DEFENSE · PROTECTION DE LA POPULATION · SPORTS DIFESA · PROTEZIONE DELLA POPOLAZIONE · SPORT ## Security through Cooperation ###### An information brochure on the Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the security policy of Switzerland (Report 2000 on Security Policy) ----- ###### This brochure summarizes the core state– ments of the report on Swiss security policy and is intended to facilitate the discussion on security policy. However, it is no substitute for the more detailed and comprehensive full report. Only the text adopted by the Federal Council is authoritative! #### Impressum ###### Concept, Realization: Rudolf Plüss, Thomas Suremann ###### Text: Rudolf Plüss, Christian Catrina, Thomas Suremann ###### Publisher: Office for Information Concepts, General Secretariat, DDPS ###### Layout/Print: Staubli Media, Bern [www.stm.ch] Druckerei Bloch AG, Arlesheim ###### Photos: Keystone-Press, Army Film Service ###### To be ordered from: see page 32 ###### Contact address: Information Service DDPS, Parliament Building, East Wing, 3003 Bern Tel ++41 31 324 50 58 www.vbs.admin.ch ###### 2 Security through Cooperation ----- #### Contents ###### Summary Our new security policy and its consequences 4–5 Fundamentals New world – new dangers 6–7 Armed conflicts and their management 8–9* Our armed forces in comparison with others 10–11* Our response: security trough cooperation 12–13 Our security policy instruments The armed forces 14–15 Armed forces: preconditions for mission accomplishment 16–17 Civil protection 18–19 Foreign policy and economic policy 20–21 Police and protection of the constitutional order 22 Information and communication 23 The framework of our security policy Resources: militia and compulsory service 24–25* Resources: modification of compulsory service 26–27 Our neutrality adapted to the situation 28–29 Strategic leadership 30 The way ahead: milestones of our security policy 31 * On these pages, this summary contains some additional information and remarks, compared with the full report. **3 3** _Security through Cooperation_ **3** ----- ###### Summary #### Our new security policy ... ###### The Report 2000 on Security Policy analyses the changed situation, describes the objectives of Swiss security policy and derives from them our strategy: security through cooperation. This strategy determines, in turn, the missions of our security policy instruments. ###### The new situation The international situation has changed fundamentally over the last decade. The conventional military threat to Switzerland has decreased. At the same time, the range of other dangers and risks has expanded considerably. Today’s security problems cut across borders. The current crises and conflicts in Europe confront many countries with the same challenges and they have a direct impact on Switzerland as well. The crises cannot be solved but by a joint effort. For this reason, greater security cooperation is imperative. ###### Our previous strategy The previous Swiss strategy of security policy aimed at security through autonomy. To a large extent it was based on worst-case assumptions (nuclear war) as criteria for the allocation of resources, and it was accepted that a heavy time burden was placed on the militia. This orientation was appropriate to the circumstances of the Cold War but the changed situation calls for a new strategy. ###### 4 Security through Cooperation ###### The new strategy: security through cooperation _The new strategy of Swiss security_ _policy is geared to cooperation._ Within Switzerland, emphasis is put on the best possible coordination of our own civilian and military instruments through comprehensive and flexible security cooperation. Internationally, cooperation with friendly states and international security organizations will be expanded, as well as Switzerland’s commitment to enhancing peace. Such a commitment reflects our own interests; it reduces the risk that Switzerland itself is affected by the consequences of instability and war. The strategy of cooperation runs like a thread through all areas relating to security policy. The path to greater security involves more cooperation. ###### Part of the framework: neutrality The law of neutrality leaves considerable freedom for manoeuvre to the neutral state. In the current political-military environment neutrality must be interpreted in an active way which expresses a spirit of solidarity. Neutrality does not prevent Switzerland from an active commitment to peace support or from cooperation in military training. However, the law of neutrality does prohibit giving military support to any warring party. For this reason, even in peacetime a neutral state cannot make any commitment to give military assistance in a war. Therefore, membership in NATO is not compatible with neutrality. ----- #### ... and its consequences ###### The new strategy will have an effect on our security policy instruments, in particular on the armed forces and civil protection. The strategy calls for a reassessment of the relative importance of the missions of our armed forces. It also calls for a partial review of our compulsory service and will have an impact on our strategic leadership. ###### Reassessment of the missions of our armed forces The new strategy demands that the previous three missions of the armed forces are evaluated anew. _Peace support and crisis management:_ Compared to the former ‘peace promotion’ mission, the armed forces must expand their engagement in the trouble area itself. If necessary, it will also be possible to arm voluntary units for their protection and the success of their mission. _Area protection and defence:_ Compared to the former defence mission, cooperation with other armed forces will be increased, particularly in training. _Prevention and management of_ _existential dangers:_ Compared to its previous civil affairs support mission, the armed forces must be able to conduct several such operations simultaneously after a short period of preparation. _Preconditions for accomplishing armed_ _forces missions:_ Altogether the armed forces must be able to fulfil all three missions. Therefore, they must be multi-functional. The armed forces need graduated degrees of readiness. High readiness is necessary for some missions, but not for all. In view of a potential threat increase, the armed forces must also be able to increase their assets accordingly. In order to cooperate better with other armed forces (e.g. in peace support operations), it will also be necessary to improve interoperability. ###### Compulsory service The militia system and compulsory service for both armed forces and civil protection will be maintained. However, flexibility must be increased. Thus, the possibility of doing this service within a single period will be introduced for certain functions. Another objective is earlier discharge from compulsory service. Moreover, citizens having fulfilled their military duty will no longer be obliged to serve in civil protection. Finally, three variants for the future assignment of personnel to the armed forces and to civil protection have been submitted for discussion. ###### Civil protection Civil protection includes various civilian means (e.g. fire brigades, civil defence, rescue services) to protect the population in the event of catastrophes, military threats or other emergencies. The responsibility lies with the cantons and municipalities. The federal authorities assist in emergencies of national magnitude. Civil protection is primarily geared to coping with disasters. Preparations for unlikely events (e.g. nuclear war) have