Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia


# THE NATIONAL DEFENCE CONCEPT

## Approved by the Cabinet of Ministers 24 May 2016 Adopted by the Saeima 16 June 2016


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Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia


# TIONAL DEFENCE
 CONCEPT

## Approved by the Cabinet of Ministers 24 May 2016
 Adopted by the Saeima 16 June 2016


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### INTRODUCTION

1. The National Defence Concept is a policy
planning document prepared on the basis
of the military threat analysis. It defi nes
the strategic goals, core principles, priorities
and general measures undertaken for
defence of the state during times of peace,
threats and war.

2. The National Defence Concept has been
developed pursuant to Article 29 of the
Law on National Security and is based on
the military threat analysis. The National
Defence Concept has been developed
taking into account geopolitical situation
of Latvia, national security and foreign
policy goals, as well as obligations of Latvia
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter − NATO) and in the
European Union (hereinafter − the EU).


3. The National Defence Concept is the
basis for national defence policy. Political and operational measures, allocation
of necessary resources, development of
the National Armed Forces (hereinafter − NAF) are all based on the National
Defence Concept. Cooperation amongst
executive authorities, state administration,
local municipalities, as well as the readiness and actions undertaken by individual
and legal entities during times of peace,
threats and war, are outlined in the National
Defence Concept. Implementation of the
national defence measures will be ensured
in accordance with available resources,
eff ecting functions and tasks of the NAF
that are stipulated by law.


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### 1. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT


4. The current international security environment is characterised by interdependence
amongst states, rapid change with outcomes that are diffi cult to predict and by
the diversity of security challenges. Security challenges arise both from states and
non-governmental organisations that use
both conventional and asymmetric warfare
elements. The world is becoming increasingly multipolar and sooner or later this
may lead to changes in the existing international order.

5. Together with the NATO and the EU allies,
Latvia has faced the deterioration of the
European security environment caused
by the Russian aggression in Ukraine. By
changing the internationally recognised
borders and not complying with assumed
international commitments, Russia is destroying the existing international order.

6. To ensure internal stability and unite its
society, Russia creates and promotes the
image of an external threat to its society
in which NATO and the EU are portrayed
as the main sources of threat. This is attested
also by the Russian National Security
Strategy approved on 31 December 2015.
Russia continues to undertake military


activities outside its territory, for example,
in Syria, in a way that is contrary to the
interests of NATO and the EU.

7. Russian foreign policy is a continuation of
its domestic policy. The current Russian
policy confi rms that Russia is prepared to
reach its goals regarding its neighbouring countries by any means, including the
use of military force to enforce its foreign
policy and security orientation.

8. As a country of the Baltic Sea Region
Latvia is most directly aff ected by what
is happening in this region. Contrary to
the declared values and commitments
undertaken in the core documents defi ning
the relationship between the NATO and
Russia, during recent years Russia has
extensively developed its military infrastructure and has been demonstrating its
military power in the direct vicinity of
Latvia’s border. Russia is striving to expand
its military presence in Belarus and this in
turn is strengthening Russia’s capacity to
act in NATO’s eastern fl ank.

9. By improving rapid response capabilities,
mobility and combat readiness of the
Russian Armed Forces, by developing the


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airborne and special task forces and by
providing modernised combat vehicles to
its armed forces in the border area with
the Baltic countries, Russia is creating
challenges to the defence of the Baltic
countries.

10. Thus, taking into account the trends within
Russian internal aff airs, the increasing
military presence in the vicinity of NATO
and the demonstrated Russian willingness
to use military force for achieving political
goals, threats to Latvia’s security during
the validity period of this Concept are
increasing.

11. It is becoming increasingly diffi cult to
distinguish between times of peace, crisis
and war within the current security environment. The elements of asymmetric
warfare are often diffi cult to identify;
they are generally intended to weaken the
state, discredit its political administration
and undermine the trust in one’s country.
Various elements of “soft” and “hard”
power are used to undermine sovereign
countries by means of the so-called hybrid warfare.

12. Since regaining of independence, Latvia
has been under assault from various elements of asymmetric warfare which have


intensifi ed in recent years. Constantly
increasing attempts by Russia to erode the
security of Latvia using various methods
can be identifi ed. Artifi cially coordinated
and managed communication (propaganda),
psychological indoctrination, attacks in
cyberspace, use of the energy industry to
attain political goals, sabotaging of the
economic and business environment by
means of the imposition of artifi cial trade
barriers and prohibitions, the provision of
support to agents of infl uence and encouragement of public dissatisfaction, military
activities close to the border of Latvia —
all these are elements of the asymmetric
warfare implemented by Russia.

