2024 ### DEFENSE OF JAPAN ----- On the Publication of "Defense of Japan 2024" KIHARA Minoru Minister of Defense The international community has entered a new era of crisis. It is now facing its greatest trial since the end of World War II. The existing order is being seriously challenged. Japan finds itself in the most severe and complex security environment of the post-war era. China has been rapidly building up military capabilities while intensifying its activities in the East China Sea, where the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands are, as well as in the Pacific. North Korea has been advancing its nuclear and missile development and pushing ahead with the launch of ballistic missiles and others. Russia has been conducting intensive military activities in the Far East encompassing the Northern Territories, while continuing its aggression against Ukraine. Russia has also been observed engaging in joint activities with China involving aircraft and vessels. Amidst the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are committed to protecting the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese people and defending Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace to the end. In fulfillment of these missions, the MOD/SDF will drive the implementation of policies expressed in the National Security Strategy of Japan, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. These policies consist of three major objectives. The first one is to steadily actualize a fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities of Japan. Building future core defense capabilities such as stand-off and IAMD (Integrated Air and Missile Defense) must be prioritized. Therefore, Japan is going to acquire various types of stand-off missiles earlier than originally planned, including Tomahawk missiles and the ground-launched version of upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles. Japan will expedite the start of the construction of Aegis System Equipped Vessels to defend herself from increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles and other threats. Enhancing sustainability and resiliency is another important task. Japan will thus proceed to improve the operational availability of equipment, secure sufficient ammunition and guided missiles, and promote focused investments to improve the resiliency of defense facilities. ----- The second major objective is to cooperate with our ally, like-minded countries, and other partners. No country can now protect her own security alone. As challenges to the existing international order continue, it is critical for Japan to deepen cooperation and collaboration with our ally, like-minded countries, and other partners with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. The Alliance with the United States is the cornerstone of our national security policy. Japan will steadily implement concrete measures to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. At the same time, it is important for Japan to enhance cooperation with like-minded countries and other partners to ensure peace and stability of the region. Japan will implement measures which contribute to realizing the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific". To this end, Japan will proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, such as bilateral/multilateral exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation, taking into account characteristics and other factors of the region and each country. Such cooperation is represented by the joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft. This joint development aims to enhance the performance of fighters, which constitutes the core defense capability of Japan. It will serve to the world a basis of security, stability, and prosperity over the coming decades. There has also been progress in multilateral cooperation centering on Japan and the United States. Last December, Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea began the operation of the realtime sharing of missile warning data on North Korea. Around that time, the Australian Defence Force participated for the first time in two Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercises: "Keen Edge" and "Yama Sakura." Japan will promote such cooperation. The third major objective is to reinforce our human resource base, which is an urgent one. As Japan is in a midst of serious labor shortages, there is an increasingly fierce competition to secure human resources. SDF personnel constitutes the core element of defense capabilities of Japan. To procure excellent human resources in the competitive recruiting environment, we will take all necessary measures to reinforce our human resource base without ruling out any options. These consist of the enhancement of SDF recruitment capabilities, the effective use of human resources, the improvement of living and working environments, and the reformation of remuneration systems. Harassment has no place in the MOD/SDF, as an organization where people matter. Recognizing that harassment damages the mutual trust among SDF personnel and shakes the very foundation of the entire organization, we will continue to create a working environment of zero tolerance for harassment of any kind by implementing effective harassment prevention measures. "Defense of Japan 2024" describes the security environment surrounding Japan and the efforts of the MOD/SDF as have been outlined above. In particular, we took care to comprehensively explain our progress towards the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities of Japan; or in other words, how Japan's defense and deterrence capabilities have been taking stable steps towards reinforcement. The year 2024 marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the SDF, and ''Defense of Japan 2024'' is the 50th commemorative issue of Japan Defense White Paper. The opening pages touch upon the 70-year history of the SDF as a special feature article. Efforts of the MOD/SDF, including the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, would not be made possible without the understanding and support by the Japanese people and countries around the world. I hope this white paper will help as many readers as possible to facilitate a better comprehension of the security environment surrounding Japan and the efforts made by the MOD/SDF. ----- Table of Contents DEFENSE OF JAPAN Special Feature 1 ���� 1 **70 Years of the SDF as described in the Defense White Papers** S p e c i a l F e a t u r e ����� 11 **2** **My Way to “Defend Japan”** The Digest presents a summary of Parts I to IV of the main text in a manner that is easy to understand. ��������������� 17 **D I G E S T** **Chapter 1 Overview** 1 Global Security Environment… ………………………………………… 33 2 Security Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region… ……………………… 34 **Part** **Ⅰ** 1 **Chapter 2 Russia’s Aggression and Defense by Ukraine** 1 General Situation… …………………………………………………… 39 2 Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine and the Future Outlook… …………… 39 3 The Impact of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine on International Affairs and Various Countries’ Responses to It…… 45 **Chapter 3 Defense Policies of Countries** Section 1 The United States…………………………………………………… 50 1 Security and Defense Policies…………………………………………… 50 2 Military Posture………………………………………………………… 56 Section 2 China………………………………………………………………… 60 1 General Situation… …………………………………………………… 60 2 Military Affairs… ……………………………………………………… 61 3 Relations with Countries and Regions… ………………………………… 87 Section 3 Relations between the United States and China, etc… ………… 93 1 Relations between the United States and China (General Situation)………… 93 2 Military Trends of the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific Region…… 95 3 Military Capabilities of Taiwan and Military Balance between China and Taiwan…… 98 Section 4 Korean Peninsula……………………………………………………104 1 North Korea… …………………………………………………………105 2 The ROK and the U.S. Forces Korea………………………………………126 Section 5 Russia… ……………………………………………………………131 1 General Situation… ……………………………………………………131 2 Security and Defense Policies……………………………………………131 3 Military Posture and Trends………………………………………………133 4 Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories… …………………………139 5 Relations with Countries and Regions… …………………………………140 Section 6 Oceania………………………………………………………………146 1 Australia… ……………………………………………………………146 2 New Zealand……………………………………………………………150 Section 7 Southeast Asia… ……………………………………………………151 1 General Situation… ……………………………………………………151 2 Security and Defense Policies of Each Country……………………………151 3 Military Modernization in the Region… …………………………………156 4 Intra-and Extra-Regional Cooperation… …………………………………157 Section 8 South Asia……………………………………………………………158 1 India… ………………………………………………………………158 2 Pakistan… ……………………………………………………………160 3 Disputes over the Sovereignty of Kashmir… ………………………………161 Section 9 Europe and Canada… ………………………………………………163 1 General Situation… ……………………………………………………163 2 Enhancement of Multilateral Security Frameworks…………………………164 3 Security/Defense Policies of European Countries and Others… ……………166 Section 10 Middle East and Africa… …………………………………………170 1 Middle East… …………………………………………………………170 2 Africa… ………………………………………………………………174 3 Trends in International Terrorism…………………………………………176 **Chapter 4** **[Trends and Challenges Facing the International Community Concerning the ][]** **Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Domains and Information Warfare** Section 1 Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology That Have Expanded to Information Warfare, etc……178 1 Science, Technology and Security… ……………………………………178 2 Trends of Military Cutting-edge Technology… ……………………………179 3 Trends of Cutting-edge Technology in the Civilian Field… …………………180 4 Diffusion of Information-related Technology and Information Warfare… ……183 5 Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technology Bases… …………183 Section 2 Trends in Space Domain… …………………………………………186 1 Space Domain and Security… …………………………………………186 2 Various Countries’ Outer Space Initiatives…………………………………186 Section 3 Trends in Cyber Domain… …………………………………………191 1 Cyberspace and Security… ……………………………………………191 2 Threat Trend in Cyberspace… …………………………………………191 3 Initiatives against Cyberspace Threats……………………………………194 Section 4 Trends in Electromagnetic Domain…………………………………197 1 Electromagnetic Domain and Security……………………………………197 2 Each Countries’ Electronic Warfare Initiatives… …………………………198 Section 5 Maritime Trends… …………………………………………………200 1 Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas,” etc.… …200 2 National Maritime Security Initiatives… …………………………………200 3 Trends in the Arctic Ocean………………………………………………201 Section 6 Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)……203 1 Nuclear Weapons… ……………………………………………………203 2 Biological and Chemical Weapons… ……………………………………204 3 Ballistic Missiles and Other Missiles………………………………………204 4 Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies……205 Section 7 Impact of Climate Change on the Security Environment and the Military……206 1 General Situation… ……………………………………………………206 2 Impact on Security………………………………………………………206 3 Climate Change in the Indo-Pacific Region… ……………………………207 **Chapter 1 Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense** Section 1 Measures to Ensure Security… ……………………………………209 Section 2 Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy… …………………210 **Part** **Ⅱ** 1 Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense… ……………………………210 2 The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution……………………210 3 Basic Policy… …………………………………………………………211 Section 3 Security Policy Framework…………………………………………213 **Chapter 2 The Three Documents, Including the National Security Strategy** Section 1 Outline of the National Security Strategy (NSS)…………………214 Section 2 Outline of the National Defense Strategy… ………………………215 1 Transition from the NDPG to the NDS… …………………………………215 2 Outline of the National Defense Strategy (NDS)……………………………217 Section 3 Outline of the Defense Buildup Program… ………………………226 1 Program Guidelines… …………………………………………………226 2 Organization of Self-Defense Forces… …………………………………227 3 Quantities of Major Procurement…………………………………………228 4 Expenditures……………………………………………………………232 **Chapter 3 Defense Buildup and the Budget** Section 1 Buildup of Defense Capability in FY2024… ………………………233 Section 2 Defense-Related Expenditures… …………………………………235 1 Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures for FY2024… …………………235 2 High-Priority Focuses……………………………………………………237 3 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures… …………………………238 4 Optimization Efforts… …………………………………………………239 5 Secure Financial Resources for Reinforcing Defense Capabilities……………239 6 Comparison with Other Countries… ……………………………………241 **Chapter 4 Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense** Section 1 National Security Council……………………………………………244 Section 2 Organization of the MOD/Self-Defense Forces (SDF)… …………245 1 Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability……………………245 2 Joint Operations System of the SDF………………………………………249 3 SDF Joint Operations Command…………………………………………250 **Chapter 5 Framework for the SDF Activities** 1 Duties of the Self Defense Forces… ……………………………………253 2 Defense of Japan… ……………………………………………………253 3 Maintenance of Public Order and Responses to Aggression that Do Not Amount to an Armed Attack……256 4 Responses to Important Influence Situations……………………………260 ----- **Chapter 1** **[Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases as ]** **a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability itself** Section 1 Reinforcing Defense Production Base… …………………………455 **Part** **Chapter 1** **Ⅳ** 1 Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases and its Basic Policy……456 2 Main Efforts in Addition to the Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases……461 Section 2 Reinforcing Defense Technology Base… …………………………465 1 Necessity of Reinforcing Defense Technology Base… ……………………465 2 Direction for Reinforcing Defense Technology Base shown in Defense Technology Guideline 2023……466 3 Development of the Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft………………………469 4 Active Utilization of Civilian Technology… ………………………………470 Section 3 Promoting Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation and Transfer of Defense Equipment……473 1 Systems Regarding Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology……473 2 Efforts to Promote the Transfer of Defense Equipment… …………………478 3 Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation……478 4 Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation… …………479 5 Other Initiatives for Defense Equipment and Technical Cooperation…………486 Section 4 Equipment Optimization Efforts… …………………………………488 1 Initiatives for Construction of Optimized Equipment Structure………………488 2 Initiatives to Make the Most of Limited Human Resources (Labor-Saving and Automation)… ………………………………………488 3 Project Management throughout Equipment Life Cycle… …………………489 4 Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters…………………490 5 Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement and Other Related Initiatives……491 6 Advancing Initiatives Aimed at Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement……492 Section 5 Initiatives for Economic Security……………………………………494 1 Developments within the Japanese Government… ………………………494 2 Initiatives of the MOD……………………………………………………494 **Chapter 2** **[Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element ]** **of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities** Section 1 Reinforcing Human Resource Base… ……………………………496 1 Enhancing Recruitment Efforts… ………………………………………496 2 Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and others… ………………………500 3 Measures to Achieve Effective Use of Human Resources, etc………………503 4 Improving Living and Working Environments………………………………504 5 Human Resource Development… ………………………………………505 6 Improvement of Treatment and Re-employment Support… ………………506 Section 2 Creating an Organizational Environment of Zero Tolerance for Harassment of Any Kind……511 1 Response to Harassment Incidents… ……………………………………511 2 Directive, etc., of the Minister of Defense on Measures to Eradicate Harassment…… 512 3 The Ministry of Defense Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention Measures……513 4 The Special Defense Inspection on Harassment Prevention Status… ………513 5 The Fundamental Review of Harassment Prevention Measures… …………514 Section 3 Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women’s Participation……515 1 Working Style Reform to Promote Work-Life Balance………………………515 2 Reform to Promote Women’s Participation… ……………………………516 Section 4 Transformation of Medical Functions………………………………520 1 Fundamentally Strengthen the Combat Trauma Care Capabilities… ………520 2 Strengthening the Medical Function to Respond to Various Situations and Diverse Missions……523 Section 5 Reinforcing Policy-Making Function… ……………………………524 1 Efforts for Reinforcing Policy-Making Function… …………………………524 2 Efforts by the National Institute for Defense Studies… ……………………524 3 Efforts by Other Institutions………………………………………………525 **Chapter 3 Measures Related to Training and Exercises** Section 1 Training and Exercise Initiatives……………………………………527 1 Training that Contributes to Reinforcing Japan’s Capability to Respond to Various Contingencies……528 2 Training that Contributes to Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance…………532 3 Multilateral Exercises Involving Japan, the United States, and Third-Party Countries……535 4 Bilateral Exercises with Like-Minded Countries……………………………537 5 Multilateral Exercises with Like-Minded Countries and Others………………539 Section 2 Establishing the Respective Training Environments and Safety Management……543 1 Training Environment……………………………………………………543 2 Initiatives for Safety Management, etc.……………………………………544 **Chapter 4 Initiatives to Live in Harmony with Regional Societies and the Environment** Section 1 Measures to Harmonize with Local Communities and the Environment……546 1 Supporting Civilian Life… ………………………………………………546 2 Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF……547 3 Measures for Securing the Understanding and Cooperation of Local Governments and Local Residents……547 4 Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas……548 5 Participation in National Events… ………………………………………551 6 Support for the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition… ………………551 7 Civil Engineering Consignments from Third Parties… ……………………552 8 Other Initiatives…………………………………………………………552 Section 2 Responding to Climate Change and Environmental Issues… ……555 1 Efforts Related to the MOD/SDF Facilities…………………………………555 2 Initiatives Related to USFJ Facilities/Areas… ……………………………557 Section 3 Public Relations Activities, Public Records and Archives Management, Disclosure of Administrative Documents, and Related Activities……558 1 Various Public Relations Activities… ……………………………………558 2 Initiatives for Public Document and Disclosure of Administrative Documents …560 **Chapter 1 Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** Section 1 Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities and Reinforcing the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country… ……265 **Part** **Ⅲ** Section 1 1 Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities………………265 2 Reinforcing the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country… ……………266 Section 2 Shaping a Security Environment that does not Tolerate Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force… ……………………………269 1 Response to Illicit Ship-to-Ship Transfers…………………………………269 2 Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East… 270 Section 3 Responding to Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attempts… ……………………………………………………273 1 Persistent ISR surrounding Japan… ……………………………………273 2 Measures against Violations of Japan’s Sovereignty… ……………………277 Section 4 Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Missile Attacks… …280 1 Responses to Invasion of Japan, Including Its Remote Islands………………280 2 Responses to Missile Attacks……………………………………………286 3 Responses in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Domains… …………………291 4 Responses in the Space Domain…………………………………………294 5 Responses in the Cyber Domain…………………………………………301 6 Responses in the Domain of Electromagnetic Spectrum……………………307 7 Responses to Large-Scale Terrorism and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure……309 8 Initiatives Related to Civil Protection………………………………………312 Section 5 Initiatives to Strengthen Intelligence Capabilities, Including Responding to Integrated Information Warfare……………………315 1 Strengthening of Functions Such as Intelligence Collection and Analysis… …315 2 Responding to Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to the Cognitive Dimension……318 Section 6 Sustainability and Resiliency Enhancement Initiatives to Ensure War Sustainability… …320 1 Securing Ammunition……………………………………………………320 2 Securing Fuel… ………………………………………………………322 3 Improving the Operational Availability of Equipment… ……………………322 4 Improving the Resiliency of Facilities… …………………………………323 Section 7 Measures for Protection of the Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals… …326 1 Response to Large-Scale Disasters, etc.… ………………………………326 **Response to the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake[… …329]** 2 Responses to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas… …331 **Chapter 2 Japan-U.S. Alliance** Section 1 Outline of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements…………………334 1 Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements… …………………334 2 Content of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation… …………335 3 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States…………………336 Section 2 Strengthening the Joint Deterrence and Response Capabilities of Japan and the United States………339 1 Cooperation in the Space and Cyber Domains… …………………………339 2 Integrated Air and Missile Defense… ……………………………………340 3 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities………………340 4 Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces… …………………340 5 Logistics Support… ……………………………………………………341 6 Bilateral Training and Exercises… ………………………………………342 7 Extended Deterrence……………………………………………………342 8 Joint/Shared Use… ……………………………………………………342 Section 3 Reinforcing Alliance Coordination Functions………………………344 1 Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)………………344 2 Closer Operational Coordination… ………………………………………346 Section 4 Reinforcing the Foundation for Allied Response… ………………347 1 Information Security and Cybersecurity…………………………………347 2 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation… ………………………347 Section 5 Efforts Concerning the Stationing of the USFJ… …………………349 1 Stationing of the USFJ… ………………………………………………349 2 Efforts for the Realignment of the USFJ… ………………………………352 3 Measures Concerning the Stationing of the USFJ… ………………………367 **Chapter 3 Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others** Section 1 Strategic Promotion of Multilateral and Multilayered Defense Cooperation……376 1 Significance, etc. of Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others……376 2 Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Various Countries……379 3 Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation… …………………………421 4 Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building… …………………430 5 Initiatives to Promote Women, Peace and Security (WPS)… ………………432 Section 2 Ensuring Maritime Security…………………………………………437 1 Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security… …………………………437 2 Counter-Piracy Operations………………………………………………438 3 Cooperation in Maritime Security…………………………………………441 Section 3 Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities……443 1 Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities…………………443 2 Initiatives to Support UN PKO and other activities… ………………………444 3 International Disaster Relief Activities… …………………………………448 Section 4 Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation……450 1 Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation……450 2 International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction……452 ----- COLUMN Commentary “Commentary” provides more detailed explanations of specific topics from the perspective of the Japanese government. VOICE “VOICE” contains thoughts and impressions from an individual standpoint by JDF personnel on the field and outside concerned parties. “Perspective” is the analysis by a researcher of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) from a more academic point of view based on an Perspective individual standpoint. This is the researcher’s own version of analysis, relying on publicly available materials, and does not represent the official view of the Japanese government or the Ministry of Defense. **第** **部** **Chapter 1 Overview** **Chapter 2 Japan-U.S. Alliance** **Ⅰ** Commentary Increasing Nuclear and Missile Capabilities in the Vicinity of Japan…… 38 Commentary Measures to Strengthen the Alliance… ………………………… 338 Commentary Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue… …………………… 343 **Chapter 2 Russia’s Aggression and Defense by Ukraine** VOICE What Was Felt from Coordination between Japan and the United States…… 345 Perspective Situation of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine… ……………… 49 Commentary Joint Use of the Lower Plaza Housing Area… …………………… 361 **Chapter 3 Defense Policies of Countries** **Chapter 3 Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others** Perspective Three-Pronged Responses Required of the United States… ……… 59 VOICE Voice of a Staff Member of the Internal Bureau of the Ministry of  Defense who Participated in the Ship Rider Cooperation Program…… 424 Commentary Chinese Military Trends Concerning Taiwan……………………… 81 Perspective Chinese and Russian Militaries Strengthening Cooperation………… 89 VOICE Voice of a Staff Member of Indo-Pacific Deployment 2023 (IPD23) Fleet Escort Force……………………………………………… 429 Commentary North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Development Trends in 2023 and beyond…… 122 VOICE The Initiative and Efforts of the Ministry of Defense for WPS Promotion…… 435 Commentary Russia’s Military Trends in the Area Surrounding Japan…………… 141 Commentary Security Issues Faced by Pacific Island Countries… …………… 150 Perspective The Significance of Finland and Sweden Joining NATO… ………… 166 **第** **部** **Chapter 1[ ][Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases ]as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability itself** **Ⅳ** Perspective Clashes between Israel and the Palestinian Militants.……………… 171 VOICE 1 Initiatives for Strengthening the Development and Production Bases of Equipment 2 Transitioning to a Key Supplier of Equipment Through the “Kimishika-Oran” System…… 460 **Chapter 4[ ][Trends and Challenges Facing the International Community Concerning the ]Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Domains and Information Warfare** Commentary Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft: Establishment of an International Organization…… 470 Perspective Information Warfare and Intelligence Services: Adaptation to Challenges Commentary “Transfer of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft to Third Countries (Main Points Discussed During the Parliamentary Debate)” …… 476 of the State-sponsored Influence Operations and Disinformation…… 182 Commentary Responses from Foreign Countries, Companies, and Others Regarding the Revision of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment… … 477 **第** **部** **Chapter 2 The Three Documents, Including the National Security Strategy** VOICE Acceptance of the Japanese-made Air Surveillance Radar System (Voice from the **Ⅱ** Commentary Counterstrike Capabilities… …………………………………… 220 Commander, 580th Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Philippine Air Force)………… 484 Perspective Significance of Deterrence……………………………………… 225 **Chapter 2[ ][Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element ]** **of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities** **Chapter 3 Defense Buildup and the Budget** VOICE Voices from an SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and his Employer…… 502 Commentary Security-related Expenses… …………………………………… 243 VOICE Voices of Re-employed Personnel and Their Employers/Chiefs… … 510 **Chapter 4 Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense** Commentary Initiative to Enhance Combat Casualty Care Capabilities: The Blood Transfusion Strategy of the Ministry of Defense for Treatment of Combat Injuries……… 522 Commentary Deepening the SDF’s Joint Operations System… ………………… 252 Commentary National Defense Academy Graduation Ceremony………………… 526 **第** **部** **Chapter 1 Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** **Chapter 3 Measures Related to Training and Exercises** **Ⅲ** Commentary Senkaku Islands, Inherent Part of the Territory of Japan…………… 274 Commentary 2023 Self-Defense Forces Joint Exercise “05JX”… ……………… 529 Commentary Reinforcing the Defense Architecture in the Southwestern Region…… 286 VOICE Voice from SDF personnel who participated in the field training exercise Resolute Dragon 23 with the U.S. Marine Corps… ……………… 534 VOICE The Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Mission… ………………… 298 Commentary The Space Security Initiative and Efforts of the Ministry of Defense…… 300 VOICE Comments from a Crew Member who Participated in Japan-France Bilateral Exercise…… 538 VOICE Studying at GSDF High Technical School… ……………………… 306 VOICE Comments from a Crew Member who Participated in “Talisman Saber 23”, a Multilateral Exercise Organized by the U.S. and Australia…… 541 Commentary Transmission of Ballistic Missile Information via J-ALERT (Notice from the Cabinet Secretariat)… ………………………… 312 **Chapter 4 Initiatives to Live in Harmony with Regional Societies and the Environment** VOICE Voice of an SDF Member Who Participated in a Civil Protection Exercise…… 314 Commentary Initiatives Aimed at Increasing Consumption of Japanese Marine Products…… 554 VOICE Voice of an SDF Ready Reserve Member Engaged in Disaster Relief Commentary The Air Review 2023…………………………………………… 560 Operations in the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake… …………… 330 ■I n d e x [ ���������������������������] 563 ■ Reference https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/index. html ----- **The Concept of the Drawing on the Front Cover ~ Swordsmith ~** Since its establishment, the MOD/SDF has been working very hard to forge its “sword” to avoid having to draw it. By forging the “sword,” i.e., deterrence, the MOD/SDF has been deterring a military invasion of Japan. Commemorating the 70th anniversary of the SDF’s establishment, the drawing represents steady progress in bolstering deterrence capabilities and the determination of the MOD/ SDF to make continuous efforts, under the National Security Strategy of Japan and other security documents. - The Defense of Japan white paper was first published in 1970, and has been published annually since 1976. The purpose of publishing this paper is to make the current status, issues and initiatives of Japan’s defense common knowledge for as many people as possible, as simply as possible. - This edition of Defense of Japan covers the defense and security environment of Japan and the initiatives of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) during the one-year period from April 2023 to March 2024. However, certain important events that took place in April 2024 and beyond are also described. - Maps in this paper may contain omissions depending on the design and layout and may not necessarily show the entire Japanese territory. - To facilitate access to the latest information even after this White Paper is published, QR codes have been included to link readers to the relevant pages on the MOD website (created based on URLs as of June 2024). Previous editions of Defense of Japan, including this edition, can be viewed on the MOD website, so please feel free to make use of it. - The photo on the back cover shows uniformed SDF personnel saluting KIMURA Tokutaro, the first Director General of the Defense Agency, in the ceremony marking the agency’s establishment. ■ 2024 DEFENSE of Japan https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_ paper/index.html Legend The terms below will be abbreviated as follows in this White Paper, and other terms may also be abbreviated appropriately. (Official names may be used in some cases for explanatory purposes.) 1. Ministry of Defense → MOD 5. Air Self-Defense Force → ASDF 9. Air Staff Office → ASO 2. Self-Defense-Forces → SDF 6. Joint Staff Office → JSO 10. National Security Strategy of Japan → NSS 3. Ground Self- Defense Force → GSDF 7. Ground Staff Office → GSO 11. National Defense Strategy → NDS 4. Maritime Self-Defense Force → MSDF 8. Maritime Staff Office → MSO 12. Defense Buildup Program → DBP 13. United Nations → UN ----- DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2024 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ----- **as described in the Defense White Papers** **70 Years of the SDF** The Ministry of Defense (MOD), formerly the Defense Agency (DA), and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) was established on July 1, 1954, and marks its 70th anniversary in 2024. “Defense of Japan 2024” is the 50th issue of Japan’s Defense White Paper since the first edition was published in 1970. This feature shows a 70-year history of the MOD/SDF—which has worked in step with the public—as described in the past 50 defense white papers. Note: The coverage of events that happened before the first defense white paper was published is based on descriptions in successive white papers up to the 2024 Defense White Paper, with a special focus on features and other articles in the 1994 Defense White Paper (the 40th anniversary of the SDF) and the 2004 Defense White Paper (the 50th anniversary of the SDF). 1954 **The Period from the SDF’s Establishment to the** Paris Agreement signed West Germany recovered sovereignty, being allowed to rearm and join NATO **Subsequent Gradual Buildup of Defense Capabilities** 【NATO website】 1953 1949 USSR carried out its first hydrogen bomb test NATO established Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Ger- States and the Republic of Korea man Democratic Republic (East Germany) established People’s Republic of China established 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance **July 1, 1954** 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty and Mutual Assistance signed (April 1949) [NATO website] Korean War broke out **Defense Agency established** **Ground, Maritime and Air** **Self-Defense Forces established** Through the GHQ, the U.S. asked the Government **Joint Staff Council established** of Japan (GOJ) to dispatch a minesweeper unit of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to Korea in order to **1952** fill the gap in the minesweeping capabilities in its The Battle of Inchon in the Korean War. landing operations. The photo shows “Yuchidori”, [AFP/Jiji Press Photo] the flagship of the JCG unit. **National Safety Agency** **established** 1954 **1950** The purpose was to comple- Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance ment the general police force. Agreement (MDA) signed based on **National Police** It did not reach an established U.S. Mutual Security Act (MSA) defense force at this point. MSA, which involved the integration of **1945** **Reserve established** economic assistance and a strengthened Ceremony marking the establishment of the DA military alliance, called on Japan to make (SDF personnel saluting Director General KIMURA Tokutaro) defense efforts on its own. **The End of the World War** **Ⅱ** 1952 Background: There Maritime Guard established SDF flag (left) and SDF naval ensign (right) was growing concern instituted upon the DA’s establishment about public order in As an organization within the JCG Director General KIMURA Tokutaro (center) Japan after the bulk of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) was deployed 1951 After the war, the allied forces occupied and disarmed Japan. [Jiji Press Photo] to the Korean penin- Treaty of Peace with Japan and Japan-U.S. sula after the Korean Security Treaty signed War started. - Japan provides facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces. The duty to defend Hokkaido was transferred from U.S. Forces’ XVI -  Treaty of Peace with Japan meant the recovery In Charleston the U S JS Asakaze and JS Ha- Corps to the GSDF Northern Army ----- ：International affairs ：Reinforcement of Japan s defense capabilities ：Japan-U.S. relations Détente ：International contribution / international exchange / cooperation with other countries, etc ：Other East-West relations remained stable. - The United States restrained its defense efforts. - The USSR consistently built up its military capabilities and expanded into Southeast Asia, Africa, etc. to 1955 1964 increase its political influence there. Warsaw Pact Organization established Gulf of Tonkin incident 1962 In response, U.S. Forces bombed Cuban Missile Crisis torpedo boat bases in North Vietnam. China conducted its first - USSR launched construction of a nuclear missile base in Cuba, escalating tensions between U.S. and USSR. nuclear test 1976 - Post-crisis efforts to avert a critical confrontation or a catastrophe 2nd Defense White Paper between the two countries led to the signing of the Partial Test published Ban Treaty in 1963 and the conclusion of the Strategic Arms (Published annually from Limitation Talks 1 (SALT I) in 1972. then on) President Kenned y 1970 ordered a naval blockade 1st Defense White Paper published in response to the Soviet Union building a nuclear missile base in Cuba. **1957** Return of Okinawa [Avalon/Jiji Press Photo] Aichi-Rogers talks (1971) **Basic Policy on** - The Agreement on the Return of Okinawa was signed 1960 Return of Okinawa (1972) **National Defense** Relocation of the Defense Agency - Following Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, the GOJ provided USFJ facilities and areas under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. - Supporting UN activities and promoting international collaboration to realize world peace - Stabilizing the livelihood of the people, fostering patriotism, and thereby, establishing the necessary basis of national security New DA HQ in Roppongi (Hinoki-cho), - Building up rational defense capabilities by steps within the limit Tokyo (From Kasumigaseki to Hinoki-cho) necessary for self-defense in accordance with national strength and An MSDF vessel unloading 54 billion yen in cash at Naha Port, Okinawa situation Prefecture, for conversion from USD to JPY following Okinawa’s reversion - Dealing with external aggression, based on the security arrangement 1954 with the U.S. , until the United Nations will be able to fulfill its functions SDF Reserve Personnel System introduced in stopping such aggression effectively in the future 1962 Defense Facilities Administration Agency Arms Exports (DFAA) established Three Principles on Arms Exports were declared at the Diet (1967) Gradual buildup of defense capabilities Arms exports to the following countries or regions shall not be permitted: Buildup of defense capabilities (1) communist bloc countries, (2) countries subject to “arms” exports embargo under First Defense Buildup Program (1st DBP) (1957) the United Nations Security Council’s resolutions, and - 1st DBP called for the buildup of minimum necessary self-defense capabilities commensurate with the national strength (3) countries involved in or likely to be involved in international 2nd DBP (1961), 3rd DBP (1966), 4th DBP (1972) conflicts. - Under these DBPs, The aim of building up defense capabilities was to effectively The Government’s Unified View on Arms Export announced (1976) respond to aggression in local or lower-level wars involving conventional weapons. Arms exports to areas not subject to the Three Principles shall also be restrained. The first joint maritime transport exercise Joint operations by the Ground, Maritime and Air SDF in DFAA plate mounted (November Shizuoka Prefecture (1962) 1962) The Joint Staff Council’s authority put under review (1961) 1971 - Grant authority to execute DA chief’s orders to joint force All Nippon Airways plane collided with SDF aircraft Joint Staff College established (1961) 1956 1964 Relocation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements SDF supported Tokyo Olympics Defense Agency Japan-U.S. Security Treaty re-signed (1960) - Clarifying the U.S. obligation to defend Japan - Deleting the provision so called “internal riots clause” that allowed U.S. Forces to put down internal riots in Japan -  Setting a framework of prior consultation between Tokyo and Washington Crashed ANA plane, and SDF personnel in search and regarding actions to be taken by U.S. Forces rescue operations near Shizukuishi, Iwate Prefecture Completed new DA building in Kasumigaseki, Tokyo (From Etchujima to Kasumigaseki) Between the late-1950s and the late 1960s, the SDF helped farmers with rice planting and others, mainly in The ASDF Blue Impulse drawing rural Hokkaido and Tohoku in the the five rings over Tokyo at the busy farming season as requested 18th Olympic Games in Tokyo by local governments. ----- Main Military Forces in Japan s Surroundings (Approximate Strength) (FY1976) **The Period of the Basic Defense Force Concept** China Soviet Far East Legend 300 Groundforces Maritime forces forcesAir **and the Period of International Contribution** 5,000 （ 10,000 troops ）[（] 10,000 tons [）] （aircraft） 125 2,000 41 more30 or 1989 End of the Cold War declared 1990 East and West Germany unified 15.5Japan16.7 470 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait North Korea ROK Taiwan U.S. Forces Japan 43 5.3 600 54（2） 8.2 200 （2.9）35.9 18 270 4.6（2） 200 U.S. 7th Fleet U.S. Forces Korea U.S. Forces Taiwan 60 4 60 0.2 150 (Note) 1 Compiled from the 1977 Defense White Paper. The Berlin Wall, a symbol of the Cold War, was torn down in 2 The number of U.S. troops stationed in these countries indicates the 1989. [EPA/Jiji Press Photo] combined total for ground, naval, and air forces. The Gulf War started when the multilateral forces resorted to the 3 Figures in parentheses indicate the military force of Marine Corps. use of force in order to eliminate the Iraqi aggression and secure 4 Figures for Japan indicate the actual strength. 1991 peace and security in the Gulf region. [AFP/Jiji Press Photo] 5 indicates the actual strength of Japan as of 1976. Warsaw Pact dissolved 1991 Civil war broke out in Yugoslavia 1976 MiG-25 landed at Hakodate Airport without permission The Soviet military aircraft made an unautho- 1983 rized landing at Hakodate Airport. This incident highlighted such issues as how radar sites Soviet military aircraft shot down KAL airliner should cope with aircraft intruding at low 1987 altitude and a gap in the early warning and U.S. and USSR signed Intermediate-Range 1988 surveillance functions. This in turn led to the in- troduction of airborne early warning aircraft and Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 1987 improvements to communication structures. 1986 1979 1985 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Sending MSDF minesweepers 1984 to the Persian Gulf following the end of the Gulf War 1983 1982 1983 Setting out the GOJ’s views as specifically as Transfer of military technologies to U.S. approved possible on what Japan’s defenses should look 1981 The Chief Cabinet Secretary stated that such provision like to form national consensus on this issue Out of consideration that mutual was not subject to the Three Principles on Arms Exports. 1980 technological exchanges with the United States in the defense sector are extremely 1979 important to ensure effective operation of 1987 **1976** 1978 the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements The GNP 1% ceiling rescinded The GOJ said that although it would not apply the GNP 1% **Formulation of the National** 1977 1976 moderate defense buildupceiling[1], it would continue to respect the spirit of seeking a [2]. “GNP 1% ceiling” adopted for defense spending (Notes) **Defense Program Guidelines** The Immediate-Term Defense Buildup Program” (Cabinet decision on November 5, 1976) called for limiting total annual defense-related expenditures to less 1 “Plans for Dealing with the Immediate-term Defense Buildup Program,” which was approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on November 5, 1976, in the FY1987 Budget (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 30, 1986) than 1% of gross national product for the time being. 2 The Program for the Future Buildup of Defense Capability (Approved by the National Security Council **(1976 NDPG)** and the Cabinet on January 24, 1987) Japan-U.S. Alliance - “Basic Defense Force Concept” Destroyer JS “Hiei” navigating - Japan is to maintain the minimum necessary basic defense capabilities Subcommittee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation established (1976) alongside a U.S. aircraft carrier as an independent nation to prevent itself from creating a power vacuum Cabinet approved Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978) during the SDF’s first participation that would destabilize the area surrounding Japan, instead of directly in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise countering military threats to Japan. - Calling for studies on joint defense planning for the defense of Japan as well as bilateral training and exercises (RIMPAC) hosted by the U.S. Navy - Defining the roles of Japan and the United States in case of contingencies in Japan ----- ：International affairs ：Reinforcement of Japan s defense capabilities ：Japan-U.S. relations 1999 North Korean mini-submarine ran aground on the east ：International contribution / international exchange / cooperation with other countries, etc ：Other Kosovo conflict breaks out coast of ROK, and its crew intruded into ROK territory A North Korean submarine designed to carry special operations forces ran aground in the ROK’s territorial waters. Its crew and armed agents on board intruded into the ROK’s territory. [Jiji Press Photo] 2000 1993 While the likelihood of a global armed conflict has become distant, security 1999 North Korea declared the withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) concerns diversified. North Korea conducted a ballistic missile test launch toward the central Sea of Japan 1998 **1995** 1997 1996 2000 **Formulation of the National** Relocation of the Defense Agency Ichigaya area at the time of relocation **Defense Program Guideline** (Hinokicho => Ichigaya) An array of North Korean missiles in the military parade celebrating the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean People’s Army. **(1995 NDPG)** Strengthening Japan’s architecture for national defense [Korea News Service/Jiji Press Photo] Joint operations The Defense Intelligence Headquarters established (1997) 1995 The authority of the Joint Staff Council (JSC) strengthened (1998) 1994 - The JSC now assists the DA chief in - Basically following the Basic Defense Force Concept disaster relief operations and international 1993 - “Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing disaster relief activities in addition to to building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense defense and public security operations. Joint arrangements in action for disaster 1992 capability, joining the existing role of “defense of the nation” The Central Command Post started operations relief operations following the eruption of Mt. 1991 following the relocation of the DA (2000) Miyake. The photo shows a RF-4 reconnais-sance aircraft flying near Miyakejima Island. 1990 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Contributing to building a more stable security environment The GOJ and the U.S. signed the Exchange of Notes and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of 1989 Japan and the U.S. on Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research on BMD (1999) Enforcement of the International Peace Cooperation Act and The government decided to introduce the BMD system (2003) amendment of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law (1992) Amendment of the SDF Law (2005) - Developed a domestic structure focusing on human resources for more active con- -  Paving the way for responding with the BMD system when no defense operation orders tribution to the international community are given The SDF Ready Reserve Personnel System introduced (1998) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel in training After the transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas became a new duty of the Dealing with various contingencies such as large-scale disasters The SDF’s first international peace SDF, the ASDF conducted trainings to change the specifications of the in-flight equipment of the cooperation activity in Cambodia. The Great Hanshin and Awaji Earthquake and the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack (1995) The SDF conducted road and bridge government aircraft from those for dignitaries to repairs, ceasefire monitoring, and those for Japanese nationals and others. other activities. Dispatch of SDF to international peace cooperation assignments including : - Cambodia (1992–1993) - Mozambique (1993–1995) - Rwanda (1994) - The Golan Heights (1996–2013) etc. Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (the SDF Law) (1994) - The transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas was The Basic Act on Disaster Management and the SDF Law amended, the Defense Agency Disaster Pre- added as a duty of the SDF vention Plan amended (1995) Amendment of the SDF Law (1999) Training for transporting Japanese nationals - Additional authority to uniformed SDF personnel in a disaster relief operation (e.g., the authority to ensure the passage of emergency - The use of SDF vessels and shipboard helicopters, in addition to SDF aircraft, is and others overseas (leading people to the vehicles when no police officers are around) now allowed to transport Japanese nationals and others overseas onboard boat) - Clarified criteria for discretionary dispatches and closer cooperation with local governments Japan-U.S. Alliance The unfortunate incident in 1995 led to the establishment of the Special Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (1996) The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) (1996 The SACO Final Report). Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation revised (1997) on Security reaffirmed the importance of Japan-U.S. The SACO Final Report agreed to return - Studying and making revisions in three areas: (i) security arrangements as a some 21% in area of the facilities and cooperation under normal circumstances, (ii) actions cornerstone of Japan-U.S. areas of the USFJ located in Okinawa in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (iii) relations, and made clear what Prefecture at the time. The photo shows cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan the Japan-U.S. Alliance should Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, The Act Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of look like in the 21st century. the total return of which was stipulated in J i Sit ti i A S di J c i t f c (1999) ----- Main Military Forces in Japan s Surroundings (Approximate Strength) (FY2004) The Period of New Threats, Diverse Contingencies, China Soviet Far East Legend 161（1） Groundforces Maritime forces forcesAir and a Growing Role of Defense Capabilities 93.9 2,390 70 （ 10,000 troops ）[（] 10,000 tons [）] （aircraft） 9 630 2001 The 9/11 terrorist attacks Japan 42.6 14.8 480 North Korea ROK Taiwan 100 U.S. Forces Japan （2.8）58.8 21.5 1.7 130 2003 10.3 580 14.8 600 （1.5） 21 530 Iraq War broke out U.S. 7th Fleet U.S. Forces Korea 61 2.7 80 70 (Note) 1 Compiled from the 2005 Defense White Paper. 2 Figures for the ground forces of U.S. Forces Japan/Korea indicate the combined total for Army troops and U.S. Marines. 3 Figures in parentheses indicate the military force of Marine Corps. 4 Figures for Japan indicate the actual strength. [dpa/Jiji Press Photo] 5 indicates the actual strength of Japan as of 1976. Developments in North Korea [AFP=Jiji] A missile launched by North Korea Discovery of a suspicious ship off the Noto Peninsula (1999) (presumed to be Taepodong I) passed over Japan (1998) - New threats, such as international terrorism and ballistic missile attacks - The direct connection between world peace and Japan’s peace - Necessity to convert the policy from putting weight on deterrence to responding to the situation 2006 2005 **2004** 2007 Nuclear test (2006) **Formulation of the National** Defense Agency superseded - From the onward, one such test each in 2009, by Ministry of Defense (MOD) 2013, and 2017, as well as two in 2016. **Defense Program Guidelines** [AFP=Jiji] **(2004 NDPG)** - Calling for multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities to work independently and proactively on implementing 2004 international peace cooperation activities while dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies - Succeeding the effective parts of the Basic Defense Force Concept 2003 Effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies 2002 Legislative measures 2001 2002 Act on Special Measures against Terrorism (2001) Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel System introduced Amendment of the SDF Law (2001) - Amendments for the response to suspicious vessels (regarding the use of weapons during Maritime Security Operations) Response to suspicious vessels - • Ammendment that allows for Guarding Operations and define the authority to conduct themAmendment for the response to armed agents (allowing both for in- A MSDF vessel in escort operation formation gathering before an order for a Public Security Operation First order for maritime security operations (1999) is issued and for the use of weapons during such an operation) - MSDF destroyers gave orders to halt and fired warning shots. - P-3C aircraft dropped bombs as a warning. Three Emergency-Related Laws (Armed Attack Situation Response Law, etc.) enacted. (2003) -  Armed Attack Situation Response Law specifies (i) basic principles, Joint exercise with JCG to deal with suspicious vessels (from 1999) (ii) the responsibilities of national and local governments, and (iii) - ”The manual for jointly dealing with suspicious vessels” cooperation of the people in armed attack situation, etc. (Armed Attack ----- - Increasing the number of submarines, introducing P-1 patrol aircraft, and upgrading fixed 3D radars ：International affairs ：Reinforcement of Japans defense capabilities ：Japan-U.S. relations 20000 7.7249 trillion yen ：International contribution / international exchange / cooperation with other countries, etc ：Other 15000 Period of this page (2001-2011) 10000 Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan 5000 - Submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japan’s territorial waters, breaching international law (2004) 0 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 (FY) - China Maritime Surveillance vessels intruded into Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, and hovered and drifted there (2008) - Chinese fishing trawler collided with a JCG patrol vessel in Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands (2010) - Change in global power balance - Chinese government ship ordered a Philippine research vessel to - Complex military situation surrounding Japan withdraw in the South China Sea (2011) - Diversification of the military role in global society 2011 - China moved to build new constructions such as station poles in Comprehensive exemptions to the South China Sea (2011) 2011 Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. (Statement - Chinese government ship cut an investigation cable towed by a **2010** by Chief Cabinet Secretary). Vietnamese resource exploration vessel (2012) **Formulation of the National** 2011 - Cases related to peace contribution and international cooperation Great East Japan Earthquake - Cases regarding international joint **Defense Program Guidelines** development and production of defense equipment that contribute **(2010 NDPG)** to Japan’s security 2010 - Developing a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the Basic Defense Force Concept) 2009 - Facilitating effective deterrence and responses to various A joint task force conducting various activities for supporting contingencies and making it possible to proactively conduct affected people, including searching for missing persons activities in order to further stabilize the security environment 2008 in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner 2007 2009 実効的な抑止・対処Effective deterrence and responses Further stabilizing the security environment Order for ballistic missile destruction measures issued for first time in the Asia-Pacific region and improving Strengthening the defense architecture in the southwestern region ASDF PAC-3 deployed in the Tohoku region after an order for ballistic Ensuring security of sea and airspace surrounding Japan the global security environment missile destruction measures was issued for the first time (2009) Improving capabilities for rapid deployment and response From 2009 - Establishing the 15th Brigade and introducing next-generation cargo aircraft Counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden Improving intelligence-gathering and patrol/surveillance postures Piracy incidents were frequent and surging in waters off the coast of Soma- - Increasing the number of transportable radars in Naha, and deploying a coast observation unit in the southwestern region operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti Ceremony to mark the delivery of submarine Ceremony to mark the granting of the unit’s The maiden flight of a prototype for the Deployment Air Force for Counter “Unryu” and granting of the MSDF flag flag in an event cerebrating the newly of next-generation cargo aircraft Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) in 2011. established 15th Brigade (XC-2) from ASDF Gifu Air Base From 2009 Counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden Piracy incidents were frequent and surging in waters off the coast of Soma lia and in the Gulf of Aden. To protect Japan-related vessels from piracy, an order for Maritime Security Operations was issued first. This was followed by an order for counter-piracy operations after the Counter-Piracy Measures Act was enacted. The MOD/SDF began to operate a new operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti for the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) in 2011. Established a structure that allows the SDF to independently and proactively engage in international peace cooperation activities Joint operations Activities for humanitarian and Joint Staff established (2006) reconstruction assistance in Iraq (2003–2009) - Changed the posture from each SDF based operations to joint based operations Clarified The status and roles of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters as “the central intelligence service for the Defense Agency” (2006) Response to ballistic missile attacks With a shift to the joint operations system, the first Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, assumed his post (March 2006) Japan dispatched the SDF units to Iraq following the collapse of the Hussein administration to provide humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support, such Continue proactive contribution to international peace cooperation activities Starting initiatives to provide capacity building (from 2012) - Creating a desirable security environment for Japan by helping the partner countries’ forces, etc., to adequately fulfill their roles in maintaining international peace and regional stability GSDF personnel explaining vehicle maintenance procedures in Timor-Leste Female SDF personnel participated in PKO for the first time, in Timor-Leste (2002) ----- e e od o e eop g egsato o eace a d Secu ty a d St e gt e g China Soviet Far East Legend 161（1） Groundforces Maritime forces forcesAir Defense Architecture in New Domains and in the Southwestern Region 142.3 2,580 60 （ 10,000 troops ）[（] 10,000 tons [）] （aircraft） 8 340 - After the GOJ transfered the owner- ship of three of Senkaku Islands in 2012, activities by Chinese vessels were markedly intensified in waters 2012 surrounding the islands. The U.S. announces a policy of - China increased the numbers of sur- Number of Incursions days into the Territorial Waters face vessels (most notably the com- around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Coast Guard Ships 102North Korea10.1 600 （2.7）54.7 ROK19.5 620 （1.5）21.5Taiwan20.1 500 U.S. Forces Japan1.814 Japan45.3 130420 strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region in its Defense Strategic Guidance - missioning of the aircraft carrier “Lia-oning”), submarines, and 4th generation fighters (2012)A Chinese warship directed a fire-con-trol radar at an MSDF destroyer in the （Days）6050403020 23Period of this page (2012-2019)52 32 35 36 29 19 32 29 40 37 42 U.S. Forces Korea U.S. 7th Fleet East China Sea (2013) 100 081 09 100 0 111 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 1.9 60 34.7 50 (Year) (Note) 1 Compiled from the 2014 Defense White Paper. 2 Figures for the ground forces of U.S. Forces Japan/Korea indicate the Developments in Russia combined total for Army - “Annexation of Crimea” (2014) 3 Figures in parentheses indicate the military force of Marine Corps. - Conducted what is known as “hybrid warfare,” which is constituted so 4 Figures for Japan indicate the actual strength. as not to be recognized as the use of force by the state 5 indicates the actual strength of Japan as of 1976. - Strengthened missile capabilities with the deployment of new equipment in the Far East, including Japan’s Northern Territories Su-35S deployed to Etorofu Island (from 2018)[Russian 2010 Ministry of Defence ROK naval patrol ship “Cheonan” website] sunk in the Yellow Sea “Bastion” surface-to-ship 2010 North Korea shelled the ROK’s missiles deployed to Etorofu Yeonpyeong island Russian President Vladimir Putin signing the Island (2016) [Russian Ministry The U.S.’s National Security Strategy (NSS) referred to global commons. 2012 legislation incorporating Crimea (March 2014)[SPUTNIK/Jiji Press Photo] of Defence website] North Korea launched - An increasingly severe security environment sur- what it calls a satellite rounding Japan **26** 2015 - The U.S.’s strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pa-•cific regionLessons learned from the SDF’s experience in the Great East Japan Earthquake **防衛白書特 集 刊行40回を迎えて平成26年版** 日本の防衛 2015 **2013** 2014 Legislation for Peace and Security enacted - Amendment of the SDF Law (including the Rescue of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas and Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces) **Formulation of the National** A CG image depicting the distribution of space debris in orbit - Enacted the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan around Earth [Courtesy of the European Space Agency] in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Se- **Defense Program Guidelines** curity (to replace the Act concerning “Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan”) - Enacted the International Peace Cooperation Act (to cover, inter alia, Internationally Co- **(2013 NDPG)** ordinated Operations for Peace and Security and so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) operations) - Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force 2014 - • Amendment of the Armed Attack Situation Response Law (to cover Survival-Threatening Situations)Enacted the International Peace Support Act (to allow for cooperation - Defense force to be more thorough with the concept of Cabinet decision on “Three and support activities in Joint International Peace Response Situation) 2013 joint operations, which enables the SDF to respond swiftly Principles on Transfer of to the increasingly severe security environment and carry Defense Equipment and Training for out various activities—such as achieving maritime and air superiority—seamlessly and flexibly Technology” “kaketsuke-keigo” operations 2012 Securing a posture for effective deterrence and response to various situations Ensuring security of the sea Response to an attack on remote islands(Strengthening of the defense architecture in the southwestern region) Response to ballistic Responses in space 2013 and airspace surrounding Japan missile attacks and cyberspace National Security Council established; National Equipping Atago-class Security Strategy of Japan formulated destroyers with BMD capabilities, - Deploying units to the southwestern region (Yonagunijima Island in 2016, Developing amphibious operations adding two Aegis ----- ：International affairs ：Reinforcement of Japans defense capabilities ：Japan-U.S. relations ：International contribution / international exchange / cooperation with other countries, etc ：Other ： ：Other -  The security environment surrounding Japan became increasingly severe and uncertain at a remarkably fast pace - China established the “East China Sea ADIZ,” - Rapid expansion in SDF’s use of new domains, which which covers the Senkaku Islands. (2013) It in- are space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum correctly indicates them as Chinese territories. - Notable trends toward further increases in - China pushed rapid and large-scale land reclamation military capabilities and activities in the Spratly Islands (from 2014 onward) 2019 Ground-deployed electronic war- **2018** fare (EW) system “Leer-3” [Official The threatening text of the malware YouTube Channel of the Russian August 2014 March 2020 “WannaCry,” which wreaked havoc Ministry of Defence] **Formulation of the National** [Sources: CSIS/AMTI/Maxar] globally [EPA/Jiji Press Photo] **Defense Program Guidelines** - The Philippines-China South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal determined the illegality of China’s ac- **(2018 NDPG)** tivities, such as land reclamation (2016) - China placed its maritime security units under the command of the People’s Armed Police - Building a Multi-Domain Defense Force (PAP) and ultimately the Central Military Com- 2018 - Truly effective defense capability that enables cross-domain operations organically fusing ca- mission (2018) pabilities in all domains by strengthening not only those in traditional domains-land, sea and air-but also those in new domains, which are space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum Strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations 2017 Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains 2016 2016 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake - GSDF Electronic Warfare Operations Unit established (2022) - GSDF Network Electronic Warfare System - ASDF Space Operations Squadron established (2020) JSDF Cyber Defense Command established by expanding the functions acquired (from 2017) - ASDF Space Operations Group established of the Cyber Defense Unit and by abolishing the SDF Command Control - ASDF stand-off electronic warfare aircraft with expanded units (2022) Communication Computers Systems Command (2022) developed (from 2020) Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains Maritime and air domains Stand-off defense capabilities Upgraded Type-12 SSM (image) F-35A fighter Soryu-class submarine 2016 - • Acquiring a new type of frigates (FFM)Acquiring F-35A/B fighters, P-1 patrol aircraft, KC-46A aerial refueling/transport aircraft Japan advocates a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision at - Increasing the number of submarines TICAD - Refurbishing Izumo-class destroyers and testing the takeoff and landing JSM-equipped F-35A (image) of F-35B fighters (2021). (Three pillars) - Conducting R&D of upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles, hyper velocity gliding - Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade projectiles for the defense of remote islands, hypersonic missiles, etc. (from 2018) - Pursuit of economic prosperity (e.g. improving connectivity) Comprehensive air and missile defense capabilities - Procuring stand-off missiles (JSM) (from 2018). - Commitment to peace and stability Mobile deployment capabilities 2015 Revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation PAC-3 Maya-class Aegis destroyer - Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism available from Ospreys C-2 peacetime - Deploying PAC-3MSE surface-to-air guided missiles - Strengthening of opera- - Increasing the number of Aegis destroyers (to 8 by 2020) tional coordination - Formulation and update of joint plans Strengthening sustainability and resiliency Type-16 mobile combat vehicles - Procuring ammunition (anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes) necessary for ----- e e od o t e ost Se e e a d Co pe Secu ty o e t s ce t e China Soviet Far East Legend 232 Groundforces Maritime forces forcesAir End of WWII and Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities 101 （4） 3,190 （ 10,000 troops ）[（] 10,000 tons [）] （aircraft） 67 8 320 China-Russia joint actions - Joint flights by Chinese and Rus- sian bombers (from 2019) - A total of 7 flights since 2019 (as of the end of March 2024) - []Joint navigation by Chinese and Japan 52 Russian navy vessels (from 14 370 2021) Russian Navy shipboard helicopter and Chinese Navy North Korea ROK Taiwan vessel participating in joint China-Russia navigation as part 110 44.9 U.S. Forces Japan - [ ]Bilateral exercises of the Russia Eastern Military District strategic command （2.9） 10.4 2 130 and staff exercise “Vostok 2022” (September 2022) [Official 10 550 29 660 （1） 21 510 Rutube channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence] U.S. 7th Fleet U.S. Forces Korea 44 2 80 50 China’s activities around Taiwan (Note) 1 Compiled from the 2023 Defense White Paper. - China conducted large-scale military activities around Taiwan. 2 Figures for the ground forces of U.S. Forces Japan/Korea indicate the combined total for - Five ballistic missiles landed in the waters around Army troops and U.S. Marines. Japan, including Japan’s EEZ (2022) 3 Figures in parentheses indicate the military force of Marine Corps. 4 Figures for Japan indicate the actual strength. 5 indicates the actual strength of Japan as of 1976. - Significant increase in the number of Chinese aircraft entering Taiwan’s airspace From February 2022 （aircraft）2000 1733 1703 Russia’s aggression against Ukraine 1500 Image of China’s ballistic missile Massive missile attacks 1000 972 J-16 launch in August 2022 U k r a i n i a n h o u s i n g 500 380 Chinese military aircraft confirmed c o m p l e x d e s t r o y e d b y R u s s i a n m i s s i l e 0 20 21 22 (Year)23 J-11 around Taiwan [Website of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense] Attacks in space, cyber, and electromagnetic attack (January 2023) domains, as well as attacks by UAVs, etc. [Facebook account of the Government of Ukraine] Approach and near-field Hybrid warfare including information warfare activities by suspicious satellites, etc. Destruction by The caption of a video taken and posted by President Zelenskyy in front **December 2022** anti-satellite of the Presidential Office to counter disinformation that he had left 2023 missiles Obstruction by Obstruction by jamming weapons Ukraine (February 2022) [Facebook account of President Zelenskyy] laser weapons **National Security Strategy (NSS)** **National Defense Strategy (NDS)** April 2023 Threats to the stable use of space **Defense Buildup Program (DBP)** Transportation of Japanese nationals and others from Sudan November 2021 Taiwan released the National Defense Report, which - Fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities as well as reinforcing the de- concerns about “cognitive warfare” fense architecture of the whole country by integrating the strength of the nation - Focusing on the capabilities of opponents and new ways of warfare The report describes “cognitive warfare” as being designed - Presenting Japan’s defense objectives, approaches, to create disorder in society by manipulating and disturbing and means by which Japan accomplishes those ob- the public’s mentality through the “Three Warfares” and disinformation via social media. 2022 jectives, in lieu of the NDPG Inside the C-2 transport aircraft carrying 45 Japanese nationals and - Fundamentally reinforcing the current Multi-Domain others from the Republic of the Sudan following the armed conflict Defense Force through further accelerated efforts between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces August 2021 Transportation of Japanese Japan-U.S. Alliance 2021 nationals and others from Japan aims to increase Afghanistan defense-related expenditures Cooperation in Policy coordination at different levels space to 2% of GDP From 2020 Japan will take necessary Japan-U.S. “2+2” measures to make the level confirmed that an 2020 Response to COVID-19 of its budget for both the attack in space could Preparation for administering vac- fundamental reinforcement lead to invocation cines at a large-scale vaccination of defense capabilities and of Article V of the center. The MOD/SDF administered The SDF organized a joint task force to complementary initiatives Japan-U.S. Security some 2.49 million doses from May transport 15 Japanese nationals and others reach 2% of current GDP for Treaty. (January 2023) Japan-U.S. joint press conference (April 2024) [Website of the Prime 2021 to March 2023. from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan FY2022 in FY2027. Minister’s Office of Japan] by C-130 transport aircraft following the (Refer to the National Se- ----- ： ：Other ：International affairs ：Reinforcement of Japans defense capabilities ：Japan-U.S. relations November 2023 ：International contribution / international exchange / cooperation with other countries, etc ：Other North Korea launched a military reconnaissance satellite Image of launching the “military reconnaissance satellite” released by North Korea From October 2023 [Korea News Service] Clashes between Israel and the Palestinian militants. April 2023 North Korea launched a solid-fuel-propelled, ICBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-18” for the first time 令和 6 年版 日本の防衛 December 2023, March 2024 An Israeli tank rolling in the north of 防衛白書 the Gaza Strip (December 2023) Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology partially amended [AFP/Jiji] Cabinet decision made in March 2024 on direct transfer of 防衛省 finished products regarding Global Combat Air Programme Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched an ICBM-class 2024 from Japan to countries other than partner countries ballistic missile “Hwasong-18”[Korean News Service/ Jiji] Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country国全体の防衛体制の強化 January 2024 - R&D (recognizing it as a matching Disaster relief teams dispatched after business) the Noto Peninsula Earthquake - Public infrastructure Development (Specific-Use Airport and Seaport) October and November of 2023 - Cybersecurity Transportation of Japanese - International cooperation for enhancing nationals and others from deterrence capabilities of Japan and The ceremony of E/N signing for the provision of coastal surveillance radars Israel SDF aircraft carrying Japanese nationals and like-minded countries (Official Security to the Philippines[Website of the Prime others from Israel landed at Haneda Airport Assistance [OSA]) Minister’s Office of Japan] Strengthening Japan’s architecture for national defense Capabilities to disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby detering invasion of Japan itself (from FY2026 to FY2025). Upgraded Type-12 SSM that have stood various etc.) - Development of hyper velocity gliding projectiles for the defense of remote islands trials on the ground [Courtesy of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.] - Strengthening of the sensor network by improving the capabilities of FPS-5, JADGE, etc. Aegis System Equipped Vessel（image） Aegis System Equipped Vessel（image） Additional capabilities to ensure asymmetric advantage across domains should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur Unmanned defense capabilities Cross-domain operation capabilities Command and control/intelligence-related functions - Implementing the cyber-related Risk Management Middle-range reconnaissance UAV (image) (image) at the GSDF System and Signal/Cyber School, etc. Vice Commander General/Admiral - Acquiring counter air electronic warfare system and Unmanned defense capabilities Research on multi-purpose combat-support USVs Middle-range reconnaissance UAV (image) (image) - Acquisition of middle-range reconnaissance UAV equipped with a synthetic aperture rada developing electronic warfare aircraft General/Admiral Chief of Staff Senior Adviser to the Commander - Research on multi-purpose combat-support USVs Counter air electronic warfare system (image) Administration Department Department Department Command and Communications Legal Affairs Commander General/Admiral Vice Commander General/Admiral General/Admiral Chief of Staff Senior Adviser to the Commander Director General, Intelligence Operations Logistics Director General, Administration Department Department Department Command and Communications - Joint development with the U.S. - Upgrading the Central Command System, and responding to information warfare with the special regard to the cognitive dimension At the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting at Camp David, the Capabilities to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner to crush the opponent’s will to invade Collaboration with three leaders affirmed progress towards the operationalization Mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection Sustainability and resiliency Countries and (August 2023) [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of sustaining and maintaining equipment Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others maneuver support vessel (image) resiliency of those facilities and the living maneuver support vessel (image) - Establishing an SDF Maritime Transport ----- **My Way to** #### 2 I am the commander of an infantry company of the Yaeyama Area Security Force at Camp Ishigaki, which was established in March 2023 in Okinawa Prefecture. Ishigaki Island is the center of the Yaeyama Islands located some 400 kilometers from Naha. Along with Miyako Island and Yonaguni Island, Ishigaki Island is the hub of the defense of remote islands, making us feel the increasingly severe security environment on the front line. For this reason, a surface-to- air guided missile unit and a surface-to-ship guided missile unit are also stationed at Camp Ishigaki. The Yaeyama Area Security Force **Working in a Company That Is Key to the** works with these units from the peacetime to A guard of honor for the Minister of Defense at the camp's opening (the author is in the left) **Defense of the Southwestern Region** be ready for any situation. Commanding the company in a combat exercise (the author is in the right) I will continue working hard every day Major OSHIRO Takanori with my colleagues, who gathered from all ❶ **[�Infantry company, GSDF Yaeyama Area Security ]** over the country. When the camp opened to **Force (Camp Ishigaki)** achieve our national defense mission with our catchword, "Work hard in Yaeyama for the peace of the nation!" ❷ **[Infantry]** The MSDF conducts 24-hour monitoring and surveillance activities in the waters **My duties in monitoring and surveillance** around Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, and my first duty after boarding the **activities around Japan, including the** MSDF destroyer JS Makinami was to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities. **Senkaku Islands** I remember having been very tense all the time for response to Chinese vessels. As an engineer officer, I monitor and manage the status of a ship's engines and electrical power.As it was necessary to record information required for surveillance during the mission, I was assigned to command collecting records. Through the mission, I directly learned about the increasingly severe security environment we The author (front) on duty face, which made me brace myself, and I strongly in the cockpit felt a sense of fulfillment and experiencing The author (right) recording information Ensign NISHIDA Saki personal growth through my contributions to ❶ **[JS Makinami (Ominato)]** national defense. I will continue to pursue this challenging work and develop myself. ❷ **[Engineer]** **Preparedness for countermeasures** As an F-2 fighter pilot, I am engaged in countermeasures **against airspace violations** against aircraft intruding into Japan’s territorial airspace. These measures involve scrambling fighters and other aircraft to deal with foreign aircraft flying in airspace surrounding Japan that may intrude into Japan’s territorial airspace without permission. In recent years, the number of scrambles has consistently remained high, nearly 1,000 times annually, as we also deal with unmanned aircraft. Upon receiving a scramble order, we promptly launch our jets, strive to ascertain the status of aircraft that may be intruding into Japan's territorial airspace, and vigilantly The author and the F-2 fighter monitor their activities. jet she is piloting Our airfields serve as the frontline, embodying Japan’s First Lieutenant The author is preparing for F-2A taking off intention and capability. With this understanding, I remain MIZUKOSHI Misaki steadfastly committed to my duties, upholding a stringent ❶ [�][8th Air Wing Flight Group, 8th Fighter] attitude and a profound sense of responsibility and urgency. **Squadron (Tsuiki Air Base)** ❷ **[Pilot]** ----- GSDF MSDF ASDF **tive officer** ❶ [Assignment] **and others** Branch of ❷ service/ appointed area **Defend Japan** (Note) The rank and assignment are as of March 31, 2024. **Deployment to two disaster relief operations: the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and the** **Great East Japan Earthquake** At the time of departure for the Great East Japan Earth- My first disaster relief operation was the Great Hanshin- quake Disaster Relief Operation Awaji Earthquake where I was engaged in saving lives as the leader (sergeant), and for the first time, I felt that I was helping people as a SDF personnel. During the Great East Japan Earthquake, I was engaged in rescue operations and searching for missing persons as an operational training officer for the 3rd Division of the Infantry Regiment. I was able to work in an organized manner, thanks to the lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and carry Service Status at the 4th Sergeant out a tough mission that only the SDF could perform. Having Recruiting Center participated in two disaster relief operations, I realized that Major IKUBO Masanori the times we are active are when people are in distress. Currently, the SDF is highly regarded, but without becoming ❶ **[�][4th Sergeant Training Unit, Middle Army ]Combined Brigade (Camp Otsu)** complacent, I will continue training to be ready for any mission at any time. ❷ **[Infantry]** Regarding ballistic missile defenses, the MSDF performs its missions on its own and also **My duties regarding ballistic missile** with the GSDF and the ASDF as a joint task force. If there is a possibility of a ballistic missile **defenses** falling into Japanese territory, Aegis will promptly launch missiles to intercept it. The job of the fire control man is to operate and maintain the SPY radar, which is the main sensor of Aegis. Since the condition of equipment is directly linked to the success of operations, I strive to work with all my strength all of the time. I believe, our mission is the elimination The SPY radar of Destroyer JS “Atago” of imminent threats at an early stage with and the author absolute accuracy, though our operations are Petty Officer 1st Class unnoticeable to the public as we work at sea. ICHINOMIYA Toshiaki ❶ **[JS Atago (Maizuru）]** ❷ **[Fire Controlman]** The author (back row, left) during maintenance work My regular job is to make contracts for the acquisition and repair services of equipment that is necessary for national defense. In November 2023, I was engaged in a mission to transport Japanese nationals and others from Israel to Japan. From the moment I had read and watched press reports in October about the deteriorating situation, I had been wanting to rush to the site as soon as possible. I was therefore confident and motivated when the mission was announced. I headed to the country, hoping to give a sense of safety, especially **Transportation of Japanese** to women and children as a female SDF personnel. **Nationals and others from Israel** At the evacuation site, we provided boarding The author responding to the Seeing off after arriving in Japan (the author is standing in the assistance from the airport terminal to the transport situation on board the flight. middle) aircraft. When we arrived in Japan and saw off the Airman 1st Class people we had assisted, I felt relieved and proud that I INOUE Mizuki had played an important role as an SDF personnel. I will pass on this experience to my juniors and continue to support the ❶ **[�][The 4th Air Depot Procurement Division�]** SDF missions by further growing myself. **（Iruma Air Base）** ❷ **[Procurement]** ----- **My Way to Defend Japan** ##### 2 **Achieving my original aspiration** The Great East Japan Earthquake was a major incident to learn about the existence of the SDF. At that time, I was in 5th grade at elementary school, and when I saw SDF personnel rescuing residents in disaster-stricken areas and helping them with outdoor cooking and bathing at evacuation sites, I thought they were cool, and I wanted to be someone who was needed like they were. That is why I joined the National Defense Academy. Currently, I make training plans for maneuvers, shooting, winter combat skills, etc. to fulfill my duties in national defense as a tank platoon leader, and I work hard with other members to strengthen my unit. Being fascinated with tanks, I spend fulfilling days as I train hard with my fellow members, who all entrust their Winter Combat Skill Train- lives to each other. ing (Ski) My future aspiration is to become a commander Second Lieutenant who is needed by my troops. NAKAGAWA Natsuki It is important to carry on the aspirations you had at ❶ **[11th Tank Unit（Camp Kita-eniwa）]** Command as a Tank Commander (the author is in the upper left) the beginning until the end. ❷ **[Armor]** I joined the MSDF because I wanted to serve people and the nation through my work, and my grandfather, whom I admire, had been a member of the MSDF. Currently, I belong to the 1st Maintenance and Supply Squadron at Kanoya Air Base.My main job includes loading and unloading electronic equipment on P-1 patrol aircraft, handling equipment malfunctions, and guiding aircraft using hand signals. Electronic equipment is essential for the activities of patrol aircraft, and the success of missions greatly depends on the condition of the equipment. So I pay close attention to the wiring, etc. when performing maintenance, and I always check the maintenance records. Therefore, when I see aircraft return home without any problems, I feel that we maintenance personnel have also accomplished the mission, which gives me a sense of achievement and makes me feel The author guiding the aircraft proud of my work. Seaman TAKEICHI Kodai ❶ **[1st Maintenance and Supply Squadron,](Kanoya Air Base)** **[Fleet Air Wing 1]** **Aiming to achieve the mission** ❷ **[Avionics Maintenance (Air Crew)]** The author working on the installation of the electronic device to be replaced **10 years of gratitude** I joined the SDF because I was impressed by the work of SDF personnel in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake. I have served at many sites as a ground radio maintenance technician and have gained valuable experience. In this sense, I am extremely grateful to my superiors and colleagues. Currently, I am in charge of managing the unit's information system and maintaining the radio equipment of the anti- aircraft unit. Although I had not imagined this when I joined the SDF, I now have a family and work with the understanding and support of my wife, for which I am extremely The author working for information grateful. Also, we are blessed with a child. The author in instrument maintenance service Seeing my child make me motivated for Staff Sergeant SHINZATO Toshiyuki child rearing as well as working harder. Our ❶ **[Patriot Operation Center,Southwestern Air ]�** life is thus fulfilling. I will carry on my work as an SDF personnel for society and my family in my own way. **Defense Missile Group (Naha Air Base)** ❷ **[Ground Radio Maintenance]** ----- appointed area (Note) The rank and assignment are as of March 31, 2024. **Promoting the space policy** I have been primarily engaged in the research and development of aircraft and related fields as a developmental engineering officer. Recently, I had the opportunity to be seconded to the Cabinet Office and now work at the National Space Policy Secretariat.The secretariat, which is responsible for comprehensively and systematically promoting and coordinating space policy, approaches work from various perspectives, including diplomacy, intelligence, security, economics, and technology. Nowadays, space services, such as communications, observation, and positioning, have become entrenched in our daily lives, making space more familiar to us while still leaving issues to be solved, including space congestion, caused by the rapidly increasing number of artificial satellites, and space debris. Through my work at the secretariat, I will strive to do my daily job to help ensure the stable Colonel and sustainable use of outer space. HAYAKAWA Yukihiko ❶ **[�][Cabinet Office, National Space Policy ]** **Secretariat (Kasumigaseki)** The author (right) participating in a tabletop exercise to strengthen the functional ❷ **[Developmental Engineering]** security of the entire space system **Working on the PFI vessel Natchan World after retirement** I am a former member of the MSDF and served as a school instructor and a destroyer captain. I retired in January 2022 and currently work as a chief officer on the PFI vessel Natchan World. In October 2022, I was registered as a SDF Reserve Personnel, and I strive to do my regular tasks and training as a SDF Reserve Personnel. The author operating the ship in Nanao Port( (when I was dispatched to the Noto Peninsula earthquake site in 2024) The main job of the ship is to transport SDF units, and I work to assist the captain with all of the operations, including Situation inside the ship navigational watches, the coordination and supervision of all (when I was dispatched to the Noto Peninsula earth- onboard operations, and the direction and supervision of the quake site in 2024) loading and unloading of tanks and other vehicles.The most memorable part of my work so far was the relief activities in response to the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake. After receiving instructions from the MOD, we made an emergency departure from Hakodate Port and rushed to Nanao Port in Ishikawa Prefecture. During my work there, I saw the enthusiasm of the people who had been dispatched to work in disaster-stricken areas, and the warm words of gratitude we received are deeply Reserve Captain engraved on my heart. TAKASUGA Masanobu ❶ **[Toyo Marine Service Co., Ltd.]** **To Enhance Local Disaster Prevention** After retiring from the GSDF, I became a prefectural disaster prevention supervisor, where I contribute **Capabilities** to the improvement of local disaster prevention capabilities in my home prefecture of Kagawa by utilizing my experience of disaster relief operations at the GSDF’s Engineer Unit and the headquarters. Currently, I am in charge of counter-disaster activities at the prefectural disaster management headquarters, as well as the education and training of prefectural staff, disaster management lectures, and liaison and coordination with the SDF. Kagawa Prefecture in particular is required to prepare for and respond to disasters, such as a Nankai Trough megathrust earthquake as well as storm and Giving a disaster prevention lecture at the 2nd Disaster Prevention Fair in flood disasters caused by typhoons. While the frequency Mannoike Forest Park (the author is Briefing the prefectural governor during the 2nd Prefectural of disasters in Kagawa Prefecture is low compared to top right) Disaster Response Headquarters Operation Drill in FY2023 other prefectures, it is extremely important to raise (the author is second from the right) disaster awareness among residents to promote self- Major General (before retirement) help and mutual support and for the prefecture and its AOI Tsuneharu cities, towns, and disaster management organizations to cooperate in conducting practical training and drills and reflect the ❶ **[�Crisis Management Division, Headquarters for Crisis ]** lessons learned. I want to contribute to saving the lives of people in the prefecture from disasters. **Management, Kagawa Prefecture** ❷ **[Disaster Prevention Supervisor]** ----- **My Way to Defend Japan** ##### 2 **For the Success of the GCAP** In the United Kingdom, where the headquarters of the international government organisation of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) is to be located, I engage in a joint development of fighter 1 aircraft between Japan, the United Kingdom and Italy as an engineer 3 2 representing the Japanese government on the preparation team. In this international project with unprecedentedly high goals A meeting with engineers (The 5 and scale, the process of integrating complex and advanced author is on the far right.) 