ROMANIA THE PRESIDENTIAL **ADMINISTRATION** ![0_image_0.png](0_image_0.png) NATIONAL DEFENSE **STRATEGY** 2015‐**2019** A StrongRomania within Europe and the *World* BUCHAREST ‐2015‐ # Table Of **Contents:** TABLE OF CONTENTS: 2 FOREWORD **** 3 INTRODUCTION **** 5 Chapter I: DEFINING NATIONAL **SECURITY** INTERESTS AND **OBJECTIVES** **** 7 | 4.1. Premises | 17 | |---|------| | 4.2.4. The economic and energetic dimension 2 | 0 | |-------------------------------------------------|-----| | 4.2.5. The diplomatic dimension 2 | 1 | | 4.2.2. The public order dimension 1 | 9 | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| | 4.2.3. The intelligence, counterintelligence and security dimension 1 | 9 | | 4.2.1. The defense dimension | 18 | |---------------------------------|------| | 1.3. National security objectives 9 | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| | Chapter IV: LINES OF ACTION AND MAIN WAYS TO ENSURE ROMANIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY | 17 | | 1.1. Values and principles | ...7 | |---|--------| | 1.2. National security interests | ..8 | 4.2. Lines of action and main ways to ensure national security..................18 4.2.6. The crisis management *dimension..........................................................21* 4.2.7. The educational, healthcare, social and demographic *dimension..........................................................................................21* FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 23 # Foreword Since taking oath in office as President of Romania, I have expressed my will and commitment to ensure Romania's assertion as a strong nation of citizens, fully aware of what it strives for in Europe, in the world and for itself. My belief stands firm. The force of a nation derives from its common values, objectives and aspirations which transcend the sum of individual interests, ambitions and achievements. Romania's national defense strategy is the clear‐cut expression of this vision. A **strong** Romania within Europe and the **world** is the clearest expression of the Strategy's final objective, and defines the profile that our country will build in the next five years and, implicitly, in the long term. First of all, a strong Romania within Europe and the world is a state that ensures the security of its citizens wherever they **are.** This statement includes many aspects. Ensuring citizens' security means respecting them at home, protecting their rights and liberties nationally and abroad, actually making the institutions work for the citizens` benefit (as they are meant to be), as well as providing security for their communities, legal guarantees and dip t loma ic protection abroad. This goal can only be achieved through constant connection with field realities, through continuous factual assessment and through understanding of phenomena and challenges that define the present situation. As a result, a strong Romania is a state that will develop its own capacity to efficiently and pragmatically operate within a different paradigm, able to respond to new realities and to anticipate evolutions of the security environment. Acknowledging the changes that have occurred over the past years in the geopolitical environment represents the first necessary step in building a Strategy that is well‐anchored in reality, which identifies the most appropriate lines of action. Secondly, a strong Romania defends its core values, interests and symbols, national assets and natural resources, as well as its institutions. Priority must be given to education and healthcare, to heritage and environment protection, as well as to support of areas of excellence. Last, but not least, a strong Romania supports the preservation of collective security and the promotion of democracy and freedom. This implies that Romania will reinforce its strategic **credibility**, will be known for its predictable and constant stance on defining its foreign, security and defense policies, as well as on strengthening democracy and the rule of law. A strong Romania not only benefits from the complete trust of its partners, but also provides confidence, stability in an intricate region, and solid respect for democratic values and principles. More than 10 years have passed since Romania's NATO accession and 8 years since our country's EU accession as a full‐fledged member. The road that we have pursued since then deserves proper acknowledgment and appreciation. Romania has changed during this period, and the National Defense Strategy intends to reassert, with utmost responsibility, the irreversible feature of this path and of its implicit commitments. The Strategic Partnership with the United States of America and the NATO and EU memberships represent the key pillars of our foreign policy. Building strong Romania is also closely linked to these pillars. 4 * * * The National Defense Strategy falls under the prerogatives of the President of Romania. This document isn't and mustn't represent the will of a sole person, even if that person holds the highest office within the state, nor the will of several institutions. The National Defense Strategy is more than that. It aims to meet society's needs and expectations and it concerns each citizen, the society as a whole, as well as state institutions. Thus, drawing up the National Defense Strategy involved several consultations with experts, political factors, representatives of the institutions ith attribut w ions in this field, members of Academia and civil society. I have always believed that national security policy (through all its elements), must be subject to dialogue and consensus throughout Romanian society. As President, my mission and responsibility is to integrate foreign and security policies in order to defend and promote our national interests. # Introduction . 