13. Russian rhetoric and military activities
demonstrate Russia’s intention to degrade
the trust in NATO’s capacity to act and
its effi ciency, as well as Russia’s desire to
split and weaken the unity of NATO countries by positioning itself as an alternative
security guarantor on the global scale.
Militarily Russia develops and exercises
capabilities that can be used to launch an
unexpected military attack against the
Baltic countries that would split them from
the rest of the NATO and obstruct implementation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty, as well as to prevent NATO from
securing dominance in the sea and air.


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14. Signifi cant security challenges are created
by the increasing instability in Europe’s
neighbouring regions, fl ows of illegal immigration and other cross-border threats,
especially terrorism. Terrorist groups like
DAESH (the self-proclaimed terrorist
organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant) represent a serious threat to the
security within the Greater Middle East
region and are creating challenges for allies
and partners worldwide. Although this
does not represent a direct military threat
to Latvia, there is still a risk to the safety
of NAF personnel who participate in inter

national military missions and operations.
The threat of terrorism and migration is
intensifying in the NATO and EU region,
therefore joint and coordinated action by
the allies is required. That can only be
achieved by strengthening the unity and
solidarity of NATO and the EU.

15. At the same time, security threats arise
from the consequences of the economic
crisis. It contributed to social inequality
and the decrease in population, which in
turn increases both domestic and external
vulnerability of Latvia to external threats.


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### 2. GENERAL BASIS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

16. The purpose of the national defence
system is preservation of Latvia’s national
independence and sovereignty. Preservation of national independence and sovereignty is possible by engaging the entire
society, by the government’s ability to
act and the military force. National defence is the responsibility of the entire
society, state institutions and the national
defence system.


in a timely manner deter, prevent and if
necessary eliminate threats. State power’s
capacity to act, its effi cient functioning and continuity will contribute to the
achievement of this task. The state must
promote and organise national military
defence, promote civic confi dence and
provide for direct, voluntary and broad
involvement in national defence. In case
of external aggression, the state uses and
implements individual self-defence and
collective defence rights and mechanisms
adhering to the principles and order stipulated in international agreements, national
and international laws and regulations.


17. Integrity, willingness, and unity of the
people of Latvia for joint resistance are
an integral expression of civic self-confi dence and national identity of Latvia
that has formed historically and that
creates a unique and strong foundation
for the national defence against any
kind of aggressors.

18. It is the task of the state to develop a
national defence system that will ensure
the survival of Latvia as a state and will


19. The foundation of the national military
defence is the NAF. The NAF ensures
national military defence and provides support to civil society during peacetime and
undertakes other assignments in accordance
with laws and international treaties.


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### 3. STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL DEFENCE


20. National defence is implemented according to the following strategic principles:

21. **State’s capacity and will to act. In a**
situation when threats are changing and
diffi cult to predict, the ability of the state
power to anticipate potential threats and
to respond thereto must be developed.
Early warning and identifi cation of
threats, information exchange and interinstitutional cooperation are necessary to
ensure the effi cient adoption of decisions.
The willingness of society to participate
in national defence and the protection
of Latvian sovereignty verifies that
Latvia will defend its independence if it
is threatened.

22. **Deterrence policy as a mean for mini-**
**mising external military threats. It is**
the objective of national defence to deter
an adversary from their intention to use
military force. An effi cient deterrence
policy takes the form of a set of measures that will demonstrate to a potential
adversary that the price of engaging in
a military confl ict against Latvia will
be high and will outweigh any potential
political, economic or military gains.
This is ensured by the sum of individual


and collective defence capabilities of all
NATO countries, including Latvia, and
allied willingness and commitment to
provide mutual assistance in case of an
attack. The presence of allied forces in
Latvia contributes to the eff ectiveness of
deterrence.

23. **Implementation of national defence**
**and overcoming of external threats.**
National defence will be implemented
as a form of collective defence; fi rst by
developing the national resistance and
military capabilities against an external
threat, secondly by continuing integration
into NATO at operational and tactical
levels and thirdly by using the collective and individual military potential of
NATO countries. In any case of military
threat, the national defence system must
be able to implement defence measures
by organising and managing military and
civic resistance and by continued functioning of the state administration and
defence of the critical infrastructure.


