DEFENSE WHITE PAPER 2000 The Ministry of National Defense The Republic of Korea # Defense White Paper 2000 The Ministry of National Defense The Republic of Korea This English version of Defense White Paper 2000 has been translated by the Translating Team of the Department of English, Korea Military Academy (KMA) on behalf of the ROK Ministry of National Defense. For comments or questions, please contact KMA English Department or MND Defense Policy Division at: English Department KMA Phone: 82-2-2197-2538 /2531 / 2544 Website: www.kma.ac.kr E-mail: jslee@kma.ac.kr Defense Policy Division MND Phone: 82-2-748-6227 Website: www.mnd.go.kr E-mail: basicpol@mnd.go.kr # Message From The Minister Of National Defense ![3_Image_0.Png](3_Image_0.Png) The year 2000 was a very meaningful year for us in Korea. We celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Korean War, in which many brave native and foreign soldiers sacrificed their lives to safeguard democracy and freedom on Korean soil. Also, for the first time in 55 years, South and North Korea held a summit and issued the "June 15 Joint Declaration," which will serve as the framework for reconciliation, cooperation, and the removal of the Cold War structure from the Korean peninsula. Since the "June 15 Joint Declaration," many changes have taken place on the Korean peninsula. First of all, talks at the ministerial level initiated the process to bring separated families together. Second, South and North Korean athletes walked together in the opening procession at the Sydney Olympics and impressed the entire world that was viewing the event. Moreover, detailed plans are underway to foster additional exchanges and active cooperation between the two countries. Finally, South and North Korea are currently rebuilding the once-connected Seoul-Sinuiju Railway and Highway. Furthermore, during the "First Inter-Korea Defense Ministers' Talks" on "Cheju" Island, both sides agreed to uphold the spirit of the "June 15 Joint Declaration" and work towards reducing military tension and establishing lasting peace. In the future, we plan to engage in dialogues at the defense ministerial level on a regular basis and pursue military confidence building measures. Our ultimate goal is to bring an end to the Cold War regime on the peninsula. I believe that such exciting developments in South-North relations were made possible because of our military's firm readiness posture. As the two countries continue to improve their relationship, a support structure built on strong security will become more important. In other words, whatever changes may come in South-North relations and the security environment, we will not lose sight of our primary task of "protecting the lives and property of our people by repelling and retaliating against external aggression on our land, air, and sea." In short, we will always hold fast to what is the most basic and fundamental duty and mission of the military. Highly significant in shaping a defense policy is the need to recognize the "actual capability" of our counterparts rather than just their "stated intention." Hence, even with the recent positive changes in South-North relations, it must be noted that the reality of North Korea's threat, with its powerful military, still exists. We will make our utmost effort to ensure military readiness at all times. For the past year, the ROK Armed Forces have been pushing ahead with three key missions in order to foster advanced combat mission-oriented elite forces. The three key missions include "establishing a robust defense posture," "fostering advanced, elite forces," and "nurturing armed forces that are loved and trusted by the people." The ROK Armed Forces will work tirelessly to safeguard the nation's interests and the invaluable lives of its citizens, foster a technology- and information-oriented professional military for the new security threats in the future, and expand military cooperation with neighboring countries on the basis of a strong ROK-US alliance. Also, the ROK Forces will strive to initiate and implement defense reforms in order to increase efficiency and ensure openness in military management and operation. Recognizing that the wellspring of a nation's defense capability are the citizens themselves, the ROK military seeks to become an "Armed Forces of the People" that are loved and trusted by the public. This year's Defense White Paper illustrates the ROK Armed Forces' policies and visions of 2000. To acquire an enriched understanding and support of the people, the Ministry of National Defense enormously expanded the scale of public information on defense policies. This book contains a detailed analysis of the changes and challenges in the international security environment, defense policy and posture for peacekeeping, the current status and tasks of national defense, military reform for the 21st century, and national defense with the people. Furthermore, a wide range of materials and data have been collected and organized into an Appendix to enhance the readers' understanding and provide assistance in conducting research in security-related fields. I sincerely hope that Defense White Paper 2000 will play an important role in sharpening people's understanding of our military and in forming a broad consensus on our defense policy. I eagerly hope that this book will provide an opportunity for the ROK Armed Forces to receive international recognition for their many notable contributions to world peace. December 1, 2000 ![5_image_0.png](5_image_0.png) Cho, Seong-Tae ROK Minister of National Defense Part One Security Environment: Changes and Challenges Chapter One Global Security Situation = Security Situation Overview - New Threats and Challenges A. Diversified Security Concepts and Increased Transnational Threats -------- 20 B. Progress in Military Science and Expansion of New Threats ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21 C. Regional Disputes and Conflicts - - International Efforts for Peace A. Expansion of UN Roles and Functions - B. Reduction of Strategic and Conventional Weaponry C. Vitalizing Security Dialogues and Regional Security Cooperation Mechanisms - Chapter Two Security Situation in Northeast Asia -------- 27 - Cooperation and Conflict in Northeast Asia - - The Four Major Powers' Policies Toward Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula - - Defense Policies and Military Trends of Neighboring Major Powers ------ 30 | A. The United States | |------------------------| | B. Japan - | | C. China - | D. The Russian Federation ## Chapter Three North Korean Situation And Military Threat - 41 - Reality of North Korean Situation A. Domestic Situation B. North Korean Foreign Policy C. Policy Toward South Korea - - North Korean Military Policy and Strategy - North Korean Military Threat ⋅ A. War and Military Command Organizations B. Organization, Weaponry and Deployment of KPA C. Level of Strategic Weapons Development ။ Assessment of Recent Military Trends and Threats Part Two Defense Policy and Posture for Peacekeeping | · North Korea Policy | |----------------------------------------------------| | · National Defense Objectives and Policy Key Notes | | A. Defense Objectives | | B. Basic Concepts for Defense Improvement | | C. Keynotes of Defense Policy | ## Chapter One Basic Directions Of Defense Policy ୧୧ ![7_image_0.png](7_image_0.png) · National Goals and Security Policy · North Korea Policy ## Chapter Two Military Preparedness For War Deterrence 74 | 86 | |------| · Military Capabilities of the Three Services | A. Army | 74 | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|----| | B. Navy | 76 | | | C. Air Force | 77 | | | D. Reserve Forces | 78 | | | · Military Strength and Augmentation Capabilities of Allied Forces | 79 | | | A. United States Forces Korea | 79 | | | B. Augmentation Forces | 81 | | | · Response Posture of the ROK Armed Forces | 82 | | | A. Maintaining Early-Warning and Crisis-Management Systems | 83 | | | B. Peacetime Military Posture | .. | 84 | | C. Military Readiness Posture for War | anay nemandana manantan | 85 | 74 | A. Combined & Joint Training and Exercises | | |----------------------------------------------|----| | B. Major Exercises of the Three Services | .. | | 65 | |------| | 66 | | 68 | | 68 | | 69 | | 70 | 77 78 79 79 82 83 C. Military Readiness Posture for War | 98 | |------| anay nemandana manantan D. Civilian-Government-Military Integrated Defense Operation Posture | 101 | |-------| | · Arms Control on the Peninsula | |-----------------------------------| | A. Positions of the Two Koreas | E. Strengthening Mental Fighting Ability of Officers and Men 88 · Enhancement of Combat Task-Oriented Training and Exercises 80 89 аз ## Chapter Three Efforts To Ease Tensions And Build A Peace Regime On The Peninsula 97 Building a Peace Regime on the Peninsula વેકે A. Maintaining the Armistice Regime and the Panmunjom General Officer-Level Talks B. Building a Peace Regime Through Four-Party Talks C. South-North Summit Talks and Inter-Korean Defense · 100 Ministerial Talks D. Efforts to Solve Problems Concerning ROK POWs and MIAs -- 108 -- -- B. The Basis of Our Arms Control Policy -- C. Controlling North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction ------- 112 # Chapter Four Stability On The Peninsula And The Contribution Of External Military Policy For Global Peace - 114 ROK-US Alliance and Our Security ...................... 114 | A. Background and Significance of ROK-US Alliance | 115 | | |----------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------| | B. Progress of the ROK-US Security Consultative Body and | | | | Combined Defense System | .. | - 115 | | 117 | | | | C. Sharing USFK Stationing Costs - | | | | D. Efforts to Resolve Pending ROK-US Issues | 118 | | External Military Exchanges and Cooperation for Peninsular and Global Peace -- A. Progress in Military Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries ------- 119 B. Diversification of Military Exchanges and Cooperation ------- 124 ROK Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations ------- 126 A. Outline of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 126 B. Status of Participation in PKO C. Laying the Ground for UN PKO Participation --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 130 · Participation in International Security Cooperation and Arms Control Activities -- 131 A. Participation in Regional and Multilateral Security Cooperation | 131 | |-------| | 134 | |-------| Dialogue B. Participation in International Arms Control Activities ## Part Three Status And Tasks Of National Defense | 143 | |-------| ## Mid-Term Defense Program And Chapter One | = 2000 Defense Budget | |------------------------------| | A. General Accounts Budget - | ## Defense Budget · Mid-Term Defense Program - A. Characteristics of Mid-Term Defense Program ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 143 B. 2001 -2005 Mid-Term Defense Program - B. Special Accounts Budget 147 The Need for a Secure and Appropriate Defense Budget - 148 Chapter Two Force Improvement Programs for Advanced Weapon Systems = Policy Directions for Defense Acquisition 150 Improvements in the Defense Acquisition System 153 ![9_image_0.png](9_image_0.png) A. Public Disclosure of the Acquisition Process -------- 153 B. Clear Setting and Prior Notification of Decision Making Standards and Guidelines 153 C. Prevention of Exorbitant Payments/Budget Waste through Improvement in Cost Information Verifying Abilities 154 D. Promotion of Information Exchange between the Military and Arms Industry Participants 154 · Status of Force Improvement Programs A. Assessment of 1999 Force Improvement Programs B. Plans for 2000 Force Improvement Programs 155 155 156 · Strengthening the Basis for the Domestic Defense Industry A. Expanding Support for R&D of High-Tech Weapons Suited for the Korean Military B. Securing Competitiveness in the Defense Industry and Consolidating Its Foundation 159 159 162 ## Chapter Three Defense Digitization For The 21E Century 166 Directions for a Defense Digitization 166 - Establishment of a Command and Control System for Integrated Warfare A. Integrated Defense C4I System B. Joint and Combined C4I Systems C. Tactical C4I System of Each Service 167 | 167 | |-------| 168 168 Establishment of Resource Management System for Efficient Defense Administration A. Defense CALS and EC System B. Functional Resource Management System | 169 | |-------| | 169 | |-------| C. Implementation of Office Automation System 171 172 - Building the Base of an Information Technology System Allowing Real Time Information Processing 173 A. Laying the Foundation for the Defense Digitization Communication System 173 B. Ensuring Network Security for the Defense Digitization Communication Network Educating Enlisted Men for Digitization ------------ 175 ## Chapter Four Fostering Defense Manpower For Advanced Elite Force Operation - 177 Fostering and Managing Elite Manpower A. Efficient Manpower Operation B. Fostering Defense Specialists 177 178 C. Expanding the Role of Women in Arms ............ 178 ----- 180 · Education Improvement for Fostering Quality Manpower A. Education Reforms to Foster an Elite Combat Force "Winning through Preparation for the Fight" 180 181 B. Creation of the National Defense University C. Expanding Civilian-Military Education Exchanges --- 181 ## Chapter Five Stimulating Motivation And Creating A Milieu For Stable Military Service 183 183 · Guarantee of Job Stability for Military Professionals A. Improvements in the Salary System Reflecting Uniqueness of the Military 183 B. Increasing Support for House Purchases and Plans to Secure and Rebuild Military Residences C. Improvements in the Living Conditions of Military Families 184 185 - Extending Support to Veterans A. Reinforcing Job Guidance Training Before Retirement and Expanding the Scope of Re-employment 186 186 B. Increasing Benefits for Retirees on Par with Active Duty Officers C. Raising Reserve Force Funds through Profit-Seeking Initiatives 188 188 ## Chapter Six Establishing Mobilization Posture For Total War 190 - Establishment of Mobilization Posture for Wartime 190 A. Manpower Mobilization B. Material Mobilization 190 192 --- 195 · Enhancement of Homeland Defense Operational Capabilities A. Mobilization for Homeland Defense Operations B. Combat Service Support --- 195 196 - Management and Training of Reserve Troops A. Organizational Formation and Management of Reserves B. Education and Training 196 196 197 ## Defense Reform For The 21St Century Part Four Chapter One Directions of Defense Reform ------- 203 Goals and Key Points of Reform 203 Reform Efforts in Progress 204 ## Chapter Two Fruits Of Defense Reform ------- | 206 | |-------| | Pursuit of Transparent and Goal-Oriented Force Improvement | |--------------------------------------------------------------| | Development of Rational Personnel and Education Systems | 210 | |-------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | A. Personnel and Education Management Improvement | 210 | | B. Promoting Comprehensive Improvement for Noncommissioned | | | Officers (NCOs) | 212 | | · Defense Management Reform | 213 | | A. Laying the Groundwork for Defense Digitization | | | in Preparation for Future Warfare | 213 | | B. Establishing a Transparent and Competitive System for Materiel | | | Procurement | 214 | | C. Building an Effective Logistical Support System | 215 | | Judicial Reform of the Military | 215 | | Creation of New Culture in the Barracks | |-------------------------------------------| | 216 | |-------| | 219 | |-------| | 219 | | 220 | | 221 | |-------| | 222 | |-------| | 224 | |-------| | Continuing Mid- and Long-Term Defense Reform | |------------------------------------------------| | A. Continuous Restructuring of the Military | | B. Creation of New Culture in the Barracks | | 219 | |-------| | 209 | |-------| | 206 | |-------| · Restructuring the Military Programs Judicial Reform of the Military | 236 | |-------| | 236 | | 238 | | 239 | |-------| | Efforts to Protect the People's "Right to Know" | |---------------------------------------------------| | A. Information Disclosure and Civil Petitions | | B. Open Defense and Defense Publicity | amana masanan ani matangganan ## Chapter Three Future Defense Reform Plan Continuing Efforts for the Progress of Defense Digitization -------- Reforms in Defense Research & Development Military Reform in Preparation for Future Warfare ## Part Five National Defense With The People Chapter One Realizing The "National Defense With The People" 229 Institutional Improvement for Fulfillment of Sacred Military Service 229 A. Institutional Progress for Creating a Sound Military Service Culture 229 B. Innovation of Military Service Administration (MSA): Pursuit of "MSA Vision 21" 235 The Korean War and National Defense A. The Significance and Missions of the Korean War B. The 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration 239 240 Increased Civilian Specialist Participation in Defense Decision Making 246 A. Defense Policy Advisory Committee 246 B. Increased of Participation of Civilian Experts in Policymaking Processes 247 ## Chapter Two Public Benefits Enhancement And Rights Protection 249 | · Environmentally Friendly Military Management | 249 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | A. Laying the Foundation for the Military's Environmental | | | Management | 249 | | B. Prevention of Environmental Pollution at Milltary Posts | 252 | | C. Nature Conservation Activities | 254 | | D. Environment Restoration | 255 | | E. Management of Work Environment and Toxic Chemicals | 256 | | The Local Community and Military Facilities | 257 | | A. Settlement of Private Land Used by the Military | 257 | | B. Relocation of Military Facilities | 258 | | C. Revision and Deregulation of Military Facility Protection Areas | 258 | | · Support for Public | 260 | | A. Military Support for Public and National Projects | 260 | | B. Support Activities for Disasters and Accidents | 261 | | Appendix | 1 | Status of Global Conflicts in 1999 | 267 | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----| | Appendix | 2 | Nuclear Capabilities of Nuclear Powers | 268 | | | Appendix | 3 | Military Capabilities of Neighboring States | 269 | | | Appendix | 4 | Comparison of Economic Indices Between South and North Korea 271 | | | | Appendix | 5 | North Korean Military Expenditures by FY | 271 | | | Appendix | 6 | Comparison of South and North Korean Military Capabilities | 272 | | | Appendix | 7 | North Korea's Missile Development and Specifications | 273 | | | Appendix | 8 | Combined and Joint Training Exercises | assascinomic in consideration | 274 | | Appendix | 9 | Korean Armistice Agreement | 276 | | | Appendix 10 | Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and | | | | | Cooperation between the South and the North | | 291 | | | | Appendix 11 | Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementation of Chapter I, | | | | | Reconciliation, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression | | | | | | and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North | | 294 | | | ## Appendices ![13_image_0.png](13_image_0.png) | Appendix 12 | Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementation of Chapter II, | | | |---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----| | | Nonaggression, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression | | | | | and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North | | | | | 297 | | | | Appendix 13 | South-North Joint Declaration | 300 | | | Appendix 14 | The Joint Press Release from the First Round of the Talks between | | | | | the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Minister of | | | | | the People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People 's | | | | | Republic of Korea | .. | 301 | | Appendix 15 | Chronology of Major Events Related to North Korean Nuclear | | | | | | | | | | Issues | 302 | | | Appendix 16 | Major International Arms Control Treaty/Organization | -- | | | Appendix 17 | Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the | | | | | United States of America - | 312 | | | Appendix 18 | 31st ROK-US SCM Joint Communique - | | | | Appendix 19 | 32nd Republic of Korea-United States Security | | | | | Consultation Meeting Joint Communique | 317 | | | Appendix 20 | Chronicle of Major Foreign Military Exchanges and Cooperation -- | 320 | | | Appendix 21 | Participants in Multilateral Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific | | | | | Region | .. | 328 | | Appendix 22 | Status of MND Participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) 329 | | | | Appendix 23 | Current Peacekeeping Operations | 332 | | | Appendix 24 | Status of ROK Armed Forces' Participation in the PKO - | 333 | | | Appendix 25 | The Logbook of the Korean Evergreen Unit's Dispatch to East Timor 334 | | | | Appendix 26 | Government and Defense Budgets by FY | 336 | | | Appendix 27 | Year 2000 National Defense Budget by Category ------------ 337 | | | | Appendix 28 | Composition of MND Budget by FY- | | | | Appendix 29 | Defense Budgets of Major Military Powers --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 339 | | | | Appendix 30 | 2000 Force Integration Project of Major Military Equipment -- 340 | | | | Appendix 31 | Status of International Defense Industrial Agreements ---- 341 | | | | Appendix 32 | Status of International Weapons Imports and Exports (1994-1998) | 342 | | | Appendix 33 | Annual Investment in R&D - | 345 | | | Appendix 34 | Defense R&D Investments of Major Military Powers 346 | | | | Appendix 35 | Status of Dual-Use Technology Development Assignments -- 347 | | | | Appendix 36 | Status of Transferring Defense Science and Technology to Civil | | | | | Industries | -- | | | Appendix 37 | Defense Education and Training System --------------------------- 349 | | | | Appendix 38 | Status of ROK Armed Forces Digitization Training and Pursuit - 350 | | | | Appendix 39 | Organization of the ROK Ministry of National Defense and the | | | | | Current Number of Military Personnel | | | | Appendix 40 | Status of Nations that Participated in the Korean War 355 | | | Contents 14 | Appendix 41 | Casualties during the Korean War | --- 356 | |---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Appendix 42 | Comparison of Military Powers Between South and North Korea | | | | during the Korean War | 357 | | Appendix 43 | Comparison of Economy Indices Between South and North Korea | | | | around the Korean War | 357 | | Appendix 44 | Establishment Plans of Military Environmental Facilities ------ 358 | | | Appendix 45 | Classification of Military Owned Lands and Buildings ------- | 358 | | Appendix 46 | National Defense Committee of the National Assembly -------- | 359 | | Appendix 47 | Status of the Enactment and Revision of Defense-related Acts | 362 | | Appendix 48 | Reform of the Judicial System of ROK Armed Forces | 367 | | Appendix 49 | Major Deregulation List Concerning Civil Petition | 368 | | Appendix 50 | The Government's Administrative Projects in the Field of Defense 369 | | | Appendix 51 | Chronology of ROK National Defense | 372 | | Appendix 52 | Previous Defense White Papers | 382 | ## Tables & Figures | Table 1-1 | North Korean Ground Force Weaponry | 51 | | |-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------|----| | Table 1-2 | North Korean Vessels | | 53 | | Table 1-3 | North Korean Aircraft | દર્વ | | | Manpower/Equipment of the Army | 75 | | | | Table 2-1 | | | | | Table 2-2 | ROK Navy Manpower and Equipment | .. | 77 | | Air Force Manpower and Equipment | 78 | | | | Table 2-3 | PKO Participation Status of the ROK Armed Forces | 127 | | | Table 2-4 | | | | | Table 2-5 | ROK's Participation in the PKO Stand-by Arrangement System | 130 | | | Table 2-6 | PKO Education Abroad | 131 | | | Table 3-1 | Defense Budget in FY 2000 | 146 | | | Table 3-2 | Breakdown of 2000 FIPs Investment | 156 | | | Table 3-3 | Women Resources Management Plan | 179 | | | Table 3-4 | Re-employment Status of Military Veterans in 1999 | 186 | | | Table 3-5 | Standard Time Spans for Mobilization Attendance | 195 | | | Table 3-6 | Education and Training Hours for Reservists in 2000 | 200 | | | Table 4-1 | Goals of Each Phase of Defense Digitization | 213 | | | Table 5-1 | Draft Standards Based on Education and Physical Grade | 230 | | | Table 5-2 | Those Exempted from Military Service Regardless of Physical Grade | 230 | | | Number of Public Service Personnel by Field in 2000 | 233 | | | | Table 5-3 | Active Servicemen in "Designated Enterprises" in 2000 | 234 | | | Table 5-4 | Civil Petition Settlement | 238 | | | Table 5-5 | Military Owned Environmental Facilities and Equipment | 252 | | | Table 5-6 | Military Wastes and Disposal | | | | Table 5-7 | | | | | Table 5-8 | Soil Contamination Tests and Restoration Projects | | | | Table 5-9 | Settlement of Private Land Cases | | | ## Tables ![15_image_0.png](15_image_0.png) | Table 5-10 Relocation of Military Facilities | 258 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Table 5-11 Cancellation and Deregulation of Military Facility Protection Areas | 260 | | Table 5-12 Farmhand Support in 1999 | 260 | | Table 5-13 Disaster and Accident Support Records in 1999 | 264 | | Figure 1-1 | US Military Capabilities in Northeast Asia | 32 | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Figure 1-2 | Japan's Current SDF Capabilities | ਤੇਕ | | Figure 1-3 | China's Current Military Capabilities | 36 | | Figure 1-4 | Russia's Current Military Capabilities in the Far East | 39 | | Figure 1-5 | North Korea's Military Command System | 49 | | Figure 1-6 | Composition of Major Ground Force Combat Units | 50 | | Figure 2-1 | Defense Development Objectives | 70 | | Figure 2-2 | Organization of the ROK Army | 74 | | Figure 2-3 | Organization of the ROK Navy | 76 | | Figure 2-4 | Organization of the ROK Air Force | 78 | | Figure 2-5 | Organization of USFK | 79 | | Figure 2-6 | Number of USFK Troops Authorized | 80 | | Figure 2-7 | Organization of the Evergreen Unit | 128 | | Figure 3-1 | Allocation of 2001-2005 Defense Budget | 145 | | Figure 3-2 | Allocation of 2000 Defense Budget by Function | 147 | | Figure 3-3 | Proportion of Defense Outlays to GDP and Government Outlays | 149 | | Figure 3-4 | Allocation of 1999 FIPs Investment | 155 | | Figure 3-5 | Concept for Stages of Improvement | 160 | | Figure 3-6 | Integrated Defense C4I System Diagram | 168 | | Figure 3-7 | Defense CALS Objectives System Diagram | 170 | | Figure 3-8 | Defense Resource Management System Development Plan | 172 | | Figure 3-9 | Defense Digitization Communication Network System Diagram | 173 | | Figure 3-10 Employment of Veterans with More Than Ten Years of Military Service 187 | | | | Figure 3-11 Status of Reserve Forces | 197 | | | Figure 3-12 Period and Contents of Mobilization Training | 199 | | | Figure 4-1 | Kyeryongdae Service Support Group | 207 | | Figure 4-2 | Creation of National Defense University (NDU) | 208 | | Figure 5-1 | Reporting and Releasing Procedures of Military Service Records | 231 | | Figure 5-2 | Process of Information Disclosure | 237 | | Figure 5-3 | Composition Chart of the Government-Military Environmental | | | Consultative Committee | 251 | | Figures Part One Security Environment: Changes and Challenges Chapter One Global Security Situation Chapter Two Security Situation in Northeast Asia Chapter Three North Korean Situation and Military Threat # Chapter One Global Security Situation ## Security Situation Overview Since the end of the Cold War, the global security situation has shown two opposing trends. One is toward peace, sustained by an increase in cooperation and reconciliation, and the other toward insecurity caused by ongoing regional conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On December 3, 1989, the United States and the former Soviet Union made a joint declaration, calling for "an official end to the Cold War between the eastern and the western blocs and for a start of a new age of cooperation for lasting peace." Positive results ensued. The eastern Europeans and the Third World adopted democracy and opted for a free market system. Further, an increasing number of countries began to resort to non-violent means to resolve inter-state disputes. However, the problems that lay dormant during the Cold War have resurfaced and, along with many new ones, are emerging as the latest threats to global security. Foremost are the frequent communal disputes, be they racial, religious, ethnic, or territorial. The countries labeled "States of Concern" are a constant threat, as they refuse to cease production of WMDs such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In addition, problems on a transnational level, including environmental pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, and refugee issues are also on the rise. As the world's sole superpower, the United States is dealing with the security issues by way of bilateral alliances and collective security establishments like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The US is expected to remain the primary stabilizing force around the globe in the new millennium, despite challenges from Russia and China, who frequently express opposing views on some of the most controversial issues facing the international community. The new millennium will also witness the United Nations enlarge its sphere of activity, as it pushes for a speedy conclusion to several important negotiations to reduce strategic and conventional weapons. A strict enforcement of the terms of these negotiations is another key concern of the organization. At the grassroots level, the UN works for stability via peacekeeping operations, sending trained men and women to areas of conflict. ## New Threats And Challenges A. Diversified Security Concepts And Increased Transnational Threats Since the Cold War, the world's attention has turned to a new set of issues. First, the sources of contention around the globe have multiplied, with diminishing natural resources and a worsening environment added to the old problems of territorial, ethnic, and religious conflicts. Additionally, many countries now feverishly pursue self-interest and competitiveness, because they recognize that only such a course of action will ensure economic progress in an age of free commerce and rapid technological advancement. Accordingly, the traditional ideas of security revolving around politics and the military have become obsolete; governments must now seek to embrace non-military measures to ensure an active economy. In other words, politics and military affairs are no longer exclusively critical to national defense as trade, finance, information, welfare, technology, resources, environment, and culture have increased in importance. And as a logical consequence, problems in the economic sector, like recession and financial crises as well as the factors that weaken the economy, such as natural disasters, organized crime, drug-trafficking, environmental pollution, and illegal cyber activities pose as serious a threat as military tension. Affected in this process are not only the individuals but also nations as a whole, and ultimately the entire global community. ## B. Progress In Military Science And Expansion Of New Threats Technology has already become the determining factor in future warfare, ![19_image_0.png](19_image_0.png) and most countries are investing heavily in high-tech weaponry and the necessary operational systems. The traditional military powers predict cyber warfare and high-level C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) warfare as the new forms of fighting in the future. They are, furthermore, making every effort to enhance their information warfare capability by increasing their own intelligence activity of producing, gathering, and transporting information in cyberspace while neutralizing their enemy's ability to do the same. Receiving yet greater attention are long-range precision missile capability, C4ISR capability that allows commanding officers to evaluate battle situations on a real time basis, and eventually space warfare capability, all of which are critical to achieving military superiority. The same countries have involved themselves in another task; they are working to limit the uncontrolled production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, in addition to the WMDs and the missiles built to deliver these deadly weapons. Successful in their resistance, however, a few countries persist in the development and production of WMDs, making many worry about the future of global security. India and Pakistan, for example, competed with each other in conducting nuclear tests and mid- and long-range missile launches in May of 1998 and again in April of the following year. Moreover, the relentless pursuit of strengthened nuclear and mid- and long-range ballistic missile capability by North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and other socalled "States of Concern" has heightened tension in the international community. It is now obvious that many countries have the technology to develop missiles and nuclear weapons, and to make matters worse, the parts for these weapons are readily available on the black market. Chemical and biological weapons (CB) are another serious threat; they have the advantage of low production cost and can be easily made. At present, even criminal and terrorist organizations are suspected of having them. ## C. Regional Disputes And Conflicts Conflicts in different parts of the world today have no easy solutions, because a complex web of problems is intricately woven together. Consequently, the international community faces a difficult challenge, as it struggles to resolve these conflicts and prevent any new ones. Records for the last several months of 1999 show 83 regions under conflict (see Appendix 1), out of which 18 produced more than 1,000 casualties each. The year 2000 experienced some reduction, with 45 regions affected by blood-shedding strife, including the civil wars in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Europe suffered through 13 conflicts in 1999, and two involved armed clashes. Most arose in areas where the displacement of communism is underway. The former Yugoslavia is a case in point. Hostility among the numerous ethnic groups in the region, with their own religion and political antagonism manipulated behind the scenes by the international powerhouses, will continue with no clear end in sight. With NATO's armed intervention, the conflict in Kosovo grew to an international crisis. Russia, China, and the former Eastern blocs voiced their displeasure over the course of action taken by the United States and the western European countries. The tension began to subside, when the Serbians agreed to the "Kosovo Peace Plan" on June 10, 1999. In the following month, the western countries launched the "Stability Pact for Southeast Europe" yet another move toward long-term peace in the region. Ethnic issues are highly sensitive, however, and lasting solutions will require more than just a few signatures on a paper. Similarly, the former Soviet Union is struggling with a number of persistent ethnic problems. Besides the well-known Russia-Chechnya conflict, frequent local wars between Georgia and Abkhazia and the civil war in Tajikistan give ample evidence to the latent, yet powerful, hostility among the different ethnic groups. Asia's ethnic conflicts are somewhat distinctive in that they are closely related to colonialism, religious plurality, and independence movements. The civil wars in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan are prime examples. The success of East Timor had a profound effect on other separatist movements in ge of widespread internal anxiety. Moving northwest to India and kistan, conflict on a national scale can be observed, with the Kargil crisis of 1999 adding fuel to the fire. Although the two countries, in an effort to prevent armed provocation and to build trust, signed the "Li lation" a few months prior to the crisis, it proved to be short-lived. Ia's neighbor to the south, Sri Lanka has a problem of its own with he il separatists calling for independence. Apparently, neither country is e to a permanent solution. In addition, the Middle East currently has the world's attention, with Israel and Palesting unable to achieve a satisfac- tory settlement. Here, progress via offeet by radical protical protical protecther the the the of long range ballistic missiles. Africa does not fare any better. At present, 1/3 of the world's local wars (27 tolal) are being fought on this continent, and half of t experienced armed violence for quite some time, and Peru's dramaticaleakened rebel armies and few instances of riots or terrorism have ved inconsequential. An exception is Colombia, where drug lords with es to the leftists are at a violent standoff with the conservatives. egrettably, the conflict has produced many casualties and is deemed to be e most serious case on the two continents. # International Efforts For Peace ## A. Expansion Of Un Roles And Functions For almost half a century since its inception in 1945, the United Nations (UN) was constrained in its activity by the debilitating ideological standoff among its member countries. With the end of the Cold War, however, came consensus and cooperation. This strengthened the UN's position, which then began to exert greater influence on global politics, particularly in the area of security. The number and the scope of the UN's peacekeeping operations are increasing steadily. Some of the more notable of these operations include preventing disputes, creating an atmosphere conducive for peace negotiations, overseeing the execution of comprehensive agreements, ensuring the distribution of humanitarian aid, and enforcing the terms of the armistice agreements. The UN takes leadership in arms reduction, an issue of utmost concern in the international community. The primary concern at present is the unhindered production of WMDs and their sale across national boundaries. First of all, the UN was the key player in concluding such international treaties as the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) and in strengthening the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). These treaties were designed to limit the production of WMDs. Moreover, in order to monitor international transfers of these weapons, the organization took the critical step of putting several highly effective control mechanisms in place. The Wassenaar Agreement, the MTCR, and many others impose severe restrictions on all traffic involving parts, technology, and information directly or indirectly related to the production of WMDs. However, recent UN activities, have been halted due to major complications in the reform of the Security Council and severe financial constraints. The US and other developed nations, on the one hand, are attempting to alleviate their burden of the UN payments via financial reform. On the other hand, Japan and Germany are seeking recognition commensurate with their monetary contribution to the organization by demanding a permanent seat on the Security Council. Support from other members is not entirely absent, as many have voiced a similar opinion on the need to reorganize and expand the Security Council. However, the thorny issue of veto rights and the size of the Council remains, with little hope of being settled any time soon. ## B. Reduction Of Strategic And Conventional Weaponry The United States and Russia concluded two treatises, START I and START II, to reduce strategic and conventional armaments. NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) signed a treaty, known as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), for the same purpose. Concluded in July 1991, START I became effective in 1994. The terms of this agreement have been successfully carried out thus far. Both the United States and Russia are optimistic in their push to reduce the number of strategic nuclear missiles to 1,600 and nuclear warheads to 6,000. The second treaty, START II, was ratified by the Russian Duma on April 19, 2000, and the two countries are well on their way to their target numbers: nuclear warheads down to the 3,000-3,500 range and the complete destruction of the entire stock of the multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles. Currently, aiming at the reduction range of 1,500-2,500 for nuclear warheads, the two superpowers are hammering out a third agreement, appropriately called START III. Since the sixteen members of NATO and the fourteen of the former WTO agreed to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (effective July 1992), a steady reduction in conventional arms followed in Europe. In November of 1999, a summit meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was held, at which time the members decided that the right of retention of the conventional arms will be transferred from NATO and WTO to individual countries. Further, progress has come in Central Europe, where the military is reducing by 10% their inventory of tanks, fighter planes, artillery, and other conventional weapons and is now planning to close down two of the four Russian bases, with plans to send the troops and their weaponry back home by the middle of 2001. ## C. Vitalizing Security Dialogues And Regional Security Cooperation Mechanisms Regional cooperation systems and regular dialogues among countries with mutual interest in security will produce positive results in building confidence in diplomatic and military relations and in regional stability. Russia and the US are setting good examples with their frequent talks and the hotline connecting their two defense ministries. As a result, trust between them has strengthened, reducing much global tension. In the Asia-Pacific region, where the interests of the major global powers intersect, bilateral security talks play an especially important role. A present pressing need is to pursue these talks with greater fervor, since China's expansionist tendency on the one hand and US-Japan's new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation on the other are raising the level of anxiety of all those affected. Moreover, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, and Japan are in the process of setting up the "Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Consultative Body" that can foster stability in the region. Though North Korea's lukewarm response has delayed this process thus far, its highly symbolic gesture of joining the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July of 2000 renewed hopes of the member countries. The ARF can now move forward with what it has been doing so successfully-building confidence and encouraging preventative diplomacy-as the unique government-level security mechanism since its inception in 1994. Many more systems are operating around the world to solve the problems distinctive to their region. # Chapter Two Security Situation In Northeast A ## Cooperation And Conflict In Northeast Asia Northeast Asian countries share a common understanding: 1 US and China now especially emerges as the key variable in the Northeast Asian affairs. Problems in the past, such as the bombing of the Chinese embassy by NATO fighter planes and the US House Representative's Cox Report, which raised suspicions of China's direct involvement in the stolen plans of highly confidential nuclear bombs and missiles, have aggravated their relationship. Furthermore, the US is pushing through the Congress a bill called the "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act," over which China has expressed extreme displeasure. However, positive efforts have not been neglected as the bilateral agreement to secure China's eventual entrance into the World Trade Organization was recently signed and as renewed military exchanges began to reduce the built-up tension. China also found some common ground with Japan. Both recognize the priority of economic progress and regional security and the symbolic significance of China's membership in the WTO. Progress, however, is offset by a serious territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and by the highly intense tug-of-war for political influence in the region. Russia generally maintains an agreeable relationship with China, as both sides concur on the need for force reduction and to build confidence in their border region, contributing much to stability in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, Russia's relations with Japan since the end of the Cold War has evolved into one of a strategically mapped out quid pro quo cooperative system. A good example is the way both are approaching the problem of the Kurile Islands (Japan's "Northern Territories" ). A schematic design of economic exchanges, based on the Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan, is in place, along with a diplomatic agreement, to ensure a peaceful resolution. As is obvious from the previous discussions, the mood in Northeast Asia is upbeat, with clear signs of open cooperation for regional progress. But also as noted above, numerous elements of conflict remain to threaten this progress. Just one example is the latest revelation that, despite signs of reform, open policy, and all-around diplomacy, North Korea remains a threat because of the unresolved problems of nuclear and ballistic missiles. Fortunately, the Inter-Korea summit in June of 2000, the first of its kind in 55 years, produced much hoped-for results, with increased exchanges and cooperation. The world community promises to keep a watchful eye on this development between the two nations. # S' Polici ![27_Image_0.Png](27_Image_0.Png) Nd The Korean Peninsula The United States, Japan, China, and Russia constitut pas bilation on the Korean per instal per instal per manis milion in provinsi Archevan Aram of poling in ministration in marto Marce an Korean of poliny in minimes more in its historical offenses and large-scale military development it ina aktera threat. It is attempting to deal with this through the US-Japan secury sys tem and by advancing int exchanges. Agreeing with the US that peace and stability on the Ke read of the US that peace Tanantextends unres central to Xortheast Asian Peace, Inpan sxiends untrseersed anport for nealt the US, Xollery Prisenters Mores and, with Be assagaron of mort for and the US, Xonburprisings th the heels of its recent economic progress, China is investing heavily to modernize the military, expecting to further raise its status as a global superpower. Moreover, China acknowledges the geopolitical significance of the Korean peninsula and hence considers the two Koreas as objects of key foreign policies. Most significant here is China's implementation of an "equidistant policy." To elaborate, China strives to strike a balance between South and North Korea, maintaining strong economic ties and improving political and military relations with the South on the one hand and giving monetary aid and holding onto the traditional alliance with the North on the other. On the issue of unification, China is a firm supporter of a peaceful resolution through direct dialogues and negotiations between the two governments on the peninsula. Not to be ignored in this discussion is Russia, who has correctly estimated the strategic significance of the Asia-Pacific by giving it greater attention than before. Russia now works diligently to defuse tension and to strengthen its strategic partnership with China, while improving relations with the countries in this part of the globe. Moreover, as countermeasures to the United States' National Missile Defense (NMD) plan and the potential monopoly of influence over the international and regional disputes, Russia has set up a reliable system of mutual cooperation with China and is pushing to hold six-party talks by adding itself and Japan to the existing 4-party conference on the security issue on the peninsula. In terms of the Korean peninsula, Russia's basic position is that, though it is not unwilling to lend support when necessary, South and North Korea should work out the details for a peaceful unification on their own. ## Defense Policies And Military Trends Of Neighboring Major Powers A. The United States 1. Defense Policy The four cornerstones of the US defense policy are maintaining global peace, creating an environment of international security favorable to its national interests, responding to various threats, and preparing for the uncertainties of the future. Northeast Asia is the region where the global superpowers, including the US, have concentrated the greatest amount of their military forces, forces that work closely together and keep a certain distance at the same time. The region also experiences continual uneasiness due to North Korea' s nuclear missiles and the troubles between Taiwan and China. The United States' defense policy underscores the reduction of tension and deterrence of war on the Korean peninsula on the basis of bilateral alliances with Korea and Japan. It is particularly concerned about the North's ballistic missile capability and considers it as the single greatest threat to security in Northeast Asia. The Theater Missile Defense (TMD) plan had already begun to be drawn up with Japan in 1999 as an antidote to protect the US forces in the area and their allies from this threat. Judging from the fact that Pyongyang will increase the range of its ballistic missiles as far as the American continent, the US is beginning to build an NMD system to defend its territory. However, the pace was slowed down by President Clinton's announcement on September 1, 2000, postponing the deployment of the NMD weaponry until the completion of all the necessary tests. He, in effect, handed the responsibility for NMD over to his successor. Russia, China, and the European Union welcomed Clinton' s decision, and experts agree that it will help induce North Korea to give up production of the missiles. ## 2. Military Trend ![29_Image_0.Png](29_Image_0.Png) The United States forces in Northeast Asia are committed to the defense of its two allies, Korea and Japan and to securing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Pacific Ocean. Convinced of importance of Northeast USS Kittyhawk aircraft carrier battle gro Asian security, the United States government selected the US Pacific Command to take the lead in developing new operational concepts based on rapid reaction forces and deployed the USS Kittyhawk aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG) from the Seventh Fleet to the region. The transfer of the Kittyhawk CVBG to the Persian Gulf in support of the airstrikes in Serbia in early 1999 raised serious doubts as to feasibility of the "Win-Win Strategy." The US responded quickly by ordering a readiness alert of all the forces on the mainland US and by deploying additional forces to the Korean peninsula to fill the vacancy left by the departure of the Kittyhawk. Clearly, the US was determined to show its commitment to the strategy that was designed to ensure victories in these two major theaters. In addition, rapid developments in the international security environment are expected in the near future. To prepare, the US overhauled its inventory of strategies and tactics. First of all, with the lessons learned in such small-scale contingencies (SSC) as in Bosnia and Kosovo, the military will seek to speed up troop transport. Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff unveiled its new long-term plan for force enhancement called, "Joint Vision 2020." It seeks to secure an absolute superiority in military and all other areas by applying the following four concepts of battlefield management: dominant maneuver, precision-guided warfare, focused logistics, and fulldimensional protection. The same plan recognizes the necessity of constant innovations in military intelligence and makes provisions for enhanced information operations and sustained combined operations with allies for Figure 1-1 US Military Capabilities in Northeast Asia ![30_image_0.png](30_image_0.png) Source: The Military Balance 1999-2000 (London: IISS, October 1999) more efficient implementation of the strategies ## B. Japan 1. Defense Policy Japan outlines the main points of its defense policy as adherence to the US-Japan security system, maintenance of sufficient forces for national defense, and continuance of diplomacy for global peace and security. Plans for augmentation of forces to attain these primary aims have been laid out in what is known as the "New National Defense Program Outline," drawn up in November, 1995. In April of the following year, the two countries issued the "US-Japan Security Joint Declaration" that redefined the terms of their alliance and confirmed this alliance as the basis of Japan's national security for the 21st century. Revised in September, 1997, the "New Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation" was followed up by the enactment of a series of laws, brought together under the "Emergency Law on Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan," drawn up in May of 1999. This delineates the steps Japan will take in the event of armed attack or visible threats to its peace and security. Japan also revised many other related laws, showing its willingness to follow through on the US-Japan' s security agreements. Moreover, aware that its new security plans with the US and consolidation of national forces increase anxiety in Northeast Asia, particularly from Russia, China, and Korea, Japan saw the need to continue the policy of conciliation and confidence-building through sustained military diplomacy. Japan backed off from its hard-line stance against North Korea's August 1998 test-fire of long-range missiles. At the time, Japan responded with a suspension of food aid and charter air transportation. In 1999, after the successful US-North Korea Missile Conference, Japan lifted most of its sanctions against North Korea, and further steps to normalize diplomatic relations with the North have been taken since the South-North Korea summit in 2000. ## 2. Military Trend Japan's basic plan for national defense hinges on the US-Japan security guarantee system. In peacetime, Japan will work closely with the United States to help the peacekeeping efforts of the UN and to build trust with the surrounding countries via security dialogue and other forms of exchange. However, in time of crisis, Japan will rely on the US-Japan combined strategy and mutual cooperative plan to manage the situation. To prepare for such a course of action, Japan is in the process of revising and refining its laws governing military action. Since the first release of the "National Defense Program Outline" in 1976, Japan has followed a fiveyear cycle of drawing up a "Mid-term Defense Program" and implementing it to strengthen military power. The "2001-2005 Mid-term Defense Program" will seek to activate the Airborne Warning and Control Japan's Aegis Destroyer Figure 1-2 Japan's Current SDF Capabilities ![32_image_0.png](32_image_0.png) Source: The Military Balance 1999- 2000 (London: IISS, October 1999). System (AWACS), introduce aerial refueling tankers, and construct long- ![33_image_0.png](33_image_0.png) range jumbo cargo transport planes and cargo transport ships. This bold new program is drawing much attention from neighboring countries. Searching for ways to raise the quality of the three branches of its military, Japan's Self-Defense Force (SDF) began to reorganize the units of the Ground SDF, enhance the mobility of the Maritime SDF, and supply new fighters for the Air SDF. The SDF then moved on to streamlining its administration, increasing the efficiency of its personnel, and eliminating bureaucracy. In short, the SDF strove to maintain the present structure in top shape while keeping up with the changes of the times. Also, since the test-fire of missiles from North Korea and the appearance of a suspicious fishing boat (March 1999), Japan has acquired several missile-carrier vessels, followed by formations of new patrol helicopter units and a special patrol unit to boost defense readiness against North Korea. Still in the works is the creation of a counter-insurgency unit, the acquisition of four reconnaissance satellites by 2002, and the enhancement of defense capabilities against biological and nuclear attack. These are a part of a larger effort to secure an autonomous intelligence activity and operational defense posture. Wanting to gain a status commensurate to its economic achievements in the global community, Japan sent several medical teams from the Ground SDF to participate in the rescue operations in Honduras when it was devastated by a hurricane in 1998. In 1999, Japan sent cargo transport planes for the refugees in East Timor. Japan has no plans to withdraw its endorsement of the UN-sponsored missions for peacekeeping and will encourage the Ground SDF to seek new outlets of service. ## C. China 1. Defense Policy With a defense-oriented policy, the Chinese military promises not to initiate war on another nation. However, when provoked, it will not hesitate to retaliate, a sign that the policy is an aggressive one. Moreover, China is seeking a policy of "conversion from quantity to quality" in order to modernize its military and to ensure readiness for local conflicts, which are to be fought by high-tech weapons. A substantial amount of the defense budget is now set aside for the Navy, Air Force, and the development of strategic missiles. When Japan and the US planned to include Taiwan in the TMD program, Beijing voiced strong opposition because it saw the move as a threat to China's sovereignty and to its unification efforts with Taiwan. ## 2. Military Trend In March 2000, the third plenary session of the Ninth National People's Congress passed the year's defense budget of approximately US $14.6 billion. This marks a 12.7% increase from the previous year. For 12 consecutive years since 1989, the military has benefited from an annual increase of 10%, or more. With the new budget, the defense ministry plans to initiate new programs to modernize the Army, Navy, and Air Force. First, the Army will improve maneuverability and firepower by increasing the number of multiple rocket launchers (MRL), purchasing the latest-model tanks, and creating new division-level units of attack helicopters. To better handle the SSCs, it is experimenting with a new rapid-reaction unit and a rapid-deployment unit. The Navy is not too far behind with the addition of a 7000-ton ![34_image_0.png](34_image_0.png) Figure 1-3 China's Current Military Capabilities Souvremenny-class ![35_image_0.png](35_image_0.png) destroyer and Kiloclass submarines, boosting its combat capabilities on and under the sea. The introduction of SU- 27/30 aircraft from Russia, along with technology transfer and licensed production, has sharpened the Air Force's ability to fight, and it is now pursuing the introduction of an early warning system. In its overall plan, China wants to improve its nuclear and missile technology and invests heavily in the research on electronics warfare. This shows that the Chinese military is very interested in strategic weapons and cyber warfare. Moreover, the military succeeded in reducing its forces by 500,000 at the end of 1999 and reorganized the present strength of 2.5 million soldiers. On October 1, 1999, a military parade to mark the 50th anniversary of the government showed off China's own DF-31 ICBMs, T-90 II tanks, FBC-1 fighterbombers for sea operations, and aerial refuelers rebuilt from H-6 bombers. ## D. The Russian Federation 1. Defense Policy Russia's key concern in security policy is the stability of the countries that belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). According to the "New Concepts in National Security" unveiled in January of 2000, the possibility of a large-scale war is said to be small while the frequency of local conflicts is on the rise. Further, the "New Policy in Diplomacy" of July, 2000 noted that Russia is taking the United States' drive to construct a new world order in its own way as a serious threat and challenge. Several months earlier on April 21, 2000, the Russian government issued the "New Military Doctrine" to underscore its willingness to resort to nuclear weapons when the security of it and its allied nations is in jeopardy. It also advocates strong measures to resolve any local wars. In other words, the doctrine promotes an offensive strategy and was issued as a presidential order. During the Kosovo war, Russia opposed the NATO air strikes on Serbia. After the war, the Russian government participated in the UN peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, resolving to intervene where its national interests are at stake. When NATO proceeded eastward even after three eastern European countries joined the organization as members, Russia put up a strong resistance. A similar reaction was shown to the development of NMD that is spearheaded by the US. To check the growth of the United States' unrivaled influence on the effort to build a viable world order, Russia reconfirmed its partnership with China and signed the "Military and Technology Cooperation Agreement" with India. Clearly, Russia is taking pains to reestablish itself as a superpower and regain the respect it once commanded. ## 2. Military Trend Russia will build its military strength and reorganize the three branches and their administrative hierarchy, according to the reforms mandated in the "Concepts for National Policy on Military Reform by 2005" (August 1998) and the "Reform Code of the Russian Military" (December 1998), put forward by the NSC in November, 2000. To be more specific, a move to downsize the forces to 850,000 by 2005 will be sustained, along with a reduction of the current seven military districts to six. Russia will, in addition, convert the four service system (Army, Strategic, Navy, and Air Force) into a three service system (Army, Navy, and Air Force). Finally, the reform includes plans for maintaining and further developing nuclear deter- Russia's TU-160 Bomber ![36_image_0.png](36_image_0.png) ![37_image_1.png](37_image_1.png) Figure 1-4 Russia's Current Military Capabilities in the Far East ![37_image_0.png](37_image_0.png) Source: The Military Balance 1999 -2000 (London: IISS, October 1999). rence. Despite severe financial constraints, Russia shows no reservation in investing in the costly development of high-tech weaponry. With plans to increase the export of these weapons, Russia created a new position of deputy prime minister for military commerce and a "Committee for Transnational Cooperation on Military Technology." This government-level support brought much needed relief to the defense budget, with an estimated increase from US $3.5 billion in 1999 to US $4.3 billion in 2000. The most eager customers are China, the Middle East, and many countries in Asia. To prepare for the loss of the buffer zone due to an expanding NATO as well as against such threats as the airstrikes on Serbia, in 1999 Russia conducted the largest military exercise in its history, called "West-99," intended to shore up readiness against a potential "Invasion from the West." The same year saw President Putin, then a Prime Minister, pay a visit to the Pacific Fleet Command to reiterate the significance of the Far East Fleet. The deputy prime minister at that time was Ilya Klebanov, and he drew up a plan to improve the Navy. As a direct result, massive efforts to modernize the Navy are under way to reverse the trend of deterioration over the past ten years. Improvements in strategic weapons can also be witnessed, notably in their quality. Even though their total number have decreased, such developments as the TOPOL-M missile, touted as a next generation armament, has increased the effectiveness of the military. It was deployed for use in combat in December of 1998. Another valuable addition was the TU- 95/160, a strategic bomber brought in from the Ukraine. # Chapter Three North Korean Situation And Military Threat Refurbishing its legal systems and institutions through a constitutional revision completed in September 1998, North Korea formed a committee of core members around National Defense Committee Chairman Kim Jong-il and other key military figures. This group is responsible for both domestic and foreign policies. On January 1, 2000, a joint editorial of the party, military, and youth newspapers (title: "Let us brighten this year that marks the 55th anniversary of our party with victories like a prime stallion running through a flame." ) emphasized the principles of ideology, the military, and science and technology as the three pillars of a great and powerful state. Thus, the government will seek to construct socialism around the Korean People's Army, with a heightened focus on economic recovery. North Korea recognizes the current economic crisis as the greatest obstacle to its vision of a socialist state and national security and is prepared to concentrate all national energies on the economy. Moreover, the ROK's policy of reconciliation and cooperation had proved successful as its counterpart in the North agreed to a summit in Pyongyang held from June 13-15, 2000. Recently, North Korea began pushing itself onto the international stage by a multidirectional and pragmatic form of diplomacy with the Western world. Despite the newly emerging atmosphere of reconciliation on the peninsula and positive diplomatic movements, it is too early to conclude that the North Korean military has given up on its longstanding strategy of communizing the South nor has fully given over to an open-door policy with the outside world. The best assessment is that this is only the beginning phase. North Korea, in comparison, boasts a military strength twice that of ours and is reported to have increased the level of military exercises since the clash off the shores of Yonpyong Islands in June of 1999. It continues to improve its forces with new productions of long-distance artillery, import of fighters and helicopters, and construction of small submarines. In addition, the army is building underground sites for missiles and consistently raising its level of combat readiness, all the while intensifying ideological indoctrination. Therefore, even after the South-North summit, no substantial changes to internal military activity are visible except for the cessation of the disparaging broadcasts at the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and other minor concessions. ## Reality Of North Korean Situation A. Domestic Situation North Korea held the third session of the tenth Supreme People's Assembly from April 4 to 6, 2000 and passed the budget and important bills, reviving the legislative functions in the process. The role of the party was emphasized through the joint editorial of the new millennium and other outlets of the media on the occasion of the party's 55th anniversary. Pyongyang is at the same time searching for ways to normalize the government's administrative system and party functions. The 60th birthday of the National Defense Committee Chairman, Kim Jong-il, will be celebrated in 2002 as the "Year of Economic Normalization," and through "The Second Chonlima All-Out Rushing Campaign" and others like it, the government will seek economic recovery. By increasing onsite visits to areas related to the economy, solidifying the laws on the economy, restructuring factories and companies, clarifying land distribution on a national level, and building new mid to small scale electric powerhouses, Chairman Kim Jong-il is seeking to break out of the economic crisis. Although these national efforts, supported by the international community and joint economic ventures with the South, are helping North Korea rise from the lowest point of its economic decline in 1999, limited resources, obsolete social facilities, and other problems desperately call for continuous foreign support for its economic growth. With the boost of its national image in the global community since the South-North Korea summit, Pyongyang is sprinting toward securing economic support and actively extending itself to draw foreign investment by coalescing the basic industry with the light industry and by other forms of improvement. However, since a bold open policy and economic reform of the market is needed for the normal development of North Korea's economy, without sweeping changes at a fundamental level, hope for economic recovery in North Korea is dim. Additionally, the factors causing widespread anxiety follow on the heels of economic depression and will remain for the time being. In order to strengthen its grip on the people to overcome their unrealistic expectations for unification and fantasies about capitalism following the South-North Korea summit, Pyongyang conducted a nationwide propaganda campaign to magnify the role of Kim Jong-il in the unification process and his leadership as the Chairman of the National Defense Committee. The government put its citizens through a more rigorous ideological indoctrination than before and is frantically searching for measures to mitigate their internal shock. ## B. North Korean Foreign Policy The current direction of North Korean foreign policy can be summarized into regime survival and external economic support. Pyongyang is conducting multifaceted diplomacy with the international community to stay on this course. To find solutions to its economic problems and maintain the communist order in the post Cold War era, Pyongyang is using brinkmanship tactics in various negotiations by taking advantage of its accumulated nuclear weapons, missiles, and WMD development. The diplomatic efforts thus far can be summarized as a policy to protect the present political system and secure economic aid via direct negotiations with the United States. In other words, North Korea used creation-of-crisis tactics to safeguard its political structure and ensure economic aid and in turn tried to bring about a package settlement to the numerous pending problems by means of negotiations designed to solve these very crisis of its own creation. Although successful in securing the US-North Korea Geneva Agreed Framework, economic aid, and other forms of diplomatic gains, Pyongyang, it appears, is acutely aware that such tactics have failed miserably in solving its main economic problem-structural inefficiency. Consequently, accepting the limited influence such brinkmanship tactics have on overcoming economic challenges, the government has recently shown signs of altering its foreign diplomatic policies. It is beginning to realize that the restoration of confidence by improving its international image and the expansion of diplomatic relations are more advantageous to securing solid economic cooperation and support than the brinkmanship tactics. Pyongyang held working-level talks with the United States in Berlin in September, 1999. As a result, the US offered a partial lifting of its economic sanctions against North Korea, who in return agreed to a moratorium on the test firing of its missiles. Up until November, 2000, the two countries engaged in six more working-level talks and two missile conferences, discussing issues of WMDs, lifting of economic sanctions, improving relations, and other comprehensive and pending problems. On June 19, 2000, the US announced that it would ease economic restrictions against North Korea. Two days later, Pyongyang responded with a communique by the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it would continue the suspension of missile test-fires. The First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Committee, Cho Myung-rok, reconfirmed the announcement on October 12. Six days earlier, the two sides issued a joint statement revealing that both are working to remove North Korea's designation as a terrorist nation. From October 9-12, the First Vice Chairman visited the United States for top-level talks to resolve longstanding issues between the two countries. Pyongyang-Tokyo relations took a quick turn for the worse after the North Korean test-fire of Daepodong-1 missile on August 31, 1998, but unofficial, civilian-level exchanges continued. By April, 2000 and after two preparatory meetings, the two countries resumed regular talks to normalize diplomatic relations. Additionally, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July, 2000, the two sides held the first ever meeting at the foreign ministers' level and agreed to continue friendly negotiations in the future. As a result, the following months, August and October, saw two conferences aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations. Since the normalization of ROK-China relations in 1992, North Korea's ![43_image_0.png](43_image_0.png) ![43_image_1.png](43_image_1.png) relationship with China has cooled somewhat. The two countries are, however, exerting concerted efforts, in the form of active diplomatic exchanges, to restore their traditional friendship. For example, the Chairmán of the National Defense Committee, Kim Jong-il, made an unprecedented visit to the Chinese Embassy in North Korea in March, 2000. A couple of months later, the Chairman made a sudden visit to China to discuss the then upcoming summit with South Korea and the issue of economic support. To return the favor, China's minister of defense, Chi Haotian came to North Korea for the ceremony marking the 50th anniversary of China's participation in the Korean War. At present, both sides are increasing the number of reciprocal visits by top-level officials. As a follow-up to the "New Friendship and Cooperation Treaty" with ## · North Korea-Russia Fraternity, Amity, And Cooperation Treaty North Korea-Russia Fraternity, Amity, and Cooperation Treaty following the denunciation of the "Treaty of DPRK-Soviet Fraternal Relations, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" (July, 1961), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia visited North Korea and officially concluded a new treaty between the two countries on February 9, 2000. The main points of the new treaty are as follows: · "Treaty of DPRK-Soviet Fraternity, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" is renamed, "North Korea-Russia Treaty of Fraternity, Amity, and Cooperation." This change signifies that the relationship between the two countries is one of bilateral cooperation; one side is no longer the provider of assistance and the other, the recipient. · The clause, "immediate military intervention and provision of assistance and resources in case of armed attack on any side of the treaty powers" is changed to "immediate mutual intervention in case of armed attack on any side of the treaty powers." - The treaty specifies the terms of cooperation between the two countries by expanding the articles of the treaty from six to twelve. Russia in February, 2000, Pyongyang received President Putin for a summit meeting in July. It is evident that North Korea is serious about restoring their former relationship of friendly cooperation. In addition, North Korea is searching for ways to expand friendly relations with the Western countries while maintaining goodwill relations of cooperation with the Third World and non-allied nations. Moreover, North Korea applied for membership in ARF in July, 2000 and began bolstering its diplomatic activities with numerous multilateral security consultative organizations and other international organizations. ## C. Policy Toward South Korea In line with the terms of the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration" issued at the historic meeting between South and North Korea in June, 2000, Pyongyang showed some changes in its attitude toward South Korea. However, its prime agenda, including the hard-line policy of communizing the South, has not been abandoned. Even with a marked increase in the joint commercial ventures at the civilian level-the Mt. Kumgang Project for example-the North Korean military continued to create a tense atmosphere by its Northern Limit Line (NLL) Nullification Declaration (September 1999) and the Declaration of Order of Navigation around Five South Korean Islands on the West Sea (March 2000). But over time, the North gained a favorable view of the ROK government's consistent policy of reconciliation and cooperation. In the early months of 2000, its desperate need to revive the economy and improve international relations had pushed Pyongyang to abandon hostility to future dialogues with the South. Since the June summit, North Korea has taken visible steps to improve the South-North Korea relations, ceasing its derogatory broadcasts at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and sending the fishing boat that drifted past the NLL back safely across the line. Other concessions included the exchange of visits by separated families, inter-ministerial talks, along with the defense ministers' talks, and invitations to Seoul's media executives. However, North Korea continues to promote its plans to draw up a united front strategy and insists that the ROK government abolish its National Security Law and dissolve the United Nations Command (UNC) on the ![45_image_0.png](45_image_0.png) peninsula. Hence, a major turning point in the relationship between the two cannot be reached until Pyongyang takes strong measures to ensure the success of the South-North Joint Military Committee and to reduce military tension. Another indispensable item is for Pyongyang's policymakers to renounce their goal of communizing the entire peninsula, a policy enunciated in the preamble of the North Korean Worker's Party Regulations. ## North Korean Military Policy And Strategy North Korea failed to meet the expectations of the ROK government when it refused to overhaul its military philosophy following the summit in June. The essence of the party regulations- "the communization of the entire Korean peninsula" –has been kept intact, as the following excerpt will show: Excerpt from the Chosun Rodongdang (North Korean Workers' Party) Regulations: The immediate goal of the Chosun Rodongdang is achieving the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of the republic, thereby successfully accomplishing its nation-wide revolutionary mission of liberating the Korean people and establishing people's democracy. The ultimate goal of the party is to spread "Juche Thought" and construct a communist society. After decades of thorough preparation based on the "Four-Point Military Guideline," adopted in 1962, Pyongyang has publicly stated on numerous occasions that the country is ready for another war. The constitution, revised in September 1998, makes special mention of the Guideline, which advocates the idea that every citizen is a soldier and every place is a fortress. The North Korean government wants to uphold these ideas, considering it as a task for the nation. Until it decides to give up on the idea of communizing the peninsula, North Korea will stay with the current defense policy, because it understands that the military is the ultimate support structure for Chairman North Korean Constitution Article 60: Self-reliant national defense can only be achieved by first arming the military and the people with political ideology, and on this foundation, instilling cadre potential in every soldier, modernizing the entire military, arming the entire population, and turning the whole nation into a fortress. Kim's political system. Pyongyang will thus maximize the use of its military power at the bargaining table with South Korea and the international community, until it feels it is the right moment for an armed revolution on the peninsula. North Korea's military strategy toward the South is "an early surprise attack" aimed at taking the initiative in the war. It will depend primarily on the mechanized and self-propelled artillery units producing rapid results for a successful blitzkrieg. At the same time, the military will deploy combined forces of the regular and guerrilla army simultaneously so that the entire peninsula can be occupied before the arrival of American reinforcements. In short, Pyongyang will fiercely implement the now famous "shortterm blitzkrieg strategy. North Korea recognizes the priority of the military in their political scheme of maintaining stability and expanding influence. Therefore, despite the worsening economic situation, sufficient funds are set aside each year for force improvement. Further, the mechanized and long-range artillery units, along with 55% of other key units, are deployed near the frontline. During the third session of the Tenth Supreme People's Assembly held in April, 2000, Pyongyang detailed the military spending for that fiscal year (FY): 14.5% of the total national budget, or US $1.36 billion. Taking into account the past budgets and constant force improvement efforts, however, the actual military expenditures are estimated to exceed 30% of the total national budget. Still, there is another source of income: the defense industry, otherwise known as the 2nd economy of North Korea. Here, independent military accounts are kept to record income from the export of arms, autonomously developed weapons, and businesses set up within the military to bring in foreign currency. Furthermore, the defense department can benefit immensely from the relatively inexpensive cost of importing weapon systems and their low overhead, made possible by cheap or even free labor, land, and public utilities. Thus, larger investments can be made to enhance force capability than is indicated by the official figures. In terms of real purchasing power, the North would be able to achieve more than triple the force improvement of the South with the same investment. ## North Korean Military Threat A. War And Military Command Organizations As shown in Figure 1-5, the highest-ranking governmental body in North Korea, called the National Defense Committee (NDC), is fully in charge of war and military command. The NDC decides on national defense-related issues and defense projects. The Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF) is under the direct control of the NDC. Through the revision of the North Korean constitution on September 5, 1998, the status of the NDC was solidified as the state's supreme body of military command and national defense management. In addition, the chairman of the NDC was designated as the country's supreme leader who ![47_image_0.png](47_image_0.png) Figure 1-5 North Korea's Military Command System controls all political, military, and economic systems in North Korea. Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the NDC and supreme commander of the KPA, is in direct control of the entire North Korean military, making decisions on war and other important military operations. As a matter of formality, the MPAF is responsible for managing and implementing overall activities of the Regular Corps through the General Political Bureau, the General Staff Department, and other organizations under the MPAF (Figure 1-5). However, in actuality, the General Staff Department has the command authority for all military operations. ## B. Organization, Weaponry And Deployment Of Kpa 1. Ground Forces North Korean ground forces are composed of 20 corps including four corps in the forward area, four mechanized, one tank, and two artillery corps, as well as the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau (LITGB) supervising the Special Operations Forces (SOF). A total of 170 divisions and brigades make up the major combat units, including 80 infantry divisions/brigades, 30 artillery brigades, 15 tank brigades, 24 mechanized brigades, and 25 SOF brigades. Figure 1-6 shows the composition of North Korean ground force combat units. The main weaponry of the North Korean ground forces is as shown in Table 1-1. The old-model T- 54/55/59 tanks still comprise Composition of Major the majority of its tanks. Figure 1-6 ![48_image_0.png](48_image_0.png) Ground Force Combat Units Recently, however, the North has domestically produced T-62 Chonmaho tanks that feature larger caliber munitions. These tanks have been deployed extensively in forward areas and around Pyongyang. The Chonmaho tanks are equipped with snorkels that enable them to Table 1-1 North Korean Ground Force Weaponry ![49_image_0.png](49_image_0.png) cross rivers up to 5.5 meters deep. North Korea possesses BTR- series and type M-1973 armored vehicles, although recently it has added to its collection the BMP series vehicles with the capabilities of a light tank. North Korean ground forces also possess artillery of various calibers and ranges, and ![49_image_1.png](49_image_1.png) more than half of these guns are thousands of artillery rounds over the Seoul area in a short time. self-propelled. Most of all, the North has a large number of multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) ranging from 107 mm to 240 mm, which could shower For air defense weapons, North Korea possesses diverse anti-aircraft artillery ranging from 14.5 mm to 100 mm, as well as SA-7 anti-air missiles. Forward area forces corps and the Engineering Forces Bureau, in particular, possess river-crossing equipment such as K-61 amphibious vehicles and S-type pontoon bridges, thus enabling the military to rapidly cross most rivers. North Korea has deployed approximately 10 corps and some 60 divisions and brigades in the forward area south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line and is prepared to launch a surprise attack and invade the South without a further deployment of its units. Deployments are as follows: four corps in the forward; eight corps in the central and Pyongyang areas; and eight in the rear area. A total of five mobile corps-one tank, two mechanized infantry corps, and two artillery corps are deployed south of the Pyongyang- Wonsan line. Mechanized infantry and tank units, organized from corps to brigade, are positioned in depth along the major axes of attack. It is estimated that these would be employed as the units for maneuver operations in depth in order to exploit a breakthrough and to penetrate into the heart of the ROK military' s rear area. Artillery units are capable of providing in-depth fire support from hardened underground sites. Additionally, these self-propelled units possess mobile fire support capability. The MRLs will be able to launch massive concentrated strikes on various targets. By operating amphibious vehicles and pontoon bridges, river-crossing engineer forces can support rapid river-crossing operations for units with troops and weapons. It is estimated that North Korea will infiltrate approximately 100,000 SOF troops into the forward and rear areas of the ROK in contingency. They may then attempt to destroy command and communication facilities, cut off lines of communication, assassinate important personnel, demolish or cripple major facilities such as airfields to reduce Seoul's war sustainability, and harass our forces in the rear area-turning virtually all of South Korea into a battlefield. In addition, the North is estimated to have built underground tunnels along the front line. It can covertly insert massive units into the South through these tunnels avoiding the obstacles positioned along the DMZ before launching an all-out surprise attack against the South. Some twenty tunnels are suspected to have been built under the DMZ by the North Koreans; the four that have been discovered thus far are all situated under the major avenues of approach into South Korea's forward area. ## 2. Navy The East and the West Sea Fleets operate under the Navy Command. These two fleets boast 16 battle groups and two seaborne sniper brigades. The following diagram provides important facts. Most North Korean combat vessels, such as light destroyers, patrol ships, guided missile boats, torpedo boats, and fire support boats, are small. At North Korean Vessels * Figures approximate ![51_image_0.png](51_image_0.png) present, over 60% of North Korean combat vessels are deployed in forward bases. From these, approximately 40 guided missile boats pose a substantial threat; they have the capability of launching missile attacks ![51_image_1.png](51_image_1.png) against our large vessels and are equipped with two to four 46-km-range Styx anti-ship missiles. The 50-some Romeo and Shark-class submarines are capable of blocking sea lanes and attacking the ROK's surface vessels, emplacing mines anywhere within the ROK maritime territory, or secretly infiltrating commandos into the South. Support vessels are composed of amphibious vessels including personnel landing craft, landing craft personnel aircushion (LCPA), surface patrol boats and mine countermeasure vessels. These support vessels, however, have a limited role in long-distance operations. Also operated by the Navy are two seaborne sniper brigades and some 140 LCPAs. One of these domestically produced LCPAs can land armed troops equivalent to the size of a platoon on a specific target. Because these LCPAs can be operated on tidal flats, they can land in most parts of the East and West coasts. With high-speed mobility of 50 knots or more, these vessels are effective in the simultaneous launch of multi-dimensional surprise attacks in the early phase of a war. The Navy has deployed the 95-km-range ground-to-ship Silkworm missiles on both the east and west coasts. Silkworm missiles, deployed in the forward area, are able to launch anti-ship attacks as far as Tokjok-do in the Yellow Sea and Sokcho and Yangyang on the East Coast. ## 3. Air Force There are six air divisions under the direct control of the Air Command, one per military district: three fighter and bomber divisions, two support aircraft divisions, and one training division. One helicopter brigade also takes orders from the Air Command. The following diagram shows the current air power in North Korea. Over 45% of North Korean aircraft consist of old models such as MIG-15s and 17s and IL-28s. MIG-19s and 21s make up the core and are quantitatively greater. The North is also equipped with many highly advanced fighters such as MIG-23s and 29s as well as SU-25s. In 1999, the Air Force purchased 40 MIG-21s from Kazakhstan and a number of MI-8 helicopters from Russia. According to the Pyongyang government's policy of fostering the aircraft industry, some fighter spare parts are domestically produced. In the early 1990s, North Korea assembled modern MIG-29s domestically with Russian technological support. Two Air Force sniper brigades are organized under the air force, and they have approximately 300 AN-2s capable of flying slowly at low altitudes. Table 1-3 North Korean Aircraft * Figures approximate ![52_image_0.png](52_image_0.png) AN-2s can easily in ![53_image_0.png](53_image_0.png) trate SOF troops deep into the South's rear areas in contingency. 40 % of all fighter planes are deployed in forward bases where they can launch surprise attacks throughout South Korea in a short period of time. Taking North Korea's MIG-29 fighter into account wartime sustainability, approximately 70 air bases, includin reserve and emergency runways, are built throughout the various areas of the North. These bases are in addition to the 20 strategic bases already in operation. A strong air defense network has been built and is maintained over the Pyongyang area and around major facilities throughout the country, including early-warning systems, air defense surveillance radar, low-altitude antiaircraft artillery, and mid- and high-altitude surface-to-air missiles. ## 4. Reserve Forces As one gigantic "garrison society," North Korea began to strenuously pursue the Four-Point Military Guidelines in the early 1960s and has succeeded in arming the entire population. Therefore, its massive reserve force can be mobilized immediately. Civilians between the ages of 14 and 60, or approximately 30% of the entire population, are subject to mobilization. Currently, the reserve troops number some 7.48 million, and each reservist is subject to 15-30 days of training a year. A closer look at the composition of reserve troops will show the for ing. Approximately 1.73 million reserves make up the RMTU (men between 17 and 45, women between 17 and 30). 4.14 million personnel are in the Worker/Peasant Red Guards (mostly men between the ages of 46 and 60), which resemble civil defense forces. 