7 9 technologies requires a high level of expertise and experience, so I feel proud and fulfilled to be able to utilize the skills I have 4 Counsellor developed as a technical and engineering official in this # 1 DOI Hirofumi project. I believe that the key to success of the project 8 ❶ **[�Embassy of Japan in the United Kingdom ]** is to recognize each other's differences in technological The author in **(London)** edges, cultures and behaviors and help each another in front of the Japa- ❷ [][Civilian official, Ministry of Foreign ] positively integrating such differences, and I will lead the nese Embassy **Affairs and Technical and Engineering Official, Ministry of Defense** project with this belief in mind. ⓾ **The Voice of a Defense Attaché to France** **Being a Defense Attaché in a War Zone** The population ratio between Japan and France is roughly 2:1, and the SDF and French Every day, I hear reports of many civilian armed forces are roughly the same size in terms of personnel. France has taken a casualties caused by attacks from Russia. different approach than Japan to maintain national defense in a declining population I work hoping for a swift resolution to this society. After the end of conscription in 2001, France adopted a volunteer system. In conflict in a manner that is desired by the 2019, France imposed on those aged 15 and older the obligation to take a course Ukrainian people. I feel a sense of solidarity that includes the field of defense under the with the military officers of NATO countries, A meeting with the Defense principle of “Universal National Service.” I which are providing various types of Minister of Moldova, a country to which Embassy of Japan in am constantly learning about the wide range weapons to Ukraine. Although Japan Ukraine is accredited. of national defense policies in France.In our cannot provide missions, we encourage a stronger presence such direct military support, we have heard numerous # 3 for European countries and others in the Indo- expressions of gratitude for accepting wounded soldiers (A reception in March 2024 to Pacific region through interaction with French at the SDF Central Hospital and providing SDF vehicles. celebrate the Japanese Emper- military personnel, military officer groups, and By continuing to collect and report on various information or’s birthday [The author is in the center.]) NATO-related European military personnel. appropriately in the region, I hope that Japan will be able Lieutenant Commander I am a member of the Kyudo (Japanese The author in front to continue to provide of a monastery Colonel HAYASHI Aiko traditional archery) club in the city, through with a table where DEGUCHI Arata support and contribute ❶ **[�][Embassy of Japan in France (Paris)]** which I strive to enhance Japan's presence in memorial flowers ❶ **[Embassy of Japan in Ukraine（Kyiv）]** to achieving peace. ❷ **[Second Secretary and Defense attach][é]** the region through training and related events. are placed ❷ **[Intelligence]** # 2 **G** **athering Information in the War Zone** **Further Strengthening Trust in Japan through PKO** **~The Israel-Palestine situation~** I have been working in the Republic of South The attack on Israel by Hamas and others that occurred on October 7, 2023, is said Sudan since January 2024 as an aviation to be the greatest tragedy for the country since the founding of the State of Israel, operations staff at the UNMISS headquarters, with over 1,200 people killed on that day alone. The ensuing fighting resulted in where I am responsible for creating and issuing numerous casualties for both Israel and Palestine, mainly in the Gaza Strip, and I daily flight plans for the UNMISS aircraft, aircraft have also experienced many sad moments. One of the missions of a defense attaché operations management based on flight plans, is to follow the latest local developments and trends safety management, and emergency flights of the Israel Defense Forces known for utilizing the handling. Checking aircraft operations status (the author is in the right) latest technologies, such as unmanned assets and Most of the multinational staff working for the AI, and accurately report it to Japanese government. UNMISS are friendly toward Japan, and I strongly feel the trust that has been built In addition to direct support, such as ensuring the # 4 by the past Japanese staff, including the missioned safety of Japanese nationals and others residing in units and headquarters personnels. I will continue to the region and, if necessary, evacuating them, we contribute to the peace and stability of South Sudan aim to make a solid contribution to defending Japan and strive to further strengthen the trust in Japan. in the Middle East Captain SUZUKI Wakana Colonel by gathering such Interactions with other countries’ military and local staffs (the author ❶ [�][UNMISS (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South ]Sudan) (Juba) The Iron Dome inter-cepts rockets fired by Hamas (photographed ❶OKAMOTO Jun[�Embassy of Japan in Israel (Tel Aviv)]information. is in the left) ❷ **[Aviation]** by the author) ❷ **[Legal]** 5 ----- appo ed a ea (Note) The rank and assignment are as of March 31, 2024. **Work in the SDF Training Squadron** I have been serving for about five months as a staff member (a communications specialist) at headquarters with a training squadron that is touring overseas for the purposes of educating and training junior officers and enhancing friendships with other countries. In parallel with my duties as a communications specialist, I am in charge of drone photography at home and abroad as well as The author holding a drone the receptions on board ships at ports of call. I use drones to record he operates videos for external release. At the receptions, I help domestic and 6 international guests understand the activities of the SDF. At the Training Squadron Headquarters, a small number of personnel handle many tasks, making it a unit where we can # 6 gain valuable experiences that we could not gain in other units. I would like to continue to strive in Petty Officer 2nd Class my duties so that many people can Meeting Miss Colombia during a reception held KINOSHITA Takao understand the activities of the SDF. on board a ship (the ❶ **[Training Squadron Headquarters (Kure)]** author is on the right) ❷ **[Communication]** **Participating in F-35 Deployment Training to the United** **Participating in Capacity Building for Laos** **States and Australia** I participated in capacity building for Laos as a I was missioned to Tindal Air Base, Australia, as a maintenance technician member of the military medicine Education Team. for the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) for F-35A fighter jets. This project aimed to enhance the capabilities of the There, I transmitted aircraft analysis data relating to the ASDF F-35A to Lao People’s Army in the fields of search and rescue Misawa Air Base (Aomori Prefecture). and military medicine, and it provided guidance This was the first time for the ASDF and advice to Lao People’s Army instructors to transmit F-35 data from abroad, and and personnel participating in the training. I felt a sense of pride and fulfillment as As a SDF personnel, I am proud to have fulfilled Working in the field (the author is second from the an engineer to be able to contribute to my mission in an environment with a different left) overseas deployment training. language, culture, customs, and religion and to I am grateful for the valuable have contributed to building trust and strengthening relations between our two countries.7 experiences I have had, such as Amid the current unstable international situation, I strongly feel that fostering The author transmitting aircraft deepening mutual friendships with analysis data trust among people through projects like this will members of the Royal Australian Air serve as a foothold for Force. I am committed to working Airman 1st Class Sergeant future collaboration in the MAEDA Yui hard to become a female SDF The closing ceremo- YAMASHITA Mao international community. ❶ **[�][Armament Maintenance Squadron,Maintenance ]** personnel who can play an active role ny of the training (the ❶ **[The 2nd Infantry Regiment（Camp Takada）]** **Supply Group,3rd Air Wing (Misawa Air Base)** both domestically and internationally. author is on the right) ❷ **[Medical]** ❷ **[Computer Processing]** # 8 **As a member of the Deployment Air Force for Counter** **Studying in New Zealand** **Piracy Enforcement (DAPE)** I am engaged in counter-piracy operations I am currently taking the Command and Staff Course at the New Zealand Defense off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of College. The course is unique in that it is an integrated course, and nearly half of Aden, and information-gathering activities the class are international students. This, coupled with New Zealand's national in the Middle East as a P-3C patrol aircraft character of accepting diversity, fosters on a daily basis lively discussions pilot of the 53rd DAPE in the Republic of across military branches and Djibouti in eastern Africa. During flights, Members of the team working national boundaries. In fact, together (the author is in the cen- I check vessels one by one until I can ter) this is the first time that an confirm there are no abnormalities, which SDF member has joined the keeps me alerted and leaves me strong fatigue after landing. But at the same time, it course, and I have received gives me a sense of accomplishment and fulfillment that I cannot experience during many words of welcome and the domestic duties. My work in cooperation with the militaries from other countries encouragement. While I am # 9 is rewarding and makes me realize that I am actually participating in international In front of the traditional Maori meeting studying until graduation, I activities. This experience has given me good opportunities to expand my worldview. house at HMNB Devonport (the author is would like to interact as much fifth from the left in the front row) During an operation- as possible with students from al flight (the author is on the right) Lieutenant Junior GradeSUGITA Yukika Major other countries and use this experience NAKANE Kohei as inspiration for my future work. I find ❶ **[�The 53rd Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement�]** **(DAPE) (Republic of Djibouti)** ❶ **[New Zealand Defense Collage, Command and Staff course]** the SDF very attractive as it offers many ❷ **[Fixed-wing aircraft pilot]** ❷ **[Air Defense Missile Maintenance]** avenues of learning through service. # 10 ----- Security Environment **Part** ###### Ⅰ Surrounding Japan **Overview** **Chapter 1** International Community Facing Its Greatest Trial Since WWII ⿟[States that do not share universal values or political and economic systems based ] on such values are expanding their influence. Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts represent a serious challenge to the existing international order. The international community is facing its greatest trial since World War II and entering a new era of crisis. The global balance of power is shifting dramatically and competition among states continues, especially between the United States and China, and is set to intensify even further in future. ⿟[Rapid developments in science and technology are fundamentally changing the ] paradigm of security. Countries are striving to develop innovative technologies that can become so-called game changers. The traditional military structure is undergoing fundamental changes, as are warfare tactics and strategies. ⿟[Risks in cyberspace and other domains are becoming more serious and other security-related ] global issues such as information warfare and climate change are emerging. ⿟[Gray zone situations involving territorial disputes are constantly occurring. The use of ] hybrid military and non-military warfare will become even more sophisticated. Increasingly Severe Security Situation in the Indo-Pacific Region Security Environment Surrounding Japan ⿟[These global security environment and challenges are particularly prominent in the Indo-Pacific region, where Japan is located, and are likely to ] intensify still further in future. ⿟[Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. It cannot be ruled out that a serious situation similar ] to Russia's aggression against Ukraine may occur in the Indo-Pacific region in future, particularly in East Asia. **Russia's Aggression and Defense by Ukraine** **Chapter 2** ⿟[Russia's aggression against Ukraine undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity ] of Ukraine. It is a serious violation of international law prohibiting the use of force and of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Such unilateral changes to the status quo by force have shaken the very foundation of the international order, including in Asia. ⿟[This situation, in which a permanent member of the Security Council, which is sup-] posed to take primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, openly engages in military actions challenging international law and the international order, claims innocent lives and repeatedly uses language and actions that can be interpreted as threats involving nuclear weapons, is unprecedented. If such aggression is tolerated, it could send out the wrong message and implication that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are also acceptable elsewhere. Accordingly, the international community, including Japan, should never tolerate Russia’s action. ⿟[In addition to Ukraine's strong resistance, the international community has united to ] implement strong sanctions and ongoing support for Ukraine, leaving Russia with no Damage in Kharkiv, Ukraine (January 2024) [AFP/Jiji Press] choice but to pay a heavy price. As an ally of the United States ― a NATO member ― and is located on the opposite side of Europe across the Eurasian continent, Japan must closely monitor future changes in the European situation, including their strategic impact, acknowledging that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific is inseparable. ----- 2024 Defense DEFENCE OF JAPAN White Paper D I G E S T **Defense Policies of Countries** **Chapter 3** The United States - Prioritizing its Response to China’s Challenges with the Superiority of Alliances and Partnerships ⿟[The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy released by the ] United States in October 2022 positioned China as a “pacing challenge,” Russia as an “acute threat,” and North Korea as a “persistent threat.” ⿟[China is posing the most serious challenge and strategic competition to the United ] States, which is prioritizing efforts to address the relevant issues. ⿟[The United States recognizes that it cannot address complex and interconnected ] challenges alone and that mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships must underpin its national defense strategy. ⿟[In the Indo-Pacific region, the United States is committed to deepening its partnership ] with allies, including Japan, and promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) through multilateral frameworks such as QUAD and AUKUS. ⿟[The United States is demonstrating its commitment to a FOIP through ongoing ] “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South China Sea and allowing U.S. Navy vessels to traverse the Taiwan Strait. Quad Leaders’ Summit (May 2023) [Website of the Prime Minister's Office to Japan] China - Intensifying Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attemps ⿟[China's external posture, military activities, and other activities are a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community and present an ] unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others. ⿟[For more than 30 years, China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget without ] transparency, engaging in broad, and rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. China will probably have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and will continue growing its force to 2035. It has increased its production of surface combatants and submarines and built its second indigenous aircraft carrier, Fujian. It continues to develop and deploy modern fighter jets and wide-ranging UAVs. ⿟[China has been intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan, including ] in the East China Sea, particularly in the area around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, Xi Jinping, currently in his third term as general secretary [EPA - Jiji Press] and the western Pacific Ocean, extending beyond the so-called the first island chain to the second island chain. ⿟[China has intensified its military activities around Taiwan. China conducted military exercises in the ] sea and airspace in several times. It is believed that through the series of activities, China seeks to create a fait accompli where the PLA is operating, and improve its actual combat capabilities. ⿟[China has intensified its activities in the South China Sea based on assertions, which are ] conflicting with existing orders of the seas, and promoting the establishment of military bases. Such actions to further promote unilateral change of the status quo by force and turning it into a fait accompli are serious concerns to Japan. Issues surrounding the South China Sea are directly connected to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and represent a legitimate concern, not only for Japan, which has major sea lanes in the South China Sea, but also for the entire international community. The third PLA aircraft carrier “Fujian,” which is China’s second indigenous one [China News Service/Jiji Press Photo] ⿟[China is further strengthening cooperation with Russia, including in military activities. It has also conducted joint bomber flights and naval navigations ] with Russia in the vicinity of Japan. These repeated joint activities are clearly intended for demonstration of force against Japan and are a grave concern from the perspective of the national security of Japan. ----- Security Environment **Part** ###### Ⅰ Surrounding Japan U.S.-China Strategic Competition Escalates; Tension Grows in Taiwan ⿟[The political, economic, and military competition between the United States and China has ] become even more evident in recent years due to various concerns such as changes in the balance of power caused by China's growing national power and various pending issues. ⿟[The overall military balance between China and Taiwan is rapidly tilting in China’s favor.] ⿟[Regarding Taiwan, China firmly maintains the principle that Taiwan is part of China and that ] the Taiwan issue is its internal affair. China has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force. In response to the strengthening US-Taiwan relationship, China has further intensified its military activities around Taiwan. ⿟[The ruling party candidate, Lai Ching-te, won the Taiwan presidential election held in January 2024.] North Korea - Making Advances in Nuclear and Missile Development President Lai Ching-te delivers a speech at his inauguration ceremony (May 2024) [Website of Taiwan’s Office of the President] ⿟[North Korea's military activities are posing an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan's ] security than ever before. They seriously undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community. They also represent a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to non-proliferation of weapons including WMDs. ⿟[North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests in the past and possesses the techno-] logical capability to mount a nuclear warhead on its ballistic missiles with their range covering the Japanese Archipelago and to strike Japan. ⿟[In recent years, North Korea has continuously pursued missile development at an ] extremely rapid pace, launching ballistic missiles that fly with irregular trajectories as well as so-called "hypersonic missiles.” North Korea is also pursuing operationaliza- tion of long-range cruise missiles designed to carry a tactical nuclear warhead. ⿟[Since 2023, North Korea has conducted launches of the “Hwasong-18”, a solid-fuel ] propelled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class as well as launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch. North Korea is focusing on qualitatively improving its nuclear and missile capabilities, such as diversifying its equipment systems and acquiring intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) means that complement its nuclear and missile operational capabilities. An image released by North Korea on the launch of a “military reconnaissance satellite” [Korea News Service/ Jiji] Russia - The Strategic Alliance between Russia Embracing the “Strong State” Model and China ⿟[The Russian military is continuing active military activities in the vicinity ] of Japan and its surrounding areas, showing its tendency to deploy the latest military equipment in the Far East. Russia's military activities in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, coupled with its strategic partnership with China, are posing a strong security concern. ⿟[Russia has been developing and deploying various new weapons under its ] “strong state” model. Since the start of its aggression against Ukraine, it has also been moving to increase troop numbers and expand and reorganize its military units. ⿟[Russia is continuing active military activities in the Northern Territories, ] which are inherent territories of Japan, under illegal occupation. As well as the ongoing construction of facilities for its troops in the region, Russia has deployed new military equipment such as coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles belonging to its Navy and fighter jets belonging to its aerospace forces. It also conducts large-scale exercises in the surrounding seas and airspace. President Putin (center) participating in the Russian Navy Day commemoration ceremony (July ----- 2024 Defense DEFENCE OF JAPAN White Paper D I G E S T Other Regions ⿟[Amid ongoing tensions between Israel and Palestinian armed groups, fighters from Hamas and other ] Palestinian armed groups invaded Israeli territory on October 7, 2023; killing and abducting Israeli soldiers and civilians. In response, the Israeli military launched a ground operation into the Gaza Strip. ⿟[Since November 2023, there have been repeated attacks by the Houthis on commercial ships in the Red ] Sea and the Gulf of Aden. On November 19, a vessel operated by a Japanese company was seized by the Houthis. An Israeli tank rolling in the north of the Gaza Strip (December 2023) [AFP - Jiji Press] **Trends and Challenges Facing the International Community Concerning** **Chapter 4** **the Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Domains and Information Warfare** Trends in Science and Technology that Are Expanding to Information Warfare and Elsewhere ⿟[The creation of science, technology, and innovation are what underpin Japan’s economic and social development. Using these technological ] capabilities appropriately is essential, not only for security but also to address global-scale issues like climate change. ⿟[To ensure technological superiority, each country is focusing its efforts on the research, development and military applications of AI, quantum technology, ] next-generation information and communication technology and other advanced, potentially game-changing technologies that could dramatically change the future character of warfare. ⿟[Information warfare by spreading disinformation and other means is ongoing.] Trends in the Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Domains ⿟[Space-based technologies and information and communication networks have become core ] infrastructures in people’s everyday lives and for the military. Meanwhile, it has been pointed out that countries such as China and Russia are strengthening their capabilities to interfere with other countries’ use of space and that their governments and militaries are involved in cyber-attacks. ⿟[Countries are working to improve their capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains; aware that ] they represent methods of warfare that effectively deter enemies from demonstrating their war potential. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) ⿟[The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological and chemical ] Pyongyang General Control Center of the National Aerospace weapons and the missiles delivering them, have been a grave threat since the end of the Cold War. Technology Administration [Korea News Service - Jiji] ⿟[In recent years, as competition and confrontation among states have intensified and as the current ] international security environment becomes complex and severe, there is concern that it is becoming difficult for the international community to rally together in taking on common challenges such as arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Impact of Climate Change on the Security and Military ⿟[Climate change represents an urgent threat to world peace and security. As well as significantly influenc-] ing the strategic environment, it affects military equipment, infrastructure and operations themselves. ⿟[Rising sea levels and extreme weather events make the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region ] complicated, and various exercises are being conducted with the possibility of an increase in military operations related to climate change in mind. NATO cyber exercise【Website of NATO】 ----- Japan’s Security and Defense **Part** ###### Ⅱ Policy **Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense** **Chapter 1** ⿟[What we must prioritize first and foremost is developing proactive diplomacy to protect the lives and ] livelihood of Japanese nationals. On that basis, it is essential to coordinate with like-minded countries and promote multilateral cooperation through the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a cornerstone. ⿟[At the same time, diplomacy needs to be backed by defense capabilities. As part of its strategic ] approach, Japan will actively pursue diplomacy under the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) and promote the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities, including the possession of counterstrike capabilities. ⿟[Adhering under the Constitution to the basic precepts of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented ] policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries, Japan ensures civilian control and observes the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Prime Minister Kishida and Defense Minister Kihara at Air Review (November 2023) **The Three Documents, including the National Security Strategy of Japan** **Chapter 2** National Security Strategy (NSS) ⿟[The NSS is Japan's supreme national security policy document. It provides strategic guidance for policies in wide-ranging areas, including not only ] diplomacy and defense, but also economic security, technology and intelligence. ⿟[Japan will take the necessary measures to ensure that the budget level for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and comple-] mentary initiatives reaches 2% of GDP in FY2022 (approximately 11 trillion yen) in FY2027. National Defense Strategy (NDS) Defense Objectives ⿟[The NDS comprehensively presents Japan’s defense objectives and approaches ] Deterring and addressing ⿟and the means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives.[The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan (GOJ) and ]the basis of Japan’s national security, is to resolutely defend to the end the Japan takes primaryinvasions of Japan.disrupt and defeat responsibility to the situation under control to the status quo by forceunilateral changes and such attempts, and bringing a security environment changes to the status tolerate unilateral that does not Shaping The U.S. as soon as possible. Extended lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihoods as well as Japan’s deterrence (Nuclear territorial land, airspace and waters. The international community, including Deterrence) Japan, is facing serious challenges and has entered into a new crisis. Japan Approaches to Achieve Defense Objectives needs to squarely face this grim reality and fundamentally reinforce its defense **1.** **Strengthening of Japan’s Own** **2.** **Strengthening Deterrence** **3.** **Reinforcing collaboration** capabilities, focusing on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare. **Architecture for National Defense** **and Response** **with Like-minded** **Capabilities of the** **Countries and Others** - Fundamental reinforcement of **Japan-U.S. Alliance** ⿟[In fundamentally reinforcing its defense capabilities, Japan focuses on seven ] Japan’s defense capabilities inforcing collaboration with as capabilities: (i) stand-off defense capabilities, (ii) integrated air and missile - Reinforcing the defense architecture Revealing the will and capabilities many countries as possible of the whole country of Japan and the United States defense capabilities, (iii) unmanned defense capabilities, (iv) cross-domain (Part III, Chapter 1) (Part III, Chapter 2) (Part III, Chapter 3) operation capabilities, (v) command and control / intelligence-related functions, (vi) mobile deployment capabilities / civil protection and (vii) sustainability and resiliency. ⿟[The NDS calls for the possession of counterstrike capabilities that mainly ] capitalize on capabilities (i), which are key to deterring invasion of Japan. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force MSDF destroyer "Ise" sailing with a Japan-Italy Formation Flight (GSDF) conducting landing training U.S. aircraft carrier in Japan-Italy Bilateral (February 2023) (January 2024) Training (August 2023) Defense Buildup Program (DBP) Three Defense Objectives and Three Approaches to Achieve them (image) ⿟[The DBP indicates the level of defense capability Japan should possess to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities under the NDS. It also sets ] out total expenditure and the quantity of major equipment to be procured to achieve this end. ⿟[By FY2027, five years after the formulation of the DBP, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities to a point Japan will be able to take primary ] responsibility for countering any invasion of its nation and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining the support of its ally and others. Further efforts will be made approximately ten years after formulating the DBP to better ensure that these defense objectives have been met and reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities so that any invasion of Japan can be disrupted and defeated earlier and at places further afield. ⿟[Total expenditure needed to achieve the level of defense buildup sought by the DBP for five years from FY2023 to FY2027 amounts to approximately ] 43 trillion yen ----- |Budget|Ch| |---|---| |①Stand-off Defense Capabilities|▪Strengthening the defense Inside the opponent's capabilities to oppose invading threat envelope forces from a safe distance where we will not be attacked| |②Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities|▪Strengthening our capabilities to respond to increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats such as missiles Shipbuilding of an Aegis System-Equipped Vessel (Note)| |③Unmanned Defense Capabilities|▪Strengthening our capabilities via information gathering and combat support with unmanned assets Preparation of UAV for reconna| |④Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities|▪Strengthening space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, land, sea and air capabilities necessary for combat by fusing all capabilities Development of Stand-off Ele| |⑤Command and Control and Intelligence-related Functions|▪ Strengthening command and control and intelligence-related functions to accelerate and refine decision-making Acquisition of Signals| |⑥Mobile Deployment Capabilities/Civil Protection|▪Strengthening maritime and air transport capabilities to quickly maneuver and deploy the necessary forces ▪Implementing civil protection by utilizing the above capabilities| |⑦Sustainability and Resiliency|▪Preparation of necessary and sufficient ammunition, guided missiles and fuel from an early stage ▪Secure funds to acquire parts for equipment, repair equipment and improve resiliency of facilities Securing the ammunition storage facilities(Note)| |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| ||0LQ|LVW|HU RI '| ||||| |2SHUDW||LQ|J )RUFH| |&RPPDQG 2SHUDWLRQ||HU V&|-6')-RLQW RPPDQG| |2SHUDWLQJ)RUFHV|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |&RPPDQGLQJ*HQHUDO *URXQG&RPSRQHQW &RPPDQG|&RPPDQGHU 6HOI'HIHQVH)OHHW|&RPPDQGHU-6 &RPPDQGHU 'HIHQVH&RP $LU'HIHQVH&RPPDQG &RPPDQGHU 2SHUDWLRQV| 2024 DefenseDefenseDefence DEFENCE OF JAPAN [Defence]White PaperWhite PaperWhite Paper D I G E S T **Defense Buildup and the Budget** **Chapter 3** ⿟[The international community is facing its greatest trial since the ] - Strengthening the defense Inside the opponent's Japan end of World War II and has entered a new era of crisis. With ① Stand-off Defense capabilities to oppose invading threat envelope this basic understanding, the GOJ secured a budget that was Capabilities forces from a safe distance where we will not be attacked necessary and sufficient for FY2024 defense buildup under the NDS and the DBP for fundamental reinforcement of defense ② Integrated Air and - Strengthening our capabilities to respond to capabilities. Missile Defense increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats such as missiles ⿟yen to steadily execute the budget, for the significant increase in [On an annual expenditure basis, the GOJ allocated 7,724.9 billion ] Capabilities Shipbuilding of an Aegis System-Equipped Vessel [(Note)] contract amount. ③ Unmanned Defense - Strengthening our capabilities via information gathering and combat support with ⿟[On a contract basis, the GOJ allocated 9,362.5 billion yen to ] Capabilities unmanned assets early start equipment procurement and the Self-Defense Forces Preparation of UAV for reconnaissance (for mid-range) [(Note)] (SDF) facility development that extend across multiple years. Allocations for FY2023 and FY2024 comprise some 42% of the ④ Cross-Domain - Strengthening space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, land, sea and air contracted 43.5 trillion yen needed to implement the DBP. Operation Capabilities capabilities necessary for combat by fusing all capabilities ⿟[The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF continues to support the ] Development of Stand-off Electronic Warfare Aircraft [(Note)] seven fields of the fundamental reinforcement of defense ⑤ Command and Control - Strengthening command and control and capabilities. Special emphasis was placed on procuring various and Intelligence-related intelligence-related functions to accelerate and refine decision-making types of stand-off missiles and Aegis System Equipped Vessels Functions Acquisition of Signals Intelligence Aircraft (RC-2) as well as on improving the resiliency of camps, bases and other existing facilities nationwide. ⑥ Mobile Deployment - Strengthening maritime and air transport capabilities to quickly maneuver and deploy the Acquisition of vessels transport [(Note)] Capabilities/Civil necessary forces ⿟[The GOJ worked to secure financial resources to reinforce ] Protection - Implementing civil protection by utilizing the defense capabilities. above capabilities - Preparation of necessary and sufficient ammunition, ⿟[Total expenses for the DBP and complementary initiatives for ] ⑦ Sustainability and guided missiles and fuel from an early stage FY2024 amount to 8.9 trillion yen, which is about 1.6% of the GDP at the time the National Security Strategy of Japan was Resiliency - Secure funds to acquire parts for equipment, repair equipment and improve resiliency of facilities formulated (FY2022). Securing the ammunition storage facilitiesThe (Note) in the figure is an image.[(Note)] Fig. II-2-2-3 Seven Functions and Capabilities on which to Focus in Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities and Their Images **Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense** **Chapter 4** ⿟[The MOD/SDF develops and executes policies based on the ] fundamental stance discussed at the National Security Council, which **����������������������������������** is a part of the Cabinet. ⿟[To rapidly and effectively fulfill the duties of the SDF, the MOD/SDF ] **�������������** **���������������������������** has adopted a joint operations system in which the Ground SDF **�������������������������������** **�����������������** **����������������������** **������������������������** **��������������������������** (GSDF), the Maritime SDF (MSDF) and the Air SDF (ASDF) are operated **����������** **��������������������������** **������������** **�������������������������** **�������������** integrally. **����������** **�����������������������������������** **���** **���** **���** ⿟[JSDF Joint Operations Command will be established in Ichigaya ] **������������������** during FY2024 as a permanent joint headquarters that can unify the **���������������** command of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF. This will allow the command of joint operations by the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to be integrated, as **��������������������������������������������** **�����������������������������** **������������������������������** **�����������������������������������������������������������������������** well as building capacity for cross-domain operations on a daily basis.l Fig. II-4-2-5 Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces and JSDF Joint Operations Command（JJOC） **Framework for the SDF Activities** **Chapter 5** ----- Three Approaches to Achieve the **Part** ###### Ⅲ Defense Objectives **Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** **Chapter 1** Creating a Security Environment That Does Not Tolerate Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force ⿟[Diplomatic efforts underpinned by Japan’s enhanced defense architecture are important for our efforts to ] prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force. Coupled with diplomatic efforts, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will promote cooperation with our ally and multilayered coordination with like-minded countries to create a desirable security environment. ⿟[As a maritime nation, it is crucial for Japan to reinforce the maritime order and ensure the freedoms and safety ] of navigation and overflight. ⿟[Japan is responding to the North Korea’s “illicit ship-to-ship transfers” in violation of the UN Security Council ] resolution, and conducting the necessary measures to secure Japan-related vessels in the Middle East region to secure the stable use of Japan’s vital sea lanes. P-3C patrol aircraft of the Deployment Air Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) engaging in information-gathering activities in the Middle Responses to Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attempts East ⿟[To influence opponent’s actions, Japan will improve and enhance training and exercises such as Flexible ] Deterrent Options (FDO) and Strategic Communication (SC) with a whole-of-government approach, as well as with its ally, like-minded countries and others. ⿟[The MOD/SDF is conducting continuous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and analysis from ] peacetime. ⿟[To verify whether unmanned aerial vehicles can serve as replacements for some of its missions in future, the ] operation and verification of MQ-9B (SeaGuardian) aircraft of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is promoted. The initial plan for three RQ-4B (Global Hawk) aircraft of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) Personnel responding to a scramble has been completed. ⿟[Followed by the establishment of the procedure to have the Minister of Defense control the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) in an armed attack situation, the MOD/] SDF constantly strengthens cooperation with the JCG. In FY2023, new joint training was conducted under the simulation of an armed attack situation. ⿟[In FY2023, ASDF aircraft scrambled 669 times (479 times in response to Chinese aircraft and 174 times in response to Russian aircraft). ] Responses to Invasions of Japan, including Missile Attacks ⿟[Japan will fundamentally reinforce its stand-off defense capabilities to respond from outside the ] threat zone, including anti-aircraft missiles, against naval vessels and landing forces that invade Japan, including its remote islands. Deployment on Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surfaced-launched variants) and acquisition of U.S.-made Tomahawks will be accelerated by one year, starting in FY2025, to promptly secure sufficient capabilities. ⿟[To strengthen the integrated air and missile defense capabilities, the MOD/SDF will start of the ] construction of Aegis System Equipped Vessels and Japan and the United States will jointly develop a Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) guided missile to counter Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Upgraded Type 12 SSM that withstood various tests on the ground ⿟[The MOD/SDF will promote the introduction of unmanned assets that can minimize human loss ] (Prototype)【Courtesy of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.】 and operate continuously for a long period of time compared to manned equipment (including the development of unmanned amphibious vehicles that can land on any shore of islands and perform tasks such as transporting supplies from the sea to the vicinity of troops). ⿟[Japan will conduct cross-domain operations that organically integrate capabilities in the space, ] cyber and electromagnetic domains, as well as land, sea and air domains. ⿟[Japan will improve mobile deployment capabilities to the southwest region, including the ] establishment of a new Self-Defense Forces Maritime Transport Group (tentative name) as a joint force. ⿟[The MOD/SDF will work closely with relevant organizations to respond to large-scale terrorist ] attacks, accompanying attacks on nuclear power plants and other critical infrastructure effectively and will smoothly implement civil protection measures, including evacuation guidance for residents. ----- 2024 Defense DEFENCE OF JAPAN White Paper D I G E S T Initiatives to Strengthen Information Capabilities, including Responses to Integrated Information Warfare ⿟[As military activities around Japan intensify, while striving to gather information quickly and accurately through various means on a regular basis, the ] MOD/SDF is reinforcing functions such as analysis. ⿟[In the international community, information warfare is being emphasized, namely the action of establishing a security environment favorable to one’s own ] country by spreading disinformation and strategic information to influence public opinion and decision-making elsewhere, even when a conflict has not yet erupted. ⿟[From the perspective of the defense of Japan, the MOD/SDF is building a system and set-up that can handle integrated information warfare reliably, ] focusing on the cognitive dimension, as well as fact-checking and analyzing disinformation and disseminating information promptly and appropriately. Sustainability and Resiliency Enhancement Initiatives to Ensure War Before Sustainability ⿟[There is a need to strive to ensure and maintain sufficient warfare sustainability so that the SDF can continue ] persistent activities in contingencies, which serves as an effective deterrence After ⿟[The MOD/SDF is promoting of various types of ammunition and expansion of the necessary ammunition storage ] facilities. ⿟[The MOD/SDF will promptly promote a system in which the capabilities of existing equipment can be fully ] demonstrated by securing sustainment and maintenance budgets and resolving equipment non-operational situations due to parts shortages. ⿟[The MOD/SDF is promoting the move underground and structural reinforcement of major command headquarters ] and creating a plan (the master plan) to consolidate and reconstruct the SDF facilities nationwide efficiently, An improved aircraft shelter for F-15 fighters promoting the facilities’ resiliency. (ASDF Chitose Air Base) Measures for Protection of the Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals ⿟[Besides invasions of Japan, large-scale disasters and infectious disease ] crises are other serious threats. In the event of a large-scale disaster, such as the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake, the MOD/SDF cooperates closely with relevant organizations to carry out life-preserving activities, emergency, livelihood support and other essential services effectively. ⿟[The SDF maintains a state of readiness and regularly conducts Joint Exercises ] to swiftly and accurately implement the rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas. The MOD/SDF transported Japanese nationals Personnel rescuing people in the 2024 Noto Peninsula After landing at Haneda Airport for the Earthquake (January 2024) transportation of Japanese nationals and and others overseas twice in FY2023 (from Sudan and Israel). others from Israel (October 2023) ⿟[To secure the safety of Japanese nationals overseas, the counter-piracy unit was assigned an additional mission to maintain a temporary posture for possible ] rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas based at the SDF facility in Djibouti. Reinforcing the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country ⿟[To protect Japan, besides strong Self-Defense Forces, it is essential for the whole country to ] Research and development Public infrastructure Development work together. Matching research and development needs based At the Specific Use Airport and Seaport, necessary on input from the MOD with technology seeds development etc. will be carried out, which contributes ⿟[To this end, in addition to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan builds an ] (research for civilian use) possessed by relevant to primarily civilian use and also smooth use by the overall national defense architecture by integrating its national power, which includes dip- ministries and agencies SDF and the JCG lomatic, intelligence, economic and technological capabilities and systematically combining all policy measures. As part of this effort, the government complements the fundamental International cooperation Cybersecurity to improve the deterrence reinforcement of defense capabilities and, alongside, promotes initiatives in four areas Introduction of active cyber defense capabilities and others of Japan and like-minded under the framework of relevant ministries and agencies to strengthen the comprehensive Developmental reorganization of the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Creating the Official Security Assistance (OSA) to help countries defense system. Cybersecurity (NISC) strengthen the security capabilities and deterrence capabilities of like-minded countries ----- Three Approaches to Achieve the **Part** ###### Ⅲ Defense Objectives **Japan-U.S. Alliance** **Chapter 2** Outline of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ⿟[The alliance with the United States is a key pillar of Japan’s national security policy. Fundamental reinforcement ] of Japan’s defense capabilities will also lead to more effective employment of U.S. capabilities, further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. ⿟[Japan has maintained its peace, security and independence centered on the Security Arrangements with the ] world’s dominant military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and a capitalist economy as well as interests in maintaining global peace and security and has strong economic ties. ⿟[Policy discussions on security between Japan and the U.S. are closely conducted at various levels of the ] MOD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including “2+2”. Japan-U.S. Joint Press Conference (April 2024) [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan] Strengthening Japan and U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities ⿟[Japan’s defense strategy and the U.S. defense strategy are in agreement that the highest priority is to ] integrate all approaches and means to prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force from occurring. Deeper discussions with the United States on both countries’ respective roles, missions and capabilities further strengthen Japan-U.S. joint integrated deterrence capabilities. ⿟[Japan will further deepen cooperation with the United States to smoothly implement allied cross-domain ] operations of the Alliance, including the space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. Regarding Japan’s counterstrike capabilities, Japan and the United States will jointly establish a cooperative framework to demonstrate such capabilities more effectively. Japan will reinforce collaboration in areas such as air defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, amphibious operations, airborne Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (May2024) operations, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT), protection of assets and facilities and logistics support. ⿟[Japan will work to improve the response capability of the Alliance, including its readiness and interoperability, ] through more advanced and practical exercises and training. ⿟[To ensure that the United States extended deterrence with nuclear deterrence at its core remains credible ] and resilient, Japan will further actively engage in and deepen bilateral discussions on extended deterrence, including those at the ministerial level. Japan-U.S. bilateral training in southern Okinawa (January Enhancement of Alliance Coordination Function 2024) ⿟[Japan and the United States established Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) to address a consistent ] joint response by the two countries seamlessly and effectively. ⿟[Subsequently, Japan and the United States have collaborated closely, utilizing the ACM, to address, for ] example, the Kumamoto Earthquake and the Noto Peninsula Earthquake, North Korea’s ballistic missile launches and China’s activities in the sea and airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands. Strengthening of Joint Response Foundation Lower Plaza Green Square Opening Ceremony (March ⿟[It is necessary to strengthen the foundation to support effective Japan-U.S. joint response at all stages. ] 2024) Japan will fundamentally reinforce information security and cybersecurity initiatives and further enhance defense equipment and technology cooperation with the United States. Initiatives for the Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan ⿟[While the presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) functions as a deterrence, it is necessary to make efforts that are appropriate for the actual situation of ] each area to mitigate the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of local residents. ⿟[The realignment of the USFJ is a crucial initiative to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa, while further strengthening the ] deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan U S Alliance Therefore the MOD will steadily advance the realignment and other initiatives and continuously ----- 2024 Defense DEFENCE OF JAPAN White Paper D I G E S T **Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others** **Chapter 3** Strategic Promotion of Multilateral and Multilayered Defense Cooperation ⿟[To create a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by ] force, it is extremely important to reinforce collaboration, not only with the ally but also with as many countries as possible. The MOD/SDF is promoting multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). ⿟[The MOD/SDF has been advancing high-level exchanges, bilateral/multilateral exercises, capacity ] building, and defense equipment and technology cooperation with various countries, both within and outside the Indo-Pacific region. ⿟[The MOD/SDF is also expanding the establishment of institutional frameworks such as the Reciprocal ] Access Agreement (RAA), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, with like-minded countries and others. ⿟[Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea have been advancing defense cooperation, ] 2nd Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (March 2024) including sharing missile warning data on North Korea in real time. ⿟[The MOD/SDF is accelerating the promotion of changing mindset among all SDF personnel and ] international cooperation on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) under the Headquarters for WPS Promotion in MOD. By holding seminars on WPS for Indo-Pacific countries, the MOD/SDF is contributing to raising awareness of WPS among the defense personnel in each country. Ensuring of Maritime Security ⿟[As a maritime nation, it is essential for Japan to reinforce the maritime order and ensure the ] freedom and safety of navigation and flights. ⿟[The MOD/SDF is promoting multilateral cooperation concerning maritime security, such as the ] monitoring of maritime situations, including ongoing counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Destroyer JS “IKAZUCHI” Engaged in Direct Escort in the Gulf of Aden (November 2023) Initiatives for International Peace Cooperation Activities ⿟[The MOD/SDF has been dispatching the personnel of Headquarters to the Multinational Force and ] Observer Mission (MFO) tasked with monitoring the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel and to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). ⿟[The MOD/SDF is actively contributing to UN initiatives for international peace by dispatching SDF ] personnel to the UN Secretariat and PKO training centers and providing various types of support to the UN Triangular Partnership Programme (UNTPP). ⿟[The SDF always maintains a posture to respond to urgent requests from affected countries for ] international disaster relief activities. Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation SDF personnel working at UNMISS ⿟[The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that could serve as their means ] of delivery, as well as that of weapons, goods, and sensitive technologies that could be adapted for military use, pose an imminent challenge to international peace and stability. ⿟[The MOD/SDF actively participates in the development of international systems and ] trainings related to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. ----- **Part** Reinforcing Common Bases ###### Ⅳ **Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases as a** **Chapter 1** **Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability itself** Reinforcing Defense Production Base ⿟[Currently, the SDF can fully demonstrate its capabilities and accomplish its mission of defending ] Japan only by using equipment that incorporates advanced technology. Defense production and technology bases are indispensable foundations for securing superior equipment; they are a virtually integral part of defense capability itself, and their fundamental reinforcement is essential. ⿟[Japan’s defense industry is responsible for each stage (research, development, production, ] sustainment and maintenance, supply, decommissioning, etc.) of the equipment life cycle, and the defense equipment and defense industry are inseparable. The Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases has been established and enacted to implement necessary measures to maintain and enhance the capabilities of the defense industry to produce advanced defense equipment and ensure high operational rates. Launching ceremony of the Mogami class destroyer JS “Yubetsu” ⿟[The MOD has announced the basic policy based on the Act. According to this policy, in addition ] (November 2023) to the measures stipulated in the Act, the MOD will promote initiatives to reinforce the bases, such as revitalizing the defense industry, building a robust supply chain, and strengthening defense industrial security. Reinforcing Defense Technology Base ⿟[How we utilize the technology possessed by our country is extremely important to ] acquire the equipment necessary for new ways of warfare. The creation of science, technology and innovation based on Japan’s advanced technological capabilities is a source that brings about economic and social development in our country and a major element of the comprehensive national strength related to our country’s security. Furthermore, strengthening Japan’s architecture for national defense is essential to actively utilize the high technical capabilities cultivated over many years by our country in the public and private sectors without being bound by conventional thinking in the security field. ⿟[The MOD has formulated the Defense Technology Guideline 2023, which defines the ] MOD policy for reinforcing defense technology bases and serves as a roadmap for the Ministry to drive various initiatives in a unified and robust manner. The MOD will Defense ministers of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy signs the Convention for establishing GIGO (December 2023). promote initiatives based on this guideline to strengthen the bases with the aim of protecting Japan through technology into the future. ⿟[For the defense of Japan, it is vital that Japan continues to employ superior, state-] of-the-art fighters that can ensure air superiority well into the future. Regarding the next-generation fighter aircraft, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy will jointly develop an advanced fighter that ensures future air superiority by bringing together technological advantages and sharing costs and risks. The three countries have signed the Convention to establish GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO), an international organization essential for an efficient delivery construct. ⿟[Fundamentally strengthening capabilities to create defense innovations and ] groundbreaking equipment are required. The Defense Innovation Technology Institute (tentative name) will be established within the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency(ATLA), which institute will conduct breakthrough research to create innovative functions and equipment from a variety of rapidly evolving science and technology that will significantly change the future of warfare by adopting approaches and methods different from those used in the past with reference to the Railgun (electromagnetic gun) under research at the Acquisition, Technology efforts of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and others. & Logistics Agency ----- 2024 DEFENCE OF JAPAN White PaperWhite Paper D I G E S T Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation and Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology ⿟[The transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in ] the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, create a desirable security environment for Japan, and provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force. ⿟[In December 2023, the government partially revised the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, ] its Implementation Guidelines, after the Working Team (WT) of the ruling parties held several of discussions on the system revisions in order to promote the smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high-security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. These steps have enabled the transfer of defense equipment in a wide range of fields, but at the same time, the review process for transfers has been made more rigorous. ⿟[The Implementation Guidelines were partially revised in March 2024 to permit the direct transfer of finished products ] related to the next-generation fighter aircraft from Japan to countries other than partner countries. A cabinet decision was taken, stating that the cabinet would decide for each case when actual transfers are made in the future. The first air surveillance radar system ⿟[Japan will improve the capabilities of the partner country’s armed forces and maintain and strengthen medium- to long-] turnover ceremony hosted by the Philippine term relationships with the partner country by strengthening initiatives for defense equipment and technology cooperation, Air Force (December 2023) including the transfer of defense equipment and international joint development. In FY2023, Japan announced the start of the cooperative development of GPI with the United States and signed the “Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Arrangement” with Australia. Concerning the Philippines, the first and the second air surveillance radar systems were delivered to the Philippine Air Force, the first finished equipment transfer from Japan to a foreign country. **Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense** **Chapter 2** **Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities** Reinforcing Human Resource Base ⿟[The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. To demonstrate the defense capabilities, ] the MOD/SDF will secure the necessary human resources and reinforce the human resource base to create an environment enabling all SDF personnel to demonstrate their abilities while maintaining high morale and pride. ⿟[Based on the “Expert Panel on Reinforcing the Human Resource Base of the MOD/SDF,” the MOD/SDF ] will implement various measures to secure diverse human resources, including those from outside the organization and promote the active participation of SDF personnel throughout their life cycle. ⿟[The MOD/SDF will enhance recruitment activities and mid-career recruitment, expand the student ] loan system, utilize the SDF Reserve Personnel, raise the retirement ages of personnel, and reappoint The SDF Reserve Personnel in action during the 2024 Noto retired uniformed SDF personnel. Peninsula Earthquake Disaster Relief Operations ⿟[The MOD/SDF is implementing effective measures throughout careers, from entry as the SDF Personnel to retirement, to improve their treatment, and living and ] working environments, to take more responsibilities for their re-employment, and to increase opportunities for honors and privileges, etc. Creating a Working Environment of Zero Tolerance for Harassment of Any Kind ⿟[To create a working environment of zero tolerance for harassment of any kind, the MOD/SDF will promote a fundamental review of the handling process of harass-] ment-related consultations, and harassment prevention measures. ⿟[The “Harassment Prevention Task Force” was formed based on the result of the special defense inspection and the recommendations of the "MOD Commit-] tee of Experts on Harassment Prevention and Measures" established under the direction of the Minister of Defense. The Task Force will review of the effective measures, including counseling system and education. ⿟[To create a working environment of zero tolerance for harassment of any kind, the MOD/SDF will regularly disseminate messages from the top management, ] i l di th Mi i t f D f i h t ti d ti i f SDF l b i d ti t iti d t th ----- **Part** Reinforcing Common Bases ###### Ⅳ Further Promotion of Work-life Balance and Women’s Participation ⿟[Ensuring preparedness to consistently respond to various situations requires ] creating an environment in which staff are both mentally and physically healthy and are able to maintain high morale and pride, and fully demonstrate their abilities. ⿟[The MOD/SDF is promoting working from home and paperless work environment, ] implementing stringent management of work hours, encouraging male personnel to take parental leave, and establishing a comfortable work environment for all personnel, etc., to encourage the participation of women personnel and improve work-life balance. ⿟[The MOD/SDF is promoting measures to support emergency attendance at work ] by temporarily taking care of children of SDF personnel at SDF camps in case emergency support is required during disaster relief operations, etc. ⿟[In addition to expanding the recruitment and promotion of women and lifting ] restrictions on the assignment of female uniformed SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF is promoting the improvement of educational infrastructure to support women’s activities and the establishment of quarters in barracks and MSDF vessels for Emergency attendance support for SDF personnel engaged in disaster relief women with a view to increasing the number of female uniformed SDF personnel. during the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake Transformation of Medical Functions ⿟[The SDF medical force needs to be transformed into an organization that focuses on not ] only maintaining the health and fitness of SDF personnel but also saving their lives from the perspective of sustainability and resiliency. ⿟[The MOD/SDF will promote the strengthening of medical function to improve the ] combat trauma care capabilities with (i) Reinforcement of seamless medical care and transportation system from the frontlines to the final rear destination, (ii) Reinforcement of joint operation readiness for medical, and (iii) Fundamental management reform of the National Defense Medical College as the three pillars. ⿟[The MOD/SDF will establish a system to autonomously secure and stockpile blood ] products based on the recommendations of the “Expert Panel on Blood Transfusion during Combat Trauma Care of the MOD/SDFs”. ⿟[The MOD/SDF will reinforce the National Defense Medical College to serve as a clinical ] site for medical officers who provide combat trauma care by establishing the “Center for Trauma, Burn and Tactical Medicine” in FY2024. Joint Logistics and Medical Training during the FY2023 Joint Exercise “05JX” ⿟[The SDF provides medical care overseas in disaster-stricken areas as part of international ] (November 2023) disaster relief activities and support capacity building in the medical field, among other international cooperation. Reinforcement of Policy-making Function ⿟[For the SDF to respond to the increasingly severe, complex and fast-paced strategic ] environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required. ⿟[The “MOD Committee of Experts on Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense ] Capabilities” will be convened as a body to obtain advice for policies from the experts, and will hold frank discussions on issues such as fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities. ⿟[The MOD/SDF is closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research ] institutions, and private companies particularly the defense industry as their core. In addition, the MOD/SDF is reinforcing its intellectual base by reviewing and reinforcing ----- 2024 DEFENCE OF JAPAN White PaperWhite Paper D I G E S T **Measures Relating to Training and Exercises** **Chapter 3** Various Measures Relating to Training and Exercises ⿟[For the SDF to fulfill its challenging mission of defending Japan, each SDF personnel and each ] unit, the core of the defense forces, must maintain and improve their high level of proficiency from peacetime. High capabilities and proficiency are the foundation of Japan’s deterrence and response capabilities. ⿟[The SDF actively conducts various high-level training and exercises to enhance the deterrence and ] response capabilities of Japan jointly with the United States. ⿟[Based on the awareness that the stability of the security environment of Japan is indispensable to ] maintain the peace of our country, the SDF actively promotes bilateral/multilateral exercises with the ally and like-minded countries and others in the Indo-Pacific Region to facilitate the realization of FOIP. FY2023 Joint Exercise “05JX” (November 2023) Improvement of Various Training Environments and Safety Management ⿟[To further improve the training environment, the MOD/SDF is promoting initiatives to enhance the ] training infrastructure in Japan and overseas, utilizing opportunities for bilateral and multilateral exercises with other countries. ⿟[The MOD/SDF strives to implement thorough safety management on a daily basis.] ASDF conducted the first Japan-France Bilateral Training in Japan (July 2023) **Initiatives on Coexistence with Regional Society and the Environment** **Chapter 4** Measures Concerning Harmony with Regional Society ⿟[The various activities of the MOD/SDF are hard to implement without the understanding and ] cooperation of every person, local governments and other organizations. It is necessary to deepen mutual trust between regional society and people, and the SDF. ⿟[For stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan, which is an extremely important element in ] securing the safety of Japan, it is essential to gain the understanding and cooperation of local governments in the surrounding areas. Responding to Climate Change and Environmental Issues ⿟[As a member of the] [Government, the MOD/SDF will address and contribute to resolving various ] climate change and environmental issues. In addition, the MOD/SDF will promote initiatives that Defense seminar in Omitama City, Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan (November 2023) focusing more on the coexistence of the SDF/USFJ facilities/areas with the surrounding areas. ⿟[The Bill for Adjustment between Defense and Wind Power was passed and enacted during the ordinary ] Diet session in 2024, promoting policies to balance national security and renewable energies. ⿟[The MOD/SDF takes appropriate measures for aqueous film-forming foam containing PFOS] Public Relations Activities,Public Records and Archives Management, Disclosure of Administrative Documents, etc. ⿟[To gain the trust and cooperation of Japanese people and various other countries, the MOD/] SDF proactively implements easy-to-understand public affairs efforts regarding MOD/SDF activities in various ways, and also manages administrative documents properly and responds appropriately to disclosure requests for administrative documents. SDF music festival as part of the SDF Memorial Day commemorative ----- **Part** ## Ⅰ **Security Environment** **Surrounding Japan** **Chapter** **1** **Overview** **Chapter** **2** **Russia’s Aggression and Defense by Ukraine** **Chapter** **3** **Defense Policies of Countries** **Trends and Challenges Facing the** **International Community Concerning the** **Chapter** **4** **Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Domains** **and Information Warfare** ----- **Part** **Overview** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **Chapter** **1** **1** **1** **Global Security Environment** Current trends in the security environment have several domains and other areas, the risks that impede free access features. First, economic and culture interactions among and utilization of these areas are becoming increasingly states are further expanded and deepened following the serious. In particular, the threat of cyberattacks, in which development of information society and the expansion the risk of exposure is relatively low and where attackers of international trade. On the other hand, there are also have an advantage, is growing rapidly. Cyberattacks states that do not share universal values or political have been used constantly to disable or destroy critical and economic systems based on these values, and they infrastructures, interfere in foreign elections, demand are expanding their influence. Unilateral changes to ransoms, and steal sensitive information, even in the the status quo by force and such attempts represent form of state-sponsored cyberattacks. significant challenges to the free and open international In addition, **grey zone situations over territories** order underpinned by the rule of law. Russia’s aggression are constantly occurring. It is highly likely that **hybrid** against Ukraine has revealed this in a most blatant way. **warfare, combining military and non-military means** The international community is facing its greatest post- to achieve military objectives, such as information war trial yet and has entered a new era of crisis. In addition, warfare that utilizes the spread of disinformation prior the global power balance has significantly changed and to an armed attack, will be conducted in an even more interstate competition across the political, economic and sophisticated form in the time ahead. military spheres is emerging. The interstate competition Furthermore, addressing those issues not necessarily between China and the United States in particular is deemed as security targets in the past, such as supply expected to further intensify in various fields. chain vulnerabilities, increasing threats to critical Second, rapid advances in science and technology infrastructures, and leadership struggles over advanced are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security. technologies, has also become a major security challenge. Countries are striving to develop cutting-edge As a result, the scope of security has expanded to include technologies that could dramatically alter the character the economic sector, making economic measures even of warfare and thus prove to become “game changers.” more necessary to ensure security. The organization of military, methods and means of warfare are changing. Third, there exists a range of global security challenges such as increasingly serious risks in cyber and other **KEY WORD** **Hybrid Warfare** domains, information warfare, including the spread of disinformation, and climate change. The so-called “hybrid warfare” represents methods intentionally blurring the boundaries between the military and non-military realms, forcing affected In cyber, maritime, space, and electromagnetic actors to take complex measures that are not limited to military actions. The means of hybrid warfare include operations using military units of **KEY WORD** unidentified nationality, cyberattacks to affect communications and other **Grey Zone Situations** critical infrastructure, the spread of false information through the internet So-called “grey zone” situations simply represent a wide range of situations and the media, and other influential operations. The combination of these that are neither peacetime nor wartime. measures is considered to amount to hybrid warfare. In hybrid warfare, In a gray-zone situation, for example, a country that confronts another over a country takes measures that are difficult to identify definitively as an territory, sovereignty or maritime and other economic interests uses some “armed attack” based on its outward appearance. It is said that such an forceful organization to demonstrate its presence in the relevant disputed approach is taken with the intent to make it difficult for the target country to region in a bid to alter the status quo or force other countries to accept its address the situation, such as delaying the military’s initial response, while assertions or demands. denying the attacker country’s own involvement. ----- **2** **yi** **g** **Part** The global security environment and challenges of Japan, remain unresolved. In addition, Japan faces **Ⅰ** articulated above are particularly prominent in the Indo- threats and challenges of various types and intensities, **Chapter** Pacific region, where Japan is situated, and may get still such as unilateral changes to the status quo by force and **1** severe in the future. The Indo-Pacific region is the core such attempts in the East and South China Seas and other of global vitality, home to more than half of the world’s areas, piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of population. The dynamism of the intersection of the mass destruction, and natural disasters. Pacific and the Indian Oceans is a growth engine for the Japan is facing the most severe and complex security global economy. Japan, situated in this region, is well environment since the end of World War II. Russia’s positioned to benefit from this. At the same time, the aggression against Ukraine has easily breached the Indo-Pacific region faces a host of security challenges. very foundation of the rules that shape the international For example, several nations and regions that possess order. The possibility cannot be precluded that a similar large military forces, including nuclear weapons, do serious situation may arise in the future in the Indo- not share universal values, nor political and economic Pacific region, especially in East Asia. Across the globe, systems based on such universal values. Furthermore, historical changes in power balances, particularly in the there exists a complex intertwining of diplomatic and Indo-Pacific region, are occurring. other relations based on historical backgrounds. In **See** Fig. I-1-1 Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan; Fig. I-1-2 Military Strength of Major Countries/Regions the case of Japan, the territorial issues of the Northern (approximate numbers); Fig. I-1-3 Main Military Forces Territories and Takeshima, which are inherent territories surrounding Japan (Approximate Strength) **REFERENCE：Security Environment Surrounding Japan** **URL：https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/index.html** ----- **ⅠPart** Fig. I-1-1 Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan **Chapter** **Demonstration of force by China and Russia** **Russia continuing active actions** **1** Deployed new equipment also in the Far East region Steregushchiy II-class frigates Assigned to the Pacific Fleet in [Russian Ministry of Defence] 2020 Joint Navigation Joint Flight Ground-to-ship missile system Bastion Newly deployed to Paramushir [Russian Ministry of Defence] Island of Chishima Islands in 2022 **North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Development** - First nuclear test in 2006 and a total of six nuclear tests thereafter - Enhancement of missile technologies, including [Korea News Service/Jiji] [AFP/Jiji] missiles with increasingly longer ranges and ones that **·Declared the completion of the nuclear force in 2017** fly on irregular trajectories **·Continued systematic development of various weapons,** **including nuclear weapons** **China’s broad and rapid change** **of military forces** Fourth and fifth generation fighters Modern destroyers and frigates (Number of launchers) (Vessels) 1,600 Approx. **1,588** 100 **94** 1,400 17.6 times 90 Approx. 80 6.3 times 1,200 70 1,000 60 800 50 600 40 400 30 20 **15** 200 **90** 10 0 0 2001 2024 (Year) 2001 2024 (Year) **In the vicinity of Japan, moves towards strengthening military** **forces and increasing military activities are notable.** 〇Indo-Pacific region has many security challenges. ・There are several nations and regions in this region with large military forces, including nuclear weapons, do not share universal values, nor the political and economic systems based on such universal values. ・There exists a complex intertwining of diplomatic and other relations based on historical backgrounds. ・Diverse threats and challenges of various types and intensities exist in this region, such as unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East China Sea and South China Seas and other areas, piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and natural disasters. (Note) Figures for modern destroyers and frigates for China show the total number of Renhai-class, Luhu-class, Luhai-class, Sovremenny-class, Luyang-class, and Luzhou-class destroyers and Jiangwei-class and Jiangkai-class frigates. Additionally, China has 49 Jiangdao-class corvettes (in 2024). ----- |74 875230 Russia Kingdom620240 he United 80 97 1140360Germany Ukraine 2 124 France 350 9 26220 13 2 50 Italy Israel 840 C 270 24 50 Iran India|3,240 110 550 10 370 36 1353 North Korea Japan 37 660 hina 29 Republic of Korea| |---|---| |Ground forces (10,000 troops) 1 India 124 2 North Korea 110 3 China 97 4 Ukraine 74 5 United States 62 6 Pakistan 56 7 Russia 54 8 Iran 50 9 Vietnam 38 10 Republic of Korea 37 - Japan 13|Maritime forces (10,000 tons (vessels))|Col3|Air forces (aircraft)|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |1|1 United States 67（5 970）||1|United States|3,320| |2|2 China 23（6 690）||2|China|3,240| |3|3 Russia 20（7 1,180）||3|Russia|1,450| |4|4 United Kingdom 7（5 140）||4|India|840| |5 U|5 India 5（0 330）||5|Republic of Korea|660| |6|6 France 4（0 290）||6|North Korea|550| |7|7 Türkiye 2（9 270）||7|Egypt|510| |8|8 Republic of Korea 2（9 230）||8|Pakistan|490| |9|9 Italy 2（6 160）||9|Taiwan|470| |10 Rep|10 Iran 2（4 560）||10|Saudi Arabia|460| |-|- Japan 5（3 138）||-|Japan|370| Fig. I-1-2 Military Strength of Major Countries/Regions (approximate numbers) **ⅠPart** 1,450 **Chapter** 3,320 54 207 675 **1** 3,240 110 74 8 75 230 Russia The United Kingdom 6 20 240 80 97 550 62 11 40 360 Germany Ukraine 236 10 13 53 370 124 France 350 North Korea 9 26 220 13 2 50 37 660 Japan The United States Italy Israel 840 China 29 270 24 Republic of Korea 50 Iran India **Legend** Ground forces Maritime forces Air forces 3 20 149 Australia (10,000 troops) (10,000 tons) (aircraft) **Large-scale military capabilities are concentrated surrounding Japan.** Ground forces (10,000 troops) Maritime forces (10,000 tons (vessels)) Air forces (aircraft) 1 India 124 1 United States 675（970） 1 United States 3,320 2 North Korea 110 2 China 236（690） 2 China 3,240 3 China 97 3 Russia 207（1,180） 3 Russia 1,450 4 Ukraine 74 4 United Kingdom 75（140） 4 India 840 5 United States 62 5 India 50（330） 5 Republic of Korea 660 6 Pakistan 56 6 France 40（290） 6 North Korea 550 7 Russia 54 7 Türkiye 29（270） 7 Egypt 510 8 Iran 50 8 Republic of Korea 29（230） 8 Pakistan 490 9 Vietnam 38 9 Italy 26（160） 9 Taiwan 470 10 Republic of Korea 37 10 Iran 24（560） 10 Saudi Arabia 460 - Japan 13 - Japan 53（138） - Japan 370 (Notes) 1. Figures for ground forces are basically the numbers of Army personnel in “The Military Balance 2024.”* Figures for maritime forces show their tonnages compiled by the MOD based on “Jane’s Fighting Ships 2023-2024.” Figures for air forces are the total numbers of bombers, fighters, attack aircraft, surveillance aircraft, etc., compiled by the MOD based on “The Military Balance 2024.” 2. Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2023; the number of combat aircraft (air forces) is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only). - Figures are rounded off to the nearest 10,000 personnel. Figures for the United States include 450,000 Army personnel and 170,000 Marines personnel. Russia’s strength includes 500,000 Ground Force personnel and 35,000 Airborne troops personnel. Regarding Ukraine, “The Military Balance 2024” states that the number of army and regional defense forces, mainly comprised of reserves, is 200,000 to 350,000, respectively. For convenience, maximum values are used. 350,000 ground troops, 350,000 regional defense forces, and 40,000 airborne troops are included. Figures for Iran include 150,000 ground force personnel of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in addition to 350,000 Army personnel. ----- **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** |Russian Far East|80,000 troops 250 vessels 4,489(*) (33) 710,000 tons 310 aircraft (*) Number held by Russia as a whole| |---|---| |Col1|Ground forces Vessels Combat aircraft Number of nuclear warheads (200,000 troops) (200,000 tons) (500 aircraft) (500)| |---|---| Fig. I-1-3 Main Military Forces surrounding Japan (Approximate Strength) 80,000 troops 250 vessels 4,489(*) U.S. Russian (33) 710,000 tons 310 aircraft 3,708 Far East (*) Number held by Russia as a whole China 1.1 million troops (35) 790 vessels 550 aircraft 100,000 tons North Korea (*) It is also said in the SIPRI Yearbook 2023 that North Korea already retains fissionable 970,000 troops (219) materials enough to produce 50-70 nuclear warheads including around thirty finished nuclear warheads. 40,000 marines (8) ROK 370,000 troops (52) 29,000 marines (4) 690 vessels 2,360,000 tons 230 vessels 290,000 tons Japan 660 aircraft 130,000 troops (15) 3,240 aircraft U.S. Forces Korea 138 vessels 530,000 tons 20,000 410 troops (5) 370 aircraft 80 aircraft U.S. Forces Japan 20,000 troops (1) 130 aircraft Taiwan 90,000 troops (7) U.S. 7th Fleet 10,000 marines (2) 40 vessels 150 vessels 410,000 tons 210,000 tons 50 aircraft 470 aircraft (carrier-based) 500km (Notes) 1 Source: Documents published by the DoD, “The Military Balance 2024” and “SIPRI Yearbook 2023,” etc. 2 Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2023; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft(excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only). 3 Figures for the ground forces of U.S. Forces Japan/Korea indicate the combined total for Army troops and U.S. Marines. 4 Figures for combat aircraft include naval and marine aircraft. 5 Figures in parentheses indicate the total number of major units such as divisions and brigades. That for North Korea includes only divisions. 6 The figures for the U.S. 7th Fleet indicate forces forward-deployed to Japan and Guam. 7 The figures for the combat aircraft of U.S. Forces Japan and the U.S. 7th Fleet include only fighter aircraft. Legend Ground forces Vessels Combat aircraft Number of nuclear warheads (200,000 troops) (200,000 tons) (500 aircraft) (500) ----- **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **Commentary** **Increasing Nuclear and Missile Capabilities in the Vicinity of Japan** There are several countries and regions surrounding Japan that Korea, in addition to repeatedly launching ballistic missiles have large-scale military forces, including nuclear weapons. that fly at low altitudes on irregular trajectories and pursuing China is seeking to modernize, diversify, and expand its their practical application, it has identified the development of nuclear forces from the perspective of ensuring deterrence and hypersonic glide warheads as one of its priority goals. It has also complementing conventional forces, and it is investing in and launched hypersonic missiles. With regard to Russia, its short- increasing the number of land, sea, and air nuclear delivery means range ballistic missile Iskander, which was used in the invasion of as well as increasing the production of nuclear warheads. North Ukraine and is believed to be deployed in the Far East, is said to be Korea has been promoting nuclear development, including nuclear capable of flying at low altitudes on irregular trajectories. Russia weapons, to build its nuclear deterrent and counter threats from the is also proceeding with the deployment of the HGV Avangard and United States. Furthermore, North Korea has indicated that it will the HCM Tsircon. Russia has announced that it will deploy the pursue the development of tactical nuclear weapons with a view new ICBM Sarmat, which is said to be capable of carrying the to dealing with an armed conflict with the U.S. and South Korean Avangard, by the end of 2024. armies that could occur on the Korean Peninsula. As for Russia, These hypersonic weapons and low-altitude irregular-trajectory it is placing importance on securing its international standing and ballistic missiles fly at lower altitudes than normal ballistic balancing its nuclear forces with those of the United States as missiles, thus delaying radar detection. Their maneuvering well as placing importance on its nuclear forces to compensate capabilities make it difficult to predict their trajectories and impact for its inferiority in conventional forces. Russia is also proceeding points, making their interception more difficult. Their development with the deployment in the Far-East of naval vessels equipped and deployment are believed to be progressing with the intent to with the sea-launched cruise missile system Kalibr, which is said counter or bypass existing missile defense networks. to be capable of carrying conventional or non-strategic nuclear Under such circumstances, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) warheads. is working to ceaselessly strengthen the quality and quantity of In this way, as the nuclear forces around Japan continue to Japan’s missile defense capabilities. However, it is becoming increase and missile forces that can serve as a means of delivering increasingly difficult to fully respond to this threat with the existing nuclear weapons have increased significantly in both quality and missile defense network alone, particularly if Japan continues quantity, missile attacks on Japan are a real threat. to rely solely on the means of missile defense. Therefore, in the For example, activities around Japan include attempts to event of a missile attack by an adversary, Japan will use its missile improve the secrecy and speed of missile launches by launching defense network to intercept incoming missiles while preventing missiles from various platforms, such as Transport Erector further armed attacks from the adversary through counterstrike -Launchers (TELs) and submarines, and attempts to improve capabilities as an absolute minimum self-defense measure that precision-strike capabilities. In addition, the development and is unavoidably necessary in cases where it is recognized that no deployment of hypersonic weapons is also in progress around other means are available. Japan, such as Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), which are said to glide and maneuver at hypersonic speeds (Mach 5 or more) (image) through the atmosphere to reach targets, and Hypersonic Cruise Trajectory of ballistic missile Missiles (HCMs), which use technologies such as a scramjet engine to enable hypersonic flight, and ballistic missiles that fly at Detection point Radar coverage low altitudes in irregular trajectories. In 2020, China began operating DF-17 semi-intermediate- range ballistic missiles, which are said to be capable of carrying HGV trajectory Detection point HGVs, and it has been pointed out that China may replace some older short-range ballistic missiles with the DF-17. It has also Launch point Impact point been pointed out that in 2021 China conducted a test launch of an HGV that can fly long distances using an ICBM. As for North Image of HGV trajectory ----- **Ukraine** **Chapter** **Part** **2** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **2** **1** **General Situation** Russia’s aggression against Ukraine undermines the order, claiming innocent lives and repeatedly making sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is a threatening mention about nuclear weapons, which can serious violation of international law, including the United be called an unprecedented situation. If such Russia’s Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of force. Such aggression is tolerated, it could send a message with the unilateral changes to the status quo by force have shaken wrong implication that unilateral changes to the status the very foundation of the international order, including quo by force are acceptable in other regions as well, in Asia. In addition, brutal and inhumane acts committed including Asia. Therefore, the international community, by Russian soldiers have been revealed in many parts of including Japan, should never forgive Russia’s action. Ukraine. The murder of numerous innocent civilians is a The international community works together in grave violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) solidarity against this Russia’s aggression by imposing and a war crime, and utterly unforgivable. sanctions against Russia and continuing to provide After the end of World War II, denial of unilateral Ukraine with defense equipment such as tanks, changes to the status quo by force became one of the artillery, and ammunition in order to support Ukraine’s foundations of international order. But, Russia, a efforts to defend itself and eject Russian military from permanent member of the United Nations Security Ukraine. The future developments surrounding Russia’s Council (UNSC), which is supposed to take primary aggression against Ukraine remain unpredictable. But responsibility for maintaining international peace Japan needs to monitor the related situation closely with and security, is now openly taking military actions grave concern. challenging international law and the international **2** **Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine and the Future Outlook** eliminate the Zelenskyy administration was finally failed **1** **The Failure of Russia’s Blitzkrieg and** after AFU fought off the AFRF in the Kyiv direction in **Ukraine’s Successful Defense** the end of March through the early April. On February 24, 2022, Russia started full-scale The AFU successfully defended Kharkiv, the second aggression against Ukraine. Mr. Zelenskyy, the president largest city in Ukraine as well as a major transportation of Ukraine, clearly expressed his intention to remain in hub. Meanwhile, it is believed that the Russian forces Kyiv from the early stage of the aggression, and the made territorial gains in southern Ukraine more quickly Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and other military and than in other area. The AFRF occupied Kherson, the para-military units obstructed the advance of the main capital city of Kherson oblast on the western bank of units of Armed Forces of Russian Federation (AFRF) the Dnieper River in early March 2022, and advanced at suburbs of the capital, which caused heavy losses further west in the direction of Mykolaiv, the capital city for AFRF aiming at taking control of the city within of Mykolaiv oblast. It is also believed that the AFRF short time period. It is pointed out that Russia’s goal to made territorial gain in the southern Zaporizhzhia oblast **REFERENCE：Information related to Ukraine** **URL：https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/ukraine2022.html** ----- Fig. I-2-1 Map of Ukraine **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Belarus Bryansk Gomel Mazuri Voronezh Chernihiv Kursk Rivne Nuclear Power Plant Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant Lutsk Poland Lviv Zhytomyr Kyiv Sumy Belgorod Valuyki Lviv Ternopil Khmelnytskyi.Nuclear power plant Ukraine Dnipro River Poltava Kharkiv Kupyansk. Tabaivka Khmelnytskyi Cherkasy Svatové Ivano-Frankivsk Uman Izium Lyman Kreminna Vinnytsia Klementchuk Severodonetsk Veseret Kramatorsk Luhansk Uzhhorod Chernivtsi Kropyvnytskyi. Dnipro Klishchiivka Bakhmut Avdiivka Russian separatist forces Moldova South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant NikopolZaporizhzhia Orikhiv Marinka Donetsk (before February 24, 2022)controlled-areas Russia Kryvyi Rih Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant Robotine Rostov-on-Don Mykolayiv Beryslav Tokmak Mariupoli OdesaOchakiv. KhersonAntoniowski BridgePidostepneKrynki HenicheskMelitopol Berzhansk Zatoka Sea of Azov Rozdolne Cheonghal Bridge Izmail Boiko Towers Yevpatoria DzhankoiKrasnovarGysike Kerch Primorsko-Akhtarsk Danube River Zminui Island SevastopolSaky (Ukrainian territory,Crimea Cape Chowder Crimean Bridge Southern Military District occupied by Russia in 2014) Major cities (state capitals are underlined) Sevastopol Novorossiysk 0km 200km Points occupied by Russia Areas occupied and held by Russia after the aggression Compiled from the GSI standard map Black Sea Tuapse and the southern Donetsk oblast on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov. **See** Fig. I-2-1 Map of Ukraine **See** **2** **Redeployment of Russian Forces and Start** **of Ukrainian Counteroffensive** **(1) Redeployment of troops and territorial expansion** **in Eastern and Southern Ukraine** Russian forces, which failed to take control of the capital Kyiv, on March 25, 2022, announced that previous military action had been at “the first phase of operation” and that the primary goal of its operation would shift to the “liberation” of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in eastern Ukraine, that is, pursuing expanded territorial gains in the regions. It is said that after withdrawing its forces from the Kyiv area and regrouping, AFRF seized Sievierodonetsk, the temporary capital city of Luhansk oblast, and its surroundings from late June to early July 2022. The AFRF concentrated its forces on seizing the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works (AISW) in Mariupol, Uk i ’ l t t h ld i th th D t k Ukrainian Military’s High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) being launched (Kherson oblast, southern Ukraine) [EPA-Jiji] oblast on the coast of the Sea of Azov. In May 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that then Defense Minister Shoigu had reported to President Putin that the AFRF completed the operation in Mariupol with the surrender of Ukrainian units at the AISW. As a result of the seizure of Mariupol, Russia secured the whole coast of the Sea of Azov and the land bridge connecting to the Crimean Peninsula. **(2) Start of Ukrainian Counteroffensive** After repelling the Russian attack on large cities such K i d Kh ki th Uk i i ilit k t fi ----- resistance to the AFRF along the entire front line as well as intensified its attacks on Russian positions from April 2022, which seemed to be prepared for the future counteroffensive. The Ukrainian military reportedly sank a Slava class guided missile cruiser “Moskva,” the flagship of Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy, by a domestically produced surface-to-ship cruise missile “Neptune” in May 2022 in southern Ukraine where Russian forces achieved relatively considerable successes. In June 2022, General Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU (then), announced that the AFU had attacked AFRF units on Zmiinyi (Snake) Island in the Black Sea, occupied in the early stages of the war and forced them to withdraw from the island. These Ukrainian attacks degraded the Russian air defense network that had been provided by the vessels of Russian Black Sea Fleet in southern Ukraine, which made it difficult for Russian Air Forces to conduct operations in the area, as a result of which made it easier for Ukraine to launch a counteroffensive in the region. It can further be seen that the AFU used the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), supplied by the United States, in action from late June 2022. The AFU announced an attack on fuel and ammunition depots in a Russia’s base near Nova Kakhovka, Kherson oblast, in July 2022 and mentioned starting a counteroffensive in the south. The Ukrainian military effectively attacked Russian command posts and logistics bases using a longrange precision strike weapons system such as HIMARS in the region, and interdicted bridges and other crossing sites over the Dnieper River. Difficulties in logistics caused by these attacks decreased fighting capabilities and morale of Russian troops in the north of the river and improved conditions for the Ukrainian counteroffensive. **3 �Ukrainian Counteroffensive on the Kharkiv** **and Kherson Fronts in 2023 and Russia’s** **Response** had become vulnerable after the redeployment of its troops to the south to prepare for the expected Ukrainian counteroffensive, which led to Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive in the east. On the other hand, in the south, as a result of efforts to cut off and undermine each AFRF unit using the Dnieper River, the AFU forced Russian troops to withdraw and successfully regained the northern part of the Dnieper of Kherson oblast including Kherson, the capital city of the oblast, in mid-November 2022. Furthermore, there was some damage caused by an explosion and destruction of a girder of the bridge connecting Krasnodar of Russia and the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine in October 2022 Russia blames Ukraine for Crimea bridge blast. **(2) Russia’s Response** Russia responded in various ways to Ukraine’s fullfledged counteroffensive, such as with troop buildups and making its occupation of Ukrainian territory a fait accompli. With respect to the buildup of forces, President Putin signed executive orders related to partial mobilization, explained the necessity of the actions and asked people for their support in September 2022. Regarding the mobilization, then Defense Minister Shoigu said that he was planning to mobilize some 300,000 reservists. Regarding Russia’s fait accompli of the occupied areas in Ukraine, Russia illegally “annexed” four regions of the occupied areas in the oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson on September 30, based on the results of what they called a “referendum” conducted in the area from September 23 to 27 to ask the people whether their territory was to be “annexed” to Russia or not. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(1) Full-fledged Ukraine Counteroffensive** In early September 2022, the Ukrainian military conducted a successful counteroffensive in Kharkiv oblast in eastern Ukraine and regained most of the Russian-occupied area in the oblast. It is probable that the Ukraine military strived to conceal its plan and intent for the counteroffensive in the east, unlike the south where the counteroffensive was conspicuous. It i l i t d t th t th R i t i th t President Putin (center) and the “heads” and “chief executives” of the eastern and southern four regions of Ukraine, at the ceremony for incorporating the regions (oblasts) (September 2022) [Presidential Executive Office of Russia] ----- In addition, AFRF has built multi layered defenses, including trenches, anti-tank ditches and concrete anti-tank obstacles known as “Dragon’s Teeth” and minefields, along the entire contact line in anticipation of counterattacks by the Ukrainian military. At the same time, the AFRF intensify bombardments with missiles and loitering munitions all over Ukraine. It is pointed out that this was aimed at depleting Ukraine’s air defense missile reserves, as well as weakening war sustainability and the fighting spirit of Ukrainian people by damaging power grids critical for civilian life in cold winter. While the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimates the number of noncombatant victims caused by Russian attack in Ukraine amount to be over 10,000 as of November 2023, the actual number is possibly much larger as accurate numbers cannot be determined due to the ongoing fighting, and the number is likely still increasing now. An apartment complex in Dnipro, central Ukraine, destroyed by a Russian missile attack on January 14, 2023 (January 2023) [Ukrainian government Facebook]. **4** **Stagnation of Ukrainian counteroffensive on** **the Zaporizhzhia front in 2023 and Russian** **eastern offensive** **(1) Provision of Western weapons to Ukraine and** **stagnation of Ukrainian counteroffensive** While thrown on the defensive in the face of the offensive on the Bakhmut front by the Russian military and other forces, the Ukrainian military received various equipment from Western countries, including main battle tanks such as the “Leopard 2A6” and “Challenger 2” and air-launched long-range cruise missiles such as the “Storm Shadow.” It seems to have been preparing for a counteroffensive by reorganizing its new units and training its soldiers in Europe. The Ukrainian military is believed to have launched a counteroffensive in early June 2023 and sequentially recaptured multiple villages; centering on the front of southern Zaporizhzhia oblast. However, the Ukrainian military is also said to have suffered significant losses in personnel and equipment as its advance was blocked by numerous antipersonnel mines and tank mines laid by Russian forces and anti-tank missiles from attack helicopters. The Ukrainian military’s counteroffensive is reportedly meant to break through the Russian military’s defensive line in the southern Zaporizhzhia oblast and advance southward to the Sea of Azov, thereby cutting off the Russian military’s land logistics route connecting mainland Russia and the Crimean Peninsula. However, it appears that the originally envisioned goals have not been achieved. The following have been pointed out as the reasons behind the stagnation of the Ukrainian military’s counteroffensive: the shortage of firepower such as howitzers and trench mortars, short-range air defense systems to protect advancing ground forces from airborne threats, obstacle-clearing equipment to break through minefields and trained soldiers in the Ukrainian military. In October 2023, the United States provided Ukraine with the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), a surface-to-surface ballistic missile system. Ukrainian forces successfully attacked Russian military airfields using ATACMS missiles. They also damaged ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet using domestically produced unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and cruise missiles. However, no major breakthrough was achieved i d ti I N b 2023 P id t **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** In January 2023, the Russian military and the private military company (PMC) “Wagner” intensified their offensive in the eastern Donetsk oblast. In May 2023, they seemed to have taken control of Bakhmut, a key transportation hub in the oblast. ----- Zelensky ordered the construction of defensive positions in preparation for a Russian military offensive, it is believed that the Ukrainian military was on the defensive. Russia claims to have quadrupled its military manufacturing capacity by the end of 2023. As Russia ramps up the pace of repair and production of various types of equipment, it is anticipated that the expansion of support from Western countries will become increasingly crucial for Ukraine’s future. **(2) Intensifying Russian military offensives and** **missile attacks in eastern Ukraine** Russian forces, which had countered the Ukrainian military’s counteroffensive with well-prepared defensive positions and ground and air forces, allegedly intensified their offensive in the Avdiivka and Bakhmut sectors of Donetsk oblast and the Kupyansk sector of Kharkiv Oblast from October 2023 onwards and seems to have seized control of Marinka in Donetsk oblast by the end of 2023. In February 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it had taken control of Avdiivka. **5 �Russia’s Attack on Nuclear Power Stations** **and Nuclear Facilities and the Situation** **Surrounding Nuclear, Biological and** **Chemical Weapons** Russia repeatedly takes dangerous actions around nuclear facilities in ongoing aggression against Ukraine. Russia occupied the Chornobyl nuclear power plant near the Belarusian border in February 2022 and also occupied the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southeastern Ukraine in March 2022. In addition, Russia attacked the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology (the KIPT), which has experimental reactors and handles nuclear substances, multiple times on and after March. In April 2022, when the Russian military conducted its first flight test of “Sarmat” the new large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in development, President Putin made a statement showing off his country’s nuclear force. Furthermore, President Putin repeatedly mentioned nuclear weapons probably with the intention of intimidation. For example, he said Russia would use every possible means to bounce back threats to the territorial integrity of the nation in his statement to people to promulgate an executive order about partial mobilization in September 2022. He was clearly keeping nuclear weapons in mind in the statement. Other high officials make similar statements repeatedly as well. Russia has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine may use chemical and biological weapons. However, the United States and the United Kingdom evaluate it as showing that Russia is preparing for the so-called “false flag campaign.” In March, 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden made a statement to the effect that there are certain signs that President Putin is considering using biological and chemical weapons in Ukraine. In May 2024, the U.S. Department of State pointed to a suspicion that Russia had used chemical weapons. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Damage in Kharkiv, Ukraine (January 2024) [AFP-Jiji] In addition, since late December 2023, the Russian military has intensified its missile attacks across Ukraine, but while the missile attacks in the winter of 2022 targeted power grids, some observers have pointed out that the targets of the missile attacks in the winter of 2023 are military industries, with an eye on a protracted war. This trend continues into the spring of 2024, with a shortage of air defense equipment said to be exacerbating damage to Ukraine. **6** **Future Outlook** While there is no predicting about what may happen in the future regarding aggression against Ukraine, there are many indications about the strategy, tactics and human and material war sustainability of both the AFRF and the AFU which may impact future developments. Some difficulties in the chain of command of the AFRF were indicated from the very early stages. It has been pointed out that, at the start of aggression, the AFRF ll t d th h i f d d i d ----- troops of a Joint Strategic Command (Military District) to each operational front as it is in peacetime and thus did not have a centralized command chain covering the entire projected force consisting of mechanized infantry forces said to be as many as 200,000-strong and missile units belonging to the Army, Navy, or Air Force, as well as sea power and air power.[1] In early April 2022, a Joint Task Force Commander was reportedly appointed to command all actions of the AFRF. This is seen as a measure to improve cooperation among services and theaters. Also, in January 2023, Russia announced that General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the AFRF, was named as the Joint Task Force Commander, aiming to improve cooperation among services, the quality of logistics support and command efficiency of the unit. In May 2023, Prigozhin’s private military company “Wagner” is said to have contributed to the capture of Bakhmut in the eastern Donetsk oblast by deploying numerous troops. However, subsequent discord between the military and “Wagner” led to Prigozhin instigating an “armed rebellion” in June 2023, allowing “Wagner”’ to advance into Russia. At one point, the “Wagner” offensive reportedly came within 200 km of Moscow, but the situation was brought under control through the mediation of the Belarusian president. In an effort to prevent the recurrence of such an armed uprising, Russia’s Defense Ministry has been encouraging former “Wagner” soldiers to sign contracts with the military. It has also been pointed out that the Ministry is trying to centralize the chain of command by managing other private military companies under the “Wagner” fighters holding Russian flags (May 2023) [AFP-Jiji] control of the General Staff Office. The AFU continues fighting until today undauntedly against the AFRF which has superior quality and larger numbers. Continuation of fighting is made possible by several factors such as a number of reservists with combat experience derived from the eastern front campaign since 2014, significant progress in training non-commissioned officers who assume leading roles in battle realized with the reorganization of the Defense Ministry and the AFU aiming to achieve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard and the introduction of rapid and highly accurate fire coordination systems based on commercial off-the-shelf technologies including the command and control support software “GIS Arta” and the situational awareness system “Delta.” For human war sustainability, it is pointed out that the number of casualties was 190,000 for the AFU as of August 2023, and 465,000 for the AFRF as of May 2024.[2] In June 2023, President Putin signed a law allowing prisoners and suspects, excluding felons, to sign military service contracts. In October the same year, the military personnel registration regulations were revised to include a new provision for “special military personnel registration,” which has facilitated the enlistment of prisoners without requiring a physical examination. These measures appear to be aimed at securing military personnel by creating an environment for deploying prisoners more quickly in actual combat operations. Ukraine seems to be facing difficulties in securing personnel, as President Zelenskyy revealed that the military is requesting the mobilization of an additional 500,000 troops in December the same year. The AFU is supported in education and training for recruits by Western countries. It is pointed out that Russia’s war sustainability for material has been undermined by hindered equipment acquisition caused by economic sanctions against the country. Even in this situation, the Russian military maintains its power by various means such as the ammunition industry operating around the clock, diverting missiles not for ground attacks, the acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) made in Iran, taking over tanks from Belarus and the procurement of artillery shells and missiles from North Korea. Furthermore, it is pointed out that Russia is capable of **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** In addition to the AFRF, paramilitary forces including the following are participating in the aggression: the National Guard of the Russian Federation (former Internal Troops of Russia), the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, and a troop called “Kadyrovites” under the control of the Head of the Chechen Republic Kadyrov. ----- prolonged battle, even under sanctions, because it has to maintain its relentless efforts to reclaim its territory sufficient production capacities for equipment including with a strong will to resist invaders, it has been pointed ammunition belonging to the technical scope of the out that there is a possibility of a prolonged battle, given **Part** former Soviet Union. Russia’s attempt to build up its strength. The Ukrainian military, on the other hand, can acquire **Ⅰ** **Chapter** only limited parts and ammunition from outside of Russia **2** because most of its equipment was manufactured in the former Soviet Union. Although some equipment can be repaired or acquired domestically, it is difficult to carry out repair or acquisition, because the major ammunition industrial cities, such as Kharkiv and Dnipro, are within the attack range of the AFRF. Therefore, support from foreign countries is important in the acquisition of equipment and ammunition as well as in education and training to change over former Soviet Union equipment to Western equipment to maintain war sustainability. While the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) is expected Prosecutors examining the wreckage of a missile allegedly made by North Korea used in an attack on Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine (Kharkiv, Ukraine) (January 2024) [AFP-Jiji]. **3** **The Impact of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine on International Affairs and** **Various Countries’ Responses to It** security and Indo-Pacific security are indivisible. This **1** **General Situation** is because Japan is a close ally of the United States, a For the Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Russia NATO member state and is located on the opposite side has had to pay a high price not only because Ukraine of Europe across the Eurasian Continent where Russia itself strongly resists Russia’s aggression but also also sits. In addition, the change in the European situation because the international community imposes strong in response to the Russia’s aggression against Ukraine coordinated sanctions against Russia and continues to can also have an impact on global affairs including support Ukraine. In Europe, the security environment developments of the strategic competition between the has reached a major turning point in the wake of the United States and China and impact on Asia. In any case, aggression against Ukraine, with countries not only it is necessary to monitor the related situations closely increasing their defense spending but also Finland and with great interest. Sweden, which had previously advocated policies of neutrality, joining NATO. Clearly, the aggression by **2** **NATO’s response** Russia, which saw NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat to itself, prompted European countries to shift Russia’s aggression against Ukraine prompted a rapidly their security policies in this manner. The aggression growing alarm amid European countries and Russia’s has made it hard for Russia to say that it has achieved aggressive actions are being viewed as the most severe its strategic goal of gaining security for itself through and direct threat to European and northern Atlantic maintaining its “sphere of influence.” security.[3] With renewed awareness of the threat of In this view, Japan needs to pay attention to the future Russia, NATO member states direct their efforts at developments of the situation in Europe, including its enhancing defense cooperation under the collective strategic effects and recognize that European-Atlantic defense system of NATO and pursue the development **3** NATO adopted a new strategic concept for the first time since 2010 at a summit meeting held in June 2022. In the previous strategic concept, the Europe-Atlantic region was considered peaceful and the possibility of an attack on the NATO territory was considered small; however, in the current strategic concept, the Europe-Atlantic region is not considered peaceful and the possibility of an attack on the member states’ territories is deemed impossible to rule out. Furthermore, Russia, with which a “genuine strategic partnership” was pursued in the previous ----- of defense capabilities in each country. For example, the unit scale in the eastern direction is expanded as needed and an agreement has been made to put 300,000 and more troops into high readiness conditions in place of NATO Response Forces. The United States also intends to enhance the strength of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe. In June 2022, the United States announced among other measures the establishment of U.S. Army V Corps permanent headquarters in Poland, increasing the number of U.S. destroyers based on Spanish ports, rotation deployment of U.S. troops in Romania and additional deployment of an F-35 squadron to the United Kingdom. **See** Chapter 3, Section 9-2 (Enhancement of Multilateral Security Frameworks) **See** Several nations including NATO member states provide equipment, training support and the like to Ukraine depending on the progress of the war. At the beginning of the war, the donor countries provided portable anti-tank missiles and man-portable surfaceto-air missiles that seemed to contribute to preventing front-line expansion by delaying the advancement of Russian military armored units and reducing the strength of airborne troops. After the AFU stopped Russia’s fullscale aggression, the countries moved towards providing large equipment that helps suppress and secure wide areas in ground fighting, such as tanks, armored vehicles and howitzers, for the Ukrainian military’s counteroffensive. In January 2023, each country announced for the first time the provision of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles not made by the former Soviet Union, beginning with the delivery of German tanks to Ukraine by Poland in February of the same year. They also came to provide longer-range artillery to attack enemy bases, following the concentration of AFRF troops in the eastern Ukraine region. Furthermore, the handing over of air defense systems from various countries rapidly progressed as a result of Russian armed forces commencing missile attacks targeting all over Ukraine including civil facilities from October 2022. In April 2023, it was reported that an air defense system called “Patriot,” capable of coping with ballistic missiles, was also provided. Some NATO member states stated that they would deliver fighter jets made by the former Soviet Union in March 2023 and the United Kingdom and the Netherlands stated in May that the two countries would establish an “international union” for fighter jets acquisition and flight training. Furthermore, the United States stated in the G7 Hiroshima summit meeting that it would support the multilateral initiative for the flight training of fourth-generation fighter jets including F-16 fighters. As of early 2024, countries including the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and Norway, have offered to provide F-16 fighters, with a total of nearly 113 fighters expected to be delivered to Ukraine. Among all of this support from various countries, the contribution of the United States is prominent. The cumulative security support from the United States to Ukraine under the Biden administration is USD 51.3 billion, including USD 50.6 billion announced after the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (as of May 10, 2024). The United States clearly shows a strong supporting attitude towards Ukraine providing not only a variety of equipment in large quantities but also familiarization training for newly delivered equipment and boot camp training outside Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited the United States in December 2022, and said support from the United States is “an investment in global security and democracy” in his speech to U.S. Congress appealing to the American people to continue support. President Zelenskyy, who had also visited the United States in December 2023, appealed for continued support to Ukraine in a speech at the U.S. Congress. The United Kingdom also provided continuous support to Ukraine through equipment support and dispatching training instructors with the United States and other countries from when Russia “annexed” the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and since the regime change from the Johnson administration to the Sunak administration, it has continuously and actively supported Ukraine by providing a variety of equipment and conducting boot camp training. In particular, the United Kingdom took the plunge to announce that it would provide its main battle tanks in January 2023 ahead of any other country. It also provided air-launched long-range cruise missiles. In addition, similarly to the United States, the United Kingdom is actively disclosing information about the Russian military movement to counter Russia’s disinformation and contain the action of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) through announcements by high officials and posting on social media. France, together with Germany, has been acting as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine in the “Normandy **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- by its veto at the European Council in December 2023 of a vote on EU financial assistance to Ukraine amounting to 50 billion euros (the assistance finally reached agreement in February 2024 as a result of a negotiation between the EU and Hungary). **3** **Other Regions Response** Format, to peacefully resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In addition, France has announced the delivery of equipment such as wheeled combat vehicles, missile air-defense systems and air-launched long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine. Germany drastically changed its defense strategy after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, announcing to deliver infantry fighting vehicles and surface-to-air missile systems and started to deliver its main battle tanks directly to Ukraine as well as permit the transfer of German-made main battle tanks from third-party countries to Ukraine in January 2023. Since then, Germany has been continuously supplying artillery shells and air defense missiles. Canada has been providing training support to the AFU since 2015. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Canada has been actively supporting Ukraine, providing military support of more than CAD 2.4 billion as of January 2024. The European Union (EU) has also decided to provide military aid to Ukraine totaling 5.0 billion euros through the European Peace Facility, an EU fund. In addition, technical support provided by private companies to Ukraine is also attracting attention. Satellite internet services using a small satellite constellation provided by U.S. companies in response to the request from the Ukrainian government are used not only as a means of communication for the Ukrainian people but also are utilized to operate the Ukrainian military’s unmanned aircraft. Moreover, it is pointed out that some European and U.S. IT/security companies have been supporting Ukraine’s cybersecurity since before aggression against Ukraine began, and have successfully reduced and localized damage from Russian cyberattacks. While players such as NATO member states and other countries moved towards supporting Ukraine, some countries are taking their own measures. Türkiye, which has deep relations with both Russia and Ukraine, shows consideration for Russia to some extent. Concretely, Türkiye declares support for Ukraine while basically not implementing economic sanctions against Russia. The country also mediates the restarting of exporting grains from Ukraine. Hungary, which deeply depends on Russia economically, has shown a more conciliatory attitude toward Russia than any other NATO member, as evidenced by its not providing weapons to Ukraine and **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** A United Nations general meeting resolution that demands an immediate stop to Russia’s aggression was adopted by approval of 141 member states, which is over 70% of UN member states, on February 23, 2023, one year since the start of aggression against Ukraine. On the other hand, in addition to Russia, some countries and regions do not sympathize with this movement. For example, six countries and regions including Belarus and North Korea were against the resolution and thirtytwo countries including India and China abstained from voting. North Korea is showing its stance of standing by Russia, for example, as it voted against the UN General Assembly’s resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine and claims that the United States and other Western countries are to be blamed for the conflict in Ukraine. It was also revealed that missiles provided by North Korea to Russia since the end of December 2023 were used against Ukraine. Japan has strongly condemned the arms supply from North Korea to Russia, as it could lead to further deterioration of the situation in Ukraine and also violate the relevant Security Council resolutions that completely prohibit the transfer and procurement of arms and related materials between North Korea and Russia. **See** Chapter 3, Section 4-1-5 (Relations with Countries and Regions) While Iran has been increasingly opposed to Western countries since its secession from the nuclear agreement with the United States in 2018, it is enhancing its relationship with Russia, particularly in the economic and military domains. Iran made an argument for a diplomatic solution regarding the aggression against Ukraine but showed sympathy for Russia’s standpoint to the extent of insisting that if Russia had not acted then NATO would have provoked the war. Then President Raisi of Iran and then Secretary Patrushev of the Security Council of Russia talked together in November A framework for dialogue based on the Minsk Protocol among the four countries of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany to resolve the situation in Ukraine, which has been deteriorating ----- 2022. The Iranian side stated it would raise its level of strategic relationship with Russia in various fields and criticized sanctions against Russia by the United States and its allies. The United States announced in July 2022 Iran’s plan to provide UAVs to Russia and in September 2022, pointed out that Russia was using Iran-made UAVs for attacks as well as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). The Ukrainian military also announced that Russia conducted attacks in various points of Ukraine using Iranian UAVs. To this, Iran claims that the delivery of Iranian UAVs to Russia was carried out before the aggression against Ukraine and suggests that their purpose was not for use in war with Ukraine. William Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), pointed out in February 2023 that Russia is considering the possibility of supporting Iran’s missile plan and providing fighter jets in return for Iran’s support. In November the same year, Kirby, Coordinator for Strategic Communications at the U.S. National Security Council, pointed out that Iran may be considering providing ballistic missiles to Russia. While he stated in February 2024 that he had “not been able to confirm” reports that Iran had provided ballistic missiles to Russia, the progress of cooperation between the two countries must be closely observed. China avoids direct criticism of Russia in respect of the aggression, requesting “self-restraint and dialogue” to both Russia and Ukraine and takes a standpoint from which China will play constructive roles in its own ways towards a solution to the Ukraine issues. However, China insists that Russia’s actions are caused by the “Cold War mentality” of the United States and other NATO countries and that it understands Russia’s reasonable concerns about security issues and criticizes sanctions against Russia and equipment delivery to Ukraine from Western countries. In September 2022, President Xi Jinping stated that China would strongly support Russia on issues about mutual core benefit at the China-Russia Summit Meeting that was held face-to-face for the first time after the start of the aggression. He also announced in regard to the aggression against Ukraine, that “China will continuously maintain an objective and fair standpoint, encourage the formation of collaborated influence in the international community and take a constructive role towards peaceful resolution of the Ukraine crises” in an online China-Russia Summit Meeting in December 2022. F th h t t d th t Chi ill l t ti roles in peace negotiations and reconstruction after the conflict in a document titled “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” published in February 2023. Xi also rated highly Russia’s intention to reopen dialogue with Ukraine as quickly as possible and was opposed to unilateral sanctions without the resolution of the United Nations Security Council in the joint communique resulting from the meeting with President Putin held in Russia in March 2023. In October the same year, President Putin visited China for the first time since the aggression against Ukraine and held a summit meeting with President Xi Jinping, mutually confirming the deepening relationship of trust between the two countries. Russia, which is internationally isolated with its aggression against Ukraine will find its political and military cooperation with China more important than ever. On the other hand, it is seen that Western countries are taking action to contain China which is deepening cooperation with Russia. In September 2022, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg pointed out that China continued to cooperate with Russia and opposed expanding NATO even after the aggression against Ukraine and the notion that NATO should regard China as a challenge to international security was adequately reasonable. The United States added Chinese entities including companies regarded as providing satellite images to Russian private military company Wagner to the list of entities subject to regulations for export from the United States. Furthermore, Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, warned Wang Yi, Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, during their meeting in February 2023 that delivery of lethal weapons to Russia would have serious consequences for the U.S.-China relationship. Japan, as a country neighboring both countries, must continue to monitor with concern the trend of cooperation between the two countries, which has deepened further since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. **See** Chapter 3, Section 2-3 (Relations with Countries and Regions) India emphasized the need for an immediate stop to hostile operations and violence, as well as the need for a solution through diplomatic means and dialogue regarding the aggression against Ukraine and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated “Now is not the age of war” to President Putin at the Indo-Russia Summit Meeting in September 2022, while India, which has t diti ll d l ti ith R i id li it **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- criticism of Russia. As stated above, India maintains a strong military cooperative relationship with Russia and responses such as increasing the import of Russian crude oil with lower prices due to the economic sanctions have been observed. Close attention should be paid to India s movement in future. **See** Chapter 3, Section 5-5-5 (1) (Relations with Asian Countries) **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **Perspective** **Situation of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine** **YAMAZOE Hiroshi, Head, America, Europe, and Russia Division, National Institute for Defense Studies** Due to Russia’s invasion, people across Ukraine have been and that this would be a good opportunity that would not come forced into a state of war for more than two years since February around in the future. However, the reality is that Ukraine is much 2022. Not only are the government and military, led by President more resilient, and the gap between the purpose of the Putin Volodymyr Zelenskiy, conducting the defense, many people are administration’s aggression of Ukraine and the reality has become also working to protect their society through the defense of their so large that it has been unable to even think about stopping it, country, Ukraine. They are helping people in trouble, providing and the number of casualties has only increased. information useful for operations, restoring communications and If Russia ends its use of force someday, realizing that Ukraine transportation infrastructure, enhancing economic and operational is resilient and that the damage to Russia is too great, it will have capabilities through technological development and production, less incentive to resort to force again. Ukraine’s current tough fight and supporting national defense policies while debating them. In a is meaningful in that it supports future peace. It is dangerous to public opinion poll at the end of 2023, more than 70% of people give Russia room for its misconception that the use of force yields said that they should not abandon their territory, and they have a results, and the ability and resolve to dispel such misconceptions strong will to continue the operations despite their predicament. will become the foundation of peace. Russian President Vladimir Putin launched an attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, declaring a “special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine.” Although Russia conducted intensive attacks on the capital, Kyiv, the attacks were not accompanied by military preparations necessary for a full-scale capture and occupation of the city. In Russia’s view, Ukrainian politics had been always divided and fragile, so Putin probably thought that a combination of military force and insider maneuvering could easily make Ukrainian people abandon Zelenskiy’s government, whose approval rating had been declining, and create a pro-Russian government. Putin may have decided the invasion in haste, believing that the United States would not be willing to become strongly involved in Eastern Europe at the time Utility workers engaged in rebuilding after the shelling of Kharkiv [Ukrinform /Jiji Press Photo] (Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher’s academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position. ----- **Defense Policies of Countries** **Chapter** **3** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Section 1** **The United States** **Chapter** **3** **1** **Security and Defense Policies** In the National Security Strategy (NSS)[1] released in challenges alone. October 2022, the United States expressed its recognition The NSS states that China presents America’s most that it faces two strategic challenges of “geopolitical consequential geopolitical challenge and is the only competition between the major powers” with China and competitor with both the intent to reshape the international Russia, and “shared challenges” which are cross-border order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, issues such as climate change. To deal with the strategic military and technological power to do it. Based on those challenges, the United States shows its stance that it recognition, the DoD shows its idea to out-compete China focuses on investment in national power as the source of while constraining Russia which poses an acute threat to its strength and calls on its allies to invest in capabilities the international system. The NDS also states that China required for enhancing deterrence while positioning remains the most consequential strategic competitor for its alliances and partnerships as the most important the coming decades and is the most comprehensive and strategic asset. Also, it states that it has a vital interest serious challenge to U.S. national security. The NDS in deterring aggression by China, Russia and other directs the DoD to act urgently to sustain and strengthen states and expresses its intention to promote Integrated U.S. deterrence, with China as the “pacing challenge” for Deterrence[2] that achieves maximum effect in deterring the Department, which indicates Biden administration’s acts of aggression through combining capabilities with stance to prioritize addressing challenges posed by China. domestic agencies and allied countries, based on the The United States has been working to address human understanding that the United States cannot afford to rely rights issues in its relations with China. The Uyghur solely on its conventional forces and nuclear deterrence Forced Labor Prevention Act went into effect in June against competitors promoting new strategies. 2022, banning the import of all products produced In addition, the Department of Defense (DoD) in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region unless released the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in the company could prove the products were not made October 2022 and expressed its intention to advance with forced labor. Under the Indo-Pacific Economic “Integrated Deterrence” and other strategic approaches Framework for Prosperity[3] (IPEF), which was launched while identifying top level priorities that the DoD must in May the same year under the leadership of the United pursue to strengthen deterrence such as defending States as part of efforts related to economic security, homeland and deterring strategic attacks. On top of that, the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement came into force in the DoD showed its recognition that mutually beneficial February this year. At the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India alliances and partnerships are the greatest global strategic (the Quad) Summit Meeting held in the same month, the advantage of the United States and are a center of gravity leaders also announced a joint statement regarding the for the NDS, with the understanding that the United principle of critical technology supply chains, promoting States cannot meet these complex and interconnected cooperation to improve resilience against various risks **1** Both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) are required by law to be submitted to Congress within a certain period of time. Titles 50 and 10 of the United States Code respectively stipulate that the NSS shall be submitted to Congress no later than 150 days after the date on which a new President takes office and the NDS shall be submitted as soon as possible after a newly elected President has nominated a new Secretary of Defense, once the Senate has approved the nomination. **2** The approach in which a seamless combination of capabilities including integration among domains and integration with allies deter aggression by convincing an opponent the cost of hostile behavior would outweigh the benefit of it. **3** The framework aims to increase economic strength, sustainability, inclusion, economic growth, fairness and competitiveness and was initiated by 13 countries in the Indo-Pacific region: the ----- to the region. In regard to Russia, the United States evaluates that Russia poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe and it is a source of disruption and instability globally but it lacks the across the spectrum capabilities of China as Russian government has chosen to pursue an imperialist foreign policy with the goal of overturning key elements of the international order. Based on the above, the United States expressed its policy to prioritize maintaining an enduring competitive edge over China while constraining a still profoundly dangerous Russia. Furthermore, the Biden administration evaluates Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as a strategic failure that profoundly has diminished Russia’s status vis-a-vis China and other Asian powers such as India and Japan. On the other hand, together with NATO allies, the United States evaluates that they are strengthening their defense and deterrence and welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO will further improve their security and capabilities. In regard to relations with North Korea, the administration announced the completion of a review of its policy toward North Korea in April 2021 and has indicated that it intends to advance diplomacy with North Korea through a “calibrated, practical approach” with the goal of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The administration has also made clear its intention to advance its consideration in consultation with allies and partners, such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, at every step of the response to North Korea. Regarding the Middle East, negotiations to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia had been underway with the mediation of the United States, which hopes to stabilize the region. In October 2023, however, Palestinian armed groups including Hamas conducted military operations against Israel. In response, Israel launched a large-scale military operation in the Gaza Strip, an autonomous Palestinian territory. Israel has announced its intention to continue operation in the Gaza Strip until it achieves its objectives, such as the destruction of Hamas and the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. Developments in the operation need to be closely watched in light of the impact it will have on future situation in the Middle East. In addition, with regard to relations with Iran, negotiations were underway to rebuild the nuclear agreement from which the previous Trump administration withdrew in May 2018, but these i d d th i i f th l ti hi between the two countries improving. The Biden administration has indicated that its foreign policy direction will be based on international cooperation and that its responses will be made in close collaboration with allies and partners. Concrete moves in this foreign policy direction are approaches by the Quad which is a coalition of democratic partners sharing a common vision, comprising Japan, the United States, Australia and India. To realize a Free and Open IndoPacific (FOIP), the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Summit Meeting held in Hiroshima in May 2023 announced concrete details of cooperation in areas such as climate change and emerging technologies. AUKUS, a security cooperation framework established in September 2021 by three countries―Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States―to deepen diplomatic, security and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, also held a summit meeting in March 2023. At this meeting, it was announced that Australia would acquire three Virginiaclass nuclear submarines from the United States in the early 2030s and that the three countries would jointly develop new nuclear submarines. **See** Section 6-1 (Australia) On the domestic political front in the United States, a presidential election is scheduled for November 2024 and attention will be focused on how the results will affect future U.S. security and defense policies, especially those relating to the Indo-Pacific region. Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Summit Meeting during the G7 Hiroshima Summit (May 2023) [Prime Minister’s Office Website] **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **1** **Perception about Security Environment** The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that the most pressing strategic challenges to pursuing a free, d ld i f ----- great powers that combine authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy. The NSS also showed its recognition that the next ten years would be the decisive decade in setting the terms of the competition with China, managing the acute threat posed by Russia and in its efforts to deal with shared challenges, particularly climate change and pandemics. The NDS states that China seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic influence and the People’s Liberation Army’s growing strength and military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interests. As a result, the United States regards China’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor as the most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security. On the other hand, the NDS indicates that the DoD would support robust deterrence of aggression by Russia that poses acute threats such as its aggression against Ukraine with its allies and partners. North Korea is mentioned as a persistent threat continuing to expand its nuclear and missile capability to threaten the U.S. homeland and East Asia and Iran is mentioned as further undermining Middle East stability by supporting terrorist groups and malicious cyber operations. Also, the NDS shows the perception that these competitors seek adverse changes in the status quo using gray zone activities. **2** **NSS and NDS** the U.S. to address shared challenges which are cross border issues including climate change. The NDS presents four top-level defense priorities to support a stable and open international system and defense commitments; namely, 1) defending the U.S. homeland, 2) deterring strategic attacks, 3) deterring aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflict, 4) building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem. The NDS also indicates an idea to advance the top-level defense priorities through 1) Integrated deterrence, 2) Campaigning and 3) Building enduring advantages. With regard to deterring aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflicts a policy to prioritize the China’s challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe is presented. As such, attention will be focused on how the United States will deal with these challenges. **3** **Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** The NSS presents a stance to deepen partnerships with allies including Japan in the Indo-Pacific region and promote “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” through multilateral frameworks such as the Quad and AUKUS. With regard to the relationship with Japan, the United States reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under mutual security treaty, which covers the Senkaku Islands. In addition, the NSS shows an intention to expand its regional diplomatic, development and economic engagement, with a particular focus on Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. Regarding the relationship with India, which is the world’s largest democratic country and a major defense partner, the NSS states that the United States and India will work together, bilaterally and multilaterally, to support their shared vision of “FOIP” and that the United States will promote prosperity and economic connectivity across the Indian Ocean region by addressing climate change and China’s coercive behavior with regional partners in South Asia, including India. The Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was released in February 2022, clearly indicated that the United States will continue to place the highest priority on the IndoPacific region where faces increasing challenges from China. It also makes clear that the United States will cooperate with allies and partners in efforts to advance “FOIP” and strengthen regional security. In July 2020, regarding China’s maritime expansion, ft th U S D D d b t Chi ’ The NSS presents three lines of effort to realize a free, open, prosperous and secure international order; namely, 1) investing in the U.S. national power, 2) building the strongest coalition of nations and 3) modernizing and strengthening the U.S. Military. The NSS also indicates six pillars as concrete approaches to realize these directions: namely, 1) breaking down the dividing line between foreign policy and domestic policy, 2) alliances and partnerships, 3) perception of geopolitical challenges, 4) involvement in other areas, 5) correspondence with new economic situations and 6) maintaining and increasing international cooperation. On top of that, the NSS shows the policies that the United States focuses on investment in domestic strength as a source of American power, positions alliances and partnerships as its most important strategic asset and deals with strategic challenges. Furthermore, the NSS presents a policy that the United States will cooperate with any countries including nond i th t i illi t k t ti l ith ----- decision to conduct military exercises in the South China Sea, the United States deployed two Carrier Strike Groups in the South China Sea for the first time in about six years and conducted naval exercises. Since then, the United States has continued Carrier Strike Group operations in the same region to demonstrate continuously its commitment to promote “FOIP” to allies in the region. In January 2022, the State Department released a study examining China’s claims regarding its maritime rights in the South China Sea in light of international law. The study noted that China’s claims over most of the South China Sea are inconsistent with international law and gravely undermine the rule of law in the ocean. In May 2023, the U.S.-Philippines summit reaffirmed the applicability of the “Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America” in the event of an armed attack against the Philippines in the Pacific Ocean, including the South China Sea. The same month, the U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines were formulated and released for the first time to serve as a roadmap for modernizing alliance cooperation. As part of its activities around strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. Navy which promotes Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO)[4] deployed the USS America, an amphibious assault ship with enhanced ability to carry F-35B fighters and other carrier-based aircrafts to Sasebo in December 2019 and deployed for the first time the MQ-4C Triton, an unmanned maritime reconnaissance vehicle, in Guam in January 2020. The U.S. Air Force which promotes Agile Combat Employment (ACE)[5] conducts ACE exercises in the Indo-Pacific region using fighter jets and unmanned aircraft. Furthermore, the U.S. Army which promotes the Multi-Domain Operations concept announced in September 2022 the deployment of a Multi-Domain Task Force[6] in Hawaii to undertake operations simultaneously in all domains including the aspect of human cognition. The U.S. Marine Corps which promotes Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)[7] deployed its first Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) with capabilities to conduct EABO activities in Hawaii in March 2022. The 12th Marine Regiment stationed in Okinawa is scheduled to transition to the 12th Marine Coastal Regiment by 2025 and as part of this effort, the unit was redesigned in November 2023. In addition, in March 2018, the U.S. military brought the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to Vietnam, as the first U.S. aircraft carrier port call in Vietnam in more than 40 years. Another port call in the country was made in March 2020, by the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt. In 2023, various U.S. strategic assets were frequently deployed[8] around the Korean Peninsula, including a strategic nuclear submarine having made its first port call in Korea in about 40 years. The United States has continued to conduct “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South China Sea and U.S. Navy vessels and aircraft have passed through the Taiwan Strait to show the U.S. commitment to “FOIP.” The United States has made it clear that it intends to continue “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in future. In September 2023, the United States further demonstrated its growing engagement in the region, which has seen China’s attempt to expand its influence, by hosting the U.S.-Pacific Island Countries Summit and announcing initiatives to strengthen partnerships Based on the posture towards the Indo-Pacific described above, the United States appears to continue to be undertaking initiatives based on its vision of “FOIP.” In contrast, while talks between the United States and North Korea have been conducted since their first summit meeting in history held in June 2018, no specific progress has been seen with regard to the dismantlement of North Korea’s missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States and South Korea took steps including cancelling or downgrading scheduled Joint U.S.-ROK exercises in response to the meeting. Then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan expressed in regard to the U.S.-ROK exercises a willingness to maintain U.S. Forces in the ROK, stating that close coordination between the military activities of the United States and the ROK will continue to support diplomatic efforts and that the two countries were committed to ensuring the continued combined defense posture of U.S.-ROK combined forces and **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** An operational concept that concentrates overwhelming combat power by dispersing each asset and integrating them through a network. An operational concept aiming to rapidly deploy Air Force powers from dispersal airfields they have been located. The Multi-Domain Task Force is an army unit with the mission of forward execution of the “multi-domain operational concept,” an operational concept that aims to defeat the enemy’s AntiAccess/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy by conducting operations in all domains (land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, the information environment including cognitive aspects, etc.). An operational concept that executes front-line operations by rapidly dispersing and deploying within the enemy’s firepower zone and establishing temporary bases. A South Korean government official has said that U.S. strategic assets were deployed around the Korean Peninsula 17 times in 2023, a significant increase from the five-time deployments ----- on the same day as NDS, which had previously been published individually, to ensure tight linkages between each strategy. In the NPR the DoD expresses that China is the overall “pacing challenge” for U.S. defense planning and a growing factor in evaluating its nuclear deterrent and evaluates that China will become a major nuclear power following Russia by the 2030s and the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers. It also states that Russia continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in its strategy, modernize and expand its nuclear forces and brandish its nuclear weapons in support of its revisionist security policy, while recognizing that the Russia’s modern nuclear arsenal presents an enduring existential threat to the United States and its Allies and partners, and the possibility of the limited use of nuclear weapons to avoid a defeat. The NPR mentions that North Korea is not a rival on the same scale as China and Russia, but it poses a persistent threat as it expands non-nuclear capabilities as well, including its chemical weapon stockpile, in addition to nuclear and ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the DoD evaluates that a crisis or conflict on the Korean Peninsula could involve a number of nuclear-armed actors, raising the risk of broader conflict. The U.S. Government expressed its goal to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, as well as its plan to pursue engagement with other nuclear powers continuously to mitigate nuclear risks based on its understanding of the situation in respect of nuclear weapons as mentioned above. The following were raised as the roles for U.S. nuclear weapons: (1) deterrence of strategic attacks; (2) assurance of allies and partners; and (3) for achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, while “hedging against an uncertain future,” which was raised as one of roles for nuclear weapons in the NPR published under the Trump administration in 2018, was eliminated this time. Also, according to the NPR, under the declaratory policy, the basic role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks by enemies and the United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances. Although the U.S. Government conducted a thorough review of a broad range of options for nuclear declaratory policy including both “No First Use” and “Sole Purpose” policies, it concluded that those approaches would result in an unacceptable level of risk in light of the range of non-nuclear capabilities being developed and fielded by competitors that could inflict t t i l l d t th U it d St t d it lli maintaining firm military readiness. The United States and the ROK have been expanding the scope and scale of exercises since the Yoon Suk Yeol administration of ROK, which exhibits a firm stance against North Korea, was inaugurated in May 2022. The reaction of Kim Jong-un, the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea, towards this situation is intensifying and he reportedly stated the aim of the United States was “to disrupt my regime anytime,” and, to restrain the United States on a long-term basis, “we can never abandon nuclear weapons.” The U.S. Government has expressed in the NSS its intention to seek a sustained diplomatic relationship with North Korea to achieve concrete progress towards compete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while it states in the NDS that the DoD will deter attacks through forward posture of U.S. forces and nuclear deterrence against North Korea, which continues to expand its nuclear and missile capability and has been trying to drive wedges among the allies At the present point, no concrete progress can be seen in the disarmament of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and missiles. However, attention will be paid to how the United States advances its policy toward North Korea going forward. **See** Section 4-1-5 (1) (Relations with the United States) **See** **4** **Innovation in the National Defense Field** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** In President Biden’s remarks at the DoD in February 2021, the President, emphasizing the importance of technologies in national defense strategies, stated that the United States would deal with dangers and opportunities generated through emerging technologies, enhance its capabilities in cyberspace and lead in a new era of competition from deep sea to outer space. In addition, the NDS states that the DoD will support the innovation ecosystem to develop defense equipment through cooperation among research institutes, private companies and government agencies as one of the approaches to building enduring advantages. It also aims to promote research and development for advanced capabilities including in directed energy and cyber as well as create opportunities in biotechnology and quantum science. Attention will be focused on activities in this field. **5** **Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy** In October 2022, the DoD released the Nuclear Posture R i (NPR) d th Mi il D f R i (MDR) ----- and partners, but it indicated that the government retains the goal of moving toward a sole purpose declaration. Based on the understanding that the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies require tailored strategies for potential adversaries, the NPR mentioned that the United States would maintain a flexible deterrence strategy and force posture against China, while it would bolster the nuclear Triad[9] against Russia through fielding a modern nuclear Triad and with flexible, tailorable nuclear forces to deter both large-scale attacks and limited strikes. It also indicated that the United States would work on the replacement program for the nuclear triad, which most systems are operating beyond their original design life, to avoid any gaps in its nuclear deterrent, ensuring that the United States can withstand any strategic attack, tailor its deterrence strategies as needed, and assure Allies in support of its extended deterrence commitments by maintaining a modern Triad. The NPR states that, although the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) loaded with low-yield nuclear warheads that are currently in action will be maintained as flexible and adjustable nuclear power, the sea-launched nucleararmed cruise missile program mentioned in the previous NPR has been canceled. Also mentioned is a plan to transfer the roles of dual-capable aircraft (DCA) from F-15E fighters to F-35A fighters to support NATO nuclear missions. Moreover, the U.S. Government withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on August 2, 2019 as the government alleged that Russia violated the treaty. In the same month, the United States conducted a flight test of a conventionally configured ground-launched missile with a range of more than 500 km. In this regard, the United States has been working on the development of intermediate-range, conventional, and ground-launched missiles whose test launches, production and possession had been restricted by the treaty. President Putin stated in his annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly of Russia in February 2023 that the implementation of the New START Treaty (New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), extended for five years in February 2021 based on the agreement between the United States and Russia, has been halted. Attention will be focused on future movement of nuclear arms control. The MDR, whose contents strongly reflect the “integrated deterrence” concept mentioned in the NDS, expresses a concept that to protect the United States and deter attacks, missile defenses are positioned as a top priority area and that they offset benefits of an enemy attack and are useful to limit damage when deterrence has been breached. Also, the U.S. Government declares that it will recognize attacks on any U.S. territory overseas including Guam as attacks directed at the U.S. mainland and states that Guam is vital as an operation base to maintain “FOIP” and that defending Guam helps realize integrated deterrence. **6** **FY2025 Budget** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** In March 2024, the United States government released the President’s request for FY2025 discretionary funding. The President’s discretionary request for the DoD is approximately US$849.8 billion, an approximately 4% increase from the previous year. Regarding this budget, the DoD has explained that it supports the continued implementation of the NDS, which shows a policy of prioritizing the response to multi-domain challenges posed by China and the deterrence of strategic attacks. Based on above, the DoD is requesting US$9.9 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to strengthen deterrence against China in the Indo-Pacific region and is also requesting US$143.2 billion for R&D on innovation and modernization. The goals for military strength include securing 1,276,700 troops - a decrease of around 7,800 from the previous fiscal year - and in terms of equipment, the procurement of 68 F-35 fighters. **See** Fig. I-3-1-1 (Changes in the U.S. Department of Defense Budget) The nuclear triad consists of “ICBM Minuteman III,” “a strategic nuclear submarine armed with Trident II D5,” and “B-52 and B-2 strategic bombers armed with nuclear cruise missiles and ----- Fig. I-3-1-1 Changes in the U.S. Department of Defense Budget DoD Budget ($100 million) Year-on-year growth rate (%) (100 million dollars) （％） 9,000 (*Estimate) 20 8,000 15 7,000 6,000 10 **Part** 5,000 **Ⅰ** 5 4,000 **Chapter** 3,000 0 **3** 2,000 －5 1,000 0 －10 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 (FY) (Notes) 1. Figures shown are the DoD expenses based on historical tables (outlays). 2. The amount for FY2024 is an estimate. **2** **Military Posture** The U.S. air forces have roughly 3,300 combat **1** **General Situation** aircraft across the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part individual branches of the broader armed forces; rather it of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, is operated under the command of the Unified Combatant the United Kingdom, Japan and the ROK, among others. Commands, composed of forces from multiple branches In regard to strategic offensive weapons including of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands nuclear force, the United States proceeded with its consist of four commands with functional responsibilities reduction based on the New Strategic Arms Reduction and seven commands with regional responsibilities. Treaty (New START Treaty) that came into force in The U.S. ground forces have about 450,000 Army February 2011. It announced that its deployed strategic soldiers and about 170,000 Marines, which are forward- warheads[10] stood at 1,419, while its deployed delivery deployed in Germany, the ROK and Japan, among other platforms stood at 662.[11] countries. Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in The U.S. maritime forces have about 970 vessels cyberspace, in May 2018, the Cyber Command, which (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.75 had been under the U.S. Strategic Command, was million tons. The 7th Fleet is responsible for the western elevated to a unified combatant command. Pacific and the Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the In August 2019, the United States founded the Space eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Command to serve as a geographic unified combatant Caribbean Sea; the 2nd Fleet in U.S. East Coast, North command and then established the Space Force as the Atlantic Ocean and Arctic Ocean; the 6th Fleet in the sixth branch of the military within the Department of the Eastern Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea and Africa; Air Force that December. and the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the **See** Fig. I-3-1-2 (Structure of the Unified Combatant Command) northwest Indian Ocean. **10 Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and warheads equipped in deployed strategic bombers (a deployed strategic bomber is counted as one warhead) are** covered. ----- the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces Korea and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Army Pacific assigns approximately 2,400 personnel to commands in Japan, such as I Corps (Forward) and 統合軍の構成 Structure of the Unified Com the Headquarters, U.S. Army Japan Command.[12] The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East Pacific and Bering Sea. The 7th Fleet mainly consists of a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. An aircraft carrier, amphibious ships and Aegis cruisers among others are assigned to the 7th Fleet. The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and Japan. Of this force, about 20,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which employs F-35B fighters and other aircraft, and other units in Japan. In addition, the force deploys maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Pacific Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters, C-130 transport aircraft and others) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters and others) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK. **See** Fig. I-3-1-3 (U.S. Forces Deployment Status); Fig. I-3-1-4 (U.S. Engagements to the Indo-Pacific Region (image)) Fig. I-3-1-2 Structure of the Unified Combatant Command **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** |President ：Functional combatant command ：Geographic combatant command U.S. Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff OperU a. tS io. n S sp Ce oc mial m and U. CS o. mSt mra ate ng dic U.S. T Cr oa mns mp ao nrt dation U.S. Cyber Command|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|：Functional combatant command ：Geographic combatant command|Col8| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |U.S. Africa Command|U.S. Central Command|U.S. European Command|U.S. Northern Command|U.S. Indo-Pacific Command|U.S. Southern Command||U.S. Space Command| **2 �Current Military Posture in the Indo-Pacific** **Region** The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region by deploying the Indo-Pacific Command, a combatant command integrating the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Space Force, in the region. The Indo-Pacific Command is a geographic combatant command which is responsible for the largest geographical area and its subordinate unified commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea. The Indo-Pacific Command consists of the U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, U.S. Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Space Forces Indo-Pacific, all of which are headquartered in Hawaii. The Army Pacific’s subordinate commands include **12 The figures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of September 30, 2023) and could** ----- Fig. I-3-1-3 U.S. Forces Deployment Status **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** (Notes) 1 Source: Documents published by the DoD (as of December 31, 2023), etc. The majority of the Space Force personnel are based in the U.S. mainland. |European Region Army ： approx. 27,000 personnel A Navy ： approx. 8,000 personnel N Air Force ： approx. 30,000 personnel A U.S. European Command Marines ： approx 1,000 personnel M|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19|Col20|Col21|Col22|Col23|Col24|Col25|Col26|Col27|Col28|Col29|Col30| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Eu|ropea|n Reg|ion|. 27,0|00 per|sonne||l||||||||||||A|rmy|： a|U.S. Fo pprox.|rces 440,0|00 pe|rsonne|l|| ||m|y|： a|pprox|||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||v r F ari|y orce nes|： a ： a ： a|pprox. pprox. pprox|8,000 30,00 1,000|perso 0 per perso|nnel sonnel nnel||U.||||||||||||N A M|avy ir Force arines|： a ： a ： a|pprox. pprox. pprox.|325,0 313,0 167,0|00 pe 00 pe 00 pe|rsonne rsonne rsonne|l l l|| |||||||||||U.|S. Euro|pean Co|mmand||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |To|ta|l|： a|pprox.|66,00|0 per|sonnel||||||||||||||Uni T|ted States Space Fo|rc：e a|pprox.|10,00|0 pers|onnel erson|nel|| |||||||||||||||||||||||otal|： ap|prox.|1,255|,000 p|||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||nd|||||Indo-|Pacifi|c Reg||ion|||U.S. N Com|orthern mand|||||| |||||||U.S.|Central||Comma||nd||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||A N|rmy avy|： ：|appr appr||ox. 37, ox. 37,|000 pers 000 pers|onnel onnel|||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||Ai M|r Forc arines|e ： ：|appr appr||ox. 28, ox. 28,|000 pers 000 pers|onnel onnel|||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||U.S.||Indo-Pa|cific Co|mmand|To||tal|：|appr||ox. 13|0,000 pe|rsonnel|||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||U.S. S|||and||| ||||U.S. A|frica Co|mmand||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||outhern|Comm|and||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 2 The number of personnel deployed in the Indo-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam. Fig. I-3-1-4 U.S. Engagements to the Indo-Pacific Region (image) ・In January 2021, in the 2021 NDAA, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative **【ROK】** was announced with the aim of strengthening U.S. deterrence in ・Deploys THAAD **【Japan】** Indo-Pacific region. ・Increased the deployment of U.S. strategic ・Deploys the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) assets around the Korean Peninsula ・Deploys the amphibious assault ship “America” ・Deploys MV-22 Osprey and F-35B **【Vietnam】** ・Additionally deploys Aegis BMD destroyers ・A U.S. aircraft carrier visited the Da Nang ・Additionally deploys an amphibious transport dock Port (for the first time since the end of the ・Newly established a small landing craft unit Vietnam War). ・Deploys unmanned MQ-9 ・U.S. Navy vessels visited the Cam Ranh Port. **【Taiwan】** **【India】** ・Decided to sell arms ・Adopted a roadmap to accelerate ・U.S. naval vessels and military aircraft passed through U.S.-India defense industry cooperation. the Taiwan Strait. ・Signed an agreement to allow ・In the 2023 NDAA, Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act was maintenance of forward-deployed U.S. passed into law, including authorization of Foreign naval assets in India. Military Funding up to USD 10 billion in five years. **【Singapore】** ・Rotationally deploys Littoral **【Guam】** Combat Ships (LCS) ・Deploys a maritime surveillance unmanned aircraft system ・Rotationally deploys P-8 **【South China Sea】** ・ Implements Freedom of Navigation Operations by U.S. vessels **【Philippines】** ・ Conducts exercises with multiple U.S. Carrier Strike Groups ・Provides anti-terrorism equipment to the Philippines ・Landing training in multilateral exercise (Balikatan) ・Agreed expansion of military sites available to U.S. **【Pacific Island Countries】** Forces from five to nine. ・Implementation of training related to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Pacific Partnership, Christmas Drop) ・2023 agreement to extend financial support to Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands based on the Compact (see note) **【Australia】** ・Concluded a defense cooperation agreement with Papua New Guinea that allows the U.S. military access to its ports and airports. ・Rotationally deploys marines ・An over-the-horizon radar for early warning that can observe beyond the horizon is under construction in Palau. ・Increases rotational deployment of bombers and fighters (Note) This refers to the Compact of Free Association (COFA) signed between the U.S. and these countries upon their ・Increased port calls and longer stays of nuclear-powered attack submarines under AUKUS respective independence from the United Nations Trust Territories of the U.S. Under the COFA, these countries are receiving financial support from the U.S. while delegating defense and security authority to the U.S. ----- **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **Perspective** **Three-Pronged Responses Required of the United States** **KIRIDORI Ryo, Research Fellow, U.S.-Europe-Russia Division, National Institute for Defense Studies** Since 2018, the United States has pursued a force construct that by enhancing productive capacity. is capable of defeating one threat while deterring others. The Joe On the other hand, responding to multiple crises with military Biden administration has taken over this “defeat and deterrence” assistance also has side effects. In the context of strategic principle, prioritizing dealing with China in the Indo-Pacific region. competition between the United States and China, there is a What is important is that the 2022 National Defense Strategy (2022 tendency to emphasize the uncertainty surrounding the situation NDS) acknowledged the United States’ acceptance of a certain in East Asia, especially Taiwan. However, US military assistance to degree of risks from military challenges posed by countries such Taiwan and also Ukraine, Israel, and other countries can become as Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist groups but excluding a difficult-to-balance tradeoff. For instance, it is believed that the China and Russia, and even if crises occur in other regions, delivery of approximately $19.2 billion worth of weapons sold national defense planning priorities, including resource allocation, to Taiwan, which was recently approved by Congress, has been must not be affected. Some have pointed out that committing to all delayed. Many of these weapons are also in high demand in issues with limited resources lacks effectiveness. Meanwhile, with Ukraine. In addition, demand for 155mm artillery shells, which are the current force construct, if deterrence fails in relatively lower widely used by many armed forces including Taiwan, is increasing priority areas, the question remains: How much risk and crises can due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in the Gaza the United States, as a global power, actually tolerate? Strip. This is further straining the already stretched-to-capacity In this sense, the United States’ responses to the situations in U.S. weapons production lines. In response to the international Ukraine and Gaza in recent years are instructive. This is because shortage of U.S.-made weapons, the Department of Defense U.S. military assistance to Ukraine and Israel could provide an announced the National Defense Industry Strategy in January indirect boost to the military operations of regional partners while 2024, aiming to address the problem by expanding long-term minimizing the need to reallocate planned defense resources. So weapons production capacity and improving efficiency. However, far, the U.S. has not deployed a large force to any regional partner shortages of many items are expected to persist, at least in the that would force a rethinking of its combat readiness, thus avoiding short to medium term. a drain on the U.S. military’s most important asset, namely its In this way, the United States continues to engage with Europe human resources. This alone demonstrates a certain effectiveness and the Middle East through military assistance while clarifying of the military assistance approach in responding to contingencies its strategic priorities. This in itself enhances the United States’ that may occur at the same time in multiple regions while placing reputation for its resolve, but how will it continue to deploy the the highest priority on strategic competition with China. It also capabilities needed to address threats in other regions, including should be noted that the military assistance model is highly the Indo-Pacific, which is its top priority? This question is posing consistent with the 2022 NDS, as evidenced by the emphasis in a major challenge to the posture of the U.S. military, which the 2022 NDS of supporting the threat response capabilities of advocates the defeating of a single threat. It remains to be seen allies and partner countries and providing necessary capabilities how the United States will deal with the dilemma of its strategic to the U.S. and its allies and partner countries in a timely manner competition with China and its other risks. (Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher’s academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position. ----- **Section 2** **China** **1** **General Situation** China, the world’s most populous country, has a vast has been suggested that the development of the Internet landmass surrounded by a long borderline as well as and elsewhere of information and communications a long coastline. It also has various races, religions, technology (ICT) has made it difficult to control activities **Part** and languages. China’s pride in its unique history of of the masses, it has been noted that rapidly developing **Ⅰ** **Chapter** having shaped a distinct culture and civilization, and ICT technologies are exploited for social control. Since semi-colonial experience in and after the 19th century 2014, China has established laws and regulations to **3** are driving its desire for a strong nation and fueling its strengthen its domestic counterintelligence system based nationalism. on “a holistic view of national security” that covers not China faces various domestic problems including only external threats but also culture and society. human rights issues. Among the problems emerging are The “anti-corruption” movement following the launch the spread of bribery and corruption among the leadership of the Xi Jinping leadership has made inroads under the of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and such issues policy of cracking down on both “tigers” and “flies,” as disparities between urban and rural areas, and between targeting both dominant figures and junior officials. It coastal and inland regions, as well as disparities within has been pointed out that a series of dismissals of senior cities and environmental pollution. More recently, the military officials from important positions since July pace of China’s economic growth has slowed and the 2023 was also a result of “corruption”, and the “anti- country is also expected to face issues associated with corruption” movement is expected to continue. the rapid aging of the population, including problems Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party related to pensions and other aspects of the social security of China, has been making his power base in CCP stronger system. The range of factors potentially destabilizing through these and other activities. “Two Safeguards” government administration has thus been expanding meaning “uphold General Secretary Xi’s core position and becoming increasingly diverse. Additionally, there on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a have been protests about human rights violations against whole and uphold the Central Committee’s authority ethnic minorities of the Tibet Autonomous Region, the and its centralized, unified leadership” was incorporated Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and elsewhere. into the Party constitution as an obligation at the 20th The international community has grown interested National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (20th in human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur CCP Congress) held in October 2022. In addition, in the Autonomous Region. In addition, in Hong Kong, in 1st Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of response to a series of large-scale protests occurring the CCP held immediately after the 20th CCP Congress, since 2019, the “Law of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping secured his third term, and personnel changes on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong that allow persons close to Xi to occupy the majority of Special Administrative Region” was established and entered into force in June 2020, resulting in the arrests of protesters. In March 2024, Regulations on the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was enacted and enforced to supplement the aforementioned law. Moreover, popular concern over the measures has spread. For example, under the electoral system in Hong Kong, which was changed to tout the idea of “patriots run Hong Kong,” “pro-China” candidates took nearly all the seats in the legislative election in December 2021 and the district council election in December 2023. Amid these circumstances, the Chinese Government Xi Jinping, currently in his third term as general secretary [ [EPA/Jiji] h b ti ht i it t l i t Whil it ----- the CCP leaderships were announced. There were moves any move towards the independence of Taiwan, and has in which high-ranking officials who were reportedly repeatedly stated that although it will strive with utmost appointed by General Secretary Xi were dismissed one effort to realize a peaceful reunification, it will not after another, including then Minister of Foreign Affairs promise to renounce the use of force. “The Anti-Secession Qin Gang in July 2023 and then Foreign Minister Law,” enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out China’s of National Defense Li Shangfu in October 2023. In policy of not renouncing the use of force, providing that **Part** general, however, an environment is being created in in the event that possibilities for a peaceful reunification **Ⅰ** which Xi’s intentions will be more directly reflected in should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ **Chapter** China’s policy decisions. nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to **3** China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In of China and that the Taiwan issue is a domestic one. the revised party constitution adopted at the 20th CCP China maintains that the “One China” principle is the Congress, the phrase “the CCP resolutely opposes and underlying premise and foundation for dialogue between deters separatists seeking ‘Taiwan Independence’” was China and Taiwan. China is also strongly opposed to any added, and blocking the independence of Taiwan was foreign intervention in the unification of China as well as placed as a party duty. **2** **Military Affairs** hindering the enemy’s ability to demonstrate its military **1** **General Situation** power. For example, it has been rapidly expanding its For more than 30 years, China has sustained high-level capabilities in the cyber domain, enabling it to disrupt growth of its defense budget without transparency, enemy communications networks, and in the field of engaging in broad, rapid improvement of its military electromagnetic spectrum, which offers the potential power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus to render enemy radar ineffective. In the space domain, on nuclear, missile, naval, and air forces. China has China is also focusing on securing supremacy in new also intensified its attempts to unilaterally change the areas, including continuing to strengthen its capabilities status quo by force in the waters and airspace of the East to limit its enemies’ use of space. Bolstering these China Sea and South China Sea, including its intrusions capabilities will reinforce China’s **“Anti-Access/Area** into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace around the **Denial (A2/AD)” capabilities and lead to the establishment** Senkaku Islands, and is expanding and intensifying its of operational capabilities further afield. military activities in the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Additionally, China is promoting the so-called Ocean, which is affecting Japan’s national security. **“development strategy of civil-military fusion”** across In strengthening its military capabilities, China has the board and is striving to develop and acquire cutting- so far emphasized improving its ability to carry out edge technologies that can be used for military purposes. practical joint operations by modernizing its military Such cutting-edge technologies include the use of through military reforms and other measures. AI (Artificial Intelligence) and other so-called game- China has also been placing emphasis on the changing technologies that will completely change the “informatization” of its military, with the aim of nature of future combat. improving the military’s overall operational capability Along with this strengthening of its military power, through the acquisition of information superiority and **KEY WORD** **Civil-military fusion** **KEY WORD** **Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)** Civil-military fusion is an initiative promoted by China as a national strategy **capabilities** designed to promote the military use of civilian resources and the civilian The A2/AD capabilities represent a concept given by the United States. use of military technologies in peacetime as well as emergency, in addition Anti-Access or A2 capabilities refer mainly to long-range capabilities to to the traditional development of defense mobilization arrangements for block adversaries from entering some operating zones. Area-Denial or AD emergency. In particular, initiatives in seas, outer space, cyberspace, and capabilities refer to short-range capabilities to limit adversaries’ freedom of artificial intelligence (AI), which are referred to as “emerging areas” for action within operating zones. China are viewed as priority areas for civil-military fusion. ----- and development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. Such military buildup in China apparently indicates that China has given top priority to dealing with a Taiwan contingency by improving its capabilities to deter or deny Taiwan’s independence and foreign military support for the Taiwanese independence and has recently considered the improvement of operational capabilities in more distant waters to protect its expanding overseas interests. Furthermore, China seems to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means in military affairs and warfare. It regards the concept of “Three Warfare” - “Media Warfare,” “Psychological Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” - as part of the political work of the military. In addition, China has set forth a policy of coordinating military struggle closely with political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors. As for the future goals of the development of national defense and military forces, General Secretary Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017 and the defense white paper released in 2019 noted that China would try to (1) basically achieve mechanization and make great progress in informatization to dramatically improve strategic capabilities by 2020, (2) basically complete the modernization of national defense and military forces by 2035, and (3) generally transform Chinese forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century. In the 5th Plenary Session held in October 2020, the goal year for 1st stage mentioned above, China’s determination to achieve a struggle goal for the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the PLA in 2027 was announced. The new “three-step development strategy” was stipulated in the so-called “historic resolution” in 6th Plenary Session in 2021, which consists of the achievement of the 100th anniversary struggle goal of the PLA by 2027 as the first step, and achievement of the aforementioned goals by 2035 and the mid-21st century as the second and third steps respectively. Furthermore, the report of 20th CCP Congress in 2022 newly stated that elevating the PLA to world-class standards “more quickly” is a strategic task for building a modern socialist country in all respects, and it is possible that the CCP is considering moving forward its target of “establishing world-class forces,” scheduled for the mid-21st century. However, China has recognized a wide gap between the real military modernization level and the level China has expanded beyond the so called the first island chain and into the second island chain, including the East China Sea around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and even the Western Pacific, including around the Izu and Ogasawara Islands, intensifying activities in the entire area surrounding Japan. China is increasing military pressure on Taiwan and also promoting the establishment of military bases in the South China Sea. Moreover, China is further strengthening its cooperation with Russia, including in military activities. China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power including its defense capabilities and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries, and others. **2** **Defense Policies** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** China has described the objectives of its defense policies and the missions of its military forces as: supporting the CCP’s leadership, China’s characteristic socialism system, and the modernization of its socialism; defending the nation’s sovereignty, unification and security; backing the nation’s sustainable “peaceful development” through protecting its maritime and overseas national interests; building strong national defense and massive military forces commensurate with the interests of the nation’s security and the interests of development; and providing strong assurances for realizing the “Chinese dream” of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. China contends that these national defense policies are “defensive” in nature.[1] To develop national defense and military forces, China has employed a policy of building the “system of modern military power with Chinese characteristics” by sustaining the military development under the party, the military buildup through reforms, military promotion based on science and technology, and law-based military governance, by pursuing practical capabilities that “can fight and win a war” by giving greater priority to the civil-military fusion, by promoting the fusion ----- required for national security, and between Chinese and world-class military forces. Although China has not defined what it means by “world-class forces,” it has been pointed out that China may be trying to develop military forces that equal or in some cases surpass the U.S. military. Furthermore, it has also been pointed out that China aims to build “world-class forces” capable of “intelligentized warfare” by acquiring advanced technology and becoming an “innovation superpower.”[2] In light of this, it is suggested that China is planning to offset its military power gap with the U.S. military, and may recognize that the “intelligentization” of its forces is a necessary condition for this. It is thought that China will aim to build an army that can “fight and win a war” against the U.S. military in the “intelligentized warfare” of the future.