#### 2006 ###### National Defense Report The Republic of China ----- ----- **2006 NATIONAL DEFENSE REPORT** **REPUBLIC OF CHINA** **CONTENTS** President's Foreword Minister's Foreword Prologue [15] Introduction [17] Part 1 Facing the Challenges Chapter 1 The Evolving Security Environment [29] I. Global Security Environment 30 II. Asia-Pacifi c Security Development 33 III. Cross-Strait Security Status 39 IV. Taiwan's Strategic Role in Asia-Pacifi c Security 42 Chapter 2 PRC's Military Development [47] I. A Force Projection Military Strategy 48 II. PRC's Defense Budget and Weapon Development 52 III. PRC's Military Capability Buildup and Exercises 57 Chapter 3 PRC's Military Threat to Taiwan [71] I. PRC's Military Strategies toward Taiwan 72 II. PRC's Military Deployment toward Taiwan 76 III. PRC's Military Capabilities against Taiwan 78 IV. PRC's Military Maneuvers against Taiwan 81 V. PRC's Possible Military Means of Invading Taiwan 82 Chapter 4 Domestic Factors [87] I. Defense Resources and Constraints 88 II. Social Expectations 89 III. The Quest for a Nationalized Defense Force 91 Part 2 Innovative Transformation Chapter 5 Adjusting Military Strategy [97] I. Military Strategy Development 98 II. Nature of the Military Strategy 100 ----- Chapter 6 Reengineering Organization Functions [107] I. Refi ning Defense Organization 108 II. Readjusting Force Structure 111 III. Reshaping Organization Culture 120 Chapter 7 Fortifying Quality Manpower [127] I. Transforming the Recruitment System 128 II. Enhancing Military Education 130 III. Fostering MND Civilian Offi cials 135 Chapter 8 Building Modern Weaponry [141] I. Weaponry Acquisition Concept 142 II. Military Buildup Procedures & Life-Cycle Management Mechanism 145 III. Current Weapon System Acquisition 149 Chapter 9 Enhancing Joint Operations Capability [153] I. Joint Operations Planning Concept 154 II. Joint Operations Command Mechanism 156 III. Joint Operations Doctrine Development 158 IV. Joint Operations Force Buildup 162 V. Joint Operations Exercises Enhancement 165 Part 3 All-out Defense Chapter 10 Concept and Vision of All-out Defense [173] I. Consolidating Consensus for All-out Defense 174 II. Strengthening Belief in All-out Defense 177 III. Building an All-dimensional National Defense 180 Chapter 11 Interdependence of Defense and Society [185] I. Defense Industrial Cooperation Program 186 II. Military-Civilian Transferable Technology 190 III. Building Defense Industrial Base 193 IV. Base Realignment Planning 196 V. Civil Support Operation 198 Chapter 12 An All-out Support for and Participation in Defense [203] I. Implementing All-out Defense Education 204 II. Recruiting Elite Canidates 207 III. Rational Defense Budgeting 210 IV. Implementing All-out Defense Mobilization Systems 213 ----- **Appendices** Appendix 2-1 Combined Military Exercises and Military Observations between the PLA and Foreign Militaries from 2004 to 2005 220 Appendix 6-1 Legislation and Amendments of the Two Defense Acts 221 Appendix 6-2 Implementation Status and Results of the Military Complaint System 232 Appendix 6-3 Administrative Implementation Status and Results of the MND Military Personnel Rights Committee 234 Appendix 7-1 Procedure of Promoting Competent Enlisted Personnel to Non-Commissioned Offi cers 236 Appendix 7-2 Principles, Plans, and Campus Placements for Streamlining Military Academies in Northern Taiwan 237 Appendix 7-3 Civilian Job Categories in the MND 238 Appendix 10-1 Administrative Conference System for All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation 239 Appendix 11-1 Case Studies of Industrial Results from Specialized Technological Projects Coordinated with the Ministry of Economic Affairs 240 **The List of MND departments and agencies** [247] **Phone numbers** [249] **Epilogue** **List of Figures** Figure 1-1 American Global Military Adjustment Plan 36 Figure 1-2 PLA Submarine Routes into Japanese Seas 37 Figure 1-3 1[st] Island Chain pivot point and keys to stability in the Taiwan Strait 43 Figure 2-1 Statistics of the PLA's fi ghters activities west of the Taiwan Strait central line from 1998 to 2005 49 Figure 2-2 PRC's Defense Budget Statistics from 1995 to 2006 52 Figure 2-3 PRC's Annual Defense Budgetary and Economic Growth Compared to Price Indices 54 Figure 2-4 PLA's land-based nuclear weapon strike range 59 ----- Figure 2-5 Strike Coverage of PLA's Short and Medium Range Missiles 62 Figure 2-6 PLA's Aerial Threats against Taiwan 63 Figure 2-7 PLA's Naval Threats against Taiwan 64 Figure 3-1 Satellite photograph of the PLA Second Artillery missile brigade facility enhancements 73 Figure 3-2 Satellite pictures of the PLA's reactive airport as transit base 74 Figure 3-3 Satellite pictures of the PLA's Intention to build Carrier Fleets 74 Figure 3-4 Satellite pictures of the PLA's Modeled Taiwanese Facilities used in Assault Exercises 75 Figure 3-5 Satellite Pictures of the PLA's Intensifi ed Takeover Exercises of Taiwan's Islets 75 Figure 3-6 PRC's Regional Railroad Map 79 Figure 3-7 PRC's Regional Highway Map 79 Figure 6-1 Organization of the Policy Branch 108 Figure 6-2 Organization of the Command Branch 109 Figure 6-3 Organization of the Armament Branch 110 Figure 6-4 Adjusted Organization of the Army 112 Figure 6-5 Adjusted Organization of the Navy 113 Figure 6-6 Adjusted Organization of the Air Force 113 Figure 6-7 Adjusted Organization of the Combined Logistics Command 114 Figure 6-8 Adjusted Organization of the Reserve Command 115 Figure 6-9 Adjusted Organization of the Military Police Command 116 Figure 6-10 Adjusted Organization of the Missile Command 116 Figure 6-11 Adjusted Organization of the Information and Electronic Warfare Command 117 Figure 8-1 Military Buildup Process 145 Figure 9-1 Objective Levels of Joint Operation Development 154 Figure 9-2 Pre-Jingjin and Post-Jingin Joint Operation Command Hierarchy 157 Figure 9-3 Military Doctrine Development System 160 Figure 9-4 Military Doctrine Development Organization 161 Figure 11-1 Categorized statistics of the application of Taiwan's ICP credits 186 Figure 11-2 Total Acquired ICP Credits in Recent Years 187 Figure 11-3 Sources of ROC ICP Credits (by Ministry) 187 Figure 11-4 Utilization (by Sector) of ICP Credits in Taiwan 188 Figure 11-5 Overall Planning on the Utilization, Release and Deregulation of Military Real Estate 197 ----- Figure 11-6 Major disaster relief missions supported by ROC Armed Forces 199 Figure 12-1 Defense Budgets as a Percentage of GDP and Government Expenditures in the Last 5 Years 211 Figure 12-2 Comparison of Armed Forces Personnel Maintenance Fees Variations between 1997 and 2006 212 ----- ----- **President's Foreword** Chen Shui-bian President Republic of China (Taiwan) August 14, 2006 Taiwan's goals for national defense are to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integri ty, to proactively prevent the outbreak of war, and to protect the lives and property of the 23 million people of Taiwan. For more than fi ve decades, China, on the opposite shore of the Taiwan Strait, has not once renounced the use of military force to annex Taiwan. Not only does this represent the most serious threat posed to Taiwan's national defense, but also the gravest challenge to Taiwan's contin ued survival. The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States have redefi ned and reshaped the con cept of national security. National security is now challenged on a multitude of fronts due to the continual emergence of non-traditional threats such as terrorist attacks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, confl icts over and safeguarding of basic energy supplies, and the spread of serious contagious diseases. Over the past few years, Taiwan has responded to developments in the cross-strait military balance and global security by striving to consolidate its defense capabilities and ensure national se curity. In the same vein, the publication of the “National Defense Report” aims to bolster the aware ness and understanding of Taiwan's people and the international community on Taiwan's national defense issues by making relevant information both public and transparent. This should also, in turn, encourage Taiwan's people and the international community to give their full support to our major defense-building efforts. In the past, confrontation between the two major political blocs—East and West—was at its most intense in Europe. Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War and the founding of the European Union, along with its continual expansion, has completely changed the face of security threats met by European nations. Major steps have been taken towards creating a Europe vested with greater freedom, democracy, peace, and prosperity. In contrast, however, a high degree of uncertainty and confl ict continues to prevail in the Asia Pacifi c region—be it on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait. In particular, China has moved swiftly in expanding its military prowess in an attempt to project its strategic lines of defense beyond that of the fi rst island chain. This poses a serious threat to the security and stability of the entire region, casting huge shadows on, and bringing new variables to, the efforts of Asia-Pacifi c na tions in achieving lasting peace. ----- Since 1989, China's national defense budget has grown annually at a double-digit rate. Facing no apparent threat, China's military expansion far exceeds what is needed for self-defense. Many Asia-Pacifi c nations, including the United States and Japan, have shown great concern over this. As a member of the world's free democracies, Taiwan has to shoulder the responsibility of its own self-defense and make contributions to the creation of a freer, more democratic, and more peaceful world. The people of Taiwan love peace. Even more so, they long for lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait. Peace, however, must be backed up by a solid national defense. While striving to pursue last ing peace in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan must not neglect to enhance and strengthen its defensive ca pabilities. To ensure that the status quo of Taiwan's freedom, democracy, prosperity, and peace is not changed unilaterally, the people must forge a consensus on national security. This will allow effec tive and powerful defense capabilities to be developed in order to deter and prevent military confl ict. In response to China's increasing military threat, Taiwan's military has made tremendous ef forts in building up its defense capabilities and improving combat readiness in recent years. A com prehensive transformation of the military has been promoted through the launch of reforms in the military's organization, troop strength, equipment, codes of conduct, personnel, and education. It is hoped that, through such reforms, a modern, powerful, and high-quality national defense force, composed of the appropriate number of personnel and demonstrating strong combat capabilities, can be established. Furthermore, Taiwan has adopted countermeasures concerning the three strategic warfares— legal contention, propaganda contests, and psychological assaults—that China's People's Liberation Army has begun to wage against Taiwan. By promoting national defense education for all citizens, the government hopes to make the people more vigilant concerning potential enemies and instill in them a consciousness of the potent threat they may face so as to reinforce their psychological de fenses. Since these measures will be of great assistance in ensuring Taiwan's national security, they deserve the attention and support of all of Taiwan's people. In closing, I would like to once again express my sincere appreciation and respect to the military's leading cadres and soldiers for their hard work and to their families for their longstand ing devotion and support. Moreover, I call on our fellow citizens to express love for their country by continuing to render unwavering support and care for our armed forces, which will, in turn, help them grow stronger and become the best defensive power and protective shield for Taiwan's sustain able development. ----- **Minister's Foreword** The essence and purpose of national defense of the Republic of China (ROC) is “all-out de fense.” The public's understanding of, support for, and participation in defense matters is the basis of a robust all-out defense. In order to promote understanding of defense administration and encour age citizens to support and participate in defense affairs, the Ministry of National Defense publishes a defense report once every two years. This report provides a general overview and assessment of changes in the defense and security environment and the ROC Armed Forces' hard work on military buildup and combat readiness over the previous two years. It also systematically explains the key points of defense administration during the current period and our vision for future policy. Besides helping realize the concept of all-out defense, the“defense transparency” exemplifi ed by the publica tion of this report also lets other countries and the international community understand our defense policy and military strategy, and thereby promotes military cooperation and avoids misunderstand ings. This report could therefore enable the international community to understand and support Taiwan's role as the “guardian of peace across the Taiwan Strait.” Looking back on the past few years, globalization and information technology have caused ma jor changes in the international security environment. The security challenges faced by the ROC are therefore becoming increasingly complex. Among these challenges, China's ever-growing military threat is the biggest menace to our country's survival and development. China has consistently re fused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. In recent years, China has actively acquired new types of weapon systems from foreign sources, deployed them along its southeast coast, and contin ued to hold large-scale military exercises simulating attacks on Taiwan. Besides its military buildup, China has also stepped up opposition to Taiwan on the political and legal fronts. For instance, in March 2005, China passed the “anti-secession law” which effectively authorizes acts of war against Taiwan. In addition, in an effort to weaken Taiwan's legal status and shake our people's morale, China has launched the “Three Warfares;” legal, psychological and public opinion, against Taiwan and the international community. The circumstances make it obvious that China is a real, direct and steadily increasing threat against our national security. The ROC Armed Forces need to constantly seek improvement in their military buildup and armament readiness if they are to cope with this challenge, maintain the military balance across the Taiwan Strait, and safeguard national security. Keeping peace across the Taiwan Strait is our nation's key mission, and is the common expec tation of our citizens. The possession of a strong defense capability is a necessary precondition to maintaining peace and deterring or curbing any actions that might jeopardize peace and security. In the face of China's formidable military threat, apart from a fi erce determination to defend ourselves, we ought to also possess substantial and effective modern defense forces. Without adequate defen ----- sive strength, no matter how much goodwill we show China, and no matter how many peace initia tives we make, a lasting, solid peace would remain beyond our grasp. In order to establish a strong defensive capability and improve professionalism and perfor mance, in recent years the ROC Armed Forces have striven to promote the reengineering of defense organizations and realize a “revolution in military affairs.” The first-of-its-kind “2006 National Security Report,” issued on May 20, 2006, explicitly elaborates on the ROC's national security strat egies. The main strategy of “accelerating defense transformation, establishing a quality and stream lined defense force” lays out guiding directions for the continued upgrading of the ROC Armed Forces. Looking towards the future, despite limited resources, we intend to create an integrated de fense force via the systematic reform of the Armed Forces' organization, military structure, strategic thinking, weaponry and equipment, development of guidelines, and human resources. We expect these efforts to boost our overall military strength, give the Armed Forces the ability to adapt to changes in the strategic environment and cope with ever-shifting challenges, and transform the ROC Armed Forces into a rigorous military capable of preventing and winning wars. The content of this defense report underscores the connection between the ROC Armed Forces' efforts to realize “defense transformation” and the goal of “all-out defense.” We hope that all citi zens would understand the importance and urgency of the Armed Forces' transformation and up grading. We believe that this understanding will win us the public's support, enable the integration of necessary resources, and strengthen public resolve. It is our wish that we together ensure national security and create sustainable national strength and vitality. The publication of this report symbolizes the ROC Armed Forces' determination to keep im proving, embrace change, and avoid complacency. The Armed Forces shall continue to uphold a philosophy of both reform and pragmatism in the future, and shall rely on innovative, transformative thinking and pragmatic, feasible actions to facilitate military buildup and readiness tasks, yielding to a highly-competent, modern defense force. I personally hope that everyone in the ROC Armed Forces would remember their mission of protecting the people in their daily routines, and would always give their full effort. I also expect all citizens to give their full support and encouragement to our dedicated, hard-working armed forces personnel, continue to show concern for our defense administration, provide suggestions, and urge the ROC Armed Forces to keep moving forward and improving, so that we can always accomplish our mission of ensuring national security and main taining peace across the Taiwan Strait. Minister Lee Jye August 2006 ----- **Prologue** The ROC is dedicated to realizing democratic governance, protecting freedom and human rights, promoting the people's welfare, and pursuing harmonious regional developments in East Asia. Its Armed Forces have consistently carried out their mission in accordance with the ROC Con stitution, made constant adjustments to meet real defense needs and changes in the environment, and continued to maintain a strong and vigilant defense in the face of the PRC's harsh rhetoric and saber rattling. As guarantor of the nation's survival, the ROC Armed Forces protect such basic values as democracy, freedom, and human rights. The Ministry of National Defense regularly compiles and publishes defense reports in ac cordance with Article 30 of the National Defense Act. These reports are intended to explain to citi zens the nation's defense and security affairs, defense policy goals, and major military buildup and combat readiness measures, while promoting defense affairs transparency, and realizing the goal of all-out defense. Guided by the National Security Council's “2006 National Security Report,” this defense report focuses on the theme of “defense transformation.” It differs from the conventional layout of the previous report which was presented according to the list of policies implemented. This report expounds the theme in three parts “Facing the Challenges,” “Innovative Transformation,” and “All-out Defense,” containing a total of 12 chapters. The following is a brief summary of each part: Part 1 Facing the Challenges This part contains the four chapters “The Evolving Security Environment, ” “PRC's Military Development,” “PRC's Military Threat to Taiwan, ” and “Domestic Factors.” It surveys the strategic environment and main challenges faced by the Armed Forces, and discusses the driving forces be hind defense transformation. This section also provides an explanation of the internal and external factors that are driving military reform and transformation. Part 2 Innovative Transformation This part contains the five chapters “Adjusting Military Strategy,” “Re-engineering Orga nizational Functions,” “Consolidating Quality Manpower,” “Building Modern Weaponry,” and “Enhancing Joint Operation Capability.” It explains how the ROC Armed Forces are responding to challenges and the specifi c actions being taken to realize reforms and transformation, including ad justment of military strategy, re-engineering of organizational functions, improvement of manpower, establishment of modern weapons systems, and enhancement of joint operation capability. These actions are intended to eliminate obstructions, establish superiority, build up strength, and overcome challenges. 15 ----- Part 3 All-out Defense This part contains the three chapters“Concept and Vision of All-out Defense,” “Interdependence of Defense and Society,” and “An All-out Support for and Participation in Defense.” It explains how the country's defense preparations and the Armed Forces' transformation are based on an“all-out de fense,” which calls for the people to understand defense concepts, identify with the nation's defense, and mobilize to support and participate in defense. This will achieve a defense consensus assuring national security and realize the goal of strength in unity. 16 ----- **Introduction** Deliberated around the theme of “defense transformation,” the 2006 National Defense Report (NDR) is divided into three major parts, namely, “Facing the Challenges,” “Innovative Transforma tion” and “All-out Defense.” The purpose of such division is to elucidate future challenges facing the ROC Armed Forces and our aggressive pursuance for defense transformation and execution of defense affairs in meeting these challenges, and to achieve an all-out defense strategy fully recog nized, involved and supported by fellow citizens. To facilitate the people's understanding of the ba sic arguments and visions of this NDR, major topics are presented along the lines of “defense policy execution through transformation,” “main thrust and momentum for defense transformation,” “fun damentals and implications of defense transformation,” “core values and visions of defense transfor mation” and “defense transformation based on all-out defense.” These are expounded as follows: **Defense Policy Execution through Transformation** Facing the multifaceted challenges of current global environment, our defense policy calls for “war prevention,” “homeland defense” and “counter-terrorism and contingency response” as the three fundamental objectives. The establishment of these objectives is based on the vision of “preventing war,” “maintaining the stability of Taiwan Strait” and “defending the national soil” dis closed in the 2002 NDR and further clarifi ed in the 2004 NDR. The continued emphasis of “war pre vention” and the “fi ve no's policy” of “no development, no production, no acquisition, no stockpile and no deployment” regarding nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons have kept the ROC Armed Forces holding fast to the just cause of seeking-peace and non-provocation. The “homeland defense” guideline emphasizes the determination and will of the ROC Armed Forces in deterring any invading forces through modern joint operations and integration with an all-out defense by our fellow citizens. The “counter-terrorism and contingency response” guideline emphasizes the con struction of a fast-responding force capable of conducting swift and effective actions against non traditional threats to achieve the goal of “preventing external attacks and internal coups.” 1. War Prevention The greatest challenge facing our national security is the PRC's military threat. And the main purpose of ROC Armed Forces' military buildup and readiness programs is to address such threat. Article 137 of the Constitution of the Republic of China states, “The national defense of the Repub lic of China shall have as its objective the safeguarding of national security and the preservation of world peace.” Hence, “war prevention” is the fundamental defense policy while “invasion deter rence and peace preservation” is the ultimate goal for all military efforts. To prevent unnecessary confl icts infl icting civilian casualties, damaging our livelihood and undermining national develop 17 ----- ment, the ROC Armed Forces must seize every opportunity to gain relative superiority over the Tai wan Strait through appropriate military infrastructure and armament readiness to deter any military invasion from the PRC. 2. Homeland Defense The main purpose for the existence of a national military force is to conduct effective military operations under proper command authority in times of crisis. The military force is expected to de ter any foreign threats and pursue victory. Article 141 of the Constitution of the Republic of China states, “The foreign policy of the Republic of China shall, in a spirit of independence and initiative and on the basis of the principles of equality and reciprocity, cultivate good-neighborliness with other nations, and respect treaties and the interests of Chinese citizens residing abroad, promote international cooperation, advance international justice and ensure world peace.” Therefore our military buildup and employment of forces also adopt a defensive stance and will neither provoke a confl ict nor initiate any preemptive strike. In the face of a hostile military action or foreign invasion, however, all necessary means of self defense will be carried out. Thus, in peacetime the ROC Armed Forces must build up its defensive and deterrent capabilities that can produce “strategic endurance but tactical expeditiousness.” This is to ensure defensive deterrence and warfi ghting activities can be conducted in a prompt and effective manner to guarantee the security of our homeland when war is inevitable. 3. Counter-Terrorism and Contingency Response Globalization brings with it the continuous expansion of multifaceted security threats to mod ern societies. The responsibilities of the ROC Armed Forces have since expanded from fulfi lling traditional military responsibilities to engaging in national security support missions during major crises, and in counter-terrorism activities and emergency disaster reliefs. Under the unifi ed com mand of the Executive Yuan, the ROC Armed Forces conduct operations with other government agencies to ensure the safety and security of civilians and their properties. Such crisis prevention and management activities require effective early warning and management systems to acquire early intelligence and information to prevent crisis escalation. In time of crisis, the ROC Armed Forces will devote itself to the supporting measures under the unifi ed command of the Executive Yuan and conduct efforts including, but not limited to, crisis intervention, damage control, public safety and recovery programs. The goal is to resolve the crisis in a prompt manner while maintaining the safety and security of our citizens. Furthermore, the ROC Armed Forces routinely conduct exercises that focus on dealing with possible special operations, infi ltration and guerilla warfare tactics by the PRC military. The goal is to construct a fast-responding force capable of maintaining the security of our nation and people. To realize the fundamental goals mentioned above, each and every military buildup and readi 18 ----- ness effort at this current stage requires us to push for necessary transformation in order to build a fast-reacting, highly effective modernized force capable of fulfi lling multifaceted defense missions. We expect to “enhance our capabilities through renovation and in turn ensure peace through our ca pabilities” so as to effectively protect the safety and security of our nation and people. **Main Thrust and Momentum behind Defense Transformation** In the face of various defense challenges, it is necessary for the ROC Armed Forces to ensure a relatively secure and stable domestic social environment to guarantee the freedom, safety and de velopment of our nation and people. On the international security arena, a fast emerging PRC has resulted in drastic changes in the global and Asia Pacifi c power structure. The PRC's rapid growing national power, coupled with an increasingly modernized military, is forming a cooperative relation ship with the surrounding nations through strategic alliance or diplomatic measures and aggressively imposing its infl uence on international affairs such as politics, economy, military and resources. In the meantime, while the PRC strives to become a prominent global power, its military pressure and threat on Taiwan have never diminished. Besides continued combat readiness efforts against Taiwan, the PRC enacted the Anti-Secession Law to formally authorize the PLA to resolve the Taiwan issue with non-peaceful means which makes the law more like a war authorization act. The fast growth of PRC's military capability has gradually resulted in a military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait. The strike range of the PLA guided missiles already covers the entire Taiwan region and its submarines are threatening our maritime routes. PLA's naval and air combat capabili ties have already penetrated the fi rst island chain of the West Pacifi c, reaching Taiwan's east coast. Our defense security is now facing the greatest threat ever and the whole combat readiness effort is increasingly urgent. All factors considered, and given the limited resources available to the ROC Armed Forces, defense transformation is the only solution to a breakthrough in the gradual military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait and to gaining a substantial superiority. Under the dual infl uence of information technology and globalization since the 1980s, revolu tionary development has taken place in military technology and defense concepts. The types of war and forms of threats keep evolving, making them complex and diverse in nature. In order to address the new defense and military threat, there has been a rising wave of “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) in the international community. And for us as a nation, having successfully undergone economic development and democratic transformation, our society is now much more open and progressive and the people's expectation of our military forces has thus increased. The ROC Armed Forces must therefore adopt every possible effective measure to develop a highly adaptive defense capability to meet the demands of the new century and maintain the sovereignty of the Republic of China in its solidarity and entirety. We must protect the basic values of democracy, freedom and 19 ----- “Defense transformation” is the unified development in the defense and other important factors. “Defense transformation” is a continuous and military capable of adapting to stra tegic environment changes, deterring multifaceted defense challenges and 20 human rights and promote the economic, social and political development of the country. Since the promulgation of the National Defense Act and Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense (hereinafter referred to as the Two Defense Acts) on March 1, 2002, the ROC Armed Forces have not only fully executed the requirements of the Two Defense Acts and met popular demands to “re- engineer defense organization” and “professionalize defense affairs,” they have also kept up with the pace of contemporary trend in military reforms. Besides implementing a RMA-driven military buildup and plan, the ROC Armed Forces have wholeheartedly pursued MND organization and pro- cesses reengineering and force structure readjustment, and simultaneously enhanced military educa- tion, doctrine and training. The current push for defense transformation is our method for dealing with continuous pressures from our enemies, threat evolution, RMA trends and the internal quest for revolution. This push for defense transformation must succeed our past accomplishments and continue to improve and strengthen the constitution of our forces, and enhance defense capability to ensure national security. As indicated in the “2006 National Security Report” by the National Secu- rity Council on May 20, 2006, the national security strategy of Taiwan seeks to “accelerate defense transformation and establish an effective and adequate defense force.” This has been the key direc- tive for the continuing push for defense transformation and RMA efforts within the ROC Armed Forces. **Fundamentals and Implications of Defense Transformation** ### To respond to changing international circum- **stances and new forms of threats, major world** **powers have one by one adjusted their strategic** **deployments and accelerated national defense** **reforms in recent years. In the face of China’** **s increasing military threat, besides having the** **resolve to defend itself, Taiwan must also adopt** **new perspectives to re-evaluate its security** **defense concepts and re-adjust armament pre-** **paredness strategies in order to strengthen its** **self-defense capability.** **－“2006 National Security Report”, National** **Security Council, May 20, 2006** safeguarding the nation. A reasonable defense transformation must at least possess the three ingredients of fundamen- tality, synergy and continuity. “Fundamentality” means that the goal of transformation focuses not ----- only on enhancing the existing capabili ties but also on triggering a broad and fundamental change in the constitution bination of enhancements to individual domain, force or branch but an overall planning and push for changes on mat- **March 15, 2004.** ters across different domains, forces or ing, training, doctrine development and military education. **Core Values and Vision of Defense Transformation** 21 ### Defense Transformation: **”A complete examination and improvement** **of the overall defense organization, military** **doctrine and weapon system in dealing with** **new strategic environment and threats.”** **－“Military Terms and Glossary Diction-** **ary”, Ministry of National Defense, ROC,** **March 15, 2004.** branches. Synergy calls for an abandonment of individual development path and seeks integration of all revolutionary elements to reach an overall breakthrough and obtain synergistic effects. “Continu- ity” indicates that the transformation itself is an enduring implementation and adaptation process. No transformation steps and targets can be reached immediately. In the course of the transformation process, we must continuously adapt to the changing environment and make fl exible adjustments so that we may excel our enemies and pass the rigorous tests of the existing environment. On the execution front, defense transformation is the multi-disciplinary integration efforts of the military under the guidance of national security and defense policies through innovative measures covering strategic planning, resource allocation, joint operation, weapon acquisition, organization reengineer- After carefully considering all major driving factors such as the external security situation, PRC military threats, defense resources and domestic political and economic infl uences, the ROC Minis- try of National Defense proposes “stable transformation” and “effect-driven” as the core values to thrust the various revolution measures. Based on the principle of “pragmatism, progressiveness and continuity,” the ROC Armed Forces will pursue multiple concrete revolution measures through suit- able and feasible means to elevate a variety of capabilities. On the basis of an “all-out defense,” we will attain the basic defense goals of “war prevention, homeland defense and counter-terrorism and contingency response” to preserve the current peace status and long term development of the nation. Defense transformation is not only limited to the vision and philosophy of the Armed Forces' overall future development, but is also an integrated realization of the overall military buildup and combat readiness. Realization of these measures requires implementation through concrete actions. To effectively tackle the constant buildup of military threats from the PRC, the ROC MND has taken a forward looking stance into our future defense manpower needs and decided that the de- fense transformation of the ROC Armed Forces must aim to be “knowledge-based,” “professional,” ----- “technology-driven” and “joint.” It will vitalize and renovate our defense organi and “combat capabilities.” It is hoped that, through “a highly effective organization and manpower” and “strategies and com challenges,” we can create a highly effec any war. teristics of modern defense and military affairs and the trend of “military profes possess fl exibility and adaptability. The in ternal environment and the culture within the organization must break the inertia and ions, encourage innovative thinking and create organizational learning. The alloca planning and concrete measures include 22 ### A professional military is also a knowl- **edge organization; from tactical maneuver** **to strategic planning, it requires a great** **amount of knowledge integration. The fu-** **ture of defense is “knowledge defense.”** **– President Chen Shui-bien, opening** **speech at “4[th] Taiwan Defense Interna-** **tional Conference,” February 29, 2004.** ### It is our conviction that only a swift **"revolution in military affairs" (RMA)－its** **structure, doctrines, trainings and equip-** **ments－can transform the ROC Armed** **Forces into a knowledge-based power of** **the next generation, converting knowledge** **to military capability in order to effec-** **tively counter impending threats.** **－President Chen Shui-bien, Presidential** **Remarks, 2004 National Defense Report,** **December, 2004.** ### On this key moment of defense trans- **formation for the ROC Armed Forces, we** **should apply new vision and thinking based** **on the spirit of “Upholding Core Values,** **Seeking Innovative Breakthrough”….to** **advance our troops and elevate the overall** **quality of our armed forces in creating an** **elite defense team.** **－Lee Jye, Minister of National Defense,** **“2005 Annual Training Review Confer-** **ence” speech, Sep 29, 2005** the functional reengineering of the defense organization, reshaping organization culture, enhancing professional military education, fostering and managing of elite civilian offi cials and renovation in recruitment system to build a highly effective and organic organization. Being “technology-driven” and “joint” implies that the ROC Armed Forces must reexamine existing strategies and behavior models under combat environments utilizing current or emerging technology conditions. We must attempt multi-dimensional thinking and draft new strategies for fu- ----- 23 Defense Transformation Core Values and Visions Organization reengineering Knowledge- Reshaping organization based Highly Effective Organization culture and Manpower Enhancing military education Flexibility and Innovative Professionalism Fostering defense civilian Professional Adaptability Learning officials Renovating recruitment system Technology- Military strategyadjustment driven Strategy and Warfighting Capabilities Integrating existing combat Adaptable to New Challenges capabilities Active and Enhancing joint operation Integrated Synchronized Fast-response capabilities Joint Modern weapon systems acquisition ture threat scenarios and construct relevant combat capabilities to meet challenges of possible war- fare or armed confl icts. The most important concept is “jointness,” meaning not only the jointness in manpower and fi re power but, most importantly, the jointness in “concepts.” In other words, the consideration of joint operations must go deeper into the layers of strategies, tactics and methods, C[4]I, organization architecture and table of organization (TOE), troop formation and mission, organi- zation culture and habits, doctrine, manuals and exercises to integrate individual forces (branches) into a truly joint military force. The goal is to form an “integrated” military force with “synchronized” combat capability and the ability to conduct “active and fast-response” operations. Current plans and concrete measures include military strategy adjustment, integrating current combat capabilities, enhancing joint operations mechanisms and capabilities and acquisition and management of modern weapon systems. The expected result is a “peacetime deterring and wartime decisive” fi ghting force with core “joint operations” capabilities. **Defense Transformation Based on All-Out Defense** As stated in Article 3 of the National Defense Act, the nature of the ROC defense strategy is of “all-out defense.” An “all-out de- fense” is the joint representation of the **The national defense of the Republic of** **China is of all-out national defense, involv-** overall strength of a nation as a whole, **ing affairs pertaining to military, civil de-** the basis for deterring war and dealing **fense and those in political, economic, psy-** with crisis, and an important concept **chological and technological domains, which** and vision for the execution of national **may directly or indirectly contribute to the** **national defense.** defense. Modern defense affairs are **- Article 3, National Defense Act** not limited to a purely military domain ----- but are multifaceted, covering politics, economy, psychology and technology, etc. The execution of modern warfare requires the contribution and devotion of manpower, resources, and fi nancial sup port of the whole nation, not just the troops alone. All these rely on the formation of an all-out de fense effort during peacetime. The relationship between the Armed Forces and its society must be mutual and interactive. The military must fulfi ll the expectations of its citizens, community and nation; properly perform its duties in protecting the nation and support the communities in a professional manner. On the other hand, the Armed Forces need the support and trust of all citizens; defense affairs need the involve ment and cooperation of the people to fulfi ll the quest for an “all-out defense.” Only through full participation from its citizens in different domains can the synergistic effects of our nation's combat capabilities come to full play to guarantee national security and protect national interests. The fulfi llment of an “all-out defense” requires all civilians' accurate understanding of, full sup port of and involvement with defense affairs. It's especially important that we acquire full recogni tion and support from our people at this key junction when the ROC Armed Forces are aggressively pushing for defense transformation to acquire a sense of unity. To achieve the all-out defense goal, the MND has conducted concrete efforts along the three axes of “consolidating the willpower of all out defense,” “integrating national defense with society and industry” and “encouraging the people's support of and participation in national defense.” It hopes to build the public's awareness of poten tial crises, consolidate and integrate the will and strength for an all-out defense, and earn concrete support and participation from all people so that the ROC Armed Forces may acquire necessary resources, recruit professional personnel, and reinforce military-civilian cooperation. Coupled with a momentum for military transformation, the Armed Forces will then be ready to meet future chal lenges. 24 ----- 25 ----- ----- ----- ----- 29 ----- 30 I. Global Security Environment The current global security environment development is in a dynamic equilibrium of the inter- national political system, in which the United States (U.S.) acts as the leading superpower. Under this system, however, there are still other countries with considerable infl uence on their respective regional affairs. For example, the rise of the European Union (EU) and the PRC has cast potential challenges over the U.S. power, instilling uncertainty into the re-arrangement of the world power or- der. Also, regional armed confl icts have resulted in an increasing emphasis on international confl ict prevention and risk management through security cooperation. The emerging unconventional secu- rity threats and their characteristics will result in wide-ranging impacts upon the international com- munity, which may further heighten the borderless, contagious and risk-sharing nature of the threats. Taiwan anxiously developing newly capabilities to ensure national security in response to current and upcoming multiple threats, the RMA policies animated by information revolution and state-of- the-art developments have not only attracted attention from major countries around the world, but also brought about uneven opportunities and challenges to the military of different countries. **1. “Uni-polar” Structure of International Political System** Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the international political system has been in a “uni-polar” structure. Generally, the U.S. is the sole superpower in the world. With areas of respon- sibility reaching most areas around the world, the U.S. has the greatest overseas force deployment and military buildup ever made. However, although the U.S. is politically and economically signifi - cant, several powers in the world, including the PRC, Russia, the EU, India, Japan, etc., still exert considerable infl uence in sub-regions, causing a complex relationship of both competition and coop- eration in international political and economic interactions. Currently, the basic power structure of a “uni-polar” system is deemed to be relatively stable. However, under the 21[st] century globalization trends and growing political and economic integration between regional powers, vertical and horizontal interaction in different political and economic is- sues will become more complex, leaving some possibility for changes of power distribution in the sub-regions. In particular, the EU's pursuit of political integration, and the increasing political and economic strengths of Brazil, Russia, India, and the PRC may turn the global power structure into a multi-polar system. ###### 01' ----- **2. PRC's Rapidly Rising International Stature** Among the current emerging great powers, the PRC is the most prominent. Since the PRC's economic reforms in 1979, its overall national strength has increased rapidly, and it gradually took on major roles in regional and global affairs. In recent years, the PRC has improved relations with neighboring countries such as India, Vietnam, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, made strategic partnerships with Russia and several major countries, and initiated the Shanghai Coopera tive Organization (SCO) to stimulate regional trade and ensure the security of its western borders. To realize all of its foreign policies, the PRC has started actively improving its relations with neigh boring countries since 1990. At that time, Central Asian countries and the PRC had to deal with separatist movements, including the Xingjian separatist movement, which also affected Central Asia. However, after the 911 incident, the American infl uence began to propagate to central Asia due to its war against terrorism. Suspecting that American infl uences may indirectly hamper its develop ments, the PRC actively expanded SCO membership and operations in coordination with Russia in an attempt to consolidate its sphere of authority, and gradually diminish and eliminate American infl uence in the region. On the other hand, the PRC continues to participate in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping roles and anti-terror cooperation with the U.S. after September 11, and acts as a major negotiator in Six-Party Talks of North Korean nuclear weapon issue. Besides actively participating in international affairs, the PRC also uses its solid economic foundation to reap strategic benefi ts from foreign policy and economic interaction. For example, in recent years, the PRC state-run oil corporation is actively buying out foreign oil companies, which is seen as a major deployment of its global energy strategy. The international community has divergent opinions of the PRC's rising prominence. There are rational reasons to see the PRC as a peacefully developing country or a threat. However, since the PRC is still one of the few authoritarian countries in the world, its decision-making processes are not relatively transparent, and it was observed to have infringed upon human rights and suppressed de mocracy and free speech on several occasions. These factors, coupled with its continual expansions, of military power, have caused the international community to remain relatively concerned about the PRC's developments. In recent years, the U.S. has repeatedly called for the PRC to be a “responsible stakeholder” in international system, and to improve transparency in its defense affairs. This height ens international expectations for the PRC to play a stabilizing and positive role on the world stage. In other words, it is hoped that, as the PRC integrates into the international political and market economy system, it will fulfi ll its responsibilities as a regional power. All in all, the pervasive effects of the PRC's emergence have politically, economically, or militarily become the most concerning strategic opportunities and challenges to its surrounding countries and major world powers. 31 ----- Overall, the global security environment in the 21[st] century is inclined to develop along the Currently, the world's hot spots of potential armed confl icts are located mostly in the Middle From a conventional security perspective, responding to external military threats is a major Globally, the most prominent unconventional threat in the world today is the spread of inter 32 **3. Persistent Threats of Regional Conflicts** Overall, the global security environment in the 21 lines of mutual benefi t and bilateral and multilateral cooperation. However, a relatively stable inter- national security environment does not guarantee the decline of regional armed confl icts. Despite emphases on international economic developments and cooperation in recent years to avoid using military means to resolve disputes, different factors of histories, ethnicities, religions, sovereignties, and natural resources in different regions never cease to cause confrontation and confl icts. Risks of regional armed confl icts still exist. Although some regional confl icts have been temporarily halted by the intervention from the UN and major regional powers, as long as the root causes of the con- fl icts remain, they will continue to pose uncertainty to future global security. East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia. For example, the Israel-Palestine confl icts, Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapon issues, India-Pakistan border disputes, and Taiwan-PRC military confronta- tion have all once caused or may cause regional armed confl icts. In addition, certain intra-national ethnic separatist movements (such as Chechnyans in Russia and Aceh separatist movements in Indonesia) and internal confl icts in certain African countries also caused caprices in regional peace and stability. Therefore, in recent years, considerable international attention to enhancing bilateral or multilateral security cooperation has aroused hopes that, through group efforts, the possibility of war and confl icts can be diminished to maintain peace and stable regional developments. **4. Unconventional Security Threats** issue for national security. However, the age of globalization and information in the 1990s have blurred international boundaries; global social interactions have become more frequent and various unconventional security threats have rapidly emerged. These include terrorism, transnational crime, economic and environmental crises, ethnic and religious confl icts, internet hacking, drug traffi cking, and cross-border diseases (e.g. SARS, avian fl u, etc.). These threats, though not threatening a coun- try's survival the same way as an outbreak of war, may still cause major negative impacts against sustained national developments, which in turn create different challenges to national security. And because these threats are usually transnational, contagious, constantly changing, and come from di- verse sources, nations often cannot respond to them alone, which calls for international and regional cooperation to prevent and respond to these threats. national terrorism. The September 11, 2001 attack in New York, the October 2002 bombing in Bali, the March 2004 bombing in Madrid, and the July 2002 bombing in the London subway and buses ###### 01' ----- 33 have all surprised the world with their borderless and indiscriminate natures, low warning levels, and prevalence of terrorism. Also, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) increases the threat of international terrorist groups against global security. Therefore, major countries in the world are currently defending against terrorist threats. These types of non-war threats means that the military needs to play with caution, a supportive role in the nation’s overall security framework to assist the maintenance of public safety. Military organizations and functions, in turn, need to be more versatile to respond to more diverse and unpredictable security challenges. **5. Technologically Driven RMA** Since the end of the 1970s, rapid progress in computer, communication, and networking tech- nologies have moved human societies from the industrial era to the information era. The information revolution not only affects technology, but also organizations, commerce, culture, and even styles of living. Subsequently, the military is affected as well. For a country in the information age, adequate military application of technology and knowledge is paramount in gaining advantages in war. Other than information technology, technological progress, such as in genetic engineering, biotechnology, lasers, materials, nanotechnologies, etc., are also advancing at an unprecedented pace, providing more technological foundations for the RMA. International security environment changes also push forth the RMA developments. In rela- tively peaceful and stable international security environments, many advanced countries have started downsizing and reforming their military, so that they can devote more resources to boost their military's technological conditions and personnel quality. Because of a decrease in, or elimina- tion of, conventional and predictable national security threats, which are replaced by diverse and highly unpredictable unconventional threats, countries need to respond by developing new military capabilities. Under this circumstance of continuous technological innovations and diverse threats, major countries around the world are implementing technology and knowledge-based reforms for their militaries to respond to future threats and risks of warfare. Technological research results and changes are beginning to be incorporated into military organizations, doctrines, and equipment. II. Asia-Pacifi c Security Development Asia-Pacifi c security developments at the start of the 21[st] century indicate that the U.S. retains its super-power status in Asia-Pacific regional affairs, with an emergence of the PRC's intent to change the current power balance. Since succeeding the Cold War Era bilateral security scenarios, ----- 34 the U.S. has an almost irreplaceable infl uence in Asia-Pacifi c security affairs. This infl uence is fur- ther consolidated after the U.S. initiated the global War on Terror and adjusted its Asia-Pacifi c stra- tegic militarty deployment. In recent years, the PRC has been rapidly increasing its military power, raising attention and uncertainty among Asia-Pacifi c countries. In particular, strategic ambivalences in Sino-American and Sino-Japanese competition and cooperation and the PRC's refusal to aban- don military options against Taiwan make the PRC the greatest uncertainty in Asia-Pacifi c stability. Also, Asia-Pacifi c maritime interests movements have become more important, such that oceanic countries in the region all strive to consolidate their maritime interests. In the future, competition for sea resources will become an important security issue in this region. Relative to the high degree of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacifi c, this region's security cooperation mechanisms are still developing rather slowly. Despite the understanding of the importance of multilateral security co- operation, the diverse interests involved amongst the Asia-Pacifi c countries mean that there are still many barriers to establishing effective and collective regional security mechanisms through regional security dialogue and cooperation. **1. Continued American Leadership in Asia-Pacific Security Affairs** After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. continues to retain leadership status and important polit- ical, economic, and military infl uence in the Asia-Pacifi c. The North Korean's test fi ring of ballistic missiles toward Japanese waters on July 5, 2006 has accentuated that there still exists an uncertainty in the Asia-Pacifi c region's security and stability. Currently, due to anti-terror and regional confl ict prevention operations (e.g. North Korea, Taiwan Strait, etc.), the U.S. is considering adjusting its strategic military deployments in the western Pacifi c to improve rapid response capabilities against inconceivable crises. Adjustments in American military deployments in the Asia-Pacifi c aim at con- solidating the northeastern Asian bases, which are primarily in Japan. Guam will continue to be the American mid-way stronghold in the Asia-Pacifi c, and military cooperation will be established in southeast and southern Asia and Oceania, with the hope of connecting the Pacifi c and Indian Ocean bases, extending the strategic Asia-Pacifi c defense line, and developing rapid mobile strike capabili- ties to effectively respond to crises in the Asia-Pacifi c. In August 2004, American President George W. Bush, announced the Global Military Adjust- ment Plan, the emphases of which include: reorganize the command system of the Pacifi c headquar- ters, withdraw American troops stationed in non-military zones north of Hanjiang, South Korea, and establish fl oating marine bases and logistical bases in Thailand. Also, as determined on Octo- ber 29, 2005, in the American-Japanese bilateral security conference, the 1[st] moved from Fort Louis, Washington, to Kanagawa, forming a joint combat headquarters with the ###### 01' ----- Japanese land defense forces. Patriot III and Standard III missiles will be deployed in Japan. High speed transports will be assigned in Guam. The headquarters of the 3[rd] Marine Expeditionary Force and parts of other forces stationed on Ryukyu Island will be moved to Guam in the next 6 years to increase Guam's aerial and naval power. In addition, American and Japanese defense and foreign affairs offi cials held the “annual security conference” in Washington on May 1, 2006 to discuss the strengthening of the alliance between the US and Japan, regional security issues, global anti-terror operations, and American-Japanese military adjustments. After the conference, they announced a “joint declaration” and issued the “U.S. Military Bases in Japan Adjustment Final Report” that both sides will continue to improve the American-Japanese alliance. The report affi rms the cooperation and division of shared strategic responsibilities, missions, and capabilities as negotiated during the October 2005 security conference. It also anticipates completion of the US-Japanese forces rede ployment, base integration, and facility returns by 2014. These entail moving the Army's 1[st] Corps Headquarters to Japanese bases, moving 8,000 combat troops to Guam, reassigning naval jets to Iwakuni base, returning 5 facilities including the Naha military port and Futenma base, deregulating airspace originally controlled by the U.S., enhancing air defense command and missile defense in telligence sharing, building battlefi eld command training centers and reinforcing joint troop training to improve American-Japanese joint operation capabilities. American military restructuring in the Asia-Pacifi c indicates that the U.S. plans to focus on this region due to the continuously increas ing military strength of the PRC. To preserve its leading status in the Asia-Pacifi c, the U.S. plans to restructure its forces so as to gain strategic advantage to maintain Asia-Pacifi c stability and military balance. (Refer to Figure 1-1, American Global Military Adjustment Plan) **2. Impacts on Asia-Pacific Security from PRC Military Buildups** In terms of overall Asia-Pacifi c security, the main variable is the PRC's rapid and continuous military buildup. Recently, the PRC's overall national strength has been rapidly increasing, and every year there is great increase of defense budgets to reinforce their armaments. These include external purchases and domestic manufacture of high-performance weapon systems, and continued manufacture and deployment of ballistic missiles. The American military report on the PLA in May, 2006, states suspicion towards non-transparency in the PRC's military intentions and defense bud gets, and believes that the PLA's ballistic missiles and other strategic weapons have achieved fi rst strike capabilities. It is evident that the PLA's modernized defense buildup intends not only to pose military intimidation against Taiwan but also to surrounding Asia-Pacifi c countries, especially those with American forces in them. The U.S. clearly warned that the PRC's military expansions have ex ceeded its needs for invading Taiwan. Also, through the PRC's active nuclear weapon developments and a PLA general stating that they may use nuclear weapons to retaliate against American attacks, 35 ----- 36 Europe:will strive for uni- Korea:withdraw 12,000 Guam:build air bases, Asia:restructure comm- fied, rapid, and simplified military personnel from expand military ports, and system in Pacific command. Adjustments non-military zones to stockpile cruise miss- headquarters, simplify will be made in Atlantic, Osan and Pyeongtaek iles, station long- military agencies stat- eastern, and southern in 2 stages. range bomber aircrafts ioned in South Korea, Europe. Air Force headquarters stationed in Japan will Germany:2 Army divis- be merged with the Air ions will be moved to Force headquarters in Poland and Bulgaria. Guam. 1 Air Force base will be Japan: move the Army's preserved. 