![0_image_0.png](0_image_0.png) GPRN DEFENSE WHITE PAPER ![0_image_1.png](0_image_1.png) The Ministry of National Defense The Republic of Korea www.mnd.go.kr # Defense White Paper 2004 The Ministry of National Defense The Republic of Korea # Message From The Minister Of National Defense ![2_Image_0.Png](2_Image_0.Png) The rapidly changing security environment at home and abroad presents new challenges as well as opportunities. Globally, transnational and non-military threats including international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are spreading dramatically. It has become imperative for peaceful nations to strengthen international cooperation to cope with this situation. Economic cooperation and interdependence among Northeast Asian nations are deepening amidst the uncertain and volatile security environment where elements of political and military friction and disputes still persist. A double-edged situation is unfolding on the Korean peninsula. There have been welcomed advances in inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation including the promotion of the construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, railway and road reconnections, and tourism at Mt. Geumgang. At the same time, however, military threats from the North remain unchanged, and military confrontation and tension continue to exist as demonstrated by the nuclear impasse, which has emerged as the paramount threat to national security of the South. Domestically, it is required to expand the role of the ROK Armed Forces to develop a future-oriented ROK-US alliance and solid defense of the Korean peninsula in line with the readjustment of the USFK including its redeployment and scale-down policies according to the changing global strategies of US. It has become essential to adopt a new paradigm and exert more proactive effort beyond the existing framework of national defense in order to overcome such daunting challenges and threats by maintaining and bolstering a solid defense posture. ![3_image_0.png](3_image_0.png) Today's global security environment is fraught with the eruption of multi-faceted friction over territory, religion, natural resources, environment, ethnicity, and many other causes that remained under the surface during the Cold War. International terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are newly emerging as serious threats to stability and peace of the international community. Since the September 11 terrorist attack, US has taken the initiative in reshaping world order in such a way as to counter terrorism and thwart the proliferation of WMD. US has also adopted a strategy of launching preemptive attacks and pursuing selective engagement in order to deter and prevent international terrorism and WMD proliferation. Closer global cooperation is urgently required to tackle the spread of various transnational, non-military threats including terrorism, international crime and illegal trafficking of weapons. In response, the international community has embarked on a concerted, proactive effort to maintain world peace and resolve disputes. ## Spread Of New Threats A. Terrorism The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack against US demonstrated that even a superpower like US is susceptible to incurring enormous property damage and human casualties comparable to war and can be plunged into shock and a sense of crisis bordering on panic due to a single act of terrorism. Based on this experience, unpredictable threats of terrorism posed by non-state rogue organizations or forces have been recognized as an important aspect of national security. Today, terrorist elements are linked through a global network, transcending territories and borders. Thus, they are extremely difficult to identify in Chapter 1. Changes and Challenges in the Security Environment ![4_image_0.png](4_image_0.png) Section 1 Global Security Situation Section 2 ![4_image_1.png](4_image_1.png) Security Situation in Northeast Asia Section 3 ![4_image_2.png](4_image_2.png) North Korean Situation and Military Threat ## Appendices | Appendix 1 | Status of Global Conflicts in 2004 | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Appendix 2 | Nuclear Capabilities of the Nuclear Powers | | Appendix 3 | Military Capabilities of Neighboring Countries | | Appendix 4 | Comparison of Economic Indices of South and North Korea | | Appendix 5 | North Korean Annual Military Expenditures (1991-2003) | | Appendix 6 | Comparison of Military Capabilities between South and North Korea | | Appendix 7 | North Korea's Missile Development and Specifications | | Chronology of Major Events Related to the North Korean Nuclear Issue | | | Appendix 8 | (Oct. 2002 - Dec. 2004) | | Combined and Joint Training Exercises | | | Appendix 9 | Chronology of Inter-Korean Military Talks (Sept. 2000 - Jul. 2004) | | Appendix 10 | | | Appendix 11 | Joint Press Statement of the First Round of the Inter-Korean Defense | | Ministers Talks | | | Appendix 12 | Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea, | | and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda | | | Apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line Areas | | | Annex Agreement to the "Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval | | | Appendix 13 | Clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the | | Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line Areas" | | | Milestones of the Inter-Korean Railway and Road Reconnection Project | | | Appendix 14 | | | Appendix 15 | 35th Annual US-ROK SCM Joint-Communique | | Appendix 16 | 36ª Annual US-ROK SCM Joint-Communique | | Appendix 17 | Status of Ministry of National Defense's Participation in the ASEAN Regional | | Forum (Apr. 2002 - Jul. 2004) | | | Appendix 18 | Developments regarding the Dispatch of ROK Armed Forces for | | Peacekeeping/Post-War Rehabilitation in Afghanistan/Iraq | | | Appendix 19 | Annual Govemment and Defense Budgets | | Appendix 20 | Year 2005 National Defense Budget | | Appendix 21 | Composition of MND Budget by FY | | 2004 Force Integration Projects regarding Major Military Equipment | | | Appendix 22 | Status of International Defense Industrial Agreements | | Appendix 23 | Status of Defense R&D Investments | | Appendix 24 | | | Appendix 25 | Organization of the ROK Ministry of National Defense and the Current Number | | of Military Personnel | | | Appendix 26 | Mid-Term Establishment Plans of Military Environmental Facilities | | Appendix 27 | Chronology of ROK National Defense (2003-Nov.2004) | 283 Chapter 6. Defense System for and by the Nation 249 Section 1. Realization of an "Open Defense Administration" . . 250 I. Information Disclosure and Improvement of the Process of Civil Petition A. Information Disclosure ······································································ · B. Improvement of the Process of Civil Petition . ll. Aggressive Publicity of Defense Programs ・・・・・・・・・・・・ 254 III. Inclusion of Non-Military Specialists in the Formulation of National Defense Policies A. Council of Defense Policy · B. Broadening Non-Military Participation ## Section 2. Fulfillment Of "Defense System for and by the Nation" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 I. Upgrading of Military Manpower Administration A. Continued Renovation toward a Healthy Military Culture B. Improvement of Administrative Services to Enhance Public Convenience II. Protection of the Environment A. Development of the Scheme of Environmental Protection . B. Prevention of Pollution In and Around Military Bases ·········· C. Reduction of Noise Around Military Airfields and Firing Ranges D. Aggressive Environment Protection Activities · E. Safety Control at Working Sites III. Development of the Local Community and Improvement of Civilian-Military Relations A. Development of the Local Community and Management of Military Facilities B. Disaster Relief C. Other Public Services · Chapter 5. Transformation of National Defense System for the Future 219 Section 1. Goal and Key Tasks of Transforming the National Defense System · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 220 Section 2. Actions Taken in Various Fields I. Reshaping of the Thoughts and Culture of the Military · A. Rethinking the Value System of the Servicemen B. Encouraging Officers to Live Sound Lives · C. Providing Better Culture and Life in the Barracks D. Stepping Up the Campaign Against Corruption, Irregularities and Irrationality ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ · · 226 II. Improvement of the Defense System A. Upgrading the Personnel Management System · B. Improving the Management of Military Manpower · C. Upgrading the Procurement System · D. Improving Judicial Institutions of the Armed Forces III. Revising the Active Service System at the MND Headquarters Level and Restructuring the Armed Forces A. Refining the Active Service System of the MND Headquarters (Munminhwa) B. Reshuffling the Organization at the Top · C. Restructuring the Units and Forces D. Improving the Structure of Military Forces in the Mid-to-Long Term to Cope with Different Scenarios of Future Warfare Section 3. Direction of the National Defense Transformation · · 243 l. Need for a New Defense Paradigm II. Direction of the Defense Transformation under the New Paradigm · · 244 A. Development of Civilian-led Control System B. Build-up of Military Capabilities Befitting the National Power ・・・・・・・・・・ ・ C. Guaranteeing Full Exertion of Combined Military Capabilities · D. Creating a Reliable Image of the Armed Forces ・・・・・・・・・・・・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ IV. Fostering of Defense Manpower A. Methods of Fostering Defense Manpower · B. Education to Foster Elite Soldiers ## Section 6. Promotion Of Welfare To Improve The "Quality Of Life" of Service Members ·· I. Improvement of Working Conditions for Military Personnel A. Better Treatment . B. Improvement of Barracks and Medical Environment · C. Improvement of the Living Conditions of the Families of Service Members D. Improvement of the Military Welfare System II. Reinforcement of Supportive Measures for Employment of Veterans 203 A. Basic Direction of Employment Support . B. Expansion of the Job Guidance and Education System for Veterans ···· · · · 205 III. Improvement of the Military Pension System . A. Characteristics of the Military Pension System B. Efforts toward Improvement of the Military Pension System · ## Section 7. Mid-Term Defense Plan And Defense Budget · · · · · · 209 l. Mid-Term Defense Plan ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 209 A. Focus and Scale of the Mid-Term Defense Plan .. B. Planned Programs by Area ················································ ·· ·· ·· ·· · II. 2005 Defense Budget · A. General Account Budget B. Special Account Budget III. Need for an Appropriate Defense Budge A. Trend of Allocating Defense Budget and Status of Defense Operation · · · · 215 B. Defense Expenditures Commensurate with National Powert ······· 12 C. Establishment of the Foundation for Participation in Peacekeeping Operations D. Overseas Dispatch of ROK Forces IV. Multilateral Security Cooperation and International Arms Control Activities · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 140 A. Multilateral Security Cooperation · B. International Arms Control Activities · Section 4. Reduction of Tension and Establishment of a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula l. Establishment of a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula A. Maintenance of the Armistice System B. Establishment of a Peace Regime C. Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issues II. Pursuit of a Reduction of Military Tension and Confidence Building · 153 A. Pursuit of Inter-Korean Military Talks B. Military Support for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Programs · · · · 158 III. Effort toward Repatriation of the ROK POWs A. Status of Non-Repatriated ROK POWs B. ROK Government's Efforts to Resolve the Issue · Section 5. Establishment of Self-Reliant Defense Capabilities . 163 I. Direction of Building Military Capabilities ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ ㆍ 163 II. Force Investment Programs and R&D Efforts for National Defense . . . 164 A. Objective and Direction of the Force Investment Programs ········ · B. Improvement of the Defense Acquisition System C. Status of Force Investment Programs · D. R&D and the Defense Industry · E. Reform of Defense Acquisition · · III. Pursuit of Defense Digitization A. Direction of Defense Digitization Policy B. Improvement of the Defense Digitization Environment C. Information and Communication Infrastructure D. Battlefield Management Information System E. Resource Management Information System Section 2. Future-Oriented Development of the ROK-US Alliance · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 103 I. Strengthening of ROK-US Security Cooperation and Combined Defense System · A. Change in US Security Strategies and Implications on the ROK-US Alliance B. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) C. ROK-US Combined Defense System | II. Establishment of the Foundation for the Development | |-----------------------------------------------------------| | of the ROK-US Alliance | of the ROK-US Alliance A. Relocation of the Yongsan Garrison ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 107 B. Redeployment of the 2nd US Infantry Division C. Reduction of USFK Manpower D. Transfer of Military Missions and Combined Command System . | III. Assuring Stable Conditions for USFK Stationing | |--------------------------------------------------------| E. Development of Combined Military Capabilities · A. Defense Cost Sharing · B. Resolution of Public Grievance and Improvement of Training Conditions . . . 114 | Section 3. Promotion of Foreign Military Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | I. Military Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries · | | A. Relations with Japan . | | C. Relations with Russia · | |-----------------------------------------------------------| | II. Diversification of Military Exchanges and Cooperation | | A. Southeast Asia and Oceania | C. Activities for Consolidating of the Bond between ROK and US IV. Development of the Future ROK-US Alliance B. Relations with China · B. Europe C. Other Regions · III. International Peacekeeping Operations A. Outline of Peacekeeping Operations B. ROK Millitary Participation in Peacekeeping Operations C. Air Force . D. Marine Corps . . . . . · · · 81 ## Section 5. Mobilization And Homeland Defense Operations Posture · · · · · · · · · · · · · ····· · · · · 82 I. Wartime Mobilization Posture A. Manpower Mobilization · B. Material Mobilization · II. Homeland Defense Operation Posture III. Reserve Force Resource Management IV. Reserve Force Education and Training . 85 A. Mobilization Training ····················································· · · · · · · · · · · · · · 88 B. Non-Mobilization Training · C. Homeland Defense Training · ## Chapter 4. Status And Tasks Of The Rok National Defense 91 Section 1. Concept and Direction of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense I. Background and Concept . . 92 A. Background of the Pursuit of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense . . . 92 B. Concept of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense · . 94 C. Significance of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense . II. Objective and Direction · A. Future-Oriented Development of the ROK-US Alliance B. Early Expansion of War Deterrence Capability · C. Military Restructuring and Defense Reform · III. Future Plans A. Defense Budget Securing and Allocation ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 101 B. Implementation of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense Plan Chapter 3. Defense Posture to Safeguard Peace ## રત Section 1. Armed Forces Employment and Force Capability I. ROK Armed Forces' Concept of Military Force Operation · II. Force Capability of Individual Services · A. Army · B. Navy · C. Air Force · D. Reserve Forces ## Section 2. Employment Of Usfk and Augmentation Forces ・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 66 I. Status of the United States Forces Korea · II. Augmentation Forces · Section 3. Military Readiness Posture of the ROK Armed Forces . I. Maintenance of Early Warning and Crisis Management Systems · · · · · · 69 II. Readiness Posture against Infiltrations and Local Provocations · · · · · 70 III. Readiness Posture against an All-Out War IV. Readiness Posture against Terrorist Attacks ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ ・ ・ ・72 V. Strengthening of Mental Armament of Soldiers ·············································································· Section 4. Combat Task-Oriented Training and Exercises · · · · · 75 I. Combined/Joint Training and Exercises · A. Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) Exercise B. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) Exercise · · · 76 C. Foal Eagle (FE) Exercise · D. Taegeuk Exercise · E. Hoguk Exercise F. Hwarang Exercise · II. Major Training of Individual Services A. Army · B. Navy · 8 Section 3. North Korean Situation and Military Threat · · · · · 36 I. North Korea's General Political Situation and Policies toward South Korea · A. Domestic Situation B. Foreign Policies · C. Policies toward South Korea II. Assessment of North Korea's Military Threat · A. Military Policies · B. War Control and Military Command Organizations C. Organization, Equipment and Deployment of the North Korean Military D. North Korea's Development of Strategic Weapons III. Major Military Developments · · · 46 ## Chapter 2. National Security Policy And Defense Policy Of The Participatory Government 47 Section 1. National Security Policy Initiative of the Participatory Government · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 48 I. National Interest and National Security Objectives · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 48 II. Principles of the National Security Strategy · A. Pursuit of the Policy of Peace and Prosperity · B. Conduct of Balanced and Pragmatic Diplomacy C. Promotion of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense D. Development of Comprehensive Security · III. Strategic and Basic Tasks Section 2. Basic Direction of Defense Policy I. National Defense Objectives II. Key Points of National Defense A. Establishment of a Firm Defensive Posture B. Pursuit of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ 56 C. Consistent Pursuit of Defense Reforms ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 57 D. Establishment of the Image of a Trustworthy Military · 7 # Table Of Contents ![14_Image_0.Png](14_Image_0.Png) Chapter 1. Changes and Challenges in the Security Environment 17 Section 1. Global Security Situation · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 18 I. Spread of New Threats ··········································· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 18 A. Terrorism . B. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) C. Persisting Regional Instability and Local Disputes D. Other Threats . II. International Efforts toward Peace and Stability · A. Dispute Settlement Efforts of International Organizations including the United Nations (UN) · B. Development of Regional Security Cooperation Systems · C. Efforts to Reduce Strategic Weapons and Prevent Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) III. Changes in Warfare · Section 2. Security Situation in Northeast Asia . I. National Defense Policies and Military Trends of Neighboring Countries ························································································· 25 A. US B. Japan · C. China . | D. Russia | |-------------| | II. Neighboring Countries' Policies toward Northeast Asia | |-------------------------------------------------------------| | and the Korean Peninsula · | ·· and the Korean Peninsula · A. US B. Japan · C. China · D. Russia . б Accordingly, the ROK military is endeavoring to establish a flawless defense posture that enables a rapid response to any conceivable threat on the basis of the seamless ROK-US alliance. In addition, it is strenuously pushing for a "cooperative self-reliant defense posture" to consolidate its absolute security capabilities by developing a solid deterrence to war at the earliest possible date. In addition, the ROK military consistently pursues national defense transformation on the basis of a new paradigm so as to cope with "changes and innovation", ensure advanced and modernized defense management and create a reliable image of the Armed Forces. Based on its clear recognition that "the source of defense capabilities is the people", the ROK Armed Forces will establish a "robust defense system for and by the nation" by maintaining a firm commitment to performing its basic duties and obligations. This "Defense White Paper 2004" aims to enlighten the people as regards such efforts. The White Paper illustrates changes in the security environment, the policies and defense posture of the ROK Armed Forces, current status and pending tasks of national defense, direction of transformation toward a more efficient national defense, and activities of the military to promote public convenience and interests as the "Armed Forces for and by the people." To resolve any questions concerning national defense, the White Paper contains, in particular, a detailed explanation about the status and direction of the adjustment of US military presence in ROK being implemented amidst keen public attention and concerns as well as the activities of the Zaytun Unit that has been successfully performing its mission of peacekeeping and post-war reconstruction in Iraq. Furthermore, a wide range of materials have been collected and organized into Appendices to enhance the readers' in-depth understanding and research of security-related fields. I sincerely hope that this Defense White Paper 2004 will contribute significantly to promoting the understanding of the people and forging a consensus regarding the nation's defense policies. I invite your continued support and interest in national defense. December 31, 2004 2 to Yoon Kwang-ung Minister of National Defense Republic of Korea substance and the time and place of terrorist attacks are unpredictable. Transnational terrorist threats exist all around the world and have fundamentally changed the traditional concepts of adversarial relations, threats and provision against threats. ## B. Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction (Wmd) Along with international terrorism, the development and proliferation of WMD including nuclear and biochemical weapons by some countries and terrorist groups are being regarded as a major threat to global security. Some countries including North Korea, Iran and Syria are technologically capable of developing nuclear weapons and missiles. Moreover, it has become very easy to procure components and materials necessary for such development through illicit international trafficking. In addition, it is relatively simple and inexpensive to produce biochemical weapons including anthrax and sarin gas. Thus, minor powers as well as terrorist organizations can easily secure biochemical weapons. As proliferation of WMD and their possible use by international terrorist groups constitute a serious threat to global security, the international community is stepping up its effort to prevent countries of concern from producing WMD and to curb their proliferation. ## C. Persisting Regional Instability And Local Disputes Due to complex factors that cause friction which remained latent during the Cold War era including disputes over territory and natural resources, religious, racial and ethnic conflicts and secessionist independence movements, local disputes in various forms are on the rise in many places around the globe. In 2004, small and large local disputes were ubiquitous all around the world including 28 conflicts in Africa including the civil war in Sudan ; 5 disputes in America including the civil war in Colombia ; 13 disputes in the Middle East including the war in Iraq ; 20 disputes in Asia including the domestic clash in Nepal ; 9 disputes in the CIS including the Russia- Chechen dispute and the war of independence in O Scene of terrorist bombing in Bali Kosovo, Europe. CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) : an association of countries founded in December 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, comprising the 12 former Soviet republics excluding the three Baltic states ![16_image_0.png](16_image_0.png) In particular, terrorist activities in Central Asia and Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack have emerged as major variables that may destabilize the regions. ## D. Other Threats With globalization accelerated by rapid development and diffusion of cutting-edge technology and IT mechanisms, interdependence among countries is deepening and the concept of boundaries being blurred. Against this backdrop, transnational, non-military threats including international crimes, piracy, illegal refugees and cyber terrorism are manifesting in diverse forms. Progressively more severe natural disasters fueled by global warming including the recent large-scale seaquake that wreaked havoc on Southeast Asia and environmental pollution as well as outbreak of new epidemics such as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) are emerging as new forms of security threats. In addition, not only individual countries, but also terrorist groups, criminal syndicates, religious and ethnic groups as well as non-governmental organizations are emerging as major actors on the international political scene, with diversified entities involved in security-related undertakings. ## International Efforts Toward Peace And Stability A. Dispute Settlement Efforts Of International Organizations Including The United Nations(Un) In the face of increasing regional disputes and transnational/non-military threats in various forms, the efforts of the UN, other international organizations and regional multilateral security cooperation bodies toward prevention and resolution is assuming growing importance. Accordingly, the UN is expanding its position to deal with the issues of disarmament, development, environment, human rights and drugs. It is also diversifying its peacekeeping operations to include prevention of disputes, creation of environments favorable for successful settlement of conflicts, monitoring of the implementation of comprehensive agreements, delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, and execution of armistice agreements. Transnational threat : threat posed by a state or non-state actor that transcends borders Non-military threat: threat posed by a state or non-state actor based on means other than military power or by natural elements As shown by the regional disputes in the Middle East and Africa, however, the UN's ability to resolve disputes remains limited in such cases where conflicting interests exist among the permanent members of the UN Security Council or where the powers fail to reach a consensus. Members fully recognize the need of the UN to transform itself into a more effective organization by reflecting the new international reality. However, they have yet to iron out existing differences to work out an agreement on the proposed expansion of the Security Council that must perform the function of maintaining international peace and security, in particular the granting of veto power to new permanent members. ## B. Development Of Regional Security Cooperation Systems Where the UN has failed to fully accomplish its designated role in resolving international disputes, multilateral regional security cooperative bodies are assuming more and more prominence. In the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is providing a forum for discussions aimed at promoting trust building and preventive diplomacy in the region since 1994. With North Korea's joining the organization in July 2000, the ARF is being developed into the only fullfledged multilateral security cooperation regime on the government level in the Asia-Pacific region. In its foreign ministerial talks held in July 2004, the parties discussed ways to facilitate international cooperation in thwarting proliferation of WMD and preventing terrorism. In conjunction with the ASEAN+3 and the APEC Summit Talks, the ARF is expected to contribute to regional security, given that it has become a channel for official and unofficial contact among the related countries in regard to regional security issues. Unfortunately, however, more time and effort is needed for the ARF to play an effective role in promoting substantive security cooperative efforts among participating nations, considering their diverse political and ethnic backgrounds, and their conflicting interests. European nations are bolstering regional security cooperation efforts based on the expansion of the political, diplomatic and military roles of the NATO and EU in juxtaposition with cooperative actions through the existing OSCE. The NATO, comprising 26 nations with 7 Eastern European countries newly accepted as members on March 29, 2004, has sought to extend its links to ASEAN: Association of South-East Asian Nations APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN+3 = ASEAN + ROK, China and Japan NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization OSCE : Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe EU : European Union AU : African Union non-European regions in terms of its posture of defense. With the number of its membership increased to 25 on May 1, 2004, the EU is pursuing cooperation to counter terrorism including establishing an intelligence sharing system among its members, blocking fund inflows to and freezing the assets of terrorist organizations, strengthening border control and creating a comprehensive anti-terrorism database. African countries organized the AU on May 26, 2001 with a view to mediate regional disputes and represent the interests of the entire continent. At the AU summit convened on February 3, 2003, the parties hammered out an agreement on the formation of the Peace and Security Council with the authority for direct involvement in armed conflicts. Currently, development of the AU into an integrated regional body in the form of the EU is being pursued. Based on such endeavors, the AU is bracing for dwindling economic assistance from the international community and the formation of regional economic blocs. However, the AU is confronted with such difficulties as conflicting interests among some member countries including the Republic of South Africa and Libya, a sense of displeasure of some member nations regarding the partial cession of sovereignty and securing of the huge amount of operating costs. ## C. Efforts To Reduce Strategic Weapons And Prevent Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction (Wmd) On May 24, 2002, US and Russia embarked on large-scale mutual reduction of nuclear weapons by concluding the "Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction" (also known as the Moscow Treaty) based on the decision to reduce the number of their nuclear warheads to the range of 1,700 to 2,200 by the end of December 2012, while leaving the composition and structure of their nuclear forces at their respective discretion within said limits. In the meantime, US harbors serious fears about the risks of development and proliferation of WMD by such countries as North Korea and Iran and the possible transfer of those WMD to international terrorist organizations. Accordingly, US is pressing ahead with the "PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative)" which blocks transactions of WMD through the sea, air and ground as part of the efforts to build an international cooperative system to control the transfer of WMD and their transport vehicles. Since the first US The Moscow Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate in March 2003 and by the Russian Federation Council (Upper House) and State Duma (Lower House) in May 2003. It went into effect with the exchange of ratification instruments in a US-Russian summit held in June 2003. ![20_image_0.png](20_image_0.png) hosted PSI meeting (attended by 11 countries; 15 member nations at the moment) in Madrid in June 2003, the US held 7 PSI meetings and 12 PSI training sessions including combined maritime exercises among PSI members as of the end of 2004. In addition, the US President Bush stressed the need for the adoption of a UN resolution to prevent the proliferation of WMD in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2003. On April 28, 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the "UN Security Council Resolution 1540." O PSI exercise (tracking of ships suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction) As stated above, US has been applying pressure on such countries as North Korea and Iran to give up their nuclear ambitions to thwart the proliferation of WMD while focusing its efforts on increasing the number of countries participating in the PSI and garnering global support including the backing of the UN. Libya's declaration of the renunciation of its nuclear program on December 20, 2003 marked a major success of US efforts to prevent proliferation of WMD in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack. In the declaration, Libya promised to completely scrap all its WMD, allow inspections by international organizations including the IAEA, eliminate any missiles in excess of the scope allowed under the MTCR and comply with international disarmament agreements including the NPT, CWC and BWC. In return, the US and the United Kingdom promised to push for gradual lifting of economic sanctions against Libya and improvement in diplomatic relations in accordance with the implementation of its renunciation of WMD and the level of its cooperation. Libya's renunciation of WMD is deemed a case attesting that the issue of WMD can be resolved peacefully through dialogue and diplomacy. UN Security Council Resolution 1540: resolution adopted by the UN Security Council to prohibit any non-state actor including an international terrorist group from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the means of their delivery IAEA : International Atomic Energy Agency MTCR : Missile Technology Control Regime NPT : Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty cwc : Chemical Weapons Convention BWC : Biological Weapons Convention ## Changes In Warfare As a result of dramatic developments in science and technology, the warfars are being subject to sweeping changes. Among major recent examples are the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq where US executed the "RDO" from the early phases by implementing large-scale air raids along with ground attacks on the basis of its superior missiles and air power. In addition, US applied the concepts of the "EBO" aimed at attaining the goals of the war as quickly as possible with minimal level of mass destruction by effectively using precision guided munitions as well as "NCW" which enhances the combat power on the basis of an efficient linkages of battle units in a network, bringing major operations to a successful end as soon as possible. All this indicates that the focus of future warfare is shifting from securing territories and inflicting massive human casualties and destruction by using large military force and conventional weapons to the elimination of the enemy's determination to fight by paralyzing its intelligence system and attacking its center of gravity based on the use of state-of-the-art weapons systems including the ISR system and long-range PGM. Under such circumstances, all countries are now concentrating their efforts on creating elite advanced military capabilities on the basis of available military technology and national competences in order to build military capabilities that reflect these new aspects of war, seeking to transform the military focused on personnel and equipment into a technology-intensive force oriented toward information and knowledge. They are also beefing up their military's capability of early warning and surveillance, mobility and precision strikes. RDO : Rapid Decisive Operations EBO : Effect Based Operations NCW : Network Centric Warfare ISR : Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance PGM : Precision Guided Munitions Strategic Center of Gravity: location, capability or characteristic from which a military unit derives its freedom of action, tangible combat capability, or the will to fight ![22_image_0.png](22_image_0.png) ## Section 2. ![22_Image_1.Png](22_Image_1.Png) # Security Situation In Northeast Asia In the post-Cold War trend of alleviation of tension and promotion ![22_image_2.png](22_image_2.png) of cooperation around the world, economic cooperation and interdependence are deepening in the Northeast Asian region. Also, countries in the region are deliberating measures to facilitate economic cooperation such as signing of FTAs while strengthening the level of cooperation toward multilateral security through the ASEAN+3, ARF and APEC. In Northeast Asia, however, the Cold War structure is still lingering with factors of potential regional friction such as the North Korean nuclear issue, cross-strait relations and possible territorial disputes over some islands and territories. Moreover, countries in the region, which have marshaled the world's largest military forces, are engaged in constant competition to expand their influence in the region. Under such circumstances, each country is continuing to make efforts to modernize and transform its military forces. ## National Defense Policies And Military Trends Of Neighboring Countries A. Us (1) Defense Policies In an effort to effectively cope with the diverse and unforeseen threats of the future, US has formulated new types of national security strategies and is pursuing more aggressive and active national defense policies to implement such strategies. US has designated the following as its four primary defense objectives: (i) safeguard US from enemy attacks; (ii) secure strategic access and maintain global freedom of action; (iii) create favorable conditions to maintain international security order; and (iv) strengthen alliances and partnerships. To THE US National Defense Policies and Strategies: presented through the "2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (Sept. 30, 2001)", "2002 National Security Strategy (Sept. 20, 2002)", "2003 Annual Report (Nov. 25, 2003)", etc. Four defense objectives of US : based on the "2004 National Military Strategy" accomplish these objectives, US is securing the capacity, on the basis of the "capabilities-based military build-up", to (i) defend the US homeland; (ii) deter threats from four kye regions; (iii) maintain sufficient military power for two simultaneous campaigns in the above stated four regions; and (iv) gain decisive victory in one of the two simultaneous campaigns stated above. In particular, US does not rule out the possibility of waging preemptive attacks and using nuclear weapons against countries or terrorist organizations that constitute a threat to its security, moving beyond its existing focus on deterrence and defensive posture in terms of the employment of its nuclear force. ## (2) Military Activities Currently, US is maintaining about 1.4-million troops (10 Army divisions, 12 Navy carrier battle groups, 46 Air Force fighter wings and 3 Marine Corps divisions) and pushing for continuous military transformation by restructuring its military into a brigade-centered one under the concept of joint mobile forces. In accordance with the global defense posture review (GPR), readjustment of the US forces is expected in Northeast Asia as well. In the annual ROK- US Security Consultative Meeting in 2004, the two sides hammered out an ![23_image_0.png](23_image_0.png) O Stryker combat vehicle agreement on a plan to restructure the deployment of the US forces stationed in the ROK. With respect to a readjustment of the US forces deployed in Japan, US and Japan are holding mutual consultations. US is discussing with the Japanese government plans to facilitate efficient operations of its Air Force deployed in Japan by consolidating its 5th Air Force based at the Yokota Air Base in Japan and the 13th Air Force in Guam. Current forces: today's operational Army as a part of the joint forces RDO: Rapid Decisive Operations Future forces: operational forces designed for the future security environment Under the concept of "RDO" which enables it to implement rapid and effective operations before the enemy reacts, US Army plans to set up future battle systems centered on 43 to 48 Units of Action (UAs) by pursuing transformation to concurrently develop and improve current as well as future forces. The Navy intends to build its forces centered on 37 ESGs under the concept of "NCW", whereby scattered warships are connected through a network for joint operations with strike capabilities to be built up by using advanced digital information technology. Under the concept of "EBO" aimed at conducting operations with minimum losses by analyzing the effectiveness of destruction of the linking elements among the enemy's political and economic networks, the Air Force is seeking to modernize its air power for the purpose of restructuring itself into 10 air mobile forces and incorporating more than 1,760 next-generation fighters and over 340 new fighters (F/A-22) into its force capabilities. At the moment, the US forces in Northeast Asia maintains one carrier battle group, eight fighter squadrons and AWACS. They are equipped with such intelligence systems and related precision strike capabilities that are immediately available for operations based on a combination of various highly functional intelligence collection systems and information collection mechanisms. | [Table 1-1] The US Military Presence in Northeast Asia | | | |----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------| | Classification | US Forces in ROK | US Forces in Japan | | 1 Army command (8th US Army), | 1 Army corps and over 1,600 | | | over 31,460 troops, 116 tanks | | | | Army | troops | | | and 111 armored vehicles | 1 fleet command, over 5,200 | | | Over 300 troops | troops, 1 aircraft carrier and | | | Navy | 9 surface warships | | | 1 Air Force command (7th Air | 1 Air Force command (5th Air | | | Air Force | Force), over 9,420 troops and | Force), over 14,130 troops and | | 84 fighters | 84 fighters | | | | 1 Marine Expeditionary Force | | | Over 180 troops | | | | Marine Corps | and over 20,000 troops | | | O Source: The Military Balance 2003-2004 | | | (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oct. 2003), etc. Shifting from its existing military strategy of concentrating its military force in Northeast Asia and the Middle East, US has newly adopted a more flexible strategy under which it can utilize its combat power anytime, anywhere in the event of a contingency according to the "GPR (Global Defense Posture Review)." Having secured overseas naval and air force bases as power projection hubs, US is pushing for an overhaul of its bases in such a posture that allows rapid dispatch of its military forces to any area of dispute in case of an emergency. NCW: Network Centric Warfare ESG: Expeditionary Strike Group EBO: Effect Based Operations AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System ## B. Japan (1) Defense Policies National Defense Program Outline : Japan's defense policy plan presenting the specific concept of Japanese defense forces and basic guidelines regarding the goal of its buildup, maintenance and operations. Following its initial formulation in October 1976, it was revised in November 1995 for the first time and on December 10, 2004 for the second time. Japan had adopted US-Japan security system as the foundation of its defense policies until 1976 when it formulated the "National Defense Program Outline" for the first time. Since its initial revision in 1995, Japan has been building up its military power in line with its mid-term defense force realignment plan implemented every five years, which is based on the concept of the so-called "Basic Defense Capability Initiative." Amidst drastic changes in the international security environment and a heightened focus on security, especially among its conservative factions since the September 11 terrorist attack, Japan adopted the "New National Defense Program Outline" in December 2004, reconstructing the existing initiative into the so-called "Multi-Functional Flexible Defense Capability Initiative." In addition, Japan is pursuing the objective of safeguarding its security and proactively seeking an expanded role in East Asia by bolstering its defense force, adhering to its exclusively defensive policies and the three principles of denuclearization, as well as stepping up cooperation with its allies, including US-Japan security system in order to deflect direct threats to the country and improve the international security environment based on the concept of a new strategy called "Total Security Strategy." Japan also shifted its Self-Defense Forces' participation in international cooperative activities from "additional duties" to "major duties," by proactively reacting to actions for international peace and cooperation including peacekeeping operations (PKO) and support for the reconstruction of Iraq. ## (2) Military Activities Following its adoption of the "New National Defense Program Outline" in December 2004, Japan formulated a mid-term realignment plan for its defense force for the period from 2005 to 2009. Major details include the proposed reorganization of the Joint Staff Council, strengthening of the authority of the chairman of the Joint Staff Council to command and control the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces and assist the operational control of the Defense Agency's director general as well as subordination of Japan's Defense Intelligence Agency under the direct command of the director general. ![26_image_0.png](26_image_0.png) The size of the Ground Self-Defense Force will be reduced as follows in accordance with dwindling threats of war in Japan: ground troops from 160,000 to 155,000; tanks from 1,000 to 600; field artilleries from 740 to 600; and military units from 11 divisions and 3 brigades to 9 divisions and 6 brigades. At the same time, the Ground Self- Defense Force plans to introduce multipurpose O Airborne Warning and Control System (E-767 AWACS) helicopters to enhance the mobility of its infantry units and improve its dispatch ability in the event of large-scale/extraordinary disasters. [Table 1-2] Japan's Major Milltary Presence | | Force Capability | |------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| | Classification | 10 divisions, 3 brigades, 2 combined brigades, over 147,000 | | Ground | troops, 1,000 tanks, 1,220 armored vehicles, 740 field | | Self-Defense Force | artilleries, 495 helicopters, etc. | | 1 self-defense fleet, 5 regional district commands, 44,000 | | | Maritime | troops, 53 frigates including 4 Aegis ships, 16 submarines, 140 | | naval vessels including 3 large-sized transport ships, 97 P-3Cs, | | | Self-Defense Force | 107 patrol/mine sweeping helicopters | | 3 corps and 1 combined brigade, over 45,000 troops, | | | Air Self-Defense | 4 E-767 AWACS aircrafts, 49 F-2 fighters, over 680 | | Force | interceptors including 203 F 15J/DJ4 interceptors | | Q Source: The Military Balance 2003-2004 | | Q Source: The Military Balance 2003-2004 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oct. 2003), etc. The Maritime Self-Defense Force intends to improve its ballistic missile defense capability by reinforcing its air defense capability, introducing Aegis ships aligned with the MD system, countering infiltrations into its islets and enhancing the ability of frigates and patrol helicopters to guard its surrounding seas. At the same time, it plans to reduce the number of its frigates from 53 to 47 and operational aircrafts from 173 to 150. The Air Self-Defense Force plans to consistently beef up its ballistic missile defense capability based on the modernization of its anti-aircraft units and automatic warning & control organizations and press for introduction of an airborne tanker and incorporation of F-2 fighters into its war apparatus. In order to strengthen the capabilities to engage in integrated operations of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, Japan has decided to pursue an increase in the frequency of joint exercises, share information and MD: Missile Defense ## Defense White Paper 2004 ![27_image_0.png](27_image_0.png) O Unmanned reconnaissance plane communication infrastructure, overhaul the intelligence collection apparatus and analysis system of intelligence units including the Defense Intelligence Agency to improve intelligence-related functions, complement the reconnaissance functions of F-15s and introduce unmanned reconnaissance planes. To enable the development of defense-related science and technology, Japan also plans to develop a command and communication system and an information network for the purpose of strengthening the system of intelligence integration, dissemination and sharing. In addition, in order to strengthen effective cooperation system with the US forces in the country, Japan has decided to expand combined exercises and bolster an effective mutual cooperation system and improve performance in connection with the establishment of the MD system. At the same time, Japan has also decided to promote cooperation in operations and equipment technology. ## C. China (1) Defense Policies In its 2004 defense white paper, China laid down its defense goals of protecting its territory and sovereignty under its "defensive defense policies" for the peaceful development of the country, supporting the reforms and opening policies initiated by the Communist Party as well as pursuing military modernization to serve its maritime interests. In order to attain these goals, China adopted such defense policies as the creation of an elite/professional military, expansion of defense expenditures to build up the military and objection to Taiwan being included in the MD system. The core of the strategy to implement such defense policies lies in its Strategy to prevail in local war with advanced technology: strategy to win a smallscale local war by applying advanced weapons and modernized tactics/strategies on the premise that large-scale wars will not occur in the future "strategy to prevail in local wars with advanced technology", which is translating into the formation of elite ground forces and improvement of the long-range projection capability of its Navy and Air Force. In particular, abiding by the principle of "One China", it considers blocking Taiwan's independence movement to be a major factor affecting its external military relations and defense policies. ## (2) Military Activities China has been pressing for the construction of a military force focused on military intelligence and computerized weapons systems, enhancing its sea and air command and strategic counterattack capability by pursuing the creation of a strengthened Navy/Armed Force and 2nd Artillery. On the basis of its "reduction of troops by 500,000" pursued during implementation of the "9.5 Plan" (1996-2000), China decided to reduce an additional 200,000 of its troops by 2005. As for its cadres, China discharged 42,000 officers in 2003 alone to be taken over by training at the National Defense University and placement on a waiting list. For the purpose of creating elite forces, improvement of mobility and 9.5 Plan: Five-year reform plan of the Chinese military that has been implemented every five years from 1955. As of the end of 2004, the "10.5 Plan" (2001-2005) is currently being executed. expansion in the scope of operations, the Army is pursuing the expansion of the Army Air Corps centered on attack helicopter units, creation of mobile strategic missile units in the southeastern part of the country, establishment of a military command and control automation system, enhancement of nighttime battle equipment as well as improvement of its anti-electronic O Sovremenny-class destroyer ![28_image_0.png](28_image_0.png) warfare capability. [Table 1-3] China's Military Presence in Northeast Asia | | Force Capability | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------| | Classification | 17 combat divisions under 4 group armies, 320,000 troops, | | Ground Force | over 2,000 tanks, more than 1,800 armored vehicles, | | various artilleries and missiles | | | About 100,000 troops of the North Sea and East Sea Fleets, | | | Navy | 926 naval vessels including 455 warships and 25 submarines and | | over 100 fighter bombers and helicopters in 1 navy air division | | | 6 aircraft divisions in the Beijing, Shenyang and Jinan military | | | districts, about 24,000 troops and more than 1,000 tactical aircrafts | | | Air Force | including bombers and fighter support aircrafts | | 2nd Artillery | 2 missile brigades in the Nanjing military region, | | (Strategic Force) 10,000 troops and about 40 Deng Feng-31 IRBM | | | C Source: The Military Balance 2003-2004 | | China's military force in Northeast Asia, the Ground Force, Navy and Air Force, respectively, include the force of the Shenyang military district, North Sea/East Sea Fleets and Beijing/Shenyang/Jinan military districts. (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oct. 2003), etc. The Navy improved its near-sea defense operational capabilities by the procurement of Sovremenny-class destroyers and Kilo-class submarines from Russia. Recently, it entered the final stage of building 4 additional Luhai- ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 31 class missile destroyers. In addition, it is constructing 094-type strategic nuclear submarines that can be loaded with JL (Julang)-II ballistic missiles with the range of 8,000km. Thanks to technology transferred from Russia in conjunction with the introduction of the latest fighters including SU-27s/30s, China's Air Force has been licensed to produce fighters. Recently, it has been pursuing the introduction of AWACS and development of J-10 type fighters. In addition, it is procuring more of the 13 airborne tankers that are already in stock, while expanding the operational range of its fighters by fitting its fighters with inflight refueling capabilities. ![29_image_0.png](29_image_0.png) ![29_image_1.png](29_image_1.png) At the same time, China has O Return of the astronaut of Shenzhou V. China's first manned spaceship shown great interest in strategic weapons and cyber warfare capabilities, based on nuclear and missile technology and has focused on conducting research in electronic warfare. China has more than 40 Deng Feng-31 intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of 8,000km. In October 2003, China successfully launched "Shenzhou V", the first manned spacecraft that it has developed by pouring approximately 2.75 trillion in development costs over a period of 11 years and 6 months. Thus, it became the third country in the world to succeed in launching a manned spaceship, demonstrating its firm determination to develop state-of-the-art technology and a space program. ## D. Russia (1) Defense Policies In its "New Military Doctrine" unveiled on April 21, 2000, Russia designated "advance prevention as well as reduction and neutralization of military threats against the Russian Federation" as the basic goals of its defense policies. In addition, the "New Military Doctrine" clearly states possible preemptive use of nuclear weapons in a situation where not only Russia, but other members of the CIS are put in a position of jeopardy. The doctrine espouses "offensive defense strategies" regarding local disputes that threaten the solidarity and maintenance of the Russian Federation such as the Chechen war. ## (2) Military Activities Russia is pushing to reorganize its military structure and achieve qualitative military reinforcement to restore its "stature as a superpower." In 2001, it adjusted the number of its military districts from 7 to 6. The country also aims to shift to the three-service system comprising the Army, Navy and Air Force by 2005. In addition, it plans to decrease the number of troops under the control of the Defense Ministry from 1.2 million to 1 million by 2005. It intends to completely move to a recruiting system by 2010 from the existing mixed system of recruiting and conscription. Russia is implementing a policy to expand its weapons exports at the state level, focusing on development of advanced equipment. Thus, weapons exports by its defense industry amounted to US$ 5.4 billion in 2003, ranking second in the world. Although the country is reducing the quantity of its strategic weapons, it has deployed upgraded Topol-M missiles in 4 military units by 2003, maintaining the rapid response posture of its nuclear arsenal. In addition, Russia has been endeavoring to modernize its nuclear force by upgrading the Topol-M missiles and TU-160 fighter bombers. The country also improved a broad spectrum of equipment and replaced ![30_image_0.png](30_image_0.png) ![30_image_1.png](30_image_1.png) CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States): an association of countries founded in December 1991 after the collapse of the Saviet Union comprising the 12 former Soviet republics excluding the three Baltic states antiquated military satellites, placing high priority on sharpening its space and missile surveillance and command/control capabilities. Apparently, such buildup of the Russian military space program is deemed an endeavor to keep pace with President Putin's military reform for the "reconstruction of the superpower" and gear up for competition with the U.S. concerning the MD system and space development. | Classification | Force Capability | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------| | 10 motorized rifle divisions, 3 machine gun divisions, | | | Ground Force | 1 artillery division, 3,900 tanks, 6,400 armored vehicles and | | 85 attack helicopters | | | 5 battle groups, 1 air division, 50,000 troops, 8 submarines, | | | Navy | 8 major warships, 99 support ships, 20 bombers, | | 45 anti-submarine aircrafts and 10 support aircrafts | | | 3 frontline air divisions, 2 long-range air divisions, 42,000 troops, | | | Air Force | 157 bombers, 137 fighters and 51 support aircrafts | | *Joint support forces of the Siberia and Far East Military Districts | | | O Source: The Military Balance 2003-2004 | | [Table 1-4] Russia's Military Presence in the Far East (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oct. 2003), etc. ## Neighboring Countries' Policies Toward Northeast Asia And The Korean Peninsula A. Us On the axis of the ROK-US and US-Japan alliances, US is seeking the role of a balancer in Northeast Asia. To assure stability of economic order in the Asia-Pacific region and prevent the emergence of any regional hegemonic power that can constitute a direct military threat to US and its allies, US is shifting the focus of its global military strategies from Europe to Asia in a bid to grapple with new developments in the security environment including threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, adjustment of the size and role of the American forces stationed in the ROK will be implemented within the framework of the "GPR" being pursued in line with the global military strategies of the U.S. Meanwhile, US is actively trying to deter nuclear development by North Korea. In relation to such efforts, US is maintaining its position to defuse the North Korean nuclear impasse peacefully on the basis of cooperation with the countries concerned within the framework of the six-party talks. It is calling on North Korea to participate in the six-party talks and give up its nuclear programs. ## B. Japan On the basis of its alliance with US, Japan spent the world's third largest defense expenditure (about 4.9 trillion yen) in 2004, following US and Russia. Japan is attempting to expand the military influence of its Self-Defense Force and promote proactive security dialogues and exchanges with the countries in the region. In particular, Japan is seeking to establish a future-oriented partnership with ROK and improve its relations with North Korea, while trying to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue on the basis of close tripartite cooperation with ROK and US. ## C. China Recognizing security in Northeast Asia as a prerequisite to accomplishing its national goal of "modernizing the country through economic development", China is espousing the policy of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula to maintain peace and stability. At the same time, by taking advantage of its geographic location as a neighboring country having diplomatic ties with both Koreas, China is engaged in pragmatic diplomacy of balance. Accordingly, China is taking a position to promote inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation and oppose nuclear possession by either of the two Koreas. ## D. Russia Russia is actively participating in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in an effort to expand its role in the Asia-Pacific and Northeast Asia by restoring its influence on the Korean peninsula that has waned in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. In addition, it is searching for closer economic ties with the two Koreas in preparation for the possible connection of the TSR with the TKR and the future linkage of its oil and gas pipes to the Korean peninsula. TSR: Trans-Siberian Railway TKR: Trans-Korea Railway ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 35 # Section 3. North Korean Situation And Military Threat In its "New Year's Joint Editorial for 2005", North Korea ![33_image_0.png](33_image_0.png) announced the direction of its economic policies as well as improvement of the living conditions of its populace. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Workers' Party and the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the military-first politics, the country underscored the solid unity among the party, military, and people with Chairman Kim Jong-il of the National Defense Committee at the center. Outwardly, the country is concentrating its efforts on gaining assurances for the maintenance of its regime and securing practical economic benefits from US by attending the six-party talks. At the same time, North Korea is executing pragmatic omnidirectional foreign policies, placing the focus on receiving economic assistance from the international community. Since the June 15, 2000 Joint Declaration, the two Koreas have engaged in brisk exchanges and cooperation including the reconnection of the Gyeongeui (Seoul-Shineuiju) and Donghae (East Coast) railways and roads, construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and implementation of the Mt. Geumgang tourism project. A total of 121 government-level dialogues have been held (as of December 2004) including political, military, economic, Red Cross and sports meetings. However, North Korea still maintains military power superior to that of South Korea in quantitative terms. North Korea is proceeding with the development of weapons of mass destruction, while beefing up its conventional military force including production of long-range artillery and Cheonmaho tanks, introduction of helicopters and construction of small-sized submarines. # North Korea'S General Political Situation And Policies Toward South Korea ## A. Domestic Situation Chairman Kim Jong-il of the National Defense Committee is focusing most of his public appearances on military-related events including visits to military units. Based on the so-called "Military-First Policy" attaching greater weight to the political role of the military, Chairman Kim Jong-il is seeking to cement internal unity and promote stability. Despite a slight improvement in economic conditions since 1999, North Korea is still plagued by persisting food and energy shortages. Due to the structural vulnerability of the socialist economic system, limitations in technology and capital, limited measures to open the economy and a lack of social overhead capital and resources including energy, the country is suffering from impediments to its efforts to achieve economic rehabilitation. Since the announcement of the "economic management improvement measures" in July 2002, North Korea has endeavored to take various actions to induce economic reforms including the implementation of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex project. In the face of increasing personnel contact and exchanges in the wake of the "inter-Korean summit" on June 15, 2000, Pyongyang is also intensifying ideological indoctrination of its populace. Military-First Policy: based on such multiple objectives as ensuring the maintenance of the regime, consolidating military power, instigating the military to lead economic construction and spreading preferential treatment for the military and a spirit of revolution to the entire society. ## B. Foreign Policies After altering the direction of its ![34_image_0.png](34_image_0.png) foreign policies to "pragmatic omnidirectional diplomacy" in 2000, North Korea has established diplomatic relations with 20 countries including the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Australia as of 2004 by consistently pushing for normalization of diplomatic ties with the West. O Six-party talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue (Beijing) Continuously demanding that US drop its policy of antagonization against Pyongyang, North Korea reacted with hardball tactics when US raised the nuclear issue in October 2002. To be specific, North Korea took a series of actions from December 2002 including abandoning the freeze on operations at its nuclear facilities and declaring its withdrawal from the NPT regime, which escalated tension between the two nations. However, mediation by neighboring countries, including China, led North Korea to participate in the six-party talks where it is seeking to settle its nuclear impasse as well as the issues of gaining assurances for the security of its regime and economic assistance. Following its agreement with Japan at the summit on September 17, 2002 to resume talks aimed at establishing diplomatic ties, North Korea has been exerting efforts to improve its relations with Japan, holding a second summit in May 2004. In addition, North Korea has been maintaining customary cooperative ties with China and Russia, based on mutual exchanges between high-ranking officials of the party, government and military including bilateral summits. Requesting China and Russia to provide economic assistance and support its positions in the six-party talks, North Korea is concentrating on securing their continuous backing. ## C. Policies Toward South Korea Since the June 15 inter-Korean summit, Pyongyang has maintained government-level dialogue with Seoul including ministerial talks. At the same time, it has expanded the scope of mutual exchanges and cooperation programs driven by practical interests such as the construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, reconnection of the Gyeongeui (Seoul- Shineuiju) and Donghae (East Coast) railways and roads, implementation of the Mt. Geumgang tourism project and reunion of separated families. In the meantime, North Korea is clamoring for the withdrawal of the US forces stationed in South Korea, underlining cooperation between the Korean people in an attempt to soften the US hard-line polices as regards its nuclear issue. The two Koreas hammered out an agreement to "prevent accidental clashes in the West Sea and to suspend propaganda activities and eliminate propaganda apparatus in the frontline areas" at the recent inter-Korean general-level talks. This indicates that North Korea may have adopted a more forward-looking approach than in the past. However, the North still takes a lukewarm position when it comes to building a substantive level of military confidence to ease tension on the Korean peninsula and produce an enduring peace. ![36_image_0.png](36_image_0.png) ## Assessment Of North Korea'S Military Threat A. Military Policies Even in the aftermath of the inter-Korean summit, North Korea has remained unchanged militarily. Since its adoption of the "Four-point Military Guidelines" as the backbone of its military policy in 1962, North Korea had completed its war preparation over an extended period of time. The country is believed to be maintaining its existing military policy for the time being. In spite of its deepening economic difficulties, North Korea is strengthening its military capability by placing the highest priority on the military in terms of allocation of national resources. Moreover, it has concentrated the major forces of its Army, Navy and Air Force to the south of the Pyongyang- Wonsan line. In the meantime, North Korea has officially announced that its defense expenditure was about 15.5% of the total national budget in 2004. Considering the characteristics of the North Korean regime and its budget system, however, its actual military expenditure is estimated at over 30% of its gross national income (GNI). In other words, North Korea's defense expenditure is covered by not only its national budget, but also by an independent military budget encompassing operations of the munitions industry (secondary economy), weapons exports and foreign currency earning activities of military units. It is thought that the country can finance its military activities at a very low cost for such reasons as state ownership of munitions factories. ## B. War Control And Military Command Organizations The National Defense Committee is the highest war control and military command organization in North Korea. It is an independent entity in charge of North Korea's Four-point Military Guidelines: 1. Fortification of the entire nation 2. Armament of the entire populace 3. Modernization of military equipment 4. Conversion of all servicemen into cadres overall decision-making and guidance for defense projects, with the Ministry of People's Armed Forces under its control. The military command system of the country is summarized in Figure 1-5. The National Defense Committee was upgraded to the highest level in the country's power echelon according to its Constitution, as revised on September 5, 1998 (Article 100), which stipulates, "the National Defense Committee is the highest military control organization under the country's sovereign power and the overall defense supervisory organization." Accordingly, the stature of its chairman was elevated to the "highest leader in the country with supreme command of directing and controlling national political, military and economic capabilities across the board." Representing the military externally, the Ministry of People's Armed Forces exercises the authority to administer the military including command of military-related foreign affairs, munitions and finances. The General Political Bureau supervises the Workers' Party organizations in the military and relevant political indoctrination programs while the General Staff Department exercises actual operational control of the military under the combined military system. [Figure 1-5] North Korea's Military Command Organization Chart ![37_image_0.png](37_image_0.png) ## C. Organization, Equipment And Deployment Of The North Korean Military (1) Army North Korea's ground forces comprise a total of 19 corps-level units including 9 corps, 4 mechanized corps, 1 tank corps, 1 artillery corps, the Pyeongyang Defense Command, Border Guard Command, Missile Guidance Bureau and Light Infantry Instruction Guidance Bureau. ![38_image_0.png](38_image_0.png) Major combat units consist of more than 170 divisions and brigades including 80 infantry divisions and brigades (including instruction divisions), 30 artillery brigades, 10 tank brigades and 7 tank regiments, 20 mechanized brigades and 25 special warfare brigades. North Korea has deployed approximately 70% of its ground forces south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, positioning 4 corps in the forward position and 1 tank corps, 2 mechanized corps and 1 artillery corps in its rear. Thus, it is maintaining the ability and posture to wage a surprise attack without any redeployment in the event of an emergency. In particular, the Seoul Metropolitan Area of the South is within range of the 170mm self-propelled artillery and 240mm multiple rocket launchers that the North has deployed in its frontline areas. This means that North Korea is capable of carrying out massive surprise bombardment against the metropolitan area from its existing positions. Major equipment held by the North Korean ground forces is specified in Table 1-6. [Table 1-6] Equipment of the North Korean Ground Forces ![38_image_4.png](38_image_4.png) ![38_image_3.png](38_image_3.png) Air Defense ![38_image_1.png](38_image_1.png) Weapons Over 15,600 units iver-Crossing ![38_image_2.png](38_image_2.png) Equipment (K-16/S-type floating bridges) Over 760/2,200 units ![39_image_0.png](39_image_0.png) ![39_image_1.png](39_image_1.png) In the meantime, it is expected that North Korean special warfare units comprising approximately 120,000 troops including those of frontline corps will infiltrate into the South at the same time in the event of a contingency situation and attempt to plunge the rear areas of the South into chaos. In addition, it is thought that the North Korean military may wage surprise attacks in parallel by using its underground tunnels located at major access roads on the frontline. ## (2) Navy The North Korean Navy consists of 2 fleet commands in the East and West Seas as well as 12 squadrons and 2 maritime sniper brigades under the O Underground tunnels dug by North Korea control of the Navy Command. The status of major naval vessels held by North Korea is summarized in Table 1-7. Among its warships, surface combatants comprise mostly small-sized, highspeed vessels including light destroyers, guard ships, guided missile boats, torpedo boats and fire support boats. Currently, about 60% of combatants remain deployed in forward bases. As regards submarines (or submersibles), North Korea has more than 60 Romeo-class and Sang-EO(Shark)-class submarines and over 10 Yugo-class submersibles. Its support ships comprise landing vessels including landing ships, high-speed landing crafts and landing craft air cushions as well as mine sweeping ships and maritime guard ships. In addition, the North Korean Navy has two sniper brigades and more than 260 troop transport vehicles including 130 landing craft air cushions and 90 high-speed landing crafts. ![39_image_3.png](39_image_3.png) ![39_image_2.png](39_image_2.png) [Table 1-7] Vessels of the North Korean Navy ## (3) Air Force The North Korean Air Force consists of four air divisions and one helicopter brigade under the central control of the Air Force Command. It deploys about 40% of its fighters in forward bases. The status of its aircrafts is presented in Table 1-8. [Table 1-8] Aircrafts of the North Korean Air Force ![40_image_0.png](40_image_0.png) First- and second-generation Soviet-made fighters including MIG- 15/17/19/21 fighters and IL-28 fighter-bombers account for approximately 70% of its aircrafts. The North also has a significant number of third- and fourth-generation fighters including MIG-23/29 and SU-25. In the late 1990s, North Korea acquired upgraded MIG-21 fighters from Kazakhstan and MI-8 and KA-32 helicopters from Russia. The North Korean Air Force has two sniper brigades and about 300 AN-2s that can support special warfare units infiltrating deep into the South's rear areas at low-altitudes in the event of contingency. ## (4) Reserve Forces North Korea has armed its entire populace according to its "Four-point Military Guidelines" strategy, maintaining the entire society as a gigantic garrison. Currently, about 30% of its population aged 14 to 60 constitutes the 7.7 million reserve forces that are subject to military exercise for 15 to 30 days a year. ![40_image_1.png](40_image_1.png) North Korea's reserve forces include the Reserve Military Training Units(620,000) to be mobilized in the event of war, Worker and Peasant Red Guard Units(5,720,000) corresponding to the Homeland Reserve Forces of the South, Red Youth Guards(940,000) which is a military organization of senior middle schools and other paramilitary units (420,000) such as the Guard Command, Ministry of Social Security, General Bureau of Logistics Mobilization, and Speed Battle Youth Shock Troops. ## D. North Korea'S Development Of Strategic Weapons (1) Nuclear Development In the 1960s, North Korea constructed nuclear facilities in Yeongbyeon. In the 1970s, it concentrated its nuclear research on nuclear fuel mining and milling as well as conversion and fabrication technologies. Based on the extraction of nuclear materials through the operation of a 5MWe nuclear reactor and reprocessing of spent fuel rods in the 1980s and afterwards, Pyeongyang has apparently completed the "nuclear fuel cycle" comprising a series of steps ranging from the acquisition of nuclear fuel to its reprocessing. It is assessed that the country conducted high-explosive experiments at the same time. At the moment, there exists no solid evidence indicating North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. However, It is assessed that Pyeongyang may have produced one or two nuclear weapons with about 10 to 14kg of weapons-grade plutonium which it extracted prior to the IAEA inspection in May 1992. In the meantime, North Korea claims that it has completed reprocessing of more than 8,000 spent fuel rods, which it had retained before lifting the freeze on its nuclear facilities in December 2002, during the period [Figure 1-9] Nuclear Facilities at Yeongbyeon, North Korea ![41_image_0.png](41_image_0.png) Nuclear fuel cycle: entire process in which uranium ore is processed in a reactor after mining and milling, conversion, enrichment and fabrication and then undergoes a series of steps including reprocessing, recycling and eventual disposal as high-level waste. from January to June 2003. Since late February 2003, the country has maintained the 5MWe nuclear reactor at Yeongbyeon in operation, which may lead to its procurement of additional plutonium. In addition, suspicions have been raised that North Korea introduced relevant components for development of a centrifugal separator necessary for uranium enrichment according to its "enriched uranium-based nuclear development program." ## (2) Biochemical Weapons North Korea launched chemical weapons development including research into chemical weapons and construction of production facilities in compliance with Kim Il-sung's "Declaration for Chemicalization" at the end of 1961. It is assessed that, since the 1980s, Pyeongyang has been producing poison gases and biological weapons. It is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of toxic agents such as nerve, blister, blood and vomiting agents as well as tear gas, which were produced at several chemical factories in the country, remain stored in a number of different facilities. The North is suspected of being able to independently cultivate and produce such biological weapons as the bacteria of anthrax, smallpox and cholera. ## (3) Mid/Long-Range Missiles In the 1970s, North Korea embarked on a project to develop ballistic missiles. In the mid-1980s, it successfully test-fired a Scud-B missile with the range of 300km, which was followed by its production and operational deployment of 500kmrange Scud-Cs. In the 1990s, the country test-fired a 1,300km-range Rodong missile and deployed the missiles for operational purposes. In August 1998, Pyeongyang unsuccessfully testfired Daepodong-1 missiles. Although the attempt failed, it can be inferred from the experiment of the missile's various functions including engine combustion and multistage body separation that North Korea has the ability to develop mid-to longrange missiles. It is assessed that the country is currently pursuing the development of Daepodong2, a long-range ballistic missile. ![42_image_0.png](42_image_0.png) Defense White Paper 2004 ## Major Military Developments ![43_Image_0.Png](43_Image_0.Png) Since the war in Iraq began in March 2003, there has been a dramatic increase in visits to military units by Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the National Defense Committee (from 24 occasions in 2002 to 50 in 2003 and 53 in 2004). Apparently, this is aimed at inducing the military to fortify its combat readiness and solidifying its loyalty to Chairman Kim Jong-il as part of his Military-First Policy. Major recent provocations by North Korea that ratcheted up military tension are summarized as follows: On June 29, 2002, one North Korean patrol boat violated the NLL (Northern Limit Line) west of Yeonpyeong Island and opened fire against a speedboat of the ROK Navy that attempted to fend off the intrusion, sparking an armed clash in the West Sea. In November 2001 and July/August 2003, North Korea fired against South Korean guard posts on the central and eastern front lines. In February 2003, one North Korean MiG-19 violated the South Korean air space above Yeonpyeong