[3] Based on that recognition, it is expected that China will further accelerate the military modernization against the backdrop of national power development and General Secretary Xi’s enhancement of his power base in the CCP in his third term and expansion of his power as Chairman of the Central Military Commission.[4] **3 �Transparency Concerning Defense Policies** **and Military Affairs** actions. For example, the submerged transit of a Chinese Navy submarine through Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands was confirmed in January 2018, but China did not acknowledge this. In the same way, in the cases of submarines in the contiguous zone around Amami Oshima Island presumed to belong to China confirmed in June 2020 and September 2021, China did not acknowledge this fact. On the contrary, there were some Chinese media reports that criticized the Japanese side by claiming they were making exaggerations. China’s influence in the international community has risen politically, economically, and militarily. It has become increasingly important for China to improve its transparency regarding defense policies and military affairs, provide fact-based explanations about its activities, and share and observe international rules as a responsible country in the international community to allay concerns about China. It is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency through such efforts as specific and accurate information disclosure. **4** **National Defense Budget** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** China announced that its national defense budget for FY2024 was approximately RMB 1,665.54 billion (approximately JPY 33,310.8 billion when the value is mechanically converted at 20 JPY per RMB.)[5] This is around 7.2% growth from the budget of the previous fiscal year according to China’s announcement. China’s announced defense budget has been increasing at a rapid pace, and the nominal size of China’s announced defense budget has increased approximately 32 times in the 30 years since fiscal 1994, and approximately 2.1 times in the decade since fiscal 2014. China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development. It is believed that China has continued to invest resources in the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem with its economic development. However, there have been many years in which the announced annual national defense budget increase rate exceeded the economic growth (an increase in gross domestic product [GDP]). Attention is to be paid to how the slowdown in China’s economic growth would affect China has neither set out a clear and specific future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured adequate transparency of its decision-making process in relation to military and security affairs. Although China had released a defense white paper roughly every two years since 1998, it has not released a white paper in recent years since “China’s National Defense in the New Era” released in July 2019 for the first time in four years. Even the white paper did not sufficiently clarify the specific situation of equipment possession, procurement goals and results, the organization and deployment of major units, the military’s major operations and training results, and the breakdown of national defense expenditures. Incidents in which Chinese authorities provide factually inaccurate explanations or refuse to admit facts regarding Chinese military activities have been confirmed, inciting concerns over China’s military decision-making and According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2021) There is a view that “intelligentization” of the military provides an excellent opportunity for a latecomer’s military to leap ahead in development and thereby rapidly surpass other advancedlevel militaries. The Central Military Commission is a leading and commanding organ to China’s armed forces. Formally, there are the CCP CMC and the People’s Republic of China CMC. However, each consists of the same members, indicating both commissions as an organ for the party to control the armed forces. The announced defense budget of China is rapidly increasing. The budget of FY2024 is about 4.3 times larger than defense-related expenditures of Japan. Japan’s defense-related ----- Fig. I-3-2-1 Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget （％） 25 20 18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** 15 10 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 |（ ion yuan)|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Defense budget (in 100 million yuan)|||| |Year-on-year growth rate (%)|||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||Japan’s defense-related expenditures in FY2024:||| ||||| ||7,7249 trillion yen||| Japan’s defense-related expenditures in FY2024: 7,7249 trillion yen 0 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 24 (FY) (Note) This basically shows the defense budget within “the central government’s general public budget,” which had been named as “the central fiscal expenditures” prior to FY2014. Year-on-year growth rate compares the budget of a given year against the initial budget of the previous year. Note that the FY2002 defense budget was calculated based on the increased amount from the defense budget in the previous FY because only the amount and rate of growth were released. For FY2016 and FY2018-2024, the amounts of “the central government expenditures,” which are part of the central government’s general public budget, are used because they were the only announced amounts. Figures for year-on-year growth rate include figures announced by China. its national defense budget. In addition, the amount of the announced defense budget is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include foreign equipment procurement costs or research and development (R&D) expenses. According to an analysis of the U.S. DoD, actual defense spending in FY2022 was significantly higher than the announced national defense budget.[6] As for a breakdown of the national defense budget, past defense white papers specified personnel, training and sustainment, and equipment expenses for the announced national defense budgets for FY2007, FY2009 and FY2010-2017 (and expenses for active, reserve and militia forces for FY2007 and FY2009). However, no more details have been given. **See** Fig. I-3-2-1 (Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget) **See** **5** **Military Posture** is defined as a people’s force created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Rocket Force, the Information Support Force, the Joint Logistics Support Force, etc. The PAP is designed to engage mainly in patrol, emergency response, counterterrorism, maritime rights protection and law enforcement, emergency rescue, defense operations, etc. The militia is planned to engage in economic construction, etc., in peacetime and undertake logistic support missions in an emergency. **(1) Military Reforms** In recent years, China is said to have been engaged in military reforms seen as the largest in its history. China is also said to have largely completed central military reforms by the end of 2016. Specifically, they abolished the PLA’s seven Military Regions and created five new Theaters with primary responsibility for command of operations, namely, the Eastern Theater, Southern Theater, Western Theater, Northern Theater, and Central Theater. In addition, they also formed the PLA Army (PLAA) Headquarters-ranked equally with the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Headquarters-, the Rocket Force (PLARF), the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), and the Joint Logistics China’s armed forces are composed of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP), and the militia. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC). The PLA ----- Support Force. Moreover, the headquarters for the entire PLA were replaced by 15 functional sections under the CMC, including the Joint Staff Department, Political Work Department, Logistics Support Department, and Equipment Development Department. On the other hand, there are also moves to reorganize the central-level organizations. In April 2024, the establishment of the new “Information Support Force” was announced. This is pointed out to be a reorganization of the Strategic Support Force which was established at the end of 2015. Military reforms seem to be under way since 2017, including those at the field level. These series of reforms are believed to be aimed at building a more combat-ready military by improving its ability to carry out joint operations. In addition, it has been noted that the reorganization of the headquarters is a means of tackling corruption at the center of the military by decentralizing the leading organs. Persons close to and deeply trusted by Xi Jinping are actively appointed as members of the CMC; for example, Zhang Youxia remained in his position as Vice Chairman of the CMC in the 1st Plenary Session after the 20th CCP Congress held in October 2022. Given these points, it is thought that Chairman Xi is attempting to further enhance his leadership in the CMC and the military. **(2) Nuclear and Missile Forces** China has continued independent efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missiles for their delivery since the mid-1950s, indicating its apparent attempt to ensure nuclear deterrence, supplement its conventional forces with nuclear capabilities and secure its influence on the international community. It is regarded that China’s nuclear strategy is to deter any nuclear attack on its territory by maintaining a nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a limited number of targets such as cities in adversary countries, should China be subject to nuclear attacks. China has explained that it is committed to “no first use” of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, to “unconditional negative security assurance” that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally, and to keeping its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. In recent years, however, doubts have been expressed about the explanation.[7] China is aiming to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear capabilities. It is investing in and increasing the number of means to deliver nuclear weapons by land, sea, and air, as well as increasing the production of nuclear warheads. The number of operational nuclear warheads in its possession exceeds 500 as of May 2023, and it has been pointed out that it may exceed 1,000 by 2030 and continue to increase until 2035.[8] Furthermore, the United States has requested China’s participation in the framework of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which sets limits on strategic nuclear forces between the United States and Russia, but China has consistently refused to participate. It is believed that China plans to strengthen deterrence against the United States and will continue to place importance on nuclear and missile capabilities in the future. China possesses ballistic missiles of various types and ranges, including ICBMs, SLBMs, intermediaterange ballistic missiles (IRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The update of China’s ballistic missile forces from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant system is improving their survivability and readiness. Moreover, it is believed that China is working to increase their performance by such means as extending ranges, improving targeting accuracy, and employing maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). China’s main ICBMs, its strategic nuclear asset, had been the fixed-site liquid-propellant DF-5 missiles. However, China has in recent years deployed the DF31, which is a mobile-type ICBM with a solid propellant system mounted onto a transporter erector launcher (TEL). In addition, China has reportedly deployed the **DF-41, a new type of ICBM that first appeared in a** military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of its founding in October 2019 and is said to have a range of approximately 11,200 km and can carry 10 warheads. China is also building ICBM silos and is reported to have constructed three new launch facilities in 2022, including more than 300 new silos.[9] In addition, it has been pointed out that China is pursuing the development of an ICBM equipped with a conventional warhead, **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023) According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023) ----- in order to be able to threaten the U.S. mainland with conventional forces[10]. With regard to submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), it is considered that Jin-class Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) equipped with **JL-2 with an estimated range of approximately 7,200 km** are operational. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that JL-3s, extended range SLBMs reportedly with a range of 12,000 km, have already been loaded into the Jing-class SSBNs, making them possible to reach the mainland United States from China’s coastal waters.[11] China’s missile forces have been put outside the framework of the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and China holds numerous amounts of ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km that had been subjected to the INF treaty. It is also deemed that China is ahead of the United States in relation to ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.[12] As for the IRBMs/ MRBMs covering the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, China has the mobile solid-propellant DF-21 and DF-26, which can be transported and operated on TELs. These are viewed as capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. China possesses ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), called “carrier killer,” which carries conventional warheads to attack overwater ships including aircraft carriers. The DF-26, which has a range including Guam and is called “Guam killer,” is considered a “second-generation ASBM” developed on the basis of the DF-21D. Its deployment was announced in April 2018. China also possesses the CJ-20 (CJ-10) long-range land-attack cruise missile with a range of at least 1,500 km, as well as the H-6 bomber that is capable of carrying this cruise missile. It is deemed that these missiles complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Indo-Pacific region including Japan. In the military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of its founding in October 2019, CJ-100/DF-100, which is said to be a supersonic cruise missile, also made its first public appearance. The deployment of these ASBMs and cruise missiles is expected to strengthen China’s “A2/AD” capabilities. Concerning SRBMs, China has deployed a large number of solid propellant DF 16, DF 15, and DF 11 missiles facing Taiwan. It is believed that their ranges cover a part of Japan’s Southwestern Islands including the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, China is believed to be rapidly developing multiple models of hypersonic glide vehicles **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **DF-41 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)** 【Specifications, performance】 Maximum firing range: 11,200 km 【Description】 New intercontinental-range ballistic missile showcased for the first time at the military parade commemorating the 70th DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile anniversary of China’s founding in [Imaginechina/Jiji Press Photo] October 2019. Viewed as capable of carrying 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and having attack capabilities with high accuracy. **JL-2 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)** 【Specifications, performance】 Maximum firing range: 7,200 km 【Description】 Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) viewed as strategic nuclear forces of Chinese Navy. It is pointed out JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile that China is developing and (SLBM) [Avalon/Jiji] deploying JL-3 SLBMs (maximum range 12,000 km - 14,000 km) with extended ranges for further strengthening strategic nuclear forces. **DF-17 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)** 【Specifications, performance】 Maximum firing range: 2,000 km 【Description】 Medium-range ballistic missiles viewed as having been developed based on DF-16 SRBMs and as being capable DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile of carrying a Hypersonic Glide capable of carrying a hypersonic glide Vehicle (HGV). Showcased for the weapon [Avalon/Jiji] first time at the military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019. **10 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)** **11 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)** ----- missile defenses. In the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019, the DF**17 MRBM viewed as capable of carrying a hypersonic** glide vehicle made its first public appearance. The U.S. |Col1|11,200km| |---|---| |12,000km|| Fig. I-3-2-2 Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing) (image) New York Washington D. C. Chicago 11,200km Los Angeles 12,000km London San Francisco Paris 5,500km Anchorage 4,000km Moscow 2,800km 2,150km Hawaii Beijing Pyongyang New Delhi Tokyo 2,150km Maximum range of DF-21, DF-21A/B/C/D/E Okinawa Guam 2,800km Maximum range of DF-3, DF-3A 4,000km Maximum range of DF-26 5,500km Maximum range of DF-4 Jakarta 11,200km Maximum range of DF-31, DF-31A/AG 12,000km Maximum range of DF-5, DF-5A/B Canberra (Note) The figure above is for illustrative purpose, showing the range of each missile from Beijing. Fig. I-3-2-3 Changes in the Number of China’s Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile Launchers (Number of launchers) 600 DoD has pointed out that China began DF 17s operations in 2020 and some older SRBMs may be replaced with DF-17.[13] Furthermore, China conducted its first orbital launch of an ICBM carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ICBM DF-41 ICBM DF-5/A/B ICBM DF-31/A/AG IRBM DF-4 IRBM DF-26 MRBM DF-3/A MRBM DF-21/A/B/C/D/E MRBM DF-17 SRBM DF-16 SRBM DF-15/A/B SRBM DF-11/A 500 400 300 200 100 ICBM IRBM MRBM SRBM 1994 2004 2014 2024 (Year) (Notes) 1 The numbers of launchers, missiles, and warheads of ballistic missiles possessed by China are not publicized. 2 This data classifies the number of launchers possessed by China into ICBM, IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM according to the general standard based on “The Military Balance” of each year. ----- downsizing, multifunctionality, and modularization of military units. Specifically, it is believed to be shifting from a regional defense type to a region-wide mobility type and is improving mobility by motorizing and mechanizing infantry units, as well as strengthening airborne units of the Air Force, amphibious units of the Army and Navy, special forces, and helicopter units. It is said that the Navy Marine Corps is still in the process of reinforcement. It is reportedly acquiring equipment and conducting training necessary to become an expeditionary force. On the other hand, it repeatedly conducts training for amphibious operation including using civilian RORO vesseles.[17] It is also pointed out that these activities suggest that Navy Marine Corps troops are to be flexibly utilized in multiple roles in a scenario surrounding Taiwan.[18] The Chinese Army is reportedly has been conducting trainings that focus on combined combat operations and incorporating mock confrontation drills to improve its ability to conduct practical operations. China has conducted on a regular basis Stride, Firepower, and Sharp Sword maneuver-exercises that cut across multiple regions. They are aiming at verifying and improving the capabilities necessary to deploy army troops to remote areas, such as long-distance maneuvering capabilities of the Army, and logistical support capabilities that include mobilizing militias and public transportation. The U.S. DoD has pointed out that the Chinese Army conducted multiple large-scale 24-hour exercises at exercise areas across the country in 2022, including exercises to respond to U.S. and Taiwanese military activities.[19] These facts suggest China’s attempt to improve its practical operational capabilities. The above described PAP consists of internal security corps, which are organized and established based on administrative divisions such as provinces and autonomous regions, mobile corps, which do not have fixed areas in charge and perform missions across different areas, and the Coast Guard, described later, which is said to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and maritime interests as well as implements law enforcement. The PAP is said to own various equipment such as armored vehicles, rotary-wing aircraft, and heavy machine guns. in July 2021. The vehicle reportedly flew approximately 40,000 km in over 100 minutes, and did not strike its target, but came close.[14] In addition, it has been pointed out that multiple warheads can be attached to the aforementioned new ICBM, the DF-41, and that China is testing an intercontinental range HGV. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that it is highly likely that the launch vehicle is derived from the DF-41. It will not only be capable of significantly extending the effective range of HGVs compared to the DF-17, but will also be capable of carrying larger, heavier hypersonic glide vehicles. These weapons are said to be more difficult for missiles to intercept because they fly low at very high speeds and are highly maneuverable. China seems to be building a missile defense system and is believed to be focusing on developing related technologies, such as the “HQ-19” ballistic missile defense system. It is believed that China has been conducting missile interceptor tests in the mid-course phase since 2010. It has been pointed out that this is an attempt to acquire capabilities to respond to IRBMs and other missiles.[15] Cooperation with Russia has also been noted, with joint missile defense computer exercises “Aerospace Safety” having been held in 2016 and 2017. In May 2019, two surface-to-air missile systems “S-400s” introduced from Russia were reportedly deployed near Beijing. In October of the same year, Russian President Putin stated that Russia was helping China build a “missile-attack early warning system.” Furthermore, the U.S. DoD has pointed out the possibility that China has at least three early warning satellites in orbit as of 2022.[16] Given that ballistic missile defense technology has the potential to be applied to missiles capable of destroying satellites, attention will focus on future Chinese missile defense trends. **See** Fig. I-3-2-2 (Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing) (image)); Fig. I-3-2-3 (Changes in the Number of China’s **See** Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile Launchers) **(3) Ground Forces** China has the third largest ground forces in the world, following India and North Korea, with approximately 970,000 personnel. China has sought to improve the operational capabilities of ground forces pursuing the **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **14 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)** **15 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)** **16 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)** **17 Roll-on-Roll-off ships. Generally, ships to which vehicles loaded with cargo are driven aboard on their own wheels, that can be transported with cargo.** **18 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2022)** ----- Furthermore, it is reported that the PAP focuses on maintaining internal security and joint operations with the PLA, and is developing capabilities for readiness, mobility, and counter-terrorism operations.[20] **See** Fig. I-3-2-4 (Deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (image)) **See** **(4) Naval Forces** The naval forces consist of three fleets: North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. China’s naval forces, which own a larger scale of ships exceeding the U.S. Navy and are said to be the largest navy in the world.[21] The Chinese Navy is rapidly modernizing, increasing production of surface combatant vessels such as the Jankai II-class frigates, which are highly capable of fleet air defense and anti-ship attack, and the Renhai-class destroyers, which are the largest in the Chinese Navy, and domestically produced Yuan class-submarines, which has its strength on quietness, as well as reinforcing landing ships and aircraft carriers. The Renhai-class destroyer is said to be equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) with 112 launch cells, almost twice the number of launch cells as the new Luyang III class destroyer. This VLS is said to be capable of launching long-range land-attack cruise missiles and YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles with a supersonic terminal attack capability, as well as ASBMs. It has also been pointed out that the destroyer is being considered as a launch vehicle to defend against ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase,[22] and that this suggests a plan for capability of carrying anti-ship HGVs. At least eight Renhai-class destroyers have been in service by April 2024, and they may become the key to the Chinese Navy’s long-range missile capabilities in the future. As for landing ships, large Yusheng-class landing ships have been launched one after another. The No.1 warship “Hainan” was commissioned in the Southern Theater in April 2021, the No. 2 warship “Guangxi” was commissioned in the Eastern Theater in December of the same year, the No. 3 warship “Anhu” was commissioned in 2022, and the No. 4 warship is said to have already been launched. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that Type-076 landing ships may be built following on from the Yushen-class landing ships. In addition, China is currently operating two aircraft carriers and is in the process of building a third. The **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Fig. I-3-2-4 Deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (image) Central Theater Northern Theater (Headquarters: Beijing) (Headquarters: Shenyang) Western Theater (Headquarters: Chengdu) Shijiazhuang Jinan Qingdao Eastern Theater東部戦区 Lanzhou (Headquarters: Nanjing)（司令部：南京） Ningbo Southern Theater Fuzhou (Headquarters: Guangzhou) Nanning Zhanjiang 500km (Notes) 1 ●Theater headquarters Theater Army organization Theater Navy headquarters 2 Theater boundaries have not been officially announced. The above map is prepared based on U.S. DoD reports, media reports, etc. **20 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)** **21 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)** ----- first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, was commissioned in September 2012, and the first domestically produced aircraft carrier (China’s second aircraft carrier), Shandong[23], was commissioned in December 2019, operating in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Pacific Ocean, respectively. Moreover, the second domestically built aircraft carrier (China’s third aircraft carrier) **Fujian, which was launched in June 2022, is** believed to be larger than the Liaoning and Shandong and equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system capable of operating fixed-wing early warning aircraft. This has been pointed out to improve operational capabilities for the carrier-based aircraft. It has also been pointed out that China has plans to build nuclearpowered aircraft carriers. China is believed to have been developing and deploying unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) that are available for military purposes. Such equipment is considered an asymmetric force that is relatively inexpensive, yet capable of interfering with the enemy’s ability to gain superiority at sea and in the water. Given these developments concerning the naval forces, China appears to be steadily building up capabilities for conducting operations in more distant waters in addition to near sea defense. It has also been pointed out that in the near future, the PLA Navy will have the capability **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **Aircraft carrier “Fujian”** 【Specifications, performance】 Full-load displacement: Over 80,000 tons Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h) Number of aircraft: 60-70, including J-15 fighters, KJ-600 early warning aircraft, and others The third PLA aircraft carrier “Fujian,” which is China’s second indigenous one 【Description】 [China News Service/Jiji] China’s second indigenous aircraft carrier believed to be equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system. The first sea trail was conducted in May 2024 (pointed out in general reporting etc.) to make long-range precision strikes against land targets using land-attack cruise missiles from submarines and surface combatant ships, and its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of surface combatants and fixed and rotary wing aircraft are significantly improved, while it continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability.[24] It is necessary to continue to monitor the related developments. The People’s Armed Police Force (PAP), one of China’s armed forces other than the military, has the Coast Guard, which is said to be the world’s largest maritime law enforcement agency, under its umbrella. Fig. I-3-2-5 China’s Main Maritime Forces Modern submarines Modern destroyers and frigates (Number of vessels) **55** 90 80 |55|55| |---|---| ||| 70 60 50 40 30 **94** (Number of vessels) 60 50 40 30 20 |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Modern submarines of Japan||||| |0|: 22 (as of March 31, 2024)|||| Modern submarines of Japan : 22 (as of March 31, 2024) 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 20 21 (Note) Total number of Jin-class, Shang-class, Song-class, Yuan-class and Kilo-class submarines |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||| |||| |||| ||Modern destroyers and frigates of Japan: 50|| |0|(as of March 31, 2024)|| Modern destroyers and frigates of Japan: 50 (as of March 31, 2024) 22 23 24(Year) 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 (Year) (Notes) 1 Total number of Renhai-class, Luhu-class, Luhai-class, Sovremenny-class, Luyang-class and Luzhou-class destroyers, and Jiangwei-class and Jiangkai-class frigates. 2 Additionally, China has 49 Jiangdao-class corvettes (in 2024). **23 The “Shandong” is a ski-jump type aircraft carrier that is said to be an improved version of the “Liaoning,” and it has been pointed out that it can accommodate increased number of aircraft** on board. ----- In recent years, the Coast Guard s vessels have become larger and more armed. At the end of December 2023, the China Coast Guard possessed 159 ships[25] with full load displacement of 1,000 tons or more, including two 10,000-ton-class patrol ships, among the world’s largest ones. The operations of vessels equipped with a gun-like armament were observed as well. It is pointed out that the newer ships are significantly larger and more capable than older ships, and are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, guns ranging from 20mm to 76mm, and other equipment, so that they are able to withstand long-term operations and engage in distant-water activities.[26] The enhanced cooperation between the PLA and the China Coast Guard has also been confirmed. In July 2018, the China Coast Guard that had been conducting maritime surveillance operations under the direction of the State Council’s Ministry of Public Security was transferred to the PAP as the PAP Coast Guard and is currently operated under the PAP, which receives unified guidance and command from the Central Military Commission. After the transfer, former naval officers were reportedly given major Coast Guard posts, indicating enhanced cooperation between the military and Coast Guard. It has been noted that retired naval destroyers and frigates were delivered to the Coast Guard, suggesting that the military has been supporting the Coast Guard in terms of equipment as well as personnel. It has been pointed out that the military forces and the Coast Guard have conducted joint exercises. The enhanced cooperation between the PLA and the PAP including the Coast Guard is believed to be intended to steadily strengthen their joint operational capabilities through the enhancement of cooperation. Amid such a situation, in June 2020, “Law of the People’s Republic of China in the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP Law) was revised, and “protection of maritime interests and law enforcement” were added to the duties of the PAP. The revised version also stipulates that the PAP shall be centrally and uniformly guided by the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the People’s Republic of China. The Coast Guard Law of the People’s Republic of China (Coast Guard Law), which stipulates the Coast Guard’s responsibilities and authority including the use of weapons, was newly enacted in January 2021 and entered into force in February 2021. The Coast Guard Law includes problematic provisions in terms of their inconsistency with international law. The Coast Guard Law must not be allowed to infringe on the legitimate interests of the relevant countries including Japan. Furthermore, it is completely unacceptable that the law **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** |Minis Agricult Rural|try of ure and Affairs| |---|---| |Central Military Commission State Council (central government) （Note 1） （Note 3） Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of General Public Security Natural Agriculture and Administration Ministry of Transport Resources Rural Affairs of Customs Militia PAP PLA China Maritime Fisheries Safety Management Administration （Note 2） Bureau China Coast Guard China Maritime China Coast China Marine Bureau of General Administration Safety Guard Surveillance Fisheries of Customs Administration Protect maritime interests Maritime traffic (Crackdown on crime, maintenance of maritime security and protection of safety, management resources development, fishery management, crackdown on trafficking, etc.)|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Minis Tran|try of sport| |||| ||China M Saf Admini|aritime ety stration| |||| |||| ||China Maritime Safety Administration|| ||Maritime traffic management|| Fig. I-3-2-6 The Coast Guard’s Transfer to the PAP (Notes) 1 Unification of PAP leadership and command system (January 1, 2018) 2 Transfer of the Coast Guard to the PAP (July 1, 2018) 3 The amendment to the People’s Armed Police Law (June 21, 2020) → In emergency situations, the Central Military Commission, or else the military of the Theater Commands, can issue orders to the divisions of the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP). 4 The scope of the China Coast Guard that is transferred to the PAP and placed under its command is unknown. 5 Units enclosed by a red dotted line belonged to the China Coast Guard before the realignment (2013). **25 According to “Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2024,” Japan Coast Guard** ----- would increase tensions in maritime areas such as the East China Sea. It is pointed out that, among the militia, whose status is China’s armed force other than the military, the so-called maritime militia is playing the role of the front guard for supporting China’s maritime interests. The maritime militia is said to operate in the South China Sea, etc. and consist of fishermen and residents of isolated islands.[27] Given the China’s emphasis on the necessity of “fully exerting the overall power of the military, police and militia” on the seas, attention should be paid to these asymmetrical forces, too. **See** Fig. I-3-2-5 (China’s Main Maritime Forces); Fig. I-3-2-6 (The Coast Guard’s Transfer to the PAP); and Fig. I-3-2-7 (Buildup **See** of China Coast Guard Vessels). **(5) Air Forces** domestic J 10 fighter. The J 15 carrier based fighters, which are also carried on the aircraft carriers “Liaoning” and “Shandong,” are said to have been copied from the Russian Su-33. China is deploying J-20 fifth-generation fighters and developing J-31 (J-35) fighter. It has been pointed out that J-31 (J-35) fighter could be the base for developing the replacement for the J-15 carrier-based fighter. As China is continuing the modernization of its bombers as well, the Air Force has increased the number of **H-6 bombers, which are capable of carrying long-** range land-attack cruise missiles with nuclear capability. In an attempt to improve bombers’ long-range operation capabilities, the Air Force has reportedly begun to operate H-6N bombers that can take advantage of aerial refueling to fly longer. It is believed to be developing a new long-range stealth bomber called H-20. It is also pointed out that China is developing an air-launched ballistic missile with nuclear capability to be carried by such bombers. Moreover, it has also been pointed out that China is developing a stealth bomber. China is also making continuous efforts to improve **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Fig. I-3-2-7 Buildup of China Coast Guard Vessels (Vessels) 160 120 100 40 20 0 |sels) 159＊2 159＊2 157 157|Col2| |---|---| |115577 115599 113300 113311 113322|| |112266|| ||| |8822 ＊＊11|| |6666 6699 7700 7711 7755 6622|| |5511|5544 4400| ||| ||| 2012 2014 2017 2019 2020 **159159[＊2]** 2023 **157157** **7171** 2022 2021 **4040** **5454** **6262** **6666** **[＊1][＊1]** Japan Coast Guard patrol ships: 1,000 ton-class or more (total tonnage) Chinese Coast Guard vessels: 1,000 ton-class or more (full-load displacement) (Notes) 1 Number of ships as of the end of FY2023 2 Number of vessels as of the end of December 2023; Estimation based on publicized information (may be altered in the future) *1 According to “Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2024,” Japan Coast Guard China’s air forces consist mainly of the Navy’s air units and the Air Force. As for fourth-generation fighters, China has introduced from Russia the Su-27 and Su30 and the Su-35 latest fourth-generation fighter. China is also developing its own domestic modern fighters. China has started the mass production of the J-11B fighter, a suspected copy of the Su-27, and the J-16 fighter, a suspected copy of the Su-30, as well as the **J-20 fighter** 【Specifications, performance】 Maximum speed: 3,063 km/h 【Description】 A fifth-generation stealth fighter. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced in February J-20 fighter [Imaginechina/Jiji Press Photo] 2018 that the J-20 has started to be delivered to operational units. **H-6 bomber** 【Specifications, performance】 Maximum speed: 1,015 km/h Main armament (H-6K): Airto-surface cruise missiles (maximum firing range over 1,500 km) H-6 bomber 【Description】 Indigenous bomber. The H-6 can carry cruise missiles (CJ-20) that can be loaded with nuclear warheads. **27 In addition, it is pointed out that while the maritime militia often rents fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen, China has built a state-owned fishing fleet in the South** China Sea for the maritime militia. It is also pointed out that the Hainan provincial government, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the militia received by the end of 2016, along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands. Since this maritime militia unit recruits military veterans as its members to create a unit on par with a career soldier unit, it is reported that salary is paid separately from its commercial fishing ----- Fig. I-3-2-8 Major Chinese Air Force Capability Fourth and fifth-generation fighters 1,600 |of aircraft) 1|,588| |---|---| 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 **1,588** |Col1|Fourth and fifth generation|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| |0|fighters of Japan: 329 (as of March 31, 2024)|||| Fourth and fifth generation fighters of Japan: 329 **0** (as of March 31, 2024) 22 23 24 (Year) **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 20 21 Su-27(J-11) Su-30 Su-35 J-10 J-15 J-16 J-20 capabilities which are essential for operations of modern air power by introducing the H-6U and IL-78M aerial refueling tankers and the KJ-500 and KJ-2000 early warning and control aircraft. Since July 2016, China has promoted the deployment of the indigenously developed Y-20 large transport aircraft. The Y-20U, an aerial refueling tanker based on this transport aircraft, has also been deployed since June 2021. China is rapidly developing a variety of domestic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes as well as those capable of carrying weapons such as missiles. Some of these are deployed and actively exported. In fact, it is suggested that the Chinese Air Force has created a UAV unit for attack missions and frequently used UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes in waters and airspace surrounding China. In 2023, the KVD-002 unmanned aircraft, which is expected to be used in support of army helicopters, was unveiled for the first time. Moreover, it has been noted that China is improving “Swarm” technology to operate a large number of small low-cost UAVs. Given such modernization status of the air forces, it is believed that China is steadily improving not only its defense capabilities for its national airspace but also capabilities for conducting combat operations and supporting ground and maritime forces in more distant areas. Fig. I-3-2-8 (Major Chinese Air Force Capability) **See** **(6) Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic domain** **capabilities** Information gathering, and command and communication in the military sector have increasingly relied on satellites and computer networks. As such, China stated that “outer space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights (capture point) in strategic competition among all parties,” indicating that it has recognized the importance of taking on information mastery in wartime when it must protect its own information systems and networks while neutralizing those of its adversaries. Regarding the space domain, it is believed that China is also planning to improve its ability to conduct military operations in space, given the fact that China’s administrative organizations and state-owned enterprises involved in space utilization are said to have close cooperative ties with the military.[28] Specifically, China has rapidly increased the number of satellites available for military purposes in recent years. For example, the “BeiDou” global satellite positioning system, which is called a Chinese-version GPS and pointed out as available for ballistic missiles and other guided weapons systems, started its global operation service in late 2018, and it is deemed that the launch of all satellites constituting the BeiDou system was completed in June 2020. In the cyber domain, China appears to be strengthening ----- its cyber operations capabilities against networks, and the U.S. DoD has pointed out that China has the ability to carry out cyber attacks that cause localized and temporary disruption to critical infrastructure in the United States.[29] Such an ability is considered to strengthen China’s “A2/AD” capabilities. It has been noted that current major military training of China always contains cyber operations covering both attacks on and defense of command systems. The militia as a part of China’s armed forces reportedly includes “cyber militias” with excellent cyber domain capabilities. With regard to electromagnetic spectrum domain, the presence of aircraft equipped with electronic warfare pods and having electronic warfare capabilities has been pointed out, including not only the Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft that frequently flies around Japan, but also J-15 carrier-based aircraft, J-16 fighters, and H-6 bombers. **(7) China’s “Intelligentization” of its Military Forces** The “intelligentized warfare” advocated by China is said to be integrated warfare deployed in the land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic spectrum, cyber, and cognitive dimensions using intelligentized weapons and equipment and corresponding operational methods based on IoT information systems. The “cognitive dimension” is believed to be recognized as important in the future aspects of warfare. Also, in respect of “intelligentized warfare,” it is pointed out that the PLA ・ has recognized that new technologies will increase the speed and tempo of future warfare, and that operationalization of AI will be necessary to improve the speed and quality of information processing by reducing battlefield uncertainty and providing decision making advantage over potential adversaries. ・ is exploring next-generation operational concepts for intelligentized warfare, such as attrition warfare using intelligentized swarms. ・ considers unmanned systems to be important intelligentized technologies, and is pursuing greater autonomy for unmanned land, sea, and air assets to enable swarm attacks, optimized logistics support, as well as dispersed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations.[30] **(8) Efforts to Develop Joint Operational Capabilities** In recent years, initiatives have been under way to improve joint operational capabilities in areas from the front line to logistics. The CMC Joint Operations Command Center is believed to have been established under the initiatives for the CCP to carry out decision making at the highest strategic level. The five new theaters established in February 2016 are seen as representing permanent joint operation headquarters. Attention will be focused to movement towards integration in personnel affairs as well; for example, General He Weidong who has experienced as a commanding officer of a joint force as Commander of the Eastern Theater Command was assigned as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission in October 2022. In recent years, China has implemented joint service trainings giving priority to practicality and other drills to improve its joint operational capabilities. These drills are apparently designed to secure the effectiveness of the abovementioned organizational reforms and other initiatives to improve joint operational capabilities and are expected to continue to progress in the future. **6** **Maritime and Airspace Activities** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(1) General Situation** Recently, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities for operations in more distant waters and airspace, including those to project power to waters including the so-called second island chain, beyond the first island chain. In such efforts, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the maritime and aerial domains using its naval and air powers. In waters and airspace surrounding Japan, particularly, Chinese naval vessels, and naval and air force aircraft suspected as conducting training and information gathering activities have been observed frequently, along with Chinese naval ships heading for the Pacific and Indian Ocean and numerous China Coast Guard vessels operating under the name of protecting maritime interests. Their activities include China Coast Guard vessels’ intermittent intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters, and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences, such as the directing of fire-control radar at Japanese SelfDefense Forces (SDF) ships and aircraft,[31] Chinese **29 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)** **30 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)** **31 In January 2013, a Chinese naval vessel directed a fire-control radar at a Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyer navigating on the high seas of the East China Sea on January 30.** Moreover, it is believed that another Chinese naval vessel directed a fire-control radar at a helicopter mounted on an MSDF destroyer on January 19. Projecting fire-control radar is normally ----- **(2) Military Activities in Japan s Surrounding Waters** **and Airspace** The Chinese Navy and Air Force have in recent years expanded and intensified their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, including the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. These activities include those allegedly based on China’s unilateral claim on the Senkaku Islands, and cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities, creating a situation of great concern to Japan. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has continued to make frequent scrambles against Chinese aircraft, as indicated by an all-time high of 851 scrambles in FY2016. China has also continued naval vessels’ passage through waters near Japan for navigation to distant waters such as the Indian Ocean, as well as activities viewed as training of maritime and air forces making forays to the Pacific and the Sea of Japan. military fighters abnormally close approach to Japanese SDF and U.S. military aircraft, and the establishment[32] of the “East China Sea ADIZ” and other activities that could infringe upon the freedom of overflight. These activities have become a grave matter of concern and are extremely regrettable. Furthermore, flying objects that were confirmed within Japanese territorial airspace are strongly presumed to be unmanned reconnaissance balloons flown by China. In the South China Sea, China is moving forward with militarization, expanding and intensifying its activities in the air and sea space in the area, and creating a fait accompli of unilateral changes to the status quo by force. It is strongly hoped that China will act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law and play active roles in the region and the international community in a more cooperative manner. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **32 On November 23, 2013, China established the “East China Sea ADIZ” including the Senkaku Islands misleadingly indicated as if they were China’s territory. China requires aircraft flying** Fig. I-3-2-9 (PLA’s Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image) Examples of the PLA Navy and Air Force confirmed around Japan (photos: MSDF/ASDF) Legend Sea power Air power H-6 bomber TB-001 Frequent advancement into the Shang-class submarine Aircraft carrier “Liaoning” reconnaissance/attack Pacific Ocean passing between Navigation in Japan’s territorial waters by a unmanned aerial vehicle Okinawa and Miyakojima Island Chinese Navy survey ship (November 2021, April, Warships of PLA Navy and Russian Navy July, September, November, and December 2022, Advancement of a Flight of a carrier-based fighter jointly navigating near or around Japan, and February, June, and September 2023) bomber all the way (including estimates) in Conducted military to the area off the the Pacific Ocean (April exercises with a number of in October 2021, September 2022, and Kii Peninsula 2018, April 2020, April and December 2021, PLA aircrafts and PLA July to August 2023 (August 2017) May and December 2022, and April, warships in the sea and air areas around Taiwan Shooting on the sea by warships of PLA September, and October Launched nine ballistic Navy and Russian Navy, in September Tokyo to November 2023) missiles towards the training area they set in the 2022 PLA exercise “Northern sea near Japan, including Amami Oshima Japan’s EEZ (August 2022) Union-2023” (July 2023) Island Okinawa Miyakojima Island Sea of Japan The PLA Navy Yonagunijima Island and Air Force’s Senkaku Islands Taiwan Frequent advancement activities in the into the Sea of Japan East China Sea Underwater navigation by China-Russia joint naval vessels including a submarine Long-distance joint flight of Chinese and Russian exercise “Joint Sea 2022” Ningbo in the contiguous zone off the bombers (July 2019, December 2020, November Senkaku Islands (January 2018) 2021, May 2022, November 2022, June 2023, A PLA Navy surface combat ship navigated in Japanese and December 2023) contiguous zone near Senkaku Islands in July 2022 Underwater navigation by a submarine presumed to belong to the PLA through Qingdao Japan’s contiguous zone 500km (June 2020) (September 2021) *Locations, tracks, etc. include images and estimates. in the zone to abide by rules set by its Ministry of National Defense and claims to take military “defensive emergency measures” against aircraft failing to do so, unduly infringing on the principle of freedom of overflight. Over the move to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, not only Japan but also the United States, the ROK, Australia, and the European ----- near Kuchinoerabujima Island and Yakushima Island, and then passed Fig. I-3-2-10 Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft (Number) Japan’s contiguous zone north of 1,000 **851** Kitadaitojima Island. Subsequently, **415[464]** zone south of the Senkaku Islands. 400 **306** Furthermore, a Shupang-class survey **851** **722** **638[675]** **571** **575** **500** **458** **479** **415[464]** **306** **156** **107** **96** **6** **0** **2** **13** **22 [43 31 38]** 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 (FY) Kuchinoshima Island, and Yakushima Island in November 2021, in April, The activities of the Chinese military have become July, September, November, and December 2022 as well more sophisticated in recent years, with signs of as in February, June, and September 2023. improvement in their ability to carry out practical In recent years, Chinese military aircraft have also joint operations. Chinese military activities in Japan’s been active in the airspace closer to the Nansei Islands, surrounding waters and airspace should be closely including the Senkaku Islands and the main island of watched with great attention. Okinawa. Such activities are thought to include warning **a. Activities in the East China Sea (including the Areas** and surveillance, combat air patrols (CAPs), and training, **around the Senkaku Islands)** or may be intended to operate the East China Sea Air Chinese naval vessels have been conducting operations Defense Identification Zone. in the East China Sea continuously and actively. Moreover, activities of unmanned aerial vehicles Declaring its own position regarding Japan’s Senkaku (UAVs) have been intensifying in recent years; for Islands, China claims that patrols by Chinese naval vessels example, UAVs such as TB-001 reconnaissance/attackin the sea areas under its jurisdiction are completely type UAVs, BZK-005 reconnaissance-type UAVs, and justifiable and lawful. Chinese naval vessels have been WZ-7 reconnaissance-type UAVs flew past alone in continuously operating in the areas near Japan’s Senkaku the air space between the main island of Okinawa and Islands. In June 2016, a Jiangkai I-class frigate became Miyakojima Island in July and August 2022, January the first ever Chinese Navy combatant vessel to enter 2023, and June 2024. In November 2022, one presumed Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands. Chinese UAV flew from the East China Sea, and after In July 2022, a Jiangwei II-class frigate passed into the heading south, flew off in the direction of the continent. contiguous zone southwest of the Uotsurishima Island. **b. Advancements into the Pacific Ocean** Submarine activities have also been confirmed. In Chinese Navy combatant vessels continue to transit the January 2018, a submerged Shang-class submarine and waters near Japan to advance into the Pacific Ocean a Jiangkai II-class frigate entered the contiguous zone with high frequency. The advancement routes are around the Senkaku Islands on the same day. This was multiplying. Chinese naval vessels have been confirmed the first time a Chinese submarine was identified and as transiting the sea area between the main island of announced as conducting submerged transit through Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and have been found the contiguous waters around the Senkaku Islands. In passing through the Osumi Strait, the sea area between June 2020 and September 2021, submerged transit of a Yonagunijima Island and Iriomotejima Island, the sea submarine presumed to belong to China was confirmed area between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoatejima in the contiguous zone surrounding Amami Oshima Island, the Tsugaru Strait, and the Soya Strait. Island. Aircraft carriers operating in the pacific ocean have In recent years, activities by Chinese Navy intelligence also been confirmed. The aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” gathering vessels (AGIs) and survey vessels have also along with several other vessels, passed the sea area been found. In November 2015, a Dongdiao-class AGI between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima sailed back and forth in waters outside the contiguous Island in December 2016. After that, Liaoning also went zone south of the Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a into the Pacific Ocean in April 2018, June 2019, April D di l AGI il d i J ’ t it i l t 2020 d i A il d D b 2021 d i M d **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- December 2022. The aircraft carrier Shandong was first confirmed operating in the Pacific in April 2023, and then again in September and October of the same year. During the deployment of these aircraft carriers into the Pacific Ocean, several cases have been observed where they have passed through the Bashi Channel from the South China Sea, or through the waters off the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island from the East China Sea. In addition, the landing and takeoff of shipborne fighter aircraft in the Pacific Ocean has also been frequently confirmed. Through this expansion into the Pacific, China seems to be aiming to improve the operational capabilities of its maritime forces, including aircraft carriers, and its ability to carry out operations in distant waters. Regarding air forces, a naval aircraft was first confirmed advancing into the Pacific Ocean in 2013, and an air force aircraft advancing into the Pacific Ocean was confirmed in 2015, and since 2017, expansion into the Pacific Ocean involving passage through the airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island has become even more active. Furthermore, the types of military aircraft that pass through this airspace are becoming more diverse year by year. Bomber flights have also been confirmed, and the U.S. DoD has indicated that the Chinese military is believed to be conducting training exercises and other activities targeting the United States and its allies.[33] Flight patterns of Chinese military aircraft have also been changing. Flights from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and from the direction of the Bashi Channel to the Pacific Ocean, both with the return trips on the same shuttle routes, have been repeatedly made. In 2016, H-6K bombers and other aircraft were confirmed as flying around Taiwan. In August 2017, H-6K bombers were confirmed as flying to waters off the Kii Peninsula after advancing to the Pacific Ocean via waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island for the first time. Through frequent long-distance flights of bombers and other aircraft, including advancements to the Pacific, and their advanced flight paths and composition, China is thought to be demonstrating its presence around areas including those surrounding Japan, and planning further enhancements to more practical operational capabilities. Additionally, activities considered planned to improve sea and air joint operational capabilities in more distant areas, such as what seemed to be air-to-ship attack drills including advancements to the Pacific Ocean, have been seen in recent years. China is expected to further expand and intensify naval and air activities in the Pacific Ocean. Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant **Fig. I-3-2-11** Ships’ and Aircraft Carriers’ Activities around the Southwestern Islands and the Soya and Tsugaru Straits (Number) 50 40 35 30 20 **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** |4433|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |4422||||| |||||| |||||| |2266 2222||||| |||||| |11|55 1166 1155|||| |11||11|1133 1133 99|| |77 88||||| |3 22 33||||| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23(FY) Number of Announcements of Chinese Military **Fig. I-3-2-12** Aircraft’s Passage between the Main Island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island (Number) 20 15 10 **1818** **14** **1212** **1010** **9** **6** **66** **66** **55** **44** **44** 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 (FY) **C． Activities in the Sea of Japan** In the Sea of Japan, China’s military activities of maritime and air forces have been intensifying, including joint activities with the Russian military. As for naval forces, they have been sailing into the Sea of Japan occasionally, such as navigating toward distant waters for trainings. Intelligence-gathering ships have also been frequently confirmed passing through the Tsushima Strait. Since 2013, China and Russia have conducted joint exercises “Maritime Cooperation” regularly in the Sea of Japan. Since 2021, joint maritime patrols with Russian ships have been carried out three times. Each time vessels that participated in the joint exercises in the Sea of Japan joined in the patrols after the exercises. ----- Regarding aircrafts, activities in the Sea of Japan have increased since it was confirmed in January 2016 that Chinese military aircraft passed through the Tsushima Strait for the first time. The types of military aircraft flying in this airspace are also becoming more diverse, and in March 2024, a WZ-7 reconnaissancetype unmanned aerial vehicle was confirmed flying for the first time. China has carried out seven joint flights of bombers with Russia since 2019; in every case, the bombers flew over the Sea of Japan, and a case in which PLA aircraft passed through Russian airspace and moved into the Sea of Japan directly was observed. China is anticipated to continue to expand and intensify its activities in the Sea of Japan also in the future. Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant **Fig. I-3-2-13** Ships’ Passage through the Tsushima Strait (Number) 14 Fig. I 3 2 9 (PLAs Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image)); Fig. I-3-2-10 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft); Fig. I-3-2-11(Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships’ and Aircraft Carriers’ Activities around the Southwestern Islands and the Soya and Tsugaru Straits); Fig. I-3-2-12 (Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft’s Passage between the Main Island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island); Fig. I-3-2-13 (Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships’ Passage through the Tsushima Strait); Fig. I-3-2-14 (Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft’s Passage through the Tsushima Strait)） **See** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(3) Activities of Chinese Ships Including Coast Guard** **Vessels in the East China Sea (including Areas** **around the Senkaku Islands)** China Coast Guard vessels have been seen almost every day in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands, Japan’s inherent territory, and repeatedly intruded into Japan’s territorial waters. Since the activities of China Coast Guard vessels based on China’s own assertion conducted in Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands are violating international law, Japan has been strongly protesting against these activities and requested them to leave many times. Despite Japan’s strong protests, however, Chinese Coast Guard vessels continued to intrude into the Japanese territorial waters in FY2023. Almost every month in 2023, China Coast Guard vessels entered Japan’s territorial waters. During these intrusions, Chinese Coast Guard vessels continuously navigated in Japan’s territorial waters for more than 80 hours, the longest time ever, from the end of March to the beginning of April 2023. Incidents occurred in which China Coast Guard ships attempted to approach Japanese fishing boats when those Japanese boats were navigating in Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. In the past, a China Maritime Surveillance vessel intruded into Japan’s territorial waters for the first time in December 2008. Since then, China Maritime Surveillance vessels and China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels have gradually intensified their activities in the Japanese territorial waters. Such activities have intensified greatly since September 2012, when the Japanese Government acquired three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsurishima Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island). China is seen to be steadily strengthening an operational posture intended to use Coast Guard vessels to intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. For example, the number of vessels involved in each territorial sea intrusion was about two to three until around 2016, whereas in recent years, the number of four-vessel intrusions has increased. Si D b 2015 Chi hi d ith **1111** **1111** **99** **99** **88** **66** **55** **44** **33** **22** **22** **11** **11** **00** **00** **00** 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23(FY) Number of Announcements of Chinese Military **Fig. I-3-2-14** Aircraft’s Passage through the Tsushima Strait) (Number) 8 6 4 0 **7** **5** **3** **3** **3** **2** **2** **1** **1** 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23(FY) ----- Fig. I-3-2-15 Activities by China Coast Guard Vessels, etc., around the Senkaku Islands 10 **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** (Month) (Year) |number of days of intrusion into Japanese territorial waters)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||| |1 5 9 08|1 5 9 09|1 5 9 10|1 5 9 11|1 5 9 12|1 5 9 13|1 5 9 14|1 5 9 15|1 5 9 16|1 5 9 17|1 5 9 18|1 5 9 19|1 5 9 20|1 5 9 21|1 5 9 22|1 5 9 1 23 2| like armament have repeatedly intruded into the Japanese territorial waters. In 2023, Chinese Coast Guard vessels were confirmed to be active in the contiguous waters around the Senkaku Islands, with the number of active days reaching 352 days and the total number of active vessels reaching 1,282, both the highest ever. Cases indicating the improvement of China Coast Guard vessels’ operational capabilities have been also confirmed. From February to July 2021, China Coast Guard vessels were seen in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands for a record 157 consecutive days. In December 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft of the State Oceanic Administration was identified as the first Chinese aircraft to intrude into Japan’s airspace around the Senkaku Islands. In May 2017, it was confirmed that an object that appeared to be a small drone was flying above a China Coast Guard vessel intruding into the Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. This flight also constitutes an invasion of Japan’s territorial airspace. China has thus relentlessly continued attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands, leading to a grave matter of concern. Japan cannot accept China’s actions to escalate the situation. In addition, in the East China Sea, China continues to engage in unilateral resource development activities even though the boundaries between Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf and those of China have not yet been demarcated. Since June 2013, it has been confirmed that construction work is progressing on a new offshore platform in addition to the four offshore platforms installed on the Chinese side of the JapanChi “M di Li ” i th E t Chi S i t th “2008 Agreement” on resource development in the East China Sea, and Japan has repeatedly protested against the ongoing unilateral development by China, and at the same time strongly requested that the work be halted. In July 2023, a buoy was found within the Japan’s EEZ on the east side of the geographical median line in the East China Sea. The buoy was believed to be installed by China. Japan has lodged a protest with China regarding this matter, and is also demanding its immediate removal. **See** Fig. I-3-2-15 (Activities by China Coast Guard Vessels, etc., around the Senkaku Islands); Reference 14 (Number of Days and Total Incursions into the Territorial Waters Around the Senkaku Islands by Ships Belonging to the China Coast Guard Bureau, etc.) **(4) Trends of Activities around Taiwan** China has intensified military activities around Taiwan. According to announcements from the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan, entry into airspace around Taiwan has been increasing since September 2020. The total number of aircraft that entered was over 970 in 2021, and that number increased significantly from 2021 to over 1,700 aircraft in 2022 and 2023. Furthermore, the Ministry announced that other aircraft such as attack helicopters, air refueling tankers, and UAVs have been reportedly observed entering the airspace since 2021, in addition to conventional fighters and bombers. Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense stated at the Legislative Yuan in May 2023 that Chinese naval vessels are deployed in the waters surrounding Taiwan, and that since around the end of 2022 they have been regularly deployed also in eastern Taiwan. Furthermore, since August 2022, China has frequently d t d ilit i i th d i ----- surrounding Taiwan. On August 2, 2022, China announced the setting of six training areas surrounding Taiwan, and conducting “a series of integrated military operations” around Taiwan, in conjunction with the visit of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (then) to Taiwan. China launched nine ballistic missiles on August 4, 2022, five of which landed within the Japan’s EEZ, an another landed at the closest point to Japanese territory, which was about 80 km from Yonagunijima Island. This is a serious issue relating to Japan’s security and the safety of its people and was perceived as a threat to local residents. In addition, some of the missiles passed over Taiwan. After that, the PLA continued the large-scale military exercise covering subjects such as joint blockage, sea and ground attack, air superiority combat, and antisubmarine warfare in air space and sea space around Taiwan for about one week. It is probable that, in this military exercise, China may have rehearsed some parts of a Taiwan invasion operation, such as the blockade of Taiwan, ground/ship attacks, the acquisition of sea/ air superiority in wartime, and gray-zone situations, including cyber attacks and “cognitive warfare.” In addition, in response to then President Tsai Ing wen’s meeting with Kevin McCarthy, then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives on April 5 (local time) during her visit to the United States as a stopover for her tour of Central America in April 2023, China conducted large-scale military exercises in the sea and airspace around Taiwan from April 8 to 10, involving numerous naval vessels and aircraft, including the aircraft carrier “Shandong.” China announced that simulated joint accurate attacks to important targets in Taiwan and the sea area around Taiwan and joint blockage by several services were executed in these exercises. It is viewed that China may have rehearsed some parts of a Taiwan invasion operation, following the exercise in August 2022. In August 2023, in response to then Vice President Lai Ching-te’s stopover in the United States on the way to South America, China conducted military exercises and deployed numerous ships and aircraft on the 19th of the same month. China announced that this military exercise practiced the coordination of ships and aircraft, as well as the acquisition of air and sea superiority. Part of the invasion strategy against Taiwan was probably rehearsed here as well. It was pointed out, however, that **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** President Lai Ching-te delivers a speech at his inauguration ceremony (May 2024) [Website of Taiwan’s Office of the President] the exercise was small in scale compared to those in August 2022 and April 2023. In addition, in May 2024, in response to Lai’s inauguration as president on the 20[th], China conducted a large-scale military exercise from the 23rd to the 24th in the sea and airspace around Taiwan, including remote islands such as Kinmen Islands. A large number of naval vessels and aircrafts was involved. Furthermore, according to an announcement by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, the Chinese military has repeatedly entered the airspace east of China-Taiwan “Median Line[34]” in the Taiwan Strait since Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. It is believed that through the series of activities around Taiwan, China seeks to create a fait accompli that the Chinese military is continuously operating there and improve its actual combat capabilities. These intensified military activities indicates a situation, where a possibility could not be excluded that tension between China and Taiwan rises in the military sense. The stability of the situation surrounding Taiwan is important not only for Japan’s national security, but also for the stability of the international community, and Japan needs to pay close attention to it with an even greater sense of urgency. **(5) Trends of Activities in the South China Sea** China has also been intensifying its activities based on assertions, which are conflicting with existing laws and orders of the seas, in the South China Sea, including waters around the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, over which territorial disputes exist with neighbors, **34 The line that supposed to have been set over the Taiwan Strait by the United States in the 1950s. Taiwan insists on the existence of the median line, and published the coordinates of it,** ----- **Chinese Military Trends Concerning Taiwan** Since the Chinese military conducted an exercise including ballistic missile launches following then Speaker of the U.S. House of **Commentary** Representatives Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2020, it has been pointed out that China has been intensifying its naval and aircraft activities around Taiwan. Here, we will look at the Chinese military’s movements around Taiwan from August 2022 to the end of 2023, focusing on the activities of aircraft and naval vessels, based on announcements from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). The first topic is aircraft activities. Since August 2022, the number of aircraft entering Taiwan’s airspace announced by Taiwan’s MND has been increasing. From January to July 2022, there were approximately 620 aircraft entering the airspace, and from August to December, there were approximately 1,110, bringing the total number of aircraft entering the airspace in 2022 to nearly double the number (approximately 970) of that in 2021. The same level of activity was maintained in 2023. Since August 2022, the Chinese military has been continuously conducting activities that cross the “median line” of the Taiwan Strait. Following the Chinese military exercise conducted in response to the visit to the United States by then vice president Lai Ching-te, Chinese military aircraft began to fly for longer distance alongside of the east side of the “median line”after crossing the “median line”. Based on the flight track chart released by Taiwan’s MND, it appears that the operating airspace of Chinese military aircraft has traditionally been centered on Taiwan’s southwest. However, from August 2022 onwards, in addition to the aforementioned flights crossing the aforementioned median line, activities moving from Taiwan’s southwest airspace into the western Pacific Ocean seem to be increasing. Regarding activities in the Western Pacific, the Chinese military conducted aircraft training using the aircraft carrier Shandong in 2023. During a military exercise coinciding with then president Tsai Ing-wen’s visit to the United States in April of the same year, it was announced that J-15 carrier-based aircraft entered Taiwan’s eastern airspace for the first time. Regarding the Western Pacific deployment of the Shandong in September of the same year, Taiwan’s defense minister pointed out that the Chinese military conducted war-gaming training with the aircraft carrier as an opposing force. These training are believed to have practiced a pincer attack on Taiwan from the east and west and preventing thirdcountry intervention. In addition, it was announced that the Chinese military’s reconnaissance drones and surveillance and attack drones have circled Taiwan multiple times since April 2023. It has been pointed out that the airspace in which Chinese military aircraft operate is gradually expanding from the conventionally established t f T i ’ th t i t T i Regarding the types of aircraft involved, the activities of fighters, bombers, manned mission support aircraft such as intelligencegathering aircraft, as well as the activities of unmanned aircraft since September 2022 have also been announced. As for military exercises around Taiwan, the ratio of unmanned aircraft and manned mission support aircraft increased in the April 2023 exercises compared to the August 2022 exercises, suggesting that the content of the exercises has deepened to a more practical level. The next topic is the status of naval vessel activities. Previously, the number of Chinese military vessels that Taiwan’s defense claimed to have confirmed in the waters surrounding Taiwan had remained at three to four per day since late September 2022. However, following military exercises in April 2023, the average daily number of Chinese military vessels confirmed by the end of the same year increased to approximately 5.8. Furthermore, Taiwan’s defense minister has pointed out that since the end of 2022, Chinese military vessels have been regularly deployed in Taiwan’s eastern waters. As a matter of fact, since March 2023, it has been announced that patrol helicopters, which appear to be carrier-based, have been operating intermittently on the eastern side of Taiwan in addition to the conventional western side operations. In this way, the Chinese military is believed to be increasing the number of naval ships deployed to the waters surrounding Taiwan and building up the posture of constant deployment to encircle Taiwan. Given these developments, the Chinese military seems to seek a fait accompli that its aircraft and naval vessels are regularly operating in the sea and airspace surrounding Taiwan, and improve its actual combat capabilities through measures such as increasing operational proficiency and intelligence gathering in the sea and airspace surrounding Taiwan. Due to this escalation of coercive military activities by China, concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, but also in the entire international community. A flight path image of a Chinese military aircraft released by the Taiwan Ministry of **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- including some member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Since 2014, on seven features of the Spratly Islands (Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reefs, Hughes Reef, and Johnson South Reef), China pressed ahead with large-scale and rapid land reclamation. The Philippines-China arbitration award issued in July 2016 denied the “historic rights” as the basis of the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, and determined the illegality of China’s activities such as land reclamation. However, China has made it clear that it would not comply with this decision and is currently continuing military activities while promoting the development of military facilities, such as batteries, and various kinds of infrastructure that can be used for military purposes, including runways, ports, hangars, and radar facilities, to militarize these features. On Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs, called the Big Three of the Spratly Islands, China has developed batteries for anti-aircraft guns, missile shelters, underground storage facilities pointed out to be munitions storage, large ports capable of accommodating combatant ships and runways available for takeoff and landing of fighters and bombers. Chinese military activities have been frequently pointed out at Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. In May 2020, it was reported that Y-8 patrol aircraft and Y-9 early warning aircraft may have been deployed on a rotational basis to Fiery Cross Reef. Additionally, in April 2018, it was reported that anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles were deployed on Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs for military training and that radar jamming systems were deployed on Mischief Reef. On the other four features, it is pointed out that the construction of facilities, such as harbors, helipads, and radars, has made progress and that what appears to be large anti-aircraft guns and a close-in weapon system (CIWS) may have already been deployed. Furthermore, in December 2022, it was reported that new construction activities were being carried out on the other four features in the Spratly Islands. If these features of the Spratly Islands are used for full-scale military purposes, it could significantly change the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. China carried out the militarization of the Paracel Islands before that of the Spratly Islands. China has reportedly extended the runway to nearly 3,000 m on Woody Island since 2013. Since 2015, fighter jets such as the J-11 and J-10 have been deployed, and since 2016, the presence of equipment that appears to be surface-toair missiles has been confirmed. In August 2023, new construction activities were reported to be underway on Triton Island. In recent years, Chinese vessels have allegedly been conducting what are likely to be survey activities in Scarborough Shoal, where a standoff took place between Chinese and Philippine government ships in April 2012. It is pointed out that new land reclamations on the shoal might be seen in the future. It is also pointed out that if China conducts land reclamations and installs radar facilities, runways, and other infrastructure on Scarborough Shoal, it could possibly increase its ability for situation awareness and power projection capabilities in the surrounding sea area and ultimately enhance its operational capabilities throughout all the areas of the South China Sea. Also, it has been pointed out that if China were to consider bastion operations (fortification) to enhance the survivability of new types of long-range SLBMs capable of hitting the U.S. mainland, the South China Sea would be the suitable choice.[35] Attention must continue to be paid to the situation in the South China Sea going forward. The activities in the sea and airspace in the area are expanding and intensifying as well. For example, in 2016 after the Philippines-China arbitral award, Chinese Air Force H-6K bombers conducted “combat patrol flights” in the airspace near Scarborough Shoal in July and August, and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that these patrols would be “regularized” in the future. In September, a joint Chinese-Russian naval exercise called “Maritime Cooperation 2016” was held in the South China Sea for the first time. It was reported in December that a H-6 bombers flew along the “nine-dash line. In 2020, when the establishment of new administrative regions called “Xisha (Paracel) District” and “Nansha (Spratly) District” under Sansha City, Hainan Province was unilaterally announced, in July, China conducted simultaneous military exercises in three sea areas (South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea) and is believed to have launched middle-range ballistic missiles in August. These vigorous activities of the Chinese military have been remarkable even in recent years. Since May 2021, there have been frequent reports of training exercises **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- Fig. I-3-2-16 Example of China’s Advancement and Militarization Utilizing the Power Vacuum in the South China Sea (image) **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** |Col1|Related Chronological Table|Col3| |---|---|---| |1950’s: Withdrawal of French Armed Forces||| |1950’s: China controlled the eastern half of Paracel Islands (South Vietnam also advanced to the islands in that same period) 1973: U.S. forces withdrew from South Vietnam 1974:China cleared the Paracel Islands of South Vietnam and controlled whole islands. (1975: Collapse of South Vietnam as a result of the Vietnam War.) Mid 1980s: A scale-down of Soviet troops in Vietnam 1980s:China advanced to the Spratly Islands 1988: China practically controlled six locations in the Spratly Islands. 1992: Withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Philippines 1995: China practically controlled Mischief Reef. 2000s:China advanced to the Southern South China Sea. 2012:China practically controlled the Scarborough Shoal. From 2014 on:China has implemented large-scale land reclamation and infrastructure building in the Spratly Islands||| year, it was also reported that the aforementioned Yushen 1950’s: Withdrawal of French Armed Forces *Image 1950’s: China controlled the eastern half of Paracel Islands (South Vietnam also advanced to the islands in that same period) Chinese advance 1973: U.S. forces withdrew from South Vietnam 1974: China cleared the Paracel Islands of South Vietnam and 1950s: controlled whole islands. (1975: Collapse of South Vietnam as a result of the Vietnam War.) Gained full **Paracel IslandsParacel Islands** control in 1974 Mid 1980s: A scale-down of Soviet troops in Vietnam 1980s:China advanced to the Spratly Islands ∴ Scarborough Shoal 1988: China practically controlled six locations in the Spratly Islands. 1992: Withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Philippines Gained control of six places in 1988 1995: China practically controlled Mischief Reef. ↓ 2000s:China advanced to the Southern South China Sea. From 2014 on - land reclamation in large scale **Spratly IslandsSpratly Islands** Mischief Reef 2012:China practically controlled the Scarborough Shoal. 1995 Fiery Cross Reef From 2014 on:China has implemented large-scale land reclamation and infrastructure building in the Spratly Islands “Nine-dash line” An example of militarization: Fiery Cross Reef Radar and communications facilities Examples pointed out as establishment of structures, etc., by countries or regions. ：China ：Taiwan ：Vietnam August 2014 March 2020 ：Philippines Aircraft hangars ：Malaysia (Photo sources) CSIS/AMTI/Maxar and runway involving carrier-based aircraft takeoff from and landing In this way, it appears that China seeks to expand its on the aircraft carrier Shandong. In December of the same presence and enhance war-sustaining and other joint class landing ships conducted a series of exercises in the South China Sea, and that exercises were conducted at several locations on Hainan Island facing the South China Sea. It was pointed out that the latter exercises in particular were possibly exercises simulating an amphibious operation using Hainan Island against Taiwan. In addition, there were incidents in which Chinese naval vessels or other ships approached or obstructed U.S. military vessels operating in the sea and airspace of this region, as well as incidents in which Chinese military aircraft approached U.S. military aircraft.[36] In October 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense released videos of 15 cases in which Chinese military aircraft took dangerous actions against U.S. military aircraft flying over the East China Sea and South China Sea. In this way, it appears that China seeks to expand its presence and enhance war-sustaining and other joint operational capabilities including military and other means in the South China Sea. Such activities conducted by China based on its own assertions, which are conflicting with existing laws and orders of the seas, further advance unilateral changes to the status quo by force and efforts to create a fait accompli. Japan is deeply concerned about these activities, and the concern is shared with the international community, including the United States and other G7 Member States. The issues surrounding the South China Sea are directly related to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and are a legitimate concern not only for Japan, which has major sea lanes in the South China Sea, but also for the entire international community. Countries concerned, including China, are urged to refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and act on the **36 In March 2009, December 2013 and September 2018, Chinese naval and other vessels approached and intercepted U.S. Navy vessels navigating in the South China Sea. In May 2016,** ----- basis of the principle of the rule of law. **See** Fig. I-3-2-16 (Example of China’s Advancement and Militarization Utilizing the Power Vacuum in the South China **See** Sea (image)) **(6) Trends in the Indian Ocean and Other More Distant** **Waters** The Chinese Navy is considered to be shifting towards “protection missions on the far seas” and has been steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters, such as the Indian Ocean, in recent years. Progress has been seen in the Navy’s development of such equipment as large combatant ships and replenishment ships and in its operational initiatives, such as deployment to distant sea areas and securing bases for this purpose. Since December 2008, Chinese naval vessels have been deployed off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to take part in international counter-piracy efforts. The dispatched vessels have conducted joint training exercises with the militaries of other countries in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere.[37] In 2023, they conducted joint exercises with the Russian and South African navies in the waters off Durban in eastern South Africa in February, and with the Pakistan navy in the northern Arabian Sea in November. In March 2024, they conducted joint exercises with the Russian and Iranian navies in the northern Indian Ocean. Retrospectively in May 2015, China and Russia had conducted a joint naval exercise called “Maritime Cooperation” in the Mediterranean Sea and elsewhere. China has also deployed a space observation support ship in the southern Pacific and dispatched a military hospital ship to waters including the southern Pacific as well as those near Latin America under “Mission Harmony.” In September 2015, five Chinese naval vessels reportedly sailed in the high seas of the Bering Sea and in U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands. In September 2022 and August 2023, Russia announced that Chinese vessels participating in joint navigation with Russia sailed through the Bering Sea. China has deployed the vessels such as the polar research vessel Xue Long 2 to the Arctic Ocean in total 13 times since 1999;[38] moreover, in January 2018, China published a white paper entitled “China’s Arctic Policy,” which mapped out a policy of active involvement in Arctic initiatives, including efforts to build a “Polar Silk Road” through the development of Arctic sea routes. It is pointed out that China could take advantage of scientific survey and commercial activities to increase its presence including military activities in the Arctic sea.[39] Additionally, China has been remarkably trying to secure overseas outposts such as harbors. For example, in August 2017, China began to operate a “support base” for logistics support of the PLA in Djibouti facing the Gulf of Aden. The Chinese military is said to be considering and planning to establish military logistics facilities in multiple countries, including Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.[40] China has been promoting its “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) whose main purpose is advertised as establishing an economic zone in regions including the Eurasian continent, with the Chinese military possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via counter-piracy activities and the improvement of counter-terrorism capabilities in coastal states through bilateral and multilateral exercises. While it is thought that the initiative includes a strategic intention to expand its influence in the region, it is possible that the initiative will further improve the PLA’s operational capabilities in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean and elsewhere. For example, China’s support for the construction of port infrastructure in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and other Indian Ocean countries as well as Pacific island countries including Vanuatu could lead China to secure outposts available for its military purposes. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **37 In addition to military exercises, port calls to countries along the Indian Ocean coast are also frequent.