##### Defence Vision 2035
## Fighting for a safer future


-----

-----

##### Foreword:

# Choices are necessary


flexible and scalable military force
that can respond to threats proactively.
A military force that can operate on
a small and specialist scale, but also
together with others in larger
configurations.

Those choices must be worth something
to us. Because security is precious.
At the moment, we are not sufficiently
able to cope with the changing threats.
In our vision, we set out where we
stand and what it’s all about. In any
event, long-term political commitment
is important for our people to be able
to bring about the necessary changes.

Together, we have worked hard on this
Defence Vision. A vision that will help
with choices. Security is not a luxury;
we and the whole of the defence
organisation will continue to fight for
a safer future.

Precisely so that in 2035 we are able
to protect what we value!

Ank Bijleveld-Schouten
Minister of Defence


**“Fighting for a safer future” is the**
**title we have given to the Defence**
**Vision on the way to 2035. We did**
**that for a reason!**

I still find it remarkable that here in
the Netherlands we take it for granted
that we can live our lives in freedom
and that nothing will happen to us.
Threats seem far away, but they are
actually close to home.

Ukraine, Crimea, Syria: the repercussions
of conflicts there can be felt here too.
We are also facing new, different
threats: Russia tried to hack the
Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The
Hague. Our own Defence Intelligence
and Security Service was able to
uncover the plot. Elections have been
and are still being influenced.
Every day, cyberattacks occur in the
Netherlands. Our open economy is
being threatened by the trade war
between the United States (US) and
China. And fake news is spreading
throughout our society. We are seeing
that now, for example, in the
coronavirus crisis. A crisis that is in
any case taking a heavy toll on us all.

This by no means comprehensive list
of issues is jeopardising our democratic
constitutional state. The constitutional
state that is crucial for our way of life,
for our freedom.

Security is not a luxury! It is a hard
and fast condition for prosperity
and democracy. It is a core task of the
government that should be prioritised.

After we took office, the state secretary
and I rolled up our sleeves and wrote
and implemented the 2018 Defence


White Paper. We set in motion all kinds
of investments and improvements and
took steps to restore and modernise
the organisation. The people on the
work floor have noticed that too. It
is a good start, but no more than that.
Especially as we have come across a
huge backlog of overdue maintenance.

In recent years, we have spoken to
a great many people, both inside the
defence organisation (from the bottom
to the top) and outside it, about what
still needs to happen. That has given
us a good idea of what is required for
the future. A safe future for us all.

For we must not be naive. As a society,
we must become more resilient and
we should also be prepared to invest
in those who defend our values: the
men and women of our armed forces.
Risking their lives if they have to, they
fight for our future security!

The future is after all uncertain. Threats
are on the increase and we will need
to be less reliant on our allies.
The defence organisation will have
to step up to the plate.

The conclusion of the threat and
problem analyses in this Defence
Vision is that, with the current design
and state of the organisation, we
are not sufficiently or appropriately
equipped for the changing threats.

Clear choices are necessary!
The defence organisation needs
greater adaptive capability, speed
and fighting power. We are choosing
a new profile and a different way of
working. In 2035, we want to be a
smart, technologically advanced
organisation. We need to be a


**3**


Ank Bijleveld-Schouten


-----

-----

# Table of contents

Foreword: choices remain necessary 3

Summary 6

Introduction 10

Threat analysis 13

Problem analysis 17

Consequences of the threat and problem analyses 19

The defence organisation in 2035 20

_Design principle 1: Unique personnel and labour-extensive capabilities_ 26

_Design principle 2: Flexibility of action: rapidly deployable, scalable and self-supporting_ 27

_Design principle 3: Strong innovative capability_ 29

_Design principle 4: Escalation dominance, with our partners_ 30

_Design principle 5: Authoritative information position_ 31

_Design principle 6: Multidomain and integrated operations_ 33

_Design priniciple 7: Transparent and visible in an engaged society_ 35

_Design principle 8: Focus on a stronger, more self-reliant Europe_ 36

_Design principle 9: Focus on further specialisation within NATO and the EU_ 37

_Design principle 10: Strategic capabilities for a resilient society_ 38

Financial overview 40

In conclusion 45

Explanatory Annexes I


**5**


-----

# Defence Vision 2035


**6**


###### Problem analysis

NATO superiority is Risk of drowning in
under pressure a sea of information


Shortage of people

Not equipped for
all hybrid and
digital threats

**UN**

Over the last 20 years,
deployed mainly
for the second
main task


The organisation is
recovering from years
of cutbacks

No response yet to
militarisation of new
domains (cyber and
space)


Digital and physical
infrastructure is not
well protected

No ability to adapt
to unpredictable
adversaries


Enemy is unknown

Divisions in trusted
alliances

Higher demand for
deployment and too
few means, supplies
and support


-----

###### Only then can the defence organisation continue to protect what we value. 7


###### To bring about the changes, we need to take steps. There is currently a mismatch between the growing demands on the defence organisation and the available resources. Long-term political commitment is required in order to be able to manage the organisation properly. Choices are necessary, because not everything is possible and not everything can be done at the same time.


-----

to wilfully destabilise countries.
Once we had a lack of information.
Now there is often too much: we
constantly have to filter and look for
the needles of truth in the haystack.
We live in a world full of connections.
We are a nation of openness and, in
our open economy, there will always
be unavoidable dependencies. This
makes the protection of our economic
security even more important.

In the physical world too, things
are becoming increasingly turbulent.
Military forces of potential adversaries
are modernising and becoming
stronger through large-scale
investments. A country such as
Russia will not hesitate to annex
part of another country, to deliberately
weaken the multilateral order or to
launch a poison gas attack in another
country’s territory. Only to
subsequently deny having done so.
The competition between major
powers is intensifying, the language
is hardening and the risk of a conflict
involving military means is thus
growing. The spread of modern
weapons and expertise to other
countries and non-state actors is
adding to the mix. At the same time,
the situation at Europe’s borders is
deteriorating, with irregular migration,
organised crime and extremism as
a potential consequence.

Old threats continue to exist and new
threats are emerging. They come our
way simultaneously and in many
forms. All analyses show that ever
more frequent demands will be made
on the defence organisation’s scarce


capabilities. We have to (be able to)
operate more frequently and in more
widely differing situations. We need
to be able to reach a mission area
faster and stay there longer.

This growing demand for defence
deployment widens the gap between
tasks on the one hand and capabilities,
supplies and support on the other.
The preponderance of NATO, on which
we rely heavily, is now under pressure;
unified action is no longer a given.
Europe has to be able to act more
independently, but cannot yet do
so. The defence organisation is
insufficiently equipped to counter
hybrid threats and actions in the
information domain. We are often
faced with a lack of courses of action
because we cannot clearly identify the
perpetrator. We also have a shortage
of personnel for the way the
organisation is currently set up.
The labour market will not provide
a solution in the future, so we will
have to find one ourselves.

###### Vision of the defence organisation in 2035
We want the freedom to live our lives
the way we want to, also in the future.
That freedom is being threatened in
ways that are constantly changing.
The threat environment is becoming
more diverse, more complex, more
alarming. This demands changes in our
defence organisation and in the way
we look at security. We can no longer
take our security for granted. We have
to work hard to protect our freedom,
prosperity and democracy. For the
defence organisation, this means


**8**


# Summary

**Our world is in a state of flux and the**
**security environment is deteriorating**
**around us. The Netherlands is a safe**
**and secure nation and our security**
**is an important condition for our**
**freedom, prosperity and democracy.**
**We are the sixth largest economy in**
**Europe; people can be themselves**
**here and can decide for themselves**
**who governs them. The defence**
**organisation defends and protects**
**our way of life and our people are**
**prepared and trained to fight for it.**
**Sometimes to the death. Because**
**security and freedom are worth**
**fighting for. As a free and prosperous**
**nation, we have much to protect**
**and therefore much to lose.**

Dutch security interests increasingly
come under direct pressure. So the
defence organisation needs to have a
response to the many threats we face,
now and in the future. Our people need
to be ready – equipped and trained.
At any time of day and in any possible
situation. At the moment, some threats
are changing so rapidly that the
defence organisation needs to adapt.
The current setup and state of the
defence organisation means that we
are not properly equipped to deal
with future (or some current) threats.
The search for solutions to this
problem is central to this vision.

###### Something is happening…
Our Kingdom is coming under attack
on a daily basis in the cyber and
information domain. Crucial physical
and digital hubs are targeted ever more
frequently. By influencing elections and
other vital processes, opponents seek


-----

innovation, modernisation and the
incorporation of different methods
of combat in which technology and
information are key. We need to be
able to adapt faster than we did in
the past. We have to be able to
respond with sufficient courses of
action, in different domains and with
different partners, both military and
civil. We also need to become more
autonomous in crucial, strategic
matters, and we must be able to
operate accordingly.

We, as Europe, need to be able to
stand on our own two feet. That way,
we can keep NATO strong. To do so,
European defence budgets need to be
increased (towards the NATO norm),
thus strengthening both Europe and
NATO and keeping the US and others
on board. We have already taken
some important steps: this cabinet
has invested heavily in the defence
organisation. Future cabinets will
address the issue of possible follow-up
steps. To shape those steps properly,
more transparency is required to
provide clarity as to how the
organisation is faring and what
options and dilemmas exist. To do
so, this Defence Vision describes
which design principles form the
basis for determining how this core
task of government can be fulfilled
in the future.

This vision therefore looks ahead 15
years. On the basis of a threat and
problem analysis, we have formulated
three characteristics and ten design
principles in order to guide and design
the organisation so that it can offer


a response to future threats and
problems. Our people are key, now
and in 2035. The characteristics for
which we are aiming are:

**1 Technologically advanced**
**2 Information-driven in**
**organisation and operation**
**3 A reliable partner and protector**

The ten design principles that will
constitute the profile of the defence
organisation are:

**Design principle 1: Unique**
personnel and labour-extensive
capabilities

**Design principle 2: Flexibility of**
action: rapidly deployable, scalable
and self-supporting

**Design principle 3: Strong ability**
to innovate

**Design principle 4: Escalation**
dominance, with our partners

**Design principle 5: Authoritative**
information position

**Design principle 6: Multidomain**
and integrated operations

**Design principle 7: Transparent**
and visible in an engaged society

**Design principle 8: Focus on a**
stronger, more self-reliant Europe

**Design principle 9: Focus on**
further specialisation within NATO
and the EU

**Design principle 10: Strategic**
capabilities for a resilient society

We are now making a start on this.
So that as it heads towards 2035, our
defence organisation will be a smart,
technologically advanced organisation
with a vast capacity to adapt to


situations and act on the basis of the
best information. We will also be
reliable for our national and
international partners and for society
so that, together, we can withstand
the threats that confront us. That way
we can keep the peace and apply
the strongest forms of force - and
everything in between, also in the
future.

The changes in the defence
organisation not only require
commitment from the defence
organisation itself. Long-term political
clarity, balancing policy and budget,
is needed to bring about a transition
and to allow realistic goals to be set.
Future cabinets will be able to address
this issue.

Choices are also necessary, as not
everything is possible and not
everything can be done at the same
time. On the basis of the (financial)
overview of all requirements (if we
design everything in the best way
possible), future cabinets will be able
to formulate an effective strategy
and decide which certainties to opt
for and what risks to take.


**9**


-----

# Introduction


could have a major impact on the
interests of our Kingdom – and which
we hope will never become a reality.
But if they do, the defence organisation
needs to be ready.

Even in peacetime, the defence
organisation’s military and civilian
personnel are working every day to
protect and defend our Kingdom, in
public view and behind the scenes.
The defence organisation’s personnel
are constantly exercising and training
and are standing by to do what is
necessary, nationally and
internationally, the moment our
interests are in jeopardy.

The defence organisation is there to
defend the foundations of our society.
The defence organisation is thus a
major prerequisite for our Kingdom’s
earning power. Because without
security, neither the economy nor
society can function properly.
Furthermore, the defence organisation
is one of the largest employers and
a major investor in the Netherlands.
The organisation’s technological and
industrial base helps to ensure a
certain level of strategic autonomy
at national level. As one of the first
responders, we ensure that a crisis
situation is sufficiently normalised
to allow other security and aid
organisations to perform or resume
their work, that we control our borders,
and also that we protect certain
computer systems and networks.
As the last line of defence, we can
deliver (extra) sustainability in normal
and exceptional circumstances to
support the civil authorities. Together,
we can thus protect and defend the
Kingdom’s national and international
interests in any circumstances.


###### A constantly changing world
Geopolitical relations are hardening
and threats are increasing in number,
variety and complexity. That is the
conclusion of the intelligence services,
the National Security Strategy, the
Integrated Foreign and Security
Strategy, the thinking and writings in
a UN, NATO and EU context and the
(inter)national academic and think
tank world. Adversaries are becoming
stronger and smarter. Major players
such as Russia and China are
modernising their armed forces and,
just like countries such as Iran and
North Korea, are launching (proxy)
attacks on other countries.

The US is turning its attention to Asia,
a policy shift initiated by President
Obama and, in a different tone,
perpetuated under President Trump.
Tensions between the US and China
also have repercussions for European
security. The Advisory Council on
International Affairs (AIV) concluded
that these developments were
weakening Europe’s position.
Economic interests and security are
increasingly intertwined and can also
clash. The coronavirus crisis is causing
an acceleration of these existing
trends and thus a further hardening
in relations. Some of the increasing
tensions are manifesting themselves
within the NATO Alliance. All this
demands a stronger Europe, one which
is an independent geopolitical player.
We will also be strengthening NATO,
which is still the cornerstone of our
security policy. Instability in countries
surrounding Europe is in the meantime
persisting or even intensifying. Criminal
organisations are threatening our
security, both in the Netherlands and
in the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom.


**10**


###### An uncertain future
Freedom, security and prosperity may
seem assured, but they most certainly
are not. A great deal of effort and
investment, often unseen, is required
to keep our society secure and free.
Over the last 75 years, we and our
partners have managed to deter
potential adversaries by being able to
deal the heaviest blow. But deterrence
is requiring ever more effort and in
the meantime our freedom, security
and prosperity are being threatened
in other ways. We have seen that in
the terrorist attacks in Europe, the
conflict in Ukraine and the downing of
flight MH17, piracy, organised crime,
cyberattacks and now coronavirus.
In the case of all large and small
strategic shocks such as these, and on
many other occasions too, the defence
organisation had to be ready and able
to act fast and effectively.

The coronavirus crisis has shown both
the strength and the weakness of
our society at times when the normal
course of events is disrupted. We have
also seen once again that a threat
seldom appears in isolation: this
crisis is accompanied by geopolitical
tensions, disinformation campaigns
and cyberattacks. The defence
organisation has provided national
organisations with various forms of
assistance with its expertise, skills
and capabilities. It underlines the
importance of a defence organisation
that can act quickly and efficiently
in the case of unpredictable events.

‘Unpredictability’ is a relative concept.
The risk of a pandemic and the
ensuing disruption of society has been
incorporated in threat analyses for
years. As have other threats which


-----

###### The Defence Vision 2035
The current setup, prioritisation
and state of the defence organisation
means that we are not adequately
equipped for the changing threats. For
an organisation tasked with protecting
and defending the interests of our
Kingdom, this is an undesirable
situation. The search for possible
solutions in this respect is therefore
central to this vision. Regardless of
what priorities are set by subsequent
governments, the defence organisation
wants to work according to the design
principles set out in this Defence
Vision. This government has already
taken significant first steps by making
investments, but it will be the choice
of future governments to take this task
further. This document provides the
tools for this, but does not pre-empt
decision making on the defence budget
by this or any future cabinets.

The instruments available to the
Netherlands to protect our freedom,
security and prosperity need to be
adjusted. Defence is essential in this
respect, and this vision focuses
specifically on the consequences of
the global changes for the defence
organisation. Other instruments are
also of great importance, such as
diplomacy, development cooperation
and various economic instruments.
This vision therefore also looks at
the role of the defence organisation in
relation to our main partners, together
with whom we protect our freedom,
security and prosperity.

There is currently a mismatch between
the growing demands on the defence
organisation and the available
resources. Personnel are experiencing
this every day. It means that, in the


coming years, much is necessary,
important and urgent. It is with good
reason that partners are pressing
urgently for the Netherlands to
increase defence spending to 2% of
the gross domestic product (GDP). The
Netherlands is endeavouring to deliver
its fair share, so that together we can
continue to protect what we value.

The number of threats requires
adaptability and focus. The defence
organisation needs to work differently.
The first, important steps in this
direction were taken with the 2018
Defence White Paper, the definitive
elaboration of the coalition agreement
for the current cabinet term, in which
decisions were made for the
investment agenda for the coming
years. The 2018 Defence White Paper
contained a commitment to present
in 2020 the incremental growth in the
context of longterm objectives for the
future. That is what this Defence Vision
does: it looks ahead 15 years and, by
identifying what is needed on the way
to 2035, will help future governments
to set policy priorities in the battle
between requirements and budget.
Because it is clear that not everything
is possible and not everything can be
done at once. Realism has to come into
play and requires a phased approach.