1. According to the provisions of the Constitution of Romania and the Law no.473/2004 on defense planning, Romania's National Defense Strategy (hereinafter, the *Strategy*) represents the main instrument that substantiates defense planning at national level and ensures the strategic framework for the whole organization and coordination of the related to the count s ry's defen e and national security, through the Supreme Council of National Defense. 2. Through its objectives and content, the Strategy refers to the country's defense and national security as a whole. Paradigm changes that occurred in the concept of country's defense and national security, related to the increasingly unpredictable dynamics of the security environment, inflict the need to reanalyze the concept and, in the immediate prospect, to update the national legal framework. 3. The Strategy reflects the need to promote an extensive national security **concept** – grounded on constitutional democracy and mutual respect between state and citizens - regarding interests related to ensuring national security in the following fields: defense (perceived in a double normative stance of national defense and collective defense), public order, intelligence, counterintelligence and security activity, education, healthcare, the economic field, the financial sector, environment and critical infrastructure. The Strategy has an integrative and multidimensional approach, whereby the defense dimension merges and mutually balances along other dimensions – public order; intelligence, counterintelligence and security activity; diplomacy; crisis management; education, healthcare and d mo e graphy. 4. The need to extend the concept of national security is also motivated by **ensuring** convergence with the European security **principles**, developed in the European Security Strategy and the European Union`s Internal Security Strategy, in which security and development are defined as directly proportional. In addition, the extension of the concept of national security aims to ensure increased resilience of state institutions and civil society against possible, fortuitous or persistent, crisis situations in an unpredictable international security environment and within an intricate security context. 5. In drawing up the new Strategy we must take into consideration the change of paradigm at global level. Romania lies in a region that was defined for a long time by the presence of frozen conflicts. Today, the region is marked by active conflicts and the deterioration of the relations between NATO and the Russian Federation. Also, the presence of conflict areas within the region raises the issue of the Romanian citizens' security. 6. At global level, terrorism has acquired new **dimensions**, being far from a distant phenomenon, but rather close to our space. Romanian citizens can be affected by the consequences of terrorist acts. The economic and financial crisis has in turn contributed to this paradigm change, and its effects are felt in the long ter . m 7. Romania is crossing a period where multiple risks, threats and vulnerabilities sometimes intersect and at times overlap, giving rise to unforeseeable effects not only at 5 natio nal or regional level, but also at global level. 8. National security cannot be ensured individually by a sole state, the new challenges of the security environment require effective and efficient collaboration within international cooperation mechanisms and formats. 9. In order to responsibly manage the impact of such strategic surprises, beyond knowledge of evolutions in the security environment, national cohesion and consensus are needed more than ever in facing vital issues for our country. 10. In order to secure necessary resources in the security field, a strong market economy is required, based on free initiative and transparent competition. 11. The strategy aims to set forth the necessary steps for strengthening Romania's strategic **credibility**, by promoting continuity and predictability derived from our NATO and EU membership statute. The extension and consolidation of the Strategic Partnership with the United States of America and of other strategic partnerships are also necessary, along with those of cooperation relations with the other international players. 12. From this perspective, objectives and lines of action regarding national security aim at the consolidation of military and national civil capacities by standards that allow the prevention, deterrence, and defense against any aggressive actions targeting our country. Of equal importance are Romania's active participation in collective defense within NATO, in implementing the solidarity and mutual assistance clause under the provisions of the European Union Lisbon Treaty, as well as in developing the European Common Security and Defense Policy, and the operations related to ensuring the European space of freedom, security and justice. 13. The Strategy defines national security interests and objectives, presents an evaluation of the security environment, identifies the main threats, risks and vulnerabilities related to Romania's fundamental interests and lays out the main lines of action for ensuring national security. 14. The Strategy represents a moral and political duty, taking into consideration that the centennial of the Union of the Romanian Principalities will be celebrated in 2018, and the fact that in 2019, for the first time, Romania will take over the presidency of The Council of the European Union, more than a decade since its EU accession. # Chapter I Defining National **Security** Interests And **Objectives** ## . 