1.18 million belong to the Red Youth Guards, a military organization of high/middle school students (ages 14 to 16). And some 430,000 personnel are in such para-military troops as the Civilian Security and Protection Agency, the General Bureau of Logistics Mobilization Department, Speed Battle Youth Shock Troops, and the Guard Command. In case of mobilization, the RMTU, under direct control of the MPAF, can be mobilized and committed immediately for every unit. In addition, the Red Youth Guards and the Worker/Peasant Red Guards, commanded by the KWP Civil Defense Department, are organized to facilitate mobilization in a short period. The key point is that North Korean reserve forces can be mobilized immediately due to the government' s control over citizens' work, travel, and place of residence. ## C. Level Of Strategic Weapons Development 1. Nuclear Development Pyongyang has exerted full efforts in nuclear development since the 1950s, receiving technological support from the former Soviet Union. North Korea has mines containing four million tons of uranium ore. In the 1960s, it established a large nuclear research complex in Yongbyon, imported an atomic reactor for research purposes from the Soviet Union, and has since been accumulating nuclear weapons technology and training nuclear specialists. In the 1970s Pyongyang concentrated its nuclear research on the nuclear fuel cycle-refining, conversion, and processing technologies. It successfully enlarged the power generation capacity of its research atomic reactor through its own technology, and in 1980 started the construction of a 5MW- level research reactor, the so-called "second reactor." In the 1980s the North focused on the practical uses of atomic energy and completed the nuclear research and development infrastructure by 1986. Thus, it began to operate uranium refining and conversion facilities. In 1989 Pyongyang embarked upon the construction of a 200MW-atomic energy power plant and large reprocessing facilities, in Taechon and Yongbyon, respectively. Additionally, the North conducted detonations to test triggering devices with high explosives. It is estimated that by the 1990s, North Korea completed the entire nuclear fuel cycle from the acquisition of nuclear fuel to its reprocessing. Nevertheless, due to difficulties in developing detonation devices and delivery systems that require advanced, precision technologies, it is doubtful whether Pyongyang has actually finished producing or now possesses usable nuclear weaponry. However, considering its capability to extract plutonium from used nuclear fuel, North Korea is estimated to be capable of assembling and producing one or two crude nuclear weapons. To freeze North Korea's nuclear weapons development program, the United States and North Korea signed the Geneva Agreed Framework in October 1994. The US, in return for the North freezing its nuclear development program, agreed to build two light-water reactors for the North, and provide it with 500,000 tons of heavy oil each year until the completion of the first reactor. Under the agreement on the "Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization" (KEDO), North Korea went on to sign the Light-Water Reactor Supply Agreement in December 1995. The construction of the reactor is currently underway. In January 1992, North Korea officially announced it would allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make regular and ad hoc inspections. However, it still prohibits IAEA inspection of undeclared facilities, refuses to submit records of its 5MW atomic reactor to be examined, and does not allow the IAEA inspection team to collect samples of materials for examination or examine spent fuel rods. North Korea finished the sealing process of spent nuclear fuel rods from its 5MW atomic reactor in April, 2000. The world has kept wary eyes on the Kumchang-ri area since mid-1998, but the US on-site inspections in May of 1999 and 2000 showed that the area did not have any nuclear underground facilities. ## 2. Chemical And Biological Weapons North Korea recognized the importance of the chemical warfare and issued the Kim Il-sung's "Declaration for Chemicalization" at the end of 1961. The defense ministry has since begun to build research and production facilities, exerting its utmost efforts to produce chemical weapons. In the 1980s, the military turned to the development of biological weapons according to Kim Il-sung' s directive that "poisonous gas and bacteria can be used effectively in war." Eight different factories in North Korea have produced lethal chemicals, such as nerve, blister, blood, vomiting agents, as well as tear gas, and at present they are stored in six different facilities. Their quantity is estimated to be somewhere between 2,500-5,000 tons. The North is also suspected of maintaining numerous facilities for cultivating and producing the bacteria of anthrax and other forms of biological weapons. In addition, the North also possesses various vehicles and equipment for launching chemical munitions. Forwardly deployed are mortars, field artillery, MRLs, and FROG rockets of over 100mm caliber. In the rear, Scud and Rodong missiles, fighters, bombers, and AN-2s are in place. This allows the North to launch chemical munitions into the ROK' s forward and rear areas simultaneously. The North may also dare to launch a secret attack in the rear through its SOF troops armed with biological weapons. To enhance its nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) operations, the North Korean military has organized chemical platoons down to the regiment level. Furthermore, North Korea has provided protective masks to the entire population. Not only military personnel, but para-military personnel and civilians must participate in regular NBC defense drills. North Korea will attempt to maintain its CB production capabilities despite its serious economic difficulties and the global movement to ban CB weapons. North Korea will continue this policy because these weapons can be produced at a low cost, they are effective, and it is relatively easy to destroy the evidence of such programs. ## 3. Mid- And Long-Range Guided Weapons Since the early 1980s, North Korea has embarked on the development of ballistic missiles. It has already domestically produced and deployed 500km-range Scud-Cs by upgrading Soviet Scud-Bs. In 1993 it succeeded in testfiring a 1,300-km-range Rodong-1 missile. Rodong-1 missiles have been deployed for operational purposes since 1997. In August 1998 Pyongyang attempted to launch a small satellite into orbit using the transformed launch system of a Daepodong-1 missile. Although the attempt failed, the missile's engine combustion, body separation, and guidance systems functioned without problems. From the test, it can be inferred that North Korea does have the capability to develop mid- and long-range missiles. The maximum ranges of Daepodong-1 and Daepodong-2, which North Korea is feverishly developing at the moment, are estimated to reach 2,000-2,500 km and 6,700 km respectively. Such a capability poses a great threat not only to South Korea but also to neighboring countries in Northeast Asia. Pyongyang is currently under scathing criticism from the international community for exporting the missiles to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Since 1996, the US and North Korea have proceeded with missile talks concerning North Korean participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). During the talks, the US has pressured the North to suspend its production and export of missiles. The talks, however, still have not produced any significant results. After the Daepodong missile incident in August, 1998, the two renewed efforts to seek comprehensive compromises. During the top-level talks with the United States on September 24, 1999, North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to a moratorium on all its missile test firing. A year later, the First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Committee, Cho Myung-rok, reconfirmed the announcement in the "US-North Korea Joint Communique" issued at the end of the talks held on October 12, 2000 in Washington D.C. The reasons for producing and possessing mid- and long-range missiles with CB weapons are simple. They provide the means for North Korea to respond to the expanding military influence of the US and Japan and use them as a bargaining chip at negotiations for regime survival, while posing threats to the neighboring countries. These weapons can also conduct decisive tactical and operational roles in contingency. In using these weapons to simultaneously attack major cities and strategic targets in the South, the North will attempt to realize its military blitzkrieg strategy. # Assessment Of Recent Military Trends And Threats Despite a steady decline in the economy, efforts to develop Daepodong missiles continue, and the numbers of long-range artillery systems (including the 170mm SP guns and 240mm MRLs) deployed near the frontline, along with the production of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, have increased. Since the clash off the shores of Yonpyong Islands (June 1999), North Korea has stepped up its military's combat capability. During the summer of 1999, the ground forces concentrated on artillery exercises and mobility training for the mechanized units. The navy focused on seashore and warship gunnery exercises, warship-to-warship guided missile firing, and sea mobility training. Regular sea and underwater infiltration exercises made up the summer schedule for the SOFs. From September to December of 1999, the Ministry of People's Armed Forces conducted a military-wide inspection and overhauled the entire weapons inventories to heighten combat readiness of all forces. The winter of December 1999 to April 2000 saw intensive training of all forces. The army stepped up live artillery fire exercises and the field mobility exercises of mechanized units. The navy felt a special need to reemphasize its overall combat readiness, while the air force conducted several combined air defense and unit deployment exercises. However, for two consecutive years, 1999 and 2000, the government passed on the defense command exercises due to its monetary constraints as well as the already intensified training of all branches after the battle off the shores of Yonpyong. Although North Korea reduced live fire and other exercises following the June summit, by August it resumed their normal pace, comparable to that of the previous year. With the lessons learned from the Gulf War and the Kosovo Crisis, Pyongyang continues to maintain a heightened combat readiness. In the forward and rear areas, the army is constructing hardened missile sites and setting up reinforcements for the existing obstacles and combat facilities on the coastlines and in forward areas. The air force strategically deployed the recently acquired MIG-21s to enhance the air defense capability of the northeastern region. Not satisfied, the air force brought in additional 240 ![59_image_0.png](59_image_0.png) fighters and deployed them to 10 different bases in the forward and rear areas. These augmentation measures were capped off with the installation of numerous air artillery systems in airports and air bases throughout North Korea. To boost the morale in the military, Kim Jong-il promised sufficient financial support and personally visited different bases to lift the fighting spirit of the soldiers. He also called for a meeting of company commanders in February 1999 and exactly a year later, held a large-scale convention of central political and military figures at the Pyongyang Gymnasium and awarded them with national medals of honor to secure their continued loyalty. Moreover, Kim Jong-il expressed the importance of company-level combat capability via sharpened instruction on military regulations and intensified indoctrination; he also underscored military-civilian integrated operational training. The ultimate purpose behind these measures is for Kim Jong-il to successfully construct a hierarchical system that places him at the top as the undisputed commander-in-chief. North Korea constructed and deployed additional midget submarines for infiltration purposes and developed an underwater supply vessel (SBS-2), which is now in operation. With no reduction in the infiltration-related exercises, North Korea continues to provide the South with ample reasons to be concerned for unprovoked infiltration. Further, despite the agreement on the NLL after the cease-fire, Pyongyang unilaterally declared a western "Military Demarcation Line at the West Sea of Korea" in September 1999. In March of the following year, the North Korean news reported that the navy command headquarters issued the so-called "Declaration of Order of Navigation around Five South Korean Islands on the West Sea," fostering yet more uneasiness on the peninsula. Following the summit, Pyongyang began to exhibit restraint in its critical broadcasts concerning the South, use refined language in reference to the political system in Seoul (no longer used are words like "puppet," "enemy," etc.), and bring down the billboards at the DMZ (messages such as "welcome to North Korea," "sold out to America," etc.). The North Korean Navy started to crack down on the fishing boats drifting south past the NLL. These and other changes were designed to prevent any unnecessary tension between the two countries. However, the North has not, in reality, let down its long-term force augmentation, combat readiness reinforcements, and infiltration-related training that continue to threaten peace on the peninsula. Part Two Defense Policy and Posture for Peacekeeping Chapter One Basic Directions of Defense Policy Chapter Two Military Preparedness for War Deterrence Chapter Three Efforts to Ease Tensions and Build a Peace Regime on the Peninsula Chapter Four Stability on the Peninsula and the Contribution of External Military Policy for Global Peace # Chapter One Basic Directions Of Defense Policy ## National Goals And Security Policy The ROK government considers its national goals and security policies as the guiding principles in setting up its defense policy. The national goals reflect the basic values of the Korean citizens as they work toward lasting existence and prosperity as a nation. Korea is ready to pursue these goals under any set of circumstances. The goals are as follows. First, Korea will uphold its nationhood, seek peaceful unification, and ensure lasting independence under the ideologies of free democracy. Second, Korea will protect the freedom and rights of its citizens and create a social welfare system that achieves equality in their standard of living. Third, Korea will work to improve its status in the international community in order to put forth dignity as a nation and contribute to world peace. The national security policies are the foundation for the national goals. President Kim Dae-jung has set the removal of the cold war system on the peninsula for "a peaceful settlement in the first year of the millennium" as the primary security objective for 2000. The President then proposed three basic directions in security policy. First, the ROK government will maintain a firm security posture. The government will not attempt to achieve unification by absorption or military threat. It is, however, prepared to respond strongly to the North's armed provocation. Important in this regard will be the ROK's ability to increase its crisis-management readiness that includes a civilian-government-military combined defense system. Further, the ROK must establish a firm security posture, which will deter the North's armed invasion and stimulate reconciliation and cooperation between the two countries. Second, South and North Korea must create a "South-North Combined Economic System." Under the principle of separation of politics and economy, the two must improve their cooperative relationship by increasing joint economic ventures and diversifying commercial exchanges at the civilian level. The ROK government needs to make another important change of developing a mutually beneficial and reciprocal relationship of cooperation that brings together its technology and capital with the North's land and labor. Third, Korea will increase its diplomatic efforts to end the cold war on the peninsula. In order to realize a substantial reduction in mutual threat, including the removal of the threat of North Korea's WMDs, Seoul must ensure that the US and Pyongyang keep the terms of their agreement. Additionally, the international community will have to encourage North Korea to subscribe to globally recognized laws and regulations as well as to join international society and function as a responsible member. ## North Korea Policy The threat of war on the peninsula will remain as long as South and North Korea stand opposed to each other and the border is divided. Thus, the South's plans to deter war and pursue reconciliation and cooperation will, in reality, become the highest priority of its defense policy. The ROK government's policy toward North Korea aims for "peace, reconciliation, and cooperation" in order to improve relations and is known as the "Reconciliation & Cooperation Policy." It seeks to maintain peace through a firm security posture and to simultaneouly pursue a course of reconciliation and cooperation. This will help create an environment in which North Korea can take the path of self-transformation and self-reform without outside coercion. The ROK government has explicitly expressed three major principles and six keynotes by which to accomplish its policy objectives toward North Korea. "No armed provocation, no absorption of the North, and reconciliation and cooperation" encapsulate the three principles. First, the government will never tolerate armed provocation of any kind that would destroy peace. In other words, the government will maintain a firm security posture to deter war on the peninsula based on solid and close ROK-US security cooperation, while taking strong countermeasures against any armed provocation. Second, the government has no intention whatsoever of unifying the peninsula by absorbing the North; the ROK has demonstrated time and again that it does not intend to harm North Korea in the least and under any circumstances. This expresses the government's will to construct a peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas and to concentrate on restoring national identity through exchanges and cooperation. Third, the government will actively promote reconciliation and cooperation. This means that it will make efforts to convert the confrontational relationship into a reconciliatory and cooperative one by first increasing economic exchanges, which could have far-reaching ramifications. South- North reconciliation and cooperation will promote mutual interests and national benefits as well as help establish a mutually beneficial relationship. The six keynotes are: "pursuit of national security in parallel with South- North cooperation;" "realization of peaceful coexistence and exchanges first;" "creation of a positive environment for the North to change through reconciliation and cooperation;" "promotion of South-North mutual bene- "securing of international support under the principle of the resolufits;" tion of the problems by the two Koreas themselves;" and "pursuit of a policy toward North Korea rooted in a national consensus." South Korea consistently maintained its policy of reconciliation and cooperation, and the North began to gain confidence in the policy. As a result, the most historic meeting between the two countries in 55 years was held in Pyongyang on June 13-15, 2000. The two leaders issued the "June 15 South- North Joint Declaration," marking a turning point in their relationship. It showed that the two countries were willing to clear up the past problems of distrust and antagonism and inaugurate in full force a new era of reconciliation and cooperation. Moreover, many changes swept across the peninsula following the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration." Both sides agreed to allow reunions for separated families, to begin a project to restore the Seoul-Shineju Railroad, and to initiate ministerial-level talks, among others. Particularly notable is the first defense ministers' talks, in which the two sides reconfirmed their desire to avoid armed conflict on the peninsula and to firmly support the vision of the "Joint Declaration of June 15." However, these achievements do not affect the ROK's defense policy in any significant way, because the substance of North Korea's military and its strength, which has a direct bearing on ROK security, remains unchanged. ## National Defense Objectives And Policy Keynotes The ROK military drew up key defense objectives in order to ensure national security, and to achieve these objectives, it decided on several basic concepts. These concepts take into consideration the duty and role of the military, the defense environment, and others, and they serve as the basis of the key points of the defense policy that pursues a consistent and productive form of mid- and long-term administration. ## A. Defense Objectives Defense Objective: The ROK military will defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, uphold peaceful unification, and contribute to regional stability and world peace. First, "defending the nation from external military threats and invasion" means protecting it from any possible external military threat as well as those immediate threats from North Korea, which, as the nation's main enemy, could endanger our survival. Second, "upholding peaceful unification" means that the nation helps to unify the divided Korea by deterring war on the peninsula, defusing military tension, and maintaining peace and stability. Third, "contributing to regional stability and world peace" demonstrates our willingness to contribute to and enhance a cooperative military relationship with neighboring countries based on our national status and security capabilities. Furthermore, this objective reflects our desire to enthusiastically join the UN in its efforts to maintain world peace. We are living up to our responsibilities and obligations as a member of the world organization. ## B. Basic Concepts For Defense Improvement While developing policies to achieve defense objectives, the military has established the basic concepts of our defense policy as follows. First, the current defense policy, centered on preparing for North Korean threats, will be transformed into one that prepares for other future threats as well. Moreover, the military can no longer delay preparation for the challenges of new forms of warfare in the future and of the changing security environment, because increasing weapon systems capabilities, improving unit organization, and training personnel will require 10 to 20 years. This amount of time is necessary because of the unique nature of the military. Korea's national defense is built on this new concept and is well prepared to deter the North's provocation and respond effectively to other outside threats. Second, the military will seek to improve its defense in order to protect national interests with a strong defense capability that is in proportion to Korea's overall national strength. The pursuit of enhanced defense capabilities based on uncertain and unclear threat scenarios could limit the military's ability to respond to unpredicted events. This is why the ROK Armed Forces are making efforts to formulate well-defined and clear threat scenarios and maximize defense capabilities. In particular, the military intends to develop defense policy in consideration of the nation's budget, as the funds for building and maintaining military strength can only be increased in an amount proportionate to the limits of the nation's economic capacity. Third, the ROK military will strengthen its external military ties to establish bilateral or multilateral strategic cooperative relations with neighboring countries. A perfect and independent defense requires a huge defense budget, but this is practically impossible to realize. Korea will therefore increase its military capability through a strengthened alliance with the United States. Korea will also engage in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations, designed strategically within the framework of its alliance with the US. Seoul is confident that these approaches to military diplomacy with other countries will bring peace and stability not only to the peninsula but also to Northeast Asia at large. The mid- and long-term objectives for improving Korea's national defense are shown in Figure 2-1. Figure 2-1 Defense Development Objectives ![67_image_0.png](67_image_0.png) ## C. Keynotes Of Defense Policy To achieve the national defense development objectives outlined above, the military has advanced defense policies according to the following five key points. ## 1. Establishment Of A Firm Defense Posture A firm defense posture means that the military is ready to deter the enemy's armed provocation and ensure total victory in war. This will require a thorough preparation, enabling our forces to respond immediately to any military threat or invasion at any given time. With this in mind, the ROK military is consolidating its crisis-management system, preparing for a possible limited or all-out war, and establishing a robust civilian-government-military integrated strategic defense posture. It is also creating an atmosphere conducive to enhancing combat-readiness and training for field units of the ground forces as well as combat units under the operational command of the navy and air force, respectively. Institutions responsible for troop education are laying the foundation for an educational system that ensures initial and sustained victory by instructing soldiers to fight with a prior grasp of the enemy situation. The same institutions are particularly concerned with raising the level of security consciousness among the troops even with the current changes in the relationship between South and North Korea. In addition, the ROK military is continually pursuing policies for boosting morale and promoting the welfare of those on active duty and in the reserve so that they can dedicate themselves fully to their country in a contingency. ## 2. Aiming For Advanced, High-Quality National Defense Another key point in the ROK's military policy is to aim for an advanced, high-quality national defense structure able to protect Korea's national interests and maintain peace and stability on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia. This is an important policy considering that the security environment in this region will undergo major transformations after the unification of the peninsula because of the dynamic relations among the neighboring military superpowers. From another perspective, this keynote policy shows the vision or the blueprint for the military's plan for the 21* century and points the way to the successful accomplishment of given tasks and to achieving the overall defense objectives. It is significant to note, however, that without a continuous reform, the ROK military cannot realize the vision of an independent defense posture, high-quality manpower, advanced weapon systems, streamlined management system, and defense digitization. Such a future-oriented military will demand more resources than before and require internal reforms such as reducing administrative overhead, increasing the efficiency of defense-related industries, and others. However, the defense ministry is aware of the limits of reforms in meeting these needs. It must therefore search for all possible ways to secure sufficient funds at the government level. ## 3. Devising Military Policy Toward The North And Defusing Tension On The Korean Peninsula The military has been focusing on efficiently minimizing the North's aggression and ultimately inducing the North to rid itself of the use of 71 provocation in favor of peaceful reunification. The recently concluded "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration" helped create a new framework for a peaceful settlement on the peninsula and speed up the process of reconciliation and cooperation between the two countries. The success of the June summit is the fruit of the "Policy of Reconciliation and Cooperation" built on a firm foundation of national security. Important to note here is that the relationship between the two countries will remain on this positive trend only when the ROK military does not let up on its present state of full readiness. In other words, it must recognize the indispensability of "national security for prevention of war and national security for reconciliation and cooperation." Thus, the military will seek to defuse tension in a military way by building military confidence between the South and North through such things as joint observation of large-scale military exercises and a military hotline, all the while maintaining a firm security posture. ## 4. Improving The Rok-Us Alliance And Strengthening Security Cooperation With Neighboring Major Powers The alliance between the ROK and the US contributed in significant ways to the deterrence of war on the peninsula, improvement of the economy in the region, and creation of the framework for the ROK's independent defense. Both agree that their cooperative military relationship must continue in order to maintain peace and stability not only on the peninsula but also in the surrounding region during the process of the unification as well as afterwards. With the basic framework of the ROK-US alliance intact, efforts for multilateral and comprehensive security cooperation with the neighboring countries will be made. In addition, the military also plans to participate in regional multilateral security cooperation and at the same time play a leading role in forming a multilateral organization dedicated to security in Northeast Asia. ## 5. Cultivating An "Armed Forces Of The People" That Works Harmoniously With The People The need to efficiently respond to various security threats in the twentyfirst century makes indispensable the military's construction of a "comprehensive security system" in which all the security factors in both military and non-military fields are balanced; cultivating an "armed forces of the people" supports this system. In other words, an all-out national defense system should be established so that civilian and military can work together as one, including the employment of civilian resources for military purposes. The military will actively cope with non-military security threats such as environmental hazards, terrorism, and drug trafficking, in addition to improving technology and national education. As a "well-prepared organization" fully armed with all the necessary equipment, our armed forces will systematically carry out projects in support of the general populace during national crises and disasters. In addition, the military will restore public confidence and promote national identity by enhancing its own economic efficiency through employing a rational management system. # Chapter Two Military Preparedness For Ar Deterrence ## Military Capabilities Of The Three Services A. Army The ROK Army makes up the core of our national defense. Its mission in peacetime is deterring war with the help of the Navy and the Air Force; its wartime mission is to bring all ground combat to victory. Organized into the ROK Army Headquarters, three Field Army Commands, the Aviation Operations Command, the Special Warfare Command, and units to support these commands, the ROK Army consists of 11 corps, 49 divisions, and 19 brigades. ![71_image_0.png](71_image_0.png) Figure 2-2 Organization of the ROK Army Approximately five hundred sixty thousand troops make up the army, and its core equipment includes some 2,360 tanks, 5,180 pieces of field artillery, and 2,400 armored vehicles. Table 2-1 shows the main components of the army. Manpower/Equipment of the Army * Figures approximat ![72_image_0.png](72_image_0.png) * Field Artillery: MRLs included: Missiles: ATACMS included The First and Third Field Army Commands have the mission to defend the region that ranges from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) to the Seoul area. Each army command consists of several corps commands, divisions, and brigades. The troops under these two commands, in response to the threat of surprise attacks or high-speed mobile warfare launched by North Korea, have deployed key ground forces along the major avenues of approach that connect Seoul to North Korea. The mission of the Second Field Army Command is to defend the entire rear area, including the coastline, that starts from the rear line of responsibility of the two aforementioned forward-area army commands. Several corps commands, divisions, and brigades make up this command. The core tasks of this army are designed to repel North Korean infiltration by land, sea, and air and should the North successfully conduct an infiltration, annihilate the infiltrated force. These tasks include guarding the coastline, defending major facilities and sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and managing reserve forces and materiel for wartime mobilization. Organized into one aviation brigade and several battalions, the Aviation Operations Command possesses various types of helicopters. The command provides maneuver forces with fire support, airlift and reconnaissance support, and if necessary, moves into the enemy's rear area to conduct timely fire support and air strikes. The Special Warfare Command consists of several brigades. Its main tasks include collecting intelligence, locating enemy targets, and carrying out other designated tasks. The Capital Defense Command consists of several divisions and focuses on the mission of maintaining the security of Seoul as well as protecting the infrastructure of the city. One reconnaissance and one decontamination battalion, and the Chemical Defense Research Institute make up the CBR (chemical, biological, and radiological) Defense Command. The command supports CBR operations, conducts research, and evaluates issues related to chemical warfare agents. Each field army, corps command, and division has its own artillery unit that provides effective fire support for the maneuver forces under it. These artillery units possess various sorts of artillery, targeting equipment, firecontrol systems, and high-tech weapons that make them capable of timely and sustained fire support. ## B. Navy Aside from war deterrence in peacetime, the ROK Navy's missions include upholding national sovereignty, protecting maritime rights, supporting government foreign policies, and enhancing national prestige. During war, the navy exercises control over the sea and the sea lines of communication that will ensure the safety of our maritime activities, prevent the enemy from exercising its own maritime operations, and carry out surprise landing operations on the enemy's flanks and in rear areas. The ROK Navy Headquarters, Operations Command, Marine Corps Headquarters, and support units make up the ROK Navy. It has 67,000 troops, including marines and operates approximately 190 vessels including submarines and 70 aircraft. Under the ROK Navy Operations Command, three fleets are based in the Figure 2-3 Organization of the ROK Navy ![73_image_0.png](73_image_0.png) East Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the Korea Straits, respectively. To guard its operational zone of responsibility, each fleet possesses combatant or combat vessels, e.g., destroyers, escorts, patrol battleships, high-speed boats, etc. The Operations Command also has its own vessels and aircraft to conduct major naval component operations such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine operations, landing, salvage, and special operations. The Marine Corps Headquarters is organized into two divisions and one brigade. For amphibious landing operations, the marines possess a wide range of landing equipment, including amphibious tanks and their own fire support. Table 2-2 ROK Navy Manpower and Equipment * Figures approximate ![74_image_0.png](74_image_0.png) ## C. Air Force The Air Force constantly keeps a watchful eye on the enemy and maintains a firm combat readiness posture for immediate retaliation should the enemy launch any provocation. The mission of the Air Force during war is to achieve air superiority so as to prevent the enemy from gaining access to our air space, to neutralize the enemy's will by destroying its principal and potential warfighting capability, and finally, to give full support to ground and naval operations. The ROK Air Force Headquarters, Operations Command, and Support Commands constitute the ROK Air Force. Two wings are directly subordinate to the headquarters; the Air Defense Artillery Command, Aircraft Control & Warning Wing, and nine tactical fighter wings come under the Operations Command. Additionally, the Training Command currently operates one training wing as well. Figure 2-4 Organization of the ROK Air Force ![75_image_0.png](75_image_0.png) Air force personnel number 63,000 and the air force possesses more than 800 aircraft including KF-16 fighters. Air operations are under the direct control of the Theater Air Control Center (TACC). At present, the air force operates aircraft that can carry precision-guided munitions and long-range air-to-air missiles. It can also provide support to ground and naval forces with close air support as part of joint air-ground-sea operations. Table 2-3 Air Force Manpower and Equipment * Figures approximate ![75_image_1.png](75_image_1.png) ## D. Reserve Forces The ROK government enacted the "Local Reserve Forces Establishment Law" in 1961. Seven years later in April 1968, after armed infiltrators from North Korea attempted an assault on the Blue House in January of the same year, it created the first Reserve forces. Since the end of the Korean War through the Vietnam War era, and up until now, the reserve forces have played a pivotal role in deterring North Korea's war provocation. During peacetime, reservists receive regular education and training, which allow them to maintain the ability to defend their homeland. Aside from homeland defense during wartime, however, the reserves are expected to carry out the same combat tasks as active duty forces; they will become supplementary manpower for creating new units, reinforcing existing units, and serving as replacements for combat losses. According to the law, those who have finished their military service must serve in the reserves for eight years. Reservists currently number 3.04 million. Individual and crew-served equipment including firearms, munitions, and tanks are stockpiled at all times in areas where reserves are expected to prepare for commitment by reinforcing units or organizing new ones. ## Military Strength And Augmentation Capabilities Of Allied Forces A. United States Forces Korea Since its arrival in Korea after the establishment of the "ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty" in October, 1953, US Forces Korea (USFK) has remained a symbol of the ROK-US alliance and continues to contribute to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia including the Korean peninsula. ![76_image_0.png](76_image_0.png) Figure 2-5 Organization of USFK 79 The commander of the United Nations Command (UNC)/Combined Forces Command (CFC) also commands USFK. Eighth US Army (EUSA), US Naval Forces Korea, US Air Force Korea, US Marine Forces Korea, and the Special Operations Command Korea make up USFK. In case of a contingency on the Korean peninsula, the USFK Commander is in full control of the operations of the Seventh US Air Force Command. The number of USFK troops currently authorized is shown in Figure 2-6. Principal equipment in EUSA includes 140 M1A1 tanks, 170 Bradley armored vehicles, 30 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 30 ![77_image_0.png](77_image_0.png) advanced fighters, e.g., 70 F-16s, 20 A- 10 anti-tank attack planes, various types of intelligence-collecting and reconnaissance aircraft including U-2s, and the newest transport aircraft. With this highly modern equipment, US Air Forces Korea has sufficient capability to launch all-weather attacks and to conduct air support operations under all circumstances. In the event the Seventh Fleet and the Seventh Air Force Command augment them, the capability of USFK will substantially increase both quantitatively and quali- MRLs as well as a wide range of surface-to-surface and surfaceto-air missiles, e.g., Patriot, and 70 AH-64 helicopters. EUSA has the capability to perform required tasks under various circumstances using this equipment. US Air Forces Korea possesses approximately 100 aircraft: ![77_image_1.png](77_image_1.png) tatively. Limited manpower and equipment are allocated to US Naval Forces Korea, US Marine Forces Korea, and Special Operations Command Korea in peacetime. However, the US Pacific Command will augment these forces and commands should a crisis or war erupt, thus providing them with a higher combat capability. ## B. Augmentation Forces US augmentation forces, including the army, navy, air force, and the marine corps, are composed of approximately 690,000 troops. The augmented forces comprise army divisions, carrier battle groups with highly advanced fighters, tactical fighter wings, and marine expeditionary forces in Okinawa and on the US mainland. The US augmentation forces have contingency plans for the Korean peninsula to execute the Win-Win Strategy in support of United Nations Command (UNC) / Combined Forces Command (CFC) operation plans. There are three types of augmentation capability: Flexible Deterrence Options (FDOs), Force Module Packages (FMPs), and the Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data (TPFDD). These are executed through a unit integration process, when the commander of CFC requests them and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff orders them in case of a crisis on the Korean peninsula. FDOs are ready to be implemented when war is imminent. They can be classified into political, economic, diplomatic, and military options. Approximately 150 deterrence options are ready to be employed. FMPs are measures that augment combat or combat support units that need the most support in the early phase of the war should war deterrence efforts through FDOs fail. Included in the FMPs are elements such as strong carrier battle groups. Under TPFDD, in which FDO and FMP are included, the key forces are planned ahead of time to be deployed in case of an outbreak of war. There are three types of forces under TPFDD: in-place forces, or forces currently deployed to the peninsula; pre-planned forces, or forces of time-phased deployment in a contingency; and on-call forces, which could be deployed if needed. 81 ## · Augmentation Forces Status In an almost simultaneous two major theater wars (2MTW: the Middle East and Korean Peninsula), the United States adopted the Win-Win Strategy as its basic strategy to resist/repulse the North Korean attack before it achieves its objectives. The augmentation forces are designed with this strategy in a view to achieve an early victory on the peninsula. As the main augmentation forces on the peninsula, the TPFDD's capability has the following history. In the early part of the 1990s, its troops numbered 480,000 and in the second half of the same decade, it planned to increase the number to 630,000. Recently, it maintains a deployment plan of 690,000 troops, 160 vessels, and 1,600 aircraft. These figures are proof that despite a plan to reduce the overall size of the forces, the US is determined to establish a firm defense of the Korean peninsula. The present forces planned for deployment have a strike capability to attack densely grouped enemy artillery, carrier battle groups with multi-dimensional battle capability, an air capability to secure air superiority, air defense, and air strikes, and a capability to respond to the weapons of mass destruction. In order to ensure smooth deployment of the augmentation forces to the peninsula in the beginning phase of a war, the ROK and US troops, under the supervision of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, conduct the RSOI exercise annually and inspect the deployment execution system and the administration of transport devices. ## Response Posture Of The Rok Armed Forces North Korea reduced its disparaging broadcasts at the DMZ and initiated other minor changes since the historic June 15 South-North Korea Summit. However, it is still pushing forward with plans to increase military training and improve combat capability and combat readiness, showing little signs of fundamental changes. ROK forces are maintaining a robust defense readiness posture that is able to respond immediately to any kind of provocation from the North. They are serious about building a dependable system of combined defense to prevent further deterioration of the situation on the peninsula and minimize tension and instability in the region. Not neglected in this process is the attempt to extend the scope of its military diplomatic efforts. ## A. Maintaining Early-Warning And Crisis-Management Systems Operating ROK-US joint surveillance equipment, the ROK Armed Forces keep track of the movements of North Korean troops. In the forward area, the ROK soldiers use their own eyes in addition to radar, thermal equipment, and electronic combat supplies to keep the ground troops in the North under close surveillance. Along the sea lines, the Navy utilizes automatic surveillance equipments such as maritime surveillance radar and the Korean Naval Tactical Data System (KNTDS) to track the movements of the North's Navy on a real time basis. The ROK Air Force operates the Master Control and Reporting Center (MCRC) 24 hours a day to watch aircraft activities in the North. If necessary, the center receives support from US intelligence satellites. The defense ministry also maintains a ROK-US combined crisis management and cooperation system for a more efficient management of indicators that might be detected through such a thorough surveillance. South Korea and the US signed an agreement in 1994 on ROK-US combined crisis management and in 1995, followed it up by a memorandum of agreement that contained implementing guidelines. Again in 1998 a memorandum of agreement on more detailed procedures for combined crisis management was signed between the two countries. In the following year, the two sides, from a mutually identical perspective, established a crisis management system that can provide consistent emergency management measures. Through four ROK-US crisis management exercises and other series of exercises, followed up by active intelligence exchanges and a series of procedural training, the two countries guarantee systematic crisis management supported by the combined ROK-US forces. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established a set of procedures based on its crisis management regulations. The Staff then recruited the number of personnel it needed on the crisis management team and imposed regular and no-notice training in order to develop practical skills to deal with crisis events. For immediate recognition and management of a crisis, the Staff implemented a system of automated command centers and a quick voice command dissemination system, and for emergencies it will work with the entire operations command to ensure high-speed transmission of information for the purpose of immediately putting the crisis management system in operation. ## B. Peacetime Military Posture The ROK military maintains a superior defense readiness posture by establishing a firm army-navy-air force joint operations posture in order to defend the country's territory under any circumstances, protect the life and possessions of ROK citizens, and contribute to international peace. On the ground, the ROK Army maintains a close lookout along the barbed wire and guard posts built across the 250-km-long MDL, where the two Koreas confront each other, as well as along the coastline. In addition, within the areas of Korea's maritime jurisdiction over the east, west, and south seas, the five islands located in the Northwest and Mara-do, Ullung-do, and Tok-do, the ROK Navy patrols the coastal and adjacent seas with vessels, submarines, and aircraft. The ROK air force patrols the air 24 hours a day with high performance aircraft and uses radar and high-tech equipment to watch and control all aircraft activities within the Korea Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ). With a civilian-government-military integrated defense system in the inland preparing for the numerous types of provocation from the North such as infiltration and terrorism, the ROK Defense Ministry is building an integrated operational execution system, which can handle all possible inputs ranging from civilian reports to military bases, police, coastguard, reserve, national guard, fishery radio stations, and local self-governments. At the 21st ROK-US Military Committee Meeting (MCM), both governments reconfirmed their willingness to respond to North Korea's infiltration and local provocations and activate ROK-US Patrol around the Tok-do Islets ![81_image_0.png](81_image_0.png) standing Military Committee meetings. Both participants also established a military operation posture, through the ROK-US Ministers' Joint Communiqué of March 2000, which can deter North Korea's armed provocation and, if provocation arises, bring an early end to it with a strong response. ## C. Military Readiness Posture For War In the event of a war on the Korean peninsula, the first few days will be crucial as to whether the ROK wins or loses due to North Korea's 1,500-km range missiles, various chemical weapons, artillery and mechanized units. Thus, the ROK military is increasing joint exercises and combined training as well as improving and revitalizing the plans of various cooperative systems, while maintaining a strong supreme command and national defense crisis response system designed to deter armed provocation and break, in advance, the North's will to initiate war. First, in order to continually revitalize the cooperative systems, South Korea annually holds the MCM and the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on the one hand and improves the ROK-US alliance system on the other hand by discussing important issues at the standing committee meetings held whenever a need arises. In terms of making improvements to the systems, the ROK and US are working closely together to develop diverse plans, including Operation Plan (OPLAN) 5027. They seek to improve and reinforce OPLAN 5027 on a regular basis with such joint and combined exercises and training as Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL), Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (RSOI), and Foal Eagle (FE). In order to protect ROK citizens and troops from the North's weapons of mass destruction, the ROK military completed in 1998 and is at present implementing a comprehensive readiness plan for missile and CB attacks. Moreover, it is reorganizing and reinforcing the CB policy department and chemical units and supplementing them with increased protective CB equipment and other supplies. In November 1999, the SCM and MCM agreed to step up ROK-US combined readiness for CB warfare with plans for early deployment of CB units in the event of a war. ## · Rok Military'S Chemical & Biological Defense System North Korea currently holds 2,500-5,000 tons of chemical weaponry, and if war breaks out, it is anticipated that they will concentrate their attack on the South's metropolitan areas with aircraft, SCUD missiles, and long-range artillery. Therefore, using ROK-US Combined Forces assets, we have maintained a 24-hour surveillance of North Korea's chemical and biological weapons production and its storage facilities. Also, we have established a solid plan to render them ineffective before an emergency situation occurs. In addition, the NBC defense command, which is in charge of preparing for chemical and biological warfare threats from North Korea, is supporting civilian-governmentmilitary integrated training for CB defense drills including quarterly civil defense CB training. We have also formed an emergency dispatch unit for every metropolitan area to respond immediately should there be an outbreak of poisonous gas. ## D. Civilian-Government-Military Integrated Defense Operation Posture In order to establish a firm civilian-government-military operation posture, the Combined Defense Headquarters held a Central Meeting for Integrated Defense in January, 2000, presided by the President. The meeting established a practical operational posture based on the revised Presidential Directive number 28, and detailed the tasks and roles of respective operational departments following two working-level meetings. Local autonomous governments held local meetings to reexamine the response posture, supported reinforcement efforts to rectify the structural vulnerability of guard post facilities along the sea lines and at harbors and ports, and engaged in long-term public relations efforts to inform the people of the civilian alert networks and methods of using these networks. Further, the ROK government improved the protection posture of the nation's key facilities by conducting a military-police-government integrated protection examination and rectifying the vulnerable areas and supplemented the protection posture by refurbishing the surveillance equipment and guard facilities and by securing enough protection personnel. In another effort, the government is devising a master plan to strengthen the protection posture and watch condition of the infrastructure of the nation's metropolitan cities. With ground combined arms training, Hwarang training, comprehensive counter-infiltration training, and other forms of integrated defense training by as many civilian, government, and military operation personnel as possible, the ROK Defense Ministry is bearing much fruit toward helping each participant acquire mastery over the integrated defense operations and procedures and is improving the protective posture of the cities' infrastructure such as the subway and buildings. ## · Civilian-Government-Military Integrated Defense System The Civilian-Government-Military Integrated Defense System is a pannational, all-out war execution system, which defends the nation by integrating the elements of national defense, such as civilian-government-military-policereserves-national defense corps, in preparation for infiltration or provocation by the enemy during both peace and war time. The Integrated Defense Headquarters adjusted and regulated the framing of the policy of the Integrated Defense and its operations. They set up detailed preparations of integrated defense in the Defense Council, which is a part of the central and regional Integrated Defense Organization. Every ROK citizen has become the nation's eyes and ears against the enemies, an essential element of successful national defense. The Regional Autonomous Party is the core administrative body of the Integrated Defense. It brings together the civilian and military sector. Through the Integrated Defense Conferences and the operation of the Defense Support Headquarters, the local autonomous governments announce situations of Integrated Defense emergencies and an end solution to the situation, support the nurturing of reserve units that are the core element of local defense, and establish systems for the local residents in vulnerable areas to report any provocation. With a near flawless coastal defense, the military maintains a system in which the enemy is spotted and destroyed before reaching the shore. Meanwhile, the police are setting up checkpoints, operating investigative searches, and managing vulnerable areas and their given areas of duty for a successful execution of integrated defense operations. The coastal police, fishery radio stations, and alert centers for fishing boats are running vessel inspections and preparing for possible infiltration of the enemy from the sea by controlling arriving and departing vessels ## E. Strengthening Mental Fighting Ability Of Officers And Men The ROK military's mental education emphasizes a realistic and practical education based on three themes: "war threats," "defense posture," and "our pledge." The military exerts efforts to sow strong conviction in the minds of all officers and men by giving them constant, repetitive mental education from the time they enter the service and after they are assigned to a unit. Mental education is regarded as an essential part of combat readiness posture, and commanders play the central role in these education programs. At this turning point in the relations between South and North Korea following the historic June 15th Summit, the mental education of the troops is as follows. First, despite changes in the security situation and the South-North relations, the ROK military's basic task of "defending the nation's territory on land, sea, and air from all outside threats by repulsing them as well as retaliating, and of protecting the ROK citizens' lives and property" remains absolutely unchanged. Second, when formulating defense policy or strategy, the military must not, under any circumstances, consider only the opposition's proposed plans. Rather, it must carefully evaluate the changes in military strength and force capability and respond accordingly. To elaborate, even if the other side declares that it has no intention of starting a war, the response posture should not change as long as there is no visible proof such as a reduction of military capabilities or redeployment of units to substantiate the declaration. This means that as long as North Korea's forces remain as they are at the present level, the ROK military should maintain an even firmer response posture than before. Third, the military must bear in mind the communists' past reconciliation-war strategy and tactics. When the opposition was strong, they pursued a policy of peace. However, they showed no hesitation to use force when their opposition became weak. Seoul should not forget this lesson from history that has revealed the communists' true intentions. The ROK military considers the above three assertions as the underlying principles for all troop education. Furthermore, it realizes that only when its response posture is invincible can the terms of the South-North Joint Declaration be carried out and a peaceful unification based on reconciliation and cooperation ultimately be possible. Finally, the military will improve the mental education of the troops, including the concept of a main enemy, in order to prevent the troops' security consciousness from growing weak. ## Enhancement Of Combat Task-Oriented Training And Exercises A. Combined & Joint Training And Exercises In order to deter war on the Korean peninsula and enhance combined operational readiness, a number of ROK-US combined exercises and training events are carried out according to integrated operation plans, whose roots can be found in the ROK-US combined defense system. The plans include the Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) exercise, the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (RSOI) exercise, the Foal Eagle (FE) exercise, the Team Spirit (TS) exercise, and others. ## 1. Ulchi Focus Lens (Ufl) Exercise The Ulchi Focus Lens Exercise is a comprehensive command post exercise (CPX), designed to enhance the conduct of war and specific warfare capabilities as well as to ensure a mastery of the procedures for specific warfare fighting capabilities. The exercise has been performed annually since its inception in 1976. It is the combination of the Focus Lens Exercise, which has been conducted under the control of the United Nations Command since 1954, and the Ulchi Exercise that has been held by the ROK since the attempted The UFL Exercise ![86_image_0.png](86_image_0.png) raid on the Blue House on January 21, 1968. During the Ulchi Focus Lens Exercise, the ROK government's crisis management and ROK-US combined crisis management processes during the early stages of war are depicted through various situations from each operational phase. ## 2. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (Rsoi) Exercise The RSOI Exercise is a command post exercise conducted under the control of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC). Contents of this computer-simulated exercise include the processes of reception, staging, movement to the forward area, and integration of US augmentation forces that would be deployed to the peninsula during war. Also included in these exercise are wartime support, mutual logistics support, mobilization, combined rear area coordination (CRAC) tasks and processes on the part of the ROK Armed Forces. The RSOI Exercise has been conducted annually since 1994. The ROK Defense Ministry, Joint Chiefs of Staff, component commands of each branch of service, and operational commands participate in the exercise. The US has CFC, USFK, and augmentation forces taking part in the exercise. ## 3. Foal Eagle Exercise The Foal Eagle Exercise is an annual ROK-US combined field maneuver conducted since 1961. Its purposes are to demonstrate ROK-US military ![87_image_0.png](87_image_0.png) The Foal Eagle Exercise resolve to deter war on the Korean peninsula and to improve the combined and joint operational posture. Participants in the 1999 Foal Eagle Exercise included ROK- US forces already stationed on the Korean peninsula, to-bedeployed augmentation forces from the US mainland, and administrative offices and reserve forces from the area where the exercise took place. The scenario for the 1999 exercise was an infiltration by North Korean Special Operation Forces into the rear area. It focused on ROK-US brigade-level force-on-force field training and combined amphibious landing operation. ## 4. Rim Of The Pacific Exercise (Rimpac) Conducted biennially (every ![88_image_0.png](88_image_0.png) even year) under the leadership of the US Third Fleet, RIMPAC is a multinational, combined sea mobility exercise in which the ROK, the US, Australia, Canada, Chile, England, and Japan have participated since 1971. The exercise is held with the objective to increase mutual The Harpoon missile fired at the RIMPAC Exercise (July 2000) cooperation and enhance the combined operations capabilities among the countries around the rim of the Pacific Ocean so that they can ensure the safety of major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and improve their combined response capabilities in the event of conflict on the sea. In 2000, the ROK Navy participated in this exercise for the 6th time since its inception in 1990. ## 5. Team Spirit Exercise Team Spirit is an annual field maneuver exercise initiated in 1976 in order to deter North Korean war provocations and fortify ROK-US security cooperation. Purely defensive in nature, Team Spirit is basically a combined exercise and is regularly held between the two allies. This is, then, quite different from what the North criticized the exercise as being-offensive training-and we have even invited the North to observe the training. Team Spirit is a mandatory exercise needed to evaluate the ROK-US alliance and to foster combined operations and military capabilities for defending South Korea. With an eye on improving inter-Korean relations, however, it has been suspended from 1994 to the present. 97 ## 6. Amrok River Exercise As the ROK military's CPX under the leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1996, the Amrok River Exercise is conducted in May of every year, with the JCS and the operational commands as key sponsors. The CPX is used to master the war execution procedures and enhance the operational command capabilities of the ROK military. During the Amrok River Exercise, the JCS and operational commands participate as the supervisory body while other units and organizations are grouped into either a response team or an execution team and conduct the exercise based on the war game model in their respective command posts and mock combat headquarters. With the Amrok exercises, the JCS has improved wartime combat capability restoration procedures and the wartime support requirement production and support system by mastering the operational command and staff activity procedures and wartime conversion procedures and implementing unit by unit operation plans. In particular, beginning in 1999, JCS increased the productivity of these exercises by operating C4I functions in an interlocking manner. ## 7. Hoguk ("Guarding The Nation" ) Exercise Conducted under the command of the ROK JCS since 1996, Hokuk training is a large-scale joint exercise in which all services gather to jointly execute operation plans along coastal and inland axes of attack. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps participated in the 2000 Hokuk Exercise along the The Hoguk Exercise ![89_image_0.png](89_image_0.png) eastern coast and inland areas in the center of the ROK. Through the exercise, combat development requirements were derived and supplemented according to various functions. In this exercise, the domestically developed Joint Battle Evaluation model was applied. This model helped make timely and objective battle assessments. ## B. Major Exercises Of The Three Services In a bid to maximize individual capabilities to perform combat missions, exercises and training on varying scales are conducted in each military service on specific training areas, land or sea, with the characteristics of Korean topography and North Korea's tactics taken into account. ## 1. Army ROK Army training is classified into two main types: individual training and collective training. All army training is conducted according to unit size, type, function, and branch. Individual training puts emphasis on specialty tasks necessary for individuals to master basic combat skills. It equips soldiers with professionalism towards their duties based on mental discipline and physical strength. In collective training, intense and practical training consists of small-unit tactics training including live-fire exercises and force-on-force field training using MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) equipment in platoon and squad teams. Battalion training focuses on field maneuver training and situational combat training. Major cold weather regimental training includes regimental combat team (RCT) training designed to perfect combined arms and joint forces operation execution capabilities and is conducted for one week or more from December to February of the following year. Division-level field maneuver training is carried out under the supervision of the corps commander for over a week on a real time basis and once during the term of a division commander. Division training is focused on integrated battle execution and firepower coordination, obstacle construction and denial operations, CB operations, and combat service support. The corps- and division-level Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) is used to nurture the combat command capabilities of corps- and divisionlevel unit commanders and staff. BCTP includes mastering tactical decision-making processes, strengthening the operational acumen of integrated combat capabilities, and assessing battlefield experiences and field standing operating procedures. BCTP is held under direct supervision of the ROK Army Headquarters within one year after the arrival of a new unit commander. 93 ![91_image_0.png](91_image_0.png) Combined arms and joint training is conducted by each operational unit, and the training includes anti-tank attack training, joint airground operations training, joint air-ground-sea operations training, joint amphibious training, and river-crossing training. Conducted in close consultation with USFK, combined training includes air assault training, NBC training, and counter-fire operations training. All are conducted annually. Miscellaneous training is carried out in extreme situations simulating combat during the year in each unit as well: night training, cold weather training, ranger training, NBC training, and search-and-rescue training. These types of miscellaneous training are conducted in every unit at each echelon. To create an atmosphere where one can be fully responsible for the training and education given to soldiers and officers and to encourage creative programs of instruction, commanders of every unit are entrusted with the full responsibility for the proper education and training of their men. A comprehensive development plan on training areas has been drawn up. Based on this plan the ROK military is promoting the establishment of integrated training areas by administrative or military district. The military is also in the process of building the Korea Combat Training Center where actual combat training using MILES equipment can be conducted against aggressor forces. ## 2. Navy The ROK Navy enhances its combat execution capability by various types of naval component operational training events such as anti-submarine, anti-surface vessel and amphibious operations, mine warfare, search and rescue and special operations. Vessels larger than patrol boats are mainly used for anti-submarine, anti- Ill battleships are utilized ![92_image_0.png](92_image_0.png) narily for offensive and nsive training with a special is on three-dimensional and orehensive maneuver trainin order to deter large-scale my maritime provocations s upgrading naval martine bilities. The navy's amphibi bilities. The navy's amphilities are operation capabilities are t upgraded through amphibious assault and surpris ing employing landing craft . Mine worfere creft ng employing landing craft. Mine wartare craft are used to foste esweeping and mine-laying capabilities, which will enable the navy to nd effectively to already laid enemy munes. The same twined to anhance their capabilities to cond ecial warfare units are trained to enhance their capabilities to c fal operations by training for coastal reconnaissance, surprise attack, urvival. Submarine units receive realistic combat training on such mısas port blockades, anti-submarine operations, surveillance of enemy ace activities, and launching torpedoes. with write conceptrate, on ophancing their capabilities to conduct a ation units concentrate on enhancing the 1 -dimensional operations through the execution of surface parrol opera- - and anti-submarine training in conjunction with surface vessels, and so a year since 1993, the ROK Navy has been conducting a large scale ce a year since 1993, the ROK Navy has been conducting a large-scale oined Surface Maneuver Training in which all available naval torces as a reasing the family of any and single this training the as the army and the air force participate. Through this training, the is developing joint operation execution capabilities based on multipleat concepts underwater, and air and air and air and on surface, underwater in being the or surface, underwater, and air assets is being increased in order to k enemy infiltration of special operation forces by high-speed landing he navies of the US and other allies with an eye to establishing a comd maritime defense posture. We continue to exert our efforts in upgrading the combined operations system between the navies of the ROK and the US by improving the existing ROK-US combined training. The ROK Navy is also in the process of increasing the frequency of military training and training observer exchanges with neighboring countries. When Korean warships visit a foreign country, e.g., cruise training of Korean Naval Academy midshipmen, or when warships from a foreign country visit Korea, the navies of the two countries conduct combined training, which not only raises Korea's international status but also enhances the ROK Navy's operational capabilities. ## 3. Air Force All ROK Air Force training is conducted as if the nation were at war. Such a level of intensity helps to enhance the capability of the air force to successfully finish its given tasks under all circumstances. There are two main types of training in the air force: air-to-air and air-toground training. The purpose of air-to-air training is to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy, at the farthest distance possible, any enemy aircraft that intrude our airspace. The air force also conducts constant day and night interception, air combat maneuver, and air-to-air intercept training. Air-to-ground training is designed to enhance our ability to launch deadly attacks against enemy strategic facilities and major military capabilities. To reach this goal, low- and mid-altitude navigation, tactical firing training, and night and all-weather training are being reinforced. Electronic warfare, search-and-rescue, tactical airlift, and reconnaissance ![93_image_0.png](93_image_0.png) ROK Air Force (air delense artillery) cold weather training training are also conducted, and in order to facilitate joint operations with the army and the navy, the air force executes close air support training. Moreover, ROK-US combined air defense training and comoffensive flight bined group training are conducted in various forms. # Apter Thr Efforts To Ease Tensions And Build A Peace Regime On The Peninsula var and sustain The ROK government is also pursuing a "Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy" geared towards the North under the recognition that by becoming a responsible member of the international community North Korea will eventually contribute to stability on the peninsula. With the "Berlin Declaration" of March 9, 2000, the four-point message was conveyed both domestically and internationally: support for North Korea's economic recovery; ending of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula and realizing peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas; the resolution of the issue of separated families; and resumption of talks between South and North Korean authorities. The "Berlin Declaration" led to the landmark South-North Korea Summit from June 13 to 15, 2000 in Pyongyang culminating in the adoption of the "South-North Joint Declaration of June 15." In order to faithfully implement the Joint Declaration, both sides are actively pushing for exchange and cooperation projects through channels such as South-North Red Cross Talks and Ministerial Talks. With the first round of Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks held in Cheju Island from September 25 to 26, ROK MND has laid the ground for providing military support for the implementation of the Joint Declaration. Furthermore, MND is executing mine clearance and roadbed construction within the DMZ , in order to provide military support for the Seoul-Shineju Railway and Highway connection project, agreed to by both sides during the second round of the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks. ## Building A Peace Regime On The Peninsula A. Maintaining the Armistice Regime and the Panmunjom General Officer-Level Talks The present state of peace on the peninsula is based on the armistice regime. The armistice regime refers to the system on the Korean peninsula built upon the Armistice Agreement of 1953. For half a century, the Armistice has acted as a legal and institutional mechanism for preventing armed conflict and managing crisis on the peninsula. However, in March of 1991, when the United Nations Command (UNC) ![96_image_0.png](96_image_0.png) named a ROK military general as senior member of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), the North refused to participate in the plenary session. As a result, the sound operation of the Commission has been unattainable. Even after the effectuation of the Basic Agreement of 1992 to which the North agreed that the current Armistice Agreement shall be upheld until the state of peace is settled on the peninsula, the North refused to comply with the armistice system as it withdrew the North Korean and Chinese side of the MAC and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee (NNSC). In March 1995, the North proposed US-North Korea General Officer-Level Talks to replace the MAC. However, under the judgment that there was a need to keep a reliable negotiation channel open for crisis management under the armistice framework, UNC and MND proposed General Officer- Level Talks between the UNC and the North Korean People's Army (KPA) on February 1998. North accepted our offer and eleven rounds of talks were held from June 1998 to September 1999. The UNC-KPA General Officer-Level Talks covers the issue of implementing the Armistice Agreement. Four representatives from the UNC attend the talks and all participants are given equal rights to speak. The talks act as a channel for crisis management as it addresses the issue of the reasons for and the responsibilities concerning the North's violation of the armistice agreement with a view to stopping further confrontations between the two Koreas. As the Yonpyong Sea Battle broke out in June 1999, however, the North insisted on initiating a working level dialogue between the US and the North to discuss the NLL (Northern Limit Line) issue in the Yellow Sea. The North set forth conditions indicating it would not have any more contacts in Panmunjom if the UNC did not accept its proposal. Moreover, the North insisted that US should receive the remains of US military personnel missing from the Korean War directly, which had been handed over to the UNC to date, according to the Armistice Agreement and customs. By denying the UNC, solely responsible for implementing the Armistice Agreement, from further dialogue or any contact, the North is attempting to dismantle the UNC and conclude a US-North Korea Peace Agreement through direct contact with the US. However, MND maintains its position, based on the Armistice 99 Agreement and the Basic Agreement, that the current state of armistice must be upheld until a solid peace has settled on the peninsula. Moreover, it believes that operation of the MAC and the General Officer-Level Talks held under its framework, as well as that of the NNSC, should be normalized. ## B. Building A Peace Regime Through Four-Party Talks It is stipulated in Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement that, "in order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides ... recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively ... " In compliance with this agreement, preliminary talks were held to discuss the political conference issue on October 1953, only to result in a collapse. Also, in 1954, a conference was held in Geneva with 20 participant nations of the Korean War but did not yield any substantial outcome. The armistice regime has been left untouched and unstable ever since. After continuous claims for the establishment of a South-North peace regime, the North began to demand a peace agreement between the US and North Korea since 1974. In particular, as crisis intensified with the North's nuclear issue in 1993, it demanded once again the conclusion of a peace treaty with the US, justified under its "New Peace Ensuring Regime" of April 1994. On April 16, 1996, the Presidents of both the ROK and the US jointly proposed Four-Party Talks in which the two Koreas, US and China would participate to discuss the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The talks envision a system of peace where the two Koreas are the main players in dealing with the peace issue and the US and China are supporters. In early 1997, a joint briefing session on the Four-Party Talks was held after the North accepted the proposal. During the third preparatory meeting in November of the same year, the participating state parties agreed to adopt the subject "Building a Peace Regime and Tension Reduction on the Korean Peninsula" as the single agenda for the Four-Party Talks and to hold the first meeting in Geneva in December 1997. Consequently, two rounds of talks were held, one in December 1997 and another in March 1998. However, due to differences in views between the ROK-US and the North, no concrete agreement could be reached. Whereas the ROK and the US proposed forming a subcommittee to address issues such as establishing a peace regime, reducing tension, and building confidence, the North persisted on placing priority on the withdrawal of US troops in the South and concluding the US-North Korea Peace Agreement. Nevertheless, during the third round of talks in October 1998, participants agreed to the composition of two subcommittees-the "Subcommittee on Tension Reduction" and the "Subcommittee on Establishing a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula." In January 1999, during the fourth round of talks, the two Subcommittees were activated for the first time, leading to the adoption of the "Memorandum on the Establishment and Cooperation of the Subcommittees." At the fifth and sixth rounds of talks in April and August 1999, respectively, the participants conducted more specific discussions on the agenda for the Four-Party Talks through the two subcommittees. However, talks have not resumed since the sixth round of talks came to a stall as the North demanded that the withdrawal of US troops and the signing of a peace agreement between the US and North Korea be included in the agenda for the Four-Party Talks. Nonetheless, the ROK government is convinced that the Four-Party Talks is the best approach, and will make continuous efforts to ensure that the two Koreas will play the leading role, with the US and China playing participating and supporting roles during the talks, in order that a peace regime may be established on the peninsula. ## C. South-North Summit Talks And Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks 1. South-North Summit Talks The ROK government has continuously pursued a "Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy" with the objective of ending the Cold War and realizing peaceful coexistence, and ultimately leading to the realization of de facto unification of the two Koreas. This Policy is based on three principles: "No armed provocation disrupting peace will be tolerated; unification by absorption will never be attempted; and reconciliation and cooperation will be actively promoted." According to this policy, the ROK government has continuously pursued policies to promote ![99_image_0.png](99_image_0.png) contacts and dialogue between the two Koreas, encourage economic exchanges and cooperation and provide humanitarian aid to the North in an attempt to guide North Korea into the sphere of reconciliation and cooperation. Through the "Berlin Declaration" of March 9, 2000, four initiatives including support for North Korea's economic recovery, ending the Cold War on the Korean peninsula and realizing peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, calling for the resolution of the issue of separated families, and proposing to hold talks between South and North Korean authorities, were announced both domestically and internationally. Due to our consistent "Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy" and the "Berlin Declaration" the North began to show signs of confidence in our North Korea policy and, at last, the two sides agreed to hold the South- North Summit. As a result, from June 13 to 15, the historic South-North Summit was held in Pyongyang and the heads of both sides announced the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration." The Korean people have at last paved the way for a new history that would end the fifty years of hostility and confrontation and begin the march for reconciliation, cooperation and peace. The background that made the adoption of the Joint Declaration possible is as follows: first, there was the historic decision by the two leaders of both Koreas to meet, with the recognition that the only possible way to reduce ![100_image_0.png](100_image_0.png) the severity of the division, to guarantee mutual prosperity and to advance the unification process was through dialogue and cooperation; second, understanding the post-Cold War trends and the matured environment for peace on the peninsula, the North felt the need to readjust its domestic and external policies and improve relations with the South; third, on the basis of mutual understanding and trust, both sides attempted productive dialogue to recognize the differences and find some common denominators; fourth, North Korea came to positively recognize South Korea's sustained policies of reconciliation and cooperation; and fifth, there was public support and international cooperation toward the "Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy." The South-North Summit marked the first meeting of the two leaders of both Koreas in 55 years of division. The meeting provided both sides with an opportunity to discuss normalizing relations and the unification problem based on their mutual recognition of the current situation. Furthermore, inter-Korean cooperation to resolve the separated family issue, reciprocal improvement in South-North cooperation along with Chairman Kim Jong-il's return visit to Seoul were all agreed upon during the summit. In sum, the summit meeting provided momentum for both sides to ensure the faithful implementation of all agreements reached up to this point and to seek the possibility of regular inter-Korean summits, thus making possible the improved relations between the two Koreas. ## 2. Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks After the South-North Summit, both Koreas witnessed exchanges and cooperation taking place in economic, social and cultural fields. The South- North Red Cross Talks were held to discuss the reunion of separated families. Moreover, the first and second rounds of the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks were held to discuss the issues of implementing the exchanges and cooperation between the two sides. In the field of military affairs, however, efforts to build confidence and ease tensions have been relatively poor. And it has been pointed out that the successful implementation of the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration" will be possible only when the military authorities of both sides guarantee an assured peace, doing away with their past mistrust and confrontation. With the belief that balanced progress in reconciliation, cooperation and peace for both Koreas is important, the government has continuously raised this issue to the North. Finally, during the second round of Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks on September 1, both sides came to the conclusion that, "South and North Korea will work toward easing military tension and ensuring peace. To that end, the two Koreas will discuss the holding of talks between South and North Korean military authorities at an early date." In a letter dated September 13, sent by the Minister of the People's Armed Forces Kim Il-chol to the Minister of National Defense Cho Seong-tae, the North announced that they would agree to our proposal to open Inter- Korean Defense Ministerial Talks. On September 14, our side replied proposing that the first round of the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks shall be held in Hong Kong from September 25 to 26. Also included in our reply were issues not only related to the implementation of the South-North Joint Declaration, but also those of mutual interest to both sides-for example, to promote confidence building measures and to reduce military tension, such as opening a military hotline between military authorities. On September 17, the North modified our reply and proposed the location of the talks to Cheju Island, and on September 18, we delivered a response accepting the modification. Finally, an agreement was reached to hold the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks. On the afternoon of September 24, the North Korean military delegation, composed of 13 persons including delegates and support staff, arrived via Panmunjom for the first time since the division of the peninsula. Talks were held numerous times from the 25th to the 26th in ![101_image_0.png](101_image_0.png) ![102_image_0.png](102_image_0.png) Cheju Island. For the first round of the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks, a delegation of five persons, headed by the Minister of National Defense Cho Seong-tae of the Republic of Korea represented the South while a delegation of five headed by the Minister of the People's Armed Forces Kim Il-chol of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea represented the North. Both sides formalized the outcome of the talks with a "Fivepoint Joint Press Release." Following the talks, the North's delegation returned to North Korea via Panmunjom after paying a courtesy visit to President Kim Dae-jung on the 26th. Following are the significant aspects of the talks and its outcome: First, it was the first time since the division of the country for military authorities on both sides to come together face-to-face for dialogue. Considering the fact that the North continuously insisted on conducting dialogue with only the US when it came to military matters, its participation in the talks itself could be marked as a progress in inter-Korean relations. Second, Defense Ministers of the two Koreas have expressed their willingness to provide military assurance for the implementation of the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration" both internally and externally. In order to remove military obstacles related to assuring travel, exchange and cooperation between civilians, both sides agreed to actively cooperate with each party. What was significant was that this agreement paved the way for active dialogue and cooperation between the military authorities of both sides. With this firm assurance of the implementation of the Joint Declaration, the scope of the South-North relations was expanded into military matters, whereas past relations were basically limited to economic, social and cultural exchange and cooperation. Third, Defense Ministers on both sides reached a consensus on eliminating the threat of war by easing tensions and establishing a peace regime between the two Koreas, a key concern. Both parties declared domestically and internationally that they would make an even effort in this regard. In the future, military authorities on both sides will be able to discuss measures for reducing military tension and building confidence, such as the establishment of a military hotline, prior notification of military exercises and large troop movements, exchanges of military personnel and informa105 tion, and the peaceful utilization of the DMZ. Fourth, since related military problems had to be resolved before beginning construction of the Seoul-Shineju Railway and the Gaesung-Munsan Highway, it became possible to begin the project after reaching an agreement to guarantee the safety of the construction effort. Fifth, to conduct the construction of the railway and road, opening some areas along the MDL and in the DMZ is inevitable. The talks provided an opportunity for both sides to reconfirm the legal and practical effectiveness of the Armistice Agreement as they agreed to set up areas of jurisdiction based on the Agreement. As a result of the talks, both sides have reaffirmed their obligation to carry out the provisions in question until the Armistice Agreement can be replaced by a Peace Agreement. Sixth, by agreeing to hold the second round of the talks at a location in North Korea, the talks provided an opportunity for the two sides to hold future meetings on a regular basis. Therefore, through the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks, which are expected to continue, the door has opened for the gradual exploration of ways to build confidence and ease military tension. Improving South-North relations is expected to take a two-track approach, as it will have economic and social exchanges and cooperation on one pillar and reducing military tension and building confidence on the other. The Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks are an important channel for exchange and cooperation, whereas the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks will act as an important channel for discussing matters related to building military confidence and reducing tension. Although we share a common wish in reducing military tension and building confidence between the two Koreas, rash expectations have to be avoided. Dialogue between the military authorities of the two sides is only in its initial stages. In the future, we must not be negligent in maintaining a firm security posture, as well as making attempts to improve South-North relations. ## 3. Seoul-Shineju Railway And Highway Connection Project The South and the North have both agreed to connect the Seoul-Shineju Line and the Munsan-Gaesung Highway during the second round of Interorts to hase Tens ![104_image_0.png](104_image_0.png) Korean Ministerial Talks with a view to implementing the "June 15 South- North Joint Declaration." To support the smooth operation of the construction project, MND is in the process of clearing mines and constructing roadbeds in the length of 9.2km north of the Imjin River, where the mines Highway Connection are buried. In order to efficiently conduct the mine clearing and roadbed construction projects, the military formed committees in both MND and the Army Headquarters. With the Defense Vice Minister as chair, the "MND Committee" is in charge of coordination and control concerning overall construction, cooperation between government bodies and external agencies, and consultation with the UNC on contact with North Korea. "The Army Committee," with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff as chair, is responsible for detailed planning of project schedules and operations. The Army has delegated the missions of guarding mine clearing and construction units, transferring military facilities and conducting supplementary works to the First Corps, and has launched the "Army Construction Corps" for handling railroad and roadbed construction. Currently, some 2,700 personnel from a total of eight battalions are committed to the construction operation. Under the conviction that this project, the first of its kind following the "June 15 Joint Declaration," will be a touchstone for future developments in South-North relations, MND has concentrated all of its military resources on this project in order to complete the construction in the shortest period possible. It is also focusing on mine clearing operations and safety measures during construction, and is taking various measures to avoid possible collision with the North. With regard to construction in the DMZ, MND is in close cooperation with the UNC. On the other hand, the ROK military is analyzing the effect the railway and highway will have on military operations after their completion and is devising necessary measures. First, the MND countermeasures to minimize military threats resulting from the road construction have been fully reflected from the planning stages of the project. Second, various blockade and denial measures have been set up so that the railway and the road cannot be used as an avenue for tactical maneuver. Third, comprehensive plans are being developed to stop the offense by integrating aircraft, attack helicopters, artillery, infantry and AT weapons to block railways and roads and prevent them from being used as a high-speed avenue of approach. ## D. Efforts To Solve Problems Concerning Rok Pows And Mias Although the two sides exchanged POWs pursuant to the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, a considerable number of ROK POWs among those detained by North Korea were left in North Korea because their individual will had not been considered. Until the early 1960s, the UNC called for the release and repatriation of these ROK POWs through the MAC, but with the North insisting that "no ROK POW lives within our territory," the matter remains unsolved even today. Since Second Lieutenant Cho Chang-ho's dramatic return to the South in 1994, returning of POWs has continued for four consecutive years; one in 1997, three in 1998, three in 1999, and eight in 2000. This issue has drawn the people's attention to the ROK POWs ever since. To fulfill its duty and obligation to those who fought and sacrificed their lives for their country, the ROK government is seeking to repatriate the ROK POWs of the Korean War held in North Korea. Considering the fact that most of the ROK POWs are of an old age, the government is calling for a quick resolution of the matter with the North Korean government. The ROK government will continue to negotiate with North Korea with a view to resolving the POW issue as a part of the separated family issue. In the meanwhile, the government has set up legal and institutional devices for a rational resolution of the matter: First, the government moved the names of some 24,000 from the MIA list to the list of those killed in action, paving the way for the bereaved families to be eligible for benefits. Second, it enacted and announced the "Bill on the Treatment of ROK POWs and MIAs," laying a legal foundation for the support and treatment of repatriated POWs and MIAs and their families as well, in order to stabilize their lives and promote their welfare. Third, in January 1999, a committee on POWs at the government level was organized with the Vice Minister of National Defense as its chairman. The purpose was to reinforce cooperation among different government agencies and to come up with solutions at the government level. Fourth, the government has established nine "MIA Register Centers" across the country to receive reports from bereaved families and to locate relatives of surviving POWs. In addition, in case there is a need for additional measures to resolve the ROK POW matter, the government will readily reflect the matter into policies. ## Arms Control On The Peninsula Arms control refers to a national security strategy to fundamentally eliminate threats resulting from military instability by means of political and military negotiations with a hostile or a potentially hostile country in order to fulfill the national security objective. Therefore, arms control focuses on eliminating, a priori, the incentive for military threats by a hostile country, reaching a balance at a relatively low level of arms and thereby limiting mutual offensive abilities. Our government is pursuing arms control policies from a national security perspective in order to eliminate military tension and realize stable military relations on the peninsula where sharp military confrontation still exists. Therefore, if North Korea would comply with arms control between South and North, which includes building mutual military confidence, arms limitation and reduction, our government will actively cooperate and implement arms control. ## A. Positions Of The Two Koreas North Korea has consistently proposed arms control schemes, pursuant to its political needs and with its primary focus on the withdrawal of US troops and the conclusion of a US-North Korean Peace Treaty. The North adamantly adheres to its principle of "arms reduction first, confidence building second," calling for drastic cuts in armed forces. Moreover, the North insists on political and military solutions first, before building mutual trust through exchange and cooperation and is calling for a package settlement whereas our government is insisting on a step-by-step approach. The chances of realizing North' s arms control plan seem fairly low since it is overlooking the fundamental principles and procedures of arms control. On the contrary, our government's policy objective in seeking South- North arms control is to enhance national security and support a peaceful unification while reacting actively to changes in domestic and international trends. That is to say, the government policy aims at establishing a peaceful coexistence through easing tensions between the South and the North and building military confidence, and furthermore laying the foundation for a peaceful unification. In other words, our government is pursuing arms control policies that focus on practicality while reflecting the interests and prosperity of nation. ## B. The Basis Of Our Arms Control Policy Our arms control policy basically adopts a gradual, step-by-step approach to arms control under the principle of "confidence building first, arms reduction second." From a political perspective, it focuses on improving mutual trust between the authorities of the two sides and enhancing exchange and cooperation in various fields through mutual recognition of respective regimes and implementation of nonagression and noninterference in internal affairs. From a military point of view, its priorities are set on ensuring military safety by limiting and eliminating the likelihood of a surprise attack and enhancing military transparency and predictability through exchanges of information on military activities of both sides. The objective of our arms control policy is to eliminate the threat of war on the peninsula and to build a foundation for unification through the ![108_image_0.png](108_image_0.png) establishment of a joint security regime. The keynotes of our arms control policy are as follows. First, inter-Korean arms control shall be based on the principle of direct resolution through direct dialogue between the two Koreas. Until now, North Korea attempted to nullify the armistice regime and to resolve the issues on the peninsula through direct dialogue with the US. However, the ROK government is convinced that the issue of peace and stability on the peninsula has to be managed by South and North. Accordingly, under close ROK-US cooperation, the government is attempting to promote arms control through direct inter-Korean talks and bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, the ROK government is engaged in active discussions with other countries that are interested in the Korean question, including the Four-Party Talks. Second, priority shall be given to the issues already agreed to between the two sides. It has been agreed by both sides to place the Basic Agreement as the interim step in the shift from armistice to peace. However, the North is neglecting this agreement. The Basic Agreement includes appropriate arms control measures to build military confidence and control the proliferation of WMDs. Giving priority to the implementation of these issues is the most efficient and appropriate means for South-North arms control. It is desirable to consult and fulfill the detailed implementation items based on the "South-North Agreement of Nonagression Between South and North Korea," with the South-North Joint Military Commission as its channel. The ROK government is calling for the North to comply with the South-North Basic Agreement, and is developing measures to meet that objective. Third, in consideration of the progress in inter-Korean relations and changes in North Korea's stance, the ROK government is engaging in a flexible integration of confidence building, arms limitation and reduction. After the historic South-North Korea Summit and the Inter-Korea Defense Ministerial Talks, the time is ripe for arms control on the peninsula. Fully considering the difference in opinions of both sides with regard to arms control, the ROK government will raise and consult step-by-step arms control measures to the North in accordance with the progress in tension reduction and confidence building. In sum, to prevent accidental armed clashes as specified in the Basic Agreement, the ROK government places primary emphasis on building military confidence as shown in the establishment of a hotline between the military authorities of both sides, the exchange of military personnel, mutual notification and observation of large-scale unit movements and major military exercises, an exchange of military information, and the peaceful utilization of the DMZ. Furthermore, the government is seeking measures to put an end to the arms race by freezing the number of arms and troops and model arms control projects. ![109_image_0.png](109_image_0.png) North Korea ## C. Controlling North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction North Korea's WMD program, such as its nuclear development program, its chemical and biological weapons, and missiles pose the greatest threat not only to the security of the peninsula, but also to that of Northeast Asia. Removing the threat of these WMD calls for an immediate opening of inter-Korean talks on arms control. Moreover, close ties and support from the international community are required. Under the Geneva Agreed Framework signed between Washington and Pyongyang in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with two 1,000 MWe (megawatt-electric) Light-Water Reactors (LWRs) as well as 500,000 tons of heavy oil per year until the first LWR is constructed, to resume inter-Korean talks and to ease economic sanctions against the North in return for the freezing and dismantlement of its nuclear development programs and transfer of spent fuel rods to foreign countries. Accordingly, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was 173 established with the ROK, US, Japan, and EU as participants. The LWR Supply Agreement was signed between the KEDO and North Korea on December 15, 1995. Since the construction of the LWR site at Shinpo, commenced in August 1997, the LWR project has so far been proceeding smoothly: ROK-US-Japan talks have been completed on sharing the LWR construction costs, amounting to US$ 4.6 billion; heavy oil continues to be delivered to the North as an alternative fuel source until the completion of the first LWR; the sealing of 8,000-odd spent fuel rods from a 5 MWe nuclear reactor in Yongbyon was completed in April, 2000 pursuant to the Geneva Agreed Framework; and the ROK, responsible for 70% of the total cost, will faithfully play a central role in the project, on the premise that North Korea will implement the Geneva Agreed Framework with sincerity. Therefore, it is Pyongyang's obligation not only to freeze its current nuclear development program, but also to make known its past nuclear activities, which have caused great anxiety worldwide, and to sincerely comply with IAEA demands to inspect and verify its nuclear facilities. Most of all, North Korea must sincerely execute the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in effect since January 20, 1992. Furthermore, North Korea must also join in international efforts for peace and stability such as participating in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and abiding by the guidelines set down by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Only when such an effort is made in a transparent way will it improve current South-North relations and will the international community lift economic sanctions, resulting in improved relations with the international community and accession into international economic organizations. Moreover, Pyongyang's international status as a member of the UN will rise correspondingly. As conveyed to the North during the South-North Korea Summit, our government's firm conviction is that the only way for North Korea to contribute to peace on the peninsula and the world is by accepting the international control regime on WMDs. In the future, we will continuously push for reconciliation, cooperation and confidence building measures so that North Korea may participate in the nonproliferation regime and give up development and operation of WMDs. # Stability On The Peninsula And Oution Of External Milit Olicy For Global Peace ## Rok-Us Alliance And Our Security The ROK and the US maintained a steadfast alliance based on the common strategic goal of preserving peace on the peninsula during the half century of the Cold War. Under the stable security environment resulting from the ROK-US combined defense system, rapid economic development and settlement of a liberal democratic regime was possible. In particular, since the inauguration of the ROK "Government of the People," the heads of both allies have solidified their well-coordinated efforts on the reconciliation and cooperation policy toward North ![111_image_0.png](111_image_0.png) Korea, thus manifesting the best possible state of the alliance. Furthermore, Rorch, and Indiators of the Ministers' Talks" of March 2000 and the 32nd during the "ROK-US Security Collective Meeting" both nations agere work amurly "ROK-US Security Com continuous development of South-North relations and to respond together to the changes that may come about on the peninsula Until peaceful unification is realized on the peninsula, the security partnership between the ROK and the US shall continue to deter war and guarantee peace. Even after unification, it is expected that the alliance will contribute greatly to the security of the Northeast Asian region. ## A. Background And Significance Of Rok-Us Alliance The first official relationship between the ROK and the US was marked by the conclusion of the "Treaty on Peacekeeping, Commerce and Navigation between Chosun and the US" in May 1882. A military relationship between the two nations started in 1888 when the US dispatched a military advisory group composed of four interpreter-officers. In a modern sense, however, military cooperative relations between the two nations solidified in September 1945 when US forces arrived in Korea to disarm the Japanese forces that lost in World War II. It was after the Korean War that the alliance between the ROK and the US began to take an important place in each other's security and foreign policy. "The ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty" was concluded on October 1, 1953, in Washington DC, immediately following the cease-fire of the Korean War, and came into effect on November 18, 1954. The treaty is a basic framework that has been established for both the ROK and the US to jointly respond to foreign aggression. Even to this day, it contributes greatly not only to maintaining security on the peninsula, but also to stabilizing the Northeast Asian region as a whole. The treaty also serves as the legal foundation of the ROK-US combined defense system: it provides the basis for the ROK- US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and other security and military related follow-up agreements signed between the governments or defense authorities. ## B. Progress Of The Rok-Us Security Consultative Body And Combined Defense System 1. The Rok-Us Security Consultative Meeting (Scm) The ROK and the US have held the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) annually since 1968, following the incident when North Korean armed guerrillas attempted an attack on the Blue House (the Presidential Residence) on January 21, 1968, and when the USS Pueblo was captured. Starting with the first meeting in May 1968 in Washington DC, 32 meetings have been held. Following the fourth meeting in 1971, the title was changed to the "ROK- US Security Consultative Meeting" and evolved into a multi-dimensional security meeting, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs taking part. The SCM consists of the plenary meeting which centers around the two defense ministers and five working-level committees. The five committees hold a series of meetings prior to the SCM, where the agenda is selected and directions for negotiation are mutually examined. The procedure of SCMs and Military Committee Meetings (MCMs) is as follows: the SCM informs the "National Command and Military Authorities (NCMA)" of strategic guidelines it may have for the "Military Committee (MC)." The ROK-US MC is co-hosted by the CJCS of the ROK and the US. As the body above the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC), the MC, in turn, notifies CFC Headquarters of strategic directives and operational guidelines. The plenary meeting of the MC takes place prior to the SCM, and the results of the MCM are reported to the SCM. Current military issues related to the CFC are discussed at the MC standing meeting whenever necessary. In the past, the significance of the meeting lay mainly in its declarative role. Starting in the late 1980s, however, the two states have not only consulted on key security issues and drawn up countermeasures on an equal footing; they have been able to jointly design long-term directions for the progress of both nations' military relations as well. These examples represent the evolution of the SCM into a substantial policy consultative meeting. ![113_image_0.png](113_image_0.png) ## 2. The Rok-Us Combined Defense System CFC has actual operational control over the ROK-US Combined Defense System. The system is based on the "Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Military Committee and ROK-US CFC," which was agreed upon at the tenth SCM held on July 26, 1977, and on the "Strategic Directive No. 1" conveyed by the MCM to the CFC in 1978. It was implemented in November 1978. The basic goal of the Combined Defense System is to deter war on the Korean peninsula and conduct effective combined operations in a contingency by means of operating the integrated force capabilities of the two nations. Upon the creation of CFC, the operational control over certain designated ROK units that the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), UNC had been exercising since the start of the Korean War was entrusted to the CINC CFC. As of December 1, 1994, however, peace time operational control over designated Korean units, which heretofore belonged to the CINC CFC, was transferred to the ROK CJCS. Since then, during peace time, the CINC CFC has only performed tasks derived from the combined delegated authority (CODA) of the ROK Chairman of JCS . The rights to maintaining the Korean Armistice Agreement still belong to the CINC UNC. The CINC CFC and the CINC UNC support and cooperate with each other. ## C. Sharing Usfk Stationing Costs In 1991, Korea agreed to share USFK costs after comprehensively considering the defense cost-sharing level of other US allies, USFK's contribution to ROK defense, and the need to develop the ROK-US military alliance into that of a "cooperative security partnership" status. During the first SOFA Special Measures Agreement for defense cost-sharing in 1991, the ROK agreed to pay one-third of the total USFK costs associated with maintaining USFK, excluding wages given to US forces and US civilian employees. The two states concluded a follow-up SOFA Special Measures Agreement for defense cost-sharing during the 1996-1998 term, which increased the amount of annual ROK burdensharing by 10% compared with the previous year based on the US$300 million which was paid by the ROK in 1995. As a result of this arrangement, ROK share of these defense costs reached US$399 million. However, taking into account the financial difficulties during late 1997, it was readjusted to US$310 million. On February 25, 1999, the ROK and the US concluded another follow-up defense cost-sharing agreement for the future after 1999. According to this agreement, the ROK would provide 257.5 billion won plus US$141.2 million in 1999, which adds up to approximately US$333 million. ROK defense cost sharing in 2000 and 2001 would be increased in connection with the nominal GDP growth rate of the previous year. Therefore, defense cost sharing in 2000 will increase by 9.78% compared to the agreed amount in 1999, and the defense costs for 2001 is currently under review. ## D. Efforts To Resolve Pending Rok-Us Issues Basic military activities such as military base establishment and military exercises may at times, unavoidably, incur inconveniences to nearby residents. As a member of the ROK-US combined defense system, USFK is playing a pivotal role in the ROK's national security. Nevertheless, concerns have increased as recent incidents concerning USFK military bases and military exercises have contributed to the list of people's inconveniences. However, since these problems result from the management of the ROK-US combined defense system and not USFK itself, it is important to note that the principle set forth to resolve the matter must include a measure to promote mutual existence. Under this recognition, the respective governments of the ROK and the US have proposed measures to resolve some of the problems concerning USFK and they are being considered from various angles. Authorities of both the ROK and the US are working closely on the issue of revising the SOFA, including measures to resolve problems related to clauses concerning unfair criminal jurisdiction in comparison with other countries and the application of environmental regulations. Moreover, to settle the inconvenience of the civilians near a US Air Force base training area in Maehyang-ri, strafing exercises have been terminated since August 2000. In addition, disposal of unexploded shells has been restricted as a countermeasure to minimize the noise problem and to implement safety measures. On issues related to the US military bases in Korea, both governments are seeking ways to find a resolution through discussions in the SOFA joint committee. Both the ROK and the US will continuously make efforts to develop cooperative defense relations, which has contributed greatly to the combined security on both sides for the past 50 years. Both nations will continuously work towards mutually reducing burdens that may come about. ## External Military Exchanges And Cooperation For Peninsular And Global Peace A. Progress In Military Diplomacy With Neighboring Countries The objective of our military diplomacy is to deter war and contribute to peace and stability not only on the peninsula but also in the region by building confidence through military exchanges and cooperation with friendly nations. Maintaining balanced military diplomatic relations with neighboring states, i.e., Japan, China and Russia, is a matter of utmost importance since these relations enhance the international community's understanding of a peace settlement on the Korean peninsula, and they contribute to regional stability and global peace. The ROK's military diplomatic activities have developed significantly since the 1990s. Since the inauguration of the "Government of the People," a series of successful summit meetings have been held for the sake of enhancing the understanding and garnering cooperation from the neighboring countries on the ROK's policy on reconciliation and cooperation towards the North. Hence, the friendly diplomatic environment has made our military diplomacy with the neighboring countries more active. In particular, following 1999, Defense Ministers' Talks were held with four neighboring countries, US, Japan, China and Russia in 2000. In the future, our military will continuously pursue balanced exchange and cooperation policies with Japan, China and Russia, on the basis of a strong ROK-US alliance. ## 1. Rok-Japan Relations The ROK and Japan have gradually expanded and developed military exchanges and relations since the establishment of a ROK military attaché office in Japan in 1966, and a Japanese military attaché office in Korea the following year. Until 1990 these exchanges were mainly personnel-based (e.g., exchange visits of military personnel and students). Since 1990, however, the scope of exchanges has expanded and become diversified. Defense Ministers' Talks have been held annually since 1994. Since 1998, the annual ROK-Japan Security Policy Consultation Meeting has been held, with participation by high-ranking foreign affairs and defense related officials from both countries. Furthermore, defense staff talks, military information exchange meetings between Defense Intelligence Agencies and the services, and air defense working-level talks have been held regularly. In 1999, emergency communications channels were established between the ROK MND and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), ROK Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), and the ROK Air Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). Moreover, communication channels between the ROK Armed Forces and Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) were diversified with the initiation of dialogues between the deputy chief of staff level of the ROK JCS and the Joint Staff Council of Japan and the ROK- Japan Navy-to-Navy talks. In August 1999, a joint search-and-rescue exercise was conducted for the first time by vessels and aircrafts of the ROK Navy and JMSDF on the high seas southeast of Cheju Island. During the ROK-Japan Defense Ministers' Talks in Tokyo in May 2000, the two Defense Ministers reaffirmed their beliefs that nonproliferation of WMDs on the Korean peninsula is crucial to regional security ![117_image_0.png](117_image_0.png) and that increased military exchange between the two countries will contribute not only in building military confidence between ROK and Japan but also in shaping future-oriented development of mutual relations. In addition, both sides reached an agreement to hold annual exchange visits by the ROK Chairman of JCS. and Japanese Joint Staff Council Chairman, and conducting joint search-and-rescue exercises on a regular basis. Besides, both sides agreed to send one cadet from both the Korea Military Academy and Naval Academy to Japan's Defense University on an exchange program in 2001, following the dispatch of an Air Force Cadet for the first time in March 2000. In the future, military exchange with Japan will take diverse forms. It will greatly contribute not only to building military confidence and promoting friendship, but also to establishing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. ## 2. Rok-China Relations There has been significant progress in the political, economic, social, and cultural relations between ROK and China despite the short eight-year relations since the normalization of ties in 1992. In 1998, President Kim Daejung visited China where he agreed to construct the "ROK-China Cooperative Partnership for the 21st Century.' Based on the extensive progress in ROK-China relations, the military relations between the two countries have progressed gradually after the estab- ![118_image_0.png](118_image_0.png) lishment of a ROK military attaché office in Beijing in 1993 and a Chinese military attaché office in Seoul in 1994. Currently, ROK-China military exchanges and cooperation have been pursued in various ways. Annual exchanges of military athletic groups have been made between the two countries since 1992. In 1999, the ROK Armed Forces Athletic Unit's soccer and basketball teams visited China, and China's handball team and Navy rowing team visited Korea. The fourth "ROK-China Defense Forum" was held in Beijing in 1999 where ideas on security on the peninsula and the region were exchanged. In addition, with regard to military education exchange, three officers were sent to the Nakyang Foreign Language Institute of the Chinese Armed Forces in 1999 for the first time and a Chinese delegation on military education came to the ROK to visit various military educational institutions. These mutual exchange visits provided a basis for the amicable relations between the military educational institutions of both nations. For the first time since the Korean War, ROK Defense Minister Cho Seong-tae visited China in August 1999. In January 2000, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian made a return visit to the ROK for the first time, and these mutual visits marked an opportunity to lift the military relations to a higher level. The ROK-China Defense Ministers' Talks greatly contributed to building military confidence between the two armed forces. In addition, official visits at the four-star general level, such as the visits by the ROK Navy Chief of Staff in April and the ROK Chairman of JCS in August 2000, paved the way for exchange of high-ranking military officials. In retrospect, the development in the ROK-China military relations in 1999 is expected to contribute significantly to the balanced development of ROK-China relations and the "ROK-China Cooperative Partnership for the 21st Century." ## 3. Rok-Russia Relations ROK military relations with the Russian Federation were initiated with the diplomatic normalization in September 1990 and the establishment of military attaché offices in each other's capitals in the following year. Despite the short time period since the normalization, exchanges between highranking officers have continued resulting in various measures to build military confidence. Since the first ROK-Russia Defense Ministers' Talks in Moscow in May 1994, five meetings have been held thus far. In addition, an active exchange of high-ranking officers has occurred as the Chairman of JCS and the Chief of staff of each branch of the ROK Armed Forces exchanged visits with ![120_image_0.png](120_image_0.png) their Russian counterparts including the Defense Minister and commanding officers of the field army commands. Since 1999, there have been exchange visits by the officers and men of the two armed forces while on leave. Military relations with the Russian Federation have focused primarily on enhancing mutual interest through exchange of military personnel up until the early 1990s. Since 1994, however, the ROK- Russia relations have been focused on the institutionalization of military confidence building. Hence, the two governments concluded the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Seas beyond Territorial Waters in 1994, MOU on Military Cooperation in 1996, Agreement on Military Science, Defense Industry and Logistics Cooperation in 1997, and MOU on Mutual Visits by Officers and Men on Leave in 1998. Currently, efforts are being made to conclude the Pact on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. Additionally, the Conference on the Implementation of the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Seas beyond Territorial Waters and the ROK-Russia Joint Defense Policy Consultative Meeting are being held on an annual basis. The ROK-Russia Defense Ministers' Talks were held in Moscow in May 2000. During the talks, defense ministers agreed to work together towards peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region and the Korean peninsula. Russia welcomed the South-North Summit and announced its full assurance and support. In addition, both sides agreed to conduct purely peace-oriented joint search-and-rescue naval exercises between the two navies and agreed to dispatch the Russian military band to the Kangwon International Tattoo 2000. In the future, military relations with Russia will continuously develop in the direction of peace settlement on the Korean peninsula and contribute to the peace and stability in the region based on the systematic efforts towards building military confidence. ## B. Diversification Of Military Exchanges And Cooperation The ROK military has exerted efforts to promote military exchanges and cooperation, and to this end it has diversified partnerships and enlarged the contents and scope of such exchanges and cooperation. Military exchanges and cooperation with major partner countries include the establishment and operation of military attache offices, mutual visits of military personnel, cooperative meetings on military exchange, seminars and meetings on military exchanges, mutual visits of naval vessels, defense industrial and logistics cooperation, and signing of military agreements. Military exchanges have been pursued consistently with geographically close Southeast Asian countries. Following the visit by the Vietnamese Vice Defense Minister in October 1999, the ROK Vice Minister of National Defense paid the first ever visit to Vietnam in April 2000, providing a basis for substantial exchange between the two armed forces. In 2000, the ROK military co-hosted the Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting with Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively, and is actively seeking improved military relations with these countries through mutual visits of naval vessels, and military education exchanges. President Kim Dae-jung made the first state visit to Mongolia in May 1999. In November 1999, the Mongolian Defense Minister visited the ROK to exchange views on the security situation on the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asian region and expressed their support for our reconciliation and cooperation policy towards North Korea. The ROK military's exchange of high-ranking military authorities and annual meetings with European countries are centered on the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The meetings to be held on a regular basis include the Joint Defense Policy Consultative Meeting and the Joint Committee on Defense Industry and Logistics Meeting. The French Defense Minister called on his ROK counterpart in January 1999. The Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Committee Meeting was held with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany respectively, in February 2000. Additionally in the following month, defense industry cooperation and defense policies of both sides were discussed through the "Joint Defense Academy cadet has been to the German Military demy since 1965 and 2000, one cadet has been to the French Military demy. November 1999, th Defense Minister urkey for the first time in June 2000, the sh Defense Minister made a return visit to Korea. Both sides agreed to ![122_image_0.png](122_image_0.png) gthen the blood-forged relations since the Korean War and promote ational exchanges and cooperation in the detense industry. the Middle East region, military attaches have been sent to Saud a, Egypt and Israel. The Detense Ministers of Kuwait paid their first to the ROK in September 1999 and October 2000, respectively, to dismutual security interests and measures to accelerate cooperation on ary exchanges . Ittart dinlomary with the Oceanian region revolves around the two utary diplomacy with the Oceanian region re cipants from the Korean War, Australia and New Zealand. Since 1996, ea and Australia have been co-hosting the annual Pol-Mil Talks in t ch the ministers of foreign affairs and defense staffs from both countries cipate, and from 1997, Joint Defense Policy Consultative Meeting has held annually. The Australian Chief of Defense Forces visited Korea in ch and the Australian Minister for Defense did so in May of 1999. Each the two countries exchanged views on a wide range of regional securituations and defense policies of interest. In February 2000, the navies of countries met for the first time to discuss means to increase exchange · · · 1000 11- Now Zealand military attaché April 1998 the New Zealand military attaché office was establish The New Zealand Chief of the General Staff paid a visit in May 1999 in the following month the first ROK-New Zealand Pol-Mil Talks and ![123_image_0.png](123_image_0.png) the Joint Defense Policy Consultative Meeting was held. In July 1999 the ROK Defense Vice Minister visited New Zealand to discuss the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and ways to increase military exchanges between the two countries. Korea concluded the MOU on Defense Industry and Logistics with Australia and New Zealand in November 1998, respectively. ## Rok Participation In Un Peacekeeping Operations A. Outline Of Peacekeeping Operations (Pko) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) can be roughly divided into peacekeeping operations led by the UN and those headed by regional organizations or an individual nation. The first UN-led PKO was launched with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) in 1948. In the 50 years since, the UN has deployed 800,000 peacekeepers from 118 nations to 53 operations. As of August 2000, over 37,400 military and civil police agents from 87 countries are serving in 15 regions of the world such as Kosovo and East Timor. Peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations or an individual nation, such as that of NATO, CIS, ECOWAS, etc., have played the role of resolving regional disputes. In the 1990s, various activities were undertaken in Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor. Operations are composed of military, civilian police, election observers, UN and international organizations, and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), etc. Military personnel usually take part as a member of the Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) or as a military observer. PKFs undertake the peacekeeping operations within the boundaries of authorities bestowed by the UN. Military observers are unarmed and are charged with such tasks as monitoring ceasefires, patrolling, inspections, and arbitration activities. The UN, in principle, fina- ![124_image_0.png](124_image_0.png) nces the expenses of peacekeeping operations headed by the UN. For operations led by regional organizations, the sending government pays expenses. ## B. Status Of Participation In Pko In 1993 a ROK engineer battalion was dispatched to Somalia. Since then, 2,360 Korean peacekeepers have been deployed to 6 different regions. As of August 2000, a total of 476 Korean soldiers are faithfully conducting their missions as apostles of peace. | Unit/Number | | | | |------------------------|-------------------|---------------|----| | Region | Dispatched(persor | September | | | orean medical unit/20 | 1994~ | 1-12th unit : | | | November | 47 | | | | nilitary observers/9 | 1994- | | | | October | | | | | military observers/3 | 1 year | 27 | | | 1994~ | | | | | October | | | | | infantry battalion/419 | 6 months | 836 | | | 1999~ | | | | | January | 12 | | | | Command staffs/12 | 1 year | | | | 2000~ | | | | | BD Command/ | February | 6 months | 13 | | MP section/13 | 2000~ | | | Table 2-4 PKO Participation Status of the ROK Arme ## 1. International Forces And Un Pko In East Timor On August 30, 1999, a UN-mandated referendum for independence in East Timor was held, in which 78.5 percent of the electorate opted for independence. However, militias who opposed East Timor's independence caused devastating violence. Accordingly, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to grant installation of the "International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET)," and the UN Secretary General together with the government of Australia officially requested the ROK government's participation. In addition, the Indonesian government agreed to the deployment of the multinational forces and actively requested the participation of Asian nations including the ROK. To maintain security and restore order, the ROK government formed the 419-member Evergreen Unit, composed of 201 infantry troops and support elements such as transportation, supply, communications, and medical personnel. The Evergreen Unit initiated operations on October 22, 1999 in Lospalos, East Timor. Figure 2-7 Organization of the Evergreen Unit (Unit: persons) ![125_image_0.png](125_image_0.png) ## · The Significance And Outcome Of Rok Armed Forces' Dispatch To East Timor Immediately after the National Assembly's approval for its dispatch on September 28, 1999, the Evergreen Unit was deployed to East Timor on October 22, the same year, following the local acclimatization and orientation training in Australia and carried out its mission as a member of the multinational forces. On February 1, 2000, it was transformed to the UN PKF. Not only does the Evergreen Unit perfectly conduct operations to maintain security and restore order such as maneuver patrols, guarding main facilities, and resident operations, it is actively engaged in relief activities such as medical treatment of local residents, military support to civilians and provision of relief goods. The locals fully support and trust the Evergreen Unit by referring to it as "the king of all multinational forces." Moreover, the unit's 25 staff members including the Korean Chief of Staff of the UN PKO Command are winning international recognition for their devotion and perfection in conducting their mission, thus greatly enhancing the status of the ROK. The following outlines the significance of ROK's troop dispatch: First, the dispatch of troops enabled Korea, which once succeeded in defending freedom and democracy with the help of the UN and the international community, to become a country giving assistance. As a member of the UN, the ROK demonstrated its will to participate in global efforts to achieve world peace. Second, the ROK dispatched an infantry battalion to broaden the scope of participation in peacekeeping activities. It was the first of its kind as only medical and engineer units were previously dispatched taking our current security situation into account. Third, with its prompt dispatch and its successful performance of the mission, the Unit is greatly contributing to peace and stability in East Timor. ## 2. Activities Of The Korean Medical Unit In Western Sahara The Korean medical unit currently participating in the "UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)" started its mission in September 1994, when the very first delegation was dispatched from Korea. As of August 2000, 20 Koreans from the twelfth delegation are conducting the mission. The Korean medical unit is the sole unit within MINSURO and performs the following duties: basic medical support to MINURSO personnel; evacuating severely injured or sick patients to larger hospitals; conducting 24 hour standby for emergency patient treatment; disinfecting the MINURSO Headquarters and inspecting both water and food hygiene. Our personnel have proudly provided faithful medical care to nearly 28,000 UN personnel for the past six years. ## 3. Military Observer Activities As of August 2000 the ROK military has dispatched nine officers to the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and three to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) as military observers. Our dispatched officers serve under the supervision of the local command and perform such tasks as monitoring ceasefires, patrolling, inspection, report, and arbitration. ## C. Laying The Ground For Un Pko Participation 1. Participation In Un Pko Stand-By Arrangement System Under the UN PKO stand-by arrangement system, UN member states designate certain units within their countries and maintain them for UN PKO participation. When the UN requests PKO troops, the requested countries provide the UN with these units within an agreed period of time. While only 35 nations expressed their willingness to participate in 1995, as of March 2000, that number has increased to 88. Korea notified the UN of its ability to provide approximately 800 participants as of March 1995. However, considering the future global security situation and the UN' s PKO policy, Korea will adjust that number and give it more detailed explanations. Table 2-5 | Infantry battalion | 540 | Two bomb disposal teams | 11 | |-------------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|------| | | 10-15 | | | | Heavy construction engineer company | 130 | Sea-borne search and rescue | 36 | | Medical support group | 70-80 | Military observers | | ROK's Participation in the PKO Stand-by Arrangement System (Unit: persons) ## 2. Development Of The Pko Education System Since 1993, our military has trained experts by sending officers to various PKO training institutions such as the Northern Europe United Nations Training Corps (UNTC), Poland, and Ireland. And since 1995, officers and related government officials have been sent to the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC) in Canada. Table 2-6 PKO Education Abroad | Classification | Courses (Duration) | Year | Personnel | |------------------|------------------------------------|-----------|-------------| | UNTC | Military observer course (3 weeks) | 1993~1997 | 9 | | Sweden | Staff course (3 weeks) | 5 | | | | 1993~1997 | | | | Norway | Logistics course (3 weeks) | 1993~1997 | 3 | | Poland | Military observer course (3 weeks) | 1996 | 1 | | Canada | Short course (2-3 weeks) | 1995~1999 | 32 | | Ireland | Observer/Staff course (3 weeks) | 1997 | 1 | To lay the foundation for PKO education domestically, in 1995 the military designated the Joint Services Staff College to be the lead institution to educate officers to become military observers and staff. In May 1998, the PKO Department was officially inaugurated within the college. Moreover, the Special Warfare Command's Education Corps will be designated as the institution solely responsible for unit-level education of PKO forces by providing solid education for infantry and engineer personnel to be dispatched. ## 3. Keeping Close Ties With The Un In a bid to nurture UN military experts, from March 1995 to March 1998, the military dispatched two Majors to the UN DPKO (Department of PKO). In December 1999, an official in charge of military affairs was sent to the Korean Mission to the UN in order to maintain close ties with the UN, and in January 2000, a planning officer was dispatched to the DPKO. ## Participation In International Security Cooperation And Arms Control Activities A. Participation In Regional And Multilateral Security Cooperation Dialogue Since the end of the Cold War, countries in the Asia-Pacific and Northeast Asian regions have started showing signs of great concern in arms reduction and arms control. They aim to increase spending on social development such as in education and welfare and to seek an economy-oriented policy in return for a partial reduction of forces and arms spending. It is hoped that this will make a positive contribution to regional stability and peace. These limited efforts, however, are not evolving into regional, comprehensive and systematic arms control regimes. Two main reasons for this are the diverse elements of perennial conflict that linger regionally including racial, religious, natural resources, and environmental problems, as well as the fact that individual nations still have different security perceptions, making it difficult to form a cohesive system for regional arms control. More than ever, it is judged that a consensus on regional arms control achieved through a multilateral security mechanism is essential from midand long-term perspectives. The ROK government is convinced that efforts to control arms through a multilateral security cooperation regime will contribute positively not only to the stability and peace in the region, but also to a peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas, arms control on the peninsula, and the creation of an environment for unification. 1. Multilateral Security Cooperation Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Two regular Asia-Pacific multilateral security cooperation dialogues are currently underway: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) at the inter-governmental level, and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia- Pacific (CSCAP) at the nongovernmental level. Currently, 23 nation members participate in the ARF, a multilateral security cooperation dialogue initiated in July 1994, including North Korea who became a member in July 2000. It consists of a Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM), and a wide range of intersessional meetings including Intersessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures (ISG-CBMs). Members exchange views on the regional security situation, and discussions on confidence-building measures, disaster relief, expert group meetings on transnational crimes (piracy, illegal immigration, illegal trafficking of small arms, etc.) and also develop preventive diplomacy that positively contributes to regional peace and stability. Participating members are actively promoting various confidence-building activities such as publication of defense policy papers, announcement 133 of defense policies, exchanges/distribution of defense white papers, participation and circulation of annually submitted materials of the UN Register of Conventional Arms(UNRCA), bilateral security/defense dialogue among regional nations, exchanges of high military officials and military exercises, and participation in arms control/nonproliferation systems (NPT, CTBT, CWC, BWC, CCW, etc.). Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) are classified into Basket 1 and Basket 2, with those to be enacted during the next one to two years belonging to the former and those to be enacted over the mid- to long -term period belonging to the latter. CBMs that belong to Basket 1 include: Seminar on Transparency and Responsibility in Transfers of Conventional Weapons in February 2001; Seminar on Shipboard Generated Waste Management in March 2001; Joint ARF Seminar on Civil-Military Relations in Peacekeeping Operations in May 2001; Meeting of Heads of National Defense Colleges and Institutions in September 2001; Workshop on Defense/Military Officials' Cooperation within ARF in August 2002; and Multilateral Exchanges and Cooperation in Military Logistics and Academic Research in Fields such as Military Law, etc. In Basket 2, Shootfest among ARF Riflemen; Military Environmental Protection Exchanges; Mutual Legal Assistance Coordination; Cooperation Against International Terrorism and Crime; Maritime CBMs and Links to Maritime Safety / Marine Environment Web Sites; etc. Furthermore, an Expert Group Meeting on Transnational Crime was held from October 30 to 31, 2000 and ISG-CBMs was co-sponsored by the ROK and Malaysia from November 1 to 3 in Seoul. The participating members have also called for constant progress in preventive diplomacy (PD) and agreed to develop this issue in intersessional meetings. On the other hand, a non-governmental multilateral security cooperation dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region for enhancing inter-state confidence and assisting in fortifying governmental level security cooperation is held in CSCAP, which was officially launched in June 1993. A total of 20 nations participate in CSCAP, including the two Koreas. CSCAP maintains a close cooperative relationship with the ARF as it makes policy proposals on regional security affairs. Developing concepts and principles in preventive diplomacy for ARF has been CSCAP' s recent contribution. ## 2. Multilateral Security Cooperation Dialogues In Northeast Asia The need for various forms of regional-level security dialogue has been brought to light since 1990 with the purpose of enhancing stability and peace in Northeast Asia. In May 1994, the ROK government officially proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) during the first ARF-SOM as a governmental level multilateral security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia. This proposal, however, made no substantial progress due to the passive stand taken by some regional countries. The ROK government has continuously sought the establishment of a multilateral security cooperation dialogue mechanism among Northeast Asian nations. In particular, with the North Korea's accession to the ARF, it is expected that active discussions on the establishment of a multilateral security cooperation dialogue mechanism in the Northeast Asian region will take place. In the meantime, multilateral security dialogues at the nongovernmentallevel are pursued at a relatively rapid pace. An example would be the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) hosted by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at the University of California, San Diego. NEACD officially started in October 1993, and individual defenseor foreign affairs-related officials or scholars from the ROK, the US, Japan, China and Russia are now participating to exchange ideas on the overall regional security issues. Although North Korea has not joined the dialogue since its participation in the July 1993 NEACD preparatory meeting, the ROK is anticipating the North's participation. The tenth plenary meeting of NEACD was held in November 2000 in Seoul. In addition to the NEACD plenary meeting, the Defense Information Sharing Study Group meeting was also held in Tokyo to search for methods to enhance military transparency among participating members. Current topics of discussion center on regional security issues including the Modernization of Military Forces and Defense Budget. ## B. Participation In International Arms Control Activities Since the end of the Cold War, the scope of international arms control, based on a broad consensus as to its necessity, has expanded to multilateral arms control, which encompasses nearly the entire world. The ROK government is also an active member of international arms control activities. Its main focus in these movements is to reflect the realities on the Korean peninsula, the national security situation and interests in the policy-making processes of international arms control organizations and inducing North Korean participation. ## 1. Nuclear Weapons Control In the 1990s, a series of notable nuclear arms control measures were undertaken. An indefinite extension of the "Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)" was approved at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in May 1995. At the resumption conference of the 52nd UN General Assembly in September 1996, the "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)" was adopted. In May 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted an a'ditional protocol named the "93+2 Program" which strengthens existing nuclear safeguards. As for the ROK, after signing it in September 1999, preparations are under way to have it ratified by the National Assembly by late 2000. Furthermore, in May 2000, the NPT Review Conference decided that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva shall conclude a "Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)" by 2005, which prohibits the production of fissile materials such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium for military use. Signatories have agreed to establish a supplementary organization for full blown nuclear disarmament negotiations stipulated in article 6 of the NPT. With its attendance at the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the ROK government has actively participated in international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The ROK is also cooperating with other international organizations to promote an early signing and ratification of the CTBT by 44 countries obligated to ratify the treaty, including the five nuclear nations, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. In addition, the ROK government is attempting to dispatch experts to various fields in the IAEA and the "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)." ## 2. Chemical Weapons Control The "Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)," entered into force on April 29, 1997, and strictly prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or retention, transfer and use of all chemical weapons. Each State Party to the Convention must submit the declaration stipulated in the provision of the convention to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) no later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force and it is subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection from the OPCW. As of September 2000, 171 nations have signed the CWC and 139 deposited their instruments of ratification or accession. The ROK government deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN on April 28, 1997 in order to take part in activities of international nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and protect the domestic chemical-related industry by getting rid of the trade restrictions. In May of the same year, the ROK was elected as a member state of the OPCW Executive Council during the first session of the Conference of the State Parties (CSP). Furthermore, Korea undertook the role of the chair nation at the third CSP session in November 1998, and fulfilled its duties as the chair nation until the commencement of the fourth CSP session in 1999. And the CSP has unanimously adopted the Korea-proposed resolution, "Recommendation on Ensuring the Universality of the Convention." The resolution reaffirms the vital and essential importance of universal adherence to the Convention for the realization of its ultimate goal of a world free of chemical weapons, urges all states which have neither ratified nor acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, and recommends that State Parties to the Convention and the Director-General of the OPCW continue to make every effort to encourage ![133_image_0.png](133_image_0.png) those states believed to possess chemical weapons, which have neither ratified nor acceded to the Convention, to do so as soon as possible. Through this resolution we expect the DPRK to join and implement the Convention. In the meantime, four ROK officers are working at the OPCW Headquarters as high- ADD Chemical Analysis Team ranking officials or international inspectors. The Chemical Analysis Team of the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) in the ROK is currently fulfilling its duties as an "Official Laboratory for Chemical Analysis" approved and designated by the OPCW since November 1998. ## 3. Biological Weapons Control The "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)," effectuated on March 26, 1975, has 145 members as of September 2000 (South Korea: June 1987; North Korea: March 1987). Because the BWC is devoid of an adequate inspection and verification system to check the observance of the BWC, member nations now focus on establishing an inspection and verification system at the Verification Experts Group (VEREX) and at the ad hoc group meetings. At the fourth Review Conference of the BWC in December 1996, members agreed to adopt inspection and verification protocols before the fifth review meeting scheduled in 2001. The ROK and western Group including the US, United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia are exerting concerted efforts to adopt the BWC verification protocols through negotiations by the end of 2000 and not later than early 2001. These negotiations, however, have hit a snag as the Nonaligned Movement nations and the western nations disagree on certain controversial points including the selection of sites and items to be inspected, visiting and inspecting systems and technological cooperation. The ROK government has positively responded to international movements to control the proliferation of biological weapons by sending its delegations composed of experts from the Korean Delegation to Geneva, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, institutes under the Ministry of Health and Welfare to the ad hoc group and review meetings. ## 4. Missile Control The modern concept of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) extends from nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (NBC) to missiles that deliver the nuclear and NBC warheads. In this respect, missile control takes a great portion of overall WMD nonproliferation efforts. The "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)," which is based on the voluntary export control of member states, is the only international missile control system in existence. The MTCR was established in 1987 among seven advanced nations, including the US and France by adopting the directives to control the interstate transfer of parts and technologies as well as the final use of missiles that can deliver at least 500kg warheads to a range of at least 300 km. The MTCR membership has expanded to 32 countries as of October 2000. Although it does not constrain the civilian aerospace industry, the MTCR has greatly contributed to the prevention and slowdown of the proliferation of attack missiles. The ROK hopes to join the MTCR, and despite its nonmembership, has observed MTCR guidelines by reflecting them in accordance with the "Public Notice on Export/Import of Strategic Materials," which has been enacted since 1993. Such decisions and efforts of the government demonstrate, more than clearly, that the ROK is well qualified to become a member of the MTCR. ## 5. Conventional Weapons Control With a sharp increase of damage done to innocent civilians in regions of international conflict caused by conventional weapons, the international community has come to realize the need to control these weapons. In particular, discussions on international control over small arms and landmines are spreading among UN members, other international organizations and nongovernmental organizations. The ROK government has been a participant in the "UN Register of Conventional Arms," implemented by UN member nations since 1993. The ROK reports the annual import and export status of the seven major conventional weapon systems registered with the UN. The ROK also participates in the Wassenaar Agreement launched in 1997 to prevent the inappropriate transfer of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. A list of arms subject to the agreement's control is included in the "Public Notice on Export/Import of Strategic Materials" to limit their exportation. As civilian casualties have recently taken a more serious turn due to landmines, an international consensus has been reached to put anti-personnel mines under control. As a result, Protocol II (Protocol on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, or the socalled "Landmine Protocol") of the "Convention of the Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)" was concluded in 1980 to prohibit the use of inhumane conventional weapons, was amended in May 1996. The amended Landmine Protocol rigidly restricts the use of landmines as it not only prohibits the use of non-detectable landmines, but also makes self-destructing and/or self-neutralizing functions of landmines mandatory. Judging that Protocol II is insufficient for obliterating anti-personnel landmine-caused casualties, however, a group of nations including Canada concluded the Ottawa Convention to ban all anti-personnel landmines. The Convention took effect on March 1, 1999. As of September, 2000, it has been signed by 139 countries, and ratified by 107. The ROK government supports the fundamental idea of a total ban of anti-personnel landmines from a humanitarian point of view. Nonetheless, because landmines are a most effective means of defense, and given the current security situation on the Korean peninsula with South-North confrontation, we cannot ratify the Ottawa Convention at this time. It is hard for the ROK to stop the use of landmines and discard its stockpile in a short time. Therefore, it is the ROK's official position that it can accede to the Convention only after alternative measures that can supplant the landmines have been devised. However, considering the necessity of utilizing and acquiring international cooperation and technological support for the elimination of landmines from the peninsula after unification, the ROK is planning to join the relatively flexible, UN-centered CCW within 2000. The ROK government on the other hand, is endeavoring to achieve an understanding of and obtain support from the international community on the current inevitability of using anti-personnel landmines due to Korea's unique security situation. At the same time, the government is doing its best to acquire alternative devices to replace anti-personnel landmines. ## Part Three Status and Tasks of National Defense ## Chapter One Mid-Term Defense Program and Defense Budget ## Chapter Two Force Improvement Programs for Advanced Weapon Systems ## Chapter Three Defense Digitization for the 21st Century ## Chapter Four Fostering Defense Manpower for Advanced Elite Force Operation ## Chapter Five Stimulating Motivation and Creating a Milieu for Stable Military Service ## Chapter Six Establishing Mobilization Posture for Total War # Chapter Or Mid-Term Defense Program And Defense Budget ## Mid-Term Defense Program A. Characteristics Of The Mid-Term Defense Program In order to plan for future defense needs, to explore the direction of military capability build-up, and to promote efficient defense expenditures, all defense tasks were classified into one of the five steps of the PPBEE System (which MND adopted in 1979, i.e., planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and evaluation), which are closely connected with one another. The Mid-Term Defense Program is the core document in the programming step of the PPBEE system, providing a blueprint that helps solidify the proposed military capability build-up and maintenance requirements for the five-year term into an executable multi-year programs within the limits of the estimated defense budget. This is established in a rolling plan that is revised and supplemented every year, based on a comprehensive assessment of various factors, including the mid- and long-term security environment, defense policy objectives, force build-up requirements, and the available defense resources. The Mid-Term Defense Program Report serves as the essential link between the planning and budgeting step and can be viewed as the starting point of defense reforms, and other policy realizations. Thus, it provides the basis for compiling a yearly defense budget as well as establishing annual unit programs such as creating, reorganizing, or disbanding units and drawing up annual military quotas and manpower management programs. ## 001-2005 Mid-Term Defense e 2001-2005 Mid-Term Defense Program was draft ve of maximizing the efficient execution of defense expenditure by nining the practicality and priority of each project in light of a Zeroerspective in order to implement essential investment as well as a tional programs within the bounds of limited available resources. e size of the available defense-related financial resources for the 2001period is in line with the ROK government's "Mid-Term Fiscal Plan for 2004 " which was that the 6% annual creath rete of the government 0-2004," which means that the 6% annual growth rate of the government . nditure was used as the basis for determining the growth rate of nse-related expenditures. As a result, the total available financial ces for defense in the next five years is projected to be 87,493.8 billion quivalent to 2.6% of GDP and 16.7% of government expenditure. e allocation of defense-related financial resources takes into account reent need for any gent need for an actual increase in defense capabilities, thus resulting defense-related financial resources from 37.0% to 40.9% by 2005." As re 3-1 shows, the relative shares of resource allocations for 2001-2005 39.5% for Force Investment and 60.5% for maintenance and operation. Is increase reflects the determination of MND to allow early acquisition. Fore defense capabilities, which ore defense capabilities, which will make possible simultaneous predness for present and future non-specific threats as well as the resultncreased maintenance and operation cost that comes along with the isition of cutting-edge military equipment. ome of the main projects represented in the FIPs include building of undetion for C4I cystems, improving counter-surveillance and undation for C4I systems, improving counter-surveillance and elece warfare capabilities, upgrading tank capabilities, procuring attack. opters, mass producing of Korean atulo and 4 octo dastronomic copters, mass producing of Korean-style and Aegis-class destroyers X-II/III), next generation fighters, and next generation guided weapons M-X), building up military technolo arting in 2000, equipment maintenance and acquisition costs, which include repair and parts ly costs, have been transferred under the 'FIP' , and the concept of life-cycle maintenance w applies to equipment acquisitions in order to seek economical maintenance and increases in e operational rate. Figure 3-1 Allocation of 2001–2005 Defense Budget ![140_image_0.png](140_image_0.png) Unit: billion won The Operation and Maintenance portion of the budget includes projects of constructing an information-based defense force, installing scientific training fields, improving environment preservation facilities, basic military camp facilities, and officer's quarters, improving military educational facilities, training defense specialists and settling financial issues involving civilian lands appropriated by the military for the protection of citizen's property rights and improvements in citizen's convenience. Furthermore, based on a mid- to long-term perspective, MND seeks to reduce investments in stationary facilities and to expand the use of fabricated buildings and container units in order to provide mobile response to the rapidly changing security environment. Such an attempt is in line with MND's objective of ensuring efficient execution of defenserelated financial resources. ## 2000 Defense Budget The FY 2000 defense budget has focused primarily on reinforcement of core fighting capabilities specializing in cutting-edge information and scientific warfare, improvement of military barracks and subsistence-related funding to boost soldiers' morale, digitization of national defense, and application of scientific methodology in the training process. Moreover, other costly expenditures were reduced to improve fiscal efficiency in the defense-related operations. ## A. General Accounts Budget The general accounts of the FY 2000 defense budget increased by 5.0% as compared with FY 1999, to 14,439 billion won, and the cross-sectional spending is listed in Table 3-1. The allocation for FIPs has increased 2.2% in comparison to that of FY 1999; however, the actual percentage of FIPs within the defense budget outlay has decreased in comparison to the 1999 figure.20 This reduction can be attributed to the government's policy of prioritizing the treatment of government employees, which meant higher wages and benefits for military personnel at the expense of a reduced allocation being available for FIPs. Table 3-1 Defense Budget in FY 2000 Unit: billion won | Classification | FY 1999 (%) | FY 2000 (%) | Increase/Decrease (%) | | | | |-------------------------|------------------|---------------|-------------------------|--------|-------|-------| | 13,749.0 (100.0) | 14,439.0 (100.0) | 690.0 | (5.0) | | | | | Total defense outlays | 113.3 | (2.2) | | | | | | FIPs | 5,230.4 | (38.0) | 5,343.7 | (37.0) | | | | Operation & maintenance | 8,518.6 | (62.0) | 9,095.3 | (63.0) | 576.7 | (6.8) | | 5,029.8 (36.6) | 5,560.9 | (38.5) | 531.1 | (10.6) | | | | Personnel expenses | 3,488.8 | (25.4) | 3,534.4 | (24.5) | 45.6 | (1.3) | | Project expenses | | | | | | | The distribution of FIPs has primarily focused on R&D expenditures for the development of precision weapon systems and cutting-edge core military technology, which would be suitable for the strategic environment of the Korean peninsula. In order to lay the core foundations for information and scientific warfighting capabilities that would be needed in the future security environment, the rate increase of FIPs reflected a greater rate for the Navy and the Air Force than for the Army. Ordinary Operation and Maintenance expenses have increased by 6.8% in comparison to that of FY 1999; however, when excluding the increase in wages and benefits for military personnel, other major operations expenses have increased by only 1.3%. The distribution of available financial resources pri- 2) 'FIPs' for 1999 have been re-accounted to apply the newly created accounting standard set for 'FIPs' starting in 2000. Previously, prior to the 2000 accounting standards, 'Defense Capability Improvement Costs' were used in lieu of 'FIPs'. ![142_image_1.png](142_image_1.png) 1) Unit activities: facility operation, computerization/information, acquisition, USFK support, etc. 2) Others: training, reserve force capability, R&D support, basic project expenses, etc. rily focused ![142_image_0.png](142_image_0.png) the forward-looki areas, namely, train- ing defense specialists, digitization of national defense, and scientific training. Unnecessary and non-urgent projects were eliminated or drastically reduced in scope, improving the efficiency and execution of defense-related operations and maintenance ## B. Special Accounts Budget There are three Special Accounts budgets under the control of the MND the Special Accounts for Military Pensions, the Special Account onal Property Management, and the Special Accounts for Executive Agency. Revenues for the Special Accounts for Military Pensions come from i vidual contributions of soldiers on active duty, government payments and subsidies from the national treasury. The Special Accouparisons are used to provide annual pensions for retired military personnel. The Special Accouparisons for ro to FY 199 sion receivership, necessary improvements in personnel treatment, and increased demand for the one-time payment of retirement pesion. Revenues for the Special Accounts fo are derived from selling military facilities that were located in or near the central parts of cities; then, those revenues are spent on relocating military ilities to the suburbs or purchasing private land that the military is currently using. In order to settle civil petitions, the Special Accounts for National Property Management for FY 2000 set aside 241.4 billion won for relocating 34 military facilities and purchasing private land that military units are presently using. The Special Accounts for Executive Agency were created for the first time in FY 2000, following the appointment of the Defense Media Service (formerly known as Defense Media Management Center) as an Executive Agency; 18.5 billion won was allocated for this need. MND forced the transformation of the Defense Media Service into a Designated MND Agency in order to increase the efficiency and public nature of its operation. ## The Need For A Secure And Appropriate Defense Budget The Republic of Korea has been pushing for military modernization programs since the 1970s; yet Korea is still short of maintaining a self-reliant war deterrence capability. Furthermore, to secure the cutting-edge technology for countering non-specific security threats in the future, MND foresees the need for immense financial resources. Additionally, due to the rise in the standard of living in the civilian sector, a comparable increase in the standard of living for troops will be necessary, and the need to press ahead with improvements in forward looking projects in scientific training and defense digitization requires a continuous increase in demand for current operations and maintenance expenditures. The effectiveness of the ROK government's North Korean policy is necessarily tied to maintaining an unwavering defensive posture in the South; hence, an appropriate defense budget must have priority in the allocation of the national budget from the perspective of national strategy. Since the 1990s, however, the ratio of the defense budget to the national economy or the total government budget has consistently decreased. Currently, it stands at the rate of 2.7% of GDP, and 16.7% of the total government budget (General Accounts) for FY 2000. Considering the increase rate of the defense budget for the past five years, the increase rate for the defense budget stands at only half the increase rate of the total government budget, largely due to the financial crisis in 1998 and 1999. If one takes into Figure 3roportion of Defense Outlays to GDP and Government Outla ![144_image_1.png](144_image_1.png) ![144_image_0.png](144_image_0.png) account the inflation rate and currency depreciation of the Won against the US dollars, the actual purchasing power of the Korean defense budget is equivalent to the 1980s' level. The defense outlay of the Republic of Korea (2.7% of GDP) is not in any way high when considering the size of the Korean economy. Countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, facing similar security concerns, maintain average defense outlays of 11.3% of GDP, four times the Korean defense outlay. Even a nation like Singapore who faces no immediate security concerns spends 5.0% of GDP on defense. In light of these circumstances, the ROK Armed Forces are striving to reduce spending and pursue the most efficient method to carry out defense tasks. Unfortunately, belt-tightening efforts alone will not be sufficient to meet the financial demands required to construct a future-oriented, hightech force structure that can respond sufficiently to both present and future security threats. Taking into account that the fielding of advanced weapon systems, training defense specialists, and military organizational restructuring require a long lead-time of 10 years or more, the ratio of the defense budget to GDP must be maintained at a minimum of 3% for a long period of time in order to press ahead with mid- to long-term defense build-up programs (Figure 3-3).3) 3) KIDA, TMid- and Long-Term Defense Budget Need Determination_ (1997), 「Establishi Determination System for Mid- and Long-Term Defense Resources Availability」(1999), # Chapter Two Force Improvement Programs For Advanced Weapon Systems ## Policy Directions For Defense Acquisition The two goals of defense acquisition are as follows: acquiring and fielding high performance weapon systems at a reasonable cost within the requested time frame; and obtaining R&D capabilities for certain key weapon systems and thus realizing a revolution in military affairs (RMA) pertaining to defense technology. Under these goals, MND has set five defense acquisition policy directions. ![145_image_0.png](145_image_0.png) 3. Ensuring the high performance of weapon systems and combat effectiveness of ![145_image_1.png](145_image_1.png) ![145_image_2.png](145_image_2.png) 5. Enhancing efficiency, professionalism, and clarity in acquisition procedures First, in order to upgrade the domestic defense science and technology capacity, MND will pave the way for technological reform by increasing investment in R&D for major weapon systems, core technologies, and parts. R&D will also be pursued under the principle of "priority to domestically produced weapons." MND plans to take various measures to strengthen the capability of the domestic defense industries to develop technologies and to give them a competitive edge, e.g., encouraging defense industrial companies to step up restructuring efforts, developing support systems for industry, etc. Second, cost-effective acquisition will be sought by diversifying the procurement sources of weapon systems and broadening international cooper- ![146_image_0.png](146_image_0.png) ation in defense industry and technology. Low-cost, highly-efficient acquisition methods will be constantly developed, including the utilization of commodities, performance upgrades, etc. MND will also reinforce pre- and post-evaluations and cost controls, and develop an "integrated project management system" and a "target management system." Third, the ROK military will ensure weapon systems performance and the combat effectiveness of integrated systems by developing specialized test and evaluation systems and by acquiring such package elements as Integrated Logistics Support. Furthermore, it will enhance integrated realtime combat capabilities through the acquisition of new integrated major and peripheral equipment systems. Integrated combat capability will be fully manifested through the early establishment of an automated information system that will ensure information sharing and dissemination. Rational establishment of technological and concomitant capacities will not only ensure the trustworthiness of these systems but also verify and improve the operational capabilities continuously. Fourth, acquisition projects, which link defense science and technology to national science and technology, i.e., civil-military dual-use technology, will be briskly promoted. MND will emphasize defense acquisition projects that can be carried out in conjunction with the development of national infrastructure industries. Fifth, MND will build acquisitions systems that are appropriate for the Electronic/Information Age, e.g., the automatic office-work performance system and the continuous acquisition and life-cycle support system (CALS), and those systems that enhance efficiency, professionalism and clarity in acquisition procedures. In addition, MND will install networks and databases for collecting, analyzing, disseminating and utilizing acquisition-related information, and accordingly, it will systematically secure, educate and manage professional manpower. Above all, the ROK military will build clear acquisition procedures by furthering information disclosure and upgrading fair decision-making processes to win the public's trust. ## · Changes In The Acquisition Policy Since the creation of the ROK forces in 1949, our military power had been maintained based on military equipment from U.S. forces. However, a serious build-up of our own military capabilities did not start until the early 1970's when armed guerrillas from the North attacked the Blue House and the withdrawal of an infantry division of the U.S. forces stationed in the Korean peninsula heightened the security threat level on the peninsula. At that time, securing self-reliant defense capabilities through military modernization was an urgent necessity, and as a consequence, an eight-year defense improvement plan, and a five-year defense plan (1st and 2nd Yulgok Projects) were actively supported in order to promote imitative development and import technology-oriented production. Additionally, efforts were concentrated on the promotion of defenserelated industry, which meant that the domestic manufacture of most conventional weapons became possible. The weapons acquisition plan of the 1970s~1980s can be labeled as 'home production of weapons." With the 1990's came an increased demand for core technology that was necessary to develop cutting-edge precision weapons; it soon became evident that imitative development and import technology-oriented production limit advancements. The dependence of ROK forces on U.S. manufactured weapons increased. However, the U.S. shied away from transferring key technologies. As a result, MND pushed for diversification of acquisition routes for weapons procurement. The ROK forces weapons acquisition plan of the 1990's transformed into 'home production of weapons and source diversification' which was based on existing domestic weapons production and seeking additional advancements through cooperation with Western European nations on defense-industry and technology issues. Currently, considering our weapons acquisition landscape, one observes the need for acquisition of weapons technology development abilities, a higher degree of precision for weapon systems, and a more complex and integrated method of acquisition demands. Furthermore, an economic, cost-effective, and technology-oriented acquisition plan is needed, and increased clarity in military acquisition projects that are executed as part of defense capabilities improvement programs has taken on increased importance. Accordingly, MND has completely reviewed and revalidated the existing acquisition plans in 1999 to allow an efficient response to the acquisition environment of the 21st century and the timely completion of defense capabilities improvement goals. Such novel efforts are supported in light of future-oriented and complete perspectives. ## Rovements In The Defense Acc ![148_Image_0.Png](148_Image_0.Png) In order to ensure transparency in the weapons procurement proced the ROK forces amended the acquisition system on several occasions, and in 1999 systematic operational guidelines were set in place that would fun- damentally secure transparency in the acquisition process. ## A. Public Disclosure Of The Acquisition Process For a firm to develop weapon systems and produce and participate by the man ce 5 formation is classified as secret and, as a regul, the a neeul, the amerity, he wever, most the the almenter, most the the erkment mester, most are mene mesti class fouriers in order in order and privile collegates or Arupture issues as as as recume unders in orde and privile collentes or and resulver and resulver any my my mane a ## B. Clear Setting And Prior Notification Of Decision Making Stand And Guidelines Decisions on type classification, acquisition method, and company se tion for delivery are the most sensitive topics in the acquisition decision process. Thus, no matter how much the military tries to ensure fairness in executing defense projects, when specific standards and procedures are not clearly established, such an effort will eventually lead to structural problems of mistrust and misgivings about the final decision by the companies which failed to obtain the right to delivery. In order to resolve these problems, MND requires all participants in the acquisition process to be notified, prior to decision making, of every evaluation element and standard. Additionally, participants will be notified of each evaluation result and the result of the decision making process. This notification process is systematically applied to every decision making process that involves comparative evaluation among participants, such as the decision on type classification and acquisition methods, field trial evaluation, or company selection for delivery. Evaluation elements, standards and procedures are developed within the departments responsible for each project. However, experts from related institutions and departments like MND, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the demanding service component, KIDA, and ADD will participate in an open forum to certify the evaluation methodology. Prospective participants are notified of this methodology prior to the evaluation through RFPs. ## C. Prevention Of Exorbitant Payments/Budget Waste Through Improvement In Cost Information Verifying Abilities Exorbitant payments made for weapons acquisition and subsequent suspicion of budget waste took place in the past due to lack of expert analysis on cost/price information and capability of inspection. In order to eradicate such suspicions, the collection · analysis · accumulation · distribution · application system was streamlined to a single line, and the cost-analysis element and its role were strengthened. Additionally, KIDA became responsible for expert cost analysis. These steps have improved analysis and inspection of cost/price information. ## D. Promotion Of Information Exchange Between The Military And Arms Industry Participants Information exchange between the military and arms industry participants is limited by the existing official contact channels and the military tradition of avoiding direct contact with industry personnel. These limitations lead to few opportunities for industry participants to promote and participate in procurement efforts, and the privileged treatment of certain companies as well as a loss of fair evaluation standards in the acquisition process have surfaced as the main problems. Accordingly, MND has secured an official channel for information exchange between the military and the arms industry through which the companies can properly provide information on their products and the military can, without any reservation, demand specifications from companies that manufacture products for acquisition. Information requests and retrievals are made on the Internet Home Page on a bilateral basis and, when needed, a standard format for information requests/retrievals is released publicly to formalize information collection. Furthermore, the industry's weapons product/technology conferences are fully utilized to promote frequent and expansive information exchange. ## Status Of Force Improvement Programs A. Assessment Of 1999 Force Improvement Programs Force Improvement Programs (FIPs) in FY 1999 suffered through major difficulties in executing the ordinary FIPs budget due to exchange rate and price instability that originated from the financial crisis, poor defense industry management conditions caused by corporate restructuring and labor disputes, creditors' refusal of payment guarantee, and early shut-down of operations for possible Y2K computerrelated problems. Figure 3-4 Allocation of 1999 FIPs Investment ![150_image_0.png](150_image_0.png) Accordingly, FIPs, if possible, transferred the weapons acquisition routes from foreign to domestic in order to promote domestic employment stability and increase the operations rate of the domestic defense industry. Additionally, a budget was executed early in the fiscal year with an aim of aiding the depressed domestic economy. As a result, actual resources earmarked for FIPs in 1999 stood at 3,761.2 billion won, and the allocation can be broken down into equipment/supplies, R&D, and facilities improvement as indicated in Figure 3-4. ## B. Plans For 2000 Force Improvement Programs 1. Scope Of Investment Of the total defense budget, which amounts to 14,439 billion won, 5,343.7 billion won was set aside for FIPs. This is 37.0% of the total defense budget and is an increase of approximately 1,600 billion won from 1999. However, | | Unit: billion won | | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------| | | Number | Amount | | | Classification | Projects | of Projects | | | Acquisition of strategic intelligence and battlefield surveillance capability (signal | | | | | and imagery intelligence collecting equipment, surveillance radar,night vision | 17 | 227.1 | | | goggles, etc.) | | | | | Strike capability | 1,316.7 | | | | | 34 | | | | ( MLRS, submarines, destroyers, KF-16 fighters) | | | | | On-going | Enhancement of basic, mandatory force capability | | | | (K-9 self-propelled artillery, tactical communications system, small vessels, 2nd | 5 | 1,247.5 | | | projects | MCRC, etc.) | | | | Projects to ensure war sustainability and survivability | | | | | (reinforcement of operational bases, repair and maintenance, various ammuni- | 90 | 1,702.6 | | | tion, etc.) | | | | | R&D and central support | | | | | (development of high-tech weapon systems, development of core technology, | 38 | 655.0 | | | defense cost-sharing, etc.) | | | | | Combat intelligence and surveillance capability | 2 | 4.2 | | | (surface surveillance equipment, creation of intelligence battalion) | | | | | Enhancement of strike capability | 4 | 135.5 | | | Newly- | (increased production of KF-16s, amphibious assault armored vehicle, etc.) | | | | launched | Basic and mandatory force capability | | | | projects | (reinforcement of Lynx operability, mock hawk combat system, fixed model | 5 | 14.1 | | TACAN, etc.) | | | | | Force capability to ensure war sustainability and survivability | | | | | (DP-ICM specification improvements, portable ground positioning systems, sub- | 4 | 41.0 | | | marine exercise equipment, etc.) | Total | 5,343.7 | | Table 3-2 Breakdown of 2000 FIPs Investment when accounting for the fact that approximately 1,500 billion won worth of repair and maintenance parts of the budget have been reclassified into the budget for FIPs, the actual increase stands at 113.3 billion won, which is 2.2% of the total defense budget. This year's FIPs focus on strengthening the weaknesses of the current force capability and expanding core technology development and base facilities for research for self-reliant weapons system management in the 21st century. Table 3-2 shows the breakdown and details of the 2000 FIP investments. ## 2. Major Projects In 2000 a. Ground Force Additional acquisition of ![152_image_0.png](152_image_0.png) 230mm multiple launch rocket systems(MLRS) capable of concentrated strikes, lattice structure tactical communications system(SPI- DER) capable of total integrated communication support, tactical C4I systems, K- 9 155mm self-propelled artillery pieces, and short- ▲ K-9 155mm self-propelled artillery range ground-to-air guided missiles (Chonma) will be continuously pursued by the ground forces. In addition, Korean land mine layers, DP-ICM specification improvements, portable Global Positioning System, the activation of a scientific national training center, and expansion of the 3rd Munitions Depot are slated for initial deployments. ## B. Naval Force Construction of large tonnage cargo ships, the first Korean destroyer in the KDX-II class, 209-class submarines, and the 1st and 2nd mine sweepers, improvement of PCC anti-ship capabilities, and development of a submarine command and communications control system will be continuously pursued. In addition, a 2nd KDX-II, next-generation submarines, domestically developed beach-land- ![153_image_0.png](153_image_0.png) ing troop transport armored vehicle, SM-II/SAAM missiles which will be deployed on destroyers, and a towed array sonar system to counter enemy torpedo attacks are slated for initial developments and deployments. ## C. Air Force ![153_Image_1.Png](153_Image_1.Png) The development of the T- 50 high-level training aircraft system, introduction of CN- 235 mid-class transport plane, securing