The three characteristics and ten design
principles will form the basis for a new
profile for the defence organisation.
For each design principle, we will give a
broad indication of what is required for
the transition between now and 2035.
If we stick to this, by 2035 we will have
a smart, technologically advanced
defence organisation which is able to
adapt to any situation and which has
the best information, allowing us to


deliver an optimal response to the
changing threat environment, in
which information plays a vital role.
The organisation will be scalable,
which means that we can operate on
a small, specialist scale as well as in a
large configuration. Given the different
types of threat, this customised
approach is essential.

Long-term political commitment to
realistic goals in terms of both policy
and budget is needed to bring about
change and to direct and design
reinforcements. Future governments
will be able to address this issue. The
defence organisation is a long-term
one: defence equipment is often so
specialised that it can take more than
ten years from an initial purchase
decision to actual delivery. That
equipment then has to last for up to
30 years, with interim upgrades.
Long-term commitment is equally vital
when it comes to personnel. In 2012,
we had to reduce the organisation
by 12,000 jobs, whereas we are now
having difficulties keeping the
organisation at authorised strength.


**11**


-----

**12**


-----

# Threat analysis


Technological trends, geopolitical
power shifts, economic, sociodemographic and ecological
developments give rise to new
opportunities, risks and threats. The
contours of a new reality are starting
to come into focus, but uncertainty
about what will eventually become
reality remains – and will do so in the
future – a sign of the times. Russia is
more aggressive, China is more
assertive and the terrorist threat
persists. Partnerships such as NATO,
the EU and the UN, upon which our
peace and prosperity are based, can
no longer be taken for granted. We
are experiencing major cyberattacks,
threats against our
vital infrastructure and influencing
by foreign powers. Climate change
means that the natural world is
becoming ever more unpredictable.
The situation in the ring around
Europe is deteriorating. Geopolitical
tensions and the rapid proliferation
of weapons are giving rise to volatile
situations.

A large number of scientific reports
and interviews with experts have been
used to produce a trend analysis and
an analysis of possible deployment
scenarios, which can be found in the
explanatory annexes[1] and on the basis
of which the following, condensed
threat analysis has been formulated.
We can conclude that, both now and
in the future, we will be increasingly
confronted by the following:

_1 Explanatory Annex I “Trend analysis 2035”_

_and Explanatory Annex II “Deployment_

_scenarios 2035” on page II and page X._


**Cyberattacks and influencing.**
Our Kingdom is under constant
attack in the cyber and information
domain. Knowledge is stolen, (vital)
systems are hacked and disinformation
influences our democracy. Economic
influence is increasingly being used to
exert pressure, also in the Netherlands.
The discussions surrounding 5G and
the production of microchips are
bringing that area of tension into sharp
focus. Social media and influencing
tactics make it easier to target individual
citizens and groups. States such as
China, Russia and Iran have a broad
range of military and non-military
instruments at their disposal, which
they can deploy separately or
simultaneously to gain more power
and influence.

**Unpredictable natural threats.**
Threats are not only posed by
state and non-state actors. More and
more often, we are being confronted
by natural phenomena. Sea levels
continue to rise, weather patterns
and ecosystems are changing. In the
Caribbean part of our Kingdom in
particular, hurricanes and extreme
weather can have devastating effects,
as we saw in the case of Hurricane
Irma. The Netherlands too is
vulnerable, both to flooding and to
forest fires. And in the area
surrounding Europe, drought,
unpredictable rainfall, salinisation
of groundwater and water shortages
could all be a source of conflict,
resulting in political instability,
radicalisation and potentially large
irregular migration flows.


**Volatile geopolitical situations.**
With increasing frequency, we
are seeing large-scale military exercises
being conducted on the borders of
NATO territory as well as territorial
violations of the land, sea, air and
cyber domains. We are facing the
consequences of a trade war between
China and the US. Countries are racing
furiously to possess ground-breaking
technologies and to set international
standards. Proxy wars are being fought
out in Syria, Libya and Yemen, and even
the Caribbean is becoming more
geopolitical. The language is hardening,
also when it comes to nuclear weapons.
The strategic stability that we have
enjoyed over the last decades is under
pressure. The international network of
arms control and disarmament is
crumbling. Developments surrounding
the Iran agreement are alarming, as are
the escalating ballistic activities of
North Korea.

**Threats to vital infrastructure.**
The Netherlands is a major player
in global trade. Consider, for example,
the number of people who fly via
Schiphol each day; on a busy day in a
corona-free period, that could exceed
200,000 passengers. The Port of
Rotterdam is the largest in Europe,
a major logistic hub for the entire
world. For data, too, we are a major
hub, given the presence of internet
cables in the North Sea and the
Amsterdam Internet Exchange. All
these intersections, also in relation
to telecommunications and energy
supplies, are vital for our prosperity
and day-to-day operations. And that
is why they are also targets for those
who want to hit us where it hurts.


**13**


-----

Criminal networks and jihadi groups
see this as fertile ground for new
recruits, while at the same time
it feeds extreme right and radical
nationalist ideology. Organised crime
will become more widespread and
more violent, in our Kingdom too.


is increasing the risk of incidents and
unforeseen attacks. There is also a
growing danger that an adversary will
develop and deploy as yet unknown
biological, chemical or radiological
agents. The proliferation of tactical
(‘small-scale’) nuclear weapons is
increasing the risk of escalation.

**Extremism and terrorism.**
In various places around Europe
and elsewhere in the world, national
militaries are unable to control jihadi
organisations. The Sahel and the Horn
of Africa, for example, are still being
plagued by jihadi and ethnically
motivated violence. Jihadi groups still
have an alarming level of freedom
of movement and capabilities. They
thrive in places where proxy wars
are fought out, such as in the armed
conflicts in Libya, in Syria and in
Yemen. Islamic State is continuing
the fight underground. Developments
in jihadi conflict areas can serve
to inspire jihadis in the Netherlands
to perpetrate attacks on home soil.

**Frustration and poverty on**
**the fringes of Europe. The**
population of Africa (already 1.1
billion) will have doubled by 2050.
Urbanised areas are becoming larger
and busier, and governments in many
parts of the world have less control
over what is happening in certain
(slum) areas. Millions of young people
are entering the labour market, but
there are not enough jobs. This is
likely to translate into even greater
pressure on Europe’s borders.


**14**


**Armed forces of potential**
**adversaries are growing ever**
**stronger through expansion and**
**modernisation.**
Potential adversaries are catching up.
Weapon systems are becoming more
precise and unmanned systems more
commonplace, reaction times minimal.
Some adversaries will opt to deploy
weapon systems without any
meaningful human control. In
combination with rising tensions
between major powers, this is leading
to a volatile situation. Despite the
coronavirus crisis, China increased
its defence budget again this year,
to 178.2 billion dollars. Beijing wants
a fully modernised military by 2035.
Russia is developing hypersonic
weapons, robots, drones, lasers and
successful area denial strategies.
And it is not just adversaries who are
investing; the US and, for example,
Australia are also investing heavily
in their defence organisations in
response to the growing threat from
China.

**Proliferation of technology and**
**(CBRN) weapons. Malicious**
factions and states are increasingly
able to access technological
applications, such as drones and
other weapons. China and Russia are
developing, producing and exporting
a growing number of more modern
weapon systems. Russia supplies
sophisticated weapon systems to
countries such as Iran, Turkey and
Syria. This democratisation of
technology and weapon systems


-----

**15**


-----

**16**


-----

# Problem analysis


compartmentalised in the security
chain to detect these threats and to
do something about them.

**We do not yet have an**
**appropriate response to the**
**militarisation of new domains, such**
**as cyber and space. As well as threats**
on land, at sea and in the air, we also
have to deal with threats in the cyber
domain, and there is a growing danger
of militarisation of space through the
deployment of satellite and antisatellite capabilities for military
purposes. Adversaries making
innovative use of these new domains
are currently one step ahead of us, and
that is dangerous. The world continues
to evolve and new threats (in new
domains) will continue to come our
way. The defence organisation lacks
the innovation and modernisation
capabilities necessary to keep pace
with these developments.

**There is a growing demand for**
**Defence deployment and we do**
**not have sufficient assets, supplies or**
**support to meet it. Threats are**
appearing from different directions
at the same time. The old threats
(conventional, nuclear, terrorist) still
exist, but new risks are emerging
alongside them, for example through
technological developments. The more
assertive stance of major powers and
other states, the unrest in places such
as the Middle East, the Sahel, the Horn
of Africa and the tense situation in the
Caribbean are making Europe and our
Kingdom vulnerable. There is a
growing probability that different
threat scenarios will become a reality
and that they will play out at the same
time. We will then need to be able
to respond rapidly and be deployable
for longer, even at the higher end of
the force spectrum. Despite major
investment by this cabinet, we still


It is the defence organisation’s job to
take account of all potential risks and
threats. Should they become a reality,
our people need to be ready – equipped
and trained. Security is not a luxury. It is
a hard and fast condition for freedom,
prosperity and democracy. This makes
it one of the government’s core tasks
that deserves to be prioritised. The
reality is that increasing demands are
being made on the defence organisation’s
scarce capacities and we have to be
able to operate in a growing number
of different situations. Both far away
and close to home. In training exercises
in which we play out threat scenarios
so that we can learn and improve, we
are not currently capable of
withstanding our (potential)
adversaries.

In its present form and state, therefore,
the defence organisation is not
adequately equipped for the changing
threats. The search for a solution to this
problem is the main theme of this
vision. Given the threat environment,
the defence organisation is facing the
following problems:

**Our superiority is under**
**pressure: as NATO, we are not**
**keeping pace with developments in**
**terms of quantity or quality. For a long**
time, our NATO Alliance had a clear
political and military-technological
superiority over the rest of the world.
The fact that we could deal the
heaviest blow served as an excellent
deterrent. This superiority is no longer
a given. While the focus of our efforts
was on combating terrorist factions in
inhospitable terrain and not on the
ability to operate at the higher end of
the force spectrum, others were preparing for large-scale conflict. Despite
this cabinet’s sizeable investment in
the support and modernisation of our


military, we are not yet equipped for
this. The same applies to operations in
urbanised terrain.

**The defence organisation cannot**
**do it alone, but cracks are**
**appearing within trusted alliances.**
A country such as ours cannot possibly
be prepared for everything on its own.
But while our potential adversaries
grow stronger, we ourselves are
dealing with rifts between partners,
with the repercussions of Brexit and
with the search for leadership in
Europe. The US is backing away while
our security will in the coming years
depend heavily on American solidarity.
A politically and militarily strong NATO
is our main guarantee of security.

**We are at risk of drowning in a**
**sea of information. We receive**
ever increasing amounts of
information. Information can easily be
manipulated by means of new
technologies and that is happening on
a huge scale. We have to be able to
filter, process, and analyse all
information and use it to guide us and
to inform our actions. We are not
adequately set up for that at this time.
The amount of data and information
available and the speed at which those
data are processed and analysed have
repercussions for all capabilities on
land, at sea, in the air, in the cyber
domain and in space.

**The defence organisation is not**
**adequately equipped to counter**
**hybrid threats or operations in the**
**information environment. States and**
non-state actors seeking power,
influence, knowledge and/or economic
gain are opting ever more overtly for
competition. In doing so, states use
hybrid activities, often with the help
of actors who cannot be linked to
them directly. We are currently too


**17**


-----

context of the second main task is
appreciated by our Allies. All too often,
unfortunately, we have to say ‘no’ in
an international context, because we
cannot supply the required contribution.
Furthermore, the demands in relation
to crisis management operations are
changing. There is, for example, greater
demand for training and capacity
building, which is in short supply in
the defence organisation.

**The defence organisation lacks**
**adaptability to cope with the**
**unpredictability of where, when and**
**against whom action will be needed.**
There is a growing variety of threats,
which in most cases emerge
unexpectedly and violently. The
defence organisation must be ready
immediately. We do not know what will
become a reality, but we can expect to
face more such scenarios. That demands
a huge amount of flexibility from the
defence organisation, something which,
because of a lack of support, supplies and
capabilities, it does not currently have.

**Our digital and physical**
**infrastructure is not properly**
**protected against (future) threats.**
This year it was coronavirus. Next time
it might not be a biological virus that
disrupts our society, but a computer
virus targeting our financial systems or
water supply. Or a terrorist organisation
threatening to use weapons of mass
destruction or simple, armed drones.
Our vital infrastructure is not sufficiently
resilient in this respect and that makes
our society vulnerable.

**We have fewer options for**
**action because we cannot clearly**
**identify the perpetrator. In today’s**
setting of hybrid conflict, it is becoming


more and more difficult to identify a
perpetrator. The investigation surrounding the downing of flight MH17,
for example, is being disrupted by
subversive activities. But it is extremely
difficult to find out who is responsible
for them. Situations such as these are
arising ever more frequently. In the
cyber domain, a hacker’s identity can
be hidden by increasingly effective
encryption. So-called deep fakes can
put words into the mouths of influential
people even though they have never
actually uttered them. State actors
covertly fund non-state actors and use
them as proxies. The inability to
discover the identity of an adversary
makes it extremely difficult to produce
an appropriate, legitimate and
proportionate response.

**The defence organisation has**
**to modernise and expand from**
**a base that has suffered years of**
**cutbacks. Over the past decades, the**
defence organisation has been scaled
down to a small, professional military
force, mainly focusing on and designed
for (limited) expeditionary deployment.
It is that very base that has been cut
back in order to preserve as much
combat power as possible. For years,
commitment has exceeded the limits
of what the organisation could provide.
The adaptation of the organisation,
the huge commitment and a range of
cutbacks meant that the organisation
at the time was depleted and hollowed
out. This cabinet has taken steps to
improve the situation, but the damage
cannot be repaired in a single cabinet
term. It has scarred the organisation
and the effects are still being felt on
a daily basis, for example in the current
state of affairs of our real estate, IT
and logistics.


**18**


have a significant shortfall in terms of
support and supplies for these future
scenarios. The gap between our tasks
and our resources is thus widening.

**The defence organisation has a**
**shortage of personnel for the**
**way we are currently set up. The**
current shortage of manpower is one
of the main risks for the defence
organisation. The labour market is
changing, not just in terms of size, but
also in terms of composition, especially
as a result of population ageing.
The number of over-65s is increasing
sharply. The number of people aged
between 20 and 65 (roughly speaking,
the working population) is barely
increasing at all. Whereas in 2012 there
were four working people to every
senior, by 2040 that will be two. The
current organisation is still not designed
for the new age and changes on the
labour market. The shortage of manpower will continue to be a structural
problem if the defence organisation
and its personnel system do not evolve
further in the intended direction.

**For the last 20 years, the**
**armed forces have mainly been**
**deployed for the second main task,**
**in expeditionary missions. In the case**
of these missions, we decide on the
basis of the available means what our
contribution will be. We supply quality.
But the efforts of the past few years have
taken their toll on the organisation: we
are largely set up to conduct missions
against low-tech adversaries with less
money, less knowledge and inferior
capabilities. Expensive weapons for
deployment at the high end of the
force spectrum were given lower priority,
as a result of which we now have too
few of them. This commitment in the


-----

# Consequences of the threat and problem analyses


at the same time and to do so with
ever-changing civil and military
partners (integrated operating). Only
then will the organisation, together
with its partners, be able to respond to
hybrid threats. In this way, we will work
together to strengthen the resilience of
our society.

We have already taken some important
steps, but there is still a long way to go.
Long-term commitment is needed to
continue in the footsteps of this
cabinet. The defence organisation
needs to become more transparent, so
that it is clear where the organisation
stands and what options and dilemmas
are in play.

On the basis of the threat and problem
analyses, this vision sets out three
characteristics and ten design
principles to direct and design the
organisation in such a way that it
will be able to respond to threats
and challenges now and in the future.


**Society expects the defence**
**organisation to be ready to protect**
**and defend our Kingdom’s interests**
**against any threat, fast and effectively,**
**wherever and whenever necessary.**
**With the expected growth in**
**deployment scenarios and the**
**changing forms of conflict, we cannot**
**guarantee this in the future. This is**
**an undesirable and even potentially**
**dangerous situation.**

Changes in the threat environment
demand changes in our defence
organisation. The defence organisation
has to be designed more smartly so
that it can contribute under its own
steam to the security of the
Netherlands, Europe and the world.
To do so, the defence organisation
must at all times be able to react
promptly, with sufficient courses of
action available from which to choose.
The defence organisation must also
take account of the hybrid context
and thus be in a position to operate
in different domains with different
military and/or civil partners.