Island. The two Koreas concluded the "agreement on prevention of accidental clashes in the West Sea and the suspension of propaganda activities and elimination of propaganda apparatus in the MDL (Military Demarcation Line) area" during the second round of the inter-Korean general-level military talks on June 4, 2004. Accordingly, the two sides decided to implement information exchange and warning communications as regards fishing ships of third nations engaging in illegal fishing activities and also dismantle visual media (propaganda materials, signs, etc.) and loudspeaker equipment used to broadcast propaganda on the frontline area from June 15, 2004. However, North Korea refused to hold inter-Korean dialogue and suspended the elimination of propaganda apparatus in the frontline area from July 2004 on the grounds that the South Korean government banned a South Korean condolence delegation from visiting North Korea to mark the 10th anniversary of President Kim II-sung's death. In particular, North Korean patrol boats violated the NLL on as many as nine occasions even after the inter-Korean general-level military talks, continuously creating tension in the West Sea. Chapter 2. National Security Policy and Defense Policy of the Participatory Government ![44_image_0.png](44_image_0.png) Section 1 National Security Policy Initiative of the Participatory Government Section 2 ![44_image_1.png](44_image_1.png) Basic Direction of Defense Policy ![45_image_1.png](45_image_1.png) ![45_image_0.png](45_image_0.png) The global inclination toward the pursuit of harmony in the post- Cold War era and improved relations between the two Koreas since the June 15 Inter-Korean summit have provided opportunities to bring 'permanent peace' on the Korean peninsula. However, South Korea still confronts a variety of threats. The North Korean nuclear impasse has emerged as the major threat to the national security of South Korea as well as a lingering issue hampering peace and stability in Northeast Asia. A readjustment of the US forces stationed in the ROK in alignment with the changing global strategies of US also impacts the overall security structure of the ROK. Furthermore, ROK faces new challenges of proactively tackling such looming security threats as transnational crimes including international terrorism. In a bid to overcome these challenges and threats and find another opportunity to spur on the process toward peace and coprosperity on the Korean peninsula, the Participatory Government of the South unveiled its "policy of peace and prosperity" aimed at laying the groundwork for peaceful unification as well as coexistence and co-prosperity in Northeast Asia. In order to implement the policy of peace and prosperity, the government has laid out specific national security policies encompassing unification, diplomacy and security. ## National Interest And National Security Objectives All countries endeavor to seek their national interests as the foremost value under any security environment. In substance, national interests are synonymous with national objectives of all countries to pursue survival and prosperity. Based on the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, the Participatory Government defined the national interests as (i) Ensuring National Security (ii) Promotion of Liberal Democracy and Human Rights (iii) Economic Development and Promotion of Public Welfare (iv) Peaceful Unification of the Korean Peninsula and (v) Contribution to World Peace and Shared Prosperity for Mankind. The government is focusing the national competencies on attaining the designated national security objectives of "Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula", "Common Prosperity of South and North Korea and Northeast Asia" and "Assurance of Public Safety" to pursue national interests in the existing internal and external security environment. ![46_image_0.png](46_image_0.png) Roh Moo-hyun presented the "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" by outlining the basic direction of the policies of his Participatory Government related to unification, diplomacy and security. ## Principles Of The National Security Strategy The government specified the following fundamental concepts of its strategies for accomplishing national security objectives, putting forward detailed guidelines for policies of each area: ## A. Pursuit Of The Policy Of Peace And Prosperity The priority goal of the government's Policy of Peace and Prosperity is to achieve stable inter-Korean relations based on peaceful coexistence, reconciliation and cooperation in accordance with the spirit of the South- North Basic Agreement of 1992 and the South-North Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000. Furthermore, the policy seeks to achieve common prosperity and form an economic community through the promotion and expansion of inter-Korean cooperation. The policy ultimately aims to translate the outcome of exchanges and cooperation into tension reduction and military confidence building. In addition, in the course of carrying out the Policy of Peace and Prosperity, the government has unswervingly adhered to the following principles : First, opposition to wars of any kind and promotion of peaceful resolution of all conflicts and issues through dialogue ; Second, pursuit of mutual trust and reciprocity on the basis of mutual recognition ; Third, resolution of all issues concerning the Korean Peninsula through international cooperation based on the principle that South and North Korea are the parties directly concerned ; and Fourth, carrying out policy initiatives based on public participation. ## B. Conduct Of Balanced And Pragmatic Diplomacy The balanced and pragmatic diplomacy practiced by the Participatory Government pursues the achievement of balance in the process of policymaking and execution as well as applying strategic flexibility to realize its security objectives. The objective of such diplomacy is to concurrently pursue national interests and universal values including peace, human rights and sovereignty. More specifically, the country's diplomatic efforts seek the development of multilateral security dialogues and cooperative policies, together with promotion of the ROK-US alliance, which constitutes the foundation of security on the peninsula. The country also desires to retain its unique characteristics and stature while proactively converging with the trend of globalization to establish cooperative/horizontal relations of reciprocity regarding its foreign relations. ## C. Promotion Of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense In an effort to establish a firm security posture that serves peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the Participatory Government seeks to establish a cooperative self-reliant defense wherein it endeavors to secure self-reliant defense capabilities and promote security cooperation among various nations. In other words, the government is endeavoring to develop capabilities and systems by which it can take the initiative in deterring war provocations by the North, while promoting the ROK-US alliance from a future-oriented perspective and proactively taking advantage of multilateral security cooperation. ## D. Development Of Comprehensive Security Today, most countries around the world are strengthening their security competences in a broad spectrum of areas in order to cope with external military threats as well as newly emerging non-military threats at home and from abroad and to effectively meet various security challenges. With a view to attaining its national security goal of gaining "Assurance of Public Safety" ; in the face of diverse security threats, the Participatory Government is pursuing the realization of a comprehensive security, an extended concept of security encompassing not only military issues, but also non-military issues pertinent to politics, economy, society, environment and so on. ![48_image_0.png](48_image_0.png) ## Strategic And Basic Tasks The government has set strategic tasks and basic tasks in line with our national interest, national security objectives and the principles of national security strategy. Strategic tasks refer to the current security issues essential to attaining national security objectives. The government places policy priority on the implementation of these tasks to produce tangible progress during its term. Basic tasks represent security policy objectives, which will serve as the groundwork for the implementation of strategic tasks. These are ongoing tasks that should be constantly pursued without time constraints. Figure 2-1 below presents the government's vision of security that incorporates such strategic tasks and basic tasks. ![49_image_0.png](49_image_0.png) In order to attain the national security goals in the face of the ![50_image_0.png](50_image_0.png) rapidly changing security environment and varying defense conditions, the ROK military establishes and pursues objectives and key points of national defense. ## National Defense Objectives ![50_Image_1.Png](50_Image_1.Png) National defense objectives : to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, uphold peaceful unification and contribute to regional stability and world peace (revised on March 10, 1994). First, "defending the nation from external military threats and invasion" means protecting the country from direct military threats from North Korea including its conventional military capabilities, weapons of mass destruction and forward military deployment as well as other external military threats that threaten the nation's right to survival. Second, "upholding peaceful unification" means contributing to peaceful unification of the two Koreas by deterring war, easing military tension and bringing a permanent peace to the peninsula. Third, "contributing to regional stability and world peace" articulates the ROK's determination to contribute to stability and peace in Northeast Asia by promoting cooperative military relations with neighboring countries based on its national stature and security capabilities and to proactively participate in the international community's efforts to maintain world peace including UN peacekeeping operations. ## Defense White Paper 2004 Key Points Of National Defense ![51_Image_0.Png](51_Image_0.Png) To achieve national security goals and defense objectives, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) consistently focuses military competences on the following key defense points : (i) establishing a firm defensive posture (ii) pursuing cooperative self-reliant defense (iii) continuously implementing national defense reforms ; and (iv) establishing the image of a trustworthy military. ## A. Establishment Of A Firm Defensive Posture The ROK military is poised to respond immediately to any conceivable military threat or aggression and maintains a firm defense posture that deters war provocations from the enemy, assuring absolute victory in the event of armed provocations. In particular, the ROK military maintains an operational posture at all times to sustain military stability in the seas northwest of the country while being fully prepared to deal with any military and non-military provocation including infiltration and limited provocation by North Korea or terrorist attacks. In the meantime, the military is devising measures to prevent accidental clashes between the South and the North. It is also stepping up military preparedness and military impact assessments in connection with inter-Korean exchange and cooperation programs including reconnection of the Gyeongeui (Seoul-Shineuiju) and Donghae (East Coast) railways and roads, and construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. On the basis of the ROK-US combined defense system that plays a pivotal role in deterring military conflicts on the Korean peninsula, the ROK military maintains vigilant intelligence monitoring and early warning systems while continuously developing its mechanism of crisis management and operational concepts to safeguard the security of the Seoul Metropolitan Area. At the same time, it is pursuing the readjustment of the American forces stationed in the country based on close mutual consultation and exerting multi-pronged efforts to reinforce combined combat capabilities and operational postures. In order to contend with the threat of international terrorism that is emerging as a new kind of threat, the ROK military maintains the posture to instantly respond to any type of conceivable terrorist attacks by the formulation and development of plans to counter such attacks. Under the circumstances, the ROK military is bolstering the system of cooperation among pertinent counter-terrorism agencies. At the same time, it is consolidating the protection of major Korean and USFK facilities and providing professional training to counter-terrorism operation units. In addition, the ROK military is strengthening the mental discipline of soldiers to maximize its intangible combat capability. In particular, the military is instilling a firm sense of national security into its soldiers to establish their values as servicemen by developing and systematically applying various mental education programs and audio-visual aids that consider the recent changes in the security environment and the needs of the new-generation solders. 55 ## B. Pursuit Of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense Self-reliant defense and the ROK-US alliance remain the two major pillars of security in the ROK. As the nation secures independent defense capabilities, its alliance with US will be further consolidated and developed with a future-oriented perspective. As a core element of its defense policies, the ROK military has adopted a strategy of "self-reliant defense" to implement national security strategies aimed at achieving peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. In compliance with President Roh Moohyun's guideline that "the foundation of self-reliant national defense should be laid during the tenure of the Participatory Government", it has formulated and executed "a cooperative self-reliant defense plan". In order to keep pace with recent developments in the strategic environment including readjustment of the United States Forces Korea (USFK), the ROK ![53_image_0.png](53_image_0.png) military is fine-tuning the ROK-US alliance, the bedrock of security on the Korean peninsula that has tremendously contributed to its peace and stability. At the same time, the ROK military seeks to bolster its capacity to seize the initiative in deterring any existing threats from North Korea while setting the stage for practical self-reliant defense by gradually enhancing its core forces to brace for unspecified future threats. In addition, the ROK military will establish a war system centered on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) by conducting rational military reorganization and strengthening the functions of the JCS. It will also transform itself into an efficient elite force fully prepared for future wars, laying the cornerstone for the maximization of teamwork. For the smooth pursuit of a cooperative self-reliant defense, it is essential to forge a national consensus and constantly secure a defense budget of an appropriate level. Accordingly, the MND is engaging in aggressive PR(Public Relations) activities to gain public understanding and support as well as conducting close consultation with related government agencies to earmark necessary defense expenditures, with the condition of the national economy taken into account. ense White Paper 2004 ![54_image_0.png](54_image_0.png) ## C. Consistent Pursuit Of Defense Reforms To gear up for the incessantly changing security environment and new challenges, the ROK military is reinforcing its readiness and capabilities through constant self-evaluation and adoption of reforms. In order to keep pace with the government's innovation efforts, the MND establishes and implements reform tasks regarding various aspects of national defense. In particular, the MND will enhance the professionalism and efficiency of all components of national defense by broadening the scope of civil control based on organizational restructuring of the MND headquarters. To enhance the defense procurement and management systems, the MND will designate reform tasks based on government-wide consultation. It will also establish the "National Defense Procurement Agency (tentative name)" incorporating the functions related to beefing up military readiness for the purpose of enhancing professionalism, transparency, accountability and efficiency regarding procurement-related affairs. The MND will also work to improve the rationality and efficiency of personnel management by ensuring that a fair and transparent human resource management system takes root through institutional improvements and that personnel training and education programs are further developed. In addition, the MND continually pursues policies aimed at boosting morale and promoting the welfare of soldiers such as improvement of barrack facilities and living quarters. At the same time, the MND endeavors to constantly upgrade the "quality of life" of military personnel by enhancing their treatment in various aspects. ## D. Establishment Of The Image Of A Trustworthy Military Even a military equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry and equipment cannot guarantee victory if it fails to earn the trust and support of its people. In order to establish an image of the armed forces that are trusted by the people, it is required for the military to develop and thoroughly adopt a desirable military culture on its own through internal reforms. Defense White Paper 200 Towards that end, the ROK military is creating an innovative military culture that underlines autonomy and responsibility, with firmly established combat-oriented values. At the same time, it is fostering a clean and transparent military culture through reforms in outlook and a variety of institutional improvements. Moreover, the ROK military will achieve an "open defense" system that guarantees public participation as well as openness and transparency. In this regard, it will enhance the fairness, transparency and customer-oriented nature of conscription administration. It will actively disclose outstanding defense issues and matters of public concern prior to receiving public requests for information disclosure, while seeking to reflect the opinions of people from various walks of life by increasing the involvement of civilian experts in defense policy development. In addition, the ROK military is totally committed to protect and promote the safety and interests of the people. As an integral part of such commitment, the military is providing support for national disaster management as one of its basic duties, pushing ahead with its organizational and institutional overhaul toward that end. To guarantee the people's property rights in relation to various military activities, measures have been devised to reduce the noise level at military airfields and firing ranges. At the same time, the ROK military is broadening the scope of environment preservation and management, securing personnel dedicated to the management of military environmental facilities and cleaning up contaminated soil. Furthermore, it stands ready to do its best to satisfy the people's right to know, eliminate any inconvenience inflicted upon them, and resolve various civil complaints. Chapter 3. Defense Posture to Safeguard Peace ![56_image_0.png](56_image_0.png) Section 1 Armed Forces Employment and Force Capability Section 2 ![56_image_1.png](56_image_1.png) Employment of USFK and Augmentation Forces Section 3 ![56_image_2.png](56_image_2.png) Military Readiness Posture of the ROK Armed Forces Section 4 ![56_image_3.png](56_image_3.png) Combat Task-Oriented Training and Exercises Section 5 ![56_image_4.png](56_image_4.png) Mobilization and Homeland Defense Operations Posture ![57_image_0.png](57_image_0.png) The Republic of Korea must take the path to merging its national competences to bring an early end to existing confrontation between the South and North by consistently implementing policies promoting peace and prosperity as well as unification. To support this national effort, the ROK military is determined to deter aggression on the basis of an impermeable combined ROK-US defense posture. Bracing for any possible armed provocation, it is reinforcing its military power and fostering the capability to formulate and execute operational plans. In particular, the ROK military is pressing ahead with the modernization of its forces in a bid to expand its role in defending the nation according to the readjustment of the USFK (United States Forces Korea). ## Rok Armed Forces' Concept Of Military Force Operation By bolstering its deterrence capabilities on the basis of the ROK-US combined defense system, the ROK military needs to prompt the North to recognize the futility of its strategy to communize and unify the Korean peninsula by force. In addition, it has to foster military stability on the peninsula through inter-Korean military confidence building and tension reduction, while dissuading armed provocation and war by creating a strategic environment favorable to ROK based on close military cooperation with neighboring countries. If the North should commit to an armed provocation in spite of the strong deterrence posture, the ROK military has the capacity to repel the enemy's primary forces at an early stage, safeguarding the stability of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA) and gaining victory without fail. In order to sustain such strategic concept, the ROK military maintains flawless preparedness against any conceivable military provocation by the North with constant development and execution of ROK-US combined operational plans for defensive purposes. The ROK military constantly seeks measures to expand our role in the defense of the peninsulaby pursuing cooperative self-reliant defense as well as strengthening the function and organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for independent war planning and operational execution from a mid-to long-term perspective. ## Force Capability Of Individual Services A. Army The ROK Army's peacetime mission is to deter armed conflicts through sentry operations, education/training and combat preparations while its wartime mission is to achieve victory in all ground combats. During peacetime, it contributes to world peace and stability by participating in international peacekeeping activities. ![58_image_0.png](58_image_0.png) The ROK Army consists of the ROK Army Headquarters, three Field Army Commands, Capital Defense Command, Special Warfare Command, Army Aviation Operations Command and support units. Its major organization and equipment are summarized in Figure 3-1. The First and Third Field Armies perform the mission of defending the region that spans from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) to the capital area. The mission of the Second Field Army is to defend the entire rear area not covered by the First and Third Field Armies. The Capital Defense Command carries out the mission of defending the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area including providing support to maintain the functioning of the capital and protecting its major facilities. The tasks of the Special Warfare Command are to collect information, locate enemy targets and carry out other designated special missions. The Army Aviation Operations Command provides maneuvering forces with fire, airlift and reconnaissance support by operating various types of helicopters. ## B. Navy The ROK Navy's missions during peacetime include deterring war, upholding maritime national sovereignty and national interests, supporting the government's foreign policies, and enhancing national stature. Its wartime missions include exercising control over the seas, ensuring the safety of the nation's maritime activities, denying the enemy's maritime activities, protecting the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) which is the nation's lifeline, and carrying out surprise landing operations on the enemy's flank and rear areas. The ROK Navy is comprised of the ROK Navy Headquarters, Operations Command, Marine Corps Command, and support units. The status of its organization and major equipment is presented in Figure 3-2. The Operations Command controls maritime operations across the board and utilizes various vessels and aircraft to conduct major naval component operations such as submarine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine operations, landing operations, salvage operations, and special operations. Each fleet command possesses combat vessels such as destroyers, frigates, corvettes and high-speed ships to defend its operational zone of responsibility. The Marine Corps Command performs the primary duty of conducting landing operations on the enemy's flank and rear areas. It also carries out such missions as forcing the dispersion of enemy forces on the coasts of the East and West Sea and safeguarding the security of the west side of Seoul and northwestern islands. ![60_image_0.png](60_image_0.png) ## C. Air Force In peacetime, the ROK Air Force constantly maintains a watchful eye over the enemy and a high-level combat readiness posture that enables immediate response, such as retaliatory strikes, to any enemy provocation. The mission of the Air Force during war is to achieve air superiority so as to prevent the enemy from utilizing the air space, neutralize the enemy's will by destroying its principal and potential war-fighting capabilities, and provide support for ground and naval operations. The ROK Air Force Headquarters, Operations Command, and support units are the components of the ROK Air Force. A total of 12 wings remain subordinated to the ROK Air Force Headquarters, Operations Command and Education & Training Command. Figure 3-3 below specifies the status of the ROK Air Force's organization and major equipment. The Operations Command utilizes various types of aircraft to conduct such air operations as offensive and defensive counter-air operations, strategic attacks, air interdictions, assisting ground and naval forces with close air support, search & rescue and transport. [Figure 3-3] Organization and Manpower/Equipment of the ROK Air Force ![61_image_0.png](61_image_0.png) ## D. Reserve Forces During peacetime, reservists maintain the readiness to perform their duty to defend their homeland while engaging in their respective daily businesses. During wartime, they become the supplementary manpower to reinforce existing units, create new units, or serve as replacements for combat losses, performing the same combat duty as imposed on those in active service. Currently, there are approximately 3.04-million reserves and they are organized into respective regional and workplace reserve units. With regard to the organization of the reserve forces, discharged commissioned officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers are placed on the reserve list until they reach the age limit of those in active service under the Military Personnel Management Act. Soldiers and military public service personnel who have completed their terms of service are organized into regional and workplace reserve units until the 8th year from the completion of their service. Figure 3-4 below specifies the current status of the reserve forces. ![62_image_0.png](62_image_0.png) ![63_image_0.png](63_image_0.png) The United States Forces Korea (USFK), stationed in the ROK in accordance with the "ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty", plays pivotal roles and functions in deterring war on the Korean peninsula and contributes to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. In the event of any aggression, it has the capacity to put more than 690,000 troops in the field to help ROK achieve victory. ## Status Of The United States Forces Korea The Commander of the USFK also serves as the Commander, UNC/CFC. Under the control of the Commander of the USFK are the 8th US Army, US Naval Forces Korea, US Air Forces Korea, US Marine Forces Korea, and the US Special Operations Command Korea. Figure 3-5 below shows the organization of the USFK. [Figure 3-6] Organization of the USFK ![63_image_1.png](63_image_1.png) As shown in Figure 3-6, the USFK is centered around two divisions and two aviation brigades, possessing more than 140 new M1A1 tanks, 170 Bradley armored vehicles, 30 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 30 multiple rocket launch systems, 70 AH-64 helicopters as well as a wide range of surface-to-air missiles such as the Patriot. As part of Global Defense Posture Review (GPR), US and ROK agreed to reduce the manpower of the USFK by 12,500 troops in three stages by 2008. In order to complement such reduction, the USFK is investing US$11 billion to upgrade its combat capabilities. ![64_image_0.png](64_image_0.png) Troops: reflects the reduction in the number of troops redeployed to the stabilization operation in Iraq [Figure 3-6] The USFK Force Status ATACMS: Army Tactical Missile System, which refers to ground-to-ground missiles operated by the Army with the maximum range of 300km ## Augmentation Forces US augmentation forces, including the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, are comprised of approximately 690,000 troops, 160 naval vessels and 2,000 aircrafts. These forces will be deployed in the event of a contingency to defend the ROK. Deployment of the augmentation forces in the event of a crisis on the Korean peninsula will be based on the "Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data (TPFDD)", which primarily encompasses "Flexible Deterrence Options (FDOs)" and "Force Module Packages (FMPs)." FDOs, consisting of approximately 130 deterrence options, refer to diplomatic, intelligence, economic and military options to be implemented TPFDD: Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data, which refers to the list and specifications of the deployment of US augmentation units as requested by the Commander, Combined Forces Command to implement operational plans of the UNC/CFC FMP : Force Module Package FDO : Flexible Deterrence Option when war is imminent. FMPs are those measures that augment major combat and combat support units requiring the most urgent support in the early phases of war, should war deterrence efforts through FDOs fail. FMPs include such major components as rapid deployment aircraft and carrier battle groups. ## Augmentation Forces And "Tpfdd" The US augmentation forces are deployed within the framework of strategic maneuvers of the US armed forces. Strategic maneuvers refer to transportation of military units and equipment to any location around the world, that is, theater-totheater transportation. Major elements of strategic maneuvers include transportation by air and sea and pre-positioning of equipment and war supplies at the anticipated area of dispute. The US augmentation forces are classified into the following three categories: First, armed forces are deployed under "Flexible Deterrence Options (FDOs)," which refer to intelligence, economic, diplomatic and military options implemented when the risk of war escalates or when a crisis situation occurs on the Korean peninsula with a view to deter war. They consist of about 130 deterrence options encompassing surveillance and reconnaissance forces. Second, armed forces are deployed under "Force Module Packages (FMPs)," which refer to plans that augment major combat and combat support units which require the most urgent support in the early phases of war, should war deterrence efforts through FDOs fail. Such elements as carrier battle groups are included in the FMPs. Third, armed forces are augmented according to the "Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data (TPFDD)" in the event of an outbreak of war, which encompass forces under FDOs and FMPs. Forces under the TPFDD are classified into inplace forces currently deployed on the Korean peninsula, pre-planned forces subject to time-phased deployment in a contingency, and on-call forces and offpeninsula forces which could be additionally deployed if needed. These the US augmentation forces include forces aimed at striking the enemy's artillery concentrated in forward areas during the early stages of a contingency, several carrier battle groups capable of implementing multi-dimensional naval operations with state-of-the-art fighters, airforce capable of gaining air superiority. defending airspace and striking enemy positions, and other forces that counter weapons of mass destruction. The fact that US plans to deploy large-scale augmentation forces in the event of a contingency on the Korean peninsula, which represent more than 40% of its Navy, 50% of its Air Force and 70% of its Marine Corps, could be understood as an expression of its unflinching determination to defend the Korean peninsula. ![66_image_0.png](66_image_0.png) The basic mission of our armed forces is to defend our territorial soil, waters and sky, as well as to establish flawless military readiness posture capable of swiftly responding to any types of provocation threatening our sovereignty. Despite the positive changes in the security environment on the Korean peninsula as a result of the promotion of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, the threat posed by the North Korean military, which is superior to the South Korean armed forces in quantitative terms, remains unchanged. Accordingly, our military maintains a robust combined defense posture with the to brace for any possible armed provocation by North Korea. It also maintains strong military readiness that enables rapid response to military threats from the North including infiltration, local provocation and all-out war as well as non-military threats such as terrorist attacks. ## Maintenance Of Early Warning And Crisis Management Systems Operating an independent signal and imagery collection system as well as the ROK-US combined surveillance assets, the ROK military monitors the activities of the North Korean armed forces round the clock. In both frontline and rear areas, the ROK military keeps the movements and training of major North Korean forces, including artillery, missile and mechanized units, under close tracking and monitoring by using a wide array of reconnaissance and surveillance system such as signal and imagery collection devices. In the sea and air, the ROK military utilizes automatic monitoring equipment to conduct maritime and aerial surveillance on a real time basis. The ROK military is also furthering the development of the ROK-US combined crisis management and cooperation system to bring an early end to crises by efficiently responding to any indicators showing abnormal movements of the North Korean military or other contingencies on the peninsula. Towards that end, ROK and US have consistently complemented their combined crisis management consultative body. In addition, they have constantly improved their crisis management capabilities through regular exercises and special training programs, based on the development of concrete procedures to deal with each type of conceivable crises. The crisis management entities comprising the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Combined Forces Command constantly pursue the alignment of their command post automation systems and improvement of their functionality in order to ensure rapid discernment of relevant circumstances and execution of effective measures by sharing information in a timely manner. ## Readiness Posture Against Infiltrations And Local Provocations As shown by the Gangneung submarine infiltration attempt in 1996, the Yeonpyeong Sea Battle in 1999, the violation of South Korean territorial waters by North Korean commercial vessels in 2001, the West Sea skirmish in 2002, repeated violation of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) and shootings against South Korean guard posts, North Korea constantly perpetrates acts of provocation against South Korea. Under the circumstances, the ROK Armed Forces maintains a 24-hour surveillance and monitoring posture on all North Korean military movements and potential infiltrators. At the same time, it conducts vigilant patrol activities by using naval vessels, submarines and aircrafts in the seas under its jurisdiction including the Five Major Northwestern Islands, Mara-do, Ulleung-do and Dok-do Islands. In particular, to be fully prepared against the possibility of any intended armed provocation in the northwestern sea, the ROK Armed Forces is reinforcing the state of combat readiness posture provided by specific operation guidelines for military engagement. In addition, the quality of patrol forces along the DMZ, the coastlines and riverbanks is being reinforced by the use of scientific monitoring equipment, while measures for the response operation system to brace for infiltrations to NLL (Northern Limit Line) : The line was established by the Commander, UNC in August 1953 to prescribe the Northern limit for friendly Navy and Air Force patrols. In the East Sea, it was marked out on the basis of the Military Demarcation Line. In the West Sea, it was drawn according to the median line between the Five Northwestern Islands and North Korean Coastline. GP (Guard Post) : Guard posts installed within the DMZ territorial airspace are being further developed. As regards establishing an integrated civilian-government-military defense posture, a central meeting on integrated defense was held in February 2004 presided over by President Roh Moo-hyun to adopt a resolution on the pursuit of full-fledged security efforts. Together with the endeavor to gain a complete understanding of integrated defense operations procedures through joint ground exercises, Hwarang Exercise and comprehensive counterinfiltration drills, the ROK military is reinforcing the posture of rear-area operations including evacuation and decontamination against potential use of chemical weapons, protection of major urban infrastructures and restoration of damaged facilities. ![68_image_0.png](68_image_0.png) Posture against NBC (Nuclear Biological Chemical) threats : In order to counter North Korea's nuclear, biological and chemical threats to South Korea, the ROK military has continuously improved its NBC operation capabilities, Among such efforts are the establishment of the ROK NBC Defense Command in 1999, organizational reinforcement and significant equipment improvement of chemical units, possible early deployment of the US NBC units, continuous procurement of gas masks for civilian use, and organization of emergency dispatch units to prepare against potential urban poisonous gas leakages. RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration) : The process of receipt, staging, onward movement and integration of US augmentation forces arriving at an operational area according to the "TPFDD (Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data)" for their ultimate conversion into combat forces meeting the commanders operational requirements. ## Readiness Posture Against An All-Out War In Order To Brace For Military Threats Posed By North Korea, The Rok Armed Forces maintains full combat readiness at all times. In other words, in an effort to address the threat posed to the capital area in the early phase of a potential war waged by North Korea, the ROK military is upgrading the operational concept of promptly striking and eliminating the enemy's core forces based on the ROK-US combined intelligence collection and precision strike capabilities. Under this operational concept, the ROK Armed Forces reinforces the ability to fight with such joint and combined exercises as Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL), Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (RSOI), and Foal Eagle (FE). As part of the efforts to seek qualitative enhancements to overcome the quantitative superiority of the North Korean military, the ROK military is indigenously developing the KDX-II (large-sized Korean destroyer), KIA1 tanks, Shingung and Cheonma missile for incorporation into its war arsenal. In addition, it consistently fine-tunes the command post automation system to ensure efficient operational command based on the use of advanced computer equipment. ## Readiness Posture Against Terrorist Attacks In the post-Cold War era, the international community faces terrorist threats in new and diverse forms as demonstrated by the September 11 terrorist attack against US No country in the world is free from such threats of terrorism. In relation to the country's hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup and the Asian Games, ROK military formulated and upgraded the comprehensive development plans to combat terrorism. It also organized units dedicated to countering terrorism and reinforced counter-terrorism organizations ![69_image_0.png](69_image_0.png) engaging in a counter-terrorism exercise and equipment to strengthen its posture against possible terrorist attacks. In order to be prepared against potential nuclear, biological and chemical terrorist attacks, the ROK Armed Forces expanded the organization and equipment related to reconnaissance and decontamination under the control of the ROK NBC Defense Command. In addition, it is stepping up education programs to enhance the expertise of counter-terrorism commandos, explosive & contamination accident handling units and snipers who are dedicated to coping with acts of terrorism. At the same time, the military is furthering close cooperation with such relevant organizations as the National Intelligence Service and the police to coordinate efforts to block in advance or respond swiftly to any type of terrorist attacks. ![70_image_0.png](70_image_0.png) ## Strengthening Of Mental Armament Of Soldiers It is required for the ROK military to establish a firm vision for the nation as regards achieving security and rebuffing the enemy as well as to arm themselves with an invincible military spirit to perform their mission with unswerving conviction. Accordingly, the ROK military conducts mental education to encourage all soldiers to safeguard the legitimacy and the free democratic system of the country, establish a vision of achieving security and rebuffing the enemy by accurately recognizing the existing security situation and military threats from North Korea and to imbed into their minds a strong conviction on the basis of which they can put the required mental components and codes of conduct into practice. For such purpose, the ROK military is developing diverse mental education programs and materials that will induce soldiers' active participation and involvement, creation of strong convictions and their translation into action, in consideration of the changes of the times and traits of the new-generation soldiers. In an effort to conduct such education in tandem with the era of information and scientific development, the ROK military is also developing a "cyber mental education system." To bring about a qualitative improvement to its mental education, the ROK military is also pressing for the establishment of a simultaneous education system for the entire Services by launching satellite television broadcasting dedicated exclusively for military purposes (scheduled for October 1, 2005). ![71_image_0.png](71_image_0.png) ## Section 4. Combat Task-Oriented Training And Exercises In an effort to bolster its deterrence capabilities as well as its readiness posture for war on the Korean peninsula, the ROK military conducts various joint/combined training and exercises including the Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) Exercise, Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) Exercise, Foal Eagle (FE) Exercise, Taegeuk Exercise and Hoguk Exercise. Such diverse training programs are designed to enhance the combat capabilities of each Service. ## Combined/Joint Training And Exercises A. Ulchi Focus Lens (Ufl) Exercise The Ulchi Focus Lens Exercise is a comprehensive command post exercise (CPX) conducted in August every year by the government and military for the defense of the ROK. As the combination of the "Ulchi Exercise" for the purpose of government-level military support and the "Focus Lens Exercise" designed to ensure proficiency in executing military aspects of the operational plans, the Ulchi Focus Lens ROK-US combined exercise has been carried out annually since 1976 based on computer simulations. During UFL, government-level drills designed to enhance war ![72_image_0.png](72_image_0.png) UFL : Ulchi Focus Lens preparedness involving not only administrative agencies, but also major industrial entities are executed. By enhancing proficiency incombined ROK- US crisis management and defense exercise procedures, the ROK military is improving its combat readiness posture and combined operation capabilities. ## B. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement And Integration (Rsoi) Exercise The RSOI Exercise is a command post exercise conducted to build competence in the processes of reception, movement to a forward area, and integration of US augmentation forces that would be additionally deployed in the Korean peninsula during war. Also included in the exercise are such procedures as wartime support, mutual logistics support, mobilization and combat power restoration on the part of the ROK Armed Forces providing support for the US augmentation forces. The RSOI Exercise is conducted in March every year. The MND, JCS, headquarters of individual Services and operational commands as well as the USFK Command and US augmentation forces take part in the exercise. ## C. Foal Eagle (Fe) Exercise The Foal Eagle Exercise is an ROK-US combined/joint field training exercise designed to improve the capabilities of combined air, ground and sea operations, combined special operations and rear-area operations. The ROK JCS, ROK-US Combined Forces Command and each operational command participate in this exercise, which has been carried out every October since 1961. Since 2002, it has been conducted in March in alignment with the RSOI Exercise. ![73_image_0.png](73_image_0.png) During the first stage of the exercise, operations to defend major facilities in rear areas as well as combined landing and aerial operations are implemented. During the second stage, corps-level field training exercises (FTX) involving Marine amphibious groups are conducted. ## D. Taegeuk Exercise As a command post exercise (CPX) conducted in May every year since 1996, the Taegeuk Exercise aims at fostering war planning and scheming capabilities of the ROK JCS in preparation for possible war. Through the exercise, the JCS ensures mastery in the performance of wartime missions and war execution procedures and enhances the system of joint operations, counter-fire operations, and deep operations based on strengthened combatoriented mindset and teamwork. ## E. Hoguk Exercise Conducted annually under the control of O Marine amphibious training ![74_image_0.png](74_image_0.png) operational commands under the supervision of the ROK JCS since 1996, the Hoguk Exercise is a large-scale field training exercise aimed at improving corpslevel ability to implement operational plans as well as enhancing large unit joint operations and integrated war fighting capabilities. The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps participate in the exercise to train against possible local provocations and all-out wars along coastal and inland axes of movement. Through the Hoguk Exercise, the ROK Armed Forces develops the concept of carrying out joint operational plans, bolsters its offensive defense posture and verifies the efficacy of its new equipment and operational standards. ## F. Hwarang Exercise All civilian-government-military operational components take part in the Hwarang Exercise that is conducted under the supervision of the Integrated Defense Headquarters. It is an expanded and upgraded form of the comprehensive training against infiltration into the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area carried out from 1977 to 1981 under the control of the Third Field Army Command in order to increase integrated defense capabilities in rear areas. The Exercise is conducted in three regions consisting of (i) Seoul; (ii) Daejeon, Chungcheong, Jeolla and Jeju provinces; and (iii) Busan, Ulsan, Daegu, and South and North Gyeongsang provinces. Under the goal of improving integrated rear-area defense capabilities during wartime as well as peacetime, the Exercise places the focus on receiving intelligence from the residents, establishing status reports and information dissemination mechanism, creating a firm integrated defense posture among civilians, the government and military, and enhancing wartime/peacetime operation plan execution capabilities. ![75_image_0.png](75_image_0.png) O Equipment decontamination exercise ![75_image_1.png](75_image_1.png) ## Major Training Of Individual Services A. Army Under the motto of ''training just like fighting a war, and fighting a war just as trained", the Army conducts simulated war unit training centered on combat missions in order to maintain complete operational capabilities in preparation against possible infiltration and local provocation in peacetime and to win all ground campaigns in wartime. For scientific development of unit training, the Army has set up various training programs including combat command training, advanced combat training, and simulation training. Based on such efforts, the Army is dramatically improving the practical effects of its education and training by allowing officers and soldiers to indirectly experience battlefield situations. The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) nurtures the combat command capabilities of commanders and staff at the levels of corps, divisions, regiments and battalions, based on the application of the independently developed "Changjo 21 Model" and "Hwarang 21 Model." The BCTP emphasizes mastering unit command procedures, strengthening the operational capabilities of integrated combat force, and assessing battlefield experiences and regulations related to field operations. Advanced combat training is a two-way free maneuver exercise utilizing "opposing forces." Based on the use of actual armed forces and equipment at BCTP : Battle Command Training Program ![76_image_0.png](76_image_0.png) the Korean Army Advanced Combat Training Center, it employs scientific training methods. Company-level training is currently being conducted. From 2005, battalion-level training will start at the Inje and Hongcheon training fields. From 2006, company-level training utilizing mobile equipment will be carried out under the control of respective standing division. ## B. Navy The ROK Navy conducts simulated war unit training in concert with the respective battlefield environment in the O Training using MILES (Multiple Integrated East, West and South Seas. Major exercises Laser Engagement System) supervised by the Navy include fleet/combat flotilla maritime maneuver exercises and Naval Academy cadets' cruise training. Maritime maneuver exercise is the training that entails offensive maneuvers designed to annihilate the enemy's naval force as soon as possible and secure control of the seas in the event of a contingency. The three-dimensional exercise involving the newest destroyers, submarines, maritime patrol aircrafts and maritime operation helicopters is conducted more than 10 times a year on average. Implemented all around the world, the Naval Academy cadets' cruise training spans 100 to 150 days each year. Its purpose is to enhance the cadets' job performance capabilities as prospective officers and raise the ROK's international stature through goodwill visits to friendly nations. Combined training participated by the ROK Navy is broken down into the ROK-US combined training to bolster combined defense capabilities and the multinational combined O Fleet maneuver exercise ![76_image_1.png](76_image_1.png) ![77_image_0.png](77_image_0.png) ![77_image_1.png](77_image_1.png) O Anti-ship missile firing exercise training to promote military cooperation with foreign countries. The ROK-US combined training ranges from anti-submarine maritime search, submarine, mine warfare, rescue, and special warfare operations to explosive disposal operations. Based on these efforts, the two countries are improving their combined operational capabilities to thwart various forms of threats that may arise in the seas surrounding the Korean peninsula. In addition, the ROK Navy takes part in the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific), a multinational combined training exercise. Promoting military exchanges and cooperation with 15 friendly nations including the U.S., Japan, Russia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France and Britain, the ROK Navy acquires advanced naval techniques and know-how through this training. ## C. Air Force The ROK Air Force maintains high-level combat readiness to sustain the ability to monitor the enemy's movements in peacetime, mount potential retaliatory attacks and prepare for possible provocations by the enemy. All Air Force training is conducted under actual combat conditions and situations in order to seize the initiative of war at the earliest possible phase by successfully securing air superiority and providing ground and naval forces with favorable conditions for their operations during wartime. Defensive counter-air training aims to block the enemy's infiltration into the nation's airspace. The training utilizes simulated enemy aircrafts which employ enemy infiltration tactics, in order to detect, identify, intercept and destroy, from a long distance, any enemy aircraft intruding by air, with the participation of interceptors and air defense artillery units. Offensive counter-air training and air interdiction training are designed to annihilate the enemy's military force and its will to fight. The training includes the ROK Air Force's independent or Combined Large Force Exercise (CLFE) and ground-to-ground deep strike training against tactical targets. To enhance the ability to respond to critical targets on a real-time basis, the Air Force conducts emergency air interdiction training. For the purpose of supporting ground and naval forces, close air support training is carried out through the use of fighters and night-vision devices that enable all-weather precision attacks. Daytime/nighttime close air support and anti-ship attack trainings are conducted against simulated targets on the ground and in the sea. In addition, joint actual bombing, nighttime bombing and precision-guided weapons trainings are implemented to enhance practical attack capabilities. ![78_image_0.png](78_image_0.png) the Seohae Grand Bridge ![78_image_1.png](78_image_1.png) ## D. Marine Corps Under the objective of instilling an unflinching Marine Corps spirit in the minds of soldiers and nurturing invincible elite combatants, the ROK Marine Corps places the focus of its training on implementing the four core tasks of mental armament, cultivation of physical strength for war fighting, enhancement of combat firing skills and improvement of NBC capabilities. Maximized training effects are generated through execution of scientific training and combat taskoriented war-like training applying simulated maneuver/observation equipment and war game models of different echelons. At the same time, the Marine Corps is enhancing its integrated combat capabilities based on air-ground-sea joint training, corps-level field training exercises, combined ground training and combined/joint amphibious training. ![79_image_0.png](79_image_0.png) As part of the effort to manage national defense resources in an efficient manner, industrialized nations around the world are gradually increasing the ratio of their reserve forces, maintaining only the critical number of standing armed force. It is plausible that potential future war on the Korean peninsula will be an all-out war where all available national resources are mobilized. Therefore, efficient management of the reserve forces will serve as a decisive factor in gaining victory in war. Considering its limited defense resources and the existing mobilization environment, the ROK military has established an effective wartime mobilization posture and bolstered homeland defense operations capabilities so as to secure elite reserve forces in concert with the direction of the construction of its standing armed forces. At the same time, the military carries out mobilization by stressing enhancement of the management of reserve resources and development of reservist training/education. ## Wartime Mobilization Posture A. Manpower Mobilization Manpower mobilization includes military force mobilization, wartime labor service mobilization, technician mobilization, etc. Military force mobilization refers to mobilizing necessary personnel to be utilized as combatants in military units for expansion of military units (enlargement or creation) or compensation for losses incurred, in the event of war, contingency or declaration of a mobilization order. As regards military force mobilization, which constitutes an integral part of manpower mobilization, the ROK military consistently seeks to improve the system of resource management and mobilized military force transportation/control to ensure efficiency in wartime military personnel mobilization. Wartime labor service mobilization refers to mobilizing personnel to perform labor including transport of military supplies and ammunitions in order to support military operations. For efficient management and operation of wartime labor mobilization, the "Wartime Labor Service Mobilization Management Regulations" were formulated. The Regulations sets out procedures for relevant affairs and integrates wartime labor service providers, who were separately managed by individual mobilizing units, into wartime labor service units to guarantee flexible management. Technician mobilization involves mobilizing persons with certain technical qualifications for equipment operation or maintenance. Originally, persons with 235 types of national technical qualifications and licenses were subject to technician mobilization. Currently, the ROK military is pursuing additional inclusions in technical mobilization of more than 30 types of advanced qualifications and licenses related to new technology and "informatization." ## B. Material Mobilization The objective of material mobilization is to back up military operations and ensure sustainable war fighting capabilities by mobilizing such resources as commodities, equipment, facilities and entities held by the civilian sector and government at the right time and place. Material mobilization is classified into industrial mobilization, transportation mobilization, construction mobilization, communication mobilization, etc., depending on the targeted resources of mobilization. Industrial mobilization refers to mobilization of items required by the military in the form of food, clothing, oil, fortification materials, etc., from production and maintenance companies, public relations media, hospitals and so forth. The MND is devising measures to relax military requirements for the utilization of goods produced for civilian use as substitutes. In a bid to enable efficient management of mobilization resources, the Ministry operates an expanded industrial mobilization information system accessible by related military echelons and organizations. Transportation mobilization means "mobilization for use" or "management on control" of such transport equipment as automobiles, ships and airplanes as well as maintenance, transport and loading/unloading service providers which the ROK military needs in the event of a contingency. For timely Mobilization for use : Mobilization for use for a certain period of time to be restored to the original owner upon termination of mobilization; applicable to equipment mobilization. Management on control : Controlling the steps of production, repair, processing and distribution to attain the purposes of mobilization, with autonomy of relevant companies guaranteed in non-controlled areas; applicable to company mobilization, etc. mobilization, the ROK military has adopted improved mobilization methods including mobilization of substitute vehicles to cover partial shortage of vehicles and expansion of the scope of potential substitute vehicles by type in areas with insufficient resources. Construction mobilization refers to "mobilization for use" or "management on control" of buildings, land, construction machinery, construction equipment maintenance service providers and construction companies that are required by the ROK military. In order to shorten the time spent for mobilization, the military has improved the current mobilization system, authorizing replacement of any deficient equipment in a city or province with similar equipment. Communication mobilization means "mobilization for use" or "management on control" of ordinary (domestic and international) communication/satellite communication lines and IT service providers. It aims at ensuring successful military operations by providing swift support to military communication networks during war. ## Homeland Defense Operation Posture Homeland defense operations are integrated civilian-government-military operations conducted by mobilizing the Reserve Forces with a view to eliminate enemy infiltrators in certain areas at the earliest possible time and to guard critical facilities and logistical supply lines, both in times of peace and war. ![81_image_0.png](81_image_0.png) O Reservists participating in counter-infiltration exercises Since its creation on April 1, 1968, the ROK Reserve Forces have killed 85 North Korean spies and armed infiltrators and captured 14 during the last three decades, based on mobilization of approximately 4 million reservists on 89 occasions. The Reserve Forces pursue stepby-step modernization of combat equipment and complementation of homeland defense supplies to enhance homeland defense operation capabilities in peace and war times. In addition, the "Rules on Nurturing and Support of the Homeland Reserve Forces" was enacted and enforced to lay an institutional basis that ensures appropriate support for homeland defense operations. The Rules provides for the responsibilities and details of support by each entity fostering the Reserve Forces, formulation of systematic nurturing plans and the procedures of handling relevant affairs. ## Reserve Force Resource Management ![82_Image_0.Png](82_Image_0.Png) Regional reserve units, which play a central role in managing reserve resources in relevant areas and conducting homeland defense operations, are organized into units at the level of the administrative districts of eup, myeon and dong around the nation. At the level of si, gun and gu, separate mobile units remain in operation. Workforce reserve units range from brigades to squads, depending on the size of reservist resources at relevant workplaces. The head of ordinary workplaces, which have reservist resources of a company or a higher level, as well as the institutions and facilities integral to national security, which have reservist resources of a squad or higher level, are required to organize reserve units. Recently, online reservist resource management and daily settlement systems were established to coordinate the functions of the regional offices of the Military Manpower Administration and reserve units. Thus, the regional offices are able to provide reserve units at each level with information regarding the status of reservist resources, transfers, and departees/returnees from the country, in addition to various electric lists (18 types) necessary for reservist resource management including those newly enlisted into the reserve service or subject to any personal status changes. This has substantially increased the efficiency of related functions. ![82_image_1.png](82_image_1.png) ## Reserve Force Education And Training Education and training of the ROK Reserve Forces are conducted for the purpose of "promoting proficiency in mobilization procedures and guaranteeing high-level combat capabilities after mobilization" and ## Defense White Paper 2004 જર "nurturing homeland defense operation capabilities" Assuring that no impediment results to reservists' livelihood, the MND has constantly improved their training system by introducing more sophisticated and intensified programs so that reservists can rapidly realize their combat capabilities. Reservists discharged from active military service no more than a year ago, who has been subject to only a four-hour-a-year call-up inspection training in the past, are now included in the targets of mobilization training. The period of mobilization training was shortened from three nights and four days to two nights and three days. In addition, exemption from training, which only those in their eighth year of reserve service enjoyed in the past, now applies to those in their seventh year of reserve service as well. This has alleviated the burden of compulsory military service on the populace. As part of institutional improvements to improve overall combat capabilities, mobilization training has been conducted, with designated mobilizing units maintained. Table 3-7 below shows annual training hours for reservists by type of training. Defense White Paper 2004 ![83_image_0.png](83_image_0.png) | [Table 3-7] Reserve Force Training Period | (Unit: Hours) | | | | | |---------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------|---------------|---------|----| | | Basic | Homeland | | | | | | Non- | | | | | | Mobilization | Homeland | Defense | Call-up | Reserve | | | Classification | Total | Mobilization | | | | | Training | Defense | Operation | Inspection | Hours | | | | Training | Training | Plan Training | | | | Persons newly discharged | | | | | | | from active service | 100 | 100 | | | | | (cadres, soldiers) | | | | | | | 1ª to | Appointees for | 28 (2 nights | | | | | 100 | 72 | | | | | | & 3 days) | | | | | | | 4e year | Mobilization | | | | | | of | Non- | | | | | | reserve | Appointees for 100 | 24 | 12 | 64 | | | service | Mobilization | | | | | | Soldiers | 5th to 6th year | | | | | | (Appointees for | 68 | 8(8) | 12(6) | (4) | 48 | | Mobilization) | | | | | | | 7th to 8th year | ରେ | 68 | | | | | Appointees for | 28 (2 nights | | | | | | 100 | 72 | | | | | | Mobilization | & 3 days) | 28 (2 nights | | | | | Officers | 100 | 72 | | | | | 1 ª to | Non- | & 3 days) | | | | | 6th | Appoin- | | | | | | Cadres | year | tees for | Non- | | | | Mobili- | Commissioned | 100 | 24 | 12 | 64 | | zation | Officers | | | | | | 7" to 8" year | 68 | ୧୫ | | | | Defense White Paper 2004 The method of summoning reservists for training was improved based on adoption of a web-based notification system. All reservists other than those subject to mobilization training are now allowed to select the time and place of their training. To conduct training in a "war-like" atmosphere and satisfy the needs of new-generation trainees, training methods applying MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) and survival game devices are being developed and utilized. ## A. Mobilization Training Mobilization training targets reservist resources in their first to fourth year of reserve service who are subject to mobilization into military units. On the basis of wartime missions, this training focuses on exercises to bolster mastery of military unit expansion/creation procedures, perform relevant duties at individual and team levels, and execute wartime operation plans. ## B. Non-Mobilization Training Non-mobilization training targets reservists in their first to fourth year of reserve service who are not appointees for mobilization as well as those who failed to participate in mobilization training. By focusing on military branch/specialty training, it enables trainees to perform their duties properly as resources to compensate for losses, when they are called into military units in wartime. At the same time, "war-like" training is being conducted through an improvement in training methods. For instance, reservists who completed active service in the Army are sent to the relevant military branch of the Army for training. Reservists who served in the Navy or Air Force on active duty are also trained in the relevant military units. ## C. Homeland Defense Training Homeland defense training is classified into basic homeland defense training and homeland defense operation plan training. Basic homeland defense training is conducted for reservists in their fifth to sixth year of reserve service. It stresses the enhancement of the ability to carry out homeland defense operations by selecting tasks essential to the execution of military missions and allowing trainees to master required tasks. Homeland defense operation plan training targets reservists who are not appointees for mobilization among the reserve resources in their first to fourth year of reserve service, reservists in their fifth to sixth year of reserve service, and non-commissioned officer resources in their first to sixth year of reserve service who are not appointees for mobilization. Focusing upon promoting proficiency in procedures to implement homeland defense operation plans, the training is conducted twice a year, i.e. once in the first and second half respectively. Under the control of the commander of a local operational unit, integrated civilian-government-military exercises are conducted in each region in alignment with the Foal Eagle Exercise and Hwarang Exercise. Chapter Status and Tasks of the ROK National Defense ![87_image_0.png](87_image_0.png) Section 1 Concept and Direction of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense Section 2 ![87_image_1.png](87_image_1.png) Future-Oriented Development of the ROK-US Alliance Section 3 ![87_image_2.png](87_image_2.png) Promotion of Foreign Military Relations Section 4 ![87_image_3.png](87_image_3.png) Reduction of Tension and Establishment of a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula Section 5 ![87_image_4.png](87_image_4.png) Establishment of Self-Reliant Defense Capabilities Section 6 ![87_image_5.png](87_image_5.png) Promotion of Welfare to Improve the "Quality of Life" of Service Members Section 7 ![87_image_6.png](87_image_6.png) Mid-Term Defense Plan and Defense Budget ## Section 1. Concept And Direction Of # Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense A cooperative self-reliant defense represents the development of a mutually complementary ROK-US alliance on the basis of "selfreliant defense capabilities" of the ROK. The ROK government has designated "concurrent development of the ROK-US alliance and self-defense" as one of the three strategic tasks of national security, converging all available national resources toward that end. Accordingly, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has formulated the "cooperative self-reliant defense plan" that enables fulfillment of the president's strategic guidelines. The MND has been concentrating its efforts on increasing self-reliant defense capabilities in line with future-oriented development of the ROK-US alliance. ## Background And Concept ![88_Image_0.Png](88_Image_0.Png) A. Background Of The Pursuit Of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense Since its foundation, the ROK military has maintained a steadfast the ROK-US alliance. It consistently endeavors to realize "self-reliant defense" capabilities by employing different methods of varying magnitudes in accordance with changes in domestic and overseas circumstances including the security environment, available defense resources and the level of public interest. Seoul started its endeavors toward self-defense on a full scale from 1971 when the size of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) was being scaled down amidst intensifying tension on the Korean peninsula. This was triggered by a rapid military build-up by Pyongyang under its "Four-point Military Guidelines", a surprise-attack attempt against the presidential office of Cheongwadae by North Korean armed agents and North Korea's capture of Strategic tasks : vital, pressing top priority security issues and tasks related to the attainment of national security goals being pursued by the Participatory Government in order to produce tangible outcomes during its tenure. the USS Pueblo, a US Navy intelligence ship in 1968. Since then, the ROK military has secured basic defensive capabilities and bolstered the operational competence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by consistently implementing the Yulgok Project until the early 1990s under the banner of strengthening its self-defense. It has made remarkable progress in terms of strengthening of defense capability, enhancement of operational capabilities and development of a combined command system as demonstrated by the fact that it took over the peacetime Operational Control Authority (OCA) in 1994. However, the economic distress of crisis proportions since the late 1990s has pointed the nation's military expenditures on a downward trend. North Korea's military threats arising from such asymmetric capabilities as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) grew at the same time. Thus, the South still fails to possess sufficient military power to seize the initiative in deterring the North. This results in security vulnerabilities as evidenced by the fact that a perceived change in the ROK- US alliance has touched off a sense of insecurity in some sectors of society. In the face of rising public expectations about the development of the ROK- US alliance commensurate with the elevated stature of the ROK, the need to expand the role of defense by the ROK Armed Forces is increasing in order to aggressively meet the changes and new challenges in the security environment including North Korea's nuclear development and USFK readjustment. Pursuit of the cooperative self-reliant defense by the Participatory Government is an expression of the country's determination to become an autonomous party as regards security on the Korean peninsula by responding to the call of the times and living up to the expectations of its populace. President Roh Moo-hyun officially espoused such policy in the congratulatory address marking the liberation of the Korean peninsula from Japanese colonial rule on August 15, 2003 and also in a speech on the ROK Armed Forces Day. ![89_image_0.png](89_image_0.png) in the congratulatory speech on August 15 National Liberation Day : "During my remaining term of office, I intend to help lay a firm foundation for our armed forces to be fully equipped with self-reliant national defense capabilities within the next 10 years." ## Defense White Paper 2004 93 B. Concept Of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense The fundamental concept of cooperative self-reliant defense is that ROK should retain the ability and mechanism to take responsibility for deterring any potential provocation by North Korea and repulsing any actual provocation, while further developing the ROK-US alliance as well as pursuing external security cooperation including military cooperation with neighboring countries and the establishment of a collective security system. [Figure 4-1] Concept of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense ![90_image_0.png](90_image_0.png) ## C. Significance Of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense (1) Self-Reliant Defense As A Universal Defense Policy All sovereign states pursue the assurance of their national security and protection/promotion of their national interests as their foremost goal. Selfreliant defense is aimed at developing the ability to accomplish such goal. Accordingly, all the countries around the world are espousing, as their basic defense policy, self-reliant national defense intended to foster competences to defend themselves from various security threats. For instance, countries that are maintaining alliances or close cooperative security ties with the US such as Japan, Taiwan, Australia and Canada are in pursuit of self-reliant defense as the fundamental direction of their defense policies. They explicitly state the Defense White Paper 2004 ![91_image_0.png](91_image_0.png) ![91_image_1.png](91_image_1.png) policy pursued by all countries in the world. For ROK, its self-defense policy represents its firm determination to become a self-reliant country that can safeguard national sovereignty on its own. ## (2) Utilization Of International Cooperative Relations As A Major Vehicle To Guarantee Security In modern times, self-reliant defense is synonymous with "cooperative selfreliant defense" that takes advantage of international cooperative relations as major measures for safeguarding security. Self-reliant defense pursued by ROK is a concept encompassing the development of self-reliant defense capabilities as well as promotion of security cooperation. In today's environment where cooperation and interdependence among countries are deepening, it is impossible for a country to perfectly defend its security only with its own capabilities. Even US, the only superpower in the world, is aggressively taking advantage of alliances or security cooperation with many other countries. Under the slogan of self-reliant defense, Switzerland and Austria, which are countries with permanent neutral status, are also maintaining and furthering close cooperation with NATO. In modern society, countries are establishing a multi-layered defense posture based on security cooperation in various forms, in addition to the efforts to secure self-reliant defense capabilities. ## (3) Maintenance And Development Of A Solid Rok-Us Alliance As A Prerequisite Given the geographic and strategic circumstances of the ROK, it is a lesson learnt from the history that an "alliance strategy" is indispensable to ensure security for the nation. Considering the security environment in Northeast Asia fraught with uncertainties as well as presence of its neighboring powers, security assurance and protection of national interests of this country can be very limited when relying on its independent capabilities. In this respect, US has been the most important partner of the ROK for the past five decades in terms of political, diplomatic, economic and technological cooperation. On the basis of the ROK-US alliance, the two countries have shared the values of "free democracy" and a "market economy" in pursuit of common security interests. Maintenance and development of the alliance with US will serve as a core factor in the process of establishing a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and achieving unification as well as in ensuring ROK's survival and prosperity after the accomplishment of unification. Accordingly, cooperative self-reliant defense constitutes a process to develop absolute security capabilities of the ROK and promote stability by cementing the ROK-US alliance on the basis of "self-reliant defense capabilities" and by stepping up security cooperation with neighboring countries. ## Objective And Direction According to the strategic guidelines put forward by President Roh Moohyun, the ROK MND formulated "cooperative self-reliant defense plan" with a view to "lay the groundwork for self-reliant national defense within the tenure of the Participatory Government"and reported such plan to the president on November 6, 2004. The MND has already established a basic initiative and plan for "self-reliant defense" in May and July 2003. The lately formulated "cooperative selfreliant defense plan" is an upgraded form of the existing plan, based on additional guidelines set by the president according to the changing defense environment including the dispatch to Iraq of some American forces stationed in ROK during May and June of 2004 and planned scale-down of the American military presence in ROK. Major details of "cooperative self-reliant defense plan" are largely divided into "future-oriented development of the ROK-US alliance", "early expansion of war deterrence capabilities" and "military restructuring and defense reforms". Among other details of the plan are defense budget requirements to attain the three objectives stated above. ![93_image_0.png](93_image_0.png) ## A. Future-Oriented Development Of The Rok-Us Alliance "Future-oriented development of the ROK-US alliance" refers to the furtherance of the alliance that has decisively contributed to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula as the basic axis of the ROK's security, in line with recent changes in the strategic environment. Towards that end, the MND has sought efficient readjustment of the USFK including the ongoing relocation of the USFK Yongsan Garrison, redeployment of the 2nd Infantry Division, transfer of the 10 major military missions to the ROK Armed Forces, and reduction of the USFK manpower. It also laid down various plans to develop the ROK-US alliance into a comprehensive and dynamic alliance for a long-term perspective. In particular, the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison is to be completed by 2008. In regards to the redeployment of the 2nd Infantry Division, small bases north of the Han River