## Secure Together ##### Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki **NEW ZEALAND’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2023-2028** TE RAUTAKI WHAKAMARU Ā-MOTU O AOTEAROA 2023-2028 ----- ### Everyone is welcomed to gather under our korowai manaaki of national security. **It is a cloak of protection that uplifts the mana of** **since passed away. Here, 51 hukahuka** **us all. The harakeke fibre threads that weave** **strands represent the shuhada of the** **together our korowai represent a desire for us** **15 March terrorist attack on Christchurch** **all to work together to protect and offer shelter** **mosques. We acknowledge them, their** **to each other, now and into the future.** **whānau, and survivors and witnesses** **of the attacks.** **The waving hukahuka (tassels) on the** **korowai manaaki signify ancestors that have** **Kia ora tātou katoa** ----- Tuia i runga Weave from above Tuia i raro Weave from below Tuia i roto Weave from within Tuia i waho Weave from the surrounding environment Tuia te muka tangata Weave to connect the people Ka rongo te pō Through the peace of night Ka rongo te ao Through the peace of day Hāumi e Join! Hui e Gather! Tāiki e Unite! ----- #### Ngā ihirangi Contents Kupu Takamua nā te Pirimia | Foreword from the Prime Minister i Tirohanga Whānui | Overview ii Kupu Whakataki | Introduction 1 **Wāhanga І | Part І** Tirohanga Rautaki | Security Outlook 4 Te Whāinga | Approach 8 Hōtaka Mahi | Programme of Action 2023-2025 11 Mahi ngātahi ā-ao | Working Together Internationally 14 **Wāhanga ІІ | Part ІІ** Ngā Take Whakamaru ā-Motu Matua me ngā Take e Kōtuitui **Core National Security Issues and Connected Issues** 16 Ngā Take Whakamaru ā-Motu Matua **Core National Security Issues** 19 - Tātāwhāinga ā-Rautaki me te Pūnaha i Poua ki ngā Ture ā-Ao | **Strategic Competition and the Rules-based International System** 19 - Ngā Hangarau Whanake, Waiwai, Matatapu hoki | **Emerging, Critical, and Sensitive Technologies** 20 - Te Kōrero Whakatuapeka | Disinformation 21 - Ngā Raweketanga o Rāwāhi | Foreign Interference and Espionage 22 - Te Whakatuatea me te Angahāruki Kaikoka | Terrorism and Violent Extremism 23 - Te Taihara Nahanaha Whiti Pae Whenua | Transnational Organised Crime 24 - Whakamaru Ohaoha | Economic Security 25 - Te Manawaroa me te Whakamaru o Te Moana-nui-a-Kiwa | **Pacific Resilience and Security** 26 - Whakamaru-ā-Moana | Maritime Security 27 - Whakamaru Pae Kati | Border Security 29 - Whakamaru ā-Ipurangi | Cyber Security 30 - Whakamaru ā-Tuarangi | Space Security 31 Ngā take e kōtuituia nei | Connected Issues 32 Te Anga Whakamua | Looking forward 34 Te Mahi Ngātahi i te Whakahaumarutanga ā-Motu | Working Together on National Security 35 ----- #### Kupu Takamua nā te Pirimia Foreword from the Prime Minister **National security is fundamental to our country and our people. Our wellbeing and** **prosperity depend on our ability to protect ourselves from threats at home while being** **able to advance our interests globally. This has always been the case for New Zealand,** **but we now have a new sense of urgency and a need to grow our capability. Recent** **events and global trends have shown that we have to be better prepared for a shifting** **world and new challenges at home.** The horrific events of 15 March, 2019 changed We do things our own way in New Zealand, and our country forever. They shattered not only the our approach to national security is no different. lives of those directly affected, but also our sense _Secure Together reflects our unique geography,_ that our geographical location might protect us history and values as a basis for how we can from the gravest security threats. In response, navigate a more contested and disrupted world. the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry The Strategy underscores the importance to into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques New Zealand of a peaceful, stable, and resilient (the Royal Commission) underscored the need Pacific, and recognises the value that close for stronger leadership, clearer direction and international partnerships contribute on every better accountability to the public on national security challenge we face. It acknowledges security. It challenged government to develop a our commitment to human rights, the rule of law, new conversation with New Zealanders about the and te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty of Waitangi. national security challenges we face. National security is one part of our collective We are making changes. Working with our aspiration for New Zealand and our future. It sits communities, Australia, Pacific nations and alongside other significant measures to improve other close partners, we are building a secure the lives of New Zealanders as we tackle issues and resilient nation that contributes to a more such as climate change, strengthen social cohesion peaceful and stable world. In doing so, we need and build economic prosperity. to improve our ability to anticipate challenges and protect the things we value most. As our first ever National Security Strategy, Secure _Together provides a foundation from which we can_ To guide us in this, we have developed face the challenges ahead and seize opportunities New Zealand’s first ever National Security to better protect our country. Strategy, Secure Together. It embeds the lessons of the Royal Commission and sets a vision for our national security that promotes a focused and integrated approach—one that positions us to act early to prevent threats whenever possible. **Chris Hipkins** Prime Minister and Minister for National Security and Intelligence ----- #### Tirohanga Whānui Overview **National security is about protecting New Zealand from threats that would do** **us harm. It is the foundation for New Zealand’s overall prosperity and wellbeing.** New Zealand is a liberal democracy based on a bicultural relationship and te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty of Waitangi. Our connections to the world have brought opportunity, prosperity, and a more diverse New Zealand. They are a source of strength and resilience. And yet these connections also mean New Zealand is exposed to global trends and an **increasingly disrupted and contested world with** direct implications at home. This new level of challenge, as well as the need to embed the lessons from the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques, means it is time to update our approach to national security. This Strategy puts in place an approach focused on **acting early and working together to create a more** secure New Zealand, now and into the future. APPROACH VISION At the heart of our national security approach is a whole-of-society vision: ###### A secure and resilient Aotearoa New Zealand— one that is protected as a free, open, and democratic society for future generations Our open society and democratic values enable New Zealanders’ diverse ways of life and pursuit of opportunities. We advance this vision by working together across New Zealand society, with our Australian ally, and international partners. INTERESTS **Protecting New Zealand from threats that would do us harm means safeguarding:** **whole-of-society vision:** Our open society and democratic values enable New Zealanders’ diverse ways of life and pursuit of opportunities. We advance this vision by working together across New Zealand society, with our Australian ally, and international partners. - Our people, land, and waters - Our independence and freedom of action - Our democracy and social fabric - Our national economic security - Our connections to the world, both physical and digital - A peaceful and resilient Pacific - A strong rules-based international system in the Indo-Pacific and beyond - A robust network of partnerships within and beyond New Zealand ----- **A resilient society, informed** **An effective national** ###### 3 **and engaged on national** **security system** **security challenges** **PRIORITY: Leading an** **PRIORITY: Working** integrated approach together to foster collective understanding and approaches describes how government will advance these priorities over the next two years. It includes two major initiatives: reform of the national security system, and fostering a public conversation on national security. It is important for New Zealanders to be empowered with information about the challenges we face, what government is doing to protect New Zealand, and what role they can play. While government is responsible for national security, New Zealanders can contribute to our collective security and resilience. New Zealand’s strong network of international partners is also integral to our national security. Every day the national security community works on the issues that most directly affect New Zealand’s national security interests. These core national security issues include: - Strategic competition and the rules-based international system - Emerging, critical, and sensitive technologies - Disinformation - Foreign interference and espionage - Terrorism and violent extremism - Transnational organised crime - Economic security - Pacific resilience and security - Maritime security - Border security - Cyber security - Space security **CONTRIBUTE?** Being aware Leading in and informed your community Taking measures to Contacting protect yourself and government if those around you concerned Lending your expertise and knowledge ----- #### Kupu Whakataki Introduction 1. **New Zealand is deeply engaged in our region and the world. With this connection** **comes opportunity, prosperity, and a more diverse country. Our openness to the world** **is part of our identity—one of our greatest strengths and sources of resilience.** 2. But like other countries, New Zealand is affected by global trends and an increasingly complex international security environment. Where we as New Zealanders once saw ourselves as largely protected from threats by geography, we now experience a virtual distance measured in seconds and keystrokes. Threats are reaching **New Zealanders more directly.