The commitment of the defence
organisation’s knowledge and expertise
for conflict prevention, in combination
with, for example, diplomacy and
development cooperation, is growing
in importance. We need to invest
comprehensively in prevention through
deterrence, by tackling the root causes
of conflict and by building local capacity
in order to turn the tide of negative
trends.

It is in our interests to keep our trusted
alliances strong. Over the next 15 years,
Europe (the Netherlands thus included)
will need to become self-reliant in terms
of security (as in other strategic matters)


and to be in a position to defend its own
interests. European defence budgets
therefore need to be increased (to
the NATO norm). In this way, we will
strengthen Europe as well as NATO
and keep the US and others on board.

When it comes to essential, strategic
matters, the defence organisation
needs to be autonomous and arranged
with as much flexibility as possible.
It should, for example, hold an
authoritative information position
and become more information-driven
in terms of organisation and operation.
The defence organisation must have
the capacity to operate in large or small
configurations, for prolonged periods
and with changing partners, thus
enabling it to counter the various
threats. The organisation should
also be equipped to operate in the
information environment, within the
prevailing ethical and legal parameters,
for example with offensive cyber
capabilities. Specialisation, in
conjunction with partners, is a method
on which to focus to ensure the
continued delivery of high quality.

The course has been set in terms of
personnel, as the first important steps
have been taken towards a more
up-to-date personnel system. Our
organisation and our personnel policy
will be more flexible and we must,
wherever possible, make use of more
labour-extensive technological
solutions. In that way, we can deploy
our scarce, unique human capabilities
where they will be most valuable.

The defence organisation needs
to improve its ability to operate in
different domains (land, air, sea,
cyber and information and space)


**19**


-----

# The defence organisation in 2035


**The defence organisation is our Kingdom’s fighting force. Our people are**
**among the few in our country who are authorised and able to use force. Military**
**personnel do this dangerous job – in some cases resulting in death – in the**
**interests of us all. So that we can live the life we want to live. With the growing**
**complexity of threats, a combination of different instruments is used in more**
**and more cases. The Netherlands leads the international field when it comes to**
**successfully combining and integrating these different instruments. Besides our**
**military, they include diplomacy, economic policy, development cooperation and**
**intelligence. Naturally, this vision focuses on the defence organisation and on**
**how the organisation should equip itself to deal with future threats.**


‘digital territory’ (the cyber domain).
Our collective opinion is also
influenced with growing frequency by
large-scale disinformation campaigns.
Furthermore, the defence and
protection of our (physical, digital and
cognitive) territory are conducted far
beyond our own territory and thus
overlap the second main task. The
support for civil authorities in law
enforcement, disasters and crises –
the third main task – has always
significantly overlapped the protection
of national territory (humanitarian aid
and disaster relief obviously take place
outside that territory too). We must,
therefore, be able to protect our
interests now and on the way to
2035, both close to home within
our Kingdom and far away in other
countries.

In the 2018 Defence White Paper, we
emphasised the growing importance
of the first main task for the defence
organisation. The focus on this task has
increased since the 2014 NATO summit
in Wales, with, for example, the setting
up of the Very High Readiness Joint
Task Force (VJTF) and the enhanced
Forward Presence (eFP) in Lithuania.
The Netherlands is participating in both.

We no longer talk about a level of
ambition to determine what we can
do. The commitment of the armed
forces is not an ambition, but a
necessity. In the redesigning of the
defence organisation, therefore, there
will be greater focus in the coming
years on the first and the third main
tasks, so that the three tasks are more
evenly balanced. There is some
catching up to be done on the first
main task, as we are not sufficiently
able to cope with high-quality


**20**


It would now be impossible to imagine
the defence organisation without these
three main tasks and they are and
will continue to be leading in our work.
Since the formulation of these main
tasks, the context has changed
substantially. Ever more frequent
demands are made on the defence
organisation, and threats have


increased in number, type and
complexity. The main tasks overlap
more and more and a clear
demarcation between the three
has become increasingly artificial.
‘Territory’, for example (first main
task), has long since ceased to refer
merely to territory in the traditional
sense, but can now also refer to


-----

adversaries, nor are we well enough
equipped for a prolonged conflict.
But the third main task is also placing
increasing demands on the defence
organisation. The organisation needs
to help to increase society’s resilience,
partly by protecting our physical and
digital infrastructure. The focus on
the first and third main tasks does not
affect the importance of the second.
Maintaining security and protecting
the international legal order are
fundamental for us all. This could,
for example, take the form of
prevention or forward defence and
could occur in a NATO, EU or UN
context as well as in ad hoc coalitions.

The first main task is thus becoming
more important. But the second main
task (abroad) and the third main task
(predominantly within the national
borders) remain vital. Over the next 15
years, it is still more likely that we will
be deployed in situations that are not
at the highest end of the force spectrum,
for example for conflict prevention,
as in Lithuania. But we have to be in a
position to be deployed more rapidly,
with more means, at higher intensity
and for longer periods. The aim is to
build a defence organisation that can
perform the three tasks successfully.
In setting up our armed forces, we are
putting as much effort as possible into
the qualities and capabilities that are
important for all three main tasks.
The defence organisation has one set
of capabilities with which it has to be
able to perform all tasks, in order to
do our job properly in the overlap of
the three main tasks. Furthermore,
the defence organisation has
capabilities for independent and
structural national tasks.


###### Three characteristics and ten design principles
To realise our vision for 2035 (see
text box), the defence organisation
needs to prepare for an uncertain
future, in line with the changes in the
threat and problem analyses. This
cabinet has taken the first important
steps. But we have to quicken the
pace. In this vision, we aim to do that
according to three characteristics and
ten design principles. Together, these
characteristics and principles form the
profile for the defence organisation
of 2035 and will help us to stay on


###### Vision 2035  Who we should be and what we should be able to do

In 2035, the defence organisation will be a smart, technologically advanced
organisation. It will have a great capacity to adapt to situations and will
act on the basis of the best information. And so it should. Because physical
and digital threats all over the world will only increase in the coming years
and the grey zone between war and peace will become ever larger.

The defence organisation will be called upon with increasing frequency.
And then our people have to be ready: equipped and trained. As our
Kingdom’s fighting force, military personnel carry on when others have
stopped.

In 2035, the defence organisation will be proactive and flexible. The armed
forces will be able to operate in small and specialised units as well as in
larger configurations. We will be able to reach multiple locations quickly
and stay there longer. We can keep the peace and use maximum force –
and everything in between. Ideally, we will prevent conflict. But if we have
to, we will fight to win.

In 2035 too, we will be a reliable partner. Because we will be doing it
together. Nationally and internationally. We will honour our commitments
and ensure that our work and systems connect seamlessly with those of
our allies.

Only then can the defence organisation continue to protect what we value.


**21**


track when making decisions about
the setup and composition of the
organisation. The success of the profile
stands or falls with the restoration and
preservation of the balance between
tasks, equipment and personnel. The
core of this profile will continue to
comprise well-trained personnel, who,
when the chips are down, make the
difference between winning and losing.

In the following chapters, we will
describe the aim of each design
principle and what is required to
achieve it between now and 2035.


-----

##### Profile in 2035:

# Characteristics of the defence organisation


**22**


Military personnel do a dangerous
job. When we look around us in
15 years’ time, we see dizzying
speeds, miniature weapons, greater
precision, far-reaching use of
artificial intelligence and big data,
even more complexity and even
more autonomous systems. Our
people work with state-of-the-art
systems so that they can work at
the highest level and as safely as
possible. Technological brilliance
is combined with flexibility. Weapon
systems can be easily upgraded
with the most up-to-date software,
can be replaced, are interoperable


with other systems and can be
deployed in a wide range of
threat scenarios. A technologically
advanced organisation requires
a strong innovative role and a
qualitatively sound workforce with
a higher proportion of personnel
trained in (information) technology.
We work with rapidly deployable,
flexible and scalable combat
units which can largely operate
independently. We are also able to
rapidly up- and downscale personnel
and equipment.


-----

**23**


###### Characteristic 3: Reliable partner and protector


context too. Threats are coming ever
closer and the role of the defence
organisation in the national security
domain is tailored accordingly. That
means we have a certain degree of
autonomy in strategic capability,
knowledge, processes, supply chains
and stocks. Industry and knowledge
institutes also play an important role
in this respect. As one of the first
responders and as the last line of
defence in major crises, we should be
able to ensure normalisation and
support for the civil authorities. We
contribute more, proactively and
reactively, to the security of the
Kingdom. We are expanding our role
in strengthening the resilience of
society and are also more transparent
in and about our work.


For our security, now and certainly
in the future, the credibility of our
alliances is vital. We want a Europe that
is stronger and more independent in its
actions when its security and interests
are at stake. We want to maintain a


strong and robust NATO Alliance.
The EU, NATO and the UN must
continue to play a part in strengthening
the international legal order and
in crisis prevention. It is only through
collaboration that we will be able
to cope with the number of different
threats. To this end, we ourselves also
need to contribute substantially and
proportionately to the response to
national and international crises and
dare to take the necessary risks – we
must not say ‘no’ too often. The need
for specific knowledge and a greater
range of capabilities is growing. On the
international stage, our comprehensive
approach (with development
cooperation and diplomacy) remains
standard, and we integrate our actions
with our civil partners in a national


-----

**24**


advanced nation: the defence
organisation contributes to and
benefits from this, by having access to
the latest knowledge and expertise.

**Design principle 4: Escalation**
**dominance, with our partners**
In all domains and dimensions, we
and our partners must be able to
defeat potential adversaries. Even in
the relatively new cyber domain and
in space (and newer domains, should
they emerge). The Netherlands
contributes to this ability with hightech equipment and high-quality
personnel.


**Design principle 1: Unique personnel**
**and labour-extensive capabilities**
Our people are and will always be the
heart of our organisation. We embrace
technology to achieve greater effects,
thanks to the combination of people
and technology. We thus produce a
response to demographic developments
and the changing labour market. This
provides a higher level of independence,
and also enables our people to work
more safely.

mensen.

**Design principle 2: Flexibility of**
**action: rapidly deployable, scalable**
**and self-supporting**
The defence organisation needs to
deliver greater customisation. We


have to be able to operate more
independently in small, specialist
deployment as well as in large-scale
configurations (both in NATO, EU and
UN contexts and in ad hoc coalitions
or alone). For that, units at lower
level also need sufficient high-quality
support to enable individual,
simultaneous, rapid, prolonged
and multifunctional deployment.
We can upscale with personnel and
equipment and we have a wide range
of reaction times.

**Design principle 3: Strong innovative**
**capability**
We are focusing on research,
development and the translation
thereof into actual technological and
social innovation and its implementation
in our organisation. The Netherlands is
a highly innovative and technologically


-----

###### Reliable partner and protector 25


**Design principle 7: Transparent and**
**visible in an engaged society**
Our defence organisation is an
inextricable part of society. We are
increasing the visibility of our work
and our people. We are thus also
contributing to security awareness
so that we as society remain alert
to (hybrid) threats, such as
disinformation, and build our
resilience to those threats. This goes
hand in hand with transparency in
respect of parliament, partners and
the public. To achieve this, the defence
organisation needs to sustain the
change in culture that is currently
in progress.


**Design principle 8: Focus on a**
**stronger, more self-reliant Europe**
We are focusing on a Europe that can
act more robustly and independently
whenever common security and
interests are at stake. Strengthening
European defence cooperation will
also contribute to a stronger NATO.

**Design principle 9: Focus on further**
**specialisation within NATO and the EU**
Within NATO and the EU, we are
focusing on further specialisation with
the aim of achieving greater shared
effectiveness. Our capabilities need to
fit perfectly with the power and added
value of the Kingdom and should


contribute to the sharing of costs
and risks. We are intensifying and
broadening our unique comprehensive
approach.

**Design principle 10: Strategic**
**capabilities for a resilient society**
With a wide range of support
activities, we are making an even
more meaningful contribution to
the security of the Kingdom. We
want to be able to guarantee the
supply of vital capabilities to
strengthen the security network
and perform our main tasks. To do
so, we need to possess the strategic
capabilities and supplies that ensure
the necessary independence and
autonomy.


-----

##### Design principle 1:

# Unique personnel and labour-extensive capabilities


The wide variety of threats requires
creativity, diversity, collaboration and
specialist knowledge. We deploy our
people wherever their unique qualities
are most valuable: wherever interaction,
empathy and ethical considerations
are involved. There are simply some
things we will never be able to leave
to robots, such as decisions about life
and death.

This is what we need to do:

We will create more customisation
for forms of appointment and contract
and for rotation policy. It will be easier
to move in and out of the
organisation, to change from civilian
to military, and vice versa. Strategic
personnel planning will be an integral
part of the planning for readiness
preparation and deployment.

Attract, develop and retain
personnel on the basis of talents and
competencies. The salaries paid to our
personnel must match these changes.
Training (life-long learning) will be set
up more often with partners.

Commanders will be given more
opportunities to recruit and retain
sufficient, qualified personnel and
thus improve their units’ readiness
preparation.

We will increase the diversity in our
workforce. We will engage (military)
specialists with different basic
requirements. We will offer full,
specialised career opportunities and
increase the diversity in management
and command positions.

We see possibilities for technologyintensive work methods in, for


**26**


**In 2035 too, the core of the defence**
**organisation’s work will consist of**
**well-trained and skilled people.**
**People who make the difference**
**between winning and losing. People**
**who dedicate themselves to keeping**
**our Kingdom safe. They are inventive,**
**resourceful and used to working in**
**stressful circumstances with**
**imperfect information.**

A shortage of this unique manpower
is one of the greatest risks for our
defence organisation. In order to
continue to attract and retain the
right people, we are applying more
customisation and greater
differentiation. The 2018 Defence
White Paper ensured significant
investment in employment conditions
and a start was made on a new
personnel model. We also invested
in the working environment and in
employees’ social and physical safety
and will continue to do so.

But the defence organisation needs
to change the way it is set up. Changes
on the labour market, demographic
developments and growing
technological capabilities require a
new way of working: more technologyand knowledge-intensive, or in other
words, more labour-extensive.
Even in a shrinking labour market,
we need to be able to hold our own.
Automation, digitalisation and
robotisation present opportunities:
by forming a ‘team’ of people and
machines, we can get the best out
of our people, make our (often
dangerous) job safer and, in certain
cases, change the physical selection
criteria.


###### Objectives for 2035

We are a good employer and an
inclusive organisation with sufficient
diversity. Social and physical safety
are embedded in our business
management and our task
performance.

We are able to attract and retain
the right people and to offer them
challenging work, career prospects
and a safe working environment. To
achieve this, we have, for example,
a more open personnel policy with
a high degree of customisation.

Our systems and work methods will
be more labour-extensive where
possible and will remain labourintensive where necessary and
desirable. Safety and quality are
leading in this respect.


example, the command and control
(C2) chain, logistics, manned weapon
systems, training exercises
(simulation) and business processes.

We will promote the measurability
and monitoring of set objectives in
respect of personnel safety and
implement an organisation-wide
system for integrated risk
management, thus providing better
insight into (safety) risks and enabling
us to be more effective in preventive
actions.


-----

##### Design principle 2:

### Flexibility of action: rapidly deployable, scalable and self-supporting


communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance) and engineers.

We need to train and exercise in
rapid and independent deployment
in large and small configurations.
Each setting requires specific skills.
The same applies to management.
Readiness preparation and
deployability objectives need to be
adapted to this new profile. We are
building on scalability of people and
equipment. In the context of rapid
striking power, quality and
collaboration, we will work with


**To cope with the huge demand for**
**tailor-made rapid, prolonged deploy-**
**ment, the defence organisation must**
**become more flexible and deployable**
**in any unit size or composition.**
**The threat analysis requires us to be**
**able to send individual units straight**
**to a particular location, and also**
**that we are capable of large-scale**
**operations (brigade, maritime task**
**force, air wing). Units should be able**
**to operate self-reliantly at lower**
**level and to combine with other**
**units (from other branches of the**
**armed forces) and national and**
**international partners. They should**
**be able to operate independently**
**and be multifunctionally deployable.**
**They need to be deployable in a**
**NATO, EU or UN context as well as**
**in ad hoc coalitions or alone.**

This new profile places demands
on our organisation. It goes hand in
hand with changes in relation to
training and exercises, management,
readiness preparation processes
and deployability objectives. It is vital
that we have the necessary support
(combat support and combat service
support): small units need to be able
to get out and about independently,
be more rapidly deployable and be
able to endure for longer. In a largescale setting too, sufficient support
is essential. We took the first steps in
this respect with the 2018 Defence
White Paper. Various reinforcement
measures for our combat support and
combat service support were set in
motion, for example. The modular
and scalable character should be
leading in our weapon systems too,
so that they can be easily upgraded,
replaced and combined with other
assets.