1.1. Values And **Principles** 15. As a European country and EU and NATO member, Romania is a democratic and social state of law, which shares the same core values as the other member states: human dignity, civil rights and liberties, free development of the human personality, justice and pluralism, and equality under the law. 16. In defining national security interests and objectives, the Strategy is grounded on the following **values**: **dignity**, viewed as a human being's essential attribute; civic cohesion and assertion of national **identity,** as common aspirations of the community of citizens united within the state; constitutional democracy and the rule of **law,** namely participative political culture, political pluralism, separation and balance of state powers, guaranteeing fundamental civil rights and liberties, and respect towards constitutional and legal provisions; Romania's state and territorial **integrity**, based on citizens' and public institutions' loyalty towards national sovereignty. 17. In order to promote these values, the Strategy is based on respecting the following principles: **continuity**, a principle that derives from the need for coherent policies through which Romania builds its future and integrates within the European and Euro‐Atlantic community. Thus, maintaining the same vision and lines of cooperation within NATO, European Union and our strategic partnerships, mainly the strategic partnership with the US, provides Romania with the conditions required to increase its conflict prevention and crisis management capacity, as well its operational threat‐respons a e cap city; **predictability**, in drawing up and implementing national security policies internally and at a foreign policy level, while firmly respecting the principles, mechanisms and procedures for consultation, decision‐ making and planning rallied in order to enhance Romania's contribution to collective defense; **legality**, a principle that involves the bona *fide* fulfillment of obligations 7 assumed by Romania at the national, European and international level, when acting to ensure and guarantee the defense of the country, of its citizens and of their fundamental rights, as well as when preventing risks, fighting threats and minimizing vulnerabilities that could increase the former; **proportionality**, a principle which aims to identify the adequate lines of action required to ensure national security, determined by the established objectives and assigned resources. 18. In order to safeguard abovementioned values and principles, the Strategy assumes a pragmatic and operational character by encouraging the initiative and the joint effort of institutions authorized for implementing defense and security policies, as well as by efficiently coordinating their actions. ## 1.2. National Security **Interests** 19. In defining national security interests, the Strategy relates mainly to the Constitutional provisions which assert Romania as a national, sovereign, independent and indivisible state. National interests naturally result from these provisions, including security interests, closely related to legitimately promoting and safeguarding the core values that guarantee the existence, the identity, the development and the stability of the Romanian state. These are the core values on which Romania builds its future and contributions for ensuring international security. 20. National security interests are: guaranteeing the state's national character, sovereignty, independence, unity and indivisibility; defending the country's territorial integrity a d inalienabilit n y; defending and consolidating constitutional democracy and the rule of law; protecting fundamental rights and liberties of all citizens and guaranteeing their safety; guaranteeing the right to preservation, development and expression of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of persons belonging to national minorit ; ies capitalizing on our country's resources and geostrategic position, in order to reach the welfare level that citizens are entitled to; reducing development disparities and the reconstruction of major public systems; ensuring the irreversible nature of belonging to the trans‐Atlantic n yst collective defe se s em; consolidating the European Union and actively participating in # 1.3. National Security **Objectives** 21. Promoting national security interests is enabled by the establishment of benchmarks of the s fort, materialized tate ef into national security objectives. 22. From an internal **perspective**, national security objectives regard: the consolidation of the national defense capacity aimed at ensuring Romania's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, as well as the security of the Romanian people; promoting and ensuring the unrestricted exercise of basic rights and liberties; sound functioning of the judiciary and upholding of the rule of law; removing deficiencies affecting good governance, enhancing administrative capacity, protecting the decision‐making process against influences and/or illegitimate or non‐transparent actions; securing efficiency of national crises prevention and management systems, both local and external, as well as military and civil; consolidating security and protection of critical infrastructures – the energy, transport and cyber security sectors – as well as food and environment security; developing capabilities to combat asymmetric threats; securing an efficient, dynamic and competitive economic environment, at an investment and entrepreneurial level, respectively, as well as the state's financial‐budgetary stability; sound, durable and socially adaptable development of major public systems (healthcare, education and social welfare); preventing radical or extremist reactions and tendencies, by observing social plura ism and cultivating l tolerance ithin civil oc ety w s i ; promoting national identity, including by means of preserving and capitalizing on the cultural and natural heritage, as well as by responsibly incentivizing fields of excellence. 