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#### 3.1. State’s Capacity and Will to Act

**3.1.1. Situational Awareness and Threat**
**Identifi cation**

24. Institutions tasked with overcoming threats
to the national security must continuously
be aware of, analyse and be able to identify
external threats in a timely manner, thus
providing time for decision-makers to
respond. It is the task of the state to improve the abilities of these institutions to
identify external threats.

25. There is a high probability that Latvia will
have to face not only attempts to destabilise the state using asymmetric warfare
but also military-related disinformation
strategies. For the purpose of identifi cation
of threats in a timely manner, analytical
abilities need to be developed in order to
process high volume of information and to
be able to operate within the environment
where false, hardly verifi able and contradictory information is disseminated.

26. Intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities and their technical provisions must
be suffi cient for decision-makers to obtain
the maximum amount of information regarding ongoing events in the territory of
Latvia, particularly, in the border areas.


27. In addition to the existing cooperation
mechanisms, exchange of intelligence
information and action coordination both
among the NATO states and the Baltic
States must be developed further.

28. Establishment of pre-approved actions will
reduce response time in case of a threat.

29. The state informs society on what actions
should civilians undertake during a military confl ict.

**3.1.2. Inter-institutional Cooperation**

30. Implementation of the national defence
measures will be achieved by simultaneously using both civil and military national and
international resources and by defi ning the
responsible institution in compliance with
the threat scenarios in a fl exible manner. In
compliance with the procedure defi ned by
the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of
Defence may act as the leading institution
in order to counter covert military threats in
peacetime within a specifi c area and for the
purpose of attaining a certain goal.

31. Public administration institutions are
responsible for the identifi cation and
overcoming of threats within their relevant


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areas. The Cabinet of Ministers will coordinate and manage this process.

32. In order to respond to challenges effi ciently, continuous cooperation and readiness
of all state administration institutions are
necessary for the elimination of threats.
Regular training in crisis management
procedures for offi cials at the government
level and responsible institutions will ensure response in a timely manner.

33. Effi cient information exchange and provision of information to the government
regarding possible threats in a timely
manner are preconditions for successful
national defence.

34. Effi cient control of the national external
border is an important factor for ensuring
both early warning and national defence.
Thus, the management of the national
external land border must be developed
as an integrated set of civil and military
measures with integrated command management, compatible technologies, procedures and response capabilities during
both peacetime and threat situation. The
State Border Guard, which will form
part of the NAF during wartime, must be
compatible with the NAF units in terms of
equipment, training and procedures.


**3.1.3. Civic Engagement in National Defence**

35. National consciousness and will of the
people of Latvia to protect their country
must be encouraged in order to strengthen
national defence. Latvia can defend itself
even when facing an adversary with military superiority. Everything is determined
by the nation’s willpower and the military strategy employed. The geography of
Latvia enables restriction of adversary’s
freedom of action and possibility to cause
maximum damage to it.

36. National defence is unconditional. It is
the duty of each citizen to defend their
country and to resist an aggressor in an
active or passive manner.

37. Patriotism is promoted by the visibility and
presence of the armed forces in all the regions of Latvia, the prestige of the military
profession, trust in the NAF and awareness
of the need for national defence. Provision
of support to civil society by participating
in parades, public events and by organising
exercises in populated places ensures the
visibility of the NAF in society.

38. Patriotism is promoted by the intellectual
and physical education of youth and their
understanding of the history of Latvia.


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39. The National Guard and the Cadet Forceare
the primary tools for involving society in
national defence. Broad public involvement will be ensured by the accessibility
and attractiveness of these institutions.

40. The National Guard is the biggest structural unit of the NAF with the broadest
representation across the country. The
National Guard provides an opportunity
to voluntarily serve one’s country by
ensuring its security and defence. Integration of the National Guard within the
joint structure of the NAF is considered
to be one of the core elements of implementation of the NAF development
plan, thus securing resource-effi cient
personnel planning.

41. The goal for the Cadet Force is to
recruit 10% of school-age youth by
2024. The objective for 2018 is to provide
an opportunity for 6% of school youth
aged 10 − 21 years (approximately 9500
youth) to take part in the Cadet Force.

42. Training of reserve soldiers has been renewed by integrating the reserve soldiers
in wartime structures of the permanent
NAF units.