This design is in keeping with the
new NATO concept of Deterrence and
Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area
(DDA). It requires more self-reliant
combat units with greater mobility
and a shorter reaction time. The
current NATO and EU arrangements
also require shorter reaction times
and greater sustainability. There are
situations in which reaction times
can be longer, however. For situations
in which we have more time to prepare
for deployment, we will make more
use of scalable solutions, some of
which are organised outside the
defence organisation. In terms of
manpower, this means, for instance,
the ability to mobilise high-quality
reserve personnel. We can achieve
scalability by working with industry,
knowledge institutes, other
government bodies and civil
organisations.

This is what we need to do:

We need to develop strategic and
operational concepts that enable us
to realise this method of operating.
We will also incorporate new warfighting
methods. At the same time, we have
to be able to connect seamlessly
with our main international partners.

We must ensure significant
reinforcement of the support for and
protection of combat units so that
they can be deployed more
independently, more flexibly, more
rapidly and for longer periods, and
are interoperable with our main
partners. We are talking here about,
for example, reinforcements in fire
support, air defence, logistic and
medical support, supplies, C4ISR
assets (command, control,


###### Objectives for 2035

We will set ourselves up according
to the principle of customisation and
quality: smaller units as well as large
configurations can operate
independently, and we will adapt our
organisational processes accordingly.

Units can be deployed rapidly in
different scenarios and have
sustainability, at all times with the
proper support and the right
equipment.

We comply with NATO and EU
arrangements regarding reaction
times. We have extra capacity in
terms of personnel and equipment
when we need it in order to cope
more effectively with high demand
and to increase sustainability.

Our weapon systems and units are
modular: easy to upgrade and to
combine with other systems and units.


**27**


-----

We will prioritise capabilities that
are easy to upgrade, are the most
labour-extensive and can be
combined with other, often more
readily replaceable systems. To do so,
we need to accelerate the translation
of requirements into procurement and
implementation, and modify the
Defence materiel process (DMP) and
the Defence lifecycle plan (DLP)
accordingly, partly by creating more
free budgetary scope. This will be at
the expense of other issues in the
already overloaded DLP, or it will
require additional investment.


**28**


flexible workforce and equipment
supplies, whereby we can up- and
downscale quickly. With this in mind,
we have already expanded our
reservist network and have simplified
the process for hiring temporary,
external civilian personnel.

Greater flexibility in (guaranteed)
capabilities requires collaboration
with industry and other non-military
organisations. To further shape the
collaboration with private partners,
we will formulate substantive (and
legal) frameworks for the adaptive
armed forces, whereby we will seek
the right balance between owning and
being able to access certain
capabilities.


-----

##### Design principle 3:

# Strong innovative capability


**To remain technologically advanced,**
**we need to be at the forefront in the**
**field of research and development.**
**Innovation for military purposes is**
**often associated with possibilities for**
**other sectors, for example in relation**
**to health and sustainability. A strong**
**knowledge and innovation role**
**for the defence organisation, linked**
**to Dutch knowledge institutes and**
**businesses, thus contributes to the**
**resilience of our society.**

The Netherlands is a nation of
knowledge development, science and
technological innovations. Various
companies and universities are global
frontrunners in respect of data science,
artificial intelligence, quantum
technology and innovations in the field
of sustainability. We can distinguish
ourselves internationally in this regard.
There are countless opportunities for
the defence organisation and for the
business community; the Defence
Industry Strategy and the Defence
Innovation Strategy were issued in 2018
to fully exploit these opportunities.

New ideas lead to a stronger, more
precise and safer way of operating.
They need to be developed, tested
and (if successful) implemented
and scaled up. In this process, extra
attention is paid to the step from
innovation to implementation.

Emerging and disruptive technologies
present risks as well as opportunities.
We are keeping a watchful eye on
the ethico-legal aspects of technology
development, such as in the case of
artificial intelligence and weapon
systems.


The retention of knowledge in relation
to defence and security technology
contributes directly to Dutch security
interests. To get the greatest return on
our efforts, we need to focus them and,
as an organisation, establish a
multiplier effect. In some cases,
off-the-shelf purchases will not suffice;
in those cases, the defence organisation
needs to develop the product itself and
act as a launching customer.

This is what we need to do:

We are putting the emphasis on
knowledge areas and technologies for
defence-specific purposes, as stated
in the Defence Industry Strategy. We
will devote particular attention to
quantum technology, artificial
intelligence, robotics, 3D printing and
bio- and nanotechnology. We will keep
an eye on the ethico-legal aspects of
said technologies.

We will prioritise research focused on
the military of the future, in particular
research into labour-extensive and
sustainable solutions and networkenabled operations. A (significant)
portion of the knowledge and innovation
budget will be allocated to this.

We will continue to promote the
ecosystems of businesses, universities
and knowledge institutes for concept
development and experimentation. We
will design our business management
in such a way as to upscale successful
initiatives and short-cycle innovation.
We can do this by establishing an
empty financial bandwidth in our DLP.
This will have to be at the expense
of other issues (within the current
parameters) or it will require additional
investment.


###### Objectives for 2035

At least 2% of defence spending
will be dedicated to research and
technology developments, as agreed
within the European Defence Agency
(EDA). This forms the foundation of
our organisation.

Research focuses on maintaining and
increasing operational striking power.
To this end, we will reinforce the
defence-specific knowledge base in
relation to network-enabled operations, labour-extensiveness and
sustainability.

We will create scope for faster upscaling
after successful experiments, both
financial and in relation to culture,
regulations and processes.

We will stimulate and accelerate the
development of technologies that
are vital to our security interests.


**29**


The Netherlands would like to have
its own technological and industrial
base. We will use interministerial
initiatives to strengthen this, such
as the growth fund. Internationally,
new programmes in the Multiannual
Financial Framework, in particular the
Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO) in the EU and the European
Defence Fund (EDF), offer promising
platforms for cooperation in relation
to research and capability development.
This requires co-funding from the
ministries with policy responsibility.


-----

##### Design principle 4: 

# Escalation dominance, with our partners


UAV capability and we are updating the
CV90 infantry fighting vehicle and, for
the artillery, the armoured howitzer.

We want to distinguish ourselves even
further on the international stage in the
field of military mobility. We currently
play a pioneering role in this respect
and we want to maintain that position.
That is because the Netherlands is an
important transit nation for the armed
forces of the US, Canada and the UK.
Our allies must be able to count on our
ability to support their troops for
extended periods of time.

This is what we need to do:

We will fulfil the capability targets
of NATO and the EU, in the process of
which we prioritise capabilities which
are needed in both a NATO and EU
context and which will help the EU to
operate at the highest end of the force
spectrum. With regard to deployment,
we will contribute proportionately to
NATO and the EU.

We will continue to prioritise the
readiness preparation of the rapid
reaction forces of NATO and the EU.
We will also honour the agreements
regarding military mobility: the logistic
conditions for the recognised military
corridors should be in place.

We will ensure a healthy balance
between investing in new capabilities
and maintaining existing ones. The
necessary support should not be
overlooked, as a lack thereof is a
pressing problem in terms of
honouring our national and
international undertakings. Consider
operational (combat) support and
problems in business management.


**30**


**Together with our NATO and EU**
**partners, we must continue to have**
**enough of the right capabilities for**
**credible deterrence and escalation**
**dominance. This requires appropriate**
**levels of training, and the ability to**
**comply with the arrangements for**
**rapid deployability. It also requires**
**investment in (conventional)**
**capabilities to boost our striking**
**power. With a conventionally strong**
**Europe, we will also reduce the risk of**
**deployment of nuclear weapons.**

In 2014, we agreed with our NATO allies
to move our defence spending over the
next 10 years towards the NATO norm
of 2% of GDP. We are currently a long
way off that figure. Allies’ capabilities
should complement each other. It is for
this reason that NATO has set up the
NATO defence panning process (NDPP),
in which agreements are made as to
who will bear the cost of which
capabilities. Our allies have rightly
concluded that the Netherlands is not
in a position to meet these capability
targets. The EU also has capability
targets that the Netherlands needs to
meet. NATO and the EU are working
closely on this[2].

With the investments made by this
cabinet, we are making good progress
in enhancing our striking power. We
have initiated essential replacement
programmes. The first F-35 fighter jets
have been commissioned and the
number of aircraft will be increased.
We are replacing the M-frigates and
the submarines. We are also investing
in new tanker aircraft and a counter
_2 For further details, see Explanatory Annex III “NATO_

_and EU capability objectives” on page XIV._


-----

##### Design principle 5: 

# Authoritative information position


secure and reliable communications.
The same applies to freedom of access
to space.

This is what we need to do:

A state-of-the-art IT system will
form the backbone of a new way of
working, based on data and data
analysis. This cabinet is already
investing in a modern IT infrastructure,
but this needs to be consolidated
further and the processes based on it
will need to be improved; there is also
a backlog to clear. We need the latest
software, as software and data play
a key role in our ability to use our
weapon systems effectively. They are
also crucial in the support chains.


**Information-driven operations**
**are the basis for the future defence**
**organisation. It is, therefore, not**
**without good reason that it was**
**prioritised in the 2018 Defence**
**White Paper. Future threats in all**
**domains as well as technological**
**developments have a huge impact**
**on the way in which the defence**
**organisation operates. Because of**
**the growing threat, the collection,**
**rapid processing and use of reliable**
**information, as well as faster and**
**more effective command and control**
**than that of the adversary, will in**
**the future be even more crucial for**
**success.**

We need to further enhance our ability
to gain rapid insight into and
understanding of our environment
and to improve our foresight. This
will allow us to get a better grip on
complex situations and operations.
On the basis of the vast amounts of
data, we can create a common
operational picture in order to
understand what is happening, thus
enabling us to identify, attribute and
avert threats at an early stage. In so
doing, we will broaden our options
for deployment, including the
possibility of preventive intervention.
This can be done by conventional
means, but information can also be
used as a combat capability, whereby
information is used to accelerate the
deployment of weapon systems and
as an independent weapon itself
(as a means of communication and
in electronic warfare).


Information is already being used
as a weapon. States and terrorist
organisations are using false or
incomplete information to gain
strategic and tactical advantage.
In doing so, they frequently cross
what are for us acceptable ethical
and legal boundaries, for instance
by influencing our way of thinking.
Our society needs to become more
resilient to this and strike back where
necessary, obviously within our
own ethical and legal boundaries.

The effective deployment of such
information and weapon systems
stands or falls with the quality of our
personnel. Our people and weapon
systems must have the best
information and the best software.
At the moment, we are too dependent
on others. For a strong information
position, the use of the right sensors
is becoming more important. Our
people and systems should therefore
be equipped with sensors of a superior
quality.

The collected information needs
to be analysed, filtered and distributed
in collaboration at central points in
the organisation so that lower-level
units have the information that is
relevant to them. Command and
control is changing because of
techniques such as artificial
intelligence and data science,
which are speeding up and improving
our decision-making process.
Essential for successful operations
are a robust infrastructure for
communication and C2 and
guaranteed access to our networks
and the electromagnetic spectrum.
Sensors and weapon systems will be
linked as a result, thus guaranteeing


###### Objectives for 2035

We are among the pioneers within
NATO and the EU in respect of
information-driven operations.

Thanks to a network of central
command and control elements,
information can be jointly analysed,
filtered and exchanged better and
faster, analyses can be combined and
thus the desired effects managed.

We will strengthen the instruments
for defensive and offensive actions
in the information environment,
making us one of the frontrunners
in the cyber domain.

We have reliable, robust and futureproof IT which supports our information-driven and technologically
advanced defence organisation and
which is easily adaptable.


**31**


-----

We will perform an effective
anticipation function whereby, to
support/promote the international
legal order, we can act proactively in
potential conflict areas and can thus
operate preventively. For example, by
means of deterrence and by advising
and training local security
organisations.

We need to protect ourselves more
effectively against the ways in which
adversaries attempt to influence our
will, perception, behaviour and
systems. Using our own capabilities, we
need to be able to operate defensively
as well as offensively, at all times within
the relevant ethical and legal
parameters. With the required
combination of high-tech capability
and specialist manpower, we must
remain one of the frontrunners in
operations in the information
environment and in the cyber domain
in particular.


The defence organisation aims to
reinforce partnerships within the
national cyber security network in order
to strengthen the resilience of that
network. In the process, we will also be
focusing on greater interoperability
with our partners in relation to IT and in
the cyber domain.


**32**


We will ensure that there are
sufficient specialist personnel in the
field of IT, cyber security and data who
can also work with artificial intelligence.
Such personnel are scarce, as are the
necessary hardware and software. We
want to join forces with our partners to
train the specialists, in return for a
number of years’ service in the defence
organisation.

We have become more reliant on
satellite systems, for both military and
civil purposes. Access to space is a
crucial link in information-driven
operations. We will be publishing a
space strategy on our position
regarding this domain. Our defence
organisation is going to work with EU
and NATO partners to raise situational
awareness in space and to establish
a strong information position in this
respect too.


-----

##### Design principle 6:

# Multidomain and integrated operations


Our devices, systems, processes and
services are interchangeable and
interoperable and can be used in
collaboration with our partners. **33**

We will provide interchangeable
and interoperable means and
methods. At the moment, the defence
organisation has too many different
systems which cannot be linked.
Linkage requires robust support and
layered protection of all elements of
the system.

Interoperability with our national
and international partners should be a
determining factor in the purchase of
means and the selection and training
of personnel.

We will continue to invest in the
multilateral cooperative alliances in
which we operate, such as NATO, the
EU and the UN. There, we will focus,
for example, on improving the
effectiveness of missions and
enhancing various types of peace and
stabilising operations and activities.
We need to contribute our fair share,
also in terms of troop supply. The
Netherlands’ position as a troop

**Once upon a time, there was only**
**land, air and sea. Our armed services**
**are based on that foundation. In the**
**last decades, however, in the**
**Netherlands and internationally,**
**the cyber domain and space have**
**been recognised as military domains.**
**So we now have five. The defence**
**organisation has therefore set up**
**the Defence Cyber Command and**
**has commissioned a centre of know-**
**ledge on space. The interdependence**
**of the five domains is growing and**
**we must therefore think, organise,**
**operate and command beyond the**
**individual domain, in other words**
**adopt a multidomain approach. This**
**is also in keeping with design**
**principle number 2. Our defence**
**elements must be able to work**
**together seamlessly (joint**
**operations) and we must be**
**able to ensure the best possible**
**collaboration with our international**
**partners (combined operations).**
**By doing so, we can counter combined**
**attacks in different domains and**
**with different instruments.**

But we are not there yet. In hybrid
warfighting, military means are
combined with civil means. The
information environment is a key
terrain in this respect. Consider
disruptive cyberattacks and
disinformation campaigns. These
threats are permanent, go beyond
the defence organisation and are
not limited to physical locations.
That is a challenge, because our
military commitment is usually
time-limited and focused on a
specific (geographical) operation.
Even with our security partners,
we are in many cases still too
compartmentalised in our work.


Over the past years, collaboration
with partners and between the
defence organisation elements has
become stronger: military personnel
have a permanent place in regional
and national crisis teams and there is
more and more joint training. With
our unique and internationally
respected comprehensive approach
in mission areas, we coordinate our
operations in the fields of defence,
development cooperation, diplomacy,
police, justice and trade. Integrated
deployment will increasingly be
designed to prevent (reoccurring)
conflict, for example by means of
deterrence, rebuilding of security
sectors or stabilisation of a fragile
situation. In the future, we will
intensify collaboration with various
public and private organisations
even further. Dutch military and civil
contributions should also be well
embedded internationally.

This is what we need to do:

We will promote network-enabled
operations and integral management
at various levels, with highly divergent
(high-tech) means and functions.
Multidomain command and control
will become the norm. This requires
modifications in design, responsibilities,
information sharing, training and
culture. It requires greater cooperation
on the part of the defence organisation
elements and the development of
multidomain and integrated doctrine
and concepts. That begins with more
joint education, training and exercises,
and with the co-location and
exchange of personnel (including
commanders and managers).


###### Objectives for 2035

Multidomain and integrated
operating is the basic premise in
operations with national and
international partners.

We have insight into potential hybrid
campaigns that could play out
simultaneously on different fronts
and we can act accordingly, together
with our partners.


-----

**34**


contributing country needs to be more
in step with other countries of similar
size and with a comparable economy.
Amongst other things, that requires
investment in what is currently scarce
capacity in respect of training,
mentoring and advice, as well as in
enabling capabilities for missions.

For the prevention and lasting
resolution of conflicts, broader
solutions are required, for which the
root causes need to be addressed.
Together with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and other partners, we will
intensify this comprehensive
approach, promote it further
internationally and expand it with
new partners.