become less important. ###### Strategic leadership The strategic leadership of the Federal Council will be strengthened. A newly created Security Steering Group will permanently assess the situation, identify risks and opportunities as early as possible and propose measures to the Federal Council. The Security Steering Group will also be charged with the efficient coordination of our security policy instruments with a view to comprehensive and flexible security cooperation. At the same time, coordination of the intelligence services will be improved. **5 5** _Security through Cooperation_ **5** ----- ###### Fundamentals #### New world ... ###### In the contemporary world, borders and geographic distances are declining in importance. More and more problems are becoming common problems – and successful solutions are also increasingly common solutions. The end of this century is, however, characterized not only by greater unity, but also by disintegration and fragmentation. This is obvious from the map of Europe and the crises and conflicts in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. This has far-reaching consequences for Switzerland, most obviously in terms of refugees seeking asylum in our country, but also in terms of a greater humanitarian responsibility. _The Kosovo war: Switzerland has assumed responsibility. Its armed forces contribute to_ _humanitarian assistance (airlift with Super Puma helicopters)._ ###### Decreasing military More internal conflicts threat _The end of the Cold War has led to a_ _Today most armed conflicts do not take_ _If crisis management is not sufficient,_ _sustained reduction of the stockpiles_ _place between states or groups of_ _local disputes may escalate to extensi-_ _of nuclear and conventional weapons._ _states. More often they pit state authori-_ _ve armed conflicts. Such conflicts can_ _The warning time for large-scale_ _ties against groups within the same_ _also affect distant states, including_ _operations with conventional means_ _state._ _Switzerland. This is most obvious with_ _has increased to years._ _regard to refugees. Some of the refugees_ _continue in Switzerland to take part in_ _This gain in security will be lasting,_ _Among the most important causes and_ _the conflict of their country of origin in_ _if weapons of mass destruction_ _motives of such conflicts are:_ _various ways. This can cause problems_ _remain under control_ _ethnic tensions_ _for the internal security of our country_ _if armed conflicts can be contained_ _efforts to gain independence_ _and its foreign relations._ _by political and military means_ _economic disparities_ _if setbacks can be overcome_ _ideological and religious disagree-_ _ments_ _individual groups striving for power_ ###### 6 Security through Cooperation ----- #### ... new dangers ###### There is a broad spectrum of dangers and risks. The intensity and integration of non-military dangers has increased. The most important dangers and risks include: uncontrolled proliferation of means of mass destruction exertion of economic pressure vulnerability of modern information and communications systems (cf. box) terrorism, violence-prone extremism and organized crime the great disparity of prosperity, the scarcity of natural resources and uncontrolled migration natural and technological disasters These dangers and risks increasingly threaten the structures of modern and open societies. _ORGANIZED CRIME: Security forces at the German-Polish border fighting_ _against organized crime from Eastern Europe._ _PROLIFERATION: An Iraqi Scud missile is destroyed under UN direction. One of_ _the greatest dangers lies in the proliferation of long-range weapon systems_ _and of means of mass destruction._ _TERRORISM: A bomb attack on the_ _U.S. Embassy in Nairobi caused the_ _death of 240._ ###### The threat to the information infrastructure _Modern societies depend heavily on_ _the undisturbed functioning of in-_ _formation systems. These are vul-_ _nerable. Attacks on these systems and_ _networks can be waged by state and_ _non-state actors, with limited means_ _and regardless of distance. The risk of_ _detection is small. The range of pos-_ _sible attacks includes manipulating_ _data, introducing malfunctions, de-_ _stroying data, software, hardware and_ _infrastructure. Motives for such attacks_ _include (economic) espionage, black-_ _mail and influencing certain decisions7 7_ _in economy and administration._ _Security through Cooperation_ **7** ----- ###### Fundamentals #### Armed conflicts ... ###### Non-military threats, and violence below the threshold of war, have greatly increased, but they have not replaced war. Today war has two faces: It is either being conducted with the most modern means from the air or with conventional arms at close quarters on the ground. These two faces were evident in the Persian Gulf and on the Balkans. The modern air war Objectives Effects on _In the Gulf war:_ **Switzerland** liberation of occupied territory and Switzerland took part in the economic enforcement of UN resolutions. sanctions against Iraq. At the request _In the war against Yugoslavia:_ of the allies, Switzerland granted overexertion of military pressure to achieve a flight rights for humanitarian purposes, political solution of the Kosovo conflict. but not for combat purposes. Since 1995 the Federal Council granted transit rights, ###### Conclusion for both in the air and on the ground, through security policy Switzerland for the international peace The high technological level and the force (IFOR/SFOR) to Bosnia and Herzeemphasis laid on air war make it possible govina. In 1999 Switzerland was not in to minimize own casualties, but the a position to grant over-flight rights for ###### Characteristics decision must still be fought out on the the NATO operation against Yugoslavia The operation against Iraq 1990/91 was ground and requires a great effort. because it was not based on a UN characterized by: Security Council mandate. the high technological level the importance of air war the use of long-range weapons the effort to minimize own casualties The NATO operation against Yugoslavia in 1999 followed a similar pattern. ###### Fighting at close quarters Characteristics Effects on The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992- **Switzerland** 1995) was waged at short distances. Both conflicts had an impact on SwitzerBesides regular armed forces, groups land through a marked increase of with various degrees of organization and requests for asylum. Within the framewith different objectives took part. The **Objectives** work of the OSCE, Switzerland is conweapons dated from various gener- The goals of both wars were self-deter- tributing to the stabilization of Bosnia ations. Most of the fighting took place mination, power, expulsion and territori- and Herzegovina (yellow berets, military on the ground, often in the form of hate- al gains. observers, election observers, humaniinspired close combat which violated the tarian aid). Switzerland is also helping rules of humanitarian international law. **Conclusion for** the Kosovo refugees within the area of The expulsion of the Kosovars followed **security policy** tension with civilian and military means. the same pattern. At the same time, NATO Wars such as those on the Balkans are was waging a modern air war against seen by the participants as feasible and Yugoslavia. The two forms of war com- promising. This makes their recurrence bined and overlapped. more probable. ###### 8 Security through Cooperation ----- #### ... and their management ###### International security structures