43. The state is off ering the opportunity to
learn basics of national defence in general
education establishments.

**3.1.4. Information Space and Cyber Security**

44. Information space and information technologies have infl uence on the functioning
of the society during peacetime and during
situations of hybrid and conventional war.

45. Reinforcement of strategic communication
capabilities at the level of sectoral ministries and government, as well as eff ective
inter-sectoral coordination is important for
security of the information space.

46. It is Latvia’s interest to ensure that
norms of democracy and freedom are
not misused to infl uence Latvia’s society in order to undermine trust in the
statehood of Latvia and the core values
of Europe and reduce the willingness of
the population to defend Latvia. Therefore, protection of the Latvian state
identity and core values is ensured in
Latvian information space. Any form
of incitement promoting war, hatred,
intolerance and denial of the core values underlying the existence of the
state of Latvia are prohibited.


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47. During a crisis or war the information and
communication technologies of the state
and private sector may be subject to cyberattacks. Therefore, it is the aim of the state to
ensure that its administration and the private
sector are aware of potential cyberspace
threats and risks; are equipped with the capabilities to identify pernicious activities
and the state has the technical and human resources for preventing or minimising
the impact of malicious activities. The state
is promoting close cooperation between the
state and private sector in order to enhance
the security and defence of cyberspace,
including provisions for the defence of the
critical infrastructure. In order to increase
the security of information and communication technologies and to promote the
responsibility of the system developers and
holders, simultaneously involving broader
society, a policy of thorough identifi cation
of vulnerabilities will be introduced.

48. During crisis and war, the government
provides for the defence of its information
space and cyberspace by using active and
passive defence measures in order to prevent external agents infl uencing the population and paralysing the government.

49. In order to promote awareness and to provide support in modern threat situations,


special units are formed and training in
cyber defence is provided both to the
National Guard and the Cadet Force.

#### 3.2. Deterrence Policy as a Mean for Reduction of External Military Threats

**3.2.1. NATO Capacity and Allied Presence**
**in Latvia**

50. The collective defence principle of NATO
and the capabilities maintained by the allies
both jointly and individually ensure the deterrence of aggressors. Existence of a strong
and united NATO is in Latvia’s interests.

51. Deterrence is enhanced by the presence
of the allied forces in Latvia; the extent
of their presence depends on our mutual
solidarity, including the contribution
provided by Latvia.

52. Effi cient combination of the alliance’s
nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defence
and conventional weapons serves as the
basis of the alliance’s capabilities and as
the guarantee for deterrence. Maintenance
of the alliance’s nuclear arsenal as well as
support to the current placement of the
alliance’s nuclear weapons in Europe is


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imperative to retain NATO’s nuclear
capacity and is in Latvia’s interests as long
as nuclear weapons exist in the world.

53. Creation of the ballistic missile defence
shield in Europe contributes to the alliance’s
defence potential and it needs to be further
adapted to suit the security situation.

54. A credible and eff ective deterrence policy
of the alliance is ensured by its ability
to react to an increasing threat by taking
decisions in a timely manner within
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
which stipulates that NATO states will
consult together whenever in the opinion
of any of them the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any
of the parties is threatened.

55. The NATO Response Force and Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force are NATO’s
primary means of response in crisis situations and these should also be employed
during peacetime for the purposes of
deterrence. Latvia is interested in making
the NATO decision-making mechanism
as effi cient as possible by ensuring prompt
re-grouping of forces, well-defi ned policies of intent and clear defi nition of the
range of authority of the NATO Supreme
Allied Commander Europe.


56. Latvia is interested in achieving a long
term solution for the substantial allied
military presence in Latvia. Deterrence
benefi ts from the continuous rotational
presence of the allied forces on land, at
sea and in the air. This requires the coordination of military training and exercise
cycles in a centralised manner and the
expansion of combat and combat support
capabilities as well as the development
of military infrastructure for ensuring
exercises and dislocation of combat
equipment of the allied forces.

57. The NATO Baltic Air Policing mission
enhances the defence of the Baltic air
space. Participation of the allied forces
in this mission attests to the presence and
solidarity of NATO.

58. Latvia is interested in the establishment
of NATO institutions and command and
control elements in Latvia, as this contributes to both further integration of Latvia
within NATO and the allied presence.
Establishment of a NATO command
centre in Latvia (the NATO Force Integration Unit) allows for coordinating and
practically supporting NATO combat formation for their operations in the region
during military exercises or operations.