** 3. In recent years, New Zealand communities have seen and felt the impacts of national security events first hand. Horrific terrorist attacks, growing disinformation, and cyber-attacks on critical national infrastructure have all left indelible marks. Other harms, such as foreign interference, may be less visible but are no less harmful to our security. These challenges demonstrate that **threats to our security can have international** **or domestic origins and, increasingly, these** **two elements are intertwined.** 4. This is just as true for our Blue Ocean Continent, Te Moana-nui-a-Kiwa. Together with our Pacific neighbours through the 2018 Boe Declaration we have recognised an array of challenges to regional security, including external interference and coercion, cyber vulnerabilities, and transnational crime, as well as the threat of climate change to all aspects of the Pacific’s way of life. We must continue to work together on these shared challenges. 5. Our national security depends on the rules-based international system—the institutions, rules, and norms that shape how New Zealand works with the world, how our voice is heard, and our interests realised. 6. The rules-based system is under sustained pressure from several sources. This makes it more difficult to foster international cooperation on emerging challenges and to prevent crossborder threats. These threats are not future challenges—they are already impacting the lives of New Zealanders and New Zealand’s national security today. **Meeting the challenge on our terms** 7. These challenges mean it is time to update our approach to national security—that we need a new level of focus on protecting New Zealand **from threats that would do us harm.** 8. Government’s approach to national security is based on New Zealand’s unique character and values. This starts with affirming the foundation of te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty of Waitangi. This Strategy reflects government’s duty, under kāwanatanga (governance), to protect all New Zealanders. It is a starting point for forging a stronger relationship between Māori and the Crown in national security—a korowai (cloak) of protection that both parties can weave together. We are committed to developing a national security community that promotes: - A partnership where both parties act honourably, reasonably, and in good faith, and where the Crown makes informed decisions in areas of national security that impact Māori interests. - Better understanding of, and ability to address, the threats faced by Māori in order to actively **protect Māori interests, which are broad and** nuanced, extending from Māori themselves, to property and culture, to the integrity of New Zealand’s democratic institutions. - The participation of Māori in the national security workforce, and the valuing of te ao Māori in national security policy and practice. 9. New Zealand is a liberal democracy that upholds human rights and civil liberties, and is committed to being a good global citizen, supporting the rules-based system, and working with our international partners. 10. Even in a disrupted world, we seek opportunities. We cut an independent path and at the same time make common cause with those who share our interests and values. Our partnerships are vital to being able to protect the national security of New Zealand and to promote our national security interests regionally and globally. ----- 11. **Our vision for national security is positive** **and intergenerational. It is about building** a secure and resilient society that enables New Zealanders’ diverse ways of life and pursuit of opportunities. 12. Government’s approach to national security focuses on prevention—to the greatest degree possible, getting ahead of threats to New Zealand whether they have domestic or international origins. Acting early at home and overseas is critical to protecting our security. Treating threats early results in less harm for the whole of New Zealand. This complements a consistent focus on building resilience and readiness when prevention is not possible. 13. We can all play a role in national security. **Working together is essential. This includes** cooperation across New Zealand society as well as internationally. While government is responsible for national security, New Zealanders, our communities, iwi and hapū, the private sector, academia, media, central and local government, and our ally and international partners all contribute to a more secure New Zealand. 14. Working together across New Zealand society means talking to people more openly about national security. This begins with enhanced transparency from government where possible. While some information should remain classified to protect New Zealand’s interests, sources, and methods, government can make more information available and accessible to New Zealanders. A more informed society is a **more resilient society, and this Strategy serves** as a foundation for developing this conversation. 15. The national security community must also be more joined-up. This involves stronger leadership and clearer ways to hold government to account. **What is in this Strategy** 16. New Zealand’s first National Security Strategy adopts a new approach, incorporating the lessons of the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques. It also takes a significant step forward in transparency, openly describing the national security challenges we face and the work of the national security community. 17. **Part I describes New Zealand’s security** **outlook and a new approach to national** **security. This includes outcomes and priorities,** with a Programme of Action that sets out steps towards meeting these priorities. 18. **Part II describes government’s work** in protecting New Zealanders through examination of 12 dynamic and evolving core **issues—those issues that have the greatest** impact on our national security interests. It also recognises broader drivers of insecurity— **connected issues—which can have national** security implications. 19. We will adapt to a changing world and build a more secure New Zealand together. This Strategy is an overarching approach for national security. It complements a number of existing strategies and policies, which remain in effect, with updates to be guided by the National Security Strategy. These include the: - Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy - Cyber Security Strategy - Maritime Security Strategy - Transnational Organised Crime Strategy - Pacific Resilience Strategy - Mass Arrivals Prevention Strategy - Defence Policy Statements and White Papers - National Space Policy - Border Security Strategy ----- # Wāhanga I Part I ----- #### Tirohanga Rautaki Security Outlook Strategic competition Challenges Transboundary to democracy challenges ----- **TIROHANGA RAUTAKI | SECURITY OUTLOOK** 31. Supporting the present rules-based system is **more important than ever. This includes support** for the rules-based system in the Pacific, which has real impacts on how we and our Pacific partners are able to pursue our interests and protect our people. **_Geopolitical change and rules at risk_** 32. Some of the most significant challenges to the rules-based system come from authoritarian countries violating rules and norms—including undermining the sovereignty of smaller countries—and efforts to change, erode, or reinterpret the rules themselves. 33. **Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a direct** challenge to the United Nations Charter and state sovereignty, and the source of great human suffering. But even before this invasion, we witnessed Russia challenging other states’ sovereignty, engaging in globally disruptive cyberattacks, and seeking to undermine democratic elections in Europe and the United States. The impacts of its efforts to spread disinformation around the world have been seen in New Zealand and the Pacific. All of these actions create significant and wide-reaching disruptions. 34. **China’s rise is a major driver of geopolitical** **change. China can play a significant role in** addressing global challenges and is an important relationship for New Zealand. Our national interests require continued engagement with China, and cooperation where our interests converge. At the same time, China has become more assertive and more willing to challenge existing international rules and norms. We have seen the building of military bases in disputed areas of the South China Sea, and the use of economic coercion. Chinese state-sponsored actors have exploited cyber vulnerabilities in New Zealand in ways that undermine our security. **_Strategic competition raises the risk of conflict_** 35. Our wider Indo-Pacific region is at the centre of strategic competition. There are concerns over potential flashpoints including Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. North Korea continues to destabilise the Korean Peninsula. In any of these instances, even tensions that fall **short of full conflict could have unpredictable but** **significant impacts on trade and supply chains,** with global effects, including for New Zealand and the rules-based international system. 36. More broadly, the erosion of the arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation architecture has negatively impacted strategic stability. **_Pressures in the Pacific_** 37. **Climate change is the single greatest threat** to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of Pacific peoples, with increasingly severe impacts including sea-level rise, more extreme weather events, freshwater shortages, pressure on food stocks, and migration—both internal and cross-border. 38. Additional challenges in the Pacific come together as compounding pressures, including development challenges, demographic and resource pressures, economic issues like indebtedness and inflation, transnational threats, and more. This layering of challenges also reduces the region’s resilience to the negative effects of strategic competition. 39. **Increasing great power attention to the region** brings opportunity in terms of finance and investments. But how these investments are made matters. We encourage countries from beyond the region to work through existing architecture, support Pacific priorities, and to be transparent with their intentions. 