1 regiment and the st Britain:2 Air force bases Pacific fleet intelligence will be merged. center to Japan, adjust Ryukyu combat troop Italy:ers in Europe will be the Navy headquart- Russia stations, Self Defense Aviation Force, and the moved from London to American military head- Naples. Canada quarters stationed in Europe Japan. Central Asia:rent 3 air- ports from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and ex-pand the Kyrgyzstan United States Arab countries PRC airport. South Asia:station in 2 Afghan airports, acquire Southeast Asia: expand partial user rights for In- Singapore naval bases, dian and Pakistani air- Africa floating marine bases in ports and ports. Thailand, and naval and air bases in Indonesia Central & South America and Vietnam Australia:oops in Ryukyu to Austra-move Army tr- Australia lia by using the northern Australian training facility Military adjustment plans:adjust stationing and command structure, build Objectives:adjust outdated military structures and deployments, respond bases in southeast and central-south Asia and Australia, and acquire ad- to future asymmetric threats, actualize new military thinking and strategy, vanced east European bases. and preserve existing bases. Combat power restructuring:the Army will be changed from heavily armor- Meaning:move strategic centers of gravity from Europe to the Asia- ed divisions to rapidly deployable brigade, the Navy's combat forces will Pacific, adjust strategic alliances and surround potential enemies, adjust be changed to strike forces, and the Air Force will establish expeditionary bases in northeastern Asia, and extend strategic defense line southward. forces to exercise global military projection. - Figure 1-1 American Global Military Adjustment Plan the U.S. side has raised serious doubt about the PRC's nuclear policy. The Japanese government's Defense White Paper issued in August 2005 also stresses that the PRC's defense policy and military development lack transparency, and that the PRC should consider whether its military modernization has exceeded self defense needs. Special attention should be paid to expansions in naval, nuclear, and ballistic missile activities, particularly the developments in the Dongfong 31 long-range ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles, and the deployment of short-ranged missiles with regards to its intentions against Taiwan. (Refer to Figure 1-2, PLA Submarine Routes into Japanese Seas) The PLA's frequent large-scale military exercises, including those in coordination with Rus- sia, indicate that the PRC wants to consolidate its military alliances and resist American-Japanese military pressure to gain leadership over Asia-Pacifi c affairs. In addition, the PLA submarines in Japanese seas, border disputes between the PRC and Japan in the economic waters of the East China Sea, and Sino-Japanese competition for Russian oil pipelines, make confl icts of interest between the PRC and Japan increasingly obvious, adding serious tension between the two countries. More importantly, the PRC still refuses to abandon military options against Taiwan, and has stipulated the Anti-Secession Law to justify its use of force over Taiwan, which completely contradicts the peace- ful development principles it continues to espouse to external audiences. This also mitigates the high ###### 01' ----- 37 Ming-class submarine routes Korea Han-class submarine routes Shandong Qingdao Japan Yellow Sea Kagoshima Jiangsu Osumi Strait Amamioshima Tanegashima Ryukyu Islands Zhejiang Fujian Miyako-jima Taiwan Guam Canton - Figure 1-2 PLA Submarine Routes into Japanese Seas degree of consensus and shared interests on maintaining regional peace and stability between Asia- Pacifi c countries. Overall, even though Asia-Pacifi c countries see economic challenges and opportunities with the rise of the PRC, the PRC's lack of transparent political and military motives cause various countries to harbor uncertainty towards the PRC's rapid military developments. If the PRC continues its rapid military buildup without exercising needed and appropriate transparency, and refuses to abandon the use of force against Taiwan, it will impose pressure on existing regional peace and stability, which no country desires. **3. Maritime Interests Become Major Interests to Regional Nations** Many islands in the Asia-Pacific are involved in long-term sovereignty conflict problems. Many countries' coastlines are close together or overlap with each other, which greatly increases risks for maritime interests confl icts in this region. After the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into effect in 1994, the already intense maritime interests confl icts in the Asia-Pacifi c became more turbulent. Stakeholder countries expressed their positions through for- eign policy announcements or military demonstrations because of issues concerning the sovereignty ----- of certain islands and control over certain economic seas. Therefore, Asia-Pacifi c countries have in Long-term disputes over Asia-Pacific oceans include the Japanese-Russian dispute over the Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan islands, and the Habomai group islands, Japanese-Korean disputes over the Liancourt Rocks, dispute over the Diaoyu Tai islands between Taiwan, the PRC, and Japan, Sino-Japanese border disputes on the East China Sea's continental shelf over oil and gas explora tion, and rights disputes in the South China Sea between Taiwan, PRC, and several Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries (Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Brunei). Rights to the South China Sea are more complicated than other sovereign water disputes as it contains rich oil, natural gas and fi sh resources with many countries getting involved. Its location on major west ern Pacifi c sea routes also makes it the focal point of many Asia-Pacifi c power competitions. In all, maritime interests have high strategic value to western Pacifi c countries, the importance of which is refl ected in ocean resources, sea lines and development of sea power. Thus, confl icts arising from After the Cold War, the bipolar U.S.-USSR system collapsed, creating an international environ ment favorable for peaceful development. The high development potential of Asia-Pacifi c countries have made them important regions of global economic development under the infl uence of a glo balized market economy. To increase their global economic competitiveness and realize benefi ts of cooperation, many multilateral trade agreements and partnerships have formed rapidly in the region. In particular, the initiatives from the “ASEAN plus 6” (i.e. ASEAN and PRC, Japan, Korea, India, New Zealand, and Australia), “ASEAN plus 3” (ASEAN and PRC, Japan, and Korea), and “ASEAN plus 1” (ASEAN and PRC, Japan, or Korea) summits all indicate intent for regional economic inte gration. In the future, an eastern Asia economic bloc may probably be formed to compete with their Comparatively, although multilateral Asia-Pacific security cooperation has received global and regional attention, many objective and subjective factors have limited progress. Currently, the more important multilateral Asia-Pacifi c cooperatives, such as ASEAN and Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC), primarily function to encourage trade and cooperation with a limited role in more sensitive military security issues. They also do not possess collective defense functions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although the region has multilateral mechanisms or forums for security issues, such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), and Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacifi c (CSCAP), none of them are for arbitrating or resolving actual confl icts. They at best provide channels for discussion, 38 vested more resources to protect national sovereignty and maritime interests. maritime interests disputes have become an uncertainty in the future of Asia-Pacifi c security. **4. Multilateral Asia-Pacific Cooperation** North American and European counterparts. ###### 01' ----- 39 consultation, or play a role of second-track dialogue platforms. Asia-Pacifi c security still relies on the legacy of the Cold War arrangements, i.e., bilateral security relations with the U.S. (including offi cial or unoffi cial U.S.-Japanese, U.S.-Korean, U.S.-Taiwanese, U.S.-Philippines, U.S.-Austra- lian-New Zealand, and U.S.-Singaporean security relationships), which form a dynamic power bal- ance to maintain regional peace and stability. What is worth noting is that the fi rst ASEAN Defense Ministers Conference was held on May 9, 2006, and shall be held annually in the future. The confer- ence has a positive impact in promoting the security cooperation functions of the ASEAN members and serves as a forerunner for the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) in 2020. Currently, Six-Party Talks for resolving the North Korean nuclear weapon issues are slowly taking place. Although there is possibility for institutionalization in the future, it remains to be seen whether it can become a regular mechanism for resolving northeastern Asia security issues. III. Cross-Strait Security Status In recent years, our government has made numerous public appeals to building a framework of peace and stability for both sides of the Strait. However, without the return of the PRC's goodwill, there have been no positive developments. In March 2005, the PRC passed the Anti-Secession Law, increasing cross-strait tensions. Despite the intimate economic, social, and cultural cross-strait inter- actions, risk of cross-strait war still remains due to the PRC's refusing to abandon military options against Taiwan and continuing its military buildup. In recent years, the PRC's strategy to Taiwan can be observed from political, economic, military, foreign, and psychological dimensions. They are ex- plained as follows: **1. Political Coercion** After Hu Jintao became the PRC's National Chairman, there have been no drastic changes in the PRC's main policies towards Taiwan. He still insists that so long as Taiwan recognizes the “one China principle,” issues of cross-strait hostilities, economic cooperation, cross-strait interactions, and Taiwan's international survival can be negotiated. Infl uenced by ethnic and unifi cation mentali- ties, the PRC still views Taiwan as a provincial government and refuses to open political talks on equal terms. Considering Taiwan's independent sovereignty and overall security, it naturally cannot accept the “one China principle” defi ned unilaterally by the PRC and unequal terms of negotiations. Because of these differences in understanding, there is a lack of trust and chances of short-term po- litical breakthroughs are limited in the short-term. Also, the PRC's continual enhancement of its mil- ----- itary deployment against Taiwan, legislation of the Anti-Secession Law, the “three warfares” policy (public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare), and repeated interference against Taiwan's efforts to participate in various governmental, private, and international organizations have made the hostile cross-strait relations ever more complex and intricate. All of these aggravated the people in Taiwan to feel antipathy towards the PRC administration. In the future, the PRC will con tinue to enhance its strength of “united front” against Taiwan, compete for civilian recognition to affect cross-strait policy, and force Taiwan to accept the “one China, two systems” political claim. In recent years, cross-strait economic interaction has increased rapidly. The PRC has become Taiwan's largest trade partner, increasing Taiwan's economic dependence on the PRC. For example, in 2005, trade between Taiwan and the PRC was approximately $US93.4 billion, making up 27.5% of Taiwan's total trade volume. Surplus with the PRC was $US49.79 billion, compared to Taiwan's overall surplus of $US4.857 billion. Cross-strait trade has been going on for over 20 years, and the PRC has become Taiwan's largest export market and source of surplus, indicating that Taiwan's eco nomic dependence on the PRC can no longer be ignored. The PRC believes that by increasing Tai wan's economic dependence on the PRC, it is rendering its best strategic means of “using economy to oppose independence and using business to facilitate talks.” Therefore, it actively seeks to infl u ence our ruling government via the opposition party's appeal for a prosperous economy by offering 15 benefi t policies for Taiwanese investors in the PRC, targeting, in particular, those in competitive high-tech industries. In doing so, the PRC intends to show its “expectation for the people in Taiwan” and to deepen its economic infi ltration on Taiwan towards a united front. Currently, over 60% of in formation technology and hardware products in Taiwan are manufactured in the PRC. This ratio has raised alarms amongst outsiders regarding Taiwan's industrial gaps. Also, the PRC plans to invest $US10 billion to attract information technology companies in Taiwan. Its 15 benefi t policies for Tai wan, proposed in the 2006 cross-strait economic and trade forum, will further accentuate the PRC's economic magnetism effects on Taiwan. If cross-strait relations worsen in the future, the PRC may place trade restrictions on Taiwan to inflict economic damage, paralyze the Taiwanese economy, and sack Taiwan's morale. It is predicted that the PRC will open up more economic benefi t policies for companies in Taiwan, and achieve its political objectives of “using economy to oppose indepen dence, using business to facilitate talks, using people to urge offi cials.” To prepare for military combat against Taiwan, the PLA is enhancing military preparedness against Taiwan with an emphasis on winning “local wars under the condition of informationaliza 40 **2. Economic Magnetism** **3. Military Intimidation** ###### 01' ----- tion.” It is pursuing various military mod ernization plans, focusing on improving joint operation mechanisms, researching powered submarines), enhancing the non military “three warfares” exercises (i.e. psychological warfare, and legal warfare against Taiwan as offi cial warfare tactics), specific exercises (i.e. the Guangze and Armed Forces. **4. Diplomatic Interference** 41 ### Information Warfare: When modern warfare **uses large amounts of information technol-** **ogy and weapon systems, it creates infor-** **mation network-based battlefields, which** **involves competition for information con-** **trol through communication, radar, missiles,** **computers, satellites, and laser technologies** **and equipments to influence the outcome of** **war. Information warfare makes the battle-** **field more transparent, troops more coordi-** **nated, operations more synchronized, strikes** **more precise, and battlespace more exten-** **sive. Their warfare modes include command** **and control warfare, electronic warfare,** **intelligence warfare, psychological warfare,** **economic warfare, and cyberwarfare.** Donghai exercises), striving for secrecy, and deliberately misguiding potential enemies. Also, the PRC continues to import advanced weapons from Russia and advanced countries to raise its rapid response and precision strike capabilities, which has gradually tilted the military balance over the Taiwan Strait to its favor. To enhance their military intimidation against Taiwan, the PLA has drasti- cally increased its missiles deployed on the southeastern coast and stationed various new types of combat aircraft and ships in southeastern airports and ports to exert more threat against the ROC As the PRC's comprehensive national power increases, it takes on active roles in regional and global affairs. In recent years, the PRC's active military buildup and aggressive actions in the energy market raised suspicions from the international society. Also, to demonstrate its status as a major power, the PRC has participated in UN peacekeeping missions, enhanced the functions of SCO, and actively participated in the Six-Party Talks. These serve to protect its own interests and also confer advantages in forcing the international community to demand that Taiwan adopt the “one China” policy, which endangers Taiwan's national survival. For example, in March 2003, Taiwanese medi- cal professionals could not attend the World Health Organization's (WHO) post-tsunami health con- ference because of the PRC's objections. In September 2003, a consensus was reached between Tai- wan and the U.S. on the American Cargo Safety Inspection (CSI) policy, but the PRC demanded that ----- 42 the U.S. sign the policy with Taiwan in an unoffi cial capacity. In October 25, 2005, the PRC used attractive economic incentives to lure Senegal to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. During his visit to the U.S. in April 2006, Hu Jintao requested that the U.S. intervene in Taiwan's independence movements and further used the Anti-Secession Law to intensify foreign policy conflicts against Taiwan. The PRC is now preying on Taiwan's major foreign policy connections in Latin America and Africa in a persistent effort to alienate Taiwan diplomatically. **5. Social United Front** The PRC's current strategy against Taiwan is to “strive for talks, prepare for war, and remain patient.” Hu Jintao intends to psychologically infi ltrate Taiwan and expand his united front to the public in Taiwan. Although the PRC expresses friendliness towards Taiwan economically and social- ly, there may be subtle political meaning within. For example, recently the PRC announced benefi ts for students in Taiwan to study in the PRC, allowed Mainlander tourists into Taiwan, held two large cross-strait religious events, allowed Taiwanese fruits to be shipped to the PRC tax-free, awarded pandas to Taiwan, etc., to befriend the Taiwanese people and improve their negative impressions on the PRC. Since Taiwan's opposition parties leaders' visits to the mainland, the PRC has held confer- ences regarding Taiwan, emphasizing its determined efforts for domination in cross-strait interaction and for approval from the Taiwanese public. This shows that the PRC will take more diverse ap- proaches in dealing with cross-strait issues. As there are close cross-strait interactions on all levels, should the PRC infi ltrate and divide the Taiwanese society by manipulating a “quantitative change” to a “qualitative change,” the policy direction and social sentiments of our nation will be affected considerably. Summarily, the PRC's strategies against Taiwan have become diverse and fl exible. Under or- ganized planning, the PRC variously employs political pressure, economic magnetism, military and diplomatic intimidation, and social united fronts, which pose grave threats towards Taiwan's national unity and maintenance of security. IV. Taiwan's Strategic Role in Asia-Pacifi c Security Taiwan, located in a major traffi c thoroughfare in the Asia-Pacifi c, is also geographically close to the PRC. It has important geostrategic value due to it being in two major strategic water territories – the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel – at the same time. Peace and stability over the Taiwan Strait affect the safety of western Pacifi c international routes and the future of Asia-Pacifi c economic ###### 01' ----- 43 development, making Taiwan an important fulcrum in Asia-Pacific security and stable develop- ments. Also, Taiwan's experience in successful economic development and defense of democracy, freedom, and human rights are of common interest with democracies around the world. It is also an important tool for exercising indirect international and inter-strait leverage. These two important strategic values are an important foundation in Taiwan's positive role in Asia-Pacifi c security. **1. The 1 st Island Chain and Keys to Stability in the Taiwan Strait** Geographically, Taiwan forms a crescent-shaped strategic front in Asia, connecting northeast and Southeast Asia, making it the pivot point in the 1st Pacifi c island chain. To the PRC, this island chain can affect the PRC's southeastern coasts, making Taiwan a spring board for the PRC's naval expansion and to penetrate the fi rst American defense in the 1[st] island chain into the 2[nd] one and the Pacifi c Ocean (Refer to Figure 1-3, 1[st] Island Chain pivot point and keys to stability in the Taiwan Strait). To American and Japanese interests, Taiwan also serves as a buffer for Japan's southern pe- ripheral seas. This strategic position is convenient for force projection towards surrounding waters, and has a balancing function for the interaction of Western Pacifi c strategic interests between the U.S., Japan, and the PRC, making it a key leverage point in Asia-Pacifi c stability and development. This special oceanic geographical characteristic makes Taiwan a point where all traffi c to and from North America and northeast and Southeast Asia must pass through. Therefore, every day there are 1.Taiwan is located in the center of the 1 island chain in the western Pacific Ocean.st 2.PRC military strategy: coastal defense, defense of nearby seas. 3.2020 target: establish effective capability to cruise and project force between 1 and 2 island chains.st nd 4.Cut off traffic thoroughfare in southeast and northeast Asia to affect the Asia- Pacific and the U.S. Aleutian Islands Alaskan Peninsula Korean Japan 2nd Island Chain Peninsula PRC 1st Island Chain Cut off Projecting Force Midway Island Taiwan Pacific Ocean Guam longitude 165。 - Figure 1-3 1[st] Island Chain pivot point and keys to stability in the Taiwan Strait ----- as many as 800 to 900 commercial boats and aircraft passing through waters and resources, and tend to be export-orient ed, they need shipping by sea to import oil, civilian goods, and industrial ma ensue on these waters, it has severe con sequences for Taiwan's national security 44 ### In 2005, after the first U.S.-Japanese “Se- **curity Consultative Committee 2-Plus- 2** **Conference,” the U.S. and Japan announced** **that they will list maintenance of peace in the** **Taiwan Strait as a major strategic goal, with** **the intent to make pre-emptive preparation** **for possible conflicts in the Taiwan Strait,** **which indicates that peace in the Taiwan Strait** **has important implications for east Asian re-** **gional security.** and Japan's and Korea's trade routes. Because Taiwan is located in the center of the PRC's coastline, 3 of 4 major PRC trade routes go through south of the Taiwan Strait. Uninhibited travel on Taiwan's surrounding waters has sig- nifi cant infl uence on the PRC's economic and overseas trade. Militarily, Taiwan divides the PRC's coastal defense line in 2, which could serve as a key lockdown function against the PRC naval and aerial entries into the Pacifi c Ocean. In the past several decades, Taiwan's advantageous geographi- cal position and strong defenses have effectively defended peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, which not only constrained the PRC's oceanic-expansion intentions, but also provided important protection for the safety of international sea lines. In the future, Taiwan will continue to play an ap- propriate role and contribute toward Asia-Pacifi c peace and stability under this geostrategic frame- work. **2. Mutual Defender of Democracy, Freedom, and Human Rights** Other than the aforementioned geostrategic values, Taiwan has achieved many years of eco- nomic development with an appreciation for democracy, freedom, and human rights. Taiwan not only shares common interests with democracies around the world, but also exerts indirect infl uence to change the PRC's authoritarian nature. Observing that the U.S., Japan, and various southeastern Asian countries are all establishing ties with the PRC, if cross-strait relations can be relaxed in the future, Taiwan is willing to engage in negotiations and actively build an interactive peace and sta- bility framework under autonomous, democratic, peaceful, and equal terms. Because Taiwan has peacefully transformed into a democratic country, people's political beliefs, freedom of the press and speech have adequate protection. This experience sets a paradigm in the PRC's democratic transfor- mation and is benefi cial to its peaceful reforms. Also, Taiwan's economic position is prominent. For example, Taiwan's information technology ###### 01' ----- industry has considerable leverage in the global supply chain. Many other traditional and high-tech industries are also world leaders. In other words, Taiwan's pursuit of democracy and economic development has received considerable attention from the interna tional community. In the future, Taiwan will continue democratization, protec tion of human rights, and economic developments to defend mainstream values cherished by the international society, with the hope of making con crete contributions regionally and glob ally. ### Promote the establishment of a “cross- **strait interactive peace and stability frame-** **work”** **As our government undertakes security of na-** **tional livelihood and development of societal** **prosperity, the reality of the close-knit in-** **teraction of cross-strait economy, trade, so-** **ciety and culture needs to be addressed in the** **face of cross-strait relations, being in a state** **of “hostility, stalemate and cold peace.”** **The government shall hold fast to a stance of** **“goodwill without retreat, stronghold without** **hostility,” and be proactive in promoting the** **establishment of a “cross-strait interactive** **peace and stability framework.” Under this** **general policy, the MND has completed prelimi-** **nary deliberation and plans on a military Con-** **fidence Building Measures (CBM), configuring** **military buffer zones and regulating a code of** **conduct in the Strait. It publicly announced** **these key undertakings in the 2004 National** **Defense Report. As we take a look into interna-** **tional cases and experience however, we see that** **the promotion of any confidence measures could** **only be built on a foundation of goodwill by the** **parties antagonistic to each other. Yet regard-** **less of our numerous good-willed proposals, the** **PRC enacted the Anti-Secession Law so as to** **step up its program of targeted military buildup** **and exercises. This has become the greatest hin-** **drance for both sides of the Strait to engage in** **peace negotiations and interactions.** 45 ----- ----- 47 ----- 48 I. A Force Projection Military Strategy With its rising political and economic power, the PRC's military strategy needs to evolve ac- cordingly, so as to satisfy the increasing demand for more dominance into various fi elds. In other words, the PRC hopes its military power can facilitate the accomplishment of its strategic goals, be extended beyond traditional territorial boundaries and projected into regions of national interests. A report titled “Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006” by the U.S. Department of Defense analyzed the recent military buildup of the PRC revealing its intention to extend its military control capabilities into the 2[nd] island chain and further into the western Pacifi c. Overall, the military strategy of the PRC clearly demonstrated a “force projection” model in pursuit of its “national inter- ests” described above. **1. Incremental Adjustments in Military Strategy** Since the founding of the PRC, “active defense” has always been the core concept in its mili- tary strategy. Meanwhile, the PLA has been giving “active defense” different interpretations based on changes in domestic and international environments during different time periods. For example, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to expand its battle space and depth of de- fense for littoral defense operations. The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is gradually transforming from a domestic air defense role to a force capable of conducting both defensive and offensive missions. Such changes have distorted the defensive nature emphasized in the “active defense” strategy. Also, the PLA has achieved signifi cant progresses in areas such as information technology, aerospace, and Second Artillery, etc. The introduction of such modern technologies and tactics has enabled the PLA to engage in electronic-magnetic and space warfares virtually eliminat- ing any physical restriction imposed by traditional territorial boundaries. These transformations have equipped the PLA with offensive combat capabilities. Based on its increasing regional infl uence and military preparations against Taiwan, its active defense concept has been adjusted to a more mutual offensive and defensive context with more emphasis on offensive actions. This adjustment in con- cept provides a concrete assurance for its increasingly expanding national interests. **2. Expanding the range of Air and Naval Fleet Activities** With the increasing PLA naval and air power, the range of PLA air and naval fl eet activities is continuously expanding. In the past, the PLA's fl eets rarely moved across the central line of the Tai- wan Strait or intruded in the exclusive economic zones of surrounding nations. Fundamental chang- es occurred after 1996. For example, in 1998, the PLAAF had over 400 sorties of fi ghters patrolling ###### 02' ----- |內部|單位 1100| |---|---| |12艦0隊指0|揮部| |---|---| |1 陸戰隊|300 指揮部| |---|---| |教育訓 2則0發0展|練暨準 指揮部| |---|---| |直屬|單位| |---|---| 49 Unit: Sorties `海軍司令部八` 1700 1500 `內部單位` 1200艦隊指揮部 `陸戰隊指揮部1300` 1200教育訓練暨準則發展指揮部 `直屬單位` 1100 940 ``` 政戰主任室 艦隊X6 陸戰旅X3 三軍聯訓基地 後支部 督察室 戰隊X1 烏坵守備大隊 指 揮 部 戰鬥系統工廠 人事軍務處 指揮部X2 大隊X3 海軍技術學校 海軍官校 軍事情報處 大隊X2 新兵訓練中心 海軍造船發展 ``` 400 `戰訓處` `陸戰隊學校` `中 心` ``` 後勤處 大氣海洋局 計畫處 通信指揮部 戰鬥系統處 勤務指揮部 主計處 ``` 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 - Figure 2-1 Statistics of the PLA's fighters activities west of the Taiwan Strait central line from 1998 to 2005 air space west of the Taiwan Strait central line. In 2005, such activities increased to 1,700 (Refer to Figure 2-1, Statistics of the PLA's fi ghters activities west of the Taiwan Strait central line from 1998 to 2005). Also, the PRC's intelligence gathering vessels continue to operate around the Taiwan wa- ters. The PRC's scientifi c research and intelligence gathering vessels have been spotted more than 20 times around the Taiwan Strait in the last three years, with several intrusions into Taiwan's exclusive economic zone. The frequent appearance of the PRC's ships around the Taiwan' waters demonstrates they are not only gathering hydrological and meteorological information of the Taiwan area but also testing Taiwan's military response time to their maneuvers as a reference if it becomes necessary to take military actions against Taiwan. In the past two to three years, the PRC frequently dispatched hydrographic vessels into Japan's exclusive economic zones to conduct marine research. This was sighted as many as 30 times in 2003. In November, 2003, a PLA Ming-class submarine was detected in Japan's Osumi Strait. In November, 2004, a PLAN Han-class nuclear submarine was spotted for the fi rst time within Japan's territorial sea. These indications showed that the PRC's naval activities have reached the 2[nd] island chain. Also, Japan fi ghters intercepted the PLA's attempts to enter Japanese airspace for as many as 30 times from April to September of 2005. It is estimated that the PRC's fl eets are actively gathering information in the East China Sea, where it is trying to effectively take command of the sea and the air in time of war and obstruct prompt intervention from the U.S. military forces and Japan's Self Defense Forces when a crisis situation escalates in the Taiwan Strait. ----- The PRC comprehends the fl exibility and diverse capabilities which military diplomacy can The PRC seeks to increase contact, cooperation and interchange with the U.S., the EU, Japan Facing south Asian nuclear arms races and the North Korean nuclear crisis, the PRC temporar To accelerate the PLA's current military modernization, the PRC is actively seeking new weap More than 80 delegations led by the heads of foreign militaries and high-level political fi gures 50 **3. Active Promotion of Military Diplomacy** achieve and therefore it is promoting military diplomacy to secure maximum leverage which politi- cal diplomacy alone can not accomplish. **(1) Analyzed Primary Objectives of the PRC's Promotion of Military Diplomacy** a. To strengthen interchange with major world powers in terms of strategic cooperation and Russia, and enhance friendly interactions through strategic security dialogue to set a positive foundation for opening other strategic cooperatives. Furthermore, it also attempts to diffuse concerns of the “China threat” among international communities through visits and cooperation amongst mili- tary personnel. b. To execute “Good Neighbor Policy” for regional stabilization ily set aside its sovereignty disputes engaging actively in negotiations with the neighboring coun- tries. The PRC is conducting unconventional security cooperation with India, Pakistan, and member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It also participated in six-party talks to re- solve the North Korean nuclear standoff, increased its dialogue and cooperation in ASEAN regional forums, and signed the “Sino-Vietnamese northern bay area joint naval patrol agreement” to create a positive international environment for the PRC's peaceful development. c. To acquire new weapon and increase warfi ghting capabilities ons and platforms from the U.S., Europe, Russia and Israel. Multiple joint exercises and military observations have been conducted between the PRC and foreign militaries with the goals of increas- ing combat effi ciency and decreasing gaps in strategic concepts with modern nations. Topics include anti-terrorism, joint naval search and rescue, joint land-air operations, amphibious operations, and offensive operations in mountainous terrain. (Refer to Appendix 2-1, Joint Military Exercises and Military Observations between the PLA and Foreign Militaries from 2004 to 2005) **(2) 2005 the PRC's Major Activities in Military Diplomacy** a. Visits from other countries from over 60 countries visited the PRC in 2005. Among them, the U.S. was the most frequent coun- try for 6 times, followed by Italy (5 times), Austria (4 times), Thailand, Cambodia, Russia (3 times each), Pakistan, Turkey, Germany, Burma, Congo, Nauru, Malaysia, Vietnam, Vanuatu, Sri Lanka, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, and New Zealand (twice each). The other delegations (total more than 40) were sent from other countries only once each. The most important delegation was led by U.S. Sec- ###### 02' ----- retary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld when he fi rst visited the PRC after taking his offi ce. b. Port visit exchanges with foreign navies PLAN's military interchanges with foreign countries in 2005 were characterized with invita tions and receptions. There was only one offi cial foreign visit by its navy to India, Pakistan, and Thailand. In the same year, U.S., British, French, Malaysian, Chilean, and Australian naval vessels visited Qingdao, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. PLAN has also engaged in combined naval search and rescue exercises with foreign countries such as Britain, France, Australia, Pakistan, Indian, and Thailand (some held during visits of other countries' military fl eets and the others held during its overseas travel stops) as well as promoting international military cooperation. c. Arms exports Recent weapons exports by the PRC include fi ghters, frigates, surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, tank repair parts, shoulder-fi red anti-air missiles, anti-tank missiles, and technical electronic surveil lance and reconnaissance equipment to North Korea, Burma, Pakistan, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Cambo dia, India, Bangladesh, and Malaysia. The PRC also signed memorandums of cooperation with the EU on topics such as space exploitation, hydrogen energy, nuclear fusion, and biotechnology, all of which deserve attention. d. Weapons acquisition The PRC imported Russian Su-30MK2 fi ghters, IL-76 strategic airlift aircraft, IL-78 refueling tankers, and S-300 SAM missiles to fortify its overall air combat capabilities. The acquisition of eight Kilo-class submarines and two Sovremennyy-class destroyers will occur by the end of 2006. The PRC also purchased large transport ships, scientifi c investigation ships, Raketnyy Kreyser class missile cruisers, and electronic equipment from South Korea, Norway, Ukraine, and France. They also conducted R&D and testing on Z-10 helicopters, quartz melting, laser glass optical materials, new fi ghters, and phased array radars with Italy, France, Canada, and Russia. The most noteworthy of such activities is joint development of the 5th generation Russia fi ghters by the PRC, Russian, and India. e. Peacekeeping missions Currently, over 1,300 PLA's military personnel are involved in ten UN peacekeeping missions. In the past, the PRC tended to participate in peacekeeping missions in Asia, but recent involvement includes dispatching peacekeeping troops to Africa due to the economic potentials of oil and miner als in the region. Also, the PRC is aggressively taking part in international peacekeeping missions to expand its weight and infl uence by assisting and collaborating with African and Latin American na tions. 51 ----- 52 II. PRC's Defense Budget and Weapon Development In the last decade, the PRC's growing economic strength allowed it to devote more resources to research and manufacturing its own weapons or import new weapons and platforms from foreign countries. These developments have become potential threats to the security across the Taiwan Strait and in the Asia-Pacifi c region. Therefore, understanding the PRC's defense budget allocation and its advanced weapon R&D is crucial in predicting the PRC's future military developments and its full military potential. This can also serve as an important reference when analyzing the PRC's military threats against Taiwan. **1. Defense Budgeting** In March, 2006, the PRC announced its offi cial defense budget as RMB 283.8 billion (approxi- mately US$ 35.1 billion), a 14.7% growth from that of 2005. It is important to note that a large num- ber of hidden budget is not included in the offi cial defense budget fi gures. **(1) Budget Summary** The PRC's 2006 defense budget (RMB 283.8 billion) accounted for 1.43% of its GDP, or 7.4% of its overall government expenditures. (Refer to Figure 2-2, PRC's Defense Budget Statistics from 1995 to 2006) **(2) Budget Structure** Unit: 100 million RMB 2838 2474.28 2172.79 1907.87 1707.78 1442.04 1207.54 1076.7 934.72 812.57 720.06 636.72 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 - Figure 2-2 PRC's Defense Budget Statistics from 1995 to 2006 ###### 02' ----- The PRC's offi cial defense budget is separated into three parts, including personnel expendi ture (i.e. personnel maintenance, primarily for salary, food, uniforms, etc for officer, solder, and employees), operations and maintenance (i.e. operational maintenance, primarily for troop training, construction facility maintenance, and daily consumables), and equipment (i.e. military investments, primarily for the scientific research, testing, procurement, maintenance, transport, and storage of weaponry and equipment), each occupying approximately one-third of the overall budget. **(3) Hidden Budgets** The offi cial defense budget, as made public by the PRC government, accounts for only part of its overall defense spending. Careful examination of previous actual military spending shows that certain outlays were channeled through some 10 other government organizations, including the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and Nuclear Engineering Department. Hidden expenses are also appropriated under non-military expenditures, such as outlays for cultural, educational programs and scientific research. Payments for military procurement are sometimes itemized through “central government appropriations,” “defense indus try earnings” and “arms sales proceeds.” Furthermore, these numbers did not include the Shenzhou manned space program, nuclear weapon storage, military police, Second Artillery Forces budgets, defense industry subsidies, and military research…etc. Therefore, it is expected that the PRC's ac tual defense budget might have exceeded US$ 90 billion and be two to three times of the offi cial fi gure, making the PRC the third largest defense expenditures country in the world (the fi rst two are the U.S. and Russia). **(4) Future Trends** The 2005 fi nancial report by the PRC State Council indicated its budgetary defi cit along with internal and external debts together have reached US$ 300 billion. However, with its US$ 818.9 bil lion of foreign reserves in 2005 and a sustainable high level of economic growth, it is expected there will be no drastic changes in the PRC's fi nancial condition. The 2005 defense budget of the PRC is anticipated to continue its 2-digit percentage growth as in previous years. In the short and medium terms, this trend is not likely to change. After the Cold War, global-scale political and military confrontations are no longer expected. Military expenditures of individual nations are expected to be maintained at the current level or even decreased, except for increased U.S. military expenditures in the Global War on Terror. The PRC's rapidly increasing defense budgets naturally arouse regional and international concerns. Facing these concerns, the PRC insists that these defense budget increases be primarily for improving the living conditions of its servicemen and offsetting the reductions in purchasing power due to infl a tion. Since the PRC has no apparent foreign adversaries and does not encounter direct and imminent military threats, its faster rate of defense budget spending over its economic growth (Refer to Figure 53 ----- 54 Growth % 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 ``` 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 ``` Budgetarygrowth 15.64 13.08 12.84 15.03 15.19 12.15 19.42 18.43 11.7 13.89 13.88 14.7 Economicgrowth 10.2 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 8 7.3 8 9.1 9.5 9.9 9 Priceindex 14.8 6.1 0.8 -2.6 -3 -1.5 -0.8 -0.8 1.2 3.9 1.8 2 - Figure 2-3 PRC's Annual Defense Budgetary and Economic Growth Compared to Price Indices 2-3, PRC's Annual Defense Budgetary and Economic Growth Compared to Price Indices) cannot resolve international concerns at its non-transparent and rapidly expanding defense budget. In the foreseeable future, with the trend of continuous economic growth, the PRC's military can acquire more resources to implement military modernization, RMA reform and transformational military developments. **2. Major Weapon R&D** To respond to future warfare requirements, the PRC is recently and actively involved in high- tech research, believing that high-tech weapons can change the patterns of war and win war it swift- ly. Current important PRC weapon research projects are summarized below: **(1) Information Technology** Recently, the PRC has been actively developing its information warfare capabilities. In addition to applying information warfare theories to national, political, and military strategies, related tactics, techniques and procedures are also applied to domains of intelligence, electronic countermeasure, computer countermeasure, and psychological warfare, with the hope of securing electronic domi- nance at both the strategic and tactical levels. To prevent enemy sabotage and espionage, the PRC is actively seeking to establish network protection and information system defense capabilities, hoping to build up safe and secure information networks. Through acquisition, replication and autonomous research, the PRC is developing related hardware and software on both offensive and defensive in- formation warfare measures to improve its hard kill and soft kill capabilities. The PRC currently has ###### 02' ----- only one electronic reconnaissance satellite. In the future, through acquiring advanced European and U.S. radar technologies, the PRC can improve its research and development capacities in fi elds of electronic and optical surveillance, interception, jamming and anti-jamming and consequently en hancing its electronic warfare capabilities. **(2) Aerospace** To secure its military command and control communications, improve precision navigation for both sealift and airlift vehicles, and conduct all-weather surveillance and reconnaissance capabili ties, the PRC continues to pursue research and development in aerospace technology to upgrade its command and control communications and establish precision image databases. The PRC currently has over twenty satellites in orbit for positioning, navigation, reconnaissance, scientifi c research, and meteorology. On October 15, 2003, the PRC launched Shenzhou No. 5, starting its fi rst manned space fl ight mission. On October 12, 2005, it launched Shenzhou No. 6, its second manned space fl ight mission. These two fl ights secured various technology data that will be valuable towards fu ture developments of aerospace military power and space surveillance capabilities. Also, the PRC is actively researching various military satellites to increase its early warning, command and control, battlefi eld surveillance, fl eet navigation, and missile control capabilities. In the near term, the PRC's aerospace research focuses on the integration of satellite surveillance and reconnaissance, precision navigation, and target imaging to increase its enemy monitoring and precision strike capabilities. The PRC is developing its Beidou satellites and participating in the EU Galileo project. The initial operation of the Galileo system may provide peaceful applications, but the PRC can use such ap plications to increase the precision of its remote control weapons and fl eet navigation positioning capabilities, which will be detrimental to Taiwan's defense operations. **(3) Second Artillery** The PRC's new ballistic missiles R&D is targeted toward “solidify, miniaturize, and mobilize.” Through integration with advanced satellite guidance systems, the precision of the PRC's overall striking capabilities can be greatly enhanced. The PRC is actively researching precision strike tech nologies such as land-based cruise missiles, satellite navigation and image matching guidance with the intent of using short and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles as its nonlinear and asym metric kill weapons. It is important to note that the PRC's existing medium and long range and in tercontinental strategic missile ranges can reach all major countries around the world, making them important tools for nuclear intimidation against other countries. **(4) Air Force** The PRC's air force buildup is focused on the following three areas: a. Modifying in-service military aircraft The PRC continues to mass-produce Sukhoi 27 (JT-11) and JT-10 fighters, and reengineer 55 ----- H-6 bombers, JH-7 bombers, early warning aircraft, and Y-8 electronic warfare planes. Apart from its own research and manufacture, the PLA introduced Russian anti-radiation and video-guided air launched missiles. Fighters are equipped with new early warning and reconnaissance equipment and beyond visual range striking weapons. By observing high-tech wars like the one in Kosovo, the PRC is currently accelerating its weapon research and production through both acquisition and self-devel opment. Currently, the PRC is focusing on research of precision air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles (ammunitions), hoping to establish precision air and ground strike capabilities against critical enemy political and economic targets. Also, the PRC is actively researching on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) by acquiring the Israeli IAI Harpy anti-radiation UAV for replication. These platforms can attack enemy C3I systems during preliminary stages of war while reducing personnel casualties and fi ghters loss. b. Replicating foreign anti-air weapons The PRC continues to acquire and is actively engaged in replicating the Russian S-300 anti-air missiles with range up to 200 km. The PRC is also replicating the Swiss-made anti-air artillery sys tems. Complemented by self-propelled anti-air artilleries, the PRC is using Hongying, Qienwei, and Feinu man-portable anti-air missiles to enhance its frontal engagement capabilities in its air defense system, providing its troops with real time anti-air supporting fi repower. c. Developing new fi ghters Xiaolong (a.k.a. FC-1) fi ghter was produced under the joint venture between the PRC and Paki stan. Agreements were signed in 1999, and there have been 4 test fl ights from 2003 to 2006. It is offi cially named the Xiaolong fi ghter, which Pakistan named JF-17. Joint production of 400 planes started in the latter half of 2005 (exporting 150 to Pakistan). The fi rst four will be tested by Decem ber, 2006 with a target annual production rate of 24 in 2008. The design of the plane is to provide mobility at medium and low altitudes, beyond visual range strike, short-range dog fi ght, precision air-to-surface strike, and anti-ship capabilities for air superiority and close air support missions. **(5) Navy** The PRC's naval weapon research focused on the following three areas: a. Surface platform research and development On the naval surface warfare platforms, the PRC is accelerating its research and manufacture of new DDG, DEG, and acquiring the Russian Sovremennyy-class destroyers. For shipborne combat systems, the PRC is actively developing phased array radar-equipped combat systems to magnify its area air defense capabilities. Its new surface combat ships have stealth capabilities, which can greatly increase its battle space survivability. Also, the PRC is currently accelerating research on large tank-landing ships to enhance its amphibious operations capabilities. b. Submarine research and development 56 ###### 02' ----- 57 The PRC is currently accelerating research on new nuclear submarines and conventional sub- marines, and purchased eight Russian Kilo-class submarines to serve as its new generation of sub- marines with superior underwater combat capabilities. c. Weapon modifi cations To enhance naval surface combat capability, the PRC is researching on their Yingji series of SSMs and Haihongqi series of SAMs, and is continuously engaged in the research and production of supersonic and submarine-launched anti-ship missiles to enhance its long range anti-ship and air defense capabilities. Also, the PLAN acquired the improved Russian SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic anti-ship missiles, and SS-N-27 Klub submarine-launched anti-ship missiles and is reengineering its land-based cruise missiles into sea-based cruise missiles to increase long-range precision and anti- carrier strike capabilities. **(6) Ground Force** The PRC's land-based weapon R&D is focused on the following three areas: a. New armored vehicles The PRC is continuing research and mass-producing T-96 and T-99 main battle tanks and accel- erating the upgrades and deployments to increase its fi repower and armor-penetration capabilities. b. New artillery The PRC is researching new 122 to 155-mm self-propelled artillery, howitzers, and projectile range extension programs. In addition to increasing fi repower, some equipment will be further modi- fi ed for air-drop and airborne operations. c. Army helicopters The PRC is accelerating research on new attack helicopters, and continuing its imports of Rus- sian MIG 17 transport helicopters to improve the fi repower and long range rapid deployment capa- bilities of its ground forces. III. PRC's Military Capability Buildup and Exercises The PRC tried “harsh rhetoric and saber rattling,” “harsh rhetoric and preparation to fight” and changed to adopt “cultural united front, military pressure” as its current approach to resolve its so called “Taiwan issue.” The use of force has never been ruled out and the PRC's current policies toward Taiwan are mostly similar to, but more fl exible than, those adopted by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Under the guidance of “peaceful unifi cation” and “one country, two systems,” the PRC is enhancing its propaganda of “placing hope on Taiwan people” as well as emphasizing on “winning ----- local wars under advanced information technology conditions” in order to force Taiwan's surrender through military intimidation. Besides continued enhancement of its combat capabilities, the PRC intends to use measures other than force for removing possible obstacles to its invasion of Taiwan if necessary in the future. This indicates the increasing delicacy and comprehensiveness behind the PRC's strategy against Taiwan. The PRC's war preparations, exercises and combat readiness efforts The PLA's strategic intent is to build upon its strategic guidance of “winning a campaign in remote areas quickly, winning the fi rst campaign decisively.” It is continuously enhancing its naval, air, Second Artillery, and joint operations capabilities. The PLA is also extending traditional ground warfare to fi elds of underwater, surface, aerial, space, electromagnetic, and network warfares. Its in tention is to obtain superiority in the “six dimensions” with an emphasis on using the Second Artil lery Force as its strategic capability. Developments are summarized below: The PLA's new ballistic missiles have integrated with advanced satellite guidance systems which can greatly increase their overall precision strike capabilities. The PLA is deploying tradi tional and nuclear ballistic missiles with a mix of short, medium, long, and intercontinental strike ranges. The PLA's nuclear weapons can reach all major countries around the world. (Refer to Figure Through years of intelligence gathering, the PLA has acquired sufficient intelligence of Taiwan's important targets and facilities. Its conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles already de ployed can attack Taiwan's major airports, sea ports, radar stations, and major infrastructures. The PLA's current strategic long-range and intercontinental counterforces are used primarily for nuclear deterrence and counterstrike. Currently, there are nearly 190 strategic missiles placed in the inland region for strategic (nuclear) counter-strike making up a preliminary nuclear deterrence system. The PLA continued reengineering its force structure in 2005. As of the end of 2005, the PLA had completed systematic organization adjustment and reforms and streamlined various agencies and combat units with current strength totaled 2.3 million after the cut of 170,000 cadres positions. In 2006, the PLA will continue its force restructuring efforts and keep reforming its manning system. Also, the PLA is actively constructing contingency forces by employing Second Artillery, fi rst line air forces along the coast, new-generation surface combatants from the East and South Sea naval 58 are summarized as follows: **1. Strategic Force** **(1) Strike range covering all major countries** 2-4, PLA's land-based nuclear weapon strike range) **(2) Multi-purpose strike capabilities** **2. PRC's Military Capabilities** ###### 02' ----- 59 The PLA has nearly 190 strate- gic missiles, 20 of which can reach inland America Alaska Russia Canada 3000KM Europe Japan 8000-10000KM U.S. the PRC India Hawaii Over 12000km Australia Dongfong 3 Dongfong 21 A Dongfong 4 Dongfong 31 Dongfong 5 Dongfong 31A Medium and long range Intercontinental Ballistic Intercontinental Ballistic strategic missiles Missiles Missiles (Japan, India) (Europe, Russia, U.S.) (Europe, Russia, U.S.) - Figure 2-4 PLA's land-based nuclear weapons strike range fl eets, and ground forces from the seven major Military Regions. Recently put emphasis on the use of both military and non-military means, and exceed battlefi elds restrictions, and strive for victories when faced with a superior adversary. This use of a supra-conventional war model has generated a certain of impacts on the operational concept of the PRC's armed forces. In the future, the PRC may also use certain “assassin's mace” weapons for precision strikes, and sabotage Taiwan's major political, economic, and military infrastructures through “acupuncture warfare” and various other asymmetric tactics, techniques and procedures with hope of securing the greatest political benefi ts through the least costs. Relevant capabilities include: ----- **(1) Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capabilities** a. Space: Currently, relevant units within the PLA General Staff Department are in charge of the operations of reconnaissance, weather, communication, and maritime monitoring satellites. These satellites are capable of performing long term reconnaissance of the surrounding areas of Tai wan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu including land, atmosphere, ocean, and electronic signals. In the future, if integrated with its surface and air target information gathered from air forces and fl eets, the PRC will be able to effectively monitoring Taiwan's military deployments. b. Air: Various electronic warfare aircraft, reconnaissance planes and early warning aircraft can be employed in the Straits or Taiwan's surrounding water and airspace to reconnoiter Taiwan's mili tary deployments and activities during peacetime or wartime. c. Sea: The PRC currently possesses 110 to 120 information gathering ships, oceanographic survey ships, hydrographic vessels, and modifi ed information gathering fi shing boats. These vessels are capable of performing electronic interception, hydrological environment research, and informa tion gathering activities around the surrounding waters of Taiwan. d. Ground: The PLA's General Staff Department and Military Region electronic reconnaissance troops can identify the types and hull numbers of ships from Taiwan or other countries traveling over the Taiwan Strait. The PRC can also use long, short, and ultra-short wave, ultra high frequency, microwave, electronic facilities, and satellite communications to perform comprehensive espionage on Taiwan's telecommunications and radar stations. **(2) Aerospace Combat Capabilities** To enhance security in military command and control communication, precision navigation for naval and aerial transportations and all-weather reconnaissance capabilities, the PLA continues to pursue aerospace research, hoping to enhance communications command and scientifi c research capabilities, and establish precision imagery data. Reconnaissance satellites supplemented by 3-D precision navigation and target imagery data will greatly increase the striking precision of the PLA's cruise missiles. **(3) Information Warfare Capabilities** The PRC recognizes the importance of battlespace ISR, and is actively enhancing information warfare capabilities for its troops to accurately moniter battlespace conditions and provide situation al awareness. Currently, the PRC's information warfare methods include computer viruses, hacking, and electromagnetic pulse assaults. Possible tactics include Trojan horses, worms, phishing, hoaxes, and spyware. The PRC may also use electromagnetic pulse weapons to directly paralyze Taiwan's C[4]ISR systems and completely acquire electronic dominance over the Taiwan Strait. **(4) Second Artillery Combat Capabilities** a. With an overall strength of over 130,000 personnel, the Second Artillery possesses over 100 60 C ###### 02' ----- ballistic missiles sites. There are over 970 ballistic missiles are strategic leverages for the PRC to apply nuclear intimidation against ma munitions, it can increase the precision and casualty radius of its missiles posing a serious PLA is forming new missile brigades in its coastal areas directly facing Taiwan and em ploying short and medium range conventional ballistic missiles, including Dongfong-11A and 15A capable of striking Taiwan's heart border, the PRC can use conventional missiles to attack all major strategic and tactical targets and strategic missiles in 2005. Compared with 2004, the number of test launches increased, fer to Figure 2-5, Strike Coverage of PLA's Short and Medium Range Missiles) capability testing. This will provide physical verifi cation and battle assessment for the troops. 61 ### Electromagnetic pulse weapons: when **nuclear weapons detonate, collision be-** **tween high gamma radiation and air parti-** **cle will produce electron radiation forming** **strong electromagnetic fields. The effects** **of which are short (less than 1 second),** **but computers and electronic equipments** **affected by the field will be hit with high-** **energy electrons resulting in destructive** **results such as lost of data due to instant** **overload on the integrated circuits and** **degaussing computer memories. This may** **cause C[4]ISR systems and high-tech weap-** **ons highly relied on computers to become** **paralyzed. These effects, however, will not** **cause casualties on human or animals.** ## C[4]ISR[systems: refers to com-] **mand (issuing orders to participating** **agencies), control (task group operations** **and firepower coordination), communi-** **cations (conveying information through** **wired, wireless, optical fibers, or satellites** **relays), information (hardware required for** **automated networks), intelligence (early** **warning and battlefield activities), recon-** **naissance (active search to detect enemy** **activities), and surveillance (passive mon-** **itoring of enemy activities).** indicating the PRC can adjust the speed of missile production and annual production rate at will un- der its ample defense budget, the determination and policy to accelerate missile developments .(Re- c. Serious threats against Taiwan materialize if the PLA complements cruise missiles with regu- lar missiles forming multi-altitude multi-function missile strikes against Taiwan's airports, ports, radar stations, and civilian facilities. Currently, live fi ring rang (e.g. airports and power plants) have been sighted within the Gansu and Xinjiang provinces. This indicates that the PRC is setting up simulated strike targets corresponding to actual intended targets for precision and warhead damage ----- 62 ZhejiangZhejiang 800KM Jiangxi DongFong-11A Second Artillery Guid-ed Missiles Quantity 600KM Growth Representative 10 DongFong-15A 190 in 1996 300KM Fujian 290 in 1998 400 in 2000 800KM Taiwan Strait 490 in 2002 Taiwan 610 in 2004 Canton 300KM Penghu 780 in 2006 600KM - Figure 2-5 Strike Coverage of PLA's Short and Medium Range Missiles **(5) Air Combat Capabilities** a. The overall air force (including paratroops) has a strength of over 380,000 personnel, and over 3,400 aircraft of various types. Over 700 fi ghters of various types are deployed within 1,080 km (600 miles) from Taiwan with 150 of them only 450km (250 miles) away from Taiwan. To en- hance the overall air defense capability, the PLA has recently accelerated its air force upgrade sched- ules and will continue to upgrade its new generation fi ghters. The war preparation efforts accelerated both in terms of quality and quantity and mostly were focused on southeastern coastal areas and the South China Sea based on the principle of deployments of “nimble front and robust rear.” The goal is to enhance air dominance over the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea . Over 400 new-gener- ation fi ghters are equipped with AA-12 and PL-12 medium/long range air-to-air missiles capable of performing regional precision air strikes (Refer to Figure 2-6, PLA's Aerial Threats against Taiwan). ###### 02' ----- 63 The PLA also enhanced its alternative battlefi eld coordinated operations and command and control capabilities in 2005. In addition to verifying the depot level integrated logistic support and contin- gency support capacities, such actions not only enhanced military deployments in coastal regions directly facing Taiwan but also increased the military intimidation against Taiwan. b. Air Defense Operation Capability: Through frequent exercise rotations in coastal regions directly facing Taiwan, the PLA's air defense forces have formed a tight multi-layered fighters, missiles and artillery fi re networks with the Jian fi ghters in the region. Current training focuses on combat command, maneuver operations, and combat support. The PLA air defense forces are ag- gressively seeking foreign air defense combat experiences to improve the overall air defense in the southeastern seas. This also poses a major threat against Taiwan's combat air patrol activities over the Taiwan Strait. c. Contingency operational capabilities: The PLA's aerial and naval contingency response maneuver force currently includes air force divisions, independent groups, radar battalions, missile divisions, missile brigades, missile groups, air assault divisions, and logistics depots. They are sup- ported by over 800 bombers of various types, and consist of over 40,000 personnel. d. Early warning capabilities: The PRC's indigenous aerial command and communication air- craft and early warning aircraft entered service in the air force in 2006, and are currently deployed in the southeastern seas. They are undergoing active testing, with the hope of increasing overall aerial command, control, and target acquisition capabilities through coordination between aircraft of 600 miles Qiang-5 Su-27 S-300 anti-air missiles 250 miles Early Warning J-11 Aircrafts Su-30 Inflight air refueling Radar Range Jammer capabilities ``` 台 灣 ``` FC-1 Electronic Surveillance Aircrafts 1.The PLA currently possesses 3,400 planes of various JH-7 types, with 400 of which are new-generation fighters. IL-76 2.Over 700 fighters of various types stationed within 600 miles of Taiwan, 150 of which are within 250 miles. J-10 H-6 - Figure 2-6 PLA's Aerial Threats against Taiwan ----- 64 different altitudes. **(6) Naval Combat Capabilities** a. With an overall strength of near 280,000 personnel (including naval aviation and marine corps), the PLAN possesses over 1,500 ships of various types in service, with over 680 naval air- craft of various types (approximately 35,000 personnel). Among them, over 180 warships of various types are deployed in regions directly facing Taiwan. For surface combat capabilities, the PLA pos- sesses over 70 large surface warships, accompanied by naval aviation forces, and is capable of con- ducting joint air-and-sea operations, and performing anti-surface, assault, and long-term maritime blockades against Taiwan. Furthermore, some of the PLAN's next-generation warships are designed with stealth and silence features. When equipped with new anti-air and anti-surface missiles, the survivability of those warships can be improved as well as its sea dominance capabilities increased dramatically. Over 130 of the remaining warships (over 760) carry anti-surface missiles with assault, blockade, and amphibious combat support capabilities (Refer to Figure 2-7, PLA's Naval Threats against Taiwan). If the PRC continues to increase its defense budget, its combat capabilities over distant high seas will be enhanced accordingly. North Sea Fleet East Sea Fleet Luda class cruiser (indigenous) Luhu class cruiser (indigenous) Song-class submarine (indigenous) Luhai class cruiser (indigenous) Ming-class submarine (indigenous) Sovremennyy class destroyer (purchased) Kilo-class submarine East Sea (purchased) Fleet South Sea `Taiwan` Raketnyy Keyser classcruiser (purchased) Fleet The PLAN possesses over 1,500 vessels of various types, over 70 of which are submarines, with over 680 naval aircrafts. Naval ships deployed in regions directly facing Taiwan include over 180 warships, over 70 of which are large surface warships. - Figure 2-7 PLA's Naval Threats against Taiwan ###### 02' ----- b. Underwater warfi ghting capabilities: The PRC has the world's 3[rd] largest (over 70 of various types) submarine fl eet with over 40 submarines equipped with good functionality to meet future en vironments. The Ming, Kilo and Song class conventional submarines and other nuclear ones (strate gic weapons) will be primary forces for invading Taiwan and countering foreign adversaries. These submarines are capable of performing underwater blockades (which only requires 16 submarines for complete blockades against Taiwan), underwater assaults, channel blockade, mining, infi ltration, and extended range nuclear intimidations. There are currently over 50,000 underwater mines of various types and most of the warships and fi shing boats (after minor modifi cation) can be used to lay mines against major ports and maritime routes around Taiwan. c. Contingency operational capabilities: PLAN's contingency forces currently consist of two marine corps brigades, over 140 vessels of various types and employ over 28,000 personnel. The PRC believes the most possible areas of military confl icts will be the East and South Sea. Therefore, PLAN's contingency forces are composed primarily from the East and South Sea Fleets. The central East China Sea Fleet also provides support for operations in the South and North China Seas. d. There are over 16,000 fi shing boats (over 80 tons) capable of conducting unconventional landing operations home ported within the three provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian directly facing Taiwan. They can carry approximately 800,000 light infantry soldiers if each carries 50 per sonnel. Besides those needs for general overseas and littoral shipping, over 1,300 commercial ships of various types stationed in the coastal areas, 800 of them can be commanded to carry fi ve to seven infantry divisions each time. However, they require aerial and naval superiority, secured beachheads and fully operational ports in order to perform administrative disembarkation. **(7) Ground Combat Capabilities** a. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) consists of nearly 1.3 million personnel. There are 7 major Military Regions, and 18 group armies. Among them, the area directly facing Taiwan is deployed with a group army consisting of over 60,000 personnel. The 7 major Military Regions consist of Nanjing, Guangzhou, Jinan, Beijing, Shenyang, Lanzhou, and Chengdu. The Military Re gions are separated into 6 major zones according to their directions of operation. The southeastern zone, including Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions, is tasked with the invasion of Taiwan and “defending the southern borders.” The northeastern zone, mainly consisting of the Shenyang Military Region, is held responsible for defending the borders with Russia and the Korean Penin sula. The southwestern zone, mainly consisting of the Chengdu Military Region, is held responsible for defending borders with India, Burma, and Vietnam. The northwestern zone is defended by the Lanzhou Military Region; its responsibilities include defending against countries in central Asia and dealing with anti-terrorism along the border. The capital zone is defended by the Beijing Military Region with the main responsibility of “defending the capital.” The Jinan Military Region acts as a 65 ----- strategic reserve and is also tasked to defend the capital. b. Ground force capabilities: The most signifi cant restructuring of the PLA's ground forces in 2005 was the reassignment of professional military branch forces under the Military Regions to the group armies. Further enhancements were made to the formation of technical branches such as army aviation, electronic defense and special forces. This restructuring increased the proportion of profes sional military branch forces in the group armies, enhanced combined weapons systems operations among various units, increased mobility and fl exibility, and enhanced the combined weapons sys tems operations among the troops. The southeastern coastal military regions are equipped with new amphibious tanks, amphibious infantry armored transport vehicles, and amphibious infantry assault vehicles. These enhancements increased landing capabilities and provided amphibious operations experiences to the troops. The PLA has also amended the wartime commandeering regulations, as signing commercial vessels to carry artillery and air defense forces to enhance air defense and land ing assault capabilities in unconventional landing operations. **(8) Rapid Reaction Force** a. PLAAF: The air force and naval aviation rapid reaction force includes aviation divisions, in dependent groups are equipped with over 800 various fi ghters and bombers, which can join combat operations immediately. b. PLAN: The PLAN continues to incorporate its support bases and placed them under direct operation and training control by each fleet command. Primary combat forces from the East Sea fl eets in the Shanghai and Zhoushan bases or from the South Sea fl eets in the Guangzhou bases can reach any destination for direct combat support within three days. c. Ground Force: Current electronic countermeasure troops can be used for electronic jamming and offensive operations against Taiwan. Also, each Military Region possesses contingency response forces without battlefi eld experience, which can reach Nanjing and Guangzhou within one to three days and report for combat duty through aerial transport and army aviation support. **(9) Joint Operation Capabilities** a. In the past few years, the PLA has aggressively made breakthroughs in satellites, communi cations and information technologies with signifi cant improvements in command, control and com munication capabilities. The PLA continues to incorporate joint operations concepts at all levels of training, and holds amphibious landing training in Nanjing, Guangzhou and Jinan Military Regions. Its aim is to enhance the PLA's C[4]I mechanism for joint operations to verify command and opera tional capabilities required during amphibious landing operations. b. Recently, joint exercise training grounds are proliferating in the PLA's Military Regions, providing all troops with joint warfi ghting and joint strike training among different armed forces branches. The purpose is to verify their joint warfi ghting personnel, fi repower, and overall strike 66 ###### 02' ----- capabilities. Military training reforms are primarily guided by combat missions, through integration with actual combat requirements and executed along the axis of training exchanges among military branches. Hence, the enhanced joint warfi ghting mechanisms. c. In the past, prominent positions in the PRC military were held by PLA army generals. Now, PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery commanders are members of the Central Military Council. Navy and Air Force generals are also members in the General Staff Headquarters indicating that the PLA's military is gradually implementing a joint command organization through the command hier archy to effectively enhance coordinated joint warfi ghting command capabilities. However, the PLA currently still lacks cross-service cooperation and actual joint warfi ghting experience. In the future, the PLA hopes to integrate C[4]ISR, new command architectures, and joint logistical support systems to achieve joint operation capabilities across services. **3. Unified Revolution of Military Affairs** In response to the complexity and variability of modern military operations, the PLA initiated a unifi ed revolution of military affairs for joint operations in 2004. A unifi ed training model tailor ing to the specifi c training needs of the information technology era were established for all military branches and services. The adjusted and innovative training subjects comprise six areas including battlefi eld information, command and control, joint strikes, general support, full spectrum protec tion, and its so-called “three warfares”.(public opinion, psychological and legal warfare) The programming to enhance unifi ed joint operations is phased into three stages: in 2005, the PLA's General Staff Department and individual Military Regions were actively involved in enhanc ing the unifi ed joint training requirements. All training and reforms will be gradually applied to the entire military. There will be major enhancements in the realization of a mechanized and IT-driven force by 2010. There will be a transformational leap prior to 2020. The contingency mobile force will be fully mechanized and IT-driven according to the schedule indicating the push for unified training is aligned with the equipment upgrade schedules. **4. Exercise to Fortify Armed Forces and Branches** To effectively enhance fi eld combat capabilities, the PLA is actively conducting training exer cises among various services and branches. In 2005, the PLA's various services and branches held over 100 exercises focusing on naval training, amphibious landings, air defense, electronic warfare, anti-terror, and joint operations exercises. Amphibious training focused on the invasion of Taiwan and the PLA conducted over eleven such exercises within the last 6 years. Recent large scale joint and combined exercises of the PLA are all held in the inland regions in order to hide their inten tions and warfi ghting capabilities from Taiwan. Besides enhancing the effectiveness of their joint 67 ----- operations capabilities and expressing its determination to defend its sovereignty to the international community, such exercises can also achieve the effects of military intimidation against Taiwan. The PLA's recent exercises and training are summarized as follows: **(1) Second Artillery** To enhance contingency response readiness capability, the PLA troops are undergoing cross-re gion mobility training in case of contingency operations against Taiwan. The emphasis is on various missile testing, test launches, and equipment operational drills, which indicates that the PLA spares no efforts in enhancing its strike power of tactical missiles. **(2) PLAAF** Participating in joint exercises is the principal task of the PLAAF. Enhanced joint exercises and the inspection of ground logistic support and maintenance capabilities, worth to provide an all-weather rapid direct (indirect) combat support capability. In 2005, the PLAAF participated in over ten major joint exercises with other services, organized subordinate branches to important combined-weapons systems training, and conducted year-end evaluations to verify annual training results. **(3) PLAN** In 2005, they focused on joint and combined-weapons systems exercises in coordination with new weapon testing schedules to enhance sea dominance capabilities. They also coordinated with the air and ground forces in more than ten joint air-sea and amphibious landing exercises. Main sub jects included communication coordination, operational command and control, and logistics support to enhance overall joint operation effectiveness and effi ciencies. **(4) PLA Ground Force** Ground troops deployed in coastal military regions focused on beach training implemented for amphibious landing, streamlining command procedures, disembarkation, and ground combat exer cises to improve joint landing capabilities. In 2005, there were over twenty major exercises focused on contingency operations and amphibious landing training in preparation for future invasion of Tai wan. **(5) Anti-terrorism Exercises** The PLA participated in over forty international and domestic anti-terror exercises with neigh boring countries focusing on the three fundamental missions of anti-terrorism “defense, rescue, and strikes.” The aim is to be familiar with various anti-terror operations and joint command capabilities to eliminate potential terrorism attacks. 68 ###### 02' ----- 69 ----- ----- 71 ----- 72 I. PRC's Military Strategies toward Taiwan Since the founding of the nation in 1949, the PRC has never renounce its military options against Taiwan. Recently, the PRC continuously utilize its military exercises and force demonstra- tion opportunities to pinpoint and intimidate Taiwan to achieve its political objectives. The PRC's military policy towards Taiwan, from Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, has focused on the fundamental directive of “peaceful unifi cation” and “one country, two systems,” underscoring the use of force as the last resort. The aim is to confuse international perceptions through peaceful unifi - cation and win public perception among the Taiwan public. Simultaneously, the PLA is also actively modernizing its military to accelerate its overall warfi ghting capabilities. It intends to use military threats to affect Taiwan's national sentiments and policies, while not ruling out the possible use of military force in the future to force unifi cation. In all, the PRC's military threats and preparations under the peaceful policy are of great threat to Taiwan's security. The current PRC military strategies against Taiwan can be observed in the following fi ve areas: **1. Possible Timing for Invasion Taiwan** Taking into consideration its economic growth and political stability, and barring unpredict- able factors, the PRC is unlikely to pick up fi ght against Taiwan in the near future. However, with its overall growth and military expansion, the PRC will have a favorable position in its use force to solve the “ Taiwan question” when it secures its military dominance. Nonetheless, a military invasion like this is also subject to international situations, the PRC's internal political and economic development, and the cross-starit dependence. At present, Beijing is still watching closely Taiwan's policy directions. **2. Justifying and Legalizing Invasions against Taiwan** On March 2005, the PRC National People's Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law autho- rizing the military to adopt non-peaceful and other necessary measures to resolve the Taiwan issue under specifi c conditions. This legalizes the lawfulness of its use of any military and non-military measures in resolving the Taiwan issue and the PRC will follow up with other related statutes in the future. If military confl icts break out across the Taiwan Strait, the PRC can use this law to justify its military actions. This will prevent the application of international laws regarding illegal wars and the use or threat of force from being applied to its invasion against Taiwan, and thus lower the likeli- hood of international intervention. ###### 03' ----- **3. Combined Applications of the Three Non-Military Warfares** In 2003, the PRC revised the “Political Work Act” to incorporate public opinion, psychological, and legal warfares as the “three warfares” and listed them as offi cial operations toward Taiwan. The purpose is to integrate related measures and achieve political objectives through non-military means, which may cultivate a favorable foundation for future military action. Overall, the PRC intends to utilize public opinion and psychological warfare to sabotage and disseminate dissension within. This aims to eliminate Taiwan's morale, resilience, and unity while controling their own ethnic and na tionalist sentiments, with a view to harness consensus and support for non-peaceful policies against Taiwan. Through legal warfare, the PRC also intends to weaken Taiwan's sovereignty, form rational justifi cation for a future invasion against Taiwan, and prepare for legal issues that may arise from invasion against Taiwan. **4. Enhancing War Preparations against Taiwan** Since the end of the 1970s, the PRC's economic reform has accomplished considerable results in the modernization of agriculture, industry, and technology. It is currently pursuing defense mod ernization to set the foundation for becoming a major global power. Especially since the 1990s, the PRC has relied on its rapidly growing economic power to develop modern military capacities. Its rapid developments in Navy, Air Force, ballistic missile, information warfare, and aerospace capa bilities have been very benefi cial for achieving quick victories against Taiwan. Recently, the PRC's military officials insisted that the “Taiwan issue” cannot be delayed indefinitely, and proclaimed that war is inevitable in resolving Taiwan issue. On September, 2004, as Hu Jintao attended the fi rst meeting of the CCP Central Military Affairs Commission after becoming the chairman of the Cen tral Military Affairs Commission, he demanded full-speed revolutionary, modernized, and normal ized force construction efforts to prepare for military confl icts. These developments facilitated with its aggressive push for military modernization, clearly indicate the PRC's insistence on forced unifi cation. Besides continuing to impose military pressure against Taiwan, the PRC is also enhancing various war preparation efforts. Relevant measures include: **(1) Second Artillery brigade facili-** **ties enhancements** - Figure 3-1 Satellite photograph of the PLA Second Artillery missile brigade facility enhancements 73 ----- Cited example is the Jiangxi Leping 815 missile brigade, approximately 700 km from Taiwan. Satellite pictures indicate that the brigade contains a headquarters, administrative building, training field, and warehouses. Over 100 Dongfong-15 mis siles with range of 800km are deployed, which can be used to attack Taiwan through railroad transportation to Fujian province. (Refer to Figure 3-1, Satellite photograph of the PLA Second Artillery missile brigade **(2) Reactivate airports as tran-sit** **bases** Fujian's Lienchung was originally an idle airport. Reconstruction began in 2001 and, by 2005, Sukhoi-27 have stationed in the airport and frequently participated in military exercise in the west of Taiwan Strait. Satellite pictures indicate these planes are equipped with air-to-air mis siles which may be the AA-12 with range Taiwan's aircraft. (Refer to Figure 3-2, Sat 74 - Figure 3-2 Satellite pictures of the PLA's reactive airport as transit base - Figure 3-3 Satellite pictures of the PLA's Intention to build aircraft carrier ellite pictures of the PLA's reactive airport as transit base) **(3) Intentions of building aircraft carrier** From May to November 2005, the previous Russian aircraft carrier Varyag was found to be undergoing repairs and main deck rust-removal in Dalien Naval Shipyard, Liaoning, which differs from the offi cial tourism purpose when it was purchased in 1998. Analyses suggested that Varyag might be a carrier training ship and could be transformed into the PLA's fi rst aircraft carrier if neces- sary. When Varyag is deployed off the Taiwan east coast beyond the fl ight range of ROC's fi ghter, Taiwan's defense might become vulnerable. (Refer to Figure 3-3, Satellite pictures of the PLA's In- tention to build aircraft carrier) **(4) Simulated facilities of Taiwan for assault exercises** In September 2005, the PLA conducted assault exercises on simulated Taiwanese defense fa- ###### 03' ----- cilities in Dahuo Island, Guangdong. The island contained simulated aircraft hang ers, F-16, and oil depots. Satellite pictures indicate that after the exercises, simulated facilities were damaged by the assaults, and the Dahuo Island was covered by missile craters of 20-meter in diameter from preci sion weapon strikes. It is suspected that, in the future, the PLA will use precision weap ons to perform joint strikes against Taiwan's critical political and military facilities. (Re fer to Figure 3-4, Satellite pictures of the Taiwanese Facilities used in Assault Exercises PLA's Modeled Taiwanese Facilities used in Assault Exercises) **(5) Intensify takeover exercises** **of Taiwan's islets** The PLA's major military regions are each equipped with tactical training bases, which organize combined armed service training rotating between troops in different bases on an annual basis. Satellite pictures indicate that the combined tactical training contain target areas named after major po lets) **5. Continuous Military Threats** 75 - Figure 3-4 Satellite pictures of the PLA's Modeled Taiwanese Facilities used in Assault Exercises - Figure 3-5 Satellite Pictures of the PLA's Intensified Takeover Exercises of Taiwan's Islets sitions in Taiwan's islets, such as Kinmen's Taiwu Mountains, Matzu's Yuntai Mountains, etc. This indicates that this military region is intensifying training on takeover operations of Taiwan's islets. (Refer to Figure 3-5, Satellite Pictures of the PLA's Intensifi ed Takeover Exercises of Taiwan's Is- The PLA's capabilities for invading Taiwan improve annually, offering it a diversity of options in making threats or actual military actions against Taiwan. If the PRC executes military action to- ward Taiwan, its main goal will be to quickly disintegrate Taiwan's national willpower, block potent foreign intervention, and force our government to enter negotiation under terms favorable for the PRC. The PRC can also opt to create military tension over Taiwan Strait through military intimida- ----- 76 tion (but not major armed invasions against Taiwan), or gradually intensify military pressure against Taiwan to force our government to surrender. II. PRC's Military Deployment toward Taiwan Recently, the PRC is actively introducing advanced foreign weapons and technologies, includ- ing high-performance Sukhoi fighter, early warning aircraft, large cargo planes, Kilo-class sub- marines, and Sovremenny-class destroyers. Furthermore, the PRC has accumulated and improved various ballistic and cruise missiles and indigenous weapon systems, causing the military balance in the Taiwan Strait to tilt over to the PRC. Possible military deployments against Taiwan are analyzed below: **1. Second Artillery** Among the PLA's regular ballistic missiles, short-range missiles are currently concentrated in the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions. The number of enhanced models is growing steadily each year which makes it possible to assault Taiwan remotely. The deployed short-range missiles provide general fi re support for tactical use when invading Taiwan. Up to the end of 2005, the PLA had deployed 784 mobile Dongfong short-range missiles, with an addition of 75 to 100 produced annually. The PLA also researches on the application of ballistic and cruise missiles for anti-carrier and land assault operations. **2. People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)** The PLAAF troops against Taiwan consist of anti-air defense and various fi ghters and bombers with over 3,400 possessing combat capabilities. Combat support includes over 90 reconnaissance planes, and some 300 transport planes, 10 of which are large transport planes. The PLAAF's elite fi ghters and the Sukhoi fi ghters purchased from Russia are mostly stationed in the eastern bases pro- viding fast air strikes against Taiwan. **3. People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)** The PLAN force against Taiwan has modernized its fl eets in the last decade by gradually retir- ing parts of the aged fl eets and replacing them with fewer but newer vessels which include approxi- mately 70 large surface combat vessels, 60 attack submarines, over 40 large amphibious transport ###### 03' ----- ships, and 50 coastal missile patrol crafts. Two-thirds of the vessels assigned under the East and South Sea Fleets can engage in immediate combat against Taiwan. When necessary, the North Sea Fleet and related resources can also be incorporated to support combat. Recently, the PRC has pur chased high-performance weapons from Russia, including Sovremennyy-class destroyers and Kilo class submarines, which are both assigned to the East Sea Fleet, and directly pose grave threats against Taiwan's maritime security. **4. People's Liberation Army (PLA)** PLA troops have a relative advantage in quantity over Taiwan (combat troops against Taiwan contain approximately 400,000 personnel stationed in Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan Military Region; an increase of 25,000 personnel between 2005 and 2006). The Nanjing Military Region, directly facing Taiwan, has 3 group armies, which would serve as the backbone for a PLA inva sion against Taiwan. Additional troops are available from Guangzhou and Jinan Military Region to increase warfi ghting capabilities. However, despite the PLA's advantage in terms of the quantity of ground troops, its required air, logistics and naval support for full ground operation is not available, making landing and air assault operations diffi cult. Therefore, the PLA is developing various air and sea transport methods to effectively support military operations against Taiwan. **5. Air Assault Forces** Recently, the PLAAF is enhancing the application of air assault forces. The PLAAF has de vised combat support tactics for landing operations, and also purchased new weapons and transport vehicles to enhance air assault warfi ghting capabilities. Therefore, in future battles across the Taiwan Strait, the PLAAF will use its air assault forces to conduct special operations to secure strategic po sitions, sabotage major political, economic, military, and life-sustenance facilities, or block Taiwan's mobile support and military maneuvers. **6. Special Forces** The PLA's special forces are individually deployed in each of the seven major military regions, and primarily responsible for battlefield reconnaissance, infiltration, and containment of enemy forces. Currently, they already possess night maneuver parachuters, helicopters, and assault boats for collecting information and penetrating deep into desired target areas. In future military confl icts, special forces can participate directly in combat or perform reconnaissance missions, to support campaign and tactical operations of other forces. 77 ----- 78 III. PRC's Military Capabilities against Taiwan. In the past few years, the PLA's military exercises have been increasingly geared towards real combat scenarios, emphasizing the precision execution of the mission and the enhancement of ac- tual combat capabilities. Exercises related to joint air-and-sea strikes, air assault, irregular landing operations, amphibious landing operations, and long-range pursuit are all highly Taiwan-specifi c. Also, the PLA has built a full-scale simulation training ground, the Dingxin base in Gansu, imitat- ing the Taichung Chingchuengang airport and Kaohsiung Tsoying naval base for simulated assault exercises. Recently, the PLA also held bombing exercises in the Dahuo and Nanjeushan islands in Guangdong and Zhejiang coastal areas with terrain similar to Taiwan's islets. This indicates that the PLA's Taiwan-specifi c simulated terrain exercises have extended from inland to the coastal regions. The above developments clearly indicate the PRC's intentions and preparations against Taiwan. Its current trends of intensifi ed military preparations and future military emphases against Taiwan can be summarized as follows: **1. Precision Missile Strikes** The PLA is deploying short-range Dongfong tactical ballistic missiles capable of carrying submunition warheads; they can also carry graphite or fuel gas warheads (40 meters circular error probable), and can reach Taiwan in 7 minutes. The PLA has started deploying cruise missiles (10 meters circular error probable) to perform precision strikes against designated political, military tar- gets and key nodes to conduct decapitation and disabling of Taiwan's command and control systems. The PLA also intends to execute offensive air operations to paralyze Taiwan's overall air defense, complemented by attacks against naval and air bases, stationed area for mobile, armored vehicle and army aviation troops, and key infrastructure nodes. There would also be sub-launched land attack missiles against Taiwan's strategic bases on the east coast, with an emphasis on increasing the strike precision of ballistic and cruise missiles. **2. Landing Assault Capability** **(1) Special forces assault** The PLA's special forces consist of over 17,000 personnel. They primarily conduct battlefi eld reconnaissance, infi ltration of key areas, assaults, takeover, containment and eliminating major mili- tary targets, and contingency mitigations. They possess contingency combat capabilities by land, air or sea. **(2) Air assault** ###### 03' ----- **(3) Amphibious assault** and are responsible for the `To Beijing` construction of beachheads. `Jinan` **ways** `Zhuzhou` Longhai, Jingguangjeu, and `Haikou` way networks from Inland to southeastern coast to greatly response to cross-strait situ 79 The PLAAF's air assault troops consist of approximately 40,000 personnel, equipped with over 80 transport aircrafts. If the PLAAF launches a surprised assault against Taiwan, they can be para- chuted onto Taiwan within 6 hours to conduct long-range maneuver and assault operation. The PLA's marine corps consist of over 8,000 personnel capable of performing conventional and non-conventional landing operations. They are newly equipped with modern amphibious ar- mored vehicles, air-cushion landing craft, new self-propelled artillery and anti-tank missile vehicles. During pre-assault operation, they primarily act as the spearhead for joint amphibious operations ``` To Beijing Shijiazhuang Yantai Jinan Liancheng Qingdao Rizhao Gunzhou Linyi Zhengzhou Xuzhou XinyiLianyun To Xian Luohe Fuyang Bangbu Haian Hefei Nanjing Qidong Xiangyang Wuhu Wuxi Shanghai Wuhan Macheng Changxing Hangzhou Wuchang Jiujiang Jinhua Nanchang Hengfeng Changsha Yingtan Wenzhou Zhuzhou Hengyang Nanping Fuzhou Ganzhou Longyan ``` `Shaoguan` `Longchuan` `Xiaman` Diagram `Nanning南寧` `Liuzhou` `Guangzhou` `Dongguan` `Shantou` Completed RailwayElectric Railway `Qinzhou欽州` `Shenzhen` Electric Railway `北海Beihai` `Zhanjiang` Under Construction `Haian` Railway Under Construction ``` Haikou ``` - Figure 3-6 PRC's Regional Railroad Map ``` Manzhouli Tongjiang Huoerguosi Harbin Suifenhe Urumqi Erlianhaotes Shenyang Huhehaote Beijing Dandong Shijiazhuang Taiyuan Yinchuan Jinan Qingdao Lanzhou Xian Lianyungang Zhengzhou Xuzhou Nanjing Chengdu Wuhan Hefei HangzhouShanghai Lasa Chongqing Nanchang Changsha Wenzhou Hengyang Fuzhou Guiyang Ruli Kunming Guangzhou Nanning Shenzhen Hekou Zhuhai Zhanjiang Haikou Sanya ``` - Figure 3-7 PRC's Regional Highway Map ----- maneuver in the Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou Military Region. Troops can be transported simultaneously to coastal ports by multiple routes, and quickly mobilized to desired regions. In the future, it will be much more diffi cult for Taiwan to monitor the PRC's troop maneuver.(Refer to Fig Currently, the PLAN possesses 29 major ports with 8 under construction. To respond to the future needs of new vessels, nuclear submarines, large ships, and the needs to increase the effi ciency in coastal logistics operations, the PLAN is actively upgrading and expanding its military and commercial ports, routes, and the docking facilities. The PLAN is also gradually enhancing mod ernization of its medium and small ports to form port groups centered on large military ports and networked with medium and small ports. This is benefi cial for economic development in the south eastern costal areas, also enhancing the amphibious operations capabilities and capacity for naval There are 95 airports along the southeastern coast of China within 1080 km (600 miles) of Taiwan, 30 of which are military airports, 28 of which are military and civilian dual use airports. In wartime, they can provide shelter for over 1,300 fi ghters to conduct combat missions. The PLAAF The PRC has completed the construction of the 8-vertical and 8-horizontal foundational opti cal fi ber network grid with use of satellite, optical fi ber, frequency-hopping, digital, encrypted, and wired communications to ensure security. Also, the PRC plans to launch communication and recon naissance satellites with military applications. In the future, the PRC may integrate military and civilian optical fi ber networks into modernized digital networks to establish a tightly integrated mili The PLA currently possesses over 60 reserve division or brigade level units with over 800,000 personnel. Currently, the PRC has over 1,300 commercial vessels subsumed and registered under militia organizations so that they can be employed to support combat missions and rapid mobiliza tion in wartime. Each military region annually performs at least one leasing and transport exercise to increase peacetime-to-wartime transition so as to enhance mobilization capabilities. Currently, the PRC has issued the Defense Mobilization Act for Civilian Transportation, establishing mobilization committees for all military regions, provincial commands, and military sub-regions, which handle vessel mobilization, organization, and exercises. The emphasis is on the integration of military, ci 80 ure 3-6 and 3-7, the PRC's Regional Railroad and Highway Maps) **(2) Maritime transport** material transportation and supply. **(3) Air transport** also possesses over 330 transporters. **(4) Military Communication** tary communication architecture. **4. Establish Mobilization Mechanisms** ###### 03' ----- 81 vilian, peacetime and wartime functions. They are coordinated with the defense transportation mobi- lization plan to ensure contingency mobility for the rapid strike capabilities of combat troops. **5. Enhance Logistics Support** The PLA's General Equipment Department, General Logistics Department and Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) joint to form the Logistics Technology Development and Exchange Center focusing on equipment research for battle and mili- tary region support. The purpose is to reduce the time on classifi cation, storage, distribution, and transportation of combat materials. They hope to establish a logistics system capable of integrating regional and organizational support while integrating general and specifi c supplies. There are seven Military Region Combined Logistics Support Zones, which provide an armed forces, military and civilian, and peacetime-and-wartime integrated maintenance and supply system. The PLA continues to explore methods to unify joint logistics support, perfecting the “grand joint logistics” policy, en- hancing the existing logistics system to resolve issues of repetitive construction and low effi ciency, etc. The goal is to support contingency operations. IV. PRC's Military Maneuvers against Taiwan Of all the aforementioned military capabilities, the current main PRC threats toward Taiwan are still focused on military intimidation and blockades. With analysis based on factors such as the modernization schedule of the PLA military, strategic concept developments, force structure and deployment and capacity of weapon research show that, the PLA's future combat capabilities against Taiwan might be increasingly perfected, and exhibited the following characteristics: **1. Multi-dimensional Assault Mode** The PRC will invade Taiwan utilizing its integrated political, economic, military, psychologi- cal and diplomatic powers with application of various high-tech weapons as well as conventional attacks and non-conventional infi ltration and sabotage tactics. The purpose is to infl ict multi-dimen- sional and multi-level strikes using asymmetric and nonlinear combat methods to rapidly destroy or paralyze Taiwan's strategic defensive postures and achieve decisive results. **2. Complete Electronic Paralysis** Prior and throughout the progression of war, the PLA will utilize satellites, military hackers ----- 82 troops, and electronic warfare troop to execute all-out electronic warfare against Taiwan, infi ltrate Taiwan's computer network infrastructure, disrupt operationbattlefield deployment and logistical facilities, sabotage civilian traffi c, electricity, telecommunications, and fi nancial networks to cre- ate chaos and fear in Taiwan society. The PLA may also utilize electromagnetic pulse weapons to directly paralyze Taiwan's C[4]ISR systems to gain complete control of the electronic spectrum over Taiwan. **3. Long-range Precision Strikes** The early stage of war might be initiated by a large number of attacks by the PRC's tactical missiles, cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles, unmanned aerial assault vehicles, and air forces to rapidly penetrate defense across the Taiwan Strait. This is to strike critical targets such as the politi- cal and economic nerve centers, military bases, airports, ports, logistics supply facilities, radar sur- veillance system and C[4]ISR systems. This could rapidly weaken Taiwan's defense capabilities and paralyze the ROC Armed Forces. **4. Victories through Shock and Awe** The PLA might use its quantitative advantage in tactical and cruise missiles, combined with Navy and Air Force, to perform long-range precision strikes against Taiwan's important military facilities and major troops deployment areas, and eliminate Taiwan's Navy and Air Force, and para- lyzing Taiwan's ground forces. After securing superiority on the air and sea dominance, the PLA will combine special forces, air assaults and amphibious operations with naval and air transport to project a large amount of forces to take over Taiwan's major political and economic nerve centers to achieve the strategic goal of “winning a campaign in a remote area quickly, and winning the fi rst campaign decisively.” V. PRC's Possible Military Means of Invading Taiwan Based on the analysis of various information, the PRC's possible military actions against Tai- wan, according to political intentions, intensity and scale of conflicts, can be divided into three categories of intimidation, paralyzation, and invasion warfare. These methods are summarized as follows: ###### 03' ----- **1. Intimidation Warfare** This type of actions involves the feature of gradual increase of military pressure, the show of force, the fl exible use of tactics and blurring of confl ict boundaries. The intent is to force surrender or infl icting psychological damage against the will to fi ght utilizing all military means without initi ating a full-scale war. **(1) Large-scale Military Exercises** Using psychological warfare concepts by gathering major forces at coastal regions to perform exercises and fi repower demonstration and spreading rumors of war through the media, and subse quently evoke panic in Taiwan to force surrender. **(2) Network and Electronic Interference** Using special agents or hackers, the PLA may disrupt Taiwan's political, economic, military, and media network systems, or adopt public opinion against Taiwan to cause disturbances and in crease psychological pressure against Taiwan. **(3) Naval-and-Air Fleet Provocations** This is to conduct provocative actions by sending aircraft or warships across the central line of the Taiwan Strait. The PLA may initiate warnings and threats to suppress Taiwan's fl eet activities, increase military pressure, and wear out our morale in a psychological manner. **(4) Partial Blockade** Through military exercises or missile test launches, the PRC may announce Taiwan's outbound maritime routes including the islets as restricted areas, forming partial blockades through maritime interceptions and exercises. **(5) Full-scale Blockade** The PLA may declare Taiwan's fl ight zone and maritime areas as no-fl y or no-sail zones or an nouncing complete blockades. They may use aircraft or submarines to lay mines on ROC's major ports, maritime routes and coastal areas and maintain full-scale and continuous blockades to force surrender by the Taiwan authorities. **2. Paralysis Warfare** This type of actions consists of the feature of surprise, long-range, precision, non-contact ambush, long-range, precision, non-contact, and nonlinear characteristics, with the aim of rapidly paralyzing Taiwan's command and control system and political and military nerve centers and disin tegrating Taiwan's organized military operations. **(1) Cyber Warfare** The PLA may use electronic jamming system as well as hackers, computer viruses, and infor mation time bombs to attack Taiwan's central command system, paralyzing Taiwan's tactical and 83 ----- The PLA may use tactical ballistic and cruise missiles to perform saturation attacks so as to de­ stroy Taiwan's political and economic centers, C[4]ISR systems, and important military facilities, and The PLA may use tactical ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles, to conduct long-range strikes against Taiwan's strategic and critical locations, followed by remote controlled, conventional and/or precision munitions strikes to paralyze Taiwan's warfighting capa­ **(4) Takeovers of Major Centers by Special Operation** The PLA may use special operation infiltration and hidden personnel within the island com­ bined with air, air assault, and amphibious strikes to conduct multi-pronged strikes against Taiwan's northern garrison areas, paralyzing and controlling Taiwan's political and economic centers through simultaneous attacks to rapidly disintegrate our government's decision-making mechanism and re­ sponsiveness in order to achieve a prompt victory. This type of action includes features such as rapid strike, shock and awe, high intensity, and large-scale fatalities. The PLA might use all military means for military takeover. Taking over islets such as Kinmen and Matzu to damage morale of our people, or forcing our Taking over the Penghu islands to serve as a stepping stone for subsequent attacks against Tai­ Direct large-scale military actions against Taiwan. In the future, the PLA will conduct low-cost, highly effective, rapid-strike, and prompt showdown combat maneuvers. It is highly unlikely for the PLA to conduct paralyzation or invasion warfare against Taiwan under the current environment, considering strategic benefits, military devel­ opment schedules and other objective and subjective limits that the PLA is facing today. The most likelihood of the PLA to conduct operation against Taiwan prior to 2008 is through intimidation. Af­ ter 2008 or 2010, the PLA's military developments will become more complete in terms of quantity and quality. If the cross-strait military balance continues to be distorted, and Taiwan's military power 84 strategic command and control mechanisms. **(2) Saturation Missile Strikes** to disintegrate Taiwan's combat willpower. **(3) Joint Precision Strikes** bilities. **3. Invasion Warfare** **(1) Islet Invasion** government to enter political negotiations. **(2) Beyond Island Invasion** wan. **(3) Main Island Invasion** ###### 03' ----- cannot be adequately transformed, it will be benefi cial for the PLA to employ intimidation, paraly sis, and invasion warfares jointly to pose extreme threats against our security. Therefore, our Armed Forces not only need to accelerate defense transformation based on the future threats to enhance combat readiness and gain relative advantages, but also need to implement all-out defense to com bine the nation's overall strength, perfecting our all-out defense system in order to ensure national security. 85 ----- ----- 87 ----- 88 I. Defense Resources and Constraints National defense is part of the nation's overall infrastructure, and thus, when allocating re- sources, the nation's overall policy must be taken into account. In the past few years, the nation's overall development plan focused on economic development and social welfare, aiming to raise national competitiveness and improve the people's well-being. Therefore, the government has made large investments in economic development, education, science, culture, and social welfare in order to realize the objectives set out in the nation's overall policy. Under these circumstances, the national defense budgets have not decreased, but were taking up smaller and smaller percentages of the GDP and the central government's budget. While Taiwan strives to develop its social and economic infrastructures, the PRC is persis- tently building up their military preparations against Taiwan. They have deployed various advanced fi ghters, warships, and anti-aircraft mis- siles near Taiwan's sovereign waters, and ### The Jingjin Program refers to the “Im- **provement of military structure and organiza-** have over 700 short-range missiles that **tion” project. This is a restructuring program** can target Taiwan's political, military, **that combines RMA philosophies, assessments** and economic centers. Considering the **of the operation of the Two Defense Acts** PRC's increasing degree of threat against **(National Defense Act, and Organization Act** Taiwan, and military advantages that **of the Ministry of National Defense), changes** **in enemy threats, and adjustments in strate-** are gradually tilting in the PRC's favor **gic thought. It also seeks to reform national** across the Taiwan Strait, the government **military structure and organization in order to** must address such security challenge **address future defense operation needs. The** by making appropriate investments in **first stage of the program started with re-** **structuring work in 2004. After registering all** the MND to ensure Taiwan's safety and **incoming and existing troops in July 2005, we** development. In doing so, not only can **will continue to stage 2 organization reforms.** we effectively protect the Taiwan Strait, **Before the end of 2008, total personnel will** but we also demonstrate to the world **decrease to 275,000 persons (250,000 per-** Taiwan's determination to defend itself. **sonnel establishment, 25,000 maintenance** **personnel). This reduced echclon of chain of** In the foreseeable future, Taiwan's **command allows commands to be executed more** GDP, government and defense budgets **quickly and logistical support to be more flex-** are not expected to increase greatly. **ible. This will enhance joint operations capabil-** Other than that, defense budgets may **ities of the armed forces and achieve complete** still be limited due to funding priorities **transformation.** for civilian programs. Because future ###### 04' ----- 89 defense budgets still cannot satisfy the needs of military buildup, we need to “fi rst focus on person- nel maintenance, followed by operations and maintenance and military investments,” to sequentially realize the objectives of military preparation. Facing these hardships, the MND will strive to acquire appropriate funding for national defense in the future in order to address increasing gaps in military strength between Taiwan and the PRC. In the future, the Armed Forces will continue with the Jingjin Program's second-stage work, accelerate streamlining of personnel and simplifi cation of service allowances, control the growth of personnel maintenance costs and operational costs, and maximize the effectiveness of military investments. In terms of national defense budgets, we will continue requesting the Executive Yuan to consider the needs of our military development and combat preparations, and to scale national defense budgets proportional to the GDP and central government budgets, so that national defense budgets receive appropriate funding. Also, in consideration of the peculiarities in national defense investments and limited resources, the MND may integrate military developments with economic developments in the future through industrial cooperation programs and privatization of resources. In this way, resources can be more effectively used and the defense establishment can make concrete contributions to public development. II. Social Expectations In democratic societies such as Taiwan, public opinion has a certain degree of infl uence over public policy planning and implementation. Public opinion can cover many issues. It can mean in- quiries, social discourse from the news and media, or even discourse and research among the strate- gist community. These opinions outside the national defense system act as important catalysts in defense transformation. They not only directly infl uence the outcome of defense policies, but also carry, to a considerable degree, supervision functions in implementation stages. With information proliferating in society, national defense information becoming more transparent, and increased participation from the strategist community, the role and infl uence of public opinion expectations on national defense affairs will increase with time. “Consolidation of military policy and command branches” and “civilian control of the military” were major transformations undergone by the Armed Forces in response to public expectations. For a long time, the Armed Forces operated under a dual command system between military command and policy. The phenomena of the General Chief of Staff wielding authority without bearing respon- sibility and the Minister of Defense bearing responsibility without wielding authority had often been ----- subject to external questioning. This dualistic system was detrimental towards national defense pol icy implementation during peacetime and combat command during wartime. Therefore, the MND acted to respect public opinion. In order to establish a defense system with “uniformity between authorities and responsibilities” and “division of professionalization,” drafting the National Defense Act and amendments for the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense began with con sultation with academic experts and other knowledgeable individuals. The Two Defense Acts were passed by the Legislative Yuan on January 15, 2000, and offi cially ratifi ed by the President in Janu ary 29, 2000, ushering in a new era for the operation of the national defense organization. In the past few years, the Legislative Yuan's National Defense Committee has proposed many changes to the MND in accordance with public expectations. These suggestions include streamlining the Armed Forces' personnel maintenance costs, reinforcing defense weapon purchases and research, improving autonomy of defense industries, and enhancing the protection of the rights of military personnel in military service. The MND is able to take all of these public expectations into account. For example, we proceeded with the Jingjin Program to lower the size of armed forces, research on modern and high-effi ciency weapons, consolidate the defense technology industries' capacities, and include military personnel into the National Health Insurance Program, which were all responses to public expectations for reforms in national defense affairs. In fact, in order to increase the public's understanding of defense affairs, the MND has consult ed with experts from various fi elds for advice on defense policies. The conceptualization and devel opment for various policies all involved constant communications with external parties through the media, public hearings, MND routine press conferences, and invitations for academics and experts to participate in discussion forums. These actions could fulfill the needs of military buildup and combat readiness as well as satisfy public expectations. Currently, the ROC Armed Forces' defense transformation aims to respond to challenges against national security that arise from changes in the strategic environment. Relevant actions include weapons acquisitions, organizational restructuring, and improvements in training, which not only satisfy public expectations but also are greatly benefi cial for enhancing combat capabilities. The MND hopes to gain needed support from the country's citizens for various projects, in order to accelerate the completion of defense transformation. 90 ###### 04' ----- 91 III. The Quest for a Nationalized Defense Force Article 138 of the Constitution of the Republic of China states that “The land, sea, and air forces of the whole country shall be above personal, regional, and party affi liations, shall be loyal to the state and shall protect the people.” This article is the conceptual foundation for the nationaliza- tion of the military and it accentuates the notion that servicemen should remain neutral and above politics in order to protect the nation. A nationalized military not only eliminates possibilities of military intervention in politics, but is also a solid power behind democratic political developments in the country. After the military is nationalized, national democratization can proceed with stability. Therefore, nationalization of the military is an important indicator of a country's democracy, and is also a goal strived for by the governments of many countries, including Taiwan. With Taiwan's democratization, the public continues to demand nationalization of the military. Therefore, the ROC Armed Forces have undergone self-assessments and formulated measures to make the military nationalized and legalistic, turning it into a force that truly belongs to the nation. To ensure that the military remains politically neutral, which is one of the objectives of nationalizing the military, the MND declared, on September 18, 2002, that active-duty servicemen and cadets can- not participate in activities of political parties or organizations during or outside of work, pursuant to the Constitution of the Republic of China, the National Defense Act, and the Organization Act of the - A nationalized military will act beyond their personal, regional, and political convictions, and serve only the country and its people ----- Ministry of National Defense. On October 23, 2003, it was declared that, starting from November 1, 2003, social events for reserve servicemen cannot be held in military bases and that active military personnel cannot participate in similar activities. On December 15, 2005, it was declared that mili­ tary personnel cannot participate in political activities without permission, and all servicemen within the Armed Forces are asked to fully obey these rules to fulfill their responsibilities of protecting the country and its people. In accordance with the aforementioned regulations and after the following elections: - December 1, 2001 Legislative Yuan and county magistrate and city mayor elections, - January 26, 2002 township mayor and county and city councilors elections, - June 22, 2002 town and village mayor elections, - December 6, 2002 Taipei and Kaohsiung mayor and city councilors elections, - August 1, 2003 Hualien county magistrate by-election, - March 20, 2004 presidential and vice presidential elections, - 2005 county, city, and township magistrates, mayors, councilors elections, the Armed Forces have been widely accepted by society in their concrete demonstrations of loyalty to the country, to the people, and to their responsibilities. In other words, the Armed Forces belong to the nation and the entire population. Most importantly, the ultimate objective for nationalizing the military is to increase the level of military professionalism and attain strong public support for the ROC Armed Forces so that the mili­ tary personnel in each echelon of command can fully devote themselves to combat readiness train­ ing to increase combat efficiency. In order to increase military professionalism, the MND has al­ ready started recruiting professional enlisted personnel to address future warfare demands for high quality manpower. From January 1, 2006, mandatory duty periods were lowered from 18 months to 16 months, so that excess manpower can be released into the domestic job market. Also, the MND will increase the military staff's professional discipline through personnel training and lifelong edu­ cation. In the future, as the military becomes more professionalized, it will also solidify the principle of a nationalized military. 92 ###### 04' ----- 93 ----- ----- ----- ----- 97 ----- 98 I. Military Strategy Development Military strategy is part of the overall national strategy. Military, political, economic, and psy- chological strategies mutually support and enhance each other under the national strategy system in peacetime. In wartime, in order to guarantee the interests and safety of the nation, military strategy needs to convert national resources into defensive power with support and cooperation from politi- cal, economic, and psychological strategies to achieve the national objectives. Therefore, military strategy is an art in guiding the development and application of military power. It can serve as stra- tegic guiding principles for all timeframes, and the basis for all military activities. Military strategy is also the center of national strategy. Its goal is to acquire the maximum probabilities and favorable outcomes in the quest for victory in wartime to support national strategies and achieve national ob- jectives. This is the “development and use of force.” With the relocation of the ROC government to Taiwan in 1949, the military strategy of the ROC Armed Forces transitioned through the following four stages: “offensive posture,” “unity of the offensive and defensive,” “defensive posture,” and “active defense.” Relevant adjustments are summarized as follows: **1. Offensive Posture (1949 to 1969)** Even as the armed forces migrated to Taiwan with the central government, military leadership within the government still endeavored in developing military capabilities hoping to reclaim the Mainland one day. “Preparation for opportunities to reclaim mainland china” based on offensive op- eration had become the strategic guidance for the era. All military preparation efforts were intended for the need to defeat the PLA with the main focus on building amphibious operations, naval, and air offensive capabilities. **2. Unity of the Offensive and Defensive (1969 to 1979)** The PRC usurped the ROC's membership in the United Nations in 1971. The ROC Armed Forces hence adjusted its military strategy from “offensive posture” to a “unity of the offensive and defensive” based on the changing political environments in the Taiwan Strait. The need for defen- sive deployment gradually became the centerpiece of the force buildup efforts and increased accord- ingly on an annual basis. **3. Defensive Posture (1979 to 2002)** On January 1979, the United States changed its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. ###### 05' ----- In response to the changes in national status and international environments, the national construc tion efforts focused on building “a bastion of nation revival” with full speed ahead in economic de velopment to raise the standard of living for our citizens. The ROC Armed Forces adjusted its mili tary strategy again to a “defensive posture” and strived to comprehensively develop a well balanced Army, Navy, and Air Force in accordance with the force buildup schedules. Priorities of force build up efforts based on the order of importance were “air dominance,” “sea dominance” and “counter landing operations.” The intent was to achieve the force buildup goal through effective execution of the “strategic endurance but tactical expeditiousness” guidance. The ROC Armed Forces developed its basic combat capabilities skills in performing effective defensive operations in 1995. The armed forces' strategic concept thus changed to “resolute defense, effective deterrence” in response to the mode of future warfare in Taiwan. The ROC Armed Forces were constructing an effective deterrence military with rapid response capabilities under the guid ance of “elite, compact and robust.” Objectives in air dominance were automatic operational control, and integrated air defense. Objectives in sea dominance were adopting missiles as major shipborne weaponry, command and control automation and conducting 3-dimensional anti-submarine opera tions. Objectives in counter landing operations were mechanization, 3-dimensional operations, elec tronic warfare, and automation. **4. Active Defense Posture (2002 to present)** In 2002, the force buildup policy of the ROC made a strategic turn from passive to active. In accordance with the “all-out defense” policy, the strategic concept was changed from “resolute de fense, effective deterrence” to its “active defense” equivalent of “effective deterrence, resolute de fense.” “Effective deterrence” refers to the building of counter-strike and defensive capabilities with deterring effects, and actively research and develop long-range, precision, deep strike capabilities to effectively disintegrate or stagnate enemy forces or fi repower advancements, so that enemies will forego all military options after rational battle damage and casualty estimation. The armed forces also combined all-out defense power and joint warfi ghting capabilities to fi rmly conduct homeland defense, and to achieve repellence, deterrence, and destruction of enemy forces. The current joint warfighting force buildup efforts are developed under the strategic guidance of “technology ad vancement, information and electronics superiority, joint interception, and homeland defense” with the operational directive of “strategic endurance but tactical expeditiousness.” 99 ----- 100 II. Nature of the Military Strategy As stipulated by the Constitution of the Republic of China, the goal of national defense is the protection of national security and to maintain world peace. The ROC Armed Forces should base on the fundamental objectives of “war prevention,” “homeland defense,” and “counter terrorism and contingency response” and establish the current defense policy considering the development of international environments and our enemy forces. Under the strategic framework of “effective deter- rence, resolute defense,” the ROC Armed Forces should also construct a deterrent force capable of conducting counter-strikes to achieve the goal of “war prevention.” The goal of “homeland defense” and “counter terrorism and contingency response” can be achieved through suitable defensive warf- ighting capabilities. Therefore, continuous RMA reforms and development of high-tech weaponry is an important pathway to support the above mentioned policies and framework. Currently, the armed forces continues to integrate warfi ghting capabilities of individual services and the purchase or development of high-tech weaponry in accordance to the force buildup guidance of “technology advancement, information and electronics superiority, joint interception, and homeland defense” to form a strong defensive power with counter-strike capabilities. Detailed contents are explained as follows: **1. Promulgation of All-Out Defense Concept** Warfare in the future will no longer be limited to military operations between defense forces. Non-military targets are more likely to be the victims of the fi rst waves of attack. In responding to the asymmetric warfare activities, critical topics for defense security affairs include the establish- ment of the all-out defense mobilization mechanism to assure a comprehensive national security and the enhancement of crisis management capabilities. Execution of Taiwan's all-out defense includes measures in both peacetime and wartime. During peacetime, this is done through joint efforts from all levels of the government to complete a comprehensive preparations for manpower, material, and warfi ghting capabilities and accumulate overall warfi ghting capabilities in peacetime in support of regional emergency crises. In wartime, we will combine civilian powers in support of military op- erations and maintain emergency response needs for public agencies and basic living needs for our citizens. In efforts to enhance the principle of all-out defense, the MND has also addressed forward looking considerations for national security and crisis management. In the future, we will actively coordinate with other ministries of the Executive Yuan for the integration efforts. In terms of legal foundations, we will establish comprehensive administrative and military mobilization systems, hop- ing to accumulate adequate peacetime preparations of the overall national resources during peace- ###### 05' ----- contingency response and security maintenance of Taiwan's critical economic infrastructure. We will seek to build a compre hensive readiness and con tingency support system based on the Planning, Programming and Budget ing System (PPBS) within legal restrictions and juris dictional boundaries. 