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59. The NATO Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence strengthens the
resilience of the alliance and Latvia to
challenges caused by threats of asymmetric warfare. Its operation in Latvia
is simultaneously a visible example of
allied presence and Latvia’s contribution
to the alliance.

**3.2.2. National Deterrence Capabilities**

60. The state ensures maintenance of the high
readiness forces during peacetime with
the ability to rapidly increase the extent of
these forces to the level required for deterrence or warfare. Readiness of the forces is
achieved by organising combat readiness
evaluations and exercises at various levels,
by training crisis management procedures
and by improving the response capabilities
of units and the NAF command.

61. The NAF command and control must be
able to operate in a decentralised manner so
that each commander of a unit and a sub-unit
is able to independently assess the tactical
situation and to select the best operational
response. Units should be able to perform
combat operations autonomously ensuring
delay of the adversary, restricting its capability to act and undermining its strategy.


62. Rearmament of the National Guard units,
decentralisation of weapon storage and
compatibility with the regular NAF units
enhance deterrence capabilities. Relevant labour relations policy contributes
to the combat capabilities of the National
Guard, including a fl exible approach of
employers to release their employees to
participate in National Guard exercises
and permission to National Guards and
reserve soldiers employed in the public
administration to attend paid exercises
during working hours.

**3.2.3. Strengthening of Strategic Partnerships**

63. United States of America (USA) is the
major strategic cooperation partner for
Latvia whose support enhances national
security and defence of the country. Latvia
aims to improve the USA awareness of
the geopolitical challenges to Latvia and
of the political will to defend Latvia within
the framework of the collective defence
policy, as well as to achieve military presence of the USA in Latvia.

64. To ensure the support of the USA with
regard to the security interests of Latvia,
cooperation with the USA takes place at
the executive, legislative and military


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levels. In addition to cooperation at the
national level, closer cooperation with
the USA non-governmental organisations
contributes to the representation of the
Latvian security interests in the USA.

65. In order to achieve more effi cient involvement of the USA in Latvian security and
defence activities, Latvia must cooperate
in the military industrial sector by means
of defence procurements; demonstrate
solidarity by participating in USA led
military operations; develop military
interoperability with USA.

66. The aim of the Baltic States cooperation is
to further military integration in order to
resist security challenges in a synchronised
and coordinated manner. This requires mutual reliance and trust, establishment of
joint command elements, coordinated
development and interoperability. Common
security challenges create the necessity for
the coordinated defence policy of the
Baltic States and Poland.

67. United Kingdom – a major military power
of the Northern Europe with a nuclear deterrent capability shares a similar regional
threat assessment to that of Latvia. Further
cooperation with the United Kingdom
will provide additional security guarantees


for Latvia and contribute to the national
defence capability.

68. Latvia is interested in close cooperation
with the Nordic States in order to strengthen
the common security of the Baltic Sea
region. Cooperation takes place in the
form of information exchange, shared
understanding of security challenges and
implementation of joint capability projects
and activities.

69. Willingness of such countries as Germany
and France to participate in Latvian
defence measures strengthens Latvia’s
security. Therefore it is Latvia’s interests to further develop cooperation with
these countries.

**3.2.4. Participation in the International**
**Security Policy**

70. The aim of Latvia’s security policy is
to further integration and protection
of Latvia’s interests in international organisations. Responsible commitment to
international obligations and their fulfi lment contribute to the national security.
Comprehensive international cooperation
is an additional tool for upholding national
defence interests.


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71. NATO is the security guarantee for Latvia.
Latvia pursues its security and defence
policy interests by contributing to collective defence, participating in measures
for the resolution of international crises
situations and by promoting security in
cooperation with its allies and partners.

72. The strength of the EU is a set of nonmilitary instruments, which contribute to
Latvia’s capability to resist a non-military
threat. Balanced use of these instruments
and the comprehensive involvement of
most EU institutions in resolving security
and defence problems is a precondition
for combating the elements of asymmetric
warfare, including the strengthening of
internal security and media space.

73. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) contributes to
crisis management and promotes transparency in military planning and arms
control. Compliance with the declared
OSCE principles is a precondition for
achieving a stable and predictable security
situation in Europe.

74. The United Nations provides an opportunity to contribute to the resolution of global
security challenges, thus enhancing the
image of Latvia as a security promoter.