40. China’s development cooperation has become a key lever to achieve its long-term ambitions in the Pacific. Its efforts to develop ports and airports in the region bring the possibility that these could become dual-use facilities (serving both civilian and military purposes) or fully fledged military bases in the future, which would fundamentally alter the strategic balance in the region. The 2022 China-Solomon Islands security agreement and ongoing attempts to create new groupings in the Pacific demonstrate China’s ambition to link economic and security cooperation, create competing regional architectures, and expand its influence with Pacific Island countries across policing, defence, digital, and maritime spheres. ----- THE PACIFIC REGION **_Challenges to cooperation in a more_** **_fractured world_** 41. Sustained engagement by the United States and other like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific and the Pacific is critical for New Zealand’s security. 42. Unfolding competition is likely to continue to promote increased cooperation among smaller groupings of like-minded countries, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, and the AUKUS security partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 43. As the number of groupings in the Indo-Pacific continues to grow, New Zealand remains committed to working closely with a range of partners to preserve an open, inclusive, stable, **and prosperous Indo-Pacific, both through** opportunities to deepen our cooperation with close partners and by upholding ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) centrality. 44. These challenges to cooperation mean it will be difficult to create new rules of the road for **emerging issues, from ethical standards around** AI, to norms on geo-engineering in response to the climate crisis, among others. **Transboundary challenges** 45. New Zealand has long had to protect itself from a variety of global transboundary challenges that have the potential to cross our border and impact individuals, iwi and hapū, our communities, businesses, and both central and local government. **Transboundary threats increasingly intersect** with each other in complex ways, and technology can extend their reach. 46. As we know from the tragic terrorist attacks on our own soil, New Zealand is not immune from the threat of violent extremism and terrorism. The overall trend in developed countries is towards smaller-scale attacks by lone actors using easily obtainable weapons. There is no single pathway ----- **TIROHANGA RAUTAKI | SECURITY OUTLOOK** to radicalisation and then violence. In the online environment, individuals will continue to engage with content that reinforces personal grievances, normalises violence, and exposes them to violent extremist material. 47. **Disinformation will continue to pose ongoing** threats to democracy and social cohesion around the world, with the potential to undermine the integrity of elections and the peaceful transition of power. 48. **Foreign interference—an act by a foreign state,** often acting through a proxy, that is intended to influence, disrupt or subvert national interests by deceptive, corruptive or coercive means—and **espionage will remain a major challenge for** liberal democracies worldwide. New Zealand and our Pacific neighbours are and will remain targets of foreign interference and espionage, with some countries likely to keep trying to penetrate our government networks, acquire sensitive research, co-opt influential figures, monitor dissidents, and influence media for their own benefit. Known interference activities have been targeted at New Zealand’s political, academic, media and private sectors, and communities. 49. Powerful global suppliers remain focused on growing the illicit drug market in New Zealand. We will continue to be exposed to networks dealing in illicit firearms, human trafficking and people smuggling, and other forms of **transnational organised crime. Technologies** will enable these groups and networks to engage in illicit activities and transactions with growing anonymity, skill, and ease. 50. The cyber domain is increasingly a theatre for strategic competition and profit. The likelihood and disruptive impacts of malicious cyber **activities impacting information systems,** telecommunication networks, and information technology infrastructures is growing. 51. **Emerging technologies such as AI,** biotechnologies, robotics, and quantum computing are developing rapidly and create opportunities, but can also be used to enable or commit harmful activity and have the potential to create highly disruptive social and economic changes. Countries will face stark choices related to research and supply chains. 52. New Zealand has an expansive maritime area of responsibility and faces a variety of challenges in **maritime security, including threats to freedom** of navigation and overflight, and maritime claims that are inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Competition for marine resources in our region is increasing, exacerbated by climate change, marine pollution, biosecurity threats, and over-exploitation. **Challenges to democracies** 53. This dynamic mix of strategic competition and transnational threats forms a challenging context. **Many of these trends disproportionately affect** **open societies.** 54. Globally, there is a sense that governments are not able to solve the most pressing issues of our time, from immigration to economic inequities. This has led to populist movements, which have moved several democracies towards more illiberal approaches. Disinformation is an exacerbating factor, becoming relevant where vulnerabilities already exist. 55. New Zealand is not immune from the root causes undermining democracy elsewhere, including **growing wealth inequality, decreasing trust** **in institutions, and a decreasing sense of** **belonging, including among young people and** those historically marginalised. 56. The pandemic has demonstrated that the exercise of state powers in ways that affect people’s daily lives can produce extreme reactions. This cycle may well play out again in countries around the world with regards to climate change policies, and responses to other emerging threats that may require changes to our ways of life. 57. Even in the face of new challenges, we believe that democracy is the most resilient form of government, and we will continue to protect our open society for future generations. ----- #### Te Whāinga Approach 58. **National security is fundamental to New Zealand’s prosperity and wellbeing. To** **sustain strong foundations, we need a clear sense of what we want to protect at** **home and abroad—a positive, intergenerational vision and a set of interests that** **reflect who we are as a country, including our unique history, culture, and values.** ###### National security is about protecting New Zealand from threats that would do us harm. PRINCIPLES 59. The agencies of the national security community bring together a range of tools—diplomacy, defence, intelligence, law enforcement, and more—to promote and protect these interests. 60. To work towards our vision of a secure and resilient New Zealand requires protecting New Zealand from threats (Outcome 1), a resilient society that is informed and engaged on national security challenges (Outcome 2), and an effective national security community (Outcome 3). 61. The national security community has identified the highest priority actions to make progress toward each of these three outcomes. These priority actions recognise the pressing need to adapt to meet the challenges of our evolving security environment. Each requires continuous improvement, including capability building and investment in partnerships. 62. A Programme of Action describes how government will advance these priorities over the next two years. After this establishment phase, government will issue a Programme of Action on an annual basis. 63. In all the work the national security community undertakes, it will be guided by the following principles: The national security community is committed to building trust and confidence with New Zealanders. This depends on being ethical and fair, reflected in the concept of matatika. The community’s commitment to protect New Zealanders is grounded in respect for universal human rights and civil liberties. **Māramatanga** Acting with insight and understanding The national security community is committed to drawing on diverse sources of knowledge and insight to understand our national security challenges, and to enable Us to act early to protect all New Zealanders. **Whakapai** Fostering improvement To better protect New Zealanders, the national security community needs to adapt its approach as the environment changes. The community embraces the concept of whakapai—a reflection of an enduring commitment to listening, learning, and to fostering a culture of continuous improvement. **Matatika** Being ethical and fair The national security community is committed to building trust and confidence with New Zealanders. This depends on being ethical and fair, reflected in the ----- **TE WHĀINGA | APPROACH** NATIONAL SECURITY VISION AND INTERESTS VISION At the heart of our national security approach is a **whole-of-society vision:** ###### A secure and resilient Aotearoa New Zealand—one that is protected as a free, open, and democratic society for future generations Our open society and democratic values enable New Zealanders’ diverse ways of life and pursuit of opportunities. We advance this vision by working together across New Zealand society and with our Australian ally and international partners. INTERESTS Protecting New Zealand from threats that would do us harm means safeguarding: **Our people, land, and waters** Protecting New Zealanders at home and abroad. Ensuring our continued territorial integrity, including our responsibilities to the Realm, and safeguarding our wider maritime region. This involves delivering on our search and rescue responsibilities, protecting our Exclusive Economic Zone, and safeguarding our interests in the sub-Antarctic Islands and Ross Dependency. **Our independence and freedom of action** Preserving