domestic mass production of KT-1 training aircraft, replacement of an obsolete radar system, repaving of airfield runways, and development of an KF-16 fighter unmanned warning system are the main objectives of the Air Force. The fostering of the domestic aircraft industry by additional production of the KF-16, acquisition of flight crew night vision goggles, and development of electronic warfare training equipment for improvement of pilots' electronic ![153_image_2.png](153_image_2.png) warfare responsiveness are slated for initial deployment in 2000. Unmanned aircraft (UAV) ## D. R&D MND intends to invest heavily in the development of high-tech weapons and in securing the ability to develop long-term core technologies suitable for the Korean military environment. Included among these soon-to-be-launched projects for systems development are: external electronic warfare equipment for combat aircraft, automated command post systems including the Korean Naval Tactical Data System (KNTDS), the second air force Master Control and Reporting Center (MCRC), UAVs, and a remote-controlled automated chemical warfare alert system. ## Strengthening The Basis For The Domestic Defense Industry A. Expanding Support For R&D Of High-Tech Weapons Suited For The Korean Military Serious defense-related R&D efforts were launched with the establishment of ADD in 1970, and for the past 30 years, the ROK military has succeeded in domestically producing most conventional weapons, which contributed greatly to the establishment of a "self-reliant defense posture." However, because the primary focus is on the domestic production of conventional weapons, the ROK military is still dependent on the developed nations for their supply of cutting-edge core technologies. As a result, in order to secure cutting-edge weapons development capabilities which would allow for responsiveness to future security environments, the ROK military has set a goal of "acquiring the ability to develop defense science technology on a par with that of advanced nations by 2015," and has systematically pushed ahead with the "Five Plans for the Advancement of Defense Science Technology," established by the MND. First, the ROK military will select the areas in need of cutting-edge core technologies which would help develop preparedness for future conflicts and, based upon such selection, press for a technological leap which would allow the ROK military to reach a technological level on a par with the advanced nations. To this end, MND published the Defense Science Technology Plan in 1999, and selected "14 major projects for weapon systems and 21 core technologies" to strategically support development efforts which will help the ROK military secure the basis for the future high-tech weapons development capabilities based on the new technology/new con- Figure 3-5 Concept for Stages of Improvement ![155_image_0.png](155_image_0.png) cept. Additionally, through step-wise concentrated investment and development, MND hopes to lay the foundations for weapons development, then concentrate on development based on the established foundation. Subsequently, a selective-leap method would be used in the end to select only the cutting-edge technologies that possess global competitiveness. Other areas will receive sponsorship through the gradual expansion of the general technology base, relying on compatible technologies for civilian and military purposes and common technology foundations. (Figure 3-5) Second, core technologies will be acquired through low-cost/high-efficiency methodology. To this end, seeking to maximize the efficiency of research activities, various technology acquisition models will be applied at each stage and every objective level for technology development. In particular, importing the core technology at its nascent stage and pursing application and improvement-oriented development efforts (so called 'mid-entry' technological development) will be expanded in order to drastically reduce the development time and the budget. Third, in order to achieve efficient technology acquisition, MND plans to make maximal use of the nation's existing scientific technology base. To this end, MND will actively participate in the initial legislative drafting of the 'National Scientific Technology Council' document, which would allow the aim of the national scientific technology policy to coincide with defense science technology. Defense R&D is conducted through a cooperative research system among industry, academia, and research centers. For the systematic, efficient execution of basic research conducted in academic fields, MND has designated five University-Based Research Centers (URCs) and government-funded research institutions since 1994. With an eye on promoting defense science and technology in connection with the progress of national science and technology, the government enacted the Dual-Use Technology Programs Promotion Act in April 1998 and, since the enactment, four government agencies have closely coordinated their efforts on four main projects: technology development, technology transfer, harmonization of standards, and exchange of technical information. Related to such efforts, within the two years since 1997, government agencies launched 7 demonstrative development projects, and in 1999 a total of 47 projects were initiated, showing a gradual increase in efforts. Fourth, the strengthening of the technology development oriented plan management system. To this end, the entire process of core technology development, specifically the planning, programming, development, application, and feed-back stages, has been designed to be uniformly executed, and the defense science technology database would be constructed in such a way as to ensure that developed technologies would not only be simply compiled in the data base, but directly applied in all stages. Such actions would allow the construction of knowledge-based comprehensive management systems Lastly, for the long term fostering and support of the defense R&D, MND is gradually expanding the R&D investment budget; currently, MND invests about 5% of its budget in R&D, but expects to reach a 10% level by 2015. Furthermore, MND plans to secure science technology experts for research, as well as secure sufficient funding for establishing a foundation for digitization, which would lead to the build-up of science and technology projects. In particular, in order to place emphasis on R&D efforts for advanced technology which would be needed in future conflicts, MND restructured ADD into a recognized research center specializing in high-tech weapon systems and core technology development since March of 2000. Additionally, R&D subsidies and bonus incentives for researchers would be provided for to stimulate productive R&D activities through adoption and execution of various incentive mechanisms. Thus, the ROK military has pushed ahead with future oriented policy objectives and, in so doing, has independently acquired core technologies and advanced weapon systems suited to the Korean environment. Such efforts would lay a solid foundation for becoming a self-reliant nation equipped with advanced defense science technologies suited for the 21st century. ## B. Securing Competitiveness In The Defense Industry And Consolidating Its Foundation Since the enactment of the Special Law on the Defense Industry in 1973, the defense industry succeeded in domestically producing many conventional weapons by the mid-1980s and did its part in developing industries in the domestic private sector in such fields as precision machinery and the heavy chemical industry. Almost 80 companies in the defense industry produce approximately 330 defense items whose sales amount to around 3,400 billion won per year. Despite the quantitative growth, however, the increased need for sophisticated weapon systems and the drive for globalization of weapons system development have resulted in lower basic weaponry requirements on the part of the military during the 1990s. Accordingly, the operation rate of the domestic defense industrial firms stands at just 50%, adding to the difficulties the companies are already experiencing. Thus, MND implemented policies aimed at developing and fostering a system of first- and second-tier companies in order to consolidate the nation's defense industry. ## 1.Developing A System Of First- And Second-Tier Defense Companies In January 1999, the Special Law on the Defense Industry was amended, providing more opportunities for qualified firms with advanced technologies to participate in the acquisition process. Additionally, MND resolved the problem of redundant investment. It allows items, whose production facilities and technologies are often interchangeable with those of the civil- ![158_image_0.png](158_image_0.png) ian sector, to be produced through competitive bidding. On the other hand, certain companies are designated to be fully responsible for developing items that require a large investment but have little demand from the military. Accordingly, pan-governmental evaluation experts have surveyed the companies, opening 19 of 47 detailed-fields (40%) in the First-tier and 147 of 241 items (61%) in the Second-tier to open-competition companies, and reduced the First-tier companies to 86 from 172, resulting in a drastic reorganization of First- and Second-tier defense companies and items. Of the items to be produced by Second-tier companies, 22 items are designated for only small- or medium-sized venture companies to compete for. ## 2. Efforts To Encourage Contractors To Consolidate The Defense Industrial Infrastructure In order to encourage defense companies' investment in R&D as well as the stockpiling of raw materials, MND financed these firms with a total of 321.1 billion won that included 118.6 billion won from the defense industrial fund created from 1980 to 1999 to foster and aid the national defense industry. In 2000, MND provided a total of 42.5 billion to 24 defense industrial companies as subsidies for stockpiling raw materials and for R&D purposes, and the defense industrial fund will be annually created to quickly reach the goal of 300 billion won. As a result, MND will increase the scope of the aid. In addition, to decrease defense costs and alleviate defense companies' financial difficulties stemming from taxation on defense materials, MND is continually working to revise the relevant tax laws to reduce or extend to zero the rate for customs tariffs, special consumption tax, and value-added tax in the defense industry. Moreover, in March 1999, the Executive Order on Special Measures for the Defense Industry was revised in order to allow idle defense production lines to be removed since the existence of these idle facilities overburdened the management of their companies. On the other hand, since the currency crisis of 1997-1998, in order to promote a smooth re-structuring and bring in foreign investments, MND has allowed foreigners to invest in domestic defense firms to the extent that such investments and subsequent acquisitions do not threaten national security. ## 3. Strengthening International Defense Industry Cooperation The ultimate goal of international cooperation in the defense industry is to enhance the competitiveness of the domestic defense industry by encouraging joint projects through strengthened international cooperation, joint production, and cooperative export. Furthermore, MND devised institutional methods to foster quality assurance, exchanges of scientists and data technologies, and the conclusion of agreements to provide price information. The latter is crucial to guaranteeing stable operation and maintenance of imported weapons on a long-term basis during the life cycle of the weapons. To date, MND has concluded defense industry cooperation agreements with 18 countries, including the U.S., Turkey, France, Indonesia, and Venezuela. This expansion in defense cooperation has diversified the industrial cooperation with European, Asian and South American countries, departing from the previous U.S. oriented cooperative basis. In the future, MND will increase cooperative ties with possible export nations for defense industry products. Meanwhile, MND has relaxed restrictions and increased support for export and marketing activities through military attaches abroad. Recently, MND initiated measures to relax the restrictions on rights to export defense industry products from the issuing of licenses to a simple listing of intents to export. In the case of exporting defense industry products, the legal basis for providing support to military-owned equipment and facilities has been laid down and military-diplomatic ties with the main arms export target nations have been strengthened. Additionally, at the 2nd floor of the War Memorial Building, models of a K-9 self-propelled howitzer, a T-50 advanced trainer plane, and other domestically produced advanced defense products are displayed for public information purposes. Furthermore, MND hosted the Seoul Air Show in 1996 and 1998 in order to demonstrate the nation's defense and aerospace technologies throughout the world and to seek out fields in which technological cooperation with advanced countries are possible. In 2001, the ROK Air Force, the ![160_image_0.png](160_image_0.png) Korea Aerospace Industries Association, and the Korea Defense Industry Association will co-host the Third Seoul Air Show, where ground and naval defense products will simultaneously be displayed to advertise the high quality of Korean defense products. # Chapter Three Defense Digitization For The 21St Century ## Directions For Defense Digitization Defense digitization is the process of transforming the overall defense structure into an information and knowledge-based one using the latest information technology consisting of computers and high-tech communications equipment. Its ultimate goal in war is to support command and control and bring about a quick victory by providing real-time battlefield intelligence and in peacetime, to guarantee the economical operation of the military via efficient defense resource management. | Core Areas (5) | Main Projects (15) | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · Creation of Integrated Defense C4I system for execution of Information/System | | | Creation of Integrated | | | Defense Digitization | integrated warfare | | · Creation of Integrated Defense Resource Management System for efficient | | | Network for information | defense operation | | warfare in the future | · Laying the foundation for Defense Information and Communication | | · Encouraging the Defense CIO system and its organization | | | Improving and increas- | · Complementing and improving organization specializing in digitization and their | | ing the efficiency of | | | human resources net- | role | | · Fostering experts in the digitization field and the education of all armed forces | | | work/pool for digitization | personnel in information technology | | · Building the basis for system integration and common maintenance environment | | | Improving the system | · Improving the evaluation procedure and operation management for defense | | and arrangements of | digitization | | · Business Process Reengineering (BPR) in all defense-related activities utilizing | | | digitization process | information digitization | | · Maintenance of the defense simulation environment | | | Build-up of Defense model- | | | ing and simulation capabili- | · Laying the basis for distributed simulation | | · Build-up of a simulation and modeling system for each branch of the military and | | | ties relying on Information | | | Communication technology | for each unit of the military | | Increasing cooperative | · Increasing the cooperative ties for national digitization efforts | | · Fully relying on the national digitization infrastructure | | | efforts with national digi- | · Building a cooperative basis for digitization fields including the industry, academia, | | tization policy objectives | and research institutes | To fulfill these goals, MND has selected 5 core areas of concentration and 15 main projects and classified them into stages as a part of the digitization policy of the ROK military. The first stage is to lay the foundations for digitization by building an ultra-high speed defense information communications network by 2005 and, in so doing, first build the command and control system (C4I) and the defense resource maintenance system which will function as the core systematic foundation for defense digitization. The second stage is to increase processing capabilities and integrate various systems while keeping up with the information technology environment by 2010 and in the process, seek to maximize efficiency in systems maintenance. The third stage is to build all encompassing defense digitization systems appropriate for a knowledge-based information society by 2015; such measures are aimed at launching the digital status of the ROK military into the top 10 ranking of militaries from around the world within the area of the digitization. ## Establishment Of A Command And Control System For Integrated Warfare Future warfare will not be mobile warfare centered on manpower and materiel; it will evolve into an integrated information systems warfare which will integrate battlefield functions where each service of the military will be an essential element of future warfare. To prepare for such a battlefield environment, the ROK military is in the process of constructing an integrated defense C4I system, joint and combined C4I systems, and a tactical C4I system for each service of the military. ## A. Integrated Defense C4I System An integrated defense C4I system would be the core of the joint C4I system and, in times of war, a national emergency planning system and a combined C4I system will also be coordinated with the integrated defense C4I system to completely command and control national warfare. To this end, the basis for a national information system and the coordinated maintenance operation environment will be constructed prior to other initiatives. Figure 3-6 Integrated Defense C4I System Diagram ![163_image_0.png](163_image_0.png) ## B. Joint And Combined C4I Systems Since 1999, the joint and combined C4I systems have overseen the operation of the Command Post Automation System (CPAS), which is the automation method of maintaining the joint chiefs of staff and command posts of each main strategic unit of the army, navy, and the air force. Based on CPAS, MND is pressing ahead for building a joint C4I system which would integrate joint military information systems, joint operations planning, programming and execution system, and combined war game systems. Additionally, Global Command and Control System-Korea (GCCS-K) and an information collection system, which are used for coordinating Korean-American efforts, will be integrated with the joint C4I system in order to gain superiority in battlefield information gathering abilities and to promote the efficient operation of the C4I system. ## C. Tactical C4I System Of Each Service The C4I system in each service is being built in sequential stages in order to focus on essential functions and accommodate the different missions and battlefield functions of each service; the tactical C4I system for each service forms the lowest level of the command and control structure in which the information collection assets (Sensor) and strike capabilities (Shooter) are connected in real time. Such a system will be coordinated with the joint and combined C4I systems so as to allow smooth interface between the information collection system and the weapon systems. The goals of the ROK Army are to automate the battle field functions of tactical echelons of the corps-level and below it and then establish an integrated combat management system. Bearing this in mind, in 1999 the army built and operated a demonstration system in one of its operational units, and as a result, sequential stages are set around the essential functions to improve capabilities and seek systematic expansion simultaneously. In the ROK Navy, the Korean Naval Tactical Data System (KNTDS), which automates surface and vessel situation information processing, is already in full operation in certain theaters of operation and its operational areas will be expanded. At the same time, some of the capabilities will be complemented to allow surface situation information processing in real time that would make integrated surface operations command and control possible; such improvements would upgrade the KNTDS into a potent tactical C4I system and allow coordinated operations with the ROK Army and the Air Force. The tactical C4I system of the ROK Air Force is the Master Control and Reporting Center (MCRC) and because its features are aging and nearing obsolescence, the construction of 2nd MCRC will be completed by 2002 for use in tactical operations. The 2nd MCRC will be coordinated with the command & control and information collection system for tactical wings to build a fully coordinated C4I system, and such a system would allow coordinated operations with the ROK Army and the Navy. ## Establishment Of A Resource Management System For Efficient Defense Administration A. Defense Cals And Ec System MND established the Defense CALS Master Plan in 1997 and is doing its utmost to complete construction of a defense CALS based on this plan to automate the acquisition and disposition of defense related items throughout their life cycle in order to prevent waste of the defense budget. For a smooth operation of the defense CALS system, MND is concentrating its efforts on standardizing the operating procedures while concurrently pressing for the development of the complete system. At the same time, acquisition of computing equipment and a digital communication network is taking place as one of the objectives of MND. When the defense CALS system is completely set up for front-line units with respect to ammunition, equipment maintenance, transportation and facilities information systems, the On-Line Real Time mode will be the functioning mode under which all the units of the ROK military, including MND, operate. Furthermore, an integrated database system will be established for joint operation of all the services (the army, the navy, and the air force) and a real time display of crucial information and efficient supply support will be realized. Due to recent developments in the Internet, the global economy is moving towards the paradigm of Electronic Commerce (EC) and under such a rapidly evolving environment, a nation or an institution that cannot adjust ![165_image_0.png](165_image_0.png) Figure 3-7 Defense CALS Objectives System Diagram to the changing milieu of commerce will fail to survive in the 21st century, called "the time of infinite competition." To adjust to the shifting paradigm of commerce the ROK government is trying its utmost to increase the nation's competitiveness and build a knowledge-based management structure into existing industries; to this end, the ROK government has selected the acquisition and supply chain of the ROK military as the route on which the 'Model Project for Government-Industry Electronic Commerce' will be carried out. Accordingly, MND has built the Defense Procurement Agency Management Information System (DPAMIS) and peripheral system interconnecting MND, industry, and financial institutions for information sharing and exchange. By the end of 2000, in conjunction with Government Integrated Technical Information System (GITIS), the Procurement Electronic Data Interface (EDI) will have been set for an expansion that would allow a customer-oriented information system by which a procurement technical information service, electronic auction, and expanded Webservices will be available. Subsequently, according to the Defense CALS total development plan, a military supply system that integrates the process from acquisition stage to the actual operations at the field-unit is being constructed and such a system will be interwoven with the ROK government, civilian, and foreign defense-related systems so as to make real time support possible during times of peace and war. ## B. Functional Resource Management System MND has classified defense resources according to their respective assignments and functions and considered the life-span of defense resources in order to increase operational efficiency. Such considerations and classifications will be the bedrock of a cutting-edge information system that will be integrated in sequential stages. From 1995 to 2007, the primary focus will be to establish a foundation and expand capabilities by building a comprehensive defense budget management system and human resources management system, among others. For each service, and for each of the functions (Personnel, Adjutant, Judge Defense Resource Management System Development Plan ![167_image_0.png](167_image_0.png) Figure 3-8 Advocate, Military Police, Inspector, Intelligence, etc.), the system will be expanded in the construction process. From 2007 to 2010, this system will be integrated to include MND and the field units, and crucial data classified according to functionalities will be stored in the policy DB. The policy DB will be developed to aid in the decision-making process. Additionally, by 2015, a system comparable to the standards of advanced nations will be completed; during this time frame, a comprehensive defense resources management DB and a decision guidance system for service branch or function should be completed. ## C. Implementation Of Office Automation System Since 1996, MND has pressed ahead with the agenda of realizing small but efficient digital defense and paperless defense administrative work by adopting and implementing the defense office automation system in the entire military. Such an office automation system is set for transformation into a Webbased environment and relies on the latest information technology. By the end of 2000, division and brigade units will have the LAN infrastructure in place and, by 2004, regimental units will have their proprietary LAN installed. By 2001, administrative personnel in the division and brigade units will have one PC per person to carry out their duties and, gradually, PC's will be supplied to administrative personnel at the company level. Building the Base of an Information Technology System Allowing Real Time Information Processing ## A. Laying The Foundation For The Defense Digitization Communication System The defense digitization communication system is designed to guarantee the production, preservation and flow of all military information necessary for warfighting and defense-related activities. It is a system that cross-connects the strategic and tactical information communication systems linked with the National Ultra-Speed Information Network and the Satellite Communications Network, which will be implemented on a gradual basis. Such a system calls for the formation of a Wide Area Network (WAN) and a ![168_image_0.png](168_image_0.png) Figure 3-9 Defense Digitization Communication Network System Diagram Local Area Network (LAN) in regimental units or higher echelons by the end of 2000. Additionally, each unit will possess an Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) switch to process large quantities of military information. Furthermore, the defense digitization communication network is being built with the intent of securing Wide-band information processing and real-time synchronization of operations among the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. These efforts will lead to the construction of a defense digitization communication system for real time, ultra-speed processing of large blocks of military information by 2005. ## B. Ensuring Network Security For The Defense Digitization Communication Network Due to the rapid developments of the digitization and information processing capabilities of the military, large quantities of military information are being processed at a high speed and with increased accuracy; such advancements result in increased risk of information leaks. To counter such a possibility, the defense digitization network will be closed to outsiders, and it will operate independently from the Internet and other outside networks. Additionally, the proper prevention of information leakage along communication lines between separate units will be ensured by operating a security lock between each unit. All the information will be encoded (100%) to completely prevent hacking on inter-unit lines, and the main PCs in each unit will have their own security mechanism installed to prevent information leaking from CDs and diskettes. Later on, in order to prepare for the eventuality of increased information exchange via the Internet and advancements in communication technology, increased efforts will be directed towards developing methods for H/W and S/W security encryption. Concurrently, all major communication routes will be monitored with increased scrutiny by the formation of a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) that will work to prevent all computer-related problems and seek responsible response efforts. Later, a security breach attempt recognition/security lock-up mechanism will be installed under the guidance of CERT and their role will be expanded. On the other hand, to ensure that the computer security-related human resource pool is not drained, there will be a selection and reclassification among officers to be trained in the security breach area as their functionality; enlisted men will be screened for information and technology-related majors in their education before enlistment. Among the officers selected, there will be increased opportunities for advanced education in the academia of Korea and the rest of the world. Furthermore, inter-ministerial efforts to prevent security breaches via the communication network will be sought among various divisions of the government on a cooperative basis. ## Educating Enlisted Men For Digitization MND is preparing for future conflicts by fostering an elite force, and transforming the enlisted men into a productive factor in the knowledgebased information society by educating them on the digitization efforts along the line of national digitization education policy. To this end, MND is seeking to foster digitization experts that will allow efficient operation of the defense information system. These educational efforts are carried out while considering each unit's specialties and assignments. An organized education atmosphere is being built according to these considerations. Currently, 150 division and brigade-level or higher units are planning to be equipped with digital education facilities, and approximately 60 units are operating such education facilities. By the end of 2000, education facilities in 90 units will be additionally built for improving the digitization education atmosphere. Also, starting in April of 2000, approximately 1,600 battalion units will be furnished with digitization education facilities to allow Internet Information Retrieval Engineer license education to be carried out for the 270,000 current enlisted men and people who have finished their obligatory military service requirements. 6,800 company level units were provided with PC education facilities for digitization education. The ROK military has built a digitization education environment to increase the operative capabilities of the Defense Information System and nurture experts in digitization within the armed services. Additionally, in order to keep up with the knowledge-based information society, plans for distance learning and a virtual education system have been implemented to systematically establish an education system for the digitization of the officers and enlisted men. # Chapter Four Fostering Defense Manpower For Advanced Elite Force Operation ## Fostering And Managing Elite Manpower In order to respond to the rapidly changing defense environment, MND is pressing ahead with the goal of educating and managing defense manpower with unique abilities and specialties. To this end, MND is working to build a defense manpower management system, foster defense specialists, and utilize and expand the role of women in arms. ## A. Efficient Manpower Operation The primary theme of the ROK military's manpower policy is to foster an elite force that can develop a military that will be strategically suitable to the 21st century battlefield environment and to seek transformation of the military from its current manpower intensive structure to a technology intensive structure that relies on specialists for sustained operation. MND will manage manpower according to changes in the security atmosphere of Far East Asia and situations in inter-Korean relations; however, the ROK military will try to reduce the number of enlisted men in the Army while seeking to increase the number in the Navy and the Air Force, managing the overall manpower with a degree of flexibility. This effort is sought for a balanced development of the three services in the military. On the other hand, the current human resource (HR) system will be reformed in order to keep up with the concept of a future high-technology combat capability, by which the higher ranks will be reduced and middle ranks will be expanded in number to facilitate the expansion of units. Additionally, to the same end, the retirement age of ranking officers will be adjusted, with practicality as the most important consideration; and other efforts will be carried out with the intention of increasing efficiency of manpower management. ## B. Fostering Defense Specialists The ROK military is seeking to reform the special manpower management system to be in sync with the future warfare patterns and multifaceted security environment. MND established the Special Policy Post management system based on the detailed analysis of specialties in 5 areas: Human Resource . Organization · Training, Policy Planning · Military Strategy · Operation, Defense Capability Improvement, Supplies · Procurement, and Defense Management Analysis. To promote efficient human resource management, an appropriate human resource structure capable of independent human resource management has been established; under such a structure, the acquisition, training, post assignment, and promotion are possible. Policy Devising Specialty Training was distinguished in order to classify training into degree-oriented and specialty-oriented one. Job assignments will be so designed as to provide experience in the field, policy-related offices, schools, and research institutions, thus promoting professional specialties on the basis of field experience. Additionally, considering human resource management, MND will guarantee promotion of an appropriate number of personnel. ## C. Expanding The Role Of Women In Arms In accordance with the government's women resources management policy of "Guaranteeing Women's Rights, Allowing Women's Development, and Expanding Opportunities for Social Participation," MND plans to expand the number of women in arms according to requirements of positions suitable for women. Currently, the number of women in arms stands at 2,085 (including officers and non-commissioned officers); however, by 2003, the number will be increased to 3,327 and, by 2020, the number will stand at 7,038. This expansion is set to drastically increase the ratio of women among officers and Table 3-3 Women Resources Management Plan (Unit: persons) | Time Frame | Total | Army | Navy | Air Force | |---------------|---------|--------|--------|-------------| | December 1999 | 2,085 | 2,021 | 34 | 30 | | 2003 | 3,327 | 2,785 | 134 | 408 | | 2020 | 7,038 | 5,030 | 1,023 | ବି85 | non-commissioned officers from 1.4% to 5%. To secure female officers each service is reserving some 10% of freshmen enrollment each year for female cadets in their respective academies. The Army recruited 62 female officer candidates graduating from civilian colleges in 1999 and, in 2000, the number of recruits was 110, a dramatic increase. The Navy and the Air Force have also established a college graduates' commissioning system and in 2000, recruited 15 female officer candidates in the Navy and 20 female officer candidates in the Air Force. Currently, only the Army is recruiting female non-commissioned officers. However, the Air Force plans to recruit 90 female non-commissioned officers each year. Starting in 2003, the Navy also plans to recruit 40 female non-commissioned officers each year. As can be seen, MND has plans to increase female participation in the armed forces, so as to expand the number of female officers and non-commissioned officers from 360 in 1999 to 473 in 2000, 573 in 2001, and 669 in 2003. In principle, female armed personnel will be assigned their posts without discrimination based on sex; however, combat, technical, and administrative posts will be assigned to women with due consideration for their suit- ![174_image_0.png](174_image_0.png) ability and preference. Additionally, female law personnel, medical personnel, and dental personnel will be sought after in an effort to broaden female participation in all aspects of military life. To attract exceptional female candidates to the military, working conditions will be improved and assignments of posts and promotion will be executed without discrimination based on sex, allowing women in the military to reach their maximum potential. ## Education Improvement For Fostering Quality Manpower The ROK military needs to recruit quality manpower and offer solid educational opportunities to those already recruited in order to build the elite combat force it desires. To this end, the ROK military is actively pressing ahead with the following main objectives for improvement in education . ## A. Education Reforms To Foster An Elite Combat Force "Winning Through Preparation For The Fight" The ROK military's primary defense management goal is "for operating units under each Service Headquarters to maintain tactical plan execution capabilities and for each Service Headquarters or above units to plan for the future and support the units under its supervision." To realize this goal, the ROK military recognized the requirement that education units within the military carry out training for elements needed for achieving the stated objective. Hence, each education unit has designed a curriculum based on combat-oriented thinking and preparation so as to allow the concept of "a winning military prepares itself for battle before getting into the fight" to be embedded in the minds of military personnel. Such education reforms will enable the military to construct a strong elite force. The current education reforms are rooted in the belief that readiness requirement is fulfilled by high-quality education and training. Accordingly, every education unit within the military is screening instructors very selectively and is designing its curriculum in a way that will satisfy the criteria of combat readiness and immediate transferability of the acquired knowledge to field and administrative duties upon graduation. ## B. Creation Of The National Defense University As of January, 2000, MND chartered the National Defense University, ![176_image_0.png](176_image_0.png) ![176_image_1.png](176_image_1.png) which is an amalgamation of the National Defense College, the National Defense Leadership Institute, and the Defense Staff College; thus, the National Defense University will be a comprehensive university encompassing a variety of fields under its control. The National Defense University will become a supreme education and research institute within the military, comprised of the National Security College, the National Defense Management College, and the Joint Staff College. Additionally, the Assignment Training Department for short-term education, the National Security Issues Research Center, and the Center for Joint Education Policy Development are located within the National Defense University. The education span of the National Defense University is, for the basic course of study, one year. There is a two year span for a Master's course, and four to twelve week courses designed specifically for the needs based on enrollee's administrative posts. Thus, there are a total of 13 education courses in the University and 1,400 national security experts are processed through the National Defense University each year. ## C. Expanding Civil-Military Education Exchanges As a means of establishing a civil-military cooperation system and upgrading the quality of military education, MND is in the midst of expanding civil-military education exchanges. In particular, the academies of each service and the National Defense University which confer degrees upon completion of studies will play a crucial role in mutual exchanges with civilian education institutes and research centers. The exchange of instructors and administrators, bilateral exchange of academic information, joint research efforts and seminars will be promoted as a part of the basic pattern of bilateral exchanges. Student exchanges and cross-conferring of grades for courses taken at each other's institution will also be promoted to improve the level and content of exchanges with civilian institutions. The National Defense University will open its doors wider for civilians. Thus far, only executives from defense industrial companies or defenserelated economic and social organizations had the opportunity to receive NDU courses as civilians. However, starting in 2000, executives from civilian institutions, academic organizations and companies unrelated to defense will be able to receive education at these defense-related institutions. Active civil-military exchanges will solidify the national consensus on defense, and will provide the military with an opportunity to disseminate national support for an idea that both the military and civilians are responsible for defense and security. These initiatives will also provide an opportunity for the military to nurture civilian military experts at a time when military-related research in the civilian sector needs to be stimulated. # Chapter Five Stimulating Motivation And Creating A Milieu For Stable Military Service The lives of military professionals are often characterized by risk taking, frequent changes of residence, work in remote and isolated areas, and difficulties with children's education. In light of their special working environment, military professionals must receive more benefits in comparison to other occupational groups. Bearing this in mind, the ROK military is pursuing various policies to guarantee job security and provide support for active-duty military families and military veterans who are striving to lead stable lives. Guarantee of Job Stability for Military Professionals ## A. Improvements In The Salary System Reflecting Uniqueness Of The Military Improvements in the compensation system for the military will be executed according to the Civil Servant Compensation Improvement Plan, but this will account for the uniqueness and specialty of the military service by creating a new subsidy for college education and a compensatory payment for living apart from families while on duty. Additionally, hazard · flight · sail · proximity to the enemy · encouragement allowances will be increased in line with inflation. For the past two years, the ROK has experienced economic difficulties and, as a consequence, some provisional allowances were eliminated or trimmed. However, starting in 2000, basic salary and family allowances were increased, and to narrow the discrepancy between the compensation package and a comparable work level in the civilian sector, a new compensatory adjustment allowance was created in the second half of 2000. ## B. Increasing Support For House Purchases And Plans To Secure And Rebuild Military Residences Due to the uniqueness of military service, men and women in the military generally work in remote areas and move frequently. Not only do service personnel themselves encounter difficulties in leading stable lives, but the same goes for their families as well. Therefore, it is the ROK military's principle to provide its members who do not have their own homes with military housing regardless of where they may be stationed, while enthusiastically helping military professionals purchase their own homes. As of the end of 1999, the number of military housing units available for occupancy stood at 67,528, or 97.3% of the actual number needed (69,374 units). The military plans to secure 100% occupancy by 2000. However, decrepit houses or quarters more than 25 years old comprise 9.0% of the available residences (about 6,000 units). Also, dwellings smaller than 43 square meters (13 pyung) constitute 15% of the available residences (10,240 units). Starting in 2000, the ROK military plans to alleviate these adverse living conditions by acquiring standardized units in each city or area that has decent transportation, cultural and educational environment for military personnel, relying on the government budget and self-reliant financial resources. Rather than building new housing units, the ROK is concentrating its efforts on the acquisition of existing units that will allow for the flexible adjustment of military-owned assets in case the need for military restructuring arises in the future. Also, the acquisition plan takes into account the age · sex · number of family members who would be living together, diversifying the sizes (24/28/32 pyung) to allow for improvements in the quality of living for those families. As of the end of 1999, long-term military professionals (serving for more than 10 years) who owned homes accounted for only 52.3% of the force, far below the civilian average of 84.2%. To expand opportunities for military professionals to purchase their own homes, MND fully supports a project for supplying housing through the Military Mutual Aid Association and plans to provide 2,000 or more home buying opportunities by relying on mortgage loans provided through MMAA. ## C. Improvements In The Living Conditions Of Military Families 1. Duty Free System For Military Personnel ![180_Image_0.Png](180_Image_0.Png) The duty free system for military professionals was introduced to provide indirect fiscal support to military personnel, although in contrast to the time of inception, various duties for home electronics (excluding airconditioners) have been eliminated and the tax-exemption level has been brought down enough to transform the current duty free system to a nominal tax-exemption mechanism. To improve this situation, starting in 2000, duty free items were drastically expanded to a variety of consumption goods, and durable goods were brought into consideration for tax exemption by cooperating with the agencies responsible for appropriate taxation. ## 2. Educational Support For Children Of Military Personnel Children of military professionals suffer an educational handicap because of their parents' frequent change of residence, work in remote and isolated areas, and separation from their families. The ROK military is currently pursuing options to install dormitories for military children and special admissions quotas for military children to various universities. Presently, the ROK military maintains 12 units of dormitories in 10 major cities across the country, providing housing for 1,868 children, and in the year 2000, the Jawoondae area of Taejon will host a new dormitory which will accommodate an additional 100 children. After 2001, there will be additional funding for children's dormitories should the need arise. Also, through a special admissions quota for military children, 137 military children were admitted to 13 universities, including the prestigious Korea University and Seogang University. In 2001, the special admissions quota is expected to be applied to 29 universities via negotiations with related administrative agencies and universities. ## 3. R&R Facilities Support for leisure and Rest & Recuperation facilities is primarily carried out by increasing the number of central R&R facilities, and acquiring additional membership privileges at civilian condominiums across major tourist attractions of the nation. Currently, the ROK military is operating six central R&R facilities, and the Taejon-Yusong R&R center and seven other central R&R facilities are slated for opening. Presently, 1,500 civilian condominium membership privileges are maintained by the ROK military, and additional 160 accounts are planned for acquisition each year. ## Extending Support To Veterans A. Reinforcing Job Guidance Training Before Retirement And Expanding The Scope Of Re-Employment Due to the characteristics of the hierarchical system of the military, mandatory retirement is inevitable for most military professionals around the age of 50. This means that the retirees must find jobs. However, the reemployment pattern of retired officers leans heavily towards military positions such as Emergency Planning Officer, Reserve Force Commanders, Military Civilian Employees, and the employment rate for the retirees over the past five years has averaged a meager 29.0%. Therefore, the military is pushing ahead to increase support for jobresearch for those who retire after a long service record. Since 1998, the job guidance training period was extended from six months to one year before retirement. The military also grants a certain level of financial support to individuals receiving this benefit as the budget permits . Table 3-4 Re-employment Status of Military Veterans in 1999 | | | Unit: persons | | | | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------|-----------|-----| | Emergenc | Reserve | Private | | | | | | | Welfare Supp | | | | | | | Force | | | | | | | | Classification | Total | lanning | Research | Group/Military Mutual | Companies | | | Officers | Commanders | ositions | Association | | | | | Total | 1,093 | 66 | 476 | 45 | පිටි | 407 | | | 45 | 72 | 201 | | | | | Officers | 860 | ee | 476 | | | | | WOs/NCOs | 233 | 27 | 206 | | | | | * Most officer retirees are employed in military-related positions while WOs and NCOs usually find jobs in | | | | | | | * Most officer retirees are employed in military-related positions while WOs and NCOs usually find jobs in civilian companies. Major curricula include courses provided within the military, private institutions outside the military, Ministry of Labor-approved on-the-job training courses, and courses for self-employment and business start-up's. This job guidance training enables service members to acquire technical or professional licenses necessary for employment before they retire. The military is increasing the job training courses assigned to the Korea Manpower Agency in order to develop courses that will ![182_image_0.png](182_image_0.png) aid adjustment to civilian job requirements. The MND Job Referral Support Center was established under the Korea Institute of Military Studies in 1997 to help service members find jobs after retirement. Also, starting in 2000, MND has cooperated with the Ministry of Labor to ensure all military retirees will be qualified to receive Ministry of Labor-sponsored job training for free. MND also expanded education opportunities at professional education organizations such as the Korea Productivity Center and the Korea Efficiency Promotion Association. In close cooperation with the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, the Emergency Planning Committee, and defense industrial companies and defense suppliers, MND is raising the mandatory legal employment rate for military veterans. By linking a job information computer network between the Central Employment Information Management Agency of the Ministry of Labor and the MND Job Referral Support Center, MND plans to give full support to retirees seeking jobs with private companies. ![182_image_1.png](182_image_1.png) ![182_image_2.png](182_image_2.png) Figure 3-10 Employment of Veterans with More Than Ten Years of Military Service ## B. Increasing Benefits For Retirees On Par With Active Duty Officers The enforcement order of the Retired Military Personnel Support Act in 1998 laid the legal foundation for veteran support with regard to reemployment, education and medical services and, in December 1999, the "Retired War Veterans Support Act" was amended to expand benefits for the veterans who were involved in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Furthermore, starting in July 2000, the Military Mutual Aid Association apartment receivership was granted to veterans, and physical fitness center admissions fees for veterans will be exempt from the special consumption tax. Also, in instances of death, funeral costs and the provision of the national flag for burial ceremonies have been granted to veterans. Free visits to military hospitals, the expansion of special considerations when applying for various government-issued licenses for people with military service records, and improvements in the issuing process of the certificate of military service are also goals intended to benefit the lives of military retirees. In addition, the relevant ministries are coordinating for the earliest possible enforcement of legislated provisions whose implementation has been delayed. These provisions include the designations of certain job positions within security or defense industrial companies and military suppliers for which military veterans receive first employment priority, special sale of houses built by public firms, and fee waivers for entrance to national parks and palaces. ## C. Raising Reserve Force Funds Through Profit-Seeking Initiatives The Center for Military Affairs was established in 1994 to support military-related research activities by reserve force members. The center participates in profit-seeking initiatives such as the investment projects of qualified venture firms to provide funding for the reserve force. ## - Amendments To The Additional Point Provision For The People With Military Service Record ![184_Image_0.Png](184_Image_0.Png) The Additional Point Provision for people with a military service record was established in 1961 and has been in operation for 40 years. The purpose of the provision was to compensate people whose chances for employment after the service were adversely affected by suspending their studies or livelihood. Such compensation was designed to boost the morale of service personnel. However, on December 23, 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that enforcement of the provision was unconstitutional and violated the rights of women and people who were exempt from military service due to entrance in the public service. After the ruling, complaints from the people who served the obligatory military service have been on the rise, and people came to view the sanctity of military service with a negative viewpoint. The morale of service personnel was lowered as a result. To counter such a negative effect, MND is enlisting the help of related government agencies, and the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs has taken on the central role of enacting the following seven points that will counteract the negative effect of nullifying the Additional Point Provision by the Constitutional Court. · Six points in the process of legislative amendments: · The following points have already been drafted and by the end of 2000, will be enacted through amendments to the Retired Military Service Personnel Support Act: ① Upward extension of three years in age limits for hiring civil servants ② When passing the civil servant examination, priorities will be given with regard to appointments 3 Accrediting the time spent in the military as work experience 4 Salary computed with steps. ⑤ Strengthening the job training program for retired military personnel: - MND, on its own initiative, is sponsoring active career related public relation and digitization-related education opportunities. - the Ministry of Labor is sponsoring retired military personnel through its job specific abililties developments program © A tuition assistance loan program on a no-interest or low-interest basis for those returning to universities after the service was perceived as being unfair for other students, and thus only higher preference would be given. O ® The National and Community Service Additional Points Provision is under a long term review at MPVA as a research project because of probable protests from women's rights groups and the lack of social infrastructure that would accommodate such a provision. # Chapter Six Establishing Mobilization Posture For Total War The current global trend in force structure is to increase the proportion of reserve forces to standing forces. The ROK Armed Forces are no exception, as decreases in the defense budget due to a limited government budget is expected to result in more dependence on reserve forces. Reserve forces will play a pivotal role in the total national force as future warfare is likely to bear characteristics of both total wars and wars of attrition. Thus, to foster and develop efficient reserves that can immediately materialize their force, the military is focusing on building an elite reserve and establishing an immediate response mobilization posture for the early stages of war. ## Establishment Of Mobilization Posture For Wartime A. Manpower Mobilization Mobilized manpower is classified into three types: combat troops, wartime labor personnel, and technical personnel. Combat troops refer to those who are mobilized in wartime to augment or create combat units. They are directly committed to the active duty force as combatants. Wartime labor personnel are mustered to carry out the simple labor of supporting the military, e.g., delivering ammunition and other supplies. Technical personnel are also mobilized to operate equipment that demands specialized skills or knowledge. Since 1999, the ROK military has been stepping up its management system for reserve combat troops, which make up the main axis of reserve forces. Thus far, the following improvements have been made: First, because local reserve companies that heretofore have been and operated by up, myun, and dong (administrative districts) have been eliminated, the number of civil servants responsible for mobilization at the Military Manpower Administration has increased. Additionally, the reporting areas for mobilization were adjusted to allow troop transport within a short period of time, which will strengthen mobilization capabilities. > Second, by comparing and analyzing the mobilization needs and available resources, unit allocation was reorganized. Additionally, taking into account the military specialties of the available manpower, the range of manpower resource allocation was expanded to allow efficient manpower mobilization to take root. Third, when designating mobilization resources, only those inapprop ately placed special personnel or people who have surpassed the obligatory period for mobilization will be accounted for by designated replacements. Hence, constancy in the make-up of units and assignment of posts will be maintained to improve combat ability, and complaints due to changes in unit and post assignments each year should be alleviated. to allow for the adoption of a practical determination system. Such a pro- gram would link the manpower mobilization needs and execution to promote clarity in the mobilization process. Fifth, the homeland reserve force defense plan and the security plan for force concentration areas were combined to strengthen the homeland defense capability. Sixth, in order to adjust the time needed to increase the size of each unit and create new units in accordance with the duties assigned to each reserve unit in wartime, the practicality of the mobilization operation plan was guaranteed and the burden of wartime mobilization reduced. venth, by carrying out a promotion policy for reserve force con ders, MND seeks to restore balance in the rank hierarchy, and at the same time, increase the desire to work as reserve force commanders for those who have chosen such a path. ian experts with technical skills will be given more opportunities to be hployed. This policy grants first priority to reservists who have rece licenses or national certificates in the technical field or specialty, to be assigned as technical personnel during wartime mobilization. Additionally, wartime mobilization notices, which are distributed via mail during peace time, will be handed out in person during a Chungmu -Type 3 Situation Alert in order to increase the ## B. Material Mobilization Material mobilization is defined as civilian or government resources to supplement the military with material in areas where there are shortages in peacetime, or to prepare for the military's strategic demands in a contingency, or finally, as material and resources to be stored for wartime. Government- or civilian-possessed materiel, equipment, facilities and services are mobilized and used in accordance with one of the following three methods: "usage mobilization," \# "consumables mobilization," \# and "control management." 6) Ministries in charge of mobilization materiel required in wartime-in trial, transportation, construction and communication-mobilize an vide materiel to the military. The military draws up the annual mobilization operation plan before exercising materiel mobilization. t the case of industry, however, certain types of materiel fall short of the tary's demands. The military is now analyzing the reasons for oriages and is formulating various alternatives. Additionally, it is deavoring to come up with a mobilization system that will enable the military to take full advantage of civilian transportation, construction and communication resources. automation program of industrial mobilization was finished in age mobilization is applied when equipment and civilian firms are mobilized for a specifie n and returned to ordinary status after the mobilization period expires. Consumables mobilization is applied when, at the inception of mobilization, the ownership of materiel and civilian firms are transferred to the institution which oversees such specific mobilization. Ordinarily, when expendable goods and products are mobilized, consumable mobilization is Control management is called for in order to achieve the mobilization objectives by controlling the production, repair, manufacturing and distribution processes as needed. Processes other than se specified above are left under the guidance of civilian firms. October 1997, and is currently in operation. MND plans to automate trans- ![188_image_0.png](188_image_0.png) portation, construction and communication mobilization efforts. Furthermore, a separate mobilization plan was drawn up in support of US augmentation forces should the US make such a request. Additionally, each year, MND tabulates the compensatory scheme for wartime or peace-time exercises during which civilian materiel and supplies are requisitioned for military use. Such a scheme is designed to minimize the burden of civilians by coming up with an appropriate level of compensation. ## 1. Industrial Mobilization Included in industrial mobilization are class I to class IX supplies, manufacturing and repair companies, hospitals, gas stations, etc. Due to the requirements of strict military standards, however, the military is facing difficulties in securing sufficient supplies for early-stage requirements. To resolve such a difficulty, the military is considering loosening the strict standards for military consumable goods so that similar civilian items can be used by the military without having to meet strict military specifications. Also, actual wartime production training is carried out among mobilized companies to enhance the wartime production capabilities. Furthermore, each year, a joint survey of resources with other government agencies are carried out to identify the reality of mobilization capacity, and the results will be reflected in the mobilization operation plan so as to guarantee the practicality of the mobilization efforts. In order to maximize the use of civilian hospitals in place of military hospitals during war, civilian hospitals will be mobilized according to the "control management method" instead of the "usage mobilization method." The current military hospital-centered evacuation system will gradually be transformed into one centered on civilian hospitals, which will lead to the creation of a medical system that simultaneously caters to military and civilian needs. ## 2. Transportation Mobilization Transportation mobilization refers to "usage mobilization" or "control management" of transportation equipment, e.g., automobiles, ships, aircraft, etc., and firms for maintenance, transport, loading and unloading of such equipment. Through the "package mobilization" or "set mobilization" of firms that maintain complementary and cooperative relations with one another, the ROK military intends to decrease the on-hand equipment in military units during peacetime as well as the requirements for creating new units during war. Additionally, efforts are being made to enhance wartime mobilization capabilities. For example, freight vehicle shortages in certain areas can be alleviated by the utilization of other types of vehicles within the same area. In addition, the need for the wartime creation of new units is being reduced to save precious national budget for defense related expenditures. ## 3. Construction Mobilization Building, land, and construction machinery, firms maintaining construction machinery, construction firms, etc. are included under "usage or consumables mobilization." In order to maximize the use of civilian resources, MND is expanding the mobilization capacity by replacing standard military equipment with similar civilian equipment. Also, equipment of comparable applications are being pursued by the military to meet this policy objective. ## 4. Communication Mobilization Satellite communication, communication lines (namely, city and international telephone lines) and public information and communication companies are placed under "usage mobilization" or "control management." In order to promptly support its command and control communication networks during times of war, the military is designating superior quality lines for mobilization and conducts actual line mobilization training to familiarize personnel with the mobilization procedure. Such training will enable the military to eliminate loop-holes in the mobilization process and encourage the development of civilian resource requisition methods. # Enhancement Of Homeland Defense Operational ![190_Image_0.Png](190_Image_0.Png) Capabilities ## A. Mobilization For Homeland Defense Operations Reserve troops are mobilized in both peacetime and war to neutralize enemy and armed infiltrators or to guard major facilities and lines of communications in areas where armed infiltration is launched or is very likely to be launched. The Homeland Reserve Forces Organization Act, first enacted in 1961, has served as the foundation for conducting homeland defense operations, and it has gone through a series of revisions. The infiltration by a North Korean armed guerrilla who came ashore in Kangnung in a submarine in September 1996 revealed the problems in the homeland defense operation. To help overcome the vulnerabilities, the act underwent substantial revisions in July 1999. To increase the attendance rate in the early stages of mobilization, reservists who are given mobilization orders are now obligated to report to a designated spot at a designated time, as shown in Table 3-5. Also, reservists who change residence must report this fact to the commander of the unit to which they belong. Any reservists, who refuse to follow these orders and obligations, or those who feign a change of residence to evade mobilization, will be punished. A set of rules have been drawn up to further enhance homeland defense operational capabilities: details are stipulated for the roles of government organizations and local governments in fostering and supporting work- Table 3-5 | | Classification | Standard Time for Call-up | |-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------| | Residents inside the "area" (area of the designated | Within 6 hours after the homeland | | | those on temporary leave inside the area | defense mobilization order is issued | | | evant gu, shi, gun and nearby gu, shi and gun) | Within 24 hours after the homeland | | | Residents living outside the "area" / those on tempo- | defense mobilization order is issued | | | Residents in an island area / those on board a fishing ves- | Within 48 hours after the homeland | | | | defense mobilization order is issued | | Standard Time Spans for Mobilization Attendance place reserves, and for activating the roles of the Local Defense Council in these operations; meals for reservists mobilized for homeland defense operations will be provided by local governments, whereas the company will provide workplace reservists with meals. ## B. Combat Service Support To provide more efficient combat service support to reserve troops mobilized for homeland defense operations, the military has upgraded prior plans and procedures for the allocation of weapons and ammunition. Also, individual equipment is prepared according to a set concept, ready for distribution and use at any time. For the efficient feeding of reserve troops, a detailed food support system, which includes the designation of various cooking utensils, transportation means and fuel supplies, was established under close cooperation with local defense support headquarters. Appropriate transportation means and the required numbers of transportation equipment have been decided. The number and types of transportation equipment needed for homeland defense operations will be maintained through close cooperation with the local defense support headquarters. All of these improvements have been made to build a firm combat service support posture. ## Management And Training Of Reserve Troops A. Organizational Formation And Management Of Reserves Due to the restructuring of government organizations, military administrative offices located in up, myon and dong have been closed down, and dong offices in small dongs have been either closed down or merged. The military administrative and dong offices in charge of the administrative work related to reservist mobilization were readjusted as well. Previously, the chief of each up, myon and dong office was responsible for forming reserve forces and conducting mobilization functions. This function, however, was shifted to the head of each local Military Manpower Administration (MMA). Also, to minimize the work load of the local home defense company and the local MMA as well as to sponsor practical operation of reserve organization and manpower resource management, a digital communication line will be brought on-line between the local MMA offices and local home defense company headquarters. The criteria for selecting reserve force commanders include physical fitness test scores, personal records while on active duty and, finally, diligence. To improve the working and living environment of reserve commanders, the military reduced the restrictions that previously were placed on commanders who wished to change work places. Additionally, in order to establish discipline over their troops, the military may transfer commanding officers, who demonstrate a lack of diligence to units located in other areas. Reporting for reserve forces has become easier for new reserve candidates. They automatically become part of the reserve force when the units in which they have served send their personal records and other necessary materials to the relevant local MMAs, replacing the mandatory in-person reporting system for reserve candidates. The status of the resource pool for the home defense forces is illustrated in Figure 3-11. ## B. Education And Training The education and training periods for reserve troops have gradually decreased for the public's convenience. Moreover, reservists who are in the first and eighth year of duty are exempt from training. However, if we compare the total time our men spend in reserve training with that of other ![192_image_1.png](192_image_1.png) ![192_image_0.png](192_image_0.png) countries, not to ment ![193_image_0.png](193_image_0.png) North Korea, it is obvious that current reserve training is insufficient. Also, the level of reservist training was previously decided by the type of service each individual had fulfilled during his obligatory military term, and thus familiarizing reserves with their actual wartime tasks had Training for mobilized reserves its limits. In order to solve these problems efficiently, the frequency of training has been n ates probof each training period increased. Tasks and those critics training are selected from mission-essential tasks and those critics. training are selected from missionfying the reserve duty system into two parts, the military enhanced the equity of reserve service: those in the first-to-fourth-year of reserve service are called Mobilizatio named Homeland Defense Reserve Forces. On the other hand, the mobilization and training abeyance system for certain reservists changed due to new developments in the security envi- ronment and social atmosphere. Certain tasks became obsolete, and posts that are deemed unessential were eliminated. Additionally, by considering the equity issue in comparison to other similar posts, reservists selected for the abeyance system will be reduced to those needed for performing essen- :: 1 f tial functions of the nation during times of war and peace. ## 1. Mobilization Training Mobilization training makes up the core of reserve force training, an onducted among Mak:::- conducted among Mobilization Reserve Forces. Training focuses on the execution of tasks specific to individuals or teams, execution of wartime opera- tion plans, and mastering the procedures of expanding and creating units. Starting in 1999, Figure 3-12 Period and Contents of Mobilization Training ![194_image_0.png](194_image_0.png) the focus was shifted to strengthening night combat training, job performance, and tactical skills training. Figure 3-12 contains the details. ## 2. Training For Absentees And Non-Designated Reservists Reservists in their second-to-fourth-year training, who are not participating in or designated for mobilization exercises, are subject to a four-day training period. This training focuses on specialty and team-level job performance training, and, with the exception of basic infantry training that is common to all branches, is conducted under the leadership of each branch commander. ## 3. Basic Homeland Defense And Homeland Defense Operational Plan Training Fifth-to-seventh-year reservists are subject to basic homeland defense training. The goal of this training is to nurture the ability to defend their homeland. Thus, the training focuses on mastering combat skills and enhancing the ability of each individual to execute homeland defense missions through task-centered training. Personnel to be mobilized for the homeland defense operation plan training are the second-to-fourth-year reserve privates who are non-participants in mobilization exercises, fifth-to-seventh-year reserve privates, and secondto-seventh-year sergeants who are not designated for mobilization exercises. This biannual training focuses on mastering the execution procedure of operation plan and is held once in the first half of the year and once in the second half. ## 4. Education And Training Support Reserve force training areas and facilities have been reorganized to enable all participants to take simultaneous, round robin training, which prevents idle time between practice sessions and facilitates training supervision. In order to maintain the participants' interest in the training, the military is developing unique training supervision techniques and continues to secure training facilities as well. The military is currently converting training areas into public parks based on the comprehensive development plans for each training area so that they can be utilized as recreational areas by residents. In an effort to enhance the welfare for reserve troops, 1,500 won of daily lunch allowances are provided to participants during basic homeland defense training and to absentees during mobilization exercises. In particular, reservists are able to voluntarily enter training centers across the nation which will facilitate the training in centers outside their living areas in case entrance to those centers are more convenient for the reservists to fulfill their obligations. Education and training hours for reservists in 2000 are listed in Table 3-6. Table 3-6 Education and Training Hours for Reservists in 2000 Unit: hours | | Training for | Homeland | | | | |-----------------------|-----------------|------------------|---------|--------------|----| | | Mobilization | Non-participants | Defense | Spare | | | Classification | Total | dance | | | | | | in Mobilization | Operational | | | | | | Training | Time | | | | | | Exercises | Plan Training | | | | | Newly discharged | 100 | 100 | | | | | (cadres and men) | | | | | | | First-year reservists | 100 | ব | વેર | | | | Designated | 100 | 34 (3 days & | 66 | | | | year | | | | | | | d | Non- | | | | | | reservists | 100 | 32 | 12 | રહ | | | designated | | | | | | | e | 5e-7* year | 68 | 8 | 12 | 48 | | r | 8th year | 68 | | | | | 68 | | | | | | | 1st year | 100 | 4 | 96 | | | | | 34 (3 days & | | | | | | Designated | 100 | 4 nights) | ୧୧ | | | | 040-4 | 20-70 | Non-Officers | 100 | 34 (3 days & | ୧୧ | | year | des- | | | | | | ignat | NCOs | 100 | 32 | 12 | રે | Part Four Defense Reform for the 21* Century Chapter One Directions of Defense Reform Chapter Two Fruits of Defense Reform Chapter Three Future Defense Reform Plan # Chapter One Directions Of Defense Reform With a goal of constructing a digitized and advanced national defense system in the 21* century, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) is systematically implementing the "Five-Year Defense Reform Project (1998~ 2003)." For the past 2 years, MND has been steadfastly carrying out short- and mid-term defense reform projects that include military organization and structure reform, force improvement, personnel and education system reform, and defense management reform among others. In the future, MND will concentrate on the "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Defense Digitization" and accelerate its ability to drastically reform the military to become the best developed national defense for the 21ª century. ## Goals And Key Points Of Reform The goal of the Five-Year Defense Reform Project, due to last until 2003, is to solidify the basis for accomplishing long-term defense objectives and then to pursue reform-oriented defense progress so that the ROK military can always stay one step ahead of the times. Four goals to be achieved by the year 2003 have been established: 1. "Strong and elite armed forces" whose members are well-disciplined and have high morale ![197_image_0.png](197_image_0.png) 2. "Military professionals" with pride and a strong sense of duty 3. "Increased efficiency in the Armed forces" by means of management reform and defense digitization ![197_image_1.png](197_image_1.png) 4. An "Armed Forces of the People" loved and trusted by the public In order to achieve these defense policy goals, MND selected and promoted the priorities listed below for short- and mid-term defense reform. As for long-term defense reform, MND will focus on creating a view of the future security environment and the defense concept. Another focus will be on fostering advanced, elite forces capable of providing a powerful national defense, through digitization and leveraging scientific advances along with the revolution in military affairs in an economical way. to the current Korean situation ![198_image_0.png](198_image_0.png) ![198_image_1.png](198_image_1.png) 1. Transformation of the military structure into an economical one, more suited 2. Implementation of transparent, goal-oriented Force Improvement Programs (FIPs) 3. Development of rational personnel and education systems and improvement of the current military service system to increase fairness 4. Streamlining military management for the efficient operation of defense resources ## Reform Efforts In Progress The National Defense Reform Committee (NDRC) was officially inaugurated on April 15, 1998. The committee, under direct control of the Defense Minister, plays a leading role in implementing the Five-Year Defense Reform Project. Each service launched its own working-level reform committee and adhered to directions from the NDRC, thus acting as a bridge between each service and MND. Having established the "Five-Year Defense Reform Project," officially approved by President Kim Dae-jung on July 2, 1998, the NDRC set forth an array of full-scale reform tasks. A total of 45 out of 58 projects were completed by the end of August 2000. The "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Planning Group" was established within the NDRC in April 1999 to devise a long-term defense blueprint detailing the future of the ROK Armed Forces. The goal of the RMA Planning Group is to create a defense strategy by analyzing the future security environment and national developmental trends and to research the general concept and direction of each of the following fields: battlefield management, military creed, military technology, force capability system, management system, and leadership and education training. In order to carry out defense digitization more aggressively, the NDRC commissioner was appointed as the Defense Minister's Head Advisor for Defense Digitization, and the Defense Digitization Planning Group was established within the NDRC in December 1999 to handle the overall planning, coordination and control of defense digitization. # Chapter Two Fruits Of Defense Reform ## Restructuring The Military For efficient, economical management of the military, high-level organizations, i.e., MND, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the headquarters of each service, were restructured and their functions readjusted in December 1998. MND has been reorganized with the aim of solidifying the core, essential functions of national defense policy (refer to Appendix 39). The Force Programming Office and the JCS Central Directorate for Force Test and Evaluation were merged into the Acquisition Office for efficient execution of Force Improvement Programs (FIPs). The integration of procurement and quality assurance-related units and offices under direct control of MND contributed to simplifying the organization. To ensure rapid operational command, JCS combined the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications and Electronics and the C4I Directorate of the Central Directorate for Operations into the Assistant Chief of Staff for Command and Communications. The Intelligence Fusion Directorate, which was recently activated, is now under the Central Directorate for Intelligence. JCS promoted the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics to the Central Directorate for Personnel & Logistics by combining them together, reinforcing the JCS mission of supporting and planning operations as the top organization in the military as well as assisting the President during war. Each branch of service gave all C4I functions to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Command and Communications; hitherto these functions were dispersed throughout different service directorates. Not only have combat development and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) functions been reinforced, but relevant organizations were also streamlined accordingly within each branch of service. A division with the sole responsibility for promoting FIPs was established in each service. Restructuring at the command and unit levels took place vigorously throughout the military, particularly in the Army. First, the Army Aviation Unit, whose role was providing operational support for each echelon and ground forces, was reorganized into the Army Aviation Operations Command, which is capable of conducting its own strategic, operational, and offensive operations. (April 1999) The Air Assault Brigade was organized under the Aviation Operations Command, combining several combat functions, for use as either an area combat support force or an operational reserve. Therefore, now having the capability of running combined arms operations, the Aviation Operations Command can run a limited independent operations and be operated as the main offensive force. In addition, MND transformed the single form of the Special Warfare Command's structure into versatile forces that can respond promptly to various threats and conflicts, particularly possible future non-military threats. (June 2000) In June 1999, the NBC Defense Command was organized under the direct control of the Army HQ in order to be able to respond promptly to massive NBC attacks launched by the North. To reinforce planning, coordinating and controlling strategic land, sea, and air transportation support, which is an important necessity in war, the Defense Transportation Command, modeled after the Army Transportation Command, was created in March 1999. In the past, each service operated its own headquarters service support office. Taking into account that all three service headquarters are located in Kyeryongdae area, the three offices were merged into one, the Figure 4-1 Kyeryongdae Service Support Group ![201_image_0.png](201_image_0.png) 207 Kyeryongdae Service Support Group in December 1998. This merge allowed the military to greatly reduce manpower and budget. In a bid to incorporate or abolish task redundancies, in April 1999, widely dispersed information command systems were centralized and intelligence collection units were reorganized according to their respective functions, i.e., signals intelligence, human intelligence and imagery intelligence. Demands for more efficient patient evacuation in emergency situations resulted in the birth of the "Aeromedical Evacuation Unit." Research institutions under the direct control of MND were subject to restructuring as well. The Defense Quality Assurance Agency (DQAA), whose research function was rather limited, has been transformed into a non-research institute. In January 1999, the Institute for Defense Information Systems merged with the Agency for Defense Development (ADD). These changes have resulted in a clear delineation of functions, one belonging to the policy-focused Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) and the other belonging to ADD, whose primary mission is to develop weapon and information systems. In January 2000, the National Defense University, the National War College, and the National Defense Leadership Institute were merged into the National Defense University (NDU), while maintaining their own objectives and characteristics. Figure 4-2 Creation of National Defense University (NDU) ![202_image_0.png](202_image_0.png) # Suit Of Transparent And Goal-C Force Improvement Programs The process of Force Improvement Programs (FIPs) was boldly reformed in order to maximize efficiency, transparency and impartiality. Acquisition- and development-related organizations were overly dispersed; their functions were subdivided too minutely. These organizations are now reorganized under the Acquisition Office, which is now responsible for all acquisition-related tasks. The key concept of this reorganization was to transform the functionally separated organizations into a single process-based organization capable of managing FIP-related tasks. Acquisition procedures for weapon and non-weapon systems were integrated and transformed into a responsible management system. Analysis and evaluation functions have been reinforced for effective decision-making support. Cost analysis and evaluation are now required before making any important decision. Most important of all, the Defense Minister issued a special mandate to the Acquisition Office to command, control and supervise tasks performed by the Defense Procurement Agency (DPA), Agency for Defense Development (ADD) and Defense Quality Assurance Agency (DQAA). This allows the Acquisition Office to command and supervise the entire acquisition administration, maintain cooperative relationships between agencies, and adjust and regulate related matters so that they correspond with the overall defense policy. With an eye on reforming acquisition procedures in general, the eight consultative bodies that were involved in the acquisition decision-making process have been drastically reduced to three. The original 38 steps in the acquisition process were cut down to 24, and 17 acquisition-related regulations have been either abolished or integrated into a single regulation. While responsibility for and authority over acquisition policy is concentrated into one department, its execution is entrusted to each service and relevant organizations. The so-called "real name system" was adopted for project management, test and evaluation, selection of equipment, and contracting. To provide a competitive edge to the defense industry, those acquisitions that demand massive capital investment and have little or no civilian requirements regarding either maintenance, manpower or technology were handed over to companies designated by MND. Moreover, various barriers to entering the defense industry were eliminated to encourage the active participation of small- and medium-sized companies or venture companies that possess high-tech industrial technology. To create more opportunity for small- and medium-sized companies and venture companies, only 24% of second-tier companies maintain monopolies over production while 76% are left to compete on their own. Additionally, in order to prepare for future warfare and uncertain security threats, it is essential for the ROK military to acquire core technologies needed for the development of high-tech weapon systems suited to the Korean defense environment. ADD was reorganized into a professional research institute for the development of high-tech weapon systems as well as core technologies. A civil and military dual-use technology center was also established for joint research projects and data sharing between relevant organizations. In addition, MND selected 15 high-tech weapon systems and related core technologies to promote independent development capability. ## Development Of Rational Personnel And Education Systems A. Personnel And Education Management Improvement The ROK military firmly established impartiality and transparency in the personnel management sector by addressing a variety of problems in its assignment management and promotion systems, the nucleus of personnel management. Detailed qualification requirements for key positions were set. Selection to these positions will be determined solely by personal competence. The entire process of personnel management for officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel will be computerized by late 2000. Moreover, the System of Advance Notification of Assignment, which was originally applied to command positions only, is now gradually being applied up to the level of lieutenant colonel. As for the promotion management system, the number of personnel to be promoted will be determined in an open policy review meeting aimed at ensuring transparency in the decision-making process related to promotions. Evaluation standards for promotion will be established and quanti- These standards are scheduled to be fully implemented in the year fied. 2000. For efficient personnel management and a higher rate of promotion, the Military Personnel Act was revised in March 1999 to readjust the minimum period of service for promotion eligibility. Officers in the rank of major and below will have more years of active duty service than in the past before they are promoted. The years of service required for colonels and lieutenant colonels in order to be considered for promotion will be shortened. Moreover, in an effort to solve the bottleneck problem in the promotion system, the System of Promotion by Term of Office and the Honorary Promotion System have been applied respectively to lieutenant colonels and majors. The educational goals and foci for all courses from candidate training to National Defense University (NDU) level, including OBC, OAC, and each service's college, were reestablished in order to improve the education management system. NDU reinforced its education program for national security policy professionals by fully utilizing its National Security College, National Defense Management College, National War College, and Job Refresher Course, along with its research institutes, the Research Institute for National Security Affairs, and the Institute for Joint Doctrine Development. For the faster import and practical use of advanced scientific technologies, a graduate program at NDU was improved by introducing an exchange program with other major research universities. However, a graduate program in the Advanced Institute of Military Science and Technology was closed down and its role of educating professionals in military science has been transferred to other civilian universities. ## B. Promoting Comprehensive Improvement For Noncommissioned Officers (Ncos) In order to be able to keep up with the development of the military and to correspond with the present and future battlefield environments, the military reestablished the role of the NCO and is promoting a comprehensive improvement plan for NCOs in order to strengthen military infrastructures. For a clear