75. Latvia’s awareness and participation in
the resolution of current challenges NATO
and EU are facing, including those, which
do not directly aff ect the security of Latvia,
promotes solidarity and ensures unity
among the allies.

76. Development of states in Europe and its
neighbourhood on principles of good governance and democracy is in Latvia’s
interests. Latvia will therefore continue
supporting eff orts of the states, which are
on the way to the Euro-Atlantic integration.

#### 3.3. Implementation of National Defence and Countering of External Threats

**3.3.1. Strengthening National Defence**
**Capabilities**

77. In case of war, the NAF ensures national
defence by employing all available means
in accordance with the procedures stipulated in given laws and regulations. The
national defence system must be capable to
respond rapidly and within the framework
of collective defence to ensure overcoming
and prevention of the threat.

78. In a situation where state of peace or war
cannot be easily distinguished, all national


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military defence instruments and resources
must be available for swift transfer from
carrying out routine tasks to implementing
assignments in time of crisis and war.

79. The national defence system must be able
to effi ciently respond to any unexpected
attack or an attack at short notice and must
be able to resist aggression during the initial confl ict stage. Presence of the allied
forces contributes to the ability to resist
aggression and host additional NATO and
allied forces.

80. Effi ciency of decision-making and response time of senior offi cials while
preventing initial threats and responding
to an unexpected external military attack
is crucial to the maintenance of the
statehood of Latvia. Senior offi cials are
therefore provided with the necessary
communication and other means. Moreover, the offi cials’ knowledge of crisis
management procedures must be continuously improved in order to achieve immediate adoption of required decisions.

81. At the same time, the Commander of the
NAF is obliged to implement military
defence measures in case of an external
threat even if the senior leadership’s
decision-making is hindered.


82. Domestic insurgency and diversions led
or organised from outside using asymmetric methods, special task forces and
intelligence services are to be assumed as
a covert and undeclared war. Decision to
overcome such threats must be taken immediately and primarily target activities
of the foreign special forces and intelligence services.

83. In case of an armed confl ict or war, the
Ministry of Defence and the NAF ensure
national military defence while the national
civil defence system provides support to
the NAF. It is necessary to defi ne the role
of the Prison Administration within the
national defence policy to strengthen the
overall national defence.

**3.3.2. NAF Tasks and Capabilities**

84. To ensure fulfi lment of the current tasks
of the NAF and those that are stipulated
in laws and regulations, the following
military capabilities of the NAF must be
developed:

   - capability to rapidly respond, prevent
and localize any potential threat as
close as possible to area of its origin by
effi cient organisation and planning of


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units’ peacetime structures, geographic
location and tasks;

- secure and, if necessary, decentralised
operation of the military command,
communication and information technologies, as well as their continuous
functioning under any circumstances,
including under the conditions of intense electronic warfare;

- capability to vigorously and effi ciently engage the adversary with
high quality equipment and technologies; land component of the NAF
shall be prioritized to guarantee the
full scope of operational capability
(combat, combat support and combat
supplies) and defensive measures;
special attention will be paid to ensuring effi cient intelligence, air defence,
antitank, tactical mobility and countermobility capabilities;

- capability to counteract an adversary
conventionally and asymmetrically, including neutralising adversary’s asymmetric warfare, special and airborne
operations. While performing this task,
the NAF ensures eff ective counteraction
to the adversary’s military initiative and
operations, demoralises the adversary


and causes maximum possible damage
to its fi ghting capabilities;

- guaranteed availability, security and
defence in any conditions of Host
Nation Support infrastructure and
access roads;

- right of the Minister of Defence to authorise destruction of infrastructure
objects by the NAF in case of operational necessity;

- capability to deploy military reinforcement to ensure defence and border
control, particularly targeting special
operations and illegal transit of weapons
across the state border in any case of a
threat to the state;

- high level of military integration, interoperability and cooperation with the
NATO force and combat structures to
ensure joint operational activities;

- availability of strategic communication capabilities both ensuring that
the society has access to information,
which is crucial for the state defence,
and defending the state’s information
space during peacetime and wartime.


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85. Considering the tasks and military capability requirements, the core of the operational capabilities of the NAF is the land forces
component, including the National Guard
and Special Operations unit, early warning capabilities, air surveillance and air
defence. Development of these units and
capabilities is a priority while planning the
NAF resources. The development of other
capabilities is closely linked to the support
to land operations and ensuring the Host
Nation Support capabilities.