our ability to take independent decisions and actions, free from coercion at home, in the region, and beyond. **Our democracy and social fabric** Protecting the integrity of our democratic institutions, norms, processes, and unique constitutional arrangements from deliberate interference and safeguarding an open, inclusive society, grounded in respect for universal human rights and the rule of law. **Our national economic security** Preventing and protecting against actions and developments that threaten the viability of our national economy, including disruptions to critical national infrastructure, supply lines, attacks on our financial institutions, and economic coercion by foreign states. **Our connections to the world, both physical and digital** Protecting our information and communication technologies, undersea cables, sea lines of communication, and our connections to space. **A peaceful and resilient Pacific** Protecting and promoting a peaceful, stable, and resilient Pacific region underpinned by Pacific regionalism. This includes all Pacific nations having the freedom to act in support of shared interests and values. **A strong rules-based international** **system in the Indo-Pacific and beyond** Protecting and shaping a regional and global rules-based system centred on liberal democratic values and multilateralism, underpinned by a commitment to the sovereign equality of all states. **A robust network of partnerships within and beyond New Zealand** Safeguarding and advancing our relationships with iwi/Māori as our Treaty partners, New Zealand society, and our Australian ally and international partners in support of our national security. with our Australian ally and international partners. **Our people, land, and waters** Tokelauans, Niueans and Cook Islanders are all New Zealand citizens. New Zealand is responsible for the defence and security of Tokelau, as a non-self-governing territory of New Zealand. This is a responsibility which in practice would only be discharged in consultation with Tokelau. The Cook Islands and Niue are self-governing states in free association with New Zealand. New Zealand has a constitutional responsibility to assist the Cook Islands and Niue with defence, if that assistance is requested by their governments. ----- ----- #### Hōtaka Mahi Programme of Action 2023-2025 64. **This section describes government’s Programme of Action to advance the** **Strategy’s three priorities over 2023-2025. Following this establishment phase,** **government will release future Programmes of Action on an annual basis.** 65. This Programme of Action sets out: - two major system-level initiatives and - further actions government will take over 2023-2025, some of which are recently underway. 66. Delivering on the Strategy’s priorities for change will foster a more effective national security community, better able to work together with New Zealanders and international partners. 67. Building a more secure and resilient New Zealand depends on the national security community carrying this momentum across the key priority areas identified in the Strategy for years to come. The Strategy can only deliver change if it is enabled by the right capabilities, legislation and regulation, structures, and partnerships. THIS PROGRAMME OF ACTION BUILDS ON RECENT GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN NATIONAL SECURITY New Zealand has continued its efforts to support resilience in the Pacific and establish closer links with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, supported by investments in critical Defence capabilities including upgrades of the ANZAC frigates, and the introduction of the P8-A Poseidon fleet. These capabilities will support peace and security operations, maritime surveillance, resource protection, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in New Zealand, the Pacific, and further afield. In its response to the Royal Commission Report, government committed to a range of national security initiatives that will contribute to implementation of the Strategy. These include the establishment of He Whenua Taurikura, New Zealand’s National Centre of Research Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, and investments in the intelligence agencies to undertake critical work to prevent and counter terrorism. At the same time, government has enhanced capabilities to help protect New Zealand’s information infrastructure from cyber-attacks, and commissioned new work to address emerging national security issues, like disinformation. New Zealand has continued its efforts to support resilience in the Pacific and establish closer links ----- ----- **HŌTAKA MAHI | PROGRAMME OF ACTION 2023-2025** ADDITIONAL ACTIONS FOR 2023-2025 **Government will undertake a suite of complementary** **actions to begin implementing the strategy’s priorities** **Priority 2: Working together** ----- ###### Mahi ngātahi ā-ao Working Together Internationally **New Zealand's strong network of international partners is integral to our** **national security. These partners bring significant contributions to protecting** **New Zealanders, our country, and our interests at home and abroad. We are** **committed to working together to build, strengthen, and deepen our** **international relationships and connectedness.** New Zealand’s closest partner and only formal ally is Our wider region is the Indo-Pacific, locating **Australia. We have deep common interests grounded** New Zealand in a larger ecosystem of nations in our geography, shared values, political outlook, and regions that include East Asia, the Pacific, and our shared commitment to the Pacific. A key the Indian sub-continent, and the Pacific Rim. objective of our national security and defence policy New Zealand has a long history of security is working in close coordination with Australia. cooperation and engagement in the Indo-Pacific. New Zealand remains committed to ASEAN centrality New Zealand has strong bilateral relationships and working together with partners to preserve an with Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United open, inclusive, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. **States, as we share a deep history and liberal** democratic values. Through intelligence sharing as New Zealand is committed to solving global part of Five Eyes and broader defence and security commons and transboundary issues through cooperation with these partners, we receive access to **multilateralism and international law. We seek to** information, tools, and capabilities that have real- work collaboratively within international coalitions world impact in keeping New Zealanders secure. In and groups to amplify our voice and impact in return, New Zealand makes an active contribution shaping and reinforcing international norms that provides similar benefits to those partners. and systems. Our liberal democratic values and commitment to human rights and the rule of law New Zealand’s home is in the Pacific. We have mean that on many security issues we also find strong cultural and historical ties, along with shared ourselves in good company alongside the European interests in a stable, peaceful, prosperous, and **Union and its members, Japan, and South Korea.** resilient region where we are a true partner in the shared stewardship of our Blue Ocean Continent– We work broadly with a wider range of cross-regional _Te Moana Nui a Kiwa. As a region, Leaders agreed_ partners across the multilateral agenda. Our support at the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum Meeting to take a for multilateral responses to collective security ‘family first’ approach to security and ensure that challenges is integral to New Zealand’s long history we can meet one another’s needs. New Zealand is of contributing to addressing security issues globally, committed to doing so, and works in partnership as we have done through military and peacekeeping across a number of areas to support regional security deployments to the Middle East and Africa, and in priorities, in line with Pacific regional commitments support of Ukraine’s self-defence. including the Boe and Biketawa Declarations. ----- # Wāhanga II Part II ----- #### Ngā Take Whakamaru ā-Motu Matua me ngā Take e Kōtuitui Core National Security Issues and Connected Issues 68. **New Zealanders being engaged and informed on national security issues is critical** **to building a more resilient society. This section explains New Zealand’s twelve core issues—** **those challenges that most directly impact our national security interests.** 69. This is not an exhaustive list of everything the national security community does. Instead, it covers the main challenges that the people working in national security deal with on a daily basis to protect New Zealanders. Specific events may arise that cut across several of these issue areas. 70. The twelve core national security issues that most directly impact our national security interests are: - Strategic competition and the rules-based international system - Emerging, critical, and sensitive technologies - Disinformation - Foreign interference and espionage - Terrorism and violent extremism - Transnational organised crime - Economic security - Pacific resilience and security - Maritime security - Border security - Cyber security - Space security 72. For many of these issues, the national security community has established policies and strategies in place. This overarching National Security Strategy complements these policies and strategies and will help guide updates to them over time. Other issues represent emerging challenges to our national security for which policy is currently being developed. This set of core issues will continue to evolve as new national security challenges emerge. 73. In addition to the core issues, this section also recognises a number of broader drivers of insecurity, or connected issues—those that may have national security implications through their scale and magnitude. Examples of connected issues particularly relevant to our security outlook include climate change; biosecurity and human health; social instability; and inequality, debt, and corruption. These are areas in which other sectors of government have frontline responsibilities, and so the national security community must enhance how it connects with these sectors and must be consistently attendant to these issues. 