will be integrated into the Dongducheon/Euijeongbu area by 2006 in stage one, while core units will be moved to Pyeongtaek in stage two. Implementation of stage two will be determined based on consultations between the leaderships of the two countries, with the security landscape on the Korean peninsula taken into consideration. Among the 10 major military missions performed by the USFK, the missions of guarding the JSA (Joint Security Area) and conducting rear area decontamination operations have already been handed over to the ROK military. During the period from 2005 to 2006, seven missions including rapid landmine installation, air-to-ground shooting range management and daytime/nighttime search and rescue operations will be assumed by the ROK Armed Forces in phases. In the meantime, possible transfer of the mission to carry out counter-fire operations will be determined according to the assessment of the ROK military's capabilities in August 2005. Concerning the downsizing of the USFK, the American military presence will be reduced by 12,500 troops by 2008 in three stages, on the basis of mutual consultations. In their consultations, the two countries will place the emphasis on the goals and visions of their alliance, stature and role of the USFK, and development of the ROK-US command structure through the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) that replaces the existing Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) for comprehensive and dynamic development of their alliance. The MND anticipates that implementation of these plans will help promote a sense of pride among the Koreans and create conditions conducive to stable, long-term stationing of the USFK. Furthermore, the MND believes that the execution of the plans will pave the way for creation of a new ROK-US alliance appropriate for the changing security landscape within the remaining term of the Participatory Government, while enabling the ROK military to play a leading role in defending the nation. ![94_image_0.png](94_image_0.png) ![94_image_1.png](94_image_1.png) ![94_image_6.png](94_image_6.png) ![94_image_2.png](94_image_2.png) ![94_image_3.png](94_image_3.png) ![94_image_4.png](94_image_4.png) ![94_image_5.png](94_image_5.png) ![94_image_7.png](94_image_7.png) ![94_image_8.png](94_image_8.png) ![94_image_9.png](94_image_9.png) ![94_image_10.png](94_image_10.png) ![94_image_11.png](94_image_11.png) ![94_image_12.png](94_image_12.png) ![94_image_13.png](94_image_13.png) ![94_image_14.png](94_image_14.png) ![94_image_15.png](94_image_15.png) ## B. Early Expansion Of War Deterrence Capability "Early expansion of war deterrence capability" means establishing military capabilities that can deter threats from North Korea at the earliest possible date in consideration of the existing security environment of South Korea, which is confronted with perennial threats from the communist North. It also means laying the foundation of substantive self-defense posture by gradually securing the core forces required to combat unspecified threats of the future. To achieve this goal, the focus of the construction of the military force is placed on setting up the so-called "Sensor to Shooter" system which enables locating targets on a real-time basis, prompt decision-making (C4I) and executing strikes against targets to properly cope with the characteristics of future wars. To be specific, the ROK Armed Forces has developed and examined various plans for the following objectives: "advancing the ability of independent surveillance and reconnaissance" that allows control of the entire Korean peninsula; "establishing real-time Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems" encompassing all military echelons ranging from tactical to strategic echelons; and "consolidating the ability to conduct strategic strikes against deep targets". Based on these plans, the ROK military continuously generates concrete measures to secure essential force requirements. With respect to the reserve forces, the ROK military has decided to reinforce its response capabilities against North Korean special operation units by revamping relevant laws and organizations and procuring materials essential to homeland defense at the earliest possible date. It will also solidify its basic forces by upgrading outdated/superannuated equipment and securing alternative forces. In addition, the ROK military ![95_image_0.png](95_image_0.png) Defense White Paper 2004 intends to consolidate the foundation of its R&D and defense industry. The nation currently ranks about the 10th in the world in terms of the technological ability to develop advanced weaponry. The ROK MND's plan addresses the country's efforts to join the ranks of industrialized nations by 2010. If these proposed measures are implemented as planned, it is anticipated that the ROK military will possess a substantial level of war deterrence capability by 2008, laying the cornerstone for seizing the initiative to defend the Korean peninsula. ## C. Military Restructuring And Defense Reform "Military restructuring and defense reform" denote taking a series of actions to develop the ROK military into an efficient elite force suitable for future warfare by diagnosing and addressing its vulnerabilities. Among the major details of such initiative is the establishment of a war fighting system centered on the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff both in name and substance, by improving its war planning and operational capabilities and strengthening the authority of its chairman. For such purposes, the ROK Armed Forces are exploring the possibility of bolstering the functions and organizational structure of the JCS in order to establish an independent war fighting organization. the ROK military is also examining ways to expand the JCS chairman's authority to engage in personnel management in an effort to secure high-quality human resources and enhance teamwork. In addition, the ROK military will upgrade its manpower-intensive force structure into a structure suitable for future warfare by adjusting the size of its forces in phases in consideration of the defense and security conditions. Based on pursuit of the so-called "civilian-led control", it will also overhaul the existing organizational structure at the MND Headquarters gradually to strengthen the functionality of the headquarters. Thus, the ROK Armed Forces will ensure harmonious alignment of national and defense policies, coordinate interests of individual Services, and strengthen cooperative ties among the pertinent government agencies. Furthermore, the ROK military will develop plans for the balanced development of each Service, creating conditions to display integrated capabilities and maximize military teamwork. It will also work to improve defense acquisition and management system including establishment of the National Defense Procurement Agency to ensure professionalism, accountability, transparency and consistency regarding procurement-related affairs. By moving forward with such military restructuring and defense reforms, the ROK Armed Forces will be able to leverage its efforts for a takeoff towards advanced national defense, which will enhance its capability to brace for future wars. ## Future Plans ![97_Image_0.Png](97_Image_0.Png) ![97_Image_1.Png](97_Image_1.Png) A. Defense Budget Securing And Allocation It is expected that smooth execution of the "cooperative self-reliant defense" will require about 99 trillion won during the next 4 years (2005~2008). The MND projects that an annual increase in the national defense budget is necessary to procure such financial resources. In consideration of the conditions of the national economy, the MND will engage in close consultations with the other government agencies to raise the defense expenditure in stages, so that an amount at the 3.2% level of GDP can be appropriated for national defense by 2008. This means that the defense budget must be increased each year at the rate of approximately 11%. In addition, the MND will make an upward adjustment in the ratio of its "force investments"(investments for substantive force improvement) to overall defense expenditures from 33.2% in 2004 to 37.5% in 2008. By contrast, it will reduce the relative ratio of ordinary operating expenses. In terms of asset allocation priorities, the force investments will be concentrated on establishment of an independent surveillance and reconnaissance system, development of deep strike capabilities, enhancement of basic forces and strengthening of R&D capabilities. Concerning ordinary operating expenses, the MND will funnel its resources into raising servicemen's morale and improving their welfare to facilitate the implementation of "cooperative self-reliant defense plan." ## B. Implementation Of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense Plan To execute "cooperative self-reliant defense plan", the MND sets its overall goals, direction and guidelines as well as its outlined implementation schedule, based on areas which it will formulate more detailed action plans . In addition, an "implementation committee" chaired by the deputy minister, will be established to examine the status of the execution of the plan and perform progress assessments on a regular basis. These efforts will guarantee the effective execution of "cooperative self-reliant defense plan." The MND is committed to laying a firm foundation for the cooperative selfreliant defense within the remaining term of the Participatory Government by consistently pushing ahead with the plan, fully reflecting such plan in formulating various planning and policy documents including the "National Defense Policy" and "Mid-Term Defense Plan." ![99_image_0.png](99_image_0.png) ![99_image_1.png](99_image_1.png) Built on the legal foundation of the "ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty" concluded on October 1, 1953, the ROK-US alliance has remained the bedrock of ROK's security for the past half a century. The alliance has played a pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, while advancing ROK's national development including the promotion of democracy and economic growth. However, the alliance is facing fresh challenges amidst the rapidly changing internal and external security environment of the post-Cold War era. Internally, there have been dramatic advances in inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation since the inter-Korean Summit in 2000. Against this backdrop, multi-pronged efforts have been made to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula toward reconciliation and cooperation. Externally, the global security environment has become increasingly complicated as evidenced by the emergence of transnational/non-military threats, not the same as traditional threats, since the September 11 terrorist attack. Especially, US, which sustained direct damage from the terrorist attack, must carry out wide-ranging strategic missions, while at the same time including homeland defense and the war on terrorism. Thus, US has been employing new strategic concepts through military transformation and Global Defense Posture Review (GPR). Along with such changes in the domestic and overseas security environment, public expectations about the ROK-US alliance, the pillar of security on the Korean peninsula, are changing by the call of the times. In 2004, the two countries made more vigorous efforts than ever to aggressively cope with such situation. In 2004, ROK and US consistently pursued the "Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA)" consultations launched in April 2003. Thus, the two nations strove to scrutinize outstanding issues between them to facilitate future-oriented development of the alliance. Managing security on the Korean peninsula in a stable manner to achieve a qualitative improvement of the combined forces, the two countries successfully paved the way to enhance major components of their alliance by relocating the USFK Yongsan Garrison and readjusting the size of the USFK manpower. In sum, 2004 was a historic watershed year to look back on the past five decades of the ROK-US alliance and gear up for a futureoriented ROK-US alliance. Now, the alliance will change and transform itself into a "comprehensive and dynamic alliance" encompassing not only military issues, but also political, economic, social and other matters, in concert with the "cooperative selfdefense" being pursued by ROK. Strengthening of ROK-US Security Cooperation and Combined Defense System ![100_image_0.png](100_image_0.png) ## A. Change In Us Security Strategies And Implications On ![100_Image_1.Png](100_Image_1.Png) O ROK-US summit on the sidelines of the APEC in 2004 the ROK-US Alliance According to changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, US has moved from "threat-based" to "capability-based" approach to strategic defense planning, focusing more on what portfolio of capabilities it will need to swiftly counter various forms of threats rather than who might be a threat to US. In other words, US has modified its existing win-win strategy (winning two major wars at the same time while reinforcing its homeland defense capabilities) to the strategy of defeating an enemy in one theater and deterring an enemy attack in another. In addition, the country has shifted to a concept of not tolerating any challenge to its military superiority and nip uncertain threats in the bud. In order to accomplish such conceptual security strategy, US has introduced sweeping modifications and improvements in its alliance strategies, millitary strategy concepts, defense readiness, and military structure that it has retained since World War II. At the same time, the country is pursuing the establishment of a sophisticated force with improved mobility and lighter equipment through "transformation", while pressing for repositioning of its military bases around the globe. According to its shift from the traditional concept of "fixed, positional bases" to "flexible, mobile bases" enabling rapid military deployment at any required time and place, US is restructuring its forces stationed abroad and readjusting the system of its overseas military bases. Under these circumstances, readjustment of the USFK is being pursued as well. Based on its strategy to proactively take advantage of the changing US global strategies, the ROK government is managing peace, prosperity and security on the Korean peninsula in a stable manner. At the same time, it is seeking a future-oriented development of the ROK-US alliance in line with progress in inter-Korean relations. ## B. Security Consultative Meeting (Scm) North Korea's attempted armed commando raid on the ROK presidential office of Cheongwadae and capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968 prompted ROK and US to set up the "SCM" Designed to assess the security situation on the Korean peninsula and devise relevant measures, the SCM has been held on an annual basis in the two countries alternately. The SCM is the highest-level security consultative body between the two countries where their diplomatic and security officials participate with their defense ministers as the chief delegates. As delegated by the NCMA of the respective nation, the SCM delivers strategic guidelines to the MC. Under the control of the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the two countries, the MC issues strategic directives and operational guidelines and assigns duties to the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC). The SCM has been performing the core functions of a substantive policy consultative body. It finds solutions to major pending security issues between the two countries based on mutual consultations and explores the direction of long-term development of their bilateral military relations. In the 36th SCM held in Washington last year, it was reaffirmed that US remains fully committed to security on the Korean peninsula. The two parties SCM (Security Consultative Meeting) : This annual consultative body comprising the defense ministers of the two countries was established to discuss and resolve major security issues in the wake of North Korea's attempted attack on Cheongwadae and seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968. With thediscussion of the potential withdrawl of the US 7th Division in 1971, the SCM was upgraded into a full-fledged security consultative body both in name and substance involving highranking diplomatic and defense officials of the two countries. MC (Military Committee) : In the 10th SCM in July 1977, the two sides agreed to create the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) and organize the Military Committee that would issue strategic directives and operational guidelines to the CFC. The Committee is a body superior to the CFC. also examined mutual agreements including the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison. In addition, they evaluated successful outcomes of mutual security cooperation including ROK's dispatch of forces to Iraq for peacekeeping and post-war reconstruction operations. They also engaged in in-depth discussions about the direction of future cooperation. [Figure 4-2] ROK-US Security Cooperation and Combined Command System ![102_image_0.png](102_image_0.png) ## C. Rok-Us Combined Defense System The CFC was set up in November 1978 to operate the ROK-US combined defense system. Basically, the purpose of the ROK-US combined defense system is to deter war on the Korean peninsula and implement effective combined operations in the event of a contingency, based on the integrated operation of the military capabilities of the two nations. Accordingly, the CFC exercises the "operational control" of designated ROK military units that was exercised by the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command after the Korean War. With the "peacetime operational control" being handed over to the ROK military in December 1994, the CFC now exercises "CODA" and "wartime operational control" only. CODA: Combined Delegated Authority The CFC updates operational plans and reviews/complements crisis management systems in order to control transitional security situations in a stable fashion. At the same time, it constantly pursues verification of the preplanned systems' viability through various exercises including the UFL and RSOI, maintaining the highest-level of combined defense posture. In 2004, the CFC computerized its theater intelligence collection and management system to enhance early warning capabilities on the Korean peninsula. In addition, it improved the interoperability of the ROK-US C4I system in a bid to substantively advance the combined defense system. In thefuture, the ROK-US combined defense system will be developed into a stronger and more efficient modern defense system in tandem with a shift of focus from ordinary forces to advanced forces through a reduction of USFK manpower and military modernization as well as the force improvement by the ROK military. ## Establishment Of The Foundation ![103_Image_0.Png](103_Image_0.Png) For The Development Of The Rok-Us Alliance Seoul and Washington reached a consensus that it was imperative to develop the Alliance commensurate with the changing security environment. Thus, they pushed for the "FOTA" talks as agreed by ROK Minister of National Defense and US Secretary of Defense at the 34th SCM in 2002. High on the agenda in the FOTA talks were relocation of the Yongsan Garrison, redeployment of the 2nd US Infantry Division, further development of combined military capabilities, reassignment of military duties and research into the ROK-US command relations. Since its first meeting in April 2003, a total of 12 sessions were held by September 2004. Based on these consultations, the two sides worked out the UA/IA and the revised LPP. By pursuing the "FOTA", the two countries laid the foundation for futureoriented development of their alliance. ## A. Relocation Of The Yongsan Garrison The project to relocate the USFK Yongsan Garrison was implemented based on the signing of the relevant MOA/MOU in June 1990. During the process, the Yongsan Golf Course was returned to ROK in 1992. However, the project has been virtually put on hold since June 1993 because of the excessive relocation expenses. In December 2001, the project was put under reexamination due to the controversial construction of apartment buildings for UA (Umbrella Agreement) : This document takes the form of a treaty outlining the principles, sites and costs of the Yongsan Garrison relocation. It consists of a preamble and 8 articles. IA (Implementing Agreement) : This document is also in the form of a treaty stipulating details necessary to the implementation of the Yongsan Garrison relocation plan. It consists of a recital and 7 articles. LPP (Land Partnership Plan) : During the 33rd SCM (Nov. 15, 2001), ROK and US signed a letter of intent on LPP, which was ratified by the ROK National Assembly at its plenary session on October 31, 2002. the US servicemen in the Yongsan Garrison. In March 2002, the two countries organized the "Committee for the Relocation of the Yongsan Garrison", embarking upon consultations to proceed with the project once again. ![104_image_0.png](104_image_0.png) At the ROK-US summit held in May 2003 after the inauguration of the Participatory Government, an agreement was hammered out on the principle of early relocation of the Yongsan Garrison. Accordingly, the two countries embarked on close working-level negotiations pertinent to the issue. Based on such negotiations, ROK and USdecided to relocate the Yongsan Garrison including the UNC/CFC to the Pyeongtaek area by the end of 2008. They also signed the UA and IA, whichsuperceded the 1990 MOA and MOU. With the ratification of the UA and IA by the ROK National Assembly on December 17, 2004, the MND started to implement the Yongsan Garrison relocation project in full scale. The two sides adopted the UA and IA by dramatically improving disputable provisions in the 1990 MOA and MOU including those provisions in potential violation of the ROK Constitution. Relocation of the Yongsan Garrison is very meaningful because it fulfills the Korean people's long-awaited yearning to reclaim the base, contributes to balanced development of the center ofSeoul, and redresses long-standing complaints from residents living near the base. From the standpoint of the USFK, the relocation will provide a basis to increase combined defense capabilities, based on improvement of its working environment including replacement of aged facilities. | [Table 4-3] Major Improvements in the 1990 MOA/MOU | | | |------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------| | | 1990 MOA/MOU | UA/IA | | | - Treaty (UA) and SOFA | | | - Document of the SOFA | document (IA) | | | Possible Violation | Joint Committee | - Ratified by the National | | of the ROK | - No ratification procedures | Assembly (provisions on | | Constitution | undertaken by the National | bearing of financial burdens | | Assembly | included in the UA) | | | - ROK's compensation for | | | | operating losses of USFK | | | | welfare/convenience | | | | Disputable | - ROK's assumption of no liability | | | facilities | | | | Provisions | explicitly stated | | | - ROK's liability for non- | | | | SOFA claims explicitly | | | | stated | - Payment of relocation costs | | | - Lack of any control | | | | Relocation Cost | after verification (elimination of | | | mechanism regarding | | | | Control Mechanism | the controversy over "carte | | | relocation costs | blanche" cost coverage) | | | - Coverage of all facility- | - Provision of all facility/ moving | | | Payment in Cash | related expenses and | expenses in kind stated | | and in Kind | payment of moving | explicitly | | expenses in cash | - Execution of joint environmental | | | Provisions on | surveys/relief procedures, and | | | Environment and | - Lack of relevant | cooperation to mutually | | Cooperation with | provisions | coordinate the relocation plan | | Local Governments | and regional development | | | | - Retrieval upon relocation of the | | | Relocation of the US | - Not subject to the | Yongsan Garrison according to | | Embassy Facilities | MOA/MOU (to remain | the agreement between the | | into the Yongsan | intact) | government agencies in charge | | Garrison | of foreign affairs | | SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) : Military cooperation and alliances among different nations enable brisk dispatch and reception of military forces. Accordingly, SOFAs have been signed between dispatching countries and host nations in order to set forth matters related to stationing of foreign forces. To define the legal status of the ROK forces dispatched to Iraq, ROK signed a SOFA with Kuwait in April 2003. ## B. Redeployment Of The 2Nd Us Infantry Division Primarily deployed around the northern part of Gyeonggi Province, the US 2nd Infantry Division has performed its given missions in an outstanding manner. However, changing unit operation concepts of US according to its new military strategies, desire to eliminate inconveniences inflicted upon local Korean citizens, and the pursuit of a balanced development of the nation, necessitated the rearrangement of the Division. In order to meet such needs, Seoul and Washington forged an agreement to "cautiously pursue redeployment of the Division in consideration of political, economic and security conditions on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia" at the summit talk held in May 2003. Accordingly, the Division is to be incorporated into major areas south of the Han River in two stages. The first phase is to consolidate small USFK bases north of the Han River into the Dongducheon/Euijeongbu area by 2006. The second phase is to ultimately integrate major USFK bases north of the river into the Pyeongtaek area. The timing of such relocation will be cautiously determined, with the security situation on the Korean peninsula taken into account as agreed at the ROK-US summit. In tandem with the first phase, site preparation and infrastructure construction for the second phase will be carried out. To facilitate the process, the two countries agreed on the revised LPP encompassing the first- and second-phase relocation of the US 2nd Infantry Division. Upon completion of the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison as well as the second-phase redeployment of the US 2nd Infantry Division, USFK bases will be mainly divided into two core areas (central and southern). This will not only increase the efficiency of the USFK unit operation, but also contribute to promoting a balanced development of ROK and redressing public inconveniences. ![106_image_0.png](106_image_0.png) ## C. Reduction Of Usfk Manpower In June 2004, US presented ROK with its proposed initiative to reduce its military presence in ROK by 12,500 personnel by 2005. In order to minimize the sense of insecurity among the people concerned about possible weakening of the deterrence against North Korea and the ROK-US alliance as a result of early downsizing of the USFK, the ROK government engaged in negotiations with US about the timing of USFK reduction and a possible adjustment in the size of its reduction. These negotiations were carried out in consideration of the symbolic role of the USFK, the ROK-US combined defense posture and the level of force improvement by the ROK military. The focus of the negotiations was placed on adjusting the timing of the USFK downsizing in line with ROK's efforts toward "cooperative self-reliant defense." In addition, minimization of the reduction of forces essential to deterring North Korea, schedule of the already agreed transfer of military missions, planned reinforcement of the USFK's capabilities, and the planned two-phased redeployment of the US 2nd Infantry Division were taken into account. Approximately four months' negotiations led the two sides to a final agreement that the USFK would be scaled down in three stages by 2008, three years later than originally planned. First, 5,000 troops including the 2nd brigade combat team of the US 2nd Infantry Division and other units related with the transfer of military missions were reduced by the end of 2004, which will be followed by a downsizing by 5,000 personnel in 2005 to 2006 and by 2,500 personnel in 2007 to 2008. In terms of the reduction in military assets, the two sides agreed that counter-fire assets including MLRSs and counterbattery radars would be excluded from the original withdrawal plan of US and remain in ROK to ensure flexibility. Tanks, armored vehicles and other major combat equipment of the units subject to downsizing will be prepositioned to ensure immediate use in the event of any contingency. By successfully reaching agreements related to the reduction of USFK manpower, the two countries resolved security concerns raised by some, with ROK given time to equip itself with alternative forces. It is also meaningful that the two nations worked out a win-win solution during the negotiation process where they fully understood each other and coordinated their positions under the spirit of the ROK-US alliance. ## D. Transfer Of Military Missions And Combined Command System Keeping pace with the development of their combined military capabilities, US handed over the missions of guarding the Joint Security Area and ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 111 ![108_image_0.png](108_image_0.png) ![108_image_1.png](108_image_1.png) O JSA (Joint Security Area) conducting rear area decontamination operations to ROK, among the ten military missions performed by the USFK. The two countries agreed that the remaining missions would be transferred to the ROK military in stages. The USFK's transfer of military missions, which expands the missions of the ROK military according to its increased capabilities, is of a symbolic significance as it helps the ROK military play a leading role in defending the nation. However, such transfer will be conducted in phases in consideration of the capabilities of the ROK Armed Forces so as to allay public uneasiness about possible weakening of US commitment to the security on the Korean peninsula. In particular, transfer of the military mission pertinent to the counter-fire operations headquarters will be determined, based on assessment of the ROK military's capabilities in August 2005. Given that development of the ROK-US combined command system is an extremely important issue that constitutes a cornerstone of mutual military cooperation, ROK will take a cautious approach to this issue by forging a national consensus and pursuing close consultations with US to gear up for future endeavors. ## E. Development Of Combined Military Capabilities ROK and US are exerting utmost efforts to prevent any security vacuum in deterring war on the Korean peninsula, in spite of the readjustment of the USFK including its reduction and redeployment. As part of such efforts, they are seeking to maintain a robust combined defense posture by improving the USFK's mission performance capabilities and pursuing force improvement of the ROK military. Towards that end, US has pursued modernization of the USFK to strengthen its capabilities, making a US$ 11 billion investmentin 150 areas. In addition, the country is seeking to maximize the effects of military operations through the restructuring of the USFK. Under these circumstances, the ROK military is working to increase its deterrence capabilities against North Korea by smoothly implementing its force improvement programs according to the initiative of a "cooperative self-reliant defense posture" and subsequently consolidating ROK-US combined military capabilities. ## Assuring Stable Conditions For Usfk Stationing In spite of steady efforts by the two countries, the working conditions of the USFK lag behind those of American forces stationed in other countries, as demonstrated by aging barracks, insufficient living quarters and increasing civil complaints regarding training grounds. It is assessed that these settings seriously affects the morale of the US servicemen in ROK. Based on a common understanding that these poor conditions impose a negative impact on the joint defense posture as well as the ROK-US alliance, the two sides have endeavored to improvethe conditions for USFK stationing in ROK. ## A. Defense Cost Sharing The cost sharing contribution refers to the amount paid by the ROK government to partially bear the expenses associated with the US military presence in the country according to the Special Measures Agreement (SMA). The ROK government has made contributions to the cost of stationing and maintaining the USFK, in consideration of the degree of the host nations' cost sharing regarding the US forces stationed in friendly countries, the level of contribution by the USFK to the security of ROK, and the need to develop the ROK-US military alliance into a "partnership based on security cooperation." The cost sharing contribution by ROK is applied to four areas: (i) labor costs regarding Korean employees by the USFK ; (ii) military construction costs for building non-combat facilities including barracks ; (iii) CDIP costs to back up combat/combat support facilities including ammunition dumps ; and (iv) logistics supportcosts to provide goods and services including railway/automobile transport support. In 2004, the ROK government paid $ 622 million as its cost sharing contribution, which helped to improve the stationing conditions of the USFK. The amount of ROK's cost sharing for 2005 and beyond will be determined according to the results of ongoing ROK-US negotiations. Cost sharing contribution : It refers to the financial assistance from the ROK government to partially cover the expenses associated with the US military presence in the country according to the "Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America Concerning Special Measures Relating to Article V of the Agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea (also known as the Special Measures Agreement)." ## B. Resolution Of Public Grievance And Improvement Of Training Conditions Training of the USFK in a "war-like" setting is integral to maintaining a solid combined defense posture. However, accidents and damages caused by its training vehicles as well as severe noise from the US Air Force fire range at Maehyang-ri have left many people in ROK including nearby residents disgruntled with the situation. This subsequently triggered deterioration in the training conditions. To iron out this issue, the two countries took measures to improve the operation of SOFA at the level of the SOFA Joint Committee as regards improving the surrounding circumstances of training grounds and safety measures which must be observed by the USFK during training. Accordingly, the ROK government has taken such measures as the installation of safety facilities, construction of sidewalks and improvement/expansion of winding or bottlenecked roads in the northern part of Gyeonggi province. In the meantime, the USFK is seeking to improve its relations with local residents by adopting comprehensive safety measures concerning its training. As part of such efforts, it is improving its unit movement regulations, improving equipment, strengthening vehicle movement control activities, and giving prior notice of training and vehicle movement plans. ![110_image_0.png](110_image_0.png) In the meantime, the two countries have agreed that the US Air Force O US Air Force fire range at Maehyang-ri shooting range at Maehyang-ri would be closed at an early date to redress civil complaints from local residents, with a substitute training ground provided to US Air Force to guarantee proper training conditions. Thus, it will be ensured that the USFK will be able to engage in effective training uninterrupted while minimizing damage to people of ROK. ## C. Activities For Consolidating The Bond Between Rok And Us Based on the common belief that it is imperative to promote mutual understanding by consolidating human relations, ROK and US are jointly developing and implementing programs aimed at boosting friendly ties among the ROK Armed Forces regional units, USFK and local residents. In a bid to step up mutual goodwill activities, the ROK military has been implementing such programs as the "establishment of sisterhood relationships between ROK-US military units", "events inviting USFK troops" and "supporter programs for USFK soldiers." The USFK is also executing a wide variety of programs of similar nature including the "New Horizon's Day", "Good Neighbor Program" and "unit opening event." In addition, the USFK is endeavoring to win the hearts of the local people, reaching out to local communities by supporting farmers during busy seasons, supporting flood relief and providing medical support. Such efforts are contributing enormously to creating stable working conditions for the USFK by providing opportunities for US soldiers and South Korean people, who have different cultures and backgrounds, to share a sense of cultural unity. New Horizon's Day : An education program conducted by the USFK to enhance the understanding of newly transferred soldiers about ROK's social and cultural traits as well as public sentiments. Good Neighbor Program : A program operated to consolidate the ties between the USFK and local residents under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief of the CFC. ## Development Of The Future Rok-Us Alliance Up to 2004, the two countries assessed that they have successfully resolved outstanding issues including the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison and redeployment of the 2nd US Infantry Division through the "FOTA" talks. Based on such outcome, the two sides reached the consensus that it was necessary to organize a similar consultative body to engage in comprehensive discussions about not only outstanding issues of the present, but also agendas associated with the future development of the alliance. Thus, they have agreed to put the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) in operation from 2005. On the basis of these efforts, the two nations will produce a blueprint for future-oriented development of their alliance to meet changes in the security landscape and to reflect the progress achieved in the inter- Korean relations and changes in the Alliance environment. ![111_image_0.png](111_image_0.png) ![112_image_0.png](112_image_0.png) The objective of ROK's military diplomacy is to deter war on the Korean peninsula and to contribute to regional peace and stability, and more broadly, to world peace by building mutual confidence with friendly nations. To accomplish this objective, the ROK military has been strengthening the long-standing ROK-US alliance. It is also pressing ahead with development of balanced military relations with neighboring countries and promotion of regional multilateral military cooperation. In addition, the ROK military has furthered its relations with nations that fought for ROK during the Korean War, while diversifying the countries with which it engages in mutual military exchanges and broadening the scope of military cooperation. By actively participating in international peacekeeping and arms control activities, the ROK military has made significant contribution to world peace and stability. ## Military Diplomacy With Neighboring Countries The focus of the ROK's military diplomacy with neighboring countries is to gain their understanding and support to resolve pending security issues, such as finding a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear issues, on the basis of the foreign policy of the government. In the long-term perspective, the ROK military aims to contribute to establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula by enhancing military confidence and ties with neighboring nations through diverse military exchanges and cooperation and by managing the security environment on the Korean peninsula in a stable manner. ## A. Relations With Japan ROK and Japan have institutionalized various military exchanges ranging from personnel exchanges, such as military personnel exchanges and exchange visits by military academy cadets, to mutual visits by military leadership and convocation of regular meetings. Since 1994, the two nations have held annual defense ministers' meetings by means of exchange O ROK-Japan Defense Ministers' Talks ![113_image_0.png](113_image_0.png) visits. On January 13, 2005, ROK National Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung and Japanese Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono held a defense ministerial meeting. This meeting was of a great significance in that the highest military leaders of the two neighboring nations met for the first time since assuming office in order to reaffirm the friendly bond of ties and discuss matters of mutual interest. During the meeting, the two military leaders exchanged views on issues of mutual security concerns including the North Korean nuclear issue and the recent political developments in Northeast Asia. They agreed to engage in close consultation sconcerning implementation of policies toward North Korea and expressed their staunch backing for the principle of peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear issues. In addition, they decided to explore ways to further develop their existing military ties driven by brisk ongoing exchanges and cooperation into more future-oriented relations. Through various working-level meetings including the ROK-Japan joint defense policy working-level meetings and security policy conferences, the ROK Ministry of National Defense has gained insight into Japan's defense policies including its recent military capability reinforcement and "emergency legislation" which stipulates how Japan would respond to contingencies and also conveyed ouropinions on matters of interest. The two sides have endeavored to broaden mutual understanding and cooperation by explaining the direction of their defense policies as well as policies related to North Korea and the ongoing consultations over the realignment of the US forces stationed in the two nations as part of the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR). Based on military confidence and ties that it has built with Japan, the ROK ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 117 military will constantly pursue promotion of substantive mutual defense/security cooperation to accomplish "early resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue to promote peace and stability in Northeast Asia in addition to cooperation in regional and international arenas" as agreed at the December 2004 ROK-Japan summit. B. Relations with China ![114_image_0.png](114_image_0.png) O ROK fleet's first visit to China On the basis of the "full-fledged cooperative partnership" as agreed by the leaders of the two nations in their summit of July 2003, ROK and China have been expanding the horizon of their security exchanges and cooperation. Mutual visits by the defense ministers of the two nations served as a catalyst to gradually widen the scope of exchanges between military leaders. With his visit to China in August 1999, then ROK National Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae became the first ROK national defense minister to visit China since the Korean War. This event opened a new chapter in military relations between the two nations. In January 2000, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian visited ROK for the first time as the country's defense minister, which was followed by a visit to China by then ROK National Defense Minister Kim Dong-shin in December 2001. This demonstrates that the two nations are committed to promote military ties and confidence through intensified efforts toward dialogue and contact between their top military leadership. Brisk exchanges between other military leaders of the two countries have been conducted as well. The Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and the ROK Chief of Naval Operations visited China in 2003 and 2004 respectively. In return, the Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and a military delegation visited ROK in 2003, and a military delegation of the Chinese General Staff Department also visited the country in 2004. Concerning other military exchanges between ROK and China, the two nations have held defense seminars and sports exchanges on a regular basis. Since 2001, they have been stepping up mutual cooperation related to security as exemplified by mutual visits of naval vessels and aircrafts. The two countries will continue to promote bilateral security cooperation toward the attainment of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and ceaselessly develop mutual defense exchange programs to sustain the balanced development of their relations and establishment of a "full-fledged cooperative partnership". ## C. Relations With Russia Following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990, ROK and Russia opened military attach offices in 1991. Since then, the two countries' military relations have progressed considerably as evidenced by exchanges between high-ranking military officials, military confidence building efforts and establishment of mechanisms for enhanced military cooperation. During Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's visit to ROK on April 10, 2003, the defense ministers of the two nations agreed to advance mutual military exchanges and cooperation. Accordingly, the two nations held a bilateral Air Force meeting in July 2003 for the first time. In August 2003, the ROK Navy, together with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, participated in a combined humanitarian maritime search and rescue exercise hosted by the Russian Pacific Fleet Command. This was a very meaningful event since the first combined military exercise involving ROK, Japan and Russia marked the beginning of peaceful military cooperation among countries in the Northeast Asian region. In February 2004, the ROK military provided support for a visit to Incheon Harbor by three Russian naval vessels carrying the Russian Pacific Fleet commander at the request from Russia. This was a part of the effort conducted ![115_image_0.png](115_image_0.png) "Koreyets"(meaning the Korean): During the Russia-Japan War in 1904, the crew of a Russian naval vessel blew up the vessel and killed themselves, refusing to surrender to a Japanese fleet in a fierce battle on the sea near Sowolmi Island, Incheon. In commemoration of the event, Russia newly named a 1,000-ton antisubmarine "Koreyets" in August 2003. to commemorate the 100th aniversary of the Russo-Japanese War. In particular, the vessels made the visit in memory of the crewmen of the Koreyets, which was destroyed by an explosion during the war. This provided an opportunity to reflect on the lessons learned from the history. At the same time, ROK-Russia conducted a maritime search and rescue exercise as part of a mine removal training. In August 2004, a meeting of the "Joint Military Committee" was held in Moscow for the first time to discuss the implementation of the "Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities" signed in 2002. This event set the stage for substantive military cooperation between the two countries to prevent any accidental armed clash. During the ROK President Roh Moo-hyun's visit to Russia in September 2004, the leaders of the two nations defined the relations between the two countries as a future-oriented "comprehensive partnership built on mutual trust", moving forward from the "constructive and mutually complementary partnership" that had defined the bilateral relations for 14 years since their establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990. Thus, the two nations secured a platform for their relations to achieve a step forward. Military relations between the two countries will continue to progress toward bringing permanent peace to the Korean peninsula and contributing to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. ![116_image_0.png](116_image_0.png) ## Diversification Of Military Exchanges And Cooperation The MND has sought to gain the support and backing from the international community concerning its defense plans by promoting military ties and amicable relations with friendly nations. At the same time, it incessantly pursues diversification of the targets of military exchanges and cooperation to ensure staunch security support in the event of a contingency. The MND is increasing the types and scope of military exchanges and cooperation including operation of military attach offices, mutual visits by military personnel, military exchanges and cooperation meetings, military education/academic exchanges, mutual visits by naval vessels, technological cooperation between the defense and logistics industries, and conclusion of military agreements. The MND hosts many large-scale international events including the Pacific Rim Army Chief of Staff Conference, Marine Week, and the Korea Air Show, further strengthening military ties with participating countries. Then ROK National Defense Minister, Cho Yung-kil, attended the "3rd Asia Security Conference" for the first time. Approximately 20 countries participated in the meeting held in Singapore in 2004. In the meeting, the minister successfully enhanced the understanding of other participants and got their support regarding the ROK government's positions and efforts toward international peace ranging from the reduction of inter-Korean military tension to involvement in counter-terrorism and WMD non-proliferation activities. In addition, the minister met with his counterparts from US, Singapore and Indonesia as well as other top military leaders, exchanging views on pending military issues and other matters of concern. ## A. Southeast Asia And Oceania Since the 1980s, various countries in Southeast Asia have newly emerged as major political, economic and diplomatic partners of ROK. They are assuming increasing strategic importance in terms of security and military diplomacy including access to resources and safe Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC), defense industrial cooperation and regional security cooperation through the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). In this context, the ROK military has vigorously pursued military exchanges and cooperation with the Southeast Asian nations, with a focus on ![117_image_0.png](117_image_0.png) exchanges between military leaders and operation of combined defense industrial and logistics committees. Among the major exchanges of military leaders conducted in 2003 and 2004 were visits to ROK by the Indonesian Air Force and Navy Commanders, Malaysian Chief of the General Staff and Navy Commander, Philippine Air Force Commander, and the Vietnamese Chief of the General Staff. In the meantime, the ROK Air O Indonesian security guards being trained in counter-terrorism operations in ROK ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 121 Force Chief of Staff visited Malaysia and Indonesia while the Army Chief of Staff visited Vietnam and Malaysia. In addition, the ROK Minister of National Defense paid a visit to Singapore. Military exchanges in various forms were also conducted such as a visit to ROK by a Vietnamese military soccer team for training, counter-terrorism training for security guards of the Indonesian president, and exchange visits by the students and cadets of national defense universities and military academies. In particular, a ROK Navy cruiser fleet toured Southeast Asian nations including the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia in 2003, which was followed by visits to ROK by the Indonesian, Malaysian and Thai naval cruiser fleets in 2004. This provided ROK with a chance to further its friendly ties with these nations. Such efforts toward diversification of military exchanges bore fruit. ROK secured a footing for substantive military exchanges with Cambodia by signing the "agreement on military training exchanges" in August 2003. In addition, the 1st and 2nd meetings of the ROK-Vietnam joint defense industrial and logistics committee were held in the two countries alternately (in ROK in 2003 and in Vietnam in 2004), increasing the number of regular bilateral forums on defense industrial cooperation with Southeast Asian nations from four to five. In 2004, a regular ROK-Indonesia Air Force meeting was held for the first time. Military exchanges and cooperation with countries in Oceania revolve around the two participants in the Korean War, i.e. Australia and New Zealand. ROK and Australia/New Zealand have annually co-hosted the Political-Military Talks attended by ![118_image_0.png](118_image_0.png) Australia foreign affairs and defense officials as well as the Mil-Mil talks between military authorities. These meetings are useful security cooperation platforms to deliberate security issues of mutual interest as well as to promot emutual exchanges. In addition, ROK has engaged in brisk military exchanges with Australia and New Zealand covering a broad spectrum of military exchange activities including frequent exchange visits by naval vessels, mutual visits by the students of national defense universities, and military education exchanges. In April 2004, the 7th ROK-Australia Mil-Mil Talks and the 5th ROK-New Zealand Mil-Mil Talks were held in Canberra and Wellington, respectively. Followed by the visits to ROK by the New Zealand Defense Minister Mark Burton and Chief of Defense Force Air Marshal Bruce Ferguson made. In 2003, a ROK Navy cruiser fleet visited Australia and New Zealand, which was reciprocated by an Australian naval vessel's visit to ROK in 2004. ## B. Europe The purpose of ROK's military diplomacy with European nations is to raise the stature and role of the ROK military in the region and thus to gain the backing of European countries for establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. To consolidate ties with nations that participated in the Korean War, ROK has paid close attention and provided supports to inviting the Korean War veterans to Korea, erection of monuments commemorating the European participation in the War, and exchanges among generations who have never experienced the War. ROK actively pursues mutual visits of military leaders with European nations. In 1999, then ROK National Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae visited Turkey, which was followed by the ROK Army Chief of Staff's visit to Spain and Turkey in February 2004. As evidenced by the visits to ROK by the Romanian Chief of the General Staff in 2002, Swedish Defense Chief and Dutch Defense Minister in 2003, and Spanish Army Chief of Staff in September 2004, ROK has increased military exchanges with countries that had an insignificant level of military relations in the past. Among regular bilateral consultations with European nations are the joint defense policy working-level meetings, joint defense industry and logistics committee meetings, and intelligence exchange meetings. With a focus placed on defense industrial cooperation, ROK is increasing the number of countries with which it engages in mutual exchanges. Concerning military education exchanges, ROK military officers were trained at military educational institutes of 13 countries including Greece, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, United Kingdom, Austria, Italy, ![120_image_0.png](120_image_0.png) ![120_image_1.png](120_image_1.png) OROK Army band poses for a commemorative picture at the Edinburgh Military Tattoo Turkey, Portugal, Poland, France and the Netherlands. In return, military officers from the four countries of Germany, Italy, Turkey and France were trained at ROK military training institutes. In 2003, the ROK Army marching band participated in the "Edinburgh Military Tattoo" (July 21 August 25, 2003), the world's most highly acknowledged festival of its kind. The band played Korean traditional military music, resulting in hugely favorable responses from the other participants as well as the spectators. ## C. Other Regions Overall military exchanges between ROK and Southwest Asian nations remain at a relatively low level. However, military exchanges are growing, with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh at the center. Concerning India, which dispatched a medical support unit during the Korean War, ROK has continuously engaged in irregular mutual visits between the personnel of military educational institutes, starting from exchange visits by students of national defense universities in 1973. On a yearly basis, ROK has dispatched one or two military personnel to the Indian National Defense University, Command Staff Collegeand so forth as trainees. Concerning naval exchanges, a ROK cruiser fleet visited India on six occasions by 2004. In 1998, the Indian Navy sent its naval vessel to the international naval review hosted by the ROK Navy. In November 2003, three Indian naval vessels entered the Busan Harbor, cementing ties between the naval forces of the two nations. In the ROK-India summit in September 2004, the heads of state agreed to promote diplomatic and security dialogue and military cooperation between the two countries. Therefore, it is anticipated that the contacts and dialogues between the military authorities of the two countries will increase gradually in the future. Following the opening of its military attaché office in Pakistan in 1990, ROK has sought military exchanges and cooperation with Pakistan centered especially around military education exchanges such as the visits by the Pakistani Navy College students to ROK conducted in April 2003. The export of one frigate to Bangladesh in 1998 provided momentum for defense industrial cooperation between the two nations. In October 2001, ROK O Signing ceremony of the ROK-Kuwait MOU on military exchanges ![121_image_0.png](121_image_0.png) opened a military attaché office in Bangladesh. Since then, the two nations have consistently pursued military exchanges revolved around their naval forces. ROK's military ties with countries in the Middle East revolve around Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and Kuwait. Among the officials who visited ROK are the Israeli Defense Ministry Director-General (September 2000), Saudi Arabian Defense Minister (October 2000) and Kuwaiti Defense Minister (November 2004). In April 2003, ROK and Kuwait signed a SOFA. The two countries opened respective military attaché offices in March 2004. In addition, ROK exchanged military attaché offices with Jordan in September 2004. During the Kuwaiti defense minister's visit to ROK, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on military exchanges and cooperation between their defense ministries, which set the stage for fullfledged exchanges of military personnel, promotion of military education exchanges and defense industry/logistics cooperation. Leveraging the dispatch of additional troops to Iraq, the MND plans to substantially step up military diplomacy with the Middle East. In February 2004, then ROK Minister of National Defense Cho Yung-kil visited UAE, Oman and Kuwait as a special presidential envoy. Keeping pace with this event, the ROK Army Chief of Staff made a visit to Saudi Arabia. During his tour of the Zaytun Unit in Iraq in November 2004, ROK Minister of National Defense Yoon Kwang-ung visited the multinational forces command in Kuwait and Iraq, expressing gratitude to the countries providing support to the dispatch operations and requesting continuing cooperation from them. In order to support the deployment of its troops dispatched to Iraq, ROK is seeking to conclude a SOFA with Qatar where the US Central Command is stationed, to facilitate the dispatch of ROK liaison officers to the country. ROK intends to further promote military ties with countries in the Middle East by increasing visits to the region by its leading officials, invitations to military leaders from the region to visit ROK, military training exchanges and defense industrial cooperation. With regard to the African continent that comprises approximately a fourth of all countries in the world, nations in the region wield a strong combined clout in the international arena. In Latin America, free trade agreements are being signed more briskly than in any other region around the globe. It is expected that the needs for military diplomacy with the region including defense industrial cooperation will increase continuously. Against this backdrop, ROK and Latin American countries sought more vigorous military exchanges in 2004 than ever before. In 2003, the ROK Chief of Naval Operations and the Vice National Defense paid a visit to Chile and Mexico. In the meantime, the Venezuelan Navy Chief of Naval Operations visited ROK in October 2003. In2004, the defense minister of Paraguay and the Army commanders of Chile and Brazil made a visit to ROK, respectively. In addition, ROK is engaging in close consultations on current defense affairs with Canada, a traditional friendly nation, convening annual workinglevel defense policy meetings. In 2003, the two countries conducted a combined anti-submarine exercise for maritime patrol aircraft, and the Canadian Chief of Defense Staff visited ROK. In 2004, the chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff paid a visit to Canada and a Canadian naval vessel visited ROK, which enhanced military exchanges and cooperation between the two countries to a higher level. ![122_image_0.png](122_image_0.png) ## International Peacekeeping Operations A. Outline Of Peacekeeping Operations With the end of the Cold War, the possibility of a large-scale war has significantly diminished. However, regional disputes over ethnic and religious differences, territories, and resources are on the increase. Under these changes in the global security environment, roles and functions of international PKOs have been expanded as "sentinels" of world peace and order. Today, countries around the world perceive international PKOs as important national tasks since participation in PKOs enables them to contribute to maintaining world peace and stability and to raise their national stature. Under the situation, PKOs are emerging as a major military function in the 21st century. PKOs are classified into UN peacekeeping operations directly led by the UN and the UN-authorized multinational forces operations led by a regional body or a certain country. The UNTSO in Palestine marked the beginning of UN-led PKOs in 1948. Since then, approximately 1 million personnel have participated in 59 UN-led PKOs in more than 120 countries during the past 55 years. As of November 2004, approximately 66,300 military and police personnel from 102 UN members were serving in 16 regions including Liberia, Georgia, India and Pakistan. UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization ## B. Rok Military Participation In Peacekeeping Operations In 1993, a ROK engineer battalion was dispatched to Somalia (UNOSOM- II) pusuant to a request from the UN. Since then, ROK has dispatched peacekeepers to Angola, Western Sahara, East Timor, etc. The ROK "Evergreen Unit", an infantry unit dispatched to East Timor in October 1999, flawlessly conducted its duties including maintenance of public order, border control and provision of military support to civil operations in the relevant region, despite domestic controversy and opposition regarding the unit's participation in PKOs. As a result, the locals dubbed the Evergreen Unit "Malraimutin" meaning the best of the multinational forces. The Evergreen Unit withdrew completely from East Timor in October 2003. UN0SOM- II : UN Operations in Somalia PKF: Peacekeeping Forces ROK's accomplishments in PKOs were duly acknowledged. General Hwang Jin-Ha became the first ROK military officer to command a UN PKO, being appointed as Force Commander of the UN PKF in Cyprus. He returned to ROK after successfully completing his duties for two years from January 2002 to December 2003. Concerning PKOs, the MND maintains close cooperation with the UN and dispatches military officers to the ROK permanent mission in the UN in an effort to foster UN-related experts. It also dispatches active-duty staff to the DPKO of the UN Secretariat for direct planning and management of UN PKOs. DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations The status of PKO participation by the ROK Armed Forces as of December 2004 is presented below. ![124_image_0.png](124_image_0.png) The ROK Armed Forces medical support group, currently participating in the MINURSO, began its mission in September 1994 when the first dispatch of a contingent unit (42 persons) was sent from ROK. As of December 2004, the 21st dispatch contingent unit (20 persons) is performing its duties. The ROK Armed Forces medical support group is the only organized unit in the MINURSO. It performs the following duties: provision of basic medical support to UN personnel ; 24-hour standby for emergency patient treatment ; prevention of infectious disease at the MINURSO Headquarters ; and inspection of both water and food hygiene. The unit has contributed to building a solid reputation for ROK by providing high-quality medical care to over 51,000 UN personnel in the past 10 years. In addition, the ROK Armed Forces have been dispatching military observers since 1994. Currently, 9 field officers are working as members of the UNMOGIP and 7 are participating in the UNOMIG. The dispatched officers serveunder the control of the local command and have been faithfully performing their duties including monitoring of any ceasefire violation, patrolling, investigation, reporting, and arbitration. The MND newly dispatched 2 military observers to the UNMIL in November 2003 and the ONUB in September 2004, respectively. ## C. Establishment Of The Foundation For Participation In Peacekeeping Operations (1) Active Involvement In The Unsas In order to ensure rapid deployment and higher-quality PKO operations by its members in the event a need for peacekeeping operations arises, the UN has recently called for the participation of its members in the UNSAS. Under the system, member nations give the UN prior notice of their units and equipment that stand ready to participate in peacekeeping operations during peacetime. Then, they maintain a standby posture at a certain level, and dispatch their units as soon as possible upon request from the UN. The MND has determined that it is necessary to actively participate in the UNSAS to enhance the efficiency of the ROK military's participation in peacekeeping operations and to ensure rapid dispatch of its units. For such purpose, it is examining ways to organize and operate a standing PKO unit at ordinary times. MINURSO : French acronym standing for the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara UNOMIG : UN Observer Mission in Georgia UNMIL : UN Mission in Liberia ONUB : French acronym indicating the UN Operation in Burundi UNSAS : UN Standby Arrangements System ## (2) Legislation Of Overseas Troop Dispatch Laws After 10 years of participating in international peacekeeping operations, the ROK military has made remarkable achievements. However, laws governing peacekeeping operations or overseas dispatch of military forces are nonexistent. In order to resolve this problem, the MND, with cooperation of other related government agencies, will make a government-wide effort to enact appropriate PKO-related laws to ensure swift dispatches as well as to clarify legal and institutional grounds concerning job specifications of related government agencies, overseas dispatch procedures and guarantee of the status of dispatched personnel. ## (3) Development Of The Pko Education System The MND plans to establish the "International Peace Support Center" at the National Defense University to function as a dedicated research center for PKO and military dispatch-related affairs as well as a specialized educational institute for training PKO personnel. The MND plans to expand its function as a special PKO educational center not only for military personnel, but also for relevant police officers and civilians. ## D. Overseas Dispatch Of Rok Forces Since the end of the Cold War in the late 20th century, terrorism has been perceived as the greatest threat to world peace and security, and has emerged as the pressing issue that needs to be jointly addressed by the international community. ![126_image_0.png](126_image_0.png) O Organization of the Afghanistan transport support unit ROK has joined the US-led international coalition against terrorism to contribute to world peace and stability and to further strengthen the ROK-US alliance. With the approval of the National Assembly, ROK has dispatched its military personnel to Afghanistan and Iraq. (1) Dispatch of ROK Forces to Support 'Operation Enduring Freedom' The war in Afghanistanis a war on terrorism commenced by US on October 7, 2001 under the name of "OEF." The operation is aimed at retaliating against Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda, the masterminds of the September 11 terrorist attack, as well as against Afghanistan for harboring them. To promote the OEF, the ROK government announced its plan to provide support to US on September 24, 2001. The government dispatched an Army medical support unit, Navy and Air Force transport support units and a construction engineer support unit, based on statutory procedures including the consent of the National Assembly. ![127_image_0.png](127_image_0.png) ![127_image_1.png](127_image_1.png) to the people of Afghanistan The first ROK medical support group comprising 100 soldiers and officers has provided medical services to US servicemen and other coalition forces Q Activities of the construction engineer unit dispatched to Afghanistan stationed in the Manas Base, Kyrgyzstan as well as to the local population since February 27, 2002. The third and ensuing contingents that started to be deployed from February 2003 have been based in the Bagram Base, Afghanistan (the largest US military base located in CJTF-180, 80km north of Kabul), with a team operating in Manas. So far, these ROK units provided medical services to approximately 120,000 allied troops and citizens of Afghanistan. In addition, they have elevated the stature of ROK by providing such services as Taekwondo lessons and granting scholarships to Kyrgyzstan college students majoring in the Korean language. The first ROK Navy transport support group consisted of one landing ship and 171 crewmembers. As the first Korean military unit to be sent to the war, it left Jinhae Harbor on December 18, 2001. The transport support group has carried out missions within the area of responsibility (AOR) of the US Pacific Command, using Singapore as its base port. So far, it has transported over 5,500 tons of US military supplies in 17 missions and provided assistance to special operations. The ROK Air Force transport support unit, which originally consisted of 76 crewmembers, began carrying out its duties on December 28, 2001, using Gimhae Airbase as its main base. Up until December 31, 2003, it performed 81 missions in total. It has functioned as a regular air conveyance line that connects Gimhae, Singapore and Diego Garcia. Within the AOR of the US Pacific Command, it has successfully carried out the transport of 310 tons of US military supplies and 600 troops. A construction engineer support group of 150 troops was additionally sent to the US base in Bagram, Afghanistan with the third medical support unit on February 27, 2003. Its primary mission has been construction and engineering works for operation of the base. It plans to perform a wide array of missions including providing assistance to local people in Afghanistan as soon as the ongoing construction works of the allied forces are completed. ## (2) Dispatch Of Seohee And Jema Units (A) 1St Dispatch US asked for support in the form of possible participation of the ROK Armed Forces in the war in Iraq by providing humanitarian support, post-war reconstruction and combat support operations in November 2002 and March 2003. The ROK government has carefully assessed the request and prepared for possible outbreak of war. When the war broke out on March 20, 2003, the ROK government unveiled its official position that "in light of various factors including the current trend of the international community, nonproliferation of WMD, and the importance of ROK-US alliance, it is in our national interest to support the US efforts." By convening the National Security Council and cabinet meetings, Seoul decided to dispatch the construction engineering and medical support units. In the process of gaining approval of the National Assembly for the dispatch, public opinion in disfavor of the dispatch mounted, with civil protests spreading. Against this backdrop, the relevant plenary session of the National Assembly had to be postponed twice. The National Assembly finally approved the dispatch in its plenary session on April 2. Subsequently, the troop dispatch to support the war in Iraq was put back on track. The dispatch of the ROK Armed Forces was implemented in stages after prior training and thorough preparation to equip the dispatched units with the capability of performing the given missions. First, three staff members were sent to Kuwait on April 7 for preparatory purposes. Twenty additional members were sent to Kuwait on April 17 for a detailed assessment of the local operational environment and duties. They also laid the groundwork for cooperation with other countries involved in the effort. On April 30, 2003, the first echelon comprising about 300 troops (Seohee Unit : a construction engineer support unit with over 200 members ; Jema Unit : a 90-member medical support unit) was deployed to Kuwait. After undergoing a one-week training program for adjustment under the supervision of US forces in Kuwait, they were assigned to the Nasiriya area. On May 14, the second echelon of 300 construction engineers was dispatched, which marked the successful completion of the planned ROK Armed Forces deployment. The Seohee and Jema Units joined the Zaytun Unit in Irbil. Until the Nasiriya base was closed on August 31, 2004, the dispatched ROK troops provided medical services to more than 15,000 patients. In addition, they supported 46 post-war rehabilitation projects including construction of hospitals, schools, public water supply and sewage systems. Furthermore, they vigorously executed humanitarian assistance programs including supply of medical equipment, medicine and wheel chairs, construction of an information and communication center, and provision of scholarships. ![129_image_0.png](129_image_0.png) ![129_image_1.png](129_image_1.png) activities (Nasiriya) ## (B) Additional Dispatch Of Peacekeeping And Reconstruction Support Units US declared the end to major combat operations in Iraq on May 1, 2003. However, increasing threats of terrorism in Iraq necessitated allied nations to dispatch additional troops. On September 4, 2003, US requested additional dispatch of ROK troops through its representative to the FOTA talks. On October 18, the ROK government announced its decision to dispatch additional troops to Iraq. The government said that it would "support the establishment of a lasting peace and rapid post-war reconstruction in Iraq, and independently determine the nature, type, scale and timing of additional dispatch in consideration of the request from US, publicopinion of the Korean people, briefing by the on-site investigation team, and the characteristics and competences of the ROK military." The ROK government finalized and unveiled its additional troop dispatch plan on December 17 by taking a cautious approach including dispatch of a government-level joint investigation team and a National Assembly investigation team, bilateral governmental consultations with US and discussions at the 35th SCM. The gist of the plan is as follows : "No more than 3,000 troops (3,700 including the Seohee and Jema Units) will be dispatched to perform the basic mission of supporting peace and reconstruction in Iraq. They will independently take charge of a certain area to fulfill their mission efficiently and secure their safety. In principle, the Iraqi military and police will carry out maintenance of public peace and order. The dispatched forces will comprise a post-war reconstruction/civilian operation unit, self-patrol unit, and a division command and subordinate teams that will command and support above mentioned operations." On December 23, a decision in favor of the dispatch ![130_image_0.png](130_image_0.png) additional troops to Iraq passed by the National Assembly was made by a cabinet meeting, which was followed by approval of the president. On December 24, a relevant motion was submitted to the National Assembly. On February 9, 2004, the motion was presented to and passed by the Defense Committee of the National Assembly. It was finally approved at a plenary session of the National Assembly on February 13. ## � Underlying Rationale For The Dispatch Of Rok Armed Forces The ROK government decided to dispatch additional troops to Iraq based on the following rationale, which is similar to that of its initial dispatch : First, promotion of ROK-Iraq relations and creation of conditions favorable for ROK to advance into markets in the Middle East and Central Asia. Second, fulfillment of its duties and obligations as a member of the UN to promote world peace and stability by providing support toward post-war peace and reconstruction in Iraq. Third, strengthening the alliance between US and ROK to create conditions conducive to resolution of pressing bilateral issues and promote confidence in ROK. Fourth, elevation of the national stature, reinforcement of the bond among countries dispatching troops, and contribution to the development of the ROK military including enhancement of its long-distance deployment and supply capabilities through participation in international peacekeeping operations. ## � Efforts To Win Public Support The MND made multi-faceted efforts to persuade the National Assembly, the press and public to support the additional troop dispatch to Iraq. The minister of national defense briefed the need for additional dispatch at the policy consultative meetings of the chief policymakers of each political party, visits to the representatives of the four major political parties, and current agenda reports to the Defense Committee of the National Assembly. The minister called for early deliberation and a quick decision at the meetings of the Defense Committee and plenary sessions of the National Assembly. In the capacity of a special presidential envoy, the Minister also visited three Middle East nations including Oman, UAE and Kuwait to promote their understanding and support for ROK's additional troop dispatch. In addition, the minister held policy presentations by inviting journalists, requesting them to publicize the necessity of the dispatch and thus cooperate in the efforts to serve the national interest to the maximum extent. � Operation of the Government-Wide Committee to Support the Dispatch The "Government-Wide Committee to Support the Dispatch" was put into operation, with the MND at the center. Chaired by the vice minister of national defense, the Committee consisted of assistant deputy minister-level officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, Ministry of Information and Communication, Ministry of Construction and Transportation, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Government Information Agency, Ministry of Planning and Budget, Office for Government Policy Coordination, Secretariat of the National Security Council, and National Intelligence Service. The Committee maintained close cooperation among the government ministries and agencies concerned. Practical issues were discussed in three rounds of working-level meetings, while items on the government-level agenda related to the dispatch were subject to deliberation in two rounds of plenary meetings. ## � Basic Dispatch Plan The missions of the dispatched troops include engaging in post-war reconstruction support and relief activities in a fixed area of responsibility, helping Iraq's autonomous administrative bodies to function properly, and cultivating friendship of the Iraqis with ROK. The Iraq imilitary and police are in charge of maintaining public peace and order in the area, and the ROK military supports military training and education. The dispatched force comprised more than 3,600 troops including the Seohee and Jema Units. Organized to flexibly perform assigned missions and ensure minimal damage, these elite troops consisted of 1,200 personnel under the division/brigade command and subordinate teams, 1,600 personnel for reconstruction support and 800 personnel for guard duties. At first, their potential dispatch to Kirkuk was subject to review. However, as the area conflicted with the ROK government's principle that "the troops will perform the missions of peacekeeping and reconstruction support in an independent area of responsibility", ROK and US agreed to change the targeted area of the troop dispatch to Irbil in the Kurdish Autonomous Region. Accordingly, the ROK government finalized the decision, on June 18, 2004, to dispatch troops to Irbil, based on several on-site investigations and cooperative activities. Thus, it