23. From the foreign policy **perspective**, Romania must pursue the elaboration of a country profile that matches the level of ambition assumed al the political level, demographic weight and economic development. 24. In this context, national security objectives pursue: strengthening Romania's profile within NATO and the EU, through conceptual, as well as operational contributions; observing the European Union's basic principles and values; consolidating the strategic partnership with the US, including the economic and trade cooperation; ensuring security in the Black Sea region; deepening cooperation with neighboring states and states of NATO's Eastern flank; intensifying regional cooperation, including in the field of defense; upholding the Republic of Moldova's European aspirations; promoting political, economic and security interests in regions strategically relevant for our country. 25. Internal and external objectives will not be attained at the desired scale in the absence of a long‐term country project, assumed by the entire political class, a project able to draw national consensus, in line with national security interests. # Chapter Ii International Security **Environment** Assessment 26. The current security environment within which Romania defends and promotes its values, principles, strategic and security goals and interests is characterized by complexity and dynamism, as a consequence of having revised the strategic and military stance of some states as well as the political, economic and technological interdependences caused by globali o zati n. 27. In perspective, the security environment will be further on influenced by multiple challenges, some of those having predictable and linear manifestations, representing consequences of some strategies aimed at by various state or non‐state actors on long term, while others, on the contrary, have an unpredictable non‐linear and profoundly disruptive charac e hich may generat t r, w e strategic surprises. 28. The European environment is undertaking a demographic transformation process with strategic implications. Demographic transformations are verifiable at statistical level, those will persist for a long time, and their implications are both positive and negative. This type of systemic transformations will impact differently upon the European states and the regions adjacent to those, while their impact upon the European security and Romania's security will be a distinct one, long term speaking. ## 2.1. The Global Security **Environment** 29. At the global level, the security environment is undertaking an ongoing transformation process, which reflects mainly upon highlighting interdependences and unpredictability within international relations system and the difficulty to delimitate classical risks and threats from the asymmetric and hybrid ones. 30. On medium and long term, the evolutions regarding the security environment will be dominated by complex trends, whose knowledge is, for our country, of paramount importance: ● redefining geo‐strategical "games"; ● rapid development of informational technology; ● the resurgence of nationalism and extremism; ● ethnical and religious fragmentation and ideological radicalization; ● adapting critical infrastructures in relation to the occ urrence of calamities, energetic crisis, cyber attacks, pandemics. 31. The high level of uncertainty of the evolutions in the security environment, correlated with internal and external factors which influence Romania's route, impose new ways of acting, based on a medium and long term vision. The dynamics of the current security environment highlights two main challenges: the identification of constancies and foreseeing any possible internal, regional and international phenomena which might impact upon Roman ia's national security. 32. In foreseeing and preventing major security issues at the global level, an important part is played by the United Nations Organization both when it comes to consultations as well as to decision making related to solving some regional crisis. Disputing more frequently lately the international regime of some treaties and understandings regarding armament, deployment and stationing of troops and military capabilities, and the measures to strengthen confidence and security at regional and international level may deepen fragmentation, divisions and cleavages, generating a turbulent reconfiguration at the international relationships level. ## 2.2. Security Dimensions At Euroatlantic **Level** 33. Romania's position on the Eastern flank of the North‐Atlantic Alliance and of the European Union, as well as at the crossroads of some areas with a high security shows that defense and security surpass the area of responsibility of a single state. It is necessary to revisit some concepts and establish new measures to ensure predictability and consensus in handling national instruments both independently, as well as in allied and community context, OSCE being, in this regard, an important element within the European security system. 34. The main warranty provider when it comes to Romania's security is The North Atlantic **Alliance**, the transatlantic relationship representing the strategic binder which awards coherence and consistency to NATO actions. The solidity of the transatlantic relationship depends on the United States' maintaining their commitment in Europe, as well as the way allies and European partners will allot financial assistance to develop their own defense capabilities. 35. An important actor in the European and Euro Atlantic environment is the Russian Federation. Its actions in the Black Sea Region, infringing upon international law, questioning international order, preserving frozen conflicts and the annexation of Crimea have raised again the NATO awareness upon fulfilling its fundamental mission that is collective **defense**, as well as the validity of the security arrangements agreed upon with Russia at the end of the XXth ce ntury. 