have been designed for peace support, crisis prevention and conflict resolution. These tasks must increasingly be assumed jointly by the international community. Conflicts should be resolved as peacefully as possible, preferably by negotiation. Pressure can be exerted with sanctions. As extreme options, the international community can threaten and apply force. Whether political efforts to resolve the problem succeed depends heavily on the credibility of such threats. The decisive prerequisite for resolving a conflict is the political will to act. This will must always be negotiated anew in the various international organizations. In principle, the use of force without a mandate of the UN Security Council is against international law. _Conflict resolution: meeting of the UN Security Council._ ###### Important organizations and agreements _UN_ _OSCE_ _Council of Europe_ _The UN is the universal governmental_ _The Organization for Security and_ _The Council of Europe is an organization_ _organization for safeguarding world_ _Cooperation in Europe promotes security,_ _of 41 European states, including Switzer-_ _peace. The UN Security Council bears_ _peace, human rights and democracy_ _land. The Council’s main purposes are_ _the main responsibility for maintaining_ _primarily through preventive diplomacy._ _the protection and promotion of human_ _peace and security. Based on the UN_ _Switzerland is a member of the OSCE._ _rights, of the rule of law and of demo-_ _Charter, the Security Council decides on_ _cracy._ _conflict management measures which_ _include those taken with the consent of_ _Partnership for Peace, EAPC_ _the conflicting parties, but also eco-_ _In 1994 NATO launched the Partnership_ _nomic sanctions and military coercion._ _for Peace programme to promote co-_ _operation for peace in Europe, in which_ _Switzerland is a participating as well. All_ _states taking part in the partnership are_ _also members of the Euro-Atlantic Part-_ _nership Council, which serves as a forum_ Arms control and disarmament agree _NATO_ _for security policy._ ments are important elements for _19 European and North American states_ enhancing international peace. They _are members of this defence alliance._ include, in particular, the nuclear non_NATO has retained its original core func-_ _EU/WEU_ proliferation treaty (1968) and the _tion of defending its member states_ _The European Union pursues a common_ conventions on biological and chemical _against military attack. For several_ _foreign and security policy. The Western_ weapons (1972 and 1993), but also the _years it has also assumed the task of_ _European Union (WEU), a military alliance_ agreements between the United States _maintaining or enforcing peace through_ _of ten European states, is both the_ of America and the Russian Federation _military means in areas outside the_ _European pillar of NATO and the military_ on strategic nuclear arms and the Treaty9 9 _alliance._ _instrument of the EU._ on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. _Security through Cooperation_ **9** ----- ###### Fundamentals ##### Our armed forces in comparison ... ###### 1 58 million Population: 544 000 km[2] Area: 460 000 359 000 : 41 500 heavily in defence (defence expenditure in relation to gross national product). The relatively low personnel expenses of the Swiss Armed Forces are remarkable ###### 4 Defence expenditures 1990[*]: 2.8 % Defence expenditures 1997: 1.6 % Personnel expenditures: 20.3 billion SFR Ratio of expenditures for operations/for procurement: 6:1 Alliance membership: NATO / WEU Conscription system 1990: universal conscription Conscription system 2000: universal conscription |Col1|1 France Population: 58 million Area: 544 000 km2 Armed forces strength 1990: 460 000 Armed forces strength 1998: 359 000 of which crisis reaction forces*: 41 500 Defence expenditures 1990*: 3.5 % Defence expenditures 1997: 2.9 % Personnel expenditures: 20.1 billion SFR|Col3|2 Germany opulation: 81.5 mill rea: 357 000 k rmed forces strength 1990: 469 0 rmed forces strength 1998: 333 5 which crisis reaction forces*: 52 efence expenditures 1990*: 2. efence expenditures 1997: 1. ersonnel expenditures: 20.3 billion| |---|---|---|---| ||Ratio of expenditures for operations/for procurement: 3:1 Alliance membership: NATO / WEU Conscription system 1990: universal conscription Conscription system 2000: professional armed forces being established|R o Al C C|atio of expenditures for perations/for procurement: liance membership: NATO / W onscription system 1990: universal conscript onscription system 2000: universal conscript| ###### 1 4 Germany ###### 2 5 ###### 5 ###### 10 Security through Cooperation ###### 2 81.5 million 357 000 km[2] 469 000 333 500 [*]: 52 000 3 ----- #### ... with others Defence expenditures 1990[*]: 2.1 % Defence expenditures 1990 Defence expenditures 1997: 1.9 % Defence expenditures 1997: Personnel expenditures: 13.2 billion SFR Personnel expenditures: Ratio of expenditures for Ratio of expenditures for operations/for procurement: 6:1 operations/for procurement: Alliance membership: NATO / WEU Alliance membership: Conscription system 1990: universal conscription Conscription system 1990: Population: Area: Defence expenditures 1990 Defence expenditures 1997: Personnel expenditures: Ratio of expenditures for Alliance membership: Conscription system 1990: _Armed forces strength:_ The figures designate active strength without reserves. In the case of Switzer **11 11** land they refer to total strength after general mobilization. _Security through Cooperation_ **11** Population: Area: Armed forces strength 1990: Armed forces strength 1998: of which crisis reaction forces Defence expenditures 1990 Alliance membership: Personnel expenditures: Ratio of expenditures for operations/for procurement: _Crisis reaction forces*_ are elements of the armed forces with a high level of readiness and suitable for deployment abroad. _Defence expenditures 1990*:_ The figures indicate the percentage of defence expenditures in relation to the gross national product. ----- ###### Fundamentals #### Our response: security ... ###### The security policy of Switzerland Our security policy serves to protect our country, population and interests against strategic dangers, i.e. the threat or use of direct or indirect force affecting considerable parts of country and population. –– 1. Objectives 2. Strategy ###### Our security policy objectives derive from the Federal Constitution (Article 2) and our interests: we wish to make our own decisions, both domestically and in our foreign relations, without being affected by the threat or use of direct or indirect force we wish to protect our population and its infrastructure against existential dangers we wish to contribute to stability and peace beyond our borders and to building an international community of common values. Thereby we reduce the risk that Switzerland and its popula- tion will be affected by instability and war abroad. This is also an expression of our international solidarity ###### In a world of common values, prob- lems and the necessity for joint solutions, a strategy of cooperation is required. Our strategy of security through cooperation relates to two levels: cooperation between our own security policy instruments, especially for missions within Switzerland (‘com- prehensive and flexible security co- operation’) and international cooperation in security policy Characteristics of the new strategy: orientation according to the current and most probable dangers flexible and modular use of our security policy instruments within Switzerland intensification of international co- operation in peace support, crisis management and training Our own security policy instruments must be kept up to date. Characteristics of the strategy to date: security through as much autonomy as possible allocation of resources according to ‘worst case scenarios’ heavy time burden on the militia |peace beyond our bo building an internation of common values. Ther the risk that Switzerland tion will be affected by war abroad. This is also of our international soli|rders al co eby w and its instab an ex darity| |---|---| |policy aracteristics of t rategy: orientation according to most probable danger lexible and modular us policy instruments wit|he ne the cu s e of ou hin Sw| |---|---| ###### 12 Security through Cooperation ----- #### ... through cooperation ###### Such force may be of politico-military origin, but may also result from disasters, terrorism or organized crime. Our security policy comprises objectives, strategy, missions and instruments. 