101 time. In time of war or crisis, we can quickly convert and adequately apply the peacetime efforts for timely support thus forming a universal peacetime-wartime all-out defense security mechanism. This is to ensure the continued survival and development of the nation and the lives and properties of its people and a concrete actualization on the principle of an all-out defense. The latest military strategies and operational readiness goals of the ROC Armed Forces are to establish concrete war-prevention capabilities and a clear declaration on the integration of the home- land security network concept and guidance in the future. We plan to establish all-round peacetime disaster relief and anti-terror functional capacities with acquisition of important equipment. Under the presumption of not affecting the armed forces' existing military training and warfighting du- ties, we will set an example of prompt disaster relief and care and protection of the people through high-efficiency responsiveness, grouping ability, mobility, and operability. Under the operational guidance of “strategic endurance but tactical expeditiousness,” we will nullify the PRC's active ar- mament expansion and its military deployment and exercises targeting Taiwan. We will prevent the PRC's attempts from using the three warfares (public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare), terrorist assaults, and military invasions against Taiwan. Gradually, we will establish our deterrence capabilities and determination for all-out defense so that enemies will be less likely to initiate war. **2. Building a Comprehensive Civil-Military Defense Capability** In the early days, military strategies of the ROC Armed Forces focused on military operational readiness planning. However, to address the threat of “unrestricted attack” from the PLA, the ROC Armed Forces will adjust the peacetime readiness and operational contingency measures to be used for disaster (pandemic outbreaks) prevention and response, search and rescue, counter-terrorism and - The jurisdiction of the ROC Armed Forces' in “crisis management” includes counter terrorism attacks ----- 102 actively modernizing its military in recent years and their threat to the national security of Taiwan has shifted from the traditional land-based operation to the development of force deployment in the “6-Dimensional” high-tech warfighting scenarios involving underwater, sea, air, aerospace, electro­ magnetic and network. Also, taken into account in the military exercise is the prevention of external intervention in the Taiwan Strait. Their concept of “winning a campaign in a remote area quickly, and winning the first campaign decisively” is intended to accelerate and enhance the acquisition and deployment of their long-range strike weapon systems for the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery. Through continuous combined arms operational training and joint exercises, the PLA wishes to ac­ cumulate experience and elevate its capacity in joint warfighting. The developments of our defense ability are based on the principle of fusing the civilian and military to strengthen our national defense, protect our country and the people. All of our construc­ tion efforts focus upon national defense. Likewise, all military facilities are intended to protect the civilian way of life. In other words, the buildup efforts have their civilian functions in peacetime, but must deliver their defensive features in wartime. Only by fusing both elements of civilian and the military can we facilitate the true fusion of the people and defense abilities. Under the principle of “preventing war but not be afraid of war, preparing for war but not provoking war,” we currently staged our combat abilities within the civilian population during peacetime to develop an all-out de­ fense capability. In wartime, civilian powers will be quickly mobilized to engage in military combat. This type of military-civilian fusion is precisely the all-out defense concept that we are actively pro­ moting today and the major factor in protecting our national security and providing stability in the Taiwan Strait. **3. Perfecting Crisis Management Mechanisms to Sustain Government Operations** Categories of the ROC Armed Forces' “crisis management” operations include the “military crisis,” domestic terrorist attacks and support operations for various types of disasters. Therefore, the MND will continue its cooperation with the national crisis prevention and response mechanisms in accordance with the “security on all fronts” principle. The MND will also be perfecting the crisis prevention and crisis management mechanism based on “national security policy,” and establishing defensive powers to counter “asymmetric” threats. Moreover, it will underscore close military-civil­ ian cooperation with a pragmatic attitude and assist the government in utilizing the organizational powers of all-out mobilization. Furthermore, to refine crisis managemant mechanisms, the MND plans to establish an integrated national crisis managemant center covering the three areas, such as “disaster prevention,” “counter-terrorism and contingency response,” and “mobilization readiness,” to address the various dangers and ensure homeland security. The spectrum of war and the development of high-tech weapon systems resulted in the pos­ ###### 05' ----- eration missions. preparation efforts to accomplish defensive operations. **4. Active Research and Development in Defense Technologies** framework of “effective deterrence and resolute defense” and under the directives of “technology advancement, information and electronics superi- **of “Five No's” policy: “No Develop-** ority, joint interception, and homeland defense.” **ment, No Production, No Acquisition,** With information and electronic warfare, missile defense systems and joint interception capabil ity as the top priority, the ROC Armed Forces needs. 103 tions” or adopts terrorist tactics derived from “unrestricted warfare,” crisis management and control will become even more challenging. Therefore, when enemies demonstrate clear hostile intentions, or exhibit behaviors clearly indicative of invasion, the MND will immediately analyze the enemy situation and issue preparatory orders for upgrade of the defense readiness condition (DEFCON) and preliminary combat directives in response to enemy threats. The National Security Council (NSC) will subsequently be convened according to legal procedures and then the resolutions from the NSC To address possible “conventional and unconventional,” “linear and nonlinear,” “symmetric and asymmetric” enemy measures to launch sudden attacks against Taiwan, the ROC Armed Forces have completed relevant operational readiness stage adjustments. We have clearly devised rules of sions. We take a “prudent to fi ght from beginning to end” approach and a “no war unless absolutely necessary” principle to devise operational readiness directives and diligently complete all combat In response to the developing threats, the ROC Armed Forces focuses its force buildup ef- forts with an emphasis on “enhancing overall joint operation capabilities” based on the strategic ### The ROC stands by its commitment **of “Five No's” policy: “No Develop-** **ment, No Production, No Acquisition,** **No Stockpile and No Deployment” re-** **garding Nuclear, Biological and Chemical** **(NBC) weapons.** are aggressively constructing a highly effective modern military force to fulfi ll the overall defense In terms of defense technology research and development, the ROC Armed Forces will con- tinue efforts in utilizing our experience and technology capacity in research and development of erational requirements of the armed forces and enhance the overall warfi ghting capabilities. At the same time, we will establish logistic systems and autonomous capacities in manufacturing certain ----- 104 key components, and secure key technologies to achieve the goal of defense autonomy. In terms of development of dual use technology, we will cooperate with the Executive Yuan's “Industrial Innovative Research and Development Center Initiative” to improve channels of infor­ mation exchange between defense technologies and the private sector and thus accelerate joint mili­ tary and civilian research and development cooperation programs. In terms of research and development for future weapon systems, we will focus on systematic and critical research and development of (in order of priority) information and electronic warfare, joint air defense, joint interception, and homeland defense. We will combine technology capacities from the private sector to achieve breakthroughs in bottlenecks for key technologies. **5. Developing Regional Military Security Cooperation** Taiwan plays an important role in the Asia-Pacific region due to its geographical location and the common value of democracy, freedom and human rights. The PLA's military expansion is a common concern for all Asia-Pacific nations, and Taiwan stands on the front line to counter its threat. The military developments of the PLA in recent years are gearing toward the invasion of Taiwan, and the danger endured by Taiwan is also the threat to Asia-Pacific stability. Therefore, the ROC's national defense policy focuses on promoting military diplomacy and reinforcing participa­ tion in regional security and cooperation. To expand regional military security cooperation, Taiwan will focus on enhancing strategic dia­ logue and security cooperation with nations that share common strategic interests. In the long run, we will strive to integrate regional powers to aid in the establishment of Confidence Building Mea­ sures (CBM) over the Taiwan Strait. In collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policy of “Comprehensive Diplomacy,” we shall also continue to promote exchange and cooperation with other nations' militaries to increase our international exposure and attain strategic military alliances so as to broaden our military intelligence warning channels, prevent conflicts and minimize out­ breaks of war. In order that a steady relationship of exchange and cooperation may continue to develop be­ tween our nation and other nation's militaries, and that the efficacy of cooperation for the parties involved may be enhanced, the MND shall gradually increase the level of exchange and enlarge the scope of cooperation through visits, inspections, seminars and other means. Based on a foundation of “mutual trust and benefit,” the MND shall continue to integrate alliance strengths in the future, use relevant mechanisms as platforms for future security cooperation, establish standardized strate­ gic dialogue and channels of security cooperation, and jointly solidify regional security and stability. ###### 05' ----- 105 ----- ----- 107 ----- |The M|inister| |---|---| |The Deputy M|inister (Policy)| |---|---| |Intern|al Units| |---|---| |Subordinate (Institut|Agencies ions)| |---|---| 108 I. Refi ning Defense Organization Since the promulgation of the Two Defense Acts on March 1[st], 2002 (Refer to Appendix 6-1, Legislation and Amendments of the Two Defense Acts), a system of “civilian control of the mili- tary” and “consolidation of military policy and command branches” has been established within the defense organization of the ROC. A vital element to a democratic state, this system fully delivers the effi ciency required for military professionalism and division of labors among the policy, armament and command branches. It's been over three years since the initial operation of this new system in February, 2003. After reviewing and examining the execution results, the MND realizes that the de- fense organization still requires further streamlining and adjustments to achieve the transformation goal. Therefore, further merging of organizations/units with similar functions is deemed necessary. Under the presumption of professionalism and functional integration, the organization reengineering efforts are gearing toward the guidance of the Policy Branch supporting the operations of the Com- mand and Armament Branch, the Command Branch planning for joint operations requirements and perform force control while the Armament Branch supports the demands of the Policy Branch and Command Branch to build a defense organization with “uniformity between authorities and respon- sibilities” and “professionalism and division of labors.” **1. Policy Branch** The Minister The responsibilities of the Policy Branch include planning and recommen- The Deputy Minister (Policy) dation of defense policy, planning and Subordinate Agencies execution of military strategies, budgeting Internal Units (Institutions) and execution of the defense budget, force Department of Strategic Planning Army Command Department of Manpower Navy Command buildup and development, planning and Department of Resources Air Force Command Department of Military Justice Combined Logistics Command execution of defense resources and man- Department of Legal Affairs Reserve Command power, defense laws and regulations, mili- Department of Reserve Affairs Military Police Command Executive Office of the Minister General Political Warfare Bureau tary laws and legal services, political war- Office of Integrated Assessment Comptroller Bureau Integrated Assessment Office Medical Affairs Bureau fare, reserve affairs, force integration and Office of Military History and Other Defense Agencies Translation (including military academies, Personnel Office military courthouses, prosecutor's evaluation, military history and translation, offices and military prisons) Accounting Office defense education and the supervision, Petitions and Appeals Committee Military Personnel Rights Committee planning and execution of other related de- fense affairs. - Figure 6-1 Organization of the Policy Branch Current internal units include Department ###### 06' ----- prisons). (Refer to Figure 6-1, Organization of the Policy Branch) **2. Command Branch** |The M|inister| |---|---| function of the Command Branch |The Chi Gener|ef of the al Staff| |---|---| the Minister of National Defense |Intern|al Units| |---|---| |Subordinate and/or|Institutions Forces| |---|---| for joint operations. Its missions Staff for Personnel and preparedness requirements, Staff for Logistics recommending allocation of de- Staff for Communications Information `，Electronics and` fense resources, supervising ef- General Affairs Office forts in combat readiness, force 6-2, Organization of the Command Branch) 109 of Strategic Planning, Department of Manpower, Department of Resources, Department of Military Justice, (Department of Legal Affairs,) Department of Reserve Affairs, Executive Offi ce of the Min- ister, Integrated Assessments Offi ce, Inspection Offi ce, Offi ce of Military History and Translation, Personnel Offi ce, Accounting Offi ce, Petitions and Appeals Committee, and the Military Personnel Rights Committee. Subordinate agencies/institutions include Army Command, Navy Command, Air Force Command, Combined Logistics Command, Reserve Command, Military Police Command, General Political Warfare Bureau, Comptroller Bureau, Medical Affairs Bureau, and other defense agencies, etc. (including military academies, military courthouses, prosecutor's offi ces and military The Minister The Chief of the General Staff Subordinate Institutions Internal Units and/or Forces Joint Operations Training and Military Intelligence Bureau Doctrine Office Communications Development Office Office of the Deputy Chief of the General Missile Command Staff for Personnel Joint Information Operation Command Office of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Intelligence General Service Command Office of the Deputy Chief of the General Tzuhu and Dasi Cemetery Management Staff for Operations and Planning Division Office of the Deputy Chief of the General Defense Language Institute Staff for Logistics Office of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Communications，Electronics and Information General Affairs Office - Figure 6-2 Organization of the Command Branch training, regulating order of battle, directing and executing operations planning and other force com- mand matters and transforming to joint operations command mechanism in times of war. Internal units include the Joint Operations, Training and Doctrine Offi ce, Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Personnel, Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Intel- ligence, Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations and Planning, Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Logistics, Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Communications, Electronics and Information and the Offi ce of General Affairs. Subordinate agen- cies/institutions/forces include Military Intelligence Bureau, Communications Development Offi ce, Missile Command, Information and Electronic Warfare Command, General Service Command, Tzuhu and Dasi Cemetery Management Division and Defense Language Institute. (Refer to Figure ----- |The Deputy Min|ister (Armament)| |---|---| |Armamen|ts Bureau| |---|---| |Intern|al Units| |---|---| |Auxili|aries| |---|---| 110 **3. Armament Branch** Under the supervision of the Deputy Minister for Armament, the mission of the Armament ``` 圖6-2軍令部門調整後之組織系統 ``` Branch is to act as the armament staff for the Minister of National Defense. Its missions include the planning and recommendation The Minister of the following: management of The Deputy Minister (Armament) weapons systems acquisition pol- Armaments Bureau icy, defense technology industrial cooperation and development, Internal Units Auxiliaries military-civilian transferable Program Evaluation Division Chung Shan Institute of Technology and Industry Division Science and Technology technology interchange, arma- Procurement Center Procurement Management Division Construction and Facilities ments collaboration and coopera- Acquisition Management Division Center Construction and Facilities Division Materiel Production and tion, integrated logistics support, Management Information Office Manufacturing Center General Administration Office Specifications Evaluation and military construction procure- Testing Center Comptroller Office ments and properties manage- ment, etc. The Armament Branch - Figure 6-3 Organization of the Armament Branch provides decision, consultation and review regarding armament matters to support the demands and requirements of the Policy and Command branches. The main body of the Armament Branch will be the Armaments Bureau with internal units of Program Evaluation Division, Technology and Industry Division, Acquisition Management Divi- sion, Construction and Facilities Division, Management Information Division, General Administra- tion Offi ce, and Comptroller Offi ce. Auxiliary institutions include the Chung Shan Institute of Sci- ence and Technology, Procurement Center, Construction and Facilities Center, Materiel Production and Manufacturing Center and Specifi cation Evaluation and Testing Center. (Refer to Figure 6-3, Organization of the Armament Branch) II. Readjusting Force Structure Military strategy, military buildup and combat readiness planning of the ROC Armed Forces are continuous adjustment and realignment efforts. Evolving synchronously with the progress in time and revising accordingly with changes in military thinking and strategy, the plan to construct a desired force structure, weaponry and equipment has been properly executed in accordance with the “Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.” However, actual combat capabilities can not ###### 06' ----- be realized instantly due to the lingering of process and scheduling in defense budgeting, doctrine, training and education, combat readiness and acquisition. Thus measures taken by the ROC Armed Forces in areas of military thinking, organization structure, personnel quality, training and education, equipment acquisition and operations and training readiness must be innovative and fl exible enough to adapt to the changes in the overall environment. Based on the planning of Phase II, Jingjin Program, the force restructure planning efforts must integrate with the specific operational requirements of the Island's geological environment. Each service is to maintain the existing combined arms brigade, flotilla and combatant wing baseline structure. Command hierarchies were adjusted through merging or deactivation of units based on mission, functionalities and responsibilities. Non-military tasks were eliminated to dedicate troops to combat and training missions. Priority is on the fulfi llment of combat units personnel needs while administrative tasks must be carried out using minimum manpower. Service headquarters are no longer in charge of commanding combat responsibilities. The organizational structure of individual service headquarters was reexamined and simplifi ed to fl atten the command and operational hierar chy. In March 2006, based on the regulation of the Two Defense Acts, Service General Headquar ters have been adjusted to Service Commands in charge of force development, training, manpower, readiness and logistics. Further adjustments have also been tailored in the logistics system, political warfare organization, military academies and military legal system. Adjustments for individual ser vices and major systems are stated as follows: **1. Army** Stationed near and safeguarding key locations in Taiwan and islets, the peacetime mission of the Army is focused on the formation of basic combat capabilities and readiness for contingency operations including protection of critical infrastructure bases, facilities and depots, supporting anti terrorism operations and supporting major disaster relief efforts in their area of responsibility (AOR). In wartime, the Army will be a component of the joint operations effort teaming with the Navy and the Air Force in defeating invading forces and ensuring the security of the nation. Based on its mission, the goal to build a “digitized, three-dimensional and mechanized” army is achieved through streamlining high level commands, simplifi cation of command hierarchy, inte gration of doctrine and training systems and integrated logistics support. Furthermore, assessment of the organization of staff units, force structure and the doctrine and logistics system has been conducted on continuous bases to strengthening the effi ciency and effectiveness in overall combat capabilities. The direction for transformation and development is toward special and joint operations aiming to build a professional force capable of conducting disaster relief in peacetime and military operations in time of war. 111 ----- |Intern|al Units| |---|---| |Ar Comm|my and X3| |---|---| |Def Comm|ense and X4| |---|---| |Aviatio Special Com|n and Forces mand| |---|---| |Educa Trainin Doct Comm|tion, g and rine and| |---|---| |Subordina|te Units| |---|---| 112 Army Command Headquarters Education, Aviation and Army Defense Training and Subordinate Units Internal Units Special Forces Command X3 Command X4 Doctrine Command Command Director of Political Combined Arms Area command X5 Special Operations Test and Evalu- Military Academy Warfare Office Brigade X7 Brigade ation Center X2 Garrison X10 Amy Faculty School Inspection Office Area command X2 Aviation Brigade X2 Artillery Train- General Service ing Center Personnel and Gen- Aviation and Training Command eral Affairs Division Command Combat Support Missile Electro- Testing Center Military Intelligence Army Aviation Depot optical Base Depot Division Combat School Combat Training Combat Support Division School Logistics Division Planning Division Comptroller Division Chemical Engineer Division Military Engineer Division Communications, Electronics and Infor- mation Division - Figure 6-4 Adjusted Organization of the Army Aviation and Training CommandAt the end of the force restructuring efforts, the Army commands will include the following units: Corp Command (3), Defense Command (4), Aviation and Special Force Command, Educa­ tion, Training and Doctrine Development Command and direct subordinate units. (Refer to Figure 6-4, Adjusted Organization of the Army) **2. Navy** Navy's peacetime operations calls for continuous strengthening of combat readiness, refining operational training, conducting maritime patrols in Taiwan Strait, ensuring the security of sovereign waters and timely support of major disaster relief efforts. In war time, Navy will conduct counter­ strike operations with the joint forces and deter any enemy maritime blockade or military invasion in an effort to secure the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) around the nation and in turn, our national security. To achieve the goal of building a highly effective elite force capable of performing fast deploy­ ment and long range strike, the organizational restructuring of the Navy is conducted through study and formation of staff units and methods of force restructuring. This is to achieve the planning goals of force construction, deployment support, restructuring and full transformation of the Navy. At the end of the force restructuring efforts, Navy units will include Fleet Command, Marine Corps Command, Education, Training and Doctrine Development Command and several direct sub­ ###### 06' ----- |Interna|l Units| |---|---| |Naval Com|Fleet mand| |---|---| |Marine Com|Corps mand| |---|---| |Educatio and D Com|n, Training octrine mand| |---|---| |Subordi|nate Units| |---|---| |Intern|al Units| |---|---| |Air Op Com|eration mand| |---|---| |Air D Artillery|efense Command| |---|---| |Edu Train Doctrine|cation, ing and Command| |---|---| |Subordi|nate Units| |---|---| 113 Navy Command Headquarters Education, Training Naval Fleet Marine Corps Internal Units and Doctrine Subordinate Units Command Command Command Director of Political Flotilla X6 Marine Corps Naval Technical Logistics Support Warfare Office Brigade X3 Command X4 Squadron X2 School Inspection Office Wuciou Defense Combat Systems Command X5 Recruit Training Group Depot Personnel and Gen- Group X2 Center eral Affairs Division Group X3 Naval Academy Marine Corps School Military Intelligence Armed Forces Joint Shipbuilding Deve- Division Training Base lopment Center Command Combat Readiness Navy Meteorological Training Division Oceanographic Office Logistics Division Communication Systems Command Planning Division General Service Combat System Command Division Image Intelligence Comptroller Division Team - Figure 6-5 Adjusted Organization of the Navy ordinate units. (Refer to Figure 6-5, Adjusted Organization of the Navy) **3. Air Force** Air Force peacetime missions including patrolling and securing the national airspace, enhanc- ing operational readiness and force training efforts in strengthening combat capabilities and combat Air Force Command Headquarters Education, Air Operation Air Defense Internal Units Training and Subordinate Units Command Artillery Command Doctrine Command Director of Political Warfare Office Communications, Air District Command Testing, Evaluation Combatant Wing X7 traffic Control and Command X3 and Tactical Resear- Inspection Office Information Wing ch Center Song Shan Air Force Air Defense Artillery Base Command Personnel and Gen- Tactical Air Control Training Centre Base Training eral Affairs Division Wing Command Logistics Command Air Defense Missile X2 Military Intelligence Weather Wing Group X2 Tactical Training Division Center Air Force Academy Combat Readiness Air Force Institute of Training Division Technology Logistics Division Planning Division Communications, Electronics and Infor- mation Division Comptroller Division - Figure 6-6 Adjusted Organization of the Air Force ----- of the integrated logistics system and systems for military buildup and ap­ |Internal U|nits| |---|---| |Subordi|nate Units| |---|---| integrate, merge and streamline the 114 readiness. Air Force also provides timely support to various major disaster relief efforts. During wartime, the Air Force will endeavor in seizing air superiority and coordinate with the Army and the Navy to execute various joint operations. By effectively unleashing its full combat capabilities, the Air Force shall defeat the invading enemy and ensure the security of the homeland. To achieve the goal of building a military service capable of conducting early warning, enemy assault prevention and long range precision strike, the organizational restructuring effort of the Air Force concentrates on fulfilling warfighting capabilities of the fighter wings while ensuring the op­ erations and safety of combat support missions to achieve the overall planning, design and officer/ solder ratio of the Jingjin Program. At the completion of the force restructuring, the Air Force will consists of operation Air Com­ mand, Air Defense Artillery Command, Education, Training and Doctrine Development Command and subordinate units.(Refer to Figure 6-6, Adjusted Organization of the Air Force) **4. Combined Logistics Command** The Combined Logistics Command is responsible for the general logistics support to all levels of the ROC Armed Forces including generic supplies, fuel, munitions, ground equipment mainte­ nance, transportation, and medical supplies; also included is the supply and distribution of spare parts for service specific equipments. Its mission also calls for timely support for major disasters relief. To build a force capable of enterprise management, proactive services, IT-driven operations, the force restructuring efforts of the Combined Logistics Command shall be based on the strengthening Combined Logistics Command Internal Units Subordinate Units Director of Political Warfare Office District Support Command X7 Inspection Office Logistics School Personnel and General Affairs Division Military Maintenance Center Logistics Planning Division Base service depot X3 Logistics Management Division General Accessory Warehouse Comptroller Division General Storage Warehouse Communications, Electronics and Image Database Information Division Service Battalions Procurement Division Military Intelligence Division Supply division Maintenance division Transportation division Ammunition Division Medical Affairs Division operations. - Figure 6-7 Adjusted Organization of the Combined Logistics Command ###### 06' ----- tics Command) **5. Reserve Command** hills and mountains. troop formations will also be restructured. serve Mobilization School. (Refer to Figure 6-8, Adjusted Organization of the Reserve Command) |Internal|Units| |---|---| |Subor|dinate units| |---|---| **6. Military Police Command** enforcement missions. They assist in Division Dispensary maintaining public security, adequate- Military Personnel Recruitment Division ly support regional disaster prevention 115 At the end of the force restructuring efforts, the Combined Logistics Command will maintain regional support command (7), Logistics School, Ordnance Readiness and Development Center, ser- vice depot (3), Reception and Storage General Depot, Spare-Parts General Depot, Map Depot and General Service Battalion, etc. (Refer to Figure 6-7, Adjusted Organization of the Combined Logis- Peacetime missions of the reserves include handling level 1 training missions for new recruits and mobilization preparations. In wartime, the reserves are charged with defending the fi rst line of defense along the coastlines, urban areas and depth of defense of all area command and outposts on To build a reserve force capable of conducting “timely, on-site mobilization and combat,” the organizational restructuring will be carried out under the directive of “regular for strike and reserves for secure.” The Reserve Command will be responsible for reserve mobilization, training, recruit- ment, and retaining missions. Organizational and military structural adjustments will focus on em- ploying separate mobilization for coastal defense troops. All headquarter staff agencies and reserve After restructuring, there will be District Reserve Command (3), County (City) Reserve Com- mand (21), recruit brigade for coastal defense (7), urban defense brigade (21), reserve troops train- ing center (3), reinforcement battalion (4), coastal defense battalion (9), reserve service centers, headquarters company (2), Communications Operations company, medical dispensary and the Re- Reserve Command Internal Units Subordinate units Director of Political Warfare Office District Reserve Command X3 Inspection Office County (City) Reserve Command X21 Personnel and General Affairs Division Coastal Defense and Recruit Training Brigade X7 Combat Readiness Training Division Urban Defense Brigade X21 Mobilization Management Division Reserve Troops Training Center X3 Logistics Division Reinforcement Battalion X4 Logistical Service Division Coastal Defense Battalion X9 Communications, Electronics and Information Division Reserve Service Center X2 Comptroller Division Headquarters Company Rear Echelon Administration Service Communications Company Division Dispensary Military Intelligence Division Reserve Mobilization School Military Personnel Recruitment Division - Figure 6-8 Adjusted Organization of the Reserve Command ----- |Internal|Units| |---|---| |Subord|inate units| |---|---| |Internal|Units| |---|---| |Subordi|nate Units| |---|---| 116 ity and national security. Military Police Command The goal of the force recon­ struction of the Military Police Internal Units Subordinate units Command is to build a force capa­ ble of garrison and specialized mis­ Director of Political Warfare District Command X4 sions, maintain military discipline, Office Regional Military Police X22 Inspection Office Military Police battalion X28 and support military operations. Personnel and General Affairs Division Headquarters Company X10 Considering factors such as enemy Military Police School Intelligence DivisionOperations Division threat and military buildup re­ Logistics Division sources, etc, the restructuring efforts Planning Division Communications and Infor- will focus on missions of military mation Division Comptroller Division police in the capital of Taipei and individual area commands based on the RMA principles. The goal is - Figure 6-9 Adjusted Organization of the Military Police Command to build a multi-functional military police force capable of anti-air assault, anti-kidnapping, anti-sabotage, anti-terrorism, urban warfare, intelligence gathering, and forensic investigation capabilities by 2008 in conjunction with a reduc­ tion in force and enhancement in combat capabilities. After restructuring, the Military Police Command will consist of 4 Commands, 22 Regional Military Police units, 28 Military Police battalions, 6 direct military police companies and the Mili­ tary Police School. (Refer to Figure 6-9, Adjusted Organization of the Military Police Command) **7. Missile Command** Missile Command Under the unified command of the ROC Joint Operation Command Cen­ ter (JOCC), the Missile Command will Internal Units Subordinate Units utilize its combat capabilities to secure strategically favorable timing and posi­ Political Warfare General Admini- Service Company stration SectionPersonnel Section Missile Group(Missile Squadron X3) tions and create advantageous postures Intelligence Section Logistics Section for the defense and security of Taiwan Missile Maintenance Section Communications, Electronics and and the offshore islands. Information Section General Administration Section The goal of the force buildup Military Discipline and Ethics Section Security Section efforts is to construct a missile force capable of joint missile defense and - Figure 6-10 Adjusted Organization of the Missile Command joint interception missions. The orga­ ###### 06' ----- |Internal|Units| |---|---| |Political Warfare General Adminis- tration Section Comptroller Section General Information and Electroni- cs Section System Acquisition Section Logistical Support Section Information Operations Section Electronic Operations Section Network Management Section|| |Subord|inate Units| |---|---| |Information and Electronics Oper- ations Group X3 Information Warfare Group ElectronicWarfare Group Joint Command and Control System Training Center Support Squadron|| 117 nizational restructuring will focus on completing the command transformation and reassignment of subordinate units without any gaps in combat capabilities or jeopardizing in mission continuity. After restructuring, the Missile Command's air defense missile forces will be reassigned to the Air Force's Air Defense Artillery Command. The Hsiung-Feng group will be reassigned under the Navy, and the Missile Command will be directed under the General Staff, where they will continue developing special missile combat capabilities. (Refer to Figure 6-10, Adjusted Organization of the Missile Command) **8. Information and Electronic Warfare Command** The peacetime missions for the Information and Electronic Warfare Command includes securi- ty protection and monitoring for command and control systems, all-weather, comprehensive, highly effective, high quality and highly reliable communications, information support missions and timely support of major regional disaster prevention and response missions. In wartime, the Information and Electronic Warfare Command will conduct effective electronic warfare support and protection to prevent enemy infi ltration, sabotage, lockdowns, or espionage of our networks. Missions also in- cludes pursuit of information and electronic superiority and integration into the major combat forces in support of the overall mission. The goal of the force reconstruction efforts is to build a force capable of conducting leading basic infrastructure, advanced command, control and information systems with fl exible information and electronic warfare capabilities. The organizational adjustments will focus on building profes- sional electronic and information warfare forces in coordination with the overall force transforma- tion to enhance command and control effi ciency. To fulfi ll the MND's information warfare guide- lines for “put priority on protective measures; fast response for domi- Joint Information Operation Command nance,” the Information and Elec- tronics Command will employ active Internal Units Subordinate Units monitoring and aggressive defense Political Warfare General Adminis- Information and Electronics Oper- measures to vigorously develop early tration Section ations Group X3 Comptroller Section Information Warfare Group warning and response capabilities for General Information and Electroni- ElectronicWarfare Group cs Section Joint Command and Control defending communications and infor- System Acquisition Section System Training Center Logistical Support Section Support Squadron mation security. In consideration of Information Operations Section Electronic Operations Section the style of future warfare and joint Network Management Section operations requirements, MND will continue improving digital communi- - Figure 6-11 Adjusted Organization of the Information and Electronic Warfare Command cations, command, and control plat- ----- forms, and pushing for electronic warfare readiness. The Information and Electronics Command will manage the electromagnetic spectrum effectively according to the guidance of the Overall Planning for Military Electronic Warfare Capability of the ROC Armed Forces with a goal to establish both After restructuring, the Electronic Warfare Command will integrate its traditional communica­ tions capacity with the Army's area commands, and incorporate the electronic warfare battalion from the Army, forming three information and electronic operations divisions, information warfare divi­ sions, electronic warfare division, joint command and control training center, and support squadrons. (Refer to Figure 6-11, Adjusted Organization of the Information and Electronic Warfare Command) The Combined Logistics Command will centralize all logistics responsibilities and functions from the logistics commands of the three individual services. The Combined Logistics Command will be in charge of handling generic logistics supply, maintenance, readiness support and resource coordination for the armed forces and assume responsibility for the Armed Forces' equipment main­ tenance, spare parts and accessory supply and allocation. All military services will maintain a single logistical staff agency handling the supervision, coordination, and control and management of spe­ To improve the logistics command and control mechanism and integrating support functions, the Combined Logistics Command will establish a comprehensive chain of command for logistics from the MND, area commands, fleet commands, air operation command, combined arms brigades The General Political Warfare Bureau will be adjusted to the Political Warfare Bureau ac­ cording to the amendment schedule of the draft Organization Act of the General Political Warfare Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense. In the meantime, the security department within the General Political Warfare Bureau will be reassigned to various levels within the intelligence system according to principles of streamlining organizations with overlapping responsibilities and similar functions. The Military Dependants Service Division will be reassigned to the Armaments Bureau based on Phase II of the Jingjin program and according to the schedule and progress of the military Units and functions will be removed from the political system including the non-staple food supply service which will be reassigned from the General Benefits Division to the Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff for Logistics and benefit affairs will be managed by trust funds due to the needs of 118 offensive and defensive electronic warfare capabilities. **9. Major System Restructuring** **(1) Logistics System** cialized and force logistics pertaining to each individual services. to the battalions based on the joint operations command mechanism. **(2) Political Warfare System** dependants service reforms. ###### 06' ----- our troops, veteran and their dependents. The Military Dependent Service Divisions with the MND and individual services will cease to function according to the phase 2 of the Jingjin program sched ule. Part of the personnel from the Military Dependent Service Division will be reassigned to the General Political Warfare Administration Division to continue providing services for military depen dents. Enhancements of the political warfare functions will be executed mainly in the area commands. MND will maintain routine civil bulletins through local governments and the private sector, and in tegrate political warfare capacities within the area commands to support military missions. Two ad ditional tactical psychological warfare squadrons will be installed and utilized in various area com mands; the two units will assist in effectively countering the public opinion, psychological and legal warfare from the PRC. After restructuring, political warfare missions will focus on psychological warfare, publica tions, and serving our citizens externally while enhancing psychological counseling, psychological warfare training, military news and nurturing mental combat capabilities for military personnel. The goal is to strengthen ourselves and overcome the enemy. **(3) Military Academy Systems** Through the principles of “concentrating education resources, integrating elite instructors, streamlining academic (administrative) hierarchies, streamlining operating procedures, and improv ing instructional content,” the MND will consider the development of military education, utilize integration and share instructors and education resources to create a positive education environment. MND will analyze the nature of the basic, advanced and higher level education classes, assess the organizational functions and educational goals of military academies to execute the merging of the military academies. The Fu Hsing Kang College will be consolidated into the National Defense University. Undergraduate, masters and doctorate programs within the Chung Cheng Institute of Technology, National Defense Management College, and the Fu Hsing Kang College will be consol idated into professional research and military academies. The National Defense Medical Center will be restored as an independent academy and be directly under the command of the Defense Medical Affairs Bureau. The goal is to develop professional leadership personnel in fi elds of command staff, strategy, tactics, defense management, technology, medicine, and sociology, etc. The Military Education Regulations will be amended accordingly with the adjustments of mili tary academies in the northern region. Existing preparatory schools and military academies will be included in the amendments of the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense for legisla tive purpose. **(4) Military Legal Systems and Prisons** The institution of the current military courts, prosecutor's offi ce of the military courts and mili 119 ----- 120 tary prisons are based on the Military Justice Law, which is incompatible with Organization Act of the Central Government Agencies. Therefore, military courts are planned to be adjusted into a two level system consists of regional and high courts in conjunction with the reform of the judicial system. The Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense and Military Justice Law will be amended at the same time to provide judicial bases for all levels of military prosecutor's offi ces and correctional agencies. III. Reshaping Organization Culture The purpose of reshaping the organization culture is to cultivate a common understanding and recognition of core values among all military personnel through consensus and vision building. The expected result is to effectively achieve the defense goals through this joint effort. In recent years, the Armed Forces have been actively pushing for organizational re-engineering, with major reforms in troop formation, new weapon systems acquisitions and the establishment of joint operation con- cepts, making this the optimum time for reshaping the military culture of the ROC Armed Forces. The core values and beliefs of the ROC Armed Forces are founded on the principles of duty, honor and country. The common goal of the organization is to “fi ght for protecting the security of the na- tion and the well-being of the people” and “fi ght for ensuring the survival, development of the na- tion, democracy, freedom and human rights.” To integrate the trends and changes of the modern so- ciety and the directions for current organizational reengineering and developments, the ROC Armed Forces will continue advancing the traditions of unity, discipline, and obedience. The ROC Armed Forces will also endeavor to promote “people-centric” and “knowledge-driven” as the central values of the organizational culture reshaping efforts, so that the Armed Forces can reform into an innova- tive, responsive, caring, open, professional, and effective modern military to respond to the chal- lenges of this era. **1. People-Centric** Building a modern professional military requires excellent military technology and effective management, elite defense personnel and innovative operational concepts. More importantly, the military should apply the people-centric core value in the policy planning and execution of train- ing, exercises, combat readiness and garrison management to harness cooperation, enhance morale among our troops and enhance psychological power. The goal is to develop professional and ethical military personnel. ###### 06' ----- 121 - A people-centric organizational culture will shape the ROC Armed Forces into a highly capable, professional but ethical modern military. A humanitarian organization bases its beliefs in the kindness, potential, rationality and freedom of will in each and every individual. It challenges group members to rethink personal values and ideas through care and respect from instinct. It encourages team members to incorporate organiza- tional, team and personal objectives and encourages autonomous innovation and contribution and jointly achieves organizational visions and objectives. Military life style centers on group activities; the leadership style of the organization needs to be based on the caring human spirit and to analyze the vertical and horizontal interconnections among group members and external entities through humanistic, psychological, and social perspec- tives. This will facilitate the pursuit of organizational visions, enhance group cooperation and orga- nizational management effi ciency. For example, when a commander truly cares about his/her troops and their families, the subordinates tend to value their relationship with the organization. When commanders listen to the voices of his/her subordinates, they will also become more loyal to their units. Caring and respectful agencies will have staffs that will compensate the unit with high work commitments. Armed forces that interact earnestly with external societies will also help to maintain positive military-civilian interactions and trust. Summarily, leadership based on the humanistic spirit will help enhance the loyalty of the subordinates towards their superiors, troop's loyalty towards their units, and harnessing comradeship to create a more cooperative and trustworthy organizational ----- In recent years, the Armed Forces have taken concrete humanistic measures in troops manage­ **(1) Protecting the legal rights of military personnel** The enactment of the Armed Forces Garrison Internal Management Regulations provides lead­ ership in basic units with a reference and rules of basic management procedures. We will continue implementing the functions of the Complaint System for Military Personnel and Military Personnel Rights Committee, and protect officers' and soldiers' rights through active measures. (Refer to 6-2, Implementation Status and Results of the Military Complaint System and Appendix 6-3, Adminis­ trative Implementation Status and Results of the MND Military Personnel Rights Committee) To promote the concept of mental well being, we will assist officers and soldiers in adapting to military life, resolve psychological problems and prevent incidents of self-inflicting wounds or suicides. The MND set up seven Regional Mental Health Centers in northern, central, and southern Taiwan, and Huadong, Kinmen, Matzu, and Penghu. We will actively pursue comprehensive tri-lev­ el prevention and treatment systems and regional assistance networks to encourage healthy mental **(3)Continue the “Three Assurance” Policy** The MND will continue executing its “Three Assurances” policy (assure safety for the soldiers, assure a steady life for the servicemen, and assure better living standards for military dependents) as major defense initiatives. We hope to increase morale and win approval from military dependents and our citizens through humanistic force management, maintaining military discipline and safety and the rights of military personnel, and continue enhancing our communications with and care for In the era of information technology and globalization, knowledge-based organizational man­ agement becomes the key factor for organizations utilizing non-physical assets to secure competi­ tive advantages. The methods and styles of warfare in the information age also endure such impacts, creating new demands of different kinds of warfare and military management. At this junction of change, the Armed Forces need to establish an organizational culture and environmental conditions favorable for creating innovation, integration, application, learning, and knowledge sharing among group members, so that organizations can create and utilize the innovation, revolution, and adapta­ tion capabilities of its members to respond to the rapid changing environment. Simultaneously, we will improve the Armed Forces' management efficiency in planning, decision-making, execution, 122 culture. ment, including: **(2)Promote mental health concept** developments among our troops. our military families. **2. Knowledge-Driven** ###### 06' ----- and supervision of military readiness through emphasis and application of knowledge as a key aiding force for military reforms. The mission characteristics and organizational functions of the ROC Armed Forces emphasize hierarchical restraints and authority in command and control and also require obedi ence and thorough execution of or ders, regulations and disciplines. To avoid inefficient learning and rigid thinking in personnel due to this rou tine-based and authoritarian hierar chical characteristic, the ROC Armed Forces need to focus on organization and knowledge-based management functions. We need to enhance the ef ficiency of military innovations and applied knowledge through reshap ing organizational culture in order to cultivate the fl exibility needed when facing environmental changes. Con crete measures include: **(1) Establish organizational** **knowledge databases and** **knowledge sharing platforms** To actualize knowledge-based management in the military, we will emphasize developing innovations in areas such as planning, decision making, execution, and supervision, systematically analyze the timeli ness and practicability of existing practices and concepts, and prevent 123 ### Summary of tri-level prevention and treatment **for psychological well being (assistance)** **Psychological consultation assistance provided** **by the ROC Armed Forces is based on the tri-level** **prevention and treatment framework, which is** **separated into Level-1 prevention (company and** **battalion chief counselor), Level-2 assistance** **(various levels of mental health centers), and** **Level-3 medication (all regional mental health** **centers), integrated with assistance resources to** **create supporting networks. The tri-level preven-** **tion and assistance system is as follow:** **◎Level-1 prevention** **Company and battalion chief counselors will** **handle emotionally unstable personnel, and assist** **in relieving psychological problems. Company-level** **commanders also need to direct the execution of** **mental assistance work in their units so that com-** **panies can exercise rapid detections and resolu-** **tions.** **◎Level-2 assistance** **Psychological counseling officers with profes-** **sional mental assistance qualifications will assist** **in cases where no visible improvement after Lev-** **el-1 prevention. They also provide adequate train-** **ing to the knowledge and skill for unit officers;** **they also play a role in enhancing the operation of** **Level-1 prevention.** **◎Level-3 medication** **Cases with no visible improvements after** **treatment from company staffs and various levels** **of mental health centers will be procedurally moved** **to Regional Mental Health Centers in northern,** **central, and southern Taiwan, and Huadong, Jin-** **men, Matzu, and Penghu. Hospital medical resourc-** **es and social support networks will be applied and** **integrated with frequent consultation to perform** **medication and mental reconstruction functions.** ----- organization members from stagnating on given habits and experiences. We will also utilize modern information technology and management methods to create knowledge databases and knowledge sharing platforms for all units and individual professional domains. This will allow rapid flow of knowledge and create maximum overall value. **(2) Nurturing and properly utilize knowledge-based management personnel** Knowledge-based organizational management depends heavily on the nurturing of relevant talent to develop a knowledge-oriented career learning capacity, so as to maximize manpower ef­ ficiency. Currently, the ROC Armed Forces' personnel development plans include: improve private sector recruitment mechanisms, introduce elite civilian officials, enhance military education, and create digital learning environments to raise the knowledge and professional quality of the armed forces staffs. **(3) Establish lifelong education standards for armed forces staffs** To create organizational culture favorable for knowledge-based management, the Armed Forces will establish a lifelong learning environment for staffs according to the Executive Yuan's Learning-based Government Action Plan and National Licensing Standard. We have enforced the Armed Forces Staffs Lifelong Learning Implementation Regulations, and required all units to pursue learning-based organization according to actual conditions and characteristics of the unit missions. This goal is to enhance learning capacity for staffs at all levels and encourage overall efficiency in military innovation and learning. **(4)Encourage knowledge and innovation in the organization** The ROC Armed Forces will encourage organizational and personal learning through officer training groups within various agencies, establish brainstorming, group discussions, and objection allowed models of decision-making. This is to actively create an organizational culture favorable for creating knowledge and innovation to build a foundation and capacity for learning-based organiza­ tion. We will replace authoritative obedience with professional leadership, and self-centric mentality with systematic thinking, and create organizational efficiency through group cooperation to lead the Armed Forces into a new era of military readiness. 124 ###### 06' ----- 125 ----- ----- 127 ----- 128 I. Transforming the Recruitment System In response to the nation's political and economic changes, public expectations and the Execu- tive Yuan's plans to reform the military service system, lower unemployment and a shortened wait- ing period for military duty, the MND has, under the guidance of the defense transformation policy, amended relevant military service laws. This is so that the national military service system will develop towards a combination of enlistment and conscription systems with “the main force based on enlisted.” In order that high quality and long-term service personnel will become primary source of future base-level troops, volunteer recruitment processes, promotional standards adjustments and appropriate shortening of mandatory service time are under consideration. In the future, for the manpower demand framework, we will consider gradually increasing the proportion of enlisted per- sonnel in coordination with the adjusted mandatory service period. We will also gradually innovate the military service system and improve manpower quality according to adjustment planning of total personnel numbers. **1. Legal Issues** **(1) Promote a Combination of** **Enlistment and Conscription Sys-** **tems** In the past, Taiwan primarily adopt- ed the conscription system. In response to defense transformation and public opinion, and pursuant to the Executive Yuan's 4-year medium-term policy proj- ect (2005 to 2008), the MND is promot- ing military service reforms in the direc- tion of “volunteer-oriented” enlistment and conscription combination systems, in the hope that by 2008 the volunteer force will reach 60% whilst the other 40% will be conscripted. **(2) Amend Relevant Military Ser-** **vice Regulations** - Having female enlisted personnel conforms to mainstream gender and feminine labor development principles ###### 07' ----- To promote military service reforms, the MND has consulted with various Executive Yuan agencies, regional military service affairs representatives and domestic experts. As a result, Articles 47 and 48 of the “Act of Military Service System” and certain articles of the “Act of Military Ser vice for Volunteer Enlisted Men” were amended. These regulations were enacted by the Legislative Yuan in November, 2005 and ratifi ed by the President on December 14, 2005. They allow senior secondary school and vocational high school graduates to apply for volunteer military service in the year of graduation (i.e. at 18 years old). Also, in order to conform to mainstream gender equality principles and to develop and utilize female manpower, references to female volunteers have now been legally stipulated to expand enlisted personnel recruitment channels and undertakings. **2. Administrative Issues** **(1) Expand Recruitment of Professional Enlisted Personnel and Reserve Non-** **Commissioned Offi cers** To professionalize the military and its personnel by streamlining troop manpower and continu ally upgrading weapons and equipments, and pursuant to the planned schedule of the Jingjin Pro gram, the MND is considering expanding recruitment of professional enlisted personnel and reserve non-commissioned offi cers. The entire project has been started since 2004 and will be completed by 2008. It is separated into three phases: “reduce personnel establishment, personnel readjustments according to the payroll,” “expand recruitment, promote transformation,” and “enlistsed fi rst, con scripts second.” **(2) Restructure Non-Commissioned Offi cer System** To expand the number of professional enlisted personnel and raise the quality of non-com missioned offi cers, the MND is gradually adjusting to a system where selection and promotion of volunteer non-commissioned offi cers are selected from professional enlisted personnel to enhance troop organizational effi ciency and utilize base-level combat capability. In the future, distinguished enlisted personnel who have passed the assessments will be promoted. (Refer to Appendix 7-1, Pro cedure of Promoting Competent Enlisted Personnel to Non-Commissioned Offi cers) **(3) Review and Shorten Mandatory Service Term** The current legal mandatory service period (reserve officer, NCO and regular enlists) is 22 months. Once the MND completes Phase 2 organizational framework adjustments of the Jingjin Program, the total personnel number in the ROC Armed Forces will be reduced. The push for a comprehensive recruitment of professional enlisted personnel will allow long-term volunteer man power to fulfi ll medium and high level skill demands for base-level troops and retain overall combat readiness. After the MND appropriately assesses the current status of volunteer recruitment, planned schedules, national fi nances, and other objective and subjective factors, it will review the mandatory 129 ----- 130 service period annually. From January 1, 2006, service time has been reduced to 16 months. Also, maximum mandatory service age is planned to be lowered from 40 to 35 to reduce the size of re- serve forces. II. Enhancing Military Education National military education has to meet the needs of defense transformation and challenges from overall environmental changes. A comprehensive education system has to be planned under the guidance of military strategy and Ministry of Education policies. For this system to operate ef- fectively, we should actualize military education concepts and set precise educational goals and emphases. Through military education renovation and curriculum improvement, the Armed Forces' objective for military buildup and readiness will then be achieved. **1. Military Education System and Concepts** **(1) Education System** The current military education system consists of the 3 levels of “basic education,” “intermedi- ate education” and “advanced education” levels, with separate education for military offi cers, non- commissioned offi cers and enlisted personnel. It has been comprehensively planned and established in accordance with the Act of Military Education and other relevant statutes. In the education for offi cers component: “Basic education” consists of credit-based curricula that are compatible with the University Act, and electives and morale cultivation courses required for junior officers. “Intermediate education” primarily consists of branch school special courses, regular courses and professional skill training courses, complemented by civilian professional train- ing courses. “Advanced education” consists primarily of curricula from War College, Command & Staff College and various graduate schools of the National Defense University, complemented by masters and doctorate programs in the civilian sector. In the education for non-commissioned offi cers component: “Basic education” consists primar- ily of electives and morale cultivation courses, complemented by basic technical certifi cates. “Inter- mediate education” consists primarily of branch school non-commissioned offi cer (NCO) courses, complemented by intermediate technical certifi cates and professional skill training in the civilian sector. “Advanced education” consists primarily of the master sergeant/chief course, complemented by advanced technical certifi cates and bachelor degree programs in the civilian sector. The enlisted component consists primarily of recruit and skill training, and the soldiers enlists ###### 07' ----- become qualifi ed NCO nominees through step-by-step individual plans. **(2) Educational concept** Overall, military education is based on the Armed Forces' mission of military buildup and is combined with the future 10-year military buildup concepts, 5-year defense force programming plan and military education objectives. It responds to the needs of military buildup and con tinues to focus on the “military ethics and skills” of servicemen as its content with emphases on “philosophy, science and art of war.” By cultivating a professional staff that is determined, competent and practical, we hope to build a modernized military with quality, adequacy and capa bility to ensure national security. Also, military education needs to comply with the troop improvement policies of the Jingjin Program. It needs to seek improvements and innovation through streamlining academy structures, adjusting curriculum design, improv ing instructor quality and maximizing utilization of educational resources. We will also adequately enforce discipline in the education system in accordance with annual education policy guidelines and assessments of existing shortcomings to improve the quality and maximize the benefi ts of education. **2. Objectives and Emphases of** **Military Education** - **(1) Education Objective** on philosophy, science and art of war 131 - Military education will continue to focus on the military eth- ics and skills of servicemen as its content with emphases on philosophy, science and art of war ----- 132 In education for officers, “basic education” aims to cultivate new junior officers of all services. “Intermediate education” aims to train O2-O4 levels commanders, staffs and professional cadres. “Advanced education” aims to foster O5 and above levels commanders, staffs, strategy planner and military science instructors, including general/flag officers. Education for non-commissioned officers includes “basic education” for eligible enlists in branch school so as to ensure that students become a civically, militarily, ethically, and tactically proficient military staff. “Intermediate education,” which comes after completion of basic education and starter-level assignments, aims to cultivate professional leaders or technicians. “Advanced edu­ cation” aims to further cultivate NCOs after intermediate education to have the professional knowl­ edge and skills required for a fine master sergeant/chief, and complemented by the MND's lifelong learning education program. **(2) Education Emphases** Spiritual education involves enhancing patriotism, in-depth studies on philosophies of war, consolidating willpower and promoting military ethics to foster resolve. It also ensures that spirit is emphasized more than physical assets, and that morale, tactics and skills are emphasized more than weapons and equipment. “Law of Armed conflict” education involves integrating relevant educa­ tion promotions of the Red Cross and incorporating “armed conflict methods” into general knowl­ edge education. This is so that all officers and cadets will be equipped with the correct war concept and molded by an image of justice's representative who shall counter attacks waged by the PRC's “legal warfare” and seize to gain an upper hand on the legal