coordinated the relevant details of the dispatch with the local authority of Irbil. ![132_image_0.png](132_image_0.png) to be dispatched to Iraq ## - Thorough Preparations For The Dispatch Upon passage of the relevant motion by the National Assembly on February 13, the MND and related departments embarked on preparatory works for the dispatch in earnest. According to the results of public notification about the dispatch and receipt of applications, the competition ratio was as high as 1 to 14.8. Finally, approximately 3,600 successful applicants were selected. A six-week training was conducted prior to the dispatch to get accustomed to local conditions, understand local practices and customs, and be equipped with the capability to perform given missions. In an effort to secure human resources who have the command of the Arabic language, the MND implemented a 12-week education program for 46 relevant military personnel. In addition, it selected and recruited 41 Arabic-speaking civilians as contract workers. By using uniforms and equipment that differentiate them from troops from other countries, the MND sought to prevent mistaken terrorist attacks against them. The MND also issued improved bulletproof jackets and helmets, in addition to the effort to shield 380 vehicles from hostile fire. ## @ Deployment And Activities Of The Zaytun Unit In Irbil After it was conclusively determined that the ROK troops would be dispatched to Irbil, 2,800 troops of the Zaytun Unit moved to Irbil via civilian airplanesand the US Air Force C-130 transport aircrafts while its equipment and materials were transported to the area on 25,000-ton commercial ships and trailers during the period from July 19 to September 22. The troops of the Zaytun Unit, which departed from ROK on August 3, arrived in Kuwait by civilian chartered planes. The troops moved to Irbil on Air Force transport aircrafts and its equipment was transported to the area by land. In the meantime, 1,200 troops in three echelons moved from Kuwait to Irbil via Nasiriya, Bagdad and Kirkuk, traveling 1,115 kilometers in over 400 vehicles. Each echelon trekked for three nights and four days during the period from September 3 to September 19. As for aerial transportation, 23 C- 130 aircrafts transported troops from September 9 to September 22. Prior to the dispatch of the armed forces, the equipment and materials to be used by the Zaytun Unit left ROK on July 19. After traveling 12,000 kilometers on two 25,000-ton commercial ships, they arrived at the Port of Kuwait. For the section from Kuwait to Irbil, the equipment and materials were transported as part of the "Pabalma (Post Horse) Operation. "The ROK Navy's vessel named "Gwanggaeto the Grea" escorted the maritime transportation, serving as a catalyst to enhance the Navy's capabilities to protect Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) in the event of a contingency. ![133_image_0.png](133_image_0.png) ![133_image_1.png](133_image_1.png) ![133_image_2.png](133_image_2.png) Chapter 4. Status and Tasks of the ROK National Defense ![134_image_0.png](134_image_0.png) ![134_image_1.png](134_image_1.png) O Zaytun Unit moves to Irbil Following the main contingent comprising 2,800 soldiers, an 800member echelon moved to the area from November 26 to December 6. Over 150 personnel of the ROK Air Force transport group and four C-130 transport aircrafts were deployed to the Kuwaiti Air Force base of Ali Al Salem on October 12-14 to provide transportation support for the Zaytun Unit and other allied troops. The Pabalma Operation conduced by the Zaytun Unit from the Kuwaiti camp of Virginia to Irbil, Iraq was a "flawless success." It realized the feat of traveling as many as 1,115 kilometers without a single accident under extremely harsh weather conditions of extreme temperatures of 50C to 60C as well as sandstorms while overcoming threats from adversarial forces. During the Operation, US forces provided air cover with 12 helicopters and two fighters as well as ground cover with 30 military vehicles including two armored vehicles and 100 personnel. In addition, the British troops covered the Zaytun Unit by utilizing 90 personnel and 20 vehicles. In war-torn Iraq, the Zaytun Unit will attempt to reproduce the glorious achievement by the Evergreen Unit that earned the nickname of "Malraimutin" meaning the best of the multinational forcesthanks to its successful peacekeeping and reconstruction operations in East Timor during 4 years from October 1999. To achieve such purposes, the Zaytun Unit formulated a three-step support plan for Iraq and the local populace, carrying out its missions as a peacekeeping/reconstruction support unit. In Stage one spanning from September 1 to November 30, the Zaytun Unit provided the local authority of Irbil with 58 automobiles, 10,000 soccer balls and investigation/security devices. It also supplied 10 school buses each accommodating 25 persons to 10 local kindergartens, and provided KRW 12.7 billion's worth of assistance for such projects as road pavement in Irbil. On November 20, the Unit opened a school for the illiterate, providing school supplies and supporting employment of local teachers. On November 27, it opened the Zaytun Hospital to provide medical support for 2,380 local residents. During Stage 2 (settlement stage), which lasts to March 2005, the Zaytun Unit will seek to win the trust of the local government and people. In Stage 3 (development stage) from April 2005, it will carry out activities to ensure the development of the local area and promotion of domestic business in Iraq. In accordance with the passage of the "motion for the extension of the dispatch of ROK troops to Iraq" on December 31, 2004, the National Assembly has confirmed Korea's commitment to the mission of providing peacekeeping and reconstruction support in Iraq until December 31, 2005. In consideration of the significant role of ![135_image_0.png](135_image_0.png) ![135_image_1.png](135_image_1.png) O Zaytun Unit helps post-war reconstruction of Iraq the Zaytun Unit, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Defense Minister of ROK visited Irbil on September 27, 2004 and November 3, 2004, respectively, to extend words of encouragement to the ROK troops stationed there. On October 10, 2004, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who had never visited an allied force unit in Iraq, made a surprise visit to the Zaytun Unit and offered gratitude and encouragement to the troops. President Roh Moo-hyun, who holds the supreme command of the ROK Armed Forces, visited the Zaytun Unit on December 8. The president voiced his appreciation for the efforts of the soldiers, who had been successfully fulfilling duties despite the harsh conditions, boosting their morale significantly. After having breakfast with 600 troops of the Unit, President Roh made a tour of major facilities including the living quarters and the Zaytun Hospital. During a dialogue with the troops, the president underlined ![136_image_1.png](136_image_1.png) the importance of the Zaytun Unit by saying that "your sweat and endeavors consolidate ROK's diplomatic as other influences, and enable the nation to have a bigger voicein the international community." ![136_image_0.png](136_image_0.png) ## Multilateral Security Cooperation And International Arms Control Activities A. Multilateral Security Cooperation In many parts of the world, such non-traditional threats as terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental pollution and cultural differences are emerging as fresh security issues, on top of various bones of contention including disputes involving territorial, resource, ethnicity and religious issues. In particular, the ember of historical frictions and the remnant of the Cold War still linger in Northeast Asia. Under such situation, multilateral security cooperation is assuming growing importance to ensure peace and stability in the region. Currently, the ARF is serving as a primary intergovernmental forum for multilateral security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region. This forum empowers its members to jointly contend with new security issues as well as traditional political and military issues. Among the non-intergovernmental forums in the region are the ASC, NEACD, LNWFZ-NEA and CSCAP. Concerning security issues, the ROK government closely cooperates with not only Northeast Asian countries, but also many other nations in the Asia- Pacific to lay a foundation for a stable security environment in Northeast Asia as well as a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues within the framework of the ARF. In the defense officials' meeting of the 11th ARF Foreign Ministers' Meeting held on July 2, 2004, ROK defense officials introduced measures aimed at mutual confidence building between the South and the North through inter-Korean General-Level Talks and military support for inter- Korean exchanges and cooperation. In addition, they gave Islamic countries an explanation about the dispatch of additional ROK troops to support reconstruction and peacekeeping in war-ravaged Iraq. At the ARF Security Policy Conference held in China in November 2004, high-ranking defense officials of ROK called for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis and prompt resumption of the Six-Party Talks. On the basis of establishing comprehensive security, the fundamental concept of a regional security consultative body, the ROK government intends to pursue proactive involvement of experts in the discussions at the government and non-government level. Thus, the government will create conditions that have a positive and favorable impact on its effort to reduce tension and bring permanent peace to the Korean peninsula, while also contributing to stability and economic development of ![137_image_0.png](137_image_0.png) O ARF Security Policy Conference ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum ASC: Asian Security Council NEACD: North-East Asia Cooperation Dialogue LNWFZ-NEA: Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for Northeast Asia CSCAP: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific the international community. In concert with such multilateral security policies adopted by the government, the MND will actively participate in various cooperative security programs including confidence building, preventive diplomacy and arms control. This will help create a security environment conducive to deterring war and establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, and promoting permanent peace and co-prosperity in Northeast Asia. ## B. International Arms Control Activities UNDC : UN Disarmament Commission CD : Conference on Disarmament IAEA : Energy Agency International Atomic OPCW : Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons NPT : Nuclear non- Proliferation Treaty cwc : Chemical Weapons Convention вwc : Biological Weapons Convention CCW : Convention on Certain Convetional Weapons Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG : Zangger Committee ZC : AG : Australia Group MTCR : Missile Technology Control Regime WA : Wassenaar Arrangement [Figure 4-5] International Non-Proliferation System ![138_image_0.png](138_image_0.png) Perceiving nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the means of delivery including missiles as a serious threat to world peace and security, the international community is currently consolidating international cooperation to thwart the proliferation of such WMD. Since the September 11 terrorist attack, in particular, the international community has strengthened international treaties and activities of international organizations related with arms control to prevent terrorist groups and rogue states from acquiring WMDs. Since gaining membership in the UN in 1991, ROK has been an active participant in international arms control and non-proliferation efforts aimed at ensuring world peace and security. It has faithfully fulfilled the required duties and obligations as a party to relevant international regimes. ## (1) Efforts Toward Nuclear Non-Proliferation The ROK government is actively involved in many international efforts of various international organizations and regimes to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons including the NPT, IAEA, NSG (a nuclear material export control regime) and the Zangger Committee. In conjunction with the international community, the ROK government is pressing for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues as the North's development of nuclear weapons has emerged as a core factor that impedes denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and hampers the international community's efforts toward nuclear non-proliferation. With regard to ROK's experiments with a minute amount of nuclear materials for academic research purpose (plutonium-based chemical experiment in 1982 and the experiment using laser isotope separation technology to separate uranium in 2000), the ROK government actively cooperated with the IAEA's inspection and verification activities. On September 18, 2004, the ROK government announced the "four principles of the peaceful use of nuclear power", reiterating its determination to pursue denuclearization. ROK swiftly took a string of measures to enhance its nuclear transparency and creditability including the establishment of an independent nuclear control organization on October 25, 2004. On November 26, 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a Chairman's Statement which stated, "The Board welcomes the active cooperation the Republic of Korea has provided to the Agency (in connection with the plutonium-based chemical experiment), and the Board notes that the quantities of nuclear material involved were not significant, and that to date there has been no indication that the undeclared experiments have continued", which redressed the international community's concerns about ROK's experiments with nuclear materials. ![139_image_0.png](139_image_0.png) (2) Efforts toward Non-Proliferation of Chemical/Biological Weapons Keeping pace with the international trend towards the prohibition and abandonment of biochemical weapons, the ROK government signed the CWC and BWC under which it has been performing related obligations in good faith. However, considering that North Korea is not a signatory to the CWC, the ROK government seized the initiative to propose and adopt a resolution calling for immediate accession to the CWC by all non-member states titled "Recommendation on Ensuring the Universality of the CWC" following the 2nd session of the Conference of the States Partiesin 1997 and the "Measure to Ensure the Universality of the Convention", a more concrete form of said resolution at the 1st CWC Review Conference in 2003. In a nutshell, the ROK government is making every effort to create an international atmosphere to induce countries of concern including North Korea to adopt relevant conventions and ultimately scrap biochemical weapons. The MND is striving to dispatch military personnel to international UNMOVIC : UN Monitoring. Verification & Inspection Commission International Assistance and Protection Course - Introduces the CWC and OPCW's missions and activities to chemical experts selected by OPCW among those nominated by CWC member states. - Introduces the trend of international chemical threats, responses by the OPCW and major countries, chemical protection methods, and related equipment and materials, and conducts practical exercises. - Held five times a year since the CWC entered into effect in 1997, with European countries including Switzerland, Sweden and Czech Republic at the center. - The ROK NBC Defense Command seeks to host the course in the 1st half of 2005. organizations related to issues regarding biochemical weapons in such capacity as a special aid to the OPCW Director-General, head of its branches and inspectors as well as defense officers to the ROK Permanent Mission to the UN and International Organizations in Geneva. Concerning WMD inspections in Iraq, the MND had its personnel participated in WMD verification and inspection training hosted by the UNMOVIC to cultivate their ability to serve as international inspectors. In sum, the MND is making multi-pronged efforts to foster domestic experts who can contribute to international disarmament activities. In addition, the MND ordered the chemical analysis laboratory of the Agency for Defense Development to obtain qualifications as an OPCW- designated laboratory each year, ensuring that it maintains the stature as an internationally recognized laboratory. The MND will host the "2005 International Assistance and Protection Course" in Seoul for the first time in Asia. Based on such efforts, the MND is propping up the ROK government's endeavors to stop the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. ## (3) Efforts Toward Non-Proliferation Of Missiles Along with nuclear and biochemical weapons, the proliferation of missiles or the delivery means of those weapons, has emerged as a fresh threat posing a stumbling block to international and regional stability. To thwart such proliferation, the international community has set up international regimes for missile non-proliferation including the MTCR and HCOC. In March 2001, ROK became the 33rd member nation of the MTCR. In October 2004, ROK hosted the Plenary Meeting of the MTCR in Seoul, displaying its strong determination toward disarmament and non-proliferation and laying the cornerstone to raise its stature in the international community. At the plenary meeting, the MND co-chaired the intelligence exchange meeting, one of the sub-sessions of the plenary meeting. The MND also explained the ROK government's position whenever the opportunity arose, and contributed enormously to the successful hosting of the plenary meeting. To find a fundamental solution to North Korea's missile development and exports that threaten world peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the ROK government has been consolidating ROK-US cooperation as well as close collaboration with other members of the international community. ## (4) Efforts Toward Non-Proliferation Of Anti-Personnel Mines And Small Weapons In tandem with the efforts for non-proliferation of WMD, the international community including the UN, other international organizations and nongovernmental organizations is increasingly engaging in a dialogue to restrict anti-personnel mines and small weapons since the damage inflicted by antipersonnel mines upon civilians is sharply increasing. In consideration of the fact that the South and the North remain in an atmosphere of sharp confrontation, ROK signed the CCW in May 2001, which restricts inhumane use of anti-personnel mines. By taking a string of measures to prevent damages sustained by civilians due to anti-personnel mines, ROK demonstrated its firm determination, both at home and abroad, to remove landmines from a humanitarian standpoint, while establishing the conditions forthe use of mines in accordance with the security environment. The MND plans to completely eliminate anti-personnel mines in rear areas by 2006. At the government-level, ROK will contribute to the UN trust fund for clearing mine fields, and actively participate in humanitarian mine removal activities to join the international solidarity toward achieving universal peace. нсос : Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation ## (5) Efforts Toward Control Of Exports Of Strategic Materials And Dual-Use Goods The most notable change in international arms control efforts since the September 11 terrorist attack can be found in the strengthened export control regimes that prevent the dispersal of dual-use goods, applicable to WMD development, into countries and groups of concern. Based on such WMD export control regimes as the NSG and MTCR as well as the Wassenaar Arrangement, an export control regime regarding conventional weapons and dual-use goods, the international community is making a concerted effort to prevent terrorist organizations and rogue countries from acquiring strategic materials and advanced technologies. To prevent the proliferation of WMD, the UN Security Council adopted "Resolution 1540" on April 28, 2004, which called on countries around the world to bolster control over strategic material exports and prohibit any support for WMD development by terrorist organizations, etc. Since 2002, the ROK government has galvanized consultative meetings among the governmental agencies related with control of strategic material export. By ensuring that these agencies share necessary intelligence and maintain consistent policies, the government is aggressively preventing and thwarting transfer of Korean-made defense industrial products and dualpurpose goods to terrorist groups and rogue states. As described above, the ROK government and MND has substantially enhanced the transparency and international credibility of the nation and it is strengthening its international influence regarding WMD by actively participating in international arms control and WMD non-proliferation activities. ![143_image_1.png](143_image_1.png) # Section 4 ![143_Image_0.Png](143_Image_0.Png) Reduction Of Tension And Establishment Of A Peace Egime On The Korean Pen The Armistice Agreement concluded on July 27, 1953 has served as the legal and institutional framework for preventing armed clashes and managing crises on the Korean peninsula. Despite harsh circumstances, peace has been firmly maintained on the Korean peninsula for the past half a century under the armistice system. Since the historic inter-Korean summit in 2000, inter-Korean reconciliation, exchanges and cooperation have gone into full swing. Against this backdrop, study on the "establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula" are underway to replace the armistice system built on the vestige of the Korean War to attain a lasting peace. The Participatory Government has placed the "establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula" as a top policy task. Currently, it is exerting full-scaled efforts to bring an enduring peace to the peninsula. Given the significant implications that the establishment of such regime would have on the security of the Korean peninsula, the government is focused on pursuing peace by degrees and in phases with the following taken into account : peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues, changes in North Korea, advancement in inter-Korean relations, and political circumstances in Northeast Asia. ## Establishment Of A Peace Regime ![143_Image_2.Png](143_Image_2.Png) On The Korean Peninsula A. Maintenance Of The Armistice System Since its signing on July 27, 1953, the Armistice Agreement has served as a legal and institutional framework for preventing armed clashes and managing ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 147 ![144_image_0.png](144_image_0.png) crises on the Korean peninsula. In particular, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) has exerted great efforts to effectively ensure the implementation of the Armistice Agreement in spite of many difficulties. As a result, peace has been steadily maintained on the Korean peninsula for the past half a century. Following the O Signing of the Korean War Armistice Agreement UNC's appointment of a ROK general as the (July 27, 1953) senior member to the Military Armistice Commission on March 25, 1991, North Korea unilaterally refused to attend the plenary session of the Commission, disrupting normal operation of the Commission. Under the circumstances, the Secretaries 'Meetings and Staffs' Meetings of the Commission had to perform its function vicariously. Despite the fact that the South and the North agreed to comply with the existing Armistice Agreement until establishment of an enduring peace on the Korean peninsula in the "South-North Basic Agreement" effectuated in 1992, North Korea has taken a series of measures to annihilate the armistice regime from 1993. After causing the withdrawal of the Czech delegation on April 3, 1993, North Korea withdrew its delegation to the Commission on April 28, 1994. It set up the so-called "DPRK People's Armed Forces Panmunjom Representative Office" on May 24, 1994 and China recalled its delegation to the Commission on December 15, 1994. North Korea also maneuvered the withdrawal of the Polish delegation on February 28, 1995 forcibly. In the meantime, the ROK government and the UNC upheld their position that the MAC and NNSC must be kept intact as long as the Armistice Agreement existed, leaving the UNC side of the MAC and NNSC in normal operation. However, North Korea officially proposed on March 2, 1995 that US-North Korean general-level talks be held instead of the MAC in an obvious attempt to obliterate the Armistice Agreement. The ROK Ministry of National Defense and the UNC suggested to the North on February 11, 1998 to hold a general-level dialogue between the UNC and the North, based on the judgment that such was required to set up a solid dialogue channel for crisis management on the Korean peninsula within the framework of the armistice system. With North Korea's acceptance of the proposal, the Secretaries' Meetings and Staffs' Meetings were held on seven occasions from March 3 to May 29, 1998. On June 8, 1998, the UNC and the North Korean People's Armed Forces signed an agreement on the procedures of their general-level talks based on mutual agreement. Following the first round of the general-level talks between the UNC and the North Korean People's Armed Forces on June 23, 1998, a total of 14 rounds were held by September 2002. During the talks, the two parties primarily sought to identify the reason and accountability for violations of the Armistice Agreement, and exchanged views on military issues of mutual interest. In particular, they signed and effectuated the "Agreement on Partial Opening of the Demilitarized Zone" during the 12th and 14th rounds in connection with inter-Korean road and railway reconnection works. Thus, they set the stage for brisk inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation using the roads and railways in the east and west coast districts. However, due to differences over the agenda of the general-level talks, the UNC and the North Korean People's Armed Forces have failed to hold additional dialogue since the 14th round. The UNC has suggested that the general-level talks be held on a regular basis to discuss compliance with the Armistice Agreement and reduction of military tension. However, North Korea refuses to come to the table, demanding that organization of a threeparty joint military body of the South and the North as well as US replacing the general-level talks be discussed as a priority. Since March 2003, North Korea has rejected to attend regular MAC Staff's Meetings, while calling for the dissolution of the UNC whenever the opportunity arises. ![145_image_0.png](145_image_0.png) ![145_image_1.png](145_image_1.png) ![145_image_2.png](145_image_2.png) ![145_image_3.png](145_image_3.png) Defense White Paper 2004 | 149 ![145_image_4.png](145_image_4.png) ![145_image_5.png](145_image_5.png) The ROK government takes the stance that compliance with the existing Armistice Agreement must be firmly guaranteed until the establishment of an enduring peace on the Korean peninsula. The government is also striving to restore the normal functions of the MAC, the UNC-North Korean People's Armed Forces general-level talks held within the framework of the MAC as well as the NNSC. In addition, the ROK government is pursuing close consultation with the UNC to galvanize inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation programs within the framework of the armistice system. In addition, it is discussing ways to provide military support for such programs by holding inter-Korean military talks. ## B. Establishment Of A Peace Regime Establishment of a regime of peace on the Korean peninsula can be defined as shifting from the armistice system built on the vestige of the Korean War to a peace regime guaranteeing an enduring peace. It is aimed at ending the deep-rooted mutual distrust and confrontational hostilities between the South and the North, bringing a permanent peace to the Korean peninsula and subsequently laying the groundwork for co-prosperity and co-existence. ![146_image_0.png](146_image_0.png) Putting forward the "establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula" as its policy goal, the Participatory Government exerts great efforts to attain the goal. Since the establishment of a peace regime would mean a transition from the armistice system that has dominated the order on the Korean peninsula for the past 50 years, the government intends to gradually pursue the goal in stages, with peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues, changes in North Korea, developments in inter-Korean relations, and political developments in Northeast Asia taken into consideration. To establish a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, the Participatory Government will cement the basis for institutionalizing peace by stepping up inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. In addition, it is making diplomatic efforts to fosteran atmosphere conducive to gaining global understanding and promoting international cooperation concerning the establishment of a peace regime on the peninsula. In the process of building a peace regime on the peninsula, the Participatory Government has unflinchingly abided by the principle that the South and the North must resolve the relevant issues as the parties directly concerned. At the same time, it intends to conclude a peace agreement and establish a peace regime on the basis of support, assurances and active participation by the international community. It is expected that a peace regime on the Korean peninsula built through such process will serve as a major driving force behind promotion of security and economic cooperation in Northeast Asia and significantly contribute to world peace. ## C. Peaceful Resolution Of The North Korean Nuclear Issues The North Korean nuclear issues was touched off when nuclear inspections by the IAEA revealed its past nuclear activities (extraction of plutonium) following detection of the nuclear facilities at Yeongbyeon by a French commercial satellite in late 1989. After undergoing a tumultuous process, the "Geneva Agreed Framework" was signed between US and North Korea on October 21, 1994. The gist of the Agreement held that US would provide North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy oil every year and two 1,000 MWe light water reactors in return for North Korea's freeze of its nuclear facilities. It seemed that the conclusion of the Agreement brought the nuclear crisis to an end. In early October 2002, however, North Korea admitted that it had continued its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, triggering another nuclear crisis. The KEDO suspended the supply of heavy oil to North Korea from December 2002, considering North Korea's pursuit of the highly enriched uranium program as a evident breach of the Agreed Framework. In response, North Korea demanded that US drop its policy antagonizing the communist North and sign a mutual non-aggression agreement. At the same time, North Korea took a series of measures to abandon its nuclear freeze, escalating the nuclear crisis. The ROK government takes the position that North Korea should not be Three Principles for the Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issues Intolerance of North Korea's nuclear possession Peaceful resolution through dialogue Active role by ROK KEDO : Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization allowed to possess nuclear weapons under any circumstances as its nuclear development poses a grave menace to stability and peace on the Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia. The ROK government also intends to find a fundamental and comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear issue by peaceful means. To be specific, it believes that the nuclear issue must be resolved in such manner that ensures North Korea's relinquishment of any and all nuclear capabilities and verification through international inspections to prevent concerns from being raised again regarding the country's nuclear weapons. To accomplish such goal, the ROK government has pushed ahead with the six-party talks based on tripartite policy coordination with US and Japan and close consultation with China and Russia. In addition, it has made aggressive efforts, through various channels of inter-Korean dialogue, to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Especially, the ROK government underscores that North Korea's aggravation of the relevant situation or possession of nuclear weapons will never be any benefit to the maintenance of its regime. The government also makes it clear that North Korea's relinquishment of its nuclear program will be compensated for significant assistance. Thanks to the vigorous efforts by the countries concerned, the 1st round of North Korea's Measures to Unfreeze Its Nuclear Facilities . Dec. 12, 2002 : Declaration to lift the freeze on its nuclear facilities . Dec. 21-24, 2002 : Unsealing of its frozen nuclear facilities - Dec. 31, 2002 : Deportation of IAEA inspectors . Jan. 10, 2003 : Declaration to withdraw from the NPT . Feb. 26, 2003 : Re-operation of the 5MWe nuclear reactor - Apr. 18, 2003 : Declaration of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods the six-party talks was held in Beijing, China in August 2003 (August 27-29), which was followed by another two rounds of the talks (2nd round on February 25-28, 2004 and 3rd round on June 23-26, 2004) and the Working Group Meeting (1st round on May 12-14, 2004 and 2nd round on June 21-22, 2004). In the 3rd round of the six-party talks held in June 2004, South and North Korea and US put forward concrete alternatives to resolve the nuclear issue, paving the way for the launch of full-fledged negotiations. However, North Korea has persistently stuck to its past positions since the 3rd round of the six-party talks, causing a delay to the 4th-round of the meeting. Unfortunately, the countries concerned have sharply divergent opinions on the specific methods to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Given this situation, it is expected that substantial dialogues and coordination efforts will be required to hammer out a concrete agreement. The ROK government will devise specific alternatives concerning major issues of contention. At the same time, it will make multi-pronged efforts to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue, seeking to induce North Korea to make a strategic decision through various channels. ## Pursuit Of A Reduction Of Military Tension And Confidence Building A. Pursuit Of Inter-Korean Military Talks (1) Inter-Korean Working Military-Level Talks The great significance of the inter-Korean working military-level talks lies in the following facts. First, the South and the North have discussed ways to facilitate military cooperation to achieve the common goal of inter-Korean road and railway reconnection on a total of 19 occasions (9 rounds of working-level meetings and 10 rounds of contacts by chief delegates). Second, they set a precedent where military assurances of non-aggression were provided to boost inter-Korean economic cooperation projects including construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and to promote civilianlevel exchanges and cooperation. In October 2000, the South proposed to hold the 1st round of the inter- Korean working military-level talks to discuss military assurances of nonaggression regarding the inter-Korean road and railway reconnection works, as agreed at the 1st round of the inter-Korean defense ministers' talks (September 25-26, 2000). However, there arose a need to establish a legal rationale for the partial opening of the DMZ and discussion of relevant military and technical issues, ahead of holding the working military-level talks. Accordingly, the UNC and North Korean People's Armed Forces adopted and effectuated the "Agreement between the United Nations Forces and the DPRK People's Armed Forces on Partial Opening of the DMZ" (November 17, 2000) regarding the west coast district that the road and railway of the Gyeongeui Line crosses. On November 28, 2000, the South and the North held the 1st round of the inter-Korean working military-level talks at Tongilgak (Unification Pavilion) on the North Korean side of the truce village of Panmunjom. In the four ensuing rounds, the two sides resolved the bone of contention regarding the designation of the joint administration area and inter-Korean road and railway reconnection and worked out final agreements on relevant details. In the 5th round held on February 8, 2001, the two sides adopted the "Agreement on Military Assurances for Designation of the Joint Administration Area and the Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North" concerning the west coast district. However, the Agreement was not put into force quickly because North Korea dragged its feet on the grounds of administrative issues. In the 7th round of the inter-Korean ministerial talks and the 2nd meeting of the Inter- Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee in August 2002, the South and the North agreed to "conclude measures for military assurances until simultaneous groundbreaking for the Gyeongeui and Donghae road and railway lines and commencement of their construction on September 18, 2002." Accordingly, the UNC and North Korean People's Armed Forces adopted and effectuated the "Agreement between the United Nations Forces and the DPRK People's Armed Forces on Partial Opening of the DMZ" (September 12, 2002) concerning the east coast district, as was done for the west coast district. In the 7th round of the inter-Korean working military-level talks (September 17, 2002), the South and the North adopted and put into effect the "Agreement on Military Assurances for Designation of the Joint Administration Area in the East and West Coast Districts and the Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North." Subsequently, the inter-Korean working military-level talks focused on practical consultations, not being shackled by political issues as in the past. Thus, the two sides successfully adopted and effectuated the "Provisional Agreement on Military Assurances for Passage of the Makeshift Roads in the Joint Administration Area in the East ![150_image_0.png](150_image_0.png) and West Coast Districts" (January 27, 2003), "Supplementary Agreement to the Provisional Agreement on Military Assurances for Passage of the Makeshift Roads in the Joint Administration Area in the East and West Coast Districts" (September 17, 2003) and the "Agreement on Installation and Operation of Guard Posts in the Joint Administration Area in the East and West Coast Districts" (December 23, 2003). The military authorities of the South and the North placed into force the above agreements by forging a consensus on substantive and specific issues based on the understanding of their respective positions and coordination of divergent views within the framework of providing military assurances for inter-Korean road and railway reconnection works as well as other exchange and cooperation programs commensurate with the progress in inter-Korean relations. The inter-Korean working military-level talks opened the possibilities for the South and the North to resolve the issues of military confidence building and arms control through dialogue. ## (2) Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks During the 13th round of the inter-Korean ministerial talks (February 6, 2004), the South and the North agreed that full-scale negotiations to ease military tension and build mutual confidence on the Korean peninsula were necessary to ensure the stable development of inter-Korean relations. Towards that end, the two sides decided to hold dialogue between their military authorities, apart from the existing inter-Korean military working-level talks aimed at providing military assurances of non-aggression for inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Although the South proposed holding such dialogue to the North (February 12, 2004), the North did not respond to the proposal. In the 14th round of the inter-Korean ministerial talks (May 7, 2004), the two sides agreed again to hold an inter-Korean general-level military meeting. At the request from the North to "hold the 1st round of the general-level military talks at Mt. Geumgang on May 26, 2004" (May 12, 2004), the South engaged in detailed negotiations with the North to convene the meeting. During these workinglevel negotiations, the two sides hit a snag concerning the rank of chief ![151_image_0.png](151_image_0.png) delegates. On May 25, 2004, they finally exchanged the lists of delegates headed by one-star generals, respectively. Thus, the 1st round of the inter- Korean general-level military talks was held at Mt. Geumgang on May 26, 2004. During the 1st-round meeting, the South put forward concrete measures to prevent accidental armed clashes in the West Sea : (i) installation and operation of direct telephone lines between the fleet commands of the West Sea ; (ii) designation and use of common radio frequencies between patrol boats ; (iii) establishment and use of visual signals (signal lights and flags) between patrol boats ; and (iv) intelligence sharing regarding crackdown on third-country vessels engaging in illegal fishing activities in the area. North Korea argued that both Koreas should cease propaganda activities provoking the other at the Military Demarcation Line and eliminate propaganda tools, saying that the two sides must put this pressing issue on the front burner. During the 2nd round of the inter-Korean general-level military talks held at Mt. Seorak on June 3-4, the two sides adopted and effectuated the "Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line Areas." In a situation where the South and the North had failed to inch toward any progress in resolving practical issues toward reducing military tension, they finally came upon a common understanding to promote military cooperation. The two sides worked out a package solution to the issues of "potential conflicts in the West Sea" and "propaganda activities" with a view to ease military tension on the Korean peninsula by preventing accidental clashes in the West Sea scarred by two previous military clashes and to protect the livelihood of Korean fishermen by blocking illegal fishing activities by third-country fishing ships. To discuss specific methods for implementing the above agreement, the 1st working-level delegates meeting for the inter-Korean general-level military talks was held in Gaeseong on June 10-12. During the meeting, the South and the North adopted and effectuated an agreement annexed to the "Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line Areas." Accordingly, the naval vessels of the South and the North tested each means of telecommunications including international common radio frequencies and signal flags/lights in the West Sea on June 14 to confirm that they were functioning properly. In addition, the South and the North ceased all propaganda activities at the Military Demarcation Line from June 15 and started to take down propaganda apparatus and toolsfrom June 16. During the 2nd working-level delegates meeting for the inter-Korean generallevel military talks held on June 29-30, the two sides reviewed the results of the 1st stage removal of propaganda apparatus at the Military Demarcation Line and discussed ways to conduct regular test communications between their naval vessels in the West Sea. However, it turned out of the South and the North in the West Sea that there existed differences between the two sides over the issue of eliminating propaganda tools. Thus, the South and the North held a dialogue between the chief delegates to the working-level delegates meeting on July 5, and reached an agreement to begin the 2nd stage removal of propaganda apparatus and implement agreements related with the West Sea in good faith from July 6. However, the inter-Korean general-level military talks and the relevant working-level delegates meetings came to a standstill as all talks between the authorities of the South and the North were completely halted from mid-July. Besides, elimination of propaganda apparatus at the Military Demarcation Line was suspended from August 13, with the percentage of completion at 50% to 60%. Fortunately, the South and the North have consistently carried out communications between their naval vessels using international common radio frequencies as well as intelligence sharing regarding third-country ships engaging in illegal fishing activities in the West Sea. In the future, the ROK military will hold the inter-Korean general-level military talks or workinglevel delegates meetings at the earliest possible date to discuss with its northern counterpart ways to implement existing agreements including the currently suspended removal of propaganda tools. ![153_image_0.png](153_image_0.png) ## B. Military Support For Inter-Korean Exchange And Cooperation Programs Under the keynote of the "Policy of Peace and Prosperity", the Participatory Government has broadened the scope of inter-Korean economic cooperation programs including reconnection of roads and railways, development of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and implementation of the Mt. Geumgang tourism project. In concert with such policy, the MND is actively providing military support for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation programs. In particular, the road and railway reconnection of the Gyeongeui and Donghae Lines crossing the DMZ has a symbolic meaning of linking the severed arteries of the peninsula. Furthermore, it constitutes establishment of the infrastructure to further develop inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. For the execution of the reconnection project, the ROK military conducted mine removal and roadbed construction at the Civilian Control Line including the DMZ. On September 19, 2000, military construction work started in the Gyeongeui Line area. On September 19, 2002, the South and the North simultaneously embarked on the road and railway reconnection works of both lines at the government level. The military authorities of the South and the North set up a military hot line between the field commanders in charge of the reconnection project to facilitate discussions about security assurances and progress in the construction works. Based on such efforts, the two sides are seeking to prevent any accidental armed clash during the reconnection of the road and railway links. | [Table 4-6] Reconnection of Inter-Korean Road and Railway Links | | | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------| | Line | Type | Scale | Section | Total Distance (km) | | Single | Munsan (South) ~ | 27.3 | | | | Railway | track | Gaeseong (North) | | | | Gyeongeui | Tongilchon (South) ~ | | | | | Line | Four | Site of the Gaeseong | | | | Road | 10 | | | | | lanes | Industrial Complex | | | | | (North) | | | | | | Single | Sacheon-ri (South) ~ | | | | | Railway | 25 | | | | | track | Onjeong-ri (North) | | | | | Two | Sacheon-ri (South) ~ | 23.7 | | | | Donghae | Road | lanes | Onjeong-ri (North) | | | Line | Unification Observatory | | | | | Makeshift | ~ Military Demarcation | 6.6 | | | | One lane | | | | | | Road | Line | | | | [Table 4-6] Reconnection of Inter-Korean Road and Railway Links Measures to prevent accidental armed clashes between the South and the North during construction works - The guard posts of the two sides in the construction areas will be set up 250 meters away from the MDL. - If the distance between the two sides is not more than 400 meters at the time of mine removal and not more than 200 meters at the time of ordinary construction works, the two sides will perform such works alternately on different dates. - Guards will comprise less than 100 persons, with personal firearms of not more than 30 live rounds of ammunition. After the groundbreaking ceremony, the military authorities of the South and the North proceeded smoothly with the construction works, engaging in consultations about specific issues necessary for construction as well as security assurances. As a result, the makeshift roads of the Gyeongeui and Donghae Lines were opened at the end of December 2002. The two sides held a ceremony marking the railway reconnection at the Military Demarcation Line on June 14, 2003. The railway & road construction in the southern section of the Gyeongeui Line was completed in the later half of October 2003. Toward the end of November 2004, the road construction from the Military Demarcation Line to the Unification Observatory in the southern section of the Donghae Line was completed and opened on December 1, 2004. The two sides concluded the "Provisional Agreement on Passage of ![155_image_0.png](155_image_0.png) Makeshift Roads" at the chief delegates' contact of the inter-Korean military working-level talks on January 27, 2003. This led to the beginning of overland tour of Mr. Geumgang by people from the South through the use of the Donghae Line makeshift road. In order to protect the safety of tourists, the ROK military has maintained a firm posture to perform rescue activities in the event there arise any accidents or emergencies. It has also rendered full support including military assurances for various inter-Korean exchanges and | Classification | Section of Military Construction | Distance (km) | | |------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----| | | North of Imjin River ~ Military | 4.5 | | | Gyeongeui | Railway | Demarcation Line (MDL) | | | Line | Road | Tongilchon ~ MDL | 5.1 | | Railway | Songhyeon 2 Gyo ~ MDL | 2.6 | | | Road | Songhyeon Jingyo ~ MDL | 2.6 | | | Donghae | | | | | Line | Makeshift | Unification Observatory ~ MDL | 6.6 | | Road | | | | [Table 4-7] Military Construction Regarding Reconnection of Inter-Korean Road and Railway Links cooperation programs such as construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and flood prevention at the Imjin River. In the meantime, the MND has scrutinized security vulnerabilities that may happen during the process of executing inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation projects. Thus, the MND has set up the best military safety mechanism appropriate to relevant conditions, based on military impact assessments by military experts and local units. Most of all, the MND is closely cooperating with the UNC under the principle that the existing armistice system must be kept intact until the system of a permanent peace is established on the Korean peninsula. ![156_image_1.png](156_image_1.png) ![156_image_0.png](156_image_0.png) railway (Donghae Line) ## Effort Toward Repatriation Of The Rok Pows A. Status Of Non-Repatriated Rok Pows The UN and Communist forces exchanged prisoners of war (POWs) pursuant to the Armistice Agreement signed on July 27, 1953. However, a considerable number of the ROK POWs detained in North Korea were not returned. Until the early 1960s, the UNC continuously requested North Korea to repatriate these POWs through the MAC. As North Korea insisted that there was "not a single ROK POW" left in the country, the matter has remained unsolved until now. In the wake of Second Lieutenant Cho Chang-ho's dramatic return to the South in October 1994, the issue of POWs came into the public limelight. To identify the status of non-repatriated ROK POWs, the MND publicized the "List of the Missing in Action" of the Korean War" in October 1997. The list containing 19,409 names was produced based on reports of MIAs and the checking of muster rolls. It is presumed that a substantial number of persons included in the list are still being detained in the North. Based on remarks by North Korean defectors and 47 POWs who have returned home, it is believed that there were 538 POWs living in the North as of December 2004. ## B. Rok Government'S Efforts To Resolve The Issue In order to "fulfill its duty and obligation", the ROK government intends to press for the repatriation of the ROK POWs through all available channels. The government has constantly raised the repatriation issue through international organizations. In addition, it has called for a fundamental resolution to the issue in its negotiations with the North Korea is refusing to discuss the issue itself, the ROK government's efforts for direct repatriation of the POWs have produced no tangible outcome. As a realistic alternative, the government has worked hard to materialize postal correspondence and reunions between POWs and their families by regarding the POW issue as a part of the "issue of separated families in a wider sense." It is expected that an increasing number of POWs will be reunited with their loved ones when construction of the Mt. Geumgang reunion center for separated families is completed and inter-Korean relations improve further. In the face of the recent sharp rise in the number of ROK POWs staying in third countries, the ROK government revamped relevant institutional systems to help them return to, and settle down in, their motherland as soon as possible. In 2004, the government formulated and issued the "Operating Regulations on Repatriation, etc. of the ROK Armed Forces Prisoners of War" (Prime Minister's Directive No. 448 ; January 19, 2004), delineating the specifications of functions and business procedures of the government agencies concerned regarding repatriation of ROK POWs staying in third countries. The Regulations above are also applicable to repatriation of the spouses and lineal descendants of the POWs. In addition, the government formulated and issued the "Regulations on Handling of Affairs, etc. Regarding the ROK Armed Forces Prisoners of War" (MND Directive No. 746 ; March 22, 2004), which clearly set forth specifications of functions and procedures by department/institution concerning affairs related to the POWs. ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 161 Thanks to such strenuous efforts by the government, there has been a sharp increase in the repatriation of the ROK POWs and their family members staying in third countries since 2004. According to the "Act on the Treatment of the ROK Armed Forces Prisoners of War Detained in North Korea" promulgated on January 29, 1999, the government supports the stable settlement of returnees into society, providing a certain amount of annuities, settlement expenses and residential assistance expenses. On a yearly basis, the MND invites the returnees and their wives to field trips to major sites pertaining to security as well as social gatherings. ![158_image_0.png](158_image_0.png) The ROK government will continue to O Ceremony celebrating the discharge from military service of Second Lieutenant Cho Chang-ho, a POW who returned home seek the repatriation of the POWs staying in third countries along with their families. At the same time, it will ceaselessly call on the North to repatriate all ROK POWs through various channels. Moreover, the government will devise and implement various measures to support the stable settlement of returned POWs and their family members into society. Defense White Paper 2004 ![159_image_0.png](159_image_0.png) Up to the present, the ROK military has relied heavily on the ROK-US combined defense system in maintaining war deterrence. As a result, it falls short of retaining independent war fighting capabilities. Recently, ROK has been in a double-edged security environment where North Korea's military threat persists amid progress in inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. What is more, ROK is witnessing drastic changes in its strategic environment triggered by the realignment of the US military presence in the country according to the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR). More than ever, it is needed for ROK to develop military capabilities to proactively cope with the changing strategic environment and effectively thwart existing threats from North Korea. ## Direction Of Building Military Capabilities Scientific and technological breakthroughs have shifted the focus of warfare from territorial conquests or mass destruction to paralyzing the enemy's intelligence capabilities and striking its center of gravity. Surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, automated command/control/communication systems, long-distance strike capabilities against deep targets and mobility superior to those of the adversarial forces are the keys to such new types of warfare. Given the security situation of the South characterized by perennial threats from the North, it is imperative for the South to establish military capabilities to deter such threats. At the same time, it needs to gradually develop core military capabilities to tackle unspecified threats in the future. Towards that end, the nation places the focus of its military capabilities on the establishment of the "sensor to shooter" system appropriate for the ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 163 features of future warfare. In addition, it aims to build "independent surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities", "establishment of a real-time C4I system" covering all tactical, operational and strategic echelons, and "expansion of strategic strike capabilities against deep targets." ## Force Investment Programs And R&D Efforts ![160_Image_0.Png](160_Image_0.Png) For National Defense A. Objective And Direction Of The Force Investment Programs The MND has formulated the goal of incorporating weapons, equipment and materials with the functionality as requested by the Armed Forces into its force capabilities in a cost-efficient and timely manner. To attain such goal, the MND laid down the following as the direction of its efforts: First, the MND will upgrade the Agency for Defense Development into a research institute dedicated to technological development to secure necessary technological components for the development of state-of-the-art weaponry. It will also innovate the existing R&D system and increase R&D investments including establishment of a new specialized R&D center. Second, the MND will upgrade the currently available weaponry and equipment and apply the principle of competition to the entire process of acquisition to ensure cost-efficient procurement of weaponry. Third, the MND will ensure integrated combat capabilities by acquiring such package elements as integrated logistics support and pursuing interface and interoperability with existing weapons systems in developing weapons domestically or procuring weapons from abroad. Fourth, any military investment project that has a significant impact on the development of the domestic industrial sector will be executed as a government-initiated project, with the national industrial infrastructure fully utilized. Fifth, the MND will open its entire acquisition process to promote transparency while identifying and redressing any institutional and procedural inefficiencies. It will also foster professional staff and improve its human resource management system in a bid to enhance the transparency, rationality and professionalism of its acquisition process. ![161_image_0.png](161_image_0.png) Incorporating weapons, equipment and materials with such functionality as requested by the Armed Forces into its force capabilitiesin a costefficient and timely manner - Securing core technologies necessary for the development of state-of- | the-art weaponry for the future | |------------------------------------------------------| | - Pursuit of economical weapons acquisition programs | - Ensuring integrated combat capabilities - Strengthening the link with the national industrial development - Promotion of the rationality, professionalism and transparency of acquisition-related affairs ## B. Improvement Of The Defense Acquisition System The MND has consistently analyzed and improved all components of its acquisition management system to ensure transparent and efficient operation of the system. In particular, it has revamped related laws, procedures and organizations to solidify the institutional mechanism of the acquisition management system. ## (1) Enhancement Of The Transparency And Fairness Of Decision-Making Regarding Force Investment Programs Complex interests prompt individual Services, government agencies and entities in the defense industry to react sensitively to formulation of a Mid- Term Defense Plan, budget compilation, approval of R&D plans, decisionmaking on specific types of weaponry, and approval of major program execution. Therefore, it is very important to ensure transparency, fairness and accountability of the relevant decision making process. Under the circumstances, the MND has improved the "approval process" to prevent any arbitrary decision-making by the party authorized and responsible to give approval. Force Investment Programs (FIPs) have been subject to deliberation and decision-making by a consultative body since May 2003. The MND also shifted to an open decision-making system involving officials in charge from the government agencies concerned as well as civilian experts, if necessary. Decision-making on types of weaponry - Granting of the eligibility to participate in a bidding process to foreign companies meeting the requirements of the ROK military on the basis of tests and negotiations - Decision-making based ![161_image_1.png](161_image_1.png) ## (2) Improvement Of Cost Efficiency Through Overseas Procurement System And Procedural Improvement In the case of overseas weapons procurement, inconsistent decision-making is likely to cause enormous waste and loss of defense resources. Besides, any dispute over fairness may flare into diplomatic discord. In an effort to find a fundamental solution to such problems, the MND institutionalized the formulation of "business strategies", ensuring consistency in the handling of relevant matters. It also enhanced the fairness and cost efficiency of its procurement system by ensuring that the specific types of weaponry to be acquired should be determined through a competitive bidding process. ## (3) Invigoration Of Military-Industrial/Academia/Research Institute Cooperation From the early phase of R&D efforts, the opinion of the military and other related agencies that articulated their needs is reflected to the utmost possible extent. In the meantime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff collects and scrutinizes the requirements for R&D of core technologies and presents its deliberation results to the MND. Not only prototype producers, but also relevant vendors participate in the basic prototype design process to ensure efficient manufacturing of prototypes. In addition, the MND is pursuing the installation and operation of a specialized defense research center in academic circles for such purposes as the establishment of core infrastructure technologies, fostering R&D research staff and performance of core technological research. ## (4) Establishment Of A Preparatory System For Implementation Of Major Acquisition Programs As regards major acquisition programs, analysis activities prior to launch of the programs have been bolstered to identify and resolve, in advance, any anticipated problems that may arise in the process of executing such programs. For efficient cost calculation, the MND has set up a systematic coordination and cooperation mechanism by improving the prior negotiation system and the business procedures of cost analysis agencies/departments. ## (5) Development Of The Defense Procurement Agency Into The Entity In Charge Of Contracts Contract-related affairs of major military programs were transferred to the Defense Procurement Agency so that the organization can handle those affairs at its responsibility. ## C. Status Of Force Investment Programs (1) Trend And Impact Of Changes In Fip Costs In line with the changes in defense expenditures, the ratio of FIP costs to the entire defense expenditures dropped from 38% in 1999 to 33.9% in 2003. Thus, it is inevitable to introduce changes in major FIPs. | [Table 4-9] Trend of Changes in FIP Costs | (Unit: hundred million won) | | | | | | |---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------|--------|-----|-------| | Classification | '00 | '01 | '02 | '03 | '04 | Total | | FIP | 52,141 54,756 57,379 62,930 | 280,643 | | | | | | | 53,437 | | | | | | | (As percentage in defense | (33.2) | (33.9) | | | | | | | (36.9) | (33.9) | (32.5) | (33.9) | | | | expenditures) | | | | | | | | Appropriate Requirements | | | | | | | | (Based on the Mid-Term | 59,441 | 63,761 69,159 75,324 79,902 347,587 | | | | | | Defense Plan) | | | | | | | | [Table 4-10] Major FIPs for 2004 | | | |----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------| | Classification | Ongoing Programs | Newly-Launched Programs | | - Tactical communication | - AWACS | | | system | | | | C4I/Intelligence | - Tactical vehicles for | | | - Multiple channel VHF | communication relay | | | equipment, etc. | - Restructuring of the mechanized | | | - MLRS (M/A) | infantry division | | | Maneuver/Strike | - K9 self-propelled artillery, | - Infrared imaging system for | | K1A1 tanks, etc. | helicopters | | | - KDX II/II | | | | - 214-class submarines | | | | Maritime/Landing | - FFX | | | (KSS II) | | | | - LPX | | | | - F-15K fighters | - Mass production of T-50s | | | Air/Air Defense | - Short-range air defense | (advanced trainer) | | guided weapons, etc. | - Life extension of F-5E/Fs, etc. | | | - Fostering the capability to develop advanced next-generation | | | | weapons system tailored for ROK | | | | Domestic R&D | - Next-generation tanks, military satellite communication systems, | | | etc. | | | ## (2) Fips For 2004 Total defense expenditures for 2004 remain at 18.9412 trillion won, up 8.1% from 2003. The amount of FIP costs stands at 6.293 trillion won, up 9.7% from 2003. ## (3) Targeted Mid-Term Fips (2005~2009) The characteristic of FIPs is that 10 to 20 years of long-term investments are required to incorporate weaponry into the force capabilities and to nurture professional staff in order to ensure timely exercise of combat capabilities. Accordingly, the MND has implemented FIPs by formulating a mid-term plan every five years. | [Table 4-11] Planned FIPs for 2005 to 2009 | Mid-Term | Major Weapons | |----------------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------| | Current Level | Target | System | | Establishment of | - AWACS | | | Tactical | strategic | - Mid- and high-altitude | | surveillance and | surveillance and | reconnaissance UAV | | early warning | early warning | - Military satellite | | capabilities | | | | C4I/ | capabilities | communication, etc. | | Electronic Warfare | - K1A1 tanks | | | Expansion of | - K-9 self-propelled | | | Limited deep | deep battle | artillery | | battle capabilities | capabilitie | - MLRS | | - Counter-battery radars | | | | Maneuver/Strike | - 4,000/7,000-ton | | | Limited | destroyers | | | Protection of | | | | coastal/near sea | - Large-sized transport | | | major SLOC in | | | | maritime | vessels | | | coastal/near sea | | | | operation | - 1,800-ton submarines | | | areas | | | | capabilities | - 400-ton high-speed | | | vessels, etc. | | | | Maritime/Landing | - Airborne tankers | | | Limited air | Expansionof the | - F-15K fighters | | operation | scope of air | - Next-generation guided | | capabilities | operations | munitions, etc. | | Air/Air Defense | | | ## D. R&D And The Defense Industry (1) Development Of Defense R&D Policies It is anticipated that future warfare will shift from equipment and manpower-driven maneuvers to knowledge and information-based operations in line with the development of high-speed communication and computer technology. Accordingly, advanced countries have made aggressive investments to acquire reconnaissance satellites loaded with super-precision imagery information sensors, underwater surveillance systems utilizing combined high-sensitivity underwater audio/non-acoustic sensors, and various intelligence guided weapons. In addition, they are striving to maintain their comparative technological advantage by adopting more stringent policies to protect core technologies. Unlike such global trend, ROK's acquisition paradigm is prone to rely more heavily on purchasing of weapons systems from overseas. For such reasons as insufficient investments in domestic technological development and reluctance of industrialized countries to transfer their technologies, ROK has been mired in a vicious circle where the technological gap between ROK and advanced countries widens and ROK inevitably depends on those countries to acquire cutting-edge weaponry and core technologies. ![165_image_0.png](165_image_0.png) [Figure 4-12] Level of ROK's Research and Development(as of 2004) power, guided munitions and intelligence/electronic warfare capabilities. To sever such vicious circle, the MND published the "National Defense R&D Policy" containing the goal of defense-related R&D, direction of future development, R&D tasks regarding weapons systems and core technologies, and so forth. This laid the foundation for systematic and goal-oriented implementation of defense R&D programs. On the basis of such efforts, the MND will press for substantive implementation of its R&D policies. Tojoin the ranks of industrialized nations by acquiring core technologies necessary to attain advanced weaponry-related R&D by 2010 and securing capabilities to independently develop sophisticated future weapons systems by 2020, the MND will exert its utmost efforts to establish self-reliant defense capabilities. To keep pace with the effort to build a future force driven by scientific and technological prowess and expedite national policies for the development of science and technology, the ROK military's defense R&D policies will be aimed at developing a core force system and achieving technological innovations. For such purpose, the ROK military formulates and implements the following key points. First, for the development of the defense R&D system, the ROK military reflected high value-added scientific and technological development tasks for national defense in the "National Science and Technology Basic Plan of the Participatory Government for 2003-2007" in 2003, ensuring that defense R&D programs are implemented in concert with government-wide science and technology policies. At the level of the MND, it specified in the "National Defense R&D Policy" that industrial entities and specialized research institutes would take the initiative for developing core defense technologies regarding which they retain a comparative edge. This sets the stage for expanding the outsourcing of core technological development. In addition, the MND has steadily revitalized the civilian-military dual-purpose technological development program being jointly implemented by four government ministries since 1999. Such effort has contributed to strengthening security capabilities and enhancing industrial competitiveness at the same time. In addition, the ROK military has set up five specialized research centers that engage in focused research into specific military technologies. Thus, the military combines the strong technological potential of the academic circles with the development of core technologies, and also induces competent human resources to participate in the development of defense technologies. In an effort to facilitate the academic circles to concentrate on research activities, the military has directed academic institutes to formulate "basic research plans on defense science and technology" to establish systematic basic research plans regarding national defense. Second, the ROK military is endeavoring to nurture the Agency for Defense Development into an advanced research center so that it can contribute to scientific development of the military, perform domestic research and development of cutting-edge core weapons systems and redress the dependence on foreign countries for the acquisition of relevant core Specialized Research Centers In order to combine the strong technological potential of the academia to developcore technologies and also encourage competent human resources to participate in development of defense technologies, these research centers have been commissioned to perform focused research into certain technological areas. For such purpose, a total of 35.2 billion won was provided up to 2003. In sum, 318 professors and 1,315 students from 125 institutions participated in these research activities geared toward 70 tasks in total. technologies. Towards such end, the military is exploring ways to help the Agency for Defense Development gain membership into the Korea Scientists and Engineers Mutual Aid Association, which provides annuities to retired researchers of government-invested research institutes, in order to secure competent human resources in the field of defense science. In addition, the ROK military will continue to improve the working conditions and welfare of researchers including an increase in salaries. Third, a dramatic increase in the absolute amount of defense R&D costs is a prerequisite to invigorating the defense R&D efforts. Major industrialized nations have maintained the ratio of R&D costs to overall defense expenditures at over 10% for the past five years. However, ROK's defense R&D investments remain at half the ratio stated above. Under its cooperative self-reliant defense posture plan, the MND will improve the conditions for defense R&D by increasing the defense R&D budget in phases with a view to attain the ratio of R&D costs to overall defense expenditures of 7% in 2008 and 10% in 2015. ## (2) History Of Rok'S Development Of Advanced Weapons Systems With the Agency for Defense Development at the center, ROK embarked upon the indigenous development of weapons systems in 1971 ranging from firearms, ammunition, communication/electronic/maneuver equipment, to maritime and aerial weapons systems. Then, the country launched the development of 60mm and 81mm mortars, small arms ammunition, mortar shells, wired and wireless equipment, and high-speed vessels. In the mid-1970s, the country entered into the stage of mass-producing basic weapons systems. Thus, ROK pursued research and development of some high-precision weaponry including machine guns, grenade launchers, 20mm Vulcan cannons, upgraded tanks, 105mm and 155mm towed howitzers, Korean warships and MLRS. In September 1978, ROK succeeded in the indigenous development of surface-to-surface guided missiles with a range of 180km. From the 1980s, ROK made efforts to upgrade its basic weapons systems and started to develop homegrown Korean weapons systems. Thus, the country began to develop Korean rifles, new 60mm mortars, 155mm upgraded towed howitzers, armored vehicles, K-1 tanks, patrol fighters, submersibles, surface-to-surface guided missiles, short-range ship-to-ship ![168_image_0.png](168_image_0.png) OKT-1, the first indigenously developed & fielded aircraft of which export negotiations are underway following exports to Indonesia in early 2001 ![168_image_1.png](168_image_1.png) O T-50, a supersonic advanced trainer and light combat aircraft under development based on the infrastructure of the domestic aircraft industry ![168_image_2.png](168_image_2.png) guided missiles and 30mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. The Korean armored fighting vehicle, developed in 1984, gained international recognition for its outstanding functionality. Following initial exports of the vehicles to Malaysia in 1993, ROK is currently discussing with many countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia to export the vehicles. In the 1990s, the era of a technological take-off, ROK secured core technologies, stepping up cooperation among industrial, academic and research organizations. The country also focused its efforts on domestic development of precision weapons systems, successfully developing core weaponry including the Tactical Fire Direction System, semi-submersible SWATHs, K731 heavy torpedoes and electronic warfare systems for fighters as well as advanced high-precision weapons including the "Cheonma" (a short-range surface-to-air missile), "KT-1" (basic training aircraft for the Air Force) and "K-9" (new 155mm self-propelled artillery). Following the export of KT-1s to Indonesia in early 2001 and K-9s to Turkey in 2000, ROK is engaging in export negotiations with many countries at the moment. In the 2000s, the era of innovation, ROK has further developed core technologies and funneled its investments into leading technologies. Thus, it completed such OK-9, new self-propelled artillery : a world-class gun with the maximum projects as the development of heavy torpedoes and range of 40km that was developed indigenously and fielded. reconnaissance drones for application to corps-level units in 2000, electronic warfare equipment for naval vessels in 2001 and ship-toship guided weapons systems in 2003. ROK also developed the T-50, a supersonic training aircraft on the strength of the basic technology of the domestic aircraft industry, consistently endeavoring to develop state-of-the-art weapons systems. Under its strategy of "selection and concentration", the MND will seek to secure core technologies regarding which ROK is heavily dependent on advanced nations. Thus, the MND will build an effective surveillance and reconnaissance system encompassing multipurpose satellites and mediumaltitude UAV at the earliest possible date. In addition, it will swiftly upgrade the functions of the Hyeonmoo (surface-to-surface missile) and secure deep strike capabilities including medium-range anti-aircraft guided missiles. At the same time, it will seek substantive enhancement of its basic force capabilities including next-generation tanks, satellite communication and next-generation high-speed vessels. Based on these efforts, the MND will proceed with constant R&D activities related to advanced weapons systems, with focus placed on C4ISR+PGM to equip the military with cutting-edge scientific weaponry and build a self-reliant core force of the 21st century. ## (3) Laying The Cornerstone For The Domestic Defense Industry The "Act on Special Measures for Military Procurement" enacted in 1973 for the purpose of nurturing the domestic defense industry was developed into the "Act on Special Measures for the Defense Industry." In addition, such systems as first-and second-tier defense companies, designation of defense products/companies, fund to foster the defense industry, employment of differential contract conclusion and cost calculation methods, and tax reductions and exemptions, have been in operation. As a result, the domestic defense industry achieved remarkable growth as evidenced by the production of various advanced precision weaponry. As of the end of 2003, 82 companies are producing and supplying 1,235 items of defense supplies. Despite expansion of its gross revenues, the domestic defense industry is confronted with serious difficulties, with average operation rates standing at merely 50%. This is ascribed to the limitations on generating further domestic demand. | [Table 4-13] Status of the Domestic Defense Industry (1998~2003) | | | | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------|----------|---------------| | | Operation Rate (%) | | | | | Revenues | Ordinary P/L | | | | | Classification | (hundred million | (hundred | Defense | Manufacturing | | won) | million won) | Industry | Industry | | | 1998 | 33,875 | -1,237 | 52.8 | 68.2 | | | | 76.6 | | | | 1999 | 31,211 | -1,287 | 50.8 | | | 2000 | 33,359 | -1,762 | 48.5 | 78.3 | | 2001 | 37,054 | -1,135 | 50.3 | 73.2 | | 2002 | 43,653 | 164 | 54.5 | 76.9 | | 2003 | 42,693 | 832 | 57.3 | 78.3 | [Table 4-13] Status of the Domestic Defense Industry (1998~2003) ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 173 In order to rectify the problems associated with the defense industry, the MND hasexecuted multifaceted policies to cultivate and support the industry. First, the MND is sharpening the competitive edge of the domestic defense industry by adjusting the first- and second-tier defense company system. Introduced in 1983 to prevent overlapping investments and expedite technological development of the defense industry, the first- and second-tier defense company system was implemented under a monopolistic mechanism. Since 1999, it has been converted into a competitive system as companies with technological prowess were induced to make inroads into the domestic defense industry in an effort to strengthen the competitiveness of the industry. As of 2003, there exist 29 first-tier companies producing 31 items and 41 second-tier suppliers manufacturing 86 items. In consideration of the development trend of domestic industrial technology, the MND plans to ceaselessly overhaul the existing items produced under the first-and second-tier defense company system. From the long-term perspective, the MND intends to streamline the system to place a focus on core strategic and stealth weapons system. Second, the MND will cement the foundation of the domestic defense industry based on efficient operation of the system of designating defense products and companies. The defense product/company designation system was introduced to ensure stable procurement and quality assurances regarding military-exclusive equipment and materials that cannot be procured under the principles of the market economy. Concerning the system, the designation of defense products has been restricted to the utmost possible extent, with weaponry on the sidelines, since the 1990s to reflect development of the domestic civilian industry and enhance competitiveness based on intensified competition among companies. As regards the already designated defense products, they are reviewed every two years as to whether such designation needs to be upheld. If it is determined that a certain item can be produced by multiple companies, such designation is revoked to shift to a competition system. The status of designation of defense products and companies as of the end of 2003 is presented in Table 4-14 below. | | Naval | Communication/ | | | | | | | | |----------------|----------|------------------|------------|-----|-----|----|-----|----|----| | Fire | Air | NBC | Others | | | | | | | | Classification | Total | Ammunition | Maneuver | | | | | | | | Power | Guidance | Vessel | Electronic | | | | | | | | Defense | | | | | | | | | | | Products | 1,235 | 353 | 168 | 168 | 237 | 80 | 144 | 26 | 35 | | (number of | | | | | | | | | | | items) | | | | | | | | | | | Defense | | | | | | | | | | | Companies | 8 | 13 | 10 | 7 | 13 | 2 | 17 | | | | 82 | 12 | | | | | | | | | | (number of | | | | | | | | | | | companies) | | | | | | | | | | [Table 4-14] Status of Designation of Defense Products and Companies In the future, the MND will restrict the designation of defense products and companies to the maximum extent to ensure efficient execution of the defense budget through competition-based procurement. It will continue to regularly examine potential revocation of designations as defense products every two years. Furthermore, it will conduct frequent reviews of such possible revocation to build an efficient system of procuring and managing military supplies. Third, the MND will galvanize the defense industry by increasing its support to industrial players. The "fund to foster the defense industry" was created in 1980 for the purpose of nurturing the defense industry and providing low-interest loans to companies in the industry. Through the application of the fund, a total of 381.3 billion won was provided by 2003 for R&D, indigenous development, stockpiling of raw materials and maintenance of idle facilities by defense companies. However, application of the fund falls absolutely short of defense companies' needs for financial assistance. To redress the situation, the MND is endeavoring to increase the fund by expanding the governmental contribution. In collaboration with the Small and Medium Business Administration, the MND has caused the "fund for technological innovation and ![171_image_0.png](171_image_0.png) development of SMEs" being operated by the Small and Medium Business Administration to be applied to the programs to domestically develop military supplies components since May 2002. ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 175 In addition, the MND has legislated the "incentive compensation system for the promotion of indigenous technological development." Under the system, any variance between the procurement price of domestically developed goods and the overseas purchase price of their counterparts is compensated if the price for domestic products is lower than foreign products. The MND has also abolished the time limit for the application of the zero VAT rate for defense goods, and extended the time limit for tariff reduction for the defense industry's raw material imports until the end of 2005. The MND will continue to devise and improve policies and mechanisms to foster players in the defense industry such as providing financial assistance for the development of core components and holding joint exhibitions of indigenously developed components by the three Services. Only to the extent that national security is not affected, the MND intends to permit foreign investments in companies in the domestic defense industry so as to promote the smooth restructuring and foreign capital attraction by domestic firms. ## (4) Consolidation Of International Defense Industrial Cooperation Strengthened international defense industrial cooperation is essential to providing further support for the export of domestic defense goods, warranting stable operation of imported weapons, and introducing advanced technologies. So far, the MND has concluded defense industrial cooperation agreements with 21 countries including US, Turkey, Indonesia, and Venezuela. Thus, the MND has diversified the counter-parties of defense industrial cooperation to include European, South American and Asian countries, departing from the previous concentration on US. Furthermore, the MND has signed agreements related to quality assurance, sharing of price information, and exchanges of technological data to ensure the long-term, stable operation of imported weaponry. In the future, the MND will consolidate cooperative ties with the counter-parties to foster defense industrial cooperation. The MND regularly holds joint committee meetings with countries that have signed agreements of defense industrial cooperation with ROK. With such efforts, the MND seeks to gain support for exports of Korean-made defense industrial commodities, explore and implement international joint cooperative programs, introduce advanced technologies, and engage in consultations to ensure smooth logistical support for imported equipment. At the same time, the MND is striving to tap new markets in South America and the Middle East for exports of defense commodities. In addition, the MND believes that the expansion of exports by the domestic defense industry is essential to sustaining the industry, which is mired in difficulties arising from low operation rates. Under such belief, the MND is converging its military diplomacy capabilities on increasing exports of defense goods, complementing its military diplomacy guidelines and devising "methods for reinvigorating defense industrial exports." Accordingly, the MND intends to reinforce the activities of overseas military attachs to support export activities and establish a government-wide support system to promote defense exports. In addition, it plans to pursue the reinforcement of the MND organization in charge of defense exports by increasing the support staff and creating overseas defense industrial cooperation officers. As incentives for defense industrial exports, the MND also plans to recognize export marketing costs of the defense industry as expenses, exclude allocation of fixed costs to exports at the time of defense industrial cost calculation, provide assistance from the state treasury to cover expenses for participation in international defense industrial exhibitions, and support installation/operation of ROK booths at such exhibitions. In addition, the MND will develop various PR methods and improve related systems to expand the volume of exports by the domestic defense industry. At the same time, it will upgrade the Seoul Air Show, which is currently focused on the Air Force, into an internationally recognized comprehensive defense industry exhibition involving the Army, Navy and Air Force by 2010. Thanks to such assistance from the government and strenuous efforts by companies in the domestic defense industry, the industry posted approximately US $420 million in combined exports in 2004, up 175% from US $240 million in 2003. In the future, mid- and long-term export policies for the domestic defense industry will be formulated on the basis of global defense industry market surveys. In addition, high-value-added export items will be aggressively developed. In the meantime, the MND will actively pursue international defense industrial cooperation to attain the goals of exporting US $ 1 billion in defense goods by 2015 and joining the ranks of advanced defense industrial countries by focusing on the development of items that consider both domestic and overseas needs from the early stage of weapons development. ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 177 | | (Unit: 10,000 US dollars) | | | | | |----------------|-----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------| | Classification | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | | Export Amount | 5,537 | 23,720 | 14,300 | 24,061 | 41,759 | [Table 4-15] Exports of the Domestic Defense Industry in the Past 5 Years (Unit: 10,000 US dollars) ## E. Reform Of Defense Acquisition Based on its recognition that there exist limits on government-wide inspections and MND-initiated reforms regarding defense acquisition, the ROK government organized a civilian-governmental joint committee comprised of relevant experts to embark on a reform of the overall defense acquisition management system from scratch. On the basis of current status survey and public consensus, the committee put forward 10 improvement tasks and formulated relevant improvement plans regarding the existing defense acquisition system. ![174_image_0.png](174_image_0.png) supplies procurement [Table 4-16] Ten Improvement Tasks Concerning the Defense Acquisition System ![174_image_1.png](174_image_1.png) Regarding the task of redesigning the organizational structure and improving human resources management among the 10 improvement tasks above, it was agreed that an independent entity tentatively named National Defense Procurement Agency will be set up to perform overall supervision of the formulation/execution of acquisition policies, in order to enhance professionalism, transparency and accountability of related affairs. The National Defense Procurement Agency will be established in January 2006 when proposed institutional improvements are formulated based on public hearings and coordination of opinions among related departments and organizations regarding the 10 improvement tasks, in addition to the completion of the enactment of the "Framework Acquisition Act" and revision of the "Government Organization Act." ## Pursuit Of Defense Digitization A. Direction Of Defense Digitization Policy (1) Goals Of Defense Digitization Defense digitization refers to a shift to an information/knowledge-focused environment of overall defense affairs by utilizing information /communication and management innovation techniques. The objective of defense digitization is to create a ubiquitous-based elite intelligent force by building an integrated information system that enables the sharing of information and knowledge both in war and peace as well as real-time distribution/utilization of such information and knowledge. As described in the conceptual diagram below, defense digitization aims to establish an integrated defense information system ensuring interoperability between the battlefield management information system and resource management information system, so that information can be distributed and used on a real-time basis in accordance with the defense digitization environment and information/communication infrastructure. Ubiquitous : meaning "whenever and everywhere" and "omnipresent". In connection with "informatization", it means an environment where any thing and person embedded in the surrounding environment like air and water are connected through an invisible network for the materialization of various services. ![175_image_0.png](175_image_0.png) [Figure 4-17] Conceptual Diagram of the Integrated Defense Information System ## (2) Policies And Strategies The defense digitization policy aims toeconomically and efficiently build a user (combatant)-oriented information system on the basis of interoperability and standardization with civilian-administrative-military cooperation in an objective-oriented and progressive/evolutionary manner. Strategies for defense digitization are divided into the following three stages as presented in Table 4-18 below. | [Table 4-18] Strategies by Stage | | | |------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | Stage | Goal | Priority | | Stage 1 | Establishment of the | - Build an information and communication | | (2005~2009) | infrastructure/core system | network-centered infrastructure | | | - Build a ubiquitous infrastructure | | | | Completion of the | - Upgrade application systems and | | Stage 2 | integrated information | integrate related systems | | (2010~2015) | system | - Create a full-fledged ubiquitous | | | environment | | | Establishment of a next- | | | | Stage 3 | - Establish an advanced intelligent | | | | generation advanced | | | (2016-2020) | information system | | | | system | | ## B. Improvement Of The Defense Digitization Environment The components of the defense digitization environment include relevant institutions and procedures, organizations and manpower, interoperability and standardization, and sustained civilian-administrative-military cooperative ties. Defense digitization has been pursued in constant reflection of the IT technologies' development trend. First, guidelines regarding defense planning and acquisition management documents are formulated and revised to improve related institutions and procedures. In addition, the ROK military is improving digitization project assessment and supervision procedures, while developing and introducing upto-date business management techniques and mechanisms. Second, the CIO system is promoted, and the organization/manpower for policy formulation/execution and technological research are efficiently reinforced. Third, common operational and data sharing environments are set up to ensure the sharing and joint use of the defense information system and information resources by all the Services for the promotion of interoperability and standardization. With the C4I system at the center, the ROK military pursues interfacing with other weapons systems including surveillance and strike systems, and builds a certification system to guarantee interoperability. Fourth, launch of a consultative body to utilize the national information infrastructure to the utmost possible extent is pursued to sustain civilian- CIO : Chief Information Officer administrative-military cooperative ties. At the same time, such events as technological symposiums on defense digitization are held to promote technological exchanges related to military digitization. ## C. Information And Communication Infrastructure Information and communication infrastructure consists of an information and communication network, computer systems and information protection systems. ## (1) Establishment Of The Information And Communication Network The ROK military built an integrated network that ensures real-time sharing of information and distribution of large multimedia contents (voice, texts, images and so on). The information and communication network being operated by the ROK military is divided into strategic and tactical communication systems. In consideration of the BCN establishment plan and application system development, the military information and communication system is being built based on the following approach : design of, and subsequent shift to, the NGN, and ultimate establishment of a ubiquitous-based information and communication network. ## (2) Establishment Of Computer Systems In alignment with the establishment of the Mega Center, the ROK military is concentrating its efforts on building an infrastructure that encompasses the host and personal computers. Establishment of the Mega Center is aimed at integrating the scattered information and communication offices and host computers of individual Services into 61 information and communication centers. One pilot center was set up for each Service with a view to completing establishment of the Mega Center in phases. In terms of the dissemination of computer systems, distribution of host computers is being pursued in line with the concept of the Mega Center. At the same time, personal computers are being disseminated under the goal of achieving "one personal computer for each military personnel in charge." As of 2004, the dissemination rate of personal and host computers of the ROK military stands at 94% and 96%, respectively. The military intends to raise the rate to 100% by 2007. BCN (Broadband Convergence Network) : An integrated broadband backbone network combining wired and wireless communication, Internet and broadcasting media which enables large-scale multimedia data distribution. NGN (Next Generation Network) : A next-generation defense information communication network that enables interoperation of multiple backbone networks including defense information and communication networks and microwave networks, and local networks set up in individual echelons. ## (3) Establishment Of Defense Information Protection System Protection of defense information refers to detecting, blocking, countering and recovering from internal and external cyber attacks to prevent any leakage of information assets to the outside. The highest priority is placed on performing information protection activities including real-time response to any attacks against networks. Under the defense information protection system, CERTs continue to be operated by the MND and individual Services. Based on the establishment of an integrated security control system for units at the level of a command or higher and a single anti-virus system for all the Services, the ROK military is tackling possible threats to its information systems including hacking and viruses on a real-time basis. In addition, it is reinforcing its exercises according to the INFOCON to gear up for potential enemy infiltrations for cyber warfare. Currently, cyber attacks including hacking against government agencies are on a gradual rise, inflicting substantial damage. To brace for such cyber attacks, close civilian-government-military cooperation is being promoted to promptly activate a response system of the agencies concerned in the event of an emergency. ## D. Battlefield Management Information System Regarding the battlefield management information system, a joint C4I system is being built to support timely decision-making in alignment and [Figure 4-19] Conceptual Diagram of the Battlefield Management Information System ![178_image_0.png](178_image_0.png) CERT : Computer Emergency Response Team INFOCON : Information Operations Condition GCCS-K : Global Command and Control System - Korea interface with surveillance and strike systems, which enables "detecting, making decisions and striking in advance of the enemy." In addition, interface between the national contingency planning system and the combined C4I system is being developed to support potential total war and ROK-US combined operations. ## (1) Joint C4I System The Joint Chiefs of Staff have operated the CPAS, which was developed to automate command post functions of the JCS Headquarters and major strategic and operational units of the three Services and to enable transmission/receipt of telegraphic messages to and from tactical units under their command. Recently, the JCS completed conceptual research into the development of the KJCCS, an upgraded form of the CPAS. By pursuing the development of the KJCCS, the JCS intends to incorporate the system into force capabilities of related units. In addition, the ROK military is pushing ahead with the establishment of an integrated military information processing system to allow real-time information sharing and distribution by all echelons through the joint C4I system. To attain the vision of a digitalized battlefield, the military seeks to set up a geographical information database management system by expressing its operational areas in numeric terms. The ground-combat tactical C4I system aims to establish a combat command/control system based on real-time battlefield surveillance by automating the battlefield functions of tactical echelons of the corps or CPAS : Command Post Automation System KJCCS : Korea Joint Command and Control System ![179_image_0.png](179_image_0.png) subordinate level. The system will be developed targeting a single corps first, and then applied to all corps for its full-fledged incorporation into the military arsenal. The naval tactical C4I system, based on the existing KNTDS, will be built in a way that enables identification of maritime conditions on a real-time basis and command/control of integrated naval operations. The air-combat tactical C4I system will serve as the core system that supports aerial operations including identification of current situation and decision-making by commanders and personnel of each operational echelon. It will be developed by 2007 in consideration of the interface and interoperability with the automated air defense system of the existing TACC and the MCRC. ## (2) Defense Modeling & Simulation System On the basis of its long-term vision to pursue the comprehensive development of modeling and simulation, the MND is building a simulation system that allows analysis of military principles, battlefield management concepts, unit structures and operational plans appropriate for future warfare. Based on such effort, the MND is also setting up a decision-making and R&D simulation system that supports analysis and assessment for each stage of weapons system acquisition. In addition, an education and training simulation system has been put into operation, based on the development of a model for each echelon including "Changjo 21", the training model for division and corps-level units of the ROK Army. In addition, the MND is pursuing the expansion of the training simulation system applicable to the JCS, individual Services, each echelon and each battlefield functions. The MND is also setting up the battalion-level KCTC to help troops accumulate indirect warfare experience in simulated battlefield environments to improve their capability to adapt to battlefield conditions as well as their tactical skills and capabilities. ## E. Resource Management Information System (1) Basic Plan The MND is pursuing the establishment of the resource management information system to integrate resource management information mechanisms for efficient management of defense resources and improved execution of defense-related affairs. KNTDS : Korea Naval Tactical Data System TACC : Theater Air Control Center MCRC : Master Control & Reporting Center кстс : Korean Army Advanced Combat Training Center ![181_image_0.png](181_image_0.png) [Figure 4-20] Conceptual Diagram of the Resource Management Information System ## (2) Status Of The Establishment Of The Resource Management Information System The operational status and development plan for each component of the resource management information system are summarized in the table below. The MND aims to integrate these components in stages by 2013. | [Table 4-21] Status of Implementation of the Resource Management Information System | | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------| | Classification | Operational Status | Development Plan | | HR Information Unit systems developed and put into operation Integrated implementation of the system for | | | | System | by individual Services and organizations | all Services after a BPR process | | Mobilization | System developed and put into operation | Integrated implementation of the system | | Information System | for each type of affair | focused on core duties after a BPR process | | Medical | Implementation of the system for 11 | Expansion of the system to all hospitals subordinate | | Information System | hospitals completed | to the ROK Medical Command in stages | | | Implementation of an integrated logistics information | | | Logistics | Ammunition and materials information | system that incorporates logistics-related information | | Information | systems developed and put into | components after the development of a materials | | System | operation | information system regarding the equipment | | | maintenance information system | | | Implementation of the system being pursued | Expansion of the electronic defense | | | Electronic | based on categorization into central and unit | procurement system in alignment with | | procurement ; Regarding central procurement, | | | | Procurement | the e-government system (G2B) and | | | the Defense Procurement Agency has built and | | | | System | the defense financial information | | | operates an integrated database system and | system | | | electronic document exchange system. | | | | Facility | System developed and put into operation for | Pursuit of real-time automatic | | Management | real estate and facility management and | processing of affairs related to each | | System | consultations about national land utilization | military facility | | Standardization of electronic document distribution | | | | Electronic | Archive system and record preservation | | | among individual Services and government | system to be implemented after setting | | | Administration | agencies by upgrading the office automation system | up an electronic record processing | | System | for national defense into a new web-based system | system | BPR : Business Process Reengineering ## Fostering Defense Manpower ![182_Image_0.Png](182_Image_0.Png) A. Methods Of Fostering Defense Manpower Rapid changes in the security environment and development of science and technology as well as high-tech weapons systems require defense manpower with stronger capabilities and various specialties. In order to achieve the objective of fostering and managing elite defense manpower, the MND is seeking to establish a more efficient manpower management system, nurture military personnel with expertise, and utilize female service members. (1) Establishment of a More Efficient Manpower Management System ![182_image_1.png](182_image_1.png) O Graduation ceremony of training NCOs The basic vision of military manpower management is to develop a balanced manpower structure infused with efficiency and effectiveness in order to implement military strategies suitable for the battlefield environment of the 21st century and ensure strong combat capabilities. The MND has formulated mid- to long-term plans to consolidate the military infrastructure. Under these plans, the MND acquires and operates the appropriate and balanced number of military officers by type of commission by improving the ROTC system and military scholarship beneficiary selection system to steadily acquire competent junior officers. At the same time, the MND is improving the manpower management system to promote the efficiency of and provide a boost to military organizations. Among the measures for such improvement are the recruitment of an appropriate number of long-term [Table 4-22] Status of Newly Commissioned Officers (Unit: number of persons) | [Table 4-22] Status of Newly Commissioned Officers | | | | | | | | |------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------| | Korea 3rd | Officer | | | | | | | | College Graduate | | | | | | | | | Military | Candidate | Others | | | | | | | Classification | Total | Military | ROTC | | | | | | Academies | Commissioning | School | | | | | | | Academy | 2,666 | 200 | 1,020 | | | | | | 2003 | 8,628 | 625 | 450 | 3,667 | 1,736 | 150 | 1,020 | | Post-2008 | 8,668 | 485 | 500 | 4,777 | | | | | Increase | +1,110 | -930 | -50 | 0 | | | | | (Decrease) | +40 | -140 | +50 | | | | | | Changes | | | | | | | | service personnel in consideration of possible promotion to higher ranks, honorary promotion and retirement for adequate manpower circulation, and support for reemployment of officers who fail to achieve timely promotion. In an effort to redress the situation where military organizations have a shorter life cycle than others by nature, the MND has been consolidating and overhauling related human resource management laws to create a manpower operation system encompassing "recruitment, appointment, service, discharge and reemployment." ## (2) Nurturing Of Defense Specialists It is imperative to nurture and manage elite defense specialists who have the expertise to lead future warfare amidst the developments of the knowledge and informationoriented society and drastic changes in the war features in the era of advanced digitalization. Accordingly, the MND has expanded the application of the defense specialist fostering system, which was initially implemented by the ROK Army in 1997, to all Services from 2002. O Technological/technical specialists. ![183_image_0.png](183_image_0.png) Defense specialists are categorized into "policy specialists" who expedite defense policy formulation and execution, "international specialists" who take charge of negotiations, exchanges and cooperation with international organizations or foreign governments, "expert specialists" who meet the requirements of high-level academic knowledge or R&D activities in certain areas, and "technological/technical specialists" who have professional skills, techniques and knowledge unique to the military. ## (3) Utilization Of Female Service Members In compliance with the government policy to "expand the role of women", each Service has been expanding the utilization of female military personnel in various areas since 2000. The number of women in the ROK Armed Forces, which stood at 2,085 in 1999 (including officers and non-commissioned officers), is set to rise to 3,689 in 2004 and 7,038 in 2020. This expansion will drastically increase the ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 187 ratio of women among officers and non-commissioned officers from 1.4% to 5%. | [Table 4-23] Female Resources Management Plan | | (Unit: number of persons) | | | |-------------------------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|-----------|-----| | | | Navy | Air Force | | | Time | Total | Army | | | | Dec. 1999 | 2,085 | 2,021 | 34 | 30 | | | | 194 | 493 | | | 2004 | 3,689 | 3,002 | | | | 2020 | 7,038 | 5,030 | 1,023 | 985 | Towards that end, each Service reserved 10% of freshmen enrollment in 2004 for female cadets in their respective academies. In addition, the Army has recruited and commissioned 153 female officer candidates graduating from civilian colleges. The Navy and the Air Force also commissioned 18 female officers, respectively, under the college graduate commissioning system. In addition, the Army, Navy and Air Force plan to recruit 200, 40 and 90 female non-commissioned officers, respectively. ![184_image_0.png](184_image_0.png) In principle, the three Services assign female armed personnel to various echelons and posts without consideration of sex in order to grant women an expanded role. Under the principle, they are assigned to positions compatible with their specialties and characteristics. Competent female resources are utilized in not only combat posts including battleship crew and fighter pilots, but also legal, medical and veterinary posts. To help women in the military to realize their maximum potential, policies for female service members are being formulated and implemented from a gender-sensitive perspective at the government-wide level. In addition, the ROK military is exerting an aggressive effort to improve their working conditions by enhancing the working environment and organizational culture, and to develop a system to protect their physiological characteristics and maternity. ## B. Education To Foster Elite Soldiers The ROK military needs to recruit quality manpower and offer solid educational opportunities to those already recruited in order to build the elite combat force it desires. Toward this end, the ROK military is actively pressing ahead with the following main tasks to achieve improvement in education. ## (1) Improvement Of School Education The ROK military has accomplished significant changes and developments based on a ceaseless effort to improve school education. Especially, it has revamped the organizational and institutional structure of educational institutes and aligned the subjects and details of education with practical combat duties so that trainees can immediately apply the knowledge learned to field operations and practical affairs upon completion of educational courses. In addition, it has improved the system to educate cadets and foster officers under the ROTC and college graduate commissioning system. The maximum number of students at military academies was reduced to create an elite educational environment and conditions in concert with the society driven by knowledge and information and O Air Force Academy cadets being trained on ![185_image_0.png](185_image_0.png) flight simulators ![186_image_0.png](186_image_0.png) ![186_image_1.png](186_image_1.png) Graduation and commissioning of Korea Military Academy cadets ![186_image_2.png](186_image_2.png) ![186_image_3.png](186_image_3.png) to build a manpower structure appropriate for the future. For the purpose of nurturing high-quality human resources, officer candidates under the ROTC and college graduate commissioning system are required to take classes on military science for credit in college. In addition, military security-related departments will be opened at 15 colleges from 2005, which will pave the way for cultivation of professional personnel majoring in military science. The ability to gain victory in future warfare hinges on the combined combat force operation capabilities. Accordingly, the ROK military is setting up a combined education system centered on the Joint Staff College. Since 2004, the ROK military has increased the number of trainees at the Joint Staff College O Engineering training of Naval Academy cadets and improved the screening procedures to grant educational opportunities to competent officers. Upon completion of the course, most trainees are assigned to policymaking departments of the MND, JCS and CFC. In the meantime, the ROK military is steadily developing an internal remote education system in tandem with computer-based training and simulatorusing education to keep pace with the era of information and science. ## (2) Expansion Of Domestic/Overseas Commissioned Education Commissioned education is being gradually expanded to nurture professional personnel in extensive areas and improve the qualifications of cadres so that they can seize the initiative to achieve more professional and scientific national defense. Degree-based education aims at fostering personnel that can be utilized by policymaking departments, educational institutes and research departments. On a yearly basis, over 420 service members are chosen for enrollment in master and doctorate courses. The number of such personnel is being raised to about 500 a year to cultivate professional human resources in the fields of advanced science and technology encompassing electric and electronic engineering, machinery, aerospace and new materials. Regarding offshore military education, the ROK military sends its trainees abroad so that they can be trained, on a commissioned basis, at military academies or national defense universities of countries with military prowess, to foster regional experts and acquire advanced military knowledge. The human resources that complete such education courses are assigned to posts relevant to the training received. ## (3) Invigoration Of Civilian-Military Educational Exchanges And Cooperation The MND is in the midst of promoting exchanges and cooperation with civilian educational institutes to enhance openness and diversity of military education. In particular, individual Services and the National Defense University actively pursue exchanges and cooperation with civilian universities and research institutes. As of the end of 2004, the ROK military signed exchange agreements with 131 outstanding civilian colleges and universities, stepping up the exchange of professors and academic information, joint research efforts and academic seminars. In a bid to improve academic conditions and job performance of soldiers, the ROK military has opened and operates branches of 43 civilian colleges (graduate schools) within 56 military units.. O Ceremony marking the signing of a civilian-military exchange and ![187_image_0.png](187_image_0.png) cooperation agreement ## (4) Expansion Of The Acknowledgement Of Military Education Credits And Qualifications Most educational courses on military science conducted by the ROK military are high-level technological education programs in the field of advanced science. Credits in such courses are acknowledged by the state. In 2003, 11 ROK Army branch schools were designated as educational institutes of which credits are acknowledged. Thus, they are expected to confer bachelor's degrees in military science from 2005. In the meantime, the military has been delegated by the Ministry of Labor to conduct national technical qualification verification examinations since 1975. By 2004, about 25,000 persons have obtained national technical qualifications under the system. | | | [Unit: number of persons] | | | |------------|------------|-----------------------------|---------|--------| | | Industrial | Assistant | | | | Time Frame | Total | Technicians | | | | | Engineers | Technicians | | | | '75 ~ '79 | 35,381 | 2,313 | 16,747 | 16,321 | | ,80 ~ '89 | 77,683 | 15,724 | 49,320 | 12,639 | | 66, ~ 06, | 97,100 | 12,850 | 84,250 | . | | '00 ~ '04 | 41,179 | 6,349 | 34,830 | . | | Total | 251,343 | 37,236 | 185,147 | 28,960 | [Table 4-24] Status of Obtainment of National Technical Qualifications Defense White Paper 2004 192 ![189_image_0.png](189_image_0.png) ![189_image_1.png](189_image_1.png) ![189_image_2.png](189_image_2.png) # Section 6. Promotion Of Welfare Improve The "Quality F Service Member ![189_Image_3.Png](189_Image_3.Png) ![189_Image_4.Png](189_Image_4.Png) Men in uniform perform their missions in a special environment. Fulfillment of military missions always entails danger. Moreover, military units are mostly positioned in remote or isolated areas. Professional service personnel with the rank of non-commissioned officers or higher face difficulties associated with the education of their children and housing as they are required to move frequently. In addition, their job security remains at a relatively low level due to earlier retirement age than ordinary government employees as well as limitations on reemployment after being discharged. Many residential facilities for soldiers are antiquated. Furthermore, leisure facilities are acutely insufficient considering the number of military personnel. Such situation dampens the morale of soldiers and also causes structural problems that prevent recruitment of competent human resources for national defense. It also hampers the attainment of the goal of safeguarding national security. Accordingly, the MND formulates and implements a wide array of welfare promotion measures to improve the "quality of life" for service members with a view to boost their enthusiasm and morale to perform their duties actively. In other words, the MND is pursuing a dramatic enhancement of their working conditions through improvement of their salary and allowance system, procurement of military housing of the size standard of "national housing", installation of living quarters equipped with individual beds and leisure facilities, improvement of meal and uniforms for soldiers, enhancement of medical services and military welfare management system, and support for children's education. At the same time, the MND is seeking to improve job security of military personnel, bolstering measures to support reemployment of retired military personnel and improving the military pension system. # Improvement Of Working Conditions For Military Personnel ![190_Image_0.Png](190_Image_0.Png) ## A. Better Treatment (1) Improvement Of The Salary And Allowance System For Military Personnel In spite of the 'Military Personnel Remuneration Act', service personnel are currently subject to the salary and allowance system applicable to ordinary government employees. Thus, the unique nature of military service is not being properly reflected. Considering the poor working conditions that military personnel face including early retirement, difficulties in finding new jobs, and constraints on their children's education, the existing 'Military Personnel Remuneration Act' must be complemented to enable the application of an independent compensation system to reflect reality. In the future, military personnel's salaries will be increased at least to the level of standard private enterprises. Factors that may require an additional raise will be determined based on research by specialized organizations and comparable cases in foreign countries. In order to reflect an appropriate increase rate, relevant laws will be overhauled including enactment of the "Enforcement Decree of the Military Personnel Remuneration Act" based on the "Military Personnel Remuneration Act." Salaries for enlisted men who are on active duty were raised by 47% in 2004. The military is planning to increase enlisted men's monthly salary to 80,000 won by 2008 by gradually raising the salaries to reach a reasonable level necessary for life in barracks. ![190_image_1.png](190_image_1.png) [Figure 4-25] Rise in Enlisted Men's Salaries (Based on the Rank of Corporals) The ROK military plans to introduce an allowance system reflecting the specialty and uniqueness of military service, and ensure equality among individual Services and branches. In addition, the military is developing separate allowances, such as outdoor billeting allowance, allowance for special operations in contact areas and special medical service allowance for medical officers, for service members and military civilian employees engaging in frequent field exercises, contact area operations and other duties that require a high level of skill and entail added risks. At the same time, the ROK military has been creating a college student tuition allowance, family separation allowance, day/night duty allowance and NCO encouragement allowance, and increasing the amount to a realistic level to compensate for frequent moving, separation from family members and disbursement of additional living expenses under poor working environment. ![191_image_0.png](191_image_0.png) O Unique working environment of the military Regarding the period of military education, of which only 50% is reflected in pay grades, the ROK military is seeking to fully reflect such period in pay grades. ## (2) Meal And Uniform Quality Improvement For Soldiers In an effort to provide new-generation soldiers with nutritious food satisfying their divergent tastes, the ROK military is endeavoring to improve the menus. To shift the focus of meals from "quantity" to "quality", the military is pressing for an increase in meal expenses. It plans to increase such expenses to a 90% level of those of civilian meals by 2009. | | (Unit: won per person/day) | | | | | |---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------| | [Table 4-26] Basic Meal Expenses for Enlisted Men | | | | | | | Classification | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | | | 4,665 | 4,665 | | | | | Military | 4,032 | 4,184 | 4,271 | | | | (Compared to Civilian) | (80%) | (80%) | (79%) | (84%) | (82%) | | | 5,568 | 5,701 | | | | | Civilian | 5,071 | 5,224 | 5,380 | | | Accordingly, the ROK Armed Forces started to provide pork ribs, chicken stew with ginseng, Vienna sausages, crab flavored sticks, etc. from 2004, and plans to newly supply foods that appeal to the tastes of new-generation soldiers including spaghetti and cold noodles. The military intends to satisfy soldiers' tastes by increasing popular menu items while reducing relatively unpopular items. In line with the trend of development in civilian apparel, the military has gradually improved military clothing, helping service personnel maintain their dignity and enhancing their convenience concerning tactical activities. Thus, the MND has formulated the "five-year clothing quality improvement plan." Under the plan, the MND provided more comfortable combat shoes made of softer natural leather as well as summer combat uniforms made of light and cool materials in consideration of the working conditions of summer. The MND began to implement the improvement plan, starting from items causing much inconvenience to soldiers. It will also begin to supply undershirts, shorts and winter underwear with quality comparable to commercial products from 2005. | [Table 4-27] Five-Year Clothing Quality Improvement Plan | | | | | |------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|------|------| | Classification | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2008 | | | 2007 | | | | | -Undershirts/ | - Cotton/ | | | | | shorts | - Winter | | | | | - Combat | handkerchiefs | | | | | - Winter | sports | | | | | shoes | - Cotton- | | | | | underwear | wear | - Shape- | | | | Quality | - Summer | padded | | | | - Woolen | - Sleeping | memory | | | | Improvement | combat | jumpers and | | | | socks | bags | clothing | | | | uniforms | trousers | | | | | - Full-dress | - Special | | | | | - Slippers | - Mattresses | | | | | uniforms | helmets | | | | | - Shoes | | | | | | ('05~'08) | | | | | ## B. Improvement Of Barracks And Medical Environment (1) Improvement of Officers' Residence and Barrack Facilities ![192_image_0.png](192_image_0.png) O Purchase of civilian apartments In accordance with the trend of social developments including enhanced public awareness and improved residential conditions, small and decrepit officers' residential facilities and barracks are being improved in stages. Based on the implementation of the "three-year plan for improvement of officers residence" including military houses and apartments since 2000, a total of 877.7 billion won has been invested for the improvement of 12,378 units with the size of 50m² or smaller, or aged 25 years or more. However, decrepit and small military housing comprises 37% of the entire military households even at the moment. Accordingly, such old and small housing will be substituted by 26,071 houses with the size of 79 to 106m². In consideration of cost efficiency, construction of new housing is being minimized, with purchasing or leasing on the rise. As regards bachelor officers' quarters, many are aged 25 years or more. Besides, 39% of their housing requirements have not been properly met. As a result, two or three persons often share a single residence. Against this backdrop, the MND will improve the current conditions by allocating available financial resources by 2009, renovating more than 25-year-old military housing or constructing required residential facilitiesto provide one residence to each relevant officer. ![193_image_0.png](193_image_0.png) As regards the barracks, the Participatory Government intends to dramatically improve the facilities during its tenure in order to improve the "quality of life" of enlisted soldiers. In consideration of the environment where new-generation soldiers were raised, per capita area for exclusive use is being expanded. In addition, the consolidated non-bedded quarters at the level of platoons are being substituted with squad-level quarters equipped with individual beds. In 2004, 382.2 billion won was poured into improving GOPs, 168 living quarter buildings of coast and riverside guard units, and the integrated barracks of 75 battalions. Under the barrack improvement project being implemented in phases, old and non-modernized barracks including those in the frontline areas will be improved first by 2009. Afterwards, already renovated barracks with consolidated non-bedded quarters are to be replaced by those with individual beds by 2015. To provide better leisure activities and convenience to soldiers, the ROK military will also set up company-level PC rooms and workout centers, and ameliorate showers and laundry rooms. It will also install convenience facilities for the exclusive use of female service members. Based on a dramatic improvement in the residential environment of soldiers, the ROK military intends to lay the basis for the improvement of their combat readiness. ![194_image_0.png](194_image_0.png) beds (after improvement) ## (2) Improvement Of The Medical Environment According to the revised Health Insurance Act and its Enforcement Decree, which went into force in May 2004, an enlisted soldier on active service, who unavoidably receives medical service at a civilian medical institute while on furlough, is eligible for health insurance benefits. Under the military hospital modernization project undertaken since 1986, 18 units have been successfully improved. In addition, construction of three hospitals including Gwangju Hospital will be completed by 2008. In an effort to maintain the Armed Forces Capital Hospital on a level of a university hospital, some professional medical officers will be chosen as clinical staff to be in charge of medical treatment, and assigned to relevant positions from 2009. In addition, the ROK military will introduce a contractbased military civilian employment system in 2005 to hire competent medical resources including civilian doctors and nurses. It is also procuring advanced medical equipment by spending 19.8 billion won over a five-year period from 2004. ## C. Improvement Of The Living Conditions Of The Families Of Service Members (1) Military Tax Exemption System The military tax exemption system was launched for the purpose of indirectly supporting the stabilization of professional service members' living conditions. Compared with the initial phase of its implementation, the effect generated by the system dramatically declined due to a reduction in tax exemptions and removal of special excise taxes regarding home electronic goods. To rectify such situation, the quantity of liquor subject to tax exemption was increased substantially. Regarding durable goods, practical tax exemptions were made available based on consultations with the agencies concerned. In particular, the MND is seeking value-added tax exemption on more than 1,400 products including daily necessities, beverages and snacks sold at post exchanges based on consultations with the agencies concerned, given that only a minute amount of exemption benefits are available concerning goods primarily used by soldiers. ## (2) Support For Education Of Children Of Service Members Professional military personnel face serious constraints on their children's education because their duties require them to move frequently, work in remote and isolated places, and live apart from their families. Accordingly, the ROK military is working hard to expand the dormitories for service members' children and increase opportunities for special admission to universities. O Dormitory for military personnel's children ![195_image_0.png](195_image_0.png) (Muyeolhaksa) Currently, 12 dormitories for service personnel's children (accommodating 1,968 persons in total) are in operation in 10 cities around the nation. In 2007, additional dormitory facilities accommodating approximately 400 persons will be built in Seoul. In addition, the "university special admission system" for military personnel's children is currently being implemented at 60 universities in 2005, up from 3 universities in 1999. The MND will endeavor to expand application of the system to national universities and junior colleges in the foreseeable future so that children of service members of all ranks may benefit from the system. Information on special admission to universities -> Web page of the MND Hoguk Foundation (www.hoguk.co.kr) ## (3) Recreation Facilities Currently, the ROK military directly operates eight recreation facilities. In addition, it holds 2,008 membership accounts in civilian condominiums and intends to secure more than 100 additional accounts each year. In order to help professional service personnel enjoy their leisure time and build up physical strength, the ROK military currently operates 27 sports centers. The Army completed construction of a sports center in Daejeon in November 2004. The Air Force plans to increase the number of holes in its golf course at the Seosan Wing from 9 to 18. In addition, the Military Mutual Aid Association intends to build three additional sports centers in such areas as Hwaseong, Gyeonggi province. In the future, the ROK military will establish a set of recreation facilities (welfare center, recreational center, condominium, golf course, etc.) in major tourist spots of each region to allow consolidated rest and leisure activities in one area. Built under the concept of a "belt", those facilities will be available all around the year. Information on rest and recuperation facilities -> Defense welfare portal (www.imnd.or.kr) ## D. Improvement Of The Military Welfare System (1) Integrated Operation Of Welfare Facilities In a bid to enhance the efficiency of military welfare facility management, the MND will consolidate the welfare facilities, which are being separately managed by the relevant units of individual Service, under the control of the Welfare Support Group of each Service. Accordingly, soldiers on active duty, who are currently working at military welfare facilities, will be repositioned at their respective units so that they can dedicate themselves to combat duties. Instead, management of the facilities will be transferred to professional employees in phases to improve management and enhance professionalism. In consideration of unique regional characteristics, those facilities located north of the Civilian Control Line, in other remote areas or at naval vessels will continue to utilize soldiers on active service. In 2003, the ROK Armed Forces set up an internet portal site for the welfare of service members (www.imnd.or.kr) that incorporates all welfare facilities of the Army, Navy and Air Force in order to create an on-line foundation for welfare enhancement. Thus, not only military personnel on active service, but their families and retired military personnel can easily search and access information on military welfare facilities. ## (2) Introduction Of The Selective Welfare System To bridge the gap in welfare benefits accessible by professional service personnel with different ranks, the ROK military is pursuing the introduction of the "selective welfare system" that is being implemented by the government as a basic model of the welfare system for government employees. Upon introduction of the system, service personnel will be allowed to choose and enjoy, within the scope of an allocated amount, the types of welfare programs that they need, which will enhance the level of their satisfaction with the military welfare mechanism. As a pilot project, this system was executed in the latter half of 2004, targeting employees of the MND headquarters. From 2005, the system will be applied to all Services. (3) Promotion of Transparency and Efficiency in Allocating Welfare Funds The MND formulated the "Military Welfare Fund Asset Management Guidelines" to ensure transparent and efficient asset management regarding military welfare funds. Starting from 2005, the MND intends to make public disclosures of the details and outcomes of such asset management, in addition to the details of the Guidelines, on its web page (www.mnd.go.kr). In an effort to ensure transparency concerning profit reports, sales and inventory management by internal convenience facilities and welfare shops of the military, the MND has set up the "point of sale (POS) information management" system. The POS system performs real-time processing of information on sales and inventory status at the point of sale, ensuring instant dissemination of such information to the Welfare Support Group of each Service. By blocking any cash and coupon-based transactions, the system maximizes users' convenience and business efficiency. ## (4) Provision Of New Types Of Knowledge-Based Welfare Using Communication Satellite System In order to create an environment where soldiers working in remote areas and their family members can acquire and utilize new knowledge and information on a real-time basis, the MND is pressing for establishment of a two-way communication satellite network using an exclusive military communication satellite that allows integrated services of Internet, television broadcasting, telephone services and so forth. [Figure 4-29] Configuration of the Two-Way Satellite Communication System ![198_image_0.png](198_image_0.png) Accordingly, the satellite infrastructure for high-speed Internet services comparable to services available in large cities will be expanded to cover the quarters at the company level. Thus, the military will build such infrastructure at all companies by 2006, meeting soldiers' needs for information and significantly contributing to boosting their morale and satisfaction. # Reinforcement Of Supportive Measures For Employment Of Veterans ## A. Basic Direction Of Employment Support Veterans epitomize the future of service personnel on active duty. Most professional service personnel are discharged from their early forties to mid fifties. Thus, it is inevitable for them to find employment after being discharged. However, on the average only 29.4% of the service personnel, who were discharged during the past 4 years after long years of service, were able to find new jobs on average. This indicates that most of them find it difficult to make a stable living. Accordingly, the MND has been formulating a long-term plan to help veterans fit into the civilian society smoothly by providing them with necessary support and to create conditions enabling active-service military personnel to remain dedicated to national security. ![199_image_0.png](199_image_0.png) [Figure 4-30] Status of Jobs Secured (Unit: number of jobs) In order to increase the reemployment rate of retired military personnel, the MND has formulated and implemented defense employment support plans since 2003. The direction of such policy is summarized as follows: i) provide support to those, who served in the military for 20 years or more, to guarantee their reemployment by expanding job opportunities inside and outside the military ii) provide job guidance and counseling to those, who served in the military for at least 10 years, to sharpen their competitive edge and help them seize limited job opportunities regarding military-related or civilian job openings; and iii) promote job-finding efforts by those who served in the military for less than 10 years by providing employment information including vacancies. On the basis of this policy, the MND identifies the employment needs of veterans who served for 20 years or longer. Then, it hires retired military personnel with professional knowledge and experience as full-time instructors of military educational institutes, for instance. In step with the ROK military's policy to expand scientific training, the MND is also broadening the scope of employing veterans with ample training experience as advanced training instructors. In addition, it is exploring and developing job opportunities for retired military personnel, which encompass management staff of military welfare facilities, reserve force commanders, and employees of militaryrelated organizations. ![200_image_0.png](200_image_0.png) ![200_image_1.png](200_image_1.png) Toward that end, the "Committee for the Support of Veterans" was set up under the control of the Office of the Prime Minister. With an eye on utilizing high-quality human resources nurtured by the military for the development of the nation, the government is exerting efforts to support job creation for retired service members. ![200_image_2.png](200_image_2.png) Thanks to such efforts, the number of retired military personnel employed into military-related posts in 2003 rose by 231 to 1,089 from the previous year. Their employment rate is expected to gradually increase. ## B. Expansion Of The Job Guidance And Education System For Veterans The MND executes expanded educational programs for veterans so that they can adapt to civilian society more easily and increase the chance of reemployment. They are subject to a social adaptation program at least one year prior to their retirement date. During active service, they are encouraged to obtain one or more qualifications based on self-development efforts and practical training. In particular, the MND has introduced the "job transfer support program" implemented by civilian businesses, providing full support for veterans' self-employment and business start-ups. In August 2003, the "MND Job-Seeking Support Center" relocated its office to a site near Yongsan Station to provide easier access to job seekers and ensure more efficient coordination with related entities. The Center provides information, counseling and employment arrangement services to retired military personnel or prospective retirees. In particular, it has built a defense employment information database so as to provide more diverse and beneficial information. ![201_image_0.png](201_image_0.png) ![202_image_1.png](202_image_1.png) ![202_image_0.png](202_image_0.png) # Improvement Of The Military Pension System ![203_Image_0.Png](203_Image_0.Png) ## A. Characteristics Of The Military Pension System The purpose of the military pension system is to contribute to stabilizing the livelihood and enhancing the welfare of veterans as well as their bereaved families. The system pays an appropriate amount of money when military personnel retire due to the age limit or physical/mental disability, or die, or are subject to medical treatment for any disease or injury inflicted in the course of performance of duties. The system, which had been operated under the "Public Officials Pension Act" enacted on January 1, 1960, was separated from the Act on January 2, 1963 due to the unique characteristics of military service. Military personnel must fulfill their missions even at the cost of their lives in order to safeguard the country and protect the life and property of people. Their private life is seriously restricted for such reasons as emergency standby, operations and exercises, and frequent moving. Due to the hierarchical characteristics of the military, mandatory retirement is inevitable for many military professionals at the age of 45 to 56 if they fail to be promoted. Besides, reemployment prospects after retirement are limited since the knowledge that they accumulate in active duty is hardly compatible with civilian occupations. Under the military pension system, beneficiaries are eligible for pension without paying contributions for the period preceding the enactment of the "Veterans' Pension Act" in 1959. For those who fought in wars such as the ![203_image_1.png](203_image_1.png) O Public hearing on the revision of the Veterans' Pension Act Korean War and Vietnam War, the number of days in combat was tripled in calculating the amount of pension. From the early phase of implementation of the military pension system when an appropriate level of funding was not yet secured, there arose entitled pensioners because of early retirement under the organizational characteristics of the military. Under these circumstances, the military pension fund suffered deficits from 1973. As a result, the government is making up for the losses. ## B. Efforts Toward Improvement Of The Military Pension System As part of the efforts to redress deficits of the military pension fund and stabilize its management, the government revised the "Veterans' Pension Act" in 2000, increasing the portion covered by individuals and the state from 7.5% to 8.5%. In addition, the government decided to apply consumer price fluctuation rates in raising military pensions, instead of active-duty compensation increase rates. The government also changed the basis for calculating the amount of pension from the compensation earned in the last month of military service to the average monthly compensation for the three years preceding retirement. In the case of a budget shortfall of the military pension fund, the government ensures that such amount is covered by the national treasury. In addition, the government legislated the accumulation of a legal reserve, laying the institutional foundation for stabilization of the fund. [Table 4-33] Trend of Increase in the Amount Covered by Individuals and the State | Classification | 1963 | 1970 | 1996 | 1999 | 2001 | |--------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| | Coverage Ratio (%) | 3.5 | 5.5 | 6.5 | 7.5 | 8.5 | Accordingly, the MND will lay the foundation for the accumulation of an appropriate amount of funding by formulating detailed standards for provisioning of a legal reserve based on consultations with the other government agencies concerned in 2005. In addition, it will integrate the special accounts for military pension and the military pension fund into a single fund. From a mid-to long-term perspective, the MND will set up and operate a military pension management corporation in order to aggressively expand the fund and stabilize its finances. ![205_image_0.png](205_image_0.png) According to the "defense planning management system", the MND undertakes the process of "planning, programming, budgeting, execution and assessment." In this phased process, the MND carries out relevant affairs in a systematic and coordinated manner in order to design the operation and construction of military capabilities and to efficiently utilize defense resources for the attainment of future defense goals. The Mid-Term Defense Plan is a core document in the stage of programming that links mid- to long-term defense planning with the defense budget for the next five years to come. The plan serves as a blueprint that encapsulates the proposed military capability build-up and maintenance requirements into an executable plan. ## Mid-Term Defense Plan A. Focus And Scale Of The Mid-Term Defense Plan The Mid-Term Defense Plan is established in the form of a rolling plan that is revised and supplemented every year. The 2005-2009 Mid-Term Defense Plan was formulated on the basis of the Participatory Government's objective to build self-reliant defense capabilities to achieve a "cooperative self-reliant defense posture." Under the plan, the amount of defense expenditures is to be raised to 3.2% of GDP based on gradual expansion during the tenure of the Participatory Government. Accordingly, the total available financial resources for defense during the five-year period is projected to be 130.4426 trillion won. GDP : Gross Domestic Product Financial resources for national defense will be allocated, with the highest priority placed on military force improvements to achieve the goal of a cooperative self-reliant defense posture. Thus, the portion of force investments that stand at about 33.2% of the total defense budget as of 2004 will begradually increased to 38.6% by 2009. ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 209 B. Planned Programs By Area (1) Force Investments Force investments aim to secure capabilities to tackle existing threats first and subsequently to brace for unspecified future threats, while strengthening domestic R&D capabilities at the same time. Among major investment projects are multi-purpose satellites, AWACS and tactical command/control systems to establish strategic surveillance and early warning capabilities and build a real-time battlefield management system. To be specific, the ROK Army put forward, as ongoing or new projects, mechanization-oriented restructuring of units and full-fledged incorporation of K1A1 tanks and new 155mm self-propelled artillery into its war arsenal to improve its abilities of conducting mobile operations and mounting deep strikes. The Navy is seeking to incorporate 4,000 to 7,000 ton-class destroyers, next-generation high-speed vessels and 1,800 ton-class submarines into its force capabilities while the Air Force pursues the inclusion of F-15K fighters and next-generation guided weapons into its war arsenal to secure long-distance aerial operational capabilities and reinforce core facility protection capabilities. As for research and development, the ROK military places the focus on strengthening the infrastructure of the domestic defense industry through domestic production of major weapons systems including multipurpose helicopters, medium-altitude reconnaissance drones and air defense command and communication systems. ![206_image_0.png](206_image_0.png) ![206_image_1.png](206_image_1.png) ## (2) Ordinary Operational Expenses Ordinary operational expenses focus primarily on improving soldiers' morale and welfare, digitizing national defense systems, consolidating education and training, meeting the requirements to preserve the existing combat force, and enhancing public convenience. To boost the morale and promote the welfare of soldiers, investments will be made to substitute consolidated platoon-level non-bedded quarters with squad-scale quarters equipped with individual beds and to improve aged residential facilities and BOQ's for officers. In addition, enlisted men's monthly salaries will be raised in phases to approximately 80,000 won by 2008. Concerning digitization of national defense and consolidation of education and training, the infrastructure to create digitized military systems including implementation of local and wide area networks and construction of the Mega Center will be completed. In addition, the ROK military will foster expert/technical personnel and expand training for officers to enhance the capabilities to cope in the era of knowledge and information of the 21st century. Regarding maintenance of existing combat force, every effort will be made to uphold a military readiness posture by guaranteeing the supply of integral components including ammunition for training and fuel for equipment operation. For promotion of public convenience, environmental preservation facilities including sewage/wastewater disposal plants and noise/soil contamination prevention facilities will be fully installed by 2009. In addition, the Mid-Term Defense Plan reflects proactive efforts to redress civil complaints including proper handling of private land being used by the military and relocation of civilian houses near military firing ranges and ammunition dumps. ![207_image_0.png](207_image_0.png) ![207_image_1.png](207_image_1.png) C Surface-to-air missile firing exercise ## 2005 Defense Budget ![208_Image_0.Png](208_Image_0.Png) The defense budget for FY 2005 concentrates on the reinforcement of selfreliant defense capabilities and improvement of soldiers' morale and welfare in line with the changing security environment. Financial resources earmarked for national defense amount to 20.8226 trillion won, up 9.9% from the figure of 18.9412 trillion won in 2004. Such amount comprises 15.5% of the government budget and 2.85% of GDP. It is noteworthy that the ratio of defense expenditures, which had remained on a downturn trend since the 1980s, took an upward turn from 2004. ## A. General Account Budget The amount and functional allocation of the general accounts of the FY 2005 defense budget are presented in Table 4-34 and Figure 4-35. | [Table 4-34] Defense Budget for FY 2005 | (Unit: trillion won) | | | | | | |-------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------|---------|-------|----------|------| | | Increase/Decrease | | | | | | | Classification | FY2004 | FY2005 | | | | | | જ | % | % | | | | | | Total Defense | 18 9412 | 100.0 | 20 8226 | 100.0 | 1.8814 | 9.9 | | Expenditure | | | | | | | | FIP Costs | 33.2 | 33.9 | 0.7726 | | | | | 6.2930 | 7.0656 | 12.3 | | | | | | Ordinary Operating | 12 6482 | 66.8 | 13 7570 | 66.1 | 1 . 