3. Missions 4. Instruments Our objectives and strategy result For its security policy missions Switzer- in three tasks. Prevention and management of land has the following instruments: existential dangers comprise: assistance in the event of natural or Peace support and crisis technological disasters at home and management abroad Switzerland benefits directly from a foreign policy protection of persons and important stable environment. It is therefore fully facilities (e.g. power and communi in our interest to contribute to peace support and crisis management. Cri- cations installations) armed forces fighting organized crime and terrorism teria for our commitment are national interests, the firm grounding in inter civil protection national law and the democratic and Defence: humanitarian orientation of such Switzerland must always be able to operations. economic policy defend its population, territory and airspace against strategic threats. Concrete activities: membership and participation in national economic supply international organizations (e.g. This requires: maintaining a credible military de OSCE) police and protection of fence capability deployment of civilian and military the constitutional order an efficient and flexibly deployable personnel (e.g. election observers, civil protection yellow berets, aid in the Kosovo information and conflict) a high level of equipment and training communication a readiness which can be adapted as humanitarian activities (e.g. Swiss the situation develops Disaster Relief Corps) armed forces that can cooperate with The security policy instruments must initiatives and services relevant to foreign armed forces for defence if be conceived in such a way that Switzer security policy (e.g. the Geneva In necessary land can react to future developments ternational Centre for Humanitarian timely, adequately, flexibly and in a Demining) coordinated manner. assistance in reconstruction (e.g. in Eastern Europe) development cooperation **13 13** _Security through Cooperation_ **13** ----- ###### Our security policy instruments #### The armed forces ###### The mission of the armed forces in security policy ###### The mission of the armed forces comprises: peace support and crisis management area protection and defence contributing to the prevention and management of existential dangers ###### Multi-functionality, readiness, force generation capability and interoperability are necessary for the armed forces to fulfil these missions. The missions of peace support and crisis management, as well as the prevention and management of existential dangers will play a more important role than in the past. The armed forces _will contribute within the framework_ _of international security cooperation_ _to peace support and crisis pre-_ _vention_ _can, after a short period of prepara-_ _tion, deploy modular units as the_ _situation requires to a crisis area for_ _extended periods_ _will train, equip and adequately arm_ _units for each operation_ ###### Peace support and _Participation in operations abroad will_ ###### crisis prevention continue to be voluntary. This is new _Compared to the previous mission of_ _Council will decide whether the Swiss_ _‘peace promotion’, the armed forces_ _Armed Forces take part in operations,_ _will have a stronger presence on the_ _with what kind of units, for how long and_ _spot and intensify relevant training._ _under which rules of engagement. Such_ _Deployed units are to be armed if this is_ _decisions will require subsequent ap-_ _necessary for their security and for the_ _proval by Parliament._ _completion of their mission. The Federal_ ###### 14 Security through Cooperation ###### crisis prevention ----- ###### of existential dangers ###### Area protection and defence ###### Prevention and management ###### of existential dangers _Security through Cooperation_ **15** ----- ###### Our security policy instruments #### Armed forces: preconditions ... ###### Multi-functionality Multi-functionality means that the armed forces are geared to mastering several and different missions. The armed forces will be multi-functional as a whole. However, the individual soldier will not have to be able to do all the different tasks at the same time. Theory and practice correspond with each other The importance of multi-functionality is becoming increasingly evident in practice. For example, the armed forces simultaneously fulfilled various missions in different places in 1999: caring for people seeking asylum, rescue, assistance and supply missions for people affected by avalanches, fighting floods, protecting foreign missions and international organizations in Bern, Geneva and Zurich, giving support to the border guard corps, protecting Swiss diplomatic missions abroad, and providing disaster relief to our neighbouring countries. Armed forces have been deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to Albania for peace support operations. Planning and conducting these missions is particularly demanding in the case of a militia system (availability of forces, predetermined duty periods, reserves). Here too, the importance of cooperation is evident: Armed forces perform together with civilian executive staffs, civil defence, police, fire brigades and other organizations. Their success depends on cooperation. _Deployment at the border_ _Guard duty_ _Peace support_ _Care of refugees_ _Rescue and aid (avalanche winter of 1999)_ ###### 16 Security through Cooperation ----- #### ... for mission accomplishment ###### Readiness and force generation capability The current security-policy situation calls for the armed forces to have graduated degrees of readiness. Warning times for the defence mission are long today. However, for peace support and coping with existential dangers, greater readiness is necessary than in the past. Parts of the armed forces must be rapidly available, after a short period of preparation. Due to their force generation capability, the armed forces continue to be prepared for a relapse into politico-military conflicts. This implies that personnel size, length of service, equipment and training can be increased adequately and in time to cope with a given situation. A timely political decision is necessary to make use of this growth potential. _Leopard II battle tank_ ###### Equipment and training The armed forces’ equipment and training are continuously being modernized. At least for parts of the armed forces, it is necessary to procure weapon systems and other equipment which meet highest European standards. The necessary industrial expertise for maintenance, upgrading and