86. In case of a crisis, the chain of supply must
be correspondent to the needs of the NAF
in order to ensure decentralised operation of
the units. The NAF creates reserves of the
necessary materials and technical assets,
munition and fuel in order to supply the
units during the situation of crisis and war.

**3.3.3. Collective Defence: Interaction and**
**Involvement**

87. The cornerstone of Latvia’s national defence is the NATO collective defence system, which ensures that an attack against
Latvia is considered an attack against the
whole alliance. Within the framework of
collective defence, Latvia expects support
from the NATO and individual allies.


88. Latvia is responsible for providing the
necessary Host Nation Support to allied
forces during peacetime and war. Host
Nation Support is ensured by the development of the necessary infrastructure and
enhanced interoperability between the
NAF and allied armed forces.

89. By contributing to the development of the
infrastructure, by coordinating and ensuring the presence of the allied forces in
Latvia, NATO supplements and improves
the capabilities to host NATO and allied
units in the territory of Latvia.

90. Clear rules of engagement for allied forces
located in the territory of Latvia in case
of an attack, a clear and tested command
and control between national and allied
forces, pre-planned, coordinated and authorised action of national and allied
armed forces are the preconditions for
successful hosting of the allied forces in
the territory of Latvia.

91. Latvia must provide the necessary support for the deployment of the allied forces
within the territory of the country in case
of crisis, including the provision of necessary territory for stationing of forces
and support of the national economy for
incoming forces.


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**3.3.4. Contribution of Latvia to Collective**
**Defence**

92. Taking into account the changes in the
strategic security environment, greater
importance must be assigned to the unity,
solidarity and preparedness of the allies
for implementing their collective defence
obligations by immediately responding to
any type of threats.

93. In the case of an attack against a NATO
Member State, Latvia provides the required support by participating in any
combat operation using the resources that
are available. The development of the
NAF combat capabilities is aligned with
NATO military capability development
guidelines and requirements.

94. Latvia is interested in promoting NATO
response capabilities and the interoperability of the allied forces. Since joining the alliance Latvia has been actively
participating in the NATO Response
Forces, which are the initial forces for
solving crises and carrying out collective
defence operations.

95. Latvia fosters the deployment capability of the NAF units in accordance
with the joint NATO policy, including


participation in the Very High Readiness
Joint Task Force that corresponds to
standards of high readiness of several
days. The NAF must maintain readiness to participate in the full spectrum
of NATO-led operations with one infantry battalion battle group for up to six
months without rotation or with units
not exceeding two infantry companies or
equivalent size specialised units for up
to six months with rotation. The Naval
Forces fl otilla of the NAF must ensure
readiness to participate in mine-countermeasure operations of NATO’s High
Readiness Forces. Latvia plans regular
engagement in the EU Battlegroups.

96. Fulfi lment of Latvia’s commitments and
its engagement abroad depends on the
level of the threat to the state, the potential in the particular threat situation and
the capabilities and resources that remain
for national defence, taking into account
the presence of the allies.

97. Latvia participates in joint collective
defence projects that provide defence
instruments, which can be used collectively by all the countries.

98. Interoperability of the allied forces, which
is developed by means of various inter

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national training courses and exercises,
is a signifi cant element of the collective
defence system. Latvia actively participates in military exercises abroad.

99. Latvia delegates representatives to the
NATO structures at all levels in order to
strengthen the alliance and to represent
Latvia’s interests.

100. Latvia’s contribution promotes the use
of the common NATO funding for developing the deployable capabilities
of the allies, enables implementation
of NATO Crisis Response System and
enables identifi cation and prediction of
the possible threats in a timely manner.
For Latvia it is important to ensure development of the NATO infrastructure
in its territory.

**3.3.5. Resources Required for National**
**Defence**

101. State institutions must ensure that they
have necessary resources that enable carrying out their assigned national defence
and security functions during peacetime,
under the conditions of threat to the state
and during wartime.


**3.3.5.1. Defence Budget**

102. A precondition for the development of
the national defence capabilities is provision of appropriate defence fi nancing.
The ability to invest in defence attests not
only to Latvia’s willingness to meet its
international obligations, but also demonstrates the capability of the state to assume responsibility for national defence
in accordance with the threat level.