74. Government is responsible for the security of our country and all New Zealanders. Government recognises that some communities are particularly vulnerable to certain threats, and that communities also have unique expertise to offer in addressing them. For many of these issues government cannot act alone—it must work together with both domestic and international partners to effectively address these challenges and protect New Zealanders. 71. These core issues span drivers of insecurity, **methods used by threat actors, and the domains** that we are trying to protect, forming a highly interconnected set.[1] 1. Issues can at different times belong in one or more of these categories—for example, cyber is a domain that we want to protect but at times can also be used as a method to cause harm by threat actors. ----- **NGĀ TAKE WHAKAMARU Ā-MOTU MATUA ME NGĀ TAKE E KŌTUITUI | CORE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AND CONNECTED ISSUES** ----- |UNDERSTANDING|PREVENTING|PREPARING| |---|---|---| |Being able to efef ctively address these core issues requires policies that are built on a solid basis of understanding. This involves working together with many parts of society. It is also where national intelligence matters most. The National Security Intelligence Priorities (NSIPs)—Whakaarotau Marumaru Aotearoa—outline the government’s requirements for intelligence and support informed decision-making about our national security. National intelligence is produced by New Zealand agencies and our partners through the Five Eyes and other intelligence partnerships. Through these arrangements we can signifci antly enhance our capability to understand and assess threats to New Zealand’s national security interests.|Preventing harm to our people, our country, and our interests is both our highest priority and the most challenging outcome to achieve. Prevention begins with identifying points of intervention and requires matching tools from across the national security community (diplomatic, economic, defence, communications) with opportunities. This process must be intelligence-led. Interventions can include shaping and inful encing the security environment, for example through diplomacy and norm-setting in regional and multilateral forums. They may include enabling our partners to act through sharing information on threats and deterring behaviours harmful to our interests. Preventing threats from manifesting can also involve disrupting activities early, such as interdicting shipments of illegal commodities before they reach our shores.|Being prepared involves identifying vulnerabilities and building collective resilience to ensure that we are able to meet challenges and recover when needed. Actions to enhance resilience can include investments in infrastructure and ensuring that New Zealand society understands national security challenges. Being prepared can contribute to prevention by dissuading actors from challenging New Zealand’s interests. The National Risk Approach is key to resilience building. The national security community must be ready to respond—to act quickly and efef ctively when required. This includes regular preparedness and planning activities, and having clear escalation pathways to Watch Groups and the Ofifcials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC), as needed.| ----- #### Ngā Take Whakamaru ā-Motu Matua Core National Security Issues ###### Tātāwhāinga ā-Rautaki me te Pūnaha i Poua ki ngā Ture ā-Ao Strategic Competition and the Rules-based International System For decades, New Zealand has benefitted from a rules-based system that reflects our values and supports our interests. Over recent years, strategic competition has intensified, impacting international cooperation and challenging the effectiveness of the rules-based system. China’s growing economic, political, and military power and more assertive pursuit of its interests abroad is a key driver of this competition. Other countries that do not view the existing rules-based system as in their interests, such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are exacerbating this dynamic. Strategic competition affects the full spectrum of New Zealand’s national security interests, both at home and offshore. 75. Addressing strategic competition and challenges to the rules-based system requires drawing on all tools of statecraft and working closely with international partners. 76. New Zealand’s approach to building readiness and resilience at home is addressed through a number of different policy areas, such as work to counter foreign interference, which can be exacerbated by strategic competition. Similarly, government is taking a range of actions to prepare for challenges to New Zealand’s maritime security and economic security that stem from increased competition. 77. Internationally, the government supports international institutions, systems, and international law, rules, and principles that reinforce our values and interests—such as the promotion of the rights and obligations enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and broader regimes. 78. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, New Zealand acted swiftly with unprecedented diplomatic, economic, and military support for Ukraine’s defence. This has included implementation of sanctions and travel bans, NZDF deployments, and support of Ukraine’s legal case against Russia at the International Court of Justice. 79. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) consistently works to maintain presence and respond to concurrent security events at home, in our region, and further afield. This requires having the capabilities and interoperability to effectively do so, and working with regional partners to support their own security. 80. Consistent efforts to support and build architecture, rules, and norms feature across our approaches to all other core issues, as each of these areas relies on the resilience of the rules-based system. **Strategic competition emerges when** countries seek to advance competing visions for regional and global orders. ----- ###### Ngā Hangarau Whanake, Waiwai, Matatapu hoki Emerging, Critical, and Sensitive Technologies Emerging, critical, and sensitive technologies bring many benefits to New Zealand with the potential to drive economic growth, domestic productivity, and environmental sustainability. At the same time, the breadth of new technologies, their rapid pace of development, disruptive and unpredictable impacts, and the lack of existing rules and norms governing their use present a range of challenges to our national security. Emerging technologies can be used to enable or commit harmful activity, such as foreign interference and espionage, violent extremism, and transnational organised crime, and may create disruptive social and economic changes that we must adapt to or overcome. 81. Government takes a long-term, strategic view to ensure New Zealand is prepared and responsive in assessing and managing emerging, sensitive, and critical technologies. Its approach is focused on enabling New Zealand and New Zealanders to maximise the benefits of technological innovation, while managing any threats and disruptions it might bring. 82. Government has developed tools to protect New Zealand businesses and society from the risks of such technology. For example, since 2020 there have been processes in place to assess the risks posed by potential overseas investments in New Zealand businesses that research, develop, produce, or maintain sensitive technology. If significant risks to national security and public order are found, government has the ability to block investments or create appropriate safeguards by imposing conditions on an investment transaction. 83. Government also works internationally to better understand and mitigate the impact of these technologies. This includes: - Shaping international rules and norms around emerging technologies through international organisations and multistakeholder forums. - Participating in agreements and initiatives to restrict access to or eliminate certain sensitive technologies (for example, the Wassenaar Arrangement), as well as through New Zealand’s own export controls system. - Exchanging technology foresight and horizon scanning with partners and in collaboration with academia and the private sector to better understand and prepare for the future. **Sensitive technologies have military or** security uses. Critical technologies have the capacity to significantly impact national security, economic prosperity, and social cohesion. Emerging technologies include a broad range of new capabilities that are in the early stages of development but have the potential to be highly disruptive or have transformative effects, depending on their future application. Many of these technologies could become critical or sensitive technologies (or both). ----- **NGĀ TAKE WHAKAMARU Ā-MOTU MATUA | CORE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES** ###### Te Kōrero Whakatuapeka Disinformation Disinformation is false or modified information knowingly and deliberately shared with the intent to cause harm or achieve a broader aim.[2] Disinformation can be created and spread by other countries as a means of foreign interference and by non-state actors from within or beyond New Zealand. It has the potential to drive societal discord, grievances, and fears, and undermine trust in democratic institutions. Though New Zealand probably has not been directly targeted by state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, the spread of disinformation in the global information environment may nevertheless threaten New Zealand’s security. 