classification of the role, authority, and responsibility of NCOs, the military has clearly specified the role of the NCO: supervision . command of soldiers, personal affairs management, barracks training, training & evaluation of soldier's specialty, management of their military lives · food · clothing · shelter, accident prevention campaigns, supply management, and facility & disaster management. This division of roles and functions allows officers to be devoted to the maintenance of combat preparedness. The military also improved the NCO recruiting system by requiring different physical and aptitude draft standards for each branch and expanding its scholarship program for junior college and technical university students to promote stable recruitment and quality improvement of NCOs. Additionally, the NCO candidate training system and the refresher training system have been improved. By extending exchange programs to civilian universities, the current average number of NCOs with college degrees (6%) is expected to increase to 11%. The military is also planning to make appropriate changes in the table of organization to allow more NCOs to carry out high echelon staff duties. To give more authority to the NCO, the military is planning to change the current name of NCO to "Deputy Officer" since the current name NCO has a meaning that is subordinate to officers. The process of making the appropriate changes in the related law is in progress. | 213 | |-------| ## Defense Management Reform A. Laying The Groundwork For Defense Digitization In Preparation For Future Warfare The goal of defense digitization is to foster an "elite group of information-oriented professional forces" that are fully capable of carrying out information warfare by the year 2015. Table 4-1 | Step 1 (1999- | Completion of advanced information | | |--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| | Establishment of | Expansion of functic | system & development of elite forces | | infrastructure and core system | and system integration | with information skills | Goals of Each Phase of Defense Digitization To further accelerate defense digitization projects, MND reorganized the Information Planning Office into a subaltern organization under the Vice Minister of Defense in April 2000 and constructed an overall management system. MND also recruited civilian specialists as information planning officers so the entire defense management system can run on the latest techniques and skills. The ROK military is now consistently pushing ahead with the defense digitization's planning · programming · budgeting execution system. It has laid the foundation for defense digitization development by setting up defense ![207_image_0.png](207_image_0.png) standards, compatibility evaluation, S/W management, and security. Internet Call Room (Calling Scene) MND has also reorganized its structure around the maintenance and enhancement of information systems and scheduled systems to be developed as well as trained its managerlevel officers on new IT technologies so that their business procedures can be improved by utilizing new IT technologies. To build the infrastructure for IT resource development in the military, MND has been setting up IT training facilities across the military, such as IT training rooms in divisions and brigades, internet training and call rooms in battalions, and PC rooms in companies. Other tasks, such as the management of military information system configuration and security enhancement, are also under step-by-step implementation for military digitization. ## B. Establishing A Transparent And Competitive System For Materiel Procurement Reform efforts in materiel procurement have focused on assuring transparency in the procurement procedure and establishing a competitive system between supply companies based on a free competition principle. More civilian companies may become suppliers to the military under the principle of free competition as discrimination against civilian businesses is uprooted; many restrictions against military suppliers, including supplier registration and inspection procedures, were abolished. The number of businesses and goods subject to safety checks were sharply cut from 1,235 to 361. Procurement-related information, which was only available at the DPA General Counseling Office, can now be easily obtained from the "DPA website at ." The task of purchasing common goods is now gradually being transferred from DPA to the Supply Administration of the Republic of Korea (SAROK), and the purchase of 740 line items has already been turned over to SAROK in 2000. The remaining 126 line items will gradually be turned over to SAROK after evaluating the economic benefits. Additionally, as a means of enforcing the real-name responsibility system, MND extended the period of keeping the original contract document until the rescission date while at the same time specifying in a contract the names of the person and office in charge when the goods were purchased. Sharing detailed information about the overall process of selecting a successful bidder or company with the public has helped increase transparency in materiel procurement. ## C. Building An Effective Logistical Support System Under the policy of minimizing military stockage of materials that can be easily obtained from the civilian sector in peacetime, the military switched 520 line items of military standard equipment with commercial materials, designating them as organizational materiel, and also turned 3,564 transportation and construction vehicles permanently reserved for wartime only into wartime mobilization materials. By doing so, the military was able to save 79.9 billion won from its budget. The military was able to improve its material mobilization ability by lowering the standards for 3,929 wartime mobilization items. The military was also able to secure sufficient supplies needed at the beginning stage of a war by switching 365 line items to commercial materials that can be utilized as war materials during wartime. The military is conducting an analysis of the economy and effectiveness of the possibility of supply · maintenance · transportation branches being operated by nonmilitary or private management. Based on the analysis results, the military plans to expand its application after going through the testing period. The flow of military logistics will be much improved with the "Military CALS Project" and other reform measures in the pipeline. The military is preparing detailed logistics reform measures such as lowering the supply level, reducing delivery time and ensuring balanced distribution. ## Judicial Reform Of The Military The judicial system and organization of the military was restructured and improved to better serve military justice and the chain of command. Prosecution was separated from the bench to ensure the impartiality and justice of the court. The MND Legal Affairs Service, which had been playing the role of both the court and the prosecution, was dissolved, and two separate bodies, the High Military Court and the MND Prosecutor's Office, were established. Moreover, an independent military court was established at each service's headquarters in July 2000. For research and study of military law, the Military Justice Research Division was established under the High Military Court and is conducting a variety of research on topics such as case analysis. Meanwhile, the MND Prosecutor's Office runs a Task Force for more rigorous investigation of corruption charges including the violation of conscription laws. Enhanced human rights protection is also included in the justice reform effort of the military. In order to better protect the rights of soldiers subject to a court martial and to alleviate their financial burden of hiring private attorneys, the military installed an Office of Court-Appointed Attorneys at the High Military Court and at each service's headquarters and created a pool of lawyers working only for the cases assigned by the military court. As the Defense Minister lifted the sanction on the establishment of a new military court, 50 additional General Military Courts were set up across division level units in June 2000. This will help reduce the need to travel a long distance to file for a warrant or to appear in court. In the end, this will increase the protection of the basic rights of the defendant and ensure the smooth and stable operation of the court martial system during war. In addition, the Summary Trial System was introduced in May 2000 to provide speedy and simple trial procedures for minor offenses. To secure talented legal resources with military experience, the military strives to revise the related laws that will open doors for reservist judge advocates to become judges of the military court and to allow them to maintain their lawyer licenses even when they retire before their compulsory military service period expires due to accidents or diseases. In addition, as part of its efforts to improve working conditions and quality of judge advocates, the military expanded opportunities for overseas training. It also plans to recruit 25 judicial officers each year through the Bar Examination for Judge Advocates to ensure a stable supply of these officers whereas the current system recruits 40 ~ 50 officers every other year. ## Creation Of New Culture In The Barracks The creation of a new culture in the barracks aims to nurture "winning soldiers" who are armed with a strong spirit and a combat-oriented mind. To create this cultural environment, the military has been implementing the following plan. First, standard daily and weekly scheduling methods were changed to increase those hours that soldiers can use at their own discretion. The new scheduling methods were designed to encourage soldiers to be more concentrated on their tasks during duty hours and to allow opportunities for the soldiers to pursue their personal development in their own areas of interest, such as PC skills, English, Classical Chinese, etc., during off-duty hours. Also, roll calls at dawn and sunset will be used more for checking the status or physical condition of the soldiers than for disciplining and inspection. Second, in order for officers to be more focused on "planning, preparation, and execution" of military exercises, the military reduced the workload on officers in squad administration. For example, the number of reports, inspections, and auditing visits by higher echelons were eliminated. In addition, since the outcome of any field operation actually lies in the hands of division commanders or brigade commanders, the military increased the power of these commanders so that they can lead their soldiers with more freedom and responsibility. Third, the "Operational Guidelines" were distributed to those officers who do not have much experience in field operations. These "Guidelines" are filled with actual examples of field operations to illustrate directions and measures newly commissioned officers can employ in the management of their units. Fourth, military facilities including barracks and various systems will be continuously improved to create an environment that satisfies the emotional needs of individual soldiers and boosts their morale. The military will continue to work for the creation of a new culture in the barracks to accomplish the following. First, military camps will no longer be seen just as "detention facilities." Rather, it will be regarded as "training facilities" for soldiers who require self-discipline and responsibility. Second, officers will be able to focus on combat readiness and capabilities. Third, officers will be armed with technical skills and knowledge and also be able to gain confidence in unit administration by using these newly acquired capabilities. Fourth, military systems and facilities will be changed and improved to accommodate the new barrack culture built on the principle of self-discipline. In the end, the military will respect the privacy of individual soldiers and inspire and encourage them to achieve greater goals. # Chapter Three Future Defense Reform Plan ## Continuing Mid- And Long-Term Defense Reform A. Continuous Restructuring Of The Military MND, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the headquarters of each service, and the RMA Planning Group are working close together on a research project to develop a future military structure in preparation for the post-unification situations. A research project on future security situations, threat analysis, military strategy, and its operational capabilities has already been carried out. Using the result obtained from this project as the basis, now the focus of the research is on figuring out the optimum level of military capability and unit structure suited to be ready for uncertain future threats. The research results will be presented in MND and JCS planning documents and the detailed execution plan will be prepared so that it can be executed without any confusion or chaos in the continuously changing South and North Korea relationship. Additionally, as a part of defense reform, the plan to restructure two field army commands and two corps commands will be carried out based on the future military structure research project results. According to this plan, "two field army commands located in the forward area will be replaced with the newly created Ground Operations Command," and "two corps commands in the rear area will be replaced with the newly created Rear- Area Operations Command." Medical unit reform was carried out by simplifying the five-step medical support system to a three-step process, thereby improving soldiers' medical benefits. The patient transfer system and medical facilities were also improved. As a part of the plan to reduce unnecessary hospital sickbeds, the number of hospitals in both forward and rear areas will be cut from 18 to 16 by the year 2004. The current total of 7,400 sickbeds will be reduced to 6,000 by 2009. MND previously decided to disband the Armed Forces Athletic Unit. However, considering the role it plays in national sports events, the World Cup or the International Council of Military Sports (CISM), the decision will be postponed until late 2000. The Korea Armed Forces Nursing Academy stopped accepting students in 1999. In its place, a system that facilitates securing civilian nurses will be adopted not only for efficient budget management, but also expansion of women's roles in the defense sector. The Korea Women's Army School, in charge of fostering and giving refresher training to female officers and NCOs, will be closed in 2001. These officers and NCOs will be educated at the Korea 3rd Military Academy and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, respectively. Refresher training will be taken over by each branch. ## B. Creation Of New Culture In The Barracks In the face of future warfare paradigm shifts which are best represented by Digitization and scientific advancement, the role of the individual soldier will inevitably expand. The sophisticated and diverse future war situations will require proper judgment and professionalism from each soldier. Taking this new paradigm shift into consideration, "the creation of a new culture in the barracks" will reform military culture to enable soldiers to think in an active and innovative manner. By doing so, it will help soldiers to develop judgment, creativity, and spontaneity. To create a new culture in the barracks, short-term projects, which can be executed immediately, are being implemented in the year 2000. As for the mid-term projects, which require testing as well as adjustment, they are scheduled to be implemented in late 2000 after close examination. Additionally, a long-term project, which requires a budget as well as system reform, will be carried out after close examination. The importance of the military barracks culture reform lies in nurturing a strong military. Therefore, instead of regulating and/or interfering with subordinate units, the military will try to provide space and give encouragement to subordinate units to enable them to use their own creativity to carry out their projects successfully. ## Continuing Efforts For The Progress Of Defense Digitization The defense digitization drive pursues the development of informationand technology-oriented professional forces capable of carrying out future information/system integration warfare and aims to achieve synchronization and integration of combat operational capabilities based on an advanced C41 system by the year 2015. Moreover, military resource management will be automated and systemized to guarantee efficient and economic administration of the military in both peacetime and wartime. Moreover, in preparation for future information warfare, efforts will be made to train IT resources systematically, and these trained resources, in turn, will further accelerate the digitization of the military. Meanwhile, the digitization efforts in force capability areas will focus on automated command systems (C4I system) which will increase the chances of winning any war. Above all, a comprehensive management body will be established at the MND level, and this body will lead military digitization efforts by restructuring the organization and functions of related agencies and departments and developing institutions and procedures to respond to changes in the digitization environment. This will lay a solid foundation for the effective management of defense digitization. With regards to the communication infrastructure for the military, the Information Super Highway, which is under construction at the moment, will be fully utilized. In addition, the strategy control network, satellite network, and Data-Link will be built to ensure wartime survivability as well as the reliability of military IT networks. C4I enhancement and the implementation of a resource management system are being pursued under a comprehensive plan in order to activate the two systems at the same time and complete the military communication network. In addition, to prevent any negative side effects of digitization, security functions will be greatly enhanced. The digitization of military resource management will focus on building an integrated resource management system and a knowledge-based decision-making support system for the effective management of the military. More specifically, efforts will be focused on constructing the CALS system and a resource management system as well as carrying out defense strategy modeling and simulation initiatives. The implementation of these systems will be guided by an objective- and system integration-oriented management approach. This will also set the example of a phase-structured system implementation practice in the military and facilitate the implementation of an efficient system which fully satisfies user requirements identified in Business Process Reengineering (BPR) efforts. Human resources needed for defense digitization will be developed through systematic implementation of IT training for all soldiers in the military. While in service, these trained IT resources will contribute to military digitization, and after the service, they will bolster the digitization of the country. To carry out defense digitization more effectively and efficiently, the IT training will be expanded to all managers, IT experts at home and abroad will be more aggressively utilized, and regulations and procedures will also be streamlined. ## Reforms In Defense Research & Development Defense technologies lie at the heart of military capabilities. Especially in the information age of the 21* century, technological superiority of the military, not the manpower of military forces, will determine the outcome of a war. Therefore, self-reliant and domestic military technologies cannot be overemphasized as a significant means to prepare for future warfare because advanced military technologies bought from abroad are not only expensive but also restrictive and limited due to the controls and regulations that their mother countries impose on technology transfers to other countries. The Korean military has been implementing various efforts to lay the foundation for the development of military technologies since the 1970s. 223 Nevertheless, the technological gap between Korea and advanced countries is still wide in most areas, especially in the area of core technologies. Korea still purchases major military parts and equipment from abroad. The reason behind this technological gap is partly due to military acquisition policy which has kept on purchasing finished products from abroad or producing and assembling military goods with imported parts and technologies. The digitization era has brought forward a paradigm shift in warfare and is requiring us to revolutionize the existing concept of military force development. From now on, any efforts to enhance military capabilities should be focused on the "software" of the military forces rather than its "hardware." Therefore, research and development systems for military technologies should be reformed first to enhance our defense technologies up to the level of advanced countries. Research and development system reforms in the military will require redesigning R&D systems and procedures for the development of advanced technologies and a stronger infrastructure for defense industries. As a stepping-stone to reach these goals, five tasks were selected as follows. First, infrastructure for advanced defense technologies will be built in connection with national science and technology strategies. Second, efforts will be focused on the development of core technologies identified on the basis of their potential values. Third, some of the core technologies identified will be subject to intensive R&D efforts to bring them up to a world-class level. Fourth, cutting-edge technologies developed by the private sector will be adopted and employed for defense technology development, if they have a comparative advantage. Lastly, defense industries will receive the necessary support to acquire international competitiveness. These tasks will be led by the "R&D Reform Team" that was added to the "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Planning Group" in May 2000. This Team will redefine and improve the paradigm of R&D efforts for defense technologies and the roles of defense industries. This Team will also make policies and plans based on these new paradigm and roles. # Military Reform In Preparation For Future Warfare The drastic development in science and technologies spurred mainly by the advances in IT technologies have brought about a paradigm shift in warfare; the mass killing and destruction in the wars of the industrial age are changing into precision targeting and paralysis of intelligence systems in the information age. The Gulf War and the civil war in Kosovo have provided us with a glimpse of what future warfare will be like. Battlefield visualization, information sharing and communication capabilities will be enhanced thanks to leapfrogging advances in precision-guided weaponry, stealth delivery systems, sophisticated sensor devices, and IT technologies. Moreover, the battlefield itself will be expanded from the earth, sea, and air to include outer space and cyberspace. This expanded battlefield will in turn stimulate the development of long-distance and precision combat capabilities. Additionally, the capability to penetrate and break down the information systems of enemies and to secure the systems of one's own country will be critical in future warfare. To meet these changed needs of the information age, the Korean military is pursuing reforms to restructure its defense systems by using the latest science and technology and to redesign the guidelines and organizations for military operations so that the new defense systems can produce their best performance. All of the restructuring and reorganizing efforts will add up to a drastic amplification of combat capabilities. The United States is drawing up the chart for the new paradigm in warfare, which is built on IT technologies, robot engineering, and micro-technologies. The main concepts behind this paradigm are "Digitization" in the Army, "Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)" in the Navy, and "Global Engagement" in the Air Force. In combination, these concepts will integrate sensor devices and precision targeting systems across the battlefield to maximize information sharing and the effects of integrated combat capabilities. The decisionmaking process in battles will also be accelerated by the integrated information and communication network. Likewise, the Korean military has installed the "RMA Planning Group" under the "National Defense Reform Committee (NDRC)" in April 1999 and launched large-scale reforms to better cope with the changing security environment around the Korean Peninsula and the paradigm shift in warfare. The objectives of the on-going military reforms in Korea are to foster combat capabilities based on IT skills and knowledge as well as to more actively tackle and satisfy the national defense requirements posed by the information age. In the end, the reforms are required to ensure survival, prosperity, and reunification of the country in the 21st century. The four areas of focus are as follows. · Establishment of Military Reform Vision and Concept. This is to make the military reforms fit together with the mid- to long-term national development visions and plans. · Development of Reform Implementation Methodologies. The methodologies identified will help the Korean military concentrate its reform efforts on core tasks and areas. · Defense Technology Development. By identifying the trend and directions of scientific and technological development one step ahead, the Korean military will develop military science and technologies that will play a leading role in the evolution of science and technology. · Stronger Defense Capabilities. Latent social resources with a comparative advantage will be actively developed to enhance defense capabilities at a lower cost. ![219_image_0.png](219_image_0.png) In line with these goals, the "RMA Planning Group" will present philosophies and methodologies of military reforms that will be most compatible with the national security and defense environment of Korea through three different phases of a research project. The completed first phase of the project delivered an analysis of the expected changes in the national security environment and the direction of national development for the next 2~3 decades and a national defense strategy based on the results of this analysis. Another benefit of the first phase was the master plan for various areas of the military including battlefield administration, principles and theories of warfare, systems for defense technology and combat capabilities, administrative systems, leadership trainings and drills. In the second phase in 2000, the project will select the main tasks based on the defined master plans and develop measures to execute these tasks. Then, the last phase in 2001 will formulate them into specific policies and plans, which will be reflected in long-term planning such as the Defense Master Plan and the overall military reform efforts. Part Five National Defense with the People Chapter One Realizing a "National Defense with the People" Chapter Two Public Benefits Enhancement and Public Rights Protection # Chapter One ![222_Image_0.Png](222_Image_0.Png) Realizing A "National Defense With The People Institutional Improvement for Fulfillment of Sacred Military Service ## A. Institutional Progress For Creating A Sound Military Service Culture The utmost priority in the administration of military service is to create a culture in which military service is considered both a duty and an honor. The public's confidence in the impartiality and equality of the draft is prerequisite for creating a condition in which every Korean man can fulfill his military service with a sense of conviction. The Military Manpower Administration (MMA) has launched an enormous project of innovation on the over-all matters of administration of the draft to establish a new military service culture. The major contents of this project are: securing clarity of information through opening it to the public and sharing it with the people; realizing a customer-oriented administration service; and pursuing innovation through the establishment of a competitive administration system. ## 1. Establishment Of Rational Draft Standards Draft standards are the deciding factors by which one's service type and period are determined. In determining these standards, the average physical grade and education level of all the draftees each year are the base factors, and the yearly requirement for draftees and the conditions of candidate supply are the sub-factors. The standards for year 2000 draft candidates are shown in Tables 5-1 and 5-2. Table 5-1 Draft Standards Based on Education and Physical Grade | Physical grade | Grade 2 | Grade 3 | Grade 4 | Grade 5 | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | |-----------------------|------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------| | | Grade 1 | | | | | | | Education | | | | | | | | College/ University | | | | | | | | students & graduates | Active duty | | | | | | | High school graduates | Physical | | | | | | | | Military | | | | | | | | service | re- | | | | | | High school dropouts | exemp- | exami- | | | | | | | Recruit service | | | | | | | Middle school | tion | nation | | | | | | graduates | | | | | | | | Middle school | Second militia service | | | | | | | dropouts or below | | | | | | | Those Exempted from Military Service Regardless of Physical Grade | Table 5-2 | Service Period | |---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | | Classification | | One among the children or siblings of soldiers or policemen | Recruit service | | killed in action, soldiers and policemen who were injured in | (six-month service as public | | war or soldiers injured on active duty who are classified as | service personnel) | | having a grade VI physical disability | | | Past convicts who served in prison for more than six months | Recruit service (28-month service | | and less than a year half | as public service | | Past convicts who served their time on probation more than | personnel) | | one year | | | Convicts who served in prison for a year and half or more | | | (except those who served their time under probation) | Second militia service | | Middle school dropouts or below | (to be called up only in | | Orphans, naturalized citizens, citizens with a partial Korean | time of war) | | lineage | | | Those who spent more than one year with physical grade VII | | Table 5-2 ## 2. Implementation Of The "Real-Name Military Service Act" On May 24, 1999, the Act of "reporting and making the military records of public office holders public" was enacted and promulgated. This Act requires elected government officers and high-ranking public officials and their sons to report and make their military records public. Public office holders are required to report and reveal their military service records as well as their immediate family members' military service records to the head of their organizations within a month after assuming their positions, and the head of their organization should report the records to the Military Manpower Administration (MMA) within a month. The head of MMA, then, should release their records to the public within one month. However, when changes in military service records occur, a report of periodic changes is required until January of the following year considering yearly December as the standard. This process is shown in Figure 5-1. For candidates for elected public offices, or those candidates who require confirmation by the National Assembly, each subordinate Chairman of the Election Management Office and the Speaker of the National Assembly are required to release the records to the public. Figure 5-1 Reporting and Releasing Procedures of Military Service Records | Public Office Holders | |------------------------------------------| | cted civil servants/ Appointed civil se | | vants higher than level one | | andidates for public offices | | sonnel who shall be appointed by the | | National Assembly and elected candidates | ![224_image_0.png](224_image_0.png) ![224_image_1.png](224_image_1.png) In relation to this announcement, for the first time in the military administration history, 12,674 military service records from 5,885 public office holders and 6,789 immediate family members were released on October 29, 1999, and as of September 2000, a total of 13,965 records including 7,413 from immediate family members have been released. ## 3. Medical Specialists In Charge Of Physical Examination Previously, active-duty military surgeons conducted preinduction physical examinations. Starting in 1999, however, civilian doctors are in charge of these examinations. The doctors are chosen from the private sector and are employed by MMA as public servants under a three-year contract. Of the 111 contracted medical doctor positions at 11 centers conducting physical examinations for conscription, 71 positions have been filled at 7 centers by 2000. Starting in 2001, all positions will be filled by contracted medical doctors. ## 4. Faithful Operation Of "Physical Grade Evaluation Committee" The Physical Grade Evaluation Committee at the MMA headquarters supervises the physical grade evaluation systems as well as inquiries raised with regard to the physical grade determination system. A similar committee within each local MMA is in charge of evaluating problematic conscription cases in its district. Additionally, local MMAs handle cases of those who wish their designated service type to be changed as well as those who do not agree with the results of their physical examinations. All final judgments by the committees require unanimity, and should this fail, draft candidates are subject to an additional in-depth physical examination at a medical hospital. The whole process of evaluating each problematic case is open to the family of the draft candidate, who may voice their opinions on the spot. If necessary, a representative from the candidate's family or participants from the draft administration briefing sessions may be invited to join the committee for a particular case. Moreover, in a bid to increase public trust in these judgments, family doctors will be asked to deliberate relevant cases with the committee starting in 2000. A total of 12,784 service exemption cases were brought before local committees in 1999; as a result, 12,558 men were exempted and 226 were subjected to in-depth physical checkups at military hospitals. Additionally, as of August 2000, a total of 9,088 service exemption cases were brought before local committees; as a result, 8,975 men were exempted and 113 were subjected to in-depth physical checkups at military hospitals. ## 5. Rational Readjustment Of The Alternative Draft System Use of the alternative draft system is now emphasized more as it promotes efficient allocation of draftees, thus greatly contributing to the society and the nation. In light of this, the ROK military has prudently readjusted the types and fields of alternative service. First, in order to recruit public service personnel with a higher level of education, the draft priority was improved changing the previous priority order of 1) faster date of physical examination for conscription and 2) older age preference to a new order of 1) higher level of education, 2) faster date of physical examination for conscription, and 3) older age preference. Therefore, in the future, in locations where there is a surplus of recruits, those with lower education will not be recruited ahead of those with higher education. In addition, to prevent problematic social disturbances caused by public service personnel while they are on duty, the "last order of the draft priority system" for public service personnel was newly established. According to this system, the following personnel are last in order of draft priority: past convicts with educational background below high school level who served in prison or received sentences more severe than paying fines (excluding convicts who violated military service law or special traffic accident law or traffic law), those who served in youth detention centers, mental patients, and personnel who have a physical grade of four on draft standards due to severe tattoos or suicidal records. | | Administration Office | International | Fine Arts/ | | | | |------------|-------------------------|-----------------|----------------|-------|-----|-----| | Total | | Public | Social Welfare | | | | | Central | Local | Cooperation | Sports | | | | | Government | Government | Organizations | Facilities | | | | | 55,257 | 12,513 | 35,742 | 5,544 | 1,253 | 101 | 104 | | (Persons) | | | | | | | | Rate (%) | 22.6 | 64.7 | 10.0 | 2.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | Table 5-3 Number of Public Service Personnel by Field in 2000 ![226_image_0.png](226_image_0.png) ![226_image_1.png](226_image_1.png) The military has elevated its management efficiency level of technical research personnel and skilled industrial personnel as part of the alternative draft system. Instead of canceling privileges of those serving as technical research and skilled industrial personnel when they violate service duty in their fields, the personnel are required to serve extra time equal to the length of their absences if the violations are light enough in such cases as non-intentional incidents or cases caused by unfair work loads or harsh orders from their superiors. Starting in 2001, research organizations that have benefited as a "designated enterprise" for more than ten years or engineering field designated enterprises for more than eight years will have limitations in recruiting technical research and skilled industrial personnel. This policy is designed to increase manpower efficiency in situations where too many designated enterprises were created. The demand for public service personnel is increasing due to the government's policy of developing small and medium sized (venture) enterprises while the number of technical research and skilled industrial personnel is limited. Table 5-4 Active Servicemen in "Designated Enterprises" in 2000 | Technical Research | Skilled Industrial | | | |-----------------------|----------------------|-----------|-----------| | Classification | Total | Personnel | Personnel | | | 2,395 | 11,019 | | | Designated enterprise | 13,414 | | | | Servicemen | 70,231 | 14,675 | 55,556 | ## 6. Enhancing Draft Administration Service For The Public MMA's internet website (www.mma.go.kr) is currently in operation and systematically carries data in over 45 fields and 360 kinds of information related to draft administration. Through the "Internet Civil Service Office" MMA provides advice on draft-related problems or questions, and openly receives various opinions, suggestions, and complaints from the public. The office also provides enlistment dates and other information requested by the public. In addition, an automated response service (ARS) telephone system is operated 24 hours a day throughout the year to provide 92 kinds of draft-related information on areas such as enlistment date, draft of supportive troops, physical examination for conscription, and so on. Centers used for physical examinations of draftees are always open to the public, and briefing sessions are held to improve public understanding on how service type and period are determined. MMA is making efforts to provide advice to draft candidates in person; at the beginning of the school year, it operates a mobile draft counseling office and conducts lecture tours. MMA routinely provides counseling and advice through newspapers, TV, and radio. MND has increased the number of flyers and booklets which provide draft-related information as well. Until recently, students younger than 17 were required to submit certificates or special confirmation of overseas study approval issued by the Ministry of Education when they intended to travel for study abroad. However, MND abolished this regulation in order for students younger than 17 to travel as general international students. Furthermore, the permission of an extension period while studying abroad has changed from every two years to the time of the student's graduation. Additionally, those who completed or were exempted from their military service duty are no longer required to report to MMA offices located at airports and harbors when they travel abroad. Draftees who desire to take the physical examination for conscription earlier than the scheduled date of the physical examination for either overseas travel or earlier enrollment purposes will be able to take the physical examination for conscription on the date of their choice, if they submit a "first priority physical examination for conscription application" before the date of their preference. ## B. Innovation Of Military Service Administration (Msa): Pursuit Of "Msa Vision 21" To promote a new military service culture with a clear military service administration, efficient personnel management, and recruitment of high quality manpower, MSA established "MSA Vision 21" to innovate the military service administration. As a result, MMA will gradually pursue an advanced military service administration by reforming its systems, procedures, and developing a new computerized information system. New computerized information systems in the areas of drafting and recruiting military personnel will be developed in 2000. In 2001, the computerized systems for reserve force management support of decision-making processes, and evaluation of military administration will be developed, and these systems will begin its operation in 2002. ## 1. Achievements Starting from January 2000, MMA operated an "automated e-mail postal service center" for mailing notices of physical examination and mobilization in order to significantly reduce the administrative workload of the military service. Since March 1, 2000, certificates of military service that were previously issued only at MMA are now issued at local military service administration offices and district offices located near city, county, district, and town. Starting on May 1, 2000, civilians can gain access to the entire process of civil petition management in real time through the internet "civil petition online system." ## 2. Future Plans Starting in 2001, all processing of physical examinations for conscription will be computerized. The main purpose of this automation is to obtain clarity and fairness in the physical examination processes and to prevent malpractice related to military service administration. In the past, draftees used to submit a "request form for postponing enlistment date" at either local MMA offices or district offices located near city, county, district, and town. Now draftees can submit the request through the internet, and they can immediately receive the answer through the internet as well. Also, current college students can decide their enlistment dates through the internet website by consulting the list of enlistment dates and the troop status of each recruiting unit. MMA also plans to process military service related jobs through the internet by networking with organizations employing public service personnel, designated enterprises of technical research (or skilled industrial) personnel, local reserve companies, and various colleges and universities. The current computer networks that are connected to share information among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice will be enlarged to include other organizations such as the Ministry of Education and the National Police Agency. Currently, draftees receive the physical examination for conscription either at MMA or military hospitals. However, in the near future, a single institution "MMA central physical examination center" will be in charge of physical examination, and this change is expected to increase consistency in draft related decisions. MMA will also adopt a double check system on decisions of military service exemption to prevent malpractice related to military service administration. ## Efforts To Protect The People'S "Right To Know" A. Information Disclosure And Civil Petitions 1. Information Disclosure The ROK government promulgated an act on the "obligatory disclosure of information by public offices," and the reason behind this is simple: to satisfy the people's right to know and to ensure clarity in administrative procedures. To keep pace with the government's policy, MND has specified, and is now implementing methods and procedures for disclosing information. MND and its affiliate organizations have set up service windows and improved their internet website to make public non-classified information and other information on major military projects. Even classified information is now released to the public when it becomes unclassified. The public has access to a sea of information; lists, handbooks of major documents, and other information that is available to everyone, and people can request the documents they desire through the internet website. The MND department in charge of releasing documents and information answers a request within fifteen days after it is received, informing the requester whether or not a document can be released. If the document can be released, it must be made available within fifteen days after the date the document's releasability is determined. Should the department reach a decision that a certain document or piece of information cannot be released, it must inform the requester of the reasons. On the other hand, the requester may appeal in writing against the decision reached by the department within thirty days after being informed. The MND Headquarters or the affiliate that produced the document or information then decides whether or not the appeal is accepted and informs the ![230_image_0.png](230_image_0.png) Figure 5-2 Process of Information Disclosure requester of the results in a letter within seven days after submission of the appeal. If the request is declined, an information notice of the administrative appeal will be mailed together with the decision. ## 2. Civil Petitions MND, looking towards better management of civil petitions, opened an internet homepage offering civil service information and made available a main MND telephone number (02-748-1111) and civil petition office number (02-748-6891~2) for civil affairs administration. Suggestions for national defense policy, and cases of assault or malpractice within the military are also processed through the Defense Reporting Center (02-748-5959). During off-duty hours, the civil petition office number is operated by an automatic recording system for the public to voice complaints. The recorded civil petitions are processed immediately after the duty hour begins the next day, and the petitioners are notified of the results. Table 5-5 Civil Petition Settlement (As of Dec. 31, 1999) | Documented Petitions | Internet Petitions | Personal Visit | Telephone Counseling | |------------------------|----------------------|------------------|------------------------| | 110 cases per | | | | | 2,658 cases annually | | | | | 3,899 cases annually | 5,920 cases annually | day average | | Out of the total civil petitions, cases of wounded on duty and veterans' benefits comprised the highest percentage (34%). Most of the petitions submitted through the internet were simple questions on enlistments and recruits of military civilian employee with 5,539 cases (94%), while those petitions resorting to law accounted for only 381 cases (6%). ## B. Open Defense And Defense Publicity MND has been continually supporting the national administration through the principle of an "open defense policy" which will satisfy the public's right to know and gives the citizen an understanding of defense policy. MND regularly offers a "daily press briefing" to defense publicity media such as the "Kook-Bang Ilbo," the "Armed Forces Broadcasting System," and the "National Defense News" where public interests such as the ogress of the major de ![232_image_0.png](232_image_0.png) policies and the security situapondes arounding the Korean Polinaula a modulas Malailer of Dollance Malaysia Malailer tions with the people possible. ## The Korean War And National Defe A. The Significance And Missions Of The Korean War The Korean War was the first war ever fought to stop the spread munism after World War II. Under the UN banner, the ROK Armed Forces and the United Nations Command defeated the North Korean Forces supported by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China that began with the North's surprise invasion across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950. The Korean War represented the triumph of free democracy in defending the freedom of the world against communist expansion. At that time, 16 nations including the USA sent combat troops as UN Forces, 5 nations including India dispatched medical support units, and over 20 nations provided material supports. The Korean War left a deep scar on humanity. It cost lives of over four million people, separated over ten million families, and destroyed $23 billion worth of properties. Also, it resulted in the continued division of the Korean peninsula for the past 50 years. We must consider the current national security situations and remember the historical lessons from the Korean War. And, we must ensure that the tragedy of the Korean War will never happen again in this Korean peninsula. ## B. The 50™ Anniversary Of The Korean War Commemoration The objectives of the 50th AKWC is to promote reconciliation, reunification, and prosperity of the Korean people in the 21st century by 1) recalling the significance and lessons of the Korean War, 2) honoring the Korean War veterans and expanding their welfare, 3) promoting national security awareness to the post-war generation, and 4) obtaining international confidence through solidifying bonds with the 21 Korean War Allied Nations. The theme of these projects that began on June 25, 2000, anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, and continue till July 2003, marking the Armistice Agreement, is Pursuing Peace beyond the Korean War, Pursuing Reunification beyond the Division.' The projects are categorized into 52 core projects conducted by the government and 41 commissional projects by local governments. In 2000, 39 core projects including the main commemoration ceremony and 36 commissioned projects were conducted. ## 1. The Significance Of The Korean War And Its Historical Lessons The objectives of commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War are to promote national security awareness through a clear understanding of the Korean War and to remind the post-war generations of the historical lessons and significance of the Korean War. To this end, the areas of Korean War history which are still under discussion will be analyzed in a scholarly manner. A total of 29 research projects including 16 military and 13 non-military-i.e. political, economic, sociological and cultural-projects, will be carried out and the results will be published as appendices to the Korean War History. In relation to these scholarly activities, MND hosted two seminars to reexamine the historical significance of the Korean War in 2000. The title of the first seminar held in April 2000 was "Pursuing Peace beyond the Korean War" with various national scholars as well as foreign scholars from the USA, Japan, China, and Russia. The title of second seminar held in June was "Fifty Years after the Korean War, from Confrontation to Peaceful Coexistence" in which scholars from the ROK, USA, and Japan participated. In addition, to honor and elevate the sprit of war heroes, the government is planning to construct the "Monument of the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War" at the Korean War Memorial. The government is also in the process of renovating 667 battlefields throughout the nation. Furthermore, projects that will transform historical battlefields into tourist attractions are now being implemented. ## 2. Honoring Korean War Veterans And The Policies Enlargement Of Welfare ![234_image_0.png](234_image_0.png) The aim of this project is to honor Korean War veterans who dedicated themselves to their nation and to elevate their pride in their participation in the Korean War by providing practical welfare benefits. Letters of Appreciation with the official seal of the President of the Republic of Korea were presented (June 2000), and the Minister of National Defense presented gifts to 53 Taeguk Order of Military Merit recipients and their families. A variety of other programs for war veterans are now in the process of implementation. These programs are: constructing monuments for KIAs in each county, writing names of the Military Merit Awardees on the road signs, emplacing doorplates at war veterans' houses, awarding honorary diploma for war veterans and constructing torsos of Military Merit Awardees and war heroes. In addition, other programs to honor war veterans include: visiting veterans' homes for consolation, inviting veterans to national events, visiting wounded veterans, searching for war comrades and commemorating the dedicated war heroes. In order to return the remains of the dead who sacrificed their lives for the country to their families, the ROK government launched a project to exhume the remains of 29 major battlefields including Dabu-Dong and Angang. During the first half of the year 2000, 41 complete remains, 1,410 fragmentary remains, and 2,361 relics were found near Dabu-Dong, Angang, and the Gaehwa mountain areas. Out of these exhumations, 144 unidentified remains were enshrined in the National Cemetery Charnel House and 2 identified remains were buried in the National Cemetery. One American remain was sent to the USA and 2 North Korean remains were buried in the North Korean Army Cemetery in Paju. During the latter half of 2000, the project to exhume remains continued around Kumsung, Baeksuk mountain, Bloody Ridge, and the Choongju area. In an effort to honor war veterans and promote their sense of pride, the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs (MPVA) revised the "regulations on benefits and support for national heroes," raised the pension of war veterans and expanded the grades. MPVA also revised the law on supporting war veterans and its enforcement ordinance to bring about a substantial increase in welfare benefits for elderly veterans with extra living expenses, funeral costs, burial subsidies, and extended their medical benefits. 3. Establishing National Identity and Security Consciousness in the Post-War Generation The post-war generation Exhumation of remains comprises 70% of the Korean population, and various events are planned to ![236_image_0.png](236_image_0.png) help them understand the significance and historical lessons of the Korean War as well as stimulate their national security awareness. One important event is the revision of the war related curricula for the elementary, middle, and high school education programs in close cooperation with the Ministry of Education. To this end, in 2000, educational curricula for the first and second grades of elementary school students were revised. According to the yearly plans of revision, curricula for higher grades up to the third grade of high school will be revised by the year 2004. Educational posters and video tapes teaching the historical lessons of the Korean war were also prepared and distributed as educational materials to soldiers, reserve troops, elementary, middle, and high schools, and other social educational organizations. In addition, MND held a public collection for war memoirs and defense related literary works. It later published the book, You Are Beautiful (June 2000). Also, MND presented the Korean War Photo Exhibition Tour in 11 different areas including Seoul. Furthermore, MND hosted a variety of education and training camps, disciplinary educational programs for soldiers and reserve troops, and speech contests. Typical among these activities was "A March for Unification" from AeKeeBong through DMZ areas to the Unification Observatory, in which 200 members of the Boy Scout federation participated. ## 4. Enhancing International Status Of The Rok With Stronger Ties Among Korean War Allies Various projects are scheduled to enhance Korea's national prestige abroad and to strengthen security ties by expressing gratitude to the 21 Korean War allies and veterans. These projects include: inviting representatives of the Korean War allies and veterans to a variety of memorial events, supporting home ceremonies and events for the Korean War allies, and sending Korean representatives to various ceremonies and events in allied countries. On June 25, 2000, the main event of " The 50th AKWC Main Commemoration" was held with over 10,000 people present including the President of the ROK, Ministers of Defense from the 21 Korean War allies, ambassadors in Korea, and war veterans home and abroad. Included in this ![237_image_0.png](237_image_0.png) "Unveiling of the Honor Roll" at the 50th AKWO Main Commemoration Dedication Ceremony of the Korean War Monument event were the opening ceremony of "The Korean War Special Exhibition" and the dedication of a war memorial for 38,000 UN soldiers and 30,000 soldies who died during the Korean War. This event reminded people of the historical significance of the Korean War and enhanced Korea's internation- al confidence among the Kor MND also held ceremonies in commemoration of the major battles in the Korean War to promote national security awareness: Pusan Perimeter, ![237_image_1.png](237_image_1.png) The Korean War Allied Nations' Ceremony of Constructing the Korean War Participation Monument Inchon Landing Operation, Seoul Recapture, and each Armed Force's commemoration. Students, citizens, and war veterans from all nations were present at these ceremonies. In support of the Korean War allies' commemorations held in Korea, the Korean delegation including Gen(Ret) Paik Sunyup, chairman of the 50th AKWC Committee participated in ceremonies such as the "Task Force Smith Commemoration" at Osan (July 2000) and the "Jangjin Reservoir tle Commemoration" held by the CINCCFC (Commader in Chief, nbined Forces Command). As part of supporting the commemorations held in allied countries, a Korean delegation including the chairman of the ![238_image_0.png](238_image_0.png) 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee, DCINC- CFC (Deputy Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command) and officers from the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs were represented at events that included the "Korean War Memorial Dedication Ceremony in Washington D.C.," "Korean War Veterans' Day Ceremony," "Inchon Landing Commemoration" held at Norfolk, Virginia, USA, Korean War Memorial Parade in New York City, and the dedication of a monument commemorating Korean War participation held at Cambra, Australia. Letters of Appreciation of the ROK President were presented to the Korean War veterans' organizations and individuals in the 21 allied nations. In the letter, the ROK President expressed a respect for their noble sacrifices and devotion, particularly their noble efforts to uphold the ideals of democracy. The President highly praised their contributions for the freedom and democracy on the universal value of mankind. He also stated that he would do his part for world peace and prosperity in the New Millennium. The Korean War allied nations paid particular attention to our sincere efforts to appreciate their sacrifices and dedication. Through newspapers and TV broadcasts, they expressed special thanks for our efforts. Some veterans wrote on their letters that they were proud to be Korean War veterans and would put the presidential letter in a frame to hang on their living room wall. During the Korean War, the ROK government presented the "Korean War Service Medal (KWSM)" but was unable to grant these medals to veterans of the United States of America and some countries of the British Commonwealth due to their home regulations that forbid them from receiving foreign decorations. However, in commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War, the Minister of National Defense formally presented the KWSMs to the CINCCFC (Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command) for those veterans who requested the medals (July 2000). The President of the ROK also presented KWSMs to the veterans at the UN Millennium Summit (September 2000). The project of presenting KWSMs will continue until 2003. These activities of the ROK government are expected to promote pride in Korean War veterans and will strengthen ties between the ROK and USA. Likewise, the Korean War veterans in some countries of the British Commonwealth are scheduled to receive KWSMs in 2001. ![239_image_0.png](239_image_0.png) Appreciation In addition, in order to promote pride in Korean War veterans abroad and strengthen ties among Korean War allies, other programs to invite allies' Korean War veterans and their families are planned. Furthermore, the committee schedules to support foreign commemorative programs in near future and will publish or broadcast special fea tures on Korea in major foreign media. Increased Civilian Specialist Participation in Defense Decision Making The era of "National Defense with the People" can arrive only when the entire nation is inspired to take a keen interest and participate in defense policies. The priority, then, is to establish and clearly execute defense policies, and to disclose the policies to the public as they stand. From this viewpoint, it is not only necessary but also efficient to encourage civilian experts to take part in the defense decision-making process. MND is taking actions to stimulate the participation of civilian experts as well as to garner their opinions when deciding on and establishing defense policies. ## A. Defense Policy Advisory Committee Through the operation of the Defense Policy Advisory Committee composed of civilian experts, since 1981, MND has strived to enhance mutual understanding of defense affairs between the society and the military. The committee is divided into 12 subcommittees and consists of 44 civilian experts with profound knowledge and long term experience in academic and mass media circles. These subcommittees include: policy, arms con- ![240_image_0.png](240_image_0.png) trol, troop information and education (TI&E), planning and management, legal affairs, personnel and welfare, mobilization, logistics, acquisition, facilities, information systems, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each committee member's role is to advise MND on the decision-making process of major defense policies. Committee members are requested to take part in an annual plenary meeting chaired by the defense minister, and quarterly meetings called by subcommittees. Apart from these regular meetings, members give ad hoc advice by making personal visits or by other means, e.g., mail or fax, should urgent events arise. In 1999, a total of 15 consultations were made on policies, including "Waste Water Disposal Facilities" and "Command and Control of KNTDS (Korean Navy Tactical Defense System)," and in 2000, a topic such as "Adequacy of North & South Korean Arms Possession Limit During the Period of Peaceful Co-existence" was taken up by the committee. In the future, the Ministry of National Defense is planning to fully cooperate with committee members to effectively cope with the rapidly changing internal and external situations. ## B. Increased Participation Of Civilian Experts In Policymaking Processes Previously, the participation of civilian experts in defense policy making was mainly indirect; opinion surveys, exchange of views at seminars, and research results were exploited in defense policy making. MND, however, has recently formed new committees consisting of civilian experts directly involved in policy formulation and decision-making. The Defense Policy Review Committee was set up in 1997, the National Defense Reform Committee in 1998, and the RMA Planning Group in 1999. Civilian experts have been assigned as policy advisors or evaluators on each committee. Especially in the case of "RMA Planning Group," the committee members are selected on a part time basis from a "pool" of military experts and civilian experts. The main purpose of the pool system is to garner a variety of innovative ideas from civilian society and expand public understanding of military policy. Since 1996, MND has been encouraging and endorsing defense related seminars hosted by civilian organizations in order to maintain the interest of civilian experts in defense issues; the research reports from these seminars provide vital information related to the review and determination of policies. Starting from 1999, government funded research projects, which were monopolized by KIDA in the past, are awarded through competition among all MND affiliated research institutions as well as civilian research institutes. Such a change in the government funded research allocation system has brought about higher quality research reports and increased the participation of civilian experts in the defense policy making process. # Chapter 1 Public Benefits Enhancement And Rights Protection onmentally Friendly Military Manager In order to improve the environmental conditions of national la precious home of our people while setting national defense as the primary duty, each unit and regional command of the Korean Armed Forces is intensifying activities that pres ## A. Laying The Foundation For The Military'S Environmental Management 1. Development of Environmental Business Management Process with environment related licenses and completing the installation of basic environmental facilities by 2005. ## 2. Strengthening Military Personnel'S Environmental Education In order to build a firm foundation for environmental management, all military personnel must have an enhanced regard for and knowledge of environmental protection. Furthermore, to make military personnel active environmentalists for society as much as possible, MND seeks to establish a firm conceptual foundation of environmental protection and integrate it in daily routines of military personnel. Particularly, the environmental education for generals was reinforced to raise the knowledge of high-level commanders, and in the future, institutions like the Armed Engineer School will train environmental specialists. Representatives from the Ministry of Environment, the local environmental management office, local government, and various environmental organizations provide environmental education for military service personnel and commanders to reinforce the importance of the environment through troop information and education periods. In efforts to improve environmental education, a research report entitled "Standardization and Program Development of the Military's Environmental Education" will be used as the primary guideline for developing proper environmental education textbooks. ## 3. Constructing Military Environmental Cooperation System A Government-Military Environmental Consultative Committee (GMECC) was organized in 1998 for the purpose of improving environmental conditions in the military and adjacent areas. The GMECC is composed of a Central Committee, four subcommittees at four major river watershed areas, and two regional committees near Taegu and Wonju. Each committee conducts 4-5 regularly scheduled meetings as well as numerous unscheduled meetings yearly. As part of GMECC's projects, the committees have strengthened their relationship by enforcing cooperative activities to recover the polluted Daeam mountain and Backdu Daegan, preserving the ecosystem near the civilian control line and cleaning the Han river estuary numerous times in cooperation with the military every year. The Ministry of Environment and local governments have compromised on an issue of managing the waste disposal on military posts, providing Figure 5-3 Composition Chart of the Government-Military Environmental Consultative Committee ![244_image_0.png](244_image_0.png) * Members of each committee: approximately 20 people (Officials of the Military, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and local governments) environmental management technology, supplying textbooks for environmental education, and supporting qualified instructors and disposal equipments, as well as manpower. Meanwhile, MND avidly supports environmental subcommittee activities under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) because they provide opportunities to discuss environmental pollution concerns posed by US Forces in Korea (USFK). Moreover, the working-level environmental cooperative system strives to upgrade the environmental situation on USFK installations. In cooperation with international military environmental management, an effort has been made to acquire environmental management technologies and information from developed nations with the intent to strengthen the military's international position. Additionally, "the research for international cooperation of military's environmental management system" was conducted to build a firm foundation of armed forces' international cooperation on environment. ## 4. Environmental Studies Conducted by the Armed ## Forces In order to eliminate environmentally detrimental factors ![244_image_1.png](244_image_1.png) Seminar unique to the military, and to draw up an "environmental management system," the military has conducted continuous studies. Through the "Armed Forces' Environment Preservation Research Seminar," which has been held periodically since 1998, the desires of working-level officers as well as environment experts have been encouraged, and their consciousness of environmental protection has been enhanced. ## B. Prevention Of Environmental Pollution At Military Posts 1. Expansion Of Basic Environmental Facilities And Equipments It is known that military posts and units are protected from non-authorized personnel by the military facility protection act. Because military posts and operating areas are close to and have relation with water supply protection zones, the efforts and responsibilities of the military as well as authorities to protect the environment are strongly recommended. From this perspective, legal disposal facilities and equipment such as wastewater treatment facilities must be purchased quickly in order to prevent contravention of environmental laws and environmental pollution on the military's posts and in its operations. The military plans to expand 706 wastewater treatment facilities by the end of 2000; wastewater treatment facilities will be constructed in the Han and Nakdong river watershed by 2001, in the Kum river and Young San river watershed by 2002, and in the remaining watershed areas by 2003. Furthermore, a total of 4,427 environmental facilities such as incinerators and soil pollution prevention facilities will be in place by 2005 and insufficient environmental facilities that were built previously will be upgraded in the near future. | | Plans for | | | | | | | | |---------------------|-------------|-----------|-------|-----------|---------|-----------|----|-----| | Total | 1999 | Plans for | After | | | | | | | Classification | 2006 | | | | | | | | | Demand | Holdings | Total (%) | 2000 | Total (%) | ട്ട് 2005 | Total (%) | | | | Basic environmental | 100 | | | | | | | | | 4,427 | 764 | 17 | 87 | 19 | 3,576 | | | | | facilities (places) | | | | | | | | | | Environmental | 5,789 | 3,400 | રત | 117 | 61 | 1,394 | 85 | 878 | | equipment (units) | | | | | | | | | Table 5-6 Military Owned Environmental Facilities and Equipment ※ Environmental facilities include 2,256 soil pollution prevention facilities (51%) In relation to the development of environmental facilities and equipment, environment public relation activities such as collecting new information and opening exhibitions were initiated and the "natural purification plan for polluted water" using swamp land and fields of parsley is in the application stage. ## 2. Waste Management And Recycling Resources The military has shown continuous efforts to prevent environmental pollution and recycle wastes through its intensive waste management. The wastes accumulated by the military are either burned by its own incinerator or sent to local governments or waste disposal companies. The wastes that cannot be treated by the armed forces are sent to professional waste disposal companies in order to prevent environmental pollution and recycle wastes. In addition, 19,991 facilities for separating solid waste materials have been placed throughout the nation to reduce the amount of waste and to recycle resources. | | Unit: ton | | | | | |--------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|---------|---------| | Amounts | Entrusted for | Self Disposal | | | | | Classification | Produced | Disposal | Recycling | Burning | Holding | | Total | 222,424 | 151,726 | 44,433 | 12,114 | 14,151 | | Regular waste | 147,053 | 118,745 | 15,838 | 11,601 | | | Livelihood | 869 | | | | | | 32,780 | 6,992 | | | | | | Food waste | 25,331 | 457 | | | | | 9,118 | | | | | | | Designated waste | 19,130 | 2,386 | 0 | 7,626 | | | Construction waste | 23,461 | 16,871 | 878 | 56 | 5,656 | Table 5-7 Military Wastes and Disposal (Based on 1999) ## 3. Environmental Impact Assessments On Military Facilities Environmentally harmful factors are carefully eliminated beforehand during the planning stage of constructing military facilities by observing the procedural details of construction stipulated by the "Act for Environmental, Traffic and Disasters Impact Assessments." This is to prevent possible civil appeals from the residents living nearby. ## 4. Entrusting Management Plans Of Environmental Facilities In order for the military to determine the realities of environmental management, find suitable solutions for each problem, and expand and operate environmental facilities and equipment effectively, each military unit is required to secure more manpower to be responsible for environmental issues. However, it is extremely difficult for the armed forces, located throughout the nation, to recruit environmentally savvy active duty personnel and specialists in short period of time because of the military's unique characteristics of maintaining force capabilities and implementing improvements. Therefore, in order to minimize losses in force capabilities, maximize effectiveness, and maintain the professionalism of environmental management, the military seeks to increase its support of environmental management plans that have been under review and are currently being used in some military units. Having professional environmental management firms for environment management will draw numerous benefits: solving environmental management problems that were a burden to military commanders, gaining the reliance and trust of citizens in military environmental management, and maximizing force capabilities by concentrating on combat drills. ## C. Nature Conservation Activities 1. Local Environmental Cleanup Activities To prevent environmental pollution within the military, preserve the natural environment, and provide a clean environment for the public, the military plays a leading role in cleaning the local environment near military units. Major environmental clean- ![247_image_0.png](247_image_0.png) up activities launched by the military include the Navy's engagement in activities to improve the maritime environment of approximately 60 islands in cooperation with local governments and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and nature conservation activities by army Armed Forces' environmental preservation activities ary personnel were held in Backdu Daegan in coo public and government ## 2. Nature Preservation Proposition Of Military Posts And Operating Areas The special interests and efforts of the military to preserve the envi ment are required due to the characteristics of military units that an ## D. Environment Restoration 1. Contaminated Soil Restoration Pr Lakage of oll from storage facilities poliutes neathy crom and on mark reaster crvil political politor polsons neactly crom and on mar minator crvil pelitions : Ill c Table 5-8 Soil Contamination Tests and Restoration F | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | | | |--------------------|--------|------------|------------|-----------| | Classification | Total | (Executed) | (Executed) | (Planned) | | Soil contamination | 1,242 | 228 | 623 | 391 | | test | | | | | * Oil storage facilities with a capacity of more than 20,000 liters were subject to tests. The numbe of restoration projects was estimated to be 25% of the total number of facilities tested Two maintenance depot sites in the Pusan area have been under restoration since 1997, with the first one fully restored. Soil contaminant characterization was completed on the second depot site, and it is now undergoing restoration. ## 2. Achievement Of A Firm Basis For The Restoration Of Environmentally Polluted Areas Although military forces are actively involved in recovering soil polluted by oil leaks and other buried wastes, various soil restoration technologies have not been invented. The development of contaminated soil restoration technology and procedures is an urgent matter due to the possibilities of further contamination caused by the operation of special weapons and munitions. Therefore, the military continually supports research for developing contaminated soil restoration technologies. The research is conducted by the armed forces within budget constraints as well as by professional research institutes that have recognized the necessity and significance of developing contaminated soil restoration technologies. In efforts to develop contaminated-soil restoration technology, the military conducted a test restoration of oil-contaminated soil using technologies developed by the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST). Additionally, MND has made attempts to commission a project that would develop contaminated soil restoration procedures and create a system similar to a research institute. In the process of pollution disposal and restoration, rational standards of pollution allowance levels and environmental disposal and restoration are being planned. Furthermore, the information gathered from pollution disposal and restoration will be accumulated to increase effectiveness, achieve objectivity, and benefit other similar projects. ## E. Management Of Work Environment And Toxic Chemicals The "Regulation on the Military Work Environment and Health Management of Employees" and "Regulation on Safe Management of Military Radiological Emissions" were enacted for the safe management of radiological emissions used by the military and to protect military service personnel from harmful pollutants such as heavy metals, organic com- ![250_image_0.png](250_image_0.png) pounds, noise, chemical dust, and medical and industrial radiation. In 1999, MND created a radiological safety inspection organization. By 2002, MND plans to form organizations to conduct specialized medical examination and inspect work environments for the health management of military personnel. At present, "Guidelines for Managing Toxic Chemicals in the Military" are being developed in order to ensure the safety of those who work with hazardous materials and are planned to be applied in 2001. In addition, the material management guideline that provides information on toxic wastes will be displayed on the intranet of MND and additional information on toxic materials will be continuously accumulated. ## The Local Community And Military Facilities A. Settlement Of Private Land Used By The Military In an attempt to protect individual property rights, our military has persistently sought ways to fairly compensate citizens or organizations for private land occupied and used by the military. In accordance with the Special Act on Acquisition or Reparations for Loss on Public Lots, the military either purchases private land it must continue to use or otherwise compensates the owners for it. If private land is deemed unnecessary for military use, it is returned to the owner immediately. If the owner of the private land that the military is currently using needs to use the land in the future or wishes to exchange it for idle public land, the military will willingly accept this kind of exchange. Aside from the general accounts budget, since 1995 the military has been allowed to use the Special Accounts Budget for National Property Management, whose main financial sources come from selling idle public land to purchase or compensate individuals for the private land it needs. Though situations may arise where the military must use a certain piece of private land for urgent military purposes, it must receive the approval of the owner, or purchase it through appropriate legal procedures. Table 5-9 shows the number of private land cases that were settled between the owners and the military. Table 5-9 Settlement of Private Land Cases | | Total Size of Land | Cases Settled | Plans | | |-------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|---------|------------| | Classification | to be Settled | (1983-1999) | 2000 | After 2001 | | | 762.3 | 4,184.4 | | | | Size (hectares) | 15,516.2 | 10,569.9 | | | | | 546.8 | 319.1 | 49.0 | 178.7 | | Budget Required (billion won) | | | | | ## B. Relocation Of Military Facilities For increased efficiency of land use, balanced development of urban areas, enhanced benefit to the public, and modernization of military facilities, the military is gradually relocating its units to the suburbs as long as military operations are not hindered. As shown in Table 5-10, a total of 3.01 trillion won was spent on the relocation of 209 units from 1966 to 1999. In 2000, the military plans to relocate 12 out of 44 units at a cost of 200.1 billion won. Table 5-10 | Unit : number of unit | | | | | | | | | | |-------------------------|-------|-------|--------|---------|-------|--------|-------|----|----| | Seoul | Pusan | Taegu | Taejon | Kyungju | Wonju | Inchon | Other | | | | Regional Classification | Total | | | | | | | | | | Total Project ('66~'99) | 209 | 53 | 40 | 18 | 20 | 18 | 23 | 9 | 28 | | Completed in 1999 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | Relocation of Military Facilities (As of Late 1999) Furthermore, a cooperative council will be formed and operated for a smoother execution of relocation projects. This will consist of relevant ministries and local governments. The military also plans to allow local governments or government-contracted organizations to construct replacement facilities for the military, and turn existing military facilities over to them. ## C. Revision And Deregulation Of Military Facility Protection Areas Under the Military Facility Protection Act, the Naval Base Act, and the Act on Air Bases for Military Use, the military has designated and managed military facility (base) protection areas that account for approximately 11.12 billion hectares. Recently, systems related to military facility protection areas were ![252_image_0.png](252_image_0.png) improved, and the boundary of these areas are being rationally readjusted not only to ensure operational efficiency but to enhance public benefit. First, a series of laws pertaining to military facility protection areas were enacted and amended from 1997 through the first half of 1999. Villages within the protected area north of the civilian control line, areas necessary to carry out unification policies, and areas used by security facilities have been designated as "limited protection areas." Under no circumstances have houses near ammunition depot protection areas been allowed to be torn down or rebuilt. But, if public projects, e.g., railway or road construction, make the removal of houses within a specific zone inevitable, the houses may be torn down and replaced. The scope of restrictions on the areas surrounding air bases was reduced. The air base protection zone for a support aircraft base area has been reduced from 5 kilometers to 2 km from the outer security line of the air base; operational bases for helicopters were separately classified and downsized in the public interest. Second, with the prior analysis system on military facility protection adopted in August 1998, consultations were left partially in the hands of administrative departments that currently are available to the public. With the introduction of this system, people can now check on local land userelated information at local civil petition offices (change of form and nature of land, permitted range or height of construction). In November 1999, 34 military facility protection areas, such as Paju, Munsan, and Yonchon in the Kyunggi province, that are 4,950 hectares in size were commissioned to the administrative government. Third, military facility protection areas were readjusted to coincide with changes in the operational environment. As of June 1998, the military lifted restrictions on 1,079.76 hectares in ten places including parts of Seoul and in areas near ammunition warehouses, all judged as marginally relevant to military operations. Restrictions on a total of 768.9 hectares in sixteen villages within the civilian control line have been reduced from "restricted protection areas" to "limited protection areas." The residents in these villages may now build or rebuild their houses or farm buildings without consulting military units. Cancellation and Deregulation of Military Facility Protection Areas Table 5-11 (Unit: hectares) | 1995~1998 | | | | | | |--------------|-----------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------| | Year | Total | Before 1980 | 1981~1985 1986~1988 1989~1993 | 1994 | | | 176,609.4 | 1,310.1 | | | | | | Cancellation | 290,571.6 | 2,805 | 4,950 | 101,805 | 2,745.6 | | 2,745.6 | 14,081.1 | 2,270.4 | | | | | Revision | 32,085.9 | 858 | 1,402.5 | 10,728.3 | | ## Support For Public A. Military Support For Public And National Projects 1. Military Support For Public The military actively participates in various endeavors where they are most needed by making the best of its manpower, equipment and technology, while not hindering fulfillment of its basic missions. In particular, given manpower shortages and economic difficulties in rural farming areas, the military is an enthusiastic volunteer and source of farmhand support in such work as transplanting rice seedlings and harvesting rice, etc. The military formed farm machine repair patrol service teams and dispatched them to places that lacked farm machine service centers. Table 5-12 | Major Support Achievements | | | | | | | |------------------------------|-----------|----------|--------------|--------|-------|---------| | Participants | Equipment | Farming | Farm Machine | Road | Water | Medical | | | Supply | Support | | | | | | Support | Repair | Repair | | | | | | 5,614 | 7,659 | 217 | 179 | 24,694 | | | | 772.931 | 5,593 | tons | persons | | | | | persons | units | hectares | units | km | | | Farmhand Support in 1999 Meanwhile, the military also provides medical service for residents in remote areas with insufficient medical care, legal counseling services to local residents, and conducts sister-relationships with nearby social welfare facilities or the underprivileged. When there was an infectious disease outbreak in Paju, Kyunggi province and Hongsung, Chungnam province between March and July of 2000, an average of 330 military service personnel and 90 sterilization vehicles day helped prevent the spread of the infectious disease. ## 2. Support For National Projects With an eye on enhancing public welfare and developing the nation's industrial infrastructure, the military has continuously taken part in national land development projects such as road construction and the reorganization of arable land. From 1990 to 1993, the military supplied manpower and equipment to help pave the Renovation of a coastal road on Kangwha Isla ![254_image_0.png](254_image_0.png) ![254_image_1.png](254_image_1.png) Freedom Expressway. In 1996, the military completed road renovation projects on both Paekryong Island and Daechong Island. Between May 1997 and December 1999, military service personnel and construction equipment have been put to work on the renovation of a coastal road on Kangwha Island. A 19-kilometer section of the Freedom Expressway was paved and starting in June 2000, a 9.5-kilometer section has been worked on with various construction equipment such as excavators and dump trucks, and the work will continue until December 2001. This military support is expected to save 18 billion won. The road, when finished, will fulfill the transportation, tourism, and farming needs of the local residents; it will enhance military operational capability as well. ## B. Support Activities For Disasters And Accidents 1. Military Preparation Of Support Activities For Disasters And Accidents The disaster and accident support activities of our military are in accordance with the Countering Natural Disasters Act, the Provisions for Countering-Disaster Tasks, and the Regulation on the Formation and Operation of the Search-and-Rescue Headquarters. The latter two are based on the Calamities Management Act. Recently, the military made efforts to reinforce and diversify its own capability for disaster and accident rescues. First, 18 military units under the control of the Special Warfare Command, the Aviation Command, and the Naval and Air Operation Commands have been designated to be a stand-by force under the command of JCS in the event of a natural disaster or a large-scale accident. The military dispatches appropriate units depending on the situation. Second, a total of 14 disaster rescue units, one at each metropolitan city or province, were designated for emergencies to provide prompt and timely life-saving rescue and emergency restoration support. These units and local administrative organizations work in close cooperation with each other. They periodically undertake joint rescue exercises and demonstrations that assess the cooperation levels among the military, the government and the civilian sectors. Third, the chains of command of supporting units are integrated for effective rescue support. In other words, ground force support is placed under the supervision of corps commanders, and maritime support under the supervision of fleet commanders. Together they have the authority to control rescue personnel and equipment. Fourth, counter-disaster monitoring centers are set up at regiment-level units whenever large-scale natural calamities are likely to occur. Military units located in neighborhoods susceptible to heavy snowfall or heavy rain are provided with restoration equipment that include snowplows and bulldozers. Fifth, the military has made it easier for residents to report accidents or disasters by setting up a nation-wide telephone number (080-960-6119). The caller can be automatically connected to the nearest military unit. Also, a "support first, report second" system was established in order to immediately mobilize military manpower and equipment from the unit closest to an affected area. Sixth, 3.7 billion won worth of life-saving equipment was procured during 1996-99 to enhance rescue and support capabilities in times of disasters or accidents. In 2000 the military plans to purchase 0.87 billion won worth of equipment to continue the upgrade of restoration support activities and capabilities. Seventh, a range of military support capabilities for civilians including medical aid, disinfection, water quality testing, laundry, and water supplies have been incorporated into a package program. In particular, an aeromedical evacuation company was created to rapidly transport patients in a serious condition from areas inaccessible by an ambulance. ## 2. Records Of Disaster And Accident Support Activities In 1999, the country experienced numerous large-scale disasters simultaneously at multiple locations that required military assistance in restoration activities at an unprecedented level. Disasters, natural and man-made, occurred in various areas, and their severity increased as shown in Table 5-13. In response, the military promptly carried out restoration support activities and employed available manpower and equipment to the maximum level possible. Although torrential rains in August 1999 cost the military many casualties, the military first helped civilians overcome the disaster and then worked to repair the damages to itself. The "Armed Forces of the ![256_image_0.png](256_image_0.png) People" will continue to provide strong support during disasters or calamities. Our military will strive to enhance its capability to respond to national crises by properly training its personnel and improving its equipment, all to minimize damage to life and property. ed Forces' disaster and accident restoration activities Disaster and Accident Support Records in 1999 | Table 5-13 | Disaster and Accident Support Records in 1999 | | | | | | | | | |----------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------|---------|---------------------|------------|---------------|-----------|-------------------|--------| | | Major Achievements | | | | | | | | | | Support | Medical | Farmland | | | | | | | | | Classification | Military | Equipment | Rescued | Road | Riverbank/ | Other Support | | | | | Personnel | Person | Repair | River | Treatment | Restored | | | | | | (person) | (unit) | (person) | (km) | Repair(km) (person) | (ha) | | | | | | Total | 1,446,651 | 20,452 | 578 | 534.9 | 485.3 | 12,861 | 1,429.1 | - Housing victims | 306per | | | · Evacuation support | 3,430per | | | | | | | | | | · Cleaning household | | | | | | | | | | | 21,071houses | | | | | | | | | | Flood | · Wall | 8,274m | | | | | | | | | Assistance | | | | | | | | | | | of Typhoon | · Land slide clearing | | | | | | | | | | 1,103,123 | 20,452 | 578 | 534.9 | 485.3 | 12,861 | 131.0 | 114places | | | | "Olga" | - Prevention of epidemic 22,274ha | | | | | | | | | | (Jul.31- | | | | | | | | | | | Aug.25) | . Wash area | 72,650kg | | | | | | | | | | - Water supply | 19,9391 | | | | | | | | | | - Waste disposal | 427tons | | | | | | | | | | - Army: | 297,655 per | | | | | | | | | Planting Rice | 3,819.8ha | | | | | | | | | | Support of | · Navy: | 22,448 per | | | | | | | | | Typhoons | 1,298.1 | | | | | | | | | | 343,528 | 202.84ha | | | | | | | | | | Ann, Bart (Sep.21- | . Air Force: | 14,864 per | | | | | | | | | Oct. 7) | 151.15ha | | | | | | | | | APPENDICES ![259_image_0.png](259_image_0.png) Appendix 1 # Status Of Global Conflicts In 1999 | Region | Armed Conflict | Confrontational Conflict | Potential Conflict | Total | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|---------| | Columbia | Falkland Islands | 4 | | | | America | Mexico | - | | | | Peru | | | | | | Burundi | | | | | | Guinea-Bissau | | | | | | Namibia | Egypt-Sudan | | | | | Liberia | Western Sahara | | | | | Ethiopia | Nigeria-Cameroon | | | | | Rwanda, Angola | Senegal | Niger | | | | Uganda | Djibouti | Lesotho | 27 | | | Africa | Ethiopia-Eritrea | Kenya | | | | Chad, Somalia | Togo | | | | | Sierra Leone | Egypt | | | | | Congo (Zaire) | | | | | | Congo (Brazzaville) | | | | | | Nigeria | | | | | | Sudan, Algeria | | | | | | Turkey-Kurds | | | | | | Lebanon | Iran-UAE | | | | | Middle | Iraq-Kuwait | | | | | Iran-Iraq | Israel-Syria | | | | | Iraq | Israel-Jordan | 12 | | | | East | Iran-Afghanistan | | | | | Palestine | | | | | | US . England-Iraq (Gulf war) | | | | | | Iran | | | | | | Sri Lanka | | | | | | Indonesia (East Timor) | Spratly Islands | | | | | Afghanistan | Paracel Islands | | | | | Myanmar | | | | | | India | Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands | | | | | Cambodia | China-Taiwan | | | | | Asia | 18 | | | | | Kashmir | China-India | | | | | Philippines | | | | | | North-South Korea | Kurile Islands | | | | | | Tibet | | | | | Nepal | | | | | | Bangladesh | | | | | | Georgia-Iphasia | Moldova | | | | | Tajikistan | Azerbaijan-Armenia | | | | | CIS | Russia-Chechnya | 9 | | | | | Estonia-Russia | | | | | Uzbekistan | North Osetia-Ingush | | | | | Kyrgyzstan | Greece-Macedonia | | | | | | Romania | | | | | | Bosnia | | | | | | Greece-Albania | | | | | Kosovo | Voivodina | 13 | | | | Europe | Cyprus | | | | | Northern Ireland | Bulgaria | | | | | | Albania | Slovakia | | | | | Aegean Sea | | | | | | Istria | | | | | 45 | 25 | | | | | Grand | 13 | 83 | | | | Total | Subtotal: 70 | | | | | * Source: The Status and Prospect of Global Conflicts (www.kida.re.kr) | | | | | ![260_image_0.png](260_image_0.png) # Nuclear Capabilities Of The Nuclear Powers | | United | France | | | | | |------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|------------|--------------|----|----| | Classification | us | Russia | China | Kingdom | | | | Total | 550 | 756 | 35~40 | 0 | 0 | | | ICBMs | | | | | | | | (inter-continental | CSS-4: 15-20 | | | | | | | SS-18 : | 180 | | | | | | | Minuteman | | | | | | | | ballistic missiles: | SS-19 : | 160 | (DF-5) | | | | | III: 500 | | | | | | | | 5,500km or more) | Type/ | Peacekeeper: | SS-24 : | 46 | = | - | | Quantity | 50 | SS-25 : | 370 | CSS-3/20: 10 | | | | SS-27 : | 20 | (DF-4) | | | | | | IRBMs | Total | 0 | 0 | 46 | 0 | 0 | | (intermediate-range | | | | | | | | ballistic missiles: | | | | | | | | 2,500~5,499km) | CSS-2 : | 38 | | | | | | (DF-3) | | | | | | | | MRBMs | Type/ | - | - | - | - | | | (mid-range ballistic | Quantity | CSS-5 : | 8 | | | | | missiles: | (DF-2) | | | | | | | 800~2,499km) | Total | 432 | 412 | 12 | 48 | ? | | SLBMs | | | | | | | | (submarine-launched | Trident C-4: | SSN-8 | : 60 | Trident D-5: | | | | 192 | M-51 : ? | | | | | | | | 48 | | | | | | | ballistic missiles) | assn-18 | : 160 | | | | | | Type/ | Trident D-5: | CSS-N-3 | M-45 : ? | | | | | | (including 3 | | | | | | | 240 | : 12 | (including ? | | | | | | Quantity | SSN-20 | : 80 | SSBNs) | | | | | (including 18 | SSBNs) | | | | | | | SSN-23 | : 112 | | | | | | | SSBNs) | | | | | | | | Total | 178 | 74 | = | = | = | | | Strategic bombers | B-2A | : 17 | TU-95 : 68 | | | | | Type/ | = | - | | | | | | B-1B | : 91 | | | | | | | Quantity | TU-160 : 6 | | | | | | | B-52H : 70 | | | | | | | | * Source: The Military Balance 1999-2000 | | | | | | | Appendix 3 # Military Capabilities Of Neighboring States ![261_Image_0.Png](261_Image_0.Png) ## Total | · Amy | | | | | |--------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------| | Classification | US(Reserves) | Russia | China(Reserves) | Japan | | | 145,900 | | | | | 469,300 | 348,000 | 1,830,000 | | | | Troops | ( 783,900) | (1,000,000) | | | | | 37 | 80 | 12 | | | Divisions | 10(8) | 9,300 | 1,080 | | | Tanks | 7,684 | 15,500 | | | | Light tanks | 6,715 | 200 | 1,200 | - | | | 90 | | | | | Reconnaissance tanks | 113 | 2,000 | | | | Armored vehicles | 17,800 | 26,300 | 5,500 | 840 | | Towed artillery | 1,593 | 2,075 | 14,500 | 460 | | | 310 | | | | | Self-propelled artillery | 2,555 | 2,636 | Various | | | MRLS | 857 | 900 | יי | 110 | | Mortars | 879 | 254 | וני | 1,250 | | TOWs: | 8,457 | Various types of | | | | Anti-tank guided | Various types but | 680 | | | | Dragon: 24,400 | AT but quantity | quantity unknown | | | | weapons | 500 | | | | | Javelin: | unknown | 11 | 710 | | | Ground-to-air missiles | 1,737 | 2,300 | | | | Helicopters | 4,923 | 2,300 | 143 | 453 | | | 10 | | | | | Aircraft | 249 | - | . | | | Classification | us | Russia | China | Japan | |------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------|---------| | 1,004,000 | App. 2,480,000 | 236,300 | | | | Total troops | 1,371,500 | 49,900 | | | | Reserves | 1,303,300 | App. 20,000,000 | 1,200,000+ | | ## - Navy | Classification | US(Reserves) | Russia | China | Japan | |--------------------------|----------------|----------|-------------|----------| | 369,800 | 230,000 | 43,800 | | | | Troops | 171,500 | | | | | (23,480) | | | | | | Submarines (Strategic) | 84(18) | 70(21) | 71(1) | 16 | | 12 | 1 | - | - | | | Aircraft carriers | | | | | | Cruisers | 27 | 7 | - | - | | Destroyers | 54 | 17 | 18 | 9 | | Frigates | 37 | 10 | 35 | 46 | | Corvettes | 21 | 112 | 676 | 3 | | Minesweepers | 26 | 72 | 119 | 34 | | Landing vessels | 42 | 25 | 70 | 6 | | Landing craft | 202 | ? | 140 | - | | Support vessels | 92 | 436 | 160 | 29 | | Cargo vessels | 24 | . | 39 | 10 | | 2,800 commercial | | | | | | Strategic transportation | 86 | ? | - | | | | vessels | | | | | Reserve transportation | 142 | - | - | - | | Fighters | 1,510 | 114 | 435 | 90(P-3C) | | Helicopters | 506 | 362 | 176 | 100 | | Marine divisions | 3 | 1 | 2 (brigade) | - | | Air Force | | | | | |---------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------|-------| | Classification | US(Reserves) | Russia | China | Japan | | 361,400 | | | | | | Troops | 210,000 | 470,000 | 45,600 | | | (176,500) | | | | | | 208 | 232 | 320(bombers) | - | | | Long-range bombers | | | | | | Reconnaissance aircraft | 259 | 135 | 290 | 26 | | | - | | | | | Command aircraft | 40 | - | - | | | Fighters | 2,598 | 1,455 | 3,000 | 363 | | | 425 | 43 | | | | Transport aircraft | 1,051 | App. 280 | | | | Tankers | 606 | 20 | ? | - | | Training aircraft | 1,217 | 1,000 | 200 | 170 | | Helicopters | 216 | - | 210 | - | | Civilian reserve aircraft | 630 | 1,500 | ? | - | ## Air Force * Source: The Military Balance 1998-1999 ![263_image_0.png](263_image_0.png) | | Comparison of South Korea | | | | | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|------------------|-------|-------------|------------| | | South Korea | North Korea | over North Korea | | | | | Classification | 1998 | 1999 | 1998 | 1999 | 1998 | 1999 | | GNP | 313 | 402.1 | 12.6 | 15.8 | 24.9 times | 25.5 times | | ( $ billions) | | | | | | | | GNP per capita | 6,742 | 8,581 | 573 | 714 | 11.8 times | 12 times | | ($) | | | | | | | | Economic growth | -6.7 | 10.7 | -1.1 | 6.2 | | | | rate (%) by GNI | | | | | | | | Total trade volume | 225.59 | 263.44 | 1.44 | 1.48 | 156.7 times | 178 times | | ($ billions) | | | | | | | | Total amount of foreign | 149.35 | 136.45 | 12.1 | 12.3 | 12.3 times | 11.1 times | | debt ( $ billions) | | | | | | | | Total population | 46.43 | 46.86 | 21.94 | 22.08 | 2.1 times | 2.1 times | | (millions) | | | | | | | | * GNI(Gross National Income): International Organizations such as the UN,IMF and main advanced nations | | | | | | | # Comparison Of Economic Indices Between South And North Korea are using GNI instead of GNP. | ( ) : Military expenditures officially announced by North Korea (unit: $ billions) | | | | | | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|------| | GNP (as | Ratio (%) of | Ratio (%) of | Exchange Rate | | | | | Total Budget | | | | | | | | announced by | Military | GNP to | Total Budget | (1 US dollar to | | | | Year | (as announced | | | | | | | South Korea's | Military | North Korean | | | | | | by North Korea) | Expenditure | to Military | | | | | | Bank of Korea) | Expenditure | Expenditure | won) | | | | | 1991 | 22.9 | 17.17 | 5.13(2.08) | 22.4 | 29.9(12.1) | 2.15 | | 1992 | 21.1 | 18.45 | 5.54(2.10) | 26.3 | 30(11.4) | 2.13 | | 1993 | 20.5 | 18.72 | 5.62(2.15) | 27.2 | 30(11.4) | 2.15 | | 1994 | 21.2 | 19.19 | 5.76(2.19) | 27.2 | 30(11.5) | 2.16 | | 1995 | 22.3 | 20.82 | 6.3 | 27 | 30 | 2.05 | | 1996 | 21.4 | ? | 5.78 | 27 | ? | 2.14 | | 1997 | 17.7 | 9.1 | 4.78 | 27 | 52 | 2.16 | | 1998 | 12.6 | 9.1 | 4.78(1.33) | 37.9 | 52(14.6) | 2.20 | | 1999 | 15.8 | 9.23 | 4.78(1.35) | 30 | 51(14.6) | 2.17 | | 2000 | ? | 9.36 | 4.5~5.0(1.36) | ? | 48~53(14.5) | 2.18 | | ※ The scale of military expenses from 1995 to 1997 averaged 27% of GNP, and the 1998 expenditure | | | | | | | ## Appendix 5 North Korean Military Expenditures By Fy temporarily rose to 52% of the total budget. 