partially also for production must be maintained. ###### Interoperability Interoperability includes all capabilities necessary for cooperating with foreign armed forces. This includes language, staff procedures, equipment and training. Interoperability facilitates cooperation in peace support, crisis management and in preventing and mastering existential dangers. This in itself does not entail joining a military alliance. The Swiss Armed Forces enhance their interoperability through joint exercises in the Partnership for Peace programme and through experiences made in genuine engagements. **17 17** _Security through Cooperation_ **17** ----- ###### Our security policy instruments #### Civil protection ###### Civil protection is a civilian instrument for management, protection and assistance during disasters, politico-military threats and other emergencies. All civilian resources for coping with disasters, armed conflicts and other emergencies are being coordinated within the framework of civil protection. In principle, the cantons are responsible for civil protection. The federal authorities provide the legal basis and support the cantons, e.g. in training. For events of national magnitude, the federal authorities assume leadership and coordinate. ###### Civil protection: Civilian leadership Missions Rescue, fire Safeguarding fighting, repair technical facilities Protection and Health, medical Logistics care, protection of services cultural assets Means Police: Fire bigades Technical facilities The police can be employed within Armed forces the frame of civil protection for Today’s civil Medical rescue Logistic maintaining law emergencies if defence resources services elements and order. 18 Security through Cooperation ----- _Civil protection: coordinated cooperation of all partners for dealing with disasters._ ###### Reorientation and adaptation of readiness ###### The security policy situation calls for a reorientation of civil protection and enables it to adapt its readiness. ‘Worst case scenarios’ (e.g. nuclear war) have become rather improbable today. Natural and technological disasters and other emergencies have become much more likely. This has consequences for the readiness of civil protection: The main emphasis for mission planning and training will be on coping with disasters. Civil protection will rely mainly on the partly professional assets designed for every-day activities. They will include, e.g. fire brigades, medical rescue services and technical facilities. The assets of civil defence will be integrated into civil protection. The civil protection assets will be designed in a modular fashion, so that modules can be employed selectively as needed. Civil authorities will assume leadership and coordinate. The responsibility for civil protection will lie primarily with the municipalities, regions and cantons. It is also they who are usually confronted with the task of coping with disasters. The federal authorities will assist the cantons if the size of the emergency calls for management and coordination at national level. The armed forces will be engaged when the civilian resources are exhausted. ###### The mission of civil protection in security policy Civil protection will serve to alert the population and protect them against disasters and politico-military threats. It will provide for the protection of vital facilities and cultural assets. Incidents will be mastered by employing the modular means of cantons, municipalities and private organizations. **19 19** _Security through Cooperation_ **19** ----- ###### Our security policy instruments #### Foreign policy and ... ###### Foreign policy is an important pillar of our security policy. It is a primary instrument for protecting our interests and expressing our solidarity with the international community. The security policy mission of foreign policy _Development cooperation_ _Support for the OSCE and the UN_ **_MENSCHENRECHTSPOLITIK: u.a._** **_Kampf der Anti-Personenminen_** _HUMAN RIGHTS: The indiscriminate effects_ _of anti-personnel mines form one of the_ _cruellest violations of human rights._ ###### 20 Security through Cooperation Foreign policy increases Swiss security by contributing to strengthening and lastingly safeguarding peace, to conflict prevention and crisis management enhancing respect for human rights and basic liberties safeguarding Swiss interests in arms control and disarmament negotiations promoting compliance with humanitarian international law assisting less developed countries and Eastern European states by raising their living standards providing humanitarian assistance in the event of disasters or armed conflicts pursuing a policy of neutrality which allows Switzerland to participate actively in the establishment of effective security structures ###### Peace support in concrete terms Through concrete contributions Switzerland supports efforts of the UN and the OSCE in peace support, preventive diplomacy and crisis management. Switzerland provides election observers and experts, contributes to the build-up of democratic structures and provides material and logistic assistance. Switzerland also supports the protection of minorities, the freedom of the press, the strengthening of local administration and an efficient justice and police who respect the rule of law. ###### Human rights policy Observance of human rights is an essential concern of Swiss foreign policy. Compliance with the provisions of human rights is in our own security interest. In the long term, peace and security can only be guaranteed if the community of states respect human rights and basic liberties, and political power is under democratic control. _DISASTER RELIEF:_ _The Swiss Disaster Relief_ _Corps conducts operations_ _all over the world._ **_MENSCHENRECHTSPOLITIK: u.a._** ----- #### ... economic policy ###### Switzerland has a long-standing vital interest in an open and liberal global economic trade system. Swiss economic policy relies heavily on cooperation for realizing our national interests. The security policy mission of economic policy Swiss economic policy promotes the Swiss economy and ensures its competitiveness. It contributes thereby to prosperity and stability in Switzerland. Swiss economic policy supports an open global trade beneficial to all partners – and hence is also conducive to reducing economic disparities which are in themselves an important source of security problems. Swiss economic policy must also be able to cope with efforts to exert economic pressure on Switzerland. This is facilitated by our presence and ability to safeguard our interests in international organizations (e.g. the World Trade Organization). Swiss economic policy also seeks to maintain the ecological balance. _Security through Cooperation_ **21** ----- ###### Our security policy instruments #### Police and protection of the constitutional order ###### Internal security has become more important to the citizens than external security. However, the distinction between internal and external security is increasingly an artificial one: Dangers to internal security are becoming more and more related to events abroad. Therefore, international security cooperation is necessary for internal security too. Internal security is a security policy issue insofar as it involves the fight against grave strategic dangers. Such is the case if the security of considerable parts of country and population is threatened. The security policy mission of police and protection of the constitutional order The majority of the police are subject to the cantons. The police fight against crime