36. The European security architecture has been under constant threat by crisis and conflicts which are ongoing in the close vicinity, in the East and in the South, which might impact, directly or indirectly upon Romania's national security interests. The recent evolutions in the Eastern Neighborhood, in the Middle East and the Northern **Africa** generate multiple challenges to the security of the community environment, thus the need that the European Union revise and strengthen its policies in the field of security and collective defense and internal affairs becomes more obvious. 37. The emerging terrorist **groups** stimulate the Islamic radicalization phenomenon at European level, highlighting the risks posed by returning to the community environment of the European jihadists, who were had been previously engaged in fights or training programs in state rrorist agen s having a very active te da. 38. The intensification of **migration** from the conflict areas or from areas with a poor economic situation has generated challenges to the capability of some member states to manage the flow of ilegal immigrants and integrate those into the local community. ## 2.3. The Regional Security **Environment** 39. At regional and sub‐regional level, the environment in which Romania defends and promotes its values, principles and interests is going through a new phase of reconfiguration. The current security dynamics may impact both directly and indirectly upon Romania's security situation and the security of its citizens. 40. Romania has an obligation to maintain the strategic balance at the crossroads of some regional security complexes, but also to contribute to the strengthening of the Europeanization process by gradual extension of the European environment of **freedom,** prosperity, security and **justice**. 41. Regional **cooperation**, by strengthening the Eastern and Southern dimensions of the vicinity policies of the European Union, has undergone a constant increase. 42. The Russian **Federation** is trying to consolidate its status as a power at the regional level, its actions having an impact upon regional stability and the European path of Ukraine, The Republic of Moldova and Georgia. 43. The perpetuation of instability in the Western **Balkans** generates populist, extremist, radical and even fundamentalist sideslips by deepening some historical cleavages and by infringing upon the rights of the ethnical communities, encouraging thus organized crime and corruption. 44. The regional energetic **architecture** may undergo alterations determined by possible syncopes in exploiting energetic resources in the Pontic area and developing some energetic projects competitive to those supported by the European Union and Romania. 45. Questioning the liberal values **system**, the sideslips from the state law rules and regulations, the authoritarian drives in exerting power; exacerbation of the nationalist and populist discourse determines the increase of regional instability and the decrease of the security feeling in the area. # Chapter Iii Threats,Risksandvulnerabilities 46. Traditionally, threats, risks and vulnerabilities related to national defense and security are assessed against some military concepts, but the current security environment calls upon an extended approach, within which one could find, besides the security related issues, the economic, social, political, technological and environment issues. 47. Threats represent capabilities, strategies, intentions or plans which may impact upon the national security values, interests and goals. 48. Risks represent the probability of manifestation of an uncertain event, having direct or indirect impact upon national security. 49. Vulnerabilities are consequences of some systemic disruptions or shortcomings, which may be exploited or may contribute to the occurrence of a threat or of a risk. 50. The deterioration of the security situation at the international level, but especially at the regional level, calls upon knowing the main threats, risks and vulnerabilities our country confronts with, in the context of the occurrence and, possibly, development of a new form of influence and constraint, as a result of a mixture of conventional and unconventional components. ## . 3.1. **Threats** 51. The actions performed to **destabilize** the Eastern vicinity generate major challenges to the security of the Euro Atlantic environment, causing regional instability and possible negative phenomena, amongst which we can mention migration, organized crime, and also alteration of the economic growth potential. 52. The perpetuation of the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea Region and the instability in the Western **Balkans** generate additional pressures for Romania. Inter‐ ethnical tensions and the regional imbalances in the states situated at the proximity may lead to the unleash of some regional conflicts. 53. The distortions on the energetic **markets** and the competitive projects of some state or non‐state actors alter Romania's efforts to provide a sufficient level of energetic security. 14 54. The cyber **threats** initiated by hostile entities, state or non‐state, upon informational infrastructures posing strategic interest of the public institutions and companies, the cyber attacks performed by cyber crime groups or the extremist cyber attacks initiated by hackers alter d y Roma irectl nia's national security. 