front. Life education involves training for military figure and conduct, and developing the character befitting of modern military service­ men. Physical training involves attaining physical fitness, improving courage and confidence, and cultivating military dignity as well as mental and physical endurance. Academic education involves completion of credit-based classes required by the Ministry of Education, complemented by military academic subjects. Through this the cadets will become familiar with command management and staffing process, develop high-tech intellect, improve in strategic and tactical competence and be molded into professional military servicemen. **3. Evaluation of Military Education and Reform of Non-Commissioned Officer Sys­** **tems** To enhance military education achievement and foster personnel with high proficiency, the MND is undertaking special education assessment measures and renovating the education system for non-commissioned officers. Concrete measures include: **(1) Basic Education Evaluation** Through objective evaluation schemes, the academies can evaluate their own education perfor­ ###### 07' ----- 133 mance and offi cers' personalities to establish a mechanism for self-improvement and strive to im- prove strategy and achieve the education objectives of military academies. **(2) Transformation of Army High Schools** To improve the quality of the Army's regular non-commissioned offi cers and fulfi ll military buildup needs, Army high schools were converted into vocational colleges on-site starting from Au- gust 1, 2005, following an approval letter from the Ministry of Education on February 4, 2005. **4. Renovation of Military Education and Curriculum** In MND's overall planning and renovation of military education, ex- isting foundations will be preserved. In the future, curriculum improvement planning will be driven in collaboration with the academy's mission and vi- sion. Objectives and con- tents for all types of cur- ricula will also be clearly set out. - Military education courses address both professional and general knowledge Basic education involves separating curricula into core courses and professional courses so as to include both professional and general knowledge. Curriculum design will continue to focus on linguistic, communication and management abilities to improve teaching, research and instructor quality. Also, through education evaluations, we will enhance civil-military interactions and con- sider integrating departments in various schools, adding courses with military characteristics, etc., to streamline organization and improve the quality of basic education and reserve NCO education. Intermediate education is based on military occupational specialty training to set a founda- tion for professional skills required to carry on organic functions. Also, we will strive to improve the quality of military instructors, retain excellent faculty, improve professional training, integrate educational resources, develop C[4]ISR-related education and implement coordinated and joint opera- tions courses. These efforts are made to fulfi ll military service needs, successfully streamline service branch schools and effectively utilize educational resources. In accordance with common and professional courses and categories of specialization. Thereof, advanced education focuses on developing various strategic knowledge to fulfi ll military buildup ----- 134 and combat readiness needs. For example, military strategy and international relations research in- stitutes will focus on national security, defense policy, international relations and political-military gaming. War College curriculum will focus on courses such as national security, field campaign strategy, military (service) strategy, joint operations and Taiwan-Penghu defense operations. Staff College curriculum will focus on staffi ng, applied operation, joint operations, and national security affairs. Graduate schools in the Chung-cheng Institute of Technology, National Defense Manage- ment College and Fu Hsing Kang College will focus on developing high-level personnel specializ- ing in military affairs, technology, management and political warfare to fulfi ll the needs for military buildup and combat readiness. In terms of lifelong learning, we will continue to promote exchanges and cooperation with civilian schools, utilize civilian educational resources to the fullest, develop distance learning and improve staff members' work-related knowledge to enhance their specialized skill levels. We will also establish comprehensive lifelong military learning environments, focusing primarily on allow- ing offi cers to attain master degrees, and non-commissioned offi cers and cadets to attain technical certifi cates to further improve the overall quality of military personnel. The curriculum improving plan is set according to the academy's visions and missions, and ensure that all curricula's objectives and contents are clearly set. Basic education entails both core courses and professional courses so as to encompass professional and general knowledge. Interme- diate education is based on military occupational specialty training in order to set a foundation for professional skills required to carry on organic functions. Advanced education is based on common and specialized courses and channeled by specialties, it focuses on developments of various strategic knowledge to fulfi ll military buildup and combat readiness needs. **5. Plans for Streamlining Military Academies in Northern Taiwan** The MND's purpose for streamlining the military academies in northern Taiwan is to address future military education developments, improve educational quality and create positive education environments to cultivate elites required for military preparations. The MND has assembled the Military Academies Merging Committee for Northern Taiwan, and will implement reforms in three stages - “planning,” “moving” and “assessing development” until September 1, 2006, the anticipated date of completion, to restructure the military education organization. (Refer to Appendix 7-2, Prin- ciples, Plans, and Campus Placements for Streamlining Military Academies in Northern Taiwan) ###### 07' ----- 135 III. Fostering MND Civilian Offi cials To coordinate with changes in defense transformation and operational reforms and ensure civil- ian control of the military, the MND will, in accordance with the law, employ no less than one-third of registered staff members as civilian offi cials, actively develop civilian offi cial system, develop their professional qualities, enhance military-civilian cooperation and improve communication ca- pabilities. This allows civilian offi cials to catalyze and create conceptual innovations in national de- fense during transformation. Therefore, fostering defense civilian offi cials is also the armed forces' goal of improving education and training for competent personnel. **1. Concept of Recruiting Civilian Officials** Civilian control of the military is an important principle for commanding and managing the armed forces in a democratic nation. The main implication is that civilian leaders are for devising national defense and military policies while military servicemen are to adopt military professional- ism, perform military policies and obey civilian leadership without interfering in politics. Since the legislation of the National Defense Act and the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense (hereinafter referred to as the Two Defense Acts), the mechanism and operation of civilian control of the military has been confi rmed, propelling Taiwan into defense transformation and usher- ing in an era of modernized defense institutions. The use of defense civilian offi cials is to support civilian leadership of the military and estab- lish a professional division of labor in the military. In this way, the innovation and revitalization of national defense affairs is benefited by implementing the employment, training, assessment, and promotional systems of defense civilian offi cials, and capitalizing on their independent thinking and viewpoints. The concepts of “civilian control of the military,” “a nationalized military,” “political neutrality” and “all-out defense” will thus follow through. **2. Establishing Civilian Official System in the MND** **(1) Current Status of the Civilian Offi cials** Since the passage of the Two Defense Acts, the MND and its subordinate agencies have set up 282 civilian posts, which are to be fi lled based on national tests and open selection processes. And up until June 2006, 184 persons have already been employed, fi lling over 65% of the vacancies. In the future, national tests and open selection processes will be continued to select quality talent. We will also apply for permits to establish a “special exam for MND civilian offi cials” to foster profes- sional talents for national defense in the long term. ----- **(2) Plan for Increasing Personnel Quota of National Defense Specialty** The MND shall create job groups and categories for the “National Defense Administration” and “National Defense Technology” with approval from the Ministry of Civil Service. In the future, persons with professional defense qualifications can be selected to fulfill the operational needs of national defense. (Refer to Appendix 7-3, Civilian Job Categories in the MND) **(3) Formulate Operational Mechanism for Defense Civilian Officials** To ensure smooth operation of civilian defense officials, yield expected benefits and thus ensure civilian control of the military and military-civilian cooperation, the MND is gradually formulating an operational model for defense civilian officials: a.Personnel Establishment In accordance with organizational adjustments of the Jingjin Program, we will designate civil­ ian quota for each service agency. Other than the sizes required by the Organization Act of the Min­ istry of National Defense, the Armaments Bureau and the National Defense Medical Bureau will need to designate one-third of their staff as civilian positions so that there are 282 civilian positions in the MND. b. Promotion In accordance with the “Civil Servant Employment Act” and the “Civil Servant Promotion Act,” we have formulated the “Internal Promotion Regulation for Civilian Personnel” to accommo­ date adjustments in the national defense civilian promotion system. This will stimulate the manage­ ment of defense civilian officials' career planning and raise their morale. c. Evaluation Process In accordance with the “Merit Evaluation Act for Civil Servants,” we have formulated the “Memorandum on the Evaluation of MND Civil Servant” and “Standards for Rewards and Disci­ pline for MND Civil Servants” to accommodate evaluations and reward/discipline affairs and thus ensure accuracy, fairness and objectivity in disciplinary affairs. d. Benefits and Rights After the passage of the Two Defense Acts, the “Regulation on Non-managerial Secondary Government Officials Accepting Compensation for Managerial Duties” and “Regulation on the Management of Overtime Work for MND Civilian Personnel” were devised in 2004 to reward sec­ ondary non-managerial personnel bonuses and overtime work. Also, in accordance with the “Mea­ sures to Improve Civil Servants Vacation Policy in All Agencies under the Executive Yuan,” there are now bonuses for overtime work during holidays, financial assistance for vacations, grants for on duty, and transportation as of 2005. At the same time, there are considerations for improvements and matters regarding other benefits and rights for civilian officials in order to stimulate morale in civil­ ian officials and retain competent personnel. 136 ###### 07' ----- cation and coordina tion, and enhance the effectiveness of civ il-military coopera tion, the following operational model has been devised: a. Job vacancies can be filled by ei ther military offi cers or civilian officials. Executives and their deputies will be as signed in such an ar rangement that if one affairs. 137 **3. Developing Professional Quality in National Defense** To foster long-tenure national defense civilian offi cials, pursuant to the relevant regulations in the “Civil Servant Training and Advanced Education Act” and “Implementation Plan for the Train- ing and Advanced Education of Civil Servants in all Agencies and Schools under the Executive Yuan,” the MND devised the “Memorandum on the Learning Process of the Training, Intermedi- ate Education, and Lifelong Learning for MND Bureaucrats” and “Implementation Plan on Staff Operation Training for Military and Civilian Personnel of the Ministry of National Defense” which will be incorporated into relevant military training courses. Through various education and training programs, civilian offi cials entering the MND service can quickly familiarize themselves with MND affairs, enhance their professional competence and utilize their skills to the full. **4. Forward-looking Civil-Military Cooperation** **(1)Enhance communication, coordination and civil-military cooperation** To accommodate the cultural gap between military and civilian personnel, improve communi- - Under national defense transformation, civilian officials are commissioned to catalyze and create conceptual innovations in national defense is a military offi cer, the other will be a civilian offi cial, and vice versa to jointly promote denfense b. In organizational affairs, we will undertake team work to enhance coordinated military- civilian cooperation and reduce the period of conceptual civil-military confl icts. c. We will undertake mixed training of military and civilian offi cials with the hope of develop- ing good communication, coordination and cooperation relationships during the learning process, ----- thus creating a common conceptual organizational culture. **(2)Mindset of Defense Civilian Officials in the New Era** The realization of the so-called Two Defense Acts assumed the democratic national defense mechanism which is characterized by civilian control of the military and consolidation of military policy, command and armament branches. It authorizes the civil minister to integrate all capacities and assume all responsibilities. In addition, the design that civilian officials are introduced to par­ ticipate in defense policy and defense affairs is expected to bring about innovative effects from mul­ tilateral perspectives. This allows the minister to have previsioned and all-round decision-making powers over national defense policies and resources so that he/she can effectively integrate military policy, command and armament branches and direct national defense policy implementations ac­ cordingly. After the ROC Armed Forces implemented the Jingjin Program, we have entered a new era of defense transformation. In addition to the professional thinking of uniformed personnel, we further expect that defense civilian officials who have been through professional training in various fields and have different thinking can be incorporated in our defense system. Currently, this concept is gradually taking shape and is exhibiting concrete results from its implementation. 138 ###### 07' ----- 139 ----- ----- 141 ----- 142 I. Weaponry Acquisition Concept Rapid advancement in military technologies resulted in a continuous upgrade of modern weap- ons systems. Maintaining the status quo will not only damage our superiority in quality but also hinder our abilities in responding to emerging threats. Furthermore, the effectiveness of any weapon system deteriorates over time and the effi ciency gained from high maintenance costs is often inferior to that of purchasing new weapon systems. Therefore, the ROC Armed Forces need to continually acquire modern weapon systems to meet the needs of combat readiness in the future and return the technology and revenue to society through integration with domestic industries and in return gener- ate maximum economic benefi ts for the nation. Important principles for weapons systems acquisi- tions for the ROC Armed Forces are described as follows: **1. Stress “Focused Development” in the Allocation of Military Investments** Modern weapon systems acquisitions of the ROC Armed Forces are based on overall planning covered by the “Ten-Year Military Buildup Concepts” and “Five-year Defense Programming Plan.” Deliberated on the priorities of military readiness, acquisitions are made based on scheduled phases to achieve the overall force construction efforts. In recent years, under the ROC Armed Forces' ef- forts to use limited defense resources efficiently, capabilities in air, naval and homeland defense have all improved. This yields considerable deterring effects on the PRC's propensity to initiate military actions against Taiwan. Facing trends toward regional confl icts and critical developments in potential warfare and the increasing demand for efficient utilization of defense resources, the ROC Armed Forces' future weapons acquisitions will depart from the “service-balanced, uniform enhancements” approach to- wards “focused development,” a new emphasis on joint operations. In anticipating future strategic situations, considering factors such as assessments of the PRC's military threats, expected defense resources and fulfi lling defensive operational requirements, future military investments by the ROC Armed Forces will focus on building critical warfi ghting capabilities, mainly Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, joint air defense, joint interception and homeland defense. These efforts shall enable the ROC Armed Forces to retain partial combat superiority in key areas in the future confl icts. **2. Prioritize Self-Reliant Defense and Social Well-Being during Weapon Systems** **Acquisitions** To catalyze effective use of overall national resources, military weapons acquisitions must seek ###### 08' ----- a balance between a self-reliant defense and the well-being of the society. This principle is adequately reflected in Article 22 of the Na tional Defense Act: “... shall follow national defense poli cies to consolidate efforts of the private sec tor to develop defense technology industries. Acquisition of weapon equipment shall fi rstly consider those built domestically. When it is necessary to pursue outsourcing channels, the acquisition activities shall realize technology transfer policy so as to establish an autono mous national defense infrastructure. The MND may cooperate or mutually entrust with domestic or foreign and public or private corporate bodies to implement R&D, production, maintenance and selling of defense technological products. In order to develop defense technology industries and relevant industrial develop ments, the MND may entrust the private sector with the management of the MND's subordi nate R&D, production and maintenance infra structures and their relevant facilities.” This Article provides the critical legal basis for the ROC Armed Forces weapons ac quisitions program. The MND will uphold this principle and actively push for weapon system research and production affairs based on the overall force construction requirements to ef fectively support joints operation missions. In the mean time, the MND will actively promote the domestic military equipment systems mar ket in hopes of integrating the defense industry with the capacity of the private sector. These 143 - The weapon research and development of the ROC Armed Forces is committed to the spirit of self-reliant and achieved multiple breakthroughs ----- 144 efforts are trying to address the nation's overall economic development and demand while expand- ing technology integration and application. To encourage private sector participation in the research, development and maintenance of military equipment, the “Annual Commercial Manufactured/Re- paired Military Equipments Exhibition” was held in August 2005 in conjunction with the “Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition.” This exhibit explored over 2,054 system, subsys- tem and components required for maintaining the armed forces' weapon systems. This is expected to stimulate approximately NT$18 billion worth of business opportunities in the future while catalyz- ing upgrades in domestic industrial technologies. In the future, the MND will continue to hold simi- lar activities to maximize the benefi ts of national resources. **3. Sustain the “From 0 to A, then A ” Policy in Weapon R&D Strategy+** In weapon system research strategies, the ROC Armed Forces believe in the “from 0 to A, then A[+]” policy to meet the operational requirements. To shorten the time period required to acquire weapons systems and fi eld them, and to effectively connect the research, development and produc- tion cycles, the MND has completed the Military Procurement Investments Planning, Programming and Budgeting Operating Regulation and relevant planning to clarify operational procedures. Ac- cording to these regulations, all major weapons systems undergoing research and developments can be deployed to basic combat units on a trial basis after fulfi lling basic operational requirements dur- ing preliminary combat assessments. The initial deployments can then gradually expand until full operational readiness objectives. Facing the challenges imposed from the continuous development of high-tech weapons by the PRC, the ROC Armed Forces' weapon research programs focus on the policy of self-reliance and actively strives for the development of information and electronic warfare capability, low-altitude missile defense networks and anti-missile capabilities, C[4]ISR enhancements and the safeguard of critical infrastructure with a comprehensive plan on the primary research and development focus in each technological fi eld. Currently, individual weapon research programs have all made major breakthroughs through the hard work of R&D departments and effectively raised the ROC Armed Forces' overall military capability. ###### 08' ----- |Major Investment Programming procedure Working plan Operational Investment System analysis requirements documents outline plan|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| ||Working plan|||| |||orking plan||| |Military manpower/firepower performance evaluation|Col2| |---|---| |Verify joint operation requirements|Validate operational requirement| ||Evaluate combat performance| |Various exercises|| Ten-Year Military Buildup Concepts Five-Year Defense Force Programming Plan ``` 〈mid-term execution plan〉 ``` Guidance Formulation Net Strategicanalysis, strategicoverall develop-Services future military Military capital and weaponsdevelopment goal Annual execution plan assess- Overall environ- ment modes buildup and annual budget ment evalu-ation analysisment require-ment warfareof policy financial guidanceIncorporate with Set out feasible items Major Investment Programming procedure Working plan Feedback Operational Investment System analysis requirements documents outline plan Military manpower/firepower performance evaluation Cost analysis Validate operational Verify joint requirement `Weaponry/equipment` operation requirements Evaluate combat performance Orders of Battle (existing combat capabilities) Various exercises 145 II. Military Buildup Procedures & Life-Cycle Management Mechanism Military buildup of the ROC Armed Forces is planned, assessed and evaluated based on guide- lines, evolution of enemy threats and joint operational requirements. The overall planning is execut- ed through detailed major investment programming procedures to ensure maximum investment re- turns from the limited defense resources. Military buildup process, major investiment programming review and weapons systems life-cycle managements are summarized as follows: **1. Military Buildup Plan** Military buildup plan and execution are based on the fl ow of “Ten-Year Military Buildup Con- cepts” and “Five-Year Defense Force Programming Plan,” annual execution plan and annual bud- gets. The “Ten-Year Military Buildup Concepts” and “Five-Year Defense Force Programming Plan” are important documents in “designing” long-term force construction needs and outlining defense manpower and weapons systems construction goals. They are written by members of the joint staff from all fi elds of expertise and tasked to analyze possible future modes of warfare and keys to vic- tory through rational and objective strategic analyses and considerations for all military (service) Ten-Year Military Buildup Concepts Five-Year Defense Force Programming Plan ``` 〈mid-term execution plan〉 ``` Guidance Formulation Net Strategicanalysis, strategicoverall develop-Services future military Military capital and weaponsdevelopment goal Annual execution plan assess- Overall environ- ment modes buildup and annual budget ment evalu-ation analysisment require-ment warfareof policy financial guidanceIncorporate with Set out feasible items Major Investment Programming procedure Working plan Feedback Operational Investment System analysis requirements documents outline plan Military manpower/firepower performance evaluation Cost analysis Validate operational Verify joint requirement `Weaponry/equipment` operation requirements Evaluate combat performance Orders of Battle (existing combat capabilities) Various exercises - Figure 8-1 Military Buildup Process ----- development needs, objective (subjective) security situations (enemy threats), future technology tion, combat requirements and sequence of priorities, which are then transferred into actual weapon The operational requirements documents, system analysis, investment outline plans and work­ ming plan following the Regulations for Programming the Military Investment. This is to ensure that all investment plans are adequate, feasible and sustainable. Afterwards, through budgeting procedures, the annual execution plan and budget are completed to set out legislative budgets and armament acquisition priorities. When purchased weapons systems are proved to be meeting the operational requirements and placed in the orders of battle, they will undergo continuous exercises to verify their joint operational capabilities and provide feedbacks to the force construction planning The Major Investment Programming Procedure of the ROC Armed Forces requires priority effectiveness of each investment project. Priority sequence stands on the concept of joint operation. The need for a weapon system and the priority of the item in the acquisition list must be assessed for tions. System analysis uses cost-benefit comparisons to analyze among various items the benefits of the life-cycle costs of the weapon, from acquisition, installation, utilization to decommission. This tional resources. The MND will subsequently complete the drafting, evaluation and authorization of the investment outline plan and working plan. These plans will then included in the annual budget estimation and presented to the Executive Yuan, then after obtaining approval from the Legislative Yuan, it will be signed by the President. With the stipulated funding, relevant procurement can come Through this strict evaluation process, ineffective investments can be avoided and a balance between “today's budget” and “tomorrow's threat” can be met, thus maximizing the efficient use of ment through lawful administration and transparent decision-making to provide the ROC Armed 146 system requirements. workflow. (Refer to Figure 8-1, Military Buildup Process) **2. Major Investment Programming Review** into practice. Forces with high-quality and high-efficiency weapon systems. ###### 08' ----- 147 **3. Weapon System Life-Cycle Management Mechanism** Military buildup and combat readiness objectives require the ROC Armed Forces to establish a suitable management mechanism before introducing or developing any weapons systems to the troops. The MND must oversee, manage and execute weapons related activities such as planning, development, production, employment, maintenance and decommission to fully utilize the expected benefits of the weapon system and minimize its life-cycle costs. Based on these considerations, the MND and all military service commands have established specialized units responsible for in- tegrated logistics tasks, so that integrated support and resource management mechanisms can be established for weapons systems from requirements analysis, contracting, research verifi cation, pro- duction designation, combat support to system decommision. This is to ensure performance of the weapon systems can meet the requirement and that supports may come rapidly, economically and effectively. After the Two Defense Acts came into effect, the ROC Armed Forces' weapon system acquisition and life-cycle management tasks are assigned to the various agencies under the military command, policy and armament branches and required services. The MND Armaments Bureau is responsible for relevant policies in armament acquisition. Currently, it has completed doctrines for acquisition management principles, project managements, system engineering management, testing and evaluation and integrated logistics support. The Armaments Bureau is also developing military logistics policies and systems for life-cycle project managers to establish precise guidance and regu- lations for armament development. To enhance the armament acquisition management capabilities for all military cadres so that relevant concepts can be deeply rooted among all echelon of commands, the MND holds various annual professional training sessions such as project management, systems engineering manage- ment, testing and evaluation, integrated logistics support and purchase management train- ing. Individual services also conduct their own training and lectures accordingly. Besides, to enhance training and pro- vide channels for information interchange between the ROC Armed Forces and the indus- tries, government and academ- ics, the MND holds Annual - The ROC Armed Forces have established precise guidance and regul- Discussion Forums for National ations for major innovations in the armament development system ----- Defense Armament Acquisition to enhance the mutual understanding and performance for the life cycle management of defense weapon system. In the future, we hope to continue promoting life cycle management concepts and work through the two aforementioned methods to actualize the life cycle management mechanism. On the management of armament life-cycle information, there are requirements to consider digitizing all logistics operation for weapon systems in every stage of the investment programming cycle to enhance the support capability for weapon systems. In the future, the MND will gradually setup an armament management information system to gather data on supply, maintenance, repair and operation to enhance the contents of the logistics support parameter database. This will effec tively push for transparency in logistics resources for weapons systems and enhance the readiness and reliabilities of the weapons systems. In logistics management information, we will push for a common operational environment and interface based on existing logistics systems of the individual services and the Combined Logistics Command to improve the performance of logistics information management. Simultaneously, im portant logistics parameters will be selected to provide logistics decision-making information. The entire project will be divided into 3 stages: “integration planning,” “system research and modifi ca tions” and “system verifi cation and validation,” which is expected to be complete in 2007. Currently, the “Armed Forces Logistics Management System” and the “Disaster Relief Information Manage ment System” are already in use, allowing commanders at all levels to be able to instantly dispatch troop logistics capacity as a reference in battlefi eld decision-making. Through breaking down the administrative hierarchy in the armed forces, units can request active supplies through network con nections, which greatly helps reduce operational procedures and increase the effi ciency of support. This approach provides necessary information for decision making during military operations along with saving public funds and unnecessary manpower. Additionally, the MND is continuously inte grating and developing a real time, precision operations management system for logistics. System function validation has been verifi ed through the annual Hanguang military exercise, showing which system function can be enhanced according to the live testing results of the exercise. We hope that a digitized management model can create a management mechanism consistent throughout peacetime and wartime, thus improving the ROC Armed Forces' performance on integrated logistics support management effi ciency. In the future, the MND will improve the weapons life-cycle management and logistics man agement mechanism, clarify logistics jurisdictions between “force construction” (weapon employ ment stage) and “force utilization” (weapon service stage) stages, and incorporate modern enterprise concepts to strive for enhancements in integration, digitization, accuracy and professionalism to cre ate a modern corporate management environment for military logistics. We will also appropriately 148 ###### 08' ----- 149 integrate, manage, allocate and apply limited available resources to support operations in the “right time, right place, right quality and right quantities.” Also, the MND will incorporate civilian tech- nologies and manpower to accelerate promotion military equipment productions through civilian contractors, in order to lower military investments costs while boosting the performance of logistics support personnel. III. Current Weapon System Acquisition To address the increasing military threats from the PRC, the MND has identifi ed key military investments through an overall review of the operational requirements. Major military investments in the future will focus on procurement of diesel-electric submarines, P-3C long-range fi xed-wing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft and PAC-3 missile systems. If they are affordable under the national fi ance, the MND will continue planning for newly designed attack helicopters, minesweeping transport helicopters, Yunpao armored vehicles and the next-generation fi ghters. The arms procurement plans for the three major weapon systems were proposed to the United States from 1995 to 1998. During that time period, the US dispatched assessment teams to Taiwan for combat capability assessments and confirmed that these three weapon systems are extremely needed purchase for the ROC's “self defense” policy. Decisions were made in 1999 and 2001 to re- lated items to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. With the consent to sell from the United States, the MND reassessed the arms procurement plan and reconfi rmed that it meets future force construction needs. The offi cial investment procedure was followed with the completion of the operational requirements document, system analysis reports and investment plans. These requests were latter submitted to the Legislative Yuan for authorization in June 2004 after the approval from the Executive Yuan. These three weapon systems to be procured are all top-notch weapons. The PAC-3 missile's interception capability has been proven to be far higher than that of PAC-2 being verifi ed through live combat. The P-3C long-range fi xed-wing ASW patrol aircraft is in active service in the Ameri- can military, and used by 16 countries over the world. The newly designed and manufactured diesel -electric submarine will be equipped with submarine-launched anti-ship missiles, advanced torpe- does and high-tech U.S. electronic warfare systems. If the ROC Armed Forces can acquire the three weapon systems, there will be structural changes in ensuring our maritime security and our military power against the PRC. Additionally, we can effectively reduce the impacts of the PRC's military threats against Taiwan. The three weapon systems can yield major military strategic benefits de- ----- 150 scribed as follows: **1. Diesel-Electric Submarines** Currently, the ROC Armed Forces possesses four diesel-electric submarines. Among which, the American Guppy II, Hai-Shih (SS-791) and Hai-Pao (SS-792) are both over 50 years old and in urgent need of replacements. Also, the Dutch Hai-Lung (SS-793) and Hai-Hu (SS-794) have both served for over 25 years. Although they still possess considerable combat capabilities, many equip­ ments require further enhancements. Therefore, to maintain submarine warfare capabilities, the ROC truly needs newly-designed diesel-electric submarines. The newly-designed diesel-electric submarine will use high-strength steel plating and sound absorption material for the hull resulting in lower noise than the nuclear submarines. It will be equipped with advanced U.S. combat systems, submarine-launched Harpoon missiles and advanced torpedoes, which will greatly increase survivability and firepower. After the navy acquires the sub­ marines, its early warning and monitoring range will increase five-fold and mobile strike capabilities will increase by over 100 times. When complemented by Kidd-class destroyers and P-3C ASW pa­ trol aircrafts, they will impose visible deterring effects against PRC's intents of naval blockades. **2. P-3C Long Range Fixed-Wing ASW Patrol Aircrafts** The ROC currently depends on the U.S.-made S-2T anti-submarine aircrafts which have served for over 40 years, clearly far beyond its service life cycle. Furthermore, its equipment and features cannot meet the anti-submarine requirements of the ROC Armed Forces. The P-3C long-range fixed-wing ASW aircraft possesses several superior characteristics; namely, faster speed, longer endurance time, great surveillance range and higher ammunition ca­ pacities. Its datalink system is compatible with the ROC Armed Forces, which is beneficial for intelligence data exchange in effective detection and attack of surface and underwater targets. The P-3C long-range fixed-wing ASW aircraft, when combined with Kidd-class destroyers, can greatly increase three dimensional joint anti-sea combat capabilities. In peacetime, it can perform anti-sub­ marine and reconnaissance missions and ensure security on maritime routes between Taiwan and the international communities. In wartime, it can perform anti-submarine, joint and mine-laying opera­ tions, making PRC's naval blockades against Taiwan more difficult. **3. PAC-3 Missile Systems** The PAC-2 missile is the current anti-missile system used in the ROC. Because it was manu­ factured much earlier, its interception rate is below that of the PAC-3. Its defense capability for population centers and industrial facilities decreases on a daily basis. ###### 08' ----- After acquiring the PAC-3 missiles, the ROC Armed Forces' anti-missile coverage area will extend to critical cities and strategic locations in northern, central and southern Taiwan. Population protection capacity is expected to increase from the current 25% to 70% and protection capacity for industrial facilities is expected to increase from 8% to over 60%, greatly reducing the offensive power of the PRC's guided missiles and increasing uncertainties in the use of the PRC's “assassin mace” weapon. The PAC-3 missile can therefore be seen as a key investment in countering a theo retical paralysis war against Taiwan from the PRC and, as such, is of tremendous help in stabilizing the population and morale and maintaining our combat capabilities. These three major military acquisitions are executed through mutual trading between the two governments. With the full control measures provided by the U.S. regulations, professional manage ment teams and contracting mechanism, corporate fraudulence and confl icts can be effectively elim inated. The MND will abide by the Government Procurement Act and Procurement Regulations for Military Agencies and follow the strict evaluation mechanisms through approval from the National Audit Offi ce of the Control Yuan and supervision from the Legislative Yuan. Furthermore, military procurements proposed by the ROC Armed Forces are not an arms race against the PRC, but, rather, for self defense needs. In fact, the ROC has no intention or ability to engage in an arms race against the PRC. Self defense is a legitimate action that a country can undertake when facing external mili tary action and needs to be adjusted according to the degree of threat. It is a passive response, not a pre-emptive action. Therefore, while the PRC increases its military threats against Taiwan on a daily basis, the ROC Armed Forces increasing its self defense power through advanced weapon systems acquisition should be a solid protection for maintaining stability across Taiwan Strait, rather than a root cause for triggering military tension. Acquiring new weapon systems is an important method to increase combat capabilities and an important step in defense transformation. The goal is to maintain the superiority in quality for the overall warfi ghting capabilities of the ROC Armed Forces. 151 ----- ----- 153 ----- 154 I. Joint Operations Planning Concept The overall joint operations concept of the ROC Armed Forces is based on constructing “long- range and in-depth warfare” and “synchronized joint engagement” capabilities to achieve “source- deterring, naval and air interceptions and elimination by counter amphibious landing” operations. When the enemy exhibits apparent intentions or actions of hostility, our defensive actions will include selecting targets of greatest strategic signifi cance or posing the greatest threats, effectively integrating all military manpower and fi repower from individual services and positioned in multiple layers according to weapons systems ranges and capabilities, gradually eliminate the enemy through these layers of interceptions and fi nally achieve our defense objectives. Currently, the ROC Armed Forces have reached level three of the fi ve-level joint operations development plan. Tightly coordi- nated joint operations will be accomplished by the future integration of the command and control (C2) datalink system provided by the Jingjin Program, which can coordinate movements between the services on the same spectrum. Reaching the level four—“integrated joint operations” and sub- sequently advance to level fi ve—“mutual dependent joint operations” will further consolidate the ROC Armed Forces' joint operations capability. (Refer to Figure 9-1, Objective Levels of Joint Op- eration Development) Level 5 Interdependence Joint Operations Level 4 Integrated Joint Operations Level 3 Closely Coordinated Joint Operations Level 2 Conflict-Reducing Military Service Operations Level 1 Single Military Service Operations - Figure 9-1 Objective Levels of Joint Operation Development ###### 09' ----- es. 155 Establish elite joint warfighting capabilities, strengthen joint interception capabilities **1. To Unify Joint Operation Command and Control Authorities** In recent years, force planning of the ROC Armed Forces all centered on the development of joint operations. Other than actively organizing and implementing the joint operational command mechanism, we are continually enhancing the mechanism's capacity and incorporating RMA (revo- lution in military affairs) principles. Coordinating with the Jingjin Program's second-stage imple- mentation and weapons systems enhancements, our emphasis is on unifying governance over joint operations command and control to create an integrated and effective joint operations force with a simplifi ed and agile chain of command and more handy logistics support to defeat any hostile forc- **2. To Implement Integrated Command and Control System for Joint Operation** In future warfare, digital datalinks will be critical equipment for control of intelligence and information to effectively execute command and control and utilization of military manpower and fi repower on the battlefi eld. Based on the requirements of joint operational requirements planning, the ROC Armed Forces will establish battlefield management systems and implement integrated joint operations communications by using the concept of network centric warfare. The battlefi eld management system will be completed through the execution of the Po-Sheng Program providing connectivity to individual platforms. Joint operations command centers and joint operations centers of all strategic executive levels can share common situational awareness and will be able to carry ----- 156 out synchronized joint operational command and control. **3. To Organize Fine Joint Warfighting Capabilities** To achieve strategic sustainability, the ROC Armed Forces adhere to strategic concept and guidance to accelerate developments in defense capabilities. Through perfection in joint operations mechanisms, modern battlefi eld management complemented by multi-discipline deterrent warfi ght- ing capabilities, we will be able to cease enemy force projection and defuse its invasion capabilities through means of destruction, constraint and attrition. In response to the PLA's non-linear warfi ght- ing models, the ROC Armed Forces focus on enhancing air and naval warfi ghting capabilities in joint interception and effectively enhancing joint operations capabilities aimed at preventing “rapid dominance” from the enemy to ensure national security. **4. Enhance Joint Interception Capability** Based on the principles of joint interceptions, the ROC Armed Forces will establish long-range, in-depth strike and synchronized joint engagement capabilities to achieve “source-deterring, naval and air interceptions and annihilation at enemy's amphibious landing.” After sustaining the first strike, or after the enemy launches its fi rst offensive actions, the ROC Armed Forces will employ “hitting fi rst without moving fi rst” maneuvers in coordination with multi-discipline deterrent forces to execute long-range precision strikes and gradually destroy enemy forces. The joint interception planning of the ROC Armed Forces has greatly improved the warfi ghting capability after validation- from the various Hanguang exercises. The ROC Armed Forces will continue to acquire advanced weapons according to the ten-year military buildup concept and the basic foundation of the Jingjin Program. We will consolidate joint interdiction capabilities to respond to the PRC's rapid armament expansion and the evolution of coastal defense strategic principles to support the strategic frame- work of “effective deterrence, resolute defense” and achieve prevention of war. II. Joint Operations Command Mechanism To establish mechanisms that are consistent through peacetime and wartime, with appropri- ate jurisdiction and able to suffi ciently utilize the effectiveness of joint operations, the ROC Armed Forces Joint Operations Command Center will directly control all strategic executive levels and establish tight joint operational command networks. Strategic executive levels will restructured into joint staff formation to address hostile threats and the nature of future Taiwan-Penghu defense op- ###### 09' ----- erations. The result is a joint operations |m Joint Operations Command Sy|Col2| |---|---| |Minister of National Defense|| |Chief of the Genera|l Staff (Command)| |Joint Operations C|ommand Center| of command and |Army G Headq|eneral uarters| |---|---| |Navy G Headq|eneral uarters| |---|---| |Air F Headq|orce uarters| |---|---| |War zone depar|defense tment| |---|---| |Naval Fle and 62,6|et Comm- 3 Group| |---|---| |Com Com|bat Air mand| |---|---| Program Joint Op |Division C ing Mec|ommand hanism| |---|---| Hierarchy) The operation of the joint operations command mechanism Warfare decision depends on the link command between command |Minister of National Defense|Col2| |---|---| |Chief of the Genera|l Staff (Command)| |Joint Operations C|ommand Center| and battlefield man |Home bat Z|Com- ones| |---|---| |Is Headq|let uarters| |---|---| |Joint F Opera Comm|leet tion and| |---|---| |Join Oper Com|t Air ation mand| |---|---| In recent years, the ROC Armed Forces execution of joint operations. 157 Pre-Jingjin Program Joint Operations Command System Minister of National Defense Warfare decision- making and Chief of the General Staff (Command) command Joint Operations Command Center Strategic Army General Navy General Air Force command Headquarters Headquarters Headquarters Strategic War zone defense execution department Naval Fleet Comm- Combat Air and 62,63 Group Command Division Command- Strategic unit ing Mechanism Combined Combat Operational level Combatant Wing Arms Brigade Squadron Post-Jingjin Program Joint Operations Command System Minister of National Defense Warfare decision- making and Chief of the General Staff (Command) command Joint Operations Command Center Strategic Home Com- Islet Joint Fleet Joint Air Operation Operation execution bat Zones Headquarters Command Command Operational level OF ─ operat- OF ─ operat- OF ─ operat- OF ─ operat- ing forces ing forces ing forces ing forces - Figure 9-2 Pre-Jingjin and Post-Jingjin Joint Operations Command Hierarchy have been enhancing battlefi eld management functions and accurately monitoring areas such as bat- tlefi eld situations, fi repower coordination, targeting intelligence, post-combat assessment and com- mand and control, etc. Other than continuing refi nements on the command and control capability of the Hengshan system, the ROC Armed Forces can effectively integrate and connect important C[4]ISR systems and weapon platforms after the Po-Sheng Program's advances into the system implementa- tion stage in 2005 and the program's subsequent completion. This will establish real time battlefi eld intelligence and control and command systems, so forces at all levels can synchronously keep track of battlefi eld situation, enhance battlefi eld monitoring and effectively perform battlefi eld manage- ment, allowing further perfections in joint operation command and control, thus benefi ting from the In order to harness highly effective command capabilities from the ROC Armed Forces' joint operations command mechanism and retain the fl exibility acquired through high survivability, the ----- 158 following enhancements will be implemented to integrate all command and control devices and plat- forms to effectively utilize battlefi eld management: **1. To Integrate All Command and Control Devices and Platforms** Currently, the Hengshan system is utilized as the integrating platform. All command and con- trol devices and platforms are integrated under the Hengshan system for simplifi cation purposes. System features were gradually upgraded as the budgets allowed. The Hengshan system can har- ness joint operations command and control and battlefi eld management functions such as battlefi eld awareness, mission planning, battlefi eld spatial coordination, targeting and weapons, battlefi eld spa- tial/execution management, intelligence, alerts and early warning management, readiness and tacti- cal maneuver, etc., thus effectively executing the joint operations command functions. **2. To Enhance Survivability of Multi-layered Communications Systems** To enhance the survivability of the military command and control systems, we will continue pushing forward acquisition of tactical digital datalink systems planned in the Po-Sheng Program. Integration with optical fiber system, the army IMSE system, microwave and EHF systems into multi-layered communication systems will enable them to possess auto-routing functions to estab- lish real time battlefi eld intelligence and command and control systems functions. This will enable all combat units to synchronously exchange tactical information, enhance battlefield monitoring capability, ensure secure information environments and effectively perform battlefi eld management. The outcome is an enhancement to the overall electronic warfare capability of the ROC Armed Forces and the survivability of communication systems, which will actualize effective command ef- fi ciency for the Joint Operations Command Mechanism. III. Joint Operations Doctrine Development Military doctrines are the basis upon which the ROC Armed Forces direct buildup, combat readiness and force employment theory and practice. It covers tactics, techniques and every level of military affairs execution, forming a comprehensive system for which the armed forces direct opera- tions, education, training and management. **1. Policy Planning** Military doctrine development is based on national situation and strength, enemy threats and ###### 09' ----- evolutions in war, technology, etc. It combines the RMA mindset and plans for the systematic ap proach, authorities and principles of doctrine development. It also focuses on joint operations to in tegrate combat support and professional manuals to establish comprehensive doctrine systems of all types for all levels. It is planned to reevaluate and amend annually so that the doctrine development possesses foresight, practicality and innovation, which enables it not only to fi t current situations but also to address future combat needs. **2. Military Doctrine Development System** Doctrines are developed under the guidance of the “military philosophy” and the “guiding principles of generalship” for the ROC Armed Forces and separated into three systems: policy, ar mament and command. They are then separated into operational, special and general doctrine and devised through division of labor between the MND and all relevant agencies (i.e. agencies, troops, schools) under the individual services. (Refer to Figure 9-3, Military Doctrines Development Sys tem) **3. Organization of Military Doctrine Development** **(1) Ministry of National Defense** Directed by the “Steering Committee for Doctrine Development,” specialized doctrine develop ment is handled by appropriate joint staffs, departments, agencies and offi ces. Subordinate schools will assist in doctrine compilation-related tasks. **(2) Joint Operations Training and Doctrine Development Offi ce** It is responsible for policy planning and operating regulations for military doctrine develop ment. It also supervises and manages the implementation of all doctrine development. **(3) Military service commands** They are responsible for military service doctrine compilation as directed by the Service Doc trine Development, Publication and Approval Steering Committee. Each division and military ser vice school assists in relevant specialized doctrine compilation tasks. **(4) Area commands** They are directed by the Steering Council for of Military Branch Service Doctrine Develop ment, Compilation and Evaluation. Doctrine education divisions and all military supervision and branch service commands handle compilation for all categories of doctrine. (Refer to Figure 9-4, Military Doctrines Development Organization) **4. Current Execution Results** (1) The doctrine development systems with three broad categories of “operational, professional 159 ----- |Supr Com de Guide|eme man- r lines| |---|---| |Milit Joi Oper Outli|ary nt ation nes| |---|---| |Joint Defense Operation Doctrines|Army A Or um tly in O esperations Navy N Oa uv tly in O esperations Air Force A ati ir o F no sr Oce u tO linp ee sr- Military Police Military Police Oper- ations Outlines Missiles and Anti- Air Artillery Others Reserve Operations Others|Col3| |---|---|---| |Joint Air Defense Doctrines||| |Joint Amphibian Operation Doctrines||| |Air-Land, Sea-Land, and Sea- Air Joint Operation Doctrines||| |Land-Air, Land-Sea, and Sea- Air Joint Operation Doctrines||| |Military Mobilization Outlines||| |Military Hygiene Duties Doc- trines||| |Military Weapon Acquisition Doctrines||| |Military Strategy Outlines||| |Military Discipline Outlines||| |||| |Political Warfare Outlines||| |Military Education Outlines||| |Military Personnel Affairs Doc- trines||| |Military Leadership Manage- ment Outlines||| |||| |Military Intelligence Outlines||| |Military Training Outlines||| |||| |Military Logistics Outlines||| |Military Communications, Elec- tronics and Information Outlines||| |Military Inspection Outlines||| |||| |Military Procurement Outlines||| |Military Construction Projects Doctrines||| |Acquisition Project Manage- ment Doctrines for Primary Military Weapon Systems and Equipment||| |Military Garrison Duty Out- lines Military Symbols Military Terminology Dictiona- ries Basic Drill ROC Armed Forces Concise English-Chinese Dictionary of Military Terms Translated Doctrines||| Doctrines developed and implemented by the Command Head- quarters Doctrines developed and implemented by the branch supervision units 160 Doctrines developed Category and implemented by the MND Joint Defense Operation Doctrines Joint Air Defense Doctrines Oper- Joint Amphibian Operation ational Joint Doctrines ForcesArmed doctrines Operations Air-Land, Sea-Land, and Sea-Air Joint Operation Doctrines Military Philosophy Land-Air, Land-Sea, and Sea- Air Joint Operation Doctrines Reserve Mobilization Military Mobilization Outlines Military Military Hygiene Duties Doc- Medicine trines Military Weapon Acquisition Resources Doctrines Planning (Department Military Strategy Outlines of Strategic Planning, Military Discipline Outlines Integrated Assessment Supreme Office) Political Warfare Outlines Comman-der Function-al PoliticalWarfare Military Education OutlinesMilitary Personnel Affairs Doc- Guidelines doctrines Manpower trinesMilitary Leadership Manage- ment Outlines Intelligence Military Intelligence Outlines Training Military Training Outlines Logistics Military Logistics Outlines Communications, Military Communications, Elec- Electronics and tronics and Information Outlines Information Military Inspection Outlines Inspection Military Military Procurement Outlines Joint Military Construction Projects Operation Armaments Doctrines Outlines Acquisition Project Manage-ment Doctrines for Primary Military Weapon Systems and Equipment Military Garrison Duty Out- General lines General Military Symbols doctrines Military Terminology Dictiona-ries Translation Basic Drill (Executive Office of the Minister) ROC Armed Forces Concise English-Chinese Dictionary of Military Terms Translated Doctrines - Figure 9-3 Military Doctrine Development System ###### 09' ----- |Service’s gen|eral commands| |---|---| |Branch Sup|ervision Units| |---|---| 161 Ministry of National Defense Directing Unit for Administrative Man- Executive Unit for Coordination Unit for Doctrine Editing and agerial Jurisdiction Doctrine Editing and Doctrine Planning Evaluation Unit Evaluation A1, A3 (B3 outlines) A2, A4, A9 A8, A9, B9, C9 A4, A5, A6, A7, A9 Service’s general commands Directing Unit for Administrative Man- Executive Unit for Coordination Unit for Doctrine Editing and agerial Jurisdiction Doctrine Editing and Doctrine Planning Evaluation Unit Evaluation B1, B3, (B4, C3 outlines) B2, B4, B9 B8, B9, C9 B4, B5, B6, B7, B9 Branch Supervision Units Directing Unit for Administrative Man- Executive Unit for Coordination Unit for Doctrine Editing and agerial Jurisdiction Doctrine Editing and Doctrine Planning Evaluation Unit Evaluation C1, C3 (C4 doctrines) C2, C4, C9 C8, C9 C4, C5, C6, C7, C9 Symbol: A: doctrine development jurisdictions 1: doctrine editing, evaluation, 6. doctrine editing of the MND direction, and policy research 7. formulating doctrine editing B: doctrine development jurisdictions of the 2: formulating doctrine editing directions framework and outlines military service commands 3. doctrine drafting, framework editing, 8. coordination of doctrine C: doctrine development jurisdictions and outline evaluation development plan of the branch supervision units 4. doctrine drafting, framework editing, 9. management of doctrine and repeat evaluations of outlines development plan 5. doctrine drafting, framework editing and preliminary evaluation of outlines - Figure 9-4 Military Doctrine Development Organization and general” doctrines are completed and merged with the revision of ROC Armed Forces Doctrine Development Operating Instruction to clarify the authorities, responsibilities and operating proce- dures of individual agencies. (2) Consolidate current development status with continuation in formulating the doctrine development system chart for the ROC Armed Forces while supervising the execution of military doctrine development, research and compilation work. In response to the promulgation of the Two Defense Acts and organizational reforms outlined by the Jingjin Program, the current quantities of doctrine (including guiding principles, educational outlines, fi eld manuals and pamphlets) will be critically assessed. Categories of doctrine will be simplifi ed while their contents will be enriched, in the hope that military doctrine can combine objective and subjective environmental factors and grasping the “written for warfi ghting,” “trained for warfi ghting” principles. The goal is to integrate joint operations with warfi ghting models of individual services and establish evaluation and verifi ca- tion mechanisms, thus enhancing the quality of military doctrine. (3) To address factors such as the establishment of military strategic decision-making and command systems, anticipation of enemy military strategies, tactical philosophies and evolutions in principles of military maneuvers, etc., the practicability and appropriateness of joint operations doc- trine will be verifi ed through the Hanguang exercises and compiled to address the nature of Taiwan- Penghu defense operations. ----- 162 (4) From 2000 to 2005, the ROC Armed Forces have completed compilations of Guiding Prin- ciples for Joint Operations of the ROC Armed Forces and twenty types of joint operations doctrine, which are edited after annual validation from the various Hanguang exercises to meet practical needs. 