Together with our national
partners, we will work on ways of
becoming less compartmentalised in
our approach, for example by means
of more joint analyses, common
strategies and integrated training.


-----

##### Design priniciple 7:

# Transparent and visible in an engaged society


**We have an active role in society. The**
**defence organisation has a relatively**
**closed culture. But secrecy is not**
**compatible with the modern world:**
**almost everyone has access to the**
**internet, and real-time information**
**is there for the taking. By actively**
**sharing more information, we will**
**not only ensure that our work is**
**better understood, but also that**
**society is less vulnerable to mis-**
**and disinformation.**

On behalf of Dutch society, the
defence organisation is permitted,
within the given parameters, to use
force to protect and defend our
interests worldwide. It is imperative
that we are accountable to parliament
and society for this and we must
therefore become more transparent.
We have already been focusing on this
issue under the current cabinet: more
incidents are proactively reported and
more insight is provided into the way
the military operates. We will continue
on this path. Over the coming years,
the transparency of the organisation
will thus grow with the changing
circumstances, which necessitate
greater openness in order to maintain
support for our operations. When
sharing information, we are at all times
mindful of personal, operational and
national security, both that of the
Netherlands and of allies and partners.

We will continue on this path. Not
only do we want to be more transparent about our work; we also want
to make it more visible. The defence
organisation often trains ‘out of sight’
in order to minimise inconvenience,
and much military deployment occurs
in other (distant) countries. Unknown
might not make unloved, but in some


cases it makes not understood. The
defence organisation wants society to
have a better insight into what exactly
our people do. We also want other
ministries, local authorities, businesses
and other organisations to have a better
idea of where to find us when they need
us. Greater visibility and clarity will also
help to involve society in the work of
the defence organisation and increase
security awareness. It will help everyone
to stay alert to threats and to build the
necessary resilience. People in military
uniform should once again become
a common sight in public.

This is what we need to do:

We will strengthen our relations
with the outside world. We will show
society how we are doing. We will
continue the culture change and start
with adaptations in our training.

We will be more visible and become
more environmentally conscious: we
will train more frequently among and
with the public and increasingly lend
our expertise to the societal debate
about topics relevant to our
organisation. We will invite external
parties more often to defence locations
in the context of good neighbourly
relations.

Through experience of psychological
warfare by adversaries in, for example,
Lithuania, Afghanistan and Iraq, the
defence organisation is aware of the
dangers of disinformation and
influencing, and thus of the need to
protect our open and transparent
society from them. Greater openness,
also about this type of threat, will
create security awareness and thus
increase societal resilience.


###### Objectives for 2035

We will continue to take steps to be
even more transparent and relaxed in
our dealings with the outside world,
and we will become more visible.

We will continue to take steps to be
even more transparent in the way we
provide information to parliament
and the public. In doing so, we will at
all times be mindful of personal,
operational and national security,
both in respect of the Netherlands
and of allies and partners.

The defence organisation is a more
proactive, societal partner and helps
society to become more resilient to
threats, including those that result
from more subtle hybrid forms of
conflict.


**35**


-----

##### Design principle 8:

# Focus on a stronger, more self-reliant Europe 


This is what we need to do:

We will intensify cooperation
within the EU and also involve third
countries, such as the UK,
permanently in the European security
structure. We are also committed
to cooperation in fora such as the
European Intervention Initiative,
the Joint Expeditionary Force, the
Northern Group and the Arctic
Security Forces Roundtable.

We will intensify cooperation with
defence organisations in Europe.
We have made significant progress in
this respect in recent years, certainly
with strategic partners.

We will focus on jointly defining
more concrete priorities in relation
to the EU’s common security and
defence policy, including cooperation
on knowledge and innovation, joint
transport and supply and the joint
development of capabilities, for
example in relation to the cyber
domain, escalation dominance and
communications and information
systems.

We are committed to consolidating
strategic capabilities within Europe.
Together with the business community
and other partners, we are building a
strong European defence market.

We will argue (even more
vigorously) for interoperability and
standardisation within the EU and
NATO, so that we can work together
to the best possible effect. We will
refine this policy line further. EU
and NATO processes must be geared
to each other so that capacity
development and investments yield


###### Objectives for 2035

We will focus more sharply on an
EU which is better able to act as a
geopolitical player and which can
protect and defend European
(security) interests independently.

We will honour the agreements made
in an EU and NATO context, namely
financial agreements, agreements
about capabilities and agreements
about deployment and readiness.


**36**


**The Europe of the future must be**
**able to act independently if and**
**when European interests are at**
**stake. The EU Global Strategy of 2016**
**specifically states that the EU must**
**be capable of conducting military**
**operations at the highest end of the**
**force spectrum. At the moment,**
**Europe has only limited capability**
**in this respect. Over the coming**
**years, therefore, we need to invest**
**more in increasing Europe’s military**
**ability to take greater responsibility**
**for its own security and the**
**representation of European security**
**interests.**

Over the last few years, many new
initiatives have been launched in the
EU in relation to security and defence.
The defence organisation is aiming
to achieve concrete results in these
new initiatives. We are one of the
drivers of the PESCO project on rapid
response teams and mutual assistance
in cyber security. The same applies
to the PESCO project on military
mobility, which supports cross-border
military transport in Europe.

We are thus focusing more intently
on a Europe, and so also an EU, that
takes responsibility, also in military
terms. This tightening of policy is
necessary to guarantee security in
Europe, including the Netherlands and
thus indirectly the entire Kingdom,
now and in the future. We will do this
in a way that strengthens NATO too.
Because a credible NATO remains
vital for our security and, as European
NATO states, we need to take our
share of the responsibilities and make
a larger, fairer contribution to the
collective.


maximum returns. Bilateral
cooperation, as well as cooperation
between the EU and NATO, must be
raised to a higher level operationally,
strategically and politically.

We will honour the agreements
made in an EU and NATO context.
To be a reliable ally, we need to grow
our defence budget over the coming
years, taking into account the scope
made available by the next cabinet.
Long-term commitment to the EU
and NATO agreements is important
for our credibility.


-----

##### Design principle 9:

# Focus on further specialisation within NATO and the EU


**We want to focus on further**
**specialisation within NATO and**
**the EU. Each country has a natural**
**leaning towards certain capabilities**
**and type of deployment. We should**
**make better use of that added value**
**in order to jointly achieve more**
**effects and raise the quality of our**
**operations.**

The capabilities we choose must be
ideally suited to the strength of our
armed forces, our Kingdom, the needs
of our society and the threats we face.
We will determine those specialisms
on the basis of the areas in which
we excel. This will result in quality,
effectiveness and efficiency. For the
time being, the current versatile and
high-quality base of capabilities will
remain relevant. From there, we can
grow and specialise. In that growth,
we will consolidate certain
specialisms: abilities and capabilities
that are not (sufficiently) available
to everyone.

At the moment, the defence
organisation excels above all in its
high-quality personnel, the F-35s
due to arrive, its submarines, its
capabilities in the cyber domain
(specifically cyber means and
intelligence), special operations
forces, integrated air and missile
defence and the Dutch comprehensive
approach to deployment.
Internationally, we are, for example,
renowned for our training of and
advice to security organisations with
the aim of promoting the international
legal order. Nationally, we also excel
in crisis management (as described
further in design principle 10), thanks
to our organisational structures,
means and knowledge on the part


of our people. We can expand our
specialisms further from these
qualities. Specialisation ultimately
means that there are some things
we will no longer do - that will be
possible if these tasks are taken
over by our partners, and vice versa.

Specialisation often begins with the
intensification of cooperation and
with the pooling and sharing of
capabilities. It is a prolonged process
that is not completed overnight.
If partnerships do not prove strong
enough, it could lead to lead to
extreme vulnerability, as it is
essentially about mutual trust.
The preconditions for specialisation
are therefore risk sharing and burden
sharing. Furthermore, it must not
be allowed to affect our role as last
line of defence or first responder.

This is what we need to do:

We will continue to build on the
knowledge and experience we have
gained from the current cooperation
and use this to be a driving force
within NATO and the EU to jointly
increase specialisation and
interoperability between partners.
In doing so, we will promote potential
leading groups of countries that can
take the lead in this.

From our base, we will start to
consolidate and expand a number
of qualities and niches: our own
specialisms. At the moment, the
defence organisation already excels
in a number of areas and it is from
there that we will develop our
specialisms. The preconditions for
specialisation should be taken into
account in the process.


###### Objectives for 2035

It is our policy commitment in NATO
and the EU to achieve further
specialisation and full interoperability.

From a versatile and high-quality base,
we will build on our own specialisms.

We will intensify our collaboration
with strategic partners as a step
towards specialisation.


We will continue to intensify our
cooperation with partners and to
participate actively in initiatives
relating to pooling and sharing.


**37**


-----

##### Design principle 10:

# Strategic capabilities for a resilient society


capabilities as one of the first
responders and as the last line of
defence. We need to have the
capabilities with which we can deliver
(additional) sustainability, in normal
as well as exceptional circumstances,
to support the civil authorities.
In respect of the latter, therefore,
the defence organisation needs a
degree of autonomy too.

The defence organisation has crisis
management as a core competency
and has the corresponding structures
for command and control. We want
to further develop this competency
to support civil organisations. In recent
years, we have already taken steps in
this respect and are now a permanent
part of national (crisis) coordination
mechanisms. Throughout the coronavirus crisis too, the defence organisation
has played a vital role in the
coordination of patient distribution
among the various hospitals. The
defence organisation can also help
more in tackling structural security
challenges in our Kingdom, for example
in the fight against organised crime
and subversion.

This is what we need to do:

The Netherlands, and thus also
the defence organisation, should own
certain strategic capabilities, systems
and supplies itself. Strategic supplies
of, for example, medical consumables,
ammunition, emergency food rations
and fuel need to be expanded so that
they are not only available for use in
other countries but also in emergency
situations in the Netherlands.

We want to contribute more to
strengthening the resilience of society,


**38**


###### Strategic capabilities
In order to protect our democratic
constitutional state and open
economy, we must remain
independent on certain fronts. So
while we often rely on good and
strong civil and military partners,
there are some situations in which
we need to be autonomous. There will
always be the inevitable dependencies,
partly because of the very nature of
our open economy. This makes the
protection of our economic security
particularly important. It requires a
more robust national security
architecture and greater autonomy
in strategic capabilities, processes,
chains and supplies for national
security and for a resilient society.

It is not possible to own everything
ourselves. In our decision making,
therefore, the risks need to be
carefully considered: where do
we want to be strategically more
independent and where do we dare
to accept the risks of dependency?
If, for example, interests are already
well protected at European level, it
may no longer be necessary to protect
them at national level. Strategic
autonomy is important in different
aspects of the security architecture,
for example certain forms of combat
power, support capabilities, supplies
and infrastructure.

###### National tasks
The national security architecture
consists of a large number of players,
one of which is the defence
organisation. Together, we need to
be able to guarantee vital capabilities
for crises and emergency situations.
The defence organisation must also
be able to contribute its unique


###### Objectives for 2035

The defence organisation has the
strategic capabilities and supplies
necessary to be able to act as the last
line of defence and as one of the first
responders.

Within the network of security
partners, we will reach agreements
about the guaranteed tasks and
capabilities in emergency scenarios
and crises, and about who delivers
what.

We will increase our availability for
deployment in the national security
domain in support of the civil
authorities. We will make greater use
of our crisis management capability
and our ability to scale up. By doing
so, we will contribute to the resilience
of our society.


as specified in Article 3 of the NATO
Treaty. This means a role for the
defence organisation in supporting the
continuity of public administration and
providing assistance with respect to
energy supplies, migration, food and
water sources, the treatment of mass
casualties, civil communications and
transport systems.

Our procurement policy takes
account of the need to be able to
guarantee our economic security and
strategic autonomy. To this end, we are
investing in knowledge, technology
and capabilities as identified in the
Defence Industry Strategy.


-----

**39**


-----

# Financial overview


military. Since the 2018 Defence
White Paper, 41 DMP A-letters for
new materiel were sent to parliament
in 2018 and 2019, and another 15
A-letters will be sent in 2020. Our
investment quotient rose in 2019
to 24% of the defence budget.

The aim of the 2018 Defence White
Paper was to invest in people, striking
power and visibility, and numerous
measures have been set in motion in
recent years to achieve this. Parliament
has been kept informed of progress
since 2018, by means of budgets,
annual reports, deployability reports,
personnel reports, and so forth.
Furthermore, separate letters were
sent (Parliamentary Papers 31 125 no.
114, 34 919 no. 55) regarding the
progress of specific, complex issues,
such as IT and real estate. These letters
communicated important policy
amendments and decisions to
strengthen our organisation. We
continue to monitor the progress
of the measures and will continue to
inform parliament of that progress.
There will also be evaluations, which
will be sent to parliament through
the usual channels.

The implementation of all these
important measures does not mean
that the intended effect is already
sustainable. More future-proof
solutions will be required when it
comes to, for example, the upkeep
and replacement of weapon systems,
our real estate, IT and staffing. This
too has been communicated to
parliament by means of the
aforementioned letters and reports.

This vision will pass design principles
on to future cabinets. On the basis of


in the defence organisation with the
coalition agreement in 2017, by the
submission of the National Plan to
NATO in December 2018 and with the
financial implementation of part of
this National Plan in 2019. Future
cabinets will address any follow-up
steps. Long-term political commitment
to realistic targets for policy and
budget is required in order to be
able to properly direct and set up
the organisation. This commitment
could bring stability to the recovery,
modernisation and reinforcement
of the defence organisation.

###### Looking back on this cabinet period
With the measures in the 2017
amendment memorandum for
operational (combat) support and
the 2018 Defence White Paper, this
cabinet, as previously stated, has taken
important steps toward the recovery
and modernisation of the defence
organisation. For our personnel and
equipment, the investments have
made a huge difference. The new
personnel agenda incorporates
enhancements, such as a new pension
scheme for military personnel, a new
agreement on terms and conditions
of employment, compensation for the
state pension shortfall and a review of
veterans policy. Important steps have
also been taken in pushing for a safe
working environment for personnel.
Our investment programme (Annex
IV of the 2018 Defence White Paper)
included a total of 100 projects:
approximately half of these projects
can still be carried out or accelerated
with additional resources as a result
of the 2018 Defence White Paper. This
is highly significant for the striking
power and deployability of the


**40**


**The rapid changes in the threat**
**environment demand changes in the**
**defence organisation. The previous**
**chapters describe the lines along**
**which the defence organisation**
**needs to develop on the way to**
**2035. The defence organisation has**
**to modernise so that it can continue**
**to perform its constitutional tasks in**
**the future and can respond to the**
**many threats. As an organisation, we**
**will have to grow gradually towards**
**this point. The necessary change of**
**course, described in the design**
**principles, will be embarked upon**
**regardless of the budget.**

In order to make the right choices,
this chapter gives an insight into the
financial translation of the Defence
Vision if we set everything up as well
as possible. This is not a claim for the
2021 Spring Financial Report or any
other such occasion. Parliament asked
for insight into the required amounts
in order to make better choices – this
summary is designed to comply with
this request.

The financial overview shows that if
we want to be in the best possible
position to counter the threats, the
required budget will exceed the NATO
norm. We are, however, in a situation
in which government funding is in
short supply. The NATO norm is based
on the notion of a balanced
organisation. The defence organisation
does not yet fit that description; steps
are being made in that direction. We
face various challenges to future-proof
and balance the defence organisation.

To this end, the cabinet has, as
previously stated, taken important
steps by making extra investments


-----

the choices made by those future
cabinets, a defence white paper will
be drawn up at the beginning of each
cabinet term. That white paper will
translate the cabinet’s decisions into
measures and will set out how the
design principles will be substantiated
and how they will contribute to the
successful ongoing development of the
defence organisation. Consideration
will also be given to how these
measures will be evaluated.

###### Inventory of financial requirements and commitments 
We are talking about substantial
amounts: if we set everything up as
well as possible, an additional €13-17
billion will be required. At the moment,
it is clear that not everything can be
done and not everything can be done
at the same time. Choices and stages
are therefore necessary: a future
cabinet will be able to create a decisive
strategy for this on the basis of this
overview. The long-term goal should
remain firmly in sight. The financial
overview below brings the implications
of the possible choices into focus: after
all, a euro can only be spent once. If we
spend it on enhancing our IT, it cannot
also be spent on improving our real
estate. Not doing everything carries
its own risks, given that the threat
analysis is a fact. Those risks must be
properly considered.

The financial requirements are shown
in bandwidths: technological
developments, market forces and
other developments are continuous
processes, which means it is not useful
to include precise figures. These
bandwidths are further substantiated
below and divided into four categories.
Three of the four categories


correspond to the policy options in the
interministerial report entitled Brede
Maatschappelijke Heroverwegingen
15 (BMH 15).