** **38 In 2012, Xue Long became the first polar research vessel to sail across the Arctic Ocean. In 2013, the cargo freighter Yong Sheng became the first Chinese commercial ship to cross the** Arctic Ocean. Canadian scientists took part in Xue Long’s voyage to the Arctic Ocean in 2017, and they succeeded for the first time in trial navigation of the Arctic Northwest Passage (along the north coast of Canada). Furthermore, its second polar research vessel Xue Long 2 completed its first Arctic Sea cruising in September 2020, and China is promoting research and construction of a heavy icebreaker. **39 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2019)** ----- of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that they have been expanding military capabilities to cover distant waters beyond China’s near seas. Given these objectives of China’s water and airspace activities and recent trends, it is believed that China plans to further expand the sphere of its activities, and further intensify its operations in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, as well as in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. **7** **International Military Activities** **Belt and Road Initiative** A concept for an economic sphere proposed by President Xi Jinping. The “Silk Road Economic Belt” (“One Belt”) and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (“One Road”) were announced in September and October 2013, respectively. Since then, the two concepts are collectively referred to as the “Belt and Road” Initiative. **(7) Objectives of Activities in Waters and Airspace** The development and activities of Chinese naval and air forces, descriptions in defense white papers, China’s geographical conditions and globalizing economy, and other factors indicate that the recent water and airspace activities of the Navy, Air Force and other Chinese organizations have the following objectives: The first is to intercept operations by adversaries in waters and airspace as far as possible from China in order to defend its territorial land, waters and airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in the effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology. The second is to develop capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. To ensure the prevention of foreign intervention in the Taiwan issue, China needs to enhance its operational capabilities at sea and airspace as Taiwan is surrounded by the sea in all directions. The third is to weaken the control of other countries on islands and China’s one-sided claims on their sovereignty and marine interests, by means of various surveillance activities and the use of force in the waters and airspace surrounding these islands. Such activities of China are considered to also have the purpose of creating a fait accompli as part of the reasons for unilaterally changing the status quo and justifying China’s claims based on its own concept of “legal warfare.” The fourth is to acquire, maintain, and protect its maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as fishing and navigating in the East and South China Seas. In order for these activities to continue safely and stably, the Chinese military is believed to be playing a role as a backstop, deterring the activities of maritime law enforcement organizations of other countries through its military presence. The fifth is to defend its sea lanes of communications. In the background is the fact that its sea lanes, including its oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are essential f th Chi Gi th t t th i **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** In recent years, the PLA has been indicating its positive attitude on nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counterpiracy, dispatching numerous units for such overseas missions. China has vowed to consistently support and actively participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), increasing its presence in UN PKOs. According to the UN, as of the end of November 2023, China had a total of 2,267 personnel including troops and police members - the largest number of peacekeepers among the permanent members of the UN Security Council - engaged in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The Chinese share has remained the second largest, after the U.S. share, since 2016. Moreover, China has been actively participating in counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. It is pointed out that factors behind such Chinese attitude include the growing need for protecting and promoting China’s national interests overseas following the expansion of national interests beyond its national borders, China’s attempt to verify military capabilities including units’ long-distance deployment, its intent to raise its status by demonstrating its will to fulfill its responsibilities to the international community, its hope to diffuse the military’s peaceful and humanitarian images, and its attempt to enhance relations with PKO regions including African countries. **8** **Education and Training** In recent years, the PLA under the policy of building a military that “can fight and win a war” has promoted practical exercises such as joint exercises led by theater d f f i l di i ----- inter theater exercises, and large exercises including distant ones, as well as night-time exercises and joint exercises with other countries, in order to strengthen its operational capabilities. In the education spectrum as well, the PLA aims to train soldiers who have the ability to execute joint operations. It was reported in 2017 that the PLA National Defense University began training to develop human resources capable of directing joint operations. China has been developing defense mobilization systems and others in order to effectively utilize private resources in case of emergencies, including wars. The military use of civilian resources includes civilian ships’ transportation of military equipment. As such initiative generally augments China’s forces available for military missions and is expected to proactively be promoted in the future, the initiative’s implications for the Chinese military forces’ operational capabilities should be watched closely. **9** **National Defense Industry Sector** in the technology area. China promotes two way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for developing the national economy while civilian technologies are absorbed for national defense development. It also seems interested in absorbing foreign technologies available both for military and civilian purposes. It is pointed out that China’s civilmilitary fusion policy gives priority to initiatives in seas, outer space, cyber, artificial intelligence (AI), and other emerging areas for China. The U.S. DoD has pointed out that civil-military fusion includes six mutually related efforts: (1) fusion of China’s defense industrial base with its civilian technology and industrial base, (2) integration and use of scientific and technological innovation across military and civilian sectors, (3) human resources development and mixing of military and civilian expertise and knowledge, (4) incorporation of military requirements into civilian infrastructure and use of civilian structures for military purposes, (5) use of civilian services and logistics capabilities for military purposes, and (6) expansion and deepening of China’s defense mobilization system in a manner that includes all relevant aspects of society and economy for use in competition and war.[43][,][44] In addition, in recent years, China has reportedly promoted the standardization of civilian products for their military adoption from the production stage under the civil-military fusion policy. This initiative is expected to allow the military to utilize civilian resources more effectively. As the growth rate of defense spending has slowed in recent years, the civil-military fusion policy is expected to become increasingly important for China, which must balance building up its defense and its economy. In addition, in order to realize the aforementioned “intelligentized warfare” advocated by China, it is key to acquire advanced civilian technologies, including so-called game-changing technologies, that would dramatically change future warfare. Therefore, because China’s civil-military fusion policy is seen as an indispensable means to achieve this, this policy, including its relationship to “intelligentized warfare,” must continue to be monitored with serious concern. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Under the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, a department of the State Council, China’s main national defense industry had consisted of 10 corporations to develop and produce nuclear weapons, missiles and rockets, aircraft, vessels, information systems and other military equipment. It is pointed out that China was the fourth largest weapon supplier in the world as of 2022.[41] While China imports highly sophisticated military equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, it is believed that China places emphasis on the enhancement of its military industrial sector, including the domestic production of equipment, to modernize its military. It has been pointed out that China is acquiring technologies ambitiously not only through domestic technology research and development and foreign direct investment, but also via illegal means in the form of secret information theft.[42] China’s civil-military fusion policy has been evident **41 According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database** **42 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)** **43 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)** **44 The existence of the “Hundred Talents Program” and the “Thousand Talents Plan” to invite to China highly specialized human resources from overseas, including people of Chinese descent,** is pointed out. As part of this, for example, it is noted that there are researchers with research experience in Japan who are engaged in developing wind tunnel test facilities necessary to ----- **3** **Relations with Countries and Regions** **1** **General Situation** **2** **Relations with Russia** China, particularly regarding maritime issues over which Ever since the so-called China-Soviet confrontation its interests conflict with others’, continues to demonstrate ended in 1989, China and Russia have placed importance **Part** its attitude of realizing its unilateral assertions without on their bilateral relationship. They have emphasized the **Ⅰ** compromise, while promoting assertive actions including deepening of their “relationship” since its establishment **Chapter** those to unilaterally change the status quo by force and in the mid-1990s. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of **3** create a fait accompli for such changes, based on its own Good- Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was assertions incompatible with the existing international concluded. In 2004, the long-standing issue of border order. China has been promoting its BRI as a national demarcation between the two countries came to a strategy, but some BRI-participating countries have recently reconsidering BRI projects due mainly to their fiscal deterioration. Furthermore, it has been pointed that there have been moves towards creating China’s own international order, including the establishment of China-led multilateral mechanisms in many fields such as security, growth, and development[45] to influence political decisions in other countries through efforts such as winning over foreign politicians.[46] At the same time, China recognizes that a peaceful and stable international environment is necessary for maintaining sustainable economic development and enhancing China’s overall national power. Based on such recognition, China has advocated building a “community of shared future for mankind” and referred to promoting the building of “a new type of international relations President Xi Jinping and President Putin holding a China-Russia summit meeting in October based on mutual respect, equity and justice, and win- 2023 [China News Service/Jiji] win cooperation.” China proactively carries out military exchanges with other countries. In recent years, China settlement. The two countries have a common view has been engaged in active military exchanges not only on promoting the multipolarization of the world and with major powers such as the United States and Russia the establishment of a new international order, and and with its neighboring countries including Southeast have further deepened their relations. At the China- Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa and Russia summit meeting in early February 2022, the two Latin America. Furthermore, movement to strengthen countries assessed China-Russia relations as “superior relationships with Pacific countries is observed. The to political and military alliances of the Cold War era.” objectives of China’s promotion of military exchanges are Furthermore, for example, amid growing tensions thought to include alleviating other countries’ concerns in U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations, China and regarding China by strengthening its relations with these Russia have consistently deepened their cooperation. countries, creating a favorable security environment for Each country is believed to be planning to create an China, enhancing China’s influence in the international international environment favorable to itself by taking community, exploring overseas arms markets, securing a united stance on security issues, such as Taiwan and stable supplies of natural resources, and ensuring foreign issues surrounding NATO’s eastern expansion, which bases. are in conflict with the United States and others. **45 For example, President Xi put forward the “Global Security Initiative” consisting of advocacy of the United Nation’s authority and status as well as opposition to security build-up sacrificing** the security of other countries in April 2022. ----- On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including fighters, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China.[47] Although China-Russia arms transactions in value in recent years have been lower than in some past period, China has apparently continued to indicate its strong interests in importing advanced Russian defense equipment and in joint equipment development with Russia. For example, China has introduced what are believed to be the latest fourth generation Su-35 fighters and the S-400 surface-toair missile system from Russia. China has been reported as the first country to import the Russian S-400. It is also suggested that Russia has concerns about competing with China in arms exports taking into consideration China’s improvement of technological power. Military exchanges between China and Russia take place in such forms as routine mutual visits by senior military officers and bilateral and multilateral exercises. For example, China and Russia have been conducting large-scale joint naval exercises called “Maritime Cooperation” since 2012, including the first in the South China Sea in 2016 and the first in the Baltic Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk in 2017. In addition, moves indicating deepened China-Russia relations have been confirmed in recent years. In the two countries’ “first joint strategic flight” of bombers in July 2019, their bombers joined in the Sea of Japan and flew to the East China Sea. In September the same year, China and Russia signed a series of documents on cooperation in the military and military technologies.[48] In October 2021, as a continuation of the joint naval exercise “Maritime Cooperation 2021,” a total of ten Chinese and Russian warships conducted joint navigation around Japan under the title “First Maritime Joint Patrol.” Furthermore, at the China-Russia Defense Ministers’ online meeting held in November the same year, both sides agreed to expand cooperation in areas such as “strategic exercises” and “joint patrols.” The joint statement issued after the China-Russia summit meeting in March 2023 specified that the two countries would regularly conduct “joint patrols” and “joint exercises” at sea and in the air. Supporting these trends, China and Russia have continued to mutually participate in military exercises since 2018. In 2018, the Chinese military participated in Vostok 2018, which is considered the largest post Cold War exercise by the Russian military, followed by Tsentr 2019 in 2019, Kavkaz 2020 in 2020, and Vostok 2022 in 2022.[49] The Russian military also participated in “Western Joint-2021” conducted by the Chinese Army’s Western Theater Command in 2021, and in “Northern Joint-2023” conducted by the Northern Theater Command in 2023. China likely regards these exchanges as an opportunity to learn about how to operate Russianmade weapons and the operational doctrine of the Russian Armed Forces, which have combat experiences. Furthermore, bombers of Russia and China have flown long distance jointly around Japan a total of seven times since the joint flight in July 2019 mentioned above, namely, in December 2020, November 2021, May and November 2022, and June and December 2023. Among others, the joint flight in May 2022 was with stronger provocation than ever because it was intended for demonstration of force against Japan, which was holding a Japan-U.S.-Australia-India summit meeting at that time. During joint flights in November of the same year, it was said that a Chinese aircraft landed at an airfield in Russia for the first time, and a Russian aircraft landed at an airfield in China for the first time. In June 2023, joint flights were conducted over a two-day period for the first time, and flights involving a total of 20 fighter jets were also confirmed, showing the diversification of their activities. Regarding activities by Chinese and Russian naval vessels, in addition to the aforementioned joint navigation in October 2021, joint navigations around Japan were carried out by Chinese and Russian naval vessels centering on participating warships of the aforementioned “Vostok 2022” in September 2022 and by Chinese and Russian naval vessels centering on participating warships of the aforementioned “Northern Union-2023” from July to August 2023. During the joint navigation conducted in 2023, it is said that more than 50 combat training exercises were conducted. Before and after the joint navigation, ships participating in it made port calls to each other’s countries for the first time, which indicated a diversification of their activities. Moreover, in June 2022, naval vessels of both countries navigated separately one week apart around Japan in almost an orbital manner. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **47 According to SIPRI Arms Transfers Database** **48 A total of more than 2,000 Chinese military personnel from land, navy, and air force troops, as well as aircraft and naval vessels are said to have participated in the “Vostok 2022” exercise.** ----- **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **Perspective** **Chinese and Russian Militaries Strengthening Cooperation** **IIDA Masafumi, Director, Security Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies** China and Russia, which experienced a severe confrontation coast of Alaska in the United States, conducted training in the during the Cold War, have gradually improved their relationship Bering Sea, and then passing between Okinawa’s main island and through confidence-building measures, such as mutual reductions Miyakojima island, they sailed to the East China Sea. It can be said in military forces deployed in border areas and border demarcation that cooperation between the Chinese and Russian militaries is negotiations. In 2003, the first joint exercise between the Chinese progressing towards a de facto alliance. and Russian militaries took place as part of a multilateral anti- One of China’s aims in strengthening cooperation with the terrorism exercise organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Russian military is to improve the operational capabilities of its Organization (SCO). In 2012, the Chinese Navy and the Russian military through joint exercises and actions with the Russian Navy jointly conducted a “maritime cooperation” exercise for the military, which has a wealth of practical experience. In addition, first time with the theme of joint defense at sea. Since then, they China, which is becoming increasingly hostile to the United States, have conducted joint exercises almost every year and not only in is aiming to gain an advantage in strategic competition with it the waters surrounding China, such as the Sea of Japan and the and its allies and partners by strengthening military cooperation East China Sea, but also in waters surrounding Russia, including with Russia, which also opposes the United States. On the other the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea. Since 2018, the hand, it is believed that Russia is placing importance on China as a Chinese and Russian militaries have been mutually participating strategic partner in countering the United States, and it also expects in strategic joint exercises conducted by the two countries, further a reduction in the presence of U.S. forces confronting Russia on enhancing the coordination between their militaries through the European front by it providing indirect support to China in its military exercises. military opposition to the United States and encouraging the U.S. Furthermore, the Chinese and Russian militaries have begun military to become more involved in the Indo-Pacific region. engaging in joint operations in the sea and airspace surrounding Even after Russia invaded Ukraine, joint exercises and actions Japan and are strengthening operational cooperation. The “Joint between the Chinese and Russian militaries have continued to be Aerial Strategic Patrol,” which began in 2019 by Russian and carried out, so it is expected that military cooperation between Chinese bombers, has been conducted with diversification of the two countries will continue to deepen in the future. To ensure participating aircraft types and expantion of flight airspace. Joint Japan’s security and maintain stability in East Asia, we must maritime patrols by Chinese and Russian warships, which began remain vigilant about such developments. in 2021, are also conducted annually. In 2023, they sailed off the (Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher’s academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position. The repeated joint flights of bombers and joint **3** **Relations with North Korea** navigations of ships between China and Russia are obviously intended as demonstration activities against China has kept close relations with North Korea under the Japan and are a grave concern for Japan’s security. 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation In this way, China and Russia is demonstrating actions Friendship Treaty. In June 2019, President Xi Jinping to enhance cooperation further even while aggression became the first Chinese president to visit North Korea against Ukraine is ongoing. There is a possibility for the in 14 years, and held his fifth summit meeting with the two countries to enhance military cooperation further, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un. and these developments, including the strengthening In October 2022, Chairman Kim sent a congratulatory of military cooperation between China and Russia, not telegram to President Xi Jinping on his election as only have a direct impact on the security environment President for his third term. In September 2023, Xi sent surrounding Japan, but may also have strategic effects a congratulatory telegram to North Korea on the 75th on the United States and Europe, and should be watched anniversary of its founding. with concern. China has reportedly adopted three principles on **See** Ch t 2 P h 3 3 (Oth R i R ) th K P i l (1) th d l i ti f th **See** ----- Korean Peninsula, (2) the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and (3) the resolution of problems through dialogue and consultations indicating that China gives priority to the maintenance of stability and dialogue as well as the denuclearization. Under these principles, China, while agreeing to UN Security Council resolutions until 2017 to enhance sanctions on North Korea, cooperated with Russia in proposing a draft resolution including lifting some of the sanctions based on UNSC resolutions recently. In May 2022, China exercised its power of veto with Russia to a draft resolution for sanctions proposed by the United States in response to North Korea’s launching of ICBMclass ballistic missiles. Although China has vowed to have seriously observed its international obligations, it has been pointed out that Chinese ships have been involved in illicit shipto-ship transfer prohibited by the UN Security Council resolutions. **4** **Relations with Other Countries** In July 2016, an arbitration award based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adjudicating the Philippines’ case against China in the South China Sea was rendered, accepting most of the Philippine claims. Under these circumstances, in recent years there have been frequent reports of sabotage activities against Philippine ships by vessels belonging to the Chinese Coast Guard. In November 2022, the Philippines announced that China Coast Guard interrupted a Philippine navy boat that collected a floating object and tried to take it back with them, and the Chinese ship then took it by force. Since August 2023, there have been numerous reports of the Chinese Coast Guard and others allegedly interfering with Philippine ships and other vessels attempting to replenish the Philippine warship Sierra Madre stranded on the Second Thomas Shoal. Of these, collisions between Chinese Coast Guard vessels and Philippine vessels are said to have occurred in October and December 2023, and March 2024. In September 2023, the Philippine Coast Guard issued a statement criticizing the Chinese side after the Chinese Coast Guard installed a floating barrier on Scarborough Shoal, and later announced that the Philippine Coast Guard had removed it. China and Vietnam have territorial disputes and oil drilling issues in the South China Sea. In August 2023, it was reported that a Vietnamese fishing boat was damaged in the Paracel Islands after being sprayed with water from a vessel believed to be a Chinese Coast Guard vessel. Meanwhile, in the demarcated maritime boundary waters of the Gulf of Tonkin, the militaries of both countries have been conducting regular joint naval patrols since 2006. In November 2023, the Vietnamese military participated for the first time in the multilateral exercise “Peace and Friendship-2023” hosted by the Chinese military in Southeast Asia. China and ASEAN have continued talks to discuss the formulation of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). In July 2019, China announced at the Chinese and ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting that they had completed the first reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text. Subsequently, a second reading was initiated. At the August 2021 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, it was noted that a provisional agreement on the Preamble had been reached. In the Joint Statement of the ASEAN-China Special Summit in November of that year, there was mention of expectations for the early conclusion of an effective and substantive COC. At the ASEAN Chi F i Mi i t ’M ti i J l 2023 **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries** As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, reciprocal summit-level visits and other activities continue to be actively carried out. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and the ROK), East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Furthermore, China has developed bilateral relations through infrastructure development support, etc., under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On the military front, there seems to be moves that China has made efforts toward military confidence building, such as the first ASEAN-China Maritime Field Training Exercise, which took place in October 2018. Moreover, the possibility of China using part of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base exclusively has been pointed out. Concerning this matter, the Cambodian side denied the existence of such a fact, saying that hosting foreign military bases is against its Constitution. In addition, in June 2021, Cambodia’s Minister of National Defense acknowledged that China had contributed to the development of the Ream Naval Base. However, he stated that access to the base facilities was not limited to China alone. Against this backdrop, a Chinese naval vessel reportedly entered the Ream Naval Base in preparation for Cambodian Navy training in December 2023 ----- relations with Sri Lanka. To Sri Lanka, which is located at a strategic point in the Indian Ocean and supports the BRI, China has provided massive economic and technical cooperation in infrastructure development, including for railroads, ports, and airports. On the other hand, in July 2017, an agreement was reached to lend interests for 99 years to Chinese enterprises at the Port of Hambantota, which is being constructed with Chinese loans. Some have noted that this constitutes what has been described as a “debt trap.” President Wickremesinghe took office in July 2022, and continues discussions with creditor countries including China to resolve the debt problem. Chinese tracking ship Yuan Wang 5 reportedly operated by the PLA Strategic Support Force entered the Port of Hambantota in August 2022. **(4) Relations with European Countries** For China, the European Union (EU) countries are increasingly in its presence especially in the economic field. European countries possess more advanced military technologies than China or Russia regarding information and communication technology, avionics/aeroengines, air independence propulsion (AIP) systems for submarines, and elsewhere. The EU countries have maintained their arms embargo on China since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, and China has requested them to lift the embargo.[50] If the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, sophisticated military technologies could be transferred to China and to third countries via China, dramatically changing the secuårity environment in the Indo-Pacific and other regions. China’s recent rise has attracted attention from NATO as well. The new strategic concept announced at a NATO summit meeting in June 2022 states that “China’s ambition and coercive policies challenge NATO’s interests, security, and values,” and expressed concern over rapid enhancement of nuclear forces, absence of transparency, and malicious hybrid and cyber activities. Based on this, it mentioned that NATO will be engaged with China for the alliance’s security interests, and to prevent China’s coercive actions to divide the NATO. China’s relations with European countries, including EU discussions on the arms embargo on China and NATO’s policy on engagement with China, should be continuously watched. the Guidelines for Accelerating the Early Conclusion of an Effective and Substantive COC” was adopted. **(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries** The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. Therefore, China is deeply concerned about the political stability and security situations, such as terrorism by Islamic extremists, in Central Asian states. Such concerns of China appear to be reflected in China’s tightened border control and its engagement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the stabilization of Afghanistan. Moreover, China is strongly interested in Central Asia, with a view to diversifying its supply sources and procurement methods for resources. China promotes cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(3) Relations with South Asian Countries** China has a close relationship with Pakistan under their “all-weather strategic partnership,” and mutual visits by their summit leaders take place frequently. Their cooperation in the military sector, including bilateral exercises, exporting weapons, and transferring military technology, is also deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases for China, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan is rising for China accordingly, partly because of the geopolitical features of Pakistan which faces the Indian Ocean. Although economic ties between China and India are strengthening, the two countries have not demarcated their borders in areas such as Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. In May 2020, a clash between Chinese and Indian forces occurred near the China-India border in Ladakh, India, and tensions between the two countries escalated with the first deadly clash in 45 years on June 15 of the same year. Since then, China and India have regularly held commander-level meetings based on the management agreement for the Line of Actual Control, a temporary border between the two countries. Currently, the countries are still continuing efforts to gradually ease tensions. In recent years, China has also been deepening its ----- and the Solomon Islands signed the Framework of Security Cooperation.” It was reported in March 2022 that the draft framework included items that allow China to deploy police and troops and allow Chinese naval vessels to call at ports and get supplies. China has also been moving to enhance military relations with Fiji and Tonga. While China has been enhancing relations with Pacific island nations, Australia and some other countries have expressed concerns about such Chinese moves. **5** **International Transfer of Weapons** **(5) Relations with Middle East and African Countries,** **and Pacific Island countries** China has been enhancing its relations with Middle Eastern and African nations in the economic realm. In recent years, it has also strengthened military relations with them. Not only intensive interactions among state leaders and senior military officials but also arms exports and exchanges between military forces are actively conducted. China also actively dispatches personnel to undertake UN PKO in Africa. Some suspect that underlying these movements could be China’s aim to ensure a stable supply of natural resources and to secure overseas bases in the future. China is Australia’s biggest trade partner. However, the relations of the two countries have deteriorated, such as China’s successive restriction on importing Australian beef and other goods, since April 2020 when Australia suggested the necessity for an independent investigation into the origin of COVID-19 in China. Subsequently, however, with the change of government in Australia, an improvement in the relations has been sought. China has also been boosting its relations with Pacific island countries by providing them with proactive and continuous economic support and medical services deploying a military hospital ship. China is reportedly promoting resources development in Papua New Guinea and has repeatedly approached it about concluding an agreement on defense and police cooperation. Moreover, it was announced in April 2022 that China **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** China has been expanding exports of weapons such as missiles, tanks, aircraft including drones, and ships. China’s major arms export destinations include Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. China has also been reportedly exporting arms to Algeria, Nigeria, and other African countries, countries in Southeast Asia including Thailand and Cambodia, Saudi Arabia, and other Middle Eastern countries.[51] Some claim that China has transferred weapons to foreign countries in order to strengthen its strategic relationships with friendly nations, enhance its influence in the international community, and secure natural resources. China has not participated in some of the frameworks for international arms export control, and some point out that missile-related and other technologies have been transferred from China to other countries. **REFERENCE : Security Environment Surrounding Japan (China)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/index.html** ----- **Section 3** **Relations between the United States and China, etc.** **1** **Relations between the United States and China (General Situation)** With regard to the relationship between the United States, as some of the challenges requiring cooperation. In this the world’s largest economic power, and China, the second way, the Biden administration takes over from the former **Part** largest, competitions between the two countries across Trump administration the deterrence stance against China **Ⅰ** the political, economic, and military realms have become while considering dealing with cross-border challenges **Chapter** increasingly apparent in recent years. This is due to important, and thus it announces managed competition **3** various concerns such as changes in the balance of power with China and cooperation in specific fields. caused by China’s growing national power, trade issues, The administration, in the National Defense Strategy issues concerning the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, (NDS) published in October 2022, placed China’s the Hong Kong issue, and human rights issues in China coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor, to regarding Uighur and Tibet. In particular, since the former refashion the Indo-Pacific region and international system Trump administration, the moves of the United States and to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences, as the China that had kept each other in check have come to the most comprehensive and serious challenge to the security surface. Under the Biden administration as well, there has of the United States. It further stated that China was a been strong interest in the irreversible developments in “pacing challenge” that needs to be dealt with, and that the strategic competition between the two countries. the Department of Defense should take actions rapidly to In October 2022, the Biden administration published maintain and enhance deterrence against China, because the National Security Strategy (NSS), identifying China China has expanded and modernized nearly every aspect as the United States’ most consequential geopolitical of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with a focus on challenge and positioning it as the only competitor offsetting U.S. military advantages. with both the intent to reshape the international order Taking a strict attitude towards China is becoming and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, common nonpartisan policy. For example, a resolution and technological power to achieve this. It stated that to establish a nonpartisan “Select Committee on the China has ambitions to become the world’s leading Strategic Competition Between the United States and power, invests in its rapidly modernizing military power, the Chinese Communist Party” was passed in the U.S. enhances its capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region, and House of Representatives in January 2023. attempts to erode U.S. alliances. The NSS also expressed On the other hand, China opposes this, stating that this the idea that the world is at an inflection point, and the next type of attitude is an old-fashioned representation of a ten years will be the decisive decade in determining the Cold War mentality and zero-sum game, and is stirring up competitive position of the United States against China. competition between superpowers. China shows a non- Based on this perception, the administration raises three compromising attitude over its own “core interests and points as the axis for its policy towards China, that is, (1) material concerns,” and uses special caution regarding investment in competitiveness, innovation, resiliency, involvement with the United States especially in regard and democracy, (2) cooperation with allies and partners, to Taiwan issues that China values as “the core of the and (3) responsible competition with China to defend core interests.” When then Speaker of the U.S. House of the interests of the United States and build a vision for Representatives Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, the future. The government stated it will pursue greater China conducted large scale military exercises in various strategic stability through measures to responsively areas around Taiwan and showed an uncompromising manage competition, lower risks of unintended military attitude against the United States. For example, China escalation, and ultimately engage with China through announced countermeasures that it withholds various measures on arms control efforts. On the other hand, the discussion between the two countries. Both countries administration expresses that it is willing to work with agreed on the importance of working out a competition China where both interests align because China, being management policy, continued dialogue, and cooperation central to the global economy, has a strong influence to deal with international challenges such as climate change on shared challenges. Climate change, nuclear non- and food security at the U.S.-China summit meeting held lif ti d th l b l f d i i i di t d f th fi t ti i d th Bid d i i t ti ----- in November 2022. However, they made no concessions in areas of conflict such as the Taiwan issue, human rights issues, and on trade issues. United States Armed Forces shot down a Chinese reconnaissance balloon that was detected over the U.S. homeland in February 2023. The U.S. Government communicated to China that the flight was a clear violation of its sovereignty and of international law, and postponed Secretary of State Blinken’s visit to China scheduled in the same month. China insisted that it was a privately owned weather observation airship that strayed into U.S. territory due to force majeure and expressed strong discontent with the shooting down of the balloon by the United States and protested against it. Against this backdrop, exchanges between the U.S. and China, including between their military authorities, slowed down, but efforts have been made to resume exchanges since then. In November 2023, President Biden held a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping for the first time in about a year. They agreed to resume high-level dialogue between military authorities, which the Chinese side appears to have suspended in response to the shooting down of its spy balloon. Additionally, they agreed to resume consultations between their military authorities, which had been suspended by China as a countermeasure when then-House Speaker Pelosi visited Taiwan. In December of the same year, a video conference was held between the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Joint Staff of the PLA, and exchanges between the U.S. and China are gradually resuming. Meanwhile, in the field of sensitive technologies and critical technologies, where U.S.-China competition is particularly conspicuous, the United States has become increasingly wary of China. China promotes the “intellectualization” of the PLA; for example, General Secretary Xi of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), stated in his report in the 20th CCP Congress in October 2022 that China “holds fast to merge and develop mechanization, informatization, and intellectualization.” Based on these movements, the Biden administration puts effort into protecting and fostering sensitive technologies and key technologies recognizing that U.S. security will be threatened as a result of the strengthening of Chinese military power due to leakage of sensitive and key technologies from the United States and its allies. Aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of the United States in the semiconductor field, the “Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act” was passed in August 2022 to support semiconductor manufacturing companies in the United States financially, while making it compulsory that the supported companies agree with the Secretary of Commerce not to enhance advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities in countries of particular concern including China for ten years. In addition, the administration announced the enhancement of Export Administration Regulations related to semiconductors in October 2022 to limit the ability of China to obtain and manufacture technologies and products used in advanced military systems to increase the accuracy and speed of military decision making. In 2023, the Biden administration continued to add companies that support the modernization of China’s military to the Entity List,[1] which regulates exports from the U.S.[2] In August of the same year, the administration issued a presidential directive restricting investment in China in three areas of national security concern: semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum technology information, and artificial intelligence. On the other hand, China criticizes these measures taken by the United States as malicious blockage of Chinese companies. Moreover, in response to the tightening of regulations by the United States and other foreign countries, China has been enforcing a series of countermeasures, such as laws and regulations, since 2020. In September 2020, China implemented its Unreliable Entity List in response to the U.S. Entity List. In December of the same year, China’s Export Control Law entered into force to control the export of technology and the like related to China’s national security and interests. As further pushing back against the United States measures, in January 2021, China passed new rules to protect its firms from “unjustified extra-territorial application of foreign legislation and other measures.” In addition to this, in June 2022, China announced the entry into force of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and implemented sanctions against U.S. individuals and organizations, including the former U.S. Secretary **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** “The Entity List is a list of companies designated by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) as having national security or foreign policy-related concerns under the Export Administration Regulations. Exports of goods, software, or technologies necessary for production or development to companies on the list require authorization from the BIS.” For example, in February 2023, the U.S. government added Chinese aerospace-related companies and organizations to the Entity List because of their support for the Chinese military’s aerospace programs, including balloons. In June 2023, the U.S. government added Chinese companies and organizations to the Entity List for their contribution to the modernization of the ----- of Commerce. China s Ministry of Commerce then China announced that it would impose sanctions on five criticized the U.S. Export Administration Regulations U.S. companies under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. related to semiconductors as disruptive to the order of the Competition in the technology field between the international economy and trading and presented a case to United States and China is likely to intensify further the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2022. in the future as both sides continue to reciprocate each In February 2023, China added two U.S. companies to its other’s efforts to set forth new regulations. For example, **Part** Entity List of untrustworthy trading partners for the first the United States made a move to enhance bilateral and **Ⅰ** time, citing repeated sales of offensive weapons to Taiwan multilateral cooperation, the effects of which can be seen **Chapter** as having undermined China’s security. In January 2024, to be spreading internationally. **3** **2** **Military Trends of the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific Region** of a strategy for ground-based theater-range missile **1** **General Situation** capabilities in the region. The Biden administration, which places utmost The United States expressed its determination to importance on the Indo-Pacific region, announced in optimize its force posture in the Indo-Pacific, including NSS that it was going to deepen its tightest partnerships Japan, in the joint statement of the Japan-U.S. Security with five allies, namely Japan, Australia, the Republic of Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. “2+2”) held in Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand based on the January 2023. Furthermore, the United States repeatedly recognition that a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is states that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty achievable only with the collective capacity of alliances is applied to the Senkaku Islands as well. The Biden and partnerships. Furthermore, it was stated that the administration also reconfirms in the NSS its unwavering Quad (comprising Japan, Australia, India, and the United commitment to defense of Japan, including the Senkaku States) and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, Islands, under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and this and the United States) are also important for dealing policy is continuously reconfirmed in various occasions with regional challenges, because total power can be including Japan-U.S. summit meetings. strengthened through cooperation between Indo-Pacific On the other hand, China resists this U.S. posture, countries and European countries. The administration saying these are acts of repressing the growth of China and also stated that it places emphasis on Southeast Asia and protecting U.S. hegemony. It is seen that China is wary Pacific Islands regions to enhance regional diplomacy, of the growth of initiatives such as the Quad into strong development, and economic involvement. Moreover, it alliances, as well as with the growing involvement of the discloses in the NDS the direction of the United States to United States in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, reinforce and build out resilient security architecture in the military power balance between the United States the Indo-Pacific region in order to sustain a free and open and China in the Indo-Pacific region is changing because regional order and deter attempts to resolve disputes China is rapidly strengthening its military power against by force. With this view, it is stated that it is necessary a background of its economic growth and other factors. to modernize the alliance with Japan and strengthen China is out of the framework of the Intermediate- combined capabilities by aligning strategic planning and Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty) and the New priorities in a more integrated manner. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START Treaty) The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for and has been enhancing ground-launched missile power Fiscal Year 2024 passed through Congress in December unilaterally. Although the United States has insisted that 2023 places importance on strategic competition with China should be included in arms control negotiations China and Russia. It includes initiatives aimed at and expressed its intention to apply brakes to China’s strengthening the posture and capabilities of U.S. forces missile power build up, China consistently refuses,[3] in the Indo-Pacific, such as increasing the budget for the asserting that the United States should take the initiative Pacific Deterrence Initiative to enhance the posture of in conducting disarmament. U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region and the formulation The changes in the military power balance between ----- the United States and China can affect peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the U.S.-China military trends in the region concerning the South China Sea and Taiwan will require further attention. **2** **South China Sea** law. The study concluded that China s claims over most of the South China Sea are inconsistent with international law and gravely undermine the rule of law in the ocean. In February 2023, during a defense ministerial meeting between the United States and the Philippines, the two countries agreed to add four new cooperation bases within the Philippines, in addition to the existing five, under the “Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)” to facilitate the rotational deployment of U.S. forces. In this way, the administration is showing its stance to further enhance cooperation with countries surrounding the South China Sea. Additionally, the United States has sought to enhance military efforts in the South China Sea. It has continuously conducted the Freedom of Navigation Operations, carried out joint exercises in July 2020 by deploying two Carrier Strike Groups for the first time since 2014, and even after President Biden took office, in February 2021, conducted similar exercises several times in order to confront China’s excessive claims on maritime interests. The United States has also conducted joint training with partner countries including Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, the Netherlands, Canada, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Responding to these American efforts, China has criticized the United States for hindering the peace and stability of the region. Additionally, there have been cases of Chinese naval vessels approaching and interfering with U.S. naval vessels sailing through the South China Sea and elsewhere, as well as cases of Chinese fighter jets allegedly approaching U.S. military aircraft. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense has recorded more than 180 dangerous flights by Chinese military aircraft against U.S. aircraft in the East China Sea and South China Sea from 2021 to 2023 and has pointed out that the Chinese military has carried out approximately 100 dangerous actions against the militaries of U.S. allies and other nations.[4] Going forward, while forming free and open order based on the rule of law is important in the South China Sea, the military tensions may rise. Japan, which promotes the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) with the United States, will have to pay great attention to the situation. **3** **Taiwan** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** With regard to the issues over the South China Sea, the United States is concerned about such dimensions as obstruction to the freedom of navigation in sea lanes, restrictions on the activities of U.S. Forces, and the worsening security situation in the entire region. The United States has requested China comply with international norms and has repeatedly criticized China’s unilateral and assertive actions. On the other hand, China expresses opposition saying the United States is the largest threat to peace and stability in the South China Sea, and confrontation between these two countries is deepening. China has been advancing into the South China Sea taking advantage of the power vacuum there since the 1950s, and promoting the militarization of the Paracel Islands. It has also been conducting rapid reclamation of the Spratly Islands on a large scale since 2014. Even after the illegality of the Chinese activities such as land reclamation was determined at the Philippines-China arbitration in 2016, China has made it clear that it would not comply with the decision and has been promoting its plan to militarize the area. **See** Section 2-2-6 (5) (Trends of Activities in the South China Sea); Section 7 (Southeast Asia) **See** The United States has been criticizing China’s action about issues concerning the South China Sea hitherto and conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations and other activities. The Biden administration has continued to show its consistent and strict deterrence stance against China. For example, it stated that the United States will reject China’s claims about maritime interests in the South China Sea and stand up together with Southeast Asian countries facing China’s pressure. Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, stated again in July 2021, on the fifth anniversary of the ruling of the arbitral tribunal to Philippines v. China, that the United States demands China comply with the obligations of international law. In addition, in January 2022, the U.S. Department of State released a study examining China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea in light of international China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China and that the Taiwan issue is its internal affair. ----- China maintains that the One China principle is the underlying premise and foundation for dialogue between China and Taiwan. China is also strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unification of China as well as any move towards the independence of Taiwan and has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force in respect of the Taiwan issue. “The Anti-Secession Law,” enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out China’s policy of not renouncing the use of force, providing that in the event that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. General Secretary Xi stated in the report to the 20th Party Congress held in October 2022, in respect of cross-strait issues, China’s position to “continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort” while he stated again “resolving the Taiwan issue and realizing China’s complete reunification is a natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.” On the other hand, the United States stated in the NSS that it has an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, does not support Taiwan independence, and remains committed to the “One China” policy which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances. Based on this, the United States also makes it clear that it intends to uphold its commitments under the TRA to support Taiwan’s self-defense, and to maintain the United States’ capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan. The Biden administration has positioned China as America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge as well as the only competitor with the intent and power to reshape the international order and has made clear its diplomatic stance to contain China through cooperation with allies and partner countries on issues concerning Taiwan and other matters. For example, since the start of Biden administration, the importance of “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” has been repeatedly mentioned at international meetings such as the JapanU.S. summit meetings, the G7 Summit, and the U.S.-EU summit meetings. Furthermore, the Biden administration has been promoting efforts to enhance Taiwan’s international standing, including calling on UN member t t t t T i ’ i f l ti i ti i the UN system. The United States has decided to sell weapons to Taiwan based on the TRA. Since the inauguration of the Biden administration also, the United States has continued to sell weapons such as self-propelled howitzers, aircraft-launched missiles, and maintenance and repair packages for air defense missile systems. The Biden administration also continued to have U.S. warships and aircraft pass through the Taiwan Strait periodically. Moreover, then President Tsai Ing-wen acknowledged that the U.S. military was visiting Taiwan for training purposes in an interview with U.S. media in October 2021. In March 2023, U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin testified at a congressional hearing that the U.S. National Guard was training Taiwan’s military. Moreover, not only the U.S. government but also the U.S. Congress has indicated its intention to further enhance support for Taiwan. Congressional delegations of the United States including then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Pelosi, visited Taiwan repeatedly and met with then-President Tsai and others, and exchanged views on strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relations and other matters during 2022. Moreover, the FY2023 National Defense and Authorization Act (NDAA) includes approvals for the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to enhance security cooperation with Taiwan, and military financing of up to US$10 billion over five years from 2023 to 2027, among other items. The FY2024 NDAA includes provisions for providing comprehensive training and advice to Taiwan’s military and establishing an institutional capacity-building program. In response to this proximity between the United States and Taiwan, China has further stepped up its military activities around Taiwan, including conducting military exercises around it when VIPs from the United States and Taiwan visited each other. **See** Section 2-2-6(4) (Trends of Activities around Taiwan); [Commentary] (Chinese Military Trends Concerning Taiwan) While the Biden administration is clarifying its stance of supporting Taiwan in the military-related area, it is deemed unlikely that China, which position Taiwan issues as “the core of the core interests,” will show a compromising attitude towards the U.S. stance. It is viewed that the U.S.China conflict over Taiwan may become more apparent. Stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan is important not only for Japan’s security but also for the stability of the international community. Therefore, it is necessary that we pay close attention to the situation with a sense of i i th b f **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- **3** **Military Capabilities of Taiwan and Military Balance between China and Taiwan** and the Nationalist Party (KMT) fell short of a majority, **1** **Relations with China** with the opposition KMT becoming the largest party Then Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen from the with 52 seats out of a total of 113 seats, the ruling DPP Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who took office in becoming the second largest party with 51 seats, and a 2016, has noted that she has never accepted the “1992 new party, the Taiwan People’s Party, holding the casting **Part** Consensus” that China claims as embodying the “One- vote with 8 seats. In response to these election results, **Ⅰ** **Chapter** China” principle.[5] In response, China has criticized the China warned Lai and his incoming administration, DPP for unilaterally destroying the political foundation saying, “The basic fact that Taiwan is a part of China **3** “the peaceful development of cross-strait relations” and cannot be changed,” and “The election results showed has emphasized that upholding the “1992 Consensus” that the DPP in no way represents mainstream public is the foundation for peace and stability in cross-strait opinion.” relations. In regard to relations between the international In a January 2019 speech at an event commemorating community and Taiwan, since around the inauguration of the 40th anniversary of China’s “Message to Compatriots then President Tsai for her first term, Taiwanese delegates in Taiwan,” regarding the application of the “one country were refused attendance at or had their invitations deferred two systems” model to Taiwan, General Secretary Xi from meetings held by international organizations, stated that “the specific form of the ‘one country, two including ones in which they had participated up to systems’ model in Taiwan will give full consideration that point.[6] Furthermore, Nauru severed diplomatic ties to the situation in Taiwan.” In her immediate response with Taiwan in January 2024 and established diplomatic to the speech, then President Tsai issued a statement relations with China, reducing the number of countries firmly rejecting the “one country, two systems” model with which Taiwan has diplomatic relations from 22 and called for negotiations between “government- when the Tsai administration first took office in May 2016 authorized agencies.” Moreover, in October 2021, at to 12. The Taiwanese authorities have strongly protested the ceremony commemorating the 110th anniversary of against these moves, describing them as “China’s attempt the Xinhai Revolution, President Xi sought to check the to compress Taiwan’s international space.” Tsai administration again, stating, “Those who… seek to split the country will come to no good end; they will **2** **Taiwan’s Military Power and Defense** be disdained by the people and condemned by history.” **Strategy** On the other hand, in her speech for the Double Tenth National Day Celebration that month, then President Tsai With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present, said, “We call for maintaining the status quo,” stating ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic a total of approximately 104,000 personnel. In regard of China should not be subordinate to each other,” and to the organization of the army, plans are underway emphasized the stance that cross-strait conflicts should to abolish the traditional Army Corps and the like be resolved through dialogue between the two sides on and establish “theaters of operation” as permanent equal footing. organizations of joint operation. The Taiwanese Minister In the Taiwan presidential election held in January of National Defense explained the reason for this as being 2024, Lai Ching-te, the ruling DPP candidate who advantageous for the execution of integrated operations declared that he would continue Tsai Ing-wen’s line, was during conflict or peacetime. In addition, it is assessed elected and took office as president in May of the same that approximately 1.66 million reserve personnel of the year. Meanwhile, in the Legislative Yuan election held on air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case the same day as the presidential election, both the DPP, of war. In January 2022, the All-out Defense Mobilization which had held an outright majority before the election, Agency was established to integrate the reserve forces **5** The “1992 Consensus” refers to what represents a common understanding reached between Chinese and Taiwanese authorities in 1992 on the “One-China” principle. The CCP and Taiwan’s Kuomintang Nationalist Party (Taiwan’s ruling party at the time), viewed as parties to the consensus, have reportedly differed over the interpretation of the consensus. In addition, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party has clarified that it has not accepted the “1992 Consensus.” ----- and public and private organizations involved in wartime mobilization to optimize the efficiency of the mobilization system in the event of an emergency. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers which were imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses the indigenously built “Tuo Chiang” stealth corvette, among other vessels. Taiwan is currently promoting a national shipbuilding program to independently build its own military vessels, which includes plans to build eleven mass-produced Tuo Chiang-class corvettes by 2026 and ultimately about eight submarines, including the first submarine, which was launched in September 2023. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 fighters (F-16V upgraded from A/B), Mirage 2000 fighters, Ching-kuo fighters, and other assets. In November 2021, Taiwan’s first unit composed of F-16V fighters upgraded from F-16A/B fighters was established at Chiayi Air Base, and the deployment of fighters capable of carrying longer-range missiles is being strengthened, including the new F-16V fighters scheduled to be introduced from the United States. Taiwan had conscription from 1951, but later transitioned to a volunteer system, with conscription ending by the end of 2018. Since then, while the fourmonth mandatory military training for males aged 18 to 36 had been maintained, the Tsai administration revived one-year obligatory military service for males of conscription age starting in January 2024. The Army formed seven new infantry brigades, primarily consisting of compulsorily conscripted soldiers, for a total of 12 brigades by 2023, and began accepting soldiers with one-year mandatory conscription from January 2024. The new conscription system has strengthened the training content beyond what was required under the previous military training obligations, and specifically, it requires enhanced training in operating new equipment and participation in practical training. On the other hand, since China has consistently expressed its intention of not renouncing the use of force to Taiwan, the country may make a decision on military options such as air and maritime blockade, limited use of force, air and missile operations, and invasion of Taiwan. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Fig. I-3-3-1 Placement of Taiwan Military Matsu Islands Matsu Defense Command Navy Headquarters Air Force Headquarters Songshan Army Headquarters (Taipei) Keelung Kinmen Defense Command Taipei Hsinchu Taoyuan Su’ao **Third Theater of Operations** Kinmen Islands Chingchuankang **Fifth Theater of Operations** Hualien Penghu Islands Chiayi Magong **Second Theater of Operations** **First Theater of Operations** Penghu Defense Command Tainan Chihhang Kaohsiung Pingtung Marine Corps Command Zuoying / Kaohsiung **F** **th Th** **t** **f O** **ti** ----- If that happens, it is deemed that China will deter or delay any potential interventions by the United States. It was reported in December 2021 that an unpublished report submitted from the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan to the Legislative Yuan described a postulated Chinese process for invading Taiwan as follows: China will assemble its military forces on the Chinese coast under the guise of exercises and use “cognitive warfare” to cause panic among the Taiwanese people. Then, naval vessels will be gathered in the Western Pacific to prevent foreign military intervention. Next, under the strategy of transformation from exercises to war, the Rocket and Air Forces will launch ballistic and cruise missiles to attack Taiwan’s key military facilities, while the Strategic Support Forces carry out cyber-attacks on Taiwan’s key military systems. Finally, after gaining sea and air superiority, landing operations by amphibious assault ships, transport helicopters, and more will be carried out, thus achieving total control of Taiwan before foreign forces intervene. In response to such moves of China, Taiwan under then President Tsai Ing-wen has put forth defense strategy called as “Resolute Defense and Multi-domain Deterrence” preventing the invasion from China at the farthest points possible within its territory with a multi-layered defense posture, which combines major equipment such as fighters and vessels with asymmetric force. According to the 2019 Taiwan Defense Report, this strategy proposes a defense concept comprising “force protection” to contain the initial destruction caused by the enemy and ensure integrity of military power through mobility, concealment, dispersion, deception, camouflage, and other tactics, “decisive battle in littoral zone” to gain a partial superiority by air assets and shorebased firepower, and deploying integrated forces in order to intercept and destroy the enemy’s landing forces, and “destruction of enemy at landing beach” to destruct the enemy at breathing, landing beach and coastal areas by integrating forces, firepower and prepositioned barriers of three services during the enemy’s landing and maneuvering operations on shore, and give them no places to set foot on.[7] This is believed to be aimed at exhausting the operational capabilities of the Chinese military and preventing or reducing the landing of Chinese troops in the face of the overwhelming gap in military strength between China and Taiwan, as well as delaying an invasion by the Chinese military and buying time until intervention by the U.S. military. It is believed that Taiwan plans to constrain any Chinese military invasion from a long distance by expanding the development and production of domestically produced asymmetric capabilities and longrange weapons, as well as introducing high-performance, long-range weapons from the United States, in order to successfully execute “Resolute Defense and Multidomain Deterrence.” Taiwan is currently strengthening its domestic development of sea and air capabilities, longrange missiles, and the like. In November 2021, a special budget bill for the expansion of sea and air capabilities was passed, and it was decided to invest 240 billion Taiwan dollars (approximately 950 billion yen) over five years for the acquisition of self-developed equipment. In addition to these, Taiwan has decided to acquire from the United States the “M142” (HIMARS) high mobility artillery rocket system, the “RGM-84L-4” (Harpoon) surface-to-ship missile system, and the “AGM-84H” (SLAM-ER) long-range air-to-surface missile. In September 2023, the 2023 National Defense Report was released for the fourth time under the Tsai administration, announcing national defense policy initiatives and other issues. The report also included a new section on China’s normalization of harassment and threats as a security issue, pointing out that since 2022, China’s military actions against Taiwan have become more frequent and diverse, including the crossing of the “median line” across the Taiwan Strait by Chinese military assets, the establishment of a no-sail/no-fly zone around Taiwan, and practical military exercises, and it expressed Taiwan’s strong vigilance against normalized activities of the PLA, claiming that China is stepping up its threats against Taiwan. In response to these Chinese threats, the report maintains the defense strategy of “Resolute Defense and Multi-domain Deterrence” while adding a new section on “Defense in Depth” in its explanation of the strategy, which specifically includes a preemptive strike against a gathering invasion force, expansion of the defense space in coordination with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, and enhancement of the combat capability of the duty and reserve forces as well as the ability to mobilize residents, demonstrating a posture of working to create a multi-layered defense line **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Note that the 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Report present tactical principles of “resist the enemy on the opposite shore, attack it at sea, destroy it in the littoral area, and annihilate it on the beachhead.” It will impose multiple interdictions and joint fire strikes to degrade the enemy’s capabilities, disrupt its offensive and prevent it from ----- and strengthen the resilience of society as a whole. In addition to this, Taiwan annually conducts the “Han Kuang” large-scale military exercise that simulates an invasion by Chinese forces. It is believed that the Taiwan military’s defense strategy has been verified through this series of drills. In recent Han Kuang exercises, training exercises, such as anti-landing and interception drills, as well as training focused on gray zone strategies, such as cyber warfare and joint training between the Navy and the Coast Guard, have been conducted. It was reported that the content of the 2023 “Han Kuang 39” exercises was set based on the invasion of Ukraine, the increased activity of Chinese naval vessels on the eastern side of Taiwan, etc. Although some exercises were cancelled due to a typhoon, exercises for anti-landings, critical infrastructure protection, wartime disaster prevention through military-civilian cooperation, and the eastern deployment of surface-to-ship missiles were conducted. **3** **Military Balance between China and Taiwan** According to the 2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” released by the U.S. Department of Defense in October 2023, the PLA’s capabilities to invade Taiwan have been assessed as follows: - The PLA Army organized six combined arms brigades capable of carrying out amphibious operations, comprising four brigades in the Eastern Theater the operational range of which includes Taiwan, and two brigades in the Southern Theater. - In order to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain and prevent intervention by third countries, the PLA Navy is deploying new attack submarines and surface combatants with an antiaircraft capability. While it has not invested in landing ships and craft considered to be enough in number for large-scale assault on Taiwan, it may intend to make up for the shortage with civilian transport ships and other vessels. - The PLA Air Force has acquired advanced aircraft to conduct air and ground-attack operations. It also has a high Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability to support military operations in the event of a Taiwan invasion. Furthermore, it is improving its ability to operate further from China through enhanced refueling capabilities. - The PLA Rocket Force intends to degrade Taiwan’s defense and break the will to fight through missile attacks against high-value targets including Taiwan’s military facilities. In addition to this, it is pointed out in the report that the Strategic Support Force would conduct cyber and psychological warfare in the event of a Taiwan invasion, and the Joint Logistic Support Force would be responsible for integrated logistical support missions. The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows: (1) Regarding ground forces, while China possesses an overwhelming number of troops, its capability of landing and invading the main island of Taiwan is limited at present. In recent years, however, China has been steadily improving its landing invasion capabilities through building and commissioning large landing ships, and it is also improving transportation capabilities by mobilizing civil transport ships and the like. Confronting this, in recent years, Taiwan also has been taking actions to improve anti-landing capabilities such as by conducting enhanced training i t i i l di J li ti t k **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** While China has continued to increase its defense budget by a significant margin, Taiwan’s defense budget, at approximately 434.5 billion Taiwan dollars for FY2024, has remained almost unchanged for nearly 20 years. China’s announced military budget in the same year totals approximately 1,665.54 billion yuan, roughly 17 times the amount of Taiwan’s in terms of U.S. dollars based on exchange rates announced by the Taiwanese Central Bank. It is pointed out that China’s actual defense expenditure has been larger than the published defense budget, indicating that the China-Taiwan defense expenditure gap could be greater. Changes in the Taiwan’s Defense Authority **Fig. I-3-3-2** Budget Defense budget (in 100 million Taiwan dollars) Year-on-year growth rate (%) (100 million Taiwan dollars) 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 12 13 14 （％） 30 25 20 15 10 －5 －10 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 (FY) ----- missiles, and expanded combat drills with reservists and would-be draftees from conscription. (2) In regard to China’s naval and air forces, the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force are being rapidly reinforced both in terms of quality and quantity. This includes the launching of the second domestic-built aircraft carrier which reportedly could be equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system, and operational deployment of J-20 fifth-generation fighters. While Taiwan strives to enhance its naval and air forces by passing special budgets for them, the capability gap is expanding in an advantageous direction for China. (3) Regarding missile strike capabilities, China has many missiles including short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and multiple launch rockets and other assets with enough range to strike Taiwan. In response, Taiwan has strengthened its missile defense capabilities by introducing PAC-3 missiles from the United States and increasing the number of Taiwan’s own Tien Kung III missile sites. However, limitations to this response have been pointed out when it comes to dealing with a saturation attack. In addition, Taiwan is enhancing stand-off attack capabilities, including |Col1|Col2|China|Taiwan| |---|---|---|---| |Total military forces||Approx. 2.04 million personnel|Approx. 0.17 million personnel| |Ground forces|Ground troops|Approx. 0.97 million personnel|Approx. 94,000 personnel| ||Tanks, etc.|Type-99/A, Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 5,950 vehicles|M-60A3, CM-11 and others Approx. 750 vehicles| |Maritime forces|Warships|Approx. 690 vessels Approx. 2,360,000 tons|Approx. 150 vessels Approx. 210,000 tons| ||Aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates|Approx. 100 vessels|Approx. 30 vessels| ||Submarines|Approx. 70 vessels|4 vessels| ||Marines|Approx. 40,000 personnel|Approx. 10,000 personnel| |Air forces|Combat aircraft|Approx. 3,200 aircraft|Approx. 470 aircraft| ||Modern fighter aircraft|J-10 × 588 Su-27/J-11 × 327 Su-30 × 97 Su-35 × 24 J-15 × 60 J-16 × 292 J-20 × 200 (Fourth and fifth generation fighters (total): 1,588)|Mirage2000 x 54 F-16 (modified V) x140 Ching-kuo x 127 (Fourth generation fighter aircraft (total): 321)| |Reference|Population|Approx. 1.402 billion|Approx. 23.6 million| ||Term of service|2 years|1 year| Fig. I-3-3-3 Comparison of China and Taiwan Military Forces (N t ) D t f “Th Milit B l 2024 ” t by developing and producing long range cruising missiles such as the “Hsiung Sheng” surface-tosurface missile, which is said to have a range of 1,200 km, and it is considered to be aiming to introduce the AGM-158 long-range air-to-surface missile from the United States. Comparison of military capabilities should be made based not only on the troop strength and the performance and quantity of equipment but also on various other factors such as the purpose and aspects of assumed military operations, operational arrangements, the skill level of personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is rapidly tilting to China’s favor. China has intensified its coercive military activities around Taiwan, and concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, which is indispensable to security and prosperity in the international community, are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, but also in the entire international community. Recognizing that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are a challenge not only for the Indo-Pacific **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- region but also a common challenge for the entire world, Japan, in cooperation with its ally, the United States, like-minded countries, and the international community, will pay close attention to the relevant situation with a Fig. I-3-3-4 Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan (Number of aircraft) 1,600 1,500 1,400 1,300 1,200 1,100 1,000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 greater sense of crisis. **See** Fig. I-3-3-1 (Placement of Taiwan Military); Fig. I-3-3-2; (Changes in the Taiwan’s Defense Authority Budget); Fig. I-3-3-3; (Comparison of China and Taiwan Military Forces); and Fig. I-3-3-4 (Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan) **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** 0 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 12 13 China (Su-27/J-11, Su-30, Su-35, J-10, J-15, J-16, J-20) Taiwan (Ching-kuo, F-16, Mirage 2000) (Note) Data from “The Military Balance” (of respective years). 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 (Year) ----- **Section 4** **Korean Peninsula** **Section 4** The Korean Peninsula has been split for more than half a century, with people of the same ethnicity divided between south and north parts. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula under such security environment is an extremely important challenge not only to Japan but also to the entire region of East Asia. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** |out 1.5 million against each other across the ed Zone (DMZ). Fig. I-3-4-1 (Military Confrontation on the Kor See|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |1 Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula Orang General Staff Department Navy Headquarters Pyongyang Defense Headquarters Toksan Chaho Kaechon Mayangdo Air Force Taejo Headquarters Pyongyang Chunghwa Nampo HwangjuPanmunjom Sagot-ri Seoul Mukho U.N. Command Headquarters Suwon U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Osan U.S. 7th Air Force Command Headquarters Headquarters PyeongtaekPyeongtaek Headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea U.S. 2nd Infantry Kunsan Taegu Division Headquarters Chinhae Kwangju Mokpo Busan 200km North Korea ROK U.S. Forces stationed in Korea||||||||||||| |||Gene Navy Pyon|ral Staff Departm Headquarters gyang Defense He||ent adquarters|||||||| |||||||||||||| ||||Air Force Headquarter|||||||||| |||||||||||||| ||||||||||.N. Command Hea .S.-ROK Combine ommand Headqua eadquarters of U. .S. 2nd Infantry ivision Headquart|dquarters d Forces rters S. Forces Korea ers||| ||||U.S. 7th Air F Headquarter||orce s|||||||| |||||||||||||| |||||||||||||| |||||||||||200km||| ||||||North Kore|a|||ROK||U.S. Fo|rces stationed in Korea| |Total military forces||||Approx. 1.28 million personnel|||Approx. 500,000 personnel||||Approx. 30,000 personnel|| |Army|Ground troops|||Approx. 1.1 million personnel|||Approx. 370,000 personnel||||Approx. 20,000 personnel|| ||Tanks|||T-62, T-54, T-55, etc. Approx. 3,500|||M-48, K-1, T-80, etc. Approx. 2,120||||M-1A2SEPv2|| |Navy|Warships|||Approx. 760 vessels 100,000 tons|||Approx. 230 vessels 290,000 tons||||Supporting corps only|| ||Destroyers Frigates Submarines|||6 21|||12 13 20|||||| ||Marines||||||Approx. 29,000 personnel|||||| |Air Force|Combat aircraft|||Approx. 550|||Approx. 660||||Approx. 80|| ||Third, fourth and fifth generation fighters|||MiG-23 × 56 MiG-29 × 18|||F-4 × 29 F-16 × 160 F-15 × 59 F-35 × 39||||F-16 × 60|| |Reference|Population|||26.19 million|||51.97 million|||||| ||Term of service|||Men: 10 years Women: 7 years|||Army: 18 months Navy: 20 months Air Force: 21 months|||||| (Note) Data from “The Military Balance 2024,” etc. ----- **1** **North Korea** repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and other missiles **1** **General Situation** with an unprecedentedly frequency. North Korea resumed Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission launching intercontinental-range ballistic missile of North Korea (hereinafter referred to as “Chairman (ICBM)-class ballistic missiles from February 2022. In **Part** Kim”)[1] made it clear that he adhered to the so-called September 2023, North Korea added a provision to its **Ⅰ** “Byungjin line” policy of simultaneous economic and constitution stating that it would “developing nuclear **Chapter** nuclear development as well as “Songun politics”[2] weapons to a higher level.” **3** in May 2016. In fact, North Korea pushed ahead and North Korea has continued to promote the conducted three nuclear tests and launched numerous development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) ballistic missiles from 2016 to 2017 and stated that it had and ballistic missiles and enhancement of their completed development of the state nuclear force. This operational capabilities by conducting six nuclear tests situation intensified sanctions based on resolutions of the and repeatedly launching ballistic missiles as a nuclear United Nations Security Council and other independent delivery system so far. North Korea, concerning its sanctions by several countries including Japan and the ballistic missiles with their range covering the Japanese United States. Archipelago, is considered to possess the technological On the other hand, in early 2018, Chairman Kim capability to mount a miniaturized nuclear warhead declared that the “Byungjin line” had been successfully and, thereby, to attack Japan. Still, it will continue to carried out and announced the “new strategic line” make greater efforts to maintain and enhance military in which it would “fully concentrate efforts on the capabilities and combat readiness, including its nuclear construction of a socialist economy.” Chairman Kim and missile capabilities. North Korea retains large-scale decided to discontinue “nuclear tests and intercontinental special operations forces and has been strengthening its ballistic rocket test-fire” and announced the nuclear test cyber force. ground had been blown up, while momentum towards While the defense budget of North Korea was said to dialogue between the United States or the ROK and make up 15.9% of its annual budget according to North North Korea grew. He also expressed during the summit Korea’s announcement regarding the Supreme People’s meeting with the U.S. in June 2018 the intention to work Assembly in January 2024, this seems to be only a part of towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. the actual defense budget. While facing serious economic However, the February 2019 U.S.-North Korea difficulties without any improvement in its human rights summit meeting ended without the two sides reaching an situation to date, North Korea continues to heavily agreement. In December of the same year, Chairman Kim allocate its resources to military affairs. In addition, announced the intention to continue developing strategic North Korea has repeatedly used provocative rhetoric weapons until the United States rolled back its hostile and behavior against relevant countries, including Japan. policy towards North Korea. Furthermore, Chairman North Korea’s military activities described above Kim showed his hostile stance towards the United States are posing an even more grave and imminent threat in January 2021 and stated to “further strengthen the to Japan’s national security than ever before and nuclear war deterrent,” showing the intention to continue significantly undermine the peace and security of the developing nuclear and missile capabilities. region and the international community. North Korea’s After that, North Korea criticizes the U.S. attitude military activities also pose a serious challenge to the towards it and continuously states its intention to entire international community with regard to non- strengthen military power including nuclear weapons proliferation of weapons including WMDs. as a “self-defense” right. In recent years, North Korea Needless to say, North Korea’s development and **1** As of May 2016, Kim Jong-un held the position of the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. At the Supreme People’s Assembly in June 2016, the National Defense Commission was renamed the State Affairs Commission, and Kim Jong-un assumed the position of Chairman of the State Affairs Commission. Reflecting this change, “Chairman of the State Affairs Commission” is used for the title of Kim Jong-un throughout this white paper. **2** In a written decision of the 7th Congress of the KWP, “Report on the Work of the KWP Central Committee” (May 8, 2016), it has been defined as a basic form of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of socialism to victory by giving priority to the military forces in all activities under the principle of military first, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the ----- possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. At the same time, sufficient attention needs to be paid to the development and deployment of its ballistic missiles and the like, military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and proliferation of WMDs and missiles by North Korea. As for North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals, utmost efforts continue to be made to realize the return of all abductees to Japan as quickly as possible by close cooperation with related countries, including the United States. **2** **Military Posture** ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and other missiles capable of flying at low altitudes with irregular trajectories in a simultaneous process of promoting the development of ICBM-class ballistic missiles covering a range of the whole U.S. territory, rapidly improving related technologies and operational capabilities and diversifying their launch platforms to include rail-launched and submarine-launched types. At the same time, North Korea has been striving to expand more practical SRBM capabilities. Furthermore, since Chairman Kim mentioned the development of “ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons including intermediate-range cruise missiles” in January 2021, North Korea announced that it had succeeded in conducting test launches of longrange cruise missiles and launched ballistic missiles in what it called training for “tactical nuclear weapons operation units.” The background for North Korea’s series of development and launches appears to be that in addition to acquiring nuclear deterrent capabilities through the possession of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles for the maintenance and survival of the regime, North Korea aims to acquire the means to be able to respond in an armed conflict that could occur between itself and the United States as well as ROK forces in which conventional forces or tactical nuclear weapons are used.[4] North Korea repeatedly stated it would enhance its military power including nuclear weapons and missiles according to the “five-year plan for the development of the defense science and the weapon system” (hereinafter “five-year plan”)said to have been presented at the 8th Congress of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) in January 2021,[5] and it is likely that it is focusing efforts on research and development (R&D) and enhancement of operation capabilities for various weapons under this five-year plan. **(2) Military Capabilities** The North Korean Army comprises about 1.10 million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them seem to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **1** **General Situation** North Korea has continued to enhance its military forces consistently in the situation of south-north division,[3] however, reduction in military assistance from the former Soviet bloc due to the end of the Cold War, its sluggish economy and modernization of ROK Forces have resulted in much of its equipment being outdated, and there is significant qualitative disparity between North Korea’s conventional forces and those of the ROK’s military and U.S. Forces Korea. Nevertheless, while North Korea is concentrating on strengthening its nuclear and missile capabilities, it also seems to be focusing on maintaining a certain military foundation for its conventional forces by continuously conducting research, development, and training. North Korea’s military forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with a total troop strength reaching roughly 1.28 million personnel. It still maintains a large-scale military force, including artillery units deployed near the DMZ. North Korea also retains special operations forces and the like on a large scale for information gathering and sabotage. In addition, many military underground facilities seem to exist all over the land, which is a peculiarity of North Korea. Furthermore, North Korea is believed to be intensively building up its WMD and ballistic missiles. In recent years, North Korea has repeatedly launched short-range North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines, consisting of extensive training for all soldiers, modernizing all military forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country, adopted at the 5th plenary meeting of the 4th KWP Central Committee in 1962. For example, at the 8th Congress of the KWP in January 2021, Chairman Kim stated that North Korea would “develop tactical nuclear weapons which can be used for various missions according to the purpose of operational duty and target of strike in a modern war” and “thoroughly contain, control and handle various military threats on the Korean peninsula which inevitably accompany the nuclear threat on our own initiative.” He also stated in September 2022 that North Korea “will be enhancing tactical nuclear operation measures relentlessly, realize higher level of diversity of applying means, and strengthen nuclear combat posture from multiple directions.” There was no direct reference to the name “five-year plan for defense scientific development and weapons system development” in North Korea’s announcement at the same Congress of the KWP in January 2021. However, when there was an announcement of the launch of a long-range cruise missile on September 13 of the same year, the North Korean media mentioned it publicly for the first time by stating that this missile development project was significant for “achieving the key objectives of the five-year plan for the development of defense science and ----- is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea is believed to deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm self-propelled artillery guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including Seoul. It has also been pointed out that, in recent years, North Korea has been developing and operating various multiple rocket launchers with extended ranges. The Navy retains about 790 ships and boats with a total displacement of approximately 100,000 tons and is chiefly comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile craft. Also, it has about 20 of the former model Romeo-class submarines, about 30 midget submarines and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and other actions of the special operations forces. In September 2023, the Navy launched a new submarine that appears to be a modified Romeo-class submarine and dubbed it a “tactical nuclear attack submarine.” The Air Force has approximately 550 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union. However, some fourthgeneration aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operations forces. Moreover, North Korea retains a large-scale special operations force[6] as so-called asymmetric capabilities. Also, it is likely in recent years that it has been strengthening its cyber forces as asymmetric forces as well in order to steal military secret intelligence and funds for developing nuclear weapons and missiles and develop capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of other countries. **3** **WMD and Missiles** 2022, in particular, it has forced through launches with an unprecedented frequency. North Korea resumed launches of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)class and longer-range ballistic missiles which it had not launched since 2018. At the same time, North Korea likely intends to enhance further surprise attack capabilities, making identification of signs of launch, detection, and interception difficult by launching ballistic missiles that can fly at low altitudes with irregular trajectories as well as by launching these missiles from a variety of platforms such as Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs)[7], submarines, and trains. Since 2023, North Korea has conducted launches of solid-fuel propelled ICBM-class and IRBM-class ballistic missiles as well as launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch. North Korea is focusing on qualitatively improving its nuclear and missile capabilities, such as diversifying its equipment systems, and acquiring intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) means that complement its nuclear and missile operational capabilities. Furthermore, given its technological maturity obtained through a series of nuclear tests, North Korea is assessed to possess the technological capabilities to mount a miniaturized nuclear warhead, at least, on such ballistic missiles as Nodong and Scud ER (Extended Range), with their range covering the Japanese Archipelago and, thereby, to strike Japan. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly expressed its intention to further strengthen its nuclear capability. **(1) Nuclear Weapons** **a. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program** Considering that North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests so far, it is conceivable that North Korea has made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program. North Korea possesses nuclear reactors,[8] including a 5MWe graphite-moderated reactor and an experimental light water reactor, as well as a reprocessing plant and uranium enrichment facilities in Yongbyon. The 5MWe **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** The launches of ballistic missiles and other missiles by North Korea have continued; moreover, from early James Thurman, then Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, stated, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 60,000” in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Additionally, the 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK notes about North Korea’s Special operations force, “The forces are estimated at approximately 200,000 strong.” The signs of a launch from a fixed launcher are easy for the adversary to detect and are vulnerable to attack by the adversary. TEL was developed mainly by the former Soviet Union, among others, in order to make the detection of launch signs more difficult and increase survivability. According to the U.S. DIA’s “North Korea Military Power” of October 2021, North Korea possesses a maximum of 100 TELs for Scud B and Scud C, 100 TELs for Nodongs, and 50 TELs for IRBMs (Musudans). As for a TEL-mounted missile launch, it is deemed difficult to detect individual specific signs in advance concerning the detailed location and timing of the launch. This is because it is operated by being mounted and transported on a TEL, and furthermore, military-related underground facilities are thought to exist all over North Korea. Nuclear reactors are classified into graphite-moderated reactors, heavy water reactors, and light water reactors, depending on the moderator used. Graphite-moderated reactors and heavy ----- graphite moderated reactor was thought to have been out of operation since 2018, but some have pointed out that it resumed operation in July 2021.[9] If it had actually resumed operation, it has been noted that it would be able to produce about 6 kg of plutonium per year (enough to produce one to 1.5 nuclear warheads). It has also been pointed out that the experimental light water reactor has been undergoing test operations since October 2023. [10] With regard to plutonium, a fissile material[11] that can be used for nuclear weapons, North Korea has suggested several times that it has produced and extracted plutonium.[12] Because the restarting or startup of the reactors could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, those activities are causes of great concern. As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment. In November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this uranium enrichment plant has been suggested in recent years; in this regard, North Korea could have increased its enrichment capabilities. Furthermore, it is also pointed out that there are some uranium enrichment facilities that have not been disclosed by North Korea. The series of North Korean behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.[13] In general, facilities used for uranium enrichment are more secretive in appearance than reactors used for plutonium production, and it is difficult to ascertain their activities from the outside. On the other hand, plutonium has a smaller critical mass than uranium, and it is pointed out that it is easier to make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter. In light of both these advantages, North Korea may continue to promote the development of both plutonium and uranium types of nuclear weapons. North Korea conducted nuclear tests on October 9, 2006, May 25, 2009, February 12, 2013, January 6, 2016, September 9, 2016, and September 3, 2017. It is highly likely that North Korea has made strides in its nuclear weapons program, while miniaturizing nuclear weapons to be loaded on ballistic missiles, collecting the necessary data through these nuclear tests. For example, in September, 2017, it was announced that Chairman Kim had visited North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute and had seen a hydrogen bomb capable of being loaded into an ICBM, in addition to which, following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test that was forced through on the same day, North Korea announced that it “successfully carried out a test of H-bomb for ICBM.”[14] In regard to miniaturization of nuclear weapons small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile, considering the fact that the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s as well as the North Korean technological maturity that is estimated to have been reached through its previous six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea, concerning its ballistic missiles with their range covering the Japanese Archipelago, has already miniaturized its nuclear warheads to mount. There have also been reports that North Korea possesses approximately 30 nuclear warheads—overall enough fissile material to produce 50 to 70 nuclear warheads.[15] Furthermore, it is likely that North Korea has been preparing for other nuclear tests, as has been suggested that North Korea has been working on restoring its northern nuclear test site since March 2022, which it officially announced it had blown up in 2018. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **9** According to the IAEA’s “Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” published in August 2021 and others. Indicated by a Member State in the interim report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee released in October 2022. **10 “IAEA Director General Statement on Recent Developments in the DPRK’s Nuclear Programme,” released in December 2023** **11 Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used** as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%). **12 North Korea announced in October 2003 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium from a 5MWe graphite-moderated reactor, and in May 2005** that it had completed extraction of an additional 8,000 used fuel rods. The 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK estimates that North Korea possesses around 70 kg of plutonium. **13 The 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK assesses that North Korea possesses a substantial amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU). It has been noted that a uranium enrichment facility** different from the one in Yongbyon exists in Kangson. **14 The yield of the sixth nuclear weapons test in 2017 was estimated to be the largest ever, with a maximum yield of approximately 160 kt. Given the size of the estimated yield, the possibility** cannot be discounted that the test was of a hydrogen bomb. North Korea also insisted that its fourth nuclear test, conducted in January 2016, was a hydrogen bomb test. However, given that the yield of that test is estimated at 6 to 7 kts, it is difficult to conceive that this was a hydrogen bomb test as generally defined. ----- state nuclear forces are exposed to any danger. From these factors, it is possible that North Korea assumes a possible use of nuclear weapons in an actual combat. In fact, North Korea has repeatedly launched missiles, allegedly, for practical training; for example, it launched missiles in “tactical nuclear operation units” training several times from late September to October 2022 and exploded test warheads simulating nuclear warheads above the targets in what was called “comprehensive tactical training for simulated nuclear counterstrike” among others in March 2023. North Korea also announced in March 2023 that Chairman Kim received explanation about tactical nuclear weapons from the department in charge and “instructed about weaponizing of nuclear weapons,” giving direction to expand the production of weapon-grade nuclear materials and nuclear weapons. Image publicly released by North Korea when it announced the Chairman Kim’s on-site guidance for a nuclear weaponization project (March 2023) [AFP-Jiji] **b. Background of the Nuclear Program and Future** **Outlook** North Korea’s ultimate goal appears to be maintaining its existing regime. It has been developing nuclear weapons to accomplish this goal through constructing its own nuclear deterrence to counter U.S. threats, including threats with nuclear weapons. These perceptions are obvious as can be seen in Chairman Kim’s speech[16] that North Korea can never abandon its nuclear weapons because the objective of the United States is to collapse “our government.” It is likely that North Korea will continue to focus on advancing development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles capable of attacking the whole U.S. territory in order to acquire deterrence against the United States. On the other hand, amid its confrontation with the Yoon Suk Yeol administration of the ROK, which pursues a strict policy toward North Korea, North Korea has described the ROK as its “principal enemy” and has repeatedly stated that it will not exclude the ROK from being a potential targets of its nuclear attack. North Korea has shown its stance to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons for deterrence against the United States as well as with a view to dealing with a possible armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. In September 2022, North Korea passed “the law on the state policy on the nuclear forces” that stipulates mission and command and control of its nuclear forces as well as conditions of using its nuclear weapons. The law notes the main mission of nuclear forces are “to deter a war.” If deterrence fails, its nuclear forces “shall carry out an operational mission for repulsing hostile forces’ aggression and attacks and achieving decisive victory of the war.” Chairman Kim justified his nuclear development, saying that by promulgating this law, “our status as a nuclear power irreversible.” Furthermore, it is stipulated in the law that nuclear weapons can be used when an attack deemed imminent, regardless if it is a nuclear or conventional, on “leadership” or “important strategic objects” and, in particular, that a “nuclear strike” will be conducted automatically and immediately in the case that “command and control system over the **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Furthermore, it is possible that North Korea will conduct additional nuclear tests in the near future to arm ICBM-class ballistic missiles with multiple warheads and operationalize tactical nuclear weapons, pursuing further miniaturization of nuclear weapons.[17] **(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons** North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition, most materials and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian uses, which in turn facilitates camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and **16 Chairman Kim stated in his speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly held in September 2022 that “while the United States aims to have us remove our nuclear weapon, its final goal is** even forcing us to abandon our executive ability for the right to self-defense or to weaken it, and to disrupt my regime anytime” and “we can never abandon nuclear weapons, ... no matter what difficulty we may face.” Furthermore, at the Supreme People’s Assembly held in September 2023, Chairman Kim stated in his speech that Article 58 of Chapter 4 of the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea clearly states that “the country will advance the development of nuclear weapons to guarantee the country’s right to survival and development, deter war, and safeguard peace and stability in the region and the world,” and that “the Republic’s nuclear forces construction policy has been made permanent as the basic law of the Republic so that no one can interfere with it no matter what.” **17 Chairman Kim mentioned “progressing R&D project to complete multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology” and “further development of downsizing and weight** ----- arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to chemical weapons, North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure for Fig. I-3-4-2 Ballistic Missiles and others Developed/Possessed by North Korea (m) the production of biological weapons. Possession of sarin, VX, mustard and other chemical weapons and of anthrax, smallpox, pest, and other biological agents that could be used as biological weapons have been pointed out. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** 30 20 10 |Col1|New type SRBM (A) / (B) / (C) / (D)|Scud B, C, ER, Modified|Nodong Modified|New type SLBM|SLBM|Ground- launched type of Pukguksong series|SLBM|Ballistic (Pos Missiles MBa isl Referred to as Ref “Hypersonic to Missiles” “H My ip se|sible) l sis ilt eic s IRBM- IC erred class c as rsonic siles”|BM- ICB lass cla|M- ICBM- ss class|Taepod varia|ong-2 Chollima-1 nt| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Range|Approx. 800 km / Approx. 400 km / Approx. 400 km / Approx. 750km(Note 2)|Approx. 300 km / Approx. 500 km / Approx. 1,000km / Under analysis|Approx. 1,300 km / Approx. 1,500 km|Approx. 650km (Note 2)|1,000 km or more|1,000 km or more|Approx. 2,000km|-(Note 3)|- Approx. 14, 5,000km (|000km 15,0 Note 4) (No|00km 15,000km te 4) (Note 4)|10,00 or m|0km － ore| |Fuel/ stage|Solid / 1|Liquid / 1|Liquid / 1|Solid / 1|Solid / 2|Solid / 2|Solid / 2|Liquid Liq / 1 /|uid Liquid Li 1 / 1|quid Liq / 2 /|uid Solid / 3 2|Liqu /|id Liquid 3 / 3| |Operation platform|TEL|TEL|TEL|Submarines|Submarines|TEL|Submarines|TEL|- TEL|TEL T|EL TEL|Laun sit|ch Launch e site| Made by MOD referring to Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, etc. (Note 1) North Korean names given in blue. [Chollima-1] [Hwasong-17] [Hwasong-15] [Hwasong-18] [Hwasong-8] [Hwasong-12] [Modified] [ER] [Modified] [B / C] [Pukguksong-2] (D) [Pukguksong] (A) (C) [Pukguksong-3] (B) (Notes) 2 Ranges of SRBM (A) / (B) / (C) and new type SLBMs are the largest ones achieved. SRBM (D) may have a range of 750 km. 3 At the time of launch on January 5, 2022, the ballistic missile referred to as a “Hypersonic Missile” flew about 500 km if it were launched with a normal ballistic trajectory. Another time of launch on January 11 of the same year, it was believed that the flight distance may have been less than 700 km if it were launched with a normal ballistic trajectory. It is also believed that the flight distance may have been longer than this, but analysis is currently being conducted. 4 Depends on weight of the warhead, etc. **18 The 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK pointed out that North Korea began the production of chemical weapons in 1980s and has stored around 2,500-5,000 tons of them. Furthermore,** it is estimated that North Korea has capabilities to cultivate and produce various kind of biological weapons such as anthrax, smallpox, and the plague on its own. North Korea ratified the ----- **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** towards the east coast of North Korea. It is assumed that Fig. I-3-4-3 Range of North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles New York Washington D. C. ICBM-class “Hwasong-18” 15,000km 10,000km Chicago (Range: more than 15,000km[ (Note1)]) London ICBM-class “Hwasong-17” Paris (Range: more than 15,000km[ (Note1)]) San Francisco Los Angeles 5,500km Moscow ICBM-class “Hwasong-15” 5,000km Anchorage (Range: more than 14,000km[ (Note1)]) 4,000km Taepodong-2 variant 1,500km Hawaii (Range: more than 10,000km) 1,300km New Delhi Beijing 1,000km ICBM-class “Hwasong-14” Pyongyang Tokyo (Range: more than 5,500km) Okinawa Guam IRBM-class “Hwasong-12” (Range: approx. 5,000km) Musudan (Range: approx. 2,500 to 4,000km) Jakarta Nodong (Range: approx. 1,300km/1,500km) Scud-ER (Range: approx. 1,000km) Canberra (Notes) 1 Depends on weight of the warhead, etc. 2 For simplicity, the distance from Pyongyang is displayed in concentric circles as an image. 3 Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea. The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel propelled is able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on engines. Many of these SRBMs are being launched North Korea aims to advance operational capabilities, as some images that show impact on a specific target have been released. (i) Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) A (referred to as “new type of tactical guided weapon” by North Korea) SRBM A has a maximum flight range of approximately 800 km, the longest ones achieved. It has a similarity to the Russian short-range ballistic missile “Iskander” and is deemed able to fly at a lower altitude with an irregular trajectory than conventional ballistic missiles. Some have pointed out that SRBM A can be mounted with a nuclear warhead.[20] North Korea also launched two SRBMs on both September 15, 2021 and January 14, 2022. Based on images released by North Korea, these missiles were launched from railway cars that appear to have been is able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on warheads. **(3) Missile Forces** The missiles deemed to be possessed and developed by North Korea are the following. **See** Fig. I-3-4-2 (Ballistic Missiles and others Developed/ Possessed by North Korea); Fig. I-3-4-3 (Range of North **See** Korea’s Ballistic Missiles); Fig. I-3-4-4 (Major Trends in North Korea’s Ballistic Missile and Other Launches); Fig. I-3-4-5 (Cases of North Korean Ballistic Missiles Overflying Japan) **a. Types of Ballistic Missiles and others Possessed or** **Developed by North Korea[19]** **(a) New SRBMs first launched since 2019** North Korea has launched various kinds of short-range ballistic missiles different from traditional liquid fuel propelled type ones such as Scud missiles since 2019. From published images, it can be ascertained that these SRBMs were launched from a wheeled-drive or continuous-tracked TEL or railway cars with the **19 According to “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in March 2023) North Korea possesses 700 to 1,000 ballistic missiles in total, 45% of which are** presumed to be Scud-class, 45% Nodong-class, and the remaining 10% other intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles. **20 According to the Congressional Research Service’s “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs” (January 2023) and others** ----- Fig. I-3-4-4 Major Trends in North Korea’s Ballistic Missile and Other Launches Number of Ballistic Missiles and Other Missiles Launched by North Korea 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 20 15 (as of May 31, 2024) 2021 2022 2023 2024 **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Taepodong Taepodong-2 variant SRBM/MRBM (Scud, Nodong, and “Pukguksong-2”) SLBM IRBM-class (Musudan, “Hwasong-12,” etc.) ICBM-class (“Hwasong-14,” “Hwasong-15,” “Hwasong-17” and “Hwasong-18”) Unknown (what could have been ballistic missiles or presumed to have failed, etc.) SRBM (A)/(B)/(C)/(D) including rail -launched ones 1998 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 |5|9| |---|---| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| |25 25|| |23|| |17|| |11|| |9 8 8 7 6|| |2 2 1|| |Kim Jong-il Kim Jong-un|| [Enhancement of missile-related technologies] 1. Enhancement of launch secrecy and instantaneity 2. Enhancement of capabilities to breach Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 3. Development of long-range missiles [Enhancement of missile operation capabilities] North Korea conducted simultaneous launches of multiple missiles, launches at very short intervals, and launches from different locations to a specific target, etc. Fig. I-3-4-5 Cases of North Korean Ballistic Missiles Overflying Japan - Launches of ballistic missiles allegedly as launches of satellites after reporting supposed falling areas to international organizations (three times) |Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance| |---|---|---|---|---| |April 5, 2009|Taepodong-2 or variant|1|Taepodong Area|3,000 km or more| |December 12, 2012|Taepodong-2 variant|1|Tongch’ang-ri Area|Approx. 2,600 km (second stage landfall)| |February 7, 2016|Taepodong-2 variant|1|Tongch’ang-ri Area|Approx. 2,500 km (second stage landfall)| - Launches of ballistic missiles without prior notice (four times) |Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance| |---|---|---|---|---| |August 31, 1998|Taepodong-1|1|Taepodong Area|Approx. 1,600 km| |August 29, 2017|IRBM-class “Hwasong-12”|1|Near Sunan|Approx. 2,700 km| |September 15, 2017|IRBM-class “Hwasong-12”|1|Near Sunan|Approx. 3,700 km| |October 4, 2022|Ballistic missiles over IRBMs in the range|1|Inland|Approx. 4,600 km| (Notes) 1 After the launch of Taepodong-1 on August 31, 1998, North Korea announced that it was the launch of a satellite. 2 Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea. ----- converted from ordinary freight cars. They have external similarities with SRBM A, and it is possible that they were developed based on that missile. North Korea has announced that it was a firing exercise by the “railwayborne missile regiment” and has also expressed its intention to expand the units in the future. (ii) SRBM B (referred to as a “new weapon” or “tactical guided weapon” by North Korea) SRBM B has a maximum flight distance of about 400 km, the longest ones achieved and is believed to be capable of flying at lower altitudes with an irregular trajectory than conventional ballistic missiles. Regarding TELs, various types can be confirmed in images published by North Korea. (iii) SRBM C (referred to as a “super-large multiple rocket launcher” by North Korea) SRBM C has a maximum flight distance of approximately 400 km, the longest ones achieved. Some of the intervals between launches were estimated less than 1 minute, suggesting that North Korea is trying to improve the continuous fire capability required for saturation attacks and the like. Chairman Kim mentioned that they can be loaded with tactical nuclear warheads.[21] Regarding TELs, various types can be confirmed in images published by North Korea. (iv) SRBM D (referred to as a “new-type tactical guided missile” by North Korea) It has been suggested that the SRBM D was developed based on the SRBM A. It is capable of flying at lower altitudes with an irregular trajectory than conventional ballistic missiles, and their maximum range could reach about 750 km. In addition, North Korea carried out two launches of what could have been SRBMs on July 31, 2019 and another two a couple of days later, on August 2. Furthermore, the analysis is ongoing regarding the details of two missiles launched on November 2, 2022, that flew approximately 150 km and 200 km, respectively. **See** Fig. I-3-4-6 (List of SRBMs A-D launch dates (including rail launched types))[2223] **See** **(b) Scud** The Scud is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile and is operated on a TEL. Scud B is an SRBM with a range of 300 km, and Scud List of SRBMs A-D launch dates (including rail**Fig. I-3-4-6** launched types) **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** |Launch dates|Type of missile| |---|---| |May 4, 2019|SRBM (A)| |May 9, 2019|SRBM (A)| |July 25, 2019|SRBM (A)| |August 6, 2019|SRBM (A)| |August 10, 2019|SRBM (B)| |August 16, 2019|SRBM (B)| |August 24, 2019|SRBM (C)| |September 10, 2019|SRBM (C)| |October 31, 2019|SRBM (C)| |November 28, 2019|SRBM (C)| |March 2, 2020|SRBM (C)| |March 9, 2020|SRBM (C)| |March 21, 2020|SRBM (B)| |March 29, 2020|SRBM (C)| |March 25, 2021|SRBM (D)| |September 15, 2021|SRBM (rail-launched)| |January 14, 2022|SRBM (rail-launched)| |January 17, 2022|SRBM (B)| |January 27, 2022|SRBM (A)| |May 12, 2022|SRBM (C)| |May 25, 2022|SRBM (possibly A or D| |June 5, 2022|SRBM (including A, B and C)| |September 28, 2022|SRBM (D)| |September 29, 2022|SRBM (C)| |October 1, 2022|SRBM (A)| |October 6, 2022|SRBM (C,A)| |October 9, 2022|SRBM (C)| |October 14, 2022|SRBM (A)| |November 3, 202222|SRBM (C)| |November 9, 2022|SRBM (possibly A or D)| |November 17, 2022|SRBM (C)| |December 31, 2022|SRBM (C)| |January 1, 2023|SRBM (C)| |February 20, 2023|SRBM (C)| |March 19, 2023|SRBM (A)| |March 27, 2023|SRBM (A)| |August 30, 2023|SRBM (B)| |September 13, 202323|SRBM (A)| |March 18, 2024|SRBM (C)| |April 22, 2024|SRBM (C)| |May 30, 2024|SRBM (C)| C is an SRBM with an extended range of 500 km. It is believed that North Korea has manufactured and retained them and has exported them to the Middle East and other countries. On November 3, 2022, North Korea launched three Scud C missiles. **21 Chairman Kim attended the event to “present” a super-large multiple rocket launcher to the 6th plenary meeting of 8th Central Committee of the KWP in December 2022 and stated this** missile’s range covered the whole ROK territory, and “even can be loaded with a tactical nuclear weapon.” He also said that the missile entered a mass production phase in January 2023. **22 It is presumed that of the six ballistic missiles launched on November 3, 2022, the two which flew approximately 350 km were both SRBM C.** **23 The two ballistic missiles launched on September 13, 2023, are estimated to have flown approximately 350 km before maneuvering and ascending again, flying a total distance of** ----- **(d) Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)** North Korea is believed to possess one Gorae-class submarine (displacement of approximately 1,500 tons) that is capable of carrying and launching a single submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and is being operated mainly as a test vessel. Additionally, in September 2023, a submarine called a “tactical nuclear attack submarine” appeared, which is believed to be a modified version of an existing Romeo-class submarine. Chairman Kim Jong-un has stated that he intends to convert all existing medium-sized submarines into submarines capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons. In January 2021, Chairman Kim mentioned the goal of possessing nuclear-powered submarines, so it is believed that North Korea will continue to focus on building them along with modifying the Romeo-class submarines. North Korea has been developing SLBMs to be mounted on these submarines, and in May 2015, it announced the first successful test launch of an SLBM.[24] North Korea is believed to be seeking to diversify its ballistic missile strike capabilities and improve its survivability. (i) SLBM “Pukguksong” (referred to as “Pukguksong” type by North Korea) This is an SLBM launched from a Gorae-class submarine. Judging from the images and footage that it has made public so far, North Korea may have succeeded in operating the “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air. Moreover, it appears, based on observations such as the shape of the flame coming out of the missile and the color of the smoke, that the solid fuel-propelled system has been adopted. If launched with a normal trajectory, this missile is expected to have a range of over 1,000 km. (ii) SLBM “Pukguksong-3” (referred to as “Pukguksong-3” by North Korea) This SLBM is different from the “Pukguksong” SLBM launched in October 2019, and if launched with a normal trajectory, it could have a range of about 2,000 km. The characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel-propelled engines are identifiable on images published by North Korea. The SLBM in question could potentially have been launched from an underwater launch test equipment. In addition, North Korea unveiled possibly new, SLBMs marked as “Pukguksong-4” and “Pukguksong-5,” the launches of which have not yet been confirmed, at The Scud ER is a ballistic missile that has an extended range due to the extension of the Scud’s body as well as the reduction in weight of the warhead, among other factors. The range of the Scud ER is estimated to reach approximately 1,000 km, and it appears that a part of Japan falls within this range. Regarding the two ballistic missiles that were launched on December 18, 2022, North Korea announced that their launch was for an important test for development of a “reconnaissance satellite” and released images. These missiles could have been ballistic missiles based on Scud-ER. Furthermore, North Korea is also developing a ballistic missile that appears to be an improvement of the Scud missile. This ballistic missile was launched on May 29, 2017. A day later, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted the new development and test launch of a ballistic rocket incorporating a precision navigation guidance system. In addition, while the images released by North Korea show that the ballistic missile was launched from a continuous-tracked TEL and had what appears to be small wings on its warhead, i.e., characteristics different from those of existing Scud missiles, the shape other than the warhead and length are similar to existing Scud missiles. Another similarity is that it can be confirmed that the missile has straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel-propelled engine. It has also been noted that this ballistic missile is equipped with a Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV). **(c) Nodong** The Nodong is a liquid fuel propelled single-stage ballistic missile and is operated on a TEL. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, reaching almost all of Japan. Although the details of Nodong’s performance have not been confirmed, Nodong may not be able to carry out precise strikes on specific target installations, as it is likely based on Scud technology. However, it has been suggested that North Korea is working to increase the Nodong’s accuracy. A launch aimed at enhancing accuracy by improving the shape of the warhead (whose range is deemed to reach approximately 1,500 km through the weight reduction of the warhead) was confirmed for the first time in the images published by North Korea a day after the launch of one Scud and two Nodong missiles on July 19, 2016. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **24 In addition to what the Ministry of Defense has so far presumed to be North Korea’s SLBM launches, North Korea announced on May 9, 2015, that it had successfully test-launched an SLBM,** ----- its military parades in October 2020 and January 2021, respectively.[25] (iii) New Type of SLBM This is a new type of SLBMs that have been launched since October 2021 and has a maximum flight distance of approximately 650 km, the longest ones achieved. Regarding the September 2022 launch, North Korea announced later that it had conducted a training exercise to launch a ballistic missile loaded with simulated tactical nuclear warhead at a “water reservoir underwater launch site” in the northwestern region and revealed the existence of a “water reservoir underwater launch site construction” plan. Based on images released by North Korea, it is possible that the missile was developed based on the SRBM A, as it has external similarities with that missile. **(e) Ballistic Missile Modified from the SLBM (referred to** **as “Pukguksong-2” by North Korea)** This is a solid-fuel propellant ballistic missile and is a modified version of the SLBM “Pukguksong” for ground launch. If it were launched with a nominal trajectory, the firing range is assessed to surpass 1,000 km. A day after the launch in February 2017, North Korea announced that it was developed as a ground-to-ground ballistic missile based on the results of the August 2016 SLBM launch. It also announced a day after the launch in May 2017 that it had again successfully conducted the test launch of the missile and that Chairman Kim had authorized its “operational deployment.” Moreover, the launch by a “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air from a continuous-tracked TEL, and the characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel propelled engines, can be confirmed from each of the images that North Korea released. **See** Fig. I-3-4-7 (List of Launch Dates and Platforms for SLBMs and “Pukguksong” Series Ground-launched Ballistic Missiles) **(f) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)-Class** (i) “Hwasong-12” type (according to North Korea’s designation) To date, North Korea has launched four liquid fuelpropelled IRBM-class ballistic missiles. One of these ballistic missiles was launched on each of May 14, 2017 and January 31, 2022, and based on their flight patterns, it is presumed that they were launched with a lofted trajectory. Had they been launched with a nominal trajectory, the maximum firing range is assessed to be close to approximately 5,000 km. In addition, the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed from the images released by North Korea a day after the launch. On August 29 and September 15, 2017 respectively, a single “Hwasong-12” missile was launched, and each flew over Japan’s territory in the vicinity of the Oshima Peninsula and Cape Erimo (both in Hokkaido). In view of their flight paths, “Hwasong-12” missiles appear to have demonstrated a certain level of function as IRBMs.[26] North Korea also launched a missile passing over Aomori Prefecture, Japan, on October 4, 2022. It is presumed that this missile was a ballistic missile with a range over that of an IRBM, based on the flight distance of around 4,600 km achieved at that time. North Korea announced later that a “new type of surface-to-surface long-range ballistic missile” was launched. From images **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** |Date|Presumed type of missile|Launch platforms| |---|---|---| |April 23, 2016|“Pukguksong”|Gorae-class submarine| |July 9, 2016|“Pukguksong”|Gorae-class submarine| |August 24, 2016|“Pukguksong”|Gorae-class submarine| |February 12, 2017|“Pukguksong-2”|TEL| |May 21, 2017|“Pukguksong-2”|TEL| |October 2, 2019|“Pukguksong-3”|* Estimated to have been launched from underwater launch test equipment| |October 19, 2021|New type of SLBM|Gorae-class submarine| |May 7, 2022|New type of SLBM|Gorae-class submarine| |September 25, 2022|New type of SLBM|* Estimated to have been launched from underwater launch test equipment| Fig. I-3-4-7 List of Launch Dates and Platforms for SLBMs and “Pukguksong” Series Ground-launched Ballistic Missiles **25 In addition, at the military parade on April 25, 2022, what may have been a new type of SLBM that has not previously been made public by North Korea was unveiled, but it was not named,** and no details have been released. **26 North Korea repeatedly launched the Musudan that is believed to be a ballistic missile in 2016. Although the missile launched in June of the same year flew a certain distance on a lofted** trajectory, the fact that there were two successive launch failures in October would suggest that there may still be obstacles remaining towards the operationalization of the Musudan and that North Korea may be concentrating on the development and operationalization of the “Hwasong-12” as an IRBM instead. It is pointed out that the range of the Musudan is up to ----- released at the time, although the date of photography was not mentioned, the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine and the TEL similar to ones for the “Hwasong-12” missile were visually confirmed. On the other hand, since the shape of the warhead and engine structure were different to that of the “Hwasong-12,” the possibility that the missile North Korea launched at that time was a new type of IRBMclass ballistic missile cannot be ruled out. (ii) New solid fuel-propelled Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) class ballistic missiles North Korea launched a solid fuel-propelled IRBM-class ballistic missiles each on January 14 and April 2, 2024. Images released by North Korea showed that the ballistic missile launched on January 14 had a conical warhead, while the ballistic missile launched on April 2 had a flattened warhead. Details of the launches, including whether these ballistic missiles were hypersonic weapons, are currently being analyzed. **(g) Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-** **Class** (i) ICBM-class “Hwasong-14” (according to North Korea’s designation) North Korea launched “Hwasong-14,” on July 4 and 28, 2017. From the flight pattern, it is presumed that the two missiles were launched with a lofted trajectory. If they were to have been launched with a normal trajectory, it is estimated that they would have a maximum range of at least 5,500 km. The images suggest that the missiles were of two-stage configuration. Furthermore, on the day following the July 28 launch, North Korea asserted that the “nuclear bomb detonation device” had functioned normally, and the safety of the warhead in an atmospheric reentry environment had been maintained. (ii) “Hwasong-15” (according to North Korea’s designation) On November 29, 2017, North Korea launched “Hwasong-15” with a lofted trajectory. In a “major report” on the day of the launch, North Korea made a “government statement,” declaring that it had successfully conducted a test launch of the “Hwasong-15,” a newly developed type of ICBM with the capability to strike all areas of the U.S. mainland and asserting that it had completed development of its state nuclear force. Moreover, another Hwasong 15 missile was launched with a lofted trajectory on February 18, 2023. Then on the following day, North Korea announced that “ICBM launch training” had been conducted and that “the reliability of the weapon system was reconfirmed and verified.” “Hwasong-15” is loaded on a nine-axle TEL, and from released images, two-stage configuration and its straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed.[27] Moreover, the range of “Hwasong-15” is estimated to be over 14,000 km based on the trajectory of maximum altitude around 5,700km and flight distance around 1,000km when it was launched in February 2023, depending on factors such as its warhead weight. In this case, the range would cover the whole U.S. territory including the East Coast. (iii) “Hwasong-17” (according to North Korea’s designation) North Korea launched one ballistic missile on both February 27 and March 5, 2022. Both are estimated to have been launched with a lofted trajectory, flying approximately 300 km, and reaching maximum altitudes of approximately 600 km and 550 km, respectively. North Korea announced the day after each launch that they were “reconnaissance satellite” development tests, but it is believed that the missiles launched were of the “Hwasong-17” type. The ICBM-class missile launched on March 24 the same year, recorded a lofted trajectory of maximum altitude over around 6,000 km and flight distance over The “Hwasong-17” ICBM-class ballistic missile that appeared at a military parade on February 8, 2023 [Korea News Service/Jiji] **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **27 Based on the released images, the “Hwasong-14”-type ICBM-class ballistic missiles have the following in common with the “Hwasong-12”-type IRBM-class ballistic missile: (1) the** configuration of engine system (one main engine and four auxiliary engines); (2) the shape of the lower part of the propulsion system (conical shape); and (3) the straight-line flame of liquid-propulsion systems can be confirmed. Based on the respective ranges that can be estimated for the missiles and other matters, it can be assumed that Hwasong-14 type was possibly ----- around 1,100 km, greatly exceeding the trajectory and distance of “Hwasong-15” launched in November 2017. North Korea announced on the following day that it conducted test launching of “Hwasong-17.”[28] While North Korea repeatedly launched missiles after that, the launches on May 4 and 25, and November 3 and 18, 2022, and March 16, 2023, are presumed to be of the ICBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-17.” The range of “Hwasong-17” is estimated to be over 15,000 km based on the past flight trajectories depending on factors such as its warhead weight. Furthermore, North Korean media later reported on the launch on November 18, 2022, stating that the “final test launch” of “Hwasong-17” was successfully conducted. From released images, “Hwasong-17” is presumed to be two-stage, and the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed. The missile is mounted on an 11-axle TEL, believed to be the largest in North Korea’s possession, and its size is thought to exceed that of the existing “Hwasong-15”type. It has been suggested that this raises the possibility that North Korea pursues a greater yield from increased warhead weight and multiple warheads, which are generally considered difficult to intercept.[29] (iv) “Hwasong-18” type (according to North Korea’s designation) On April 13, July 12, and December 18, 2023, North Korea launched a single ICBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-18.” The Hwasong-18 is a new three-stage solid-fuel propelled missile, and during its launch on Image officially released by North Korea when it launched an ICBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-18” [Korea News Service/Jiji] April 13, it is estimated to have flown about 1,000 km while changing direction to the left (i.e., north). North Korea announced this launch as its “first test launch,” and images released by North Korea show the missile was launched by so-called a “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after being ejected into the air, and from a TEL assumed to be the same as the 9-axle TEL shown for the first time in the military parade in February 2023. Radial exhausts, a typical characteristic of solid fuel-propelled engines, can be confirmed from each of the images that North Korea released. The Hwasong-18, was also launched as a “test launch” on July 12 of the same year, with a flight distance of approximately 1,000 km and a maximum altitude of over approximately 6,000 km, and depending on the weight of the warhead carried, the range of the Hwasong-18 could exceed 15,000 km. Regarding the launch on December 18 of the same year, North Korea announced that it was a launch training “with the purpose of inspecting the readiness of North Korea’s nuclear war deterrence and confirming its maneuverability, combat capability, and reliability.” **(h) Taepodong-2** Taepodong-2 is a long-range ballistic missile launched from a fixed launch pad. It is believed to use in its first stage, four engines, each of which was developed based on the technologies of Nodong, and the same type of engine in its second stage. Its range is estimated to be approximately 6,000 km for the two-stage type, while the range of its three-stage variant can be more than Image released by North Korea when it launched a “military reconnaissance satellite” [Korea News Service/Jiji] **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **28 North Korea also launched a ballistic missile shortly prior on March 16, 2022, but it is presumed to have not flown properly, and other details, including the type of missile, are still being** analyzed. **29 Eleven Hwasong-17s and five launchers that may be TELs for as-yet unannounced new ICBM-class missiles (later, North Korea announced the launching an ICBM-class ballistic missile** they called Hwasong-18 from a TEL that was viewed identical to this one) were shown in what was called the “ICBM column” at the military parade in February 2023. Since the number of missiles significantly increased from the four Hwasong-17s and four Hwasong-15s shown at the previous parade (in April 2022), it is pointed out that North Korea was showing off its ----- approximately 10,000 km assuming that the weight of the warhead is not over approximately 1 ton. Taepodong-2 missiles and its variants have been launched a total of five times by February 2016. **(i) Chollima-1 (according to North Korea’s designation)** “Chollima-1” is what North Korea claims to be a “new satellite-carrying rocket” intended to launch a “military reconnaissance satellite.” “Chollima-1” is launched from a fixed launch pad and is three-stage configuration. North Korea used “Chollima-1” to conduct a total of three launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch in May, August, and November 2023, with the first two launches believed to have failed. As for the November launch, analysis in cooperation with the United States and the ROK confirmed that the object launched at that time was orbiting Earth.[30] **(j) Ballistic Missiles Referred to as “Hypersonic Missiles”** On January 5 and 11, 2022, North Korea launched one ballistic missile each day, which it referred to as a “hypersonic missile”. Both missiles are believed to have flown at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. In particular, the missile launched on January 11 may have flown at a maximum speed of approximately Mach 10 with an irregular trajectory that included horizontal maneuvers.[31] Based on images released by North Korea, it is confirmed that the missiles were launched from a wheeled TEL and that they had a conical warhead and were equipped with an engine appearing to be a liquidfuel propulsion system. It has been pointed out that its conical warhead may have been based on Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV)-related technology. In any case, based on announcements to date, it is clear that North Korea continues to pursue the development and enhancement of hypersonic missiles and the like in an attempt to breach other countries’ missile defense networks. It is necessary to monitor its future technological progress, including its application of these technologies on longer-range missiles and moves for the development of a possible ballistic missile with a flat warhead (referred to as the “Hwasong-8” by North Korea), which was launched on September 28, 2021 with the designation of being a hypersonic missile. In addition, the aforementioned new IRBM-class ballistic missile launched on January 14, 2024, is currently under analysis, including whether it was a hypersonic weapon. **b Other Missile Forces under Development by North** **Korea** **(a) Cruise missiles** While North Korea has been supposed to develop and retain anti-ship cruise missiles with relatively shortrange including ones modified from Chinese-made cruise missiles, in recent years it stated its intention to develop new cruise missiles which are supposed to load tactical nuclear weapons on them. For example, Chairman Kim mentioned the development of “ultramodern tactical nuclear weapons including intermediaterange cruise missiles” in January 2021. In fact, North Korea announced that it successfully conducted a test launch of a newly developed long-range cruise missile in September 2021, then that a long-range cruise missile that is believed to be of another type was launched in January 2022. These cruise missiles were repeatedly launched after that and announced as launches of “strategic cruise missiles” said to be deployed in the “tactical nuclear weapons operation unit.” It is clear that these missiles have come to be known as “Strategic Cruise Missile Hwasal-1” and “Strategic Cruise Missile Hwasal-2” respectively. According to North Korea’s statement, these cruise missiles flew up to 2,000 km. It Image released by North Korea when it launched a “submarine-launched strategic cruise missile” [Korea News Service/Jiji] **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **30 The launched object separated into several parts, the first of which is presumed to have fallen into the Yellow Sea approximately 150 km west of the Korean Peninsula, the second into the** East China Sea approximately 350 km west of the Korean Peninsula, and the third passed over the airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima island and into the Pacific Ocean approximately 1,000 km west of Okinotorishima, outside Japan’s EEZ, all of which are presumed to have fallen outside the predicted drop zones. **31 It is presumed that the ballistic missile lunched on December 23 2022 was the same as the ballistic missiles launched on January 5 and January 11, 2022 that North Korea referred to as** hypersonic missiles. In addition, a missile with an appearance similar to the Hwasong-8 was unveiled at an exhibition titled “Armed Equipment Exhibition 2023” in July 2023 and a military ----- was also announced that strategic cruise missiles were launched from submarines in March 2023 and January 2024 and from a patrol ship in August of the same year. In January 2024, North Korea also test-fired a cruise missile it called “Pulhwasal-3-31,” but details of the missile, including the differences with the conventional “Hwasal,” remain unknown. While many of the details, including their actual performance, are still unknown, it is obvious that North Korea pursues implementation not only of ballistic missiles but also of long-range nuclear capable cruise missiles. If the series of the announcements about flying distances and the like are factual, there is a need for concern, as these missiles pose threats peace and stability in the region. **(b) “New Type of Tactical Guided Weapon”** On April 17, 2022, North Korea announced that a “new type of tactical guided weapon” was launched. The missile announced at that time was seen at the military parade on April 25, and also later appeared in North Korean media. It can also be confirmed that the missile is transported on a three-axle wheeled TEL and radial exhausts, a typical characteristic of solid fuel propelled engines. This missile is believed to be one of the weapons that North Korea is developing as potentially tactical nuclear weapons, in aiming to deal with armed conflicts that may occur with U.S. Forces and ROK Forces involving conventional forces and/or tactical nuclear weapons. This belief is based on North Korea’s announcements stating that these missiles are significant in drastically improving long-range artillery firepower and strike capabilities on each front and enhancing “effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons operation.” **c Trends in Ballistic Missile Development** North Korea has driven ballistic missile development and attempted to improve related technologies and operation capabilities quite rapidly and in continuous manner. These trends have the following characteristics. **(a) Improvement of missile-related technologies** (i) Improvement of concealment and promptness North Korea appears to be seeking to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing concealment and promptness to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch. North Korea has repeatedly launched missiles from various platforms such as TELs, submarines and railway cars in recent years. Using these platforms, launchers can be concealed, and missiles could be launched from any position. It appears that North Korea aims to k id tifi ti f i f l h d t ti d interception difficult, by improving concealment. In addition, particularly since 2019, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles using solid fuel. It is therefore believed that North Korea is proceeding with the development of solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Generally, solid fuel-propelled ballistic missiles are relatively easier to store and handle. Additionally, since they come preloaded with solid fuel, they can be quickly reloaded onto launchers and relaunched in a relatively short time. In this respect, they are considered militarily superior. Such characteristics are expected to contribute to improving the ability to conduct surprise attacks. While in the past solid fuel propelled ballistic missiles developed and retained by North Korea were mainly short-range missiles, Chairman Kim raised the development of solid fuel propelled ICBMs as a task in January 2021 and has actually launched solid fuel propelled ICBM-class ballistic missiles as well as new solid fuel-propelled IRBM-class ballistic missiles, so future developments need to be closely watched. (ii) Enhancement of penetration capabilities for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) North Korea is advancing the development of ballistic missiles that fly at low altitudes with irregular trajectories in an attempt to breach other countries’ missile defense networks. The SRBM A, SRBM B, and SRBM D, as well as rail-launched ballistic missiles and a new type of SLBM with a similar outline to the SRBM A, with irregular trajectories, are believed to be capable of flying at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. Furthermore, North Korea raised the development of “hypersonic gliding flight warheads” as one of its priority targets. Actually, it has launched several types of missiles it called “hypersonic missiles” since September 2021. In this way, North Korea is persistently pursuing missile development to make interception difficult and to breach missile defense networks. (iii) Developing long-range missiles North Korea consistently pursues development of SRBMs flying with irregular trajectories as well as long-range missiles with ranges covering the United States. North Korea’s ICBM-class ballistic missiles Hwasong-17 and -18 are thought to have a range of over 15,000 km depending on the weight of its warhead, etc. In such a case, the whole U.S. territory including the East Coast is within its range. For the operationalization of these ballistic missiles, it is said that technology to protect the re-entry vehicle f th t l hi h t t t d d i **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- the atmospheric re entry of the warhead is required. Although North Korea announced that the reliability of warheads in the re-entry environment had been proven after launching ICBM-class missiles “Hwasong-14” and “Hwasong-15” in 2017, careful analysis is still needed to determine whether this technology actually has been established. On the other hand, should North Korea make further progress in the development of long-range ballistic missiles, it may unilaterally come to have a recognition that it has secured a strategic deterrence against the United States. If North Korea has such a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, it could lead to an increase and escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region, a situation that Japan needs to be deeply concerned about. **(b) Enhancement of missile operation capabilities** North Korea has launched ballistic missiles in various patterns such as multiple and simultaneous launches, consecutive launches at very short intervals and multiple launches from various locations at specific targets. First, there have been some cases since 2014 in which it launched multiple missiles from unprecedented locations, cutting across the Korean Peninsula, in the early morning and late at night using TELs. In recent years, North Korea has conducted launch drills and other training combining SRBMs with various types of artillery, showing that it has the capability to launch multiple missiles simultaneously at a given time and place. Second, North Korea attempts consecutive launches at very short intervals. For example, the SRBM C which North Korea refers to as a “super-large multiple rocket launcher” is thought to be developed in order to enhance continuous fire capabilities. In fact, from 2019, there was a case, in which two SRBM C were launched at estimated intervals of less than one minute. Third, there have been some cases since 2019, in which North Korea launched multiple ballistic missiles and other weapons from various places and hit specific targets. Through these launches, North Korea is believed to be pursuing the enhancement of practical missile operation capabilities with saturation attack and the like in mind. **(4) Future Trends in Weapons Development** Chairman Kim specifically mentioned the development of various weapons as future military objectives at the 8th Congress of the KWP in January 2021. The goals presented at this time are believed to be included in the “five-year plan.” With regard to nuclear weapons and missiles, Chairman Kim also mentioned “tactical nuclear weapons” as further advancement of nuclear technology, miniaturization and weight reduction of nuclear weapons and development of tactical weapons. He also stated that North Korea would promote the production of “supersized nuclear warheads,” improve its hit rate on targets within a 15,000 km range and upgrade its “preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike capabilities.” In addition, North Korea mentioned the promotion of research and development of multi-warhead technology, “hypersonic gliding flight warheads,” nuclear-powered submarines, “underwater-launched strategic nuclear weapons” and solid fuel-propelled ICBM, demonstrating its stance of relentlessly pursuing increasingly complex and diverse modes of attack. In addition, besides the nuclear and missile capabilities, development of reconnaissance means, including military reconnaissance satellites and unmanned reconnaissance aerial vehicles, was also mentioned. In fact, since this year, North Korea has launched missiles repeatedly as if to advance the process of the development plan presented at the Congress. Furthermore, these objectives seem to have a certain degree of priority. North Korea stated that the hypersonic missile R&D project was “belonging to the five high priority challenges in the strategic weapons division of the five-year plan” when it launched a missile referred to as “hypersonic missile Hwasong-8” in September 2021. North Korea stated in December 2022 that the “captive firing test of high-thrust solid-fuel engine” was completed successfully and that Chairman Kim rated this highly, saying, “another significant problem has been solved to realize the five high priority challenges in the strategic weapons division of the five-year plan,” and stated that he expected to “show another new strategic weapon” in the shortest period of time.[32] At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in December 2023, Chairman Kim stated that the launching of satellites would mark “the realization **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **32 Chairman Kim also stated in the 6th plenary meeting of 8th Central Committee of KWP at the end of the same month that North Korea will develop “another ICBM system” with the mission** ----- of the prerequisite task of modernizing the Republic s armed forces, as set out at the 8th Congress of the Party.” From these statements, North Korea is believed to be promoting research and development while prioritizing the realization of “hypersonic gliding warheads,” solidfuel-propelled ICBMs, and the launch of “military reconnaissance satellites” in its “five-year plan.” On November 21, 2023, North Korea launched the “Malligyong-1,” which it claims is a “reconnaissance satellite,” using the aforementioned “Chollima-1,” and it insisted that it had accurately entered its orbit. Regarding this “reconnaissance satellite,” North Korea had been publicly disclosing its activities toward its launch since 2022. On February 27 and March 5 of the same year, North Korea launched ICBM-class ballistic missiles, claiming that they were tests for the development of a “reconnaissance satellite,” and later made public footage of Chairman Kim’s inspection of the “reconnaissance satellite,” during which he stated that the purpose of military reconnaissance satellites is to obtain real-time military information on the ROK, Japan, and the Pacific Ocean, that a large number of “reconnaissance satellites” would be deployed within the “five-year plan” period, and that to that end, the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in the Tongch’ang-ri district would be renovated and expanded. In May, August, and November 2023 and May 2024, North Korea went ahead with launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch from the vicinity of Tongch’ang-ri on the west coast of North Korea towards the south, after giving advance notices of the durations and drop zones. The launches in May and August 2023 and May 2024 are believed to have failed to deploy satellites, but as for the launch in November 2023, it was confirmed that the object launched at that time is orbiting Earth. The details of what functions this object is performing are still being analyzed. At the December 2023 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Chairman Kim Jong-un mentioned the launches of three additional reconnaissance satellites as a goal for 2024 and is expected to continue to conduct launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch in the future. Furthermore, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Kim Yo-jong stated in December 2022 and February 2023, “try right now” and “the frequency for us to use the Pacific Ocean as our shooting range” was dependent on the action of U.S. Forces in refuting views questioning North Korea’s acquisition of atmospheric re-entry technologies for ICBM-class ballistic missiles. It is pointed out that this was suggesting the possibility for North Korea to decide to verify whether its ICBM-class missiles can tolerate practical use through launching them towards the Pacific Ocean if North Korea escalates provocation in the future. In addition, North Korea showed its stance to pursue the diversification of its nuclear delivery systems through the statement made in March and April 2023 and January 2024 that it had tested weapons called an “underwater nuclear attack boat,” namely “Haeil”, and a weapon described as an “underwater nuclear weapon system”. In this way, North Korea constantly focuses on the R&D of related technologies in line with the “five-year plan,” while claiming that these are “defensive” actions and making the situation a fait accompli. It is possible that North Korea may continue to repeatedly launch various missiles and the like to accomplish the “five-year plan.” **4** **Domestic Affairs** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(1) Developments Related to the Kim Jong-un Regime** In North Korea, the power base centered on Chairman Kim is being solidified. The constitution of North Korea stipulates that the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission is “the supreme leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who represents the state,” and it is pointed out that North Korea is run under the leadership of the KWP. Chairman Kim took the office of **REFERENCE : Security Environment Surrounding Japan (North Korea)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/index.html** **REFERENCE : Information related to North Korean missiles, etc.** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/surround/defense/northKorea/index.html** ----- **North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Development Trends in 2023 and beyond** Recently, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and others with an unprecedented frequency. In 2022, North Korea **Commentary** launched 59 ballistic missiles, the highest number ever in a single year. Although the number of launches in 2023 was not as high as in 2022, North Korea launched new solid-fuel propelled ICBM-class ballistic missiles as well as a “military reconnaissance satellite” using “Chollima-1”, what North Korea claims to be a “new satellitecarrying rocket.” Thus, North Korea seems to be focusing on improving its nuclear and missile capabilities in a qualitative sense. The Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea held in 2021 provides a glimpse into the blueprint for the currently observed direction of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. At the Congress in 2021, Chairman Kim mentioned specific goals, such as reducing the size and weight of nuclear weapons, the development of tactical nuclear weapons, “super-sized nuclear warheads”, “hypersonicgliding flight warheads,” and solid-fuel propelled ICBMs, and the operation of “military reconnaissance satellites.” North Korea appears to be systematically strengthening its nuclear and missile development and operational capabilities to achieve these goals. Looking at the situation of North Korea’s actual launches, we can see that technological progress has been made to a certain extent in line with these development goals. In particular, regarding ICBM-class ballistic missiles, North Korea launched the liquid fuelpropelled “Hwasong-17” and the solid fuel-propelled “Hwasong-18” in March and December 2023, respectively, as launch training, indicating that their test launch stage had been completed. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the goals mentioned at the 2021 Workers’ Party Congress are not all of North Korea’s development goals, and the boundaries of the development goals may expand depending on the development situation. In the past, there have been cases where weapons systems that were not explicitly mentioned at the 2021 Workers’ Party Congress were later found to be included in the development goals, as evidenced by remarks made during inspections by Chairman Kim. It is believed that both the production of transporter erector launchers (TELs), which was mentioned by Chairman Kim during his military factory tour in August 2023, and the renewal of IRBM capabilities, which was mentioned by him during the IRBM solid fuel engine test in November 2023, are also development goals. From 2023 to 2024, Kim Jong-un inspected factories producing various types of TELs and it was reported that in January 2024 the production of TELs for strategic missiles was making progress. Since 2024, North Korea has also launched new solid-fuel propelled IRBM-class ballistic missiles. North Korea has been developing and launching various types of i il hil t th ti f th i t if i it ti stance toward the ROK. Continuing on from 2022, North Korea has conducted short-range ballistic missile launches with high frequency since 2023, including launches purported to be training for a “tactical nuclear operations unit.” In April and August 2023, it was reported that Chairman Kim checked a front-line offensive operation plan and discussed military action guidelines for frontline troops at meetings of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Workers’ Party of Korea, with images of Chairman Kim pointing to what appears to be a map of the ROK . The December 2023 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea described its relations with the ROK as “relations between two states hostile to each other” and referred to North Korea’s readiness in a contingency to mobilize all means, including nuclear weapons, to conquer the entire territory of the ROK. Domestically, North Korea seems to be making progress in legislation on its nuclear weapons. In September 2022, North Korea adopted “the law on the state policy on the nuclear forces,” which sets forth the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. And in September 2023, it amended the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, stipulating that it would develop nuclear weapons to a higher level to deter war. Thereby, North Korea is believed to have indicated to the international community its direction toward possessing and developing nuclear weapons as its external stance. As these examples show, throughout the year, North Korea has sought to improve its missile-related technologies and operational capabilities, which are believed to be aimed at 1) acquiring deterrence against the United States through the possession of nuclear and long-range missiles and 2) developing tactical nuclear weapons and various missiles as their delivery systems that enable North Korea to deal with an armed conflict against U.S. and ROK forces. In particular, regarding the development of tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery means, it has been suggested that North Korea is attempting to compel its adversaries to fear the possibility of it using nuclear weapons as a military response in the event of a war and aiming to take the lead in managing the escalation of the situation. If North Korea becomes more confident in its ability to manage situations at all stages of a conflict, its military provocations could escalate further. Image released by North Korea in January 2024 regarding the inspection of the **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- the general secretary of the party in January 2021. **(2) Economic Conditions** In the economic domain, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and diminishing economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, it faces enhanced independent sanctions by countries including Japan and the United States and sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions adopted in response to nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches.[33] Furthermore, it is believed that COVID-19 infections and natural disasters largely affected North Korea’s economy from 2020. However, North Korea declared victory over and eradication of COVID 19 in August 2022. It is now considered that restrictions have been somewhat relaxed, as evidenced by North Korea inviting representatives from China and Russia to its military parade in July 2023. In January 2021, Chairman Kim presented a new “five-year plan for national economic development” based on self-reliance and self-sufficiency. Regarding this plan, Chairman Kim had stated in 2023 that the task was to “establish a decisive guarantee for the completion of the five-year plan,” but in 2024, looking back over the three years from 2021, he said that “he has become confident that the five-year plan can be fully completed.” Thus, even under difficult circumstances, it is believed that North Korea continues to consider rebuilding the economy in accordance with “the plan” important. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** |Items|Sanction content|Related resolution| |---|---|---| |Crude oil|Restriction of annual supply to 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons|No. 2397 (December 2017)| |Petroleum refined products|Restriction of annual supply to 500,000 barrels|No. 2397 (December 2017)| |Coal|Total ban on imports from North Korea|No. 2371 (August 2017)| |Ship offloading (ship-to-ship transfer)|Banned|No. 2375 (September 2017)| |Date|Resolution|Catalyst event|Main content| |---|---|---|---| |July 15, 2006|No. 1695|Seven ballistic missile launches (2006/7/5)|Request transfer prohibition on related goods and funds for nuclear and missile plans| |October 14, 2006|No. 1718|First nuclear test (2006/10/9)|Prohibition on export and import of weapons of mass destruction related goods and large weapons| |June 12, 2009|No. 1874|Taepodong-2 launch (2009/4/5), second nuclear test (2009/5/25)|Adoption of financial regulations| |January 22, 2013|No. 2087|Taepodong-2 launch (2012/12/12)|Addition of six organizations and four individuals to sanctions| |March 7, 2013|No. 2094|Third nuclear test (2013/2/12)|Tougher financial regulations and obligation to conduct inspections of goods suspected of transporting embargoed goods within one’s own territorial waters| |March 2, 2013|No. 2270|Fourth nuclear test (2016/1/6), Taepodong-2 launch (2016/2/7)|Ban on air fuel exports and supply and ban on coal and iron ore exports by North Korea (excluding those for personal livelihood or unrelated to North Korea’s nuclear and missile plans)| |November 20, 2016|No. 2321|Fifth nuclear test (2016/9/9)|Establishment of an upper limit on coal exports by North Korea (roughly $400 million/7.5 million tons a year)| |June 2, 2017|No. 2356|Ballistic missile launches since 2016/9/9|Addition of four organizations and 14 individuals to sanctions| |August 5, 2017|No. 2371|ICBM-class “Hwasong-14” launch (2017/7/4 and 7/28)|Total ban on coal imports, total ban on iron and iron ore imports, and establishment of an upper limit on the total number of work permits for North Korean workers for the first time| |September 11, 2017|No. 2375|Sixth nuclear test (2017/9/3)|Addition of oil to supply restrictions for the first time, addition of textile products to the import ban, and ban on work permits for overseas workers| |December 22, 2017|No. 2397|ICBM-class “Hwasong-15” launch (2017/11/29)|Further supply restrictions in the oil area, expansion of the scope of bans on trade (exports/imports) with North Korea bans, and return of North Korean workers to North Korea| Fig. I-3-4-8 Sanctions based on UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea Main content Summary of recent UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions against North Korea (Note) Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea. **33 In recent years, North Korean fishing boats and Chinese fishing boats have been conducting illegal operations within Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surrounding Yamato tai, creating** a situation that threatens the safety of Japanese fishing boats operating in the EEZ. In this sea area, the Fisheries Agency and the Japan Coast Guard are working together to conduct strict surveillance vigilance and control in the waters around Japan, including issuing warnings to foreign fishing vessels engaged in illegal fishing. See the Cabinet Office Annual Report, “The situation of the oceans and the implemented measures by the Government with regard to the oceans,” the White paper on Fisheries and the Japan Coast Guard Report for further details of ----- Nevertheless, as North Korea is unlikely to carry out any structural reforms that could lead to the destabilization of its current ruling system, it will face various challenges in making fundamental improvements to its current economic situation. Furthermore, it has also been pointed out that amid the difficult economic and food situation, the regime is wary of social unrest caused by the influx of information from abroad and is further strengthening its ideological control. This is notable from the perspective of the stability of the regime. North Korea is presumed to be evading the UN Security Council sanctions by conducting ship-to-ship transfers prohibited by the UN Security Council resolutions.[34] The final report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee (“Final Report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to resolution 2680 (2023)”), released in March 2024, pointed out that, between January 1 and September 15, 2023, approximately 1.02 million to 1.52 million barrels of refined petroleum products, exceeding the annual limit of half a million barrels, may have been illegally transported to North Korea with North Korean-flagged tankers. **See** Fig. I-3-4-8 (Sanctions based on UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea) **See** **5** **Relations with Countries and Regions** continued goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Although the United States clearly stated, in the National Security Strategy (NSS) published in October 2022, that it will seek sustained diplomacy with North Korea to make tangible progress towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, progress such as formal restarting of dialogue has not been seen, and the relationship between the United States and North Korea remains deadlocked. Although North Korea voluntarily declared to stop “the test launch of inter-continental ballistic rockets” in April 2018, no progress has been seen in the U.S.-North Korea relationship. Then, in January 2022, Chairman Kim ordered North Korean officials to “promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporarily suspended activities” based on the assessment that the “hostile policy and military threat by the United States have reached a danger line that cannot be overlooked anymore.” In fact, North Korea restarted launching ICBM-class ballistic missiles from February 2022. Chairman Kim stated that North Korea will thoroughly prepare for long term confrontation against the United States.[35] **(2) Relations with the ROK** The three inter-Korean summit meetings in 2018 led to major progress in inter-Korean relations, including an agreement on the “Panmunjom Declaration,” which confirms, among other matters, that the two parties agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain and confirmed the common goal of realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The summit meetings also led to an agreement on the “Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018,” which refers to the ending of military hostilities, and the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” which prescribes concrete measures to ease inter-Korean military tensions. However, there has been no progress in inter-Korean relations since the breakdown of the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in 2019. Furthermore, in April 2022, after President Yoon Suk Yeol, who demonstrates a strict stance against North Korea, assumed the presidency in the ROK, Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Central **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(1) Relations with the United States** In June 2018 at the historic U.S.-North Korea summit meeting, Chairman Kim presented his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, the second U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in February 2019 ended without any agreement being reached between the two countries. After that, while North Korea stated that the United States is its “biggest enemy,” it has shown a stance that the key to establishing a new U.S.-North Korea relationship is withdrawal of hostile policy towards North Korea by the United States. In April 2021, the United States announced that it had completed a review of its policy towards North Korea and that it would explore diplomacy with North Korea under a “calibrated practical approach” with the **34 In the period from the beginning of 2018 to the end of March 2024, MSDF patrol aircraft and ships have observed 24 cases in which a North Korean-flagged tanker was sailing alongside a** foreign-flagged vessel were anchored side-by-side on the high seas. As a result of comprehensive judgment by the government, there are strong suspicions that the observed vessels were engaging in illicit ship-to-ship transfers. **35 On July 17, 2023, Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the KWP, said that if the United States further strengthens its extended deterrence posture, “the United** ----- Committee of the KWP, stated in her press statement that while the ROK was not a main enemy and that the north and the south were of the same nation who should not fight each other, if the ROK selected a military confrontation, “our nuclear combat forces will fulfill their duty.” Chairman Kim also stated in his speech in July 2022 that if the ROK conducted preemptive strikes, North Korea would retaliate immediately and the “Yoon administration and his armed forces will be annihilated.” North Korea’s attitude to the ROK began to turn harsh. Regarding its military activity involving a series of missile launches, North Korea announced it had conducted training of “tactical nuclear weapons operation units,” hypothetically targeting airfields in the ROK in October 2022. Moreover, until December of the same year, North Korea repeatedly conducted shelling towards the area in which military exercises are banned by the military agreement between the south and north Korea. In November 2023, in response to North Korea’s launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch, the ROK suspended some clauses of the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain” and resumed the reconnaissance and surveillance activities against North Korea along the Military Demarcation Line it had conducted in the past. In response, North Korea declared the complete abandonment of the agreement. In December of the same year, Chairman Kim described the relationship between North Korea and the ROK as “the relationship between two hostile nations” and mentioned the necessity of “keeping pace with the powerful military actions of the Korean People’s Army to subjugate the whole territory of the south” in contingency as an important task in the external sector. In addition, in January 2024, North Korea and the ROK conducted firing drills on both sides of the North Limit Line (NLL), including around Yeonpyeong Island (Yeonpyeongdo). **(3) Relations with Other Countries** While North Korea has been repeating hardline statements against the United States and the ROK, it appears to be seeking to strengthen cooperation with China and Russia, with the North Korean Foreign Ministry stating that the relationships between China, North Korea and Russia “play a central role in protecting peace and stability not only in the Korean Peninsula and the surrounding region but also in the world.” (i) Relations with China China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on North Korea. The “Sino–North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance” signed in 1961 is still effective, and China is currently North Korea’s biggest trade partner. In 2021, trade volume between China and North Korea was very large, accounting for over 90% of North Korea’s total trade (excluding trade between North Korea and the ROK),[36] suggesting North Korea’s dependence on China. In regard to the situation in North Korea and its nuclear issue, China has stated that the issues should be resolved through dialogue and consultations based on the concept of a “dual-track approach” (denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the transition from the armistice mechanism to a peaceful mechanism) and the principle of phased and synchronized actions. In recent years, China has demonstrated a stance of defending North Korea’s repeated provocations through exercising its power of veto with Russia over a draft UNSC sanction resolution proposed by the United States for North Korea’s launching of ICBM-class ballistic missiles, and it stated that the current worsened situation on the Korean Peninsula was caused by the United States. The China-North Korea summit meeting was held five times from March 2018 to June 2019. In October 2022, Chairman Kim sent a congratulatory telegram to General Secretary Xi Jinping on his reelection. In September 2023, General Secretary Xi sent a congratulatory telegram to Chairman Kim on the 75th anniversary of the founding of North Korea in which he conveyed China’s desire to Then Russian Defense Minister Shoigu’s visit to North Korea [AFP-Jiji] **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- work with the North Korean side to strengthen strategic veto with China against the draft sanction resolution communication and deepen practical cooperation. proposed by the United States, mentioned above. (ii) Relations with Russia North Korea continuously shows the stance to assist When Chairman Kim visited Russia in September 2023, Russia, insisting since the start of Russia’s aggression North Korea expressed its intention to place the highest against Ukraine in February 2022 that the cause of the priority on relations with Russia. situation in Ukraine is the United States and Western Concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue, Russia, along countries. In October 2023, Japan, in cooperation with the **Part** with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization United States and the ROK, conducted related intelligence **Ⅰ** on the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six- gathering and analysis and obtained information sufficient **Chapter** Party Talks. In October 2021, Russia submitted a draft to believe that North Korea had provided Russia with **3** UN Security Council resolution on North Korea jointly military equipment and ammunition. Furthermore, it with China stating that North Korea had already taken was revealed that North Korea had provided Russia many denuclearization measures and that there should be with ballistic missiles, which were used against Ukraine adjustment of some sanctions concerning the economy between the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024. and livelihoods, and in May 2022, Russia exercised its **2** **The ROK and the U.S. Forces Korea** **1** **General Situation** **2** **Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the** **ROK** The Yoon Suk Yeol administration, established in May 2022, positions North Korea’s nuclear and weapons of The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital mass destruction as the most pressing security threat in Seoul, which has a population of approximately 10 the “National Security Strategy” it announced in June million, is situated close to the DMZ. 2023 and stated that it would actively deter various In Defense White Papers under the previous provocations from North Korea, including nuclear and administration, the words “main enemy” and the phrase missile threats, and would strongly retaliate and repel “the North Korean regime and its military are an enemy North Korea if it went ahead with a provocation. of the ROK” had not been used, but in the version of the The U.S. Forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed Yoon administration, the latter expression was used again. in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The The ROK has continued to undertake reforms of its ROK has established very close security arrangements national defense. The Yoon administration is promoting with the United States primarily based on the U.S.- “Defense Innovation 4.0” based on cutting-edge science ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. Forces Korea and technology such as artificial intelligence (AI) from have been playing an important role in securing peace the fourth industrial revolution. The administration also and stability of the region such as playing a vital role stated that it would construct stepwise combined combat in deterring a large-scale armed conflict on the Korean systems of manned and unmanned platforms to resolve Peninsula. Also, in the aforementioned National Security the shortage of soldiers and minimize casualties in war. Strategy, the ROK acknowledges that the U.S.-ROK alliance, which marked its 70th anniversary in 2023, **3** **Military Posture of the ROK** has been playing a central role in maintaining peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK’s military capacity is as follows. The ground The strategy also states that the geographic scope of forces consist of 17 army divisions with approximately the U.S.-ROK alliance will be expanded globally and 370,000 personnel and 2 marine divisions with that the ROK will work together with friendly nations, approximately 29,000 personnel; the naval forces consist centered around the United States, to build an open, of approximately 230 vessels with a total displacement inclusive, and rule-based international order in the Indo- of approximately 290,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Pacific region based on the solidarity of freedom with Force and Navy combined) consist of approximately 660 them. combat aircraft. Th ROK F h b d i i it ilit ----- forces not only its Army but also its Navy and Air Force in order to establish an omni-directional defense posture. The ROK Forces are focused on building the “Korean three-axis system” consisting of kill chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR). In January 2023, President Yoon stated that the KMPR is the most important part of the “Korean three-axis system.”[37] Amid this, in December of the same year, the ROK military’s first reconnaissance satellite, which the ROK Ministry of National Defense positions as the foundation of the “Korean three-axis system,” was launched in the United States. The strategic command for the effective integrated operation of forces in the system is scheduled to be established in 2024. In terms of ballistic missiles, the ROK appears to have operationally deployed Hyunmoo-2 missiles with an estimated range of 300-800 km and other missiles. The ROK also promotes the development of “high power” type missiles; for example, it is said that a test launch of Hyunmoo-4 missile with a two-ton warhead and 800 km firing range was successfully conducted in 2020, and a missile under development that is said to be Hyunmoo-5 and equipped with a heavier warhead was announced in October 2022.[38] Moreover, the ROK announced that it successfully conducted a test launch of a submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) in 2021. With regard to cruise missiles, the ROK appears to have operationally deployed the Hyunmoo-3 surface-tosurface cruise missile, which is believed to have a range of about 500-1,500 km, and the Haeseong series ship-toship/ship-to-surface cruise missiles, which are believed to have a maximum range of 1,000-1,500 km. Furthermore, the ROK has been actively working on equipment export in recent years. In particular, in 2022, the annual export resulted more than doubled that of 2021 on a contract basis, reaching US$17.3 billion, including a large-scale export contract with Poland that is striving to enhance its defense capabilities after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Although the value for the 2023 contract was about $14 billion, down from the previous year’s record high, the number of export partners reportedly increased from 4 to 12 countries. Defense spending in FY2024 (regular budget) increased by about 4.2% from the previous fiscal year to nearly KRW 59.4244 trillion, marking the 25th **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Fig. I-3-4-9 Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget 60 Defense budget (in 1 trillion won) Year-on-year growth rate (%) 55 45 40 15 35 30 20 15 5 10 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 (Note) According to the website of the Ministry of National Defense of ROK (accessed in December 2023) (FY) **37 Minister of National Defense Shin Won-sik stated in December 2023 that Korea Massive Punishment & Retaliation (KMPR) is a “strategy to eliminate the enemy leadership.” He went on to** point out that the ROK does not possess nuclear weapons that would constitute the basis for mutually assured destruction on nuclear terms, and that the safety of its leadership is more valuable than that of its citizens for North Korea, concluding that the combination of traditional U.S. nuclear forces and the ROK’s high-power conventional forces could enhance the integrity of deterrence. **38 At the large-scale “Armed Forces Day” event in September 2023, a “high-power Hyunmoo surface-to-surface missile” was unveiled, with a description of “three-axis system” on its** ----- consecutive year of increases since 2000. In addition, according to its “2024-2028 Defense Mid-term Plan,” the ROK will increase its defense budget by 7% on an annual average over five years until 2028. **See** Fig. I-3-4-9 (Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget) **See** **4** **U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S. Forces Korea** At the summit level, the ROK stated in the Washington Declaration of the U.S.-ROK summit meeting[41] in April 2023 that the country recognized the importance to trust the U.S. commitment for extended deterrence and reaffirmed the ROK’s commitment to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), whose establishment was announced at the summit meeting, held its inaugural meeting on July 18, 2023, and on the same day, a U.S. strategic nuclear submarine made its first port call in the ROK in about 40 years. While the United States and the ROK had aborted or reduced the scale of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises from 2018, considering the progress of dialogue with North Korea, both countries have been expanding the scope and scale of the exercises since the Yoon administration was established in May 2022. The regular command post exercises have been changed to the form that the Freedom Shield (FS) exercise is conducted in first half of a year and the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise is in the latter half. In the UFS exercise from August to September 2022, a field training was resumed in parallel with command post exercises for the first time in four years. In March to April 2023, in cooperation with the FS exercise, largescale joint field training “Warrior Shield” was conducted with U.S. bombers, aircraft carrier and amphibious assault ship deployed. In addition, the UFS exercise was held in August of the same year continuing on from the 2022 exercise, and field training was conducted on a larger scale than the 2022 UFS exercise. Regarding the deployment of U.S. strategic assets around the Korean Peninsula, a U.S.-ROK maritime exercise involving the U.S. aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan and a U.S.-ROK air exercise involving U.S. B-1B bombers were conducted in 2022.[42] In 2023, U.S. strategic assets, including the aforementioned U.S. strategic nuclear submarine, were alledgedly deployed 17 times, a significant increase from five in 2022. At the same time, the two countries deal with such issues as the transition of operational control (OPCON) **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** The United States and the ROK have taken various steps to deepen the U.S.-ROK Alliance in recent years. The two countries regularly confirm the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK Alliance at various levels. As specific undertakings through the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), a consultative body headed by the defense ministers of both countries, the two countries approved the “Tailored Deterrence Strategy,” designed to enhance deterrence against North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats, at the 45th U.S.ROK SCM in 2013. At the 46th SCM in 2014, the two countries agreed on “Concepts and Principles of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Comprehensive Counter-missile Operations (4D Operational Concept)” to tackle North Korean ballistic missile threats. At the 47th SCM in 2015, the implementation guidance on the 4D Operational Concept was approved. Recently, at the 53rd SCM in 2021, the United States and the ROK approved new Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) for the first time in 11 years and agreed to update their operation plans based on the SPG. Moreover, at the 54th SCM, the first for the Yoon administration in 2022, both countries agreed to several measures to enhance extended deterrence such as strengthening deployment of U.S. strategic assets[39] around the Korean Peninsula[40] and regularly conducting tabletop exercises including a North Korea nuclear use scenario. At the 55th U.S.-ROK SCM in 2023, the “2023 Tailored Deterrence Strategy,” revised for the first time in 10 years, was approved, and it was confirmed that it reflects guidelines for how to utilize all categories of U.S. military capabilities, including U.S. nuclear capabilities, as well as ROK’s conventional capabilities. **39 According to the ROK “Defense White Paper 2022,” U.S. strategic assets are the military capabilities provided by the United States that effectively deter external attack and provocations and** ensure an overwhelming response. They include the U.S. nuclear triad (ICBMs, strategic bombers, and strategic submarine ballistic nuclear (SSBNs)), as well as some conventional forces (aircraft carrier strike groups, B-1B bombers, and cruise-missile nuclear submarines [SSGNs]). **40 The ROK stated that it will increase the frequency and intensity of deployment of U.S. strategic assets to a level equivalent to permanent deployment.