102 joint operations doctrine provided by allied nations have been translated. Furthermore, relevant joint operations planning will be formulated to regulate command and control authorities and responsibilities, procedures and references for joint operations. The National Defense Univer- sity will be responsible for integrating joint operations training classes and establish a professional curriculum based on the practical needs of the Taiwan-Penghu defense operations, to enhance the joint operation capability of the ROC Armed Forces staffs. (5) To achieve the goal of “doctrine formalization at the completion of regimentation,” rel- evant joint staff, military service inspection, doctrine and training departments will be merged into inspection teams, focusing on areas such as Hanguang exercises, the Po-Sheng Program, newly established units and acquisition of new weapons equipment to monitor and understand the state of military doctrine development. IV. Joint Operations Force Buildup In recent years, under the guidance of “reducing quantity, improving quality” and “new high- tech” force restructuring developments, the PLA continues to enhance its missile deployments towards Taiwan and develop naval, air and joint operational capabilities. In response to the PRC's continuous military expansions and the resultant threats to Taiwan's security, the ROC Armed Forces are actively restructuring the organizational framework of military manpower, promoting all- out defense and consolidating joint operations effi ciency. Furthermore, the ROC Armed Forces will conduct in force restructuring planning in accordance with the development principles of “advanced technology taking the lead, information and electronic superiority, joint interdiction and homeland defense” and actively develop warfi ghting capabilities suffi cient for deterring hostile forces. **1. Increase Joint Consensus and Develop Joint Efficiency** Force construction planning of the ROC Armed Forces focuses on integrating and utilizing joint operations warfi ghting capabilities of the individual services. We will capitalize on measures such as sustained operation of joint operations mechanism, establishment of joint forces, enhance- ments in joint operations training, amendments in joint operations doctrine and validation through exercises. Further efforts will be made to integrate joint operations command-and-control, C4ISR ###### 09' ----- 163 software and hardware to enhance battlefield management and harness the full potential of joint operations effi ciency, in order to respond to the PRC's strategy of “ winning a campaign in a remote area quickly, and winning the fi rst campaign decisively” against Taiwan. **2. Joint Surveillance and Enhancing Battlefield Command and Control** After completion of the Po-Sheng Program, the MND will integrate battlefield intelligence from early warning aircraft, satellites, radars and warships forming tight joint surveillance and battlefi eld management platforms through the multi-layered communication network of the armed forces with shared battlefi eld imaging. This will enhance transparency in the surrounding maritime and air combat zones for Taiwan's peripheral areas, enhance effi ciency and survivability in the com- mand and control function of the joint operations command mechanism and thus benefi t the execu- tion of joint interceptions. **3. Fortify Joint Protection to Ensure Infrastructure** The preservation of the armed forces joint combat capability and its anti-special operations seek to maintain fundamental establishments in politics, economy, morale and military. Numerous “Hanguang Exercises” have testifi ed that each operational area has already completed contingency response measures of the infrastructures. In addition, by coordinating with the force deployment ad- justment per Jingjin Program, the armed forces can now effectively engage in anti-special operations against the enemy. Moreover, in order to locate critical nodes of protective targets, devise detailed protection efforts and ensure comprehensive combat capabilities, various operational areas have already designated effective contingency forces according to enemy threats, nature of protection tar- gets and mobility. For example, airports and naval ports will be mainly guarded by mechanized ar- mored troops, while the Army aviation and special forces will be stationed in the high mountains to counteract the enemy's special operations. The armed forces will also monitor precisely the frequen- cy and cycle of the PRC's satellite activities above Taiwan and the islets in peacetime and possible actions that may be taken by the PRC in wartime by way of “camoufl age,” “evacuation,” “cover,” “mobilization,” “operational redeployment,” and utilizing civilian fortresses. All these work to for- tify the protection efforts of infrastructures. **4. Long-range Precision Strikes and Destruction of the Enemies' Core Warfighting** **Capabilities** The construction of the deterrence capability of the ROC Armed Forces are aimed at weakening the enemies' combat capacity and stagnating or repelling enemy offensives. In the future, the unifi ed command of the Joint Operations Command Center integrated with air and electronic warfare func- ----- 164 tions will allow precision strikes, destruction, sabotage, paralysis and exhaustion of the fi rst-wave enemy offensive against Taiwan. Simultaneously, it can also ensure the mobility of the ROC Armed Forces, selection of targets which pose the greatest threat to Taiwan and thus utilizing joint opera- tions capability and integrated weapons systems effi ciency to gradually eliminate invading forces, making it the best strategic goal for source-deterring. **5. Joint Multi-Layered Interceptions for Secured Air Defense** The PLA's guided missiles are the greatest threats to Taiwan's air defense, so the ROC should actively develop low-altitude air defense artillery (ADA). After the completion of the networked command, control and surveillance systems for shared anti-missile joint engagement, it will pos- sess active “critical area defense” functions. Under the operational control of the Joint Operations Command Center, the current PAC-2 air defense missiles will be utilized in coordination with the planned purchase of PAC-3 air defense missiles to form a tight low-altitude pan-Taiwan anti-missile defense system. Also, we will also employ the air force's beyond visual range firepower and the navy's anti-air fi repower to establish a multi-layered anti-air interception network, utilize the multi- layered interception capabilities to protect the overall warfi ghting capability, thus ensuring Taiwan's naval and air spaces security. **6. Joint Counter-blockades to Annihilate the Enemy upon Landing** Navy's warfighting capability developments focus on missile-oriented ship weaponry, auto- mated command and control and 3-D anti-submarine operations. After the fi nal incorporation of the Keelung class vessels into the navy, the command and control effi ciency of the Maritime Joint Op- erations Command Center will be improved tremendously by simultaneously extending the opera- tional radius of the southern, northern and eastern sea-and-air regions. If diesel-electric submarines and long-range anti-submarine aircraft are acquired as planned, they can enhance anti-submarine functions and enable air combat management, sea-surface strikes and rapid mining functions. We will also incorporate sea-surface combat support groups, submarines, auxiliary warships and air and coastal fi repower to secure and maintain safe routes and carry out sea-and-air joint escort operations, which can effectively counter enemy blockade maneuvers and ensure access to international waters. **7. Elimination of Enemy Amphibious Landing Forces through Joint Firepower** Littoral areas are the weakest link of traditional amphibious operations. The Army will acquire mobile MLRS (multiple launch rocket system) to be employed in coastal areas, complemented with army aviation to extend the land-based anti-sea capabilities. With enhancements to the Army's joint operations command and control platform functions in all area commands, the joint warfighting ###### 09' ----- 165 capability will improve considerably. In terms of debarkation strikes and shoreline elimination as- saults, each area command can effectively combine naval and air power, army aviation attack heli- copters and precision-based fi repower to rapidly assemble joint fi repower to employ in nearby mari- time and coastal areas, so that enemy landing troops will not be able to conduct successful landings. **8. Rigid Information Security Protection, Ensure Information and Communication** **Security** Under the threats of information warfare from an organized “Net Army” by the PLA toward our critical military information systems, the ROC Armed Forces must construct rigid information and communication security protection mechanisms and capacities to ensure the normal operations of our critical command and control systems and communications and information infrastructures. The development strategies include constructing professional forces, acquire various equipment and systems, develop relevant doctrine, procedures and regulations, acquire key technology development capacity, strengthen communications and information security education, enhance relevant concepts and cultivate elite personnel, integrate joint operations command mechanisms, strengthening infor- mation and communications security contingency operations, enhancing mobilization readiness to integrate with the overall national information and communication security protection capacities. V. Joint Operations Exercises Enhancement “Integration of existing warfi ghting capabilities” is currently one of the critical MND initia- tives. The development and effective utilization of joint warfighting capabilities depends on the results of joint warfi ghting exercises in peacetime. Facing future challenges of “multi-dimensional battle space,” “all-out information and electronic warfare,” “non-contact combat engagements,” “all-out involvement warfare” and “unrestricted warfare,” the ROC Armed Forces have planned fi ve concrete measures to improve joint operations, which can be summarized as follows: **1. Improve Exercise Planning and Enhance Joint Warfighting Capabilities** To build on the accomplishments of the Hanguang No. 20 & 21 exercises and continue inves- tigation on enhancements for existing problems in combat readiness, the MND will focus on verify- ing the restructured organization, operating procedures and command and control capacity of the ROC Armed Forces joint operations command mechanism and evaluating defense operation readi- ness and the appropriateness of developments in the warfi ghting capability. The Hanguang No. 22 ----- 166 exercise were built on the results of the Hanguang No. 21, incorporate the organization restructuring of the Jingjin Program and actively enhance the applied knowledge and quality of the joint staff. Along with the schedule of the Po-Sheng Program, the MND will gradually enhance the joint opera­ tions command mechanism and battlefield management efficiency and more earnestly investigate potential problems within the military crises management mechanism and invite all departments to collectively deliberate on solutions. To effectively respond to threats of unlimited warfare from the PLA and the dangers of terrorism, the MND will collectively enhance homeland defense capabili­ ties, concentrate national strength and realize the all-out defense to ensure national security. **2. Expand Reserve Mobilization and Enhance Overall Warfighting Capabilities** Under the guidance of the “regulars for strikes, reserves for secure” principle and in coordina­ tion with progress in the Jingjin Program, military manpower will be separated into regular forces and reserves. Regular forces will handle rapid response combat and mobile strike missions. Reserves will handle disaster response and support and homeland defense. In 2005, Hanguang No. 21 exer­ cise mobilized a reserve brigade for the annual Hanguang and Tongshin exercises. Results have been verified to be positive. The 2006 plan calls for the enhancement of the coordination capabilities and operating mechanism for all agencies. Also included is the expanded mobilization of various types of reserves to validate mutual support operating mechanisms and operational guidelines. This is to enhance the all-out defense capabilities, thus enabling execution of broad-based homeland defense operations and thus ensuring national security. **3. Enhance System Performance and Support Validation through Exercises** Since the Hanguang No. 20 exercise, the ROC Armed Forces have introduced Joint Theater Simulation Systems from allied nation to conduct war games. Execution results show visible en­ hancements compared to the past. However, there is still considerable room for enhancement in meeting the needs in terms of Taiwan-Penghu defense operations environments and characteristics. To realize the management principles and concepts of the joint operations training system and con­ tinue enhancing the ROC Armed Forces' joint operations training results, we have initiated develop­ ments on an armed forces joint operations training management system that fulfills the requirements of Taiwan-Penghu defense operations. Through strict and detailed requirements, planning, execution and evaluation procedures in joint operations training and automated standard operating platforms, we will gradually implement the system from strategic executive levels to basic fighting units, in the hope to further perfect the ROC Armed Forces' joint operations training system, so as to improve joint operations training results and capability. Compared to previous years, it will better serve the needs of future battlefields and provide enhancements in joint operations capabilities. ###### 09' ----- 167 - Operation drills and exercises are carried out in order to precisely evaluate the efficacy of the armed forces' combat readiness training **4. Simplify Exercise Missions and Strengthen Basic Training** The Hanguang No. 22 fi eld exercise planned in 2006 has simplifi ed and merged with the an- nual joint operations exercises. Conceptualization for the second-stage computerized war game will continued. All troops will report exercise results under a unified conceptual framework, perform “preservation of warfi ghting capabilities,” “joint interceptions” and “homeland defense” procedures in the “synchronization throughout different locations” setting. All units are guided to implement the fi eld exercise by the Joint Operations Command Center to meaningfully assess the ROC Armed Forces' training results on combat readiness in order to enhance joint operations capabilities and ful- ----- 168 fill combat readiness tasks. **5. Improve Exercise Topics, Elevate Training Effectiveness** To effectively enhance the ROC Armed Forces' joint operations efficiency and fulfill the needs of future warfare, the ROC Armed Forces will continue assessing and improving joint operations ex­ ercise topics and implementation methods. Ineffective training classes will be eliminated and more flexible training methods will be applied. Also, to address to the Jingjin Program's second-stage warfighting capability developments and designations of regular and reserve troops, the ROC Armed Forces will assess comprehensively the utilization of current training grounds with consideration for more emphasis on the planning of troop training and training facility development. Other than fulfilling the needs for basic and special operations training, we will consolidate the utilization of existing resources to develop large, generalized, modernized, standardized and formalized training grounds for joint operations. The ROC Armed Forces will continue the purchasing of training simu­ lation instruments, enhance basic training requirements and use network and multimedia education to simulate battlefields. Verification of tactical training will be conducted through live exercises with increased training frequency to accumulate warfighting experiences in order to effectively increase joint operations training efficiency. ###### 09' ----- 169 ----- ----- ----- ----- 173 ----- 174 I. Consolidating Consensus for All-out Defense **1. Principles of All-out Defense** **(1) Conceptual Outline of All-out Defense** “All-out defense” refers to an aggregated national defense power derived by combining avail- able tangible weaponry and civilian resources and psychological willpower from both the military and the civilian regardless of peacetime or wartime, frontline or rear area. In other words, all-out defense takes national defense weaponry as core, all-inclusive defense as entity, and the national defense establishment as foundation. Therefore, “all-out defense” possesses the following proper- ties: fusion of peacetime and wartime defense functions, oneness of the military and the civilian, all- inclusive participation in defense with openness and transparency, fusion of national, civil, and psy- chological defense, fusion of defense and civilian technology, and fusion of tangible and intangible combat powers. **(2) Legal Sources of All-out Defense** To implement the principle of all-out defense, the ROC government has legislated several statutes to take this goal into effect. For example, the National Defense Act took effect on March 1, 2002, states in its Article 3: “The national defense of the Republic of China is of all-out national defense, involving affairs pertaining to military, civil defense and those in political, economic, psy- chological and technological domains, which may directly or indirectly contribute to the national defense.” The “Act of All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation,” enacted and promulgated on No- vember 14, 2001, is also a concrete step towards actualizing the principle of all-out defense. Since June 3, 2002, the Executive Yuan has also maintained a mobilization conference, formally initiating work on an all-out defense mobilization system that is vital to national security. Also, to further pro- mote a legal awareness of “all-out defense” and enhance Taiwan’s overall defense capabilities, the “All-out Defense Education Act” was enacted and promulgated on February 2, 2005, and offi cially took effect on February 1, 2006. All-out defense has so far been suffi ciently supported by the rule of law for most intents and purposes and will thus produce positive benefi ts in developing patriotism in the citizenry, actualizing all-out defense, and ensuring national security and the people's well-being. **(3) Recognition for All-out Defense** War affects not only military affairs but also various social spheres. In evolutionary peacetime, war and the patterns of security threats have also undergone remarkable changes. Therefore, defense has become closely related to national development and the people's lives and asset, and is no lon- ger for the sake of military actions and servicemen's responsibilities. Victory can only be achieved through consolidating power from the entire population. As our national defense establishment trims ###### 10' ----- and streamlines its regular military forces, it is of great importance to accumulate “large reserve forces” and push for the “integration of defense and industry” based on the Act of All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation. Moreover, it is to consolidate the people's willpower and actualize all-out defense through aggregating the power from the public. This type of all-out defense is based on es tablishing “tangible combat power” and “intangible psychological defense,” which take the political establishment as the foundation, military buildup as the core, economic development as the back bone and psychological establishment as the driving force. In this way, the “military and industry integration” policy will be realized, the nation's manpower, material and fi nancial resources will be effi ciently utilized, and defense preparations will be supported as to enhance the strength of all-out defense. **2. Building an Awareness for Potential Crisis** The greatest threat to Taiwan's national security comes from the PRC. Over the past several decades, the PRC has persisted with various political assaults and military threats, and has attempted to stir discord within Taiwan and isolated it diplomatically. Taiwan's people cannot take a chance to expect international assistance and friendly responses from the PRC. We need to actively consoli date our military establishment, integrate military-civilian power and raise the people's awareness of the notion that everyone is connected to and responsible for national defense and security, so that, in crises or war, we may consolidate the people's willpower to respond to threats against national secu rity. In recent years, the PRC has kept exercising its two pronged strategy (carrot and stick) toward Taiwan with the intent of obscuring identities of enemies and allies, causing our psychological com bat readiness to lapse, and thus “making Taiwan surrender without a war” and achieving its objec tive of peacefully incorporating Taiwan. In terms of the PRC's intangible military strategic intimida tion, they primarily rely on “three warfares” as their main thrust. As for the “legal warfare,” they refuse to abandon military options against Taiwan, but stipulated the Anti-Secession Law to serve their purpose of catalyzing unifi cation through legislation. As for “psychological warfare,” while the Anti-Secession Law evoked fi erce reactions from Taiwan, the PRC then actively pursued united front techniques to win approval from the public in Taiwan and divert their dissatisfaction with the Anti-Secession Law. As for “public opinion warfare,” the PRC, under the guise of a friendly foreign policy that seeks to “enrich, harmonize with and pacify neighboring countries” and, with many op portunities that arise from high-level diplomatic trips, has subliminally misguided international per ceptions and, by any means, fabricated reasonable justifi cations for its “unifi cation by force.” The “three warfares” waged against us by the PRC may be slightly different in terms of the ends and means concerned, but when used interchangeably, they all aim to shake our armed forces' 175 ----- At the same time, for the PRC of fensive moves that stresses “winning fensive moves that stresses “winning a campaign in remote areas quickly, a campaign in remote areas quickly, winning the fi rst campaign decisively”, winning the fi rst campaign decisively”, and rear area, servicemen and civilians. and rear area, servicemen and civilians. Everyone should take military and ci-Everyone should take military and ci Only by raising the public's aware-Only by raising the public's aware ness of potential crisis, establishing ness of potential crisis, establishing Taiwan be prevented, which will, in Taiwan be prevented, which will, in turn, solidify national security.turn, solidify national security. National security requires solid armed forces and the protection of armed forces and the protection of goal lies in the foundation of unani-goal lies in the foundation of unani mous support from the public. Ever mous support from the public. Ever since martial law was rescinded in since martial law was rescinded in Taiwan, the social atmosphere has Taiwan, the social atmosphere has 176 morale, disintegrate our people's mental defense, and mislead international perceptions. The ROC Armed Forces shall continue to collect and study the strategies and actions of the PRC's “three war- fares.” An example of such endeavor would be the “anti-three-warfares series” published by the Fu Hsing Kang College. All these work to expose the intentions and operational means of the PRC's “three warfares” against Taiwan, build an all-out psychological defense, correct international per- ceptions so as to actively increase the psychological and strategic capabilities of the professional political warfare units, and counter the non-violent attacks of the PRC's “three warfares.” ### Taiwan's All-out Defense - Establishing an **Awareness for Potential Crisis** **In the early years, the PRC, swearing that** **they would “bloodbath Taiwan,” mounted an** **assault as the KMT government in Taiwan had** **not fully stabilized. At that time, the entire** **nation's military and civilians agreed to repel** **the PRC at all costs, and harnessed unified and** **valiant morale amongst themselves to defeat** **invading forces. That we won the Gu Ning To** **victory and established half a century of stable** **development in Taiwan owed itself to the key** **factor of our determination to “live or perish** **with the island.”** **Half a century ago, we won in Gu Ning To** **and the battle of August 23, which not only** **destroyed the PRC's intention of invading Kin-** **men and Matzu and “militarily liberating”** **Taiwan, it also revealed to the world the PRC's** **military and expansionary ambitions. There** **is an ancient saying, “those who forget war** **will be in danger.” This means that if any na-** **tion becomes complacent and ignores enemy** **threats, it is liable to perish. The violent expe-** **rience from those before us told us that only** **by promoting the spirit of living and suffering** **together and raising awareness for potential** **crisis are we able to attain the greatest pro-** **tection for national survival, development and** **the people's well-being.** ###### 10' ----- 177 changed. Travel between Taiwan and the PRC is now frequent, and the general public has become desensitized in their awareness of the military threat. This has made many people in Taiwan forget that they are still in a “political and military standoff” and lack crisis awareness regarding national security, not knowing that the PRC is a constant threat to Taiwan in many different ways. Therefore, all-out defense plays a very important role in maintaining national security; estab- lishing awareness of all-out defense cannot afford any delay. However, in attempting to develop strong defense capabilities to ensure national security, not only do servicemen need to maximize their tangible combat capabilities, the entire population also needs to harness intangible psychologi- cal combat capabilities in order to prevent the nation from being defeated. II. Strengthening Belief in All-out Defense **1. Confidence in All-out Defense** Total mobilization of the all-inclusive defense is to put all-out defense into practice. To achieve all-out defense, the government has tabled the National Defense Act and the Act of All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation (Refer to Appendix 10-1, Administrative Conference System for All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation). We have followed the principle of “incorporating mobilization in policy implementation and assimilating combat readiness in economic infrastructure” and gradu- ally established a new mobilization framework that can effi ciently support military operation and also address basic civilian needs to satisfy all-out defense needs and thus solidify national security. All-out defense is implemented through the following areas: **(1) Awareness of All-out Defense through Education** Through school, social and community education, and implementation of on-the-job training from government agencies, the public can assess and recognize national and political values. And, through this consensus, we can enhance confi dence and the overall quality of the public, and consol- idate their psychological defense powers. Therefore, the MND actively promotes national defense education by designating each September 3 to be the all-out defense education day and coordinating various education plans and relevant activities in accordance with Article 6 of the All-out Defense Education Act: “The Legislative Yuan shall designate an All-out Defense Education Day and hold relevant events to enhance all-out defense education.” **(2) Incorporate Civil Defense Organizations to Maintain Awareness of Potential** **Crisis** Civil defense organizations are mandated to protect our homes, properties, and assist in the ----- maintenance of security. If they can hold the support and participation from the public during peacetime, they will be able to adequately sup Therefore, our objectives will be to incorporate civilian organizations to encourage public morale, support mil for potential crisis and readily train for and develop civilian defense capa tary and civil defense. **(3) Apply Reserve Troop Or-** Currently, every municipality has a reserve soldiers assistance cen ter, which, in peacetime, focuses on needed. In wartime, they can become the foundation for psychological nections and services can improve 178 # Switzerland's All-out Defense - Determina- **tion for All-out Defense Mobilization** **Switzerland is renowned for its long history** **of neutrality. It is located in central Europe and** **was frequently coveted by surrounding power-** **ful nations. But since the 19th century, it was** **able to keep its citizens away from several major** **wars in Europe, and this was not because of mere** **luck. Analyses show that a major factor lied in** **a defense policy that fuses military and civil-** **ian elements and delegates military power to the** **general public, harnessing high levels of defense** **powers as a result. Aggressors will thus consider** **the costs of invasion and hold their fire. Dur-** **ing World War II, Hitler's army planned to annex** **Switzerland after conquering France. However,** **at that time, the German military observed the** **depth of Switzerland's all-out defense and con-** **centrated morale combat powers, and estimated** **that an invasion of Switzerland would cost at** **least 1 million casualties. It then cancelled any** **plans of such invasions after weighing the costs** **and benefits.** **In the case of Swiss all-out defense, we can** **understand that the depth of Switzerland's all-** **out defense and concentrated morale combat** **power were built on the foundation of consen-** **sus on all-out defense and independence, which** **ensured national security. This is a policy that** **should be adopted by the ROC.** wartime performance in mobilization, disaster relief, propagation, social order and security work. **2. Significance of Morale Combat Power** Actualizing morale combat capability is a prerequisite for all-out defense and is equally impor- tant to soldiers and civilians alike in peacetime and wartime. Especially for a country that has never stepped away from the threats of war, we need to spiritually harness a awareness for potential crisis to coalesce the general public to defend against hostile threats, understand and recognize the impor- ###### 10' ----- 179 ### Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military thinker, had unique beliefs on harnessing **military morale combat power. He believed that leaders should demonstrate exem-** **plary behavior, instruct and test their troops on a personal basis, be the first to** **enter combat, and exercise courage and decisiveness so as to harness team spirit** **among their troops.** **Sun Tzu's Art of War stated, “Regard your soldiers as your children, and they** **will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons,** **and they will stand by you even unto death. If, however, you are indulgent, but un-** **able to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your com-** **mands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers may act** **like spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose,” and also, “The** **Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they** **will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.” This clearly il-** **lustrated that leaders need to exercise leadership through compassion and discipline** **to develop sufficient combat coordination skills and a family-like bond among the** **troops. They will then be able to exercise the maximum combat power through team-** **work when performing and accom-** **plishing real combat missions.** **The Prussian military thinker,** **Karl Von Clausewitz's greatest con-** **tribution to war theories is his em-** **phasis on psychological factors, such** **as his belief that the human “spir-** **it” is more important than con-** **cepts of war fronts and operational** **angles.** **The British military thinker, B.** **H. Liddell Hart, creator of “Strat-** **egy,” emphasized that strategy** **needs to understand effective na-** **tional mobilization of national eco-** **nomic and human resources, and also** **adequately account for the national** **morale power (i.e. educating the** **public to develop high degrees of mo-** **rale capacity). It is therefore evi-** **dent that enhancements in national** **morale capacities and qualities have** **significant effects on war.** ----- 180 tance of all-out defense and invest national resources into the defense establishment in order to be able to command strong combat capabilities in times of war. This is the most practical method of war prevention and ensuring national security through deterrents. **3. Benefits from Self-dependence and Self-help** Our national defense principle focuses on preparation for, prevention of, and elimination of war. Our national defense position is to avoid war by preparing for it. To achieve this goal, we need to recognize the only power to deter war and attain peace. Modernized defense is geared towards building a multi-dimensional, comprehensive and trustworthy defense with unanimous participation of the public. Only by harnessing consensus on all-out defense, utilizing the nation's complete com- bat powers and developing independent and confi dent defense infrastructures can we consolidate a self-suffi cient defense force. III. Building an All-dimensional National Defense **1. Political Establishment as Foundation** Democracy, freedom and human rights are basic values of Taiwan's foundation. Comprehen- sive democracy requires comprehensive defense. An impeccable defense mechanism is important for the protection of Taiwan's constitutional democratic system. Based on the value of constitutional democracy, legislation must be adopted to boost a sound defense system. After the National Defense Act and the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense took effect on March 1, 2002, “consolidation of military policy and command branches” has democratized and legalized the na- tional defense system, ensured civilian control of the military and clarifi ed jurisdictions, thus usher- ing in a new era for Taiwan's defense system. This important result indicates that the early stages of Taiwan's objectives in modernizing its defense establishment are completed. **2. Economic Establishment as Backbone** Overall national defense power relies on strong economic capacity as its backbone. Economic and national defense infrastructures are complementary to each other. Only a strong economic es- tablishment can support higher defense needs and boost investment confi dence among the general public and foreign investors to highly correlate with each other. The two are thus a strong cause and effect of one another. Therefore, a strong economic establishment is the backbone for defense, and national defense power is the guarantee for economic establishment. ###### 10' ----- **3. Psychological Establishment as Driving Force** All-out defense is based on constitutional, military, economic, and psychological establish ments. Peacetime training and military reserves from the public are meant to combine civilian with military elements, so that in times of war, we can encourage all-inclusive participation to achieve all-out defense. Therefore, in observing that all-out defense particularly emphasizes psychological strength, intangible defense and trust from the people, consolidation of mental defense or establish ing consensus or participation all rely on the application of education and public relations from the national defense agencies. For all-inclusive participation during wartime, we require effective appli cation of manpower, fi nancial and material resources. This requires group coordination, so that the application of ideological warfare, mass warfare and organizational warfare are the driving forces of psychological strength for all-out defense. **4. Military Establishment as the Core** In recent years, the armed forces have dedicated themselves to developing the modernization of defense capabilities and continued pushing for military refinement policies aimed at building armed forces with adequate numbers, high quality and strong combat power. We understand that only refi nements and consolidations in the armed forces' combat capabilities and preparations can guarantee victory over the enemy for national security. National security is not merely a duty of government policy; it is more closely connected to the entire military and civilian establishment. As the proverb says, “God helps those who help themselves.” Under the defense policy guideline of “war prevention, homeland defense, counter-terroism and contingency response,” the ROC Armed Forces have planned several major military procurements, which are not aimed at engaging in an arms race against the PRC, but are to enhance our own defensive and war-deterring capabilities. In light of the current urgency for military developments in national defense, unanimous military and civilian sup port are especially required to take the principles of all-out defense into practice. **5. Technological Research as Guidance** Facing current and future defense challenges, along with necessary military procurement from external sources, our nation's own defense technology research and development is also commis sioned to drive and enhance overall combat power. In response to the PRC's escalating military threats and changes in the nature of combat, such as information warfare, precision strikes, etc., the armed forces are in urgent need of high-tech defense establishments to enhance self defensive capa bilities. Under the current armament management system, the MND will integrate more comprehen sive and effective defense technology research management institutions to accelerate the participa tion of defense technology research from industrial, academic and research communities. Then, the 181 ----- MND will assist the industries to build on research results to promote the market ing of subsequent manufacture of military products to military agencies. This can bring about more business opportunities, fulfill modern citizen's responsibilities, and ensure shared participation in national defense construction and sustained na tional security. All-out defense is a concept that the government has been actively promoting government has been actively promoting in recent years. The basic principle is to in recent years. The basic principle is to raise the public's awareness for potential raise the public's awareness for potential crisis, harness solid willpower to protect crisis, harness solid willpower to protect the nation, actively participate in the na-the nation, actively participate in the na tional defense construction and solidify tional defense construction and solidify national defense powers. The spirit of national defense powers. The spirit of all-out defense is to apply tangible and all-out defense is to apply tangible and intangible resources from the public to intangible resources from the public to increase defense powers, deter the enemy increase defense powers, deter the enemy and ensure national security. Because and ensure national security. Because Taiwan-Penghu defense operations are of Taiwan-Penghu defense operations are of a defensive nature, if war breaks out in a defensive nature, if war breaks out in the future, there will be no distinction be-the future, there will be no distinction be tween military and civilian. Everyone re-tween military and civilian. Everyone re sisting the enemy together is a must. Vic-sisting the enemy together is a must. Vic tory means survival of nationhood; defeat tory means survival of nationhood; defeat means the opposite. The military and the means the opposite. The military and the civilian will live together or perish. There-civilian will live together or perish. There fore, we should establish comprehensive fore, we should establish comprehensive all-out defense systems early on through all-out defense systems early on through legislations and integration with politi-legislations and integration with politi cal, economic, military and psychological cal, economic, military and psychological elements, and strive for common causes elements, and strive for common causes in order to truly realize all-out defense. in order to truly realize all-out defense. 182 ### Israel's All-out Defense - Harnessing Pop- **ulation-wide Defensive Willpower** **At the founding of Israel, there was** **already a military policy that maintained** **strong reserve troops in addition to its** **regular troops. Reserve troops even became** **the main body of the Israeli military. Reserve** **mobilization became the core of Israel's all-** **out defense. Other than mobilization of com-** **batant, logistical support mobilization was** **also an important factor to the success of** **mobilization. Each level of the Israeli govern-** **ment's industrial and transportation depart-** **ments, local industries, hospitals and schools** **all have detailed mobilization plans, allowing** **all personnel and resources to be included.** **In the fourth Middle East war in 1973,** **Israel had sent 400,000 troops to the front** **line after 48 hours of mobilization, and** **among more than 1 thousand tanks destroyed,** **more than 700 were repaired in 10 days. This** **mobilization efficiency ultimately ensured** **the security of Israel. That Israel can main-** **tain stable development amidst the surveil-** **lance of large enemy forces is, at least in** **part, due to the development of awareness** **for all-out defense.** **From the case study of Israel's all-out** **defense, we can see the Israelis' support for** **an all-out defense consensus. They have high** **regard for the government, for supporting** **defense mobilization policies and for par-** **ticipating in defense establishment and their** **executions thereof, which guarantee national** **security.** ###### 10' ----- Facing the current environment, building consensus for all-out defense cannot be delayed. The foun dation of all-out defense is decided by socio-military relations. Only through healthy civil-military relations can the foundation be set for long-term national peace. Future developments on socio military interactions will be based on all-out defense principles. Conceptually, we will continue to incorporate majority public opinions with an open approach. Methodically, we will include abundant civilian resources into the national defense system, incorporate multi-partisan powers, actualize all out defense principles and enhance overall national combat power. 183 ----- ----- 185 ----- 186 I. Defense Industrial Cooperation Program Internationally, Industrial Cooperation Programs (ICP) are government acquisitions that require foreign contractors to perform technology transfers, domestic acquisitions and investments, coopera- tive research, personnel training, international sales and other such activities with reversed recipro- cal benefi ts amounting to a certain percentage of the procurement contract overall value, in order to promote the nation’s industrial and commercial developments. Concrete benefi ts from such activities can accelerate developments of domestic industries and lower life-cycle costs of the weapon systems and ensure capabilities for future equipment maintenance. In stimulating the private investment plan within the overall government economic revitaliza- tion planning, we will include ICP terms in the planning stage of procurement programs under the Sources Technologi- Domestic Domestic Sales Personnel Authenti- Joint condition that such terms will cal transfers investments procurement assistance training cation Research Percentage 50.2% 19.6% 16.6% 5.7% 4.1% 3% 0.9% not impact the acquisition of (%) military goods. The purpose Domestic procurement 16.6% is to build domestic industrial Authentication 3% capabilities and thoroughly Joint Research 0.9% elevate the domestic industries Personnel training 4.1% Technological transfers 50.2% and technology level.(Refer to Figure 11-1, Categorized Sales assistance 5.7% statistics of the application of Taiwan's ICP credits) Domestic investments 19.6% **1. Sources of ICP Credits** - Figure 11-1 Categorized statistics of the application of Taiwan’s ICP **and Execution Results** credits ICP credits are managed by the Ministry of Economic Af- ### US dollar/credit point: when governments use fairs and distributed to various **foreign purchase opportunities to demand that** domestic government agencies **foreign contractors provide a certain ratio of the** and private firms after negotia- **purchase contract's total value in order to engage in** **reversed reciprocal benefit activities in the country,** tions within the inter-departmen- **the converted value of this proportion is called the** tal Executive Committee for **“industrial cooperation credit”, which is measured** Industrial Cooperation Programs. **in “US dollar/credit point”, which is not an actual** From 1988 to 2005, major for- **currency, but, rather, “promised values.”** eign purchases from govern- ###### 11' ----- 187 Credits: hundred millions of US dollar/credit point **6000** **5000** A total of 50 foreign firms from 12 countries, for total ICP credits of **4000** The Executive Yuan approved the 6.94 US dollar/credit point. ICP Promotion Organization. The first ICP agreement The Government Procurement **3000** signed by Yingtai corps. Act took effect. (Authorized by CAL) **2000** 246 **1000** **77** **78** **79** **80** **81** **82** **83** **84** **85** **86** **87** **88** **89** **90** **91** **92** **9393** **94** `年 度` - Figure 11-2 Total Acquired ICP Credits in Recent Years ment departments and private sectors involved signing over 80 industrial cooperation contracts with over 50 international corporations in 12 countries, including the United States (US), receiving approximately 6.94 billion US dollar/credit point. There have been concrete results in building ICP operational mechanisms, target setting, regulation implementation, industrial rewards policies and scheduled progress (Refer to Figure 11-2, Total Acquired ICP Credits in Recent Years). Defense procurement contracts have provided 4.9 billion US dollar/credit point in ICP credit, totaling 71% of total credits (Refer to Figure 11-3, Sources of ROC ICP Credits [by Ministry]). The ROC Armed Forces have used this feedback mechanism to receive over 30 implementation benefi ts, represent- ing 23% of Taiwan's total Ministry of Environ- received credits (Refer to Sources MND agenciesCivilian Ministry ofEconomicAffairs Communi-Transport-ation and the InteriorMinistry of ProtectionAdministr-ment cations ation Figure 11-4, Utilization [by Percentage(%) 71% 10% 10% 7% 1% 1% Sector] of ICP Credits in Ministry of the Interior 1% Environment Protection Administration 1% Ministry of Transportation and Communications 7% Taiwan). Most of the credits are used in domestic indus- Ministry of Economic Affairs 10% tries to enhance industrial competitiveness. They can Civilian agencies 10% Ministry of National Defense 71% also be directly applied to defense technology research plans, which are beneficial for raising the country's do- mestic technological profi le. Therefore, not only inte- - Figure 11-3 Sources of ROC ICP Credits (by Ministry) ----- catalyze industrial, economic and social Academic agencies 1% prosperity, making it an optimum op­ portunity for the prospective domestic firms. **2. ICP Planning for Major De­** **Expected Benefits** The MND conducts ICP planning 188 For-profit Military Research Government Academic Sources agencies agencies agencies agencies agencies Percentage 60% 23% 10% 6% 1% (%) Academic agencies 1% Military agencies 23% Government agencies 6% For-profit agencies 60% Research agencies10% - Figure 11-4 Utilization (by Sector) of ICP Credits in Taiwan Article 22 of the National Defense Act, “When it is necessary to pursue external procurement, the acquisition activities shall realize technology transfer policy…” and the guidance of “ICP credits from defense procurements must be utilized in defense” by the Legislative Yuan. ICP credits plan­ ning, utilization and expected benefits of major military procurement programs are stated as follows: (1) In May 2004, the Executive Yuan approved three major military investment plans for PAC-3 air defense missile system, P-3C long-range fixed-wing ASW aircraft and diesel-electric submarines. The designated ICP credits for each individual investment are 50% for the PAC-3 air defense mis­ sile system, 70% for the P-3C long-range fixed-wing ASW aircraft and 40% for the diesel-electric submarines. The MND has completed the assessment of ICP requirement items based on the actual needs and the expected benefits will be in further enhancements of our defense technology capaci­ ties. (2) If the three major military acquisitions successfully enter the procurement stage, it is expected to generate over 6 billion US dollar/credit point in commercial opportunities, which is approximately equal to the accrued ICP credits since 1988. The credits will first be assigned for defense industry development. Remaining credits can be applied to national strategic technology in­ dustries such as aerospace, shipbuilding, information and communications, medicine, biotechnology and other high value-added key industries. If appropriately managed, the ICP credits produced by these three military contracts can overwhelmingly stimulate the domestic economy. (3) To properly utilize the designated 70% ICP credits of the Po-Sheng Program (approximately 749 million US dollar/credit point), the execution of the ICP program will be carried out using the protégé strategy. The prime contractor will cooperate with major domestic communication firms which will lead other smaller subcontractors to form industrial clusters for the defense industry. This strategy will facilitate the integration of capacities from defense technology industrial organizations ###### 11' ----- and domestic communications and information technology industries and set the foundation for the design, integration development and employment of large C[4]ISR systems. The leverage values pro vided by the large amount of ICP credits in the future can elevate domestic defense technology ca pabilities and accelerate development of armament systems compatible with the existing industries. We are optimistic with the future development of Taiwan's defense industry. **3. Future Emphasis** According to the MND's ICP operation regulation, it requires at least 40% or above ICP credit feedbacks, in each military investment case which exceeds $5million.To effi ciently utilize ICP cred its and ensure foreign contractors' fulfi lling their ICP promises, MND will be involved in the overall ICP planning as soon as the military acquisition procedures start. All units within the ROC Armed Forces are prohibited from signing any FMS (Foreign Military Sales) Letter of Offer and Accep tance (LOA) or commercial contracts unless they obtain a signed Letter of Undertaking between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the prime contractor has been obtained. The above condition can only be ignored if the signing of the Letter of Undertaking severely affects the schedule of the acqui sition. The legal binding of the Letter of Undertaking will ensure foreign contractors enforce their commitments and the proper execution of the ICP benefi ts. In the meantime, the MND will devise “ICP integration mechanisms” jointly with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and establish databases of required items to increase execution effi ciency. Planned future developments include: **(1) Increase Percentage Allocation of Technology Transfers** The acquisition of key technologies is critical in constructing a self reliant defense and in dustrial technology upgrades. Defense policy is to continue the gradual increase of percentage in technology transfer to aid domestic defense industrial organizations in acquiring and developing key technologies. **(2) Assist Domestic Firms in Establishing Relevant Maintenance Capacities** In the future, the ROC Armed Forces will focus on developing and maintaining core capaci ties and gradually rely on the private sector to promote defense technology industries. Therefore, when maintenance of certain weapon system is deemed to be more effective than contracted out to private fi rms, we will use ICP opportunities to demand that foreign contractors assist domestic fi rms in establishing relevant weapon systems repair capabilities. The goal is to stimulate enhancements in personnel, technology and equipment capacities and enhance research, manufacture and repair capa bilities of military equipment in Taiwan. **(3) Acquire Relevant Technologies and Management Knowledge through Coop-** **erative Production with Contractors** Recent international trends in ICP execution are leaning toward joint ventures or cooperative 189 ----- 190 production. Contractors' intent for cooperative production will be strengthened through measures such as market development, labor costs and subsequent demands while buyers can acquire product- specific technologies or develop related products. Therefore, we intend to introduce important technologies through cooperative production models and thereby enhance the technology levels of domestic industries. **(4) Obtain Integration Technologies through Shared Research** Shared research is an effective strategy in procuring design and system integration technolo- gies, but usually at a greater cost to the buyers. If shared research is carried out through an ICP, contractors' costs can be partly covered by the reversed reciprocal ICP benefi ts. Therefore, it allows us to procure important design knowledge and system integration technologies from original foreign contractors and dramatically lower relevant domestic costs of industrial research and development. **(5) Enhance Research Capacity to Gain Leverage in Key Technology Inter-** **change** Weapons systems acquisitions of the ROC are carried out simultaneously through channels of R&D and procurement. Normally, when our capability in certain technology reaches a certain threshold, our chances of acquiring weapon systems using related technologies will be higher. Therefore, we will continue our focus on raising research capacities and to capitalize on ICP op- portunities, in hopes of establishing bargains to exchange key technologies or purchasing advanced weapon systems. II. Military-Civilian Transferable Technology Modern technologies have significant influence over national security and the economy. To achieve scopes and economies of scale, a reasonable and necessary approach is making research on military and civilian transferable technology one of our major technology development strategies, especially when dealing with the recent government budgetary shortfalls and increasing costs of re- search on military equipment. **1. Planning Concept** Defense industry is an important indicator of industrial capability for modern nations. Further- more, the defense industry possesses characteristics of technology-centric, high value-added and broad industrial connectivity. For many years, research in Taiwan's defense industry involved little direct participation from domestic private companies due to the demands for high quality but low ###### 11' ----- quantity goods. In recent years, defense budgets have gradually decreased. The MND still needs to develop portions of weapon systems and equipment required by the individual services under the budget constraints to replenish or replace defi ciencies in weapons procured from the international market. In order to lower costs, it has become necessary to support military equipment manufacture by domestic private sectors. To capitalize on the private sector's high effi ciency and low costs, the Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) under the MND's Armaments Bureau will provide assistance in design and quality control. By encouraging technology enhancements in pri vate sector industries through joint cooperation, we can establish a more self-reliant defense indus try for the nation. It can also integrate and provide more weapons systems equipment needed by the ROC Armed Forces due to the lowered production costs and shortened R&D schedules. **2. Past Accomplishments** **(1) Professional Technology Service and Promotion** The CSIST will open its three campuses in Taichung, Chingshan and Longyuan to provide and facilitate comprehensive dual-use technologies. The Taichung and Longyuan campuses provide innovation and incubation centers to participating companies. The Longyuan campus is currently working with the Ministry of Transportation and Communications in the “Taoyuan-Longyuan Mo bile Communications Center” project and has currently registered 33 companies. Over 2,000 people visited the campuses annually in 2004 and 2005 and there have been over 100 technology R&D workshops. There are, on average, some 400 technology service contracts and cooperation plans val ued at approximately NT$ 100 million. Using the research manpower and environment in Longyuan as incentives, we are actively recruiting companies to setup in the research park and successfully forming an industrial cluster. Currently, we have signed a strategic partnership with the Longtan Hope Campus to develop the Longtan Twin Star Project. In the future, we will actively integrate with surrounding technology and industrial parks to form a complete value chain from research, de velopment, production, and testing to fi nal certifi cation. These efforts will provide further assistance in the formation of the defense industry cluster. **(2) Technology Development Programs** From 2002 to 2005, CSIST has accumulated 537 academic and industrial cooperation and technology transfer projects, 403 patent applications, 255 patents, 58 patented applications and 200 items involved in private business investments. CSIST successfully led industry to invest ap proximately NT$ 9 billion, resulting in a production value of over NT$ 30 billion. There are over 40 instances of privatization in traditional, high-tech and defense industries. (Refer to Appendix 11-1, Case Studies of Industrial Results from Specialized Technological Projects Coordinated with the Ministry of Economic Affairs) 191 ----- **(3) Establishing System of Cen-** **tral-Satellite Factories for De-** **fense Industries** An MND project cooperated with Public and Private Military Industries.” Through open channels of research, repairing military products and 5,492 types of military equipment. The estimat directly benefi t stimulating the domestic economy and increasing internal demand. **(4) Results from the 2005 Taipei** **and Technomart** 192 ### Technology Development Programs: **CSIST, under the Armaments Bureau, par-** **ticipates in the Ministry of Economic Af-** **fairs' Technology Development Programs,** **where they apply their experiences in defense** **technology research and system integration** **to assist traditional industries and small and** **medium businesses in upgrading and trans-** **formation. Combine with existing niches in** **the development of civilian products with** **economic in scales, and assist companies in** **the research and manufacture of military** **goods. This will assist in execution of policies** **such as the “National Establishment Plan”** **and the “Economic Stimulation Project.”** **Through expansions and exchanges in military** **and civilian dual-use technology capabilities,** **military and civilian technologies can mutu-** **ally complement each other to establish an** **all-out defense system and catalyze overall** **national economic developments.** The 2005 Taipei International Invention Show and Technomart was held in coordination with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, with nine major themes: bicycles, wafer grinding and manufactur- ing, automotive safety devices, self-service printing devices, photo-catalysts and paints, fi reproof materials, unmanned aircraft, military and police dual-use devices and fi refi ghting equipment, nano- technology microstructures and medicine-producing methodologies. There were an estimated 159 patents and results from Technology Development Programs deemed to be commercially valuable. We assist in the enhancement of industrial capabilities by transferring these technology capacities to the industries. **3. Future Development Plans** We will continue our cooperation with the Ministry of Economic Affairs' dual-use technology development program privatization plans to assist domestic firms in technology research and in- novations, expand operational effi ciencies of industrial service and catalyze formation of defense industry clusters. We will also form strategic partnerships with relevant domestic research and academic organizations and industry fi rms. Through assistance from external capacities in search ###### 11' ----- 193 - Military and civilian transferable technology is one of the major strategies in national technology development of partnerships for cooperation, we will improve mutual capabilities to create win-win situations. We will establish spin-off companies according to plan and aggressively assess every possible case. We will devise business strategies, models and courses of action; vitalize organizational functions and manpower utilization of the MND's technology research division. This will quickly raise our industrial technology levels and accelerate developments in industries required by the ROC Armed Forces. We will also establish international cooperation, actively expand and form strategic partner- ships with foreign agencies, and enhance our overall competitiveness. III. Building Defense Industrial Base In the early days, the ROC Armed Forces needed to maintain self-reliant capacities for combat readiness due to lack of domestic technology capabilities and funding. However, with changes in strategic thinking and technology advancements, there is an urgent need to integrate with the private sector to modernize national defense to maximize the application effi ciency of the nation's overall resources. Therefore, the MND has adhered to the spirit of the Two Defense Acts and completed var- ious privatization plans of national defense resources and relevant measures according to the Execu- tive Yuan's policy of expanding domestic needs and market stimulation. We will strive to complete ----- planning and relevant measures to privatize national defense resources so that it is from the people and for the people. We will inject demands to the domestic markets through these privatization ef­ forts to improve technology levels. Also, Taiwan's private sector has made notable progress on de­ velopments in information, communications and electronics reaching international levels. Therefore, we will capitalize on this niche, combine private sector capabilities into defense and strive for a self reliant defense, in the hopes of creating an all-out defense with popular backing from our society. Planning for the privatization of defense resources is based on the concept of increasing the percentage of defense budgets to be used in domestic industries, which can effectively increase incentive for private sector participation in the defense establishment and assist industrial and eco­ nomic developments nationally. Other than continuing to direct general military demands to domes­ tic markets, non-core maintenance capacities for existing weapons will all be privatized. The ROC Armed Forces itself will not establish any capacities. If new weapons systems can be manufactured by the private sector, international sources will not be considered. We will strive for lower military engagements, lower foreign procurement expenditures and increased privatization budgets to adjust Since 2002, we were generally able to satisfy our privatization goals. In 2005, we also achieved our privatization goal of NT$ 59.9 billion and we will strive to complete the following major long Based on the IDF fighter jet, the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation has been contracted to carry out projects to improve fuel capacity, pilot control, electronic warfare and self defense capabilities, etc. Annual privatization from 2001 to 2007 is expected to be valued at over Construction for 30 new speedboats is planned to replace existing vessels. Annual privatization Production for 9000 units is planned. Annual privatization from 2004 to 2009 is expected to be Manufacture for more than 15,000 units is planned. Annual privatization from 2004 to 2009 is 194 **1. Strategic Planning of Privatization** deployment of national defense resources, in order to increase domestic privatization. **2. Implementation Results** term privatization projects: **(1) Research and manufacture of military aircraft** NT$1 billion. **(2) Manufacture of large guided missile speedboats** from 2005 to 2010 is expected to be valued at over NT$4.3 billion. **(3) Light and medium armored vehicles** valued at over NT$ 3 billion. **(4) Manufacture and maintenance of frequency-hopping radios** ###### 11' ----- expected to be valued at over NT$1.7 billion. **(5) Strategic commercial maintenance of military aircrafts** Complete outsourcing for commercial maintenance is planned for nineteen items includeing the ATEC5000 avionics test platform. Two additional items, including F-16s, will have complete com mercial maintenance arrangements prior to the end of 2006. Annual privatization from 2003 to 2011 is expected to be valued at over NT$3.5 billion. **(6) Strategic commercial maintenance of military warships** Complete trial run for commercial maintenance on three types of warships including the Cheng Kung class frigate. Privatization value is expected to be more than NT$ 2 billion. **3. Direction of Future Executions** **(1) Encourage domestic research and manufacture of military equipment** The Major Equipment programming procedure for weapon system acquisition will be modifi ed with joint development of the “Regulation for evaluation of military equipment acquisition through domestic production capacity” by the MND and Ministry of Economic Affairs. Any weapons that can be manufactured domestically will not be procured from foreign sources. **(2) Enhance ICPs from foreign procurement** To ensure the transferring of key technologies and upgrade the level of domestic defense tech nology industry developments, foreign purchase contracts over US$ 5 millions will require the signing of ICP Letter of Undertaking by the primary contractor for obligation of ICP tasks. The em phasis will be on technology transfer to domestic fi rms focusing on subsequent research, production, maintenance and repair capacities as major ICP items. **(3) Continue pushing for strategic commercial maintenance** The ROC Armed Forces will continue the overall planning for commercial maintenance of mil itary aircraft and warships with accelerated planning on the push for land-based military equipment commercial maintenance. The aim is to establish long-term commercial maintenance partnerships with domestic fi rms. **(4) Government-owned and contractor-operated (GOCO) transformation of** **military factories** The MND has completed the GOCO transformation of the 302 military outfi ts manufacturing factory of the Armament Bureau and the aircraft maintenance plant of the Air Force 2[nd] Logistics Area Command. In the future, we will still focus on privatizations of low-sensitivity but highly dual usable military factories (e.g. Waste Ammunition Processing Centers of Combined Logistics and Printing Presses of the Armaments Bureau, etc.) based on the results of the privatization efforts. **(5) Develop dual-use technologies** 195 ----- 196 We will integrate technology superiorities from the private sectors including advanced technol- ogies in information, electronics and mechanical engineering, etc. and expand dual-use technology programs. We will transfer technologies to fi rms allocated in the CSIST's campuses and accelerate strategic partnerships between CSIST and the private sector to form spin-off companies. This will fulfi ll the purpose of military-civilian interchanges and enhance the country's overall technology ca- pabilities. IV. Base Realignment Planning In the process of integrating the restructuring of overall military manpower and the yields from nation-wide land development, issues such as base utilization, construction of training grounds and building restrictions in military zones have impacted the developments of local communities. For balance in developments of national security, regional developments and social needs, based on the concept of “nurturing combat readiness in economic development,” the MND has reevaluated the utilization of military estate under the condition of minimum national security requirements and zero impacts on combat readiness. Adequate adjustments have been made on military deployment and facilities with diminishing restricted construction zones. We will base our planning on the three dimensions of “reassessing and consolidating camps,” “overall planning of training grounds” and “reassessment of outpost and restricted military construction zones.” Comprehensive assessments on the effi ciencies of the overall utilization of military real estate will be conducted to promote regional economic prosperity, encourage urban development, protect citizens' legal rights and fully integrate the military with the society. **1. Implementation Concept** Based on the principle of striving for consistency between peacetime and war time, we will in- tegrate prioritized defense objectives and training grounds and reassess and merge all small training grounds through the guidelines of “merging small camps with large ones” and “one base for all three services.” We will also focus on building and development of suitable joint service training grounds. Those with no combat readiness impacts will be evaluated for deregulation or relinquishment. **2. Planning Goals** The plan is separated into three stages within 5-year from the start of the planning till the end of 2009. More than 2,026 hectares of land will be released and more than 2,937 hectares will be ###### 11' ----- 197 deregulated. (Refer to Figure 11-5, Overall Planning on the Utilization, Release and Deregulation of Military Real Estate) Outposts and Stages Camps Training Grounds Restricted Areas Short term 171 locations 23 locations 6 locations (before 2005) 328.39 Hectares 153.7 Hectares 1003.3722 Hectares Mid-term 307 locations 47 locations 31 locations (before 2007) 555.76 Hectares 204.16 Hectares 1934.1078 Hectares Long term 131 locations 15 locations 0 locations (before 2009) 528.88 Hectares 219.49 Hectares 0 Hectares Total 694 locations 37 locations 2026.38 Hectares 2937.48 Hectares - Figure 11-5 Overall Planning on the Utilization, Release and Deregulation of Military Real Estate **3. Expected Benefits** (1) The MND has requested all area commands (defense commands, garrison commands) to assess prioritized defense objectives within their areas of responsibilities in case of domestic emer- gency responses (anti-terror) incidents and implement prioritized defense preparation missions for sensitive areas that may be critical to the overall national security. Mission preparations have been completed to drastically increase our domestic emergency response capabilities and benefi t the gov- ernment's anti-terror efforts. (2) There are 694 relinquished bases occupying 2,026 hectares of land. They will be returned to their previous owners or local governments, or through the legal procedure “transfer” to the Na- tional Property Bureau to allow effi cient land use. Resultant benefi ts can improve the fi nances of the nation, support military buildup and combat readiness and increase overall combat capabilities of the ROC Armed Forces. (3) After releasing 45 small training grounds, we can effectively eliminate civil complaints and address the issue of local developments. The completion of large joint training grounds in the north- ern, central and southern regions in the future will be benefi t the development of universal, modern- ized, mechanized and standardized training, creating multiple win-win situations for the govern- ment, regional districts and the ROC Armed Forces. (4) After the ease of building restrictions near important military facilities, there will be 2,937.48 hectares of deregulated lands effectively ensuring the legal rights of our citizens, encouraging re- gional developments and addressing the needs of major national developments and defense needs. ----- 198 V. Civil Support Operation Defense affairs execution is part of the overall government policy. Therefore, the ROC Armed Forces are closely connected with the society. In terms of all-out defense, the key is the gathering of public opinion and the utilization of the morale of our citizens. In terms of social development, military personnel and resources can provide timely and needed support for our society which is especially important for disaster relief or disease prevention as long as combat readiness is not com- promised. Therefore, peacetime military-civilian interactions and suffi cient information interchange can establish a military-civilian operational model and increase the recognition and support of our citizens toward defense affairs. **1. Disaster Relief** **(1) Policy Planning** To strengthen disaster relief mechanisms and functions, the ROC Armed Forces will deploy military assistance when major disasters occur in accordance with the provisions in the Disaster Prevention and Response Act and the Application Procedure for Requesting Armed Forces Disaster Relief. The ROC Armed Forces will conduct disaster support duty in the sympathy with the victims as soon as the incidents occur. We will try to limit property damage or personnel casualties of our citizens as long as such disaster relief efforts do not compromise our combat readiness, damage the command and control system of the ROC Armed - The armed forces engages in disaster relief at the first Forces or overburden their support ca- available opportunity pacities. **(2) Implementation Results** In 2005, the ROC Armed Forces' Disaster Response Center successfully accomplished all mis- sions assigned by the Central Disaster Response Center. It performed 6 major disaster support mis- sions during the 0612 fl ood, the Haitang, Martha, Terry and Longwang typhoons and 158 generic emergency support missions. It assigned a total of 53,182 personnel, 2,375 vehicles, 708 sorties of aircraft, 253 sets of disinfectors, 125 unit water pumps, 290 vessels and 5 rubber boats to those ef- forts. It has evacuated 533 refugees, assisted and medicated 889 injured citizens, cleared out 18,105 ###### 11' ----- 199 From Jan, 1, 2005 to May, 31, 2006 Disaster Relief Resources Devoted ``` Incidents Days ``` Personnel Vehicles Aircrafts Boats 0612 Flood `10` `10,203` `609` `0` `4` Haitang Hurricane `11` `16,623` `543` `37` `0` Martha Hurricane `4` `3,107` `155` `0` `1` Terry Hurricane `4` `5,238` `188` `1` `0` Longwang Hurricane `3` `1,620` `263` `0` `0` Pearl Hurricane `5` `226` `18` `0` `0` General Rescue Missions `114` `16,165` `599` `670` `285` Total `151` `53,182` `2,375` `708` `290` - Figure 11-6 Major disaster relief missions supported by ROC Armed Forces tons of waste, cleaned 1,723 km of roads and sewage pipes, pumped out 7.98 million tons of fl ood water, used 58,050 sandbags, transported 102 tons of civilian material, cleaned 289 classrooms, activity centers, parks and homes for elderly persons living alone, repaired 530 meters of dams, dis- infected 146 square kilometers of environment and built 2 Bailey bridges and 1.5 km of makeshift roads. In the future, the ROC Armed Forces will continue assisting all levels of the government and performing various disaster relief works to minimize the losses of disaster-struck regions. Also, to alleviate the greater Taoyuan region's water shortages caused by typhoons, from April 12, 2006, the ROC Armed Forces built the upstream section of Lofu bridge for the Shihmen Reservoir in co- ordination with the Northern Water Resources Offi ce of the Ministry of Economic Affairs' Water Resources Agency and it was completed by May 18, 2006. It removed 124,465 cubic meters of silt, exceeding original expectations (it removed 50,000 cubic meters of silt before the end of May 2006) by 200%. After completing the Shihmen Reservoir mission, the ROC Armed Forces adequately per- formed silt removal work in severely silt-damaged areas, as commanded by the fourth conference of the Executive Yuan's Gravel Supply Task Force on May 15, 2006, without compromising troop training and daily operations.