84. Government is seeking to support a whole-ofsociety approach to build understanding and resilience against the harms of disinformation. This is led primarily by those outside government in recognition of the need to maintain openness and uphold the right to freedom of expression. ###### Disinformation has the potential to drive societal discord, grievances, and fears, and undermine trust in democratic institutions 85. This whole-of-society approach has three key initiatives: - Convening a civil society-led group to advise government on options to strengthen resilience to disinformation. This includes exploring the design for a non-government entity to lead long-term work on disinformation. - Establishing a fund to support community projects and organisations in helping to build New Zealand’s resilience and capacity to respond to disinformation. - Commissioning public research and analysis to monitor and analyse New Zealand’s online information ecosystem, and the impacts of disinformation. 86. To ensure that New Zealand is well-positioned to understand and be attendant to the impact of this issue, government has also created a new intelligence priority focused on the national security implications of disinformation. 2. This is distinct from misinformation, which is false or modified information though not created or shared with the direct intention of causing harm. ----- ###### Ngā Raweketanga o Rāwāhi Foreign Interference and Espionage All countries engage in foreign influence activity to shape perceptions and decision-making in other countries. Such activity becomes foreign interference when it is intended to influence, disrupt or subvert another country’s interests by covert, corruptive, deceptive or threatening means. This includes activities by a foreign country to influence elected officials, explicitly or implicitly. Espionage refers to clandestine activities undertaken to collect information, materials, or capability to obtain competitive advantage at the expense of New Zealand’s security, international relations, and economic wellbeing. Foreign interference and espionage present a significant and growing national security threat to New Zealand. Government is building resilience to this threat in partnership with stakeholders across society. 87. The Countering Foreign Interference Work **Programme focuses on managing risks to our** democratic institutions and civil and political rights, to economic prosperity (especially protecting our critical infrastructure and sensitive technology), and building our resilience to economic coercion. 88. Acting early to prevent and reduce the impact of foreign interference and espionage means engaging with a wide range of groups— communities, researchers, elected officials, businesses, and other organisations—to increase understanding, raise awareness of the risks, and support better risk management. Government initiatives to advance these goals include: - Published guides to support entities to understand and manage foreign interference risks. - Funding for the Ministry for Ethnic Communities, to enhance our understanding of our diverse ethnic communities’ experiences with foreign interference to support their resilience. 89. Government continually reviews our policy and regulatory settings to maintain our resilience against foreign interference. It has undertaken reforms to manage foreign investment risks, limit foreign political donations, ensure the security of our telecommunications networks, and limit the export of strategic goods, such as military goods and materials that could be used in the production of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. 90. The Countering Foreign Interference Work Programme will continue to consider how to make New Zealand more resilient, for example through the development of stronger policy and regulatory settings. This includes considering measures to promote greater transparency of foreign country activity and the adequacy of relevant criminal offences. |Protecting democratic institutions and civil and political rights|Col2|Col3|Protecting sustained economic prosperity|Col5|Col6|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Robust government and electoral systems|A resilient academic and media sector|Strong and connected communities|Protecting our sensitive technology|Resilient critical national infrastructure|Managing risks arising from access and control|Reducing exposure to economic coercion| Boosting awareness and capability Stronger policy responses and regulatory settings Increasing transparency of foreign state activity ----- **NGĀ TAKE WHAKAMARU Ā-MOTU MATUA | CORE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES** ###### Te Whakatuatea me te Angahāruki Kaikoka Terrorism and Violent Extremism Violent extremism is an evolving threat, driven by increasingly complex and convoluted ideologies. Terrorism continues to threaten the safety of individuals, the security of democracy, and the cohesion of communities, globally and in New Zealand. New Zealand’s terrorism threat environment is dynamic and influenced by both domestic and international actors and events. 91. New Zealand’s Countering Terrorism and Violent **Extremism Strategy focuses on bringing our** nation together to protect all New Zealanders, with prevention as a priority. 92. New Zealand's approach to preventing and countering all forms of terrorism and violent extremism is based on te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty of Waitangi, human rights, open government norms, and the principle of proportionality. ###### New Zealand’s approach to countering terrorism and violent extremism focuses on bringing our nation together to protect all New Zealanders 93. Initiatives introduced in response to the Royal Commission Report, which enable us to act early to prevent and reduce the threat of terrorism, include: - He Whenua Taurikura National Centre of Research Excellence, producing and coordinating research. - Kia mataara ki ngā tohu—Know the signs, a guide for identifying signs of violent extremism. - He Aranga Ake, an early intervention programme working with individuals displaying concerning violent extremist behaviour. 94. While government maintains primary responsibility, all New Zealanders can play a role in preventing and countering violent extremism. The annual He Whenua Taurikura hui on countering terrorism and violent extremism brings together a wide range of participants and perspectives, to collectively examine challenges and opportunities, share insights and expertise, and advance solutions. 95. New Zealand also works closely with international partners in regional and multilateral initiatives to contribute to global efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism. New Zealand is a member of the Australia-New Zealand Counter Terrorism Committee, which enables trans-Tasman cooperation. New Zealand, alongside France, also leads the global implementation of the Christchurch Call to Action to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online. ----- ###### Te Taihara Nahanaha Whiti Pae Whenua Transnational Organised Crime Transnational organised crime (TNOC) operates across national borders or is carried out in one country with strong links to other countries. TNOC spans a wide range of illicit activities, including illicit drug trafficking, financial crime, wildlife trafficking, cybercrime, and exploitation of people. TNOC is a worldwide problem that undermines community wellbeing, governance, economic development, and national security. 96. The New Zealand Transnational Organised Crime **Strategy 2020-2025 provides the framework for** a coordinated response to prevent and disrupt TNOC that includes government, private sector, communities, and international partners. 97. The Strategy coordinates a range of initiatives aimed at bringing stakeholders together, increasing our understanding and awareness of TNOC, and aligning priorities to disrupt TNOC threats impacting New Zealand. Activities include: - Strengthening our understanding of TNOC through research projects in collaboration with academia and building our insights through the implementation of a strategic intelligence fusion centre. - Delivering training and education material to government, private sector and community partners so TNOC can be recognised and reported appropriately. - Aligning our policy and legislative settings to make it harder for TNOC groups to operate in New Zealand. - Supporting agencies to disrupt TNOC networks through coordinated operational action. 98. New Zealand has a very strong enforcement approach, working closely with our international partners to target and disrupt TNOC networks. The Resilience to Organised Crime in Communities work programme complements these efforts in focusing on the domestic context, addressing social drivers of organised crime, wellbeing harms, and building community resilience against organised crime. ###### Transnational organised crime spans a wide range of illicit activities, including illicit drug trafficking, financial crime, wildlife trafficking, cybercrime, and exploitation of people ----- **NGĀ TAKE WHAKAMARU Ā-MOTU MATUA | CORE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES** **NEW ZEALAND'S** **ECONOMIC** ----- ###### Te Manawaroa me te Whakamaru o Te Moana-nui-a-Kiwa Pacific Resilience and Security New Zealand’s national security is intertwined with the security, stability, and resilience of the Pacific region. Our geographic location and identity mean that we share in collective kaitiakitanga responsibilities. New Zealand affirms our commitment to the Boe Declaration, the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, and Pacific regionalism. By supporting Pacific approaches and priorities, we build resilience for all our countries. 102. The core of New Zealand’s Pacific Resilience **Approach is partnership. How New Zealand works** with Pacific partners continues to be as important as what we do. The national security community will continue to listen and reflect on what our Pacific partners are telling us of their experiences, share our own challenges and perspectives, coordinate across issues and work together to build shared resilience to the pressures our region faces. 