and ensure public security, law and order. Operations are led by federal authorities if the cantons lack sufficient resources to cope with the events. The _protection of the constitutional order_ helps to safeguard the democratic infrastructure, the rule of law and the rights and liberties of the population. It serves to identify dangers linked to violence at an early stage and prevent terrorism, extremism, espionage, weapons proliferation and organized crime. At the federal level, protection of the constitutional order supports the police and cantonal judicial authorities. ###### International cooperation Dangers and risks are becoming increasingly international. This is also true for internal security. Therefore, the fight against violence, terrorism and organized crime must also be internationalized and coordinated. Security through cooperation applies here too. With the agreements of Schengen and Dublin, the EU has developed two effective instruments. They define controls at the external borders of the Union and a uniform procedure for granting asylum. These agreements help establish a European area of security. As non-member of the EU and the European Economic Area, Switzerland cannot join these agreements. As far as possible, Switzerland strives to compensate for this disadvantage by concluding bilateral agreements, in particular with its neighbours. _Organized crime such as international drug trafficking can_ _only be fought through international cooperation._ ###### Assistance by the armed forces If the resources of the civil authorities are no longer capable of maintaining security and public order, they can request assistance by the armed forces. Such armed forces engagements are always subsidiary: The responsibility for the ###### 22 Security through Cooperation operations rests with the civil authorities. Assistance by the armed forces consists mainly in protection, logistics, and transport. Forces employed in such operations must be adequately equipped and trained. ----- ###### Information and communications Direct communication by the responsible authorities has political significance. As a consequence of the information revolution, the influence state authorities have on information is diminishing. This has the advantage that undemocratic governments find it increasingly difficult to deny their population access to correct information. Conversely it has also become easier to disseminate false and misleading information. ###### Information and communications infrastructure The information and communications infrastructure of Switzerland is exposed to many risks, not only in crisis situations but permanently. In principle, each member of the information society is responsible for the security of his or her means of information and communications. But because of the # @ very high level of networking, coordinated efforts are necessary to ensure The security policy security. The necessary structures mission of information The governmental information agencies will satisfy the population’s need for information will communicate, within Switzerland and beyond its borders, decisions and measures concerning security policy will substitute false and misleading information with factual information In normal situations, information on security policy is disseminated through civilian media. In special and extraordinary situations, the governmental information agencies (Federal Chancellery, Division for Press, Radio and TV in the Federal Council’s staff, Information Regiment 1) will ensure that the population is continually informed openly and comprehensively on important issues even when the civilian media can no longer fulfil their role. Timely and relevant information can decisively contribute to mastering crises and disasters. **23 23** _Security through Cooperation_ **23** ----- ###### The framework of our security policy #### Resources: militia ... ###### The citizens of Switzerland pay the price for security in the form of money (taxes) and time (compulsory service). Security policy must ensure a reasonable relation between expenditure and results. Financial resources must be allotted in such a way that our security policy satisfies the requirements and is as efficient as possible. ###### The militia armed forces Several European states have recently abolished compulsory military service for professional armed forces. However, in Switzerland national circumstances and requirements continue to favour the militia system. It is firmly anchored in the citizens’ minds. Switzerland will therefore maintain its militia armed forces. The militia system also has cost advantages, in comparison with professional armed forces. Moreover, it strengthens the link between armed forces and the population, and is an ex ###### Finances Security policy and its instruments must be given sufficient resources. Although the availability of financial resources does have an influence on security policy, this must not be allowed to become the determining factor. Security policy requirements must be defined on the basis of ###### Federal defence expenditures Expenditure in percent of total federal expenditures _1980:_ _1990:_ _1995:_ _14.5%_ _1998:_ _11.5%_ ###### 24 Security through Cooperation pression of the citizens’ direct responsibility for the state. At the same time an increasing number of service personnel experience the limits of the militia system when they have to reconcile the demands of profession, family and compulsory service. The armed forces themselves also realize that the militia system gives rise to problems in certain areas. These relate primarily to the need for a high degree of operational readiness. If the armed forces have to conduct several missions simultaneously, the availability of manpower quickly reaches its limits with the present militia the security policy situation. If the personnel strength of the armed forces and of the civil protection should decrease in the future, financial requirements cannot be expected to drop to the same extent. system. It must therefore be optimized. As far as absolutely necessary the professional component will be increased, especially for the areas of peace support, advanced technology and training. ----- #### ... and compulsory service ###### The current organization of the compulsory service place a heavy burden on the militia. Despite this, the availability of the armed forces is very limited in peacetime. Improvements are necessary. The militia system, universal conscription and compulsory civil protection service will be maintained, but their organization and duration will be adapted to the security-policy situation. Optimization measures will be taken in the context of the reform options presented below. These adaptations do not require a constitutional amendment. However, if compulsory duties were to be modified fundamentally, the Federal Constitution would require amendment. Three models (pp 26-27) indicate possible reforms in compulsory service. ###### Elements for a reform of compulsory military service _The elements of reform aim at reducing the length of time during which a citizen_ _is liable to serve in the armed forces. This would match the requirements of_ _society and the economy better than the present system does._ These elements would also result in a greater readiness for some parts of the armed forces. This is necessary for both domestic operations (area protection, prevention and management of existential dangers) and for voluntary operations abroad (humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peace support). These adaptations could be realized