All the requirements set out below
will benefit our personnel directly
and indirectly: they will significantly
improve their working conditions.
We have included the improvements
specific to personnel policy in the
categories of ‘modern business
management’ and ‘agile and futureproof’.

**Our international tasks, obligations**
**and agreements**
The Netherlands has made
agreements in a NATO context about
defence spending for the common
defence of allied territory. Within
NATO and the EU, these agreements
about defence spending have been
converted into capability targets for
all countries, something to which the
Netherlands has also committed.
These targets are based on the new
security environment and the
(potential) threats we are facing[3].
If each country adheres to the
agreements made and achieves the
capability targets, we will be better
able to protect our common security.

To achieve the capability targets,
substantial structural investments
are needed: the incorporated sum
of an additional €6.5-8 billion is
explained in the BMH.[4] Investments
in these capabilities will modernise
and strengthen our armed forces,
broaden our range of options for
action and increase sustainability,
boost the resilience of Dutch society
and strengthen the bonds with NATO,
the EU and the UN.


**Information-driven operations**
The amount of data and information
available and the ever faster
processing and analysis thereof will
only increase further in the coming
decades. This has repercussions for
the entire defence organisation and
all operations of the armed forces.
Operations are increasingly being
driven by information, and
information forms the basis for raising
the tempo and precision of combat.
The information environment, and
particularly influencing by digital
means, is becoming more important.
Sensors are required for this, for
example, as well as connections and
capabilities to filter, process and
analyse data. Robust IT is also needed,
as outlined in the recent
parliamentary paper on IT. Investment
in information-driven operations will
serve to enhance our digital resilience,
partly because of the emphasis on
deterrent capabilities in the digital
domain and by strengthening our
own defence. The additional structural
amount of €1.5-2 billion included
for this is also set out in the BMH.

**Modern business management**
We have made significant progress in
recent years, but more is required to
modernise our business management
in order to achieve a state of balance.
Over the last few years, therefore,
we have been taking an inventory.
Even after the investments of the last

_3 For further detail about the capability objectives of_

_NATO and the EU, see Explanatory Annex III on page_

_XIV._

_4 The Brede Maatschappelijke Heroverwegingen_

_assumes an additional €7 billion in structural terms,_

_based on the 2018 price index._


**41**


-----

###### Additional investment bandwidth (x bn euro)


**9**

**8**

**7**

**6**

**5**

**4**

**3**

**2**

**1**

**0**


International
tasks,
obligations and
agreements
**6.5-8 bn**


Informationdriven
operations
**1.5-2 bn**


Modern business
management
**1.5-2 bn**


Agile and
future-proof
**3.5-5 bn**


**42**


few years, it is clear that recovery
is still necessary for the required
readiness and deployability of the
military in order to be able to carry
out the defence organisation’s
constitutional tasks. This applies
in particular to real estate, IT, major
equipment, materiel maintenance,
staffing and good employership,
general business management and
social and physical safety. The additional
structural amount of €1.5-2 billion
included for this is set out in the BMH.

**Agile and future-proof**
We need to become more agile in
order to be able to respond to
changes in our environment and to
potential adversaries. To this end,
we have to strengthen our combat
support substantially so that our
forces can operate more
independently, faster, longer, more
frequently and more effectively.
Technologically advanced and labourextensive solutions and high-quality
personnel are also vital in this respect.
Above all, we need to enhance our
innovative capabilities.


and improve quality in certain areas.
We want to be even better able to
support our national partners, deliver
the guaranteed support autonomously
and in any circumstances, and be able
to maintain this over longer periods of
time.

This category concerns an additional
structural requirement of €3.5 to €5
billion.


accordingly, however, these items are
also to be found in the other
categories. The four categories thus
complement each other and together
contribute to the strengthening of
the defence organisation.

The next cabinet – also depending on
economic developments – will want
to place new emphasis and priorities
on countless other issues, including
defence, and will have a certain level
of resources to do so. The defence
organisation is aware of the fact that
it is impossible to predict in advance
how much in the way of resources a
cabinet will allocate to the
organisation. The rapidly changing
global security environment and the
further recovery of the defence
organisation mean that there is
currently a mismatch between the
organisation’s tasks and the budget:
at the moment, we cannot fully meet
the demands placed on us or honour
the agreements made in a national
and international context. Even with
substantial growth in the defence
budget, the next cabinet will be


Technological developments and
changing global relations mean that
the defence organisation is going to
find itself in relatively new domains in
the coming years. We need to be able
to use information as a weapon in all
domains. What is more, developments
in the space domain not only have
major implications for our security,
but also for our economy and
prosperity.

To guarantee the ability to be futureproof in the performance of tasks
and obligations in the national
security domain, we need to expand


###### First steps
When consideration is being given
to financial choices for the defence
organisation (additions as well as
reductions), a balance always needs to
be sought between the needs in these
four categories. They cannot be seen
in isolation, but as complementary to
and in part dependent on each other.
The fulfilment of the international
obligations (the first category), for
instance, occurs on the basis of the
premise that we want our operations
to be information-driven and that we
have sufficient (combat) support to
deliver flexibility and customisation.
To arrange the current organisation


-----

obliged to make choices, set priorities
and decide what it expects from the
defence organisation. A balance has
to be sought between the defence
organisation’s goals and tasks and
the means required to achieve and
perform them. To achieve greater
stability for the defence organisation,
long-term commitment is needed to
bring the organisation up to date.

In the light of the threat environment,
the NATO allies have agreed to make
every effort to grow towards a
defence budget of 2% of GDP (the
NATO norm). As a prosperous nation
that derives so much benefit from our
partnerships, it is important to take
our share of the responsibility for the
protection of our common security. To
be a reliable partner, one of the three
characteristics identified in this vision,
we must be willing to honour our
NATO agreements. We could start by
equalling the average of the European
NATO members so that we deliver
a proportionate contribution to our
European partners. This would be a
good onward step to the policy of this
cabinet. It would send a strong signal.

The Netherlands is expected to reach
a GDP percentage of 1.48 in 2020. This
rise is entirely related to the anticipated
development of the economy because
of the coronavirus crisis. The average
among European NATO states will also
rise further as a result, reaching an
estimated 1.8%. In 2021, the Netherlands
will still be among the states with the
lowest contribution. That will remain
so on the present course towards
2024: most countries have announced
intensification, so the gap will widen.
NATO recently expressed its grave
concern on this subject in the periodic


report on the Netherlands in the
context of the defence planning
capability review.[5]

A future cabinet may choose to
substantiate the most essential
conditions (consider above all the
reinforcement of our combat support
and logistics, IT and our personnel)
and a number of targeted reinforcements in our striking power.
These capabilities must match the
unique qualities of the defence
organisation and specifically
strengthen the EU and NATO.

###### Development paths
Defence is an important condition for
and part of the earning potential of our
society: without security, there can be
no properly functioning economy or
society. An investment in the defence
organisation is thus an investment in
our economy and prosperity.

To give an idea of how the defence
organisation could become stronger
over the coming years, three possible
development paths are shown below:
1. Grow towards the average among
European NATO states in 2024:
before the coronavirus crisis, this
amounted to 1.83% of GDP. This is
likely to rise as a result of economic
developments. Further growth
towards the NATO norm of 2% of
GDP in 2030.
2. Grow towards the NATO norm of
2% in 2024: in accordance with
agreements made by government
leaders at the NATO summit in
Wales and later in Warsaw.

_5 As previously, the defence organisation will send this_

_report to parliament after declassification._


3. Grow towards the entire
requirement indicated below in
2035.

It is, of course, quite possible that
future cabinets will opt for a different
path. Whichever path is chosen,
however, choices will be necessary,
depending on the budget available.


**43**


-----

Current budget (budget 2021) (€bn)
Growth path to European NATO average in 2024 (pre-coronavirus)
Growth path to NATO norm (2% in 2024)
Defence Vision growth path (in full)
Current GDP percentage
Growth path to European NATO average in 2024 (pre-coronavirus)
NATO norm
Defence Vision growth path (in full)
Growth path to NATO norm (2% in 2024)


28

27

26

25

24

23

22

21

20

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

09

08

07

06

05
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035


**44**


3,00%

2,80%

2,70%

2,90%

2,60%

2,50%

2,40%

2,30%

2,20%

2,10%

**2,00%**

1,90%

1,80%

1,70%

1,60%

1,50%

1,40%

1,30%

1,20%

1,10%

1,00%

0,90%

0,80%

0,70%

0,60%

0,50%
2020

|Col1|2020|2021|2022|2023|2024|2025|2026|2027|2028|2029|2030|2031|2032|2033|2034|2035|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Current budget (OB2021) (in €bn)|11,5|11,6|12,1|11,8|11,8|11,4|11,4|11,3|11,2|11,4|11,2|11,2|11,2|11,2|11,2|11,2|
|Required additional budget (in €bn):|||||||||||||||||
|Growth path to European NATO average in 2024(1.83%)|0|0,1|1,5|3,2|3,9|4,4|4,9|5,4|5,9|6,4|7|7|7|7|7|7|
|Growth path to NATO norm (2% in 2024)|0|0,4|1,5|3,2|5,4|5,9|6,1|6,4|6,6|6,7|7|7|7|7|7|7|


Defence vision growth path (in full) 0 0,4 1,5 3,2 5,4 6,4 7,4 8,4 9,4 10,4 11,4 12,4 13,4 14,4 15,4 16


-----

# In conclusion


**The threats that we as a Kingdom**
**need to be able to withstand are not**
**static. Technological developments,**
**geopolitical changes and also such**
**issues as climate change and**
**demographic developments are**
**altering the threat environment.**
**Threats are now evolving so quickly**
**that the defence organisation has**
**to adapt. And given the current**
**setup and state of the defence**
**organisation, we are not adequately**
**equipped to deal with future**
**(or some current) threats.**

In 2035 too, we will need a defence
organisation that can protect our way
of life and the interests of our society.
The defence organisation will be
called upon with increasing frequency.
And our people need to be ready:
equipped and trained. As our Kingdom’s
fighting force, military personnel carry
on when others stop. Ideally, they
will prevent a conflict. But if they have
to, they will fight to win. Sometimes
paying the ultimate price: their life.

The defence organisation will get
to work on the basis of the profile
outlined in this Defence Vision.
So that on the way to 2035 it becomes
a smart, technologically advanced
organisation with a great capacity
to adapt to different situations and act
on the basis of the best information.
We will also be an organisation on
which our national and international
partners and society can rely.


The three characteristics and ten
design principles will provide guidance
and help to maintain a steady course
in the decision making regarding the
design and composition of the
organisation. The success of the
profile will also depend on the
restoration and maintenance of the
balance between tasks, equipment
and people.

The defence organisation is going to
move forward along the path to 2035.
In order to be fully equipped for future
(and some current) threats, we need
long-term commitment from the
politicians. Future cabinets can
address this issue. We must be able
to move forward in the coming years
and know where we stand. Choices
will also be necessary, as we cannot
do everything and we cannot do it all
at the same time.

The world will look different in 2035.
Security is not a luxury, it cannot be
taken for granted and it does not come
cheap. But it is vital for the protection
and defence of our interests. For the
preservation of what we value.


**45**


-----

**I**


##### Defence Vision 2035

# Explanatory Annexes

###### Explanatory Annex I: Trend analysis 2035 (page II) Our world is constantly in motion. We monitor the trends and developments that affect the future (operational) environment in which our defence organisation will be operating.

 Explanatory Annex II: Deployment scenarios 2035 (page X) In order to determine the best profile for our defence organisation to enable us to perform our tasks properly in the future, we frequently use deployment scenarios in addition to environmental and threat analyses.
 Explanatory Annex III: NATO and EU capability objectives (page XIV) In order to ensure that the capabilities of allies complement one another, NATO uses the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). The EU also has targets for strengthening combined deployment and qualities.


-----

##### Explanatory Annex I:

# Trend analysis  2035

Our world is constantly in motion. We
monitor the trends and developments
that affect the future (operational)
environment in which our defence
organisation will be operating. Technological trends, geopolitical shifts of
power, economic, socio-demographic
and ecological developments bring
new opportunities and risks. The
contours of a new reality are becoming Socioincreasingly visible, but uncertainty demographic

changes

about what will eventually become
reality continues to be characteristic
to our time, also in the future.


Current trends and developments point
towards significant changes.
Technological possibilities in particular
are expanding rapidly. They bring us
great opportunities; for example,
robotics, artificial intelligence and
quantum technology can further enrich
our daily lives. A fridge that does its own
shopping when products have run out,
new cures for diseases that used to
be deadly, and robots capable of giving
people the care they need. Distance
is becoming even less relevant thanks
to developments such as self-driving cars
and better means of communication.

Change also carries risks, however.
The defence organisation’s job is to take
account of precisely those risks. The
defence organisation is the insurance
policy for a great many risks about which
we are uncertain as to whether they will
ever materialise but which will have a
disruptive effect if they do. We therefore
need to acknowledge and evaluate those
risks, so that we can prevent or mitigate
them as much as possible. The Netherlands is an open and diverse country of
connections and internal and external
security are therefore inextricably linked.
We are an important hub for air traffic


(Schiphol), shipping (Ports of Rotterdam
and Amsterdam) and data traffic
(Amsterdam Internet Exchange). We
are in the top 20 of the world’s largest
economies and there is a wide variety
of backgrounds and outlooks among
our population. Open connections are
our strength. But also our weakness.

Poverty and poor governance elsewhere
in the world, from North Africa to
Venezuela, lead to people smuggling,
drug trafficking, other forms of organised
crime and extremism that could have an
undermining effect in the Netherlands
too. One-sided strategic dependencies
(economically as well as in relation to
security) can lead to vulnerability. A
conflict in the Middle East may create
problems with foreign terrorist fighters
years later. An outbreak of a new and
aggressive virus in Asia could shut down
our economy. A digital attack launched
from abroad could disrupt systems in


**II**


the Port of Rotterdam. A tragic example
of how international developments can
strike at our heart is the downing of flight
MH17 above Ukraine, as a result of
which 298 people lost their lives, 193 of
whom were Dutch.


-----

data protection, privacy and other
ethico-legal issues.

The current content of jobs will
change, new types of job will emerge,
and the need for different
competencies will arise. These changes
in the job market will lead to a high
demand for specific (and therefore
scarce) job profiles in the technology
sector. Throughout the job market,
there will be a growing focus on
competencies such as the ability to
switch quickly and to adapt to and
embrace new possibilities. Older
workers may find it more difficult to
do this.


Artificial intelligence changes the
planning and conduct of military
operations. Operations become
information-driven. This dependence
on technology can also cause
vulnerability.


Digitalisation creates new possibilities
for deterrence and protection.


Technology helps to achieve more
effects by the same number of people
and to work better and more safely.


Unmanned systems are more common.
Both on land, at sea and in the air. They
are used by more and more actors,
including non-state actors.


There is permanent surveillance in the
electromagnetic spectrum.


**III**


######    Increasing technological possibilities

Innovative and ground-breaking
applications of artificial intelligence,
quantum technology, battery and
nanotechnology, 3D printing and
bio- and gene technology are finding
their way into our daily lives.
Technological developments are
changing our way of thinking, decision
making and acting. They are changing
the international economy, our way
of communicating with each other,
our transport, the job market and our
security, to name but a few. It also
changes our approach to conflict
and warfare. New domains such as
the cyber domain and space offer
new opportunities. Weapon systems
are becoming ever faster and more
accurate.

Technological trend monitors
developed by research institutes such
as the Netherlands Organisation for
Applied Scientific Research describe
the changing relationship between
man and machine. Algorithms are
becoming better and better at
identifying patterns, gradually enabling
them to respond more accurately
to users’ wishes. Unmanned systems
are becoming more powerful and
versatile. People’s intellectual and
physical faculties can be enhanced
with implants and pharmaceutical
agents. On the one hand, future
generations will be more accustomed
to working with machines in support
of their day-to-day activities. On the
other, rapid developments will give
rise to societal debates on (new)
legislation and regulations regarding


Satellites provide crucial
communication and navigation. The
use of space is becoming increasingly
essential.


Attacks no longer take place within a
single domain or at a single location,
but are coordinated on different fronts
and over prolonged periods of time.


The proliferation of tactical (‘smallscale’) nuclear weapons increases the
risk of escalation. The threat of as yet
unknown biological, chemical or
radiological agents is also growing.


Faster, more precise weapons shorten
reaction times, including missiles that
can hit Europe directly. This puts the
concept of meaningful human control
under pressure.