103. The Pacific Resilience Approach recognises that national security risks often have a range of underlying social, political, economic, and environmental drivers. New Zealand has committed to providing over NZ$1.8 billion in development assistance to Pacific countries between 2021-22 and 2023-2024 (budget years), in areas ranging from climate finance, education, health systems, governance and democracy, infrastructure development, and more. 104. Government’s climate finance commitment is NZ$1.3 billion for 2022-2025, of which at least half will go to the Pacific region. The NZDF is improving its capabilities to support responses to challenges in the region, including the increasing number of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions associated with climate change. 105. The NZDF’s Pacific Leader Development Programme implemented in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Vanuatu supports the development of bespoke leadership frameworks and training to enhance the professionalism of security personnel. 106. Additional resilience building programmes include: - capacity building by police—NZ Police has eight capability development programmes in 11 Pacific countries; - joint infrastructure developments; - strengthened cyber security protections; and - efforts to reduce and adapt to the impacts of climate change. 107. New Zealand conducts regular maritime surveillance in the Pacific to protect fisheries. Patrolling also strengthens maritime security through gathering intelligence to disrupt transnational organised crime. ###### How New Zealand works with Pacific partners continues to be as important as what we do ----- **NGĀ TAKE WHAKAMARU Ā-MOTU MATUA | CORE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES** ###### Whakamaru-ā-Moana Maritime Security New Zealand’s maritime security interests extend well beyond our immediate borders with our vast maritime area of interest covering 1/12th of the world’s surface area. Maritime security involves preventing, detecting, mitigating, and responding to risks introduced by illegal, malicious, unregulated, unreported, negligent, or harmful (or potentially harmful) activities at sea. There are a variety of current challenges that run counter to New Zealand’s maritime security interests, including maritime claims that are inconsistent with UNCLOS and threats to freedom of navigation and overflight. New Zealand also faces a significant seaborne illicit drug threat, and competition for maritime resources is increasing. 108. New Zealand’s Maritime Security Strategy articulates how New Zealand delivers maritime security for our nation and region. This requires that the right people, processes, policies, systems, and laws are in place to prevent and reduce harm from threats. Government has allocated funding to build this capability. ###### Deterrence plays a large role in preventing maritime security threats 109. Deterrence plays a large role in preventing maritime security threats. This is achieved through visible and sustained maritime patrol efforts covering New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone and the high seas, with a particular focus on the South Pacific, and including the Southern Ocean. This presence is currently provided primarily through Navy patrol vessels and the new Air Force P8-A patrol aircraft alongside the inshore surface patrol capabilities operated by Customs and the Police. 110. New Zealand’s regulatory and law enforcement agencies are ready to impose financial or physical costs on those who actively undermine New Zealand’s maritime security interests. The Maritime Powers Act 2022 provides New Zealand law enforcement agencies with powers to enforce New Zealand’s criminal law in international waters. 111. New Zealand delivers maritime security through a whole-of-government approach coordinated by the National Maritime Coordination Centre, and through partnering internationally. For example, the NZDF contributes alongside partners to securing maritime lines of communication and promoting UNCLOS. In New Zealand, government works with local iwi, the private sector, and community organisations. ----- NEW ZEALAND MARITIME DOMAIN AND AREA OF INTEREST Exclusive Economic Zone Extended Continental Shelf CCAMLR Statistical Subarea in the Ross Dependency New Zealand Search and Rescue Region Territorial Sea New Zealand Maritime Domain New Zealand Area of Interest Map Source: NASA’s Earth Observatory. Data Sources: Toitū Te Whenua Land Information New Zealand (LINZ), Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea (DOALOS), Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand (RCCNZ), and Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). New Zealand Area of Interest ----- **NGĀ TAKE WHAKAMARU Ā-MOTU MATUA | CORE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES** ###### Whakamaru Pae Kati Border Security New Zealand’s border is one of our key interfaces with the world. It includes our physical border and extends offshore and into the digital domain. Effective border security is about safeguarding New Zealand and our people from threats, including transnational criminals, people smugglers, human traffickers, espionage agents, illicit drug and firearm smugglers, terrorists and violent extremists. The need for security is balanced with facilitating efficient flows of people, goods, and information across the border to contribute to New Zealand’s prosperity and wellbeing. 112. In January 2021, government established the Border Executive Board to strengthen existing collaboration of border agencies and to develop a Border Sector Strategy. Border security is supported by the Transnational Organised Crime **Strategy and the Maritime Security Strategy.** 113. Within New Zealand, managing border security relies on agencies working together. Initiatives such as the Joint Border Analytics Team and the interagency Integrated Targeting and Operations Centre bring staff together from border agencies to share information and expertise, identify and target risks to our borders, and disrupt and reduce threats. ###### Effective border security is about safeguarding New Zealand and our people from threats, including transnational criminals, people smugglers, human traffickers, espionage agents, illicit drug and firearm smugglers, terrorists and violent extremists 114. Visa application assessments play a vital role in preventing national security risk at the border, as well as offshore passenger screening and intervention. In addition, the Mass Arrivals Prevention Strategy helps agencies to manage the risk of maritime mass arrivals and supports our international commitment to prevent people smuggling. 115. Border agencies seek, where possible, to manage or neutralise risk offshore before it gets to New Zealand. This is achieved through close cooperation with international partners. Collaboration and information sharing about threats improves collective understanding of the challenges New Zealand faces. ----- ###### Whakamaru ā-Ipurangi Cyber Security Cyber security means protecting people and their computers, networks, programs, and data from unauthorised access, disruption, exploitation, or modification. Malicious cyber actors, including state and non-state actors, present a persistent threat to all New Zealanders as well as New Zealand organisations, businesses, and government. 116. Since the publication of New Zealand’s Cyber **Security Strategy 2019, government has** undertaken a range of measures to influence the cyber security environment and enhance New Zealand cyber security capability. 117. The bulk of cyber security capability and effort occurs outside government, with individuals and private organisations working to protect their data, networked devices, and infrastructure. 118. Government invests in multiple ways to assist the wider public and business communities through: - Delivering advice and support to all New Zealanders, including individuals, Small and Medium Enterprises, and Nationally Significant Organisations. - Providing advanced threat detection and disruption services against sophisticated and state-sponsored threats. - New Zealand Police’s investigation of cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime. - Expansion of the Government Communications Security Bureau’s (GCSB) threat detection and disruption services for government and private sector organisations to counter malicious cyber activity. - The Department of Internal Affairs’ response to and prevention of online harms. 119. Government work is currently focused on strengthening the cyber resilience of critical infrastructure; improving cyber incident reporting, access to information, and support available to New Zealand organisations and individuals; lifting collaboration between government and industry; and developing a strong and capable cyber workforce. New Zealand needs to ensure it has the right cyber capabilities and tools to be able to advance its national security interests. 120. Government also works with international partners on cyber security issues, including on crossborder cybercrime and on cyber capacity building, particularly in the Pacific, and cooperation to promote a free, open, and secure internet. Law enforcement agencies work with international partners, including by sharing information and intelligence to prevent cyber attacks at source in other countries. ###### New Zealand needs to ensure it has the right cyber capabilities and tools to be able to advance its national security interests ----- **NGĀ TAKE WHAKAMARU Ā-MOTU MATUA | CORE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES** ###### Whakamaru ā-Tuarangi Space Security Many of the critical services New Zealanders increasingly rely on are supported by space-based infrastructure, from weather observations to banking and financial transactions. Space-based assets also help us observe our land and seas, understand climate change, and respond to natural disasters at home and in the Pacific. However, our reliance on space assets also makes us vulnerable to threats that would disrupt these services. Strategic competition and increasing space congestion raise new risks that could adversely affect our space infrastructure and access. 