103. Pursuant to the Law on Medium-Term
Budget Framework for 2016, 2017,
and 2018, the approved increase in the
budget expenditure of the Ministry of
Defence is equivalent to 1.4% of GDP
in 2016 and to 1.7% of GDP in 2017.
The approved increase of the defence
expenditure of Latvia in 2018 will
amount to 2% of GDP. Latvia has committed to maintain this level of fi nancing
during following years. In compliance
with the NATO defi nition these resources
may be used for defence purposes only.
Latvia has to maintain a balanced defence expenditure structure by allocating less than 50% to expenditure on
personnel and administration, 30%
to expenditure on maintenance and a
minimum of 20% to the procurement
of new equipment.


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**3.3.5.2. Personnel**

104. In order to perform the defi ned national
defence tasks, it is necessary to increase
the number of NAF personnel by primarily focusing on enhancing the operational
capabilities of the NAF. The basis of the
NAF structure is combat units and the
elements of combat support, combat supply and command and control required
for their operation. During peacetime, the
NAF maintains 17500 militarily trained
personnel including 6500 professional
soldiers, 8000 National Guards and 3000
reserve soldiers.

105. In order to enhance the operational capacity of the NAF, essential improvements
to its recruiting capacity, introduction of
more fl exible selection criteria and adaptation of the training programs for
professional soldiers are required taking
into account the demographic and physical development trends in Latvia. It is
particularly important to facilitate further
development of the Cadet Force movement by promoting the popularity of
the Cadet Force among young people,
as well as by enhancing motivation and
providing various options for further
involvement of young people and a
wider society in national defence, such


as participation in military training
courses, camps, by joining the National
Guard and service in the NAF.

106. It is necessary to promote National Guard
training by off ering a fl exible and attractive
participation system. Employers’ willingness to provide more fl exible working
hours to allow National Guard members
to participate in national defence-related
activities will ensure that National Guards
receive comprehensive training.

107. By promoting the sustainability and capacity of the NAF structure, the motivation of highly qualifi ed and experienced
experts to remain within NAF will be
enhanced. In this regard, the system of
social guarantees for soldiers must be
expanded and its links with personal
career and professional growth criteria
must be aligned with the level of
knowledge, operational experience and
qualifi cations required for military service.
Analogous measures should also be implemented for the offi cials of the Ministry
of Interior and Prison Administration with
special service ranks in order to eliminate
diff erent motivation systems in defence
and internal services, which could lead to
the weakening of domestic security and
unreasonable competition.


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108. In order to promote the national defence,
it is necessary to improve the mobilisation system by resolving questions of personnel mobilisation and the legal status of
the personnel to be included in the NAF,
as well as by ensuring access by the NAF
to the resources of national economy in
case of a threat to the state. It is important
to ensure the maintenance of state control
over the critical infrastructure, especially
in the area of communication in a situation involving a threat to the state. The
Ministry of Defence must have a priority
role with regard to the use of mobilised
resources in case of crisis and war.

**3.3.5.3. Military Industry**

109. Taking into account the geography of
Latvia, Latvia needs to continue develop

ing a competitive military industry which
would minimise its dependence on deliveries of munitions and equipment from
other countries in crisis situation, enabling
it to meet the minimum requirements for
national defence by itself. Thus, development of the domestic industry will contribute to the operational military needs
required for the national defence.

110. It is necessary to use domestic scientifi c research capacity to develop NAF
capabilities and to assume responsibility
for any risks that may arise in connection with the research process and the
introduction of new technologies and
production methods.


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### 4. CONCLUDING PROVISIONS

111. The defence budget until 2018 will be
planned in compliance with the accelerated budget increase approved by the
Cabinet of Ministers and will thus be
equivalent to 2% of GDP by 2018. The
Ministry of Defence will implement
the National Defence Concept within
the framework of allocated state budgetary funds.

112. The NAF development plan and this
Concept serve as the basis for development of mid-term planning documents,
including the guidelines issued by the
Minister of Defence for the development
of the national defence system and planning of next year’s budget.

113. The NAF development planning process must ensure the continuity of the


implementation of this Concept. Within
this process it is important to identify the
core capabilities of the NAF for undertaking the key tasks of the national defence.

114. State institutions ensure implementation
of the National Defence Concept in compliance with their competence and tasks
set forth in laws and regulations.

115. On the basis of the Concept, the Minister of Defence issues guidelines to the
NAF Commander on the key principles
of state defence’s operational planning.

116. Pursuant to the National Security Law,
the Saeima [Parliament] approves the
National Defence Concept at least once
during its every convocation by 1st October of the second year of its term.


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