-----

######    Changing geopolitical relations 

The rise of a power such as China
offers many economic opportunities,
but also brings security risks. The
discussions about 5G and the
production of microchips are clear
evidence of this tension. The US is
increasingly regarding the Asian great
power as an existential rival. Russia
and other regional powers
occasionally use the new geopolitical
situation to their advantage. All this
can put Europe in a difficult position,
as we are situated between the US
and China and are vulnerable to
Russian aggression. This rivalry is also
felt in the Caribbean part of our
Kingdom.

The (Western) rules of play that we
have used on the world stage over
the past decades are also changing.
As many actions and reactions during
the COVID-19 crisis have emphasised,
various players have subordinated
transparency, cooperation and
international solidarity to the
furthering of their own interests.
Beijing is claiming a greater role on
the world stage, the US is going its
own way, and non-state actors have
an ever greater say. Examples of the
latter are large tech companies,
authoritative NGOs and even wealthy
individuals.

The US appears to be backing away,
while for its security Europe will
continue to be highly dependent on
solidarity within the NATO Alliance,
and particularly that of the US, in the
years to come. While we remain
committed to freedom and


democracy and endeavour to preserve
a multilateral world, we will also have
to learn to navigate a world where
unilateralism and protectionism,
bilateral agreements and ad hoc
coalitions play a greater role.

The increasing tensions between
great powers are already manifesting
themselves: trade wars between
states, proxy wars in the Middle East
and North Africa, and a more
aggressive rhetoric, which is often
disseminated unfiltered through
social media. We see large-scale
military exercises at the borders of
our Alliance and increasingly frequent
territorial violations of the land, sea
and air domains, also in the
Netherlands. We see a race for the
possession of ground-breaking
technologies and for the power to
set international standards.

Increasing tensions are accompanied
by tougher nuclear rhetoric. Russia’s
development and deployment of the
ground-launched cruise missile SSC-8
heralded the end of the INF Treaty
and there are other developments
raising concern: those concerning the
Iran deal, North Korea’s ballistic
activities and investments in new
(dual-capable) weapon systems.


The situation in neighbouring
Venezuela is not likely to improve any
time soon, making the Caribbean part
of the Kingdom more ‘geopolitical’.


The new relations boost far-reaching
(European) defence cooperation.


Hybrid conflicts are the ‘new normal’.
Deployment increasingly focuses on
the cyber domain and the information
environment.


Uncertainty prevails within NATO and
the EU as a result of Brexit, the search
for leadership in the EU, and the
behaviour of certain allies.


States such as China, Russia and Iran
are trying to gain more influence, also
by military show of force and
intimidation.


**IV**


The likelihood of a conflict with military
aspects between great powers is
growing. Great powers are focusing on
constant technological innovation.


Tensions are rising more visibly in areas
such as the cyber domain, on the high
seas, in the polar regions and in space.


Chances are that more protracted
conflicts will arise around Europe with
interference from various great powers.


Increased pressure on the international
legal order renders multilateral conflict
resolution more problematic. This has
consequences for mission mandates.


-----

We must take into account the
possibility of outbreaks of new (and
old) communicable infectious diseases
that can spread rapidly. COVID-19 was
preceded by other coronaviruses, such
as SARS. Such outbreaks – and worse

- cannot be ruled out in the future,
especially in densely populated areas.
As has become painfully clear, such
infectious diseases can have major
consequences for the international
economy.


Volatility on the international markets
means that the price and availability of
defence equipment can fluctuate
greatly.


The current crisis presents opportunities to restructure the economy in a
more sustainable manner.


Large IT multinationals are becoming
increasingly influential. For the defence
organisation, too, dependence on
commercial parties is on the increase
(but so too are the opportunities).


**V**


######    International economic developments

For a long time, protectionism and
state subsidies were internationally
seen as undesirable. That idea has
changed. The free-market economy
cannot be taken for granted in the
future. The closing of borders and
economic hubs during the COVID-19
crisis has accelerated this trend of
protectionism. We will continue to
feel the effects in the coming years,
both in the public and private sectors.
The national budgets of many
countries will also remain under strain
in the coming years and oil prices
may continue to fluctuate.

The increasing scarcity and
geographical distribution of not only
oil and gas reserves, but also that of,
for example, uranium and rare-earth
metals, could stir up (trade) conflicts.
Economic conflicts will affect prices
and availability of goods and services.
Rare-earth metals are indispensable
for technologically sophisticated
applications such as smartphones,
but also wind turbines, electric cars,
new generations of batteries, jet
engines, satellites and missile
guidance systems.

The international economy has been
moving towards digitalisation for
years, and the crisis of recent months
has given this trend an extra boost.
Large IT multinationals (such as
Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Microsoft,
Facebook and, perhaps in the near
future, Tencent) now have more
resources at their disposal than
many a country.


Public budgets are under pressure,
which is aggravated by current
economic conditions. There is no
guarantee of growth for the defence
organisation.


Trade disputes surrounding rare-earth
metals may increase. Certain rare-earth
metals are indispensable for applications such as jet engines, satellites and
missile guidance systems.


The current economic crisis, triggered
by COVID-19 measures, will lead to
higher unemployment and financial
problems worldwide for years to come.


-----

######    Demographic and social developments

The world population will increase by
approximately one billion people over
the next 15 years. That growth is
unevenly distributed. Africa’s
population (currently 1.1 billion) is likely
to have doubled by 2050, while its
economic development is lagging
behind. A large group of young people
will start looking for other livelihoods.
Moreover, this a region that is also
facing other challenges, such as the
effects of climate change.

In stark contrast are Europe, Russia and
China, whose populations are ageing.
Growing numbers of people worldwide
will move to cities, especially in coastal
areas and poorer regions. Of all the
continents, Africa’s urbanisation is
progressing at the highest rate.
According to consultancy company
McKinsey, in 2025 there will already be
100 African cities with a population of
over a million. This is not an exclusively
African trend: Latin America and Asia
are also seeing a growth in the number
of megacities, including cities with
populations of around 30 million
inhabitants.

This often unevenly distributed
population growth and urbanisation
will in all likelihood have social
consequences as well. This could
increasingly lead to conflicts in major
urban areas. The global polarisation
between democracy and autocracy,
and between the haves and have-nots,
may increase as a result of these
developments. A possible pandemic
could further reinforce this trend. In this
respect, autocracies are making grateful


use of technological applications to
restrict freedoms, while democracies
are taking measures to, for example,
protect the privacy of citizens. Between
these two extremes, a growing number
of so-called ‘unfree democracies’ are
emerging.

The Netherlands, too, is becoming ever
more crowded. According to research
by the Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency (PBL) and Statistics
Netherlands (CBS), in 2035 we will have
a population of approximately 18.3
million people with increasingly diverse
backgrounds. The big cities are growing
considerably. It is not only the size, but
also the composition of the population
that is changing, mainly as a result of
ageing. The number of people over 65 is
rising sharply, whereas there is hardly
any growth in the number of people
between the ages of 20 and 65 (roughly
speaking, the working population). In
2012, there were four working people
for every senior; in 2040, there will be
only two.

This also has consequences for our
national budgets: the same number of
people have to drive the economy and
prosperity of our country. To illustrate
the contrast: based on current trends,
more than 300 million young people
will be entering the labour market in
the Middle East and North Africa
between now and 2050.


Competition on the labour market is
growing and the population composition is changing. This requires a
different approach to recruitment and
to the way the organisation is
designed.


Urbanisation in places such as Africa
and the Middle East means that
conflicts occur more frequently in
major cities.


Criminal networks and jihadi non-state
actors continue to find fertile ground,
but other forms of extremism are
springing up too.


Organised crime is becoming increasingly large-scale. Developments in the
Caribbean are increasingly felt in the
Netherlands.


**VI**


Our borders are coming under (even)
greater pressure. An unregulated
increase in the number of migrants
seeking protection and a better life
cannot be ruled out.


-----

Energy independence could enhance
security (also in mission areas) and
could have operational advantages.


Extreme differences in temperatures
can affect equipment and personnel.


New rules concerning sustainability
mean higher initial costs, but could
save costs in the long term.


Growing number of conflicts over
natural resources.


Increased demand for humanitarian aid
and disaster relief.


**VII**


######    Ecological developments

Scientists have agreed for years that
we should not underestimate the
effects of climate change. Reports by
the UN Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) have become
increasingly alarming over the years.
The Global Risk Reports of the World
Economic Forum (WEF) have been
claiming for years that climate-related
risks are most likely to occur and will
have the greatest impact. Sea levels
continue to rise and weather patterns
and ecosystems are changing. The risk
of flooding, forest fires and health
threats is increasing.

Precisely in the region surrounding
Europe, such as the Middle East, the
Sahel and the Horn of Africa, drought,
unpredictable rainfall, salinization of
groundwater and water scarcity could
become sources of conflict. In the Nile
Delta in Egypt, for example, the saltier
water could cause crop failures, and in
the Yemeni capital of Sana’a,
groundwater levels are steadily
dropping. In the Arctic, new shipping
routes are beginning to emerge and
the extraction of rare-earth metals is
becoming more feasible. Scarcity of
resources such as water could lead to
famine, local (and geopolitical)
conflicts and migration flows. We
should bear in mind that weather
conditions could cause damage to
buildings and infrastructure.

The Netherlands is vulnerable too:
60% of our surface area is at risk of
being flooded. Unlike other countries,
however, we are fortunate to have the
means to protect ourselves. The Water


Act of 2017 stipulates that the risk of
a person dying as a result of flooding
may not be greater than one in
100,000 years, and we are working
hard to make our dikes future-proof.
There is no such statutory provision
for other risks. But even with such a
provision in place, extreme weather
can still pose a serious risk. There is
also a risk of forest fires in the
Netherlands, while in the Caribbean
part of our Kingdom, hurricanes will
continue to have devastating effects.

Both nationally and internationally,
discussions are being held on climate
change, sustainability, the energy
transition and the possibilities of
geo-engineering (large-scale
manipulation of weather systems
using technology). The outcome of
these discussions will partly
determine what consequences there
will be for the future. Their translation
into society and into legislation and
regulations will affect all of us. It may
lead to changes in sectoral
employment, for example.


-----

###### Conclusion: Adapting to a new operational reality

As set out above, the (near) future will
bring a great number of new elements
to our operational environment. For
example, we may be faced with a
larger number of unexpected crises
that also require the deployment of
the defence organisation. We do not
know whether or when something
will become a reality, but the defence
organisation must always be ready
to serve our society. We are also
increasingly ‘troubled’ by the
permanent strategic rivalry between
great powers such as the US, China
and Russia and the hostile hybrid
activities in which that rivalry
manifests itself. Information and
cyber resources are being deployed
ever more frequently as weapons in
this playing field. The conventional
threat is also growing, however, given
the fact that adversaries have highly
advanced (and nuclear) weapon systems
at their disposal. The speed and
precision of combat are increasing.

The current and future threats are so
significant, numerous and diffuse that
we cannot be prepared for all of them
by ourselves. The reliability of trusted
partnerships will come under further
pressure in the coming years, but our
partners will remain crucial for our
ability to act collectively against the
many threats that are coming our way.

We do not yet have an answer to all
those new elements. If we look from
an overarching perspective at what
is coming our way, we come to the
following conclusions regarding the


necessary renewal of our organisation
on the way to 2035:

We need to be (even) better able
to anticipate and adapt, and to
act quickly and inventively. We must
work to increase our own resilience
and contribute to a more resilient
society. We will need to have (and
retain) certain personnel and materiel
capacities ourselves in order to be able
to take action in unexpected crises.
The defence organisation will have
to make a greater contribution to the
protection of national security.

Within a broader and integrated
network of military and civil
players, we must find a better response
to organised hybrid campaigns that are
under way constantly and on different
fronts (economic, cyber domain,
information domain, military, etc.).We
must therefore also be able to act
independently on a more permanent
basis in various domains, both at the
low and high ends of the force
spectrum.

We must remain able, together
with our partners, to deter
adversaries that are technologically
equal or superior to us (conflict
prevention) and, if necessary, to
confront them (and win). This is also
relevant to the heightened nuclear
threat. Innovation and renewal of our
own weapon systems and our own
methods are therefore essential.
Deterrent measures against the
Russian threat will also remain
necessary in the future.

Using technological, personnelrelated and other solutions, we
must ensure that we have sufficient


capacity for the objectives we set. We
need to structure ourselves differently,
achieving more effects with the same
number of people.

We must identify our added
value, i.e. the strength of our
organisation, more clearly and on that
basis make the greatest possible
contribution to partnerships. The
same goes for our partners: we must
reinforce each other on the basis of
our individual and collective strength.

We must continue our efforts to
be a reliable ally, if only so that
we can expect the same reliability
from our partners. Europe (and thus
the Netherlands too) will have to play
a greater, more self-reliant role in the
field of security (as well as in relation
to other strategic issues) over the next
15 years.


**VIII**


-----

**IX**


-----

##### Explanatory Annex II:

# Deployment scenarios  2035


In order to determine the best profile
for our defence organisation to enable
us to perform our tasks properly in the
future, we frequently use deployment
scenarios in addition to environmental
and threat analyses. In view of the
uncertainties inherent in the
developments in our environment, a
growing number of different
deployment scenarios are conceivable.
From scenarios at the high end of the
force spectrum against (at least)
equivalent adversaries operating with
the most technologically advanced
materiel (an Article 5 situation in the
context of the NATO Alliance) to
deployment against non-state actors
conducting low-tech operations with
asymmetrical warfighting methods. We
must also be able to act in crisis
situations and to provide humanitarian
aid and disaster relief, and we must be
prepared to make our contribution to
the protection and defence of the vital
interests of the Kingdom. From socially
disruptive cyberattacks to pandemics,
from ecological disasters to large-scale
unrest. For the preparation of this
Defence Vision, we organised various
scenario sessions using existing and
new scenarios, including those
conceived in the context of the
inter-ministerial Brede
Maatschappelijke Heroverwegingen
(BMH) in 2020.

###### Overview of scenarios used
As part of the BMH, three conceivable
scenarios requiring the deployment of
the defence organisation for the period
up to 2025 were drawn up. These were
fictitious scenarios with a significant
degree of probability and impact. In
addition, deployment scenarios for the
period up to 2035 were developed by
the defence organisation itself. These


scenarios will remain relevant over the
next 15 years, although their aspects
will change depending on changes in
elements of the environmental
analysis.[6] A brief outline of the
scenarios used is given below.

**1 Civil war in a North African country:**
a civil war in a North African country
creates a power vacuum that allows
extremist non-state actors with a
considerable number of supporters in
the Netherlands and with covert
support from a foreign power to
operate unhindered. This deteriorated
security environment leads to a sharp
increase in irregular migration from
North Africa to southern Europe.
The plight and despair of migrants
are being exploited. The country’s
authorities appeal to the international
community for help, and this forms the
basis for intervention. A blockade by
non-Western countries prevents a
UNSC resolution from being adopted.
Several European and non-European
countries provide neither political nor
military support. The extremist group
commits an attack on a resort in a
neighbouring North African country,
where a large number of Western
tourists are staying. This attack results
in a large number of Dutch victims.
The same extremists call for follow-up
attacks, explicitly designating the
Netherlands as a target. Based on
intelligence and police information,
this threat is considered to be
extremely serious. The Dutch
parliament agrees to contribute to
a military mission of a number of
like-minded European countries to

_6 For more details, see In-depth Supplement I_

_“Trend analysis 2035” on page II._


the North African country. Where
necessary, military interventions are
made in order to prevent further
escalation. In this mission, the defence
organisation collaborates with various
ministries and investigation and
intelligence services as part of a
whole-of-government approach.
The mission involves long-term
deployment, including aftercare and
reconstruction, in the North African
country and in the Netherlands, in
which the defence organisation needs
to contribute to the security and
protection of both military facilities
and civilian objects.

_This scenario shows the vulnerabilities that_
_arise when a situation at Europe’s borders_
_gets out of hand and Europe is largely left to_
_its own devices. The course of the scenario_
_reveals, for instance, the lack of_
_sustainability. It also shows how events_
_abroad can lead to polarisation and the_
_erosion of resilience in Europe and in the_
_Netherlands._

**2 Hybrid attack on the Netherlands:**
the security environment for one of the
NATO allies is deteriorating rapidly. A
neighbouring country, possibly with
the intention of preparing to commit a
flagrant violation of territorial integrity,
is causing social and political unrest. It
is doing so through cyberattacks, social
influencing and physical sabotage, to
name but a few. This country appears
to be steering towards a physical
confrontation. These disruptive
activities are also taking place in the
Netherlands. The cyberattacks are not
only aimed at military targets, but also
at unbalancing society by creating
chaos. The purpose of the attacks is to
disrupt decision-making processes and
to put pressure on the NATO Alliance.


**X**


-----

Dutch strategic targets, such as the
Port of Rotterdam). In addition to
kinetic resources, other means of
denying access include electronic
warfare, deployment of cyber
weapons, and an intensive information
operation.