1088 | 8.8 | | Costs | | | | | | | | Personnel | 7,9881 | 42.2 | 8,5948 | 41.3 | 0.6067 | 7.6 | | Costs | | | | | | | | Project | 4 6601 | 24.6 | 5,1622 | 24.8 | 0.5021 | 10.8 | | Costs | | | | | | | The allocation for Force Investment Programs (FIPs) totaled 7.0656 trillion won, up 12.3% from FY 2004. The FIP allotment reflects the annual financial requirements to secure core combat capabilities including K1A1 tanks, new 155mm self-propelled artillery, 7,000 ton-class destroyers, 1,800 ton-class submarines, F-15K fighters and AWACS. In addition, it focuses on the expansion of R&D investments regarding core weapons systems including next-generation tanks, M-SAM (medium-range surface-to-air guided weapon) and satellite communication systems to maximize existing combat capabilities through equipment upgrades and maintenance. Ordinary operating costs rose to 13.7570 trillion, up 8.8% from 2004. Such expenses mainly reflect the costs of enhancing service members' morale and welfare based on creation of quarters furnished with individual beds, securing of BOQs, a rise in enlisted soldiers' salaries, and expansion of the military unit operational costs to a realistic level. In addition, such expenses reflect the increased budget for purchasing fuel for equipment operation and securing necessary training grounds to maintain combat readiness and capabilities of the military. The expenses also take into account the financial resources required to expand environmental preservation facilities and relocate civilian houses near ammunition dumps to promote public convenience, as well as the financial requirements for enforcement of special laws to provide compensation to personnel who performed special operations. [Figure 4-35] Allocation of FY2005 Defense Budget by Function ![209_image_0.png](209_image_0.png) support for USFK, etc. The 2005 defense budget was produced with the primary objective of efficiently utilizing limited resources by reexamining each project from a zero-base perspective. As a result, a curtailment of costs totaling approximately 60 billion won was applied to increase the expenditures earmarked to boost soldiers' morale and welfare and execute FIPs. ## B. Special Account Budget There are three special account budgets under the control of the MND: the Special Accounts for Military Pensions, the Special Accounts for National Property Management, and the Special Accounts for Executive Agency. Revenues for the Special Accounts for Military Pensions are used to pay out pensions to retired military personnel. The Special Accounts for Military Pensions for FY 2005 were increased to 1.6608 trillion won, up 7.6% from the previous year to reflect the rise of consumer prices in 2004 and the increase in pension recipients. | [Table 4-36] Special Account Budget for 2005 | (Unit: billion won) | | | | |------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|-------------------|------| | Classification | FY2004 | FY2005 | Increase/Decrease | % | | Special Accounts for | 1,660.8 | 118 | 7.6 | | | | 1 ,542.8 | | | | | Military Pensions | | | | | | Special Accounts for | 390 | 134.9 | | | | National Property | 289.2 | 679.2 | | | | Management | | | | | | Special Accounts for | 21.2 | 28.6 | 7.4 | 34.9 | | Executive Agency | | | | | Revenues to fund for the Special Accounts for National Property Management are derived from sale of military facilities located in urban areas. These revenues are spent on relocating military facilities to rural areas or purchasing private land that the military is currently using. In order to settle civil petitions, the Special Accounts for National Property Management for FY 2005 set aside 679.2 billion won for relocating 30 military facilities and purchasing private land that military units currently use. The Special Accounts for Executive Agency were created to ensure that the Defense Agency for Public Information Services serves as an executive agency that pursues the public interest with enhanced independence and efficiency in terms of operation. For FY 2005, 28.6 billion won was allocated to these accounts to fund production of newspapers, broadcasting programs and movies as well as military satellite television broadcasting. ![210_image_0.png](210_image_0.png) ## Need For An Appropriate Defense Budget For the purpose of maximizing combat capabilities in the pursuit of a "cooperative self-reliant defense posture" to deter North Korea's aggression, the ROK military must lay the foundation for boosting service personnel's morale and welfare and ultimately building an intelligence-driven, scienceoriented force for national defense. Since the 1980s, however, allocation of financial resources for national defense has been on a downward trend, considering the size of the national economy and expansion of the government finance. This has resulted in enormous difficulties in maintaining the existing forces as well as establishing more advanced forces. ## A. Trend Of Allocating Defense Budget And Status Of Defense Operation The nominal amount of defense expenditures has been growing steadily. However, cost-increasing factors including arise in commodity prices, high prices of advanced weapons systems in line with development of science and technology, increase of military personnel's salaries to a realistic level according to the growth of national income, and growing needs for fulfilling servicemen's welfare have placed strains on the management of the national defense budget. Until the early 1980s, the ratio of defense expenditures to the GDP stood at approximately 6%. However, such ratio dropped to 2.7% in 2003. In addition, the ratio of defense expenditures to the government budget has been gradually dwindling from 34.7% in the early 1980s to 15.8% in 2004. ![211_image_0.png](211_image_0.png) ![211_image_1.png](211_image_1.png) [Figure 4-37] Ratio of Defense Expenditures to GDP and Government Budget As a result, the ROK military has insufficient flexibility to implement new projects to foster combat capabilities. Under the circumstances, a substantial portion of its tanks, artillery and fighters are aged. In addition, a shortfall in R&D financial resources has caused a delay in cultivation of independent R&D Insufficient defense financial resources also negatively affect the operation of existing forces. The training ammunition supply stands at only 90% of the relevant requirements. Due to limited fuel supply, the flight training hours of fighter pilots fall short of the optimum level. In addition, the level of military personnel's welfare lags far behind the living conditions of ordinary people in a situation where urgent FIPs and other maintenance projects are given priority in light of the limited defense resources. Under such circumstances, the ROK military has independently sought measures to enhance the efficiency of national defense management through budget cuts and zero-base budget reviews. However, such efforts face limitations in overcoming the overall deterioration in relevant conditions. ## B. Defense Expenditures Commensurate With National Power Defense expenditures shore up economic growth by deterring war and maintaining peace. In turn, economic growth generates the ability to make investments in national defense, further consolidating national strength. For ROK, which still remains in military confrontation with North Korea, stability and peace propped up by staunch defense capabilities are prerequisites to further economic development. Considering its strategic environment and the close interrelation between its security and economy due to a heavy dependence on foreign trade, ROK must establish an appropriate level of military power commensurate with its economy, which ranks 12th in the world. However, its per capita defense expenditures rank merely 29th in the world as of 2002. The portion of its defense outlays to GDP remains lower than other countries with imminent security threats such as Israel. ROK needs to make active investments in national defense to guarantee its survival and prosperity in a security environment fraught with uncertainties. The defense budget for 2004 took up about 2.8% of GDP, up 0.1% from 2003. This is meaningful as the downward trend of military budget allocation that had persisted for more than 20 years was reversed. Given the financial requirements by areas and projects for the establishment of self-reliant defense capabilities, however, it is believed that defense expenditures must be allocated at a stable rate of at least 3% of GDP from the mid- to long-term perspective. [Figure 4-38] Ratio of Defense Expenditures to GDP in Countries Facing Dispute/Confrontation (%) | Saudi | Turkey Iran Greece China Cuba Egypt Pakistan U.S. ROK India | | | | | | | | | | | | |--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| | Syria Israel | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Arabia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 12 | 10.3 | 9.7 | 5.1 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 2.7 | Q Source: The Military Balance 2002-2003 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oct. 2002), etc. Chapter 5 Transformation of National Defense System for the Future ![214_image_0.png](214_image_0.png) ![214_image_1.png](214_image_1.png) Section 1 Goal and Key Tasks of Transforming the National Defense System Section 2 Actions Taken in Various Fields Section 3 ![214_image_2.png](214_image_2.png) Direction of the National Defense Transformation # Section 1. Goal And Key Tasks Of Transforming The Natic ![215_Image_0.Png](215_Image_0.Png) Defense System The MND endeavors to manage the national defense system by adopting the latest technology and approach while consistently reforming the defense structure to enhance the roles and awareness of the Armed Forces. In step with the rapidly evolving technology and changing mindsets of the Korean people in the 21st century, the MND responds to the development of state-of-the-art technology and shifting paradigms of war, while reshuffling the organization and elevating combat capabilities to the highest level possible. Adopting the "Robust Defense System for and by the Nation" as a goal for the transformation, the MND has identified three key tasks: reshaping of thoughts and military culture; improvement of the national defense system; revision of the active service system at the MND headquarters and restructuring of the Armed Forces. The MND has drawn up 101 measures designed to facilitate the pursuit of the three tasks. Such endeavors have built the basis for speeding up the military transition by creating a common understanding of the "change and transformation" of the different services defining "nation", "work", and "life and death" for professional soldiers. The reshaping of thoughts, one of the important tasks that the transformation effort should tackle, ensures transparency in personnel management to facilitate the improvement of the national defense system and provides a suitable culture and quality of life for soldiers by modernizing military facilities. The MND is endeavoring to expedite such changes and improvements to ensure national security by restructuring the Armed Forces around sophisticated technology taking full account of possible battle scenarios of the future. [Table 5-1] Goal of Transformation of the National Defense System and Key Tasks | Goal | Robust Defense System for and by the Nation | | |-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------| | | Revising the active | | | Reshaping of the | service system at the | | | Key | Improvement of the | | | thoughts and culture of | MND headquarters level | | | tasks | defense system | | | the military | and restructuring the | | | | Armed Forces | | | - Revision of the | - Refining the active | | | system of values of | - Upgrading the | service system of the | | professional military | headquarters | | | personnel | | | | personnel | management system | - Reshuffling the | | - Encouraging officers | - Improving the | organization at the top | | to live healthy lives | management of | - Restructuring the | | - Providing better | military manpower | | | Activities | units and forces | | | culture and life in the | - Upgrading the | | | barracks | - Improving the | | | procurement system | structure of military | | | - Stepping up the | - Improving the judicial | forces in the mid-to- | | campaign against | long term to cope with | | | system of the Armed | | | | corruption, | different scenarios of | | | Forces | | | | irregularities and | future warfare | | | irrationality | | | ![217_image_0.png](217_image_0.png) To execute the goal of building a "Robust Defense System for and by the Nation", the Ministry has introduced three core values to guide the work and life of the soldiers: Serve the country with loyalty; Don't put self-interests before the interests of the people; Don't fear to make the ultimate sacrifice for the country. On the basis of these three values, it strives to reshape the mindsets and culture of the military. In addition, the MND endeavors to eradicate bad practices on military premises, foster self-discipline in daily barracks life, and develop the leadership of officers while bolstering the campaign against corruption, irregularities and irrationality. ## Reshaping Of The Thoughts And Culture Of The Military O Forum for generals titled "Changes and Revolution" ![217_image_2.png](217_image_2.png) ROK military has grown steadily amidst continuing challenges over the past fifty years or so and has proven its reliability as a defensive force that supports stable development of the nation in the face of dynamic changes of the security environment. The MND has instilled in the mindset of all the personnel involved that achieving such transformation requires the mindset, value system, and ethics to continue to win the trust of the people and achieve the transition goal of building a "Robust Defense System for and by the Nation". Embarking on the reformation of mindsets and the national defense system with such understanding, the Ministry has set out clear and sound values for soldiers to help them live up to the set values and adapt to changing thoughts and society while devoting themselves to the crucial ## A. Rethinking The Value System Of The Servicemen ![217_Image_1.Png](217_Image_1.Png) roles and duties that they must perform as soldiers. The three main values of the nation, work, and life and death of the soldiers and the accompanying nine virtues are as follows: First and foremost is "Serve the country with loyalty". We take pride in national competency and devote ourselves and serve the nation to preserve freedom and democracy as well as promote national growth with infinite love and loyalty for our fatherland. Second is "Don' t put self-interests before the interests of the people". Keeping in mind the royal summons that we are blessed to be soldiers, we cultivate moral virtues and live an essential life while employing creativity to fulfill our responsibilities for the nation and our brethren. Third is "Don't fear to make the ultimate sacrifice for the country". We seek to live an honorable life as a soldier inheriting from our ancestors the spirit of defense of the fatherland and value of genuine courage which allows us to willingly sacrifice our own safety and security as well as life for the country. The MND published an "ethics of Armed Forces" manual that emphasizes the three core values that define the core ideals for soldiers. The utilization of the manual at schools and in education related to the military life shapes the thinking of commanders so that servicemen not only keep them in mind but also live by them. Recognizing that professional soldiers are required to abide by a higher standard of ethics and morals and that a real soldier should pursue honor, the defense organization spurs reshaping of thoughts to offer sound values and strict work ethics for military officers. O Ethics of Armed Forces Manual ![218_image_0.png](218_image_0.png) ## B. Encouraging Officers To Live Sound Lives Acknowledging that it is their duty to devote themselves to serving the country, ROK soldiers try to cherish positive elements of the existing culture while assertively root out wrongdoings to form a sound organizational culture. To this end, the MND is reengineering the operational process as follows: eliminating elements of authoritarianism and formality and encouraging discussion; introducing an efficient decision-making system such as verbal reports and on-line approvals; undertaking "one-suggestion-by-oneserviceman" initiative; and implementing various junior board activities. All these steps aim at allowing creativity and self-regulation to enhance the military culture. Furthermore, the Ministry has devised and executed the "Code of Conduct of Employees of the Ministry of National Defense", based on which it corrects bad practices such as taking requests or bribes. The MND strictly carries out its plan to set the role model for officers to encourage them to lead an upright private life, and create a desired military culture. ## C. Providing Better Culture And Life In The Barracks (1) Eliminating Various Abuses On The Compound In an attempt to ensure a better life and culture at the barracks, inhuman behavior such as battery, physical and verbal abuse, and wrongdoings in and around the premises will be stamped out to encourage servicemen to respect and trust each other. To this end, the MND has revised and refined various systems: it diagnoses units in depth to better understand the actual life and activities in the barracks; it assigns a counselor for service life and operates a report center to timely consult and resolve difficulties experienced by servicemen; it operates a plan to manage personal matters regarding servicemen with the help of their families; it has improved the personality test to identify who is not adapting to ![219_image_0.png](219_image_0.png) or is unqualified for military service; and, it offers special educationon sex ethics and morals. Club activity at barracks (model plane club) Coupled with theses attempts, the Ministry has studied the basic rights of servicemen and sought to refine relevant institutions since 2004. It is also revising a character improvement program and regulations regarding barracks life in a reasonable way, and developing a system to prevent an array of accidents. ![220_image_0.png](220_image_0.png) ## (2) Encouraging Self-Discipline In The Barrack ROK Armed Forces are encouraging selfdiscipline and responsibility among servicemen so that they may lead active and positive lives. To accomplish this, ROK military has endeavored to switch to a self-disciplined and active lifestyle by rescheduling daily timetables and granting as much free time as possible. The Ministry is expanding its roles as a venue for O Acquisition of government-recognized technology certificate during service national education by installing an Internet café at the level of every company to help servicemen develop themselves, expanding the list of government-acknowledged technology certificates that servicemen may apply for, offering opportunities for every single serviceman to join a hobby club, and helping each serviceman to acquire one area of specialty. | (Unit: No.of persons) | | | | | | | |-------------------------|------------|------------|------------|----------|-------|-------| | PC | Document | Network | Industrial | | | | | Information | | | | | | | | Total | Technician | | | | | | | Search | Manager | Controller | Manager | Engineer | | | | 77,333 | 20,791 | 2,236 | 45,830 | 627 | 1,420 | 6,429 | [Table 5-2] Government-Acknowledged Technology Certificates as of 2003 ## (3) Cultivating Leadership Of The Officers Low-level officers who share life and death as well as pleasure and pain with enlisted soldiers need to cultivate the ability to lead and manage their men. The MND doubles its efforts to make sure that the officers will be able to maximize the combat capabilities of their men by employing reasonable and human-driven leadership. To this end, it offers an extensive list of leadership programs that satisfy different conditions at different units ranging from education facilities to field units. Moreover, in an effort to nurture all servicemen to become leaders of various social circles, the Ministry is constructing a leadership framework based on which it studies various leadership subjects and offers relevant education by opening a Leadership Center at the National Defense University and under each headquarters of individual Services. ## D. Stepping Up The Campaign Against Corruption, Irregularities And Irrationality In spite of anti-corruption drives initiated by past governments, the Korean people still believe that corruption is prevalent in society and the country ranks poorly in uprightness in the world. The latter factor has led to degrading ratings for the nation in the honors quotient. To brush off the negative image, the Participatory Government is assertively pursuing a "Stamp Out Corruption" initiativeas one of the major national tasks. The MND carries out an extensive anti-corruption campaign to keep pace with the government's efforts to eradicate irregularities, create a virtuous military culture and gain the trust of the nation. The campaign may be summarized as follows: First, the MND established on May 19, 2003 the "Code of Conduct of Employees of the Ministry of National Defense for Integrity, etc.", which served as a turning point in rooting out such irrational practices of the past as accepting money, presents, or entertainment. Second, it formulated the "Guidelines on Operation of the Internal Report Center" on June 17, 2003, which requires the 162 units and institutions of the division level or above to set up and operate an Internal Report Center from July 1. Taking its step further, the Ministry installed another center on the intranet on November 19, 2004. The report center is run as a regular channel which allows reporting of corrupt or irregular activities and facilitates the selfcleanup function. Third, the MND formed a mobile investigation team on March 1, 2004 to exterminate offensive actions that still exist in such vulnerable areas as facility construction and operation of welfare facilities. The team has since investigated a total of 16 cases. In 47 of the investigated cases, rigorous position-related or administrative actions have been taken to deter recurrence of similar cases: 5 cases received punishment, 7 warnings, and 21 notifications. Fourth, the Ministry studied and analyzed the factors that cause objectionable activities referring to defense-related laws and institutions in July 2004 to eliminate corruptive sources. Based on the study and analysis, it was able to list a total of 89 tasks to improve the array of systems, and then asked related departments to actively carry out the tasks. Fifth, on September 24, 2004, the MND Anti-Corruption Council was set up, led by the Vice Minister for National Defense and composed of nine members including the Acquisition Officer, Chief of Personnel and Welfare Bureau, and Chief of Military Installations Bureau. The council holds a meeting every month to regularly check and evaluate the measures taken to curb unethical actions, diagnose susceptible areas, devise anti-corruption programs, and deliberate the rewarding of individuals or institutions for national merit. Apart from the council, each Service was asked to set up and run an anti-corruption team on its own, led by the Vice Chief of Staff. Furthermore, the Ministry adopted another plan to autonomously and actively root out detrimental activities: the establishment of an audit and internal inspection committee. The committee is led by the MND Inspector General and consists of such relevant officers as engaged in inspection, legal affairs, military prosecution, security, and joint investigation. It holds monthly meetings to discuss current issues related to objectionable actions, share a wide range of information, and maintain efficient cooperation. Sixth, the MND, for the first time since ROK Armed Forces were established, arranged a joint anti-corruption workshop for civilians and military personnel on October 28, 2004. The workshop was attended by about 150 persons including all officers of the general level at the MND and Joint Chiefs of Staff, heads of institutions under direct supervision of JCS, chief personnel in charge of military supply, facilities and procurement, and presidents of military supply companies. At the workshop, the attendants were able to understand the importance of eradicating dishonest deeds while committing to joining the extensive anti-corruption and cleanness campaign. Seventh, the MND conducts an educational tour for the campaign to have people grasp the government's commitment toward exterminating corruption, creating a clean image of the government and public officers, and gaining trust for the national defense system from the ![222_image_0.png](222_image_0.png) people. During the first phase, it provided education on the anti-corruption campaign for 51 schools and command level units, 23,000 persons of NCO level or above at administrative units or institutions (including generals) from November 15 to December 22, 2004. During the second phase, all NCOs and above at working-level field units of corps level or below were provided with continuing education and asked to commit themselves to the concept of integrity. Through such education sessions, the Ministry endeavors to encourage a firm dedication to eradicating corruption and voluntarily preventing unsuitable activities. Apart from these efforts, the MND also undertakes various assertive measures to root out the corruption-laden environment by diagnosing the corruption risks of each institution, unit and area based on an analysis of recent corruption cases, calling for shared accountability for incidences of corruption, intensifying the punishment as well as the reward system while offering benefits to individuals or organizations of national merit, strictly restricting retired persons on joining related businesses, and improving the system of entertainments or social gatherings. The broad anti-corruption drive also includes instilling awareness of the campaign among the people by intensifying education and publicity, proliferating and disclosing audit results, utilizing on-line monitoring of the national defense system to collect relevant opinions, including evaluation of corruption-associated factors in multi-facet assessment, and installing a pop-up window on the website of the Center for Defense Information that fosters anti-corruption commitment. The Ministry will continue to actively conduct anti-corruption measures including the improvement of the system. It will also set out guidelines to exterminate corruption related to large projects of KRW50 billion or more as well as critical projects of less than KRW50 billion to ensure that no improper actions occur from the planning stage to the completion of the project. The MND will exert utmost efforts to assist the Participatory Government in stamping out irregularities by evaluating uprightness of each unit and institution. TT Improvement of the Defense System ![224_image_0.png](224_image_0.png) ## A. Upgrading The Personnel Management System The MND endeavors to consistently upgrade the personnel management system to ensure transparency and fairness in handling personnel matters, selecting elite resources who have the potential to become military specialists, and that right persons are consigned to appropriate assignments. Personnel matters will be managed in an open and transparent manner with the personnel management authority at every unit playing an active role in deciding matters concerning education, assignments and promotions. As regards promotions, free competition and multi-faceted open evaluations that are currently implemented in part will be gradually applied across all the ranks so that fair competition takes root. In an attempt to solicit career military service, the Ministry plans to upgrade the service review and evaluation system targeting long-term servicemen, and to offer numerous benefits such as term-based assignment, honorary promotions and employment priority to those who have served the Armed Forces with due loyalty. Moreover, the MND intends to develop the expertise of those who work at a policy-related position to make sure that defense policies are executed in a more efficient and effective manner. To meet this target, the MND attempts to organize a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) system, under which officers who prove to be capable of taking part in joint operations will be assigned to the MND, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Forces Command. Moreover, the Ministry plans to encourage Navy ![224_image_1.png](224_image_1.png) and Air Force officers to explore secondary specialty related to policies to refine their expertise on the subject. In the meantime, the MND is pushing forward the amendments of various laws: it intends to adopt a rotating assignment system to resolve congestion in the process of assignment and promotion; it O Forward-oriented human resource cultivation and right-man-to-right-place system will manage manpower at the organizational level and help retired servicemen sharpen their competencies for job placement; and, it also plans to better handle "extra-quota" regarding occupational training. With a view to take the personnel management system to a higher level and to cultivate quality resources and allocate right persons to right places, the Ministry shall continue to manage matters related to promotions and assignments in a fair and transparent way. ## B. Improving The Management Of Military Manpower (1) Reduced Compulsory Service Period Since 2003, the MND has been shortening the mandatory service period in phases to relieve the pressure of long-term military service and to ensure that all subject persons share equal service obligations. For those who had joined the Armed Forces before September 2003, the period will be gradually reduced by one week while for those who enlisted after October 2003, the period shall be abbreviated by two months (one year for special researchers). To avoid a reduction in voluntary enlistment into the Air Force, those who joined the Air Force after November 2004 are to serve 27 months, one month less than what was previously required. With such revisions, disputes over the principle of equity are being resolved step by step. As a offset the negative impacts of the shortened service requirements, the MND is placing NCOs in areas of maintenance and technology where one is required to have specialized skills as well as appointing them to lead squads to increase combat capabilities and efficiency. [Table 5-3] Shortened Service Period for Mandatory Service | Air Force | | | |-------------------------------------------|--------|--------| | Army | Navy | | | From 28 months to 26 From 30 months to 27 | | | | From 26 months to 24 | | | | months | months | months | An alternate service system was introduced with the purpose of first meeting the demand for expert and active service forces, and then exploiting surplus manpower in other industries and public areas. The alternate service | [Table 5-4] Reduced Service Period for Alternate Service | | | |------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------| | Industrial Technician | Public Service | | | Special Researcher | From 36 months to 34 | From 28 months to 26 | | From 4 years to 3 years | months | months | system has also reduced service period in each area. Since military manpower is expected to diminish from 2005 due to the shortened service period and declining birth rate since the 1980s, the MND continuously attempts to secure required manpower while maintaining the resources for core industries of the country. ## (2) Improvement Of Training And Welfare Of Reserve Forces In refining the reserve forces system, the MND places emphasis on increasing convenience in trainings of the reserve forces and improving their quality and operational capabilities. First, the scope of those who are excused from reservist training has been expanded from those that have been discharged 8 years ago to those that have been out for 7.8 years. Mobilization training was reduced to 3 days from 4 days. On the other hand, the Ministry now includes Year 1 recruits who were only subject to call-up inspection in the mobilization training. With these changes, the MND will be able to execute mobilization training at the unit level in the true sense. To ensure that reserve forces receive real combat training, the NCOs and enlisted soldiers who miss mobilization training are brought to each branch or unit for on-compound training. The MND has also established rotating training sites, procured gas masks and battle dress uniforms, survival drill devices and high-tech equipments such as MILES. Second, the MND plans to change the dining system to improve and gradually expand the free dining that is currently provided by only some units. As part of the measures to improve the dining system, per capita meal expense has been raised to 3,500 won a day from 3,000 won, and an attempt to raise training allowance on a stepby-step basis to a reasonable level is being considered. Third, professors or administrative personnel at universities have commanded the reserve forces at each relevant schools. However, the MND is endeavoring to assign fulltime commanders to replace them and also plans to improve the quality ![226_image_0.png](226_image_0.png) of the operation by revising relevant laws such as the Establishment of the Homeland Reserve Forces Act in such a way as to dissolve poorly managed reserve forces at universities. Fourth, to reinforce operational capabilities the Ministry strives to procure high-tech combat equipment for the reserve forces and obtain critical combat supplies that are in shortage for homeland defense. Fifth, the MND has formulated and executed a master plan to start exploring training sites for reserve forces by installing training centers at each city or province, purchasing such training sites that are likely to trigger complaints from residents, repairing worn-out facilities, and maintaining the training sites using IT systems. | Forces discharged from training | Expanded from Year 8 to Years 7 and 8 | |-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------| | Mobilization training period | From 4 days to 3 days | | | Full-time commanders will replace professors or | | Reserve forces at universities | administrative staff who have been acting as | | | commanders at universities. | | Expansion of free meals | From 25 units to all the units gradually | | Increase in meal expenses | From 3,000 won to 3,500 won | | Raise of training allowance | Travel expense to be provided from 2006 | | | Securing supplies, developing training sites, and | | Others | employing high-tech equipment | [Table 5-5] Refinement of Reserve Forces Training and Welfare ## (3) Improving The Mobilization System The MND is formulating a mobilization designation plan, a management of mobilization resources plan and an execution plan that focus on enlarging the list of elite resources, reinforcing the transportation system, managing manpower at the organizational level, and building up the mobilization information system. First, the Ministry has broadened the designation scope for large cities from districts to entire cities to mobilize more elite resources and upgrade the transportation scheme. At the same time, the MND has consolidated those squadron that have been managing mobilized resources independently and organized transportation squads, and integrated transportation units that had been operating independently at the corps-level. These innovative transformation methods have beefed up the transportation of units. The revisions have enabled the MND to enhance the efficient operation of the reserve forces. ![228_image_0.png](228_image_0.png) [Figure 5-6] Organization of Transportation Units and Revision of the Operation System The MND further drew a list of various specialties for NCOs among which one may be chosen if one lacks the expertise for a specific assignment. This allows for more flexibility in allocating resources and establishes a framework to mobilize forces in an efficient manner during emergencies. With such a framework in place, the Ministry can cope with contingencies more effectively. In regards to the resources subject to wartime labor service mobilization and technician mobilization, the Ministry requires each unit to modify the criteria to estimate its resources so that competent persons are assigned to the right places. The system also requires units in the organization to provide higher flexibility for wartime operations. Lastly, the MND is constructing an information system for mobilization which interfaces with the Military Manpower Administration, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation and other entities to ensure adequate management of mobilization forces. ## C. Upgrading The Procurement System The MND is exploiting an on-line bidding system to assure that supplies are procured in a transparent and efficient manner. Moreover, it endeavors to take the procurement system to the next level in purchasing supplies of higher quality while abolishing the Safety Check for Military Supply System. ![229_image_0.png](229_image_0.png) ![229_image_1.png](229_image_1.png) (1) Adoption of On-line Bidding The on-line bidding system was first introduced by the Defense Procurement Agency in April 2001 and has been adopted by all forces since July 2003. The on-line payment system that interfaces with the MND Treasury Information System was developed and put into operation in July 2004. ## (2) Abolishment Of The Safety Check Of Military Supply System The Safety Check of Military Supply System that had been in operation for 46 years since 1957 was terminated in September 2003. Free competition that was introduced after the abolishment has offered more business opportunities to private companies. (3) Transfer of Procurement of Regular Supplies to Public Procurement Service In order to have procurement experts handle the government purchase process and expand purchase source of regular supplies, the MND transferred the procurement of regular military supplies to the Public Procurement Service in 1999. [Table 5-8] Transfer of Procurement of Regular Items ![230_image_0.png](230_image_0.png) In accordance with the MND's plan for outsourcing the procurement process, 3,326 items were transferred to the agency in 2003, and 3,932 items in 2004, an 18% increase. ## (4) Refinement Of The Quality Control System As weapons technology becomes more sophisticated and requires proficiency in quality control, the Ministry is selecting competent personnel and educating them at domestic and overseas institutions while involving them in the entire process from development of arms to quality inspection. This is to guarantee that the quality-related process is handled by specialists with the highest level of efficiency. Moreover, the MND utilizes the "Customer Satisfaction Index for Military Supplies" to actively resolve user complaints to help increase the reliability of ![231_image_0.png](231_image_0.png) ![231_image_1.png](231_image_1.png) Discussion on improvement of the quality of military supplies quality inspections and user satisfaction. It has also reshuffled the Quality Assurance Council to an open decision-making body to gather comments and opinions of key departments engaged in formulating assurance policies as well as the suppliers. The MND has also conducted the "Defense Quality Award System" since 2004 to motivate defense businesses to focus on quality improvement. ## D. Improving Judicial Institutions Of The Armed Forces (1) Background And Developments As the nation expects the judicial institutions of the Armed Forces to be improved in the wake of the inauguration of the Participatory Government, ROK Armed Forces embarked on the improvement of its judicial system with a view to guarantee independence of the judicial institution while taking into account the special military circumstances. On the basis of an improvement plan internally established in July 2003, the MND has taken active part in discussions on reforming the military judicial system led by the Judicial Reform Committee which operates under the auspices of the Supreme Court. Through discussions and debates in and out of the Armed Forces, the Ministry strives to ensure independence and fairness of military courts while guaranteeing more autonomy and expertise to the military prosecution office. It also tries to devise measures to heighten the constitutionality of the punitive and confinement system. The MND is taking necessary steps to amend the relevant laws with 2005 marked as the target year for implementation. ## (2) Highlights Of The Revised System · Heightened Independence And Fairness Concerning the existing judicial system and its operations, the discussions and debates revealed the following weaknesses: fairness of trial may be undermined by the commander of a concerned unit; military judges have lower level of expertise; and the judicial personnel is not well managed. To tackle such issues, the Ministry has implemented the "Military Judge Pool" system that selects judges among competent military law officers and puts them under the supervision of the MND. The members of the pool travel to different regions to judge cases. Moreover, the defense body built a foundation to assure independence and authority of the military courts by terminating past practices of the confirmation by judicial officer system and the referee system that have been criticized for possible infringement of the constitutional right to be judged by a judge and that arbitrary sentence reduction may violate the concept of equality. > Increased independence and expertise of the military prosecution office The MND considers two options: one, to maintain the current prosecution organization but divest the head of a concerned unit of the authority to lead and supervise the prosecution office to grant more sovereignty to the military prosecution office which investigates and prosecutes cases; two to guarantee autonomy by putting the military prosecution organization directly under the authority of the MND. Regarding the issue of the prosecution office's control over the military police in conducting investigations, the MND is considering to increase the level of control that the prosecution office has on the military police in certain cases in order to improve. ## @ Constitutionality Of The Punitive And Confinement System As regards the punitive and confinement system that involves physical detainment, the MND has introduced a system that allows a military judicial officer to deliberate the lawfulness of a decision to detain. It has also constructed a system to suspend detainment when a case is being appealed. These two systems were devised to assure that the accused is punished or detained in a fair manner, conforming to law. In the meantime, the MND has also taken various measures to reform the judicial system such as the improvement of judicial personnel and resource management to ensure that judicial officers possess the required expertise, and revision of sentence standards to better protect the rights of the accused. # Revising The Active Service System At The Mnd Headquarters Level And Restructuring The Armed Forces ## A. Refining The Active Service System Of The Headquarters (Munminhwa) Munminhwa denotes the institutionalization of civilian-led control over military forces, under which a legitimate civilian president elected by the nation and a group of political figures including the civilian minister of national defense lead and control the Armed Forces. The system allows a circle of civilian experts to decide core national defense policies and operate military capabilities in compliance with political and diplomatic decisions of the government. ![233_image_0.png](233_image_0.png) More and more countries have adopted the system wherein the headquarters of their national defense organizations are run by civilians. In US, which clearly represents such trend, the Department of Defense is mostly staffed by civilians who are security specialists while most professional military personnel are engaged in command duties at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With such division of responsibilities, many security and defense-related research institutions exist in Washington where the head office of the DOD is located. Civil professors are pegged, whenever a need arises, to work in national defense areas for a set period of time, and later return to their work in academia. ROK MND has recently encountered remarkably higher expectations of the nation as well as the government as the democratic institution has stabilized. And furthermore, the Ministry believes that now is the right time to permit civilian talent to control the Armed Forces to take the overall defense system of the country to the next level. If the defense minister's staff mainly consists of active professional soldiers, they may find it difficult to maintain a neutral perspective and balance in deciding and executing policies, while such a system may also be hampered by conflicting interests among the different forces. For such reason, the Ministry deems it critical to engage competent civilian resources in leading the national defense system. Many active professional military perssonnel and veterans who have been retired for less than 5 years are positioned across the top layer of the hierarchy at the headquarters. Policy Planning Bureauand Acquisition Office have hired many soldiers while the Planning & Management Office and Vice Minister's Office are mostly run by general public officers. Such arrangement seems to indicate that the civilian-led defense system has a long way to go and that the basis for efficient civilian-led control needs to be solidified. Thus, the MND strives to gradually employ more civilians at the headquarters in the mid-to-long term while allocating an optimum number of professional soldiers to the required positions to push ahead the civilian-led controlled system. Nevertheless, the essence of the new concept, Munminhwa, is not to merely increase the number of civilians, but to nurture and make the best use of specialists in military policies and management while smoothly coordinating policymaking and organizational operations to handle overall political and military matters more efficiently. The MND will consistently endeavor to divide roles of the MND and the JCS and assure respective authorities to both entities while widening the functions of the JCS as it seeks to create the civilian-driven structure. It will also endeavor to involve the JCS chairman, who is the ranking representative of the Armed Forces, in meetings of the NSC's Standing Committee so that he may state the opinions of the Armed Forces in formulating government and defense policies. Above all, to develop civilian specialists in military affairs, it is crucial to enhance the knowledge and expertise of public officers in related areas while continuing to produce qualified personnel by formulating or broadening related education programs. To accomplish this, the MND may need to off ermilitary science courses at regular universities. With such goals in mind, the Status of efforts to open military science courses - 2004: Daejeon University - 2005 (scheduled): Kyungnam University, Wonkwang University and Chosun University ![235_image_0.png](235_image_0.png) ![235_image_1.png](235_image_1.png) Ceremony for the Conclusion of the Agreement on Civilian and Military Cooperation in Military Science Development Ministry intends to more actively recruit outside experts such as those who have passed the national examination of administration proficiency and retired veterans. They will be trained to become specialists who will work at the headquarters, handling both political and military matters. ## B. Reshuffling The Organization At The Top ROK Armed Forces aim to proactively cope with the evolving defense environment and transform the organization into a state-of-the-art institution. To achieve this objective, the MND is reshuffling the overall top management and reducing the budget through reengineering processes while seeking the highest military efficiency. With the purpose of instilling efficiency and actively coping with the new security challenges of the 21st century, the headquarters has reshuffled the adhoc bodies and non-regular groups that have been operating to meet the increasing workload. Moreover, it officially incorporated any existing indispensable groups into the regular organization without increasing the overall number of personnel. The Ministry has taken a further step to create a new bureau, the Chief of Policy Planning Bureau, to gather and coordinate defense policies and to negotiate national defense, diplomacy and military matters with North Korea. The Ministry also introduced the new positions of Welfare & Health Officer and the Troop Information & Public Affairs Officer. The functions of the two positions are to improve the overall welfare policies such as improvement of barrack facilities and occupational guidance for would-be retirees, and to effectively carry out public relations activities regarding national defense policies, respectively. As it becomes more significant to research, develop and produce weapons domestically, the MND has started to hire civilian specialists. To accomplish this, the Ministry decided to offer the positions of research and development officers to civilians, who will lead localized R&D projects. On the other hand, the JCS has assumed a leading role in warfare operations by intensifying warfare planning and operation capabilities and expanding the chairman's authority to cope with possible changes in the ROK-US combined command structure in the future. In conjunction with such movements, headquarters of each Service continues to solidify its functions of operational support and mobilization to continue to adapt to the evolving defense landscape and administer millitary matters more appropriately. ## C. Restructuring The Units And Forces ROK Armed Forces are rearranging military facilities that have seized to operate efficiently either to meet new conditions or utilize the limited defense budget more sensibly while restructuring units to assure military powers are managed more effectively. In 2004, each Service reduced operational and maintenance costs by resolutely scrapping inefficient military equipment that has increased operation and maintenance expenditures as well as outdated equipment that was still being utilized even after substitutes were procured. Moreover, to enable efficient and economical operations, each Service merged similar or common units as long as combat capabilities were not undermined, scaled down or dissolved units with reduced roles and responsibilities due to the changing operational environment, and standardized the organization. The restructuring resulted in the reduction of 10,000 soldiers in 2004, and the saved labor cost was allocated to reinforcing military power with increased combat capabilities. In 2005, the units will be continued to be reshuffled to achieve the objective of advancing the efficient operation of military forces. ## D. Improving The Structure Of Military Forces In The Mid-To-Long Term To Cope With Different Scenarios Of Future Warfare In the 21st century, the MND will be required to field technology-intensive forces to readily adapt to different strategic environment and war scenarios. To meet such requirement, the Ministry seeks to first fortify military power to deter existing threats while securing high-end capabilities required to tackle potential threats of the future in the long term. ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 241 To this end, the Ministry has enhanced responsiveness to threats poised by WMD, and prepared the forces to be highly ready for combat in the future. It has also restructured the forces phase-by-phase in consideration of further enhancing the forces and fresh security challenges. ## (1) Development Of The Joint C4Isr As regards the C4I System being developed by each Service, the MND intends to design a joint C4IS around the KJCCS, and a joint C4ISR that interfaces with such weapons systems as surveillance and shooting. After the design is completed, the MND plans to integrate overlapping functions across all C4I Systems used by each service and devise a joint C4ISR System for the future with consideration of the possible introduction of "Network-Driven War" and other advancements enabled by information technology. ## (2) Construction Of The Cyber-War Platform The evolution of computerization, information network and various accompanying services has brought about consequences along the way. The MND, acknowledging that such negative developments may trigger a cyberwar, established cyber-war doctrines to formulate a cyber-war platform, and formed a master plan to protect information and improve intelligence capabilities. ![237_image_0.png](237_image_0.png) More widely, it has erected an integrated security control system at the corps level or above, a single anti-virus system across all the forces, and a MND authentication system. It also continues to train cyber-war specialists, maintain collaborative and cooperative relationships with external institutions and provide improved training on INFOCON to gear up for encroachment through the cyber world. KJCCS (Korea Joint Command & Control System) : joint C4I System that is an enhancement of the command post automation system C4ISR : Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance # Section 3. Direction Of The National Defense Transformation Since the Minister of National Defense Yoon Kwang-ung took office, he has consistently stressed that the MND should realize a "Robust Defense System for and by the Nation" by operating the national defense system on the basis of a new paradigm. The new paradigm calls for an advancement of a civilian-led control system, construction of military capabilities befitting the national power, maximization of consolidated forces, and creation of a reliable image of ROK Armed Forces. ## Need For A New Defense Paradigm The need for a new defense paradigm has arisen in the wake of recognition that the previous approach was not adequate to cope with the rapidly changing security situation and defense environment. Over the past half century, the national defense system of ROK has steadily evolved in spite of tense confrontation with North Korea. Today the MND is expected to reform and reshape the mindset of the personnel engaged in national defense to cope with the dynamic changes in security circumstances in and out of the country. Under the current defense environment, the nation has found itself dragged into a conflicting situation where it needs to cope with military confrontation with North Korea while seeking reconciliation and co-existence at the same time. To make the situation more complicated, ROK is also undergoing transitions in security matters as the USFK is being rearranged in step with GPR (Global Defense Posture Review) of US. These internal and external factors have underscored the significance of establishing a clear direction for a build-up of military capabilities fitting the new strategic environment and the achievement of a cooperative self-reliant defense scheme. Today, security has a broader connotation that encompasses politics, economy, society and culture. On the basis of the new concept of security, security needs to be considered from the perspective of a grand national strategy: defense policies and strategies should be implemented as a part of national security policies and strategies while military capabilities also need to be constructed befitting the national power and status. ## Direction Of The Defense Transformation ![239_Image_0.Png](239_Image_0.Png) Under The New Paradigm A. Development Of Civilian-Led Control System Civilian-led Control assures that the Armed Forces representing the government as well as the people are managed, controlled and supported in an efficient manner. Embarking on the initiative, the headquarters of the MND endeavors to enhance efficiency in operating the national defense system by carrying out and supporting the government's policies and the national strategies from the military point of view while ensuring correct balance and harmony in leveraging the specialty and expertise of civilian officers and active soldiers. Civilian-led Control means that the Armed Forces should be managed and controlled by civilians contemplating the status and position of the MND from the perspective of the central government. In addition, civilian specialists are asked to play a crucial role, appreciating the special conditions of the Armed Forces and offering comprehensive and extensive viewpoints regarding defense matters. For Civilian-led Control as expected, the MND should define and refine the concept of civil control over the Armed Forces, review the plan to reinforce the functions of the JCS and each Service in line with the modified active service organization of the MND headquarters. It is also required to polish personnel policies including those related to promotions and assignments to encourage each service to think in a broader sense than its own interests and to recommend a scheme to effectively utilize a pool of military specialists that has been already developed and is being exploited. Furthermore, the MND needs to devise a program to educate and secure a civilian experts group. # B. Build-Up Of Military Capabilities Befitting The National Power The MND needs to solidify self-reliant defense capabilities to aggressively cope with security threats and to implement cooperative self-reliant defense in accordance with strategic motives. It should not, however, ignore the national strategy that incorporates various aspects such as economic power, international status and evolving nature of the ROK-US alliance whilst assuring that ROK Armed Forces play a leading role. Military capabilities should be built in conformance with the objectives of national and military strategies. Furthermore, since defense resources are secured from overall national strength including economic power, the defense budget to strengthen military capabilities and operation of the national defense should be handled in accordance with the national and military strategies and within the limit of available resources. As a consequence, the focus in constructing the military capabilities should be placed on securing the selfreliant war-deterrence capability. At the same time, however, the MND is expected to select and intensively enhance one or two core capabilities of each service and function to be fully prepared for unspecific threats in the future. To achieve such objectives, the MND should obtain intelligence and early warning capabilities, i.e. systems independently for surveillance, reconnaissance, command and control, and communications. The Ministry further needs to devise a battlefield management scheme to operate the combat capabilities of the Sensor-Decision (C4I)-Shooter in real time in an integrated manner, keeping in mind the fact that we now face "wars backed by visual aids" rather than the previous "wars backed by listening aids". ROK Armed Forces need to develop the ability to precisely take out strategic targets in deep areas. While reinforcing such capability, however, cooperation with US and the international community should be pursued concerning the WMD of North Korea. On the other hand, the MND should also obtain the means such as precision-guided munitions to enable ROK forces to attack and paralyze the enemy in emergencies. It must also reinforce counterfire and long-range precision weapons to close the gap with North Korea in the field of firepower, while maintaining our capability to achieve air ## Defense White Paper 2004 245 and maritime superiority at the early phases of war. ROK Armed Forces should obtain within the next 10 years such capabilities required to deter war. In an effort to take a more active role in the UN peacekeeping operations, ROK forces need to form standing units of reasonable sizes for timely overseas dispatch and to stand by for any urgent requests in the midst of increasing demand for participation in PKOs. To guarantee this, the MND should seek to revise relevant laws and institutions from a broad perspective. ## C. Guaranteeing Full Exertion Of Combined Military Capabilities The MND strives to reduce foreign dependence in constructing, managing, and operating the defense forces and to resolve the existing disparity across various functions while satisfying requirements to enable the Armed Forces to fully exert consolidated power under the special conditions on the Korean peninsula, and effectively preparing for future warfare. During the period of economic growth, ROK forces have been enhanced continuously. The recent changes in US Forces in South Korea have presented a good opportunity for ROK forces to assume a greater role in national security. Taking advantage of the occasion, ROK forces need to prepare itself for future warfare through aggressive restructuring the military capabilities and defense system reforms, and especially transform themselves into information and technology-based forces to fully exploit the consolidated capabilities. To meet this objective, the MND needs to build a war-fighting systemled by the JCS, prepare legal and institutional systems to ensure balanced development of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and turn the existing manpower-intensive force structure to a more efficient and technologyintensive structure consisting of skilled personnel. The MND needs to strengthen the JCS's functions and organization to enable it to take the leading role during wars, establish a war plan and execute operations independently. In addition, it should not only consider transferring some of the headquarters' functions associated with military command to the JCS, but also reinforce the organization to enable it to prepare for the rearrangement of command structure between ROK and US while continuing to produce and secure qualified personnel by acquiring advanced military systems through the Combined Forces Command. To erect an institutional framework necessary for symmetrical advancement, the defense organization is expected to define basic guidelines and direction in relation to the balanced development of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Ministry should also devise a way to ensure equal and rotating assignment opportunities for personnel at the JCS, Defense Agencies and joint units, and to include the required staff in the Ministry's headcount to ultimately set a legal and institutional basis. Taking a step further, the defense organization needs to strengthen its functions to review, analyze and evaluate budget investment plans to assure that defense resources are allocated wisely and that the forces consolidate their efforts in building a compelling military while avoiding redundant investments across the forces. ## D. Creating A Reliable Image Of The Armed Forces The MND endeavors to polish its image to gain the trust and support of the nation by creating a desirable military culture and service conditions, while realizing "the goal to defend the nation and serve the nation" in accordance with the comprehensive concept of security and demands of the nation. The Armed Forces face difficulties when they fail to win the trust and support of the people in spite of the high-tech armament and gears that it may have in its stock. To obtain the trust of the people, the Armed Forces need to develop and establish a sound military culture through internal reforms and heightened leadership capabilities based on the framework of democracy and civilian-led control. In addition, it needs to improve the morale of servicemen, welfare programs and service environment while realizing the "Open Defense Administration" that encourages not only involvement of the entire nation, but also openness and transparency as well as the concept of "Defense System for and by the Nation" to protect the safety and interests of the people. In order to make the defense system more open and transparent through the "Open Defense Administration", the Ministry needs to ensure that military manpower administration is managed more fairly and in a customer-friendly manner. The Ministry should be willing to disclose to the public current defense topics, issues of the national interest as well as defense administration ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 247 information before the nation demands it. It needs to involve more civilian experts in developing defense policies to gather different opinions of different sectors of society. "Defense System for and by the Nation" means that the MND stands ready to take an active role in managing national disasters and offering assistance upon the outbreak of catastrophes to proactively protect the safety and interests of the nation, while doubling efforts to protect the property rights of people by extending a helping hand to them. 248 ![243_image_11.png](243_image_11.png) Defense White Pape ![243_image_0.png](243_image_0.png) ![243_image_1.png](243_image_1.png) ![243_image_2.png](243_image_2.png) ![243_image_3.png](243_image_3.png) ![243_image_4.png](243_image_4.png) ![243_image_5.png](243_image_5.png) ![243_image_6.png](243_image_6.png) ![243_image_7.png](243_image_7.png) ![243_image_8.png](243_image_8.png) ![243_image_9.png](243_image_9.png) ![243_image_10.png](243_image_10.png) ![243_image_12.png](243_image_12.png) ![243_image_13.png](243_image_13.png) ![243_image_14.png](243_image_14.png) Chapter 6 Defense System for and by the Nation ![244_image_0.png](244_image_0.png) Section 1 Realization of an "Open Defense Administration" Section 2 ![244_image_1.png](244_image_1.png) Fulfillment of "Defense System for and by the Nation" ![245_image_0.png](245_image_0.png) The MND makes available information on the administration of the headquarters and each Service in an attempt to satisfy the public's "right to know" and to provide opportunities for the people to be involved in defense affairs to allow an "Open Defense Administration" that pursues "Defense System for and by the Nation". The Ministry is also reorganizing the process of civil petition, and taking more active steps to publicize defense activities so that the people can easily access defense information. In parallel with such steps, the Ministry has formed the Council of Defense Policy. The council was formed with a view to assure the nation that defense policies are formulated and executed in a transparent manner, engaging non-military specialists in various fields to formulate defense policies and finally to win the understanding and support of the people. ## Information Disclosure And Improvement Of The Process Of Civil Petition A. Information Disclosure The MND formulated the "Guidelines on Disclosure of Administration Information" pursuant to the "Act on Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies" and applies the guidelines to fulfill the people's "right to know" and grant them the opportunity to voice their thoughts concerning defense matters while improving the level of transparency in handling state affairs. Taking more aggressive steps to disclose information, the Ministry has assigned full-time personnel to handle the matter at the MND headquarters, each Service and other institutes, in addition to creating a public files corner on the MND website to enable the public to have easy access to defenserelated information. As of October 15, 2004 the "Public Files Corner" provided 183 public files among the "Annual Report of National Defense Statistics", 3,255 major documents, and some 180 files related to defense policies. The disclosure request is handled as shown in the Figure 6-1. In 2003, the Ministry received a total of 314 requests for information, a 179% increase from the 175 in the previous year (detailed numbers are indicated in Figure 6-2). ![246_image_0.png](246_image_0.png) [Figure 6-1] Information Disclosure Process ![246_image_1.png](246_image_1.png) [Figure 6-2] 2003 Information Disclosure (Unit: No. of cases) The Ministry intends to broaden the list of available files except for classified intelligence related to national defense and security to fulfill the people's "right to know". This will ensure that defense affairs are administered in a clear manner. ![246_image_2.png](246_image_2.png) [Figure 6-3] "Public Files Corner" on the MND Website ## B. Improvement Of The Process Of Civil Petition The MND installed a single point of contact (02-748-1111, 0114) and an exclusive line for civil affairs (02-748-6891~2) to expedite processing of civil petitions. Coupled with the call lines, the Ministry opened some civil affairs sections such as "Talk to the Minister" and "e-Civil Petition" on the MND website to increase the level of convenience for people handling civil affairs. The MND also created the "MND Reporting Center" and an exclusive report line (02-748-5959) separately to prevent battery and abuses that threaten constructive military culture Critical reports are handled and processed by the reporting officer himself. The Ministry has formed the "MND Civil Petitions Reconciliation Committee" and "MND Working-level Civil Petitions Committee" to deal with distress reports, collective petitions, long-term pending issues, and recurring petitions. Moreover, the MND has issued the "MND Civil Petition Process Guide" and "Resolved Civil Petitions" to help the public better comprehend how civil petitions are managed, and to assist relevant officers in using them as reference. The booklets are distributed to the Civil Petition Office and concerned departments at defense-associated institutes (units) such as headquarters of each Service and their military units. The Ministry has provided regular education sessions to civil petition officers at each organization (unit) to reshape their thoughts and attitude toward civil affairs as a response to the determination of the Participatory Government to resolve problems associated with civil petitions. Some crucial cases are processed through the Direct Engagement Scheme under which the cases in question are directly reported to and handled by the minister or the deputy minister. Regular training and the direct handling program have laid a solid foundation to handle civil petitions in a customer-friendly manner. Along with such endeavors, the Ministry seeks to reengineer the MND Civil Petition Process by identifying and refining some 80 civil-petition-related systems and processes that cause inconvenience to the public. In particular, the Ministry has revised the civil ![247_image_0.png](247_image_0.png) and "Resolved Civil Petitions" petition hand-over system to expedite the process by scanning the petition documents and sending them to [Table 6-4] Civil Petitions by Type (Unit: No. of cases) organizations in charge in real time and on-line. Moreover, the MND has developed a "Petition Receipt Announcer" program that tells a petition officer at a relevant institute (unit) either in voice or a pop-up window that a petition has been received so that the officer may process the case promptly. The division level or above including the MND utilizes the program to speed up the process. The program also allows the officer to skip the complicated connection to check on the arrival of petitions, which ultimately streamlines the process greatly. The Ministry attempts to consolidate the paper document system and Internet petition system that are processed separately via the intranet and Internet into the Internet environment to upgrade the civil petition service. To achieve this objective, the Ministry plans to build and start up "the MND Petition Portal System" in the first half of 2005. The MND Petition Portal System will notify the progress of petition service ![248_image_1.png](248_image_1.png) such as receipt, handover and processing in real time via e-mail or mobile phone to keep petitioners updated regarding their concerns whilst surveying customer satisfaction by e-mail and incorporating the survey results in improving the petition service. The MND will likely make great strides in refining administration services with the portal system in place. O Civil petition booth at the MND headquarters ![248_image_0.png](248_image_0.png) The MND attempts to publish and distribute "the MND Civil Petition White Paper", an extensive guide on the MND civil petitions that covers the current state of civil petition service, successful cases, petition service improvements and future policies. The Ministry receives and handles 68,000 to 70,000 petitions every year and the number has been rising by 3 to 5% each year since the Participatory Government began its term. The percentage of civil petitions submitted via the Internet is on the increase as Internet usage spreads further. ## Aggressive Publicity Of Defense Programs The MND makes continued efforts to publicize the open defense administration by sharing as many core defense policies as possible with the public and earnestly collecting opinions of various sectors and fields of society. It has introduced an open-ended registration program. The program permits all registered media to report on news and issues related to defense not only to fulfill the people's right to know and the needs of the press but to ensure that accurate information is provided. In addition, chief officers give briefings on defense-related matters on a regular as well as needed basis. ![249_image_0.png](249_image_0.png) The Ministry also employs other military PR media such as the Korea Defense Daily Newspaper, National Defense Broadcasting and National Defense Newsletter to distribute to internal as well as external readers PR materials on current defense issues and those related to the national interest. In particular, a military satellite TV ![250_image_0.png](250_image_0.png) channel that will start broadcasting in October 2005 in earnest is expected to bolster PR activities as a national defense channel, and to vastly improve the state defense PR system. In the midst of the evolution toward the information-driven society, the MND is continuing to strengthen Internet-based PR activities. It has made a major revision to its website and interoperates the National Defense Newsletter which is an on-line newspaper and News Briefing on the website of the Government Information Agency, which ensures consistency of government policies while helping Internet users search information more conveniently. With the policy customer service system that was built as a part of the customer management program, the MND classifies stakeholders associated with the national defense and the general public into several interest categories, and sends them policy information via e-mail. The system serves as a two-way PR channel that collects the opinions of the service customers that are later reflected in relevant policies. The Ministry has also taken another approach to enlighten the people regarding national security: it invites opinion leaders from various sectors such as the press, academia, civil organizations and veteran groups and presents the finer points of national defense policies, and takes them to sites that are critical to the state defense and security. The MND has doubled its efforts to support various programs such as youth camps for national defense, overnight stays at the barracks, production of private films and broadcasting materials, local cultural events, and improvement of public access to security tour sites. All the efforts are meant to reach the goal of "Defense System for and by the Nation". Defense White Paper 200 ## Inclusion Of Non-Military Specialists # In The Formulation Of National Defense Policies In the age of "Defense System for and by the Nation", defense policies should be formulated and implemented in a transparent manner, and the entire process needs to be open to the public. The MND has found that it is most essential to involve and interest the people in state defense policies to fulfill the goal. On the basis of such finding, the Ministry has designed and implemented various programs to allow civilian experts of different backgrounds to participate in formulating defense policies. ## A. Council Of Defense Policy Since 1981, the MND has operated the Council of Defense Policy consisting of specialists from various private sectors ranging from academia to the press who have extensive knowledge and experience. The council has not only offered advices on defense administration, but helped civilians and the military party better understand each other. The Council of Defense Policy holds two different types of meetings: a general meeting that is held every year with the defense minister as chairman; and, group meetings that are convened more than once every quarter. The table below shows the number of advisors who are assigned to each of the 13 subcommittees. | Planning & | Office of | | | | | | | | | | | |-----------------|------------------------|------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|----|----|----|----|----|----| | Policy Planning | Acquisition Office(11) | | | | | | | | | | | | Office(10) | Management | Assistant | | | | | | | | | | | | Minister(6) | | | | | | | | | | | | Office(7) | JCS | | | | | | | | | | | | policy | international | education | DIOTHTHIDGIO | A BERKSHIP | research & | | | | | | | | | logistics | facilities | acquisition | information | | | | | | | | | planning | cooperation | & PA | & budgeting | affairs | development | | | | | | | | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 14 | [Table 6-6] Members of the Council of Defense Policy (Unit: No. of persons) In concert with the government's efforts to encourage social participation by women, the Ministry as of 2004 has appointed 10 female advisors, who are assigned to various subcommittees. Taking into account the nature of each subcommittee, the Ministry plans to expand the number of women in the council. It also appoints many reputable persons from different regions and civil institutes as advisors to capture a wide spectrum of ideas and opinions of diverse classes and fields, and to reflect them in formulating defense policies. ## B. Broadening Non-Military Participation In the past the MND utilized indirect methods of collecting ideas from nonmilitary specialists regarding defense policies: it conducted surveys and referred to study results of civilians in establishing policies, or exchanged opinions at seminars. From 1998, however, it included civilian experts in various policy deliberation bodies to reflect their views in formulating and implementing national defense plans. To further encourage civilian contributions, the Ministry reorganized the Committee for Innovation of National Defense into the Committee for National Defense Research, and placed non-military specialists and retired veterans as members. To keep civilian scholars interested in defense issues, the defense organization assists private groups in arranging academic seminars related to state defense while exploiting the perspectives of nonmilitary specialists as the principle source of reference in reviewing and deciding policies in each field concerned. Furthermore, the MND outsources an increasing number of defense research projects to private institutions, through which it has been able to gather different perspectives and employ such information in developing defense policies. ![252_image_0.png](252_image_0.png) ![253_image_0.png](253_image_0.png) ![253_image_1.png](253_image_1.png) To achieve the goal of realizing "Defense System for and by the Nation," the MND is taking dramatic measures to revise the military manpower administration and to increase national participation and interest. As part of the most challenging steps to inspire voluntary assumption of military obligations, the Ministry has introduced an array of systems to increase fairness and transparency in the manpower management scheme while rolling out the system under which recruits can choose enlistment dates and units as they please. The MND strives to manage the Armed Forces in an environmentfriendly manner by preserving the nature surrounding the military posts and not causing any inconvenience to the public while actively participating in efforts to clean up many neighborhoods. It also has devised a way to reduce noise in military airfields and firing ranges that has troubled the residents, and revised rules on military facilities protection area to protect the people's properties. Coupled with such endeavors, the Ministry also spares no effort in rescuing people from various disasters such as typhoon or heavy snowfall by employing military forces and equipment. ## Upgrading Of Military Manpower Administration A strong national defense can be secured only when the people regard fulfillment of military service as not only an obligation but as a privilege. Under such belief, the Ministry is making every effort to create a pleasant military culture by improving the manpower administration. A. Continued Renovation toward a Healthy Military Culture (1) Increased Fairness and Transparency in Manpower Management Operation of Physical Examination Center in two-phase decision making The Military Manpower Administration opened a Physical Examination Center in 2002 to ensure that a discretionary decision on exemption from military duties (5 to 6 grade of physical fitness) by a full-time checkup doctor does not raise any fairness-related issues and to alleviate inconvenience experienced by recruits due to military hospital's request for a second examination. The physical examination was broken down into 15 categories by the checkup center, an independent professional organization, that rates physical fitness grades and a total of 22 full-time doctors conduct conscription examinations. Seven departments that deal with a huge number of examinees have multiple full-time doctors to arrive at decisions based on consensus to dismiss outside requests or pressure associated with physical checkup. The center also exploits high-tech medical equipment such as MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) to grade physical conditions in a more accurate diagnosis. As regards some diseases that are obvious to notice or those which need to be monitored by the recruits' family, however, the Physical Fitness Rating Committee of Regional Military Manpower Administration is permitted to make an immediate decision upon unanimous consensus as previously done to mitigate troubles felt by recruits in a 2nd checkup following a rating of the 5th or 6th grade. As another step to reduce inconvenience caused by the central checkup, the examination O Opening of the Physical Examination Center ![254_image_0.png](254_image_0.png) center has introduced a reservation system to allow recruits to select a checkup date within a period of two months. In particular, the physical examination at the center has been processed using a computer system since September 2003, which interfaces with physical checkup systems at regional administrations. The interface with each local agency facilitates the sharing of checkup data in real time and increases the efficiency of the checkup process. ## Operation Of Physical Fitness Rating Committee (Hereinafter The "Committee") With a view to prevent irregularities in the physical rating process and to assure fair and open decision making, the Military Service Act was revised to permit the formation of a committee to guarantee fair physical examination in February 5, 1999. Along with the legislative amendment, the Military Manpower Committee, Central Committee and Regional Committee were set up at the central administration, the Main Physical Checkup Center and the local administrations. The Military Manpower Committee deals with physical checkups and issues related to physical grading scheme whereas the Central Committee deliberates those whom the physical checkup center fails to rate or those who have raised objection concerning the rating. On the other hand, the Regional Committee handles those who have been rated as 5th or 6th grade by the regional committee due to obvious symptoms of a disease and released from the central examination list (119 diseases outlined in the conscription checkup rules). From 2003, those who have one of the diseases under intensive control and thus are rated as 4th to 6th grade were added to the deliberation list. At the Regional Committee, physical condition is rated by a conscription officer, a chief doctor, a doctor of a department concerned and an external personnel appointed by the local administrator (member of a non-profit organization such as the Citizens' Alliance for Better Military Manpower Administration, Transparency International-Korea, or People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) by unanimous consensus. They request a second examination to the Physical Examination Center when they fail to reach a consensus. The Central Committee can make a 1st decision at a deliberation committee meeting when a consensus is obtained. The meeting needs to beattended by more than 7 persons including the chief of the checkup center, an administration officer, a doctor, another doctor of a department concerned, and a doctor of radiation and diagnosis department. If they fail to reach a conclusion, the deliberation committee invites all full-time doctors at the examination center to a meeting where they review two options of rating that received the most support, and opt for one that garners the majority votes. If the vote ends up in a tie, the chairman of the committee makes the final decision. ## @ Selection And Control Of Major Diseases As some would-be servicemen have attempted to avoid active service on grounds of a tattoo or the condition of hyperidrosis, the administration included in the major diseases list 16 diseases that could damage the body or deemed deceitful in order to prevent recurrence of such illicit attempts. Those who are rated as 4th to 6th grades with one of the major diseases are sent to a local committee for a 2nd rating. If it is believed to be intentional, a letter that states causes of such disease and physical disability as well as a letter of a conscription doctor need to be submitted to the chief of a police station for investigation. If elaborate analysis of rating results including monthly changes in stand-by force or exemption uncovers a concerning factor, quick action is usually taken to resolve it. ## 9 Appointment Of Conscription Checkup Ombudsman Personnel from such civil agencies as the Citizens' Alliance for Better Military Manpower Administration, Transparency International-Korea, or People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, who are elected as ombudsmen, monitor the entire checkup process and receive complaints or difficulties reported by examinees and their families to make necessary corrections and improvement. @ Examination exclusion for relatives or in-laws of conscription doctors In 2004, a policy to found doctors from examining conscripts that are relatives or in-laws was introduced to eliminate the possibility of biased rating and to dispel the negative perceptions of the public. The list of subject persons encompasses relatives within 8 degrees of kinship and in-laws within 4 degrees of kinship of all conscription doctors. As regards the exclusion method, those who are given a 4th to 6th grade by their relatives or in-laws are sent to the examination center by the local administration. In the event a doctor of the checkup center is involved, the relative or in-law of the doctor is sent to the Central Committee for the physical rating. ## (2) Strengthening The Management Of Those That Choose Alternate Ways To Service @ Management Of Public Service Personnel The Alternate Service System aims at efficiently allocating surplus forces to make contributions to the nation as well as the society. The MND manages alternate service tightly by strengthening election criteria, establishing service disciplines and continuously updating the status. Approximately 72,000 public service personnel are carrying out their duties at about 4,200 institutes including state agencies and local organizations. The Ministry strives to manage them more effectively by updating the status continuously while offering more intensive education to personnel concerned, as well as increasing the capability to manage, guide and supervise them in an efficient manner and preventing evasion of service. [Table 6-7] Alternate Ways to Serve as of October 2004 (Unit: No. of persons) | Servicemen at Administrative Organization | International Arts/Physical | | | | | | |---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|----------|-------|-----|-----| | Total | Social | Cooperation | Training | | | | | State | Local | Public | Welfare | | | | | 72,549 | 13,570 | 45,033 | 10,039 | 3,591 | 184 | 132 | ## · Management Of Researchers And Industrial Technicians With the decline in the number of those who are eligible for military service, the number of those choosing alternate ways to serve are reducing as well. To alleviate the shortage of manpower, candidate companies are rated prior to designation, and manpower is not assigned to failing businesses with low ratings. In case a company is undergoing an administrative proceeding such as indictment or warning, manpower assignment to the organization is prohibited during a certain period of time. | Researchers | Industrial Technicians | | | |------------------|--------------------------|--------|--------| | Classification | Total | 2,909 | 12,203 | | No. of Companies | 15,112 | | | | Manpower | 69.911 | 10,796 | 59,115 | | (No. of persons) | | | | [Table 6-8] Selected Companies and Assigned Manpower as of October 2004 The MND evaluates the designated businesses and grants benefits to top ranking firms with manpower allocation while operating the servicemen with stringent control using results of the status update. ## (3) Intensive Management Of Overseas Emigrants And Residents Recently many would-be recruits have attempted to avoid military service on the grounds of overseas residence, which has resulted in heated debates. In an attempt to efficiently control prospective military manpower living overseas, the Ministry intends to guarantee the most convenience for true emigrants while undertaking strict measures against those who flee military obligations by taking advantage of loopholes. Even though a person is exempted from service or given permission to delay on the grounds of acquiring permanent residency by all family members, etc. he is prohibited from traveling to a foreign country and required to assume military duties if he stays in Korea for more than one year, is paid under a continued employment, or earns more than 10 million won a | | | (Unit: No. of