55. **Terrorism** is a persistent threat, having forms of manifestation very difficult to foresee and counter, including from the perspective of identification and de‐structuring the flows of recruitment and financing those activities. The national contingencies which take part in missions abroad are exposed to risks and threats generated by the actions of the terrorist forces, organizations and groups. The increasing fundamentalist propaganda, especially virtually, favors the appearance of new cases of radicalization or of implication in terrorist extremist actions. 56. The proliferation of the weapons of mass‐destruction proliferation and of the bearing **vectors**, as well as the traffic of dual‐use products, may alter national security in the context of a destabilization at the regional level. 57. The hostile informational **actions**, which trigger the development of some support points on national territory, especially with an influential purpose, may impede Romania's strategic projects and its decisions at the state level. ## 3.2. **Risks** 58. Regional **instability** limits Romania's ability to promote its strategic interests, especially those regarding supporting Moldova's European route, solving the frozen conflicts, ensuring energetic security, protecting the rights of the Romanian communities and of the economic activities performed in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Romania at the Black Sea. 59. The un‐fulfillment of Romania's **development** goals can be generated by the persistence of the economic difficulties, proliferation of the underground economy and of corruption, tax evasion, the insecurity of infrastructure, as well as by external factors such as the perpetuation of the development gaps at the European Union level and the low degree of resistance to the major issues on the external markets, especially in the financial‐banking area. 60. Risks of social **nature** persist on the background of some trends such as the demographic fall, the migration of the active population, the degradation of the environment factors, the shortcomings/deficiencies in the national health, education and social assistance systems, but also the distortions on the labor market. 61. Radicalization of the extremist **entities** present on Romania's national territory may occur in the context of the intensification of the extremist flows of ethnic or religious nature or of any other nature. 62. Border **criminality** from drugs, people, armament and goods smuggling, illegal migration to economic‐financial criminality is another phenomenon which might impact upon Romania's national security. 63. Illegal smuggling of conventional **armament** may derive from some state or non‐ state actors' interest to perform such operations, targeting conflict areas or areas having a potential to turn into an armed conflict. 64. Risks with low probability, but major **impact** remain of interest for national security: military confrontations of low intensity, but persistent in time, migration flows generated by natural disasters, pandemics, ecologic disasters. ## 3.3. **Vulnerabilities** 65. The ability of the state institutions to assess and diminish the impact of risks and threats is limited by the persistence of some vulnerability in: absorption of European funds, using public funds, energy, critical infrastructure, agriculture, environment protection, justice, health, education and scientific **research**. The inexistence of a real multiannual budget planning to determine taking the responsibility for and fulfillment of some investment programs has negative effects, including in relation to increasing the capabilities of the armed forces nd following commitments regarding military expenditure a . 66. The ability of the central and local administration to implement national and European public **policies** represents another vulnerability. 67. The inter‐institutional reaction in crisis situations is altered by the **insecurity** of resources and the incoherence in managing various types of risks. This vulnerability becomes even more important if we refer to the interoperability ability of various state institutions which must take actions should any asymmetric or hybrid threats occur. 68. **Corruption** makes the state vulnerable, generates prejudices to economy and alters the country's development potential, the governance in good conditions, the decision‐making process in the best interest of the citizens and of the community, as well as the confidence in justice and state institutions. Externally, the persistence of corruption has negative impact upon credibility and our country's image. 69. Other vulnerabilities derive from exclusion and social polarization, the poverty degree, the demographic fall, migration of the specialized work force, the socio‐economic disparities between regions and counties, the fragility of the spirit and the civic solidarity. # Chapter Iv Lines Of Action And Main **Ways** To Ensure Romania'S National **Security** ## . 4.1. **Premises** 70. The national security goals and interests represent the basis on which the main directions and the ways to ensure the national security are grounded in a dynamic and complex international security environment. Furthermore, the lines of actions come under the obligation to prevent, fight and respond to potential threats, risks and vulnerabilities that Romania may face over the following five years and in the long run, in a credible manner, under the constitutional principle of unitary coordination. 