without a constitutional amendment. ###### for certain functions the option of doing military service within a single period contractual service earlier discharge after completion of from compulsory compulsory service service (‘temporal volunteers’) increase the proportion of professional soldiers, NCO’s and officers, as far as this is absolutely necessary 25 25 _Security through Cooperation_ **25** ----- ###### The framework of our security policy #### Resources: modification ... ###### The threat situation permits a reduction in personnel strength of the armed forces and of civil protection. This reduction can be realized by lowering the age of discharge from compulsory service. However, concrete numbers for personnel strength can only be identified on the basis of the forthcoming guidelines for the armed forces and civil protection. Three variants for the future assignment of persons liable to serve to the armed forces and civil protection will be examined. ###### Model A At conscription, citizens unfit for military service for health reasons would, as in the past, be assigned to civil protection (if not altogether dispensed from compulsory service). All citizens fit for military service would have to do basic military training (recruit school). Subsequently some of them would, however, be assigned to civil protection service. If necessary, transfer from the armed forces to civil protection would also be possible at a later stage, as long as not all the compulsory service days have been fulfilled. ###### 26 Security through Cooperation _They have four things in common:_ contrary to the present situation, persons having completed their com pulsory service would no longer be liable to civil protection service all male citizens would remain liable to serve women could assume service duties on a voluntary basis each of the variants would require an amendment of the Federal Constitution |Armed forces (Confederation) possibly re ‘Service Refresher within a courses single period’|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Civil protection (cantons) signment Standby Reserve elements elements|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||possibly re||as|signment||||||| |||||||||||||| |||||||||||||| |Recruit school direct assignment at (Confederation) conscription (healthreasons)||||||||||||| ###### Civil protection _(cantons)_ ###### Standby Reserve ----- #### ... of compulsory service ###### Model B Armed forces Civil protection _(Confederation)_ _(cantons)_ At conscription, citizens fit for service would be directly assigned either to the armed forces or to civil protection, with the armed forces’ requirements **‘Service** **Refresher** **Standby** **Reserve** having priority. There would be no freedom of choice **within a** **courses** **elements** **elements** for being assigned to the armed forces or civil **single** protection. However, the citizen’s preferences and **period’** aptitudes would be taken into account. Training for the armed forces and for civil protection respectively would take place separately. The main responsibility for civil protection training would lie **Basic training for** **Basic training for** with the cantons and municipalities. **the armed forces** **civil protection** ###### Dispen- Conscription Civil sation joint, simultaneous service Model C Armed forces Civil protection _(Confederation)_ _(cantons)_ At conscription, citizens could choose between service in the armed forces and in civil protection, ###### ‘Service Refresher Standby Reserve provided that the personnel needs of both are met. ###### within a courses elements elements Training for the armed forces and for civil protection ###### single respectively would take place separately. The main ###### period’ responsibility for civil protection training would lie with the cantons and municipalities. ###### Basic training for Basic training for the armed forces civil protection Dispen- Conscription Civil sation joint, simultaneous service Freedom of Choice **27 27** _Security through Cooperation_ **27** |Armed forces (Confederation) ‘Service Refresher within a courses single period’|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| |||||| |Basic training for the armed forces||||| |Civil protection (cantons) Standby Reserve elements elements|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| ||||| ||||| |Basic training for civil protection|||| |Armed forces (Confederation) ‘Service Refresher within a courses single period’|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| |||||| |Basic training for the armed forces||||| |Civil protection (cantons) Standby Reserve elements elements|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| ||||| ||||| |Basic training for civil protection|||| ###### Civil protection _(cantons)_ ###### Standby Reserve ###### elements elements ----- ###### The framework of our security policy #### Our neutrality ... ###### Elements of neutrality What kind of security policy commitment is compatible with the law of neutrality? A neutral state may neither participate in an armed inter-state conflict nor give military support to any party. In peacetime a neutral state may not allow any foreign military bases on ###### The law of neutrality its territory and must abstain from entering any obligation for military The law of neutrality provides the legal basis for international commitments support in a war. of neutral states. Legally binding are the provisions of the Hague Accord of 1907. They stipulate non-participation in wars as the most important obligation of a neutral state. _The following is compatible with_ _the law of neutrality:_ participating in economic sanctions ###### ++ participating in peace support The international situation operations under a mandate of the The international situation significantly determines the scope of neutrality UN Security Council or the OSCE, policy (see right-hand page). The practice of neutrality must take the interna- or with the consent of the conflicting tional situation into account if neutrality is to be understood and respected. parties granting transit rights for peace support operations under a mandate of the UN Security Council or ###### ++ the OSCE, or with the consent of Tradition and history the conflicting parties membership in international organi The policy of a state is not defined in a vacuum, but is based on traditions and zations (e.g. OSCE, Council of history. Over the course of history neutrality has become a foreign policy Europe, Euro-Atlantic Partnership norm for the Swiss authorities. This norm has been adapted and implemented Council) according to national interests. Traditionally Swiss neutrality has also served participating in the ‘Partnership for to maintain Switzerland’s internal cohesion. Peace’ programme membership in the United Nations and the European Union cooperating in military training and procurement _Incompatible with neutrality are_ _commitments containing an_ _obligation for support in a war._ _In concrete terms, the following is_ ###### Neutrality policy _ruled out:_ The law of neutrality, considerations regarding the international full membership in the Western situation and considerations of history and tradition are translated European Union into decisions which shape our neutrality policy. Neutrality policy membership in NATO and is hence the result of a thorough assessment of the situation. So stationing of foreign military bases ### == changing situations make the definition of neutrality policy a in Switzerland dynamic process. ###### 28 Security through Cooperation ###### The law of