** **41 President Biden stated in the joint press conference after the U.S.-ROK summit meeting that the United States will not station nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.** **42 Other than this, U.S.-ROK air force training was conducted with B-52H bombers and F-22 fighter jets deployed around the Korean Peninsula in December 2022. The name of the U.S.-ROK** air force training conducted from October to November 2023 was changed from “Vigilant Storm” to “Vigilant Defense,” but no announcement was made about deployment of U.S. strategic ----- to the ROK and the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea. For the transition of OPCON to the ROK, aiming to complete the transition by December 1, 2015, the two countries have reviewed the approach of transitioning from the existing combined defense arrangement of the United States and ROK Forces, to a new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces and supported by the U.S. Forces. Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the two sides decided at the 46th SCM in 2014 to re-postpone the transition of OPCON and to adopt a conditionsbased approach, i.e., implementing the transition when conditions such as the ROK Forces’ enhanced capabilities are met. At the 50th SCM in October 2018, it was decided that following the transition of OPCON, a ROK military officer will serve as the commander of the Future Combined Forces Command, replacing the current arrangement of a U.S. military officer serving as the commander of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) verification was conducted as the first step to evaluate ROK Forces’ capability in combined command post exercise in August 2019, and the important role of the exercise to verify IOC was confirmed. Furthermore, Full Operational Capability (FOC) evaluation was conducted as the second step in the UFS exercise in 2022, and at the 54th SCM in November 2022, it was confirmed that the FOC evaluation was successfully conducted and that all assessment tasks met the criteria.[44] ROK Forces stated that the United States and the ROK comprehensively consider the results of combined evaluation about ROK Forces’ military capabilities of leading U.S.-ROK combined defense and ability to respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, which are necessary for the transition of OPCON, then steadily promote evaluation of the Future Combined Forces Command according to procedures for each of the steps. The 55th U.S.-ROK SCM in 2023 also discussed the future direction toward the transition of OPCON to the Future Combined Forces Command. With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces Korea, an agreement had been reached in 2003 on the relocation of the U.S. Forces’ Yongsan Garrison located in the center of Seoul to the Pyeongtaek area, south of Seoul and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north of the Han River to the south of the river. Subsequently, however, the agreement has been partially revised, due to various factors, including: in relation to the postponement of the transition of OPCON, it After the China-ROK foreign ministers’ meeting in August 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China insisted that the ROK government stated the policy of “One Restriction” in which the ROK limits the operation of the THAAD already deployed to U.S. Forces Korea, in addition to the “Three Nos” (no participation in the United States’ missile defense system, no consideration for additional THAAD deployment, no development of Japan-U.S.-ROK security cooperation to military allies) that the ROK government is said to have announced externally in 2017.has been necessary for some U.S. Forces personnel to remain at Yongsan Garrison; and it was decided that the counterfires forces of U.S. Forces Korea would remain in their location north of the Han River to counter the threat of North Korea’s long-range rocket artillery. In July 2017, the U.S. Eighth Army headquarters relocated to the Pyeongtaek area; in June 2018 the headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea and UN Command, and in November 2022, the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command Headquarters also relocated to the same area. Concerning defense burden sharing, whereby the ROK government bears a portion of the total stationing costs of the U.S. Forces Korea to ensure a stable stationing environment, in March 2021, the United States and the ROK reached an agreement on the 11th Special Measures Agreement (SMA). This agreement is valid for six years from 2020 to 2025. Total amount for FY2020 remains unchanged at the FY2019 level and 13.9% increase for FY 2021, compared to FY2020, while for FY2022-FY2025 the rate of increase in the ROK defense spending from the previous year will be applied. **5** **Relations with Countries and Regions** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(1) Relations with China** China and the ROK have made continuous efforts to strengthen their relations. China opposes the deployment **43 The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean** Peninsula and to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency. ----- of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to U.S. Forces Korea, saying that it undermines the strategic security interests of China. Although both countries agreed in October 2017 to continue communicating on the THAAD-related issues that China was concerned about through channels established between their respective military authorities, conflicting views still remain.[46] The Yoon administration has made it clear that the THAAD issue is a matter relating to the sovereignty and security of the ROK and that it will respond consistently and resolutely based on national interests and principles. Attention will be focused on future trends in China-ROK relations. **(2) Relations with Russia** The ROK and Russia have agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and military supplies. Both countries held Defense Strategy Dialogue in August 2018 and agreed to promote the dialogue to vice minister level and, in November 2021, also agreed to set up hotlines between Navies and between Air Forces. The ROK has implemented sanctions against Russia and provided military supplies and other resources to Ukraine in a show of solidarity with the international community following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine since February 2022. Although the ROK still maintains a cautious attitude to deliver lethal weapons to Ukraine, President Yoon suggests possible support outside the scope of humanitarian and economic ones when Ukraine civilians receive attacks in a largescale. An attention will be focused on what measures the ROK will take based on the situation in Ukraine and in terms of stably managing the relationship with Russia. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **45 A ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase from the ground. It captures and intercepts targets at high** altitudes outside of the atmosphere or in the upper atmosphere. Additionally, after North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test in January 2016, it was temporarily deployed by the U.S. Forces Korea in 2017. **46 After the China-ROK foreign ministers’ meeting in August 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China insisted that the ROK government stated the policy of “One Restriction” in which the** ROK limits the operation of the THAAD already deployed to U.S. Forces Korea, in addition to the “Three Nos” (no participation in the United States’ missile defense system, no consideration ----- **Section 5** **Russia** **1** **General Situation** President Putin, who has been seeking the revival of against Ukraine. Russia as a strong and influential power, commenced Russian forces around Japan in recent years have **Part** full aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. introduced new types of equipment and activities. Also **Ⅰ** Russia’s aggression against Ukraine undermines the movement to enhance strategic cooperation with China, **Chapter** sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and it such as the joint flights of Russian and Chinese bombers, **3** is also a serious violation of international law including joint navigation of warships and continued mutual the Charter of the United Nations, which forbid the use participation in exercises is observed. Military trends of force. The aggression shakes the foundations of the of Russia in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, international order and is understood as the most serious combined with this strategic cooperation with China, are and direct threat to defense in the European area. strong concerns for security. Also taking into account Russia also makes clear its stance that it continues to movements in the aggression against Ukraine, close work on the modernization of strategic nuclear weapons, observation of the situation is required. and repeats speech and behavior that can be taken as **See** Chapter 2 (Russian Aggression and Defense by Ukraine) nuclear weapons threats in the middle of the aggression **2** **Security and Defense Policies** Security Strategy in the military sphere, states the **1** **Strategic and Policy Documents** existing view that while the probability of an outbreak of Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities of a large-scale war is decreasing, military risks to Russia domestic and foreign policies in the “National Security are increasing, such as the movement of NATO’s military Strategy” revised in July 2021. infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders including The National Security Strategy states that Russia’s the expansion of NATO, and the establishment and policies through now to strengthen its defense deployment of strategic missile defense (MD) systems. In capabilities, domestic unity, and political stability, and addition, the doctrine expresses growing alarm, defining modernize its economy, and develop its industrial base, the following as new military risks: NATO’s military have strengthened Russia as a sovereign state capable buildup; the realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; of pursuing an independent domestic and foreign the rise of global extremism (terrorism); the formation policy and effectively opposing external pressures. This of governments in neighboring countries that carry out indicates Russia’s awareness of the existence of external policies threatening Russia’s interests; and the incitement threats and its belief that it is a “strong state” that will not of ethnic, social, and religious confrontations in Russia. succumb to them. It also states that the North Atlantic In addition, the doctrine raises characteristics of Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military activities around modern military warfare as being the massive use of Russia are a military threat and that the deployment of precision weapons, hypersonic weapons, electronic U.S. intermediate- and short-range missiles in Europe warfare equipment, all types of autonomous vehicles, and the Asia-Pacific region is a threat to strategic stability. and the like, as well as the phenomena of automation In the defense section, the Strategy commits to and centralization of operations through a network of giving continued priority to the role fulfilled by Russia’s automatic management systems. In addition, without military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and using the phrase “hybrid warfare,” the doctrine also preventing military conflict by maintaining a sufficient points out the integrated use of military force and level of nuclear deterrent capability and combat readiness political, economic, informational and other non-military of Russian military forces, including the Armed Forces measures, as well as participation in hostilities by of the Russian Federation (AFRF). irregular armed groups and private military companies. The Military Doctrine, revised in December 2014 as The Military Doctrine positions nuclear weapons as d t b t ti ti th i i l f th N ti l ti l t f ti th tb k f ----- budget in FY2024 accounts for 6% of GDP. Furthermore, the budget to be implemented in FY2023 (provisional amount) increased 36.9% from the previous year, and the original budget for FY2024 increased 68.2% from the previous year due to the aggression against Ukraine.[1] **See** Fig. I-3-5-1 (Changes in Russia’s Defense Expenditure) **3** **Military Reform** nuclear wars and military conflicts that use conventional weapons. Regarding the criteria for its use, it states Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation not only for the use of nuclear or other WMDs, but also in the event of invasion using conventional weapons, where the survival of the country itself is imperiled. In June 2020, for the first time, Russia released a policy document, “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” which is equivalent to the so-called nuclear doctrine. Criteria for the use of nuclear weapons are the same as the criteria described in the military doctrine, but the document clarifies the conditions for Russia to newly proceed to the use of nuclear weapons. In the “Basic Principles,” it is explained that, in addition to the “individual states [...] that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary,” “military coalitions (blocs, alliances)” in which these countries participate are also subject to Russia’s “red lines” for nuclear deterrence. **2** **Defense Budget** With regard to Russia’s defense budget, the amounts executed from FY2011 to FY2016 (implemented amount) showed year-on-year double-digit growth and reached 4.4% of GDP. After that, it has generally remained at a level of around 3% of GDP, but original **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Russia has promoted full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization. By January 2021, joint strategic commands were placed instead of four military districts (Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Districts) as well as the Northern Fleet (in charge of units facing the Arctic) and the military forces have been jointly operated under each District Commander in this system. However, since the commencement of the aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Russia shows some movements to increase strength as well as to enlarge and reorganize units. Defence Minister Shoigu proposed to increase total strength to 1.5 million troops, establish two military districts in Moscow and Leningrad, reorganize several existing brigades into divisions, newly deploy one corps to the Finland border region, and other measures to President Putin at the Ministry of Defence staff conference expanded meeting in December 2022. At a meeting in December 2023, it was reported that the number of the military personnel had reached 1.15 million during the year and that two combined arms armies, a mixed aviation corps, four divisions, 18 brigades, and 28 regiments had already been newly formed. On February 26, 2024, President Putin signed a presidential decree on the reestablishment of military districts, which stipulated the creation of the Moscow Military District and the Leningrad Military District. As for the navy, in May 2023 the Commander-in Chief of the Russian Navy expressed his recognition that “a strong navy directly commanded by the General Headquarters of the Navy is necessary,” and it has been pointed out that during the same year, each fleet of the Navy was withdrawn from the subordination of the military districts and returned to direct subordination to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy from corresponding military districts. This is believed to be because the Russian Navy placed more importance on Fig. I-3-5-1 Changes in Russia’s Defense Expenditure (1 trillion rubles) （％） 8.0 40 7.0 30 6.0 20 5.0 10 4.0 0 3.0 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 20212022 2023 2024 (FY) Defense expenditure FY-on-FY growth rate (%) (in 1 trillion rubles) (Note) Data announced by the Russian Ministry of Finance and Federal Treasury (the amount for FY2014-FY2021 is expenditures, for FY2023 is expenditures budget (provisional) as of September 1 of the year, and for FY2024 is original budget.) ----- establishing a unified operation of naval vessels and on an unified operation system at the military district aircrafts by the General Headquarters of the Navy than level when operating its fleets . **3** **Military Posture and Trends** Russia’s military forces are comprised of forces such and other equipment. **Part** as the AFRF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Regarding strategic nuclear forces, Russia possesses **Ⅰ** Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine- **Chapter** the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range **3** Federation. The AFRF consists of three services and bombers comparable to the United States in scale. two independent forces: Land Forces; Navy; Aerospace In 2011, Russia started the deployment of ICBM Yars, Forces; Strategic Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces. which is considered a multi-warhead version of ICBM In developing its military capabilities, after having Topol-M. The large **ICBM “Sarmat” was scheduled** been conscious of the United States, which it has to be deployed in 2023 in order to replace ICBM confronted in the past, and ensured a balance in its “Voyevoda” made in Ukraine during the Soviet era, but nuclear forces, Russia is expanding equipment similar it has been pointed out that its launch tests in February to that of advanced nations, such as land-attack and November 2023 may have failed, and at the end of cruise missiles capable of being precision-guided and the same year, Defense Minister Shoigu announced that unmanned vehicles, for its conventional forces that it preparations were underway for its deployment in 2024. perceives as inferior to those of advanced nations. As Seven Borey-class Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile for its asymmetric responses, it is believed that Russia Submarines (SSBN), which carry the new-type SLBM places importance on improving its so-called “A2/AD Bulava, were commissioned. Also, there are plans to (Anti-Access/Area-Denial)” capabilities through long- deploy five of such vessels each to the Northern Fleet and range surface-to-air and surface-to-ship missile systems Pacific Fleet in the future. Russia also continues to carry and electronic warfare equipment. out. The modernization renovation of Tu-95 bombers **See** Fig. I-3-5-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military (image)) **Surface-to-surface missile system “Iskander”** **Specifications, performance** **1** **Nuclear and Missile Forces** Maximum range: 500km Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces not only to secure **Description** Ballistic and cruise missile types its global position and to strike a balance with the nuclear exist. The ballistic missile type is forces of the United States, but also to supplement its said to fly at a lower altitude than Surface-to-surface ballistic missile system conventional forces, which have been severely depleted normal ballistic missiles and “Iskander” [Official YouTube Channel of the in the course of its continued aggression against Ukraine. to take an irregular trajectory Russian Ministry of Defence] Russia is thus making efforts to maintain readiness, and during the terminal phase. is renewing various platforms, early-warning systems, **Sea-launched cruise missile system “Kalibr”** **ICBM “Sarmat”** **Specifications, performance** **Specifications and performance** Range: Submarine-launched type Under development (deployment (to-ground) approximately 2,000 scheduled in 2024) km; Surface-launched type (to- ground) approximately 1,500 km **Description** Speed: Mach 0.8 Advanced large (silo-launched) ICBM It is believed to be available **Description** Sea-launched cruise missile system for various types of warheads as ICBM “Sarmat” [Official Rutube channel of Actually used in Syria and “Kalibr” [Official YouTube Channel of the a response to advanced missile the Russian Ministry of Defense] Ukraine. Can be loaded on Russian Ministry of Defence] defense systems and to be guided with Russian satellite navigation system various platforms, and the GLONASS. 46 missiles scheduled to be deployed. Russian Navy continues to acquire loaded ships. ----- Fig. I-3-5-2 Location and Strength of Russian Military (image) **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** |tonomous Republ|ic)| |---|---| |Col1|Col2|Col3|Central Military District (HQ: Yekaterinburg)| |---|---|---|---| |(HQ: Yekaterin Southern Military District Caspian Flotilla (HQ: Rostov-on-Don) Astrakhan|||(HQ: Yekaterin| ||Southern Military District (HQ: Rostov-on-Don)||| |Vlad|ivos|tok| |---|---|---| Leningrad Military District (HQ: Saint Petersburg) Baltic Fleet Baltiysk Northern Fleet (Kaliningrad Oblast) Severomorsk Black Sea Fleet Moscow Military District Sevastopol (HQ: Moscow) Eastern Military District (Ukraine’s (HQ: Khabarovsk) Crimea Autonomous Republic) Central Military District (HQ: Yekaterinburg) Southern Military District Caspian Flotilla (HQ: Rostov-on-Don) Astrakhan Pacific Fleet Vladivostok Ground forces Sea power Air power Reference |Col1|Russia| |---|---| |Total military forces|Approx. 1,100,000 personnel| |Ground troops orces Tanks|Approx. 500,000 personnel| ||T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Approx. 1,750 (Not including mothballed tanks. Approx. 5,750 including mothballed ones)| |Warships Aircraft carriers Cruisers wer Destroyers Frigates Submarines Marines|1,179 vessels, Approx. 2,070,000 tons| ||1 vessel| ||3 vessels| ||11 vessels| ||18 vessels| ||50 vessels| ||Approx. 250,000 personnel| |Combat aircraft Modern fighter aircraft wer Bombers|1,377 aircrafts| ||MiG-29 × 108 Su-30 × 125 MiG-31 × 142 Su-33 × 17 Su-25 × 170 Su-34 × 124 Su-35 × 111 (Fourth generation fighter aircraft: Total 797) Su-57 × 12 (Fifth generation fighter aircraft: Total 12)| ||Tu-160 × 16 Tu-95 × 58 Tu-22M × 58| |Population nce Term of service|Approx. 141.51 million| ||1 year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system)| (Note) Sources are “The Military Balance 2024,” etc. Ground force’s strength is including 550,000 Ground Force personnel, 40,000 Airborne troops personnel, and the 30,000 personnel of “the separatist in Eastern Ukraine” forces that Russia announced to incorporate to AFRF. ----- **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **ALBM “Kinzhal” It is suggested that Russia has used Zircon in Ukraine** **Specifications, performance** Speed: Mach 10 or more Range: 500 km (Total range with combat action radius of loaded aircraft: 2,000 km) **Description** Air-launched ballistic missile ALBM “Kinzhal” [Official YouTube Channel (ALBM) loaded on a fighter that of the Russian Ministry of Defence] can be maneuvered during flight. Some point out that ALBM is an air-launched version of a ground-to-ground short-range ballistic missile system “Iskander.” and the new production of Tu-160 strategic bombers and Russian Ministry of Defence announced that four new Tu-160 strategic bombers were delivered in 2023. As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia is working to deploy various non-strategic missiles such as the surface-to-surface missile system **“Iskander,” which is** believed to be capable of carrying either conventional or non-strategic nuclear warheads, the sea-launched cruise missile system “Kalibr,” the air-launched cruise missile Kh-101, and the air-launched ballistic missile “Kinzhal.” Russia places these missiles as “non-nuclear deterrence by precise guided weapons,” and considers them important. In particular, Russia has been promoting the deployment of warships capable of carrying the “Kalibr” submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) system in the Far East. It is necessary to closely watch this trend because it could have a major impact on the security environment around Japan. **2** **New Types of Weapons** Russia has opposed ongoing missile defense system build ups by the United States domestically and abroad in recent years. Russia announces that it develops the following various advanced weapons in order to penetrate missile defense systems deployed in the United States and other countries, that can be countermeasures for Russian ballistic missiles which are the foundations of Russia’s nuclear forces. ・ Hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) “Avangard,” which is claimed to be capable of flying at speeds greater than Mach 20 in the intercontinental atmosphere ・ Sea-launched hypersonic cruise missile (HCM) “Zircon,” which has a believed range of 1,500 km ith th i d f M h 9 **HGV “Avangard”** **Description** Viewed as capable of flying through the atmosphere at a speed exceeding Mach 20 and of avoiding MD systems by changing altitudes and trajectories. It is believed that 12 missiles were deployed as of the end of 2023. ALBM “Kinzhal” [Official YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence] **HCM “Zircon”** **Specifications, performance** Speed: Mach 9 Range: 1,500 km **Description** Ship-borne type HCM sharing a launcher with cruise missile HCM “Zircon” [Official YouTube Channel of “Kalibr.” Started to be deployed the Russian Ministry of Defence] in January 2023. Ground-to-ship version is reportedly under development. **Surface-to-air missile system “S-500”** **Description** Ground-to-air missile system succeeding “S-400.” It is believed that pre-production models are currently experimentally deployed in air Surface-to-air missile system “S-500” defense units around Moscow. [Official YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence] ・ Nuclear cruise missile “Burevestnik,” which is capable of flying at lower altitudes with no substantial range limitation ・ Nuclear-powered unmanned underwater drone weapon “Poseidon,” which is claimed to be able to navigate at high-speed in the deep sea Of these new weapons, HGV “Avangard” is deployed already, and HCM “Zircon” is believed to be deployed because Russia announced in January 2023 that the Gorshkov-class missile frigate RFS Admiral Gorshkov, equipped with **HCM “Zircon,” is going to be deployed** to the high seas as a part of the Northern Fleet. It is t d th t R i h d Zi i Uk i ----- Regarding Russia s own missile defense equipment, it is reported that the delivery of advanced **surface-to-** **air missile system “S-500” to each unit started in spring** of 2022, and it was announced that test launches of an advanced ballistic missile intercept missile system were conducted in November 2022. **3** **Conventional Forces and Other Issues** Unit, and many new EW systems have been procured and distributed or allocated to each service and force. In particular, it has been pointed out that in Ukraine, various electronic warfare equipment, including the Pole-21, are being deployed on the front lines and used against the Ukrainian military’s GPS-guided artillery shells and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). **See** Chapter 4, Section 2-2-3 (Russia); Chapter 4, Section 4-2-3 (Russia) **5** **Trends Related to the AFRF (General)** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Russia has conducted research and development for equipment based on its State Armament Program (GPV). However, it is pointed out that several factors, such as the need to cover the loss of equipment from the aggression against Ukraine, and very low availability of machine tools and various parts due to economic sanctions, are hindering the continuation of the GPV. Land Forces continue tests for advanced equipment such as T-14 tanks and Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled 155 mm howitzers. The Aerospace Force announced that deployment of the pre-production model of the so-called “fifthgeneration fighter” Su-57 was started, and that it is putting effort into integration of unmanned aircraft and manned aircraft for UAV development. The Russian Navy plans to increase the rate of modernization of its equipment to 70% by 2027. Because the development of surface vessels for coastal waters is being completed, the Navy will now move on to building surface vessels for the open sea. **4** **Space and Electromagnetic Domain** Since 2010, the AFRF has been conducting large-scale round-robin exercises in each military district, with the objective of verifying the combat readiness of the military districts, etc.[2] These exercises are helping to improve the long-distance mobilization capability of the AFRF. In 2022, the strategic command and staff exercise Vostok 2022 was conducted in the Eastern Military District with over 50,000 troops, and 14 countries including China and India participated. Zapad 2023 scheduled for 2023 in The Western Military District, was canceled. Among exercises for nuclear and missile forces, in February 2022, just prior to the start of the aggression against Ukraine, a large-scale missile exercise was conducted across Russia as a “strategic deterrence forces exercise” using strategic nuclear forces such as ICBMs and SLBMs as well as missile forces capable of carrying conventional or tactical nuclear warheads (Iskander, Kalibr, Kinzhal, and Zircon). In addition, a similar missile exercise for strategic nuclear forces also was conducted as “strategic deterrence training” in October 2022 and in October 2023. In the Arctic Region, Russia is developing coastal surveillance radar networks for enhanced vigilance and surveillance. At the same time, Russia is rebuilding airfields and deploying Tu-22M medium-range bombers and MiG-31 interceptor fighters, while also deploying surface-to-air missiles and surface-to-ship missiles to develop sufficient preparedness for dealing with airborne threats from the north and attacks from ships. Along with these developments, Russia has built a large-scale residential facility for personnel at the base in two places within the Arctic Region. In addition to the development of such military facilities, the AFRF has also been conducting such The AFRF has also been stepping up its activities in the realms of space and electromagnetic spectrum in recent years. Russia is believed to be promoting the development of anti-satellite weapons such as the “Nudol” anti-satellite missile system. In November 2021, Russia announced that it would conduct a satellite destruction test using an anti-satellite missile. Since 2013, Russia has put satellites into both low and geostationary orbits to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), which have repeatedly been observed engaging in frequent RPO with other countries’ satellites on geostationary orbits. In the electromagnetic spectrum domain, since 2009, the AFRF has established an Electronic Warfare (EW) The exercises were conducted primarily in the Eastern, Central, Southern, and Western Military Districts, and are called “Vostok (East),” “Tsentr (Central),” “Kavkaz (Caucasus),” and “Zapad ----- activities r4 as various exercises by naval vessels, strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN, and patrol flights by long-range bombers. For example, the comprehensive Arctic expedition “Umka-2022” was held in the Chukchi Sea in 2022. The tactical exercise “Finval-2023” was held in the Bering Sea, outside the Arctic Ocean, in addition to the Chukchi Sea, and the AFRF is believed to be strengthening its defense posture in the Arctic by expanding the area in which it conducts exercises. In addition, Tu-95 bombers flew over the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea in June 2023, and some believe that these activities were conducted to contain Finland, which had joined NATO in April of the same year, and Sweden, which had joined in March 2024. Russia thus appears to be stepping up military activities, so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required. **6** **Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan** of the AFRF in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions. **(1) Nuclear Forces** As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, approximately 30 Tu-95 bombers are deployed in Ukrainka, and it is reported that the Russian Ministry of Defence has plans to deploy Tu-160 long-range bombers newly in the Far East, so it will be necessary to keep e4 on future deployment trends of these bombers. As for maritime nuclear forces, four Borey-class SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. Russia plans on deploying five Boreyclass SSBNs to the Pacific Fleet in the future. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(2) Ground Forces** The Eastern Military District now consists of 31 brigades and two divisions with approximately 80,000 personnel in total, including motorized rifles (mechanized infantry), tanks, artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, material and technology security (logistics), and air defense, as well as a marine brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has introduced new equipment, such as the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, “Bal” and “Bastion” surface-to-ship missiles, and the “S-400” surface-to-air missile system. Surface-to-ship missile system “Bastion” 【Official YouTube channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence】 Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010. Land Forces, the Pacific Fleet, and the Air Force and Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military District Commander, who conducts unified operation of these services. Meanwhile, in December 2023, Russian media reported that command of each fleet, including the Pacific Fleet, was transferred from the Military District Commanders to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. It will be necessary to continue to closely monitor the trends in the Russian military’s chain of command, organizational restructuring, and changes in its joint operational posture since the aggression against Ukraine from the perspective of how the Russian military will reflect the lessons it learned in Ukraine in its operational posture. The current presence of the AFRF in the Far East region is significantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. In recent years, Russia has also been deploying the latest equipment in the Far East. It announced that the percentage of new equipment in the Eastern Military District was 56% as of December 2021. Given that the AFRF set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with conflicts through the intertheater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness it it i t k tt ti th t d **(3) Naval Forces** The Pacific Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. The fleet is comprised of approximately 253 ships with a total displacement in the region of approximately 710,000 tons, including approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately 15 submarines (approximately 10 f hi h l d b i ) W hi ----- **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **Steregushchiy III-class frigates** **Specifications, performance** Full-load displacement: 2,235 tons (for the type without “Kalibr”), 2,500 tons (for the type with “Kalibr”) Maximum speed: 26 knots Main armament: SS-N-30A Steregushchiy III-class frigates [Official anti-ground cruise missile (anti- YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry ground “Kalibr,” maximum range: of Defence] 1,500 km), SS-N-27A anti-ship cruise missile (anti-ship “Kalibr,” maximum range: 660 km), SS-N-26 anti-ship cruise missile (“P-800 Onix,” maximum range: 300 km), 9M96 surface-to-air missile (maximum range: 60 km) On-board aircraft: One helicopter (Ka-27) **Description** Russian Navy’s new-type frigate. One frigate armed with “Kalibr” cruise missiles and four without are assigned to the Pacific Fleet. Surface-to-ship missile system “Bal” 【Official YouTube channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence】 equipped with cruise missile Kalibr have also been deployed sequentially to the Pacific Fleet since 2021. As of the end of FY2023, such warships as one Udaloyclass frigate and four improved Kilo-class submarines in Vladivostok, as well as one **Steregushchiy III-class** **frigate and one Yasen-class nuclear-powered attack** submarine in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy are deployed. Su-35 fighters 【Official YouTube channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence】 carried out by Pacific Fleet vessels, along with patrols by nuclear-powered submarines. In April 2023, the commander of the Pacific Fleet was replaced for the first time in 11 years, and the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that a surprise inspection of the Pacific Fleet was conducted with the participation of more than 25,000 personnel and more than 160 vessels. Defense Minister Shoigu explained that the objective of this inspection was to “prevent the aggression of an enemy into the southern Sea of Okhotsk,” indicating that Russia intended to show off the capability of the Russian Navy to actively operate in the Sea of Okhotsk, which Russia considers crucial as an operating area of strategic nuclear submarine, even while it is engaged in the aggression against Ukraine. In addition, President Putin stated during a related exercise that military power of the Pacific Fleet “can be used in conflicts on all fronts.” It is believed that his statement was aimed to emphasize that the naval forces in the Far E t i t i i th b t di hil **(4) Air Forces** In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys approximately 320 combat aircraft from its Aerospace Forces and Navy combined. Existing models are being modernized and new models, such as the Su-35 fighters and the Su-34 fighter-bombers, are being introduced to improve their capabilities. **(5) Operations in the Vicinity of Japan** In the vicinity of Japan, the AFRF has been actively continuing its activities, including exercises and drills which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as verifying the results of the military reform. The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak. With regard to naval vessels, their activities are generally increasing in recent years. For example, i i d l di t h b ----- ground forces are dispatched from the Eastern Military Changes in the Number of Scrambles against **Fig. I-3-5-3** District to Ukraine. Russian Aircraft Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol (Number) activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia 500 **473473** has been increasing flights by long range bombers. Also, 450 **390390** there were flights of Tu-95 bombers refueled in mid-flight 400 **Part** and supported by A-50 early warning and control aircraft 350 **359359** **343343** **301301** **Ⅰ** and Su-27 fighters as well as flights of Tu-160. In October 300 **288288** **268268** **258258** **266266** 250 **Chapter** 2023, two Tu-95 bombers, accompanied by two fighter 200 **174** **3** jets, flew from the Sea of Japan and headed southeast 150 **150 150** **[174]** toward Japanese airspace, and one aircraft, presumed 100 to be a Russian helicopter, violated the airspace over 50 territorial waters off the Nemuro Peninsula in Hokkaido. 0 According to the Russian Defence Ministry, two Tu-95 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 (FY) bombers flew over the Sea of Japan in January 2024. **See** Fig. I-3-5-3 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft) **4** **Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories** Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia announced deployment of coastal (surface-to-ship) has redeployed Land Forces units on Kunashiri, Etorofu, missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands in 2016, and and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which in August 2018, three Su-35 fighters were reportedly are inherent territories of Japan. deployed at the new civilian airport on Etorofu Island, While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far which was opened to military and civilian dual use in less than that at peak times, one division, which belongs January of that year. to a corps still stationed in South Sakhalin, is located As for equipment of the Land Forces, in December on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. Furthermore, tanks, 2020, media related to the Russian Ministry of Defence armored vehicles, various types of artillery, anti-air reported the deployment of **“S-300V4” surface-to-air** missiles, and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles are **missile (maximum firing range of 400 km) in Etorofu** deployed. and Kunashiri Islands. It has been revealed that the Furthermore, in recent years, Russia has been S-300V4s on both islands have disappeared since the upgrading the facilities of its troops located in the aggression against Ukraine. The missing S-300V4s are Northern Territories. It is also deploying new equipment believed to have been diverted for use in Ukraine, and such as coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles belonging to the impact of continued operations in Ukraine is also its Navy and fighter aircraft belonging to its Aerospace evident in Russia’s air defense posture in the Far East. Forces, conducting large-scale exercises, and continuing Furthermore, in January 2022, it was announced that in its vigorous military activities under the illegal occupation the previous year, the tanks of the units located in the of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories Northern Territories had been replaced with T-80BV of Japan. Some point out the background for such moves as **Surface-to-air missile system “S-300V4”** being the rising military importance of all of the Sea of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN, as well as the **Specifications, performance** trend of increasing Russian military activities not only in Maximum firing range: 400 km Maximum altitude: 37 km the Northern Territories but also in South Sakhalin and **Description** the Chishima Islands, whose jurisdiction has not been Air defense missile said to have determined. capabilities to deal with stealth Surface-to-air missile system “S-300V4” In recent years, the deployment of major new aircraft. [Official YouTube Channel of the Russian i t i th N th T it i h i l d d th Ministry of Defence] ----- tanks, which are suitable for operation in cold regions. to ship missile system Bastion to South Sakhalin at the Military exercises have also continued in the Northern end of 2021, to Matua (Matsuwa) Island of the Chishima Territories. In June 2021, landing and anti-landing Islands in December 2021, and to Paramushir Island exercises were conducted on Etorofu Island, Kunashiri of the Chishima Islands in December 2022. There are Island, and South Sakhalin, involving over 10,000 reports on the establishment of a new coastal (surface- military personnel, 500 ground equipment and machines, to-ship) missile brigade placed in South Sakhalin, with 32 aircraft, and 12 vessels. jurisdiction over units located on Etorofu and Kunashiri **Part** In addition, in the vicinity of Sakhalin and the Islands. It is necessary to monitor with strong concern the **Ⅰ** Chishima Islands, which, like the Northern Territories, Russian military movements in the Far East, including **Chapter** are adjacent to the Sea of Okhotsk, it is reported that the the Northern Territories, while taking into account **3** AFRF newly deployed the S-400 surface-to-air missile developments in the aggression against Ukraine. system to South Sakhalin in February 2021, the surface- **5** **Relations with Countries and Regions** series of processes originating from the withdrawal **1** **General Situation** announcement of the United States side. In November On March 31, 2023, President Putin approved the new 2020, the United States pulled out of the Open Skies Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation Treaty, which was signed by the Western countries and for the first time since 2016. In this document, Russia Russia allowing its participants to mutually conduct condemns Western countries for adopting anti-Russian unarmed observation and surveillance flights, and this policies and emphasizes cooperation with countries such was followed by Russia announcing its withdrawal in as China and India, while stating that it aims to build January 2021. a multipolar international order.3 Moves to strengthen On the other hand, with regard to the New Strategic collaboration with China in particular have been seen Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which set the upper since the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, seemingly in inverse limit of strategic nuclear forces for Russia and the proportion to the deepening of Russia’s conflict with United States, although both countries agreed on its Western countries, and is significant especially since the unconditional extension for five years in January 2021, aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. just before the expiration of the treaty in February of the same year, President Putin unilaterally declared “holding the treaty in abeyance” in February 2023, which is not **2** **Relations with the United States** stipulated in the treaty. President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative **See** Chapter 2, Paragraph 3-2 (NATO’s response) relations with the United States in the economic domain, while opposing the United States on any action Russia **3** **Relations with China** considers as “a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia’s strategic interests.” Russia has exported military equipment such as surface- On the military front, feeling that the United States’ to-air missiles, fighter jets, and submarines to China installation of missile defense systems both at home since the 1990s until recent years. Russia also continues and abroad - including in Europe and the Asia-Pacific to advance close military cooperation even during the - undermines global and regional security, Russia has aggression against Ukraine, and Russia and China criticized these moves for upsetting the strategic balance. conduct various joint military actions. Russia is also moving forward with the development In June and December 2023, the “China-Russia joint of new strategic weapons that are said to be capable of air patrol,” which has been conducted annually since reliably penetrating missile defense systems. 2019 by Russian Tu-95 bombers and Chinese H-6 In regard to arms control between the United States bombers, was conducted in the airspace from the Sea of and Russia, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Japan through the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. (INF) Treaty ended in August 2019 during the former In September 2022, warships of Russia and China T d i i t ti ft h i th h d t d j i t t i i t f R i E t ----- **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **Commentary** **Russia’s Military Trends in the Area Surrounding Japan** As Russia continues its aggression against Ukraine, the country and conventional warheads. In Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, it is is believed to have suffered significant losses in conventional newly deploying Steregushchiy III class frigates and Yasen M class forces, primarily ground forces, including units deployed in the submarines, and in Vladivostok, it is newly deploying Improved Kilo- Far East region. These losses will likely further deepen its reliance class submarines, both of which are capable of carrying “Kalibr” on nuclear forces in the future. In the area surrounding Japan, cruise missiles. “Zircon” hypersonic cruise missiles, which were Russia is expected to further focus on the defense of the area deployed in January 2023, will also be equipped on Gorshkov- surrounding the Sea of Okhotsk, which is its waters of operation class missile frigates that are currently under construction and for strategic nuclear-powered submarines. may be deployed in the Far East region in the future. Regarding its strategic nuclear-powered submarines, Russia These naval and air forces are expected to be utilized on a has deployed four new types of Borey-class SSBNs since 2015. regular basis to act as a deterrent to the United States and its In the future Russia is expected to have a total of five Borey-class allies, including Japan. Increased naval and air force activity was SSBNs, and it is modernizing and upgrading some of its existing seen even before the start of aggression against Ukraine. For nuclear-powered submarines. example, in December 2017, Russia deployed Tu-95 bombers to In recent years, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Biak in eastern Indonesia, and in the summer of 2021, the Pacific (AFRF) has newly deployed “Bastion” and “Bal” surface-to-ship Fleet reportedly conducted a large-scale exercise in the central missiles and S-400 surface-to-air missiles in the Kamchatka Pacific west of the Hawaiian Islands. Furthermore, with China, Peninsula, which is in the vicinity of the Sea of Okhotsk, Russia has been conducting joint flights of bombers from 2019 Russia’s waters of operation for nuclear-powered submarines; onward and joint navigation of warships from 2021 onward in the in the Chishima Islands and South Sakhalin, which are disputed area surrounding Japan. territories; and in Japan’s Northern Territories. These moves are We must watch Russia’s military developments in the Indo- thought to be part of Russia’s so-called “bastion” strategy, in which Pacific region, including the area surrounding Japan, as well as it seeks to prevent other countries’ militaries from approaching the trends in Russia’s cooperation with China, with strong concern. area around the Sea of Okhotsk, the waters where it operates its strategic nuclear-powered submarines. In addition, from the perspective of strengthening the “bastion” strategy, the AFRF is expected to develop and utilize naval and air forces based in Primorsky Krai and the Kamchatka Peninsula. Specifically, Russia is in the process of upgrading the Pacific A Russian Navy Kilo-class submarine that moved westward through the Soya Strait from October 6 to 7, 2022. It is believed to be the “Magadan,” the third Improved Kilo- Fleet with ships armed with “Kalibr” cruise missiles, which are class submarine in the Pacific Fleet capable of carrying the “Kalibr” cruise missile. precision-guided munitions capable of carrying tactical nuclear ----- Fig. I-3-5-4 China-Russia Joint Flights (FY2023) China-Russia Joint Flights (FY2023) June 6, 2023 June 7, 2023 **Part** : Russian Tu-95 bomber×2 : Presumed Russian fighter jet × 2 (presumed) **Ⅰ** : Presumed Russian aircraft × 1 (presumed) **Chapter** : Chinese H-6 bomber×2 **3** : Presumed Chinese fighter jet × 2 (presumed) : Presumed Chinese fighter jet × 3 (presumed) : Presumed Chinese fighter jet × 2 (presumed) : Presumed Chinese fighter jet × 4 (presumed) : Presumed Chinese fighter jet × 2 (presumed) : Presumed Chinese fighter jet × 2 (presumed) : Chinese H-6 bomber×2 : Russian Tu-95 bomber×2 : Presumed Chinese fighter jet × 2 (presumed) December 14, 2023 : Russian Tu-95 bomber×2 : Tu-142 patrol aircraft×1 : Presumed Russian fighter jet × 2 (presumed) : Su-35 fighter jet x 2 : Chinese H-6 bomber×2 : Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft × 1 : Presumed Chinese fighter jet × 2 (presumed) : J-16 fighter jet x 2 : Presumed Chinese fighter jet × 1 (presumed) : Presumed Chinese fighter jet × 2 (presumed) ----- Military District strategic command and staff exercise Vostok 2022. After the exercise, warships of both navies, consisting mainly of vessels that participated in the exercise, conducted the China-Russia Joint Naval Patrol for the second time since October 2021, in the sea area around Japan. In July 2023, Russia’s naval vessels participated in the exercise “Northern/Interaction-2023,” led by China’s Northern Theater Command in the Sea of Japan, and then through August, the two countries’ naval vessels conducted their third “China-Russia joint navigation” in the sea area around Japan. These repeated joint flights of Russian and Chinese bombers and joint navigations of naval vessels are intended to be demonstrative behavior against Japan, so they are a significant concern for the security of Japan. The Russian Navy Steregushchiy-class frigate “Gromkiy” firing live ammunition in the Sea of Japan off the western coast of Hokkaido, Japan in September 2022 as part of the “Vostok 2022” exercise integration treaty with South Ossetia in 2015, and other efforts, Russia has been working to ensure its military influence. However, today, after more than thirty years have passed since the collapse of USSR, none of the former Soviet Union countries except Belarus support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Some consider that Russia’s influence on the former Soviet area will decline still further in the wake of the aggression against Ukraine. Russia strengthens military cooperation with Belarus along with the start of the aggression against Ukraine. Belarusian President Lukashenko asked President Putin to modernize his country’s aircrafts to allow them to carry nuclear weapons in June 2022, and President Putin agreed. It was announced in February 2023 that Belarusian forces deployed surface-to-surface missile system Iskander received from Russia. In May 2023, it was announced that the defense ministers of the two countries had signed documents regarding procedures for storing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. In December 2023, Belarusian President Lukashenko stated that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons that Russia had delivered to the Belarusian territory was completed in October. In the Caucasus region, Azerbaijan launched a military operation in September 2023 to force Armenian forces to President Aliyev leads at the military parade in Nagorno Karabakh region [EPA/Jiji] **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Fig. I-3-5-4 (China-Russia Joint Flights (FY2023)); Section 2-3-2 (Relations with Russia) **See** **4** **Relations with Former Soviet Republics** Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with former Soviet republics as one of its most important foreign policy objectives. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the region. It deploys its troops in the Collective Security Treaty Organization[3] (CSTO) members Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), and Ukraine (Crimea). Through the conclusion of an alliance and strategic partnership treaty with Abkhazia in November 2014, the conclusion of an alliance and CSTO is a military alliance consisting of six member states, namely Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Article 4 of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty, which is the grounds for establishing the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), states that, in the event of an act of aggression against any of the participating States, “all other participating States at the request of this participating State shall immediately provide the latter with the necessary assistance, including military, and provide support by the means at their disposal in ----- withdraw from the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, which had unilaterally declared independence on Azerbaijan’s territory and had been exercising effective control over the region. After being attacked by Azerbaijani forces, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic surrendered in September and signed an agreement for the dissolution of the republic by January 2024. Following the dissolution, nearly 80,000 of the 120,000 Armenian residents of the republic are believed to have fled to Armenia. As a result of this conflict, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which had been exercising effective control over 4 part of Azerbaijan’s territory for more than 32 years since the end of the Soviet Union, disappeared. The Russian armed forces, stationed as peacekeeping forces in the republic, were unable to prevent the military conflict, which caused Armenia, a CSTO member state and Russia’s military ally, to lose trust in Russia, and some believe this has exposed the decline of Russian influence in the region. **5** **Relations with Other Countries** conducted the first joint naval exercise between the two countries, the Myanmar-Russia Maritime Security Exercise (MARUMEX), in November. Russia is also seen to be strengthening its cooperation with North Korea. In September 2023, Chairman Kim Jong-un visited the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russian Far East and held the first summit meeting with President Putin in four years. He also visited Komsomolsk-onAmur and was briefed on the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter jet, and then he visited Vladivostok, where he was briefed on the Udaloy-class destroyer “Marshal Shaposhnikov”. **(2) Relations with European Countries** Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner in the areas of common interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia thereafter, including that in the military domain, except for the NRC’s ambassadorlevel meetings. Moreover, with the aggression against Ukraine, the relationship between Russia and European countries is the tensest it has been since the Cold War era. **See** Chapter 2, Paragraph 3-2 (NATO’s response) **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(1) Relations with Asian Countries** Russia recognizes that the significance of the AsiaPacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy and considers it strategically important to strengthen its status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic development in Siberia and the Far East, and security. In Asia, in addition to its relations with China, Russia assigns an important role to its Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership with India. In December 2021, in conjunction with the annual summit meeting, the inaugural 2+2 Dialogue of the Foreign and Defence Ministers was held in New Delhi. As for military arrangements, another example of the ongoing wideranging military cooperation between Russia and India is the joint exercise “INDRA,” which has been taking place since 2003 with the involvement of the armies and navies of both countries, with their air forces also taking part in the recent years. Furthermore, Russia is working to strengthen its relations with ASEAN, and conducted the Naval Cooperative Exercise with ASEAN countries firstly in the inshore waters of Indonesia in December 2021. In addition, vessels from the Russian Pacific Fleet visited eight countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia between November and December 2023. In particular, Russia co-hosted an anti-terrorism tabletop exercise with Myanmar within the framework of the ASEAN Defense Mi i t ’ M ti (ADMM Pl ) i A t d th **(3) Relations with Middle Eastern and African** **Countries** In the Foreign Policy Concept published in March 2023, comprehensive mutual cooperation with Iran, total support for Syria, and deepened partnerships with Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other countries are stated definitely. Above all, for Syria, the AFRF has continued to secure the Tartus Naval Base and Khmeimim Air Base in Syria since September 2015 to conduct operations to support the Assad administration. In operations in Syria, Russia has conducted bombings using fighter bombers and long-range bombers, as well as attacks using cruise missiles from surface ships and submarines deployed in the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. It has been pointed out that Russia maintains a military presence in Syria and is building permanent “A2/AD” capabilities by deploying longrange surface-to-air missiles, as well as expanding cooperation with neighboring countries such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Taking this into account, R i i fl th t M dit i ----- especially Syria, cannot be ignored. Russia is increasing its influence over both the Syrian situation and peace in Libya, while at the same time coordinating its interests with Türkiye. In May 2020, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) announced that Russian MiG-29 fighters were delivered to Libya after military aircraft insignia had been removed in Syria and accused of Russia’s involvement in creating the war situation in Libya using private military companies (PMCs) that the Russian government supports. It has been also noted that approximately 2,000 personnel from PMCs under the General Staff of the Russian Ministry of Defence are operating in Libya. In December 2020, the Russian government announced an agreement with the government of Sudan to set up a naval base on the Red Sea in Sudan, northeastern Africa. If a base of the Russia Navy were to be established in Sudan in the future, it is believed that deployment capabilities of the AFRF would be improved in the direction of the Indian Ocean. In January 2022, the Malian military spokesman stated that Russian instructors had been dispatched to the country under a bilateral agreement to train Mali’s military, and It is reported that 1,000 personnel from PMCs under the General Staff of the Russian Ministry of Defence are operating in Mali. In February 2023, warships of the Russian Navy Northern Fleet including an Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate conducted a joint naval exercise with navies of China and South Africa in the Indian Ocean east of South Africa, for the second time since 2019. **6** **Arms Exports** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Russia actively promotes the export of arms not only to maintain the defense industrial base and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. Export control is exclusively conducted by the Rosoboronexport State Corporation. Currently, Russia has the third largest share of arms exports in the world after the United States and France,[4] exporting fighters, vessels and surface-to-air missiles to regions including Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. In recent years, Russia has actively tried to sell not only to conventional importers of its products but also to U.S. allies and U.S. friendly countries such as Türkiye. However, the U.S. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) passed in 2017, and sanctions against Russia from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine are seen to be having a severe impact on Russia’s defense industry. **See** Chapter 4, Section 1-5 (Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technological Bases) **REFERENCE : Security Environment Surrounding Japan (Russia)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/index.html** According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia had the third largest share of arms exports in the world (11%) after the United States and France between ----- **Section 6** **Oceania** **Australia** **1** The Albanese Labor Party Government formed in **1** **General Situation** May 2022 clearly stated that it would follow the basic Australia is an island nation that forms a continent direction of the previous government’s defense policy **Part** solely with its own territory and has the geopolitical and announced that it would conduct Defence Strategic **Ⅰ** **Chapter** characteristics of being located at a certain distance from Review (DSR) to implement this policy and optimize the major powers and at low risk of being directly involved Australian Defence Force (ADF). **3** in international conflicts. It is promoting an open, In April 2023, following the completion of the DSR, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region and is a conducted by the former Minister of Defence and the special strategic partner with Japan; sharing fundamental former Chief of the ADF, the Government released the values and strategic interests. National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, which includes the Review itself and the government’s response to the challenges set out in DSR to reform the Defence’s **2** **Defense Policies** posture and structure. The DSR recommended to transform **(1) Defense Strategies** the ADF from a traditional “balanced force” capable of Given the normalization of diplomatic relations between responding to range of contingencies and having low- the United States and China in 1970s, Australia had level conflicts in mind to a “focused force” designed to improved its relations with China and it continued to address the nation’s most significant military risks. It assume that there was no immediate or direct threat to also recommended that the A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Australia. Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities Denial) capability be enhanced by adopting a “Strategy conducted in 1986, assessed itself as “one of the most of Denial[1]”and improving long-range strike capability, secure countries in the world” and indicated that it would undersea warfare capability and shorter-range capability. receive at least 10-years’ warning before any major The Albanese Government agreed with these attack on Australia. This outlook defined Australia’s recommendations by the DSR in principle and identified defense policy even after the Cold War. priority areas for immediate action, including the In July 2020, the former Morrison Conservative following: Coalition Government released the 2020 Defence ･ Acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through Strategic Update to reconsider its defense strategy in AUKUS to improve Australia’s deterrence capabilities response to Australia’s strategic environment that had ･ Developing the ADF’s ability to precisely strike deteriorated more rapidly than anticipated due to military targets at longer-range modernization in the Indo-Pacific region and intensifying ･ Improving the ADF’s ability to operate from competition between major powers, including the United Australia’s northern bases States and China. The former government stated that To achieve the above, the Government developed the Australia’s defense plan based on the aforementioned National Defence Strategy (NDS) and the Integrated 10-year warning time was no longer appropriate. Investment Program (IIP) in April 2024. The Government Furthermore, the objectives for Australia are to has announced that it will update these two documents deploy military power: (1) to shape Australia’s strategic biennially and also announced to boost defense spending environment, (2) deter actions against the country’s to 2.4% of GDP by 2033. interest and (3) respond with credible military force when required. To achieve the objectives, the Australian **(2) AUKUS initiatives** Government plans to deploy military capabilities In September 2021, then Prime Minister Scott Morrison, including a long-range strike capability and grey-zone along with the leaders of the United States and the response capability. United Kingdom, announced the establishment of a **1** According to the National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, a strategy of denial is a defensive approach designed to stop an adversary from succeeding in its goal to coerce states through ----- new trilateral security cooperation framework, AUKUS, aimed at deepening diplomatic, security and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Through this framework, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia announced to promote (1) deeper informationand technology-sharing, (2) foster deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial infrastructure and supply chains and (3) deeper cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities. Furthermore, as concrete initiatives, they clarified: (1) support for Australia to acquire at least eight nuclear-powered submarines[2] and (2) technical cooperation for advanced capabilities (cyber, artificial intelligence [AI]), quantum technology and undersea capabilities). In April 2022, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced in relation to aforementioned (2) that they would deepen their cooperation regarding hypersonics and counter-hypersonic capabilities, electronic warfare, defense innovation and information sharing. In addition, Australia has announced its intention to advance cooperation with the United States on the introduction of Tomahawk cruise missiles and standoff missiles, as well as on the development of hypersonic missiles for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). In March 2023, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States held a summit meeting in the U.S. and announced that they will deliver conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines for Australia through three-phase approach, while meeting the commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. In the first Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. leaders announcing Australia’s policy to acquire nuclear powered submarines, at U.S. Naval Base Point Loma in San Diego (March 2023) [DVIDS] phase, the U.S. and the U.K. plan to establish rotational presence of their nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) as early as 2027 at the HMAS Stirling on western Australia and the Royal Australian Navy will also be on board to conduct practical training. The second phase is to acquire up to five U.S. Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s. In the third phase, AUKUS partners will deliver a trilaterally-developed submarine (SSNAUKUS) for both Australia and the U.K. They will incorporate the cutting-edge submarine technologies of the U.S. to the U.K.’s next-generation design. The two countries intend to build the submarines in their domestic shipyard. In December 2023, Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. held an AUKUS defense ministers’ meeting and confirmed the progress of support for Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and advanced technology cooperation. During the meeting, it was announced that: Australian Navy crew would begin operations in Guam in 2024 to acquire nuclear-powered submarine maintenance skills in support of the Submarine Rotational Force – West (SRF-West) that will be established off the west coast of Australia. The three countries will conduct joint experiments and exercises with uncrewed maritime systems and share and process maritime data in real time to improve their the maritime domain awareness and all three countries will promote the technological development of quantum sensing to improve undersea positioning capabilities and to accelerate technological development of submarine-based undersea vehicle as part of efforts to further develop the SSN-AUKUS. In April 2024, an AUKUS defense ministers’ joint statement was issued, confirming cooperation in the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS’s Pillar I, while announcing its consideration of that cooperating with Japan under Pillar II, the area of advanced capabilities. **3** **Relations with Foreign Countries** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(1) Relationship with the United States** Australia and the United States have an alliance based on the ANZUS (Security Treaty among Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America) Treaty,[3] a mutual defense treaty that underpins Australia’s security Australia had planned to procure 12 conventional submarines (attack-class submarines) from France, but this plan was suspended when it was decided to acquire nuclear-powered submarines within the framework of AUKUS. A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New ----- defense area such as dialogues between the defense authorities, bilateral exercises, and mutual visiting of vessels, in addition to exchanges and cooperation in the political areas. Meanwhile, Australia has been clearly showing its wariness towards China by explicitly conveying its stance on China given the military use of South China Sea and its expansion to Pacific island countries. The Australian government has been expressing strong concerns over China’s reclamation and construction activities in South China Sea and opposing any unilateral attempt to change or influence the status quo through militarization or coercive actions on disputed features. It has also expressed its intent to continue exercising its rights to freedom of navigation and overflight. In April 2020, Australia had suggested the necessary for an independent investigation into the origin of novel coronavirus outbreak in China. China successively imposed trade blockages on Australian beef and other products, leading to a rapid deterioration of the AustraliaChina relations. Subsequently with the change of government in Australia, the two countries resumed diplomatic and security dialogue and the first Australia-China defense ministers’ meeting in about three years was held in June 2022. In November 2023, Prime Minister Albanese visited China and met with President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Qiang. This visit of Australian Prime Minister to China was the first time in seven years. On the other hand, according to the Australian government, in November 2023, there was an incident which had resulted in the injury of an Australian diver. When the diver on the Royal Australian Navy frigate; frigate conducting monitoring and surveillance activities against North Korea’s illicit “ship-to-ship transfers”, was removing a fishing net entangled in the ship’s screw within Japan’s EEZ, sonar waves were emitted by a Chinese navy guided-missile destroyer sailing nearby and had injured the Australian diver. The Australian government expressed serious concerns to the Chinese government, describing the Chinese navy’s activity as dangerous and unprofessional, but the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted the Chinese military had consistently conducted professional operations in accordance with international law and practice. **(3) Relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island** **Countries** I it 2020 D f St t i U d t A t li policy. In response to the spread of communism in East Asia and the descending British influence in the AsiaPacific after World War II, Australia strengthened its alliance with the United States, mainly possessing U.S.made high-performance land, sea and air equipment. Australia has dispatched its troops to U.S.-led wars and conflicts, such as the Vietnam War, the Gulf War and military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly convening the foreign affairs and defense ministerial consultations or AUSMIN (Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations), to discuss major diplomatic and security issues. In July 2023, AUSMIN was held in Australia and in their joint statement, both countries noted that the U.S.-Australia alliance has never been stronger and committed to expanding collaboration between the two countries, as well as with regional partners and institutions, to ensure an Indo-Pacific that is open, stable, peaceful, prosperous and respectful of sovereignty. In November 2011, the United States and Australia announced the “Force Posture Initiative,” a framework for the rotational deployment of the U.S. forces to Australia as part of the U.S. rebalance policy during the Obama administration. Since 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps has been deployed on a rotational basis to northern Australia, including Darwin. Additionally, the U.S. Air Force has been deploying B-52 strategic bombers and F-22 fighter jets to Australia as needed to conduct joint exercises and training with the RAAF. In July 2023, the rotational deployment of the U.S. Army landing craft took place for the first time during the U.S.-Australia joint exercise “Talisman Sabre.” The United States and Australia have also indicated their intention to deploy the U.S. Navy patrol and reconnaissance aircraft on a rotational basis in Australia in the future. Since 2005, the U.S. Forces and ADF have biennially conducted “Talisman Sabre” to improve interoperability and strengthen ties among participating countries. In 2023, it was the largest exercise ever, with 13 countries participating, with Indonesia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga participating for the first time. The exercise was conducted in the land, maritime and air domains, including amphibious operations and land combat training. **(2) Relationship with China** China is Australia’s largest trading partner and two t i h d t d i h i th **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- Indian Ocean. Australia has been strengthening its defense relationship with the Philippines, primarily through support for building counter-terrorism capabilities and at the Australia-Philippines defense ministers’ meeting in February 2023, it was concurred that this meeting would be held annually from the following year. Australia has been participating in the U.S.-Philippines joint exercise Balikatan since 2014 and in August 2023 it conducted its first Australian-Philippines amphibious exercise, Exercise Alon, which included scenario training for reclaiming enemy-captured island. Additionally, in November the same year, Australian and the Philippines forces conducted Maritime Cooperative Activity in the water and air around the Philippines for the first time. Regarding Pacific Island countries, the Albanese Government criticized the former Morrison Government for failing to intervene in the signing of a framework agreement between Solomon Islands and China on security cooperation in April 2022 and announced a basic policy to strengthen engagement with Pacific Island countries. Based on this policy, the government announced the establishment of Australia Pacific Defence School to provide training programs for members of Pacific Island countries and security forces and the establishment of a framework to support the development of climate-resilient infrastructure for these countries for which climate change is a critical issue. Australia plays a leading role in assisting these countries in fields such as security maintenance, natural disasters response and maritime patrol. In addition, in the field of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF assets to the South Pacific to assist with patrol activities. Australia has provided 18 Guardianclass patrol boats to Pacific island nations. **See** Paragraph 2 (New Zealand) and Section 7 (Southeast Asia) announced a policy of focusing on the Indo Pacific region, particularly the adjacent areas from the northeastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland Southeast Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific. Australia has been deepening its relations with Indonesia in the security and defense fields following the signing of the Lombok Treaty, a security cooperation framework, in November 2006 and the elevation of their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in August 2018. The bilateral relationship has been strengthened through initiatives such as the regular holding of Foreign and Defense Ministers Meetings (2+2) and the announcement in February 2024 that they are considering a treaty-level defense cooperation agreement. With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries out regular combined joint exercises in the South China Sea and other areas under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA; entered into force in 1971) framework, whereby the two countries, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand would consult together in the event of any form of armed attack or threat of such attack against Singapore or Malaysia, for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken. Australia considers that Singapore is its most advanced defense partner and that they share Australia’s interest in a secure maritime trading environment. The defense cooperation between the two countries is also deepening, including the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Military Training and Training Area Development in Australia under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in October 2016. Regarding Malaysia, Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian Air Force Base Butterworth and contributes to maintaining regional security and stability through patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- **Commentary** **Security Issues Faced by Pacific Island Countries** Pacific Island Countries is a collective term for 14 island countries years geopolitical competition between the major powers has located in the South Pacific Ocean. They are important to Japan become apparent due to China’s increasingly active international as they are a source of abundant marine resources due to their approach. For example, while China secured a security cooperation **Part** vast exclusive economic zones and serve as transport routes for agreement with the Solomon Islands that reportedly includes **Ⅰ** energy resources. provisions that allow the dispatch of Chinese police and military to **Chapter** On the other hand, due to their distance from other regions and them as well as Chinese port calls and replenishment of ships, the **3** their narrow and dispersed national territories, they face various United States has signed a defense cooperation agreement with constraints and vulnerabilities, and none of them, excluding three Papua New Guinea, which is said to include U.S. military access countries, have their own military. Under these circumstances, to Papua New Guinea’s ports and airports. Furthermore, as China they position climate change as the single greatest security threat seeks to expand its influence through large-scale infrastructure and take the loss of land due to rising sea levels and the expansion development and the dispatch of hospital ships, the United States of natural disasters seriously. is attempting to maintain and expand its existing military presence These countries have traditionally had deep relationships with simultaneously. Thus, competition between the United States and the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. However, in recent China over involvement in the region is attracting attention. **2** **New Zealand** New Zealand is located in the Indo-Pacific and is an risks. On China, the DoD observed that the country is important strategic cooperative partner that shares using all instruments of national power in ways that fundamental values with Japan. can pose challenges to existing international rules and In July 2022, the Department of Defence (DoD) norms. Also, it is assessed that China continues to invest announced that it would conduct a Defence Policy heavily in growing and modernizing its military, and is Review to formulate a long-term defense strategy in increasingly able to project its military and paramilitary light of the growing impact of climate change and the force beyond its immediate region, including across the intensification of strategic geopolitical competition, wider Indo-Pacific region. including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It was In light of this assessment, the DoD indicated that the decided that this “review” would be implemented Defence Forces would shift its focus to more actively through the development of four documents. shaping the country’s security environment, rather than In August 2023, as the first phase of this “review,” responding to incidents as they happen. Regarding the DoD, recognizing that the country is facing the most climate change, the DoD affirmed its commitment challenging strategic environment than it had for decades, to continuing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster released the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement, Relief (HADR) activities for Pacific Island countries in which sets out defense policy goals and strategies and cooperation with like-minded countries and others. announced the Future Force Design Principles, which The DoD intends to release a defence white paper guide the New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) with the final defense policy, strategy, capabilities and investment plans for the next 15 years. budget, as well as a defence capability plan outlining In its Statement, the Department of Defence (DoD) a defense development plan to complete the Defence noted that the heightened competition and tensions in Policy Review. the disputed Indo-Pacific region could have significant As for diplomatic relations, New Zealand has impact on New Zealand’s interests and that the impact maintained close relationships with the United States of climate change will exacerbate existing fragilities and Australia and sees Australia as its only formal within Pacific Island countries and across the region defense ally. hi h i t i i d ----- **Section 7** **Southeast Asia** **1** **General Situation** Southeast Asia is the center of the Indo-Pacific region, obstructing the safe passage of ships. In order to cope located at the intersection of the Pacific Ocean and the with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are **Part** Indian Ocean and occupies a strategic position for traffic, working to build military forces for national defense and **Ⅰ** linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the maintenance of domestic public security, as well as for **Chapter** Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. Therefore, addressing new security issues such as counter-terrorism **3** it is an important region for Japan, which relies on and counter-piracy. Each country is also pursuing maritime transport for many of the supplies needed for cooperation respectively with such countries as the economic activities and the lives of the Japanese people. United States, China, Russia, and Australia to this end. Meanwhile, this region still has destabilizing factors, Recently, given the backdrop of economic development, including the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, countries have been modernizing their military forces, ethnic minority issues, and separatist and independence mainly their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening movements. Moreover, there has also been problems their maritime law enforcement capabilities. with Islamic extremist groups and piracy incidents **2** **Security and Defense Policies of Each Country** facility was held in April 2021. **1** **Indonesia** Concerned about the “nine-dash line” claimed by Indonesia is a major country in Southeast Asia, with the China, which overlaps with Indonesia’s EEZ in the world’s largest Muslim population. At the same time, it vicinity of the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has enhanced is the largest archipelago country in the world as it has its patrol activities in the area. In December 2019, vast territorial waters and occupies a strategic position Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a note of for maritime traffic. protest on the grounds that a Chinese Coast Guard vessel As part of its military force reform, Indonesia aims to had been found to have operated illegally in the EEZ meet the minimum requirements for defense capabilities— around the Natuna Islands by escorting fishing fleet. what it calls “Minimum Essential Force (MEF).” In Indonesia adopts a free and active foreign policy and particular, Indonesia acknowledges that its maritime emphasizes cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. defense capabilities are still very much inadequate. With the United States, Indonesia is strengthening Accordingly, Indonesia has announced a defense budget its cooperative relationship in such fields as military increase as well as a policy to bolster its deployment of education and training and military equipment assets to the Natuna Islands, in the South China Sea, and procurement. In addition, Indonesia has carried out other locations. Indonesia has deployed an integrated unit bilateral training including army exercise Garuda Shield, and an air squadron, etc., and in December 2018, it was naval exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training reported that the transfer of the headquarters of a naval (CARAT)[1] and counter terrorism exercise Southeast Asia combat group command to Natuna is almost completed, Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT)[2] with the U.S. that an opening ceremony of a military base with piers In 2023, Indonesia continued on from the previous year to that can accommodate submarines, and hangars for conduct multilateral multi-service exercise Super Garuda unmanned vehicles was conducted, and furthermore, that Shield, participated by armed forces of Australia and the ground-breaking ceremony for a submarines support Singapore, the Self-Defense Forces of Japan, and others. **1** A general term that refers to a series of bilateral naval exercises that the United States conducts with Bangladesh and other Southeast Asian nations. ----- noted for its strategic significance. Its armed forces had control over the government following the collapse of the socialist regime in 1988. However, with an economic slowdown caused by the economic sanctions imposed by the West, the transition to civilian rule was completed based on the road map to democracy. Myanmar’s parliamentary election was conducted in November 2020, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) secured an overwhelming single majority in both houses with the number of seats significantly higher than the previous election. However, in February 2021, then State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and her party’s senior members were detained by Myanmar’s military, which was claiming election fraud, and the armed forces declared a state of emergency to carry out a coup d’état, and powers were handed over to the commander-inchief. The State Administration Council (SAC) chaired by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces Min Aung Hlaing was formed by the Armed Force. Then, in April of the same year, although the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) instituted by Pro-Democracy Group declared the establishment of the National Unity Government (NUG), the Armed Forces designated them and others as Terrorist Organizations. After the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting held the same month with the presence of a Myanmar military representative, a “Five-Point Consensus” was agreed to, recognizing ASEAN’s proactive and constructive role in promoting a peaceful resolution. In August of the same year, SAC announced the establishment of an “interim government” with the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces as the “provisional prime minister.” Since late October 2023, fighting has intensified in the northeast, with three ethnic armed groups launching large-scale attacks on the Armed Force, and the Armed Force retreating from several towns. In early January 2024, the ethnic minority side revealed that more than 2,300 Armed Force soldiers, including generals, had surrendered in the eastern region. Meanwhile, in midJanuary, the Armed Force and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the Armed Force and the three ethnic armed groups had reached a ceasefire agreement in northern Myanmar, mediated by China. The details of this ceasefire agreement have not been publicized, and its effectiveness remains to draw attention. At the ASEAN Summit meeting held in May 2023, the **2** **Malaysia** Malaysia’s first defense white paper, which was published in December 2019, finds its potential to serve as a bridge between the vast Pacific and Indian Oceans as the country is divided in two territories—Peninsular Malaysia, and Sabah and Sarawak, on the island of Borneo—located between the two oceans. The white paper also recognizes the fact that, while Malaysia’s strategic location and natural resources are blessing ones, they also pose a security challenge to itself. Given these attributes, Malaysia has historically been affected by the political dynamics of major powers, and even today, Malaysia sees in its defense white paper that uncertain U.S.-China relationship is the most important strategic challenge for Malaysia. In connection with the recent continued anchoring of Chinese vessels around South Luconia Shoal, over which Malaysia claims sovereignty, Malaysia has announced that its Navy and maritime law enforcement agencies would conduct around-the-clock monitoring, and that Malaysia would protect its sovereignty. Along with this expression of protest and strengthening of its maritime defense capabilities, the Minister of Defense reportedly announced the decision to establish a new naval and air base near the airport in Bintulu, which is close to James Shoal and South Luconia Reef. Malaysia has also striven to bolster its defense posture in eastern Malaysia including carrying out live-fire missile exercises in Sabah state, on Borneo in eastern Malaysia in July 2019. In particular, as well as conducting bilateral exercises with the U.S. such as CARAT and SEACAT, Malaysia has been promoting military cooperation including capacity building in the maritime security field. Malaysia also prioritizes defense relations based on the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)[3] and has established the headquarters of the Integrated Area Defence System (IADS), which coordinates the activities of the FPDA, at the Royal Malaysian Air Force Butterworth Air Base. **3** **Myanmar** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Myanmar shares borders with China and India and is a gateway to the Indian Ocean for China and some ASEAN countries. In light of these factors, Myanmar is Entered into effect in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of an aggression towards ----- Chairman s Statement expressing continued deep concern over the escalation of the conflict and violence was issued. In January 2024, Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar Alounkeo visited Myanmar and held talks with current “regime” officials, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and ethnic armed groups. Myanmar has maintained a good relationship with China since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1950 and the country is regarded as a major supplier of equipment. Myanmar has also received Chinese aid for pipeline construction and the development of Kyaukpyu Port. In January 2020, President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to visit Myanmar for 19 years and affirmed China’s policy of promoting economic cooperation through the The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Myanmar maintains a cooperative relationship with Russia in the military field since the period of the past military regime, and Russia was a destination for students from Myanmar and a supplier of major defense equipment. In July 2022, the Commander-in-Chief visited Russia, and discussed promotion of defense cooperation with the Deputy Defense Minister. Furthermore, in September 2022, the Commander-in-Chief met President Putin for the first time, in Vladivostok, to exchange views on cooperation in all sectors, emphasizing their good bilateral relations. Cooperative relations with North Korea, including weapons trades, were maintained under Myanmar’s military regime in the past. Following the transition to democracy, although Myanmar denied its military ties to North Korea, the report issued by the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea in March 2018 reported that the country received a ballistic missile system and other weapons from North Korea. A report published by the United Nations Human Rights Council in May 2023 indicated that from February 2021, when the military launched its coup, until December 2022, at least $1 billion worth of weapons and components for manufacturing them were exported from foreign countries to Myanmar. This included Myanmar’s imports such as Su-30 fighter jets from Russia and JF-17 fighter jets from China. **4** **The Philippines** location and rich natural resources have also provided a strong temptation to expansionist powers. Traditionally, the Philippines has positioned resolving internal armed conflicts as its greatest security concern, but it has begun to shift its focus to strengthening territorial defense against the backdrop of the recent dismantling and weakening of domestic anti-government armed groups and rising tensions in the South China Sea. The Philippines, with a historically close relationship with the United States, has maintained a cooperative relationship with the U.S. under Mutual Defense Treaty and Military Assistance Agreement, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992. In February 1998, the two countries signed a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which prescribed the legal status of U.S. military personnel when the U.S. Forces conducts combined military exercises or other related activities in the Philippines. Furthermore, in April 2014, the two countries signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which allows enhanced cooperation in disaster relief, rotational deployment of the U.S. Forces, construction and improvement of agreed locations in the Philippines by the U.S., and U.S. Forces’ prepositioning of equipment and others. In March 2016, the two countries agreed on five bases of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for carrying out defense cooperation under the EDCA. Although former President Duterte notified the United States its intention to terminate the VFA in February 2020, he decided to withdraw the notice in July 2021. In recent years, the two countries have been conducting various military exercises, including large-scale exercise Balikatan, amphibious exercise KAMANDAG, and maritime exercise Sama Sama. President Marcos, who took office in June 2022, met with President Biden of the U.S. for the first time in person in September 2022 in New York. The two leaders discussed the situation in the South China Sea and underscored their support for freedom of navigation and overflight and the peaceful resolution of disputes. In February 2023, defense ministers of the U.S. and the Philippines announced the agreement to designate four new bases for the EDCA. These four bases consist of three in northern Luzon Island near Taiwan and one on Palawan Island facing the South China Sea. Furthermore, in May 2023, the U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines were adopted and released for the first time, which serve as a roadmap of modernization of alliance ti d d i i t bilit b t th **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** The Philippines considers that its archipelagic attributes and geographic location are a source of both strength and l bilit M th t th t it t t i ----- U.S. and the Philippines. In September 2023, the U.S.