71. The lines of action and ways to ensure Romania's national security aim at: Strengthening strategic **credibility** through stability and predictability, both at home and abroad. Consolidating strategic credibility is based on strengthening the defense capabilities, public order and security at national level, as well as on securing a collective response regarding the defense of the Euro‐Atlantic space and a joint reaction needed for the consolidation of freedom, security and justice w t e ro i hin th Eu pean space; Ensuring a congruous legal **framework,** both for the unitary coordination of activities on the country's defense and national security at the level of the Supreme Council of National Defense, as well as for the organization and functioning of institutions with competence in the field, in line with new security challenges, and particularly for a full adjustment to the NATO and EU membership condition. A legal framework tailored to the requirements of collective defense principles of the European space of freedom, security and justice, calls for security strengthening by enhancing the respect for the basic rights and the principles of constitutional democracy; Enhancing inter‐institutional **collaboration** to identify and meet strategic national security goals. This will be the key element needed for transition from a sector wide approach to a more coherent and flexible inter‐institutional planning conception; Focusing on **prevention** and preventive mechanisms in the field of national security and country's defense, namely better anticipation, knowledge, and construction of an integrated responsiveness, that should be balanced, flexible and supple. In the current context, besides ## 17 knowing the risks and threats, in all aspects – sources, ways of expression, means and techniques – developing the anticipation capacity, based on knowledge and education, is fundamental. To this end, developing appropriate systems for the early spotting of dangers, risks and threats, with a view to preventing their occurrence, through a combined use of military means and civil instru ments, is mandatory; Allocating resources through an **integrated**, continuous, multi‐annual and rigorous planning **process**, able to respond both to new inter‐ institutional planning demands, at a national level, and to rigors of principles of multi‐annual budget planning habitual to NATO and the EU. ## 4.2. Lines Of Action And Main **Ways** To Ensure National **Security** 4.2.1. The Defense **Dimension** 72. Romania must concentrate strategic efforts for the defense and the security of its citizens and of the national territory, as well as for granting support to allied and partner states, in accordance with commitments made under international treaties. To this end, developing the capacity to respond to new security environment challenges, and preparing the population and terr defense are necessary actions. itory for 73. Lines of **action** aim at: consolidating the national defense capacity, which includes the efficient use of NATO mechanisms; continuing the transformation, modernization and procurement of Romania's armed forces, by allotting at least 2% of the GDP to the Defense budget, yearly, for 10 years time, as of 2017; developing the capacities required to respond in case of asymmetric and hybrid threats; deepening the security dimension of the Strategic Partnership with the US, by consolidating military cooperation, including the national territory and the Black Sea region; reaching performance standards needed to achieve interoperability with armies of other member states and bringing in line legal and normative provisions regulating the training a tion of armed for nd instruc ces; adapting the security industry to the armed forces' equipment requirements and to the competitive environment; developing cooperation in the field of security industry with states of the Euro‐Atlantic space, by capitalizing on multinational cooperation opportunities, amid NATO and EU initiatives; consolidating the national role and presence in civil missions and military operations through participation in monitoring missions and crisis management in areas of priority interest for Romania. ## 4.2.2. The Public Order **Dimension** 74. Lines of action in this field will particularly target: increasing the citizens' level of security by protecting their life, bodily integrity and ownership rights; identifying and counteracting activities conducted by organized cross‐ border crime networks and dismantling criminal groups; preventing and fighting against tax fraud and other forms of economic and financial crime; fighting against drug consumption and trafficking; securing the border, particularly the external frontier of the European Union, in order to combat illegal migration, human trafficking and other risks bearing an impact on national security; increasing the responsiveness and management of the emergency situations; enhancing road and transports safety; ensuring human resources, as well as material, financial and informational means needed for maintaining and developing the operational capacity of relevant institutions, based on a rigorous planning process. ## 4.2.3. The Intelligence, Counterintelligence And Security **Dimension** 75. With respect to this dimension, lines of action aim at: defending constitutional order and values; identifying and signaling acts of corruption; drawing attention to systemic dysfunctions in ensuring vital services for the populat on, a well as fl ws in major public systems; i s a identifying and signaling dysfunctions, risks and threats regarding: energy security; the management of EU funds; the functioning of financial markets; population food safety; environment safety; regional and transport infrastructure development objectives; identifying interferences that can affect economic and financial decision‐ making at a strategic level and combating large‐scale tax fraud acts; ensuring mechanisms to prevent and counteract cyber attacks targeting informational infrastructures of strategic interest, associated with promotion of national interests in the field of cyber security; identifying nd c unteracti g as a o n ymmetric and hybrid actions; identifying and signaling deficiencies