persons) | | | |---------------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------|----------|----| | [Table 6-9] Emigrants subject to military service | | Profit-making | | | | Reason | Stay for more | Permanent | | | | Total | than one year | Return | Activity | | | Year | | | | | | October 2004 | 219 | 73 | 142 | 4 | | 2003 | 255 | 86 | 163 | ნ | | | 149 | 8 | | | | 2002 | 275 | 118 | | | | | 143 | 114 | 11 | | | 2001 | 268 | | | | year for other personal services by staying in Korea for more than 60 days. ## @ Whole Family Obtaining Permanent Residency A person all of whose family members have acquired permanent residency in a foreign country is not subject to conscription examination. However, a misunderstanding that this implies a permanent exemption has produced unexpected victims. To correct the misinterpretation, the MND has rephrased the term of "Service Exemption" to "Service Delay" to prevent such misunderstanding and negative thoughts by the public toward such exemption. ## @ Period Of Local Stay If a person subject to military service stays in Korea for more than one year, he is required to serve in the Armed Forces. Under the current system, however, many would-be recruits with foreign residency can stay in Korea for as long as they want, frequently traveling to and from Korea whereas some recruits end up having all their stays combined because they return to the country within 6 months. To mend this drawback, the Ministry plans to shorten domestic stay from one year to a total of 6 months. ## B. Improvement Of Administrative Services To Enhance Public Convenience (1) Call Center (Counseling) For Manpower Administration Civil Petitions Since civil petitions related to manpower administration have been handled locally either by the central administration or by the 13 local administrations, citizens have faced difficulties and inefficiency. The MND has operated the Call Center since July 2002 to consolidate the petition handling process. Citizens may call 1588-9090 (pronounced like gukbang gukbang ("defense defense" in Korean) from anywhere in the country without pushing any area code to receive advice. They may also make reservation by phone for counseling. Once a reservation is made, the system checks it as soon as business starts on the following day and contacts the person through a recall function. The Call Center is run through an integrated system that deals with petitions collected via various means, such as the telephone, Internet or fax. | [Table 6-10] Counseling on Manpower Administration | (Unit: No. of cases) | | | |------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------|-----------| | Classification | Total | Internet | Telephone | | October 2004 | 2,994,454 | 875,618 | 2,118,836 | | 2003 | 3,882,444 | 1,106,652 | 2,775,792 | | 2002 (July ~ Dec.) | 1,832,306 | 539,327 | 1,292,979 | The Ministry is making strides to upgrade the competence-level of counselors by inviting lecturers and build cooperative and support relationships with private call centers to provide upscale services and improve counselors' capabilities and specialty through counseling education. On the other hand, the Ministry strives to identify ideas for improvement of laws and institutions as well as the resolution of complaints and troubles of citizens through counseling, and to reflect them in making policies on manpower administration. ## (2) Autonomous Fulfillment Of Military Duties The defense organization provides choices and extends more autonomy in fulfilling individual military duties. It has also revised relevant systems, environment, and services to be servicemen-friendly to ensure fairness and transparency in administering military matters and to create a desirable service culture. ## - Choosing Enlistment Dates And Training Units Since 2001, recruits have selected their enlistment date and training unit, which had been decided by the Administration in the past, based on such personal considerations as the timing of returning to school. In the first year of implementation, some 30,000 recruits representing 13.5% of the total recruits chose the date and unit themselves, while in 2004 the number increased to 70,000 or so, 38.9% of the estimated number of recruits. The Ministry also implemented "Action against Contingency System" that is similar to a train ticket reservation system to allow a person to choose a date and join the Armed Forces as soon as an enlistment schedule shows a vacancy in the interested force. The Ministry will expand the system so that all the active recruits may choose for themselves the desirable date and a unit when enlisting. ## Central Recruiting Of The Army After 2003 when the MMA started to manage recruiting for the Army, the volunteer rate surged by 160% while the supplement rate rose by 13.8% from 2002. The success is believed to have been driven by offering information on the interested force via e-mail or SMS of mobile phones, and such improved service as less required documentation. Encouraged by the achievement, Army recruiting was transferred to the Administration in 2004, which has taken full charge of supplementing the active force of the Army in a real sense. Meanwhile the MMA continues to pursue the increase of convenience to the people and efficiency of the overall process by sending enlistment notices via e-mail. Such continuing process improvements have helped ease time and space constraints in handling recruitment. [Table 6-11] Highlights of Recruitment Process Improvement - Applications received on the Internet - Information offered on type of force one can apply for - Application information on interested force sent via e-mail and SMS of mobile phones - Recruitment results transmitted via SMS of mobile phones - Number of documentations and visits reduced ## Joint Enlistment In an effort to ease insecurities of new recruits and concerns of their families over adaptation to the military life, the Army introduced a system that permits a recruit to enlist and serve with his friend or colleague until he is discharged. In 2003 when it was first implemented, 20,000 recruits benefited from the system. "Choose-Yourself System on the Internet" was created to facilitate the operation of the system, and unstable connections to the Internet server that occurred in the early phase have been resolved. Other improvements and refinement of the system include change of monthly recruiting intervals to conscription on a needed basis throughout the year, and expansion of the applicable specialty list from 6 to 40. The Army is making continued efforts to upgrade the system. ## @ Open Process Of Katusa Selection KATUSA : Korea Augmentation To the United States Army Since serving in the KATUSA is deemed to be a good chance to improve language ability during one's service period, the number of applicants has steadily increased. The increasing preference, however, provoked distrust of the people with overheated application and irregularities in selecting and assigning servicemen for KATUSA duties. The MND has allowed families of applicants, civil agencies and the press to monitor the selection proceedings to cope with the issue and assure transparency in selecting and assigning the forces. Furthermore, observers are granted the right to pick numbers at random, and then the computer system selects recruits. The entire process is posted on the Internet while the results are delivered via SMS of mobile phones. These endeavors are helping to ensure open and transparent administration. From 2004, recruits noted their desired enlistment month when submitting an application. The months that the recruits request are usually accepted. Regarding language proficiency requirement, the Army took radical actions to grant more opportunities to competent recruits by lowering the cutoff score of TEPS to 625 from 640. The Ministry continues to polish the institutions to enhance combat forces and convenience of the people. ## (3) Aggressive Public Relations - Tv Advertising And Network System The MND produced and aired commercials on KBS, KTV, and YTN to instill in people pride in military service, and to have them deem it as an honorable duty while realizing the significance of military obligations. The advertising campaign was well received by the people thanks to the collection and incorporation of ideas of different sectors and fields ranging from specialists and members of civil groups to PR personnel of the Armed Forces. Moreover, to revise the existing one-way publicity, the Ministry implemented the CRM that supplies customized information and services requested by the customers from a database. Exploiting the system, the MMA disseminates extensive information on military manpower administration including the "MMA Newsletter" via e-mail to some 454,000 subscribers. It has also placed a banner on the website of each defense organization so that visitors may easily access the information they require. TEPS : Test of English Proficiency. Seoul National University CRM : Customer Relationship Management Banner : A type of advertising found on an Internet homepage that consists of a banner-shaped graphic image ## @ Direct Visits In an effort to fully guarantee a "Healthy Army Life," the MMA strives to be reborn as a customer-friendly organization by arranging presentation by members of civil organizations, visiting remote islands that are usually difficult to travel to, and giving presentations on military manpower administration to families of recruits subject to physical examination. ## J The Media In juxtaposition with the above approaches, the MND employs the press as one of the basic means of briefing to provide the citizens with policy information in a timely manner. Especially, for essential policies as well as improvements of institutions intended to increase the people's convenience, the Ministry makes sure that appropriate PR plans are devised and aggressively publicizes them in advance. As a part of the publicity system, the Ministry has, since September 1, 2003, frequently provided a range of information from morning notes by the Administrator, fresh information on policies of each office and bureau, activities of local administrators to various events through state briefings. ## · Events To Proliferate A Positive Image The MMA tries to hold diverse events to publicize the bright aspects of the manpower administration. To accomplish this, the organization carries out the "Find a noble family of military service" that searches for families with three generations completing active service. The agency selects 40 families that have served for three generations and grants them a "Certificate of Noble Family." Then the families are posted on the Hall of Honor on the MMA's website. Through such activities designed to enhance its image, the MMA strives to highlight the nobility of the military service. It also holds literary and animation contests under the theme of the military duties, and appoints an honorary ambassador to tour each ![262_image_0.png](262_image_0.png) ![262_image_1.png](262_image_1.png) local administration every month to work as a conscription officer for a day and talk with servicemen. The MMA plans to develop brand new publicity approaches such as diverse events to disseminate a fresh image of the organization, help society take pride in military service, heighten the patriotic spirit and create a pleasant military culture. It also endeavors to reinforce the publicity plan to reach a broader class of customers. ## Protection Of The Environment ![263_Image_0.Png](263_Image_0.Png) The activities of the Armed Forces geared toward protecting the environment relate directly to the preservation of national territory where people live and work. Keeping this in mind, the military undertakes active measures to refrain from damaging the environment during military operations, to preserve land surrounding military posts, and to clean up local areas. ## A. Development Of The Scheme Of Environmental Protection (1) Improvement Of The Protection Process ROK Armed Forces have established departments dedicated to environmental protection at the headquarters of each Service, and the Army also plans to set up such departments at corps-level units. In order to heighten the effectiveness of environmental protection, the 1,258 full-time personnel that are already in place will continue to perform their tasks while the number of such human resources will continue to be increased. [Table 6-12] Staffing of Environment Preservation Departments (Unit: No. of persons) | Total Manpower | By 2003 | 2004 | After 2005 | | |------------------|-----------|--------|--------------|-----| | Needs | % | | | | | 1,609 | 1,123 | 70 | 136 | 351 | ## (2) Upgrading Environmental Education ROK Armed Forces have intensified environmental education targeting all servicemen as well as commanders. Approximately 1,000 persons are trained on the execution of preservation tasks every year at the National Institute of Environmental Research and Comprehensive Munitions Academy, while Korea Military Engineering School is intensifying training for servicemen. Military education centers and units of every level arrange education to enlighten soldiers as regards pollution issues while independent specialists are invited to provide better and more effective sessions. As part of the daily environmental protection activities, ROK Armed Forces clean up the environment, separate wastes, reduce daily garbage, and avoid using disposable goods. ## (3) Cooperation With External Institutes To Protect Environment Surrounding Military Posts Since civilian residents and military units share land surrounding military bases, mutual collaboration between the military, local organizations, residents, and NGOs is indispensable in resolving environmental problems in the areas concerned. Realizing the importance of the joint efforts, the military continues to strengthen cooperative ties with the private sector as well as government agencies. To assure multilateral collaboration, the Military and Government Environment Council was formed in 1998, which operates two committees: a central committee consisting of 3 central government agencies including the MND and the Ministry of Environment, and 6 regional committees composed of military units of each Service, local administrative institutes associated with environmental protection, and other regional agencies. Each committee meets more than twice a year to support each other in implementing preservation tasks. O Treatment of wastes by the Armed Forces ![264_image_0.png](264_image_0.png) The MND also holds annual "Military Seminars for Environment Protection" attended by environmental experts, working-level personnel, and non-governmental institutes to determine, analyze, and address issues related to pollution concerning the Armed Forces. ## B. Prevention Of Pollution In And Around Military Bases (1) Augmentation Of Environmental Protection Facilities As part of the efforts toward increasing the number of water purification facilities, the MND constructed 2,127 waste or polluted water treatment installations by the end of 2004, and now treats wastewater in collaboration with sewage handling agencies of local administrations. It also commissions independent businesses to operate such facilities that handle more than 200 tons per day to purify polluted or wastewater in a more effective and efficient manner. | Classification | Total Needs | By 2004 | 2005 | Beyond 2006 | | |-------------------|-----------------|-----------|--------|---------------|-------| | % | | | | | | | No. of facilities | 6,475 | 4.344 | 37 | 498 | 1,633 | | Facilities | 100 million won | 5,768 | 3,386 | 568 | 1,814 | [Table 6-13] Environment Protection Facilities The Ministry is continuing its efforts to speed up the installation of a total of 6,475 facilities to prevent air and land pollution while complying with heightened environmental protection standards and renovating or repairing old facilities. ## (2) Waste Management And Recycling Non-industrial waste discarded by the Armed Forces is processed by outsourced local organizations if the situation allows. Only when the scrap cannot be handled by the agency, is it burnt at a military incinerator. On the other hand, the military has investigated all wastes buried at each base and is | [Table 6-14] Treatment of Military Wastes in 2003 | (Unit: Ton) | | | | | |-----------------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------|------------|--------|-------| | Waste | Internal | | | | | | Classification | Outsourcing | | | | | | Volume | Total | Recycling Burning Others | | | | | Total | 199,667 | 133,121 66,546 | 60,332 | 4,869 | 1,355 | | Daily | 104,962 | 74,855 30,107 | 25,238 | 4,869 | | | Non- | | | | | | | industrial | Food | 35,197 | 871 34,326 | 32,971 | 1,355 | | Classified | 11,950 | 10,011 | 1,939 | 1,939 | | | Construction | 47,558 | 47,384 | 174 | 174 | | dealing with the situation as set out in a master waste treatment plan. Wastes classified as hazardous including oil and acid are recycled to the greatest extent possible, and then the remaining non-recyclable scraps are sent to an outside processing company. As of the end of 2003, the Armed Forces have installed and operate 25,000 pieces of sorting equipment to promote waste recycling. ## (3) Minimization Of Damage To The Environment By Military Construction When constructing military facilities, the Armed Forces develop a plan to curb toxic elements generated from the work and manage the project in an environment-friendly manner from the planning stage. In parallel with these endeavors, the military follows the procedures of the environmental impact evaluation and preliminary environment investigation while formulating and implementing the Plan for Environment-Friendly Management of Construction Sites. The plan follows through on the review and collaboration regarding not only project selection and design but also minimization of waste and hazards. ## (4) Inspection For Contamination Of Land To prevent land pollution, the Armed Forces inspect oil storage facilities and wastes buried at all military bases on a regular basis, and implement countermeasures. Furthermore, the control over inspection of fertilizer residue and use of farming chemicals at 26 military physical exercise sites has been heightened. The Armed Forces wash down contaminated land on an annual basis according to priorities, and have completely cleansed 20 sites including the Old Maintenance Site \#2 in Busan last year (costing 12.2 billion won). Some 20 sites are planned to be swept on a step-by-step basis. ![266_image_0.png](266_image_0.png) around military bases ## C. Reduction Of Noise Around Military Airfields And Firing Ranges ROK forces have formulated and are executing an anti-noise plan that comprises of changes to flight routes and schedules in order to minimize the inconvenience and to resolve civil petitions. Taking a step further, the armed forces have installed and operated 13 noise-proof maintenance shops to suppress noise emitted in servicing aircraft. The MND is pushing ahead with legislation of a Special Noise Act that aims to address noise complaints. The military has studied noise pollution at major airfields and 40 firing ranges to facilitate the legislation, and is attempting to estimate the funding required and to setout a financing scheme on the basis of the study. The Ministry intends to place the special act in effect in 2006 following preparation of the financing plan and such legislative procedures as public hearings. ## D. Aggressive Environment Protection Activities (1) Local Cleanup ![267_image_0.png](267_image_0.png) More than 2 million soldiers pick up some 1.5 tons of waste by cleaning up mountains, streams, coasts, and parks surrounding military bases and training sites every year. The scope of clean-up activities range from the One Mountain and One Stream per One Unit, National Cleanup Campaign, Hangang (river) Cleaning, Environmental Cleanup on Remote Islands to Waste Collection in Flooded Areas. Such activities contribute to creating a fresh and pleasant living environment for residents and keeping the country untainted. ## (2) Conservation Of Wild Animals And The Ecosystem ROK Armed Forces have actively participated in conserving special protective areas such as Jirisan (mountain), Daeamsan (mountain) (Yongneup), Uponeup (marsh) and Mulgeomi (natural monument) pursuant to the "Plan for Ecosystem Preservation Surrounding Military Bases." In 2003, in particular, approximately 130,000 servicemen took part in protecting wild animals and nature by scattering 165 tons of feed for wild animals in winter, removing 4,750 pieces of poaching devices such as snares and traps, and operating 731 surveillance posts. The military forces are restoring and cleaning up old or abandoned structures such as guard posts, trenches or iron fences that were built for military operations, training or surveillance, but now lie in ruin. During training, an effort is made to not to damage the environment and refrain from discarding or burying waste. ## E. Safety Control At Working Sites Under the MND's regulations such as the Rules on Military Working Sites and Workers' Health Management and the Rules on Military Radiation Safety Management, the military revises and refines policies to better control working areas and radiation safety in order to maintain safety at worksites. The Ministry has also prepared and is implementing a plan to regulate toxic elements at work sites, such as heavy metal, solvents, noise, dust, and medical and industrial radiation. In 2003, the MND specified radiation equipment for non medical purposes that have been installed at 15 units to the Ministry of Science & Technology for inspection whilst designating the Korean Army Maintenance Detachment as the safety inspection agency to investigate 1,200 pieces of radiation equipment. In addition, the military inspected the working environment at 37 units and examined physical conditions of 4,300 workers. The military continually endeavors to ensure a safe work environment. In 2004, the Ministry upgraded working conditions at 20 worksites at 7 units including a naval maintenance facility, investigated radiation status at some 130 bases, examined the health of about 4,600 workers, and evaluated labor conditions at 38 units. ## Development Of The Local Community And Improvement Of Civilian-Military Relations A. Development Of The Local Community And Management Of Military Facilities (1) Private Land Used By The Armed Forces ROK Armed Forces have paid compensation for or bought out private land that they have used to protect the property rights of the people. As part of the policy, they purchase land lots that they need to use continuously by paying consideration in pursuant to the Act on Acquisition of and Compensation for Land for Public Benefits Projects whereas returning those they no longer need. In the event that an owner of a piece of land that the military forces are utilizing desires to exchange his property with idle state land, the armed forces positively reviews the request. Since 1995, the military forces have been active in buying land lots in use by leveraging the normal budget, proceeds from sale of idle state land as well as a special budget for state properties management. ## Defense White Paper 2004 | 273 [Figure 6-15] Disposal of Private Land ![269_image_1.png](269_image_1.png) Purchased land('83~'03) ![269_image_0.png](269_image_0.png) 35,310,000 Pyeong, If the Armed Forces require a certain piece of land for military purposes, they must obtain the approval of the owner or buy the lot following a lawful process prior to use. Figure 6-15 shows disposal of private land used by ROK Armed Forces. ## (2) Relocation Of Military Facilities To avoid creating discomfort, ensure effective utilization of land, achieve balanced development of urban areas, and modernize military facilities, the MND has gradually relocated military facilities mobilizing the special budget for state properties management as long as the relocation does not affect military operations. The Ministry has transferred facilities every year since 1966. In spite of the continuing relocations, the Ministry is facing increased calls for the movement of military posts by residents and local governments after the local administration system was introduced. The Ministry, however, finds it difficult to do so because it has not been allocated the necessary budget and lacks financial resources due to delayed sale of land in the midst of the slow real estate market. Between 1998 and 2004 the MND relocated 56 bases at a cost of 1,397.7 billion won, and in 2005 it plans to relocate 31 bases with 233.5 billion won in costs. Military bases will continue to be relocated. [Table 6-16] Relocation of Military Facilities (1998 to 2004) | Gang | Gyeong | Chung | Gyeong | Gyeong | Jeon | Jeon | | | | |-----------------|----------|---------|----------|----------|--------|--------|------|----|----| | Region | Total | Seoul | -cheong | -buk | -nam | -nam | -buk | | | | -won | -gi | | | | | | | | | | No. of | 56 | 7 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 14 | 2 | 1 | | relocated units | | | | | | | | | | ## (3) Institutional Improvement And Deregulation To Safeguard Military Facilities The MND has formulated such acts as Protection of Military Facilities Act, Naval Bases Act and Air Bases Act to safeguard core installations and to ensure smooth military operations. Pursuant to the acts, the Ministry has secured 3,210 million Pyeong (10,611,570,247m2) as restrictedareas in and around the border zones and main establishments. As a consequence, immense parts of the country have been designated as the protection zone, which has caused inconvenience and discomfort to the people and limited the rights to use the land. Perceiving the problems such restrictions cause, the Ministry is seeking to revise relevant systems and ease related rules. ## Amendment Of Acts And Revision Of Institutions Acts associated with military establishments (bases) have been amended several times since their formulation in 1970. Major revisions are described in Table 6-17. [Table 6-17] Major Revisions of Acts and Institutional Improvements - The Ministry has changed the scope of control and protective zones such as civilian settlements north of Civilian Off Limits Line, reunification-related project areas, and security tour regions to restricted zones. - No one is allowed to build or expand any house within ammunition storage protection area. Now, however, in the event it is unavoidable to demolish a house within a restricted area for public projects including construction of railways or roads, the house can be relocated. - The base protection zones that extended 5 kilometers from the outer boundary of all airfield bases have now been reduced to 2 kilometers from the rim. - Consultation may be delegated to an administrative agency to streamline process as long as it complies with building height regulating provisions set forth in facility protection rules. ## @ Adjustment Of Protection Zone And Deregulation The MND held 28 meetings of "the MND Deliberation Committee for Military Facilities Protection Zone" between 1975 and January 2004 to assure efficient operations and guard the citizens' rights to their properties. Through the meetings, the Ministry adjusted the protective zones and deregulated the relevant rules as shown in the Table 6-18. [Table 6-18] Release from and Deregulation of Military Installations Protection Zone (Unit: 10,000 Pyeong) | Total | Before 1988 | 1989 to 1994 | 1995 to 2003 | 2004 | | |--------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------| | Year | 96,619 | 32,758 | 55,163 | 5,176 | 3,522 | | Release | (3,194,016,529m²) | (1,082,909,091m²) | (1,823,570,248m²) | (171,107,438m²) | (116,429,752m²) | | 11,323 | 3.358 | 5.686 | 961 | 1.318 | | | Change | (374,314,049m²) | 87,966,942m2 | (31,768,595 m²) | (43,570,247 m2) | | | | 33,632 | | | | | | Consultation | 37,124 | (115,438,016 m²) | | | | | delegated | (1,227,239,669m²) | (1,111,801,653 m³) | | | | Concurrent with such adjustments and deregulations, the Ministry formed the Committee for Improved Management of Military Facilities Protection Zone led by the chief of the Operations Division at JCS in January 2003, which adjusts the protective areas by releasing, designating or changing them, deregulates related rules, redefines military operability review policies, and refines relevant laws and institutions. All such efforts aim to guard the assets of citizens and ensure their convenience as long as it does not undermine military activities. In January 2004, in particular, the Ministry dramatically eased restrictions on 83.32 million Pyeong (275,438,016m²) of land in 460 areas including Gyeonggi and Northern Gangwon provinces while additionally designating or changing 10.01 million Pyeong (33,090,909m²) in 36 other regions that are essential for military purposes. Furthermore, it set the entire area of Seoul as a defense cooperation zone against potential air attacks. The Ministry will continue to revise systems to protect the people's property rights. ## B. Disaster Relief The world has recently witnessed devastating natural disasters such as typhoons, floods, and heavy snow that have occurred due to climate disorders including global warming. It is believed that the global community will continue to be beset by environmental calamities. Confronted with the magnifying environmental challenges, people aspire to live safer lives. To appease such concerns over safety, the Participatory Government has reorganized the overall disaster control scheme by enacting and promulgating the Framework Act on Disaster and Safety Control on March 1, 2004, and installing the National Emergency Management Agency on June 1, 2004. The MND formed a Disaster Control Department on August 14, 2004, and spares no effort in safeguarding lives and properties against not only conventional military threats but disasters and calamities as part of comprehensive security system. ## (1) Mnd'S New Paradigm On Disaster Control ROK Armed Forces were firmly committed torescue and relief activities during such national disasters as typhoon Rusa in 2002, typhoon Maemi in 2003, and the snowstorm in the central region in 2004. Despite continuing support for rescue and relief efforts, it may be said that disaster management has been somewhat neglected under the traditional security regime that aims at defending people's lives assets, and the country against external invasions. As a response to rising demands for safety management, the MND decided to play an active role in state disaster control. Under such determination, the Ministry plans to incorporate necessary provisions in various strategies including framework defense policies and defense white papers so that public service during national emergencies is carried out as one of the fundamental duties of the Armed Forces in accordance with a new definition of security. To back up the commitment, ROK Army will set up a Disaster Control Department at its head office in 2005 while the Navy and Air Force plan to form similar organizations at team level. The Ministry also seeks to institutionalize cooperative relations such as information sharing on availabl eresources of the Armed Forces for emergency control with the National Disaster Management Agency and signing collaboration agreements with the Agency and between military units and local governments. Taking a step further, the Ministry intends to prepare detailed guidelines for 11 types of natural and personal disasters such as typhoons and seaquakes as well as 8 categories of national infrastructure protection in line with the NSC's standard guidelines on crisis control, and distribute them to all the Armed Forces to make it readily available when a calamity occurs. The defense organization deems it essential to instill in commanders and servicemen a correct perception of the rescue and relief activities along with physical preparations, and plans to open a disaster control course at military academies including the National Defense University. Lectures will be arranged by specialists while sending more personnel and instructors to fire fighting school, central 119 station, civilian colleges, and disaster control research centers for education. O Restoration of a greenhouse after the ![272_image_0.png](272_image_0.png) snowstorm in March 2004 ![272_image_1.png](272_image_1.png) Provision of emergency relief supplies The new disaster control initiative will greatly contribute to reinforcing military readiness and combat capabilities by gaining the trust of the people and reinforcing the idea that the Armed Forces stand by them in trying times. (2) Readiness Posture for Disaster and Emergency Control The Ministry has developed rules related to disaster management to integrate emergency management by the Armed Forces, and operates 390 disaster monitoring offices and disaster rescue units throughout the nation. The emergency provisions that the Armed Forces have formulated are discussed below. First, the Ministry has set up and operates search and rescue units as well as disaster rescue units. The search and rescue units of each Service with advanced skills stand by round the clock to perform rescues from devastating catastrophe, aircraft crashes or shipwrecks. The military has designated a total of 13 disaster rescue units, one at each metropolitan city and province to enable swift rescues. The units stand ready to provide support whenever administration agencies or citizens call for assistance. Secondly, the Ministry invested 5.84 billion won between 1996 and 2002 to procure rescue equipment and to strengthen required facilities. Thirdly, the comprehensive support for disasters and emergencies by the Armed Forces comprises medical assistance, quarantine, water inspection, washing clothes and water supply. The Armed Forces also run air transportation units to ensure mobility in transporting patients in critical conditions from places that ambulances cannot access. ![273_image_0.png](273_image_0.png) Fourthly, the military operates some 110 emergency and rescue units as well as hospitals for emergency patients during heavy traffic periods such as Lunar New Year and Chuseok (Korean Thanksgiving) holidays. These various rescue schemes help the Armed Forces gear up to provide immediate public support around the clock. | [Table 6-19] Rescue and Relief Activities over the Last 5 Years | | | | | | | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|---------|----------|--------|-------|-----------------|------------------| | | Support | | | | | | | | | Mobilized Force | | | | | | | | | | Classi | Life | Medical | | | | | | | | Manpower | Road | House | checkup | Farmland | | | | | | -fication | Equipment rescue | /bank | (No. of | Others | | | | | | (10,000 | (No. of | (ha) | | | | | | | | (pieces) | (No. of | bldg) | | | | | | | | persons) | (km) | | | | | | | | | persons) | persons) | - Prevention of | | | | | | | | 2000 | 52 | 3,790 | ଚେ | 1,493 | 459 | 5.926 | landslides: 114 | | | | Quarantine: | | | | | | | | | 2001 | 184 | 66,892 | 124 | 681 | 36,252 | . | 24,445ha | | | | - Washing clothes: | | | | | | | | | 2002 | 98 | 22,872 | 111 | 567 | 11,822 | 2,750 | 1,830 | 154,500kg | | | - Dredging of water | | | | | | | | | | reservoirs: 43 | | | | | | | | | 2003 | રક | 16,818 | 69 | 120 | 9,712 | 1,500 | 3,947 | - Removal of | | | soil/filth: 82,163 | | | | | | | | | 2004 | 23 | 5,054 | 2 | 59 | 569 | 1,500 | 63 | tons | | | - Quarantine: 3 | | | | | | | | | Total | 412 | 115,426 | 306 | 1,493 | 59,848 | 6,209 | 11,766 | occasions (2003) | ## (3) Support Provided ROK Armed Forces provide emergency control and reconstruction by employing their manpower and equipment whenever a disaster such as typhoon Maemi in 2003 and the subway fire in Daegu, or disease pig cholera or the bird flu breaks out. Among other things, in March 2004 the military distributed food and blankets to people stuck on highways due to the heaviest snow ever experienced in the central region of the country. Active involvement in prompt rescues and clearing of snow greatly eased the discomfort and inconvenience felt by the people. ## (4) Engagement Of Local Reserve Forces The local reserve forces whose duty is to guard its local territory also participate in rescue and relief efforts as well as national emergencies. To involve the reserve forces, the MND developed the Guidelines on Reserve Forces Management for Disasters and Emergencies in 2003, and in 2004 established on early warning system for outbreaks of emergencies by exploiting Xroshot of the reserve forces organization and thus minimize the damage to the people. Above all, the reserve forces took an active part in restoring the regions affected by the typhoon Maemi by mobilizing some 90,000 personnel together with 429 volunteers of the Daegu Universiade. Furthermore, it released 5,000 reserve forces living in affected areas from reserve force training so that they dedicate themselves to restoration of their communities. ## Defense White Paper 2004 279 C. Other Public Services ROK military assumes active roles leveraging all of their manpower, equipment, and technology available in relevant areas that need the support of the Armed Forces while making doubly sure to fulfill their primary obligations. ## (1) Extending Help To Farmers ![275_Image_0.Png](275_Image_0.Png) ![275_Image_1.Png](275_Image_1.Png) O Repair of farming machinery The Armed Forces regularly extend assistance to farmers who lack manpower and equipment and thus have difficulties in seeding and harvesting. To keep abreast with structural changes in farming communities, the military helps them reinforce the agricultural infrastructure by restructuring roads and rebuilding riverbanks rather than merely providing manpower. The military has established the Equipment Repair Service Team to travel to areas that do not have farming machinery repair centers, and fix such machines as cultivators and planters as part of technological support. [Table 6-20] Support for Farmers in 2004 | Activities | | | | |--------------|-----------------|---------------------------|------------| | Manpower | Equipment | Machine Repair of farming | Medical | | Farming | repair | roads/waterways | assistance | | 344,773 | 8,225 Jeongbo | 6.320 | 2,554 | | 6,136 pieces | 68 km | | | | persons | (81,570,615 m²) | units | persons | ## (2) Medical Assistance, Quarantine And Other Support ROK Armed Forces strive to improve public health by offering medical services free of charge and preventing epidemics in vulnerable regions on a regular basis. In addition, they carry out the "Build Brotherhood Relationships" campaign that encourages each military unit to support more than 1 welfare organization or family in need. Round-the-year public services that ROK military provides include advice to local people to resolve legal issues. In 2003 when SARS broke out, the Armed Forces dispatched an average of some 100 medical staff every day to the international airport and quarantine offices. The medical staff examined a total of 475,060 persons, and hospitalized 17 people suspected to have contracted the disease and 3 people with the possibility of being contracted with the disease, which helped block the disease and significantly prevent further dispersion. ![276_image_0.png](276_image_0.png) SARS : Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome O Medical treatment using high-pressure chamber In December 2004, the Navy treated 170 female divers in Hwasun, Jeju Island using the high-pressure chamber of the vessel, Cheonghaejin, which is a specialized ship for rescue operations involving submarines. The treatment helped the Navy win the trust of the people. High-pressure chamber : used to train submarine crew and divers to adapt to undersea operations using high-pressure oxygen. It can be exploited to cure submarine-related sicknesses such as chronic muscle pain, arthritis or minor heart trouble by applying underwater pressure of a certain level to given spaces. ![277_image_0.png](277_image_0.png) Status of Global Conflicts in 2004 Appendix 1 ![277_image_1.png](277_image_1.png) Nuclear Capabilities of the Nuclear Powers Appendix 2 Military Capabilities of Neighboring Countries Appendix 3 Comparison of Economic Indices of South and North Korea Appendix 4 Appendix 5 North Korean Annual Military Expenditures (1991-2003) Comparison of Military Capabilities between South and North Korea. Appendix 6 Appendix 7 North Korea's Missile Development and Specifications Chronology of Major Events Related to the North Korean Nuclear Issue (Oct. 2002 - Dec. 2004) Appendix 8 Appendix 9 Combined and Joint Training Exercises Chronology of Inter-Korean Military Talks (Sept. 2000 - Jul. 2004) Appendix 10 Joint Press Statement of the First Round of the Inter-Korean Defense Ministers Talks Appendix 11 Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation Appendix 12 of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line Areas Appendix 13 Annex Agreement to the "Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes Appendix 14 Appendix 15 Appendix 16 Appendix 17 Appendix 18 Appendix 19 Appendix 20 Appendix 21 Appendix 22 Appendix 23 Appendix 24 Appendix 25 Appendix 26 Appendix 27 in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line Areas" Milestones of the Inter-Korean Railway and Road Reconnection Project 35t Annual US-ROK SCM Joint-Communique 36ª Annual US-ROK SCM Joint-Communique Status of Ministry of National Defense®Øs Participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (Apr. 2002 - Jul. 2004) Developments regarding the Dispatch of ROK Armed Forces for Peacekeeping /Post-War Rehabilitation in Afghanistan/Iraq Annual Government and Defense Budgets Year 2005 National Defense Budget Composition of MND Budget by FY 2004 Force Integration Projects regarding Major Military Equipment Status of International Defense Industrial Agreements Status of Defense R&D Investments Organization of the ROK Ministry of National Defense and the Current Number of Military Personnel Mid-Term Establishment Plans of Military Environmental Facilities Chronology of ROK National Defense (2003-Nov.2004) Appendix ( ] # Status Of Global Conflicts In 2004 | | As of Oct. 31, 2004 | | | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------|-----------| | Armed Conflicts | Confrontational Conflicts | Potential Conflicts | Ended | | | Region | (Intensity) | (M) | (L) | Conflicts | | Liberia: B-M | | | | | | Guinea-Bissau: L-M | | | | | | Namibia | | | | | | Nigeria: D-C | Nigeria-Cameroon | | | | | Burundi: C | Rwanda | | | | | Somalia: C | Lesotho: | | | | | Western Sahara | Sierra Leone: | | | | | Sudan: D-A | L-End | | | | | Africa | Senegal | M-L | | | | Algeria: C | Djibouti: | | | | | (28) | Ethiopia | R Congo | | | | Angola: D | L-End | | | | | Ethiopia-Eritrea | Togo | | | | | Uganda: C | Egypt | | | | | Ivory Coast: C-D | Egypt-Sudan | | | | | DR Congo: B-C | Central African Republic | | | | | Chad | | | | | | Kenya | | | | | | America | Columbia: B-C | Peru: M-L | | | | Mexico | | | | | | (5) | Haiti: C | Falkland Islands | | | | Israel-Syria: D-M | | | | | | Iraq: A-B | Iran-Afghanistan: | | | | | Middle | Yemen: C | Iran-UAE | M-L | | | East | Palestine: C | Iraq | Iraq-Kuwait | | | (13) | Israel-Lebanon: D | Iran | Israel-Jordan | | | Turkey-Kurds: D | Iran-Iraq | | | | | Myanmar: D-M | | | | | | Nepal: B-C | North-South Korea | | | | | Indonesia: B-C | Spratly Islands | | | | | Thailand: D | Kurile Islands | | | | | Philippines: C-D | Bangladesh | | | | | Asia | US-Afghanistan: C | Paracel Islands | | | | (20) | Afghanistan: C | Senkaku/Diaoyu | | | | Sri Lanka: D | China-Taiwan | | | | | India: D | China-India | | | | | Kashmir: C | Cambodia | | | | | Tibet | | | | | | Moldova | | | | | | North Osetia-Ingush | | | | | | Russia-Chechnya: | Azerbaijan-Armenia | | | | | cis | B | Estonia-Russia | | | | (a) | Uzbekistan | | | | | Georgia: M-D | Kyrgyzstan | | | | | Tajikistan | Greece-Macedonia | | | | | | Romania | | | | | Macedonia: D-M | Bosnia | | | | | Northern Ireland | Voivodina | | | | | Europe | Kosovo: D | Greece-Albania | Bulgaria | | | (14) | Cyprus | Slovakia | | | | Albania | Aegean Sea | | | | | | Istria | | | | | O Source: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses; The Status and Prospect of Global Conflicts (www.kida.re.kr). | | | | | "A" indicates the most intense dispute with "D" indicating the least. Defense White Paper 2004 # Nuclear Capabilities Of The Nuclear Powers | | United | | | | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------------|------------|----| | Classification | us | Russia | China | France | | | | | Kingdom | | | | | | | Total | 550 | 30+ | 0 | | | | | 725 | 0 | | | | | | | ICBMs | SS-18: 150 | CSS-4 | | | | | | (intercontinental | Minuteman | SS-19: 150 | (DF-5): 24 | | | | | ballistic missiles: | Type/ | III: 500 | SS-24: 36 | | | | | 5,500km or more) | Quantity | Peacekeepe | SS-25: 36 | CSS-X-9 | | | | r: 50 | SS-27: 29 | (DF-5): 8 | | | | | | Total | 0 | 0 | 110+ | 0 | 0 | | | IRBMs | | | | | | | | (intermediate- | | | | | | | | range ballistic | | | | | | | | missiles: 2,500 | CSS-2 | | | | | | | ~5,499 km) | (DF-3): 32- | | | | | | | Type/ | CSS-3 | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | MRBMs | Quantity | (DF-4): 20 | | | | | | (mid-range | CSS-5 | | | | | | | ballistic missiles: | (DF-21): 60 | | | | | | | 800~2,499 km) | Total | 432 | 540 | 12 | 58 | 64 | | SSN-8: 24 | | | | | | | | SLBMs | Trident C-4: | SSN-18: | | | | | | (submarine- | 192 | 112 | Trident D-5: | M-4: 32 | | | | | CSS-N-3 | | | | | | | launched ballistic | Type/ | Trident D-5: | SSN-20: | 58 | M-45: 32 | | | | (JL-1): 12 | | | | | | | missiles) | Quantity | 240 | 100 | (including | (including | | | (including | SSN-23: 96 | 4 SSBNs) | 4 SSBNs) | | | | | 18 SSBNs) | (including | | | | | | | 13 SSBNs) | | | | | | | | Total | 203 | 240 | 180 | | | | | TU-95: 63 | | | | | | | | Strategic | TU-160: 15 | | | | | | | B-2A: 21 | TU-22M/ | | | | | | | Bombers | Type/ | H-6: 140 | | | | | | B-1B: 89 | MR: 162 | | | | | | | Quantity | H-5: 40 | | | | | | | B-52H: 93 | (including | | | | | | | 45 of the | | | | | | | | Navy) | | | | | | | | C Source: The Military Balance 2003-2004 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies; Oct. 2003) | | | | | | | # Military Capabilities Of Neighboring Countries | Army | | Japan | | | |--------------------------|----------------|---------|-----------|---------| | Classification | us | Russia | China | | | Troops | 485,500 | 321,000 | 1,600,000 | 149,360 | | Divisions | 10(8) | 39(15) | 59 | 10 | | (Reserve) | | | | | | Tanks | 7,620 | 21,870 | 7,180 | 1,000 | | Light tanks | 6,719 | 150 | 1,500 | . | | | - | 90 | | | | Reconnaissance tanks | ଚିଚ | 2,000 | | | | | 25,975 | 4,500 | 1,220 | | | Armored vehicles | 15,910 | | | | | Towed artillery | 850 | 10,065 | 14,000 | 860 | | | 1,200 | 550 | | | | Self-propelled artillery | 697 | 4,705 | | | | MRLS | 2,087 | 2,606 | 2,400 | 120 | | Mortars | 1,076 | 2,550 | 100 | 1,940 | | | Various types | | | | | | TOWs: 8,724 | | | | | Anti-tank | of AT but | | | | | | Dragon: 19,000 | 6,500 | 650 | | | guided weapons | quantity | | | | | | Javelin: 950 | unknown | | | | Surface-to-air | 1,281 | 2,670 | 284 | 800 | | missiles | 1,700 | 327 | 495 | | | Helicopters | 4,597 | | | | | Aircrafts | 298 | 4+ | 16 | | | Total | | | | | |----------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------| | Classification | us | Russia | China | Japan | | Total troops | 1,427,700 | 960,600 | 2,350,000 | 238,579 | | Navy | | | | | |------------------------|---------|---------|--------------|-----------| | Classification | us | Russia | China | Japan | | Troops | 155,000 | 250,000 | | | | 400,000 | 44,390 | | | | | Submarines (Strategic) | 72(16) | 53(13) | 69(1) | 16 | | 12 | 1 | . | | | | Aircraft carriers | . | | | | | Cruisers | 27 | 7 | . | - | | Destroyers (Training) | 49 | 14 | 21 | 45(2) | | Frigates (Training) | 30 | 10 | 42 | 8(1) | | Corvettes | 21 | 88 | 368 | (7) | | Minesweepers | 26 | 60 | 39 | 31 | | Landing vessels | 40 | 22 | 56 | 8 | | | . | | | | | Landing craft | 200 | 80 | 55 | | | Support vessels | 35 | 436 | 163 | 26 | | Cargo vessels | 24 | 8 | | | | | . | | | | | Reserve transportation | 127 | . | . | | | Fighters | 1,705 | 217 | 200 | 104(P3-C) | | Helicopters | 693 | 102 | 51 | 107 | | Marine divisions | 3 | 1 | 2 (brigades) | . | | Classification | us | Russia | China | Japan | |---------------------------|---------|----------|---------------|---------| | Troops | 367,600 | 184,600 | 400,000 | 45,459 | | Long-range bombers | 203 | 606 | 180 (bombers) | . | | Reconnaissance aircraft | 239 | 214 | 290 | 44 | | Command aircraft | 62 | 20 | . | - | | Fighters | 3,513 | 908 | 1,700 | 367 | | Transport aircraft | 1,020 | 354 | 513 | 42 | | Tankers | 659 | 20 | 10 | - | | | 200 | 170 | | | | Training aircraft | 1,637 | 1,135 | | | | Helicopters | 219 | 848 | 90 ~ 100 | દવે | | Civilian reserve aircraft | 927 | 1,500 | . | . | ## Air Force O Source: The Military Balance 2003-2004 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies; Oct. 2003) and Defense of Japan 2004 White Paper (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency; July 2004) # Comparison Of Economic Indices Of South And North Korea | | Comparison of South | | | | | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------|-------|------------|------------| | South Korea | North Korea | Korea over North Korea | | | | | | Classification | 2002 | 2003 | 2002 | 2003 | 2002 | 2003 | | GNI ($ billions) | 477.0 | 606.1 | 17.1 | 18.4 | 28 times | 33 times | | Per capita GNI ($) | 10,013 | 12,646 | 762 | 818 | 13.1 times | 15.5 times | | Economic growth rate (%) | 6.3 | 3.1 | 1.2 | 1.8 | | | | by GNI | | | | | | | | Total trade volume | 2.39 | 139.2 times | 155.9 times | | | | | 314.6 | 372.64 | 2.26 | | | | | | ($ billions) | | | | | | | | Total population | 47.64 | 47.93 | 22.37 | 22.52 | 2.1 times | 2.1 times | | (millions) | | | | | | | | O GNI (Gross National Income): Since 1993, such international organizations as the UN and MF and major industrialized | | | | | | | nations have been using GNI instead of GNP. (GNI=GNP) Appendix (5) ## North Korean Annual Military Expenditures | Figures in parenthesis represent military expenditures officially announced by North Korea (unit: $ billions) | | | | | | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|----------|------------|------| | GNI | Ratio (%) of | Exchange | | | | | | Total Budget | Ratio (%) of | | | | | | | (as announced | Military | Rate | | | | | | (as announced | Military | Military | | | | | | Year | by South | Expenditure | (1 US dollar: | | | | | by North | Expenditure | Expenditure | | | | | | Korea' s Bank | to Total | North Korean | | | | | | Korea) | to GNI | | | | | | | of Korea) | Budget | won) | | | | | | 1991 | 22.9 | 17.17 | 5.13(2.08) | 22.4 | 29.9(12.1) | 2.15 | | 1992 | 21.1 | 18.45 | 5.54(2.10) | 26.3 | 30(11.4) | 2.13 | | 1993 | 20.5 | 18.72 | 5.62(2.15) | 27.2 | 30(11.4) | 2.15 | | 1994 | 21.2 | 19.19 | 5.76(2.19) | 27.2 | 30(11.5) | 2.16 | | | 2.05 | | | | | | | 1995 | 22.3 | 20.82 | 6.24 | 28 | 30 | | | 5.78 | 27 | . | 2.14 | | | | | 1996 | 21.4 | . | 4.78 | 27 | 52 | 2.16 | | 1997 | 17.7 | 9.1 | | | | | | 12.6 | 9.1 | 4.78(1.33) | 37.9 | 52(14.6) | 2.20 | | | 1998 | 15.8 | 9.23 | 4.78(1.35) | 30 | 51(14.6) | 2.17 | | 1999 | | | | | | | | 2000 | 16.8 | 9.57 | 5.0(1.37) | 29.8 | 52(14.3) | 2.19 | | | 2.21 | | | | | | | 2001 | 15.7 | 9.81 | 5.0(1.41) | 31.8 | 51(14.4) | | | | 50(14.9) | 2.21 | | | | | | 2002 | 17.0 | 10.01 | 5.0(1.49) | 29.4 | 44.4(15.7) | 145 | | 2003 | 18.4 | 11.25 | 5.0(1.77) | 27.2 | | | | O The amount of military expenditures during the period from 1995 to 1997 represents estimated expenditures at | | | | | | | ## (1991~2003) the average ratio of 27% to GNP. # Comparison Of Military Capabilities Between South And North Korea | | As of Dec. 2004 | | | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|----| | Classification | South Korea | North Korea | | | | Total | 681,000 | 1,170,000 | | | | Troops | Army | 550,000 | 1,000,000 | | | (Peacetime) | Navy | 67,000 | 60,000 | | | | 110,000 | | | | | Air Force | 64,000 | 19 | | | | | 13 | (including the Artillery | | | | (including the Army | Corps, Missile Guidance | | | | | Corps | Aviation Operations | Bureau and Light Infantry | | | | Command and Special | Instruction Guidance | | | | | Warfare Command) | | | | | | Unit | Bureau) | | | | | | 75 | | | | | Divisions | 49 | 69 | | | | Mobile | 19 | (about 10 guidance | | | | Brigades | | | | | | Army | brigades not included) | | | | | Tanks | 2,300 | 3,700 | | | | Armored | 2,400 | 2,100 | | | | vehicles | | | | | | Equip- | Field artillery | 5,100 | 8,700 | | | ment | | | | | | Principal | MRLS | 200 | 4,600 | | | force | Surface-to- | | | | | capabil- | 30 (launchers) | 60 (launchers) | | | | ities | surface guided weapons | | | | | Warships | 120 | 430 | | | | Landing | 10 | 260 | | | | Sur- | vessels | | | | | Navy | face | Mine warfare | 10 | 30 | | ships | ships | | | | | Support | 20 | 30 | | | | vessels | | | | | | Fighters | 530 | 830 | | | | Air | 70 | | | | | Special aircraft | 30 | | | | | Force | (including naval aircraft) | | | | | Support aircraft | 200 | 520 | | | | | 690 | 320 | | | | Helicopters | (including all helicopters | | | | | of the three Services) | 7,700,000 | | | | | | (Reserve Military Training | | | | | Reserve troops | 3,040,000 | Units, Worker and Peasant | | | | | Red Guard Units, and Red | | | | | | Youth Guards) | | | | | O The Navy troops of the South include 27,000 troops of the Marine Corps. The equipment of its Army (divisions and | | | | | brigades) represents the combined equipment of the Army and Marine Corps. O The field artillery of the North does not include infantry regiment-class 76.2mm guns. # North Korea'S Missile Development And Specifications ## - Chronology Of North Korea'S Missile Development | | Development and Production Activities | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Time | · Participation in China's missile development project and acquisition of missile | | Early 70s | technology (presumption) | | · Introduction of USSR-made Scud-Bs and launchers from Egypt for reverse | | | 1976~1981 | engineering/development | | Apr. 1984 | · First test-firing of improved Scud-B | | May 1986 | · Test firing of Scud-C | | 1988 | · Operational deployment of improved Scud-B/C | | May 1990 | · First identification of the Rodong missile | | May 1993 | · First test-firing of the Rodong missile | | Jan. 1994 | · First identification of the Daepodong-1 | | 1998 | · Operational deployment of Rodong missiles | | · Test firing of the Daepodong-1 | | | Aug. 1998 | (North Korea claimed that it had launched a satellite.) | | Classification | Scud-B | Scud-C | Rodong-1 | Daepodong-1 | Daepodong-2 | |------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|---------------| | Range | 300 | 500 | 1,300 | 2,500 | 6,700 | | (km) | | | | | | | Warhead weight | | 1,000 | | | | | | 800 | 600 | 500 | 500 | | | (kg) | | (estimated) | | | | | Operational | Operational | Operational | Under | | | | Remarks | | Test-firing | | | | | deployment | deployment | deployment | development | | | ## - Specifications Of North Korea'S Missiles Chronology Of Major Events Related To The North Korean Nuclear Issue (Oct. 2002~Dec. 2004) | Date | Major Details | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · US announces that North Korea admitted to its nuclear program during Assistance | | | Oct. 17, 2002 | Secretary of State James Kelly's visit to North Korea in early October. | | · The leaders of ROK, US and Japan agree to maintain a united front regarding the | | | North Korean nuclear issue during the APEC meeting (Los Cabos, Mexico). | | | - The three leaders reach consensus on the seriousness of the North Korean | | | Oct. 27 | nuclear issue as well as the need to thoroughly delve into the issue and end the | | North's nuclear program at the earliest possible date. They also declare that the | | | three nations will maintain a united front until the resolution of the issue. | | | Nov. 15 · KEDO decides to suspend the supply of heavy oil to North Korea for December. | | | · North Korea starts to take measures to lift its nuclear freeze. | | | - Unsealing of the 5MWe experimental nuclear reactor and disabling of surveillance cameras | | | Dec. 21 | - Unsealing of the nuclear fuel production plant and radiochemical laboratory (reprocessing | | facilities) and disabling of surveillance cameras (Dec. 23) | | | Dec. 31 · North Korea expels IAEA inspectors. | | | Jan. 10, 2003 · North Korea declares its withdrawal from the NPT. | | | · In a special session, the IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution to report the | | | Feb. 12 | North Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council. | | · The spokesperson of the North Korean Foreign Ministry maintains that | | | reprocessing of spent fuel rods is underway. | | | Apr. 18 | - North Korea "is successfully engaging in the final stage of reprocessing of over | | 8,000 spent fuel rods." | | | Apr. 23-24 · A tripartite meeting of US, China and North Korea is held in Beijing. | | | - The heads of state of ROK and US issue a joint statement following their summit. | | | - They reaffirm their determination to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear | | | May 14 | issue based on concerted efforts by the countries concerned as well as an | | adamant intolerance of North Korea's nuclear ambitions. | | | May 31 · US President George Bush unveils the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative). | | | · The North Korean Central Broadcasting Station points out the strengthening of self- | | | defensive nuclear deterrence. | | | Jun. 25 | - "We will boost our efforts to build self-defensive nuclear deterrence as a | | legitimate self-defense measure to cope with the increasingly menacing US | | | strategy to isolate and throttle North Korea." | | | · ROK-China joint statement is issued during President Roh Moo-hyun's visit to China. | | | - " The two sides have reached a consensus that it is imperative to maintain peace and stability | | | Jul. 7~10 | on the Korean peninsula and build a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The two sides firmly | | believe that the North Korean nuclear issue can be peacefully resolved through dialogue." | | | Aug. 27-29 · 1st round of the six-party talks (Beijing, Diaoyutai State Guest House) | | | · In the 47th General Conference, the IAEA adopts a resolution | | | on the North Korean nuclear issue. | | | - The IAEA calls on the North to completely relinquish its nuclear program and | | | Sept. 19 | stresses the importance of the endeavor to resolve the nuclear issue through | | dialogue. | | | Date | Major Details | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · The spokesperson of the North Korean Foreign Ministry argues that reprocessing of | | | spent fuel rods was completed. | | | Oct. 2 | - "Reprocessing of more than 8,000 spent fuel rods was completed and the resultant | | plutonium was diverted in a way that strengthens North Korea's nuclear deterrence." | | | · A 14-pont joint statement is released at a summit of the leaders of ROK, China and Japan to | | | bolster consultations and cooperation related with disarmament. | | | Oct. 7 | - "We reaffirm the commitment to peaceful settlement of the North Korean nuclear impasse | | through dialogue as well as denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and the decision to | | | make a concerted effort of addressing all matters of concern of relevant parties." | | | · US President Bush expresses his position regarding the North Korean nuclear issue | | | during the ROK-US summit. | | | Oct. 20 | - "Although US has no intention of invading the North, all options remain on the table | | for addressing this situation" if North Korea threatens peace with nuclear weapons. | | | · IAEA General Director El Baradei speaks about North Korea's nuclear capabilities. | | | Oct. 24 | - "North Korea has sufficient plutonium to produce five to six nuclear weapons." | | Dec. 10 · US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld mentions the risks of North Korea's export of | | | nuclear warhead technology. | | | Dec. 12 · The EU Chairman's statement urges North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program. | | | · The IAEA Board of Governors holds a special session and adopts a resolution to | | | Dec. 12 | report the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council. | | - An unofficial US delegation visits North Korea to have a look at the North Korean | | | nuclear facilities. | | | Jan. 6 ~ 10, | - John Lewis (professor at StanfordUniversity), Sig Hecker | | 2004 | (former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory), etc. | | - Hecker gives a testimony at a US Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing | | | (Jan. 21). | | | · The spokesperson for the North Korean Foreign Ministry states that Libya's | | | Jan. 9 | renunciation of WMD has no effect on North Korea. | | · The Lower House of the Japanese Diet passes a bill to impose sanctions against | | | North Korea. | | | - In its plenary session, the Lower House passes a bill regarding the proposed | | | Jan. 29 | revision of the foreign exchange management and foreign trade law to the effect | | that Japan may independently impose such sanctions as suspension of | | | remittances to North Korea and restrictions on entry of North Korean ships even | | | without a request from the UN. | | | · US President Bush proposes seven measures to thwart the proliferation of WMD in | | | his address at the National Defense University. | | | i) Expansion of the parties participating in the PSI as well as its functions | | | ii) Overhaul of each country's applicable laws to prevent proliferation | | | iii) Expanded application of the Nunn-Lugar program to block dissemination of WMD | | | iv) Elimination of the possibility of nuclear development under the guise | | | Feb. 11 | of peaceful use | | v) Permission of only the signatories to the Additional Protocol to import nuclear | | | facilities for civilian use | | | vi) Establishment of an IAEA special committee with practical binding authority | | | vii) Prohibition of countries suspected of proliferating nuclear weapons from | | | serving on the IAEA Board of Governors or the special committee | | | Date | Major Details | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · 2nd round of the six-party talks | | | - Summary of the Chairman's Statement | | | · Promotion of mutual understanding in spite of some differences | | | · Expression of the determination to build a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and | | | resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully | | | Feb. 25~28 | · Agreement to address the nuclear issue and other matters of interest on the basis | | of "coordinated measures" | | | - Agreement to hold the tripartite meeting in Beijing in the 2nd quarter of 2004 | | | · Agreement to organize a Working Group to prepare for the plenary meeting | | | · Duties of the Working Group to be determined through diplomatic channels | | | - North Korean leader Kim Jong-il mentions during his visit to China that North Korea | | | has abided by the ultimate principle of establishing a nuclear-free Korean peninsula | | | Apr. 19 | and that the country's basic position to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue | | through dialogue remains unchanged. | | | May 12~14 · 1st meeting of the Working Group is held (Beijing). | | | · Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visits North Korea for a summit with Kim Jong-il. | | | May 22 | - They agree that the nuclear issue will be settled within the framework of the six-party talks | | and the planned missile test firing should be put on hold. | | | Jun. 10 · North Korea is urged to scrap its nuclear development program at the G8 summit | | | Jun. 21~23 · 2nd meeting of the Working Group is held. | | | · 3rd round of the six-party talks is held and the Chairman's statement adopted. | | | - Summary of the Chairman's statement | | | · Reaffirmation of the commitment to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and | | | underscoring of the need to take the "first steps" at the earliest possible date | | | · Emphasis on the pursuit of a step-by-step process | | | of "words for words" and "action for action" | | | Jun. 24-26 · Consensus that the proposed alternatives will provide a useful basis | | | for future discussions | | | · Agreement in principle that the 4th round of the six-party talks will be held | | | in Beijing by the end of September | | | · Agreement that the Working Group will be convened at the earliest possible date to | | | define the scope, duration and verification as well as corresponding measures for | | | the first steps toward denuclearization, and as appropriate, make recommendations | | | for the fourth round of the talks | | | · US Secretary of State Colin Powell expresses the US position that no reward will | | | be provided to North Korea in return for its renunciation of the nuclear program. | | | Jul. 6 | - "There will be no reward for North Korea because it does what it shouldn't have | | done. A nuclear freeze is not enough for North Korea. Total dismantlement of its | | | nuclear materials and facilities must be implemented." | | | Jul. 7 - North Korea argues that no method put forward by a foreign country | | | can resolve its nuclear issue. | | | · North Korea clarifies its position on verification methods. | | | - "What we mean by verification is monitoring of the status of the nuclear freeze. | | | Jul. 14 | Inspection of our nuclear facilities and materials can be discussed only in the | | stage of dismantlement of the nuclear program." | | | Jul. 27 · North Korea says that US is not the only party who can wage a preemptive attack. | | | | Major Details | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Date | · North Korea argues that a nuclear freeze will be impossible without compensation. | | - "If US is not interested in the proposal of a "nuclear freeze in return for | | | Aug. 10 | compensation, the two countries should go their own ways. US should not think | | of a freeze without compensation even in its wildest dreams." | | | · The ROK Ministry of Science and Technology reveals its nuclear research | | | Sept. 2 | institute's experiment with enriched uranium. | | · North Korea clarifies that it will not attend the six-party talks until an elucidation of | | | the nuclear experiment by the South. | | | Sept. 16 | - "We cannot sit at the table to discuss our nuclear weapons program until we are | | clearly briefed on the clandestine nuclear experiment by the South." | | | Oct. 18 · US President Bush signs the "North Korean Human Rights Act." | | | · North Korea puts forward three conditions for its participation in the six-party talks. | | | i) US should drop its policy of antagonism against North Korea. | | | Oct. 22 | ii) US should participate in a "nuclear freeze in return for compensation" scheme. | | iii) The nuclear issue of the South must be discussed first. | | | · US Secretary of State Powell says that North Korea's three conditions for | | | participating in the six-party talks are unacceptable. | | | Oct. 23 | - "Anything that North Korea wants to discuss must be addressed within the | | framework of the six-party talks. It should not attach any preconditions to | | | participating in additional six-party meetings." | | | - North Korea argues that it has never insisted upon holding a bilateral meeting with | | | us. | | | Nov. 14 | - "We have never had any expectations about, nor worked toward, bilateral talks | | with US. It is nonsense that we engage in a bilateral talk with a party which is | | | intriguing to subvert our regime." | | | · A ROK-US summit is held. | | | - The leaders reaffirm the principle of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula and | | | Nov. 20 | agree to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in a peaceful and diplomatic | | manner within the framework of the six-party talks. | | | · The spokesperson of the North Korean Foreign Ministry hints at the possibility of a | | | delay in the six-party talks. | | | Dec. 4 | - "We are in no hurry to hold the meeting and intend to take a wait-and-see attitude | | as the 2nd-term Bush administration has not emerged yet." | | | · US Assistant Secretary of State Kelly expresses the US position regarding the | | | North Korean nuclear issue (in an interview with Hankuk Ilbo, a daily newspaper). | | | - "If North Korea agrees to dismantle all its nuclear programs, the Armistice | | | Dec. 13 | Agreement on the Korean peninsula can be replaced by a multilateral | | peace/cooperation treaty." | | | - "Kim Jong-il is in the position to transform North Korea." | | # Combined And Joint Training Exercises | 1. ROK-US Combined Exercises | | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------| | Name | Type | Purpose | Contents | | | · Exercise of combined crisis management | | | | | procedures | | | | Mastery of the | | | | | Consolidated | · Exercise of wartime switchover procedures | | | | Chungmu Plan and | | | | | UFL | command | · Exercise of US reinforcement force | | | OPLAN 5027 execution | | | | | post exercise | deployment procedures | | | | procedures | · Exercise of OPLAN 5027 execution | | | | | procedures | | | | · Mastery of procedures | · Mastery of combined/joint reception, | | | | of deployment of the US | staging, forward movement and integration | | | | reinforcement forces | procedures | | | | and ensure sustained | | | | | war-fighting capabilities | · Creation and restoration of the combat | | | | | capabilities of the ROK forces | | | | of the ROK forces | | | | | Command | · Support of wartime host nation | | | | RSOI and | post and field | · Enhancement of | · Mastery of combined special operation | | training | | | | | FE | combined/joint | execution procedures | | | exercises | operational capabilities | · Protection of airports and ports of | | | in the rear area | debarkation, major facilities and strategic | | | | including improvement | points | | | | of combined special | · Maritime mobile combat units, combined | | | | operations and | landing, and theater/guided missile defense | | | | air/maritime operations | | | | | 2. Joint Exercises and Training (ROK Forces) | | | | | Purpose | Contents | | | | Name | Type | · Mastery of wartime operational command and | | | | staff activities | | | | Improvement of | · Exercise of wartime switchover procedures | | | | Taegeuk | Command | wartime operational | · Mastery of offensive counter-fire and active | | Exercise | post exercise | command capabilities | deep operational procedures | | of the ROK JCS | · Improvement of the operation of command | | | | | post automation systems | | | | Improvement of corps- · Improvement of operational plan execution | | | | | | capabilities | | | | level joint operations | · Verification of joint air-ground-maritime | | | | Hoguk | Field training | and integrated combat | operation systems | | Training | exercise | capabilities with | · Increase of counter-fire/ integrated combat | | operation plan | | | | | execution training | capabilities of echelons | | | | | · Improvement of the operation of integrated | | | | | combat management systems | | | | | · Development of counter-fire and deep | | | | Improvement of corps- | operation systems | | | | Corps-Level Field training | level integrated war | · Mastery of cooperative operations and | | | FTX | exercise | fighting capabilities | maneuver procedures | | | · Cultivation of air-ground joint operational | | | | | capabilities | | | ## 3. Other Major Combined Exercises | Name | Type | Participants | Contents | |---------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------| | | · Offensive/defensive sea exercises | | | | | · Protection of sea lines of | | | | ROK, US, Australia, | | | | | Even years | communications (SLOCs) | | | | RIMPAC | Chile, UK, Japan, | | | | (May~July) | · Naval blockades and air attacks | | | | Canada, Peru | · Naval gunfire training | | | | | · Guided missile and torpedo firing | | | | ROK-JAPAN | · Basic tactical training | | | | Odd years | | | | | Search and | ROK, Japan | · Search and rescue training for | | | (June~August) | | | | | Rescue Training | stranded vessels and aircrafts | | | | Every other | ROK, US, Australia, | · Submarine evacuation and rescue | | | Pacific Reach | year | Japan, Singapore. | training | # Chronology Of Inter-Korean Military Talks (Sept. 2000~Jul. 2004) | Classification | Date | Place | Details of Major Consultations/Agreements | |-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------| | 1st Round of the Inter- | Sept. | Jeju | Adoption of the five-point joint press release of | | Korean Defense | 24~26, | Island | the inter-Korean defense ministers talks | | Ministers Talks | 2000 | Consultations about the "(proposed) inter-Korean | | | | agreement on military assurances" | | | | | · Designation of the timing and scope of the Joint | | | | 1st Round of the Inter- | Nov. 28, | Unification | Administration Area, location of the roads, | | Korean Military | 2000 | Pavilion | and construction of facilities in the Joint | | Working-Level Talks | Administration Area | | | | | · Simultaneous commencement of landmine | | | | | removal in the DMZ | | | | | Consultations about the "(proposed) inter-Korean | | | | | agreement on military assurances" | | | | | · Finalization of the routes of the inter-Korean | | | | | roads | | | | 2nd Round of the Inter- | Dec. 5, | House of · Discussion of the designation and operation of | | | Korean Military | 2000 | Peace | the Joint Administration Area as well as joint | | Working-Level Talks | regulations | | | | | · Narrowing the differences regarding the | | | | | simultaneous commencement of landmine | | | | | removal in the DMZ | | | | | The meeting ends in an hour after the South | | | | 3rd Round of the Inter- | Dec. 21, | Unification explains and delivers its proposed agreement | | | Korean Military | 2000 | Pavilion | to the North and the two sides decide to discuss | | Working-Level Talks | the proposed agreement in ensuing talks. | | | | | Major details of the discussion: "(proposed) | | | | | inter-Korean agreement on military assurances" | | | | | · Designation and operation of the Joint | | | | 4th Round of the Inter- | Administration Area | | | | Jan. 31, | House of | | | | Korean Military | · Mine removal in the DMZ, method of | | | | 2001 | Peace | | | | Working-Level Talks | road/railway reconnection works, and the | | | | | method of contact and communication between | | | | | the military personnel in charge of the | | | | | construction sites | | | | | "Agreement on Military Assurances | | | | | for Designation of the Joint Administration Area | | | | 5th Round of the Inter- | Feb. 8, | Unification in the East and West Coast Districts | | | Korean Military | 2001 | Pavilion | and the Construction of Railways and Roads | | Working-Level Talks | Connecting the South and North" | | | | | ("MilitaryAssurance Agreement") | | | | 6th Round of the Inter- | Sept. 14, | House of | | | Korean Military | Adoption of the Military Assurance Agreement | | | | 2002 | Peace | | | | Working-Level Talks | | | | | Chief Delegates' | Confirmation and initial exchange of the text | | | | Contact for the Inter- | Sept. 16, Unification of the Military Assurance Agreement, | | | | Korean Military | 2002 | Pavilion | and discussion of the procedures | | Working-Level Talks | of the 7th inter-Korean military working-level talks | | | | Classification | Date | Place | Details of Major Consultations/Agreements | |-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| | 7th Round of the Inter- | Sept. 17, | House of | Exchange and effectuation of the Military Assurance | | Korean Military | 2002 | Peace | Agreement | | Working-Level Talks | · Confirmation of North Korea's position on the 2nd | | | | 1st Round of the Inter- | round of the inter-Korean defense ministers talks | | | | | Unification | | | | Korean Military | Oct. 3, | · Exchange/discussion of the mutual construction | | | Working-Level | 2002 | Pavilion | plans by timeline and route diagrams for the | | Contact | reconnection of railways and roads | | | | | · (Draft) agreement regarding the convocation of the | | | | 2nd Round of the | 2nd round of the inter-Korean defense ministers | | | | Inter-Korean Military | Oct. 11. | House of | talks | | Working-Level | 2002 | Peace | · Consultations regarding balanced construction | | Contact | works in the DMZ/ supply of demining equipment | | | | 3rd Round of the Inter- | · (Draft) agreement regarding convocation of the 2nd | | | | Korean Military | Oct. 16, | Unification | round of the inter-Korean defense ministers talks | | Working-Level | 2002 | Pavilion | · Consultations regarding balanced construction | | Contact | work in the DMZ of road/railway reconnection | | | | | · Agreement, in principle, on the wording of the joint | | | | 4th Round of the Inter- | press release and convocation of the 2nd round of | | | | Oct. 25, | House of | | | | Korean Military | the Inter-Korean defense ministers talks | | | | Working-Level | 2002 | Peace | Discussion of matters regarding communication | | Contact | line connection for the Donghae Line | | | | | · Consultations over such issues as verification of | | | | | balanced construction for inter-Korean railway/road | | | | 5th Round of the Inter- | reconnection, joint measurement and | | | | Nov. 13, | Unification | communication line connection for the Donghae Line | | | Korean Military | | | | | Working-Level | 2002 | Pavilion | * Regarding the issue to hold the 2nd round of the | | Contact | Inter-Korean defense ministers talks, the North | | | | | refuses to comment, saying only that it is "difficult | | | | | for administrative reasons." | | | | | Consultations over the (proposed) makeshift road | | | | 6th Round of the Inter- | passage agreement regarding the Gyeongeui Line | | | | Korean Military | Dec. 23, | House of | | | 2002 | Peace | and Donghae Line, and connection of the | | | Working-Level | communication lines concerning the Donghae Line | | | | Contact | | | | | 7th Round of the Inter- | Adoption and effectuation of the "Provisional | | | | | Unification Agreement on Military Assurances for the makeshift | | | | Korean Military | Jan. 27, | roads in the Joint Administration Area in the East | | | Working-Level | 2003 | Pavilion | and West Coast Districts" | | Contact | Agreement on mutual visits to the construction sites | | | | 8th Round of the Inter- | June 4, | House of | for inspections | | Korean Military | | | | | Working-Level | 2003 | Peace | (Date of visit: June 11/ Number of personnel: 10 | | Contact | persons each for the east and west coast districts) | | | | | Adoption and effectuation of the supplementary | | | | | agreement to the "Provisional Agreement on Military | | | | 8th Round of the Inter- | Sept. 17, | Unification | | | Korean Military | Assurances for Passage of Makeshift Roads in the | | | | 2003 | Pavilion | | | | Working-Level Talks | Joint Administration Area in the East and West | | | | | Coast Districts" | | | | Classification | Date | Place | Details of Major Consultations/Agreements | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------| | 9th Round of the Inter- | · Expression of mutual positions on the proposed | | | | Nov. 14, | House of | | | | Korean Military | "agreement on installation and operation of guard | | | | 2003 | Peace | posts in the Joint Administration Area" | | | Working-Level Contact | · Bridging the gap regarding the "agreement on the | | | | | installation and operation of guard posts in the | | | | | Joint Administration Area" | | | | 10th Round of the | | | | | Inter-Korean Military | Nov. 28, | Unification · The South and the North agree that some | | | Pavilion | disputed provisions will be discussed and revised | | | | Working-Level | 2003 | in the form of document exchanges and that the | | | Contact | relevant agreement be signed and effectuated at a | | | | | plenary meeting. | | | | | Exchange and effectuation of the "agreement on | | | | 9th Round of the Inter- | Dec. 23, | House of | installation and operation of guard posts in the Joint | | Korean Military | 2003 | Peace | Administration Area in the east and west coast | | Working-Level Talks | districts" | | | | | Expression of mutual positions regarding measures | | | | 1st Round of the Inter- | May 26, | Mt. | to prevent accidental armed conflict in the West Sea | | Korean General-Level | 2004 | Geumgang and to stop propaganda activities and remove | | | Military Talks | propaganda tools from the demilitarized zone | | | | | Adoption and effectuation of the "Agreement on the | | | | 2nd Round of the | prevention of accidental naval clashes in the West | | | | Jun. 3~4, | Mt. | | | | Inter-Korean | Sea, and the cessation of propaganda activities and | | | | Seorak | | | | | General-Level | 2004 | the elimination of propaganda apparatus from the | | | Military Talks | demilitarized zone" | | | | | Adoption and effectuation of the "agreement | | | | 1st Working-Level | annexed" to the Agreement on the prevention of | | | | Delegates' Meeting for | Jun. | accidental naval clashes in the West Sea, and the | | | the Inter-Korean | 10~12, | Gaeseong | cessation of propaganda activities and the | | General-Level Military | 2004 | elimination of propaganda apparatus in the | | | Talks | demilitarized zone | | | | | · Exchange of the list of subjects for the first-stage | | | | 2nd Working-Level | propaganda apparatus removal and mutual | | | | Delegates' Meeting for | Jun. | confirmation/ assessment, and agreement to | | | the Inter-Korean | 29~30, | Paju | discuss some differences at a later date | | 2004 | | | | | General-Level Military | · Proposal by the South suggesting measures to | | | | Talks | improve matters pertaining to the West Sea | | | | | · Consultation over differences regarding the | | | | | subjects of first-stage propaganda apparatus | | | | Chief Working-Level | removal | | | | Delegates' Contact for | · Agreement on commencement of the second- | | | | Jul. 5, | | | | | the Inter-Korean | Gaeseong | | | | 2004 | stage removal of propaganda apparatus | | | | General-Level Military | · Reaffirmation of the implementation of mutual | | | | Talks | agreements in good faith regarding matters | | | | | pertaining to the West Sea | | | | O Nov. 28, 2000 ~, South Korean chief delegate to the inter-Korean military working-level talks: Army Brigadier | | | | | General Kim Gyeong-deok, deputy chief of arms control | | | | O Oct. 25, 2002 ~, South Korean chief delegate to the inter-Korean military working-level talks: Army Colonel Mun Seong-muk, head of the MND inter-Korean meeting task force team O May 26, 2004 ~, South Korean chief delegate to the inter-Korean general-level military talks: Navy Brigadier General Park Jeong-hwa, deputy chief of JCS operation planning # Joint Press Statement Of The First Round Of The Inter-Korean Defense Ministers Talks Talks between the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Minister of the People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were held on Jeju Island of the South on September 25 - 26 to provide military assurances for the implementation of the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration adopted during the historic Inter-Korean Summit. Five delegates headed by the Minister of National Defense, Cho Sung-tae, of the Republic of Korea represented the South while five delegates headed by the Minister of People's Armed Forces, Kim II-cheol, of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea represented the North in the talks. In the talks, the two sides agreed that since the adoption of the Joint Declaration, various projects had been pursued in earnest and proper military measures were accordingly required to facilitate the process. Based on this, the two sides agreed as follows: 1. The two sides shall do their utmost to implement the Joint Declaration made by the heads of South and the North and actively cooperate to remove military obstacles in assuring travel, exchange and cooperation between civilians. 