272 Appendix ![264_image_0.png](264_image_0.png) ![264_image_1.png](264_image_1.png) | | As of Dec. 31,1999 | | | | |-------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------|---------|--------| | Classification | South Korea | North Korea | | | | | 1,000,000 | | | | | Amy | 560,000 | 1,170,000 | | | | Troops | Navy" | 67,000 | 690,000 | 60,000 | | | 110,000 | | | | | Air Force | 63,000 | | | | | Corps | 11 | 20 | | | | 49 = | 67 30 | | | | | Unit | Divisions | 19 | | | | Brigades4) | (Excluding about 30 Artillery Brigades) | | | | | Tanks | 2,360 | 3,800 | | | | Army | Armored vehicles | 2,400 | 2,300 | | | Equip- | | | | | | ment | 12,500 | | | | | Field artillery61 | 5,180 | | | | | Principal | Helicopters | 600 | - | | | force | | | | | | capabil- | Surface combatants | 160 | 430 | | | ities | 20 | 4706 | | | | Support vessels | | | | | | Navy | Submarines/submersibles | 10 | 90% | | | 70 | - | | | | | Aircraft | 540 | | | | | Fighters | 870 | | | | | Air | Special aircraft | 40 | | | | Force | Support aircraft | 230 | 840 8 | | | | 7,480,00010 | | | | | Reserve troops | 3,040,000 * | | | | ## Comparison Of South And North Korean Military Capabilities * 1) Marine Corps included 2) Marine Corps divisions included 3) One missile division included 4) Mobile and combat brigades such as light infantry, mechanized infantry, tank, special warfare, patrol, marine, and assault, etc. *Combat support / combat service support brigades excluded 5) Field artillery includes rockets, guided weapons and MRLS. 6) Approximately 170 surface patrol boats of the Surface Patrol Boat Forces included 7) Some 40 Sang-0-class submersibles included 8) All North Korean aircraft(helicopters) operated by its air force 9) Eighth-year reservists included 10) The Reserve Military Training Unit, Worker/Peasant Red Guards, Red Youth Guards and social security agents included ![265_image_0.png](265_image_0.png) # North Korea'S Missile Development And Specifications - Chronology of North Korea's Missile Development and Production | Date | Development and Production Activities | |---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · Involved in China's development of missiles, and acquired missile | | | Early 70s | technology(estimation) | | 1976~1981 | · Introduction of USSR-made Scud-Bs and launchers from Egypt | | 1984 | · First test-firing of improved Scud-B | | 1986 | · Test firing of Scud-C | | 1988 | · Operational deployment of improved Scud-B/C | | · Assumed to have started the development of Rodong missiles | | | 1989 | · First identification of Rodong missile | | 1993 | · First test-firing of Rodong-1 | | 1994 | · First identification of the Taepodong-1 | | 1998 | · Operational deployment of Rodong missiles | | 1998. 8 | · Test-firing of the Taepodong-1 (North Korea asserts of having launched satellites) | | Classification | Scud-B | Scud-C | Rodong-1 | Taepodong-1 | Taepodong-2 | |------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|---------------|---------------| | Range | 300 | 500 | 1,300 | 2,500 | | | (km) | Development | | | | | | Warhead weight | 1,000 | | | | | | 1,000 | 770 | 1,000 | estimated | | | | (kg) | (estimated) | | | | | | Operational | Operational | Operational | | | | | Remarks | Test-firing | | | | | | deployment | deployment | deployment | | | | ## Specifications Of North Korea'S Missiles ![266_image_0.png](266_image_0.png) ![266_image_1.png](266_image_1.png) | 1. ROK-US Combined Exercises | Purpose | Contents | | |---------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------| | Name | Туре | · Wartime watchover procedures | | | Consolidated | · Deployment of US reinforcement forces | | | | Ulchi-Focus | Exercise Chungmu Plan and | | | | command | · Execution of procedures in OPLAN 5027 | | | | OPLAN 5027 | | | | | Lense (UFL) | post | · Combined procedures of crisis | | | | management | | | | | · Movement management of US | | | | | reinforcements and exercise of the | | | | Master procedures of the US | procedures of forces deployment | | | | reinforcement plan as well as | · Wartime host nation support | | | | ROK force support, | (WHNS) | | | | Command | mobilization, logistical | · Protection of airport and port of | | | RSOI | post | supports, role of rear area | debarkation and exercise of | | coordinator, force restoration | controlling combined vessels | | | | procedures | · Exercise of procedures of ROK | | | | | vessels mobilization | | | | | · Combat power demobilization | | | | | · Combined Unconventional Warfare | | | | Combined special operations, | Task Force's execution of OPLAN | | | | combined operational capability | 5027 | | | | Field | in the rear area, and combined | · The Second ROK Army rear area and | | | Foal Eagle | maneuver | and joint air/ground/navy | integrated defense operations training | | operational capability | · Corps level FTX and combined/ joint | | | | improvement | amphibious operations | | | | | · Theater-level combined and joint | | | | Improvement of ROK-US com- | training | | | | | · Air assault, river-crossing, division- | | | | Field | bined and joint operation capa- | | | | Team Spirit | maneuver | bility | level exercises | | | · Aircraft carrier training, emergency | | | | · Discontinued since 1994 | runway exercises | | | ## Combined And Joint Training Exercises ![267_image_0.png](267_image_0.png) | Name | Type | Purpose | IMA YHAT Contents a | |---------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------| | | · Mastery of armistice operational | | | | | command and staff activities | | | | JCS | Command | Improvement of operational | · Mastery of war deterrence and | | Command Post | post | command capabilities of the | transformation procedures for crisis | | exercise | ROK JCS | management | | | Exercise | · Improvement of integrated defensive | | | | | operation capabilities | | | | | - Improvement of counter infiltration | | | | | operation capabilities | | | | Improvement of the joint | | | | | Field | · Joint air-ground-maritime training | | | | Hokuk | operation capabilities and | | | | maneuver | · Review of new operations plan and | | | | establishment of military | | | | | Training | exercise | preparedness for NBC warfare | | | readiness | · Establishment of realistic combat | | | | | support system | | | ## 2. Joint Exercises And Training (Rok Forces) | Name | Type | Participants | Contents | |----------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------| | | · Offensive/defensive exercises at | | | | | sea, protection of sea lines of | | | | Even year | | | | | RIMPAC | ROK, US, Japan, Canada, UK, | communication (SLOCs) | | | (May-July) | Australia, and Chile | · Naval blockade and air attack | | | | · Naval gunfire training | | | | ROK-JAPAN | Odd year | · Search and rescue training for | | | Search and Rescue | (August- | stranded vessels and aircrafts of | | | ROK, Japan | | | | | training | September) | ROK/Japan. | | | First held in | Submarine evacuation and | | | | ROK, US, Australia, Japan, | | | | | Pacific Reach | 2000 | rescue training in the west pacific | | | Singapore. | | | | | (October 1-14) | region. | | | ## 3. Major Training Of Neighboring States Korean Armistice Agreement agreement between the Commander-in-chief, united nations command, on THE ONE HAND, AND THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNING A MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA ## Preamble The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea. ## Article I Military Demarcation Line And Demilitarized Zone 1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities. 2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map. 3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map. 4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone. 5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil skipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side. 6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone . 7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless ![269_image_0.png](269_image_0.png) specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission. 8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the commander into whose territory entry is sought. 9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission. 10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission. 11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone. ## Article Ii Concrete Arrangements For Cease-Fire And Armistice A. General 12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63. hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.) 13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall: a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all ![270_image_0.png](270_image_0.png) of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone. b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it seems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae-do and Kyonggi-do shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of Paengyong-do (37º 58' N, 124º 40' E), Taechong-do (37º 50' N, 124º 42' E), Sochong-do (37º 46' N, 124º 46' E), Yonpyong-do (37º 38' N, 125º 40' E) and Woo-do (37º 36' N, 125º 58' E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units of personnel by other units of personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis: provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of the side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include place of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof. ![271_image_0.png](271_image_0.png) d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry eumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof. In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statement regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof. e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished. f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side. g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable. h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams. i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine. j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage. 14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side. 15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters continuous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea. 16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters continuous to both. 17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement. 18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides. ## B. Military Armistice Commission 1. Composition 19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established. 20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of generals or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents. 21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required. 22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing recordkeeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat, a Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic. 23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of ![273_image_0.png](273_image_0.png) both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams. ## 2. Functions And Authority 24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement. 25. The Military Armistice Commission shall: a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of Panmunjom (37ª 57' 29" N, 126° 0' 00"E). The Military Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission. b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman. c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary. d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary. e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams. f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement. g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. h. Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established. i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ. j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission. 26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary. 27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to Append ![274_image_0.png](274_image_0.png) ![274_image_1.png](274_image_1.png) dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched any one time by the senior of either side on the Commission. 28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. 29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides. 30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall be reported to the Commanders of the opposing sides. ## 3. General 31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior member of either side; provided that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side. 32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting. 33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. 34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side. 35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice. ## C. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission 1. Composition 36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established. 37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, Sweden and Switzerland, and two (2) of whom shall be ![275_image_0.png](275_image_0.png) appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The term neutral nations as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the other side. 38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants, who may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission. 39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary recordkeeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. 40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only. b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed. ## 2. Functions And Authority 41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be carrying out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13. c. and 13. d. and Paragraph 28. hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission. 42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall : ![276_image_0.png](276_image_0.png) a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, b. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary. c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13. c. and 13. d. of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28. hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, anti-ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristic of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition. d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in- Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof located in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission. f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission . g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspections Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission. 43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry: | | Territory under the military control of | | | |--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------| | Territory under the military control | the Korean People's Army and the | | | | of the United Nations Command | Chinese People's Volunteers | | | | | SINUIJU | (40° 06' N, 124° 24' E) | | | INCHON | (37° 28' N, 126° 38' E) | CHONGJIN | (41° 46' N, 129° 49' E) | | TAEGU | (35° 52' N, 128° 36' E) | HUNGNAM | (39° 50' N, 127° 37' E) | | PUSAN | (35° 06' N, 129° 02' E) | (41° 09' N, 126° 18' E) | | | KANGNUNG (37° 45' N, 128° 54' E) | MANPO | (39° 36' N, 125° 36' E) | | | KUNSAN | (35° 59' N, 126° 43' E) | SINANJU | | These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within ![277_image_0.png](277_image_0.png) the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map. ## 3. General 44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member. 45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese. 46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only. 47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which they were received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Copimission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted. 48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side . 49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice. 50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission ## Article Iii Arrangement Relating To Prisoners Of War 51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody to each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement. a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number. b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission." c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English "송환" (Songhwan) in Korean, and "還返" (Chien Fan) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war. 52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated in accordance with the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement . 53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route . 54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51. a. hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time. 55. Panmunjom is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War. 56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in- Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57. hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of ![279_image_0.png](279_image_0.png) war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53. and 54. hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange for security at the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war. b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission. c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war. 57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51 a hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by performing such humanitarian services which are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving prisoners of war by both sides at the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war, and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while on route from prisoner of war camps to the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. b. The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below : 1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War. 2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team. 3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team. 4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from the team with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require. ![280_image_0.png](280_image_0.png) 5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to team operating in the territory under his military control. 6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War. c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control. d. The joint Red Cross team shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51. a. hereof, who insist upon repatriation. 58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war : 1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged. 2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 58. a. hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. c. Any escaped prisoners of war who return to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition. 59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commanderin-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance of all such civilians who desire to return home. ![281_image_0.png](281_image_0.png) b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so, and civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory tinder the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side. c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59. a. hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59. b. hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. d. 1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and directions of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians. 2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission. 3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission. ## Article Iv Ecommendation To The Governments Oncerned On Both Sides 60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc. # Article V Miscellaneous 61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides. 62. The Article and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides. 63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 22:00 hours on 27 July, 1953. Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 10:00 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic. MARK W. CLARK General, United States Army Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command | | KIM IL SUNG | |------------------|----------------------| | PENG THE-HUAI | | | Commander | Marshal, Democratic | | Chinese People's | People's Republic | | Volunteers | of Korea | | | Supreme Commander; | | | Korean People's Army | ## Present WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR. Lieutenant General, United States Army Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation NAM IL General, Korean People's Army Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers # Agreement On Reconciliation, Nonaggression And Exchanges And Cooperation Between The South And The North To Enter Into Force As Of February 19, 1992 ![283_Image_0.Png](283_Image_0.Png) The South and the North, In keeping with the yearning of the entire Korean people for the peaceful unification of the divided land; Reaffirming the three principles of unification set forth in the July 4 (1972) South-North Joint Communique; Determined to remove the state of political and military confrontation and achieve national reconciliation; Also determined to avoid armed aggression and hostilities, reduce tension and ensure peace; Expressing the desire to realize multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to advance common national interests and prosperity; Recognizing that their relations, not being a relationship between states, constitute a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards unification; Pledging to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification; Hereby have agreed as follows: ## Chapter I South-North Reconciliation Article 1 The South and the North shall recognize and respect each other's system. Article 2 The two sides shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs. Article 3 The two sides shall not slander or vilify each other. Article 4 The two sides shall not attempt any actions of sabotage or overthrow against each other. Article 5 The two sides shall endeavor together to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement (of July 27, 1953) until such a state of peace has been realized. Article 6 The two sides shall cease to compete or confront each other and shall cooperate and endeavor together to promote national prestige and interests in the international arena. Article 7 To ensure close consultations and liaison between the two sides, South-North Liaison Offices shall be established at Panmunjom within three (3) months after the coming into force of this Agreement. Article 8 A South-North Political Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the coming into force of this Agreement with a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on South- North reconciliation. ## Chapter Ii South-North Nonaggression Article 9 The two sides shall not use force against each other and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other. Article 10 Differences of views and disputes arising between the two sides shall be resolved peacefully through dialogue and negotiation. Article 11 The South-North demarcation line and areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military ![284_image_0.png](284_image_0.png) ![284_image_1.png](284_image_1.png) Demarcation Line specified in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, and the areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present time. Article 12 To implement and guarantee nonaggression, the two sides shall set up a South-North Joint Military Commission within three (3) months of the coming into force of this Agreement. In the said Commission, the two sides shall discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reduction, including the mutual notification and control of major movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof. Article 13 A telephone hotline shall be installed between the military authorities of the two sides to prevent accidental armed clashes and their escalation. Article 14 A South-North Military Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the coming into force of this agreement in order to discuss concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on nonaggression and to remove military confrontation. ## South-North Exchanges And Cooperation Chapter Iii Article 15 To promote an integrated and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, the two sides shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, including the joint development of resources, the trade of goods as domestic commerce and joint ventures. Article 16 The two sides shall carry out exchanges and cooperation in various fields such as science and technology, education, literature and the arts, health, sports, environment, and publishing and journalism including newspapers, radio and television broadcasts and publications. Article 17 The two sides shall promote free intro-Korean travel and contacts for the residents of their respective areas. Article 18 The two sides shall permit free correspondence, meetings and visits between dispersed family members and other relatives and shall promote the voluntary reunion of divided families and shall take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues. Article 19 The two sides shall reconnect railroads and roads that have been cut off and shall open South-North sea and air transport routes. Article 20 The two sides shall establish and link facilities needed for South-North postal and telecommunications services and shall guarantee the confidentiality of intro-Korean mail and telecommunications. Article 21 The two sides shall cooperate in the economic, cultural and various other fields in the international arena and carry out joint undertakings abroad. Article 22 To implement accords on exchanges and cooperation in the economic, cultural and various other fields, the two sides shall establish joint commissions for specific sectors, including a Joint South- North Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission, within three (3) months of the coming into force of this Agreement. Article 23 A South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the coming into force of this Agreement with a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on South-North exchanges and cooperation. ## Chapter Iv Amendments And Effectuation ![285_Image_0.Png](285_Image_0.Png) Article 24 This Agreement may be amended or supplemented by concurrence between the two sides. Article 25 This Agreement shall enter into force as of the two sides exchange appropriate instruments following the completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect. Signed on December 13, 1991 Chung Won-shik Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea Chief delegate of the South Delegation to the High-Level Talks Yon Hyong-muk Premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Head of the North Delegation for the South-North High-Level Talks ![286_image_0.png](286_image_0.png) Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementation of Chapter I, Reconciliation, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North To enter into force as of September 17, 1992 The South and the North, As a result of concrete negotiations to ensure compliance with and implementation of Chapter I, Reconciliation, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, have agreed as follows: ## Chapter I Recognition Of Each Other'S Systems Article 1 The South and the North shall recognize and respect each other's political, economic, social and cultural systems. Article2 The South and the North shall guarantee the freedom to disseminate information about the truth of the other's political, economic, social and cultural systems and institutions. Article3 The South and the North shall recognize and respect the authority and competence of the other's authorities. Article4 The South and the North shall have a working-level legal group discussion and resolve issues of revising or scrapping legal and institutional devices that infringe on the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North. ## Chapter Ii Noninterference In Each Other'S Internal Affairs Article 5 The South and the North shall not interfere in the legal system and policies of the other side. Article 6 The South and the North shall not interfere in the external relations of the other side. Article 7 The South and the North may request the other side to redress any matter that infringes on the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation. ## Chapter Iii Cessation Of Vilification And Slander Article 8 The South and the North shall not slander or vilify the other side through the news media, leaflets or other means. Article 9 The South and the North shall not revile specific persons of the other side. Article 10 The South and the North shall not vilify and slander the authorities of the other side. Article 11 The South and the North shall not distort facts about the other side nor fabricate and disseminate false facts. Article 12 The South and the North shall not regard as slander or vilification objective and factual media coverage of the other side. Article 13 The South and the North shall not vilify or slander the other side within the Demilitarized Zone through broadcasts, billboards or any other means. Article 14 The South and the North shall not vilify or slander the other side at mass meetings or events. ## Chapter Iv Prohibition Against Sabotage And Subversion Article 15 The South and the North shall not attempt any acts of sabotage or subversion against the other in any form, direct or indirect, violent or nonviolent, including acts of terror, abduction, recruitment, murder or injury. Article 16 The South and the North shall not resort to propaganda or agitation aimed at sabotaging or subverting the other side. Article 17 The South and the North shall not organize, support or protect any terrorist organization in its own area, the area of the other side, or overseas, intended to sabotage or subvert the political or legal system of the other side. ## Chapter V ![287_Image_0.Png](287_Image_0.Png) Transformation Of State Of Armistice Into State Of Peace Article 18 The South and the North, in order to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North, shall sincerely comply with and implement the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation, and the Joint declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Article 19 The South and the North shall adopt appropriate measures in order to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North. Article 20 The South and the North shall sincerely abide by the Military Armistice Agreement until a solid state of peace has been established between the South and the North. ## Chapter Vi Cooperation In The International Arena Article 21 The South and the North shall not vilify and slander each other in the international arena, including at international meetings, and shall closely cooperate with each other in order to maintain the dignity of the Korean people. Article 22 The South and the North shall consult with each other on matters effecting national interests and take the necessary joint measures. Article 23 The South and the North, in order to promote the common interests of the Korean people, shall maintain close contacts between their diplomatic missions overseas in areas where both sides have diplomatic missions. Article 24 The South and the North shall champion and protect the ethnic rights of overseas Koreans and shall endeavor to promote reconciliation and unity among them. ## Chapter Vii Implementation Mechanisms Article 25 The South and the North, to implement Chapter I, South-North Reconciliation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperationbetween the South and the North, shall organize and operate the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission. An agreement to establish the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission shall be separately adopted. Article 26 The South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission shall have a working-level legal group and a working-level group for cessation of slander and vilification. It may form additional working-level groups with concurrence of both sides. Accords concerning organization and operation of the working-level groups shall be adopted by the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission. ## Chapter Viii Amendments And Effectuation Article 27 This Protocol may be amended or supplemented by agreement between the two sides. Article 28 This Protocol shall enter into force the day it is signed and exchanged by the two sides. ## Supplementary Note The following provisions proposed by the North but not included in this Protocol shall be further discussed in the South-North Political Committee: 1) The North and the South shall endeavor to affiliate with international organizations under a single name for a single seat; 2) The North and the South shall endeavor to participate in political events including international meetings as a single delegation representing the entire Korean people; 3) The North and the South shall not side with nor cooperate with attempts by a third country in the international arena to undermine the interest of the other side; and 4) The North and the South shall have the working-level legal group discussion and resolve the issue of revising or abolishing treaties or agreements signed by either side with other countries which run counter to the unity and interests of the Korean people. September 17, 1992 Chung Won-shik Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea Chief delegate of the South Delegation to the High-Level Talks Yon Hyong-muk Premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Head of the North Delegation for the South-North High-Level Talks Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementation of Chapter II, Nonaggression, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North To enter into force as of September 17, 1992 ![289_image_0.png](289_image_0.png) The South and the North, As a result of concrete negotiations to resolve military confrontation as well as to comply with and implement Chapter II, Nonaggression, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, have agreed as follows: ## Chapter I Nonuse Of Military Power Article 1 The South and the North shall prohibit the use of military power, including shooting, bombarding, bombing and other forms of attack and destruction, against the people, property, vehicles and civil and military ships and airplanes on the other side of its jurisdiction including the Demilitarized Zone. Neither side shall resort to armed provocation that inflicts damage to the other side. Article 2 The South and the North shall not infiltrate into or attack by military force the administrative region of the other side or even temporarily occupy part or whole of the area of the other side. Under no circumstances shall the South and the North infiltrate a regular force into the administrative region of the other side with any means or method whatsoever. Article 3 The South and the North shall not engage in hostile acts against citizens from the other side, who are visiting in accordance with an agreement between the two sides, or their belongings or transportation vehicles, nor block their way. In addition, the issues of the nonreinforcement of military power along the Demilitarized Zone, suspension of scouting activities against the other side, and nonblocking of territorial waters and air space of the other side (all proposed by the North), and the issue of guaranteeing the security of Seoul and Pyongyang (proposed by Seoul) shall continue to be discussed in the South-North Joint Military Commission. ## Chapter Ii Peaceful Settlement Of Disputes And Prevention Of Accidental Armed Clashes Article 4 The South and the North upon detection of any sign of deliberate armed aggression from the other side, shall immediately notify the other side and demand clarification and shall adopt necessary measures so as to prevent it from escalating into an armed clash. The South and the North, upon the discovery of any unintentional armed clash or aggression due to misunderstanding, misperception, mistake or unavoidable accident, shall immediately notify the other side in accordance with the signals agreed to by both sides, and shall adopt precautionary measures to prevent such incidents. Article 5 When an armed group, an individual, a vehicle, a civil or military ship or airplane has violated the administrative region of the other side due to natural calamity, navigational error or other unavoidable cause, the trespassing side shall immediately notify the other side of the incident along with the fact that it has no aggressive intent and shall abide by instructions of the other side. The other side shall immediately confirm the incident, guarantee the safety of the persons and equipment concerned and take measures to repatriate them. Repatriation shall be completed within a month in principle but may be further delayed. Article 6 In the event of an outbreak of a dispute such as accidental aggression or armed clash between the South and the North, the military authorities of both sides shall immediately have the hostile acts of the armed group of its own side stopped and shall immediately notify the military authorities of the ![290_image_0.png](290_image_0.png) other side through the military hotline or other available means of communications. Article 7 The South and the North shall discuss and resolve all military disputes and confrontation through a mechanism agreed to by the military authorities of both sides. Article 8 The South and the North, whenever either side has violated this Protocol on the compliance with and implementation of the nonaggression chapter of the Basic Agreement, shall conduct a joint investigation to determine the cause of and responsibility for the violation and shall adopt measures to prevent the recurrence of such an incident. ## Demarcation Line And Areas Of Nonaggression Article 9 The South-North demarcation line and areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line specified in the Military Armistice Agreement and the areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present time. Article 10 The South-North, sea nonaggression demarcation line shall continue to be discussed. Until the sea nonaggression demarcation line has been finalized, the sea nonaggression zones shall be identical with those that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present time. Article 11 The air nonaggression demarcation line and zone shall be the skies over the land and sea demarcation lines. ## Establishment And Operation Of Military Hotlines Article 12 The South and the North in order to prevent the outbreak or an escalation of any armed clash, shall establish and operate direct military hotlines between the Minister of National Defense in the South and the Minister of the Peoples Armed Forces in the North. Article 13 The direct military hotlines shall use means of communication agreed to by both sides to send the texts of messages over telex, facsimile or telephone. If necessary, the military authorities of both sides may directly converse with each other over the telephone. Article 14 Technical and practical matters concerning the establishment and operation of the hotlines shall be discussed and resolved by a working-level communications group, composed of five members from each side, as soon as possible following the coming into force of the Protocol. Article 15 The South and the North shall open the military hotlines within 50 days of the effectuation of the Protocol. ## Mechanisms For Con Ultation And Implementation Article 16 The South-North Joint Military Commission shall carry out its duties and functions as provided in Article 12 of the Basic Agreement and Article 2 of the Agreement to Establish a South-North Joint Military Commission. Article 17 The South-North Joint Military Commission shall discuss and adopt concrete measures on issues both sides recognize need to be resolved to effectively comply with and implement the nonaggression chapter of the Basic Agreement and remove the military confrontation between the South and the North. ## Er Vi Amend Nd Effectuation Article 18 This Protocol may be amended or supplemented by agreement between the two sides. Article 19 This Protocol shall enter in force on the day it is signed and exchanged by the two sides September 17, 1992 Chung Won-shik Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea Chief delegate of the South Delegation to the High-Level Talks Yon Hyong-muk Premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Head of the North Delegation for the South-North High-Level Talks ![292_image_0.png](292_image_0.png) ## South-North Joint Declaration In accordance with the noble will of the entire people who yearn for the peaceful reunification of the nation, President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and National Defense Committee Chairman Kim Jong-il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held a historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 to June 15, 2000. The leaders of the South and the North, recognizing that the meeting and the summit talks, the first since the division of the country, were of great significance in promoting mutual understanding, developing South- North relations and realizing peaceful reunification, declared as follows: 1. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country. 2. Acknowledging that there is a common element in the South's proposal for a confederation and the North's proposal for a loose form of federation as the formulae for achieving reunification, the South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction. 3. The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day and the question of unconverted long-term prisoners who have been given long prison sentences in the South. 4. The South and the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in social, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and all other fields. 5. The South and the North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreement expeditiously. President Kim Dae-jong cordially invited National Defense Committee Chairman Kim Jong-il to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim Jong-il decided to visit Seoul at an appropriate time. June 15, 2000 | Kim Dae-jung | |-------------------| | President, | | Republic of Korea | | Chairman, National Defense Committee | |----------------------------------------| | Democratic People's Republic of Korea | ## Kim Jong-Il The Joint Press Release from the First Round of the Talks between the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Minister of the People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ![293_image_0.png](293_image_0.png) Talks between the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Minister of the People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were held on Cheju Island in the South on September 25-26 to provide a military assurance for the implementation of the June 15 South-North joint declaration adopted during the historic inter- Korean summit. A delegation of five headed by the Minister of Defense Cho Seong-Tae of the Republic of Korea represented the South while a delegation of five headed by the Minister of the People's Armed Forces Kim II-chol of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea represented the North in the talks. In the talks, the two sides held the same view that since the adoption of the joint declaration various projects are being pursued for its execution and that appropriate military measures are necessary. On such basis, the two sides agreed as follows: 1. Both sides shall do their utmost to implement the joint declaration made by the heads of the South and the North and actively cooperate with each other to remove military obstacles in assuring travel, exchange and cooperation between civilians. 2. Both sides shared the same view that to reduce military tension on the Korean peninsula and to remove the threat of war by establishing a durable and stable peace is a matter of vital importance and agreed that they shall work together toward this goal. 3. Both sides shall allow the entry of personnel, vehicles and equipment into their respective section of the Demilitarized Zone with respect to the construction of a railway and a road that connects the South and the North, which is a pending issue between the South and the North, and guarantee their safety. The workinglevel officials from both sides shall meet in early October to discuss the details related to this. 4. The two sides will handle the problem of opening the Military Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone in the areas around the railroad and the road that connect the South and the North on the basis of the Armistice Agreement. 5. Both sides agreed to hold the second round of the talks at a location in the North in mid November. September 26, 2000 Cho Seong-Tae Minister of National Defense Republic of Korea Kim Il-chol Minister of People's Armed Forces Democratic People's Republic of Korea 302 Appendix ![294_image_0.png](294_image_0.png) ## Chronology Of Major Events Related To North Korean Nuclear Issues | Date | Contents | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | North Korea builds IRT-2000 type research reactor: construction started by support | | | Jan. 1962 | from the Soviet Union | | Sep. 1974 | · North Korea joins the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) | | · North Korea concludes a safeguards agreement with the IAEA on the research | | | Sep. 1977 | reactor | | · North Korea starts building the 1st atomic reactor with 30MW heat output | | | July 1980 | · Soviet Union concludes a technological cooperation agreement with North Korea to | | Dec. 1985 | support the nuclear power plant (400MW × 4) | | · North Korea joins the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) | | | Dec. 12 | · North Korea State Administration Council newly establishes atomic energy | | Dec. 1986 | department | | Feb. 1987 | · North Korea operates a test run on the 2nd atomic reactor | | · IAEA Executive Board forwards the safeguards agreement to North Korea based on | | | June 5 | INFCIRC-153 | | Mar. 6, 1990 | · IAEA Executive Board advises comprehensive safeguards agreement to North Korea | | · North Korean ambassador to UN proposes the simultaneous nuclear facilities | | | Nov.16 | inspection of USFK andNorth Korea for allowing IAEA inspection | | · President Roh Tae Woo expresses the possibility of Denuclearization of the Korean | | | June 28, 1991 | peninsula under the assumption that north-east Asia will be denuclearized | | · President Roh Tae Woo declares 5 principles for denuclearization: "Korea will not | | | manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons," and that "they shall | | | Nov. 8 | not possess reprocessing and enrichment facilities" | | · Signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsular | | | · Manufacturing and the use of nuclear weapons will be prohibited | | | · Nuclear energy will be used for maintaining peace | | | · Nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities shall not be possessed | | | Dec. 31 | · Organizes a procedure for inter-Korean inspection | | · Organizes North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) within a month | | | · Declaration will be made effective when the text is changed | | | Jan. 30, 1992 | · North Korea signs a safeguards agreement with the IAEA | | · Organizes the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) | | | Mar. 14 | | | April 9 | · North Korea ratifies the IAEA safeguards agreement | | · North Korea submits the initial report to the IAEA. North Korea reports the 7 | | | May 4 | facilities and the possession of 90g of reprocessed plutonium | | · IAEA undergoes an inspection to verify the accuracy and completeness of the initial | | | May 23~June 5 | report submitted by North Korea | | · IAEA informally demands North Korea the access of the 2 areas suspected of nuclear | | | Dec. 12 | waste storage. North Korea allows the inspection of only 1 area | | · Hans Blix, the secretary-general of the IAEA, urged a special inspection of the 2 | | | Feb. 10, 1993 | undeclared facilities in North Korea | | Mar. 12 | · North Korea announces withdrawal from the NPT | | Date | Contents | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · UN Security Council passes a resolution urging North Korea to (1) accept the IAEA | | | May 11, 1993 | inspection and (2) suspend it's withdrawal from the NPT | | · US holds the first top-level talks with North Korea in New York | | | June 2~June 11 | - North Korea agrees to the comprehensive and unbiased safeguard measures by the | | IAEA | | | · US and North Korea hold a second round top-level talks in Geneva, Switzerland | | | July 14~July 19 | · Discusses the reduction of graphite-moderated reactors and substitution of the | | related facilities with LWR | | | November | · North Korea proposes a packaged management of nuclear problems to the US | | - North Korea disobeys the safeguards agreement and unloads fuel from its 5MW | | | May 1994 | nuclear reactor | | June 13 | · North Korea submits a withdrawal agreement to the IAEA | | · Former US president Carter visits North Korea | | | June15~June18 | · North Korea proposes reopening of the US-North Korea top-level talks for freezing | | its nuclear program | | | · The third US-North Korea top-level talks were held in Geneva, and the issues of | | | July 8~July 10 | North Korea's its nuclear program freeze were discussed | | · US and North Korea sign an Agreed Framework in Geneva | | | · Replace the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project (supply | | | two 1000MW level LWR) | | | Oct. 21 | · Deliver 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually | | · Improve US-North Korean relations | | | · Achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsular and reopen inter-Korean talks | | | · North Korea's obligation for denuclearization | | | Nov. 1 | · North Korea agrees to freeze its existing nuclear program | | Jan.18 ~ | · US and North Korea hold a conference to remove fuel rods from the 5MW reactor | | Jan. 23, 1995 | · Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) agreement signed in | | New York | | | Mar. 9 | · Executive Board Members: ROK, US , Japan, and EU (4 countries) | | · Non-Executive Board Members: Finland, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, | | | Argentina and Indonesia (7 countries) | | | · US technology team arrives in North Korea to remove fuel rods from North Korea's | | | June 20 | 5MW reactor (8000 fuel rods were found) | | · KEDO and North Korea sign the Light Water Reactor (LWR) Supply Agreement | | | Dec. 15 | · 18 full text reorganized / 4 sub-departments | | April 27, 1996 | - US NAC International starts canning fuel rods of 5MW atomic reactor | ![295_image_0.png](295_image_0.png) 304 Appendix ![296_image_0.png](296_image_0.png) | Date | Contents | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | - The Protocols on Exemption of Privileges, Transportation, and Communication are | | | July 11 | signed between KEDO and North Korea. | | Sep. 18 | · Incursion of a North Korean submarine onto the east coast of South Korea | | · KEDO and North Korea sign the protocol concerning actions in the event of | | | June 24, 1997 | nonpayment with respect to financial obligations regarding the LWR | | July 28 | · Opening of KEDO office in Kumho area of North Korea | | · Time Magazine (Aug. 17) suspects underground nuclear facilities in Kumchangri, | | | Aug. 10, 1998 | North Korea | | · North Korea fires a ballistic missile (Taepodong-1) | | | Aug. 31 | - IAEA General Assembly adopts a resolution calling for North Korea's allowing | | Sep. 24 | nuclear inspections | | · The KEDO Executive Board adopts the resolution on cost-sharing for light-water | | | Nov. 10, 1998 | reactors (LWR) | | · The US and North Korea conclude an agreement on the inspection of underground | | | Mar. 16, 1999 | facilities in Kumchangri | | May 3 | · Japan signs an agreement on extending loans to KEDO | | · The US delegation visits the Kumchangri site | | | May 18~May 24 | · State Department Korea Division Deputy Manager Joel Wit and 14 other staff | | members | | | May 25 ~ May 28 | - US North Korean policy coordinator William Perry pays a visit to the North | | July 2 | · Conclusion of the South Korea-KEDO agreement to extend loans worth $3.22 billion | | · National Assembly ratifies KEDO agreement to extend loans | | | Aug. 12 | - North Korea demands countermeasures against the delays in building the LWR | | Aug. 24 | · Agreement is reached between US-North Korea on missile issues | | Sep. 12 | · William Perry, the special assistant to the President of the US, reports to the US | | Sep. 15 | Congress on the policies towards North Korea | | · Bill Clinton, President of the US, announces partial release of the restrictions against | | | Sep. 17 | North Korea | | · In the keynote address of UN General Assembly, Park Nam Soon, the minister of | | | Sep. 25 | foreign affairs of North Korea declares that North Korea will not fire missiles during | | the US-North Korea top-level talks | | | · Australia decides to support KEDO, donating 2 million Australian dollars | | | Sep. 30 | · IAEA adopts a resolution calling North Korea's allowing nuclear inspections | | Oct. 1 | - KEDO annual meeting held in New York | | Oct. 5 | · US Congress approves $35 million crude oil budget for the year 2000 | | Oct. 7 | · US Senate rejects Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification proposal | | Oct. 13 | | | Oct. 23 | · Radioactivity detected in a Russian train headed for North Korea | ![297_image_0.png](297_image_0.png) | Date | Contents | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Oct. 28, 1999 | · KEDO watches North Korea's heavy oil using ultrasonic flux measuring instrument | | · The US Republican Party's policy report points out the possibility of North Korea's | | | Nov. 3 | developing Nuclear weapons | | Nov. 16 | · KEDO completes the donation of 500,000 tons of heavy oil for 1999 | | - A KEDO Executive Board meeting is held to discuss financial plans and issues on | | | Nov. 23 ~ Nov. 24 | concluding contracts | | - KEDO signs a Turn-Key Project (TKC) with the Korea Electric Power Corporation | | | Dec. 15 | (KEPCO) | | · Estimates the completion dates as the year 2007 for the first, and 2008 for the second | | | Dec. 28 | · KEPCO's domestic enterprises conclude an agreement with KEDO | | - US and North Korea hold the Berlin conference, agreeing to hold the Washington | | | Jan. 22, 2000 | top-level talks (Jan. 28) | | · KEDO and International Cooperation Bank of Japan agree to loan funds for the | | | Jan. 28 | construction of LWR | | · North Korea warns the possibility of annulment of the Geneva Agreement due to | | | Feb. 2 | the delay in building the LWR | | Feb. 3 | · Construction of the LWR is commenced | | · US and North Korea hold a preliminary top-level talks in New York | | | · North Korea demands its exclusion from the terrorist countries and to improve | | | Mar. 7 | relations with US | | · US persuades North Korea to abandon the development of missiles, and to continue | | | the Geneva Agreement | | | · KEDO and North Korea negotiate the training protocol (3rd) | | | April 1 ~ April 4 | · Agreement was reached, but signatures still needed | | May 25 ~ May 27 | · US undergoes the 2nd inspection of the Kumchangri area in North Korea | | July 3 ~ July 4 | · KEDO and North Korea negotiate the quality guaranteeing protocol (4th) | | July 30 | · KEDO and EU deliberate over additional contribution issues | ![298_image_0.png](298_image_0.png) # Major International Arms Control Treaty/Organization ## 1. Non-Proliferation Treaty (Npt) | 1. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · Promoting peaceful use of nuclear power | | | Main | · Prohibiting the acquisition, transfer and assistance of nuclear weapons technology and nuclear | | materials | | | Contents | · Concluding a safeguard measure agreement with the IAEA is obligatory, when joining the NPT | | · In 1958, Ireland submitted an informal petition to the UN General Assembly on the dangers of | | | Status of | proliferation of nuclear weapons | | Progress | · In 1966, the UN agreed to a resolution allowing the 18 ENDC countries to set the treaty principles | | · In 1970, effectuated by US, Russia, and UK | | | · 187 countries (as of September 2000) | | | Status of | * Major non-participant countries: Israel, India, Pakistan, Cuba, etc | | Affiliation | · In 1975, South Korea joined, and in 1985, North Korea joined (In March 1993, announced to secode, | | and in June 1993, withheld to secede) | | | · In May 1995, the NPT Review and Extension Conference was held, deciding on an indefinite | | | extension | | | Current | · Reveiw Conference to be held every five years | | · Advanced countries with nudear power continue to insist on the enforcement of NPT whereas, | | | Situation | developing countries with nuclear power are urging for passive guarantee of security and | | collaboration with developed nuclear powers for a peaceful utilization | | | · South Korean government supports the Nuclear nonproliferation regime, and urges North Korea | | | to abide by the IAEA safeguard measures | | | Future | · Promotion of international technology cooperation for a peaceful utilization of nuclear power is | | Directions | not restricted | | · Non-nuclear states are urging nuclear states to decrease their substantial nuclear stockpile. | | | 2. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) | | | · Prohibiting overall nuclear experiments including peaceful nuclear blasts in all areas | | | such as, underground, underwater, atmosphere, universe, etc. | | | · Establishment of an inspection performance system (international inspection | | | Main | organizations, construction of nuclear experimentation monitoring station system, etc.) | | Contents | * Effective after 180 days from the date of ratification in five countries that possess nuclear | | weapons, South and North Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel, and 44 other nations (countries | | | that possess nuclear power plants) (Cf., impropriety within two years of its effectuation) | | | · After 1970, the 1st UN committee (field of politics and security) failed to adopt the | | | resolution of CTBT's recommendation over several occasions due to lack of cooperation | | | from the major nuclear power countries such as US | | | · Conclusion of CTBT increasingly required due to the cessation of the cold war, | | | Status of | conclusion of START, NPT Extension Conference in 1995, etc. | | Progress | · Introduction and adoption of the resolution on CTBT in the 52nd United Nations General | | Assembly by a collaborative proposal of 126 countries including South Korea, US, Russia | | | and other countries under the lead of Australia in September 1996 | | ![299_image_0.png](299_image_0.png) | · Since opening membership in September 1996, 155 countries have signed the Treaty by | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Status of | September 2000, including South Korea, US, Japan, China, Russia, etc., (28 countries | | Affiliation | sanctioned among mandatory ratification of 44 countries), ratification by 55 countries | | · Since March 1997, signatories have been attempting to establish CTBTO | | | (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization) with the object of carrying out | | | investigations, education and operation of inspection system | | | · Western group including US is inducing the early signing of the treaty by major non- | | | Current | member countries such as North Korea, India, Pakistan, etc. | | Situation | · Signatories have concluded a mutual agreement on the organization and funds | | necessary for an interim administrative office, and have finished the composition of the | | | organization chart on practical affairs, and are trying to adopt proper means | | | · Continuous international efforts to urge India, Pakistan, and North Korea's signing of | | | Future | CTBT is expected | | Directions | · Continuous efforts for South Korean experts to join the organizations of CTBT | | · Banning development, production, storage, acquisition, use of biological weapons and | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | launch pads, and conversion and abandonment of stored biological weapons and | | | production facilities for peaceful objectives | | | · Continuous efforts for a peaceful utilization of bacteriology | | | · BWC Review Conference held every five years | | | Main | * Problems on implementation of treaty | | Contents | - Lack of plans to supervise its implementation and to impose sanctions on those | | who violate the treaty | | | - Potential use of biological weapons for attack purposes by permitting the research | | | activities to be used for defense purposes | | | - Absence of an organization responsible for overall administrative and technical | | | operations | | | · Adoption of Geneva Protocol in June 1925 | | | - Prohibits the use of suffocative, toxic gases and bacteria for the purpose of war | | | - However, there are no regulations on its development, production and storage | | | · In the 1970s, although Russia and the East European countries insisted on the | | | comprehensive prohibition of biological & chemical weapons, only the provisions for | | | Status of | | | Progress | the Biological Weapons Convention was presented due to US and United Kingdom's | | assertion of dealing with the two matters separately | | | · The BWC negotiations were accelerated due to US's announcement of abandonment of | | | chemical & biological weapons in 1969 and production, storage and use renouncement | | | of its weapons in 1970 | | | - Adoption of biological weapons convention among member nations in December 1971 | | | · Convention effectuated on March 26, 1975 | | | - 141 countries (as of September 2000) joined; South Korea joined in June 1987 and North | | | Status of | Korea signed in March 1987 | | Affiliation | · Most countries have signed except Israel, Syria, Egypt, etc. | ## 3. Biological Weapons Convention (Bwc) ![300_image_0.png](300_image_0.png) | · Discussions currently under way on plans to establish an international inspection | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | system (establishment of an inspection organization and detailed procedures for | | | inspection) | | | · Since 1995, special group meetings are being held to discuss BWC inspection provisions | | | Current | in Geneva. | | Situation | - Organization of ROK delegation (composed of personnel from the Ministry of Foreign | | Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy) | | | - During the 3ª Evaluation Conference (December 1996), member nations established a | | | mutual agreement to conclude negotiations on a verification protocol until the next | | | Evaluation Conference in 2001 | | | · Actively participated in negotiations for BWC verification protocol, reflected the | | | situation of South Korea | | | Future | - Continuous consideration on the plan to minimize damage on the biological industry | | Directions | · Induce participation of North Korea in BWC verification system | | - Possibility of eliminating the threat of North Korean biological weapons with North | | | Korea's participation in the verification system | | | 4. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · Prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling, use of chemical weapons | | | · Destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities (within ten years of the | | | Main | effectuation of the Convention) | | Contents | · Subject to international inspection of Convention's implementation | | - The states directly under the threat of the chemical weapons have rights to be | | | supported and protected internationally | | | · CWC was launched as a result of multilateral negotiations from the 1968 Geneva | | | Conference on Disarmament (CD) | | | Status of | · 126 states including ROK signed the CWC in Paris on January 13, 1993 | | Progress | · The convention entered into force on April 29, 1997 | | * The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established to | | | verify and coordinate the States Parties pursuant to the provision of the Convention | | | Status of | · 171 states signed and 139 states ratified the Convention as of September 2000 | | Affiliation | · ROK signed the Convention in 1997; the DPRK has not yet signed | | · At the 3d session of the Conference of the States Parties in 1998, the ROK was elected | | | as chair of the Conference | | | - The Chemical Analysis Laboratory of ADD was designated as one of 12 OPCW's | | | Current | official laboratories | | Situation | · The Director-General of the OPCW visited Seoul on November 1998 | | · Four ROK officers are working at the OPCW Headquarters as high ranking officials | | | or international inspectors | | | · Urging all states including North Korea to join the convention | | | Future | · Promote international cooperation on protection against the threat of chemical | | Directions | weapons | ## 4. Chemical Weapons Convention (Cwc) 5. Zangger Committee (Zc) | | · Function: When exporting nuclear related materials, exports must be made under | |-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Main | IAEA security measures within the international exporting control system | | Contents | · Items under export control: nuclear materials, equipment, and facilities | | | * Excludes technology and double purposed items | | | · In order to comply with NPT Article 3, "the countries directly concerned cannot provide | | Status of | nuclear materials and equipments without the condition of safety measures," this | | Progress | committee was established in August 1974 with the lead of Swiss diplomat, Zangger | | Status of | · 34 countries (South Korea signed on October 17, 1995/North Korea has not joined) | | Affiliation | | | Evaluation | · Overall peformance is weak due to few limited items and meager export conditions | ![301_image_0.png](301_image_0.png) | · Conditions for exporting nuclear related materials | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | - Application of IAEA comprehensive safeguard measures on exports | | | - Advance agreement with the original supplier country is required when re- | | | transfering(exporting) to a third country | | | Main | - Pledge on physical defense measures and use for peaceful purposes | | Contents | · Items under control | | 1 - Section 1 : 43 items including nuclear materials/facilities/equipments/technology | | | etc. (including Zangger Committee's limited items) | | | - Section 2 : 69 double usage items (high-tech materials including robots, machine | | | tools, high explosives, etc. ) | | | · After the nuclear experimentation of India-Pakistan, more and more countries are | | | recognizing the necessity of a stronger control system that can supplement the | | | Status of | Zangger Committee. | | Progress | - In January 1978, 7 countries led by the US and the UK announced the London | | Guideline, which resulted in the establishment of NSG. | | | Status of | · 35 countries including US, England, Russia (South Korea joined October 13, | | Affiliation | 1995/North Korea has not yet signed). | | · Nuclear export control regarding technology transfer is expected on the Third | | | Current | World/developing countries. | | Situation | · Establish a cooperative regime among members and continue monitoring North | | Korea to reduce nuclear threats on the Korean peninsula. | | ## 6. Nuclear Supplier Group (Nsg) ![302_image_0.png](302_image_0.png) ## 7. Australia Group (Ag) | 8. Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · Export restrictions on strategic materials | | | - Conventional weapons : items such as tanks, armored tanks, artillery, aircrafts, | | | attack helicopters, battleships, missiles, etc. according to "UN Register of | | | Conventional Arms system" (February, 1992) | | | Main | - Dual-use goods and technologies : precise machine tools, super computers, etc. | | · Restriction criteria | | | Contents | - Selecting controlled items by each member nation, decision on the exportation will | | be made by each individual nation | | | - Obligation to exchange information concerning exports, planning cooperation | | | between member nations and exporting control | | | · In November 1996, 17 member nations including COCOM (anti-communist bloc export | | | Status of | control system, established in 1949), US, England, France, and others dismantled the | | Progress | previous COCOM and established new strategic material export control system including | | Russia, East European countries, and communist bloc in order to stop the flow of strategic | | | materials into countries located in troubled spots after the end of the Cold War. | | | Status of | · 33 countries signed as of September 2000 (including South Korea) | | Affiliation | · After the launching of the current system, detailed discussions on operational policy | | are under way | | | Current | · South Korea cooperates through the "Public Notice on Export/Import of Strategic | | Situation | Materials" (Issued 1993, Revised May 1995) | | · Close cooperation among member nations to prevent proliferation of chemical | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | weapons | | | - Consideration of efficiency on measures used by members concerning information | | | exchange and consultations on proliferation of chemical weapons | | | Main | - Adoption of additional measures when necessary | | Contents | · Carries no legal binding force as it is an unofficial conference | | - Each member nation carries out its own control measures | | | - Control measures depend upon member nations' willingness to stop the proliferation | | | of genocidal weapons | | | · Claims of chemical weapons use were raised during the Iran-Iraq War | | | · Consultation on export control of chemical materials was suggested by the Australian | | | Foreign Minister Haydon in April 1985, and the Australia Group was established | | | Status of | · After the first meeting in June 1985, meetings were held at the Australian Embassy in | | Progress | Paris two times every year | | · Export control on 54 items of raw materials used in production of chemical weapons | | | · Agreement on the limitation of moving raw materials used in production of | | | biological weapons, its producing facilities/equipments (December, 1992) | | | Status of | · 30 countries (as of March, 1999) (South Korea joined in October, 1996) | | Affiliation | · With the effectuation of CWC, more emphases put on stopping the proliferation of | | Current | | | Situation | chemical weapons | ![303_image_0.png](303_image_0.png) ## 9. Convention On Certain Conventional Weapons (Ccw) | 9. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · International convention to limit/prohibit the use of certain conventional weapons | | | which may result in indiscriminatory killings. Composed of four protocols. | | | · 14 protocol : prohibit fragmentation weapons undetectable by X-Ray | | | · 2n4 protocol : prohibit mines and booby-traps | | | - 3n4 protocol : prohibit flame weapons | | | · 4th protocol : prohibit laser weapons that cause blindness | | | · Major context of the revised 2nd attached protocol (mine) (May 3, 1996) | | | Main | · In principle, prohibit the use of undetectable anti-personnel mines | | Contents | · Only allow its use with measures to protect civilians with detectable materials | | (more than 8 grams of metal) | | | · Deferring the attachment of detectable materials possible for nine years | | | · Remote delivery (over 500m) anti-personnel mines to be equipped with self- | | | destruction and self-neutralizing functions | | | · Permitting the transfer of technology among member nations and prohibiting the | | | transfer of mines/technology among non-member nations | | | · 79 countries signed as of September 2000 (US, China, Russia, Japan, and others | | | Status of | joined; North Korea has not joined; South Korea is in the process of attempting for | | Affiliation | accession) | | - It is not an option but a basic obligation to become a member of CCW (as a mutually | | | Current | compensating measures to persuade non-members to at least join), including the | | Situation | context of urging CCW non-member nation's signing on the draft of Ottawa | | convention | | ![304_image_0.png](304_image_0.png) ![304_image_1.png](304_image_1.png) # Mutual Defense Treaty Between The Republic Of Korea And The United States Of America Signed at Washington October 1,1953 Entered into force November 18,1954 The Parties to this Treaty, Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area, Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stand alone in the Pacific area, Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area, Have agreed as follows: ## Article 1 The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations. ## Article 2 The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this treaty to further its purpose. ## Article 3 Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. # Article 4 ![305_Image_0.Png](305_Image_0.Png) The Republic of Korea grants, and the Unites States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement. ## Article 5 This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instrument of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington. ## Article 6 This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other party. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. DONE in duplicate at Washington, in the Korean and English languages, this first day of October 1953. FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: Y. T. Pyun FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: John Foster Dulles ![306_image_0.png](306_image_0.png) ![306_image_1.png](306_image_1.png) # 31St Rok-Us Scm Joint Communique (November 23, 1999, Washington, D.C.) 1. The 31st ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Washington on November 23, 1999. ROK Minister of National Defense Cho Seong Tae and US Secretary of Defense William Cohen led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. Before the SCM, the Chairmen of the respective Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cho Yung Kil and General Henry Shelton, presided over the 21st RQK-US Military Committee Meeting (MCM) also on November 23. 2. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen assessed the current international security situation and the security environment in and around the Korean Peninsula. They reaffirmed that the security of the Korean Peninsula is vital to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region as well as to the security of the United States. Both Ministers noted the significant contributions that the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty and US and ROK forces have made, and continue to make, to the deterrence of war on the Korean Peninsula and to the stability of Northeast Asia. 3. Both Ministers reaffirmed that matters involving the Korean Peninsula should be resolved primarily through direct dialogue between South and North Korea, as the parties directly concerned. To this end, they emphasized that dialogue between the authorities of the South and the North should be resumed to implement the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation between the South and the North" (the South-North Basic Agreement) of 1992. Secretary Cohen expressed his appreciation for the ROK Government's efforts to lay a firm foundation for the promotion of exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea through active implementation of its engagement policy, which is based on three principles: 'no tolerance for any armed provocation, no pursuit of unification by absorption, and promotion of reconciliation and cooperation.' Secretary Cohen noted the achievements the ROK Government has made in its engagement policy as witnessed in the Mountain Kumgang Tour and the proposed West Coast Industrial Complex projects. He also expressed his hope that the ROK Government's consistent efforts to promote reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea would achieve the intended results. Both Ministers also agreed that a strong ROK-US combined defense posture ensuring firm security on the Peninsula is essential for the ROK Government's engagement policy to attain its objectives. 4. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho welcomed the recent developments in US-DPRK relations developing out of the Perry review process and the September and November rounds of talks in Berlin. The Ministers concurred that continued progress on a comprehensive approach is important to laying the foundation for peaceful coexistence and ending the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula. They also expressed their hope that continuing US-DPRK discussions will provide the political foundation for improved bilateral relations and will also contribute to progress in South-North dialogue. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen commended the close consultation and coordination among the ROK, US, and Japan during the course of Dr. Perry's policy review, and also expressed their commitment to maintain this close trilateral coordination as they pursue a comprehensive approach toward North Korea. 5. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen concurred that positive progress in the Four Party Talks is important for the reduction of tension and establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, they noted the accomplishment of the four parties in pursuing substantive discussions during the fourth, fifth, and sixth plenary sessions through two subcommittees: one on tension reduction and the other on establishment of a peace regime on the Peninsula. The two Ministers also expressed their hope that the ![307_image_0.png](307_image_0.png) seventh plenary session will produce more substantive progress toward the objectives of the talks. Both ministers reaffirmed that the Military Armistice Agreement of 1953 remains valid and should be observed until superseded by a permanent peace arrangement. They shared the view that the ongoing General Officer Talk, agreed to by the United Nations Command and the Korean People's Army, will contribute positively to maintenance of the Armistice Agreement, as well as crisis management along the DMZ. 6. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho reaffirmed that the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," concluded in February 1992, should be fully implemented and that North Korea's pledge in the US-DPRK Agreed Framework to freeze arid eventually dismantle its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon should be faithfully upheld. The two Ministers concurred that smooth implementation of the lightwater reactor (LWR) project in North Korea is critical to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. With regard to the suspect underground construction in North Korea, the two Ministers expressed their satisfaction that access to the site, which will continue in the future by agreement with North Korea, had allayed suspicions about the nature of the site. 7. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho expressed concern about the threat that North Korea continues to pose to US and ROK national interests on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. With regard to the June naval clash, both Ministers urged the North to accept the practical value of, and abide by, the Northern Limit Line, which has been an effective means of separating South and North Korean military forces and thus preventing military tension for forty-six years. They expressed concern that North Korea, despite profound economic difficulties, continues to develop and produce major weapons systems, such as submarines, long-range artillery, and ballistic missiles. They also noted that North Korea's chemical and biological weapons pose a threat to ROK and US security interests and urged North Korea to abide by international conventions banning the production, possession, and use of these weapons. In particular, they stressed that North Korea should accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention without delay. Both Ministers once again reaffirmed that North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons would not be tolerated in any situation. 8. The two Ministers assessed positively North Korea's September 1999 announcement that it will not testlaunch another missile for the duration of US-DPRK negotiations to improve relations, and urged the North to cease its testing, development, deployment, and export of missiles. They also shared the view that the US and ROK will squarely address the threat posed by North Korea's missiles by continuing close consultations and maintaining a solid combined defense posture. 9. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho agreed that the ROK-US security alliance is stronger than ever and that combined defense readiness should be steadfastly maintained against a wide range of possible threats. The two Ministers stressed that the combined ROK-US forces on the Peninsula are a defensive force that should continue to maintain and develop combined readiness, tactics, doctrine, professionalism, training, and interoperability. Secretary Cohen reaffirmed the US commitment to render prompt and effective assistance to the ROK in deterring and repelling any armed attack against the ROK in accordance with the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The US also reaffirmed its commitment to provide a nuclear umbrella for the ROK. The two Ministers agreed that in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, the US and the ROK will closely cooperate in dealing with the situation. In this regard, they discussed several practical steps, including the timely deployment of US reinforcements in an emergency. Both Ministers shared the view that ![308_image_0.png](308_image_0.png) robust combined exercises are vital to deterring war on the Peninsula and enhancing combined readiness, and noted the significant progress the ROK has made in chemical and biological defense preparedness. 