121. Government’s new National Space Policy outlines the values and objectives underpinning New Zealand’s space policies, including protecting and advancing our national security interests. ###### We work closely with local industry and international partners to advance our common interests in space 122. Government’s approach to managing threats from or to space includes: - Regulation—the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Act 2017 ensures that any payload launched from New Zealand is not contrary to New Zealand’s national security or national interests and is compliant with our international obligations and sustainable approach to space. - Partnership—we work closely with local industry and international partners to understand changing technologies, manage risks, and seize opportunities to advance our common interests in space. - International norms—we advocate for the development of international norms and standards that help reduce the risk to space assets and ensure a sustainable and peaceful space environment. 123. New Zealand actively cooperates with international partners on space issues. Since 2015, New Zealand has been a member of the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) defence initiative alongside Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. CSpO’s goal is to improve defence coordination, to ensure that space remains safe, secure, and accessible to all. ----- #### Ngā take e kōtuituia nei Connected Issues In addition to these core national security issues, there are several broader drivers of insecurity— issues connected to national security that can increase vulnerabilities and exacerbate threats through their scale and magnitude. From population pressures, to social media, to the next pandemic, there are a range of factors that can have security implications. Leading connected issues that can drive insecurity include: Āhuarangi Hurihuri | Climate Change 124. The effects of climate change will have major impacts on food and energy security, and human health and wellbeing. In future years, it will increasingly aggravate population displacement, economic dislocation, and resource scarcity. Tensions will grow both within and among countries as they attempt to secure their interests in a changing environment. 125. Delayed global policy action against climate change is likely to continue. Inequalities and social divisions will be exacerbated not only by the physical impacts of climate change, but also by poorly planned and executed mitigation and adaptation policies. Key areas of concern will be impacts on water, sea levels, food, health, critical infrastructure, and biodiversity. Pressure may increase to deploy risky geo-engineering techniques to prevent further warming. 126. At a regional level, water stress, flooding, and extreme weather events will be acutely felt at home and in the Pacific. This will increase Pacific Island countries’ already high economic burden of adaptation. There will likely be increasing needs for disaster relief operations in the area. Haumaru koiora me te hauora tangata | **Biosecurity and Human Health** 127. Harmful pests, plants, and diseases entering New Zealand can damage human and animal health and wellbeing, impose additional burdens on biodiversity and health systems, and harm New Zealand’s economy, environment, and diverse ways of life. They can also have significant economic implications, limiting access to export markets, and can endanger taonga plants and native species, upset delicate ecosystems, spoil our waterways, destroy wilderness areas, and at their extreme, prevent us from freely moving around our country. 128. Pandemics, like COVID-19 and influenza H1N1 2009 (swine flu), result in tragic loss of life, have long-term health consequences, and are a drain on economies and human development worldwide, with long-term political and security implications. While foremost a public health issue, the recent pandemic has contributed to political tensions, emboldened extremists, and heightened division. Pāhekeheke Pāpori | Social Instability 129. Social cohesion is where all individuals and groups in society have a sense of belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition, and legitimacy. Socially cohesive societies are those in which people have high levels of trust in one another and in institutions. This is important for social stability, a healthy society, and New Zealand’s collective security and wellbeing. 130. Liberal democracies, like New Zealand, are based on principles of trust—between individuals, communities, and the institutions of governance within a population. When any of these dimensions of trust are weakened, social cohesion is threatened. This loss of cohesion can pose significant risks to democracies and drive instability through disengagement and societal fragmentation, creating vulnerabilities to foreign interference, extremism, and civil unrest. Te Ōrite Kore, te Noho Nama, me te Whakakonuka | **Inequality, Debt, and Corruption** 131. Inequality of income, wealth, education, health, and opportunity has grown and will continue to grow within countries. This inequity drives social discontent, which can undermine social cohesion and contribute to a lack of trust in governments and institutions around the world. ----- **NGĀ TAKE E KŌTUITUIA NEI | CONNECTED ISSUES** 132. Inequality among countries is also high and expected to continue to grow over the next two decades. Economic conditions in developing economies continue to deteriorate, posing a significant threat to their stability. The debt burden in the developing world has been further aggravated by the pandemic and will increasingly become unsustainable for a range of countries. This increases vulnerability to foreign powers and potential for exploitation. 133. The challenges of corruption and kleptocracy are receiving increased attention because of the global reach of Russian money working in tandem with state power, and other countries undertaking similar influence activities. Corruption of elites remains a concern, including when it comes from foreign powers and in the context of development projects. New Zealand and our region are not immune from this challenge. |Col1|Col2| |---|---| |Col1|Col2| |---|---| **Climate** - Rising temperatures - Ocean acidification - Changing rainfall - Increasing **effects** - Melting ice - Intensifying patterns (floods/ wildfires - Sea-level rise cyclones droughts) - Heatwaves **Environmental** - Coral bleaching - Coastal erosion - Decline in - Declining efficiency **impacts** - Decreasing and - Decline in freshwater of natural carbon shifting fish stocks agricultural resources sinks and marine life productivity and - Biodiversity loss nutrient dense food - Wildfires **Economic and** - Loss of livelihoods - Increasing migration - Economic losses - Eroding of cultural **social impacts** and educational and displacement including supply identity, traditional opportunities within and chain disruptions ways of life, and - Declining food and between borders and impacts to tangible and water security - Negative health important or intangible assets - Damage to outcomes and climate-sensitive infrastructure greater spread of sectors infectious diseases **Safety and** - Increased morbidity - Land and maritime - Exacerbated - Inundation of **security risks** and mortality disputes geopolitical geographic features - Human security - Damage to critical tensions from which maritime challenges infrastructure - Instability within zones are measured - Resource - Ungoverned countries - States competition and unilateral - Increased demand uninhabitable, conflict geo-engineering for humanitarian temporarily or - Conflict over cross- - Strain on militaries’ assistance/disaster permanently, due border migration resources and relief operations to sea-level rise or and displacement readiness and aid severe weather ----- #### Te Anga Whakamua Looking forward 134. The world today is contending with a range 137. The National Security Strategy embeds this of complex and disruptive security challenges. approach for the long term. It underscores the In order to thrive, we will need to draw on all need to raise awareness of national security of our strengths as a country, both within and issues and lays a foundation for all parts of our beyond our borders. society to work together to lift our resilience. 135. New Zealand’s first National Security Strategy 138. This Strategy is not an end. It is just the lays out a vision to help us navigate this dynamic beginning. Our approach to national security security environment. It reinforces the need for and the specific issues of greatest concern us to be clear-eyed on risks, prepared for change, will continue to evolve and adapt. and to put in place the right capability to be 139. The national security community is committed effective. The earlier we can act, the more to the work that lies ahead and to protecting harm we can prevent. Aotearoa New Zealand as a free, open, and 136. Government’s ability to truly deliver on democratic society for future generations. this Strategy—and the whole-of-society vision it embodies—depends on working together with New Zealand society and with our valued international partners. ----- #### Te Mahi Ngātahi i te Whakahaumarutanga ā-Motu Working Together on National Security ###### NATIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY Private Sector Academia ----- A variety of agencies come together to form the national security community, focused on protecting our country, our people, and our interests. Some agencies’ primary function is national security, while others contribute to national security within broader mandates. Indo-Pacific Pacific ----- **Copyright Information** This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence. In essence, you are free to: share ie, copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format; adapt ie, remix, transform and build upon the material. You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the licence and indicate if changes were made. [https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/publications/aotearoas-national-](https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/publications/aotearoas-national-security-strategy-secure-together-tatou-korowai-manaaki) [security-strategy-secure-together-tatou-korowai-manaaki](https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/publications/aotearoas-national-security-strategy-secure-together-tatou-korowai-manaaki) ISBN: (print) 978-0-947520-34-2 ISBN: (digital) 978-0-947520-33-5 -----