2. The two sides held the same view that to reduce military tension on the Korean peninsula and remove the threat of war by establishing a durable and stable peace is a matter of vital importance and agreed that they should work together towards this end. 3. The two sides shall allow the entry of personnel, vehicles and materials into their respective sections of the Demilitarized Zone with respect to the construction of railways and roads that connect the South and the North, which is a pending issue between the South and the North, and guarantee their safety. The working-level officials from both sides shall meet in early October to discuss related details. 4. The two sides shall handle the issues of opening the Military Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone and designating a South-North administrative area in the areas around the railways and the roads that connect the South and the North on the basis of the Armistice Agreement. 5. The two sides agreed to hold the second round of the talks at a location in the North in mid- November. September 26, 2000 Jeju Island ROK National Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae DPRK Minister of People's Armed Forces Kim Il-cheol # Agreement On The Prevention Of Accidental Naval Clashes In The West Sea, And The Cessation Of Propaganda Activities And The Elimination Of Propaganda Apparatus In The Military Demarcation Line Area The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held the 2nd round of the inter-Korean general-level military talks at Mt. Seorak on June 3~4, 2004, and agreed to the following: 1. The two sides shall exert joint efforts to ease military tensions and solidify peace on the Korean peninsula. 2. To prevent accidental naval clashes in the West Sea, the two sides shall carry out the following measures from June 15, 2004. a. The two sides shall strictly control naval vessels (naval ships) to prevent them from entering into confrontations with one another in the West Sea. b. Under no circumstances shall either nation impose unjust physical action in the West Sea against naval vessels (naval ships) and civilian ships of the other side. c. The two sides shall use international standard radio frequencies (156.8 MHz, 156.6 MHz) to prevent naval vessels (naval ships) from engaging in conflicts with one another and to avoid misunderstandings in cases of being lost in their sea route, being in distress, calling for rescue, etc. in the West Sea. d. As an auxiliary measure, the two sides shall enact and utilize rules governing marine signal flags & signal lights. e. Based on the mutual understanding that accidental clashes may occur in the sensitive waters of the West Sea in the process of cracking down on and controlling illegal fishing by fishing boats from a third country, the two sides shall mutually cooperate to diplomatically resolve this problem and exchange information on the movement of illegal fishing boats. f. The two sides shall use the communication line of the west coast district for the time being to exchange opinions related to problems in the West Sea. To ensure smooth and swift communication for the prevention of naval clashes in the West Sea, the two sides shall: i) separately extend the existing communication line of the west coast district to the respective areas of the South and the North; ii) establish a communication liaison office in each area by August 15; and iii) mutually cooperate to modernize the communication liaison office. 3. The two sides have agreed to cease propaganda activities in the Military Demarcation Line areas in order to ease military tension on the Korean peninsula and eliminate distrust and misunderstandings between the military forces of the South and the North. a. The two sides shall cease all propaganda activities via broadcasts, signboards, leaflets, etc. in the Military Demarcation Line areas from June 15, 2004, which marks the 4th anniversary of the historic June 15 South-North Joint Declaration. b. The two sides shall initiate a three-stage measure to eliminate all propaganda apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line areas by August 15, 2004. · The first stage shall take place as a model project from June 16 to 30 in the section between Military Demarcation Line marks No. 0001 and No. 0100, which includes the joint administration area of the South and the North in the west coast district and the Panmunjom area. · The second stage shall take place from July 1 to 20 in the section between Military Demarcation Line marks No. 0100 and No. 0640. · The third stage shall take place from July 21 to August 15, and involve full elimination of all propaganda apparatus in the section between Military Demarcation Line marks No. 0640 and No. 1292. c. As propaganda apparatus are fully eliminated at each stage, the two sides shall notify each other of the progress, and inspect and confirm from their respective areas whether the other nation has eliminated the propaganda apparatus. If necessary, the two sides may conduct mutual inspections. d. As propaganda apparatus are fully eliminated at each stage, the two sides shall report severally to the media on the progress of the elimination of propaganda apparatus. e. Under no circumstances shall either side reinstall propaganda apparatus or resume propaganda activities. 4. The two sides agree to hold follow-up military talks to devise specific measures to implement the agreements reached in this mecting. ## June 4, 2004 | Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks | Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks | |---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| | Head of the South's Delegation | Head of the North's Delegation | | Major General Ahn Ik-san | | | Rear Admiral(L) Park Jeong-hwa | | ## Annex Agreement To The "Agreement On The Prevention Of Accidental Naval Clashes In The West Sea, And The Cessation Of Propaganda Activities And The Elimination Of Propaganda # Apparatus In The Military Demarcation Line Areas" The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reached the following agreements at the working-level delegates' meeting for the inter-Korean general-level military talks held on June 10~12, 2004 to implement the "Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities & the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line Areas" agreed to at the 2nd inter-Korean general-level military talks on June 4, 2004. ## 1. Measures For Prevention Of Accidental Naval Clashes In The West Sea 1) Establishment And Use Of Standard Radio Frequencies By Naval Vessels Of The South And The North In The West Sea a. The main and auxiliary standard radio frequencies to be established and used shall be 156.8 MHz and 156.6 MHz. The main frequency shall be used when it is possible to finish communication within one minute. If communication is to last over one minute or is impossible for such reasons as a system failure, the auxiliary frequency shall be used. In the event it is impossible to use the auxiliary frequency, the main frequency shall be used again, with a frequency selected and used within the scope of 1 to 16 channels. b. In such case where naval vessels of either side call those of the other side, the code to call naval vessels of the South and North shall be "Mt. Halla" and "Mt. Baekdu", respectively. During such call, it shall be allowed to check the loudness and clarity of sounds by asking the counter-party to confirm. The counter-party shall respond by using a scale of one to five and may request output increase in the event of a low level of volume or clarity of the sound. Communication setup between naval vessels of the two sides shall be carried out in the following manner: South: "Mt. Baekdu, Mt. Baekdu. From Mt. Halla. Confirm sound loudness and clarity level." North: "Mt. Halla, Mt. Halla. From Mt. Baekdu. Sound loudness and clarity level is five." c. If there are not less than two naval vessels from either side in a certain sea area, communication shall be conducted between the commanding vessels only. d. During communication, neither side shall make unnecessary remarks that may provoke the other. 2) Designation and Use of Signal Flags and Lights a. In consideration of the international signal system under the International Code of Signal and the special circumstances surrounding the South and North, the two sides shall additionally designate and use signal flags and lights as auxiliary means of communication as specified in Appendix 1. b. If it is impossible to communicate with each other using standard radio frequencies, or if a vessel of either side unavoidably approaches the other (due to engine troubles, disasters, poor water conditions, and so forth), said signal flags and lights shall be used. c. Signal flags shall be hoisted on the outermost flag line on the port and starboard or the highest point of the mast of a naval vessel. d. During nighttime, naval vessel signal lights shall be used in the following manner: one red light or flashing light on the mast (excluding sound) shall be lit, and searchlights be repetitively used until the other side's vessel replies by sending international Morse codes corresponding to the relevant signal flags. Signal lights for mutual communication shall be AA AA(. - . - - - - ) for calling and TTTTT(-) for replying. ## 3) Sharing Intelligence On Movements Of Illegal Fishing Ship a. The military authorities of the two sides shall exchange information on the movements of ships engaging in illegal fishing activities once a day (09:00). b. Daily exchange of intelligence shall be carried out according to the form in Appendix 2 by using the communication lines in the west coast district. c. The details of intelligence to be exchanged by the two sides shall be the fishing time, location and number of the ships engaging in illegal fishing activities. ## 4) Installation/Operation Of Communication Lines And Liaison Offices For The Prevention Of Accidental Clashes In The West Sea a. The two sides shall engage in consultations over matters pertaining to the installation and operation of new communication lines and liaison offices for the prevention of accidental clashes in the West Sea through working-level communication contact in June. b. In the event of any communication failure after installation of new communication lines and liaison offices, either side shall promptly give notice thereof to the other side by using other means of communication, and restore their respective communication lines as soon as possible. c. New communication lines shall be connected at the Military Demarcation Line about 5 kilometers east of the Joint Administration Area road in the west coast district at 09:00, August 12, 2004. Test communication shall be conducted at 10:00. ## 5) Communication And Operation a. Means of communication (wired and wireless communication, signal flags and lights) shall be kept available for transmission/reception at all times. Either side shall immediately respond to a call from the other side. b. Regular communication testing using the communication line of the west coast district shall be conducted twice a day (09:00 and 16:00). c. If emergency contact is required in connection with the prevention of an accidental clash in the West Sea, the communication line of the west coast district shall be used. d. In order to implement the agreement on the prevention of accidental clashes in the West Sea, test operation by type of communication means shall be conducted as specified in Appendix 3 on June 14, 2004. ## 2. Measures For The Cessation Of Propaganda Activities & Elimination Of Propaganda Apparatus In The Military Demarcation Line Areas The two sides shall implement the cessation of propaganda activities and the elimination of propaganda apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line areas in accordance with the principle of simultaneous action. 1) The two sides shall discontinue all propaganda activities in the Military Demarcation Line ## Areas From 00:00, June 15, 2004. a. The two sides shall cease all propaganda activities using loudspeakers, signboards, standing electronic boards and leaflets as well as the spread of various materials using balloons and apparatus. b. Each side shall cease all propaganda activities targeting the troops of the other side from a place that they can observe. 2) From 00:00, June 16 to 17:00, August 15, 2004, the two sides shall eliminate all propaganda apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line areas in three stages. a. The two sides shall thoroughly eliminate propaganda apparatus under the principle that propaganda will not be seen or heard by the other side. b. The scope of such elimination shall include all loudspeakers, stone inscriptions, signboards, standing electronic boards, leaflets, propaganda images, slogans, writings and so forth in the Military Demarcation Line areas that propagandize a side's ideological system and are recognized by the other side as slander, defamation or instigation. c. As regards religious installations including a cross lighting tower, stone statute and stone pagoda, the two sides shall take measures not to impact the other by erecting such means as a screen. d. Propaganda apparatus installed at the mouth of the Han River, the coastal areas and islands of the West Sea shall be included in the scope of the cessation of propaganda activities and the elimination of propaganda apparatus. Elimination of the propaganda apparatus in those areas shall be limited to the period of stage 1. e. The two sides shall exchange a list containing the location, types and details of the targets to be eliminated by the other (on the basis of the Military Demarcation Line marks) seven days prior to the completion of the elimination of propaganda apparatus by stage, and then verify the results of such elimination according to said list. f. If there arises any delay in such elimination for unavoidable reasons, either party shall give prompt notice of the cause thereof and modified schedule to the other, and may adjust such schedule by mutual agreement. g. In principle, verification of the elimination of propaganda apparatus shall be conducted by the naked eye. If there arises any doubt, the two sides shall exchange opinions through written notices. Any differences between the two sides shall be settled on the basis of consultations by working-level delegations. h. One day prior to the completion of the elimination of propaganda apparatus by stage, the two parties shall hold a meeting of working-level delegations to check the final results, and then move to a next stage. If necessary, the two parties shall conduct on-site inspection under the guidance of a respective verification team comprising three to five persons chosen by mutual agreement and causing the teams to meet each other on the Military Demarcation Line at an agreed time. i. On the last day of each stage, the two parties shall announce the relevant results to the press. ## 3. Modification, Complementation And Effectuation a. This Agreement shall take effect on the date when the heads of the delegations of the South and North exchange this Agreement after affixing their signatures thereto. b. This Agreement may be modified or supplemented by mutual agreement as necessary. c. The two sides have executed this Agreement in two counterparts, which have the same effect. ## June 12, 2004 | Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks | |---------------------------------------------| | Head of the South's Delegation | | Rear Admiral(L) Park Jeong-hwa | Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks Head of the North's Delegation Major General Ahn Ik-san # Milestones Of The Inter-Korean Railway And Road Reconnection Project | | Details | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Date | | | Aug. 21, · Organization of the MND committee for the implementation of inter-Korean railway/road | | | 2000 | reconnection | | Aug. 26 · Establishment of the 1st Army construction unit (for Gyeongeui Line construction). | | | Sept. 18 · Groundbreaking ceremony of the Gyeongeui Line | | | · Commencement of demining for the Gyeongeui Line south of the DMZ | | | Sept. 19 | (2 engineer battalions) | | · Inter-Korean defense ministers talks (Jeju Island): agreement on the principles of | | | implementation of the construction works | | | Sept. 26 | (Partial opening of the DMZ, setup of the Joint Administration Area, military working-level | | contact, etc.) | | | · Commencement of roadbed construction of the Gyeongeui Line south of the DMZ | | | Oct. 12 | (Roadbed construction: 5 engineer battalions/ Guard: 1 battalion) | | - Inter-Korean military working-level talks (5th round): Signing of the "Agreement on | | | Sept. 26 ~ | Military Assurances for Designation of the Joint Administration Area and the | | Feb. 8, | Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North" | | 2001 | Signing of the agreement by North Korea/delay in its effectuation due to North Korea's | | unilateral postponement of the exchange of the agreement | | | Aug. 14, · Completion of demining for the Gyeongeui Line south of the DMZ | | | 2001 | | | Oct. 13 · Completion of roadbed construction for the Gyeongeui Line south of the DMZ fence | | | Dec. 31 · Completion of railway/road construction for the Gyeongeui Line south of the DMZ fence | | | Apr. 11, · Opening ceremony of Dorasan Station | | | 2002 | - Agreement in the 2nd meeting of the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion | | Committee | | | - Gyeongeui Line Railway: completion at the end of Dec. 2002 Gyeongeui Line Road: | | | Mar. 2003 (end of May) | | | Aug. 31 | - Donghae Line Makeshift Road: completion in late November 2002, connection in early | | December | | | - Donghae Line Railway/Road: completion under the objective to finish the construction | | | within a year (end of Sept., 2003) | | | · Establishment of the 2nd Army construction unit | | | Sept. 7 | (for the construction of the Donghae Line) | | · Signing of the inter-Korean military assurance agreement: "Agreement on Military | | | Sept. 17 | Assurances for Designation of the Joint Administration Area in the East and West Coast | | Districts and the Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North" | | | - Demining for construction of the Gyeongeui Line in the DMZ/Roadbed construction for | | | railway/road reconnection | | | (Demining: 2 engineer battalions, | | | Sept. 19 | Roadbed construction: 2 engineer battalions, Guard: 1 battalion) | | · Demining in the DMZ and makeshift road roadbed construction for the Donghae Line | | | (Demining: 1 engineer battalion, | | | Roadbed construction: 2 engineer battalions, Guard: 1 battalion) | | | Date | Details | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Dec. 11, · Completion of the makeshift road construction for the Donghae Line (6.6km) | | | Dec. 24 · Completion of the construction of the makeshift road for the Gyeongeui Line | | | Dec. 31 · Completion of the railway construction for the Gyeongeui Line (DMZ 1.8km) | | | · Working-level consultations on inter-Korean railway/road reconnection (Pyongyang): | | | Jan. 24. | Agreement to carry out construction works starting from the Military Demarcation Line | | 2003 | toward each other's side | | · Opening ceremony of the Donghae Line makeshift road | | | Feb. 14 | (Unification Observatory, temporary CIQ) | | · Completion of the road/roadbed construction for the Gyeongeui Line | | | May 17 | - Roadbed measurement and transfer to the Seoul Regional | | Construction Management Office | | | Jun. 14 · Event marking the Gyeongeui/Donghae Line railway reconnection on the MDL | | | · Participation by a delegation from the South in the ground-breaking ceremony of the | | | Jun. 30 | Gaeseong Industrial Complex (119 persons): via the makeshift road | | of the Gyeongeui Line | | | Oct. 31 · Completion of the road construction of the Gyeongeui Line (DMZ 1.8km) | | | Nov. 15 · Dissolution of the 1st Army construction unit | | | · 9ª inter-Korean military working-level talks (Panmunjom): Adoption of the agreement on | | | Dec. 24 | installation and operation of guard posts in the Joint Administration Area | | Jan. 31, · Building of new guard posts in the Joint Administration Area of the east | | | 2004 | and west coast districts | | May 1 | · Completion of road pavement in the DMZ for the Donghae Line | | · Completion of dismantling of the makeshift road of the Donghae Line | | | Jun. 11 | · Completion of railway track construction in the DMZ for the Donghae Line | | - Return to their unit by forces in charge of finishing the roadbed of the Donghae | | | Jul. 12 | railway/road (1 engineer battalion (-)) | | · Completion of railway track construction for the section from the south | | | Jul. 30 | of the DMZ to the Tongjeon Tunnel on the Donghae Line | | Oct. 8 | · Return to their unit by remaining construction forces (1 platoon (+)) | | Nov. 29 · Dissolution of the 2nd Army construction unit | | | Nov. 30 · Dissolution of the Army implementation committee | | | Dec. 31 · Dissolution of the MND implementation committee | | # Joint Communique Thirty-Fifth Annual Us-Rok Securit Consultative Meeting NOVEMBER 17, 2003 SEOUL 1. The 35th Republic of Korea(ROK)-United States(US) Security Consultative Meeting(SCM) was held in Seoul on 17 November 2003. ROK Minister of National Defense Cho Yung-kil and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. Before the SCM, the Chairmen of the respective Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Kim Jong-hwan and General Richard B. Myers, presided over the 25th ROK-US Military Committee Meeting(MCM) on 15 November 2003. 2. Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his appreciation for President Roh Moo-hyun's decision to provide additional forces in Iraq and $260 million in Iraq reconstruction funds from 2003 to 2007. He promised that the US would work closely with the Republic of Korea, particularly on intelligence sharing and logistic planning, to ensure a smooth and timely deployment of forces. The Secretary praised the performance of the ROK forces already in Iraq and Afghanistan, noting that they are demonstrating their world-class military capabilities. The Secretary and the Minister agreed on the need to assist the people of Iraq and Afghanistan rebuild their nations and establish stable democratic institutions that prevent aggression and climinate terrorism. The Secretary and the Minister shared the view that the dispatch of additional ROK forces to Iraq will not only further strengthen the ROK-US alliance but also will serve as an opportunity to increase the ROK's prestige in the international community. 3. Recalling the 50th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, Minister Cho and Secretary Rumsfeld reaffirmed that the armistice and the United Nations Command have been crucial instruments in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Noting the significance of the 50th Anniversary of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, signed October 1, 1953, the Secretary and the Minister praised the accomplishments of the alliance over the past half-century, and commended the men and women of the combined ROK-US military forces for their dedication in ensuring peace and prosperity in the region. They both expressed the strong belief that the ROK-US partnership remains fundamental to the interests of the two nations and pledged to continue efforts to strengthen and enhance the alliance for the future. 4. Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister Cho expressed satisfaction with the results to date of the Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA), which began in 2003, and continues in 2004. They reviewed agreements for the relocation of US forces from the Seoul metropolitan area, enhancement of combined capabilities, transfer of military missions, and the realignment of US forces based in Korea. Both agreed that these initiatives, once fully implemented, will modernize and strengthen the alliance while adapting it to changes in the global security environment. In this regard, the Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed the continuing importance of the strategic flexibility of United States forces in the Republic of Korea. 5. Recalling the agreement of President Roh and President Bush to relocate the US forces from the Seoul metropolitan area at an early date, Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister Cho expressed their regret that the two sides were unable to conclude the agreements before the 35th SCM. The Secretary and the Minister reiterated both governments' commitment to relocate Yongsan garrison from Seoul metropolitan area at the earliest possible date. The Secretary and the Minister agreed to continue negotiations on this issue. 6. The Minister and the Secretary agreed on the importance of adapting the alliance to changes in the global security environment and of taking advantage of advances in military art and science to transform the combined defense of the ROK. Secretary Rumsfeld reiterated the United States' commitment to a program of enhancements directly related to the defense of the ROK over the next three years, valued at $11 billion. Minister Cho expressed his gratitude for the commitment and renewed his commitment to pursue transformation of the ROK military, while coordinating ROK effort with those of the US, and ensuring enhanced combined operational capabilities for the ROK-US Combined Forces Command. 7. Acknowledging the professionalism and excellence of the ROK military, and the ROK desire for a more predominant role in peninsula defense, Secretary Rumsfeld endorsed the agreement to transfer ten mission areas to ROK forces. Minister Cho reiterated that ROK forces would work closely with the Commander of the Combined Forces Command to ensure that this mission transfer results in an increase in combined readiness. 8. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed the principle that the realigmment and consolidation of the US forces based in Korea into two hubs south of the Han River will proceed in two phases. They agreed that this realignment and consolidation will improve combined readiness, enhance force protection, increase efficient use and balanced development of ROK land, and provide a basis for an enduring US contribution to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Emphasizing that the first phase should begin as soon as possible, they reaffirmed that the exact timing of the second phase of relocations will be determined by the highest national authorities according to the principles expressed in the ROK-US Presidential Joint Press Statements of 14 May and 20 October 2003. 9. The Secretary and the Minister agreed that North Korea continues to pose a global threat to our common interests despite its dire economic circumstances. They shared a grave concern that North Kores's selfacknowledged nuclear weapons program threatens regional and global security and violates North Korea's commitment to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. They emphasized that North Korea's continued development of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, along with the danger of exporting those weapons and technologies, are causes of significant concern for the alliance and the international community. They reaffirmed that any North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction would have the gravest consequences. 10. The Secretary and the Minister called on North Korea to completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons programs and to cease the testing, development, deployment, and export of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and related technologies. Affirming the solidarity of the ROK-US alliance, and recalling the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Safeguards Agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, they shared the view that North Korea should take the opportunity afforded by the Six-Party talks. 11. Assessing the threat posed by North Korea's military to peace and stability in Northeast Asia, the Minister and the Secretary agreed to maintain a strong combined defensive capability to deter North Korean threats. Secretary Rumsfeld reaffirmed the US commitment to the security of the ROK and to the continued provision of a nuclear umbrella for the ROK, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty. Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister Cho agreed on the need to continue to maintain a US troop presence on the Korean Peninsula and concurred that the alliance will serve to bolster peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. 12. The two delegations agreed that the 35th SCM and the 25th MCM provided an excellent opportunity to further solidify the ROK-US security alliance and address issues related to the current and future security relationship. Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister Cho agreed to hold the next SCM at a mutually convenient time in 2004 in Washington DC. # Joint Communique Thirty-Sixth Annual Us-Rok Security Consultative Meeting OCTOBER 22, 2004 WASHINGTON D.C. 1. The 36th Republic of Korea(ROK)-United States(US) Security Consultative Meeting(SCM) was held in Washington, D.C. on 22 October 2004. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and ROK Minister of National Defense Yoon Kwang-ung led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. Before the SCM, the Chairmen of the respective Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers and General Kim Jong-hwan, presided over the 26th ROK-US Military Committee Meeting(MCM) on 21 October 2004. 2. Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his appreciation for the ROK's dispatch of additional forces in Iraq, noting that the ROK, as the third largest troop contributor, was playing a vital role in assisting the Iraqi people to build a free and secure society. He promised that the US would continue to work closely with the ROK, particularly on intelligence sharing, to ensure the smooth accomplishment of the ROK forces' mission in Iraq. The Secretary praised the performance of the ROK forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary and the Minister agreed on the need to increase cooperation in combating global terrorism, and shared the view that such cooperation will further strengthen the ROK-US Alliance. 3. Minister Yoon and Secretary Rumsfeld expressed the strong belief that the ROK-US Alliance remains vital to the interests of the two nations and noted with satisfaction the successful efforts to build a comprehensive and dynamic alliance relationship. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed that the Armistice Agreement and the United Nations Command remain crucial instruments in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. 4. Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister Yoon expressed satisfaction with the results of the Future of the ROK- US Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) over the previous 18 months. Both agreed that initiatives to enhance combined capabilities, transfer military missions, and realign US forces based in Korea, once fully implemented, will significantly strengthen the alliance while adapting it to changes in the global security environment. Nothing those changes, the Secretary and the Minister once again affirmed the continuing importance of the strategic flexibility of US forces in the ROK. 5. The Minister and the Secretary agreed on the importance of adapting the alliance to the changes in the global security environment. Secretary Rumsfeld reiterated the US' commitment to an $11 Billion program of enhancements directly contributing to the defense of the ROK. Minister Yoon expressed ROK's commitment to coordinate ROK's 'Cooperative Self-reliant Defense Plan' with the US transformation efforts, ensuring enhanced combined operational capabilities for the ROK-US Combined Forces Command. 6. The Secretary and the Minister emphasized the importance of maintaining readiness while implementing mission transfers and realigning U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea. They reviewed the status of the transfer of ten mission areas to ROK forces, and reiterated their commitment to ensuring that the successful transfer of missions increases the readiness of the combined force. 7. Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister Yoon reviewed agreements to relocate the Yongsan Garrison and realign other USFK bases. The Secretary noted that the implementation of the agreement on the relocation of U.S. forces from the Seoul metropolitan area fulfils not only the pledges made by President Bush and President Roh in 2003, but also a promise made to the Korean people a decade earlier. Minister Yoon expressed his understanding that the consolidation of the USFK bases will lead to an increase in the readiness of both the USFK and the CFC. Both the Secretary and the Minister observed that these relocations were a win-win for the alliance. 8. The Secretary and the Minister discussed at length plans to redeploy 12,500 US troops from the peninsula. They highly evaluated the close consultation process through which the decision was made. The Secretary described how changes in U.S. global defense posture and U.S. efforts to transform its forces were the primary factors for the redeployment. The Secretary further noted that Korea's investment over the last decade in building a modernized military, as well as the achievements of the FOTA process over the last 18 months, had made this redeployment possible. Finally, the Secretary acknowledged the concern expressed by some Koreans and offered assurances that the unique security situation of the Korean Peninsula is being taken into full account. The Secretary and the Minister expressed their shared commitment to ensure that the redeployment would not weaken the combined deterrent and defensive capabilities of the Alliance and warned that for anyone to perceive a weakening would be mistake. 9. The Secretary and the Minister agreed that North Korea continues to pose a threat to the common interests of the US and the ROK. They shared a grave concern that North Korea's nuclear weapons program constitutes a threat to regional and global security and violates North Korea's commitments to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They observed that North Korea's continued development of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, along with the danger of exporting those weapons and technologies, is a cause of significant concern for the alliance and the international community. They reaffirmed that any North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction would have the gravest consequences. 10. The Secretary and the Minister noted that both the US and the ROK are committed to the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programs and called on North Korea to cease the testing, development, deployment, and export of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and related technologies. Affirming the solidarity of the ROK-US alliance, and recalling the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Safeguards Agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, they urged North Korea to take the opportunity afforded by the Six-Party talks. 11. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that maintaining strong combined defense capabilities to deter North Korean threats was vital to maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Secretary Rumsfeld reaffirmed the US commitment to the security of the ROK and to the continued provision of a nuclear umbrella for the ROK, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty. The Secretary and the Minister agreed on the need to maintain a US troop presence on the Korean Peninsula and concurred that the alliance continues to serve to bolster peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. 12. Once again recognizing the achievements of FOTA discussions as well as the successful outcome of the USFK troop redeployment consultations, the Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed their commitment to continued high-level consultation by directing the establishment of the ROK-US Security Policy Initiative. They agreed that this forum would apply the format of the previous successful consultations to the broader, long-term issues the alliance faces. The Minister and the Secretary further agreed that in order to maintain momentum, this forum should meet as soon as practical. 13. The two delegations agreed that the 36th SCM and the 26th MCM had further strengthened the ROK- US Alliance and help chart a course for the future security relationship. Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister Yoon agreed to hold the next SCM at a mutually convenient time in 2005 in Seoul. ## Status Of Ministry Of National Defense'S Participation In The Asean Regional Forum (Apr. 2002~Jul. 2004) | Date/Place | Multilateral Security Cooperation Meetings | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · Intersessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures (ISG-CBMs) | | | - Exchange of opinions on the political/security situation in the Asia-Pacific | | | Apr. 22-24, | - Discussion of counter-terrorism and countermeasures against transnational crimes | | 2002 | - Implementation of confidence building measures and review | | Hanoi, | of the newly proposed CBMs | | Vietnam | - Review/discussion of preventive diplomacy and development of overlapping | | CBM/PD initiatives | | | - Agreement on the establishment of a defense dialogue | | | · Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) | | | - Exchange of opinions on regional security situation | | | - Review of ARF activities/Formulation of recommendations to the 9th Foreign | | | May 16~17 | Ministers' Meeting | | Brunei | - Examination of New Zealand's initiative for "CBM activity maintenance system" and | | Brunei's nine recommendations for the development of the ARF | | | - Consultations on joint counter-terrorism efforts | | | · Foreign Ministers' Meeting | | | - Exchange of views on regional/international security situation | | | - Discussion of ways to consolidate joint efforts and hold seminars to counter terrorism | | | Jul. 31, | - Agreement on the establishment of an intersessional meeting on counter-terrorism | | 2002 | and transnational crimes | | Brunei | - Agreement on establishment/convocation of the Defense Officials' Meeting | | (defense dialogue) | | | - Publication of annual security prospect and experts/dignitaries' list | | | Aug. 28~30, · ARF Workshop on Defense/Military Officials' Cooperation | | | - Agreement to make concerted efforts to develop measures on military confidence | | | 2002 | building through military exchange and cooperation, exchange of military education | | Seoul, | materials, exchange of national defense intelligence, and discussion of outstanding | | ROK | military and security issues with the network of defense officials | | · Meeting of Heads of Defense Universities, Colleges and Institutions | | | - Analysis of the details of military expert training programs for the 21st century | | | Sept. 16-20, | - Establishment of the scope of education for each issue of military education | | 2002 | - Sharing of experiences and exchange of views regarding problems related to | | Moscow, | military education | | Russia | - Coordination of military and police education systems | | - Counter-terrorism in terms of military education | | | Sept. 25~27, · ARF Seminar on Military Logistics Outsourcing Support | | | 2002 | - Military logistics structure and operational system | | Beijing, | - Allocation of military budgets and redeployment of idle human resources | | China | - Defense policies related to outsourcing | | · Intersessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures (ISG-CBMs) | | | - Calling for peaceful and early resolution of the North Korean nuclear impasse | | | based on serious concerns about the issue | | | Nov. 19~22, | | | 2002 | - Discussion of counter-terrorism and transnational crimes | | Wellington, | - Emphasis on the efforts to step up disarmament and non-proliferation | | (NPT, CTBT, CWC and BWC) | | | New | - Ways to promote confidence building measures and strengthen the control of the | | Zealand | exports of dual-use goods | | - Convocation of the first official Defense Officials Meeting | | | Date/Place | Multilateral Security Cooperation Meetings | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Seminar | | | Dec. 4~6, | - Establishment of an effective disaster monitoring and response system | | 2002 | - Roles and interoperability of domestic government agencies/organizations | | Singapore | - Civilian-military cooperation, and voluntary participation in/ joint efforts for | | | humanitarian activities | | · ARF Intersessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures | | | - Request to North Korea to return to the NPT and cooperate with the IAEA | | | | regarding its nuclear issue | | Mar. 25~28, | - Discussion regarding the war in Iraq | | 2003 | (objection by Malaysia, Indonesia, China and Russia) | | - Efforts to promote counter-terrorism and jointly tackle transnational crimes | | | Vientiane, | | | Laos | - Emphasis on disarmament/non-proliferation (NPT, CTBT, CWC and BWC) and | | | universality | | - Reaffirmation of the initiative to strengthen the control of the exports of | | | | dual-use goods | | · Senior Officials' Meeting | | | - Request to North Korea to return to the NPT and resume cooperation with the | | | | IAEA regarding its nuclear issue | | Apr. 29~ | - Post-war issues in Iraq | | May 1, 2003 | - Cooperation to jointly cope with SARS | | Siem Reap, | - Strengthening of disarmament/non-proliferation regimes | | Cambodia | (NPT, CTBT, CWC and BWC) | | - Convocation of a defense officials' meeting at the level of deputy | | | | ministers/assistant deputy ministers | | · Foreign Ministers' Meeting | | | - Discussion of ways to jointly cope with the North Korean nuclear issue, terrorism | | | June 17~18, | and transnational threats as well as the suppression of human rights in Myanmar | | 2003 | - Request to North Korea to resume cooperation with the IAEA and rescind its | | Phnom | decision to withdraw from the NPT in the Chairman's Statement | | Penh, | - Hailing the resumption of the inter-Korean ministerial talks and reaffirmation of the | | Cambodia | importance of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation | | - Welcoming of the tripartite talks in Beijing (Apr. 23-24) and calling for the | | | | settlement of humanitarian issues | | · Meeting of the Heads of Defense Universities, Colleges and Institutions | | | Oct. 15~17. | - Expansion of the military's role regarding disasters and calamities | | 2003 | (President Hwang Gyu-shik) | | New Delhi, | - Maintenance of a flexible posture of the military to brace for disasters and calamities | | India | - Devising measures to minimize man-made disasters | | - Ways to promote international cooperation when necessary | | | · ARF Intersessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures | | | - Discussion of such issues as the North Korean nuclear impasse, developments in | | | Nov. 19~22, | Myanmar and East Timor, and strengthening of a regional cooperative body | | 2003 | - Need to exert efforts toward stabilization of Iraq at an early date | | Beijing, | - Active support by all members for an early convocation of the 2nd round of the six- | | China | party talks | | - Non-traditional security threats including terrorism, drugs, piracy, illegal | | | | immigration and money laundering | | Date/Place | Multilateral Security Cooperation Meetings | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · ARF Intersessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures | | | - New maritime security initiative and regional cooperation | | | Apr. 10~14, | - Results and significance of the dispatch of troops to Iraq by some nations | | 2004 | - Discussion of the possible establishment of a high-ranking defense officials' | | Yanggon, | security policy conference | | Myanmar | - Positive assessment of the 2nd round of the six-party talks and support for | | denuclearization of the Korean peninsula | | | · Senior Officials Meeting | | | May 11~12, | - Threats of WMD proliferation on the Korean peninsula | | 2004 | - Regional maritime security initiative | | Yogjakarta, | - Establishment of the ARF Security Policy Conference | | Indonesia | (Convened in China in November for the first time) | | · Foreign Ministers Meeting | | | - Military support and confidence building for inter-Korean exchange and | | | Jul. 1~2, | cooperation, and preparation for dispatch of troops to Iraq | | 2004 | - Efforts to counter terrorism and transnational crimes | | Jakarta, | - Discussion of a regional maritime security initiative for maritime safety | | Indonesia | - Assessment of the results of the third round of the six-party talks for resolution | | of the North Korean nuclear impasse | | | · ARF Security Policy Conference | | | - Held for the first time in China in accordance with the country's proposal, with | | | Indonesia as the chair | | | Nov. 4~6, | - Discussion of measures to counter terrorism and transnational crimes as well as a | | 2004 | regional maritime security initiative | | Beijing, | - Calling for early resumption of the six-party talks to find a solution to the North | | China | Korean nuclear issue | | - North Korea's expression of its unflinching position regarding the nuclear issue by | | | high-ranking personnel from the Ministry of People's Armed Forces participating in | | | the Conference for the first time. | | # Developments Regarding The Dispatch Of Rok Armed Forces For Peacekeeping/Post-War Rehabilitation In Afghanistan/Iraq | Dispatch of ROK Forces to Support 'Operation Enduring Freedom'(Afghanistan) | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Date | Major Details | | Sept. 11, 2001 | Simultaneous terrorist acts committed against US by means of airplanes | | Declaration by US President George Bush that the terrorist attacks within US | | | will be regarded as an act of war | | | Sept. 12 | Adoption by the UN Security Council of a resolution denouncing terrorism | | (No. 1368) | | | Message from then ROK President Kim Dae-jung conveyed to US President | | | Bush | | | Sept. 17 | · ROK will provide support as an ally in line with the spirit of the ROK-US Mutual | | Defense Treaty and actively promote international solidarity as well. | | | Review by the NSC Standing Committee of a plan to provide military support to | | | Sept. 23 | the US | | Prior notification by ROK of its specific plan to provide military support to US | | | · Dispatch of a medical support unit, provision of transport assets, dispatch of | | | liaison officers, etc. | | | Sept. 23 | * Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade → US Embassy in ROK/ ROK MND | | - USFK | | | Official announcement of the troop dispatch plan by the ROK government after | | | Sept. 24 | giving explanation to and securing cooperation from the National Assembly | | (presidential secretary for foreign affairs and security) | | | Adoption by the UN Security Council of a resolution to prohibit sponsorship of | | | Sept. 28 | terrorism (No.1373) | | Oct. 8 | Air raid by the US-Great Britain allied forces in Afghanistan | | Oct. 16 | Finalization of the basic troop dispatch plan by the MND (Minister's report) | | Request from US to ROK to dispatch troops (medical support unit) according to | | | Nov. 14 | the ROK government's proposal | | Nov. 16 | Dispatch of an ROK field survey team to the allied forces (10 persons) | | Request by the US Pacific Command for a US Joint Chiefs of Staff's RFF | | | Nov. 20 | regarding dispatch of ROK Navy/Air Force troops | | Nov. 27 | Submission of the relevant agenda to the cabinet meeting | | Nov. 28 | Approval by the president | | Passage of the relevant motion in the 20th plenary meeting of the National | | | Dec. 6 | Assembly | | Dec. 19 | Dispatch of the Navy transport support unit | | Dec. 21 | Dispatch of the Air Force transport support unit | | Dispatch of the Army medical support unit | | | Feb. 29, 2002 | | | Date | Major Details | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Request from the US Central Command to all its allies through the allied nations' | | | Aug. 15, 2002 | cooperation team to dispatch construction engineer units to Afghanistan | | Deliberation by the NSC Standing Committee and consultations over proposed | | | Oct. 31 | dispatch of construction engineers | | Nov. 4 | Prior report to the Defense Committee of the National Assembly | | 1st and 2nd briefing to the National Assembly/political parties (1.8~14) | | | * Targets: chairman and expert members of the Defense Committee of the | | | Nov. 4-7 | National Assembly, and chief policymakers of each political party | | Resolution by the cabinet meeting | | | Nov. 5 | Approval by the president | | Nov. 7 | | | Nov. 12 | Submission of the relevant motion to the National Assembly | | Submission of the agenda to the Defense Committee and plenary session of the | | | Jan. 16~22, 2003 | National Assembly and passage of the motion | | First Dispatch of ROK Troops to Iraq | | | Date | Major Details | | The first request from US (US ambassador to ROK delivers a non-paper to the | | | ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.) | | | Nov. 20, 2002 | · Humanitarian support and post-war reconstruction support | | · Transportation, equipment, combat support troops (engineers, medical staff, | | | etc.), mine sweeping unit, etc. | | | ROK's presentation of the results of its review to US | | | (The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade delivers a non-paper to the | | | ROK embassy in US) | | | · Possibility of providing assistance to refugees in Iraq, supporting neighboring | | | Dec. 27 | countries and backing up post-war rehabilitation efforts | | · Military support: Dispatch of ROK troops deployed in the war in Afghanistan; | | | Possible to additionally dispatch one engineering company | | | The second request from US (The US ambassador to ROK delivers a non- | | | paper to the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.) | | | · Short-term essential items for safety and security in Iraq, immediately | | | following the outbreak of the war | | | Mar. 13, 2003 | · Requested Items: | | a. Military support (infantry and engineer units, etc.) | | | b. Experts on WMD / explosive ordnance disposal | | | c. Decontamination after NBC attacks | | | d. Humanitarian & medical support, etc. | | | 11:30, Mar. 20 | Launch of attack on Iraq by US (05:30, Mar. 20, local time) | | Convocation of the NSC Standing Committee; decision on dispatch of | | | Mar. 20 | construction engineering and medical units | | Resolution in the cabinet meeting to approve troop dispatch to Iraq; Motion to | | | Mar. 21 | dispatch troops to Iraq passed by the Defense Committee of the National | | Assembly | | | Plenary session of the National Assembly held regarding the planned troop | | | Mar. 28~29 | dispatch | ## Dispatch Of The Rok Military Construction Engineers To Afghanistan | Dispatch of Additional ROK Troops to Iraq | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Date | Major Details | | Sept. 4, 2003 | Request from US to ROK to dispatch additional troops | | Decision by the ROK government to dispatch additional troops based on | | | Oct. 18 | collection of public opinions and advice from experts | | On-site investigations/consultations to determine dispatch methods | | | · ROK government's joint on-site investigation (twice) and the National | | | | Assembly investigation team's local survey activities | | · Consultation with US (3 times); Collection of opinions from politicians | | | ROK government's decision on and announcement | | | Dec. 17 | of additional troop dispatch plan | | Dec. 17~22 | Area and timing of dispatch, and logistics support | | Resolution by the cabinet meeting, approval by the president and submission of | | | Dec. 23~24 | the motion to the General Assembly | | Jan. 11~19, 2004 | On-site investigation of logistic support requirements | | Submission of the agenda to the Defense Committee and plenary session of | | | Feb. 9, Feb. 13 | the National Assembly and passage of the motion | | Dispatch of a field survey team | | | Feb. 24~Mar. 3 | Local consultations on change of the region of dispatch | | Mar. 15~19 | * Agreed to select between Irbil and Suleimania | | June 18 | Determination by the NSC Standing Committee as regards the area of | | | dispatch (Irbil) and the schedule of deployment | | Jul. 9 | Operation of the government-wide committee to support the dispatch | | Aug. 3 | Departure of the 1st contingent of 329 troops (advance team) from Kuwait | | Sept. 3 | Departure of the 1st main echelon of 257 troops from Kuwait | | Completion of the deployment of the main echelon of the Zaytun Unit | | | Sept. 22 | (2,884 troops) in Irbil | | Nov. 25 | Departure of the follow-up echelon of 312 personnel from Kuwait | | Date | | Major Details | |---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | | Resolution by the plenary session of the National Assembly to approve the | | | Apr. 2 | troop dispatch | | | | Dispatch of the advance team (20 personnel; Nasiriya; via Kuwait) | | | Apr. 17 | Dispatch of the 1st echelon (medical support and construction engineering unit | | | Apr. 30 | of about 300 personnel; Nasiriya; via Kuwait) | | | | Dispatch of the 2nd echelon (about 300 engineers; Nasiriya; via Kuwait) | | | May 14 | | | | Sept. 1 | Closing of the Nasiriya base; Joining the Zaytun Unit | | | | (Unit: trillion won, %) | | | | | |-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------| | | 1998 | 1999 | | | | | Classification | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | | | | Government Budget | 99.1801 | 109. 6298 | 118.1323 | 120.1394 | 134.3704 | | (Increase Rate) | (11.8) | (10.5) | (7.8) | (1.7) | (11.8) | | Defense Budget | 15.3884 | 16.3640 | 17.5148 | 18.9412 | 20.8226 | | (Increase Rate) | (6.3) | (6.3) | (7.0) | (8.1) | (9.9) | | | 6.2930 | 7.0656 | | | | | Force Investments | 5.2141 | 5.4756 | 5.7379 | | | | | (4.8) | (9.7) | (12.3) | | | | (Increase Rate) | (△2.4) | (5.0) | | | | | (33.5) | (33.2) | (33.9) | | | | | (Ratio) | (33.9) | (32.8) | 12.6482 | 13.7570 | | | Ordinary Operating Costs | 10.1743 | 10.8884 | 11.7769 | (8.8) | | | (Increase Rate) | (11.4) | (7.0) | (8.2) | (7.4) | | | (66.5) | (67.2) | (66.8) | (66.1) | | | | (Ratio) | (66.1) | 8.5948 | | | | | Personnel Costs | 6.4822 | 7.0104 | 7.5788 | 7.9881 | | | | (5.4) | (7.6) | | | | | (Increase Rate) | (16.8) | (8.1) | (8.1) | (42.2) | (41.3) | | (Ratio) | (42.1) | (42.8) | (43.3) | 4.6601 | 5.1622 | | Project Costs | 3.6921 | 3.8780 | 4.1981 | | | | (Increase Rate) | (3.1) | (5.0) | (8.3) | (11.0) | (10.8) | | | (24.6) | (24.8) | | | | | (Ratio) | (24.0) | (23.7) | (23.9) | | | | Defense Budget Ratio | 2.8 | 2.85 | | | | | Ratio to GDP (%) | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 15.5 | | | Ratio to Government Budgets (%) | 15.5 | 14.9 | 14.8 | 15.8 | | | O Government budgets: based on General Accounts | | | | | | # Annual Government And Defense Budgets Year 2005 National Defense Budget (Unit: 100 million won) | | Increase | | | | | |--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|------------|-------|------| | Classification | 2004 Budget | 2005 Budget | (Decrease) | % | | | · Personnel costs | 79,881 | 85,948 | 6,067 | 7.6 | | | · Project costs | 46,601 | 51,622 | 5,021 | 10.4 | | | · Meals | 10,549 | 11,186 | 637 | 6.0 | | | | 30 | | | | | | · Clothes | 2,550 | 2,580 | 1.2 | | | | - Unit activity | 4,753 | 6,184 | 1,431 | 30.1 | | | · Education | 1,682 | 1,733 | 51 | 3.0 | | | and training | | | | | | | · Equipment | 4,838 | 5,122 | 284 | 4.1 | | | management | | | | | | | Ordinary | · Material procurement | 1,003 | 1,051 | 48 | 4.8 | | Operating | | | | | | | Costs | · Facility construction | 8,177 | 9,399 | 1,222 | 13.6 | | · Facility maintenance | 2,948 | 3,424 | 476 | 16.1 | | | · Reserve forces | 705 | 787 | 82 | 11.6 | | | · Research/Auxiliary | 1,591 | 1,748 | 157 | 9.9 | | | institutes | | | | | | | · Support for stationing | 3,343 | 3,318 | 425 | △0.7 | | | forces | | | | | | | · Basic project costs | 4,281 | 4,834 | 553 | 12.9 | | | · Executive agency | 181 | 256 | 75 | 41.4 | | | expenses | | | | | | | | Increase | | | | |--------------------------|-------------|-------------|--------|------| | Classification | 2004 Budget | 2005 Budget | % | | | | (Decrease) | | | | | Total | 189,412 | 208,226 | 18,814 | 9.9 | | Force Investments | 62,930 | 70,656 | 7,726 | 12.3 | | | | 8.8 | | | | Ordinary Operating Costs | 126,482 | 137,570 | 11,088 | | # Composition Of Mnd Budget By Fy (Unit: 100 million won) | | Force Investments | | | | | | | | |----------------|--------------------------|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------|------|------| | Defense Budget | Ordinary Operating Costs | | | | | | | | | Year | Increase | | | | | | | | | Increase | Increase | | | | | | | | | Amount | Amount | Ratio | Amount | Ratio | | | | | | | Rate | | | | | | | | | Rate | Rate | | | | | | | | | 31,207 | 15.7 | 19,329 | 18.2 | 62.1 | 11,815 | 11.8 | 37.9 | | | 1982 | 62.7 | 12,216 | 3.4 | 37.3 | | | | | | 1983 | 32,741 | 4.9 | 20,525 | 5.8 | | | | | | △2.0 | 60.9 | 12,939 | 5.9 | 39.1 | | | | | | 1984 | 33,061 | 1.0 | 20,122 | | | | | | | 36,892 | 11.6 | 21,845 | 8.6 | 59.2 | 15,047 | 16.3 | 40.8 | | | 1985 | 42.7 | | | | | | | | | 1986 | 41,580 | 12.7 | 23,842 | 9.1 | 57.3 | 17,738 | 17.9 | | | | 21,453 | 20.9 | 45.2 | | | | | | | 1987 | 47,454 | 14.1 | 26,001 | 9.1 | 54.8 | | | | | 17.5 | 55.3 | 24,652 | 14.9 | 44.7 | | | | | | 1988 | 55,202 | 16.3 | 30,550 | | | | | | | 9.0 | 34,155 | 11.8 | 56.8 | 25,993 | 5.4 | 43.2 | | | | 1989 | 60,148 | 7.2 | 42.0 | | | | | | | 1990 | 66,378 | 10.4 | 38,515 | 12.8 | 58.0 | 27,863 | | | | 12.6 | 44,988 | 16.8 | 60.2 | 29,776 | 6.9 | 39.8 | | | | 1991 | 74,764 | 38.2 | | | | | | | | 1992 | 84,100 | 12.5 | 51,968 | 15.5 | 61.8 | 32,132 | 7.9 | | | | 34,173 | 6.4 | 37.1 | | | | | | | 1993 | 92,154 | 9.6 | 57,981 | 11.6 | 62.9 | | | | | 11.5 | 64.2 | 36,116 | 5.7 | 35.8 | | | | | | 1994 | 100,753 | 9.3 | 64,637 | | | | | | | 1995 | 110,744 | 9.9 | 71,032 | 9.9 | 64.1 | 39,712 | 10.0 | 35.9 | | 10.6 | 79,772 | 12.3 | 65.2 | 42,662 | 7.4 | 34.8 | | | | 1996 | 122,434 | 14.5 | 35.4 | | | | | | | 1997 | 137,865 | 12.6 | 89,032 | 11.6 | 64.6 | 48,833 | | | | △2.2 | 50,902 | 4.2 | 36.9 | | | | | | | 1998 | 138,000 | 0.1 | 87,098 | 63.1 | | | | | | 85,186 | △2.2 | 62.0 | 52,304 | 2.8 | 38.0 | | | | | 1999 | 137,490 | △0.4 | 2.2 | 36.9 | | | | | | 144,774 | 91,337 | 6.8 | 63.0 | 53,437 | | | | | | 2000 | 5.0 | 33.9 | | | | | | | | 153,884 | 6.3 | 101,743 | 11.4 | 66.1 | 52,141 | △2.4 | | | | 2001 | 5.0 | 33.5 | | | | | | | | 163,640 | 6.3 | 108,884 | 7.0 | 66.5 | 54,756 | | | | | 2002 | 32.8 | | | | | | | | | 7.0 | 117,769 | 8.2 | 67.2 | 57,379 | 4.8 | | | | | 2003 | 175,148 | 33.2 | | | | | | | | 8.1 | 126,482 | 7.4 | 66.8 | 62,930 | 9.7 | | | | | 2004 | 189,412 | 8.8 | 66.1 | 70,656 | 12.3 | 33.9 | | | | 2005 | 208,226 | 9.9 | 137,570 | | | | | | # 2004 Force Integration Projects Regarding Major Military Equipment | | (As of Dec. 2004) | | | |--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------| | 2004 Force | | | | | Type | Integration Plan | Other | | | (Number) | | | | | K1A1 tanks | 26 | R&D | | | K-9 155mm self-propelled | 50 | R&D | | | artillery | | | | | New decontamination | 32 | R&D | | | trucks | | | | | Ground Force | 7 | Overseas purchase | | | MLRS | | | | | Capability | ATACMS: 110 | Technology introduction | | | Spider Tactical | 4 | R&D | | | Communication System | | | | | Ground Tactical C4I System | 1 | R&D | | | Cost Guard Radar | 8 | R&D | | | and Unmanned Equipment | | | | | Destroyer (KDX-II) | 1 | Domestic production | | | Minesweeper (MSH) | 1 | Domestic production | | | Naval | | | | | Force | | | | | Capability | ASTT upgrade | 1 | Overseas purchase | | Improvement of White Shark | ნ | Technology introduction | | | firing capabilities | | | | | Fighter (KF-16) | 10 | Licensed production | | | Basic training aircraft (KT-1) | 16 | R&D | | | Air Force | | | | | Capability | C-130 navigation equipment | 13 | Overseas purchase | | Air crew night vision goggles | 105 | R&D | | | Short-range anti-aircraft | 12 | R&D | | | guided weapon (Cheonma) | | | | | Air Defense | 30mm self-propelled | 16 | R&D | | Capability | anti-aircraft artillery (Biho) | | | | Portable anti-aircraft | 72 | R&D | | | guided missiles (Shingung) | | | | # Status Of International Defense Industrial Agreements Agreements on Cooperation in Defense Industry and Logistics Agreements on Exchanges of Scientists/ Technicians and Technology Data Agreements on Quality Assurance Agreements on Providing Cost Information | us | us | us | us | |----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------| | United Kingdom | France | United Kingdom | United Kingdom | | France | Italy | France | Germany | | Italy | United Kingdom | Spain | | | Spain | Israel | Switzerland | | | Indonesia | Canada | | | | Israel | Italy | | | | Thailand | Netherlands | | | | | Belgium | | | | Malaysia | | | | | Philippines | Denmark | | | | Romania | Australia | | | | Canada | Philippines | | | | | Germany | | | | Russia | Israel | | | | Germany | | | | | New Zealand | Turkey | | | | Netherlands | Indonesia | | | | Turkey | New Zealand | | | | Venezuela | Greece | | | Vietnam Australia Bangladesh 21 5 18 ‌‌‌ # Status Of Defense R&D Investments | | (Unit: 100 million won) | | | | | | | |-----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----| | | Increase (Decrease) | | | | | | | | Classification | 2003 | 2004 | Amount | % | | | | | Defense Expenditures | 189,412 | 14,261 | 8.1 | | | | | | 175,148 | | | | | | | | | Total | 7,386 | 7,968 | 582 | 8.1 | | | | | Ratio to Defense | 4.2 | 4.2 | | | | | | | Expenditures (%) | | | | | | | | | Subtotal | 6,277 | 6,684 | 407 | 6.5 | | | | | Research Assistance for | | | | | | | | | the Agency for Defense | 4,386 | 5,091 | 705 | 16.1 | | | | | Force | Development (ADD) | | | | | | | | Investments | | | | | | | | | R&D | Military Management R&D | 1,427 | 1,417 | -10 | -0.7 | | | | Costs | KTX-Il government | 464 | 176 | -288 | -62.9 | | | | contribution | | | | | | | | | Subtotal | 1,109 | 1,284 | 175 | 15.7 | | | | | 942 | 1,073 | 131 | 13.9 | | | | | | Ordinary | ADD | | | | | | | | Operating | Korea Institute for | 158 | 202 | 44 | 27.9 | | | | Costs | Defense Analyses (KIDA) | | | | | | | | Policy Research | 9.19 | 9.19 | . | . | | | | | - Mid-Term Plan for 2005~2009 | (Unit: 100 million won) | | | | | | | | Mid-Term Financial Resources Allocation | | | | | | | | | Classification | '06 | '07 | '08 | 60. | | | | | Total | .05 | | | | | | | | Defense Expenditures | 1,305,026 208,226 235,500 261,620 289,280 310,400 | | | | | | | | 75,886 | 8,774 | 11,628 | 14,971 | 19,125 | 21,388 | | | | Total | Ratio to | | | | | | | | Defense | 4.21 | 4.94 | 5.72 | 6.61 | 6.89 | | | | 5.81 | | | | | | | | | Expenditures | | | | | | | | | (%) | | | | | | | | | Subtotal | 67,406 | 7,367 | 9,901 | 13,276 | 17,345 | 19,517 | | | ADD | 44,302 | 5,412 | 6,986 | 8,060 | 10,987 | 12,857 | | | R&D | Investments | Military | | | | | | | Costs | 22,532 | 1,605 | 2,693 | 5,216 | 6,358 | 6,660 | | | Management | 572 | 350 | 222 | | | | | | KTX Cost | | | | | | | | | Subtotal | 8,481 | 1,407.2 | 1,727.2 | 1,695.2 | 1,780.2 | 1,871.2 | | | ADD | 1,467 | 1,550 | 1,635 | | | | | | Ordinary | 7,347 | 1,202 | 1,493 | | | | | | Operating | KIDA | 1,088 | 196 | 225 | 219 | 221 | 227 | | Costs | Policy | 46 | 9.2 | 9.2 | 9.2 | 9.2 | 9.2 | | Research | | | | | | | | # Organization Of The Rok Ministry Of National Defense And The Current Number Of Military Personnel (As of Dec. 31, 2004) ![321_image_0.png](321_image_0.png) National Defense University Korea Armed Forces Athletic Corps Defense Security Command Defense Transportation Command Defense Communication Command Forces Chemical Biological Radiological Defense Command Armed Forces Medical Command Seoul Armed Forces Hospital Gyeryongdae Service Support Command Institute for Military History Compilation Women's Forces Development Group Military Manpower Administration Joint Chiefs of Staff Central Directorate for Intelligence Central Directorate for Operations Central Directorate for Strategic Planning Central Directorate for Personnel/Logistics ACofS for Command and Communications ACofS for Civil & Psychological Warfare Combat Readiness Inspection Office Secretaries Office Public Affairs Office Office of the Judge Advocate | Army | Navy | (Unit: persons) | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-------------------|--------| | Navy | Air Force | Other | | | Classification | Total | Army | | | 594,000 | 74,000 | 68,600 | 7,432 | | Total | 742,000 | 67,000 | 64.000 | | Military personnel | 681,000 | 550,000 | | | 13,247 | 4.692 | 4,577 | 4,760 | | Military civilians | 27,276 | 2,672 | | | Civilian government officials | 2,672 | | | | Full-time reservists | 31,175 | 29,763 | 1,412 | | - Including military civilians serving as reserve force captains (Army: 4,026 / Navy: 138) | | | | # Mid–Term Establishment Plans Of Military Environmental Facilities | | (Unit: 100 million won, number of facilities) | | | | | | | | |-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|------|----------------------|----|-----|-------| | | Total | Procurement | Mid-term Plan for 2006-2010 | | | | | | | Classification | Requirement | (by 2005) | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 2009 2010 Total | | | | | Total | 6,475 | 4,842 | 490 | 671 | 297 | 82 | 93 | 1,633 | | Sewage/Wastewater | 3,307 | 2,455 | 394 | 362 | 27 | 49 | 20 | 852 | | Disposal Facilities | | | | | | | | | | Incinerating Facilities | 60 | 57 | . | . | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | | Noise prevention | 13 | : | | | | | | | | | 13 | ... | . | .. | . | - | | | | Facilities | | | | | | | | | | Soil contamination | 2,929 | 2,151 | 96 | 309 | 269 | 32 | | | | Prevention facilities | | 72 | 778 | | | | | | | Air contamination | 166 | 166 | . | . | - | . | . 1 | 100 | | Prevention facilities | | | | | | | | | | Required budget | 5,568 | 3,954 | 1,012 | 555 | વેર | 65 | 87 | 1,814 | ![323_image_0.png](323_image_0.png) # Chronology Of Rok National Defense (2003~Nov.2004) | | Major Details | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Year | Date | | Jan. 16 | ROK decides to dispatch an additional engineering unit to Afghanistan. | | The "ROK Army Dasan Unit" is established to support the War on Terrorism by US | | | Feb. 6 | General Cho Yung-kil assumes office as the 38th Minister of National Defense. | | Feb. 27 | ROK and US conduct RSOI Exercise. | | Mar. 19 | ROK-Japan defense ministers talks | | Mar. 29 | The National Assembly passes a "motion to dispatch ROK military units | | Apr. 2 | to the war in Iraq." | | Apr. 8-9 | 1st FOTA talk | | Apr. 10 | ROK and Russia hold defense ministers talks. | | "Munmu the Great", the second ship under the Stage II Korean destroyer project | | | Apr. 11 | (KDX-II), is launched. | | Apr. 15 | "Seohee Unit", the engineer unit dispatched to Iraq, is established. | | "Jema Unit", the medical support unit dispatched to Iraq, is established. | | | Apr. 17 | The 1st contingent of the "Seohee Unit" is dispatched to Iraq. | | Apr. 30 | The 1st contingent of the "Jema Unit" is dispatched to Iraq. | | ROK and US hold a summit to discuss peaceful resolution of the North Korean | | | May 15 | nuclear issue and development of the ROK-US alliance. | | Roadbed construction of the Gyeongeui road line is completed. | | | May 17 | | | May 19 | The "code of conduct for government employees" goes into effect. | | 2003 | The MND and USFK adopt a SOFA Joint Committee document on safety | | May 30 | measures for local residents during training. | | The MND and USFK formulate a USFK force improvement plan. | | | May 31 | The ROK National Defense Minister Cho Yung-kil and US Deputy Secretary of | | Jun. 2 | Defense Wolfowitz exchange opinions. | | The MND decides to pursue excavation of the bodies of fallen soldiers during the | | | Jun. 3 | Korean War as a permanent project. | | A ceremony marking the completion of construction of a domestic MLRS factory | | | Jun. 4 | is held. | | Jun. 4~5 | 2nd FOTA talks | | Jun. 12 | First US AWACS aircraft flight by a ROK Air Force control officer | | Jun. 14 | Ceremony to mark connection of the Gyeongeui/Donghae railways | | President Roh Moo-hyun's dialogue with the Armed Forces command | | | Jun. 21 | (Gyeryongdae) | | Unveiling ceremony of the monument commemorating the armed clash in the | | | Jun. 24 | WestSea(2nd Fleet Command) | | Ceremony to enshrine memorial tablets of the war dead of the Korean War | | | Jun. 24 | (National Memorial Board) | | Jun. 27 | ROK-US defense ministers talks (Washington) | | Jema Unit's opening of a field hospital (Nasiriya, Iraq) | | | Jul. 11 | | | Year | Date | Major Details | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | Jul. 15 | Export of two domestic aircrafts (KT-1B) to the Indonesian Air Force | | | Jul. 22~23 | 3rd FOTA talk | | | Ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement | | | | Jul. 27 | (War Memorial of Korea/House of Peace at Panmunjom) | | | The 4th contingent of the Dongeui Unit and 2nd contingent of the Dasan Unit | | | | Aug. 27 | leave ROK for rotation. | | | Sept. 3-4 | 4th FOTA talks | | | Sept. 4 | Successful first flight of A-50, an indigenously produced aircraft | | | Sept. 22 | "Jema Unit", a medical support unit to be dispatched to Iraq is organized. | | | Sept. 24 | MND dispatches an on-site investigation team to Iraq. | | | Ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the ROK- | | | | Sept. 30 | US Mutual Defense Treaty (USFK) | | | Oct. 6~8 | 5th FOTA talk | | | Oct. 6 | Dispatch of the 19th contingent of the medical support team to Western Sahara | | | Oct. 13 | Completion of construction of the MND new building | | | Oct. 23 | Complete withdrawal of the Evergreen Unit | | | Oct. 30 | Development of "Shingung", an anti-aircraft guided weapon | | | 2003 | Dispatch of the 2nd joint investigation team of the ROK government for the | | | Oct. 31 | dispatch of additional troops to Iraq | | | Nov. 3 | Restructuring of the MND (Reorganization of 11 entities) | | | Nov. 4~9 | Opening of the (4th) "Korea Air Show 2003" (BEXCO) | | | Meeting between ROK JCS Chairman Kim Jong-hwan and Chief of General | | | | Nov. 10 | Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army | | | Nov. 12 | Launch of "Daejoyoung", a next-generation destroyer | | | Nov. 15 | 25th MCM (Military Committee Meeting) | | | Nov. 17 | 35th SCM (Security Consultative Meeting) | | | Dispatch of a National Assembly investigation team to Iraq for additional troop | | | | Nov. 18 | dispatch | | | Nov. 26 | ROK-Japan defense ministers talks (Defense Agency, Tokyo) | | | Dec. 3 | Commissioning of "Lee Sun-shin", the country's first 4,000 ton-class destroyer | | | Dec. 8 | MND holds SLIS of all Services. | | | Dec. 20 | Mass production of KO-1, a low-speed controller | | | Resolution by the cabinet meeting in favor of the "motion for additional dispatch | | | | Dec. 23 | of ROK Armed Forces units to Iraq" | | | Organization of the Korean Multi-Purpose Helicopter (KMH) development | | | | Jan. 10 | project team (Rationale for organization: Presidential Decree No. 18109) | | | Jan. 15~16 | 6th FOTA talks (Hawaii): Finalization of the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison | | | Organization of a planning team for the establishment of additional military units | | | | 2004 | Jan. 16 | to be dispatched to Iraq | | Feb. 5 | MND pushes for an AWACS program. | | | Passage of the "motion for additional dispatch of ROK Armed Forces units to | | | | Feb. 13 | Iraq" in the National Assembly plenary meeting | | | Year | Date | Major Details | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | Feb. 13~14 7th FOTA talks | | | | Feb. 16 | ROK sets up military attache's office in Iraq. | | | Feb. 17 | ROK-US Two plus Two meeting (63 Building in Yeoido) | | | Feb. 23 | Organization of the Zaytun Unit (Special Warfare Command training team) | | | Launch of the specialized flying object research center by the MND/Agency for | | | | Feb. 24 | Defense Development (Seoul National University) | | | Departure of the 3rd contingent of the Dasan Unit and the 5th contingent of the | | | | Feb. 27 | Dongeui Unit | | | Feb. 27~ | Defense Minister Cho Yung-kil tours three Middle East countries to explain the | | | Mar. 4 | purport of additional troop dispatch. | | | Mar. 3 | Return from Iraq to ROK by the field survey team | | | Mar. 4 | Announcement of overhaul of the defense affair and record management system | | | The Defense Security Command holds the first civilian hearing on modification of | | | | Mar. 5 | its defense affairs. | | | Meeting between ROK JCS Chairman Kim Jong-hwan and Vietnamese Chief of | | | | Mar. 8 | the General Staff Phung Quang Thanh | | | Mar. 15 | ROK sets up military attache's office in Kuwait. | | | The "ordinance on organizational reshuffle of the MND and entities under its | | | | Mar. 20 | control" (increase of 1 office, 2 bureaus and 3 divisions) enters into effect. | | | Apr. 9 | Departure of an on-site investigation team to Iraq | | | Apr. 14 | Shipment of the hulls of Apache helicopters for export | | | 2004 | MND announces the organization of the USFK base relocation | | | Apr. 18 | implementation team. | | | First return of the remains of an ROK POW | | | | Apr. 30 | ROK-US CFC announces creation of the USFK Patriot defense brigade. | | | May 6~7 | 8th FOTA talks (US Secretary of Defense) | | | Agency for Defense Development announces independent development of state- | | | | May 10 | of-the-art technology regarding "vertical launch" of guided missiles. | | | 1st development of a reagent for biological warfare agent analysis by the ROK | | | | May 18 | NBC Defense Command | | | May 26 | 1st round of the inter-Korean general-level military talks (Mt. Geumgang) | | | May 30 | Departure of a field survey team for troop dispatch | | | 2nd round of the inter-Korean general-level talks | | | | Jun. 3 | (Kenshington Star Hotel, Mt. Seorak) | | | Keynote speech by ROK Defense Minister, Cho Yung-kil, at the 3rd Asia Security | | | | Jun. 5 | Conference (4-6) | | | Jun. 7~8 | 9th FOTA talks (Seoul) | | | Jun. 10 | 1st working-level contact for inter-Korean general-level military talks (Gaeseong) | | | Signing of an agreement in the working-level contact for inter-Korean general- | | | | Jun. 12 | level military talks | | | Jun. 14 | First wireless communication between naval vessels of the South and the North | | | The ROK JCS holds the 1st Rose of Sharon meeting in 2004 | | | | Jun. 15 | (Korea Military Academy). | | | | Major Details | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------| | Year | Date | | | Jun. 18 | Finalization of additional dispatch of the Zaytun Unit to Iraq | | | 2nd working-level delegates contact for the inter-Korean general-level military | | | | Jun. 29 | talks (Paju) | | | Ceremony to pronounce the vision of defense transformation | | | | Jul. 1 | ("Robust Defense System for and by the Nation") | | | Chief working-level delegates contact for the inter-Korean general-level military | | | | Jul. 5 | talks (Gaeseong) | | | Jul. 14 | A North Korean patrol boat ship violates the NLL in the West Sea. | | | Jul. 22 | Agreement on USFK base adjustment at the 10th FOTA talks (Washington) | | | Yoon Kwang-ung assumes office as the 39th Minister of National Defense. | | | | Jul. 29 | The destroyer "Lee Sun-shin" successfully launches an SM-2 for the first time | | | (RIMPAC 2004). | | | | National Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung presides over SLIS of all Services. | | | | Aug. 11 | Revision of the "delegation and approval provisions (directive)" is announced. | | | The F-4D sets record of 70,000 accident-free flight hours for the first time in the world. | | | | Aug. 16 | A department dedicated to disaster management is set up. | | | 11th FOTA talks (Seoul) | | | | Aug. 19 | The 4th contingent of the Dasan Unit and 6th contingent of the Dongeui Unit are | | | Aug. 27 | dispatched. | | | Aug. 30 | A directive to review the introduction of civil control in stages by 2006 is issued. | | | Sept. 2 | Revised NLL operational rules are announced. | | | 2004 | Sept. 3 | "Environment-friendly construction guidelines" are formulated. | | The ROK government reaches a final decision to set up the "National Defense Acquisition | | | | Sept. 9 | Agency" headed by a deputy minister-level officer under the control of the MND. | | | The ROK JCS chairman makes the first regular report to the presidential office of | | | | Sept. 16 | Cheongwadae. | | | Extension of the timing of USFK reduction is discussed in the 12th FOTA talks. | | | | Sept. 21 | (Washington) | | | Sept. 22 | Zaytun Unit arrives in Irbil. | | | An event celebrating Armed Forces Day is held on the 56th anniversary of its | | | | Oct. 1 | establishment. (Gyeryongdae) | | | Oct. 6 | The USFK announces its downsizing in three stages by 2008. | | | The military authorities of the South and the North hold contact regarding | | | | Oct. 7 | construction of the makeshift roads of the Gyeongeui and Donghae Lines. | | | A ceremony to send off the "Daiman Unit" which will provide airlift support for the | | | | Oct. 11 | Zaytun Unit is held. (Seoul Airport) | | | Planned improvement of the military judicial system is announced. | | | | Oct. 20 | | | | Oct. | ROK and Thailand holds a meeting of the Joint Logistics Cooperation Committee. | | | (Seoul) | | | | 25~29 | | | | Oct. 26 | ROK and US sign the UA and IA. | | | Oct. 28 | Workshop on "anti-corruption campaign" is held. | | | Nov. 1 | ROK takes charge of security of the Panmunjom JSA. | | | Nov. 10 | ROK begins the construction of the first Korean Aegis destroyer (KDX-III). | | # Our Territorial Soil, Waters And Sky To Be Defended By The Rok Armed Forces ![327_image_0.png](327_image_0.png) ![328_image_0.png](328_image_0.png) The Ministry of National Defense The Republic of Korea 정책기획관실 # 기본정책과 도서임 ![328_Image_1.Png](328_Image_1.Png)