in the optimum functioning of critical infrastructures; preventing and fighting terrorism; knowing, preventing and eliminating risks and threats generated by hostile intelligence actions, securing counterintelligence protection of national interests, as well as of classified information; identifying and counteracting organized cross‐border crime carrying out activities with a high economic and social risk, and preventing their access to the state's decision‐making mechanisms and national economic resources; knowing the objectives, resources and lines of development of clandestine arming programs concerning conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction and carrying vectors, as well as counteracting illegal transfers of strategic products. ## 4.2.4. The **Econo** Mic And Energetic **Dimension** 76. Lines of actio n in this field are: promoting free initiative and protecting private property; ensuring the competitive framework and competitiveness by reducing factors that affect the sound functioning of the business environment; ensuring transparency of local markets and their capacity to function connectedly with external markets; ensuring energy security by effective adjustment and streamlining of the primary energy resources consumption structure, increasing energy efficiency, developing projects aimed at ensuring diversification of access to resources, increasing the interconnectedness and competitiveness capacity, including by the implementation of the Energy Union's objectives; promoting policies that reduce the development gap between the country's various regions; developing and streamlining infrastructure networks; consolidating local capital; preventing and counteracting factors generating risks to the population's food safety and environment security. # 4.2.5. The Diplomatic **Dimension** 77. In this field, li nes of action, upheld by active diplomacy, are: consolidating strategic dialogue within the European Union, NATO and other inte national cooperation formats; r fostering strategic partnerships, by extending cooperation in the economic field; enhancing cooperation with states from NATO's Eastern flank, in trilateral and bilateral formats; promoting the Black Sea's strategic significance and cooperation formats in the area; involving Romania in the reflection process regarding the OSCE's future role; upholding public diplomacy actions to promote national security interests and support undertaken objectives, in cooperation with other public or private institutions. ## 4.2.6. The Crisis Management **Dimension** 78. Lines of action in this field particularly aim at: upgrading the national integrated crisis management system; preparing institutions and the population for crisis and civil emergency situations, including through mobilization training and drills, as well as through international cooperation; preparing decision‐makers to take action and make decisions during crisis situations; ensuring material and human resources required by institutions with competence in crisis management, in line with a planning process. ## 4.2.7. The Educational, Healthcare, Social And Demographic **Dimension** 79. Current challenges regarding Romania's security call for the development of a creative intellectual system, where education, healthcare and the social **factor** should prevail. 80. Lines of action in this field will primarily aim at: drawing up a large‐scale national education project, aimed at ensuring planning mechanisms for curricula, projects and achievements; motivating scientific research, in correspondence with the education system, as a key process in comprehending the nature of current threats and challenges; fostering the security culture, including through continuous education, aimed at promoting values, norms, attitudes or actions allowing for the assimilation of the national security concept; boosting the responsiveness of the public healthcare system in case of pandemics or emergency situatio s; n shaping the healthcare system by placing the patient/citizen at the center of this system; linking labor market policies to healthcare and education policies, in order to s pport sustainable development processes; u adopting coherent measures aimed at reducing the degree of deterioration of demographic situations and at scaling down development gaps at territorial level. # Final **Considerations** 81. In the spirit of values and principles on the grounds of which the Strategy was set up, meeting its goals entails a joint effort at the level of the political class and the civil society, as well as the efficient use of our country's human, material and financial resources. It is desirable that the political class take on the worded interests and objectives, by ensuring decision transparency and the judicious use of public funds, and that the civil society become involved in the development of the security culture and in the open debate of security issues. 82. Strategic consistency and coherence rely on the convergence of objectives and lines of action put forward by the National Defense Strategy, the Programme for Government and the planning documents at the NATO and the EU level. This convergence must be pursued through setting up priorities and making objectives viable, budget planning and proper resource allocation. 83. A necessary condition for making the Strategy operational is the revision of the legislative framework in the field of national security. Beside flaws displayed in time, this revision must take into consideration the new threats and the need to observe civil rights and liberties. In order to attain the objectives and to accomplish the directions shouldered by the current Strategy, institutions with competence in the field will elaborate the subsequent sector wide strategies, programs and activity plans.