(Refer to Figure 11-6, Major disaster relief missions supported by ROC Armed Forces) **2. Maintaining Public Security** **(1) Policy Planning** ----- Based on the Criminal Litigation Act, the Regulations on Assigning Law Enforcement Person­ nel and regulations on military police support, in efforts to assist law enforcement agencies maintain public security, the ROC Armed Forces will strive to be alert at all times, negate damage from disas­ ters, restore order as soon as disturbances happen and prevent subsequent disturbances from occur­ ring. We will join efforts with the police and administrative systems to develop comprehensive early warning functions and setup a foundation for anti-terrorism, to ensure the safety of our society and From 2005 till May 31, 2006, we have assisted with 1,173 criminal investigations, arrested 2,154 suspects, captured 354 military deserters, disciplined 13 gangsters, uncovered 63 cases of stowaway Mainlanders, 58 stowaway fugitives, confiscated 206 articles of firearm, 1,715 rounds of ammuni­ tion, 212 cases of illegal substances (1,313,872 grams of heroine, 5,880.18 grams of amphetamine, 162.1 grams of marijuana, 145.68 grams of Ecstasy and 268,108.41 grams of ketamine) and pros­ ecuted 376 drug traffickers. In terms of assisting forensic investigations, the Forensic Investigation Center under the Military Police Command has undertaken 4,341 assignments supporting military justice and law enforcement agencies in forensic investigation cases for material evidence. It has To properly care for the environment and natural resources, we will actively cooperate with resource recycling, treatment and prevention of public pollution, maintenance of biodiversity and sustainable environmental development. The ROC Armed Forces will also enforce relevant envi­ ronmental and ecological protection in accordance with all pollution prevention and treatment and We will cooperate with the Promotion Plan for Green Purchases approved by the Executive Yuan and actively promote purchases of certified environmentally safe products. In 2005, expen­ ditures on environmentally safe products shire 83.6% of overall expenditures of the ROC Armed Forces. To improve garbage classification and disposal in the ROC Armed Forces, we have fully cooperated with garbage classification measures and contracted local environmental government agencies or publicly or privately owned waste disposal agencies approved by the Environmental Protection Administration to perform disposal work. We hope that this will decrease waste pollution 200 the nation. **(2) Implementation Results** made considerable contributions towards maintaining public safety. **3. Environmental Protection** **(1) Policy Planning** ecological protection legislation. **(2) Implementation Results** a. Waste Disposal and maintain environmental quality. b. Treatment and Prevention of Water Pollution ###### 11' ----- We will continue the operation and maintenance of waste (polluted) water treatment facili ties in all hospitals, military factories, ports and logistics depots in the ROC Armed Forces to deal with various industrial and civil water pollution to ensure water quality. We will revise the MND's Response Plan for Major Maritime Oil Pollution Incidents in accordance to the Executive Yuan amended national Emergency Response Plan for Major Maritime Oil Pollution and regularly renew relevant system information for emergency response for major pollution according to the ROC Armed Forces' marine pollution response support capacity to maintain normal operations of commu nication and response for marine pollution. c. Noise Control To decrease noise pollution due to military aviation operations, we will strengthen our control on fl ight training and testing except for emergency combat missions. We will also take environmen tal fl ight routes to avoid passing through densely populated areas. On January 1, 2005, the Principles for Managing Aerial Noise Enhancement Funds for Military Airports Provided to county (city) gov ernments by the Ministry of National Defense came into effect. Funding has been budgeted to subsi dize county and city governments where the Civil Aviation Authority is located to provide assistance to their noise prevention and treatment efforts. d. Biodiversity The ROC Armed Forces published the “Promotion of Biodiversity—Treatment and Prevention Plan for Invading Fire Ants” plan and set up communication systems for fi re ant activities, military fi re ant information websites, and strengthed efforts in fi re ant detection, monitoring, treatment and prevention. We also held four training and lecture sessions in the northern, central, southern and eastern regions for biodiversity and fi re ant treatment and prevention. We trained 463 instructors to better cooperate with the government's work in warding off fi re ants. 201 ----- ----- 203 ----- 204 I. Implementing All-Out Defense Education To improve the people's knowledge and consensus of all-out defense, refi ne defense develop- ments and ensure national security, the All-Out Defense Education Act was promulgated on Feb- ruary 2, 2005 and was to be implemented within a year of its promulgation. It is not only a major component of all-out defense implementation but is also an effective strategy against the PRC's “three warfares.” All-out defense education consists of 4 categories. They are school education, governmental on-the-job training, social education and protection of defense artifacts, publication and education. The All-Out Defense Education Act designates the MND as the central competent authority with coordination from the Ministry of Education, Central Personnel Administration, Civil Service Pro- tection and Training Commission, Council for Cultural Affairs, Government Information Offi ce and all special municipality and county (city) governments in implementing all-out defense education. The MND had completed the “Implementation Plan for the All-Out Defense Education Act” in July 2005. It also coordinated with all relevant agencies to complete all preparation work for implemen- tation by October of the same year so that implementation could offi cially commence after the All- Out Defense Education Act came into effect in February 2006. **1. Planning the Implementation of All-Out Defense Education** **(1) School Education** Safety and disaster prevention education and fi eld trips to military sites, defense artifact mu- seums, or military history parks will be added for junior high schools and elementary schools. In senior and vocational high schools, defense-related political, economic, technological and psycho- logical education with various field trip activities will be added. In universities, defense general knowledge courses will be built; defense security, all-out defense mobilization, cross-strait relations, and defense-related political, economic, technological and psychological education will be added. **(2) Governmental On-the-Job Training** Depending on the nature of the civil servant's job, lectures on defense organization, cross-strait relations, military exchanges, defense resources, defense economics, defense technologies, military- civilian matters, social psychology, defense artifacts, disaster prevention education, self defense and defense mobilization will be added. **(3) Social Education** For the general public, defense knowledge, civil-military relations, community defense, disas- ter prevention and safety, self defense education, defense mobilization education will be enhanced. ###### 12' ----- **(4) Protection of Defense Arti-** **facts and propagation** The MND and relevant agencies will gather, maintain and manage mili tary sites, artifacts and facilities that are meaningful for defense education and implement field trips and activities to fulfi ll educational purposes. **2. Major Points of All-Out De-** **fense Education** (1) Article 6 of the All-Out De fense Education Act requests the Ex ecutive Yuan to designate an all-out defence education day and conduct relevant activities to enhance all-out defense education. The MND thus held an online poll in June, 2005 to pick a date for the all-out education day. September 3 was the date most widely voted for so the MND suggested the Executive Yuan to designate it as the “all-out defense education day.” To ex pand the scope of various activities in the All-Out Defense Education Act, the MND has also planned Armed Forces Day, expanded various propagation and celebration events, conducted various regional defense education lectures, opened up bases for visitors, and per formed vessel, fi ghter plane and equip- and awareness for all-out defense ment demonstrations. 205 - Propagation & education will improve the people's knowledge and awareness for all-out defense (2) To prepare various school education, governmental on-the-job training and social education instructors for the All-Out Defense Education Act, the MND and the Ministry of Education have, between October and December 2005, held 8 series of the “2005 All-out Defense Education Instruc- ----- tor Training Course,” with over 2,400 senior and vocational high school instructors participating. According to the overall national strategic and security threats mentioned in the National Security Council's “National Security Report” and the MND's “National Defense Report” and all-out educa tion requirements, we will devise diverse, colorful, and concise textbooks and videos so that the instructors may acquire knowledge related to all-out defense in a gradual and unobtrusive fashion. The MND will also rely on this experience to buildup relevant instructors and courses and coordi nate with the Ministry of Education (in accordance with relevant instructor training regulations) to gradually establish a qualifi ed instructor base for all-out defense education required by all levels of school education, governmental on-the-job training and social education. (3) In order to implement multi-dimensional teaching and practical experience in all levels of military education, the MND has, since 2006, combined the “National Defense Professional and Military Features” to hold 12 types of “Military Summer Camps” in the north, central and south regions of Taiwan and offshore Penghu area. The camps emphasize learning through having fun and the types of camps include “Boot Camp,” “Airborne Training,” “Missile and Artillery,” “Mechanized Infantry Combat Training,” “Special Operation,” “Amphibious Reconnaissance,” “Jungle Life,” “Sea Navigation,” “Aviation and Air Defense,” “Mobilization,” and “Secret Services.” They are mainly for students of senior or vocational high schools and above and 3,400 people will be recruited an nually. It is hoped that these practical training, experience and settings may guide the youth in their recognition of the importance of defense to national security, strengthen their understanding of de fense affairs, build an all-out defense consensus and encourage the people's awareness in national defense. (4) To fulfi ll the All-Out Defense Education Act and make the public suffi ciently understand the defense establishment, from October 2005, the MND has been choosing bases from the north, central, south, east, or offshore islands to carry out the “Journey of Discovery” trips every Saturday and Sunday. Each base will display its equipment and hold air shows, exercises and family activi ties according to the characteristics of each base. For example, in the 2005 Double Tenth Day holi day (from October 8 to 10), the MND opened 25 bases in the Taiwan and Penghu area (13 Army, 4 Navy, 3 Air Force, 3 Reserves, 1 Combined Logistics and 1 Military Police bases), including combat power exhibits in the Army's Huko base, Navy's Tsoying base and Chiayi Air Force Base. Within the 3-day vacation, 68,231 visitors were accommodated. (5) Given limited space, in order to preserve military artifacts, the MND will actively refur bish the appearance and improve the exhibit themes of important military artifacts in the Armed Forces Museum. Currently, the museum attracts approximately 50,000 visitors each year and is an important site for promoting all-out defense education. Other than the Armed Forces Museum and unit history museums, the MND is also actively helping local governments display retired military 206 ###### 12' ----- 207 equipment. As of October 2005, there are 37 display sites across Taiwan, displaying 206 items. The regional military history parks in Chi-chi town of Nanto county and Madou town of Tainan county are the largest of such display sites. Displaying retired equipment is not only an important part of all-out defense education, it has also become a tourism asset for the local government, which is very helpful for promoting local prosperity. II. Recruiting Elite Candidates A modernized military depends heavily on high-quality personnel. A modernized defense also relies on high-quality personnel to effectively increase combat capabilities. Currently, the armed forces are striving toward the goal of being high-quality, streamlined and powerful. As the new-gen- eration forces are transformed, besides relying on cutting-edge weapons for such enormous defense responsibility, those operating the weapons are the key to actualize combat power and secure victory. Because the armed forces need more professional personnel to perform various missions, the MND has planned a comprehensive recruitment and employment system for offi cers, non-commissioned offi cers and professional enlists to attract competent civilian citizens into professional defense. They are summarized below: **1. Military Academy Undergraduate Program** **(1) Recruiting Classes** These include the Chinese Military Academy, Naval Academy, Air Force Academy, Fu Hsing Kang College, National Defense Management College, Chung Cheng Institute of Technology, and the National Defense Medical Center, which recruit students with senior or vocational high school level learning. **(2) Admission** There are two methods of admission: School recommendations (current graduates of domes- tic senior high schools) and personal applications (current graduates or graduates of domestic high school or vocational high school or above, or students deemed to have enough learning to qualify for university exams). **(3) Enrollment** a. From 2006, all joint military academy entrance exams were ended and have been replaced by selection methods. b. Selected admission will be based on schools recommendation or personal applications: ----- Current domestic senior high school gradu ates qualifi ed for university major programs and recommended by their attending schools can register with the Military Academy Undergradu ate Program Recruitment Committee, and partic ipate in the 2006 College Entrance Examination Center's Academic Profi ciency Exam (hereinafter referred to as Academic Proficiency Exam). After passing the stage-1 Academic Profi ciency Exam and stage-2 military academy selection, they may be enrolled. Every student recom mended by the respective participating school Graduates or currently graduating students from domestic or foreign senior high schools, vocational high schools, or higher, who qualify for university major programs, or those who have been deemed to have fulfi lled the Article 2 requirements of the “university-equivalent learn ing capacity standards,” and have participated in the Academic Proficiency Exam, have to report to the Military Academy Undergraduate Program Recruitment Committee. After pass ing the stage-1 Academic Profi ciency Exam and stage-2 school-specifi c evaluations, they may be 208 (a)School recommendation can be recommended to one department. (b)Personal applications - Attracting outstanding civilians to join the Defense profession to a maximum of 5 departments, or 2 departments in the same school. **(4) Application Method** Registrations are accepted online only and the required application materials must be mailed to the Recruitment Center. (URL of the Armed Forces Recruitment Center: http:/rdrc.mnd.gov.tw/) **2. Volunteer Professional Preparatory Military Officer Class** **(1) Recruitment Overview** ###### 12' ----- In coordination with the Jingjin Program's streamlining of the number of officers, medium term volunteer military offi cer classes handled by the military services (selection, transfer, naval professionals, and other professional classes, etc.) have been simplifi ed, and universal “Volunteer Professional Preparatory Military Offi cer Class” have begun since 2005. They provide one year or less basic education for reserve offi cers. Those who have successfully completed the course will be commissioned as second lieutenants and have to serve for 5 years. **(2) Recruitment Targets** Youths who have bachelor degrees or above but have not been drafted are welcome. **(3) Examination Method** The MND will refi ne the examination and selection process by adopting “one result (fi tness test) for multiple applications” and enlist examinees who have passed the concurrent reserve offi cer examination, oral exams and physical fi tness tests, and have university bachelor degrees or higher. Youths who have not been drafted will undergo written exams, intelligence tests, oral exams and physical fi tness tests. **3. Professional Enlists Program** **(1) Recruitment Overview** The Armed Forces' recruitment efforts of “professional enlists” since 2005 have met positive public reaction. Approximately 6,644 people were recruited, which is 101.27% of the annual target. Nearly 20% are individuals with bachelor degrees or above, which indicates drastic improvements in the quality of professional enlists. When young students graduating from school face career and draft choices, joining the professional enlists will not only help in planning personal careers and life development and increase personal knowledge and skills, it also offers many benefi ts. As society values certifi cation more and more, discharged professional enlists will be more competitive than people of the same age. The armed forces' recruitment of “professional enlists” is not only a positive choice for society's youth, it also creates win-win scenarios between society and military, leading the armed forces into an era of high-quality and high-combat capability forces. **(2) Ways of Recruitment** These are categorized into three channels: “civil youths,” “draftees under training,” and “active regular enlisted.” Annual recruitment targets are based on the characteristics and requirements of different military services. Public Announcements will be made through various military recruitment channels as appropriate. **(3) Ways of Application** Civil youth are universally required to fi ll and mail out online forms. Active regular enlisted will be handled by appropriate unit commanders or personnel offi cers. Draftees under training will 209 ----- 210 be handled by appropriate unit commanders or personnel offi cers in their respective batch of con- scription. **4. Defense Civilian Officials** The Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense requires that one-third of the MND staff be civilian officials, which are usually civil servants from other agencies transferred to the MND by open selection. We have also applied for a “Civil Servant Special Examination for MND Civilian Personnel Examination” from the Ministry of Examination, hoping to develop long-term civilian defense offi cials through restrictions on transferring civil servants using specialized tests (at least 6 years). We will also incorporate defense-related test subjects to select personnel with defense- related talents to participate in defense affairs so as to nurture civilian defense offi cials for the future decision-making hierarchy. The “Civil Servant Special Examination for MND Civilian Personnel Examination” was held from May 6 to June 7, 2006, with class-1 tests (4 positions; qualifi ed persons will be employed in level 9 positions) and class-2 tests (29 positions; qualifi ed persons will be employed in level 7 posi- tions). Test contents included general subjects, defense laws and national security policies to address future requirements. Qualifi ed persons will receive on-the-job training in accordance with the Civil Servant Training and Advanced Education Act. The MND will implement additional military and civilian staff training plans which are separated into basic, specialized and joint staff training. This will improve professional defense qualities and military-civilian cooperation. III. Reasonable Defense Budgeting Defense establishments are important foundations of the national development. Appropriate defense investment can be the strongest protection for a solid national security, political democ- racy and economic prosperity. The amount of defense investment is decided by overall government policy objectives and the degree of threats the nation faces. On the one hand, the government needs to insist on political and economic developments for the good of the people and simultaneously consolidate defense potential. On the other hand, the government needs to observe developments in cross-strait relations and trends of external military threats and invest adequately in defense es- tablishments to secure political and economic development results. The two need to be balanced by limits and opportunities of objective and subjective conditions. ###### 12' ----- 211 **1. The Ratio of Defense Budget to GDP and Total Central Government Budget** Since 2000, government policies have focused on economic objectives and establishments. An- nual defense budgets have remained between 240 and 280 billion NTD. But with the total central government budget greatly Unit: 100 million NTD 120000 increasing after 1999 and a stable GDP growth, defense budgets are becoming smaller 100000 proportional to GDP and to- 60000 tal government expenditures. (Refer to Figure 12-1, Defense 20000 Budgets as a Percentage of GDP and Government Expen- ditures in the Last 5 Years) 0 ``` 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 ``` **2. The MND's Economiz-** GDP 101,943 103,186 107,704 111,316 115,218 **ing Efforts on the Budget** gov’t budgetTotal central 15,907 15,503 15,916 16,083 15,718 The MND has cut down defense budgetNational 2,604 2,572 2,641 2,586 2,525 - Figure 12-1 Defense Budgets as a Percentage of GDP and unnecessary expenditures and Government Expenditures in the Last 5 Years reassessed armament needs to do its best to maintain general military preparations. However, many of the MND's cost-saving efforts could not be numerically realized because of the government's increasing the overall budget without increasing the defense budget. For example, the MND has actively simplifi ed personnel affairs to lower personnel costs. For ten years between 1997 and 2006, we have saved approximately NTD 40.5 billion. However, defense budgets have slightly decreased over the last decade. In addition, the implementation of several policies also amount to an additional NTD 60.8 billion in personnel maintenance cost, far more than the NTD 40.5 billion saved by the MND, causing personnel maintenance fees to increase in proportion to defense budgets (Refer to Figure 12-2, Comparison of Armed Forces Ppersonnel Maintenance costs Variations between 1997 and 2006). The aforesaid policies include the MND's 5-time cooperation to adjust wages for mili- tary and civil servants (1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2005), implementing new retirement standards (1997), increasing retirement fund liquidity (2004 and 2006), joining the National Health Care In- surance Program (Since 2001), issuing volunteer service wages (2000), and recruiting professional enlists (2003 and 2005). Nevertheless, the MND still tries to maintain adequate military investments to keep up with military development schedules. Since 2000, we were barely able to complete major military pur- chase budgets for the Kidd destroyers (2002), the Po-Sheng Program (2003), and long-range surveil- ----- 212 1997 2006 Instances Increase Decrease Budget Budget 1997 Personnel Maintenance 1237 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2005employment adjustments 216 1997 new retirement standards 26 1998 group emergency insurance 5 1998 labor laws for hired persons 3 2000 wages for volunteer service 77 2000 increase in regional wages 5 2001 and 2002 vacation subsidies 22 Increases 2001 bonus for pilots whocontinued serviceJoined National Health Care Insurance Program in 2001 607 2003 improvements in non- 88 commissioned officer standards 2003 and 2005 recruitments of profe-ssional enlists 46 2003 and 2006 severance pay 8 2004, 2005, and 2006 retirementfund allocations 19 Reserve troop salaries (2001) 18 2005 National Health Care InsuranceProgram rate adjustments 8 Total 608 Decreases Saved personnel maintenance costs 405 2006 Personnel Maintenance Costs 1440 - Figure 12-2 Comparison of Armed Forces Personnel Maintenance Fees Variations between 1997 and 2006 lance radar (2004). However, facing the PRC's continuous two-digit percentile growth in defense budgets, introductions of precision weapons and increased deployments against Taiwan, the military balance across the Taiwan Strait is beginning to disadvantage Taiwan. The scale of Taiwan's current military investment can maintain current contracting schedules, but is still insuffi cient for military development needs, never mind being minimally suffi cient for militarily deterring the PRC's intent to invade Taiwan. Therefore, military investment needs to be expanded and accelerated. Other than urgent equipment renewal needs to increase overall combat power, the MND plans to recruit 45,561 professional enlists between 2005 and 2008. The items required to be budgeted for include salaries, professional wages, volunteer wages, primary and secondary food allowances, mili- tary insurance subsidy, National Health Care Insurance Program, retirement funds, and mission or station-specifi c regional allowance (in the outer or offshore islands), naval duty allowance, special forces allowance, funeral assistance, and marriage assistance. According to current remuneration ###### 12' ----- 213 standards and scheduled calculations, an additional personnel maintenance fees of NTD 26.4 billion will be required between 2006 and 2008. To address increased need for military investment and personnel maintenance fees, and en- hance self defense capabilities, the President has, after listening to the Executive Yuan's “2005 Total Central Government Budget” on August 4, 2005, indicated that defense budgets should be annually increased to 3% of GDP within 3 years if possible. To allocate 3% of annual GDP, defense budget will be around 350 billion NTD per year (base on 2006 GDP 11.5218 trillion NTD). The MND hopes that the public understands the hardships of the times and supports appropriate increases in defense spending. We will also continue all cost-sav- ing measures and sincerely assess military development needs to lower overall government fi nancial burdens, and use ICPs and defense privatization so that increases in defense spending also yield eco- nomic benefi ts, creating military-civilian win-win situations. IV. Implementing All-out Defense Mobilization Systems All-out defense mobilization is the strategically defensive national mobilization of political, economic, military, psychological and technological powers through military strategic frameworks and guidance. The Executive Yuan follows the stipulation of the “Act of All-Out Defense Mobili- zation Preparation” to set up the “Conference for All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation of the Executive Yuan.” The MND's Department of Reserve Affairs serves concurrently as the conference secretary. It coordinates 8 ministerial conferences on matters regarding preparation work for morale, manpower, material & economy, fi nance, transportation, health, technology and military affairs. It also participates in 25 conferences of mobilization preparation held by special municipalities and county (city) governments. It is hoped that the all-out defense mobilization efforts may be realized cooperatively. All-out defense mobilization takes both defense and civilian developments into account. In peacetime, mobilization follows the principle of “incorporating mobilization in policy implementa- tion and assimilating combat readiness in the economic infrastructure.” The central ministerial and local governments reinforce aspects of mobilization preparation such as morale, manpower, material & economy, fi nance, transportation, health, technology and military so as to strengthen preparedness for contingencies. All these are connected with emergency systems of disaster prevention and relief, contagious disease prevention and treatment, radiological disaster contingency, and anti-terrorist ac- tion. They serve as the main support for the “homeland security network,” nurture the nation's over- ----- 214 all defense potential and provide disaster relief assistance. During a crisis, the people will be appro­ priately mobilized as per peacetime planning and training to effectively support military operations, maintain emergency response functions in public institutions, and provide basic civilian needs. **1. Directions for Enhancing All-Out Defense Mobilization** (1) Propagate the idea of all-out defense and develop the people's consensus on national de­ fense to achieve an all-out defense that is “all-dimensional,” “participated in by the people,” “inte­ grated,” and “trusted by the people.” (2) Deal with the possibility of “compound crises” and carry out all-out defense mobilization systems to connect all response mechanisms so as to facilitate the functions of related supporting mechanisms for disaster contingencies. (3) Lay down the guiding principle of “incorporating mobilization in policy implementation and assimilating combat readiness in economic infrastructure,” carry out the policy of “integrating national defense with the people's livelihood,” and preserve the dynamics of comprehensive mobili­ zation so as to reinforce war preparedness. (4) Upgrade the function of the “Coordination Organization of All-out Defense Combat Capa­ bilities” as an interface and coordinate with mobilization conferences of local governments so as to transform the people's power into combat power.” (5) Enhance contingency management response capabilities for multi-dimensional disasters, establish operating procedures for coordination and meet the requirements for defense so as to put various contingency management mechanisms into assessment in annual “Wan-an Exercises,” by which all-out defense capability can be strengthened. (6) Focus on being “skillful in mobilization, swift in troop formation, and fast in replenishment of combat strength” and thereby improve reserve units' personnel, equipment and training readiness and integration so as to effect the capabilities of timely mobilization and combat. **2. Concrete Improvements in All-Out Defense Mobilization** **(1) Enhance the Education and the Integration and Coordination of All-Out De­** **fense Mobilization Mechanisms** In order to effectively integrate “administrative mobilization” and “military mobilization” mechanisms, the MND held “Executive Seminars of All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation” in 2004 and 2005 respectively. Trainees were executives of mobilization preparation from central governmental agencies, headquarters and commands of all services, operational areas and county (city) governments. Lectures, military specialty courses and wargaming were given during the seminar. Through this centralized education measure, it is hoped that the functions, related laws ###### 12' ----- and operational functions of mobilization preparation conferences can be enhanced; the knowledge of all-level leaders can be increased; the coordination effectiveness can be improved; and the all-out defense readiness can be realized. Other than the executive seminars, the MND will also hold seminar tours for base-level mobiliza tion cadre in the north (including Matzu), central, south (including Kinmen), Hualien and Taitung, and Penghu in order to en force understanding of mobilization laws and measures for all levels of mobilization cadre, and to familiarize them with rel evant operational procedures. These semi nars are directed at mobilization prepara tion personnel from central governmental agencies, and secretarial units, executives and staffs (including registered public and private-sector agencies) for county (city) government mobilization conferences and the Coordination Conference of All-out Defense Combat Capabilities. These two types of seminars are greatly benefi cial for establishing coordination among various mobilization mechanisms and improving mobilization personnel's competence. The MND is currently reviewing the “Act of All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation” and relevant sub-regulations to enhance all levels of conference functions and ac- defense mobilization resources may come to full play. **(2) Improving Verifi cation and Exercises** 215 - The registration, formation and implementation of all-out defense mobilization tualize all-out defense mobilization functions. It will also run the mobilization, disaster prevention and rescue, and combat capabilities coordination conferences together so that the nation's limited ----- Recently, in order to verify the appropriateness of annual mobilization preparation plans to raise emergency mobilization and response capacities, the MND would annually incorporate them into the Hanguang Exercises, and invite other central governmental agencies and county (city) govern­ ments, and important public agencies to perform wargame or live exercises. For example, in 2002, there were 10 test exercises on mobilization of oil, electricity, tap water and reservoirs, which effec­ tively increased emergency response capabilities. In 2003, we performed at-sea refueling exercises with rented oil tankers to fulfill combat support requirements. In 2004, to verify the efficiency of ad­ ministrative mobilization in supporting various reserve troop mobilizations, the MND incorporated the stage-3 exercises of the Hanguang No. 20 Exercise and performed preparation training on the Jialuhtarng coast of Fangliao Township in Pingtung County, Chaojhou Town, and Laiyi Township after carrying out the policy of the “separetion of active and reserve forces.” To raise the public's sense of urgency, and implement all-out defense concepts, overall military-civilian capabilities also used to implement general urban defenses in Chaojhou Town. Besides, the MND have finished the national material mobilization information registry system to quickly and accurately control civilian material mobilization capabilities, and enable peacetime support for disaster prevention and relief, and wartime support for military combat. Simultaneously, to address non-contact, nonlinear, and asymmetric warfare developments, and natural and man-made disasters in peacetime, the annual all-out defense mobilization (Wan-an) exercise has exceeded its traditional anti-air exercise to focus on homeland defense. The exercises focus on special municipalities, county (city) governments' mobilization mechanisms, civil defense, emergency medicine, anti-terrorist attacks, disaster prevention and rescue, nuclear incidents and other contingency mechanisms. Through these coordinated training exercises, it is hoped we can en­ hance coordinated response capabilities with “mechanisms integration”, “military-civilian oneness,” and “government-military compatibility” so as to consolidate the “homeland security network” and actualize all-out defense. In 2005, the annual all-out defense mobilization exercises (Wan-an No. 28) focused on homeland defense and anti-terror support exercises. During the exercise, some 29,000 military, police, firefighting, civil defense, medical, and public and private industrial personnel, 3,000 vehicles of various types and industrial machinery, 24 helicopters, 21 boats, and 30 vehicles with detoxification equipment were mobilized, sufficiently indicating the strength of all-out defense mobilization. In the future, we may incorporate flood prevention training to actualize the overall es­ tablishment of the homeland security network. **(3) Integrating and Improving Civil Defense Systems** To address changes through time, Taiwan's civil defense has changed from passive civil air defense to active civil defense, air raid protection and supporting military duties during wartime. Matters related to military affairs will be the directed by the central competent authority (Ministry of 216 ###### 12' ----- the Interior) and the MND. In wartime, the MND will coordinate with the Ministry of the Interior to use civil defense organizations to support military duties. Therefore, civil defense can be defi ned as an internal defense that is closely connected to defense affairs. Civil defense covers sending air alert notice, broadcaseting alarms and air raid evacuations and disaster protection. It also assists with major disaster rescue,social order maintenance, military duty reinforcements, and the regimentation, training, exercising and logistics support of motor, boat, and aviation equipment. As it is closely related to the jurisdiction and contents of all-out defense mobilization, it has been incorporated as a preparation item in all-out defense personnel mobilization. 217 ----- ----- ----- 220 Appendix 2-1 Joint Military Exercises and Military Observations between the PLA and Foreign Militaries from 2004 to 2005 Participating Date Exercise Name Location Notes Countries Sino-French Qingdao's outer China, The largest and most content- March 16,2004 military rich naval exercise between exercise seas France China and foreign navies The first Sino-British exercise, Sino-British naval Yellow Sea, China, and observed by naval officers June 20,2004 search and rescueexercise near Qingdao Britain from 15 countries, including the U.S., France, and Germany "Friendship - Pamir Plateau, 2004" Sino- Xinjiang China, First Sino-Pakistani anti-terror August 6,2004 Pakistani anti- (Sino-Pakistani Pakistan military exercise terror exercise border) "Jiaolong - 2004" With 50 observers, including September 2, PLAN amphibious Shanwei, French and German military landing operation for China observers and domestic and for- 2004 naval marine corps Guangdong eign National Defense University students "Tiehquen - 2004" September 25, mountain assaultexercise for Queishan, Henan China Observed by military leaders and observers from 16 countries and 2004 mechanized infantry military attaché from 13 countries divisions Sino-Australian joint China, October 2004 maritime search and Yellow Sea Joint maritime search and rescue exercise Australia rescue exercise Vladivostok, August 18 Sino-Russian Russia, and China, Observed by defense chiefs from "Peace - 2005" SCO member countries and SCO to 25, 2005 military exercise Shandong Russia military observers Peninsula, China "Beijian 2005" land- With 40 invited observers, September 6to 27, 2005 and-air joint operation exercise Zhu Rih He,Inner Mongolia China including American and Russian military attaché stationed in China "Sino-Pakistani November 21 Friendship 2005" joint Karachi port, China, Joint maritime search and to 24, 2005 maritime search and Pakistan Pakistan rescue exercise exercise November 28 "Sino-Indian Friend- ship 2005" joint mari- Kochi military China, to December 1,2005 time search and resc-ue exercise port, India India Joint maritime search and rescue exercise December 9 "Sino-Thai Friendship southern seas China, 2005" joint maritime of the Se Tao Yi Joint maritime search and to 13, 2005 search and rescue port, Thailand Thailand rescue exercise exercise ----- 221 Appendix 6-1 Legislation and Amendments of the Two Defense Acts 1. Legislative Background Article 137 of the Constitution of the Republic of China states that: “The national defense of the Republic of China shall have as its objective the safeguarding of national security and the preservation of world peace. The organization of national defense shall be prescribed by law.” Therefore, it has been an important agenda of the MND since 1950 to formulate a defense organization act that can establish a legalized, democratized, modernized, and professionalized defense system which can then promote all-out defense efforts and integrate overall national power. It has also been a legal project regarded highly by all generations of the Legislative Yuan legislators. Because of the people's full support and dedicated guidance from the Legislative Yuan legislators, this ma- jor defense legislation has fi nally been completed after nearly 50 years of endeavor and renamed as the “National Defense Act.” The Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense was also amended in accordance with the legislative principle of the National Defense Act and the considerations of the defense organization modern- ization. 2. Legislative Process of the National Defense Act and the Amended Organization Act of the Ministry of Na- tional Defense The MND has been investigating defense organization issues since 1950. In 1952 and 1954, the MND completed and revised the draft of the National Defense Organization Act and submitted it (by way of Execu- tive Yuan letters) for review in the Legislative Yuan. The draft had been put on hold because there was no consensus on whether the power of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces should be independent and because of the problem of overlapping authorities between the Defense Conference and the Executive Yuan, etc. In 1970 the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense was carried into effect. The MND, hav- ing observed many objective changes in the last decade and that the formerly submitted draft of the National Defense Organization Act was no longer appropriate, requested that the Executive Yuan repeal the act in 1971 with permission from the Legislative Yuan. In the meantime, both the Executive Yuan and MND agreed that some defense organization acts, such as the rights and organizational regulations of general headquarters out- lined in the amended Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense in July 1978, and the Organization Act of the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense on July 17, 1978, etc., still applied to all of the armed forces. This was deemed to temporarily suffi cient the primary functions of standing defense institution, so the National Defense Organization Act was not amended and re-submitted to the Legislative Yuan. On June 1, 1990, Mr. Chen Lu-an became the Defense Minister, and instructed on June 7 that modifi cation of the legislation of the National Defense Organization Act should be resumed. On June 1992, the preliminary draft of the National Defense Organization Act was completed, but it was not submitted to the Executive Yuan ----- because it was considered only an internal staff study. At the end of the same month, former Premier Hao con sidered that the drafting of the National Defense Organization Act should be managed by the Executive Yuan because of its potential impacts on high levels of the command hierarchy. Therefore, all drafting work for the National Defense Organization Act were transferred to the Executive Yuan. In March 1993, former Defense Minister Sun Chen resumed all drafting work for the National Defense Organization Act with relevant agencies as per Executive Yuan's instructions. Other than relevant MND and General Staff personnel, both the Secretariats of the National Security Council and the Executive Yuan, and the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, and Economic Affairs were also incorporated to form a steering committee and a drafting committee for the drafting. The process took 8 months and dozens of large and small confer ences were held, with 13 of them offi cially recorded. 3 drafts (A, B, C) of the National Defense Organization Act were completed and submitted to the Executive Yuan for deliberation. In March 1994, the Executive Yuan replied that the submitted National Defense Organization Act draft should be resubmitted after appropriate revi sions based on Constitutional changes and trends. In July 1997, the National Assembly completed provisional Constitutional Amendments, and the Amend ment statues were signed by the President on the 21[st] of the same month. The MND thus initiated research and completed drafts A and B (A: maintain status quo; B: adopt new approach) of the National Defense Organiza tion Act under the direction of former Defense Minister Chiang Chung-ling and in observance of the Constitu tional changes. The drafts were submitted to the Executive Yuan for deliberation on September 1 of the same year. The Executive Yuan invited pertinent departments to 3 reviewing boards. Because both drafts had their rationale, no consensus was reached. On December 31, 1997, the Executive Yuan replied to the MND that the National Defense Organization Act should expand its applicability and be renamed the National Defense Act, and that the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense should be amended and submitted to the Executive Yuan. Military command and policy should be unifi ed within the ministerial hierarchy, and the Chief of the General Staff should focus on military preparations and troop training to clarify the authorities and responsibilities in the National Defense Act. On April 30, 1998, the MND weighed opinions from all sides, as per Executive Yuan requests, and reported the drafted National Defense Act and the amended Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense to the Executive Yuan. The Executive Yuan invited relevant departments to 4 review conferences, and on May 20 of the same year, submitted the two drafts to the Legislative Yuan for review. Regrettably, during the term of the 3[rd] Legislative Yuan, the regulation never reached the actual review stage. The defense committee of the Legislative Yuan had only convened a “Public Hearing for the National Defense Act” on October 14, 1998; and held a “Report Conference on the Draft for the National Defense Act” on the 19th of the same month. Because the Executive Yuan's draft of the National Defense Act and the amended draft of the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense to the Legislative Yuan had not been reviewed by the committee of the 3[rd] Legislative Yuan, the 4[th] Legislative Yuan could not continue deliberation, as per the Legislative Yuan Func tioning Act. On February 4, 1999, the Executive Yuan suggested that the drafts should be re-submitted. Former Defense Minister Tang Fei instructed his colleagues to weigh various opinions on the previous drafts, and on June 24, 1999, they were submitted to the Executive Yuan again after editing certain contents in the draft of the National Defense Act and the amended draft of the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense with 222 3 ----- an aim for corresponding jurisdictions, hierarchical responsibilities, and focus on mechanism functions. They were passed by the Executive Yuan at the 2643[rd] Yuan conference, and submitted to the Legislative Yuan on August 31, 1999. The Legislative Yuan began evaluation of the two drafts in November, 1999, during which the defense and legal committees held 6 joint conferences to evaluate the Executive Yuan draft of the National Defense Act by legislators Tsai Ming-Hsien, Lin Cho-shui, Chou Cheng-chih, Ting Shou-chung, Chu Fong-chi, Hau Lung-bin, and Huang Erh-hsuan, and the draft of the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense submitted by legislator Tsai Tung-rong. The legal and defense committees held 2 joint committees to review 2 versions of the amended draft of the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense: one forwarded by the Executive Yuan, and the other by legislators Chu Fong-chi, Lee Ching-hsiung, and Lin Cho-shui. Thanks to media and public support, the draft of the National Defense Act and the amended draft of the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense were fi nally completed in 3 readings in the Legislative Yuan on January 15, 2000, and promulgated as Hua-Tsung-(1)-Yi-Tzu No. 8900026960 and No. 8900026970. 3. Legislative Principles of the National Defense Act and the Amended Organization Act of the Ministry of Na tional Defense (1)To establish a defense institution tailor-made to meet our national needs, the MND focused on the following 5 principles during the early drafting stages of the National Defense Act: a. Consistency with Constitutional Institution The legislation of the National Defense Act affects the foundation of our defense institution, which is also part of the central government institution. This naturally requires careful planning based on the presidential, Executive Yuan, and various departmental jurisdictions outlined by the Constitution and its Amendments. b. Observance of World Trends Defense institutions in modern democracies have existed for many years. Their operations deserve our ref erence. Therefore it is benefi cial to compare the advantages and disadvantages among them, and tailor them to meet our national requirements. c. Respect for Public Expectations Democratic polity means governance by the people. Legislating the National Defense Act naturally needs to fulfi ll public expectations on unifi ed military policy and command and civilian control of the military so as to fulfi ll the quest of democratic governance. d. Consideration of Military Needs Modern wars often take place in an instant and are diffi cult to predict precisely. Especially as there is in suffi cient strategic depth in the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu areas, warning times will be short. Appro priate military reactions need to be executed immediately to ensure national security. Therefore, accounting for military needs is naturally a necessary factor in legislating the National Defense Act. e. Institutionalization of Defense Establishment Legislating the National Defense Act is meant to integrate limited resources, suffi ciently utilize overall na tional strength, and establish comprehensive and sustainable defense institutions to achieve standardization and support sustainable Constitutional development of the country. (2)The Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense was amended as follows in coordination with 223 ----- considerations for unifi ed military command and policy and modernization and professionalizing of defense organizations as outlined by the National Defense Act: a. Realization of Civilian Control of the Military The National Defense Act confirms civilian control of the military and unified military command and policy. To provide an environment for civilian ministers, the MND's staff agencies need to be improved to es tablish strategic and resource planning and military integration and assessment departments for the Minister. In this way, the Minister has long-term planning capabilities for defense policy and can supervise and evaluate the allocation and execution of defense budgets, direct and monitor military command, and armament development to facilitate defense administration. b. Professional Division of Labor The National Defense Act confi rms the 3-part defense organization of policy, command, and armament. MND agencies would undergo corresponding adjustments so that the policy branch handles strategic planning and resource acquisition and policy directions for command and armament branches. The command branch would handle combat operations, combat requirements recommendations, and military developments. The armament branch would establish armament development capacity and support the command branch's combat needs. c. Coordination with Government Organization Reengineering Government re-engineering is necessary because of the trend of the times and public expectations. To ef fectively increase administrative effi ciency in defense, it is necessary to coordinate with the legislative intent of the Organic Standard Law of the Central Government Agencies of appropriate jurisdictions, clarify frame works, streamline manpower, and make fl exible adjustment. The MND and subordinate agencies should be adjusted to decrease defense hierarchy, establish fl attened command systems, and increase military combat ef fi ciency to build high-tech, professional, and all-out military forces. 4. Important Issues during the Legislative Yuan's Deliberation upon the Two Defense Acts The 4[th] Legislative Yuan review of the National Defense Act drafts and the amended drafts of the Orga nization Act of the Ministry of National Defense include the versions submitted by the Executive Yuan and 9 other National Defense Act drafts proposed by legislators Tsai Ming-hsien, Lin Cho-shui, Chou Cheng-chih, Ting Shou-chung, Chu Fong-chi, Hau Lung-bin, Huang Erh-hsuan, and Tsai Tung-rong, and 4 other amended drafts of the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense, proposed by legislators Chu Fong-chi, Lee Ching-hsiung, and Lin Cho-shui. The review work was diffi cult. Fortunately, with multi-partisan coordination, a consensus was reached, and the acts were legislated. The major issues are summarized as follows: (1)Military Neutrality There were no specifi c military administrative neutrality clauses in the Executive Yuan's drafts, except requiring compliance to other administrative neutrality laws (i.e. the administrative neutrality requirements of public servants outlined in the Public Offi cials Election and Recall Law, Civil Organizations Act, and the Political Neutrality Act). However, some of the legislator-proposed versions would prevent servicemen from participating in political activities, and political parties or organizations from exploiting the military, and also demanded non-partisan political education. After several multi-partisan negotiations with the MND, Paragraph 224 ----- 2 of Article 6 of the National Defense Act was added so that servicemen cannot serve under political parties, organizations, or candidates for public offi ce, force other servicemen into joining or assisting political parties or organizations or activities held by candidates for public offi ces, or engage in political party or policy promotion of other political activities in military agencies. Paragraph 3 stated that current servicemen who violate these stipulations will be disciplined by the MND. (2) Authority of the Commander-in-chief The Executive Yuan's draft designated the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the national armed forces. Many of the legislator versions were the same. However, some legislators advocated that the President is to be a symbolic commander, while actual troop command would be exercised by the Executive Yuan Pre mier and the Defense Minister. Some also wanted the President to not hold command rights during peacetime (during which the Defense Minister would hold command rights), but be able to command the troops through the defense minister during wartime. After many explanations from the MND, the majority of legislators agreed that the President should hold troop command rights over the nation's armed forces. (3)Military Command Procedures a. The Executive Yuan's draft stipulated, “The President has troop command rights through the Defense Minister, who would order the Chief of General Staff to execute presidential orders.” Some legislator versions agreed with the Executive Yuan version, while other versions suggested that troop command has to be approved by the Executive Yuan Premier. b. The Executive Yuan's draft and most legislator drafts agreed that the Chief of the General Staff has troop command rights (some did, however, support using language such as "under the Minister's orders"). Some legislators opposed. c. After the MND explained many times to the legislators about hierarchical responsibilities, time-effi cien cy mechanisms, and the principles of civilian control of the military and unifi ed military policy and command, the Executive Yuan's draft was partially edited so as to make the President command the troops through the De fense Minister, who would, in turn, order the Chief of the General Staff to carry out the commands. (4)Qualifi cation Requirements for Defense Ministers The Executive Yuan's draft clarifi ed that the defense minister is a civilian job, without any restrictions on whether discharged soldiers can serve in the position. Some legislators suggested that soldiers who have not been discharged for a given length of time should not be eligible for the defense minister position. The MND explained to the legislators that, because of Taiwan's unique situation, it is inappropriate to require soldiers to be discharged for a minimum amount of time before becoming eligible for the defense minister position. Al though the cause was agreeable, such restrictions were not placed in the fi nalized legislations. However, it was still decided that, after the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense went into effect, the Defense Minister should, as frequently as would be appropriate, come from a civilian background, to accentuate civilian control of the military. (5)Addition of an Extra Deputy Defense Minister The Executive Yuan's draft and many of the legislators' drafts had no regulations on the number and ju risdictions of deputy defense ministers. Some legislators supported allowing 3 deputy ministers for policy, command, and armament. Some supported changing the title of “deputy minister” to “administrative deputy.” 