_This scenario presents NATO’s current_
_vulnerabilities that arise in a rapidly evolving_
_situation in which the adversary makes the_
_first move. It concerns, among other things,_
_the obstruction of means of communication_
_and therefore command and control,_
_response times of our units and the resilience_
_of the Alliance against disinformation and_
_against an adversary who plays allies off_
_against one another._

**4 Crisis in the Caribbean:**
in this scenario, the security
environment in parts of the Caribbean
has deteriorated. New oil discoveries
lead to border conflicts in the north of
South America. The South American
countries concerned are reinforcing
and modernising their military
capabilities with support from abroad.
In the countries concerned and on the
islands of Bonaire, Curaçao and Aruba,
there are fears that the border conflicts
in the north of South America will
escalate in military terms and
destabilize the region. Curaçao and
Aruba are inundated with refugees
who have risked crossing over to our
Kingdom in makeshift vessels. The
large number of refugees creates food
shortages on the islands. Riots break
out on the islands and the population
has resorted to plundering. Armed
organised international gangs take
advantage of the unstable situation by
trafficking large quantities of drugs and
arms and exploiting the flow of
refugees (robbery, extortion,


recruitment, smuggling). There are also
cases of violent robbery aboard ships
anchored off the islands.

_This scenario shows the vulnerabilities that_
_arise in the event of a serious disruption of_
_internal security on the Leeward Antilles, a_
_humanitarian emergency and violent_
_organised (drugs-related) crime. It is also_
_intended to test what we can do when faced_
_with a possible military escalation in the_
_Kingdom, taking into account the fact that_
_the Caribbean parts of our Kingdom lie_
_outside the NATO Treaty area as well as_
_outside the EU._

**5 Developments in the Arctic: as a**
result of climate change, the ice in the
Arctic is melting; new sea routes
between Europe and Asia are opening
up and the extraction of raw materials
in the area is becoming easier. At the
same time, the melting of the Arctic
and Antarctic ice caps is causing sea
levels to rise. Combined with extreme
weather changes, this increases the risk
of flooding in large parts of the
Netherlands. The Arctic is also linked to
other theatres (of conflict), including
the Baltic States, the Atlantic, the
North Sea and what is know as the
Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. In the
context of changing geopolitical
relationships and attempts to secure
access to oil and gas reserves, exclusive
economic zones and shipping routes,
the importance of sea and subsea
connections is on the rise. For example,
the new Northern Sea Route has been
claimed by a large Arctic country.
Linking these interests to security
makes the Arctic a potential
deployment area for instruments of
power, including armed forces.
Countries could thus increase their
control over the Arctic, for example by


**XI**


One of the physical activities involves
an explosion in a gas pipeline. The
attack is claimed by a local action
group. However, there are indications
that the aforementioned neighbouring
country of our ally was (indirectly)
involved.

_This scenario presents the vulnerabilities_
_that arise when defending our vital interests_
_against a hybrid opponent. It involves,_
_for example, our information position/_
_intelligence, digital resilience, the detection/_
_dismantlement of subversive structures and_
_scale-up capability in the event of an acute_
_threat. It also reveals a lack of resilience._
_Incidents are causing damage to civil and_
_military targets and to digital and physical_
_infrastructure. They are aimed at influencing_
_the population, adversely affecting our_
_democracy from within._

**3 Attack on a NATO ally: a large**
country neighbouring a number of
NATO allies sets its sights on achieving
rapid military success by invading and
occupying the territory of a NATO ally
– so quickly that NATO is politically and
militarily unable to prevent the attack.
This operation is characterised by a
pre-emptive strike, a rapid
concentration of resources and the
subsequent sealing of the area of
operations. After its military objectives
have been achieved, the country tries
to force political negotiations. In
addition to modern fighting power and
high-tech weapon systems, the
attacker also has tactical nuclear
escalation dominance. It is capable of
sealing the area of operations and
severely restricting NATO’s freedom of
action. This anti-access and area denial
concept (A2AD) also has an offensive
component, such as the deployment of
long-range missiles (also aimed at


-----

**_Authoritative information position:_**
the increased threat means that
credible deterrence or the ability to
win the fight is even more dependent
on the extent to which the defence
organisation can access reliable,
high-quality information and
intelligence from all domains and
dimensions before the adversary does.

**_Integrated command and control and_**
**_information-driven operations: in_**
order to be faster in decision-making
and weapons deployment than the
adversary, we need fully integrated
command and control at all echelons.
Using information as the driver to
structure the operations of the armed
forces as a whole requires network
interoperability, both internally
and with all our (potential) military
and civil partners. It requires linked
(autonomous) systems, robust
(network) support and layered
security of all the system components.

**_Information as a weapon: armed_**
forces that also use information
as a weapon in its own right and that
are permitted to use this weapon at
an early stage and offensively where
necessary.

**_Support for civil authorities:_**
permanent assistance of civil
authorities through unique and specific
capabilities, provided by, for example,
the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee,
CBRN units, the Defence Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Service, logistics
capabilities, the Major Incident Hospital
and special units.

**_Increased focus on crisis_**
**_management: national threats and_**
developments will continue to require


imposing area denial (A2AD). In the
Arctic, Dutch maritime and energy
companies as well as military units
are increasingly confronted with
provocations by military units from
the large Arctic countries.

_This scenario demonstrates that a large-_
_scale (military) conflict in the Arctic is not_
_expected in the next 15 years. However, the_
_interplay between ecological, economic and_
_political-military interests makes the Arctic a_
_delicate area that may also affect_
_developments in the Baltic States and the_
_Nordic countries. The threat in this scenario_
_also shows that the remote Arctic can indeed_
_affect the security of the Netherlands and_
_Northern Europe. Close monitoring of_
_(military) developments in the region is_
_therefore extremely important._


###### Effects on the armed forces
The developments described in the
trend analysis and the elaboration of
scenarios as outlined above together
form the basis of the characteristics
and design principles set out in this
Defence Vision. The conclusion is that
in order to be able to perform our
tasks properly in the changing
environment, we need:

**_Reliable partners: we need reliable_**
collaboration with like-minded
militaries in order to be able to act
collectively, using both kinetic and
non-kinetic means simultaneously in
all domains, in all dimensions and in
all phases of the conflict. Together, we
must be able to deter or to win the fight.

**_Fast response times and_**
**_independent deployability: we must_**
be ready at all times and be prepared
for sustained deployment. We must
be able to arrive on the scene quickly
and, where necessary, operate
independently.

**_Flexibility and versatility in_**
**_deployment: along with our allies_**
and partners, we need to invest in the
‘new’ domains such as the cyber
domain and space, while at the same
time continuing to invest in (weapon)
systems and effects in the other
domains and dimensions.

**_More anticipation, prevention and_**
**_de-escalation: to avert increasing_**
threats and prevent the escalation of
conflicts as much as possible, the armed
forces can be deployed at an early
stage, for example by prepositioning
(combat) units in potential crisis areas
or by preventively conducting
targeted offensive (cyber) actions.


**XII**


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**XIII**


crisis management, a core competency
of the defence organisation. The ability
to manage crises under demanding
conditions is a competency that can be
used at national level to support the
competent authorities.

**_Resilience and engagement_**
**_of society: increased threats_**
not only necessitate international
cooperation, but also require that
Dutch society be engaged in the
sustainment and deployment of the
defence organisation. Social engagement
of this kind will promote adaptability,
flexibility and effectiveness.

**_Greater effects through technology:_**
in order to be able to continue to
act decisively, the defence organisation
will have to use technology to achieve
greater effect with the same number
of people. This may also reduce risks
to personnel.

**_High-quality personnel: personnel_**
will still make the difference in
2035 too, but the role of personnel in
the various domains will be different
in the future. New technological
applications create new relationships
between people and technology.
These developments result in a
different personnel structure and
a different mix of required skills and
qualifications. In order to remain
relevant, the defence organisation will
be composed differently and make
greater use of technology. In brief, the
organisation will be structured in a
more labour-extensive way.

**_Armed forces that are combined and_**
**_jointly interoperable with military_**
**_and civil partners: both at national and_**
international level.


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##### Explanatory Annex III:

# NATO and EU capability objectives


###### NATO capability objectives 
NATO wants the capabilities of allies
to complement each other. To promote
this, NATO uses the NATO defence
planning process (NDPP). In this
process, NATO looks at what is going
on in the world, what the Alliance
wants to achieve and what it wants
and needs to be, in order to be able to
subsequently flesh out the Alliance’s
ambition and main tasks and to
determine which capabilities are
needed to realise those (for collective
defence, crisis management and
cooperative security). NATO is working
closely with the EU in this area, so that
priorities for the capability targets are
attuned to one another as much as
possible. Increasing interoperability is
a spearhead for both organisations.
Standards are being developed to
achieve this.

The NDPP has a four-year cycle and
comprises five steps:
**1 Political guidelines: what do we want**
to be able to do?
**2 Determining the capability targets:**
what do we need for this?
**3 Dividing the capability targets: who**
does what?
**4 Facilitating implementation: how**
should the targets be realised?
**5 Reviewing results: have the targets**
been achieved?

The capability targets consist of both
quantitative and qualitative targets. In
other words, they are about numbers
of weapon systems, but also about the
level of training of units. NATO
classifies the targets according to
‘abilities’ – the ability to achieve the
Alliance’s ambition. These abilities are:


**_Prepare: the ability to train and_**
ensure the readiness of units,
partly by (large-scale) exercises, but
also by, for example, having situational
awareness in the cyber domain and
having adequate strategic supplies.

**_Engage: the ability to engage_**
opponents in and from the
various domains (land, sea, air, cyber
and space). Examples are groundbased firepower (such as a heavy
infantry brigade), sea-based firepower
(such as shooter capability for missile
defence and anti-submarine warfare)
and the necessary capabilities to carry
out precision strikes from the air in
A2AD environments.

**_Sustain:_** the ability to provide
the necessary support so that
(combat) units are able to carry out
operations and missions. This includes
logistics support with various
(strategic) transport capabilities for
land, air and sea, but also specialist
support such as medical facilities.

**_Consultation, Command & Control_**
**_(C3): the ability to conduct_**
adequate command & control and
communication. This ability is realised
through the various (deployable)
headquarters that make it possible to
direct operations in the various
domains. These command & control
structures depend on communication
and information systems in order to
function.


**_Protect: the ability to protect vital_**
interests and units. Examples
include ground-based air defence,
naval mine countermeasures and CBRN
protection.

**_Inform: the ability to collect_**
information and intelligence.
This is achieved by platforms such as
airborne joint intelligence, surveillance
& reconnaissance, and units for land
intelligence, surveillance, targeting
and reconnaissance.

###### Targets for the Netherlands
The most recent political guidelines
were adopted in 2019. In 2021, the
capability targets will again be divided
among allies. It is expected that a
greater number of units will have to
be available with a higher degree of
readiness.

In the NDPP cycle that closes in 2020,
152 quantitative and 64 qualitative
capability targets were allocated to and
accepted by the Netherlands. The
Netherlands has three priority targets:
(1) a fully-fledged mechanised brigade;
(2) joint intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capability to generate
more intelligence and (3) joint theatreenabling capability for the provision of
support in an area of operations.
According to NATO, the Netherlands is
currently unable to meet these targets.
Indeed, the figures speak volumes: as
regards the quantitative targets, in the
NDPP cycle that closes in 2020, the
Netherlands only met 28.9% in full,
62.2% in part and 8.9% were not
met at all. As regards the qualitative
targets, 48.8% were met in full, 44.9%
were met in part and 6.3% were not
met. The problem lies particularly in
shortfalls in striking power and


**XIV**


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these areas. In addition, NATO has
developed guidelines for resilience
to help countries prepare themselves.
Civil-military cooperation is essential
to realising this.

###### Ready for the future
**NATO reflection process**
In December 2019, the Heads of State
and Government decided in favour of a
reflection process to strengthen
NATO’s political dimension. That
decision was preceded by a tumultuous
period for the Alliance, including
Turkey’s invasion of north-eastern
Syria and French President Emmanuel
Macron’s statement that NATO was
brain-dead if it was possible for an ally
to take such unilateral action.

The process was launched under the
leadership of the NATO SecretaryGeneral, assisted by ten people. This
group will submit its report to the
Secretary-General (who is not bound
by the advice) in December 2020. The
reflection process should result in a
decision by heads of state and
government at the NATO Summit in
2021.

For the Netherlands, the restoration of
mutual cohesion and solidarity is
central to the reflection process. For
this to happen, NATO must prove again
that it is relevant to all allies, both by
making optimum use of available
resources and by finding answers to
new threats. In this respect, the
Netherlands believes that all three of
NATO’s main tasks (collective defence,
crisis management and cooperative
security) are important and that the
balance must be maintained.


In addition to receiving a report by the
reflection group, the Secretary-General
will also hold discussions with young
people, civil society and the private
sector to gather ideas on how NATO
can continue to be able to meet
tomorrow’s challenges.

**NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept**
NATO is currently also looking at the
future and, for that reason, it is
developing the NATO Warfighting
Capstone Concept (NWCC). The NWCC
will be published this year and will look
20 years ahead. It will examine NATO’s
current and future needs to be able to
win a conflict. This concept is based on
three operational frameworks:
shaping, contesting and fighting. The
NWCC should help the Alliance to
identify the capabilities necessary for
the conflict of the future.

###### EU capability objectives 
The EU uses a capability development
plan (CDP). The purpose of this EU
capability plan is to enable the EU to
achieve the agreed European level of
ambition and to implement the
priorities set in the EU Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
adopted by the Member States. The
strategic compass currently being
developed by the EU Member States
(completion expected in 2022) should
ensure an agreed common future goal
with regard to, among other things,
European capability development.

The CDP will set out which capabilities
the EU needs. Furthermore, the
Coordinated Annual Review on
Defence (CARD) identifies
opportunities for further cooperation
in European capability development.
The priorities set as part of European


**XV**


sustainability. The extent to which the
Netherlands is meeting over 0.4% of
the capability targets cannot be
measured because of a lack of data.

###### Additional NATO obligations
In addition to the financial contribution
– the 2% standard (cash) – and
realising the NDPP capability targets
(capabilities), the Netherlands is also
expected to contribute in relation to
activities, operations and missions
(contributions). On none of these three
points are we doing what is expected
of us. For example, we are not making
a proportionate contribution to
missions, such as those in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Various units are on standby
for missions: we are participating in,
for example, the enhanced NATO
Response Force (including VJTF),
the Amphibious Task Group (ATG),
the Standing NATO Maritime Group
(SNMG) and the NATO Readiness
Initiative. Together with Belgium,
the Netherlands also provides the
Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) to guard
the airspace of the Benelux countries.
The Netherlands participates in NATO’s
nuclear task and also has a task in host
nation support for military units
transiting the Netherlands.

The national resilience of society is
essential for security and collective
defence. In 2016, the NATO allies,
including the Netherlands, undertook
to improve civil preparedness. To this
end, NATO set basic requirements with
regard to seven strategic focus areas:
continuity of government, energy,
uncontrolled movement of people,
food and water resources, mass
casualties, civil communications and
transport systems. NATO assesses
the level of preparedness of allies in


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capability development are largely the
same as those set in the context of
NATO. This means that the Netherlands
can contribute to meeting the
ambitions of both NATO and the EU
simultaneously.

In 2017, in the context of the
Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO), the Netherlands agreed to 20
binding commitments to further
strengthen EU defence cooperation.
These are financial and operational
commitments, as well as commitments
to increase cooperation in the field of
materiel. The Netherlands has
committed to, among other things:

a regular increase of the defence
budget;

making units available for the
realisation of the EU’s level of
ambition;

providing substantial support to
CSDP missions and operations in the
form of personnel, materiel or
training;

striving for an ambitious approach
to the sharing of common costs of EU
military missions and operations;

strengthening cooperation in the
fields of cyber capabilities and military
mobility;

a more multinational and
harmonised approach with regard to
capability development and
procurement.

The agreement reached by the
European Council in July 2020
regarding the Multiannual Financial
Framework (MFF) for 2021-2027
includes an amount of €7 billion for
the European Defence Fund (EDF),
for the (partial) financing of crossborder defence research and capability


development. In order to be eligible
for financing under the fund, consortia
must demonstrate that the portion of
the costs not covered by EDF funding is
covered by other means (co-financing).
For this, no specific budget line has yet
been included in the defence budget.
To ensure full participation of the
Dutch defence industry, which can help
fulfil national defence requirements
and mitigate EU shortfalls, it is
important that the Dutch government
has the possibility of providing
co-financing, because significant
economies of scale can be achieved
through the EDF. In addition, crossborder cooperation contributes to
the promotion of interoperability. **XVI**


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**October 2020**


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