10. Regarding the long-term future of the bilateral security alliance, the Ministers reaffirmed that the ROK-US security alliance will play a pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, which is essential to the process of reunification. They also expressed their belief that the US and ROK will continue to share democratic values and security interests even after the immediate threat to stability has receded on the Korean Peninsula. The two Ministers concurred that the affiance will serve to bolster peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia- Pacific region as a whole. They also agreed that the two countries will most effectively promote their common values and interests by maintaining their bilateral security alliance for the long term, while adapting it to changing circumstances. In this regard, the two Ministers agreed to discuss the long-term development of ROK-US security relations for the 21st century through periodic working-level security dialogues. 11. The Ministers pledged that the two governments would make joint efforts through the Bilateral Coordinating Group to establish the facts of what happened at No Gun Ri. Both also noted that the No Gun Ri incident will not undermine the close bilateral cooperation based upon trust and friendship built over nearly fifty years of partnership. In that regard, both Ministers agreed that the process should be thorough, complete and transparent, and concluded as quickly as possible. 12. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho agreed to work together closely in completing the SOFA revision process as expeditiously as possible. Both Ministers agreed that adjusting the ROK's current voluntary restraint on missiles should be accomplished as soon as possible in accordance with the MTCR guidelines. 13. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen expressed their appreciation for the important contributions of the SCM subcommittees on policy review, logistics cooperation, security cooperation, and defense technology and industry cooperation. They looked forward to seeing the positive work begun under the ROK-US Joint Working Group on Acquisition Matters continue through the efforts of the SCM subcommittees and proactive efforts by the industries of both countries. The two Ministers also agreed to pursue expeditious conclusion of technical arrangements and annex to the Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement (WHNS) on the basis of agreed cost-sharing principles. 14. The two delegations agreed that the 31st SCM and the 21st MCM provided an excellent opportunity to further solidify the ROK-US security alliance and address issues related to the current and future security relationship. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho agreed to maintain close consultations and to hold the next SCM at a mutually convenient time in 2000 in Seoul. 15.Minister Cho expressed his gratitude to Secretary Cohen for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality and also for the excellent arrangements that made this meeting a success. # 32Nd Rok-Us Scm Joint Communique (September 21, 2000 Seoul, Korea) ![309_Image_0.Png](309_Image_0.Png) 1. The 32nd ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting(SCM) was held in Seoul on September 21, 2000. ROK Minister of National Defense Cho Seong-Tae and US Secretary of Defense William Cohen led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. Before the SCM, the Chairmen of the respective Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cho Yung Kil and General Henry Shelton, presided over the 22nd ROK-US Military Committee Meeting (MCM) on September 20. 2. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen reviewed the current security situation in and around the Korean Peninsula and assessed the positive developments that have been taking place on the Korean Peninsula since the historic inter-Korean summit meeting held in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15. Both Ministers hoped that active implementation of the South- North Joint declaration of June 15 would lead to broad cooperation and a fundamental reduction of tensions on the Peninsula. In this regard, Secretary Cohen welcomed the decision to hold an inter-Korean Defense Ministers meeting, and the two Ministers hoped that a substantial discussion regarding military confidence building measures would take place there. Both Ministers reaffirmed that they would maintain close policy coordination toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK/North Korea) in order to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. 3. The two Ministers shared the view that the inter-Korean summit meeting was the result of four factors: a) the engagement policy towards North Korea, which has been consistently pursued by the Republic of Korea and the United States; b) a strong ROK-US security alliance; c) close ROK-Japan-US trilateral coordination: and d) support by the international community. 4. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen reaffirmed the importance of full implementation of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Declaration of the Korean Peninsula, the Agreed Framework of 1994, and North Korea's responsibilities under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and associated safeguards agreement. With regard to the suspect underground site at Kumchang-ri in North Korea, the two Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the prompt completion of the second visit there, which confirmed the conclusion of the first visit in May 1999 that the facility did not violate the Agreed Framework. 5. The two Ministers concurred that measures such as the reunion of separated families, the continued dialogue between South and North Korean authorities, inter-Korean economic cooperation. and the reduction of loudspeaker denunciations along the DMZ have created a positive environment for inter-Korean reconciliation. However, they noted that North Korea's chemical, biological, nuclear, and long-range missile programs continue to pose a threat to ROK, US, and regional security. They urged North Korea to abide by international conventions banning the production, possession, and use of these weapons. The two Ministers emphasized the need for North Korea to take substantial and verifiable measures to reduce military tensions and support the positive environment created by recent inter-Korean dialogue and diplomatic progress between North Korea and other countries. 6. Both Ministers welcomed the efforts by the US and North Korea to hold bilateral talks on matters such as 318 Appendix ![310_image_0.png](310_image_0.png) ![310_image_1.png](310_image_1.png) nuclear nonproliferation, missiles, and terrorism. They also took positive note of the first meeting between the US Secretary of State and the North Korean Foreign Minister, held at the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) in July 2000. In particular, the two Ministers welcomed North Korea's reaffirmation in June 2000 of its missile testing moratorium and the resumption of US-DPRK missile talks. They also hoped that the U.S. and North Korea would resolve issues of mutual interest through dialogue, leading to the improvement and development of their bilateral relationship. 7. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen shared the view that the Four Party Talks are a valuable forum for the reduction of tensions and establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Both Ministers expect that the recent developments in inter-Korean relations and US-DPRK relations will result in a resumption of the Four Party Talks. Both Ministers reaffirmed that the Military Armistice Agreement of 1953 remains valid and should be observed until superceded by a permanent peace regime. 8. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen agreed that the ROK-US security alliance is stronger than ever and that combined defense readiness should be steadfastly maintained to deter a wide range of possible threats and to reinforce engagement with the North. Secretary Cohen reaffirmed the US commitment to render prompt and effective assistance to the ROK in deterring and repelling any armed attack against the ROK, in accordance with the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The US also reaffirmed its commitment to provide a nuclear umbrella for the ROK. The two Ministers agreed that in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK and the US will closely cooperate in dealing with the situation. In this regard, they discussed several practical steps, including the timely deployment of US reinforcements in an emergency. Both Ministers shared the view that combined training and exercises are crucial in deterring war on the Korean Peninsula and enhancing combined readiness. 9. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen reaffirmed that the ROK-US security alliance plays a pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The two Ministers expressed their belief that the alliance will serve to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole even after the immediate threat to stability has receded on the Korean Peninsula. They also agreed that the two countries would most effectively promote their common values and interests by maintaining their bilateral security alliance for the long term, while adapting it to changing circumstances. In this regard, the two Ministers agreed to continue their joint efforts for the long-term development of ROK-US security relations in the 21st century. 10. The two Ministers appreciated their two governments' joint efforts through the Bilateral Coordination Group to establish the facts of what happened at Nogun-ri and agreed to continue these efforts. Both also noted that the Nogun-ri incident will not undermine the close bilateral cooperation based upon trust and friendship built through fifty years of partnership. In that regard, both Ministers agreed that the process of establishing the facts of what happened at Nogun-ri should be thorough, complete and transparent, and should be concluded as quickly as possible. 11. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen expressed their satisfaction that the negotiations to revise the SOFA had resumed in Seoul in August 2000 and that the ROK and the US agreed to revise the SOFA as soon as ![311_image_0.png](311_image_0.png) possible. The two Ministers concurred that the revision of the SOFA, taking both sides' interests into full account, will positively contribute to the long-term strength of the ROK-US alliance, and they agreed to make active efforts for completing the SOFA revision process as expeditiously as possible. 12. The two Ministers also agreed that the issue of adopting the ROK's new missile guidelines should be resolved as soon as possible in accordance with Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. 13. Secretary Cohen announced that he had given authority to United States Forces Korea to begin work with the Korean Government on the development of a Land Partnership Plan. While recognizing the need for cooperation on this plan, and for balancing the desires of the Korean public and the training needs of U.S. Forces Korea, the two Ministers agreed to fully discuss the detailed plan between USFK and the Korean Government. The plan seeks to consolidate U.S. units and installations through a small number of new land grants and the return of a substantial amount of the land currently used by U.S. force stationed in Korea. 14. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen acknowledged the important contributions of the SCM subcommittees on policy review, logistics cooperation, security cooperation, and defense technology and industry cooperation in facilitating consultations on, and the resolution of, issues between the two Ministries. 15. The two delegations agreed that the 32nd SCM and the 22nd MCM provided an excellent opportunity to further solidify the ROK-US security alliance and address issues related to their current and future security relationship. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen agreed to maintain close consultations and to hold the next SCM at a mutually convenient time in 2001 in Washington, DC. 16. Secretary Cohen expressed his gratitude to Minister Cho for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to the U.S. delegation and also for the excellent arrangements that made this meeting a success. # Chronicle Of Major Foreign Military Exchanges And Cooperation(1995~2000) | | Overseas Visits | | |----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| | Date | Visits to the ROK | | | 1995 | Jan.19 | US JCS Chairman | | Jan. 27 | US Secretary of Defense | | | US President of the Korean War Veterans | | | | Feb. 8 | Association (KWVA) | | | US Assistant Secretary of Defense for | | | | Feb. 24 | East Asia and Pacific | | | March 21 | US Army Chief of Staff | | | March 27 | US Commander-in-Chief, PACOM | | | April 3 - 14 | JCS Chairman to US, Japan | | | April 18 | US Congress specialists and assistants | Vice Minister of National Defense to | | April 29 - May 10 | Canada, Poland, and Japan | | | May 1 - 5 | ASDF Chief of Staff, Japan | | | May 7 - 12 | Malaysia War College Professors | | | May 19 - 21 | ROK-Russia Defense Ministers' Talks | | | May 19 - 22 | Australian Navy Port Call | | | Students from National Institute for Defense | | | | May 22 - 28 | Studies, Japan | | | May 23 - 27 | German Defense Minister | | | May 24 | Members of the US Defense Map Agency | | | June 1 - 7 | Thailand Army College Students | | | June 5 | US Military Academy Cadets | | | June 6 - 9 | Chief of Naval Staff, Pakistan | The 2nd East Asia Security Conference | | June 9 | (US) | | | Peruvian Defense Minister | | | | June 11 - 16 | Vice Minister of National Defense to | | | July 10 - 15 | Malaysia | | | July 25 - 28 | Army Chief of Staff, Malaysia | | | Aug. 16 | US Ambassador of Defense Cost Sharing | | | Aug. 24 | US Senator (1) | ROK-Israel Defense Ministers' | | Aug. 26 - 29 | Talks(Israel) | | | Aug. 28 | US Undersecretary of Navy | ROK-US, ROK-Japan Defense Ministers' | | Sept. 2 | Talks | | | US Assistant Secretary of Defense for | | | | Sept. 6 | International Defense Affairs | | | Sept. 14 - 15 | ROK-Germany Defense Staff Talks | | | Sept. 22 - 24 | ROK-Japan Defense Ministers' Talks | | | Sept. 30 | British Royal Defense College students | | | Oct. 11 - 14 | ROK-Japan Defense Staff Talks | | | Oct. 18 | US Ambassador of Defense Cost Sharing | | | US Secretary of Defense, JCS Chairman | | | | Nov. 2 | | | ![312_image_0.png](312_image_0.png) ![313_image_0.png](313_image_0.png) | Date | Visits to the ROK | Overseas Visits | |------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| | Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, | | | | 1995 | Nov. 4 - 10 | Turkey | | Nov. 9 - 23 | Asia Pacific Security Seminar (Japan) | | | Students from Staff College, Ground | | | | Nov. 13 - 18 | Self-Defense Force, Japan | | | Nov. 29 | Defense Minister, Ethiopia | | | 1996 | Jan. 5 | ROK-UK Defense Ministers' Talks | | US Assistant Secretary of Defense | | | | Jan. 15 | for East Asia and Pacific | ARF Intersessional Support | | Jan. 18 - 19 | Group Meeting (Japan) | | | Feb. 25 - 29 | Army Commander, Paraguay | | | Feb. 26 | ROK-Sweden Defense Ministers' Talks | | | March 2 | US Commander-in-Chief, PACOM | Asia Pacific Multilateral Security | | March 18 - 26 | Conference (Thailand) | | | March 26 | Air Force Commander, Philippines | | | A Cruise Squad of the Singapore | | | | March 30 - April 2 | Naval Academy | | | March 30 - April 6 | Navy War College Students, Pakistan | | | April 4 - 9 | French Navy Port Call | | | US Secretary of Defense | | | | April 15 | International Security Cooperation | | | April 27 - May 3 | Meeting (U.K.) | | | | ROK-Japan Defense Ministers' | | | May 13 | Talks (Japan) | | | | ROK-Thailand Defense Ministers' | | | May 17 | Talks (Thailand) | | | | ROK-Saudi Arabia Defense Minsters' | | | May 19 | Talks (Saudi Arabia) | | | May 26 - 28 | Former Gulf War Commander, Saudi Arabia | | | June 3 | ROK-Pakistan Defense Ministers' Talks | | | June 3 - 8 | Commander of the Warsaw Forces, Poland | | | June 4 | Members of the Japanese Diet | The 3rd East Asia Security | | June 7 | Conference (US) | | | | The 5th West Pacific Navy | | | June 9 - 14 | Symposium (US) | | | June 10 - 16 | Defense Institute students, Japan | | | June 12 | Minister of Communications, Netherlands | | | June 13 - 17 | National War College Students, France | | | June 21 - 25 | Vice Minister of National Defense | | | | to Singapore | | | June 29 - July 4 | A Cruise Squad of the Thai Naval Academy | JCS Chairman to Romania, Switzerland, | | July 2 - 14 | Sweden, and Japan | | | US Commander-in-Chief, PACOM | | | | July 8 | ROK-Australia Pol · Mil Talks | | | | Visits to the ROK | Overseas Visits | |-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| | Date | ROK-Malaysia Defense Industry and | | | 1996 | July 8 - 10 | Logistics Joint Committee | | US Assistant Secretary of Defense for | | | | July 16 | International Security Affairs | | | Participation in the 300th Anniversary of | | | | July 26 - Aug. 2 | the Foundation of the Russian Navy | | | Members of the Military Research | | | | Aug. 6 | Committee, World Politics Association | | | US Commander-in-Chief, the 7th Fleet | | | | Aug 7 | Director, US Defense Intelligence Agency | | | Sept. 2 - 6 | Japanese Navy Port Call | | | Sept. 14 - 18 | New Zealand Vice Defense Minister | | | Sept. 17 - 20 | Air Force Chief of Staff, U.K. | | | Sept. 21 - 24 | Commander-in-Chief, Malaysia | ROK-Japan Defense Staff Talks | | Oct. 16 - 19 | | | | Oct. 21 - 24 | Defense Minister, Malaysia | | | Oct. 30 - 31 | Minister of National Defense to US | | | Nov. 3 - 6 | Minister of National Defense to Russia | | | Nov. 15 - 20 | Italian Navy Port Call | | | Dec. 8 - 10 | Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, Japan | ROK-Europe(Germany/France/UK) | | Dec. 11 - 21 | Defense Staff Talks | | | 1997 | Feb. 1 - 4 | US Army Reserve Commander | | Feb. 3 - 5 | Defense Minister, Kirghiz | | | Army Chief of Staff, Paraguay | | | | Feb. 25 - 29 | | | | March 20 - 22 | Chief of Staff, GSDF, Japan | | | March 29 | National Defense Chief of Staff, Switzerland | | | April 1 | US Secretary of Defense | | | April 8 - 9 | US JCS Chairman | | | April 20 - 26 | Commander-in-Chief, Sweden | | | Director of the Defense Intelligence | | | | April 21 - 25 | Agency, Mongolia | | | April 22 | US Secretary of the Navy | Global Air Chiefs Conference | | April 22 - 29 | Minister of State, JDA, Japan | | | Commander-in-Chief of the | | | | April 30 - May 4 | Ground Forces, Turkey | | | US Secretary of the Army | | | | May 6 | ROK-Israel Defense Industry and | | | May 18 - 21 | Logistics Joint Committee | | | Vice Defense Minister, Israel | | | | May 21 - June 19 | British Navy Port Call | | | June 2 | US Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces | | | June 14 - 16 | Navy Chief of Staff, India | JCS Chairman to US, Mexico, and Japan | | June 21 - July 5 | The 6th ROK-Thailand Defense Industry and | | | June 23 - 27 | Logistics Joint Committee | | | June 26 | The 2nd ROK-France Defense Staff Talks | | | Vice Prime Minister, Russia | | | | July 4 - 9 | | | ![314_image_0.png](314_image_0.png) | Date | Visits to the ROK | Overseas Visits | |--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| | 1997 | July 5 - 8 | JCS Chairman to Japan | | Vice Defense Minister, Bangladesh | | | | July 7 - 11 | | | | July 9 - 11 | Air Force Commander-in-Chief, Thailand | | | July 10 - 12 | Defense Minister, Philippines | | | July 13 - 17 | ROK-Japan Defense Staff Talks(Japan) | | | The 3rd ROK-Philippines Defense Industry | | | | July 22 - 26 | and Logistics Joint Committee | | | Assistant Defense Minister for Economy & | | | | Technology, Turkey | | | | July 28 - Aug. 1 | The 2nd ROK-Turkey Defense Industry | | | Meeting | Pacific Area Logistics Conference | | | July 31 - Aug. 1 | (Vancouver) | | | | The 4th ROK-Japan Defense Staff Talks | | | Aug. 7 - 9 | (Japan) | | | Sept. 2 - 6 | ASDF Chief of Staff, Japan | The 4th ROK-France Defense Industry | | Sept. 3 - 5 | and Logistics Joint Committee (Paris) | | | Sept. 5 - 8 | Australian Navy Port Call | The 7th ROK-Britain Defense Industry | | Sept. 8 - 10 | and Logistics Joint Committee (London) | | | Sept. 21 - 25 | UK Navy Chief of Staff | | | Sept. 24 - 28 | German Navy Port Call | | | Deputy Director General of the JDA Defense | | | | Oct. 8 - 10 | Bureau (US-Japan Defense Guideline | | | Briefing) | The 2nd Asia Pacific Defense | | | Oct. 20 - 24 | Officials Forum (Tokyo) | | | Oct. 27 - 28 | The 3rd ROK-Germany Defense Staff Talks | | | Students from Staff College, Ground Self- | | | | Oct. 27 - Nov. 1 | Defense Force, Japan (28 students) | | | Vice Director of Japan Defense Institute | | | | Nov. 5 | visits the ROK MND Policy Deputy Minister | The 4th Asia-Pacific Security Seminar | | Nov. 6 - 20 | (Tokyo) | | | Vice Defense Minister, Germany, | | | | Nov. 16 - 19 | Signs the MOU of ROK-German | | | Defense Industry Cooperation | | | | Nov. 19 - 21 | Brazilian Navy Port Call | | | Italian Permanent Deputy Minister of | | | | National Defense; attends Defense | | | | Nov. 19 - 23 | Industry and Logistics Joint | | | Committee(Seoul) | | | | Nov. 19 - 26 | Vice Minister of Defense to Russia and China | | | Nov. 21 | ROK-Russia Defense Staff Talks (Moscow) | | | Romanian Defense Minister | | | | Nov. 26 - 29 | Signs the MOU of ROK-Romania | | | Defense Industry Cooperation | | | ![315_image_0.png](315_image_0.png) ![316_image_0.png](316_image_0.png) | | Visits to the ROK | Overseas Visits | | |---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------| | Date | | | | | 1997 | Dec. 5 | ROK-Australia Defense Seminar (KIDA) | The 29th SCM/MCM (Washington) | | Dec. 9 | US Secretary of Defense | | | | 1998 | Jan. 21 - 22 | | | | Feb. 2 - 4 | Air Force Chief of Staff, Japan | | | | Australian Foreign Minister visits Minister | | | | | March 24 | of National Defense | | | | Director of Japanese Defense | | | | | April 1 | Intelligence Agency | | | | Head of the National Defense College, | | | | | April 19 - 25 | Kenya | | | | April 23 - 24 | ROK-US-Japan East Asia Security Forum | | | | April 24 | Delegation of the US CFR | | | | April 27 - 29 | US JCS Chairman | | | | US Air Force Chief of Staff | | | | | May 1 - 4 | Australian Military Academy Cadets | | | | May 2 - 17 | US Assistant Secretary of Defense for | | | | May 6 | International Security Affairs | | | | May 6 - 9 | Head of the National Defense College, Italy | | | | May 6 - 10 | Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces | | | | Delegation of Switzerland Officers | | | | | May 9 - 14 | Participation in the 100th Anniversary | | | | of the Foundation of the Philippines | | | | | May 13 - 28 | Navy (one convoy) | | | | The First Vice Minister of National | | | | | May 28 - June 3 | Defense, Russia | | | | Special Envoy of the French Defense | | | | | June 8 - 12 | Minister | | | | June 14 - 21 | Australian Defense Management Seminar | | | | June 16 - 18 | The 30th SCM Subcommittee | | | | June 16 - 19 | The 2nd ROK-UK Defense Staff Talks | | | | June 25 | The 5th ROK-Japan Defense Staff Talks | | | | June 26 | The 1st ROK-Japan Security Policy Council | | | | National Defense University | | | | | July 6, 1998 | students, Nigeria | | | | July 8-13 | A Cruise Squad of the Thai Naval Academy | Minister of National Defense to the US | | | Aug. 21 | PLA Vice Chief of Staff, China | | | | Vietnamese Military Personnel | | | | | Aug. 25-Sep. 25 | Soccer Team for Training | | | | Aug. 31-Sept. 2 | Minister of National Defense to Japan | | | | Sept. 9-10 | The ROK-Australia Defense Staff Talks | Civil-Military Forum in the | | | Sept.12-18 | Asia-Pacific (US) | | | | Deputy Secretary of the | | | | | Sept. 19 | US Department of Defense | High-level Military Talks in the | | | Sept. 28-Oct. 2 | Asia-Pacific (US) | | | | Head of the Federal Department | | | | | Oct. 12 | of Defense, Switzerland | | | | Date | Visits to the ROK | Overseas Visits | |-----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | 1998 | Oct. 28-Nov. 2 | Minister of Brazilian Army | | Oct. 29 | Air Force Chief of Staff, France | | | The Chairman of the US Asia-Pacific | | | | Nov. 10 | Senate Subcommittee on Asia-Pacific Affairs | | | Nov. 16 | Defense Chief of Staff, Canada | | | The 5th ROK-France Defense | | | | Nov. 16-21 | Industry and Logistics Joint Committee | | | Nov. 26 | Chief of Army Staff, Japan | | | Nov. 29-Dec. 3 | The ROK-Canada Defense Staff Talks | | | Dec. 15-20 | ROK-China Defense Staff Talks | | | 1999 | Jan. 6-8 | Minister of State, JDA ('99) | | The 30th SCM (US Defense Secretary, | | | | Jan. 14-15 | Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, US | | | Commander-in-Chief, PACOM) | | | | Jan. 19 | French Defense Minister | | | Feb. 2-14 | JCS Chairman to the US and Canada | | | Feb. 5 | Chief of Naval Staff, Pakistan | | | The ROK-US-Japan Trilateral Meeting | | | | Feb. 26-27 | Commander-in-Chief of the | | | March 2-7 | Navy, Russian Federation | | | Director of US DIA, | | | | March 10-14 | US Secretary of the Army | | | March 17-19 | US Commander-in-Chief, PACOM | | | March 21-24 | Naval Chief of Staff, France | | | March 23 - 26 | National Defense Chief of Staff, Australia | | | March 29-April 1 | MSDF Working-level Officers, Japan | | | April 12-16 | PRC Naval Boat Race Team, China | | | Commander-in-Chief, Royal Cambodian | | | | April 22 | Armed Forces | | | May 6 | ASDF Chief of Staff, Japan | | | May 7 | Chief of the General Staff, New Zealand | MND Personnel & Welfare Bureau | | May 9-19 | Director participates in the 54th CISM | | | | General Meeting in the Netherlands | | | May 13 | Chief of the Navy, Bangladesh | | | The ROK-Philippines Joint Conference on | | | | May 17-21 | Defense Industry | | | May 21 | US War College students | | | The ROK-Australia Defense Ministers' | | | | May 26 | Meeting | | | Singapore Defense Minister visits his | | | | June 4 | counterpart | Observers for Amphibious Training | | June 6-12 | of the Turkish military | | | The ROK-Australia and the ROK-New | | | | June 13-21 | Zealand Pol · Mil & Mil · Mil Talks | | ![317_image_0.png](317_image_0.png) ![318_image_0.png](318_image_0.png) | | Visits to the ROK | Overseas Visits | |---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | Date | | | | 1999 | Goodwill Envoy to Russia | | | June 16-17 | | | | June 16-20 | Army Commander-in-Chief, Ecuador | | | Heads of the Federal Department of Defense, | | | | June 17 | Civil Protectional Sports, Switzerland | The 31st SCM/SCC, DTICC, LCC | | June 21-26 | Subcommittee to the US | | | Minister of Education (also 2nd Minister | | | | July 4-6 | of Defense), Singapore | Vice Minister of Defense to New Zealand, | | July 7 - 9 | Brazil, and Venezuela | | | July 13-14 | ROK-Japan Security Policy Consultation | | | July 15 | JCS, ROK-JSO, JDA Staff Talks | | | | ROK Naval Academy Midshipmen to | | | July 19-24 | China | | | July 29 | ROK-US Defense Ministers' Talks | The ROK Armed Forces Athletic Unit | | | participates in the 2nd International | | | Aug. 6-19 | Military Sports Council (CISM) | | | Aug. 12 | ROK-Russia Defense Staff Talks | | | Aug. 23-29 | ROK-China Defense Ministers' Talks | | | Sept. 3 | ROK-Russia Defense Ministers' Talks | | | Sept.13-17 | Kuwait Defense Minister | | | Members of the Swiss Society for Military | | | | Oct. 4-9 | Historical Studies, Switzerland | | | Students of the British National | | | | Oct. 5 | Defense College visit Defense Vice Minister | | | President of the German War College | | | | Oct. 6 | visits Vice Defense Minister | | | The President of the Japanese Self-Defense | | | | Oct. 11 | College visits Policy Counselor | | | Oct.18-22 | Vietnamese Vice Defense Minister | | | Nov.10-15 | Chinese Educational Representatives | | | Nov.11-21 | Sang-mu Basketball Team to China | | | Nov.17-21 | Minister of National Defense to Turkey | | | Nov.21-23 | The 31st SCM/ 21st MCM | | | | ROK-Canada Defense Staff Talks | | | Nov. 24 | | | | Dec.5-11 | Inspector General, Venezuela | | | Dec.7-10 | ROK-Mongolia Defense Ministers' Talks | | | Dec.14-18 | ROK-China Defense Policy Consultation | | | ROK-China Defense Ministers' Talks | | | | 2000 | Jan.19-23 | (Jan. 20) | | ROK-Turkey Defense Industry & | | | | Jan.23-27 | Logistics Joint Committee | ROK-Russia Intelligence Staff Talks | | Feb. 8 | The 2nd ROK-Egypt Intelligence | | | Feb.12-13 | Exchange Meeting | | | Date | Visits to the ROK | Overseas Visits | |-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------| | Feb. 14-15 | The 1st ROK-Australia Navy-to-Navy Meeting | | | Delegation of the Military Advanced | | | | Feb. 14 | Research Institute, France | ROK-Russia Arms Control and Non- | | Feb.17-18 | proliferation Meeting | | | Feb. 24 | Former Defense Minister, Australia | | | US Commander-in-Chief, PACOM, visits | | | | Feb. 26 | Defense Minister | ROK, UK, France, Germany Defense | | Feb.27-March 9 | Industry & Logistics Joint Committee | | | March 14-17 | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Japan | | | Shenyang Military Region Basketball Team, | | | | March 15-25 | China | | | March 17-18 | US Secretary of Defense | | | March 19-22 | Air Force Chief of Staff, US | ROK-UK-France-Germany Defense | | March 23-April 1 | Staff Talks | | | April 13-19 | JCS Chairman to East Timor, Australia | | | April 22-27 | Vice Defense Minister to Vietnam | | | April 24-28 | ROK-Russia Defense Staff Talks | | | Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, | | | | May 1-5 | Turkey | | | May 9-10 | ROK-Australia POL · MIL/MIL · MIL Talks | | | May 14-18 | Air Force Chief of Staff, Spain | | | May 14-19 | Navy Chief of Staff, Indonesia | Minister of National Defense to Russia | | May 15-24 | and Japan | | | Representatives of the Chinese Defense | ROK-Indonesia(May 28-31)/ | | | College | ROK-Philippines(June 1-3)/ | | | May 28-June 6 | ROK-Thailand(June 4-6) Defense Industry | | | | & Logistics Joint Committee | | | May 29 -June 2 | Chief of Navy Staff, Japan | | | The 50th Anniversary of the Korean War | | | | (Netherlands, Luxembourg, UK, Belgium, | | | | June 3 - 28 | Canada, Turkey, Philippines, US, France, | | | Australia, New Zealand, Greece, Norway, | | | | Denmark, Italy, Thailand, Colombia) | | | | July 5 - 8 | Defense Minister, New Zealand | | | Aug. 27 -31 | Navy Chief of Staff, Bangladesh | | | Aug. 28 - Sept. 4 | JCS Chairman to China | | | Sept. 3 - 7 | Navy Commander-in-Chief, Philippines | | | Sept. 25 - Oct. 1 | Army Chief of Staff, Malaysia | | ![319_image_0.png](319_image_0.png) 2000 ![320_image_0.png](320_image_0.png) Participants in Multilateral Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific Region | | ARF (23) | NEACD | CSCAP | | |------------------|------------|-------------------|---------|------| | Country | Nonmember | | | | | | ASEAN | Countries | (5) | (20) | | | (10) | in the ASEAN (13) | | | | ROK | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | DPRK | | 0 | | | | | 0 | | | | | us | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | Japan | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | China | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | Russia | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | Australia | | 0 | | | | | 0 | | | | | Canada | 0 | O | | | | New Zealand | 0 | O | | | | Malaysia | | 0 | | | | | 0 | | | | | Thailand | 0 | 0 | | | | Indonesia | | O | | | | | 0 | | | | | Singapore | | 0 | | | | | 0 | | | | | Philippines | 0 | 0 | | | | Vietnam | | 0 | | | | | 0 | | | | | Laos | 0 | | | | | Myanmar | 0 | | | | | Brunei | O | | | | | Cambodia | 0 | 0 | | | | Papua New Guinea | | 0 | | | | | 0 | | | | | India | 0 | 0 | | | | EU Chair Country | 0 | 0 | | | | Mongolia | | O | | | | | O | | | | ![321_image_0.png](321_image_0.png) ## Status Of Mnd Participation In The Asean Regional Forum(Arf) | (From January 1996 to July 2000) | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Date/Place | Multilateral Security Cooperation Meetings | | · ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building | | | Measures (ISG-CBMs) | | | Jan. 18-19, 1996 | - discussed promoting periodical issuance of Defense White Paper and | | Tokyo, Japan | submitting to Senior Officials Meeting | | - promoted Defense Authorities' participation in Senior Officials Meeting | | | and Inter-Sessional Support Group Meeting | | | · ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building | | | Measures (ISG-CBMs) | | | April 15-16 | - promoted the participation of UN Register of Conventional | | Jakarta, Indonesia | Arms(UNRCA) | | - discussed member countries' participation in military training and prior | | | notification | | | · ARF Disaster Relief Meeting | | | Feb. 19-20, 1997 | - discussed building contact point between each nation's disaster relief systems | | Dublin, Ireland | - discussed continuous information exchange of each nation's disaster relief | | activities | | | · ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Confidence Building Measures(ISG-CBMs) | | | - maintained each nation's discussion on defense policy and recommended | | | submitting the national defense policy book | | | March 6-8 | - urged participation of the non-member nations in UN conventional | | Beijing, China | weapons relocation registration system | | - discussed vitalizing plans on confidence building measures in non- | | | militarized fields | | | · ARF PKO Meeting | | | March 10-14 | - discussed standardization of training courses for PKO personnel | | Kuala-Lampur, Malaysia | - introduced Korea's policy of peacekeeping activities and status of | | participation | | | · Workshop on Clearing Mines | | | April 7-11 | - discussed world-wide mine issues | | Wellington, New Zealand | - announced ROK government's position toward the use of mines. | | · The 4th ARF Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) | | | May 19-20 | - discussed regional security situation, evaluated inter-sessional meetings | | Langkawi, Malaysia | - agreed to hold the Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions. | | · The 4th ARF Foreign Ministerial Meeting (FMM) | | | - confirmed support for the peace regime of the Korean peninsula and the | | | July 27 | four-party talks | | Kuala-Lampur, Malaysia | - emphasized the impropriety of Taiwan's relocation of nuclear wastes and | | guided understandings/support | | | · The 1st ARF Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions | | | Oct. 7-8 | - discussed regional security education and cooperation in the research area | | Manila, Philippines | -discussed continuous holding of the Meetings of Heads of Defense | | Colleges and Institutions | | | · ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building | | | Nov. 4-6 | Measures (ISG-CBMs) | | Brunei | - reviewed security situations in the Asia-Pacific region | | - discussed promoting cooperation of maritime security | | | | Multilateral Security Cooperation Meetings | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Date/Place | · ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building | | Measures (ISG-CBMs) | | | March 4-6, 1998 | - discussed new confidence-building measures, national defense policies and | | Sydney, Australia | preventive diplomacy | | - exchanged views on CWC and the ban on anti-personnel landmines | | | · The 5th ARF Senior Officials, Meeting (ARF-SOM) | | | - discussed security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, arms | | | May 20-22 | control/disarmament and nonproliferation | | Manila, Philippines | - reflected the development of South-North Korea Talks, Four-Party Talks | | and KEDO in the chairman's statement | | | · The 5th ARF Foreign Ministerial Meeting (FMM) | | | - discussed regional security situation and reviewed the result of the | | | intersessional meeting | | | July 27 | - encouraged the participants to support the NEASED | | Manila, Philippines | - reflected the ROK government's view on the ban of anti-personnel landmines | | - reconfirmed the holding of the 2nd Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges | | | and Institutions in Seoul | | | · ARF Defense White Paper (DWP) conference | | | Sept. 1-3 | - discussed the contents and ways to write the DWP | | Canberra, Australia | - provided advice to the countries which have not published the DWP | | · The 2nd ARF Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions | | | - information exchanges through the internet and e-mail among colleges and | | | Sept. 8-10 | institutions and joint studies on the textbooks | | - discussed promoting the exchange programs of students and professors, | | | Seoul, Korea | and enhancing security consensus among Heads of Defense Colleges and | | Institutions | | | · ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building | | | Measures (ISG-CBMs) | | | Nov. 4-6 | - reviewed confidence-building measures (short-, mid- and long-terms) | | Honolulu, US | - discussed the law and order at sea and sea preservation issues at a meeting | | of maritime security and environmental experts | | | · ARF Military Medicine Symposium on Tropical Medicine and Epidemic | | | Nov. 25-27 | Control in Tropical Regions | | Beijing, China | - discussed tropical epidemics including malaria, and visited medical centers | | and military hospitals | | | · ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building | | | Measures (ISG-CBMs) | | | - exchanged regional security perceptions among countries; reviewed | | | confidence-building and preventive diplomacy | | | March 2-5, 1999 | - explained engagement policy toward North Korea, Four-Party Talks, South- | | Bangkok, Thailand | North Basic Agreement, KEDO, ROK's position on the ban of anti-personnel | | landmines, and proposed joint dealing of the Y2K problem | | | - discussed international arms control/disarmament and nonproliferation | | | March 22-26 | · ARF PKO Seminar | | - exchanged advanced experiences and training for PKO operations | | | Tokyo, Japan | · ARF Disaster Relief Meeting | | April 11-14 | - discussed ways to reinforce bilateral and multilateral cooperation | | Moscow, Russia | - tour of disaster relief activities employing advanced equipment | | · ARF Professional Development Program | | | April 18-23 | - trained on multilateral security cooperation techniques | | Washington DC, US | - visited crisis management center and multilateral cooperation simulation | | · The 6th Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM) | | | - shared regional security perceptions among countries and reviewed | | | confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy | | | May 19-21 | - discussed international arms control/disarmament and nonproliferation | | Singapore | - combined the results of intersessional meetings and made recommendations | | for the ARF Foreign Ministerial Meeting | | ![322_image_0.png](322_image_0.png) | Date/Place | Multilateral Security Cooperation Meetings | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | · The 6th ARF Foreign Ministerial Meeting (FMM) | | | - exchanged views on international/regional security issues (the Korean | | | Peninsula, South China Sea, East Timor, and the importance of the major | | | July 26 | powers' relations) | | Singapore | - agreed on the continuous development of arms control, disarmament, | | confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy | | | - approved the meetings/activities of the next intersessional year (1999-2000) | | | · The 3rd ARF Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions | | | Sept. 21-25 | - Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century | | Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia | - Multilateral Cooperation among the Defense Colleges and Defense Research | | Institutions of ARF Member Countries | | | · ARF Professional Development Program | | | Oct. 19-20 | - Introduced Chinese Security Policy | | Beijing, China | - discussed the concept of preventive diplomacy | | · ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building | | | Measures (ISG-CBMs) | | | Nov. 12-15 | - exchanged the perception of regional security issues | | Tokyo, Japan | -defense official's lunch discussions on defense issues; discussed the promotion | | of the role of the military in ARF | | | · ARF Seminar on Law of War or Armed Conflict | | | Dec. 13-16 | - discussed the application and education of the Law of War or Armed Conflict | | Canberra, Australia | - discussed the problems on abiding by the rules of engagement to prevent the | | war or armed conflict | | | · ARF Seminar on Disaster Relief | | | Jan. 25-28, 2000 | - discussed disaster relief cooperation on the levels of individual nations, small | | Bangkok, Thailand | regions and regional areas | | - discussed plans for the readiness of regional disaster posture | | | · ARF Defense Language School Seminar | | | March 28-31 | - discussed each nation's National Defense language training situations, and | | Canberra, Australia | exchanged information | | - Introduced Military English education situation in Korea | | | · ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures | | | April 4-7 | - explained ROK's engagement policy toward North Korea, Berlin Declaration | | Singapore | etc., and to gain international support | | - discussed transnational crime, and exchanged security perceptions | | | · ARF Professional Development Programs | | | April 23-28 | - discussed bilateralism and multilateralism | | Brunei | - promoted understanding of ASEAN cooperation methods | | · ARF Disaster Relief Meeting | | | May 4-6 | - discussed efficient cooperation ways for disaster relief among participant | | Hanoi, Vietnam | nations | | - discussed the role of the military for disaster relief | | | · The 7th ARF Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM) | | | May 17-19 | - explained South-North Korea Summit Meeting | | Bangkok, Thailand | - discussed DPRK's joining ARF | | · The 7th ARF Foreign Ministerial Meeting (FMM) | | | - welcomed North Korea's ARF participation and discussed the progress of | | | July 27 | South-North relations | | Bangkok, Thailand | - discussed the peaceful settlement of regional problems and CBM, and agreed | | to actively involve in developing preventive diplomacy | | ![323_image_0.png](323_image_0.png) ![324_image_0.png](324_image_0.png) # Current Peacekeeping Operations | | As of August 30, 2000 | | | | | | |----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------|----| | Date of | Location of Deployment | Number | Number of | | | | | No. | Name | Establish- | deployed | | | | | | and Missions | nations | | | | | | ment | | | | | | | | 1 | UNTSO | 1948. | 6 | UN Truce Supervision in Palestine | 153 | 22 | | UN Military Observer Group in India and | | | | | | | | 2 | UNMOGIP | 1949. | 1 | 46 | 8 | | | Pakistan | | | | | | | | 3 | UNFYCIP | 1964. | 3 | UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus | 1,251 | 11 | | UN Disengagement Observer Force in the | | | | | | | | 4 | UNDOF | 1974. | 6 | 1,035 | 6 | | | Golan Heights | | | | | | | | 5 | UNIFIL | 1978. | 3 | 5,619 | 11 | | | UN Interim Force in Lebanon | | | | | | | | 6 | UNIKOM | 1991. | 4 | UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission | 1,111 | 32 | | UN Observation Mission for | | | | | | | | 7 | MINURSO | 1991. | 9 | 265 | 29 | | | Referendum in the Western Sahara | | | | | | | | 8 | UNOMIG | 1993. | 8 | UN Mission of Observers in Georgia | 102 | 22 | | 9 | UNMIBH | 1995. 12 | UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina | 1,723 | 43 | | | UN Mission of Observers in Peninsula of | | | | | | | | 10 | UNMOP | 1996. | 1 | 27 | 23 | | | Prevlaka(Croatia) | | | | | | | | UNMIK | 1999. | 6 | UN Peacekeeping Mission in Kosovo | 4,018 | 57 | | | 11 | UNAMSIL | 1999. 10 | 12,481 | 35 | | | | 12 | UN Truce Supervision in Sierra Leone | | | | | | | 1999. 10 | UN Transitional Administration in East | 9,352 | 48 | | | | | 13 | UNTAET | Timor | | | | | | MONUC | 1999. 11 | UN Truce Supervision in the Democratic | 262 | 37 | | | | 14 | Republic of Congo | 10 | 8 | | | | | 15 | UNMEE | 2000. | 8 | UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea | | | | ※ 15 Mission Areas, 89 Nations, and 37,400 People Participated | | | | | | | ![325_image_0.png](325_image_0.png) Appendix 24 # Status Of Rok Armed Forces' Participation In The Pko ## - Participation Records O Regions: 6 (Somalia, Angola, Western Sahara, India · Pakistan, Georgia, East Timor) · Number of participating personnel: Approx. 2,820 * Aug. 1999: 32(50th in the world) -> Nov. 2000: 476(26th in the world) ## - Status Of Participation In Detail | | (As of Nov. 2000) | | | | | |-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------|----| | | Number of People | | | | | | Region | Number of people | Period | Rotation Period | yearly | | | | 504 | | | | | | | 1993. 7~1994. 3 | 6 months | | | | | 252 Engineer battalions | (2nd detachment) | | | | | | Somalia | | | | | | | Past | 6 Headquarters command | 1993.12~1994. 9 | 1 year | б | | | staffs | | | | | | | Parti- | 594 | | | | | | 198 Engineer battalion | 1995.10~1996.12 | 6 months | | | | | cipations | (3rd detachment) | | | | | | Angola | 6 Headquarters command | 1996. 2~1997. 2 | 1 year | б | | | staffs | 345 | | | | | | | 1st-4th detachment : 42 | | | | | | West | 1994. 9~ | 6 months | | | | | 20 Medical units | 5th-6th detachment : 20 | | | | | | Sahara | 7th detachment : 14 | | | | | | | 8th-13th detachment : 20 | | | | | | Present | | | | | | | Parti- | India · | 9 Military observers | 1994.11~ | 1 year | 54 | | cipations | Pakistan | | | | | | Georgia | 3 Military observers | 1994.10~ | 1 year | 27 | | | 419 Infantry battalions | 1999.10~ | 6 months | 1,256 | | | | East | 12 Headquarters | 2000. 1~ | 1 year | 12 | | | Timor | command staffs | | | | | | 13 Brigade Headquarters | 2000. 2~ | 6 months | 21 | | | ![326_image_0.png](326_image_0.png) # The Logbook Of The Korean Evergreen Unit'S Dispatch To East Timor ## Preparataration For Dispatch ~ Move To Townsville, Australia | Preparataration for dispatch ~ Move to Townsville, Australia | | | |----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | | Contents | Notes | | Date | | | | Sep. 7, 1999 | Examined (unofficially) dispatch possibilities from UN | | | President Habibie showed approval to the deployment | | | | Sep. 12 | of the multinational army | | | The standing committee of the National Security | Decision made on dispatch policy | | | Sep. 13 | Meeting considered plans for dispatch (The 70th) | | | Sep. 14 | Party · Government coordination meeting on dispatch | | | Approval of activation of UN Security Council | * activation of multinational | | | multinational army (Resolution no.1264) | army headquarters | | | Sep. 15 | Official dispatch demanded by UN Secretary General | command(Sep.16) | | and Australian Foreign Minister | | | | Dispatched Ministry of National Defense field | Brigadier general Kim Tae- | | | Sep. 19 | investigation Team (Sep. 19 ~ Sep.25/Austrailia, East | Young and 1 member | | Timor) | | | | Informed the Blue House of dispatch plans and | | | | explained to the National Assembly | · deployment of Australian | | | Sep. 20 | Domestic training before dispatch (Sep.20~Oct.2, 2 | Army to East Timor | | week period) | | | | Decided on dispatch plans in a cabinet meeting | | | | Sep. 21 | Liaison officer deployment (Sydney, Australia Theater | | | Sep. 24 | 2 lieutenant-colonels | | | Headquarters) | Ministry of national defense issue | | | Proposal of agreement to dispatch passed National | | | | Sep. 28 | dispatch order | | | Assembly plenary meeting | | | | Evergreen unit activation ceremony (5th brigade, | | | | Sep. 29 | Special Warfare Command, supervised by the Army | | | Chief of the Staff ) | Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) | | | Departure of advance element (58) | Cooperation/Reconnaissance | | | Oct. 1 | Evergreen unit report to the President (Kyeryongdae, | | | on the Armed Forces Day ceremony) | team ride together | | | Evergreen Unit farewell ceremony (14:00/Seoul | · on-site coordination adjustment | | | International Airport, supervised by the minister of | | | | Oct. 4 | national defense) | training(1 week for each | | | echelon, Townsville) | | | The 1st echelon's departure (15:00, 209)/moved to | | | | Townsville, Australia | | | | The 2nd echelon's departure (15:00, 152)/moved to | | | | Oct. 9 | Townsville, Australia | | ## After East Timor Deployment ![327_Image_0.Png](327_Image_0.Png) | Date | Contents | Notes | |----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------| | Advance element deployment to East Timor (156) | | | | Oct. 16, 1999 | Cargo-transport ship arrived in Port Com | | | Main body deployment to East Timor (263) | | | | Oct. 22 | Finished unloading and transport of equipment and | | | material transport | | | | Multinational Force's command group visited | * UNTAET activation approved | | | Oct. 25 | Evergreen unit (general in command/deputy | (Security Council resolution | | commander) | no.1272) | | | Nov. 27 | Received UN's East Timor PKF involvement request | | | Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on-site visit for | | | | Dec. 7 | Acofs, J-3, and 18 members | | | guidance(Dec.7 ~ 11) | Chairman of the National | | | National Defense Committee comforting party of | | | | Dec. 21 | Defense Committee and 4 | | | National Assembly visited Evergreen unit | Assemblymen | | | | Brigadier general Kwon, Haing- | | | Jan. 8, 2000 | Dispatched staff to PKF headquarters command | keun and 11 staff | | CNRT Chairman Gusmao visits minister of national | | | | Jan. 28 | defense | | | Feb.1 | Multinational Army switched over to UN PKF | | | Dispatched east brigade liaison group/military | Colonel Lee, Byung-Ju and 12 | | | Feb.18 | police element | members | | Resupply for the preparation for rotation of units | | | | Mar.10 | 2 vessels of Navy LST | | | (Mar.10 ~ April 8) | | | | Mar. 20 | The activation ceremony of 2nd detachment unit | * Guidance visiting team rides | | April 18 | The departure of 1st echelon, 2nd detachment | together(6) | | April 20 | The return of 1st echelon, 1st detachment | | | April 26 | The departure of 2nd echelon, 2nd detachment | The 2nd detachment commences | | April 27 | The 1st and 2nd detachments change command | mission | | April 28 | The return of 2nd echelon, 1st detachment | | | The 1st detachment disband ceremony (drill ground | | | | May 3 | of 5th Brigade, Special Warfare Command) | | | National Assembly's approvan of the extension of | Extension period: Oct. 2000 ~ | | | Sep. 29 | the Evergreen Unit's operation in East Timor | Dec. 2001 | ![328_image_0.png](328_image_0.png) ## Government And Defense Budgets By Fy | | (unit: 100 million won, %) | | | | | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------| | Classification | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | | | 4,532,764 | 4,443,665 | 4,837,778 | 5,321,556 | | | | · Current GDP | 3,773,498 | 4,184,790 | | | | | | (Increase Rate) | (8.9) (Around10.0 ) | | | | | | | (16.7) | (10.9) | (8.3) | (△1.9) | | | | | · Government | 807,629 | 884,850 | 926,576 | | | | | 556,058 | 635,883 | 711,528 | | | | | | Budgets | (16.8) | (14.4) | (11.9) | (13.5) | (9 6) | (4.7) | | (Increase Rate) | | | | | | | | · General | 864,740 | | | | | | | 518,811 | 588,228 | 667,064 | 755,829 | 836,852 | | | | Account | | | | | | | | (Increase Rate) | (20.0) | (13.4) | (13.4) | (13.3) | (10.7) | (3.3) | | · Government | 37,247 | 47,655 | 44,464 | 51,800 | 47,998 | 61,836 | | financing special | | | | | | | | accounting | (27.9) | (△6.7) | (16.6) | (△7.3) | (28.8) | | | (△14.9) | | | | | | | | (Increase Rate) | | | | | | | | · Defense | 115,070 | 127,360 | 143,505 | 143,755 | 143,368 | 150,432 | | Budgets | (10.7) | (12.7) | (0.2) | (△0.3) | (4.9) | | | (9.9) | | | | | | | | (Increase Rate) | | | | | | | | · National | 110,744 | 122,434 | 137,865 | 138,000 | 137,490 | 144,390 | | DefenseBudgets | (0.1) | (△0.4) | (5.0) | | | | | (9.9) | (10.6) | (12.6) | | | | | | (Increase Rate) | | | | | | | | . Office of Military | 1,388 | 1,599 | 1,590 | 1,422 | 1,305 | | | Manpower | 1,161 | | | | | | | Administration | (△10.5) | (△8.2) | | | | | | (8.1) | (19.6) | (15.2) | (△0.6) | | | | | (Increase Rate) | | | | | | | | Combatant Police | 4,165 | 4,456 | 4,737 | | | | | 3,165 | 3,538 | 4,041 | | | | | | Unit and National | (6.3) | | | | | | | Maritime Police | (11.1) | (11.8) | (14.2) | (3.1) | (7.0) | | | (Increase Rate) | | | | | | | | · Defense | | | | | | | | Budget Rate | | | | | | | | · Ratio of | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2.9 | | | | | defense outlay | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.2 | | | | | per GDP (%) | | | | | | | | · Ratio of | 21.7 | 21.5 | 19.0 | 17.1 | 17.4 | | | 22.2 | | | | | | | | defense outlay | | | | | | | | per budget (%) | | | | | | | | ※ Ratio of defense budget per fiscal budget is found according to the General Accounts Stands | | | | | | | 336 Appendix 27 # Year 2000 National Defense Budget By Category ![329_Image_0.Png](329_Image_0.Png) | | (unit: 100 million won) | | | | |-----------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|----------|-------| | Classification | 1999 Budget | 2000 Budget | Increase | % | | Total | 137,490 | 144,390 | 6,900 | 5.0 | | Investment budget | 52,304 | 53,437 | 1,133 | 2.2 | | · Improvement of defense capacity | 41,403 | 42,188 | 785 | 1.9 | | · Equipment maintenance | 10, 514 | 10,878 | 364 | 3.5 | | - Acquiring supporting equipments | 387 | 371 | △16 | △4.1 | | Current Operating expenses | 85,186 | 90,953 | 5,767 | 6.8 | | - Personnel expenses | 50, 298 | 55,609 | 5,311 | 10.6 | | · Project expenses | 34,888 | 35,344 | 456 | 1.3 | | · Subsistence | 9,467 | 9,567 | 100 | 1.1 | | · Clothes | 2,161 | 2,212 | 51 | 2.4 | | - Unit activity | 2,993 | 3,380 | 387 | 12.9 | | - Education and training | 1,521 | 1,295 | △226 | △14.9 | | - Equipment management | 4,550 | 4,151 | △399 | 78.8 | | · Facility construction | 3,888 | 4,061 | 173 | 4.4 | | · Facility management | 2,020 | 2,061 | 41 | 2.0 | | · Material procurement | 717 | 670 | △47 | △6.6 | | · Reserve forces | 594 | 568 | △26 | △4.4 | | · Research/Auxiliary | 1,060 | 964 | △96 | △9.1 | | · Support for stationing forces | 1,968 | 2,255 | 287 | 14.6 | | · Basic project expenses | 3,949 | 3,985 | 36 | 0.9 | | · Financial transfer expenses | - | 175 | 175 | . | ![330_image_0.png](330_image_0.png) # Composition Of Mnd Budget By Fy (unit: 100 million won) | | (unit: 100 million won) | | | | | | | | |------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------|--------|----------|--------|------| | | Force Investment | | | | | | | | | MND Budget | Current Operating Expenses | | | | | | | | | Year | Increase | Increase Composition | Increase Composition | | | | | | | Amount | Amount | Amount | | | | | | | | | Rate | Rate | Rate | | | | | | | Rate | Rate | | | | | | | | | 1979 | 15,366 | - | 9,077 | 00 | 51.9 | 6,289 | - | 40.9 | | 1980 | 22,465 | 46.2 | 13,219 | 45.6 | 58.8 | 9,246 | 47.0 | 41.2 | | montonine | .... | 14.3 | 39.2 | | | | | | | 1981 | 26,979 | 20.1 | 16,408 | 24.1 | 60.8 | 10,571 | | | | | 62.1 | 11,815 | 11.8 | 37.9 | | | | | | 1982 | 31,207 | 15.7 | 19,392 | 18.2 | | | | | | 5.8 | 62.7 | 12,216 | 3.4 | 37.3 | | | | | | 1983 | 32,741 | 4.9 | 20,525 | | | | | | | 20,122 | △2.0 | 60.9 | 12,939 | 5.9 | 39.1 | | | | | 1984 | 33,061 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | 36,892 | 11.6 | 21,845 | 8.6 | 59.2 | 15,047 | 16.3 | 40.8 | | | 1985 | ..... | ...... | | | | | | | | 41,580 | 12.7 | 23,842 | 9.1 | 57.3 | 17,738 | 17.9 | 42.7 | | | 1986 | 20.9 | 45.2 | | | | | | | | 1987 | 47,454 | 14.1 | 26,001 | 9.1 | 54.8 | 21,453 | | | | | 55.3 | 24,652 | 14.9 | 44.7 | | | | | | 1988 | 55,202 | 16.3 | 30,550 | 17.5 | | | | | | 11.8 | 56.8 | 25,993 | 5.4 | 43.2 | | | | | | 1989 | 60,148 | 9.0 | 34,155 | | | | | | | 38,515 | 12.8 | 58.0 | 27,863 | 7.2 | 42.0 | | | | | 1990 | 66,378 | 10.4 | ...... | | | | | | | ........ | | | | | | | | | | 74,764 | 12.6 | 44,988 | 16.8 | 60.2 | 29,776 | 6.9 | 39.8 | | | 1991 | 84,100 | 12.5 | 51,968 | 15.5 | 61.8 | 32,132 | 7.9 | 38.2 | | 1992 | 37.1 | | | | | | | | | 92,154 | 9.6 | 57,981 | 11.6 | 62.9 | 34,173 | 6.4 | | | | 1993 | 5.7 | 35.8 | | | | | | | | 1994 | 100,753 | 9.3 | 64,637 | 11.5 | 64.2 | 36,116 | | | | | 39,712 | 10.0 | 35.9 | | | | | | | 1995 | 110,744 | 9.9 | 71,032 | 9.9 | 64.1 | ........ | ...... | | | ..... | 12.3 | 65.2 | 42,662 | 7.4 | 34.8 | | | | | 1996 | 122,434 | 10.6 | 79,772 | 11.6 | 64.6 | 48,833 | 14.5 | 35.4 | | 1997 | 137,865 | 12.6 | 89,032 | | | | | | | 0.1 | 87,098 | △2.2 | 63.1 | 50,902 | 4.2 | 36.9 | | | | 1998 | 138,000 | 38.0 | | | | | | | | △0.4 | 85,186 | △2.2 | 62.0 | 52,304 | 2.8 | | | | | 1999 | 137,490 | 37.0 | | | | | | | | 144,390 | 5.0 | 90,953 | 6.8 | 63.0 | 53,437 | 2.2 | | | | 2000 | | | | | | | | | ![331_image_0.png](331_image_0.png) Appendix 29 # Defense Budgets Of Major Military Powers | | | (unit: Constant in 1998) | | | | |--------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------| | | GDP | Defense Budget | GDP to | Manpower | Military Expenditure | | Country | (US $ billion) | (US $ billion) | Defense Budget(%) | (thousand persons) | per Capita (US$) | | us | 8,500 | 265.9 | 3.2 | 1,402 | 982 | | Japan | 3,800 | 37.0 | 1.0 | 243 | 293 | | Germany | 2,100 | 32.4 | 1.5 | 334 | 395 | | France | 1,400 | 39.8 | 2.8 | 359 | 676 | | Russia | 1,100 | 53.9 | 5.2 | 1,159 | 368 | | United Kingdom | 1,300 | 36.6 | 2.8 | 211 | 624 | | Canada | 604 | 6.6 | 1.1 | 229 | | | | | 61 | | | | | Italy | 1,200 | 22.6 | 2.0 | 298 | 391 | | Spain | 553 | 7.3 | 1.3 | 194 | 186 | | Mexico | 400 | 3.8 | 1.0 | 175 | 39 | | Brazil | 583 | 18.1 | 3.2 | 313 | 108 | | Argentina | 289 | 5.2 | 1.8 | 73 | 147 | | China | 703 | 36.7 | 5.3 | 2,820 | 30 | | Taiwan | 310 | 13.9 | 4.6 | 376 | 642 | | Indonesia | 189 | 4.9 | 2.6 | 299 | 24 | | Thailand | 137 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 306 | 32 | | Israel | 97 | 11.0 | 11.6 | 175 | 1,844 | | Malaysia | 88 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 110 | 146 | | Singapore | 96 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 73 | 1,543 | | Egypt | 69 | 2.8 | 4.1 | 450 | 45 | | Australia | 390 | 7.4 | 1.9 | 57 | 391 | | India | 469 | 13.8 | 3.0 | 1,175 | 14 | | South Korea | 426 | 12.9 | 3.1 | 672 | 278 | | North Korea | 14 | 2.0 | 14.3 | 1,055 | 93 | | * Source: The Military Balance 1999 - 2000 | | | | | | # 2000 Force Integration Project Of Major Military Equipment | 2000 Force | | | | |------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------| | Type | Integration | Other | | | Project (Number) | | | | | Command / fire control | R&D | | | | 48/56 | | | | | armored personnel carrier (APC) | | | | | New model of K-9 155 mm | R&D | | | | 18 | | | | | self-propelled artillery | | | | | CBR scout car | 23 | R&D | | | | Import & Production of | | | | 10 | | | | | Ground | BO-105 light scout helicopter | technology | | | Force | MSC-500K Tactical Communication | б | R&D | | Capability | System | Import & Production of | | | The next generation VHF | 34 | technology | | | Low-altitude detection acquisition radar | 8 | R&D | | | Oerlikon upgrade | 10 | R&D | | | Destroyer (KDX-I) | 1 | Domestic construction | | | 2 | | | | | Landing ship (LST) | Domestic construction | | | | SSM Harpoon | 16 | FMS | | | Naval | | | | | Force | Submarine(KSS-1) | 2 | Domestic construction | | Capability | Sea patrol aircraft (ISAR) | 5 | FMS | | Maritime operation helicopter (LYNX) | 8 | Foreign purchase | | | 13 | R&D | | | | Sea surveillance radar | 10 | Licensed production | | | Fighter (KF-16) | | | | | Basic training aircraft (KT-1) | 13 | R & D | | | Air Force | | | | | Capability | HARPY | 110 | Foreign purchase | | Air-to-air Missile(AIM-120) | 100 | FMS | | ![332_image_0.png](332_image_0.png) Appendix 31 Status of International Defense Industrial Agreements ![333_image_0.png](333_image_0.png) | | As of late June 2000 | | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------| | Agreements on | Agreements on | Agreements on | | | Cooperation in | Science and | Agreements on | Providing Cost | | Defense Industry and | Technology Data | Quality | | | Logistics | Exchanges | Information | | | ns | ns | us | us | | | United Kingdom | United Kingdom | | | United Kingdom | France | France | Germany | | France | Italy | | | | United Kingdom | Spain | | | | Italy | Switzerland | | | | Spain | | | | | Indonesia | Canada | | | | | Italy | | | | Israel | Netherlands | | | | Thailand | Belgium | | | | Malaysia | | | | | Philippines | Denmark | | | | Romania | Australia | | | | | Philippines | | | | Canada | Germany | | | | Russia | | | | | Germany | Israel | | | | New Zealand | Turkey | | | | Netherlands | | | | | Turkey | | | | | Venezuela | 15 | 3 | | | 18 | 4 | | | | ※ Italic 6 countries are newly joined members for the Agreement since 1999 | | | | ![334_image_0.png](334_image_0.png) ![334_image_1.png](334_image_1.png) Status of International Weapons Imports and Exports (1994 -1998) 1. Major Weapons Export Total by Country | | (Unit : Constant US$ million in 1990) | | | | | | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------| | Exporter and ranking | Total | | | | | | | | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | | | | | | 1994 | 1994-1998 | | | | | | | | 1994-1998 | 1993-1997 | 53,882 | | | | | | | U.S. | 1 | 9,844 | 9,580 | 9,712 | 12,404 | 12,342 | | | 1 | 1,155 | 3,602 | 2,956 | 1,276 | 12,260 | | | | 2 | Russia | 2 | 3,271 | | | | | | 5 | 756 | 806 | 1,924 | 3,284 | 3,815 | 10,585 | | | 3 | France | 673 | 8,913 | | | | | | United Kingdom | 3 | 1,494 | 1,708 | 1,800 | 3,238 | | | | 4 | 1,425 | 1,399 | 686 | 1,064 | 7,211 | | | | 5 | Germany | 4 | 2,637 | | | | | | 6 | 731 | 849 | 751 | 338 | 157 | 2,826 | | | 6 | China | | | | | | | | Netherlands | 7 | 495 | 378 | 414 | 551 | 506 | 2,344 | | 7 | 298 | 1,742 | | | | | | | 8 | Italy | 8 | 306 | 330 | 366 | 442 | | | | 195 | 516 | 449 | 1,541 | | | | | 9 | Ukraine | 10 | 189 | 192 | | | | | 9 | 365 | 436 | 239 | 137 | 217 | 1,394 | | | 10 | Canada | 221 | 1,343 | | | | | | Spain | 11 | 275 | 111 | 99 | 637 | | | | 11 | 206 | 257 | 292 | 147 | 1,017 | | | | Israel | 12 | 115 | | | | | | | 12 | 13 | 378 | 188 | 132 | 30 | 16 | 744 | | 13 | Czech Republic | | | | | | | | Belarus | 14 | 8 | 24 | 129 | 516 | 16 | 693 | | 14 | 89 | 51 | 600 | | | | | | Belgium | 16 | 20 | 296 | 144 | | | | | 15 | 155 | 51 | 136 | 585 | | | | | 16 | Sweden | 17 | 63 | 180 | | | | | 15 | 165 | - | - | 392 | = | 557 | | | 17 | Moldova | 1 | 401 | | | | | | 20 | 131 | 184 | 65 | 20 | | | | | 18 | Poland | 15 | 318 | 3 | 382 | | | | Australia | 19 | 24 | 22 | | | | | | 19 | 70 | 75 | 122 | 62 | 35 | 364 | | | 20 | Switzerland | 18 | | | | | | | 21 | 186 | 54 | 9 | 56 | 2 | 307 | | | 21 | Norway | . | 233 | | | | | | Denmark | 22 | 230 | e | 3 | - | | | | 22 | 48 | 44 | - | 205 | | | | | 23 | Slovakia | 23 | 28 | 85 | | | | | 0 | . | - | - | 170 | 170 | | | | 24 | Uzbekistan | 63 | 134 | | | | | | 25 | 38 | 40 | 28 | 28 | 9 | | | | 25 | Brazil | 75 | 41 | 129 | | | | | Singapore | 31 | 11 | 2 | . | | | | | 26 | 48 | 48 | 22 | - | - | 118 | | | 27 | North Korea | 24 | | | | | | | 33 | 25 | 38 | - | יי | 52 | 115 | | | 28 | Indonesia | 110 | | | | | | | Qatar | 26 | 51 | 15 | - | 44 | = | | | 29 | 27 | 30 | 110 | | | | | | South Korea | 29 | 8 | 25 | 20 | | | | | 30 | - | 30 | 52 | 18 | 100 | | | | 31 | Greece | 35 | - | | | | | | 226 | 298 | 303 | 131 | 209 | 1,167 | | | | Others* | 112,278 | | | | | | | | 20,073 | 20,861 | 21,984 | 27,416 | 21,944 | | | | | Total | | | | | | | | | * Countries that exported less than US $100million from 1994 to 1998(Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1999) | | | | | | | | ![335_image_0.png](335_image_0.png) 2. Major Weapons Import Total by Country | | (Unit: Constant US$ million in 1990) | | | | | | | | |----------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------| | Importer and ranking | Total | | | | | | | | | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | | | | | | 1994-1998 | 1993-1997 | 1994-1998 | | | | | | | | 1 | Taiwan | 2 | 731 | 1,162 | 1,451 | 5,311 | 4,656 | 13,311 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 2 | Saudi Arabia | 1,298 | 1,249 | 1,961 | 3,292 | 1,948 | 9,748 | | | 3 | Turkey | 3 | 1,386 | 1,327 | 1,132 | 1,394 | 1,376 | 6,615 | | 4 | Egypt | 4 | 1,926 | 1,645 | 940 | 931 | 440 | 5,882 | | 5 | South Korea | 5 | 642 | 1,553 | 1,589 | 731 | 656 | 5,171 | | 6 | Greece | 7 | 1,172 | 943 | 241 | 832 | 1,566 | 4,754 | | 7 | India | 8 | 497 | 932 | 988 | 1,266 | 466 | 4,149 | | 8 | Japan | 6 | 678 | 948 | 624 | 662 | 1,181 | 4,093 | | 629 | 442 | 600 | 840 | 756 | | | | | | 9 | Arab-Emirates | 11 | 3,267 | | | | | | | 10 | Thailand | 12 | 758 | 628 | 555 | 1,128 | 63 | 3,132 | | 11 | Kuwait | 10 | ਕੋਰੇ | 974 | 1,338 | 418 | 228 | 3,007 | | 12 | Malaysia | 15 | 453 | 1,143 | 200 | 780 | 59 | 2,635 | | 13 | Pakistan | 14 | 683 | 242 | 552 | 614 | 525 | 2,616 | | 14 | China | 9 | 112 | 427 | 1,115 | 834 | 104 | 2,592 | | 15 | us | 13 | 711 | 459 | 431 | 696 | 223 | 2,520 | | 796 | 229 | | | | | | | | | 16 | Israel | 20 | 73 | 46 | 1,285 | 2,429 | | | | 17 | Spain | 18 | 646 | 395 | 441 | 230 | 402 | 2,114 | | 18 | Finland | 19 | 196 | 162 | 581 | 439 | 647 | 2,025 | | 19 | Singapore | 26 | 187 | 232 | 538 | 123 | 685 | 1,765 | | 20 | Indonesia | 21 | 600 | 359 | 547 | 141 | 66 | 1,713 | | 21 | Brazil | 23 | 236 | 236 | 491 | 437 | 196 | 1,596 | | 22 | Swiss | 31 | 114 | 106 | 199 | 400 | 441 | 1,260 | | 25 | 537 | 223 | 194 | 103 | | | | | | 23 | Chile | 151 | 1,208 | | | | | | | 24 | Iran | 16 | 348 | 243 | 537 | 24 | 24 | 1,176 | | 25 | Italy | 24 | 131 | 187 | 241 | 552 | 4 | 1,115 | | 26 | Qatar | 36 | 14 | 15 | 58 | 553 | 389 | 1,029 | | 27 | 17 | 596 | 130 | 110 | 18 | 132 | 986 | | | Germany | | | | | | | | | | 28 | Oman | 30 | 201 | 175 | 347 | 158 | 17 | 898 | | 29 | Canada | 27 | 432 | 177 | 164 | 86 | 33 | 892 | | 29 | 142 | 97 | 182 | 469 | . | 890 | | | | 30 | Peru | | | | | | | | | 31 | United Kingdom | 44 | 38 | 93 | 216 | 88 | 362 | 797 | | 32 | Vietnam | 37 | ; | 277 | 246 | 96 | 168 | 787 | | 33 | Australia | 28 | 302 | 71 | 149 | 24 | 189 | 735 | | 40 | 65 | 65 | 63 | 230 | 306 | 729 | | | | 34 | Mexico | | | | | | | | | 35 | Sweden | 35 | 252 | 84 | 47 | 258 | 87 | 728 | | 36 | Norway | 34 | 57 | 102 | 200 | 186 | 170 | 715 | | 37 | Netherlands | 38 | 140 | 47 | 187 | 99 | 242 | 715 | | Importer and ranking | Total | | | | | | | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|---------|-------|-----| | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1994-1998 | | | | | 1994-1998) in | 1993-1997 | 223 | 93 | 243 | 131 | 690 | | | | 38 | Myanmar | 32 | - | 219 | 166 | . | 547 | | | 39 | Kazakhstan | 39 | = | 162 | | | | | | 332 | 5 | 29 | - | 527 | | | | | | 40 | Algeria | 41 | 161 | | | | | | | 47 | 148 | 85 | 44 | 98 | 110 | 485 | | | | 41 | Argentina | 45 | 310 | 51 | 106 | ﺘ | - | 467 | | 42 | Armenia | 431 | 15 | 3 | 14 | · | 463 | | | 43 | Portugal | 33 | | | | | | | | 49 | 66 | 129 | 53 | 74 | 141 | 463 | | | | 44 | Denmark | 56 | 37 | 14 | 169 | 177 | 453 | | | 45 | Austria | 54 | 3 | 41 | 30 | 160 | 210 | 444 | | 46 | France | 55 | | | | | | | | 50 | 39 | 87 | 39 | 160 | 119 | 444 | | | | 47 | Columbia | 46 | 16 | 4 | 18 | 349 | 17 | 404 | | 48 | New Zealand | 43 | 129 | 40 | 89 | 143 | - | 401 | | 49 | Morocco | 48 | 61 | 29 | 177 | 110 | 18 | 395 | | 50 | Cyprus | 51 | 14 | 26 | 225 | 74 | 9 | 348 | | 51 | Bahrain | 64 | - | 24 | 43 | 104 | 164 | 335 | | 52 | Jordan | 22 | 4 | 67 | 125 | 72 | 58 | 326 | | 53 | Hungary | | | | | | | | | 54 | 50 | 56 | 60 | 158 | 42 | 40 | 356 | | | Sri Lanka | 41 | 35 | 252 | 35 | - | - | 322 | | | 55 | Slovakia | 58 | 6 | 154 | 114 | e | - | 274 | | 56 | Poland | | | | | | | | | Philippines | 56 | 109 | 32 | 30 | 54 | 47 | 272 | | | 57 | | | | | | | | | | 58 | Bangladesh | 57 | 89 | 126 | र्वे | 24 | - | 243 | | Yemen | 62 | 196 | - | - | - | 5 | 196 | | | 59 | (Southern Rebels) | 63 | 96 | l | 10 | 3 | 84 | 194 | | 60 | Angola | 60 | 57 | 86 | 2 | 37 | - | 182 | | 61 | Croatia | | | | | | | | | Tunisia | 64 | 21 | 581 | 60 | 40 | 1 | 180 | | | 62 | 59 | 64 | 28 | 2 | 34 | 34 | 162 | | | ез | Belgium | 65 | 1 | - | 51 | 77 | 16 | 145 | | 64 | Bulgaria | | | | | | | | | Yemen | 67 | - | 142 | - | ت | - | 142 | | | 65 | | | | | | | | | | 66 | 53 | 63 | 43 | 21 | - | - | 127 | | | Syria | | | | | | | | | | Lebanon | 66 | 13 | 59 | 27 | 6 | 17 | 122 | | | 67 | 75 | 16 | 1 | 30 | 48 | 27 | 122 | | | 68 | Eritrea | | | | | | | | | Romania | 73 | 43 | 1 | 35 | 12 | 20 | 111 | | | 69 | Cambodia | 72 | 64 | - | 34 | 6 | 4 | 108 | | 70 | ୧୫ | 19 | 38 | 51 | 20 | - | 128 | | | 71 | South Africa | 334 | 342 | 398 | 512 | 241 | 1,827 | | | Others* | 20,073 | 20,861 | 21,984 | 27,416 | 21,944 | 112,278 | | | | Total | | | | | | | | | | * Countries that imported less than US $100million from 1994 to 1998(Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1999) | | | | | | | | | ![337_image_0.png](337_image_0.png) Appendix 33 # Annual Investment In R&D | | | (Unit: 100 million won) | | | | | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------|--------------|------|------| | | | R&D Expenditures | R&D Expenditures to (%) | | | | | | Defense | FIP" | | | | | | | | Year | | FIP | | | | | | | Budget | Expenditure | Defense | | | | | | | | | Operation Expenses | Total | Budget | Expenditures | | | | 1996 | 122,434 | 42,662 | 3,008 | 1,095 | 4,103 | 3.4 | 7.1 | | 1997 | 137,865 | 48,833 | 3,432 | 1,211 | 4,643 | 3.4 | 7.1 | | 1998 | 138,000 | 50,902 | 3,661 | 1,129 | 4,790 | 3.5 | 7.2 | | 137,490 | | | | | | | | | 1999 | 52,304 | 5,960 | 1,051 | 7,011 | 5.1 | 11.4 | | | 2000 | 144,390 | 53,437 | 6,482 | 967 | 7,449 | 5.2 | 12.1 | | ※ This recalculation is based on the output criterion of the OECD research development costs | | | | | | | | (R&D budget of the Department of Planning Budget is based on the government common standard from 2000) 1) FIP: Force Improvement Programs Appendix 34 ![338_image_0.png](338_image_0.png) ![338_image_1.png](338_image_1.png) Defense R&D Investments of Major Military Powers | Year | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | Unit | |---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|---------|--------|---------|--------| | Country | 257,975 | 253,423 | 252,379 | | | | | MND budget (A) | 274,624 | 271,739 | US$ | | | | | | (million) | | | | | | | us | R&D budget (B) | 36,597 | 35,772 | 36,404 | 36,469 | 35,324 | | | 14.39 | 14.00 | (%) | | | | | Ratio (B/A) | 13.30 | 13.16 | 14.11 | | | | | MND budget (A) | 35,725 | 34,196 | 35,736 | 36,111 | 33,254 | US$ | | United | (million) | | | | | | | R&D budget (B) | 3,408 | 3,422 | 3,491 | 3,785 | 3,909 | | | Kingdom | (%) | | | | | | | Ratio (B/A) | 9.54 | 10.01 | 9.77 | 10.48 | 11.75 | | | MND budget (A) | 42,240 | 37,861 | 32,711 | 30,703 | 28,353 | US$ | | | (million) | | | | | | | France | R&D budget (B) | 5,525 | 4,932 | 3,821 | 3,254 | 3,148 | | Ratio (B/A) | 13.08 | 13.03 | 11.68 | 10.60 | 11.10 | (%) | | MND budget (A) | 32,745 | 26,641 | 26,002 | 23,790 | | | | 34,625 | US $ | | | | | | | | (million) | | | | | | | Germany | R&D budget (B) | 1,981 | 1,850 | 1,487 | 1,410 | 1,262 | | Ratio (B/A) | 5.72 | 5.65 | 5.58 | 5.42 | 5.30 | (%) | | | 39.9 | | | | | | | MND budget (A) | 53.4 | 46.4 | 41.7 | 37.6 | US$ | | | | (billion) | | | | | | | Japan | R&D budget (B) | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.1 | | | 2.76 | (%) | | | | | | Ratio (B/A) | 3.00 | 3.02 | 3.12 | 2.66 | | | | 48,577 | 104,300 | Russia Rubles | | | | | | MND budget (A) | 80,185 | 81,765 | - | | | | | (59,379) | (83,000) | (billion) | | | | | | | si ( ) is | | | | | | | | 11,574 | - | | | | | | Russia | R&D budget (B) | 4,936 | 6,475 | 10,800 | revised | | | Ratio (B/A) | 10.16 | 8.08 | 11.10 | 13.2 | : | (%) | | MND budget (A) | 8.6 | 9.7 | 11.0 | - | | | | 7.47 | US$ | | | | | | | | (billion) | | | | | | | China | R&D budget (B) | - | - | - | - | ﻳ | | Ratio (B/A) | - | - | - | (%) | | | | ※ Source (excluding Russia, China) : The Military Balance 1999-2000 | | | | | | | * Unit : Constant 1997 US$million (Japan : 1998 US$billion) Appendix 35 Status of Dual-Use Technology Development Assignments ![339_image_0.png](339_image_0.png) | | Assignments | Remarks | |----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------| | Classification | | | | Assignments | · High output coil laser. | | | planned in | · Uncooled thermal imaging device. | Supported by | | 1997 | · Auxiliary power unit. | | | (3) | the Ministry of | | | | Science and | | | | · Wideband adaptive antenna for satellite communication. | | | Assignments | Technology | | | | · High voltage/super capacitor. | | | planned in | | | | 1998 | · Carbon-carbon brake disk. | | | (4) | · Semi autonomous underwater vehicle & manipulater technology. | | | | · Low Capacity ATM switching system. | | | | · Automatic intellectual tracking/recognition algorithm of multi | | | | targets. | | | | · Neutron detector using semiconductor. | | | | · Phase shifter/radiating element module for the passive phased | | | | array antenna. | | | Assignments | · Traveling wave tube. | Supported by | | planned in | · High sensitive, broadband DLVA. | | | 1999 | the MND | | | (12) | · High voltage power supply for high power amplifier. | | | | - Multi-channel high temperature superconducting | | | | SQUID(Superconducting Quantum Interference Device) Sensor | | | | technology. | | | | · Magnetite coating treatment by using Plasma. | | | | · Semiconductor bridge. | | | | · Digital controlled anti brake system. | | | | · High performance hydraulic serve valve. | | | | - Real time simulation using 3D-VR. | | | Assignments | | | | planned in | · Blind Source Noise Cancellation technology. | Supported by | | 2000 | · Shock-absorbing titanium alloy. | the MND | | (4) | · High Voltage/ high current closing switches. | | 348 Appendix ![340_image_0.png](340_image_0.png) ![340_image_1.png](340_image_1.png) Status of Transferring Defense Science and Technology to Civil Industries ## Industries/Organization | Industries/Organization | Ap- | | | |------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------| | | proved | | | | Name | Transferring Enterprise/Institution | Remarks | | | | Cases | LG Software, Ministry of Maritime Affairs & Fisheries, | | | | Headquarters of Air Force, Defense Security Command, | | | | | National Intelligence Service, Korean Mechanics, Korea | | | | | Telecomm. tech., Samsung Elec., Ministry of Environment, | Transferring | | | Information on computer | Handong Univ., Wisdom Enterprise, Korean Tele-optics, | Done | | | | Army, Engineering Information 21, Emergency Planning | | | | instruction and graphics | 46 | (28) | | | | Commission, Aerospace, Panasia Eng., Plus Telecom, Shinhwa, | | | | SW | Girlim System, Korea Water Resources Corp., LG precision, | | | | | Geobank, Media Data System, Korea Resources, More Tech, | | | | | Daewoo Heavy Industries & Machinery, Choongang JDS. | Transferring | | | | Korea Land Corporation, Samsung SDS, Dacom. | (3) | | | Infrared detecting device | Transferring | | | | | l | Taesan, Precision Co. Ltd. | | | manufacture technology | Done | | | | Acoustic shielding device | Transferring | | | | | 1 | Unison Industry. | | | design technology | Done | | | | 300 ton-level catamaran type | Transferring | | | | semi-submarine design | 2 | Korean Mechanics. | Done(2) | | technology | | | | | Analysis of ceramic oscillation | Transferring | | | | | 1 | Daewon Electronics. | | | and design technology | Done | | | | Oil pressure driven control | Transferring | | | | | 3 | Samsung Aerospace, Hyundai Precision, Korean. | | | technology | Done(3) | | | | S/W forecasting morning and | Transferring | | | | | 1 | Korean Mechanics. | | | evening in Korean coast | Done | | | | Super-light deposition | Transferring | | | | | 1 | Korean Tele-optics. | | | processing technology | Done | | | | Optical fiber device using optical fiber | Patent | | | | grating, optical fiber birefringence | 1 | Donam System. | Pending | | modulator etc. (4 types) | | | | | Wireless ATM connection | Transferring | | | | | 2 | Gauri Info-Comm. Corp., K-JIST. | | | technology | Done(2) | | | | Real time, flying orbit | Transferring | | | | | 1 | K-JIST. | | | monitoring S/W | Done | | | | Closed circuit digital propelling | Transferring | | | | | 1 | Hankook Industrial Machinery. | | | device | Done | | | | Design air pressure driven | Transferring | | | | | Aerospace Research Institute. | | | | | 1 | | | | device for posture control | Done | | | | Low noise, fast frequency shifting | 1 | Radionics. | Transferring | | microwave signal generator | | | | | Small size, high performance | Transferring | | | | | 2 | Movies/Hanhwa. | | | vein-pump design technology | (2) | | | | Microwave vector receiver | Transferring | | | | | 1 | KMW. | | | design technology | | | | | High performance molecular | 1 | Dongwon Special Chemicals. | | | explosive, Improved composition | Transferring | | | | techniques of HNIW | | | | | Future tactical communication | 1 | LG Innotek. | | | system technology | Transferring | | | ## Defense Industry | | Name | Enterprise | Remarks | |--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------------|-----------| | Highly explosive compound manufacturing and KM-180 refilling tech. | Hanhwa | Transferring Done | | | Compressed composite explosive (DXD52, 56) tech. | Hanhwa | Transferring Done | | | Molded composite explosive (DXD-3) tech. and mine refilling tech. | Hanhwa | Transferring Done | | | Propellant material composition tech. | Hanhwa | Transferring Done | | | Molded composite explosive (DXD-4) tech. | Hanhwa | Transferring Done | | | Compressed composite explosive (DXD-53) tech. | Hanhwa | Transferring Done | | | Compressed composite explosive (DXD-57) and Pentolite tech. | Hanhwa | Transferring Done | | | HNS composition tech. | Hanhwa | Transferring Done | | | Molded composite explosive (DXD-5,6) tech. | Hanhwa | Transferring Done | | | Highly explosive compound processing tech. | Poongsan | Transferring Done | | ## Appendix 37 Defense Education And Training System Defense education and training School education | | Professional specialty | | | |------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------| | Military education | education | | | | Security/ | | | | | Management | - Domestic and overseas | | | | National | schools | Profes- | civilian and military | | Defense | | | | | College | National War | sional | colleges | | College | academic | - Doctorate program | | | education | - Master's program | | | | Senior Service College | | | | | Career | Advanced | | | | education | Advanced | | | | military | millitary course | · Domestic and overseas | | | Course | (NCO) | | | | (officer) | Intermediate | military education | | | On the | | | | | military | (Including training) | | | | Basic | course (NCO) | job | - millitary education | | military | training | organization | | | Basic military | | | | | Course | - civilian education | | | | course (NCO) | | | | | (officer) | organization | | | | | - Industrial organization | | | | - Military Academy | | | | | · The 3rd Military | | | | | Academy | | | | | Officer | · ROTC/Bachelor | | | | Basic | Self | | | | military | officer/ Special | · Domestic(night) school | | | Academy | develop- | - Master's course | | | ment | - Bachelor's course | | | | educa- | | | | | NCO course | · College(2 year) | | | | tion | | | | | Soldier course | | | | ![341_image_0.png](341_image_0.png) ![341_image_2.png](341_image_2.png) ![341_image_3.png](341_image_3.png) ![341_image_4.png](341_image_4.png) ![341_image_1.png](341_image_1.png) Appendix ![342_image_1.png](342_image_1.png) # Status Of Rok Armed Forces Digitization Training And Pursuit ## 1. Purpose Of Pursuit And Needs A. Purpose Of Pursuit · Digitization Training for servicemen connected with civic digitization education. · National defense digitization training will function as citizen's digitization education. · Providing digitization training for the 200,000 discharging servicemen each year. · Strengthen digitization training by the introduction of the defense chief information officer(CIO) system. ## B. Needs · Digitization of Armed Forces personnel on preparation for the future Information Warfare. · Digitization training for servicemen to suit information-oriented society. · Production of digitally educated personnel for national education environment. · Production of digitized technical personnel by modernization of the digitization training system of Armed Forces. · Strengthening digitization training for all service members following the introduction of CIO system and the construction of C4I and CALS. ## 2. Status Of Digitization Training A. Digitization Training System | Computer Technical Personnel | General Users | | | | |----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------| | Classification | Officer's Basic Course, Officer's | | | | | Basic | Beginner's course for computer | Advanced Course, Army College | | | | operation officers | | | | | | Education | (Lt. Colonel class, Colonel class) | | | | | Amy | Residence course of civilian | | | | | Career | Self-Education of Service Unit | | | | | graduate schools and of National | (Division level or higher) | | | | | Education | Defense University | | | | | Computer Science department, | Computer Science department, | | | | | Basic | General Administration Service | General Administration Service | | | | Education | School | | | | | School | | | | | | Navy | Residence course of civilian | Navy College, Armed Forces Staff | | | | Career | College, National Defense | | | | | graduate school and of National | | | | | | Education | Defense University | University | | | | | Computer training center, School of | | | | | Basic | Computer training center, School of | Communications and Electronics, | | | | Education | Communications and Electronics | computer center in each service unit | | | | Air | | | | | | Force | Residence course of civilian | Air Force College, Armed Forces | | | | Career | graduate school and of National | Staff College, National Defense | | | | Education | Defense University | University | | | | Residence course of civilian | Armed | Forces Staff College, | | | | Basic | graduate school and of National | National | Defense | University, | | Directly | Education | Defense University | Defense Computing Center | | | Subordinate | Armed Forces Staff | College, | | | | Organization | Residence course of civilian | | | | | Career | National Defense University, | | | | | to MND | graduate school and of National | Defense Computing Center, KIDA, | | | | Education | Defense University | Civilian Organization | | | ![342_image_0.png](342_image_0.png) ![343_image_0.png](343_image_0.png) B. Digitization Training Records | | | | (Units: Persons) | | | | |----------------|--------|--------|--------------------|-----------|--------|-------| | | | | Subordinate | | | | | Classification | Total | Army | Navy | Air Force | to MND | | | Total | 14,423 | 8,739 | 2,861 | 1,821 | 1,002 | | | 1998 | Users | 13,404 | 8,088 | 2,790 | 1,725 | 801 | | Managers | 1,019 | 651 | 71 | 96 | 201 | | | Total | 93,298 | 49,849 | 10,151 | 23,049 | 10,249 | | | 1999 | Users | 85,900 | 46,360 | 9,643 | 21,698 | 8,199 | | Managers | 7,398 | 3,489 | 508 | 1,351 | 2,050 | | (Units: Persons) C. Business Residence Course | Classification | Total | Subordinate | | | | |------------------|---------|---------------|--------|-----|-----| | Army | Navy | Air Force | to MND | | | | 549 | 120 | 69 | સ્ને | 296 | | | 1998 | | | | | | | 1999 | 725 | 261 | 83 | 122 | 259 | (Units: Persons) * Intelligence communication education center, government computer information management center, information technology education center, industrial technology education center, etc. | Classification | Total | Army | Navy | Air Force | |------------------|---------|--------|--------|-------------| | 16 | 12 | 4 | . | | | 1998 | 43 | 25 | 11 | 7 | | 1999 | | | | | D. Construction of Digitization Training Center for Division/Brigade level and higher level Units | Classification | Total | Army | Navy | Air Force | |------------------|---------|--------|--------|-------------| | 1999 | 6,842 | 5,978 | ਕੰਟੇਰੇ | 405 | (Units: Centers) E. Construction of Computer Education Center (PC room) for Company-level Unit (Units: Centers) ※ Establishment of three 486 class PCs in company-level units(20,526 total): comfort kit, lease expired PC, etc. ![344_image_0.png](344_image_0.png) ## 3. Digitization Training Plans | B. Education Contents and Organization | | | | |------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------| | Education Contents/Level | Education Organization | | | | Classification | · Acquiring advanced | · National defense university, | | | | Advanced Institute for Military | | | | intelligence policy and new | | | | | · Intelligence System | Science and Technology | | | | Masters/Doctorate | technology | | | | Intelligence | · Domestic and foreign civilian | | | | · Possess the ability of R&D | | | | | · Intelligence System | college/research institution | | | | Technical | of core technology | | | | experience of 5 years | · Korea Institute for Defense | | | | · Design information system | | | | | Personnel | or more | Analysis | | | and possess development | - Government computer | | | | tech. | information administration center. | | | | · Possess ability for | | | | | · Intelligence, Signal | · Candidate/refresher education | | | | Intelligence | information system | - Each information commun- | | | Corps | administration/operation | | | | System | · Intelligence System | cation institute | | | · Possess the ability to | | | | | Management | Operation | · Supplementary training | | | support the execution of | - Civilian college/research | | | | Personnel | supporting | combined information | | | personnel | institute | | | | warfare | | | | | · Advanced | Senior service college/ | | | | · Major Ranked | nation / Digitization policy | National defense university | | | Person | of ROK armed forces and | - CIO training course | | | - Policy decision/ | propelling direction | · Supplementary training | | | managers | · Combined information | - School institution/ | | | - Leader of colonel- | warfare / possess ability to | education center | | | level or higher | execute CIO | - Lecture tour | | | Users | · General Leader | · Candidate education | | | · Possess operation ability of | | | | | - Officer, warrant | the Information System | - Officer/NCO training course | | | O | officer, | (C4I, Resource | · Refresher education | | noncommissioned | - Armed forces staff college, | | | | Intelligence | Administration System, | | | | officer, | senior service college, service | | | | OA, etc.) | | | | | - Military-civilian | · Possess the ability to | school | | | System | employee/regular | · Supplementary training | | | execute information | | | | | jobs | - Information education center | | | | warfare | | | | | · Possess ability to use | - Information education center | | | | information tools | · Internet education center in | | | | Acquiring 2nd level license | | | | | · Regular soldier | battalion | | | | of Information Searching | · PC room in company | | | | Ability before discharge | | | | | A. Yearly Goals of Personnel Education | (Units: Persons) | | | |------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------|---------| | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | | | Classification | | | | | Total | 200,000 | 270,000 | 270,000 | ![345_image_0.png](345_image_0.png) ## C. Phase Of Propelling Strategy In Detail | | (Units: Centers) | | | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------| | Year | 2001 ~ | | | | | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | Remarks | | | Forces | 2002 | | | | | Total | 16 | 43 | 55 | 36 | | - | 18 | 28 | . | Defense budget | | Army | Supported by Ministry of | | | | | 7 | | | | | | 12 | 5 | 36 | Information and Communication | | | 4 | 8 | б | - | Defense budget | | Navy | 3 | 5 | Supported by Ministry of | | | . | - | Information and Communication | | | | . | 4 | 2 | - | Defense budget | | Air Force | 9 | Supported by Ministry of | | | | 100 | 3 | - | Information and Communication | | | * During 2001 ~ 2002, 48 centers in division level unit or higher echelons will be equipped with 50 seats | | | | | (1) Construction of Digitization Training Center (Division/Brigade level Unit) size training center (2) Construction of National Defense Cyber Education System (2000~2002) · Research on the Construction of Remote Defense System space(ADD project): 1999~2001 * Completion of research on defense cyber education system and the prototype =>Build cyber education system environment for the military · Select test sites on the basis of research results, construct system and promote gradual enlargement. · Establishing the foundation for defense remote education system by using the facilities of digitization training centers (150 centers) * Enabling the digitization training and remote education through Defense Intranet · Provide and support combined education environment for cyber education training. · Cyber education system for civil service workers from the government organization and promote combined cyber education system in tandem with industry, schools and research centers ## 4. Expected Results A. Increase digitization training opportunities for servicemen by the enlargement of training centers. B. Develop digitized minds by high-tech digitization education. C. Develop high-tech intelligence warfare ability by fostering information application ability for managers/officials/users. * Develop high-rank officials (battalion level or higher) to lead digitization->promote digitization policy, integrate digitization/possess CIO execution ability D. Military's leading role in developing digitized personnel in realizing information-oriented society. ![346_image_0.png](346_image_0.png) # Organization Of The Rok Ministry Of National Defense And The Current Number Of Military Personnel ![346_image_2.png](346_image_2.png) Management Office ![346_image_1.png](346_image_1.png) | Air Force | Others | | | | | |-------------------------------|----------|---------|--------|--------|-------| | Classification | Total | Army | Navy | | | | Total | 759,059 | 608,903 | 74,739 | 68,049 | 7,368 | | Military personnel | 691,600 | 560,500 | 67,850 | 63,250 | | | Military civilians | 28,583 | 13,980 | 4,834 | 4,799 | 4,970 | | Civilian government officials | 2,398 | . | - | 2,398 | | | 2,055 | - | | | | | | Full-time reservists | 36,478 | 34,423 | | | | (Unit : persons) ![347_image_0.png](347_image_0.png) Appendix 40 # Status Of Nations That Participated In The Korean War | Nations that Dispatched Combat Troop Units: 16 Nations | | | | | |----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|-----------| | | Scale of Participation | | | | | Number of | | | | | | Allies | Participants | Ground Force | Navy | Air Force | | 8 Infantry Divisions | | | | | | 1 Marine Division | Far East Navy | | | | | USA | 1,789,000 | Far East Air Force | | | | 2 Regimental Combat Corps | US 7th Fleet | | | | | 302,483 Troops | | | | | | 2 Infantry Brigades | 17 Navy Vessels | | | | | United | 56,000 | 1 Marine Special Commando | (Including 1 Aircraft | | | Kingdom | 14,198 Troops | Carrier) | | | | | 1 Aircraft Carrier | 1 Fighter Squadron | | | | 2 Infantry Battalions | | | | | | Australia | 8,407 | 2 Destroyers | 1 Transport Aircraft | | | 2,282 Troops | 1 Frigate | Formation | | | | 1 Infantry Battalion | | | | | | Netherlands | 5,322 | 1 Destroyer | - | | | 819 Troops | | | | | | 1 Infantry Brigade | 1 Transport Aircraft | | | | | Canada | 25,687 | 3 Destroyers | | | | 6,146 Troops | Squadron | | | | | New | 1 Artillery Battalion | | | | | 3,794 | 1 Frigate | - | | | | Zealand | 1,389 Troops | | | | | 1 Infantry Battalion | 1 Destroyer | | | | | France | 3,421 | - | | | | 1,119 (1,185) Troops | | | | | | 1 Infantry Battalion | | | | | | Philippines | 7,420 | - | - | | | 1,496 Troops | | | | | | 1 Infantry Brigade | | | | | | 14,936 | - | - | | | | Turkey | 5,455 Troops | | | | | 1 Infantry Battalion | 7 Frigates | 1 Transport Aircraft | | | | Thailand | 6,326 | 1,294 (2,274) Troops | 1 Cargo Vessel | Formation | | 1 Infantry Battalion | 1 Transport Aircraft | | | | | Greece | 4,992 | = | | | | 1,263 Troops | Formation | | | | | Republic of | 826 | : | 1 Fighter Squadron | | | South Africa | 1 Infantry Battalion | | | | | 3,498 | - | - | | | | Belgium | 900 Troops | | | | | 1 Infantry Platoon | | | | | | 83 | | | | | | Luxemburg | - | - | | | | 44 (48)Troops | | | | | | 1 Infantry Battalion | | | | | | Columbia | 5,100 | 1 Frigate | . | | | 1,068 Troops | | | | | | 1 Infantry Battalion | | | | | | Ethiopia | 3,518 | - | - | | | 1,271 Troops | | | | | | | Scale of Participation | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------| | Number of | | | | | Allies | Participants | Support Unit and Facilities | | | Service Personnel | | | | | Sweden | 160 | 154(162) | Red Cross Hospital | | 627 | 70(333) | 60th Field Hospital | | | India | 100 | Hospital ship | | | Denmark | 630 | | | | Norway | 623 | 105(109) | Mobile Surgical Hospital | | 128 | 72 | 68th Red Cross Hospital | | | Italy | | | | | ※ Participated Troops were counted according to the maximum amount of troops at the end of the | | | | Nations that Dispatched Medical Support Units and Facilities: 5 Nations Korean War (1953. 