225 ----- After the MND explained the military and constitutional characteristics of the National Defense Act and the importance of its contents towards defense matters, there was no major controversy on deputy defense ministe rial vacancies, and so there needed to be regulations only in the Organization Act for the Ministry of National Defense, and not the National Defense Act. The MND has many jurisdictions that may not be consistent with other departments, and the position of deputy ministers also have historical signifi cance, and needed to remain. Most legislators agreed. It was then decided that 1 deputy defense ministerial position will be added in the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense, who will be a general or on Special Appointment Rank. Also, in order to minimize MND bureaucracy, administrative deputy minister positions have been lowered from 3 to 2. (6)Organization and Functions of Service Headquarters Many legislators believed that the military headquarters (commands) should handle military preparations without holding combat command rights, that joint operation should be handled by separate combat (zone) headquarters under the defense minister's directions, and that military headquarters (commands) should be gradually streamlined into doctrine-based commands. The Defense Minister repeatedly explained during the evaluation meeting that the emphases of restructuring was not about nominal adjustments of the agencies but rather the utilization of their future functionalities. After the military headquarters (commands) have been as signed under the MND, they should still retain their autonomy. Their missions could be simplifi ed, but they needed to be structurally complete. The degree of restructuring should be based on need: give whatever was necessary, and cut down that which was not; this was not a one-size-fi ts-all restructuring. After multi-partisan negotiations with the MND, it was decided that the National Defense Act would not regulate the organization of military headquarters, and that Article 10 of the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense would empower the MND to establish army, navy and air force general headquarters (GHQ), and combined logistics, reserve and military police commands, whose organization would be determined by order. The MND could assign agencies and troops subordinate to the aforementioned military agencies under the command of the General Staff Headquarters. The general army, navy, and air force headquarters would be changed to the army, navy, and air force commands within 3 years. If necessary, a 1-year extension would be allowed. 5. Important Contents of the National Defense Act and the Amended Organization Act of the Ministry of Na tional Defense (1)The National Defense Act comprises 7 chapters and is further detailed in 35 articles. Important contents are summarized as follows: a. Confi rming Overall Defense Concepts National defense refers to security preparations taken to defend a nation's territory, sovereignty, and people; the contents of which include military and all-out defense, and political, economic, psychological, and technological affairs that may be directly or indirectly benefi cial to accomplishing defense objectives. This can not be accomplished by military force alone. Therefore, the National Defense Act outlines the all-out defense concept to integrate and apply overall national resources, establish defense capabilities, and achieve defense objectives. (Articles 2 & 3) b. Defi ning the Scope of the Defense Forces 226 ----- The defense military forces of the Republic of China are defi ned to include the Army, Navy and Air Force. In wartime, the MND can assign other legally established armed units to participate in the order of battle ac cording to military needs, after receiving permission from the Executive Yuan. (Article 4) c. Reassuring the Idea of a Nationalized Military Article 138 of the Constitution stipulates that all of the ROC's Army, Navy, and Air Force soldiers should transcend their personal, regional, and political relations, and loyally serve the nation and its people. Therefore, the National Defense Act outlines concrete contents to assure a nationalized military, describing that the ROC's Armed Forces shall remain neutral from individual, regional and partisan affi liations in accordance with the Act. The National Defense Act also explicitly forbids active servicemen to be involved in political activities. (Article 6) d. Specifying Defense Establishment and Jurisdiction Based on the Constitution, its Amendments and relevant laws, we have set out, in Chapter 2, the defense establishment, authorities and responsibilities, clearly identifying the defense authorities and responsibilities of the President, the National Security Council, the Executive Yuan, and the MND, so that one can coordinate with the other and accomplish defense objectives. Major ideas in the statute are as follows: (a) The President commands the Armed Forces Article 36 of the Constitution empowers the President to command the national Army, Navy, and Air Force. Therefore, the highest level in the military chain of command is the President. At the ministry level, such defense commands are usually held by Defense Ministers in foreign advanced democracies. Direct mili tary command next to the President, however, is better delegated to the Chief of the General Staff, the one with military professionalism. Therefore, the President delegates his power of being Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to the Defense Minister, who then delegates that authority to the Chief of the General Staff, who then directly commands the Armed Forces. This design allows for more effective exercise of combat power and secures a better chance of victory. (Article 8) (b) The National Security Council acts as the consulting agency for the President's defense policy deci sions Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Constitutional Amendment and Article 2 of the Organization Act of the Na tional Security Council state that the National Security Council acts as a consulting agency for the President's national security-related policy guidelines, and that defense affairs should comprise an important part of na tional security affairs. It is thus specifi ed that, to make national security-related defense policy guidelines or to respond to urgent defense situations, the President is empowered to convene national security conferences. (Article 9) (c) The Executive Yuan formulates defense policies Article 53 of the Constitution states that the Executive Yuan is the country's highest level executive organ. Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Constitutional Amendments states that the Executive Yuan takes responsibility to the Legislative Yuan. It is thus specifi ed that the Executive Yuan is responsible for formulation of defense policies, consolidation of overall national power and supervision of its subordinate agencies to conduct relevant defense affairs. (Article 10) (d) The MND is in charge of defense affairs across the country 227 ----- The MND is the executive agency for defense-related affairs under the Executive Yuan. It is thus specifi ed that the MND is in charge of defense-related affairs across the country. It should serve professional functions in military policy, command, and armament branches to make defense policy proposals based on national security needs, and formulate military strategy as guiding principles for military preparations. (Article 11) e. Jurisdictions of the Minister of National Defense and the Chief of the General Staff (a) The Minister of National Defense manages military policy and command To unite military policy and command components, meet public expectations, and realize the democratic principle of civilian control of the military, it is specifi ed that the Minister of National Defense is a civilian of fi cial position which supervises all defense affairs (i.e. military policy, command, and armaments), so that de fense affairs are subject to public scrutiny. (Article 12) (b) The Chief of the General Staff is in charge of military command affairs and commands troops under the order of the Minister of National Defense Commanding troops is a professional military function that is worked within the military all over the countries in the world. Additionally, because the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu regions face strong mili tary threats from the PRC, our defense operations are required to be joint. Furthermore, territory and defense resources in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu are limited, not as abundant as the ones possessed by the US military, which allows distinct separation between the Joint Chiefs of Staff (staff) from the other combatant commands (command). Taiwan needs to learn from most European countries, i.e. to combine staff and com mand components. The General Staff Headquarters will act concurrently as the joint operations command for simplifi cation purposes. It is thus specifi ed in Article 13 that “The MND has under it the General Staff Head quarters (GSH), serving as a staff organization of the military command system, and the command mechanism for joint operations for the Minister. The GSH is headed by the CGS, who is in charge of military command affairs, and is under the Minister's orders to command the ROC Armed Forces.” This will utilize the functions of military professionalism and ensure a system of matching jurisdictions and level-based responsibilities. Also, Article 14 regulates troop command items, concretely clarifying the jurisdictions of the Chief of the General Staff. f. Enumerating Activities Subject to Military Chain of Command Article 14 of the National Defense Act enumerates all activities subject to military chain of command and clarifi es its coverage. Regulations are as follows: (a) Personnel management and service duties (b) Gathering and analyzing of military intelligence (c) Planning and implementing the order of battle and operations plans (d) Deployment and training of the forces (e) Preparation and implementation to mobilize the forces (f) Formulation of military doctrine and research and development (R&D) of combat activities (g) Allocation and utilization of military personnel, equipment and supplies (h) Planning and implementing operations in communications, information and electronic warfare (i) Implementation of political warfare (j) Supervision over tactics and techniques 228 ----- (k) Other activities subject to the military chain of command g. Clarify the Rights and Obligations of Military Personnel The rights and obligations of current servicemen in Taiwan have been defi ned by the Conscription Act, Act of Military Service for Offi cers and Noncommissioned Offi cers of the Armed Forces, Act of Commission for Offi cers and Noncommissioned Offi cers of the Armed Forces, Act of Assignment for Offi cers and Noncom missioned Offi cers of the Armed Forces, Act of Merit for Offi cers and Noncommissioned Offi cers of the Armed Forces, Act of Medal of Honor of the Armed Forces, Act of Military Education, Act of Insurance for service men, and the Act of Compensation for servicemen. However, the National Defense Act is the foundational defense statute and the troops are the foundational defense power. To demonstrate respect for the position of current servicemen, we have specially specifi ed the basic duties and rights of current servicemen in the text of Article 3 of the National Defense Act. h. Ensure Preparedness of Defense Powers Due to limited national resources, appropriate application dictates that registration and manpower acquisi tions related to defense budgets should be geared towards defending national security. Civilian powers should also be combined to develop defense industries, achieve autonomous defense establishments, and integrate the results into civil society. At the same time, it is specifi ed that, in order to meet national security needs, the Ex ecutive Yuan may approve emergency or classifi ed defense infrastructures or facilities, and all levels of govern ment should cooperate accordingly. i. Implement Mobilization and Civilian Defense According to Laws In modern warfare, a nation cannot achieve victory without mobilizing its entire powers. Therefore, Ar ticle 24 states that, to meet defense needs, the President may issue constitutionally legal emergency orders and implement national or partial mobilization. The results of mobilization, however, depend on detailed peacetime preparations. It is thus specifi ed that the Executive Yuan may designate relevant agencies to formulate required quantities of material in storage, draw up mobilization preparation plans, and conduct mobilization exercises to verify the feasibility thereof. Also, to realize all-out defense, safeguard the people and their properties, assist disaster relief and response during peacetime, and effectively support military duties during wartime, civil de fense organizations may be established according to law to implement civil defense training in peacetime. j. Develop External Military Cooperation The MND will establish military cooperation with friendly countries. Rights and duties of military troops or servicemen from friendly nations stationed in the ROC territory should be regulated by treaties or agree ments so that they are subject to parliamentary supervision. (2)In order to cooperate with unifi ed military policy and command, civilian control of the military and utiliza tion of professional division of labor, the following important amendments to the Organization Act of the Min istry of National Defense were made: a. Clarify the Jurisdictions of the MND The MND's jurisdictions were originally regulated by various internal agencies, as dictated by the Organi zation Act of the Ministry of National Defense. Contents were complex and tedious, and were deemed likely to cause organizational rigidity and lacking in fl exibility and spirit. To enable the MND to coordinate with objec tive and subjective situational changes, fl exible adjustments were made to the jurisdictions of internal agencies. 229 ----- Laws related to these agencies stipulate only their jurisdictions and responsibilities and not the spirit of their jurisdictions. The MND's jurisdictions, as specifi ed by Article 4 of the Organization Act of the Ministry of Na tional Defense, are as follows: (a) Planning, recommendation, and implementation of defense policy; (b) Planning, rectifi cation, and implementation of military strategy; (c) Planning and implementation of defense budgetary plans; (d) Establishment and development of military forces; (e) Research and development of defense technology and weapons systems; (f) Planning and implementation of armament production and construction of defense infrastructure; (g) Planning and implementation of defense manpower; (h) Rectifi cation and implementation of commission, decommission, promotion and transfer of military personnel; (i) Planning and implementation of defense resources; (j) Management and implementation of defense codes and regulations; (k) Planning and implementation of military justice related affairs; (l) Planning and implementation of political warfare; (m) Planning and implementation of reserve affairs; (n) Integration and assessment of military buildup; (o) Planning and implementation of the editing and translation of the Armed Forces' history and adminis tration; (p) Planning, management and implementation of defense education; (q) Planning, implementation and supervision of other defense related affairs. b. Change the General Staff Headquarters into the Minister's Military Command Staff and the Armed Forces Joint Operation Command Mechanism Previously, the Chief of the General Staff served as the President's chief of staff in the command system. The President held command powers, which was delegated directly to the Chief of the General Staff to com mand the troops. In the administrative system, the Chief of the General Staff was only the chief of staff to the Minister of Defense. The National Defense Act has clarifi ed defense institutions with unifi ed military policy and command. The President controls troops command rights, which is now delegated to the Minister of De fense, and then to the Chief of the General Staff to execute such rights. The position and jurisdictions of the General Staff Headquarters, as dictated by the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense, were thus changed into the minister's military command staff and the armed forces joint operations command mechanism. The General Staff Headquarters now submit military requirements, recommend military defense resources al locations, supervise military readiness and training, sets out the order of battle, and formulates and executes operation plans and other relevant commanding affairs. Its organization is stipulated by law. (Article 6) c. Change Service General Headquarters into Subordinates of the MND To cooperate with unified military policy and command and organizational flattening, various military general headquarters originally under the General Staff Headquarters would be assigned under the MND, where the MND would establish Army, Navy and Air Force Command Headquarters, and combined logistics, reserve, 230 ----- and military police commands, and other military agencies, to allow more convenient ministerial direction and supervision, and reduce institutional hierarchy. To successfully exercise troop command, the MND may assign agencies and combat troops related to commanding forces in all military general headquarters to the command of the General Staff Headquarters for exercise of troop command and to ensure successful execution of mis sions. The Army, Navy, and Air Force General Headquarters shall be restructured to the Army, Navy, and Air Force Commands within 3 years. If necessary, a 1-year extension would be allowed. (Article 10) d. New Ministerial Units in the MND To ensure unifi ed military policy and command and civilian control of the military, streamline personnel quota, and maximize functional utility, the MND has added the Department of Strategic Planning, Department of Re sources (originally the Department of Materials), Department of Reserve Affairs, Integrated Assessment Offi ce, Military History and Translation Offi ce, and the Inspection Offi ce to facilitate the Minister in managing all de fense affairs. e. The MND will Establish the Armaments Bureau and Other Agencies It is specifi ed that the MND will establish the Armaments Bureau, General Political Warfare Bureau, and the Comptroller Bureau, the organization of which will be stipulated by law. (Articles 7 to 9) f. Amend MND Personnel Numbers and Job Positions The Deputy Minister position has been increased from 1 to 2, held by either generals or Special Appointment Rank and Administrative Deputy Ministers positions have been reduced from 3 to 2. The legal personnel size of the Ministry has been reduced from 782 persons to 696 persons, with the condition that, 3 years after the pas sage of the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense, civilian positions have to occupy at least one third of total personnel establishment. If necessary, a 1-year extension would be allowed. (Articles 13 to 15) g. Implementation Dates Amending the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense involved major changes to the MND and subordinate agencies. In order to enable more convenience for the MND to adjust relevant agencies the implementation date of the amendment will be determined by the Executive Yuan within 3 years of announc ing the amendment, in coordination with the National Defense Act (Article 23). As approved, by the Executive Yuan Tai-90 Fang Tzu No. 073408—letter No. 2 on December 24, 2001, the Two Defense Acts were to be en forced on March 1, 2002. 231 ----- 232 Appendix 6-2 Implementation Status and Results of the Military Complaint System 1. To respond to the Executive Yuan's single-window policy, the MND is focusing on convenient, focused, and single-service principles to raise the quality of the Armed Forces' work on complaints. On December 1, 2003, 12 “0800 complaint hotlines” (0800534780-5, 0800534880-5) were established to handle violations against the rights of servicemen and military dependents, and relevant administrative inquiries and affairs. The hotlines also universally manage, track, and process complaints to shorten the operational period, so as to properly man- age each case with concrete results, ensure the rights of servicemen and military dependents, and encourage intra-troop harmony. Services of the MND's “0800 complaint hotlines” include: (1) Violations of the rights of servicemen. (2) Inappropriate discipline or wrongful accusation-related treatment of individual servicemen. (3) Violations of benefi ts normally entitled to family members of servicemen. (4) Other inquiries related to personal services, operation exercises, logistical maintenance, medical prob- lems, legal consultation, military material purchases, military dependent loans, psychological assistance, mili- tary (general) discipline, unit management, internal management, or reserves management. 2. The establishment of the Armed Forces' complaint system for servicemen is meant to establish communica- tion channel and protect the legal rights of servicemen and military dependents, and contracted personnel. To enhance the management and investigation and processing mechanism of the complaint cases, each case will be managed and processed effectively according to the military complaint system. We have specially incorporated the Enforcement Regulations of Military Personnel Complaint Procedures as a special section in the Enforce- ment Regulations of Military Discipline Maintenance, clarifying the boundaries of complaints, jurisdictions, rights of appellants, duties, and time limits for the complaint process. We have also listed appellant protection clauses, which require appellants to remain anonymous. Violators may be severely disciplined, according to the situation in question. 3. Statistically, the MND's 0800 complaint hotlines have, from January 1, 2005, to July 15, 2006, received and completed 648 complaint cases and 29,709 service inquiries. Among these cases, 492 cases involved violations against regulations, 20 individuals were turned over to law enforcement, and 330 individuals were administra- tively disciplined. Implementation results are positive. 4. Because social fraud has been very prevalent in recent years, and methods thereof are increasingly creative, the MND, in order to protect servicemen and military dependents from being deceived, has changed the exist- ing toll-free complaint phone number “08005374780” to an inquiry assistance hotline for military dependents ----- on May 1, 2005, and subsequently used Jyuguang Day televised education, Youth Daily News, Valor Monthly, and Soldiers' Diaries to promote the 0800534780 service hotline. It is also incorporated into the “104 Directory Assistance” for open inquiries, so that servicemen and military dependents can use them at their convenience. 5. From the founding of the 0800534780 service hotline to July 15, 2006, the MND has received 47 suspected fraud cases from the search assistance division for military dependents, which effectively protects servicemen and military dependents from being conned. Also, that hotline also received 342 general public cases, which, although not of MND jurisdiction, out of the MND's basic principles of service, were still transferred to the “165 anti-fraud inquiry assistance hotline” of the National Police Agency of the Ministry of the Interior. 6. Because the 12-line complaint hotline numbers are long and not easy to remember, the MND has planned to create hotlines with a single simplifi ed number, after observing convenience measures taken by 8 current do mestic government agencies and civilian agencies, such as: Lifeline (1995) and the Consumer Protection Com mission (1950). The MND has requested approval for establishing 4-digit service hotlines from the Directorate of Telecommunications of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. 7. The MND's 4-digit hotline number is designated to be 1985, which shares phonetic similarities with “you help me” in spoken Mandarin. The entire project was approved by the National Communications Council (NCC) on July 4, 2006, and would come into effect on August 1, 2006, making the MND the 9th agency in the country to use special 4-digit service codes. The hotline's services include: (1) Violations against the legal rights of servicemen. (2) Servicemen who are personally subjected to inappropriate discipline or wrongful accusation. (3) Violations against benefi ts entitled to the dependents of servicemen. (4) Sexual harassment complaint cases. (5) Security-related reporting services. (6) Anti-fraud (include search assistance) cases. (7) Inquiry services (we process inquiries related to military personnel affairs, combat exercises, logistical maintenance, medicals, law, military material purchases, military housing loans, psychological assistance, mili tary (general) discipline, education, and reserve management). 233 ----- 234 Appendix 6-3 Administrative Implementation Status and Results of the MND Military Personnel Rights Committee 1. To protect the legal rights of servicemen, the MND has officially initiated the MND Military Personnel Rights Committee on March 2002 to eliminate uncertainties among servicemen, solve their life and work prob- lems, and harness loyalty. Our work in protecting the legal rights of servicemen is deeply trusted. 2. Scope of the Committee (1) Cases of legal rights violation. (2) Cases of inappropriate discipline or wrongful accusation. (3) Cases of severe injuries and casualties. (4) Disputes over sexual abuse allegations. (5) Lawsuits caused while carrying out duty in service. (6) Other human rights abuse cases that may not be protected by current MND rules and regulations and that need inter-agency review or negotiations. 3. The Military Personnel Rights Committee system is divided into two tiers. The fi rst tier includes the military personnel rights committees in the General Political Warfare Bureau, Army Command Headquarters, Navy Command Headquarters, Air Force Command Headquarters, Combined Logistics Command, Reserve Com- mand, and the Military Police Command, which are responsible for deliberating military personnel rights re- lated cases submitted by organic members. The second tier is the Military Personnel Rights Committee of the MND, which is responsible for coordinating and managing cases of personal rights violation and deliberating appeals against decisions from the fi rst tier Military Personnel Rights Committees. 4. Implementation Results (1) Based on law, including the “Establishment and Processing Regulations for the Military Personnel Rights Committee,” the “Processing Regulations for Legal Assistance for Servicemen Involving in Lawsuist on Duty,” and the “Investigation Regulations for the Military Personnel Rights Committee,” the Military Person- nel Rights Committee provides legal service and assistance to military personnel involving lawsuits or their personal rights being violated during offi cial duty. In 2005, the Military Personnel Rights Committees have completed 113 cases on personnel, training, logistics, medical care, legal consultation, mental counseling, de- pendents service, military discipline, and others, and effectively protect the individual rights of all servicemen. (2) The MND regularly (every season) summons counsellors inside and outside the department to deliber- ate on military personnel complaint cases. We may invite knowledgeable individuals from the public, academic experts, and agency representatives to assist with processing cases, investigations, and inquiries. In 2005, we have processed 36 deliberation and re-deliberation cases, making the protection of military personnel rights ----- more objective and impartial. (3) To increase the understanding of servicemen regarding the Military Personnel Rights Committee, counsellors have attended troop lectures and visits, and we have implemented knowledge contests with prizes, questionnaires, annual supervision evaluations, and distributed promotion cards, division summaries, note books, to increase promotion, supervise verifi cation, and protect the rights of servicemen. (4) In fi lming the supplementary episode for military personnel who were sued for public misconduct, the Military Personnel Rights Committee has invited Chen Sung-yung, Tsai I-lin, and Hsieh Tsu-wu to star in the “Everyone is a Champion” show, with coordination from Jyuguang Day educational broadcasts. To increase promotion results, the show was made into DVDs and distributed to company-level troops for education. We hope to achieve education through recreational methods. 235 ----- 236 Appendix 7-1 Procedure of Promoting Competent Enlisted Personnel to Non-Commissioned Officers Civil youths Active soldier Army senior high (individuals who Reserve duty duty school graduates have not served) Selection Upon Passing Assessment On-base duty On-base duty Private: 6 months Change to Private: 6 months Private 1 class:st volunteer duty Re-enlisted Private 1 class:st 1 year 1 year Having served Having served Having served (concurrent withfor18 monthspromotion to (concurrent withfor 18 monthspromotion to Having served for6 months (concurrent withfor 18 monthspromotion to 3 class)rd 3 class)rd 3 class)rd Voluntary Application Pass Evaluation from Fail Continued company-level assessment commander Commander’s recommendation Participate in Fail Continue serving assessment as professional volunteer soldier Pass Serve Non-commiss- Fail ionedofficer trainingFinish of service4 years Discharge then become Encour- agements Volunteer non-commiss- Continue serving as ioned officer professional volunteer soldier ----- 237 Appendix 7-2 Principles, Plans, and Campus Placements for Streamlining Military Academies in Northern Taiwan 1. Principles of streamlining the academies in northern Taiwan (1) Concentrate educational resources: We will perform on-site integration according to basic, intermedi- ate, and advanced education class characteristics to maximize the benefi ts of educational resource integration. (2) Integrate competent instructors: We will use learning-based class designs to integrate multi-disciplinary instructors according to educational level to increase educational quality and research standards (3) Simplify education organization: In accordance with the schedule of the Jingjin Program, we will strive to simplify education organization through restructuring to increase the effectiveness of personnel usage. (4) Simplify Operational Procedures: Use modernized management to simplify various administrative education procedures to effectively support educational work and increase administrative effi ciency. (5) Improve educational content: Through overall curricula planning, we will strive to improve and univer- salize the basic, intermediate, and advanced military education systems and their educational contents. 2. Streamlining Plans and Campus Placements (1) Restructuring the National Defense University The National Defense University will establish a War College, Army Staff College, Navy Staff College, Air Force Staff College, Institute of Technology, Management College, and Political Warfare College. The original Fu Hsing Kang College's political research classes and the Intelligence School's intelligence research classes will be integrated into various staff college curricula. Also, the National Defense Medical Center, originally un- der the National Defense University, will become an independent school. (2) Campus placements a. The headquarters of National Defense University, War College, Army Staff College, Navy Staff College, and Air Force Staff College will be placed in the Taoyuan Bade campus. b. The National Defense University Strategic Research Center, National Defense Management College, and the Political Warfare College will be placed in the Taipei Fu Hsing Kang campus. c. The Chung Cheng Institute of Technology will be placed in the Dashi Yuan Shulin campus. d. The National Defense Medical Center will be placed in the Taipei Neihu campus. ----- 238 Appendix 7-3 Civilian Job Categories in the MND Composition Job categories Selected Recom- Recom- Agencies involved Selected and Recom- mended and Delegated Total mended mended Delegated General 57 2 53 5 39 156 Placed in all departments, offices, and bureausother than the Personnel Office, Accounting Office, administration and the Military Personnel Rights Committee Personnel 5 12 1 18 Department of Manpower, Personnel Office administration Education and culturaladministration 1 3 4 Department of Manpower Woodwork 1 3 1 5 Department of Resources engineering Industrial 1 2 1 4 Department of Resources engineering Land properties 1 3 4 Department of Resources Legal affairs 8 6 14 Department of Legal Affairs, MilitaryPersonnel Rights Committee Legal administration 3 8 11 Department of Military Justice Library and artifactmanagement 2 3 2 7 Military History and Translation Office News editing 2 3 1 6 Military History and Translation Office Accounting 3 6 1 3 13 Accounting Office, Armaments Bureau,Medical Affairs Bureau Statistics 1 1 Integrated Assessment Office Business Armaments Bureau management 3 3 6 administrationEconomic 1 1 3 1 2 8 Armaments Bureau Mechanics 2 2 Armaments Bureau Electronics 1 1 Armaments Bureau managementInformation 1 2 2 1 6 Armaments Bureau, Medical Affairs Bureau Medical 1 2 3 Medical Affairs Bureau Environmental Medical Affairs Bureau administration 1 3 4 3 11 Total 89 4 109 26 52 280 Not including the Minister, deputy Ministers, and other Special Appointment Ranks job positions 1.Currently, there are 95 civilian job categories for public servants. 2.The MND (including the Medical Affairs and Armaments Bureaus) have 280 civilian job vacancies Notes (not including the Minister and deputy Ministers) under 19 job categories. 3.Category-wise, the “general” category has the most job vacancies, at 156. The fewest job vacancies are in Statistics and Electronics: 1 each. ----- |Conference for all-out defense mobiliz- ation preparation of the Executive Yuan|Col2| |---|---| ||Secretarial agency| ||Department of Reserve Affairs, MND| |Col1|Central ministerial conference of mobilization preparation|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Mobilization preparation conference of special muni- cipality and county (city) governments|Military mobiliz- ation prepar- ation confer- ence|Techno- logy mobiliz- ation prepar- ation confer- ence|Hygiene mobiliz- ation prepar- ation confer- ence|Transport- ation mobiliz- ation prepar- ation confer- ence|Finance mobiliz- ation prepar- ation confer- ence|Material and economy mobiliz- ation prepar- ation confer- ence|Man- power mobiliz- ation prepar- ation confer- ence|Morale mobiliz- ation prepar- ation confer- ence| Reserve Affairs, MND Central ministerial conference of mobilization preparation 239 Appendix 10-1 Administrative Conference System for All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation All-out defense mobilization is a strategically defensive and openly national mobilization that incorporates military strategic frameworks and guidance that strive for effective deterrence and resolute defense so as to adequately utilize political, economic, military, psychological, and technological powers to consolidate national security. The Executive Yuan adheres to the regulations of the Act of All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation and established the “Conference for All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation of the Executive Yuan.” The MND serves concurrently as the secretary of this conference. It coordinates 8 ministerial conferences on mat- ters regarding morale, manpower, material & economy, transportation, fi nance, health, technology and military affairs. It also participates in 25 conferences of mobilization preparations with local governments of all ech- elons. It is hoped to promote the all-out defense mobilization efforts cooperatively. In addition, , the guidelines, projects, categorized plans, and execution plans for mobilization preparation are set up according to the various responsibilities so that each mobilization preparation item can be carried out in the order instructed. The system is as follows: Conference for all-out defense mobiliz- ation preparation of the Executive Yuan Secretarial agency Department of Reserve Affairs, MND Central ministerial conference of mobilization preparation Material Techno- Transport- Man- Military Hygiene Finance and Morale logy ation power mobiliz- mobiliz- mobiliz- economy mobiliz- mobiliz- mobiliz- mobiliz- ation ation ation mobiliz- ation Mobilization ation ation ation prepar- prepar- prepar- ation prepar- preparation prepar- prepar- prepar- ation ation ation prepar- ation conference of ation ation ation confer- confer- confer- ation confer- special muni- confer- confer- confer- ence ence ence confer- ence cipality and ence ence ence ence county (city) governments Subordination line Administrative coordination line Data source: from Articles 7, 8, 10, and 12 of the Act of All-out Defense Mobilization Preparation ----- 240 Appendix 11-1 Case Studies of Industrial Results from Specialized Technological Projects Coordinated with the Ministry of Economic Affairs Statistical research indicates that, from its participation in the technological plans in the Ministry of Eco- nomic Affairs from 2002 to 2005, the Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology, under the MND's Arma- ments Bureau (henceforth abbreviated as the CSIST), has encouraged industrial investments of approximately 9 billion NTD, with production values of over 30 billion NTD. There are 40 commercialization projects for traditional industries, high-tech industries, and military goods. Classic case studies are summarized as follows: 1. Case Studies of Implementation Results from General Technological Plans (1) Ultra-wideband (UWB) plans to cultivate commercial potential for wireless communications industries Many market survey institutions expect that the global demand for UWB wireless electronic conveyance equipment and microchips will be more than 40 million units in 2007. The UWB industry can expect to suc- ceed the wireless LAN as another star industry. To address global industrial demands of possibly USD 1.39 billion in commercial value, the CSIST's elec- tronics department takes over 20 years of experience in radar and communication system development, without relying on transfers of foreign technologies, and autonomously manufactures UWB system simulation plat- forms and RTL design codes, setting a foundation for domestic commercial wireless communication industries. In 2005, as the international MB-OFDM UWB regulations were being completed, this plan achieved major breakthroughs in the 2004 implementations. The design results were verifi ed through testing to be completely compatible with the international MB-OFDM UWB regulation standards, meaning that we have technically grasped the core of the industrial standards. The research results of this UWB microchip system have received special attention from United Microelectronics Corporation, Genesys Logic, Sunplus Technology Co., VIA Networking Technologies Inc., Terasoft Inc., Winbond Electronics Corp, Taifa Corp, and Gentek Technology. Relevant technologies have been transferred to Advantech, Terasoft Inc., and Horng Yih Enterprise Corpora- tion. Currently, we have acquired 6 domestic and external patents, and will apply for more patents in the future. With this plan, a research partnership with relevant fi rms is established and jointly develops wireless USB communication IC-related products, which is expected to transfer to 2 or more domestic wireless communi- cation IC design fi rms, which can shorten at least 6 months worth of research time, and encourage corporate investments of 300 million NTD or more, creating 3 billion NTD or more in production value for the UWB industry. It can also reduce domestic fi rms' reliance on technologies from large international fi rms, and create lucrative commercial opportunities for domestic UWB industries. (2) Use corporate technological projects to create new domestic navigation electronics industries ----- The research team for the electronics department of CSIST has been working on implementing the aero space information broadcasting and communication technology plans from FY 2004 to 2006, striving to focus on international orders. The efforts to incorporate international partner fi rms are gradually attaining expected benefi ts. Although external investments have been weakening for 2 straight years, and the domestic aerospace industry environment is less than desirable, we could still rely on abundant experienced personnel and domestic production capacity to attract external investment and on certifi cation technologies to establish the only aero space electronics research center in Taiwan. Other than assisting domestic industries in achieving aerospace electronics certifi cation thresholds, the growth of the aerospace electronics research center also becomes a ma jor advantage in attracting foreign aerospace electronics companies to make investments in Taiwan. Through authorizations of key patents, we are actively assisting the industry in striving for international orders and turning to domestic mass-production, which is an important stage for traditional industries desiring reform and creating high value-added electronics and information industries. After 1 year of diligence in developing cargo aircraft communications, navigation guidance, and display control computers (AVIONIC 500 Airborne Computer), we have, under the witness of the Taiwan Aerospace Industry Association, offi cially contracted 1,000 units worth of fi rst-quarter orders that need to be completed during 2006 to domestic fi rms, assisting the domestic navigation electronics industry in earning 140 million NTD. Before 2008, we expect to receive orders for 2,700 units with a production value that may reach 370 mil lion NTD. Also, to address market opportunities and changes, we are actively involved in research for fl ight safety and rescue system products (PLB/ELT/EPIRB, etc.), and adequately using domestic industrial capacities for manufactures of relevant GPS modules, antennas, frameworks, low-power and electricity sources. There have been 2,500 external orders on PLB products, which need to be completed by the end of 2006. The domestic in dustry is planning to begin mass production by the start of 2006. Production value is approximately 110 million NTD, which may exceed 240 million NTD before 2008. (3) Strive to create an industry for automotive safety and electronic sensor and control systems The global market demand is expected to experience compounded growth of 12% every year hereafter. By 2010, the global market production may be valued at over 100 billion NTD. If we can secure 10~15% of the greater China regional market, Taiwan's car and accessory industry scale can increase twofold over the present state, reaching a production value of 800 billion NTD. Automotive safety and electronic sensor and control sys tems and accessories play signifi cant value-added roles. In time, domestic car manufacturers may focus on de velopment and sales of cars and accessories. Taiwan may gradually become a transportation and development center while engaging in the manufacturing of different products around the world. For many years, under the budgetary support of industrial plans of the Department of Industrial Technol ogy in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the CSIST's 4[th] Research Institute's executive team has integrated and reformed the application of rocket/missile fuel, explosives, electronic surveillance tracking/strike and launch control, and quality control projects. With cooperation from partner fi rms, system designs and technological and domestic industrial developments in automotive safety and electronic sensor and control systems have started from almost nothing in the beginning to the foundation we have today. The technological standard also went from trailing behind for at least 30 years to world-class competitiveness today. We also established au 241 ----- tonomous core technologies and patent transfers for many automotive safety and electronic sensor and control system software and hardware, achieving domestic mass production and commercialization. Implemented items from planned industrial results include: a. Establish and develop emerging industries for vehicle safety devices We have assisted GSK Intek Co., Iron Force Industrial Co., Tongli Electronics, Ho Hong Jung Automa tion Co., Mei-An Autoliv Co., Universal Scientifi c Industrial Co., and Lonex Corp in entering the international fi rst-class accessory supply chain. We can created 3 billion NTD in internal and external product sales, which is expected to increase to as much as 12 billion NTD in the next 3 years. b. Assist the nationalized production of components / system manufacture We have provided Yulon, Kuozui Motors, China Motor Corporation, Ford Lio Ho Motor Company, and Formosa Automobiles Sales Corp with newly marketed cars and comprehensive quality control and testing ser vices. We can lower foreign exchange losses by at least 4 billion NTD every year. c. Successfully built professional and internationally reliable testing centers for automotive driver seat/ front passenger seat/anti-side collision airbag systems, and received 3 national CNS certifi cates and an award from Sweden's Autoliv, the largest fi rm in the world, as the most advanced facility of its kind in the Asia-Pacif ic, which can provide the government with inspection tools for imported cars after Taiwan joins the WTO, and ensure the quality of internally or externally sold products. (4) Develop recorded media target material technologies to open new optical electronics material indus tries “Target” refers to the metallic, non-metallic, or compounded materials used for sputter coating. As the optical electronics industry develops rapidly, it has become a unique key upper-level industry in Taiwan. In the past, raw coating (target) materials required by optical domestic electronics industries were mostly imported from Japan or the U.S., with an annual demand of over 15 billion NTD, which not only caused severe foreign exchange losses, but also reduced relevant domestic industrial development autonomy. But, after the initiation of the CSIST's material and optical electronics research institute's 2-stage target material and production technology plan, we have fully focused on recorded media target material and produc tion-related technologies, successfully demonstrating the following concrete industrial benefi ts: a. Create production value This technology has currently developed over 20 types of recorded media target material. Every year, there are over 6 partnership fi rms, including RITEK Corporation, China Steel Corporation, Nanya Technology Cor poration, Solar Applied Materials Technology Corp, Fu Sheng Group, Prodisc Technology Inc., Homogeneity Co., and Gloria Material Technology Corp. Simultaneously, this attracts foreign target material companies to build factories in Taiwan. In 2004, domestic fi rms have produced recorded media-related target material worth 4 billion NTD or above, while offshoot optical electronic products are worth over 20 billion NTD. b. Increase the competitiveness of the optical electronics industry Before these technological developments, target materials were very expensive for related domestic indus tries, often with prices more than 50% of total costs, and there was no way to secure development information. For example, before these technological developments, 1 unit of silver-titanium (Ag-Ti) target material for CDs had to be imported externally at NTD 20,000 to 30,000. After we successfully assisted domestic fi rms to devel 242 ----- op the technologies, 1 unit of target material costs only NTD 5,000, which greatly lowers target material costs, directly benefi ting the domestic optical electronics market, and increasing our international competitiveness in optical electronic products. Also, these technologies are benefi cial for future product improvements and newly applied fi elds. c. Raise the quality of the equipment manufacturing industry Key production equipment for this project were all designed and made by CSIST and domestic firms, which is compatible with the objective of increasing domestic industrial manufacturing technology standards, and benefi cial for subsequent improvements and characteristics enhancements. Therefore, domestic target ma terial manufacturing currently uses mainly domestically produced equipment. d. Encourage upgrading and transformation of traditional industries In its earlier years, Solar Applied Materials Technology Corp focused on selling automotive chemicals and pure silver target material, while China Steel Corporation focused on steel and aluminum goods. Because CSIST successfully transferred the vacuum sensor-based welding and vacuum powder metallurgy technolo gies for recorded media target material production to Solar and China Steel, the two companies successfully reformed to focus on developing applied material technologies and producing high-level target materials. Solar also became an over-the-counter (OTC) company at the end of 2005. e. Formation of local target material industries The domestic recorded media and related fi elds spend over 10 billion NTD a year on raw coating material, almost all of which is imported. Because we have assisted domestic fi rms in successfully developing recorded media target material, foreign target material fi rms were forced to cut their prices in half, withdraw from the domestic market, or build factories in Taiwan. Other than many foreign fi rms building factories in Taiwan, cur rently, Solar Applied Materials Technology Corp, TTMC Corp, China Steel Corporation, Sintel Ltd., Lishan Corp, and Homogeneity Co. have all invested in production, breaking the American and Japanese oligopoly in the market of related photo-electric target materials, making target material manufacturing a new industry in Taiwan. 2. Case Studies of Implementation Results for Technological Projects for the Commercialization of Military Goods The CSIST's technological projects for military goods commercialization have resulted in the commercial ization of 32 items of military goods, 87 cooperation contracts, and 66 cooperation fi rms (including strategic research partnership contractors) between 2004 and 2005. Costs of subsidizing partner fi rms in the development of military goods are approximately 240 million NTD, which encouraged fi rms to invest 420 million NTD. In come derived from the application of research results from fi rms is almost 100 million NTD. Currently, much has been accomplished already. The developed military goods research and production chains are expected to signifi cantly benefi t the nationalization of Taiwan's armament industry and the establishment of autonomous defense technology industries. At the same time, the CSIST can assist fi rms to raise technologies from OEM levels to ODM levels through the implementation of programs, which is highly valuable for the industries. Be low are explanations for four crowning examples: (1) Manufacture of bulletproof ceramic armored vehicles: 243 ----- Hocheng Corporation, a materials and chemical processing company, participated in the military goods de velopment project for high bullet-resistance ceramic material and accessories. They made high bullet-resistance material and accessory technology for bulletproof vests in the development of bullet-resistant ceramics. They also participated in Foreign Comparison Tests (FCT) plans in the U.S. and successfully passed preliminary selections in May 2005. In the future, they will become full-fl edged contractors, becoming the only Taiwanese company that can provide bullet-resistant ceramic materials for the American military, which provides many commercial opportunities in the American military goods market. In its execution of the commercialization plan for military goods, the company has successfully established self-manufacturing capacities for military goods, and raised development personnel quality. In the future, when the armored vehicle upgrade plans offi cially en ter production, it can generate an expected 300 million NTD in orders yearly. Also, technologies related to high bullet-resistance ceramics can be used for civilian bulletproof vests, bulletproof airplane cockpits, bulletproof limousines, etc., which is expected to generate at least 100 million NTD yearly. This no doubt opens the way for transforming and upgrading traditional industries. (2) Application and development of composite material winding technology Kingent Corp Ltd., which once belonged to the traditional material and chemical industries, has gone from manufacturing traditional tanks with low added value and technological level to high value-added manufactur ing of special winding composite units, precision processing, and testing under the guidance of the CSIST's specialized military goods commercialization technological plans. The company has received orders exceeding 10 million NTD after successful guidance, and has applied for derivative patents. This plan is expected to raise the autonomy and timeliness of relevant military weapon equipment deploy ments, reduce foreign armament procurements, and raise domestic market support for defense. It is estimated that, within 5 years, the company is expected to receive orders for composite material launching tubes worth 100 million NTD. After helping the company upgrade its technological competence and investment capital, de velop high-quality composite material products with valuable civilian applications, and invest in defense affairs departments, we can expect to further expand derivative production benefi ts. (3) Research and manufacture of unmanned remote-controlled target planes Grand Wing Servo Tech Co. focused on the research and sales of recreational remote-controlled models (including planes, cars, boats) in the past. To increase the added value and recreational level of their products, they participated in the commercialized plan for the research and manufacture of small military unmanned remote-controlled target plane systems. They effectively raised research capacity to the level of high-tech extra LOS target planes, which has enabled aerial environmental monitoring, pollution monitoring, traffi c monitor ing, spraying of agricultural chemicals, fi shery resource control, live artillery ammunition targets, and border patrol. In the future, annual production is expected to be at least 100 vehicles, with a value up to 200 million NTD. (4) Research and manufacture of active phased array radar signal transmission modules Mag.Layers Co. and Advanced Ceramic X Corporation, partners in communications and optical electronic technology, were originally contractors for manufacturing passive microwave components for electrical capaci tance and inductance. They jointly participated in the commercialized research plan of low-temperature co-fi red ceramic (LTCC) transmission modules to develop advanced microwave transmission module manufacturing 244 ----- technologies for radar systems. They have raised the average industrial standards in LTCC technology to the level of large-area modules and cavity packaging, which can be applied to instant multi-target 3-D monitoring and tracking active phased array radar systems. This allows us to strive for lucrative commercial opportunities in upgrades of anti-missile and war zone defense systems from the US, Europe, Japan, and the armed forces. It is anticipated that, in the future, production value can reach several billion NTD. 245 ----- 246 ----- **The List of MND departments and agencies Phone numbers** |Contact Numbers of MND Administrative Agencies|Col2|Contact Numbers of MND Agencies|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |General Political Warfare Bureau|02-23118696|Army Command Headquarters|03-4792111| |Armaments Bureau|02-23677652|Kinmen Army Defense Command|0823-32471| |Comptroller Bureau|02-23111960|6th Army Command|03-4502101| |Medical Affairs Bureau|02-23119729|8th Army Command|07-6691419| |Department of Strategic Planning|02-23313523|10th Army Command|04-25814627| |Department of Military Justice|02-29338805|AAF Special Operations Command|06-2304201| |Department of Manpower|02-23122767|Matzu Army Defense Command|0836-22101| |Department of Resources|02-23119927|Huadong Army Defense Command|03-8223103| |Department of Legal Affairs|02-23120453|Penghu Army Defense Command|06-9270162| |Department of Reserve Affairs|02-23616698|Navy Command Headquarters|02-25333181| |Executive Offi ce of the Minister|02-23318391|Naval Fleet Command|07-5813141| |Inspection Offi ce|02-23119831|Naval Recruit Training Center|07-5857025| |Integrated Assessment Offi ce|02-25337680|Navy Marine Corps Command|07-5815179| |Military History Translation Offi ce|02-25327440|Air Force Command Headquarters|02-27111101| |Petitions and Appeals Committee|02-23310628|Air Operation Command|02-27326840| |Military Personnel Rights Committee|02-23616600|Air Force Air Defense Artillery Command|03-3687273| |Offi ce of Joint Operations Training and Doctrine|02-28850627|Combined Logistics Command|02-27854121| |Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Personnel|02-29391910|1st Combined Logistics Regional Support Command|06-9217881| |Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Intelligence|02-23612853|2nd Combined Logistics Regional Support Command|03-8223103| |Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations and Planning|02-23313994|3rd Combined Logistics Regional Support Command|03-4502101| |Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Logistics|02-23119912|4th Combined Logistics Regional Support Command|07-6691409| |Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Communications, Electronics and Information|02-23884414|5th Combined Logistics Regional Support Command|04-25814625| |0800 toll-free military inquiry phone numbers||Reserve Command|02-23111501| |MND|1985(direct 4-digit dialing)|Northern Reserve Command Post|02-29412332| |Army Command Headquarters|0800-060070 0800-321454|Central Reserve Command Post|04-23116163| |Navy Command Headquarters|0800-221760|Southern Reserve Command Post|07-5515275| |Air Force Command Headquarters|0800-081400|Military Police Command|02-25972181| |Combined Logistics Command|0800-251090|No. 202 Military Police Command Post|02-23119531| 247 ----- |Reserve Command|0800-077775 0800-231882|No. 203 Military Police Command Post|04-22227602| |---|---|---|---| |Military Police Command|0800-221507|No. 204 Military Police Command Post|07-2211171| |Missile Command|0800-370885|No. 205 Military Police Command Post|02-29615340| |Debt Relief for Military Offi cers and Soldiers|0800-666659|Missile Command|02-29018480| |Military Personnel Recruitment Center|0800-000050|Information and Electronic Warfare Command|02-29114145| |Military Legal Inquiries Hotline|0800-880585|National Defense University|03-4890510| |Career Guidance for Retired Soldiers|0800-712712|Fu Hsing Kang College|02-28946697| |Military Dependents Assistance Foundation|0800-209393|Chung-Cheng Armed Forces Preparatory School|07-7414188| |Military Friends Society|0800-231688|Tri-Service General Hospital|02-87923311| 248 ----- **Epilogue** Since 1992, the MND has published a defense report every 2 years. This is the 8th publication of the de fense report, which is intended to reiterate the emphases of defense policy, encourage transparency in defense information, and actualize all-out defense concepts. More importantly, it expresses the ROC Armed Forces' determination and efforts in defense transformation in the face of current defense challenges. At the same time, it is hoped that, by conveying transformation concepts, the report will encourage the public to devote more care, support, or participation in defense affairs, call on competent youths for military enlistment, and strive for reasonable defense budgets. Moreover, it also hopes to increase international understanding and support for Taiwan's efforts in maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, enabling Taiwan the opportunity to build “cooperative security” with other members of the “democratic community.” The current edition of the defense report differs from those of the past, which were basically compilations of policy or administrative data from various agencies. In this report, a focused and theme-based editing ap proach was employed, where defense transformation is the main axis. With the explanatory framework of “Fac ing the Challenges,” “Innovative Transformation,” and “All-out Defense,” it describes the ROC Armed Forces' facing diverse defense challenges, reveals future directions and current concrete measures of defense trans formation, and explains the importance and concrete actions of all-out defense so as to realize the objective of promoting defense transformation and winning public approval. An innovative means was attempted as the working method for this defense report; a task group model was adopted and the “National Defense Report Project Offi ce” was set up on September 2, 2005. It incorporated relevant internal staff units, administrative agencies, and National Defense University specialists to form a core editing team. Under the direction of consultant counsellers (hiring 30 civilian academic experts) and superiors from various levels, the team was responsible for the conception, composition, coordination, and integration of each part and its chapters. Also, to ensure that the entire report demonstrates consistent contents and iterations yet include diverse consultations and reviews, relevant internal units have performed joint reviews during the editing period. Civilian academic experts and defense counsellers from the Legislative Yuan were also invited on many occasions to participate in group discussions and provide advice for preliminary and repeated reviews on the chapters, summaries, composition themes, and drafts. They assisted in the actual editing of part of the contents in this report to improve the “consistency” and “extensiveness” of the report's overall contents. Furthermore, in terms of the report's page layout, a more lively and vivid visual design concept served as its foundation and a colorful picture-text editing method was adopted. This increases the richness and read ability of the contents with the hope of attracting more readers, so that more people will become interested and passionate in defense affairs, further actualizing the all-out defense concept. The successful publication of this defense report owes itself to the contributions of full participation from internal units and external academic experts. In the future, the MND will continue to strive for innovation and practicality. To realize the goal of effective public supervision, the MND will enable the public to inspect con crete results of defense policies through the regular publication of defense reports. At the same time, it is hoped that this report will encourage the public to understand defense affairs and build a consensus for all-out defense so as to strengthen the solid foundation of national security. 249 ----- 250 ----- **2006 ROC Defense Report Editing Committee** Chairperson: Lee,Jye Deputy Chairpersons: Lee,Tien-yu Ko,Chen-heng Chu,Kai-sheng Directing Team for Policy: Tseng,Jing-ling Hu,Chen-pu Lin,Jan-yi Shen,Kuo-jen Chi,Ling-lien Yu,Lian-fa Chaou,Shih-chang Wang,Li-shen Pang,Sheng-chu Wu,Dar-pong Liao,Tieh-ming Kao,Kuang-chi Lu,Tai-shen Wu,Wei-rong Wang,Chi-lin Chen,Hong-I Lin,Chin-ching Lei,Yu-chi Liu,Kuo-tong Hsieh,Yun-lung Liu,Jiun-ying Wang,Chun-chang Hsu,Tai-sheng Lee,Ching-guo Wang,Ming-I Cheng,Shih-yu Lee,Ming-fan Chao,Te-yung Chang,Li-chung Chiang,Kao-ching Consultation Team: Ding,Arthur-s Chi,Le-yi Soong,Jaw-wen Lee,Wen-chung Lee,Deng-ker Lin,Chong-pin Lin,Wen-cheng Lin,Cheng-yi Lin,Bih-jaw Shiah,Hua-min Hung,Lu-hsun Shiah,Yng-jou Wong,Ming-hsien Kao,Chung-yuan Kang,Ning-hsiang Chang,Wu-ueh Chang,Jung-feng Mei,Fu-hsing Bih,Chung-ho Chen,Chung-shin Fuh,Wei-ku Huang,Chieh-cheng Yang,Philip Yang,Chih-heng Yang,Nien-dzu Liu,Fu-kuo Tsai,ming-yen Cheng,Tung-y Chung,Chien Lang,Ning-li (names ordered according to number of strokes in surname) Editing Team: Chen,Yuan-hsiung York,Chen Chai,Wen-chung Chiou,Yen-jen Lin,Chien-cheng Wu,Chun-shu Chang,Syi-sang Lo,Hua-hsing Lee,Tieh-shang Chien,Shu-fen Chen,Zhun-lun Lin,Yuen-ling Shih,Chi-liang Chang,Hsi-chih Yang,Yu-chin Chang,Kuang-shih Wu,Tzu-chiang Tsao,Shien-chung Hsu,Ching-yao Chao,Chih-hsing Ko,Li-yen Lee,Chun-hsien ----- **National library Cataloguing in Publication(CIP)** **Information** Book Title： 2006 ROC National Defense Report Author： National Defense Report Editing Council, Ministry of National Defense Publisher： Ministry of National Defense Contact Address： No. 164, Boai Rd., Taipei City（Taipei Postal Mailbox No. 91195） Web Site： http：//www.mnd.gov.tw/ Telephone： 02-23313523 Fax：02-23709530 Online Version： http：//report.mnd.gov.tw/ Sold in： 1.Government Bookstore, Taiwan Television Enterprise, Ltd B1, No. 10, Sec. 3,Pate Rd., Taipei City, Taiwan, ROC Telephone: 02-2578-1515; Web Site: http://www.govbooks.com.tw 2.Wu-Nan Cultural Enterprise (Distributor): No. 558, Hsinfu Rd.,Taiping City, Taichung County, Taiwan, ROC Telephone:04-2395-3100; Web Site: http：//www.wunanbooks.com.tw Publication date: Aug. 2006 Wersion: 1st edition Price: Hardcover: NT$630 Paperback: NT$430 GPN：1009502073（Hardcover 1009502072） `（Paperback）` ISBN-13：978-986-00-6318-9 978-986-00-6347-9（Hardcover） `（Paperback）` ISBN-10：986-00-6318-4 986-00-6347-8（Hardcover） `（Paperback）` Copyright  2006 by the Ministry of National Defense, Taiwan, ROC All rights reserved. Reprints without permission will be prosecuted. -----