neutrality The law of neutrality provides the legal basis for international commitments of a neutral state. ###### ++ ###### The international situation The international situation significantly determines the scope of neutrality policy (see right-hand page). The practice of neutrality must take the interna- tional situation into account if neutrality is to be understood and respected. ###### ++ ###### Tradition and history history. Over the course of history neutrality has become a foreign policy norm for the Swiss authorities. This norm has been adapted and implemented according to national interests. Traditionally Swiss neutrality has also served to maintain Switzerland’s internal cohesion. ###### Neutrality policy The law of neutrality, considerations regarding the international situation and considerations of history and tradition are translated ### == The policy of a state is not defined in a vacuum, but is based on traditions and ----- #### ... adapted to the situation ###### Neutrality policy in the 20[th] century The scope varies 1919 Armed escorts of the Swiss Armed **1995** Forces protect the **1920** Switzerland transport ofgoods throughEastern Europe. Differentialneutrality:Switzerland joins **1928** **1990Switzerland takes** grants transitrights forequipment and **1999During the** the League of Integral neutrality: part in economic personnel to the Kosovo war the Nations. The failure of theLeague of Nations’sanctions againstItaly causeSwitzerland toreturn to integralneutrality. **1939** **1953Since 1953Switzerland hasprovidedobservers for thearmistice line inKorea.** sanctions againstIraq, therebydeviating fromintegral neutrality. internationalpeace forceIFOR/SFOR forBosnia andHerzegovina.Switzerland alsoprovides alogistic unit for Federal Councilrefuses to granttransit rights forNATO air combatunits.Switzerlandprovideshumanitarian At the outset of Bosnia (yellow assistance and World War II the berets). its armed forces Federal Council provide air reaffirms transport. Switzerland’s neutrality and mobilizes the armed forces to protect its independence. _New situation, new responses: The room for manoeuvre of neutrality policy has changed repeatedly during the 20[th] century._ _International changes called for new responses._ The neutrality policy of Switzerland was never something immutable. The policy Switzerland practised was always in keeping with the international situation. Obviously, the scope of our neutrality policy was very limited during World War II. Surrounded by the Third Reich, Switzerland mainly emphasized its independence. The situation after World War II allowed for a more active engagement in the spirit of solidarity. Switzerland made use of these opportunities, for example by taking part in peace-keeping operations or in the Partnership for Peace programme. That Switzerland sovereignly used its security policy scope, was evident already in 1919. At that time the Swiss Government – with the consent of all governments concerned – sent armed military escorts to Eastern Europe. These escorts were assigned to protect the transport of goods from the Swiss textile industry. _DOCUMENTARY RARITY: photograph of a_ _Swiss military escort in August 1919 in29 29_ _front of the Russian Church in Warsaw._ _Security through Cooperation_ **29** ----- ###### The framework of our security policy #### Strategic leadership ###### The activities of numerous instruments – situated in various federal departments and at different levels – must be coordinated to ensure our security: Strategic leadership is necessary. The newly created Security Steering Group assists the Federal Council in this task. The Security Steering Group is a staff of the Federal Council. It includes as permanent members the top officials of the federal departments responsible for security affairs. If necessary, non-permanent members from cantons and scientific experts will be integrated. The Steering Group will contribute to an early identification and improved management of major security problems. It will monitor the situation and its possible evolution. It will identify dangers and risks, but also opportunities to counter them as early as possible, and work out what the options are and what measures should be taken. Another important task of the Steering Group will be applying comprehensive and flexible security cooperation to our own security policy instruments. _Refugee drama in Kosovo._ ###### Assess the situation ... _Terrorist attack of 1997 in Luxor._ ###### ... identify possible threats ... Coordination of the intelligence services The post of a coordinator for intelligence cooperation will be created within the federal administration. This coordinator will belong to the Security Steering Group and have the support of a small office for early situation assessment. The coordinator will ensure that the Security Steering Group – and thereby also the Federal Council – receives the relevant information in time, so that it can effectively assume strategic leadership. ###### 30 Security through Cooperation _Security risk of PKK protests._ ###### ... work out our options. ----- #### The way ahead: milestones of our new security policy ###### Security policy is not just a matter for the armed forces and civil protection. Our security policy instruments include foreign policy, economic policy, national economic supply, police, protection of the constitutional order and information. However, armed forces and civil protection are the instruments with the greatest need for reform. The Report 2000 on Security Policy provides the basis for these reforms. The projects for reforming the armed forces and civil protection are currently in the planning stage. Respective guidelines will be presented in the year 2000. Implemen- tation of reforms is planned for 2003. August 1996 Federal Councillor Adolf Ogi tasks the ‘Study Commission on Strategic Issues’ with the definition of Switzerland’s current position in security policy. February 1998 The report of the ‘Study Commission on Strategic Issues’ is published. September 1998 The Federal Council defines political guidelines for the elaboration of the new report on Swiss security policy. June 1999 The new report on Swiss security policy is published. It is the strategic basis for reforming the armed forces and civil protection. It is submitted to Parliament for attention. Reform project Reform project Armed Forces XXI Civil protection Prospective studies Partial projects Conceptual studies Draft for guidelines: political Draft for guidelines: political decision by the Federal Council decision by the Federal Council Defence guidelines Guidelines Armed Forces XXI Civil Protection Deliberation in Parliament Deliberation in Parliament Amendment of the legal bases, possibly also amendment of the Federal Constitution. 31 31 _Security through Cooperation_ **31** ----- **Types of puplication** The Report 2000 on Security Policy can be obtained in 3 different versions in various languages: **Complete** reference number German 97.667 d French 97.667 f Italian 97.667 i English 97.667 e **Summary (brochure)** this edition reference number German 97.668 d French 97.668 f Italian 97.668 i English 97.668 e **Flyer (prospectus)** reference number German 97.673 d French 97.673 f Italian 97.673 i English 97.673 e **They can be obtained free of** **charge from** SFOBL/EDMZ 3003 Bern Only written orders will be accepted. ©1999/2nd edition General Secretariat DDPS Report and brochure have also been published on the internet under www.vbs.admin.ch Form 97.668 e 10.99 10 000 VBS 99697 ###### 32 Security through Cooperation -----