the Civil Service to anticipate risk and identify
opportunities over the medium-to-long term, and to make recommendations on
how best to enable shared strategic analysis across Government on future
challenges. The review was published on 21[st] January 2013. The review resulted
in a new structure for undertaking horizon scanning across Government, which
aims to improve commissioning, co-ordination, oversight, and the quality of
outputs.

109. The new cross-government horizon scanning programme, announced in June

2013, joins up existing work and groups within different departments to form
„communities of interest‟ so as to maximise capability, commission new work and
ensure that horizon scanning is linked into policy development at all levels.
Duplication will be reduced and new insights will be generated.

110. As the programme is relatively new in its formation, it is too early to measure

the implementation of the recommendations; but early signs indicate that the
„communities of interest‟ are already bringing together Departments which had
previously not joined up.

111. More information on the Horizon Scanning Programme can be found at this

[link: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/horizon-scanning-programme-a-new-](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/horizon-scanning-programme-a-new-approach-for-policy-making)
[approach-for-policy-making.](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/horizon-scanning-programme-a-new-approach-for-policy-making)

**D. Reflections on lessons from implementation**

112. As work on implementing the 2010 National Security Strategy and Strategic

Defence and Security Review has progressed, there have been several areas
where experience has helped inform the development of policy. This section
highlights some examples.

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113. In the international policy context, we need to continue to reflect fully on the

lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq, both in defence terms and in terms of public
support for the use of military intervention. We need to reflect on capability gaps
(for example in surveillance) and how such gaps can be met in the future; and on
the implications of technological change for both the future of conflict and the
options available to the UK to deter, contain, and intervene internationally.

114. Since 2010, the Conflict Pool has continued to make a contribution to

conflict prevention and resolution overseas, for example by supporting political
reconciliation in Somalia, providing police training in Libya, and helping to reform
the security sector in Mali. The 2013 Spending Round announced the
Government‟s intent to build on the Conflict Pool‟s successes by bringing
together new and existing resources from across Government into a new
**Conflict, Stability and Security Fund of £1 billion under the strategic direction**
of the National Security Council. This will fund a broader range of activity to help
prevent conflict and tackle threats to UK interests that arise from instability
overseas. The role of the National Security Council in setting priorities for the
fund will ensure an integrated cross-Government approach, drawing on defence,
diplomacy, development assistance, stabilisation, security and intelligence.

115. Experience from the approach to national security threats set out in the UK‟s

Counter-Terrorism CONTEST strategy published in 2011, as well as from the
implementation of the 2011 strategy Local to Global: reducing the risks from
organised crime, has been brought to bear on the new Serious and Organised
**Crime Strategy. The reform of the counter-radicalisation work stream for**
CONTEST and the revised Prevent Strategy (June 2011) have also formed the
basis for the work of the Extremism Task Force, particularly on the need to look
at all forms of extremism and robustly to tackle extremism wherever we find it.

116. Following the threat of strikes by fuel tanker drivers in 2012, identifying

lessons on how to improve preventative approaches, which could reduce the
impact or scale of civil emergencies before they happen, has become a key
focus. These would also be essential in the case of some of the top tier risks, set
out in the National Security Strategy, which could overwhelm locally delivered
response, particularly for wide-area emergencies. A Tier 1 exercise planned for
2014 will look to test evolving thinking on the use of military planning and delivery
capability, particularly with civilian emergency response mechanisms.

117. The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games was the largest sporting

event in UK history; and lessons from the 2012 security programme have been
shared with Glasgow for the 2014 Commonwealth Games and the authorities in
Brazil for the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Protecting
the Games required the largest ever peace time security operation in this country.
This highlighted the mutual benefits of closer working relationships between
central government and the local response tier. Government continues to foster
these through greater information sharing (risk assessment and planning
assumptions) and improving awareness and understanding of Government
resilience strategy. Up to 14,500 police officers and 18,000 Armed Forces
personnel were deployed on Games security duties. About one million

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accreditation application background checks were completed for Games Family
Members, workers, volunteers, athletes, journalists and officials. Nearly six
million people arrived at Heathrow alone during July and August 2012.

**Conclusions**

118. The 2010 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security

Review took a risk-based, whole-of-government approach to security, and
established the National Security Council so as to ensure prompt, coherent,
coordinated and well-informed decision-making on all strategic defence and
security issues. This extends security strategy beyond the scope of military effect
and the confines of traditional military strategy. Such an approach reflects the
varied pace of evolving global risks and opportunities, and their wide-ranging
consequences. It is intentionally adaptable. It allows for uncertainties in the
domestic and international context.

119. As documented in this report, the risk-based approach directly informs the

relationships between policy and implementation, strategy and delivery, words
and action. There has been continued implementation progress over the past
year; and although many of the remaining challenges relate to factors beyond our
control, the Government remains focused on building on successes to date.

120. Looking ahead, the Government is now reflecting on lessons learned from the

experience of implementing these commitments as it begins to prepare for the
2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.

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