7.) ※ Number inside of parenthesis indicates maximum number of troops during the Korean War. | Appendix 41 | Casualties during the Korean War | (Unit : persons) | | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|---------|--------|-------| | | Prisoners of | | | | | | Killed in | Wounded in | Missing in | | | | | Total | | | | | | | Allies | Action/Death | Action | Action | War | | | 555,022 | 28,611 | 14,158 | | | | | Total | 776,360 | 178,569 | 450,742 | 24,495 | 8,343 | | South Korea | 621,479 | 137,899 | | | | | U.S. | 137,250 | 36,940 | 92,134 | 3,737 | 4,439 | | United Kingdom | 4,908 | 1,078 | 2,674 | 179 | 977 | | Australia | 1,584 | 339 | 1,216 | 3 | 26 | | 645 | - | 3 | | | | | Netherlands | 768 | 120 | | | | | 312 | 1,212 | 1 | 32 | | | | Canada | 1,557 | | | | | | New Zealand | 103 | 23 | 79 | 1 | r | | | 12 | | | | | | France | 1,289 | 262 | 1,008 | 7 | | | | 16 | 41 | | | | | Philippines | 398 | 112 | 229 | | | | 2,068 | 163 | 244 | | | | | Turkey | 3,216 | 741 | | | | | 1,273 | 129 | 1,139 | 5 | - | | | Thailand | | | | | | | Greece | 738 | 192 | 543 | - | 3 | | | 9 | | | | | | South Africa | 43 | 34 | . | - | | | 336 | 4 | 1 | | | | | Belgium | 440 | 99 | | | | | 2 | 13 | . | ﻊ | | | | Luxemburg | 15 | | | | | | 639 | 163 | 448 | - | 28 | | | Columbia | | | | | | | Ethiopia | 657 | 121 | 536 | י | - | | - | - | . | | | | | Norway | 3 | 3 | | | | | ※ The number of ROK Army's POWs includes the number of POWs who were exchanged and additionally | | | | | | ## Appendix 41 repatriated. ![349_image_0.png](349_image_0.png) Comparison of Military Powers between South and North Korea during the Korean War | Units / Troops | | Major Equipments | | | |-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------| | Classification | South | North | South | North | | Infantry: 8 divisions | Infantry: 10 divisions | Howitzer: 91 | Howitzer: 552 | | | Marine: 1 dnit | Tank: 1 brigade | Anti-tank artillery: 140 | Anti-tank artillery: 550 | | | Ground | Other support dnits | Other mechanized units, | Mortars: 960 | Mortars: 1,728 | | Force | guards, special units | Armored Vehicles: 27 | Armored Vehicles: 54 | | | 96,140 persons | 191,680 persons | Tanks: 242 | | | | | Guarding Ship: 28 | Guarding Ship: 30 | | | | Navy | 7,715 persons | 4,700 persons | Auxiliary Vessel: 43 | Auxiliary Vessel: 80 | | | Training / Liaison Plane | Fighter / Bomber/Others | | | | Air Force 1,897 persons | 2,000 persons | : 22 | : 211 | | | Total | 105,752 persons | 198,380 persons | | | | Comparison of Economy Indices between South and North Korea | | | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|---------------| | | around the Korean War | | | | Classification | South | North | Remarks(Year) | | Total Population | 20.19 | 9.75 | 1949 | | (Millions) | | | | | GNP | 710 | 390 | 1949 | | ($ millions) | | | | | Total Food Products | 345.5 | 124.4 | 1950 | | (10,000 ton) | | | | | Total Aquatic Products | 21.6 | 27.3 | 1949 | | (10,000 ton) | | | | | Total Coal Production | 112.9 | 400.5 | 1949 | | (10,000 ton) | | | | | Total Production of Electric | | | | | Power | 23.1 | 104.7 | 1950 | | (10,000 Kilowatts) | | | | | Total Length of | | | | | Rail roads | 4,423 | 1950 | | | | 3,815 | | | | (Km) | | | | | Total Length of Road | 24,932 | 13,549 | 1949 | | (Km) | | | | | Total Trade Volume | 140 | 1949 | | | ($ millions) | 510 | | | | ് Source: The Changes in Viewpoint of ROK's Economic World (Aug. 1998, National Bureau of | | | | ## Appendix 43 Statistics) ![350_image_0.png](350_image_0.png) | Establishment Plans of Military Environmental Facilities | (Unit: Centers) | | | | | | | | |------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|-----| | | Mid-term Plans | | | | | | | | | Total | Maintain | | | | | | | | | Classification | Requirement (by 2000) | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | Total | | | 851 | 540 | 1,119 | 1,160 | 416 | 341 | 3,576 | | | | Total | 4,427 | | | | | | | | | Waste Water Disposal | 279 | 222 | 175 | 0 | 0 | 676 | | | | Facilities | 1,308 | 632 | | | | | | | | Combined Purifying | 621 | 74 | 261 | 151 | 135 | 0 | 0 | 547 | | Group | | | | | | | | | | Incinerating | 229 | 138 | 0 | 26 | 27 | 26 | 12 | 91 | | Facilities | | | | | | | | | | Noise Preventing | 7 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 6 | | | 13 | | | | | | | | | | Facilities | | | | | | | | | | Soil Contamination | 0 | 0 | 718 | 822 | 388 | 328 | 2,256 | | | 2,256 | | | | | | | | | | Preventing Facilities | | | | | | | | | | Required Budgets | 2000:15.0 | 84.5 | 77 | 68.6 | 10.7 | 10 | 250.8 | | | (billion won) | | | | | | | | | Appendix 45 Classification of Military Owned Lands and Buildings | Buildings | | (Unit: Hectares) | | | | |----------------|-------|--------------------|------|-----------|----| | | | Subordinate to | | | | | Service | Total | Army | Navy | Air Force | | | Use | | MND | | | | | 238 | 343 | 205 | | | | | Total | 2,300 | 1,515 | 66 | | | | Administration | 304 | 155 | 30 | 53 | | | 993 | 690 | 109 | 119 | 76 | | | Residence | 20 | 43 | 3 | | | | Factory | 149 | 83 | રકે | 10 | | | Storage | 376 | 273 | 23 | | | | Other | 479 | 314 | 56 | ટેતે | 50 | | Lands | (Unit: Hectares) | | | | | |-------------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------|--------| | | Subordinate to | | | | | | Service | Total | Army | Navy | Air Force | | | Use | MND | | | | | | Total | 136,561 | 96,020 | 10,926 | 17,757 | 11,857 | | 26,004 | 20,929 | 987 | 1,571 | 2,518 | | | Building | 52,163 | 2,584 | 7,250 | 5,917 | | | Training | 67,914 | 921 | 277 | | | | Ammunition | 12,306 | 10,415 | 693 | 228 | | | 8,333 | 1,016 | 191 | 6,897 | | | | Air field | 22,004 | 11,497 | 6,471 | 1,119 | 2,917 | | Other sites | | | | | | (As of December 31, 1999) ![351_image_0.png](351_image_0.png) # National Defense Committee Of The National Assembly ## Functions Of The Committee The Committee performs the examination of bills and petitions falling under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense(MND) and concerning affairs of the National Security Council(NSC), carries out the inspection and investigation of the State Administration on the Administrative Agencies under its jurisdiction and takes on other duties as prescribed by law. | Classification | Committee Meeting | Contents | |-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------| | | · Organizes the evaluation subcommittee to improve the | | | The 201st Extraordinary | | | | Session of the National | defense capacity. | | | | Feb. 24, | | | Assembly | 1999 | · Reports on the pending defense issues and answers | | (Feb. 8 ~ Mar. 9) | questions. | | | | · Decides to organize the petition evaluation subcommittee. | | | | April 14 | · Reports the investigation results on the death of Army 1st | | | Lieutenant Kim, Hun and answers questions. | | | | · Reports the examination results of evaluation | | | The 203rd Extraordinary | subcommittee to improve defense capacity. | | | | April 23 | | | Session of the National | · Reports the reinvestigation results on the death of Army | | | Assembly | 1st Lieutenant Kim, Hun. | | | (April 9 ~ May 3) | · Reports main pending issues/investigation on | | | | April 27 | conscription absurdity and answers questions. | | | · Deliberates and decides on the legislative bill of reporting and | | | | May 3 | opening conscription records of public servants to the public. | | | · Reports the situation of North Korean patrol boats intruding the | | | | June 10 | | | The 204th Extraordinary | Northern Limit Line(NLL) and answers questions. | | | Session of the National | | | | Assembly | · Reports plans to deal with North Korean ships intruding the | | | (May 31 ~ June 25) | June 17 | Northern Limit Line and answers questions. | | | · Chooses the resolution "Warning towards North Korea" | | | | · Decides on the bill of establishment of National Defense College | | | The 206th Extraordinary | and to choose the revised acts among the acts on the military | | | Session of the National | personnel acts. | | | | Aug. 10 | | | Assembly | · Reports examination results of petition evaluation subcommittee. | | | (Aug. 2 ~ Aug. 14) | · Reports pending issues and answers questions. | | ## Committee Activities For 1999/First Half Of 2000 (Related To The Mnd) | Classification | Committee Meeting | Contents | |---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| | | · Reports on the main pending issues. | | | The 207th Extraordinary | | | | Session of the National | · Reports on the current military situation of North Korea and our | | | Sep. 7, 1999 | | | | Assembly | military readiness concerning the North's declaration of NLL | | | (Aug. 17 ~ Sep. 9) | nullification and answers questions. | | | | · Decides on the proposed plans on the Inspection of State | | | | Administration in 1999. | | | Sep. 20 | · Approves organizing the subcommittee that writes the final | | | | report on the Inspection of State Administration in 1999. | | | | · Decides on the bill of approval of settlement of accounts and | | | | disbursement of reserve fund for the fiscal year of 1998. | | | Sep. 21 | · Reports on the current issues on the troop dispatch to East | | | | Timor and answers questions. | | | | · Inspects State Administration (20 organizations including | | | Sep. 29~Oct. 18 | MND, Joint Chiefs of Staff, each Service HQs, etc.). | | | Nov. 5 | · Reports on the crashing accident of an air force fighter. | | | | · Reports on the budget bill of tax revenues and annual | | | | expenditures for 2000 and answers questions. | | | Nov. 17 | | | | The 208th Regular Session | · Reports on the pending problems of spreading defoliant | | | of the National Assembly | in the DMZ and answers questions. | | | (Sep. 10 ~ Dec. 18) | · Decides on the budget bill of tax revenues and annual | | | Nov. 18 | expenditures for 2000. | | | | · Approves the revised service acts. | | | | · Approves organizing the fact-finding committee for the crashing | | | Nov. 23 | accident of the air force fighter and the spreading of defoliant in the DMZ. | | | | · Reports on the pending problems of the crashing accident of the | | | | air force fighter and the spreading of defoliant in the DMZ. | | | Nov. 24 | · Investigates the crashing accident of the air force fighter. | | | Nov. 29 | · On-site investigation of the defoliant spread in DMZ. | | | | · Decides to choose the final report on the Inspection of | | | | State Administration. | | | Dec. 1 | · Reports on the investigation on the crashing accident of the air | | | | force fighter and the spreading of defoliant in the DMZ. | | | | · Reports on the main pending defense issues including | | | May. 17, 2000 | the Baekdu project and answers questions. | | | Being out of Session | * The 15th National Assembly's last Committee Session. | | | | · Reports on the status of duty of the MND and answers questions. | | | The 212th Extraordinary | June. 22 | | | Session of the National | * The 16th National Assembly's 1st Committee Session. | | | | · Reports on the work status of the Military Manpower | | | Assembly | June. 28 | | | (June 16 ~ July 4) | Administration Agency and answers questions. | | ![352_image_0.png](352_image_0.png) - Members of National Defense Committee, National Assembly Chairman ![353_image_0.png](353_image_0.png) The Grand National Party (Executive Member) ![353_image_1.png](353_image_1.png) ![353_image_2.png](353_image_2.png) ![353_image_3.png](353_image_3.png) ![353_image_4.png](353_image_4.png) ![353_image_5.png](353_image_5.png) ![353_image_8.png](353_image_8.png) ![353_image_7.png](353_image_7.png) ![353_image_6.png](353_image_6.png) ![353_image_9.png](353_image_9.png) The Millennium Democratic Party ![353_image_10.png](353_image_10.png) ![353_image_13.png](353_image_13.png) ![353_image_11.png](353_image_11.png) ![353_image_12.png](353_image_12.png) ![353_image_14.png](353_image_14.png) ![353_image_15.png](353_image_15.png) ![353_image_16.png](353_image_16.png) ![353_image_17.png](353_image_17.png) ![354_image_0.png](354_image_0.png) ![354_image_1.png](354_image_1.png) ## Status Of The Enactment And Revision Of Defense-Related Acts | Organization Field | Law Number and | | |----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------| | Name | Main Contents | | | Date of Promulgation | | | | Enacted no. 9 | · Determines the defense organization establishment | | | (Nov. 30, 1948) | system. | | | | · Assigns Marine Corps to the Navy and uses colors for classification. | | | Act on the | · Prepares grounds to authorize each service component | | | Organization of | Partially revised no. 2642 | commander a part of the authority given to the Minister of | | National Armed | (Oct. 10, 1973) | National Defense in order to establish units and | | Forces | organizations under control. | | | Partially revised no. 2829 | · Determines details of establishing Joint Chiefs of Staff and | | | (Dec. 31, 1975) | of composing Joint Chiefs of Staff Council. | | | | · Establishes National Defense College as subordinate to the MND | | | Enacted no. 937 | | | | (Dec. 31, 1961) | to nurture officers who can contribute to national security. | | | Act on the | · Classifies education course as security course, master' s | | | Establishment | Partially revised no. 3202 | course, special short term course. | | (Dec. 28, 1979) | | | | of National | · Establishes National Security Research Institute. | | | Defense College | Nullification and | Enacts Act on the Establishment of National Defense | | Enactment no. 6017 | College to unify National Defense College and National | | | (Sep. 7, 1999) | War College. | | | | · Establishes short-term military academies to train short- | | | Enacted no. 2073 | | | | (Dec. 21, 1974) | term service officers. | | | Act on the | Partially revised no. 3112 | · Grants college admission to graduates of short-term | | Establishment | (Dec. 5, 1978) | military academy. | | of Short-term | | | | Military Academy | Partially revised no. 3596 | · Undergraduate course newly-established. | | (Dec. 31, 1982) | · Changes admission requirements to admit 2-year college | | | Partially revised no. 4838 | graduates or those who have completed 2-years or more | | | (Dec. 31, 1994) | in a 4-year college. | | | | · Prepares establishment grounds for Korea Armed Forces | | | Enacted no. 2828 | Nursing School (3-year course) as subordinate to MND to | | | (Dec. 31, 1975) | | | | Act on the | train armed forces nurses. | | | Establishment | · Changes Korea Armed Forces Nursing School to Korea | | | of Korea Armed | Armed Forces Nursing Academy. | | | Partially revised no. 3247 | | | | (Jan. 4, 1980) | · Grants 2-year college nursing degree qualifications to those | | | Forces Nursing | commissioned as second lieutenants after graduation. | | | Academy | Partially revised no. 3267 | · Changes 2-year college course to 4-year college course. | | (Dec. 4, 1998) | | | | Enacted no. 374 | · Establishes a 4-year military academy to train army · | | | (Oct. 1, 1955) | navy · air force career officers. | | | Act on the | | | | Establishment | · Adds Bachelor of Arts and Sciences and Bachelor of | | | Partially revised no. 2670 | | | | of Military | (Dec. 31, 1973) | Engineering courses to the general education course. | | Academy | Partially revised no. 5058 | · Changes admission requirements to recruit female cadets. | | (Dec. 29, 1995) | | | ![355_image_0.png](355_image_0.png) ## Personnel Affairs | Personnel Affairs | Law Number and | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Name | Main Contents | | | Date of Promulgation | · Regulates various fundamental laws related to military | | | Enacted no. 1006 | | | | (Jan. 20, 1962) | personnel administration. | | | · Expands the application of Military Personnel Act to reservists. | | | | Partially revised no. 3265 | | | | (Dec. 4, 1980) | · Classifies long-term service NCO and short-term service NCO. | | | · Changes the rank structure of NCO. | | | | Military | · Newly establishes the branch of air defense artillery in the basic | | | Partially revised no. 4085 | branch of Air Force. | | | Personnel Act | (Mar. 22, 1989) | · Establishes Honorable Discharge Policy for personnel with 20 | | years or more in service. | | | | · Newly establishes the policy of workplace difficulty resolution. | | | | Partially revised no 4839 | | | | (Dec. 31, 1994) | · Newly establishes education on vocational guidance. | | | Partially revised no. 5703 | · Establishes officer promotion committee meeting of marine corps | | | in the headquarters command of marine corps. | | | | (Jan. 29, 1999) | | | | Enacted no. 243 | | | | Appointment of | · Prepares grounds for the appointment of judge advocates. | | | (April 24, 1952) | | | | Military Advocates | Partially revised no. 1904 | · Judge advocates should be treated at the same level as a civilian | | Act | judge or a prosecutor. | | | (Mar. 3, 1967) | | | | Enacted no. 1004 | · Newly established. | | | (Jan. 20, 1962) | · Newly establishes the policy of transferring cases between the | | | military prosecution department and the civilian prosecution. | | | | Partially revised no. 2539 | · Newly establishes the policy of immediate appeal and changes | | | (Feb. 17, 1973) | causes for arrest. | | | · Newly establishes the regulation for issuing detention warrant | | | | after arresting criminals in the act. | | | | Partially revised no. 3993 | · Revises name to military court. | | | (Dec. 24, 1987) | | | | Act on Military | · Unites High Military Court in the Ministry of National Defense | | | (MND) and that in the headquarters of each service, and | | | | Court | establishes it inside the MND. | | | · Separates military prosecution department from military court | | | | Partially revised no. 4704 | and newly establishes the policy of criminal investigation. | | | (Jan. 5, 1994) | · Grants military judges the authority to issue warrant for arrest, | | | and guarantees the approval of the unit commander before being | | | | arrested by the prosecutor. | | | | · Newly establishes the policy of informal trial. | | | | · Introduces the policy of urgent arrest. | | | | Partially revised no. 6037 | · Newly establishes the policy of notifying charges. | | | (Dec. 28, 1999) | · Introduces the policy of summary judgment. | | | · Establishes the standards for personnel administration, such as | | | | Enacted no. 1337 | the definition of military employees and their treatment, | | | (May 1, 1963) | qualifications, etc. | | | · Changes the name of military employee to military civilian employee | | | | Totally revised no. 3342 | | | | Act on Military | (Dec. 31, 1980) | · Classifies regular and special military civilian employees. | | Civilian | · Classifies regular and functional military civilian employees and | | | Employees | Totally revised no. 4159 | introduces the regulation of appointment after examination. | | Personnel | (Dec. 30, 1989) | · Newly establishes the policy of workplace difficulty resolution. | | Administration | · Guarantee of social status for class I military civilian employee | | | shall be eliminated. | | | | Partially revised no. 5061 | Administrative litigation for long-term sentence must pass | | | (Dec. 29, 1995) | through the military civilian employee administrative | | | adjudication committee. | | | | Act on the | · Establishes and enforces the basic policies regarding prisoners of | | | Enacted no. 5705 | | | | Treatment of | war such as repatriation plans, and prepares grounds for | | | (Jan. 29, 1999) | | | | Prisoners of War | compensation once they return. | | Appendix ![356_image_0.png](356_image_0.png) ## Logistics | Law Number and | | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------| | Name | Main Contents | | | Date of Promulgation | · Establishes the standards for the management of military | | | Enacted no. 1310 | supplies based on article 3 of Act on Materiel | | | (Mar. 23, 1963) | Management. | | | Act on the | · The heads of organizations subordinate to MND and the Chief of | | | Management of | Staff of each service component shall lease the military supplies | | | Military Supplies | Partially revised no. 4248 | in an emergency when executing combined operations with | | (Aug. 1, 1990) | foreign forces, and must get the approval from the Minister of | | | National Defense afterwards. | | | | · Enacted for the purpose of promoting development of logistics | | | | Enacted no. 2540 | industry and contributing to the procurement of logistics | | | (Feb.17, 1973) | material. | | | Partially revised no. 3003 | · Establishes logistics industry promoting funds. | | | (July 23, 1977) | | | | Act on Special | | | | Measures for | · Renames Special Act on Logistics Procurement as Special Act on | | | Defense Industry | Partially revised no. 3699 | Defense Industry. | | (Dec. 31, 1983) | · Encourages the participation of the competent industries in the | | | Partially revised no. 5614 | defense industry. | | | (Dec. 31, 1998) | · Newly establishes the policy on supporting exportation. | | | Law Number and | Main Contents | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Name | Date of Promulgation | · Establishes military facility protection area for the purpose of | | Enacted no. 2388 | protecting military facility and securing efficient military | | | (Dec. 26, 1972) | activities guaranteeing safety. | | | · Classifies military facility protection area as controlled protection | | | | area and restrained protection area. | | | | Partially Revised no. 3497 | | | | Protection of | (Dec. 31, 1981) | · Establishes the military facility protection area review committee | | Military | in MND. | | | Installations Act | · Reduces and readjusts the scope of restricted areas for civilians to | | | Partially Revised no. 5270 | resolve inconveniences of those living near the DMZ. | | | (Jan. 31, 1997) | · Prepares grounds to appoint anti-aircraft defense coordinated | | | area. | | | | · Establishes grounds to protect military telecommunication | | | | Enacted no. 901 | functions that contribute to military administration as well as | | | (Dec. 30, 1961) | | | | Military | execution of operations. | | | Telecommunications | | | | Act | · Establishes grounds for consulting with the related central | | | Partially revised no. 4346 | | | | (Mar. 8, 1991) | administrations' organizations when removing obstacles etc. | | ## Facility/Communication Fields Martial Law/Requisition ![357_Image_0.Png](357_Image_0.Png) | Law Number and | | | |------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Name | Date of Promulgation | Main Contents | | · Prepares grounds for the military to restrain the rights and | | | | Enacted no. 69 | obligations of people for the benefit of national security, in times | | | (Nov. 24, 1949) | of war, disaster, or in a state of national emergency. | | | Martial Law | · In the case of security status martial law, the national assembly | | | Act | Totally revised no. 3442 | must be informed. | | (April 17, 1981) | · Sufficient compensation shall be made when having damaged | | | the peoples' properties in the area of emergency martial law. | | | | · Establishes details about requisition and compensation for | | | | Enacted no. 1336 | materials, facilities, or rights which are essential to the military | | | (May 1, 1963) | operations in the area of emergency martial law. | | | Requisition | Partially revised no. 2263 | · Establishes legal procedures for requesting payment for | | Act | (Dec. 31, 1970) | requisition compensation. | | Partially revised no. 3527 | · Eliminates articles that allow the requisition of real estates | | | (Dec. 31, 1981) | necessary for military operations even in time of peace. | | | Conscription Affairs | Law Number and | | | Name | Main Contents | | | Date of Promulgation | | | | Enacted no. 41 | · Requires compulsory military service all male citizens. | | | (Aug. 6, 1949) | · Classifies service status as 3 categories of active duty, reserve, | | | Totally revised no. 444 | and citizen service. | | | (Aug. 15, 1957) | · Newly establishes the regulation of short-term service for | | | elementary school teachers. | | | | · Classifies service status as active duty, reserve, replacement | | | | Totally revised no. 1163 | status, and citizen service. | | | (Oct. 1, 1962) | · Establishes the conscription office in order to divide draft | | | administration duties. | | | | Partially revised no. 2226 | The head of the conscription office will supervise the | | | (Aug. 7, 1970) | administration of draft. | | | · Enforces military education for those enrolled in high school | | | | Totally revised no. 2259 | level or higher. | | | Military | (Dec. 31, 1970) | · Part of draft administration will be authorized by the ward head, | | Service | mayor, county chief, etc. | | | Act | · For those drafted in active service with qualifications of a judge, | | | Partially revised no. 3111 | prosecutor, doctor, pastor, or priest shall be allowed to be | | | (Dec. 5, 1978) | transferred to active or reserve officer status. | | | Abolishes the Act on the Special Treatment of Military | | | | Obligation and the Act on the Special Measures for the | | | | Disobedience of Military Service. The contents of these two acts | | | | will be united. | | | | Totally revised no. 3696 | · For those killed or injured during military education, | | | (Dec. 31, 1983) | compensation shall be made in veteran's welfare, and medical | | | facilities of the military shall be made available. | | | | · Expands the policy on postponing the examination of conscripts | | | | to include those enrolled in high school. | | | | · Abolishes reserve conscript system and newly establishes full- | | | | Totally revised no. 4685 | time reserve service system and public service personnel system. | | | (Dec. 31, 1993) | · Unites the acts on regulation of military obligation . | | | Law Number and | Main Contents | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------| | Name | Date of Promulgation | · Newly establishes the pro bono lawyer system. | | Partially revised no. 4840 | · Newly establishes the law of criminal punishment for public | | | (Dec. 31, 1994) | service personnel who are absent without leave for 8 days or | | | more. | | | | · Selects full time reserve service system draftees by draft only | | | | Partially revised no. 5271 | · Abolishes technical qualifications for those who apply for skilled | | | Military | (Jan. 13, 1997) | | | Service | industrial personnel. | | | · Draft administration affairs commissioned to a town, Myon (a | | | | Act | subdivision of a Kun), or a village shall be restored to a local | | | conscription office. | | | | Partially revised no. 5757 | Imports the policy of dedicated physicians for the examination of | | | (Feb. 5, 1999) | conscripts. | | | · Adjusts the age that qualifies for exemption from the military | | | | service for overseas immigrants (31 years of age ->36 years of age). | | | ![359_image_0.png](359_image_0.png) # Reform Of The Judicial System Of Rok Armed Forces ## O Outline · Reorganized the armed forces judicial organization and operating system · Enhanced the efficiency · fairness · reliability of the judicial system ## Direction Of Reform · Strengthened the command authority of the armed forces - Established division level common military courts · Established the principle of restraint and balance/enhanced the fairness of decision -> Reorganized the judicial organization (separated the military court from the military prosecution) · Strengthened the competitiveness of the judicial organization -> Reform the judge advocate acquisition and personnel management system · Promoted the interests of servicemen -> Supplemented the public defense department, imported the summary judgment system ## D Established Division Level General Military Courts · Abolished restriction on establishing a total of 50 (34 in the Army, 7 in the Navy, 9 in the Air Force) divisionlevel unit general military courts · Prepared for a harmonious management of military court in times of war and secured basic rights for the accused by quick judgments ## D Revamped Judicial Organization · Divided / separated judicial and prosecuting organizations - Abolished MND Legal Affairs Service -> Newly established High Military Court / MND Prosecutor's Office - Separated / established military court in each headquarters · Assigned general officer as the head of High Military Court · Organized special department in the MND Prosecutor's Office to settle large/mid-sized cases · Operate the Second Division of High Military Court in each service headquarters · Endowed the functions of examining laws and research by means of establishing the Military Justice Research Division ## Improved Recruit/Management Of Jag Officers · Improved the appointment examination of JAG officers (recruiting annually) · Arranged the ground for appointing reserve service judge advocates into judges · Promoted maintaining lawyer status for the JAG officers who were discharged by accidents in line of duty or sickness during the mandatory service · Expanded the opportunities of overseas training courses for judge advocates · Varied the source of recruiting JAG officers (including foreign license holders) · Promoted the stipulation of acts regarding the treatment of JAG officers ## D Newly Established The Public Defense Department · Newly established the public defense department in each service headquarters and in High Military Court · Operating the pool system for public defenders in military court ## Final Evaluation · Assigned the jurisdiction for military justice to the division-level commanders · Protected the rights of the accused by establishing the public defense department · Enhanced professionalism and trust within and outside the military by separating the military court from the military prosecution · Substantiated the military law personnel and boosted their morale ![360_image_0.png](360_image_0.png) # Major Deregulation List Concerning Civil Petition | | Date of | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| | Classification | Context | Operation | | Restrictions | | | | Concerning | 1. Nullify members of reserved forces' reporting. | July 1, 1999 | | 2. Nullify reporting changes of residential area and military service | | | | Registration of | | | | Reserved Forces | record. | | | (2 Cases) | | | | Restrictions | 3. Nullify military purveyance firm registry and the term of | | | Related to | validity. | | | Military | 4. Nullify researching the actual condition of military purveyance | July 16, 1998 | | Purveyance Firm | firm. | | | Registry | 5. Made drastic cut on the safety diagnosis items of military | | | (3 Cases) | purveyance firm (1,235-361 items). | | | 6. Nullify the property changes reporting of non-profit corporation. | | | | 7. Nullify the property increase reporting of non-profit corporation. | | | | Restrictions | 8. Nullify the member selection reporting of non-profit corporation. | | | Related to Non- | 9. Nullify the member inauguration approval of non-profit | | | profit corporation | corporation. | | | Supervision | Jan. 11, 1999 | | | 10. Nullify property transferring and disposition and issue of bonds | | | | (6 Cases) | reporting of non-profit corporation. | | | 11. Nullify the disposition of fundamental property and the | | | | approval of issue of bonds of non-profit corporation. | | | | 12. Nullify submitting accompanying documents to request | | | | reissuing military pension certificate application. | | | | 13. Nullify the obligation of appointing representative for salary | | | | receiving personnel. | | | | 14. Nullify address change(changing name and etc) reporting | | | | obligation of pension receiving personnel. | | | | 15. Nullify submitting accompanying documents when reporting | | | | changes on pension payment institution. | | | | 16. Nullify reporting receiving-personnel' s re-retirement retirement | | | | Restrictions | pension. | | | Related to | 17. Nullify reporting obligation on selecting(change, dissolution) | | | Military Pension | Dec. 18, 1998 | | | representative of the family of the deceased. | | | | (10 Cases) | 18. Nullify reporting obligation of the birth of an unborn child of | | | receiving personnel of the family of the deceased pension. | | | | 19. Improvement on accompanying documents when reporting for | | | | re-employment(re-inauguration) receiving personnel of | | | | retirement pension. | | | | 20. Improvement on reporting personal history of overseas | | | | residents' retirement pension. | | | | 21. Improvement reporting loss of receiving rights of the family of | | | | the deceased pension. | | | ![361_image_0.png](361_image_0.png) ## The Government' S Administrative Projects In The Field Of Defense | | Number of Projects : Total 64 | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------| | | Time taken for measure | | | | Subject | Section in charge | | | (deadline) | | | | | | | Transparency and rationalization of the Force | | | | Improvement Program (FIP) | | | | * The redirecting of force improvement and its goal | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Acquisition Policy Bureau | | * System of pre-evaluation and post evaluation of the | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Analysis and Evaluation Bureau | | departments | | | | * Improving the usage and the weapons-cost information gathering | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Analysis and Evaluation Bureau | | * Improvement of acquirement development organization | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Acquisition Policy Bureau | | and procedure | | | | * Preparation of the civilian specialist usage system for | Finished (2nd half of 1998) | Programs Management Bureau | | international contracts | | | | * Expanding support for Korean high-tech weapons R&D | Finished (2nd half of 1998) | Programs Management Bureau | | Efficiency of supply procurement | | | | * Strengthening the competitiveness and clearness of | Continued | Logistics Management Bureau/ | | munitions purchasing and facilities ordering. | Military installations Bureau | | | * Investigation of the supply specialist agencies security | Finished (2nd half of 1998) | Logistics Management Bureau | | * Guaranteed participation in competing for the Defense | Finished (2nd half of 1998) | Logistics Management Bureau | | Industrial Company | | | | * Maximizing the use of Civilian resources | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Logistics Management Bureau | | DExpanding the competitiveness of the defense industry | | | | * Maintaining the systemization and specialization of the | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Acquisition Policy Bureau | | defense industry | | | | * Defense industries development and the changing | Finished (2nd half of 1998) | Acquisition Policy Bureau | | international defense industry co-operative | | | | □Structural reform for efficient and economic military | | | | management | | | | * Re-examination of the functions of senior ranks | Finished (2nd half of 1998) | Planning and Coordination Bureau | | * Simplifying the system of command | Finished (1st half of 2000) | Defense Reform Committee | | * Reorganization of research body and the subsidiary organizations | 2002 | Planning and Coordination Bureau | | * Integration of corps and common functions | Finished (2nd half of 1998) | Planning and Coordination Bureau. | | · Promoting of defense digitization for future warfare | | | | * Setting the main objective and direction for defense digitization | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Defense Digitization Planning Bureau | | * C4I construction | Continued | Defense Digitization Planning Bureau | | * Construction of the automated Information system | Continued | Defense Digitization Planning Bureau | | * Development of the Information security system | Continued | Defense Digitization Planning Bureau | | * Promoting of the Korean Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) | 2002 | Defense Reform Committee | | * Reinforcing the education of the soldiers defense | Continued | Defense Digitization Planning Bureau | | digitization knowledge | | | | D Strong force built on solid training | | | | * Strengthen simulation training | Finished (1st half of 1999) | JCS Force Analysis Office | | * Developing the next generation soldiers command and | Finished (2nd half of 1999) | Personnel and Welfare Bureau | | leadership ability | | | | * The improvement of living standards for the new | Continued | Defense Reform Committee | | generation of soldiers | | | | * Promoting and developing the plan for better treatment | Continued | Defense Reform Committee | | and self-development of Non Commissioned Officer. | | | | * Military schooling reform | Second half of 2000 | Personnel and Welfare Bureau | ![362_image_0.png](362_image_0.png) | | Time taken for measure | Section in charge | |-------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------------| | Subject | (deadline) | | | Elite orientation of reserved forces. | | | | * Betterment of reserved forces management system. | Finished (2nd half of 1998) | Mobilization Bureau | | * Operation preparedness supplementary for the homeland | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Mobilization Bureau | | defense. | | | | * Betterment of personnel management system for the | Finished (1st half of 1998) | Mobilization Bureau | | commanders of reserved forces, | | | | | | | | Build the ability first personnel management system. | 2nd Half of 2000 | Personnel and Welfare | | * Setting up the qualification of the main assignment to a | | | | position/ assignment to a position. | Bureau | | | | Finished (2nd half of 1998) | Personnel and Welfare | | * A system of advance notice for an assignment to the | Bureau | | | position by an echelon. | | | | * Betterment of a promotion system. | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Personnel and Welfare | | | Bureau | | | Consideration for the professionalism of military manpower. | Personnel and Welfare Bureau | | | | Finished (1st half of 1998) | | | * Setting up the occupation for the professional manpower. | Personnel and Welfare | | | * Betterment of personnel management for professional | Finished (1st half of 1998) | Bureau | | manpower. | Personnel and Welfare | | | * The ministry of national defense / JCS (joint chiefs of | Finished (1st half of 1998) | Bureau | | staff) / combined forces command, settle the assignment | | | | system (to a position) of the best manpower. | | | | Betterment of service condition for the professional | | | | soldiers/ service men. | Continued | Personnel and Welfare Bureau | | * Betterment of service condition for the professional soldier. | | | | * Consideration on the efficiency of feeding management | Continued | Logistics management Bureau | | and betterment of a kitchen condition. | | | | Support the transferred soldiers for stabilization of livelihood. | | | | * Reinforce the report activity on professions. | Continued | Personnel and Welfare Bureau | | | Continued | Personnel and Welfare Bureau | | * Magnify an employment occupation and betterment of | | | | honorable treatment. | | | | . | | | | Solidify the Korea - U.S. security corporation system. | | | | * Development of a joint defense project. | Finished (1st half of 1999) | JCS Central Directorate for Operations | | * Resolve the defense cost sharing. | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Policy Planning Bureau | | | Continued | Military Installations Bureau | | * Deliberation about the military facilities of U.S. armed | | | | forces in Korea and removal of military bases. | | | | O Reinforce the military diplomacy with | | | | surrounding countries. | | | | * Build a military reliance with Japan. | Continued | Policy Planning Bureau | | * Restrain North Korean provocations and, lead to the point | Continued | Policy Planning Bureau | | in opening with China. | | | | * Exchange with Russia on defense scientific techniques, | Continued | Policy Planning Bureau | | information, protection of marine resources, and military | | | | exchanges on related matters with Russia. | | | | O Active participation in the multilateral security | | | | cooperation for all. | Continued | Arms Control Bureau | | * Participation of all, for Security Corporation in military | | | | field. | Continued | Arms Control Bureau | | * Participation for all security policy development. | | | ![363_image_0.png](363_image_0.png) | | Time taken for measure | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------| | | Subject | Section in charge | | | (deadline) | | | | | | | O Adjustment of military protection area and the expansion of | | | | the authorization limits for the government office | | | | * Revision of a variety of regulation on military facility | Finished (2nd half of 1998) | JCS Central Directorate for | | protection areas. | Operations | | | * Adjustment of military facility protection areas. | Continued | JCS Central Directorate for | | · The settlement of the issues of private land occupied by the | Operations | | | military and re location of military facilities. | | | | * The project of relocation status of military facilities. | Continued | Military Installations Bureau | | * Expedition of the settlement of the issues of private land | Military Installations Bureau | | | | Continued | | | occupied by the military. | | | | * Transfer to the KEPCO from the military high voltage | 2002 | Military Installations Bureau | | cable. | | | | Activities of enhancement of peoples benefits | | | | * Always ready for the disaster and accident relief system. | Finished (2nd half of 1998) | Logistics Management Bureau | | * The military nature protection activities strengthen. | Military Installations Bureau | | | | Continued | | | * The military campaign of publicity with the people. | Continued | Troop Information and Public | | | Affairs Bureau | | | * Projects to commemorate the 50th Commemoration of the | 2002 | Committe for the 50th | | Korean war. | Commemoration of Korean | | | | War | | | | | | | ·Reform military service system to exterminate draft irrationality | | | | * Real Name Military Service Act for elected government | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Personnel and Welfare | | officers and high-ranking public officials. | Bureau/ Military Manpower Adm. | | | * Limiting and discontinuing factors of military service | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Personnel and Welfare | | exemption. | Bureau/ Military Manpower Adm. | | | * Reducing the scope of service exemption. | Personnel and Wellare Bureau/Military Manpower Adm. | | | * Public service personnel and full time reservist system | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Personnel and Welfare | | has been upgraded. | Bureau / Military Manpower Adm. | | | * Reinforcement for condition of medical discharge. | Finished (1st half of 1999) | Personnel and Welfare Bureau | | * Justice and clearness of physical exams course. | 2002 | Military Manpower Adm. | | | | | | · Expedition for development of applied technology and | | | | putting the research results into practical use | | | | * The systematic promotion of civilian-military integrated | Continued | Programs Management | | technology research results. | Bureau | | ![364_image_0.png](364_image_0.png) # Chronology Of Rok National Defense | | Contents | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Date | Oct. 21 | The national police was organized. | | Ceremony to celebrate the creation of the Liberation Army Corps. | | | | Nov. 11 | | | | 1945 | Nov. 13 | A military command was set up at the US Military Government Office. | | Dec. 5 | The Military English school was created. | | | Jan. 15 | The South Chosun Defense Guard was created at Taeneung. | | | Organization of one regiment for each province commenced space(nine regiments). | | | | Jan. 17 | The Naval Midshipmen Academy (now the ROK Naval Academy) was established. | | | Jan. 21 | "Student-soldier alliance" incident forced private military organizations to be removed. | | | The South Chosun Defense Guard General Command was set up at Taenung. | | | | Feb. 7 | | | | 1946 | March 29 | The Defense Command was renamed the Ministry of Defense (MOD). | | The South Chosun National Defense Guard Academy was created at Taeneung. | | | | May 1 | | | | June 15 | MOD, the South Chosun National Defense Guard, and the Marine Corps were renamed the | | | Domestic Guard Department (the Ministry of Unification and Defense, or MUD), the Chosun | | | | guard, and the Chosun Coasts Guard, respectively. | | | | 1947 | Aug. 30 | The Chosun Coast Guard took over the responsibility from the US Navy of guarding coastal areas. | | Aviation units were created under the direct control of MUD at Susaek. | | | | May 5 | Inauguration of the lst Minister of National Defense, Lee Bum-suk. | | | Aug. 16 | | | | Aug. 24 | The ROK-US preliminary security agreement was concluded. | | | The US Preliminary Military Advisory Group (PMAG) in the ROK was created. | | | | Aug. 26 | The Chosun Guard and the Chosun Coasts Guard were incorporated into the armed forces. | | | Sept. 1 | | | | 1948 | Sept. 5 | The Chosun Guard and the Coastal Guard were renamed as the Chosun Armed Forces and | | the Navy, respectively. | | | | The Air Force received its first L-4 aircraft. | | | | Sept. 13 | | | | Oct. 19 | The 14th regiment rebelled in Yosun. | | | The law on formation of the armed forces was enacted. | | | | Nov. 30 | | | | Dec. 15 | The Army and the Navy General Commands were renamed as the Army Headquarters and | | | the Navy Headquarters, respectively. | | | | Jan. 20 | The preliminary order on the volunteer military personnel to save the nation was enacted. | | | The Women's Aviation Training Unit was created. | | | | Feb. 15 | | | | March 21 | Shin Sung-mo was inaugurated as the 2nd Minister of National Defense (MND). | | | The Marine Corps was created. | | | | April 15 | | | | May 12 | The Army was reorganized into six divisions. | | | 1949 | June 30 | The withdrawal of USFK was completed. | | July 1 | The Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG) was created. | | | Aug. 6 | The Military Service Law was enacted. | | | Oct. 1 | The Air Force was created. | | | The Air Force Headquarters announced its regulations on organization of an office. | | | | The ROK's first combatant ship named Paektusan (PC-class) was purchased from the US. | | | | Oct. 17 | | | | Dec. 6 | The first physical examination for conscription was held. | | | Jan. 26 | The ROK-US Mutual Defense Aid Treaty was concluded. | | | The Agreement of the Establishment of the United States Military Advisory was organized. | | | | Feb. 28 | The regulations on the duties of the military personnel were announced. | | | March 2 | The Naval Base Law and the Maritime Defense Act were enacted. | | | April 14 | The Military Personnel Assistance Law was enacted. | | | April 28 | The Military-owned Territories Law was enacted. | | | 1950 | June 25 | The North Korean military crossed the 38th parallel, conducting an unprovoked | | attack on South Korea. | | | | July 2 | The air force received its first F-51 fighter from the US. | | | July 9 | The 8th US Army Command was established in Taegu. | | | July 11 | The ROK Navy was incorporated into the Far East Navy. | | | July 16 | Operational control of the ROK Army, Navy and Air Force went to the Commander- | | | in-Chief, United Nations Command. | | | ![365_image_0.png](365_image_0.png) | Date | Contents | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Sept. 1 | The ROK Women' s Army Corps was established. | | | Sept. 15 | The United Nations Forces (UNF) conducted the Inchon amphibious operation. | | | Sept. 28 | The ROK government recovered Seoul. | | | Oct. 1 | The ROK Armed Forces crossed the 38th parallel. | | | 1950 | Oct. 19 | The ROK Armed Forces captured Pyongyang. | | Oct. 25 | The Chinese Communist Army (CCA) entered the Korean War. | | | (First engagement of the war with the CCA in Unsan) | | | | Dec. 1 | The United Nations Command (UNC) decided upon a full retreat of the UNF. | | | April 1 | The Marine College was established. | | | May 7 | Lee Ki-bung was inaugurated as the 3rd Minister of National Defense. | | | July 10 | The plenary session of the armistice talks was initiated. | | | 1951 | Aug. 17 | The Korean military attache office was established in the US. | | Oct. 26 | Second recruit service personnel were called up. | | | Oct. 30 | The Korean Military Academy was reopened with its academic system transformed into a | | | four-year course. | | | | March 29 | Shin Tae-young was inaugurated as the 4th Minister of National Defense. | | | 1952 | May 7 | At an enemy prisoner war camp in Koje Island, a rebellion occurred, and its commander MG | | Dodd was captured. | | | | April 6 | At the armistice talks, a treaty on the exchange of wounded POWs was signed. | | | June 3 | A major law on mobilizing workers was enacted. | | | June 30 | Son Won-il was inaugurated as the 5th Minister of National Defense. | | | July 27 | The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed. | | | 1953 | Aug. 5 | ROK-US talks were held in Seoul. | | POWs were exchanged at the truce village of Panmunjom. | | | | Oct. 1 | The ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded. | | | Oct. 12 | A coastal guard for defense of the peace line was inaugurated. | | | Oct. 26 | A preliminary to political talks was held at Panmunjom. | | | Dec. 15 | The First Army Command was created. | | | Jan. 14 | Second recruit service personnel were called up. | | | Jan. 18 | The coast guard installed signs at Tok-do, saying, "This island belongs to the ROK." | | | March 21 | The army's first field army commander took over the operational command authority of the | | | 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Corps from the US. | | | | May 1 | The Tok-do defense team composed of 20 civilians was dispatched. | | | July 9 | Naval cadets first engaged in cruise training. | | | Aug. 12 | At ROK-US military talks, it was agreed to reinforce the armed forces and to replace the | | | reserve forces' old equipment. | | | | Sept. 2 | The ROK government decided to arm Tok-do. | | | 1954 | Sept. 27 | ROK-US military talks were held to discuss issues including reinforcement of the ROK | | Armed Forces. | | | | Oct. 3 | The ROK government took over administrative authority over all recaptured areas from the UNF. | | | Oct. 20 | The ROK Armed Forces took over the operational command authority of the 6th ROK Corps. | | | Oct. 31 | The Second Army Command was created. | | | Nov. 18 | The ROK-US memorandum of agreement (MOA) was signed, in which CINC UNC | | | continued to have operational control authority of the ROK military. | | | | Nov. 20 | Eighth US Army (EUSA) Headquarters was moved to Japan from the ROK. | | | Nov. 23 | At ROK-US military talks, reinforcement of the ROK Armed Forces was discussed. | | | Jan. 14 | At ROK-US military talks, naval power reinforcement was discussed. | | | Jan. 28 | ROK-US military assistance talks were held. | | | 1955 | June 21 | ROK-US military-economy talks were held in Washington. | | Oct. 5 | The first four-year Korea Military Academy (KMA) graduates (11th class). | | | Feb. 20 | The ROK Army and Navy Headquarters announced their regulations on organizations of an office. | | | April 13 | The military announced its cemetery regulations. | | | May 26 | Kim Yong-wu was inaugurated as the 6th Minister of National Defense. | | | 1956 | Sept. 21 | ROK Armed Forces Day was announced as October 1. | | Oct. 26 | The ROK joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (LAEA). | | | Dec. 3 | ROK-US combined military talks were held in Tokyo. | | ![366_image_0.png](366_image_0.png) | Date | Contents | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | March 24 | ROK-US military talks were held in Washington. | | | May 22 | The Military Armistice Commission's UN representative informed the ROK military of the | | | committee's decision to modernize ROK' s military equipment (removed line D of Article 13 | | | | 1957 | of the Armistice Agreement). | | | July 1 | The UNC was moved to South Korea from Japan. | | | July 6 | Kim Jung-ryel was inaugurated as the 7th Minister of National Defense. | | | Jan. 17 | The ROK Air Force took over the Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) from the US Air Force. | | | Feb. 16 | A Korean Air Lines DC-13 was hijacked. | | | The US State Department announced that USFK would not leave South Korea. | | | | Feb. 19 | | | | 1958 | April 13 | The Air Force procured the first RF-86F reconnaissance aircraft. | | July 16 | The Air Force procured the first H-19B/D helicopters. | | | May 5 | The ROK-US combined amphibious operation, "Turtle Training" was carried out. | | | May 22 | The MND took over arsenal operational authority from the USFK. | | | 1959 | An air control and warning system (AC&WS) was taken over from the US. | | | July 15 | | | | July 27 | The ROK succeeded in launching a rocket for the first time. | | | May 2 | Lee Chong-chan was inaugurated as the 8th Minister of National Defense. | | | Aug. 23 | Hyon Suk-ho was inaugurated as the 9th Minister of National Defense. | | | 1960 | Sept. 12 | Kwon Chung-don was inaugurated as the 10th Minister of National Defense. | | The number of the ROK Armed Forces was fixed at 600,000 under an agreement between the | | | | Dec. 29 | ROK and the US. | | | Hyun Suk-ho was inaugurated as the 11th Minister of National Defense. | | | | Jan. 30 | | | | May 16 | The 5 · 16 Military Coup occurred. | | | Chang Do-young was inaugurated as the 12th Minister of National Defense. | | | | May 20 | The UNC took over operational command of the ROK units mobilized for the 5.16 Military Coup. | | | May 26 | | | | 1961 | June 12 | Song Yo-chan was inaugurated as the 13th Minister of National Defense. | | Park Pyong-kwon was inaugurated as the 14th Minister of National Defense. | | | | July 10 | | | | Aug. 19 | ROK-US high-level military talks were held in Chinhae. | | | Oct. 13 | A ROK-US combined commanders meeting was held at EUSA headquarters. | | | The Homeland Reserve Forces Act was enacted. | | | | Dec. 27 | | | | Jan. 20 | A new military penal code, military administration and criminal law, military court martial | | | law, and the military personnel law were enacted. | | | | March 17 | The ROK-US high-level military talks were held in Washington. | | | At the ROK-US high-level military talks, some issues were agreed upon including a military aid project. | | | | April 13 | The Military Personnel Clothing Decree was announced. | | | 1962 | April 27 | The rank badges of the enlisted men (EM) in the three services were unified and standardized. | | At the ROK-US high-level military talks, the issue of financing additional defense expendi- | | | | May 1 | tures was agreed upon. | | | July 30 | The first ceremony of entering the student military training course was held. | | | The Military Pension, Military Pension and Special Account Laws were enacted. | | | | Jan. 28 | | | | March 16 | Kim Sung-eun was inaugurated as the 15th Minister of National Defense. | | | A law on confiscation, one on noncombatants and one on military personnel salary were enacted. | | | | May 1 | | | | 1963 | The ROK Armed Forces first procured a destroyer. | | | May 17 | | | | June 1 | The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was established. | | | The National Security Council Act was enacted. | | | | Dec. 14 | | | | Jan. 4 | High-level ROK-US economy- and military-related talks were held. | | | The Vietnamese government publicly asked the ROK for military assistance. | | | | July 15 | MND established the war history compilation committee. | | | 1964 | Aug. 7 | | | Dec. 19 | US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to ROK President Park Chung Hee requesting | | | that the ROK government dispatch its troops to Vietnam. | | | | Jan. 26 | The ROK National Assembly passed an act on dispatching troops to Vietnam. | | | The Civil Defense Improvement Committee was set up under the National Security Council (NSC). | | | | Feb. 24 | The ROK's Dove Troops were dispatched to Vietnam. | | | March 10 | | | | 1965 | June 1 | The ROK Armed Forces first organized NIKE guided missile forces. | | The ROK-US Treaty on Basic Relations was signed. | | | | June 22 | ROK-Japan high-level military talks were held to review the issue of dispatching troops to Vietnam. | | | June 28 | | | ![367_image_0.png](367_image_0.png) | Date | Contents | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Sept. 6 | The ROK-US military executive agreement in Vietnam was concluded. | | | 1965 | Oct. 3 | The Blue Dragon Unit was sent to Vietnam. | | Oct. 16 | The Wild Tiger Unit was sent to Vietnam. | | | March 4 | The ROK and US governments signed the Brown Memorandum and an MOA on the | | | conditions under which the ROK government decided to dispatch its troops to Vietnam. | | | | March 15 | A code of conduct and regulations for behavior were established and announced. | | | June 22 | The ROK defense minister and US Secretary of Defense discussed the issue of modemizing | | | 1966 | the ROK Armed Forces. | | | July 9 | The ROK-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was concluded. | | | Aug. 30 | The White Horse Unit was dispatched to Vietnam. | | | Nov. 7 | The office of the Korean military attache was set up in Japan. | | | Jan. 19 | A PCE-56 patrol boat was sunk by North Korean shore guns near the truce line in the East $ | | | Sept. 5 | ROK-US high-level military talks were held to discuss the issue of military aid. | | | 1967 | Nov. 3 | The ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and US Secretary of State discussed modernizing the | | ROK Armed Forces and other issues. | | | | Dec. 28 | The first Defense White Paper was published. | | | Jan. 21 | Armed North Korean agents attacked the Blue House. | | | The USS Pueblo was hijacked by North Korea. | | | | Jan. 23 | | | | Feb. 28 | Choi Young Hee was inaugurated as the 16th Minister of National Defense. | | | April 1 | ROK Reserve Forces was created. | | | President Park Chung Hee held talks with US President Lyndon B. Johnson in Honolulu to | | | | April 18 | discuss military aid and dispatch of ROK forces to Vietnam. | | | May 28 | A ROK Defense Minister first met a US Secretary of Defense in Washington. | | | 1968 | The UNC changed its rules of engagement, taking over ROK countermeasures authority, in | | | July 9 | particular the counter infiltration operations when North Korea infiltrated the DMZ. | | | Aug. 5 | Lim Chung-Shik was inaugurated as the 17th Minister of National Defense. | | | The 1st Focus-Lens Exercise was held. | | | | Oct. 13 | | | | Oct. 15 | The ROK-US Staff Group for Operations Planning was organized. | | | Oct. 30 | North Korean armed agents infiltrated into Ulchin and Samchok. | | | At the talks between ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State, increases | | | | Dec. 4 | in US military aid to the ROK were discussed. | | | March 16 | ROK-US Focus Retina combined operations were conducted. | | | April 11 | The ROK-Britain combined operations, "Foam Report" were carried out in the Yellow Sea. | | | April 15 | The US Navy's E-121 reconnaissance aircraft was shot over the East Sea, killing 31 persons. | | | June 4 | The 2nd ROK-US defense cabinet members' meeting was held. | | | June 16 | Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) were set up at 16 teachers' colleges around the country. | | | 1969 | July 22 | The ROK Defense Minister and US Secretary of State met to discuss reduction of the ROK | | Armed Forces. | | | | Oct. 20 | The military executive agreement was signed between the ROK forces stationed in | | | Vietnamese and the Vietnamese Joint Chiefs of Staff. | | | | Dec. 11 | A Korean Air Lines YS-11 was hijacked by North Korea. | | | March 10 | Chung Lay Hyuk was inaugurated as the 18th Minister of National Defense. | | | May 26 | US government offered the last batch of free military aid to the ROK. (Free military aid was | | | given over 25 years.) | | | | July 11 | ROK-US high-ranking military talks were held to discuss reducing USFK and modernizing | | | the ROK Armed Forces. | | | | July 22 | | | | 1970 | The 3rd ROK-US defense cabinet level meeting was held in Honolulu. | | | Aug. 6 | The Agency for Defense Development (ADD) was created. | | | Aug. 20 | The Military Manpower Administration replaced the Bureau of Military Manpower. | | | Sept. 1 | The MND HQ building was moved from Huam-dong to Samkakji, Yongsan. | | | Oct. 14 | At ROK-US military talks, the two sides agreed to modernize and cut down the number of | | | troops. | | | | Feb. 6 | The 4th talks between ROK National Defense Minister and US Secretary of Defense were held | | | 1971 | in Seoul. | | ![368_image_0.png](368_image_0.png) | | Contents | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Date | March 4 | Freedom Bolt ROK-US combined airborne transport training was carried out. | | The US 7th Division was withdrawn from the ROK. | | | | March 27 | | | | April 1 | The US Military Advisory Group in South Korea was incorporated into the US Joint Military | | | Support Group. | | | | April 22 | The ROK and the US agreed to build a factory for M-16 rifles. | | | 1971 | July 1 | The ROK-US 1st Corps was established. (The US Army I corps was removed.) | | July 13 | The annual 4th ROK-US SCM (renamed), was held in Seoul. | | | Aug. 25 | Yu, Jae-hung was inaugurated as the 19th Minister of National Defense. | | | A hot-line between the South and North Korean Red Cross organizations was set up at | | | | Sept. 21 | Panmunjom. | | | Dec. 27 | A special act was enacted on safeguarding the nation. | | | Feb. 11 | ROK Minister of National Defense Yu, Jae-hung held talks with Vietnamese President Thieu. | | | May 18 | A ROK-US high-level military working group meeting was held. | | | The 5th annual ROK-US SCM was held at the US Air Force Academy. | | | | June 27 | | | | July 4 | The ROK government announced a South-North joint communique stating that the two | | | Koreas would try to unify peacefully and independently. | | | | Aug. 11 | A ROK-US milifary working-level meeting was held to discuss withdrawing the ROK troops | | | 1972 | from Vietnam. | | | Aug. 30 | The first plenary session of the South-North Korean Red Cross talks were held in Pyongyang. | | | Sept. 15 | SOFA was signed between the ROK and West Germany Ministers of Defense. | | | The co-chairmen of the South-North Coordination Committee first met at Panmunjom. | | | | Oct. 12 | | | | Dec. 26 | The Military Secret Protection Law and the Military Facilities Protection Law were both announced. | | | Dec. 29 | The first official defense objectives were set up. | | | Jan. 13 | The 1st National Security Council was established in 1973 to discuss basic national security policies for 1974. | | | Feb. 17 | A special action law on military procurement was announced. | | | The withdrawal of the ROK forces from Vietnam was completed. | | | | March 23 | | | | July 1 | The Third Army Command was created. | | | 1973 | Aug. 28 | The Mukwunghwa Conference was first held. | | Sept. 13 | The 6th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | Oct. 10 | The Marine Corps was incorporated into the navy. | | | Dec. 3 | Suh, Chong-chul was inaugurated as the 20th Minister of National Defense. | | | Jan. 18 | President Park, Chung-hee proposed signing an inter-Korean nonaggression treaty. | | | Jan. 21 | The ROK-US Logistical Cooperation Group was established. | | | Aug. 15 | North Korean armed agent Mun, Se-kwang attempted to shoot President Park, Chung-hee | | | 1974 | and the first lady was killed. | | | Sept. 24 | The 7th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Honolulu. | | | Nov. 15 | Tunnel No. 1 aimed at infiltrating into the ROK was discovered under the DMZ by North Korea. | | | Nov. 22 | At ROK-US summit talks, the US reaffirmed its commitment to help defend the ROK. | | | March 17 | A small array of exercises, which had been carried out since 1961 were incorporated into the | | | Doksuri (Foal Eagle) Exercise. | | | | March 19 | Tunnel No. 2 was discovered. | | | April 23 | The ROK signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. | | | The Ulchi Exercise (ROK) and the Focus-Lens Exercise (the ROK and the US) were combined | | | | May 5 | | | | 1975 | to become the Ulchi Focus-Lens Exercise. | | | June 30 | The Combat Reserve Forces was created. | | | Aug. 27 | The 8th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | Sept. 2 | A ceremony was held to celebrate the creation of the Student Defense Corps. | | | Sept. 22 | The Civil Defense Corps was created. | | | May 26 | The 9th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Honolulu. | | | The Team Spirit Exercise was first carried out. | | | | June 7 | | | | 1976 | Aug. 18 | Axe-wielding North Korean armed agents intruded the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. | | Sept. 6 | Patrol zones in the Joint Security Area were divided. | | | Anti-submarine helicopters (ALT-III) were first procured. | | | | Feb. 1 | | | | May 11 | The ROK-US started the talks on the reduction of the USFK. | | | 1977 | July 20 | The 10th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | Dec. 20 | Roh, Jae-hyun was inaugurated as the 21st Minister of National Defense. | | ![369_image_0.png](369_image_0.png) | Date | Contents | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | July 6 | The ROK and the US concluded a basic memorandum of understanding on Korean-made | | | tanks. | | | | July 27 | The 11th annual ROK-US SCM was held in San Diego. | | | July 28 | The 1st ROK-US military committee was held in San Diego. | | | 1978 | Sept. 26 | The Agency for Defense Development (ADD) succeeded in test-firing a Korean surface-to- | | surface guided missile (Paeckgom). | | | | Oct. 17 | Tunnel No. 3 was discovered. | | | Nov. 7 | The ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) was created. | | | July 20 | US President James Carter announced that the US would consider withdrawal of USFK. | | | Oct. 19 | The 12th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | 1979 | Oct. 26 | The 10 · 26 Incident occurred. | | Dec. 12 | The 12; 12 Incident occurred. | | | Dec. 14 | Ju, Young-pok was inaugurated as the 22nd Minister of National Defense. | | | Jan. 30 | The Kobukson was launched, made according to the ancient turtle-ship. | | | March 14 | The ROK-US 1st corps was reorganized into the Combined Field Army (CFA). | | | 1980 | April 8 | The first domestically-built destroyer Ulsan was launched in Chinhae. | | Dec. 4 | The draft age was reduced to 19 and the military service term was cut to 30 months. | | | Dec. 19 | The top limit age for reservists was reduced from 35 to 33. | | | Jan. 3 | At the ROK-US military summit, a 14-point communique was announced including the | | | cancell-ation of planned withdrawal of the USFK. | | | | 1981 | April 30 | The 13th annual ROK-US SCM was held in San Francisco. | | June 19 | ROK-US naval maneuvers exercise was carried out in the East China Sea. | | | Jan. 1 | The conscription age was reduced to 20 from 21. | | | March 31 | The 14th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | 1982 | May 21 | Yun, Sung-min was inaugurated as the 23rd Minister of National Defense. | | Sept. 9 | The first domestically made fighter F-5F named Ceykong was issued. | | | Nov. 18 | Korea's first domestic patrol vessel ICC was launched. | | | April 2 | The ADD launched Korea' s first midget submarine, the Dolgorae. | | | The 15th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington. | | | | April 15 | | | | Sept. 1 | A Soviet fighter shot down a Korean Air flight near Sakhalin, killing all 269 passengers on | | | board. | | | | 1983 | Oct. 9 | The Aungsan Cemetery in Yangoon, Burma, was bombed by North Korean special agents. | | Eighteen senior government officials, who were scheduled to pay respects at the cemetery | | | | were killed. | | | | Dec. 8 | A ROK-US memorandum of understanding was concluded on the joint production of the 155 | | | mm self-propelled artillery. | | | | May 10 | The 16th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | ROK-US combined air-ground exercises were carried out. | | | | 1984 | A ROK-US memorandum of agreement was concluded on the ROK-US WRSA and the sale of | | | June 25 | stockpiled US supplies to South Korea. | | | Aug. 4 | The Emergency Resource Management Law was enacted. | | | Feb. 15 | The ROK government held a ROK-US joint standing conference on the export of helicopters | | | to North Korea. | | | | Mav 8 | The 17th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington. | | | July 1 | The air force started its operation of the automatic defense system. | | | 1985 | Aug. 22 | Working-level delegations met in their third round of the South-North Korean Red Cross | | meetings. | | | | Sept. 21 | The ADD demonstrated Hyunmu surface-to-surface guided weapons. | | | Dec. 3 | The plenary session of the 10th South-North Korean Red Cross Meeting was held. | | | Dec. 31 | The ADD succeeded in developing Korean armored personnel carriers (K-200). | | | Jan. 1 | Standby reservists service term was extended from 14 months, to 18 months, and the | | | enlistment system was improved. | | | | 1986 | Jan. 8 | Lee, Ki-baek was inaugurated as the 24th Minister on National Defense. | | April 3 | The 18th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | Aug. 30 | The first launching ceremony of domestically-produced minesweepers. | | | Date | Contents | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | March 1 | The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) was established. | | | May 7 | The 19th annual ROK-US SCM held in Washington, DC. | | | June 25 | South Korea joined in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). | | | July 14 | Chung, Ho-yong was inaugurated as the 25th Minister of National Defense. | | | 1987 | Sept. 18 | The christening ceremony and fire power testing of the Korean tank K-1 ("88 tank"). | | Nov. 1 | The ROK Marine Corps Command was separated from the navy. | | | Nov. 29 | A Korean airliner, a Boeing 707, was bombed by a North Korean agent (Kim, Hyun-hee) and | | | crashed over the Andaman Sea. | | | | Feb. 26 | Oh, Ja-bok was inaugurated as the 26th Minister of National Defense. | | | April 29 | The US government began to ask the ROK government to share the cost of protecting the gulf | | | oil supply. | | | | June 8 | The ROK-US Mutual Logistical Support Treaty was concluded. | | | The ROK-US Defense Technology Tie-up MOU was concluded. | | | | 1988 | The 20th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | June 9 | | | | Dec. 5 | Lee, Sang-hoon was inaugurated as the 27th Minister of National Defense. | | | Dec. 29 | The Defense White Paper began to be published on an annual basis(It was first published in | | | 1967, but only periodically.). | | | | Dec. 31 | The Disaster and Suspension Compensation System for army reservists was established. | | | The ROK and Spain exchanged memoranda regarding the concept of defense industry | | | | May 24 | cooperation. | | | July 18 | The ROK and the US concluded a MOU on the use of technology to produce defense | | | products. | | | | 1989 | July 19 | The 21st annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington. | | July 22 | ROK Army and Air Force HQs moved to Kyeryongdae. | | | Sept. 26 | The ROK and Italy concluded an MOU about governmental quality assurances for defense | | | equipment. | | | | Dec. 30 | Integration and Abolition of the Special Supplementary System. | | | lan 1 | The age limit of homeland reservists was reduced from 35 to 33. | | | Feb. 15 | Talks between the ROK Minister of National Defense and US Secretary of Defense were | | | conducted. | | | | March 3 | Tunnel No. 4 was discovered. | | | March 24 | The ROK Navy first participated in RIMPAC exercises. | | | The ROK and the US agreed in principle to transfer the USFK base at Yongsan to a provincial city. | | | | June 25 | | | | July 31 | The ROK and France Ministers of National Defense concluded a treaty on mutual support for | | | 1990 | the Chonma missile project. | | | The first South-North high-level talks were held in Seoul. | | | | Sept. 4 | | | | Oct. 1 | Under a new joint force system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created. | | | Oct. 8 | Lee, Chong-ku was inaugurated as the 28th Minister of National Defense. | | | The 22nd annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington. | | | | Nov. 15 | The working-level negotiation team and on-the-spot investigation team were dispatched to | | | Dec. 29 | Saudi Arabia with a mission to prepare for dispatching a medical care support team to Gulf War. | | | The ROK Armed Forces Medical Care Support Group was dispatched to the Gulf. | | | | Jan. 23 | | | | Jan. 25 | The treaty on creating JUSMAG-K was concluded. | | | US senior representative of the United States Forces to the Military Armistice Committee was | | | | March 25 | replaced by a representative from the ROK. | | | July 1 | The army's air defense artillery was transferred to the air force. | | | The air force' s Air Defense Artillery Command was established. | | | | Aug. 30 | An MOU on the Korean fighter project was concluded between the ROK and US. | | | 1991 | Sept. 12 | Korea's first submarine (the Changbogo) was first procured from abroad (Germany) and was | | launched. | | | | Sept. 19 | The ROK Armed Forces took full responsibility for guarding the entire 155-mile truce line. | | | Oct. 1 | A Korean military attache office was set up in Russia. | | | The ROK and Thailand concluded an MOU on logistical cooperation. | | | | Nov. 4 | President Ro, Tae-woo declared that South Korea entirely gave up nuclear weapons. | | | Nov. 8 | | | | Nov. 21 | The 23rd annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | The ROK and the US concluded the Wartime Host Nation Support. | | | ![370_image_0.png](370_image_0.png) ![371_image_0.png](371_image_0.png) | | Contents | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Date | Dec. 13 | The South-North Basic agreement was concluded. | | 1991 | Dec. 18 | President Ro, Tae-woo declared South Korea was a nuclear-free zone. | | Dec. 20 | Choi, Se-chang was inaugurated as the 29th Minister of National Defense. | | | Jan. 7 | The MND announced that it would not carry out the Team Spirit Exercise. | | | Jan. 20 | The ROK-North Korea joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. | | | March 2 | The ROK and Spain concluded an MOU on acquisition and logistical support cooperation. | | | March 4 | The ROK and France concluded an MOU on defense industry and logistical support cooperation. | | | 1992 | The ROK and US dissolved the ROK-US CFA. | | | June 26 | | | | Aug. 20 | The US Air Force, Korea (AFK) first deployed US Patriot missiles in the ROK. | | | Oct. 8 | The 24th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington. | | | Oct. 12 | The launching ceremony of the first domestic submarine, the Ichon, was held. | | | Feb. 26 | Kwon, Young-hae was inaugurated as the 30th Minister of National Defense. | | | April 23 | The "Sangroksu" PKO unit was created to be dispatched to Somalia. | | | June 17 | ROK Navy HQ was moved to Kyeryongdae. | | | July 30 | PKO (engineer battalion) was Dispatched to Somalia. | | | Sept. 16 | The ROK-Italy concluded an MOU on logistical support and defense system cooperation. | | | Sept. 22 | ROK Navy vessels made the first visit to Russia's Vladivostok port. | | | 1993 | Sept. 27 | The ROK and the United Kingdom concluded the MOU in the Sphere of Defense Industrial | | and Logistical Support. | | | | Oct. 8 | The first Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) was held. | | | Nov. 4 | The 25th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | Dec. 22 | Lee, Byong-tae was inaugurated as the 31st Minister of National Defense. | | | Dec. 31 | A Korea military attache office was set up in China. | | | Jan 1 | The service system of reserve forces was revised from the age limit system to the period | | | system: the mobilization training period and time were reduced; the standby replacement | | | | system was abolished; the recruitment of standby reserves and public service personnel were | | | | newly established. | | | | March 18 | The withdrawal of the PKO engineer battalion was completed. | | | April 16 | A Chinese military attache office to South Korea was set up. | | | April 28 | North Korea called for a new peace regime to replace the armistice. | | | May 4 | The ROK and Germany concluded an agreement on enhancing defense and military exchanges. | | | May 24 | The ROK and the Philippines conduded an MOU on logistics and defense industry cooperation. | | | July 25 | The first Asian Regional Forum (ARF) was held. | | | Aug. 18 | The ROK and the US agreed that the US 7th Fleet would belong to the United Nations | | | 1994 | Command (UNC) in a state of war on the peninsula. | | | Sept. 6 | The ROK Medical Care Support Group was sent to the Western Sahara. | | | Oct. 6 | PKO troops were dispatched to Georgia as military observers. | | | Oct. 7 | The 26th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington. At the talks, the two sides agreed on | | | an FDO deployment in emergencies on the Korean peninsula. | | | | Oct. 21 | The Agreed Framework was signed between the US and North Korea. | | | Oct. 23 | Former 2LT Cho, Chang-ho, who had been a POW in North Korea since the Korean War, | | | escaped from North Korea and returned to the ROK, via China. | | | | Nov. 10 | The PKO military observers were sent to India and Pakistan. | | | Dec 1 | The ROK Armed Forces took over peacetime operational command authority from the | | | United Nations Forces. | | | | Dec. 24 | Lee, Yang-ho was inaugurated as the 32nd Minister of National Defense. | | | Feb. 28 | Poland withdrew from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom under | | | the pressure of withdrawing from Pyongyang. | | | | March 9 | The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Örganization (KEDO) was set up. | | | May 1 | The ROK and Canada concluded an MOU in order to increase military exchanges and cooperation. | | | May 5 | The ROK and Poland concluded an MOU to enhance military exchanges and cooperation. | | | 1995 | June 19 | The Aprok River Exercise was first carried out. | | Aug. 27 | South Korea and Israel concluded an MOU to increase military exchanges and cooperation. | | | Oct. 5 | PKO engineer battalion was dispatched to Angola. | | | Oct. 9 | The ROK and Indonesia concluded an MOU on defense logistics and defense industry cooperation. | | | Oct. 13 | The ROK entered the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG). | | ![372_image_0.png](372_image_0.png) | Date | Contents | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Nov. 3 | The 27th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | Nov. 28 | The christening ceremony and the trial flight of the first domestically-made military aircraft, | | | the KT-1, Ung-bi. | | | | 1995 | Dec. 15 | A LWR treaty was concluded between KEDO and North Korea. | | Dec. 29 | Part of the law on the establishment of academies was revised to open the door for the | | | admission of women. | | | | March 28 | The first Hokuk Exercise was conducted. | | | April 4 | North Korea announced that it would abandon its responsibilities to take part in managing | | | the Demilitarized Zone. | | | | April 16 | The ROK and the US presidents proposed Four-Party Talks for peace on the Korean | | | peninsula. | | | | April 17 | The first RSOI exercise was conducted. | | | 1996 | Sept. 18 | A North Korean midget submarine and armed agents intruded into Kangnung. | | Oct. 1 | The ROK entered the Australia Group (AG). | | | Oct. 18 | Kim Dong-jin was inaugurated as the 33rd Minister of National Defense. | | | Oct. 21 | The 1996 Seoul International Air Show was held. | | | Nov. 1 | The Korean military attache office was set up in Vietnam. | | | The 28th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | | Dec. 23 | PKO engineer battalion was withdrawn from Angola. | | | The service term for stand-by reserves was curtailed from 28 months to 26. | | | | Jan. 1 | | | | Jan. 13 | The Integrated Defense Law was enacted. | | | March 3 | Women cadets first entered the ROK Air Force Academy. | | | The ROK joined the CWC. | | | | April 28 | | | | June 30 | The first domestically-made KF-16 was delivered. | | | Sep. 24 | The ROK joined the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). | | | 1997 | Oct. 27 | The ADD successfully test-fired the Chonma, a domestically-made, ground-to-air missile. | | Nov. 17 | The ROK and Germany concluded an MOU on defense industry cooperation. | | | The ROK and Russia concluded an agreement on defense industry and logistics cooperation. | | | | Nov. 20 | | | | Nov. 27 | The ROK and Romania concluded an MOU on defense industry and logistics cooperation. | | | Dec. 9 | The first plenary session of the Four-Party Talks was held; the 29th annual ROK-US annual | | | SCM was held in Seoul. | | | | March 4 | Chun Yong-Taek was inaugurated as the 34th Minister of National Defense. | | | April 15 | The Defense Reform Committee was inaugurated. | | | North Korea dispatched a midget submarine to Sokcho. | | | | June 22 | | | | June 23 | The 1st General Officer-Level Talks were held at Panmujom. | | | June 30 | ADD succeeds in developing torpedoes for submarines or submersibles. | | | The ROK MND minister met with his US counterpart. | | | | July 9 | | | | July 15 | The ADD finished developing the Chonma missile. | | | North Korea launched the Taepodong-1 missile. | | | | Aug. 31 | | | | 1998 | The ADD succeeded in developing a new model 155 mm self-propelled artillery. | | | Sept. 30 | | | | Sept. 31 | The ROK MND Minister met with his Japanese counterpart. | | | The International Naval Review was opened. | | | | Oct. 13 | | | | Oct. 26 | The 1998 Seoul International Air Show was held. | | | Nov. 27 | The ROK and New Zealand concluded an agreement on logistics cooperation. | | | Dec. 18 | A North Korean semi-submersible craft infiltrates into South Korean waters in the Korea | | | Strait. | | | | Dec. 31 | The ADD succeeded in developing a military aircraft KT-1 for the first time. | | | Jan. 7 | The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Japanese counterpart. | | | Jan. 17 | The 30th ROK-US annual SCM was held in Seoul. | | | The ROK and Great Britain concluded an MOU on data and scientist exchange between the two countries' MNDs. | | | | Feb. 2 | | | | May 24 | Cho Seong-Tae was inaugurated as the 35th Minister on National Defense. | | | 1999 | May 26 | The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Australian counterpart. | | June 15 | The ROK and North Korean navies were engaged in a battle in the Yellow Sea. | | | July 29 | The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his US counterpart. | | | Aug. 2 | Thefirst Reconnaissance & salvage exercise for peace between the naval forces of Korea and Japan | | | Aug. 23 | The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Chinese counterpart. | | ![373_image_0.png](373_image_0.png) | | Contents | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Date | Sept. 3 | The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Russian counterpart. | | 1999 | Oct. 4 | The PKO was dispatched to East Timor. | | Nov. 3 | The 31st annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington. | | | National Defense University, National War College, and National Defense Leadership | | | | Jan. 6 | Institute were merged into National Defense University. | | | Jan. 20 | The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Chinese counterpart. | | | The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his US counterpart. | | | | March 18 | | | | March 23 | North Korea declares integrated order in the five islands in the Northwest. | | | 2000 | May 16 | The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Russian counterpart. | | May 22 | The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Japanese counterpart. | | | June 13 | President Kim Dae-Jung visited Pyongyang for South-North Summit (June 13-15). | | | Sep. 21 | The 32nd annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. | | | The South-North Defense Ministerial Talks was held in Cheju Island during Sep. 25 to 26. | | | | Sep. 25 | | | Appendix ![374_image_0.png](374_image_0.png) ## Previous Defense White Papers | | Remarks | | | |--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------| | Year | Contents | Major Data | | | Structured by 6 chapters. | · Main unit drill. | | | | | · The present condition of defense | | | | Ch1. Introduction. | budget. | | | | Ch2. International Situation. | · The first publication. | | | | | · National benefits from the Vietnam | | | | Ch3. The overall situation of the ROK | | | | | 1967 | war. | | | | National Defense. | · Utilized in military. | | | | | Enforcement process of compensation | | | | Ch4. Defense policy and enforcement of | for commandeered properties. | | | | a policy. | | | | | Ch5. The three services. | · Military support project for the people. | | | | Ch6. The ROK armed forces in Vietnam. | · Organized the ministry of national | | | | Structured by 7 chapters. | defense. | | | | | · Relationship with the national | | | | Ch1. Introduction. | defenses the main international an | | | | Ch2. International situation. | agreement synopsis. | | | | Ch3. Rehabilitation of the Korean | · Utilized in military. | | | | domestic defense concept. | The present condition of defense | | | | | budget | · The publication have | | | 1968 | Ch4. An aspect of North Korean | A fixed amount table of accident | been disconnected | | invasion, general condition of | | | | | military power, and latest tendency. | compensation payment for the ROK | between 1969~1987. | | | | solders in Vietnam. | | | | Ch5. 1968 basic defense policy. | | | | | Ch6. Detailed enforcement of policy of | A military salary table and a table of | | | | the three services. | pension criterion. | | | | Ch7. 1970' s trend of defense policy. | Installation rule of the homeland | | | | | reserve forces. | | | | | · The present military power condition | | | | Structured by 6 parts. | Republication. | | | | | of the main countries. | | | | | . | Support expenses for the U.S. forces in | Open to the public. | | Ch1. Introduction. | First publication by | | | | | Korea. | | | | Ch2. Security environment. | | | | | 1988 | · North Korean conscription system. | the character of | | | Ch3. Military preparedness. | · Acceptance of a donated defense fund | document. | | | Ch4. Defense management. | Began sale in the | | | | | and a details of expenditures. | | | | Ch5. Services. | · Growing steps of the Korean defense | market. | | | Ch6. Citizens' lives and national defense. | industry. | | | | Structured by 14 chapters. | | | | | Ch1. The basic defense policy condition. | · The present condition of the main | | | | Ch2. The military environment around | countries' military powers. | | | | the Korean peninsula. | · A military truce committee council on | | | | Ch3. North Korean military threat | related matters. | | | | against South Korea. | · The present condition of improves | | | | Ch4. Truce agreement system of Korean | various laws and regulations. | Published English | | | peninsula. | · The 21st SCM joint statement. | version of Defense | | | Ch5. Military preparedness. | | | | | 1989 | · The present condition of ROK-U.S. | White Papers | | | Ch6. ROK and U.S. combined forces in a | defense cost sharing. (1988). | (1989~present). | | | posture of defense. | · The realities of the main provocations | | | | Ch7. Comparison between North and | from North Korea. | | | | South Korean military powers. | · Introduction of a business program to | | | | Ch8. Build up the self-reliance power of | promote scientific defense research. | | | | national defense. | Introduction of a memorial business of | | | | Ch9. Defense budget. | the Korean war. | | | | Ch10. Defense procurement. | | | | | Ch11. Reserved forces. | | | | ![375_image_0.png](375_image_0.png) | Year | Contents | Major Data | Remarks | |----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------| | Ch12. Betterment of personnel | Activity of a war history compilation | | | | management system. | history. | | | | 1989 | Ch13. Conscription administration. | Activity of a support project for the | | | Ch14. National convenience defense | people. | | | | administration. | · The present conditions of military force | | | | | in major nations. | | | | Structured by 5 parts | · Procedure of weapon system | | | | 1. Introduction. | acquirement. | Thesis of the '88 and | | | 2. Security environment. | · Improvement of female officer | | | | 1990 | 89 White Papers' | | | | 3. Military preparedness. | personnel. | basic points. | | | 4. Defence management. | · Results of the civil appeal | | | | | simplification. | | | | 5. The people and the army. | · Main activities of all armed forces. | | | | | · The armed forces athletics activity. | | | | Structured by 6 parts | · The current state of each nations | | | | | military index worldwide. | | | | 1. Introduction. | · Current state of major nuclear powers. | | | | 2. International security environment. | Noted in Defense | | | | | · START /CFE reduction agreement. | | | | 1991 | 3. Korean peninsula security | White Paper 1991- | | | | · Current condition of the GULF war | | | | environment. | 1992. | | | | | participating nations. | | | | 4. Defense posture. | | | | | 5. Defense management. | · North Koreas provocation towards the | | | | | south. | | | | 6. The people and the army. | | | | | Structured by 5 parts | · Chronology of UN peacekeeping. | | | | 1. Introduction. | - KOREA/RUSSIAN, KOREA/CHINA | | | | | Joint declaration of friendship. | | | | 2. Security environment and the military | Noted in Defense | | | | 1992 | · SOUTH/NORTH basic agreement. | White Paper 1992- | | | threat. | | | | | 3. Military preparedness. | · Joint statement concerning the | 1993. | | | | denuclearizing on the Korean | | | | 4. Defence management. | peninsula. | | | | 5. The people and the army. | · Current condition of North Korea's | | | | | nuclear related facilities. | Noted in Defense | | | 1993 | · Current comparison of the north-south | White Paper 1993- | | | | military capabilities. | 1994. | | | Structured by 5 parts | · Influence of civilian technology in the | | | | | military. | | | | | · PKF's activity and achievements. | | | | 1. Introduction. | · STARTI/II, CFE, NPT, CWC, MTCR, | Noted in Defense | | | | WHNS | | | | 1994 | · Construction of the war memorial hall | White Paper 1994- | | | 2. Security situation and threat evaluation. | . | Agency for defense development. | 1995. | | | · Introduction of the military cadet | | | | | education. | | | | 3. Military preparedness. | · US/NK nuclear basic written | | | | | agreement. | | | | 4. Defense management. | · Korea/Russia memorandum of | Noted in Defense | | | 1995 | agreement concerning military | White Paper 1995- | | | | 1996. | | | | | exchange. | | | | 5. The people and the military. | · Record of rice sent to North Korea for | | | | | assistance. | | | | | Journal of the 50 years of ROK/US | | | | 1996 | Noted in Defense White | | | | | military relations. | Paper 1996-1997. | | | | Major Data | Remarks | | |-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------| | Year | Contents | · Journal of foreign military relations | | | | and co-operations. | | | | | · Current day to day press briefings. | 11 | | | 1996 | 11 | · Intro of the National Defense College, | | | | KIDA and ADD. | | | | | · Defense Burden sharing and the Trend | | | | Structured by 6 parts | of ROK support for the USFK. | | | | | · IAEA. | | | | 1. National goals and Defense objectives. | Counter infiltration Operation in the | Noted in Defense | | | 2. Security Environment. | Kangrung Area. | White Paper 1997- | | | 1997 | 3. National Defense Policy. | The present condition of the Defense | 1998. | | 4. Defense Posture. | Budget. | | | | 5. Defense Management. | · Comparison of the key countries the | | | | 6. People and the military. | Defense Budget. | | | | | · National Memorial Board. | | | | | · Europe Security. | | | | | · The Present Condition of Combined | Noted in Defense | | | | and Joint Training. | White Paper 1998. | | | | · A Historical study on sources that | | | | | establishes Korea's Territorial Rights | | | | | to Island of Tok-do Historic | | | | 1998 | Cover design | | | | | Consideration of Dok-Do. | changed | | | | · Current Peacekeeping Operations. | (The color of the cover | | | | · Composition of MND Budget. | was change from | | | | · Cooperation of the Defense industry | white to blue and the | | | Structured by 5 parts | agreements current condition. | symbol was input). | | | | Status of Defense Industrial Products | | | | | Exports. | | | | | · The Battle of Yonpyoung in the Yellow | | | | 1. Changes and Challenges of Security | Sea. | | | | | · Status of Global conflict in 1998. | | | | Environment. | · Military Capabilities of Major countries | | | | | · TMD system. | Noted in Defense | | | | White Paper 1999. | | | | 2. Defense Policy and Posture for | · The main countries of RMA. | | | | | · Status of international weapon exports | | | | | and imports. | Plan of Major | | | Peacekeeping. | · Plan of force capability for the main | Weaponry full force | | | | weapon system. | capability | | | 3. Status and Tasks of National Defense. | · Comparison of Economic and Military | (Announcement of | | | 1999 | capabilities between North and South | level of magnification | | | 4. Defense Reform for the 21st Century. | Korea | information). | | | | · North Korea's Missile Development | | | | 5. National Defense with the People. | and Production. | | | | | Chronology of the General officer level | BOX(conflict in | | | | Talks at Panmunjom. | Kosovo, North | | | | · Status of investment of the Defense | Korea' s CBR warfare | | | | Research and Development. | capability , NLL, etc.) | | | | · Innovation of the administration of | detailed description | | | | draft. | introduction. | | | | · Introduce the National Assembly NDC. | | | | | · 1998 Public Opinion Poll on Security | | | | | Consciousness. | | | | | · Chronology of ROK National Defense. | | | ![377_image_0.png](377_image_0.png)