-Philippines joint navigation, which had ended under the Duterte administration, was carried out, with a U.S. destroyer and a Philippines frigate conducting joint navigation in the South China Sea. In November, in the water and air surrounding the Philippines, including the South China Sea, they carried out Maritime Cooperative Activities. Thus, the defense cooperation between the two countries has begun to progress again since the inauguration of the new administration. The Philippines and China have competing claims over the sovereignty in the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal of the South China Sea. In January 2013, seeking a settlement under international law, the Philippines started arbitral tribunal proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS against China. In July 2016, the final award was rendered, accepting nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions. The Government of the Philippines released a statement that it welcomed the award by the arbitral tribunal and strongly affirmed its respect for the decision. The conflicts between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea dispute were observed even after 2020 during which the COVID-19 infections became a global pandemic. The Philippines protested that a Chinese military vessel had directed fire-control radars at a Philippine Navy ship in February 2020, and that China had established administrative districts on islands in the South China Sea in April of the same year. In his policy speech in July 2022, President Marcos emphasized that he would not allow any attempt by foreign power to take even one square inch of the Philippines’ sovereign territory. Furthermore, in the same month, the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines released a statement commemorating the sixth anniversary of the award. Chinese Coast Guard vessel firing water on a Philippine supply ship near Second Thomas Sh l (D b 2023) [AFP Jiji] In January 2023, President Marcos met with President Xi Jinping during his state visit to China. They agreed to appropriately manage the differences between the two countries regarding the South China Sea issue through peaceful means, and also agreed to establish a direct communication mechanism between the diplomatic authorities of the two countries. However, since then, there have been frequent reports of obstructive activities by Chinese Coast Guard vessels and other vessels against the Philippine vessels in areas such as the Spratly Islands. For example, the Philippines government announced that in December 2023, The Philippines supply ship and the Philippines Coast Guard Vessel were obstructed by the Chinese Coast Guard vessel and others through dangerous maneuvers such as intentional collisions and firing of water cannon near the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, where the Philippines warship Sierra Madre was stranded. The Philippines’ supply ship, escorted by a Philippines Coast Guard Vessel, was attempting to replenish the supplies of the stranded warship. In response, President Marcos condemned the action by the Chinese vessels towards the Philippines vessels and their personnel, pointing out that it was aggression and provocation, and a clear violation of international law. The same month, Defense Minister Teodoro held a telephone conversation with U.S. Defense Secretary Austin. During the conversation, it was reiterated that the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to both countries’ armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft -including those of its coast guardanywhere in Pacific, to include the South China Sea. **See** Chapter 4, Section 5-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas,”etc.) **5** **Singapore** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Given its limited land area, population, and resources, Singapore’s existence and development depend on the peace and stability of the region in a globalized economy. Singapore highly prioritize its national defense, with defense spending accounting for about 10% of its national budget. In October 2022, the Digital and Intelligence Service was established as the fourth service of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), integrating existing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and cyber capabilities. Singapore emphasizes the importance of cooperative l ti ithASEAN d th FPDA d h l d d ----- defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region. With the aim of contributing to peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports United States’ presence in the Asia-Pacific. Since signing the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (November 1990), Singapore has been allowing the United States to use military facilities in the country. In addition to the port calls to Changi Naval Base by U.S. aircraft carriers, the rotational deployment of Littoral combat ships (LCSs) began in 2013. In 2015, the P-8 patrol aircraft of the U.S. Forces were deployed to Singapore for around one week for the first time. The two countries have committed to continue carrying out similar deployments routinely. In addition, Singapore conducts combined exercises with the U.S., such as CARAT and SEACAT. Singapore has strong economic ties with China, and the two countries also conduct bilateral naval exercises. In October 2019, the two countries signed the enhanced Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation (ADESC), which formalized existing defense cooperation, including regularization of dialogue and exercises. On the other hand, diplomatic relations with China have been strained partly due to Singapore’s advocacy of the ruling of the arbitral tribunal to Philippines v. China when it comes to the resolution of the South China Sea disputes and partly due to Singapore’s defense cooperation with Taiwan. In March 2020, Singapore and Australia signed the Treaty on Military Training and Training Area Development in Australia. This treaty enables the Singapore Armed Forces to access Australia’s training area which will be newly developed. **See** Section 6-1-3 (3) (Relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island Countries) **See** **6** **Thailand** States based on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Treaty) (effective from February 1955), and the U.S. military has access to the Thai military’s U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield. Thailand has been conducting the U.S.-Thailand combined exercise “Cobra Gold” since 1982, which is currently one of the largest multilateral exercises in Southeast Asia. In addition, the marine corps of the two countries have continued their combined naval training CARAT and counter-piracy and trafficking exercise SEACAT. Thailand and China have conducted combined training such as Blue Strike between their marines and Falcon Strike between their air forces. **7** **Vietnam** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Based on its viewpoint that the sea is closely associated with the national construction and defense, Vietnam has established the objective of becoming a strong marine country, particularly prioritizing the modernization of its military forces and law enforcement forces at sea as well as ensuring the capability for maritime domain awareness, maritime independence, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and national interests at sea. Vietnam deploys its omni-directional diplomatic policy and intends to actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with every nation. In March 2016, Vietnam opened an international port in the Cam Ranh Bay, which is located in a strategically important location, and Navy vessels from many countries including Japan have called at the international Cam Ranh Bay port. Vietnam and the United States have strengthened their military relations in recent years. This has taken such forms as combined training with the U.S. Navy and port calls by U.S. Navy vessels in Vietnam. In 2017, mutual visits were conducted by the leaders of both countries and an agreement was reached on the deepening of defense cooperation. In March 2018, the USS Carl Vinson became the first U.S. aircraft carrier to visit Vietnam since the Vietnam War. In September 2023, during U.S. President Biden’s first visit to Vietnam as president, he met with then President Thưởng and agreed to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. In this context, the United States committed to continue to support Vietnam in building an independent defense capability. Vietnam and Russia continue to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense, with Vietnam dependent R i f th j it f it d f i t Thailand’s defense policy includes: strengthening defense cooperation through ASEAN, international organizations, and other entities; defense that makes comprehensive use of political, economic, and other national strengths; and effective defense aimed at increasing the readiness of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and developing the defense industry. Under its flexible omni-directional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries. I ti l Th il d h lli ith th U it d ----- In April 2018, the two countries signed a military and acknowledgement that Vietnam and China need to resolve technical cooperation roadmap, while in July 2019, a the territorial disputes with special precaution, avoiding Vietnamese naval vessel visited the port of Vladivostok negative impacts on general peace, friendship, and for the first time. In December the same year, a submarine cooperation for development between the two countries. rescue vessel from Russia’s Pacific Fleet visited the port As such, it recognizes that the two countries should of Cam Ranh and participated in the first bilateral joint continue negotiations and consultations to find peaceful submarine rescue exercise. solutions on the basis of international law. In August **Part** **See** Section 5-5-5 (1) (Relations with Asian Countries) 2023, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of **Ⅰ** Vietnam has been actively engaging in high- Vietnam reported that a Vietnamese fishing boat engaged **Chapter** level government exchanges with China under their in fishing activities in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands **3** comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership. In was damaged by water sprayed by a “vessel marked with December 2023, President Xi Jinping visited Vietnam and Chinese characters.” The report included a photo of the met with General Secretary of the Communist Party Nguyen. vessel marked with the characters “China Coast Guard.” The joint statement noted that joint patrols in the Gulf of On the other hand, it is also pointed out that, while still Tonkin and mutual visits by warships would continue, and falling short of the scale of the China’s past reclamation, that the cooperation and exchange mechanisms between Vietnam has accelerated and expanded landfill work at their navies and coastguards would be deepened. several of its outposts in Spratly Islands, where Vietnam On the other hand, there are conflicting claims over is competing for territorial rights against China.[4] territorial issues in the South China Sea. The defense **See** Chapter 4, Section 5-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the white paper published in November 2019 demonstrates an Freedom of the High Seas,”etc.) **3** **Military Modernization in the Region** In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased purchase three 209-class submarines (made in the ROK), their defense spending against the backdrop of economic with two of them produced in the ROK and the other in development and other reasons, and are modernizing Indonesia. their military forces, focusing on inducting equipment Regarding its air force capabilities, Malaysia signed such as submarines and fighters, including fourth- a contract to purchase 18 FA-50 light combat aircraft generation fighters. (made in the ROK) in February 2023. It has also In addition, each country is striving to enhance their introduced ScanEagle unmanned reconnaissance aircraft intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) (made in U.S.). capabilities including naval vessels and unmanned Regarding its naval force capabilities, Malaysia is vehicles, against a background of disputes over territorial promoting the construction of six domestically produced rights in the South China Sea. littoral combat ships (LCSs) and launched the first ship For its air force capabilities, Indonesia plans to acquire in August 2017. By December 2021, it introduced four 42 Rafale fighters from France, and is negotiating with littoral mission ships (LMSs) (made in China). the United States for the procurement of 36 F-15EX Myanmar received a Kilo-class submarine (made in fighters. In January 2016, Indonesia concluded a detailed Russia) from India in December 2019, and in December agreement with ROK including a cost sharing and bilateral 2021, commissioned its Ming-class submarine (made in cooperation in the joint development of the 4.5 generation China). Myanmar’s submarine procurement is drawing fighter jet KF-21. In July 2022, the first flight of the attention from neighboring countries. Myanmar introduced initial prototype aircraft took place. Indonesia introduced FTC-2000G light combat aircraft (made in China) in ScanEagle UAVs from the United States. In December December 2022. Furthermore, Myanmar introduced Su-30 2019, Indonesia unveiled the prototype Black Eagle UAV, fighters (made in Russia) by December 2022. a domestically produced unmanned aerial vehicle that has The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to adopted the design of the CH-4 UAV (made in China). modernize its defense equipment against the backdrop Regarding naval forces, Indonesia signed a contract to of conflicts over territorial rights in the South China Sea. ----- In terms of air force capabilities, between November submarines by May 2017, the first of which Singapore 2015 and May 2017, the Philippines successively received in July 2023. In March 2023, the Singapore introduced 12 FA-50PH light fighters purchased from government signed a contract with a domestic company the ROK. The Philippines is currently planning to to design and build six multi-purpose combat ships to acquire multi-role fighters. The candidates are JAS-39 replace the existing missile corvettes. Gripen from Sweden and F-16 fighters from the U.S. As for the air force capabilities of Thailand, it introduced **Part** The Philippines also received six A-29 light attack 12 Swedish-made JAS-39 Gripen fighters by 2013. **Ⅰ** aircraft from Brazil in October 2020 and In March 2021, Regarding Thailand’s naval forces capabilities, the **Chapter** it announced its plan to purchase 18 more. In November country established a Submarine Squadron Headquarters **3** 2022, it received ScanEagle reconnaissance UAVs from in July 2014. In April 2017, the Royal Thai Navy drew the United States. Furthermore, a procurement contract up a plan to purchase three Yuan-class submarines from for a supersonic cruise missile “BrahMos” from India China over the next 11 years, and the Thai Cabinet was concluded in January 2022. approved the purchase of one vessel. Although the As for naval force capabilities, the Philippines received submarines were originally planned to be equipped with three Hamilton-class frigates from the United States by German engines, the procurement has been delayed 2016. The Philippines introduced two Indonesian-made due to Germany’s refusal to export them to China. In landing dock vessels by 2017. In addition, two frigates addition, the Cabinet approved in September 2012 a plan were introduced from the ROK by March 2021. The to introduce two frigates. The first frigate was received August 2019 commissioning of a Pohang-class corvette from the ROK in December 2018. In September 2019, received from the ROK marked the restoration of the Thailand signed an agreement to purchase a 71 dock- antisubmarine capability that the Philippines had long type transport landing ship from the ROK. lacked. That September, the Philippines conducted the As for Vietnam’s air force capabilities, it started to DAGIT-PA multi-service military exercise involving the successively introduce Russian-made Su-30 fighters in army, navy, and air force, during which the four AAV- 2004, and to date, the total number of delivered Su-30 7 assault amphibious vehicles that it had commissioned fighters came to 36. In January 2020, it was reported that the previous June were operated. Vietnam had ordered 12 Yak-130 training aircraft from Singapore is actively striving to modernize its forces. Russia and received the first six aircrafts in November Today, it is one of the largest arms importers in the world. 2021. Vietnam also introduced ScanEagle reconnaissance It introduced 40 U.S.-made F-15 fighters by 2013 UAVs from the United States. and also participates in the U.S.-made F-35 Joint Strike Regarding Vietnam’s naval forces capabilities, it Fighter (JSF) Program. In January 2020, the U.S. successively introduced six Russian-made Kilo-class Government officially approved the sale of F-35B fighter submarines by January 2017. By February 2018, Vietnam jets to Singapore. started the operation of four Russian-made Gepard-class Regarding naval force capabilities, Singapore signed frigates. a contract to purchase four German-made 218SG **4** **Intra-and Extra-Regional Cooperation** Southeast Asian countries are utilizing ASEAN as a In addition, ASEAN attaches importance to expanding framework for regional multilateral security and have its relations with countries outside of the region. It holds made efforts to improve the security environment in the the ADMM-Plus framework, a platform that adds eight region and promote mutual trust by holding the ASEAN non-ASEAN countries including Japan to ADMM. Regional Forum (ARF), a venue for dialogue on security ASEAN and the United States held their first ASEAN- issues, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting U.S. Maritime Exercise (AUMX). With China, ASEAN (ADMM). held the first naval table-top exercise, and the first naval In September 2023, ASEAN held its first military field training exercise. Furthermore, ASEAN countries exercise on its own, and also held a maritime exercise conducted the first Naval Cooperative Exercise with in the waters surrounding Indonesia, including the North Russia in inshore waters of Indonesia. N t S ----- **Section 8** **South Asia** **1** **India** **1** **General Situation** it is pointed out that India perceives China and Pakistan India is the world’s largest democratic country. It has as major threats with non-demarcated border issues in **Part** achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and regard to land and India recognizes that it may have to **Ⅰ** has significant influence in the South Asian region. Also, fight a ‘two-front war’ with China and Pakistan, and **Chapter** it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is appears to be forming its defensive strategy. **3** of strategic and geopolitical importance. India has also Based on this recognition, India is vigorously increased its presence as a geopolitical player, while the strengthening and reorganizing its armed forces. It is international community in return has high expectations considering the creation of a integrated force with the for the country’s role. aim of strengthening operational and organizational India traditionally has aimed at nonaligned and cooperation among military services. Under the initiatives omnidirectional diplomacy. The Modi administration of “Make in India” and “Self-Reliant India” (Atmanirbhar has maintained the neighborhood first policy, which Bharat in Hindi), the Modi government is actively working emphasizes strengthening relations with South Asian towards the domestic production of military equipment countries, while expanding the focus of strengthening and taking measures to promote exports. India’s external relations to the Indo-Pacific region, in While the Army is the largest ground force in the accordance with the “Act East” policy. In addition, the world with approximately 1,240,000 personnel, it is administration has carried out proactive foreign policy, trying to convert Battle Squads into Integrated Battle placing priority also on India’s relations with the United Groups (IBGs[1]) in an effort towards force structuring States, Russia, and Europe, as well as the Middle East and optimization as a part of the “Land Warfare and Africa. Doctrine - 2018.” It is believed that the army strengthens On the other hand, India has non-demarcated border firepower by deploying self-propelled howitzers and issues with China and Pakistan. There are also concerns howitzers, and promotes deployment of drones for about the activities of ultra-leftists and secession and attack and reconnaissance near the India-China border. independence movements, as well as activities of Islamic Meanwhile, the Army is continuing its efforts to ease extremists. Accordingly, defending its land borders tensions, including holding the 20th corps commander- and tackling the threat of domestic terrorism are major level meeting in October 2023.[2] concerns for India. In addition, in recent years, India has considered efforts for maritime security as a focus point important, strengthened its presence in the Indian Ocean, and clearly recognized China’s increased activity in the Indian Ocean. **2** **Military Affairs** In the integrated doctrine published by the Ministry of Defence in 2017, India stated that India’s traditional threats primarily emanate from the disputed land borders with India’s neighbors. Maintaining territorial integrity and preserving national sovereignty continues Indian Navy aircraft carrier “Vikrant” and aircraft carrier “Vikramaditya” conducting to remain a major strategic challenge for India. For this, exercises [Courtesy of the Indian Navy] **1** IBGs consist of infantry, air defense, armored, logistics units and others with support from attack helicopters. IGBs are units of brigade size with characteristics appropriate to threats, terrain, and task. It is reported that an exercise of IBGs was conducted in 2022. **2** Regarding the issue of the border area between India and China, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping engaged in conversation at the BRICS summit in South Africa in August 2023, ----- The Navy has placed Sea Control as the key concept to operate the fleet, and aircraft carriers as the key vessels for the Sea Control concept. In addition, the Navy mentioned its plan to build three aircraft carrier battle groups. The country’s first domestically built aircraft carrier “Vikrant” was commissioned in September 2022. This brings the total number of Indian Navy’s aircraft carriers to two, including “Vikramaditya”, which was modified after purchasing it from Russia. In June 2023, the first exercise involving both aircraft carriers was held. India has also placed emphasis on the operation of submarines and is proceeding to enhance them. The Air Force is operating French-made Rafale and Mirage 2000 fighters, as well as Russian-made Su-30MKI fighters and domestically produced Tejas light fighters. Meanwhile, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is making it difficult for India to repair parts for Russian-made fighter jets and transport aircraft. It is working to inventorize these parts and also produce them domestically. An inter governmental agreement was signed in September 2023 between India and Russia for enabling manufacture of Russian origin spares in India. As for its air defense system, India has introduced the Russian-made “S-400” surface-to-air missile system, as well as the Israeli-made Heron MKII unmanned aircraft for ISR purposes. In addition, India is a nuclear-weapon state with approximately 164 nuclear warheads as of January 2023, and while it maintains the nuclear doctrine[4] published in 2003 and policies including the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests announced immediately after the nuclear test in 1998, it has been promoting development, performance improvement, and deployment of various ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. In 2022, India succeeded in launching a supersonic cruise missile BrahMos (extended range) from a Su-30MKI fighter jet, launching the IRBM Agni-III, Agni-IV, and Agni-V, launching a ballistic missile from nuclear submarine INS Arihant, and other activities. In June 2023, India successfully conducted a nighttime launch test of the “Agni Prime,” which it calls a new generation ballistic missile, followed in December by the training launch of the “Agni-I,” a short-range ballistic missile. **3** **Relations with Other Countries** **(1) Relations with the United States** India and the United States being in a relationship of the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership are steadily deepening defense and security cooperation in recent years, and agreed on holding Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers’ Meetings (“2+2”) annually. In June 2023, Prime Minister Modi visited the United States and met President Biden at the White House. The two leaders highlighted the friendship and growing cooperation between the two countries, and issued the “Joint Statement”. This statement outlined wide-ranging cooperation, including the acceleration of cooperation in the defense industry, a technology transfer to produce General Electric engines for Tejas light fighters in India, the signing of a memorandum of understanding to enable U.S. naval assets in India to be maintained and repaired, and India’s procurement of MQ-9B (Sea Guardian) unmanned aircraft and their assembly in India. In November the same year, the 5th U.S.-India 2+2 was held in New Delhi, in which the two countries agreed to promote a cooperative relationship. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** President Biden and Prime Minister Modi holding the U.S.-India summit meeting (June 2023) [EPA/Jiji] **(2) Relations with China** **See** Section 2-3-4 (3) (Relations with South Asian Countries) **(3) Relations with Russia** **See** Section 5-5-5 (1) (Relations with Asian Countries); Chapter 2, Paragraph 3-3 (Other Regions Responses) According to the Indian Navy’s “Maritime Security Strategy”, “Sea Control” means that a defined maritime space (including surface, underwater, and air)can be used for specific period of time and for one’s own purposes and its use by adversary can be denied. India raises its continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, along with credible minimum deterrent, “No First Use” policy, and its policy of no use against non-nuclear ----- **(4) Relations with South Asian Countries and** apprehension to Chinese tracking ship Yuan Wang 5 s **Southeast Asia** port call to the Port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka from India exports and provides military equipment as a part of July to August 2022. cooperation that India promotes with other South Asian Based on its Act East policy, India continues to countries in the security field under its “Neighborhood engage with Southeast Asian nations and other countries First Policy.” India was the only country that sent in the Indo-Pacific region on a bilateral, regional, and several warships to the international fleet review held multilateral basis. India supports capacity building and **Part** by Bangladesh for the first time in December 2022. conducts joint military exercises on a regular basis using **Ⅰ** **Chapter** On the other hand, India keeps guard on heightening operational experience of Russian equipment. Chinese influence on South Asia countries, and showed **3** **2** **Pakistan** as evidenced by the October 2023 launch test of the **1** **General Situation** ballistic missile “Ababeel,” which it claims has been Wedged between the powerful South Asian nation of India converted into a Multiple Independently targetable Re- and politically unstable Afghanistan, and sharing borders entry Vehicle (MIRV), for the first time since 2017, as with China and Iran, Pakistan is placed in a geopolitically well as a launch drill of IRBM “Ghauri.” significant and complex position. Particularly in the In its comprehensive policy document “National border area with Afghanistan, extremist organizations Security Policy 2022-2026” formulated in December are engaging in cross-border terrorist activities, and 2021, Pakistan described its security at its borders and Pakistan’s actions in the fight against terrorism could in the Indian Ocean and stated its intention to strengthen significantly impact the stability of Afghanistan.[5] its information and cybersecurity capabilities, as well as Relations with Afghanistan are increasingly complex, to build capabilities to counter hybrid warfare, such as with the Pakistani government proceeding to deport disinformation and influence operations. illegal immigrants, including numerous Afghans, since In recent years, Pakistan has also been promoting the November 2023. modernization of equipment, and while it makes attempts In January 2024, Pakistan and Iran exchanged cross- at domestic production through joint development of border attacks targeting militant strongholds near their equipment and technology transfer, it promotes its border, resulting in casualties. relationship with China in military fields, and rising of dependence to China is observed. The Pakistan Army operates “Al-Khalid” tanks jointly developed with China **2** **Military Affairs** as its main battle tanks and has also introduced China’s Pakistan takes the position that maintaining nuclear “VT-4” tanks. Pakistan is enhancing the Comprehensive deterrence against attacks with nuclear and conventional Layered Integrated Air Defense (CLIAD) system by weapons by India is essential to ensure national purchasing air defense systems such as “LY-80” and security and self-defense. Pakistan is believed to retain “HQ-9/P” from China. around 170 nuclear warheads as of January 2023. The The Pakistan Navy is replacing or augmenting its development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles aging warships, introducing submarines, and cooperating capable of carrying nuclear warheads is still continuing. with China and Türkiye. Regarding its other activities, Tactical nuclear missile “Nasr” and IRBM “Shaheen- the Pakistan Navy hosted the multilateral maritime joint II” are already operative. In addition, the flight test of exercise “AMAN-23” in February 2023, in which 50 ground-to-ground missile “Shaheen-III” with the range countries participated, and in November the same year, it of 2,750 km was successfully conducted in April 2022. conducted the joint exercise “Sea Guardian-2023” with Pakistan has been enhancing its military capabilities, the Chinese Navy in the Arabian Sea. **5** The Pakistan Security Report 2023, published by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), pointed out that both the number of terrorist attacks and the number of casualties in Pakistan have increased for three consecutive years since 2021. The report further noted that approximately 93% of terrorist attacks in 2023 were concentrated in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan provinces along the Afghan border, mainly perpetrated by three groups: Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K)” and the ----- In addition to operating JF 17 fighters jointly administration established in April 2022. In September developed with China and produced domestically, the the same year, the U.S. Department of State decided to Pakistan Air Force introduced Chinese-made J-10CE approve the contract of a maximum US$450 million fighters in March 2022. Both aircraft participated in the related to maintenance and support of F-16 fighter jets “Shaheen-X” joint training exercise with China in August for Pakistan, to facilitate counterterrorism operations. and September 2023. In addition, the first delivery of Furthermore, General Bajwa, Chief of Army Staff of **Part** the attack UAV “Bayraktar Akinci” from Türkiye was Pakistan, visited the United States in October 2022 for **Ⅰ** reportedly made in April the same year. the first time in three years and met with U.S. Secretary **Chapter** of Defense Austin. Conversely, in March 2023, the **3** **3** **Relations with Other Countries** Pakistani government announced that it would not accept an invitation from the United States to attend the second **(1) Relations with the United States** Democracy Summit. Under the caretaker cabinet, which The United States designated Pakistan as a “Major was inaugurated in August the same year, the Army Chief Non-NATO ally” in 2004 and has strengthened the of Staff Munir visited the United States in December the relationship because Pakistan has cooperated with the same year, during which time he visited the U.S. Central United States in the field of counterterrorism since the Command headquarters, and held talks with Secretary of terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. However, the Defense Austin and others. Future defense cooperation two countries continued a tense relationship, with both between the two countries will be a focus of attention. countries blaming each other over their responses to terrorism. **(2) Relations with China** On the other hand, improvement of the relationship **See** Section 2-3-4 (3) (Relations with South Asian Countries). with the United States was seen under the Sharif **3** **Disputes over the Sovereignty of Kashmir** India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty Finally, the countries agreed to comply with the ceasefire of Kashmir,[6] and have had three armed conflicts of in February 2021. The Indian Ministry of Defense significant scope. In the Kashmir region, collisions announced in December 2023 that this agreement often occurred along the Line of Control, and the two significantly improved the situation. countries repeatedly restarted and suspended dialogue. **See** Fig. I-3-8-1 (Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate numbers)) **6** India asserts the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document by which the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan’s independence, and contends that this matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement (an agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the withdrawal of their military forces that was reached following a summit meeting held in Simla in northern India). On the other hand, Pakistan declares that this should be decided through ----- **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Fig. I-3-8-1 Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate numbers) Approx. 560,000 troops Approx. 90 vessels Approx. 110,000 tons Approx. 490 aircraft Approx. 1.24 million troops Pakistan Approx. 330 vessels Approx. 500,000 tons Approx. 840 aircraft [Legend] India Ground forces (200,000 troops) Naval vessels (100,000 tons) Combat aircraft (200 aircraft) 500km |Col1|Col2|Col3|rox. 560,000 t rox. 90 vessel rox. 490 aircr|roops s Approx. 110, aft| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| ||||A A A A|pprox. 1.24 mill pprox. 330 vess pprox. 500,000 pprox. 840 aircr| ||||India lance 2024,” et raft.|c.| |[Lege|nd] Ground forces ( Naval vessels ( Combat aircraft|200,000 troops) 100,000 tons) (200 aircraft)||| |||n “The Military Ba include naval airc||| ----- |Current members|bers|Col3| |---|---|---| |NATO (32 countries) France Germany Italy Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg The United States Spain Portugal U.K.(Note 1) Greece Czech Republic Canada Austria Hungary Poland Norway Ireland Denmark Slovakia Iceland Malta Lithuania Estonia Türkiye Cyprus Latvia Romania Albania Bulgaria Slovenia Montenegro Croatia Finland North Macedonia Sweden||| ||NATO (32 countries)|| |France Germany Italy Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg Spain Portugal Greece Czech Republic Austria Hungary Poland Ireland Denmark Slovakia Malta Lithuania Estonia Cyprus Latvia Romania Bulgaria Slovenia Croatia Finland Sweden||| |EU (27 countries) As of April, 2024||| |Col1|Joined the EU in May 2004 U in July 2013 982 Joined NATO in 1999 April 2009| |---|---| |Original EU members Joined the EU by 1995 Joined the EU in January 2007 Joined the E Original NATO members Joined NATO by 1 Joined NATO in March 2004 Joined NATO in|| ||| **Section 9** **Europe and Canada** **1** **General Situation** With the end of the Cold War, many European countries Middle East turmoil such as the prolonged civil war in and Canada now recognize the need to address diverse Syria. **Part** security challenges. At the same time, these countries To respond to such challenges and situations, Europe **Ⅰ** had recognized that the threat of large-scale invasion and Canada have sought to further strengthen and expand **Chapter** by other countries had disappeared. Nevertheless, since multilateral frameworks, such as the North Atlantic **3** the heightening of tensions in Ukraine in February 2014 Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union and particularly with the aggression against Ukraine (EU). At the same time, it is working to contribute to that began in February 2022, there is a growing need to the security and stability of the international community revisit existing strategies and plan new concepts in order by proactively participating in activities outside the to deal with Russia’s unilateral changes to the status region. Moreover, steps are taken at the national level quo by force as well as hybrid warfare. With regard by reviewing security and defense strategies, reforming to international terrorism, the continuity of threats has national defense systems, and strengthening bilateral and been recognized and there is a continuous need to take multilateral defense and security cooperation. counterterrorism measures. In addition, border security **See** Fig. I-3-9-1 (Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States); problems remain a challenge, including those regarding Chapter 2, Paragraph 3 (The Impact of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine on International Affairs and Various Countries’ refugees and migrants that have rapidly increased due to Responses to It) Fig. I-3-9-1 Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States Current members Expansion situation of the member states NATO (32 countries) France Germany Italy Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg The United States Spain Portugal U.K.[(Note 1)] Greece Czech Republic Canada Austria Hungary Poland Norway Ireland Denmark Slovakia Iceland Malta Lithuania Estonia Türkiye Cyprus Latvia Romania Albania Bulgaria Slovenia Montenegro Croatia Finland North Macedonia Sweden Original EU members Joined the EU by 1995 Joined the EU in May 2004 EU (27 countries) As of April, 2024 Joined the EU in January 2007 Joined the EU in July 2013 Original NATO members Joined NATO by 1982 Joined NATO in 1999 Joined NATO in March 2004 Joined NATO in April 2009 Joined NATO in June 2017 Joined NATO in March 2020 (Note) 1 The United Kingdom left the EU on January 31, 2020. Joined NATO in April 2023 Joined NATO in March 2024 ----- **2** **Enhancement of Multilateral Security Frameworks** on an understanding of how the situation has drastically **1** **NATO** changed. Founded for the core task of collective defense among Since 2014, NATO has overhauled its plans and member states, NATO celebrates its 75th anniversary structures to ensure member states can respond to any in 2024. It has expanded the scope of its activities to threat from any direction, with an agreement to establish **Part** conflict prevention and crisis management since the end a forward presence, particularly in the east. The first **Ⅰ** **Chapter** of the Cold War. NATO’s three core tasks are deterrence multinational battalion-sized battlegroups were deployed and defense, crisis prevention and management, and in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in 2017, with **3** cooperative security. further battlegroups having been created in Bulgaria, Amid an increasing sense of crisis among member Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia since 2022. At the states in response to Russia’s aggression against NATO summit in June the same year, it was agreed that Ukraine, a new NATO Strategic Concept was adopted these battlegroups would be expanded from battalion at the NATO Summit in June 2022 for the first time in to brigade size as needed. A new force model was also twelve years since 2010. Although the previous Strategic agreed, on a far larger scale with far greater readiness Concept stated that the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace than traditional readiness. and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO The NATO summit in July 2023 approved the most territory is low, this new Strategic Concept states that comprehensive and detailed regional defense plan the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace and the possibility since the Cold War. This is expected to significantly of an attack against member states’ sovereignty and improve the consistency between NATO’s collective territorial integrity cannot be discounted. defense plans and NATO members’ own plans for force, In the previous Strategic Concept, NATO had stated readiness, capabilities, and command and control. that it was aiming for “a true strategic partnership” with Under this new defense plan, “Steadfast Defender Russia. In the new Strategic Concept, however, NATO 2024,” the largest-scale military exercise since the end placed Russia as the most significant and direct threat to of the Cold War, was conducted from January to May member states’ security and to peace and stability in the 2024. Involving all NATO member states, the exercise Euro-Atlantic area. saw NATO troops rapidly deployed from North America This new Strategic Concept mentioned China for the to the Atlantic Ocean to strengthen the defense of the first time, stating that China’s ambition and coercive Euro-Atlantic region. policies are the challenge against NATO’s interests, Additionally, alongside collective defense, NATO’s security and values. The new Strategic Concept also core tasks include operations to prevent and control pointed out that the deepening relationship between crises from inside and/or outside of member states. China and Russia and their mutually reinforcing In the Mediterranean, a permanent maritime force attempts to undercut the rules-based international order has been deployed due to increase in the influx of illegal run counter to NATO’s values and interests. immigrants transiting the Mediterranean. This force In addition to this, it mentioned the nuclear and missile monitors the influx of illegal immigrants and shares development by North Korea for the first time and stated information. Also, a wider array of missions including that the Indo-Pacific region is an important region and counterterrorism and capacity building assistance have NATO will strengthen dialogue and cooperation with the been conducted. In the Middle East, with regard to the partners, as it can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), NATO has NATO invited Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the dispatched early warning and control aircraft forces and ROK as the important partners to the NATO Summit implemented NATO surveillance and reconnaissance held in June 2022, and decided to enhance cooperation missions since October 2016. It is also supporting with them on maritime security and disinformation security units of Iraqi Armed Forces on training and countermeasures among other issues. capacity building. NATO is also carrying out missions in Through these actions, NATO has emphasized one Kosovo and other countries. of its core missions of defending member states while Regarding defense spending among NATO member t th i d t d d f biliti b d t t th 2014 t t t t f 2% f GDP ----- and in November 2022, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg stated that 2% of each member country’s GDP should be more as a kind of floor than a ceiling. At the July 2023 summit, NATO member states agreed to invest a minimum of 2% of their respective GDPs in defense spending. As a result, defense spending across European member states and Canada increased by 11% in 2023, and by 2024, defense spending in 18 countries is expected to reach 2% of each GDP. In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Finland and Sweden reversed their longstanding policy of military non-alignment and joined NATO in April 2023 and March 2024, respectively. This brought the total number of NATO members to 32. **2** **EU** based international order, partnership with countries sharing the same values, including Japan, is necessary, along with the reinforcement of economic relations with Taiwan, including through trading and investments. In March 2022, the European Council adopted the Strategic Compass laying out a common strategic vision for security and defense policies in the next five to ten years. The document stated that the EU will establish a fully operational EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5,000 troops by 2025 for use in rescue and evacuation operations. In response to the adoption of the Strategic Compass, the EU conducted “LIVEX23,” the EU’s first live exercise, as part of the EU’s “MILEX23” military exercise held in September to October 2023, to improve the “EU Rapid Deployment Capacity.” **3** **Cooperation between NATO and the EU** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** The EU is strengthening its security initiatives under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)[1]. In December 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched as a defense cooperation framework comprising 26 of the member states. NATO made it clear that it promotes developing new capabilities in aviation and maritime domains, training and support for armed forces and sharing expertise of specific domains such as the cyberspace domain through this framework. Therefore, the strengthening of Europe’s defense capabilities is expected.[2] Furthermore, the EU is enhancing its engagement to the Indo-Pacific region, disclosing its first IndoPacific strategy in April 2021 followed by a joint communication detailing it in September 2021. This joint communication states that the growing tensions resulting from China’s significant military buildup and show of force in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait have a direct effect on security and prosperity in Europe. To achieve the aim of a rules Advancements have been seen in cooperation between NATO and the EU in addressing unprecedented challenges efficiently. The third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation was signed in January 2023. In light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, NATO and the EU stated in the declaration that they were at a key juncture for EuroAtlantic security and stability, and that China’s growing assertiveness and policies present challenges that need to be addressed. In addition, it was stated that NATO would further strengthen their cooperation in existing areas in order to deal with the security threats and challenges evolving in scope and magnitude, and that NATO and the EU would enhance and deepen cooperation especially to deal with growing geostrategic competition, resilience issues, protection of critical infrastructure, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, security implication of climate change as well as foreign information manipulation and interference. The EU, although it has a property of non-binding multilateral cooperation, introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which covers all areas of foreign and security policy based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to offer peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP to CSDP and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP. ----- **Viewpoint** **The Significance of Finland and Sweden Joining NATO** **TANAKA Ryosuke, Research Fellow, U.S.-Europe-Russia Division, National Institute for Defense Studies** One of NATO’s long-standing challenges has been to strengthen Additionally, the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO will the defense of the Baltic Sea region, which lies on the front line also lead to the enhancement of NATO’s defense plans. NATO **Part** with Russia. reportedly approved defense plans for the Baltic states and Poland **Ⅰ** In particular, if Russia were to occupy the Suwałki Gap, which in 2019, but it was unclear whether NATO assumed cooperation **Chapter** connects the Russian exclave Kaliningrad with Belarus, the Baltic with Finland and Sweden in the plans. With both countries **3** states would be at risk of becoming geographically isolated from becoming members, however, future NATO defense plans are the other member states. To address these concerns, since Russia expected to be developed with the assumption of some degree unilaterally annexed Crimea in 2014, NATO has been working to of access to both countries. This means that both countries could expand its forward presence and reinforcement posture on its become options for reinforcement routes from member states or eastern flank. as starting points for counterattacks, which would also lead to the The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO realized in development of NATO’s defense plans for the Baltic Sea region. 2023 to 2024 further strengthens the defenses of the Baltic Sea More importantly, the accession of the two countries to NATO region. Both countries have been increasing their interoperability will link the Baltic Sea region and the Atlantic Ocean (including with NATO member states since 2014. Furthermore, Finland has the Arctic region [High North]) as part of NATO territory. This will a large number of ground forces, including reserves, and it is improve the connectivity of NATO’s territory across North America, strengthening its air power with the procurement of F-35s while the Atlantic Ocean, Europe, and the Baltic Sea region, and it will Sweden is enhancing its naval power with a focus on submarines. also contribute to the improvement of NATO’s overall defense This strengthening of the national defenses of both countries planning. NATO approved regional defense plans for its entire combined with their improved interoperability with member states territory in 2023. The membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO will contribute to a more robust NATO’s defense posture in the may lead to the further development of the regional defense plans. Baltic Sea region, where both countries are located. (Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher’s academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position. **3** **Security/Defense Policies of European Countries and Others** In the 2023 Refresh, the administration stated that the **1** **The United Kingdom** U. K. considers the Euro-Atlantic region as the first- After the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom, order priority and Russia as “the most acute threat.” It perceiving that there is no direct military threat against also stated that the U. K. would enhance NATO further, the country, has advanced national defense reform with and contest the malign Russian influence by exposing particular focus on improving its overseas deployment disinformation. In addition, the administration evaluated capability and readiness, in order to deal with new that China “is posing an epoch-defining and systematic threats such as international terrorism and proliferation challenge.” Furthermore, it stated that the U. K. consider of WMDs. the Indo-Pacific as a permanent pillar of the U. K.’s The Johnson administration (then) published international policy, support for the concept of a free the Integrated Review 2021 for security, defense, and open Indo-Pacific and adopt a policy to enhance development, and diplomatic policy in March 2021. The its commitment in the Indo-Pacific through various administration set forth a framework of the Indo-Pacific measures such as building deep relations anchored in tilt while maintaining and strengthening the relationship decades-long economic, technological and security ties with the United States, European countries, and NATO. with partners including Japan. Furthermore, the Sunak administration announced In July of the same year, the Ministry of Defence h I d R i R f h 2023 i M h 2023 bli h d h D f C d P (DCP23) hi h ----- military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, as well as enhancing its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment required in the future. The Macron administration presented in November 2022 the National Strategic Review 2022 (Revue Nationale Stratégique 2022) that showed an analysis of the security environment home and abroad, as well as its strategic goals and priorities for 2030. The administration also stated that the relationship with Russia transferred from potential competition to an open opposition, and its relationship with China transfers to a more intense contest. In addition, the review indicated enhanced strategic autonomy and secured nuclear deterrence as France’s strategic objectives to be achieved by 2030. Since France has territories in the Indo-Pacific region, it is the only EU member state that has continuous military presence in the region, with approximately 7,000 personnel and vessels permanently stationed. France places importance on commitment to the region. The Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, which was published in June 2019, states that China’s growing influence is shifting the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the importance of strengthening partnerships with the United States, Australia, India, and Japan[4]. The National Strategic Review 2022 mentioned above stated that France will strategically strive to build partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, and play the role of a balancing power in order to maintain the strategic stability of the region. In line with its policy of active engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, France dispatched an aircraft carrier group and other units to the region in 2019 and 2021 and conducted the multilateral exercise “ARC 21” with Japan, the United States, and Australia in 2021. In addition, from June to August 2023, the French Air and Space Forces conducted a mission for large-scale power projection to the Indo-Pacific called “Pégase 23,” showcasing its capability to swiftly deploy from its mainland to the region to deal with various crises and regional instabilities. France has conducted monitoring and surveillance activities against illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean flagged vessels since 2019. In 2023, the frigate outlines efforts in the defense field such as defense capability development, based on the Integrated Review Refresh. While no major changes were made from the DCP21, which comprehensively set out the design and equipment of the U.K. military for the next few decades, the DCP23 emphasizes human resources, science and technology, innovation, and enhanced cooperation with industries, based on the lessons-learned from the Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the United Kingdom, in collaboration with related countries and NATO, is strengthening its security presence in the Nordic and Baltic Sea regions. In September 2023, Carrier Strike Group(CSG) led by HMS Queen Elizabeth, was dispatched to the Nordic waters. In December of the same year, the naval and air forces conducted activities mainly in the Baltic Sea to safeguard important undersea infrastructure. In addition, more than 20,000 British troops are scheduled to be deployed across Northern Europe in 2024. The United Kingdom remains committed to the Indo Pacific region. In July 2023, the U.K. participated in the multilateral exercise “Talisman Sabre 23” hosted by the United States and Australia. In October, the U.K. participated in “Bersama Lima” held in Malaysia, the exercise based on the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).[3] These underlines the U.K.’s commitment in strengthening relationships with the regional partners. In December of the same year, the U.K. announced that the CSG, scheduled to be deployed to the Indo-Pacific in 2025, would call on Japan. In addition, the U. K. has conducted monitoring and surveillance activities in waters around Japan, against illicit maritime activities such as ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean flagged vessels since FY2018. In early January 2023, HMS Spey conducted monitoring and surveillance activities. **2** **France** Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence of its defense policies, while having led initiatives to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military capacity by streamlining and integrating **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Military arrangements concluded in 1971 among the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore Meanwhile, the French government strongly condemned the United States and Australia because of Australia’s cancellation of the purchase contract for French-built submarines resulting ----- Prairial and the patrol aircraft Falcon 200 monitoring and surveillance activities, the former in early April, and the latter from early to late October respectively. France also prioritizes its involvement in the Middle East and Africa. The French military has been operating in Iraq since 2014, providing military support to Iraqi security forces fighting ISIL. The French military has been participating in the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) since its establishment in 2020. In Africa’s Sahel region, France launched “Operation Barkhane” in 2014 and the operation of European Special Forces “Takuba” in 2020 as counter-terrorism measures centered on Mali. However, both operations ended in 2022 due to deteriorating relations with Mali and other reasons. Meanwhile, the French military was transferring troops from Mali to Niger but was forced to withdraw from Niger following the military takeover there in July 2023. After 10 years of counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel region, the only French military presence in West Africa, including Sahel, was in Chad, Senegal, and Cote d’ Ivoire. **3** **Germany** solving global issues, the elements of systemic rivalry and competition have increased. Regarding defense spending, the government clarified its policy of setting it at 2% of GDP on average over multiple years. Furthermore, in November the same year, the German Ministry of Defense announced the Defense Policy Guidelines 2023 based on said strategy. Recognizing that Germany must become the backbone of deterrence and collective defense in Europe, the policy stated that the core missions of the German Bundeswehr would return to national and collective defense. In particular, it underlined Germany’s responsibility to make an evergreater contribution to the defense of NATO’s eastern member states, and Germany decided to station one brigade permanently in Lithuania. Germany’s defense budget for 2024 is 51.9 billion euros, the highest amount since the creation of the Bundeswehr, with 19.8 billion euros coming from special funds. Collectively, this total equates to 2.1% of Germany’s GDP. The special funds will be used to fund important procurement programs. So far, Germany has concluded contracts to procure F-35A fighter jets and CH-47F transport helicopters and has begun procuring the “Arrow” missile defense system. The Eurofighter electronic warfare program, involving radar development, is also underway. As for the brigade’s permanent presence in Lithuania, a roadmap was signed by German Defense Minister Pistorius and then Lithuanian Defense Minister Anusauskas in December 2023. The brigade will comprise three combat battalions with a strength of approximately 5,000 personnel and is scheduled to be deployed from 2025. Regarding the Indo-Pacific as well, the German government formulated the Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 2020 and announced that it would strengthen its involvement in security policy in this region. In recent years, Germany has continued to dispatch assets to the Indo-Pacific region to strengthen its presence, while at the same time placing emphasis on cooperation with partner countries that share common values, such as Japan. In July 2023, the Bundeswehr participated for the first time in the multilateral exercise “Talisman Sabre 23” hosted by the United States and Australia, aiming to strengthen multilateral cooperation and interoperability in the region. In addition, following the dispatch of the German frigate “Bayern” in 2021, two naval vessels are l d t b di t h d i i 2024 **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** While Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction of its military personnel since the end of the Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany has advanced the reform of its armed forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conflict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the UN. However, following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Germany made major changes in its security policy, acknowledging that it was at a “watershed era (Zeitenwende).” Specifically, it provided arms to Ukraine, imposed strict economic sanctions against Russia, increased its defense spending as a ratio of GDP to over 2%, strengthened its contribution to NATO, and established a special fund equivalent to 100 billion euros for the Bundeswehr. In June 2023, the German government announced the first comprehensive national security strategy that considered security as part of all policy areas, not just the diplomatic and military. The government assessed Russia as the most significant threat in the Euro-Atlantic i d i t d t th t hil Chi i t i ----- traditionally supports the activities of the United Nations, and the Trudeau administration has expressed its stance that contributing to the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is of utmost importance. Concerning its involvement in the Indo-Pacific region, in November 2022, Canada announced its first IndoPacific Strategy as a comprehensive road map to deepen its engagement in the region over the next decade. In the strategy, China is mentioned as an “increasingly disruptive global power” and that it is looking to shape the international order into a more permissive environment for China’s interests and values. The strategy also states that Canada will challenge China if it engages in behavior that undermines Canada’s national interests or those of its partners in the region. On the other hand, Canada showed its intention to cooperate with China to find solutions to global issues such as climate change. In addition, Canada has clarified its strategic objectives such as promoting peace, resiliency, and security of the region and expanding and deepening security relationship with allies and partners including Japan. Canada has also stated its intention to continue monitoring and surveillance activities against illicit maritime activities[5] including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean flagged vessels, which started in April 2018. In 2023, Canada conducted monitoring and surveillance activities by patrol aircraft in early April and early October. On the other hand, Canadian warships have passed through the Taiwan Strait[6] several times since 2018 in accordance with international laws and Canada has stated that it strengthens its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region, including by increasing the number of frigates. In 2023, Canada crossed the Taiwan Strait three times, while it had only crossed just once the previous year, Canada’s future involvement in the region should be closely watched. **4** **Canada** In a National Defence Policy paper published in June 2017, the Department of National Defence of Canada showed its recognition that the United States is “still unquestionably the only superpower,” while also stating the view that a degree of major power competition has returned among China, Russia, and others, which is causing the growing importance of deterrence again. In accordance with this understanding of the security environment, Canada places importance on its own national land and the North American region on the basis of the national defense policy. Based on the idea that global security has a direct connection with Canadian defense, Canada positions active international contribution as a basis of the national defense policy. In terms of the building-up of defense capability, the Canadian defense policy focuses on the fields of space, cyberspace and intelligence. It also stated plans to increase the national defense budget, which once declined in the 2010s, by more than 70% in 10 years, and the Regular Force by 3,500 (to 71,500) military personnel. Furthermore, Canada released the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework in September 2019, indicating a policy to enhance Canada’s military presence in the region, based on the recognition that strategic, military, and economic importance of the region is increasing. Canada has also been conducting “Operation Nanook”, a military exercise in the Arctic region, since 2007. Canada regards the United States as its most important ally and conducts air defense, space defense, and maritime patrolling and monitoring activities in North America jointly with the United States through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). As a founding member, Canada also places importance on its relationship with NATO, and has been actively participating in NATO-led operations. Canada **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Canada has deployed its assets within the framework of “Operation NEON” to execute the sanctions against North Korea from June 2019. In October 2023, a Canadian military patrol aircraft in the operation was reportedly approached in an unusual manner by Chinese military aircraft over the East China Sea. ----- **Section 10** **Middle East and Africa** **1** **Middle East** Israel for a meeting. A document including contents that **1** **General Situation** the foreign ministerial meeting would be held annually, The Middle East region is a geopolitical key point which and working groups for various themes including **Part** connects Asia and Europe. In addition, the Middle East is regional security would be established was adopted in **Ⅰ** **Chapter** a major source of energy supply for the world and contains November the same year. In this way, cooperation in the major routes for international commerce. Japan is also field of security was expanding between Israel and the **3** dependent on the region for approximately 90% of its Arab countries that had normalized diplomatic relations crude oil imports. Peace and stability in the Middle East with Israel. region is extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. **3** **Situation Surrounding Israel and Palestine** Meanwhile, in this region, clashes between Israel and Palestinian militants and attacks on ships by the Houthis Clashes frequently occurred between Israel and have occurred and continue. In addition, in April 2024, Palestinian militants, and tensions between the two sides a related facility of the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, continued. Meanwhile, on October 7, 2023, Palestinian Syria, was attacked, and Iran determined that Israel militants such as Hamas in the Gaza Strip fired perpetrated the attack. In retaliation, Iran launched a thousands of rockets at Israel. Additionally, numerous number of missiles and drones toward Israel, prolonging militants invaded Israeli territory, killing and abducting high tensions. Israeli soldiers and civilians, including foreigners. In response, the Israeli military began airstrikes on the Gaza Strip the same day. After that, the Israeli military **2** **Situation Surrounding Middle East Peace** conducted “localized raids” into the Gaza Strip, and In Palestine, the moderate Fatah, which governs the since October 27, they have been conducting ground West Bank, and the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas, operations, deploying tanks, bulldozers, and other which effectively controls the Gaza Strip, are in conflict, vehicles. A temporary truce held from November 24 splitting the area, against the backdrop of a stagnating to November 30, and some hostages taken by Hamas Middle East Peace Process. and other Palestinian militants were released. However, In such circumstances, after then U.S. Trump fighting resumed on December 1. Israeli Prime Minister administration announced its recognition of Jerusalem as Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to destroy Hamas and the capital of Israel in 2017 and moved the U.S. embassy recover the hostages. from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018, the tensions have risen, particularly in the Gaza Strip. In 2020, the administration announced a new Middle East peace plan, but the Palestinian side refused to negotiate, opposing the plan’s descriptions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian border and the possession of Jerusalem. On the other hand, since August 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco have successively agreed to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel as a result of active encouragement from the Trump administration to establish a peace agreement between Israel and the Arab countries. This was the first time Israel established diplomatic relations with Arab An Israeli tank rolling in the north of the Gaza Strip (December 2023) [AFP-Jiji] countries since that with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994). In March 2022, the foreign ministers of Israel, Bahrain, Since the beginning of the clashes between Israel E t M UAE d th U it d St t th d i d P l ti i ilit t i O t b 2023 tt k b ----- **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **Viewpoint** **Clashes between Israel and the Palestinian Militants.** **NISHINO Masami, Senior Fellow, Asia and Africa Division, National Institute for Defense Studies** On October 7, 2023, militants of the Islamic fundamentalist the fighting drags on, the more likely it is that Israel will be able organization Hamas, which effectively controls the Gaza Strip, to thoroughly search and neutralize Hamas leaders, and Hamas is invaded southern Israel, killing approximately 1,200 people and running short of supplies and finding it more difficult to continue abducting over 200 others. These human casualties shocked fighting. In light of this, it can be said that prolonged fighting is Israel. In the past, Hamas frequently used suicide bombings, so advantageous for Israel. However, even if the Israeli military wins, Israel began full-scale construction of a separating wall in 2002 to it is likely that some Gaza residents will continue to support contain them. Later, when Hamas focused on launching rockets, Hamas, and Hamas members are also present in the West Bank Israel began operating the Iron Dome missile defense system in and neighboring countries, so although Hamas will be weakened, 2011, which intercepted most of them. As a result, Israel believed it is unlikely to be destroyed. that the threat from Hamas was reduced, but this belief was The number of deaths in the Gaza Strip has risen, prompting shattered. more countries to criticize Israel, but countries other than the It has been suggested that one of the factors behind Hamas’s United States are unlikely to have a significant impact on Israel’s attack this time was that Saudi Arabia and Israel were close to military operations. The United States, which is seen as the only establishing diplomatic relations. If the two countries established country that can exert enough influence to force Israel to stop the diplomatic relations, other Arab countries were expected to follow fighting, has continued to supply weapons to Israel but warned in suit. Hamas appears to have tried to provoke the conflict to prevent May 2024 that it would stop supplying some weapons depending the establishment of such diplomatic relations. on the actions of the Israeli military. The United States has already This attack served as a reminder of the importance of lessons halted the supply of some ammunition, and this change in the US from the past. On October 6, 1973, during a Jewish holiday, stance could affect Israel’s military operations in the medium to Israel suffered a surprise attack by Arab forces, resulting in heavy long term. damage. Therefore, the lesson was that Israel needed to be As for the full-scale spillover of the conflict beyond the Gaza prepared because the enemy would launch a surprise attack on Strip, both the United States and Iran, the latter of which backs holidays when its defense systems were off guard. However, half pro-Iranian groups such as Hezbollah conducting attacks in a century later, Israel was again subjected to a similar surprise solidarity with Hamas, will try to avoid such spillovers. Some proattack. Iranian forces, such as the Houthis in Yemen, are not hesitating The Israeli military immediately launched a counterattack, to escalate the conflict, but since the U.S. military and others are sending ground forces into the Gaza Strip in late October. In the primarily dealing with the Houthis, Israel does not have to use its fighting in the Gaza Strip, Israel has the advantage in military resources against distant adversaries. However, in April 2024, Iran strength, so Hamas is focusing on: concealing the whereabouts of directly attacked Israeli territory from its own territory for the first its leaders and hostages, using propaganda to win public opinion time using ballistic missiles, and Israel appears to have attacked on its side, and negotiations by its leadership abroad. Israel’s goal Iran in response. In such a case, the United States has a policy of is to destroy Hamas, i.e., to disable its leadership and military wing not cooperating with an attack on Iran in order to avoid escalation, and rescue the hostages. Hamas’s goal is to maintain its existence so Israel is likely to cope with it on its own. Attacks against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. To achieve its goal, Hamas will likely need to in neighboring countries, like the killing of a leading member of leverage hostages and public opinion to negotiate a permanent Hamas in Lebanon in January 2024, are expected to occur in the ceasefire. future. The Gaza Strip is small and has been blockaded, so the longer (Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher’s academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position. ----- Hezbollah, a pro Iranian armed group in Lebanon, and other groups have intensified in northern Israel. The Israeli military has responded with airstrikes against Hezbollah sites. Yemen’s Houthi rebels have also sporadically launched missiles and drones toward Israel. To strengthen its deterrence in the Middle East, the United States is increasing its military assets, such as dispatching aircraft carrier strike groups and aircraft, and conducting activities such as intercepting drones and missiles launched by the Houthis. **4** **Situation in the Gulf Region** Amid this situation, the United States scaled down its troops stationed in Iraq to 2,500 members by January 2021 and ended the combat duty of its forces in Iraq at the end of December of the same year. The mission of the U.S. Forces moved to advising, training, and information collecting. From April the same year, it was reported that part of the fighters and air defense assets deployed in the Gulf region by the Trump administration were pulled out. The presence of U.S. Forces in the Gulf region had been shrinking since the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan left the area in September 2021, with the absence of U.S. aircraft carriers continuing for some time. However, since the outbreak of conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants in October 2023, the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower has been dispatched to the Middle East region and U.S. aircraft and air defense assets have also been additionally deployed to the same region, thus the presence of U.S. military has been enhanced. **(2) Maritime Security in the Gulf Region** Since May 2019, sporadic events affecting the navigation safety of civilian vessels have occurred in the waters of the Middle East. Amidst rising tensions in the Middle East, countries continue carrying out efforts to safeguard maritime security in the region. The United States proposed the Maritime Security Initiative in July 2019 and established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) with its command center opened in Bahrain in November. The IMSC has been joined by 12 countries, including the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Albania, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Seychelles, Latvia, and Jordan, in addition to the United States (as of March 2024). Furthermore, in January 2020, eight European nations – France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Portugal – issued a joint European declaration of support for the creation of the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH). This mission commenced full operations in February of the same year. Furthermore, in response to the frequent attacks on **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(1) Military Trends in the Gulf Region** Various situations including military activities are created in the Gulf region in relation to the changes related to the final agreement concerning the nuclear issues of Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[1] Since May 2019, the United States has announced the dispatch of carrier strike groups and bomber units in response to Iran’s threats to its own troops and interests. The United States deployed troops in Saudi Arabia in July 2019 for the first time in around sixteen years since 2003. In the midst of this, Iran announced its shooting down of a U.S. unmanned reconnaissance aircraft over the Straits of Hormuz in June 2019. In July of the same year, the United States announced that a U.S. amphibious assault ship had shot down an Iranian drone over the Strait of Hormuz in July of the same year. Since October the same year, there have been multiple attacks by militant organizations on U.S. military bases in Iraq. The United States pointed out Iran’s involvement in the attacks, and conducted an aerial bombing of the base of an armed organization said to be supported by Iran. In addition, in January 2020, the United States killed Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who was operating inside Iraq with the militant organization’s leaders, as a deterrent to further attack plans. Although Iran attacked Iraqi bases hosting U.S. Forces in Iraq with a ballistic missile in retaliation for the killing, after that, both countries clearly showed a willingness to avoid escalation. JCPOA decided that Iran would reduce its enriched uranium stockpile and the number of centrifuges, ban the production of weapons grade plutonium, and accept IAEA inspections, among other measures, in exchange for ending the sanctions of previous UN Security Council resolutions and the U.S. and EU’s nuclear-related sanctions. In May 2018, the U.S. President Trump (then), announced the U.S. secession from JCPOA, and in November of the same year, the United States resumed all its sanctions and successively added further sanctions. In this situation, Iran announced that while it would not withdraw from JCPOA after May 2019, it would suspend its compliance with JCPOA step by step. Although Joe Biden, the new president of the United ----- civilian vessels by Houthis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since November 2023, the United States announced the launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) to conduct patrols in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. OPG is a multinational security operation under Combined Task Force 153, the mission of which is to conduct maritime security and capacity building activities from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, on January 12, 2024, U.S. and British forces, supported by Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, and Bahrain, attacked Houthi’s military bases. Since then, U.S. Forces have continuously attacked Houthi’s military bases, including joint attacks with British forces. Japan needs to continue to pay close attention to the future developments surrounding the situation in the Gulf region. **See** Chapter 4, Section 5-2 (National Maritime Security Initiatives) **See** **5** **Situation in Syria** stabilization of Syria. **6** **Situation in Yemen** In Yemen, following anti-government protests that occurred from February 2011 and international pressure afterward, then President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to resign. Through the election held in February 2012, then Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi was elected as the new president. Meanwhile, the confrontation intensified between the government and the opposition insurgent group Houthis, based in northern Yemen. As the Houthis invaded the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and other locations, the President requested support from Arab countries. In response, in March 2015, coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia began air strikes against the Houthis. In response, the Houthis also launched attacks on the mainland of Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles, UAVs, cruise missiles, and other weapons. In December 2018, a cease-fire in Hodeidah city, host to the biggest port in Yemen, was agreed upon between the Houthis and the Yemen government. However, the cease-fire was implemented to only a limited degree. In November 2019, the Yemeni Government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group in southern Yemen, signed the Riyadh Agreement[2] in the capital of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh. Then, the new cabinet was established in December 2020. President Hadi newly established the “Presidential Leadership Council,” and announced that he would transfer all of his authority in April 2022. The council comprises delegates of all the political powers in Yemen, except the Houthis, and aims to strengthen the governance of the government and conclude the negotiation with the Houthis. In the same month, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Yemen announced that the parties to the armed conflict agreed on a two-month ceasefire throughout Yemen. Although it was announced that the ceasefire agreement had not been renewed in October after it was first renewed in June and August of the same year, large-scale armed conflicts, aerial bombings by the coalition of the willing, and cross-border attacks by the Houthis have rarely occurred in Yemen since the ceasefire became effective. Against this backdrop, an agreement was reached in December 2023 to proceed **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** In Syria, violent conflicts have continued since March 2011 among Syrian government forces supported by Russia and Iran, Syrian opposition groups supported by Türkiye, and other organizations. Although it has been pointed out that Russia has been redeploying some of the troops stationed in Syria to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it seems that Syrian Government forces control most of the country, and the situation is advantageous to the Assad administration as a whole. In these circumstances, a trend is observed in which the Syrian government, and Arab countries and Türkiye that have supported the opposition, attempt to improve diplomatic relations. For example, in May 2023, a meeting of Arab League foreign ministers decided to allow the return of Syria, whose membership had been suspended in 2011, and President Assad attended the summit held in the same month. According to an estimate by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in June 2022, more than 300,000 citizens died in a series of clashes from March 2011 to March 2021 in the situation in Syria. There has been no concrete progress in peace negotiations and political processes up to the present because of continuing conflicts. Further efforts by the international community are needed to realize the As conflicts continued between the Yemeni government and the STC, which seeks autonomy for the southern part of the country, the Riyadh Agreement stipulated the establishment of a ----- with the creation of a roadmap for the realization of a In March 2020, the United States announced that it had ceasefire, but the prospect of the conclusion of a final begun the withdrawal of its forces. Moreover, peace peace accord remains elusive. negotiations began between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, in Qatar, in September 2020. U.S. Forces completed the withdrawal by the end of August 2021. **7** **Situation in Afghanistan** In this situation, the Taliban expanded their ruled area In Afghanistan, the Taliban intensified their offensive as quickly and in August 2021, they brought the capital city **Part** the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) launched Kabul under their control. In September the same year, **Ⅰ** **Chapter** education, training and advice for the Afghan National they announced the establishment of a caretaker cabinet. Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in the wake of The Taliban has attained no approval as a government **3** withdrawal by the International Security Assistance from other nations as of March 2024. However, the Force (ISAF) in December 2014. Meanwhile, the Taliban claimed that they accepted the new Chinese ANDSF faces challenges regarding logistics, morale, air ambassador’s credentials in September 2023, and that capabilities, and troop-commander leadership, allowing China officially accepted the Taliban’s ambassador to the Taliban to expand their control in Afghanistan. China in December the same year. In February 2020, an agreement was signed between Attention will be focused on the Taliban’s internal the United States and the Taliban that included the governance and international negotiations with other conditional phase-out of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. countries. **2** **Africa** and sporadic armed conflicts in local areas continue. **1** **Challenges Facing African Countries** In recent years, West Africa has seen a series of African countries gather interest from the international military takeovers. community because of the population of over 1.4 billion In Mali, the government collapsed due to military people, high potential, and abundant natural resources. rebellions led by Colonel Goita in August 2020 and On the other hand, the region faces many security May 2021, and an interim government was established challenges such as armed conflicts, terrorism, and piracy. with Colonel Goita as interim president. The French In Sudan, the national army clashed with the Rapid military deployed troops to engage in counter-terrorism Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group, in April operations starting in 2013, but its relationship with 2023 over the integration of the RSF into the national Mali’s interim government deteriorated due to slow army and other issues, leading to an armed conflict. progress in counter-terrorism operations and anti-French Since May 20 the same year, a ceasefire agreement and pro-Russian public opinion in Mali, resulting in the mediated by the United States and Saudi Arabia has been withdrawal of the French troops in August 2022. In June repeatedly announced, but no new ceasefire agreement 2023, a resolution was adopted to withdraw the United has been announced since the ceasefire agreement period Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization ended on June 21. Heavy fighting continues to this day. Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), a United Nations PKO, Since gaining independence in 2011, South Sudan by December the same year, raising concerns that the has experienced two large-scale armed conflicts due to security situation would worsen going forward, including political rivalries. Following the second conflict, the terrorism. parties involved, including President Kiir and former Vice Military takeovers occurred in Mali’s neighbors, President Machar, signed the “Revitalized Agreement Burkina Faso and Niger, in January and September 2022, on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of and July 2023, respectively. South Sudan (R-ARCSS),” which presented a roadmap **See** Fig. I-3-10-1 (Current UN Peacekeeping Operations); Paragraph 3-2 (Trends of Activities in Africa); Chapter 4, towards the establishment of an official government. Section 5-2 (2) (Piracy); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-2-2 An interim government was established in 2020, and (UNMISS) a national election is scheduled for December 2024. However, the implementation of the agreements reached i th R ARCSS i li it d d liti l i l i ----- Fig. I-3-10-1 Current UN Peacekeeping Operations **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ❶ 11 ❽ 10 ❼ ❾ ❻ ❺ ❸ ❹ ❷ (Note) According to the United Nations (as of the end of March 2024). Middle East |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |⑥|United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)|May 1948| |⑦|United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)|May 1974| |⑧|United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)|Mar. 1978| |Africa|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Mission|Date Established| |①|United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)|Apr. 1991| |②|United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)|Jul. 2010| |③|United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)|Jun. 2011| |④|United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)|Jul. 2011| |⑤|United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)|Apr. 2014| |Asia|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Mission|Date Established| |⑨|United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)|Jan. 1949| Europe |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |⑩|United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)|Mar. 1964| |⑪|United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)|Jun. 1999| ----- Russia is believed to be maintaining significant influence **2 �Relations between African Countries and** in Africa. **Other Countries** In addition, China and Russia are strengthening In terms of security, African countries have long and deep cooperation with South Africa. For example, the two relationships with the United States, Europe, and Russia. countries conducted joint military exercises in Africa in Based on this, the relationship with Russia has been November 2019 and February 2023. further deepening recently, and Chinese involvement to **Part** Africa is prominent. **(2) The United States and Europe** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** The U.S. have had military cooperation with **(1) China and Russia** African countries through the U.S. Africa Command **3** While China has enjoyed economic profit in Africa since (AFRICOM)’s joint exercises.[4] The United States has the 2000s, military involvement has also been increasing showed its intention to build up its partnership with in recent years. In August 2017, China began to operate African countries through efforts to enhance the peace a “support base” for logistics support of the PLA in and security of Africa in the National Security Strategy Djibouti, and it is pointed out that a large landing ship (NSS) published in October 2022. It is expected that the called at the “support base” in March and August 2022. United States will continue to be involved in Africa. PLA activities have also been seen on the west coast of Europe has shown its presence in the form of stationed Africa. In June and July 2023, Chinese naval anti-piracy troops, training mission, and dispatching personnel units visited the Gulf of Guinea countries and conducted to counter-terrorism operations for some time. Thus, joint exercises. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that Europe is expected to maintain its involvement in Africa. China may be considering the establishment of Chinese For example, France has conducted counter-terrorism military-related facilities in Tanzania and Equatorial operations and provided capacity-building assistance Guinea, and China is expected to continue expanding its in multiple regions across Africa. While there is a trend military presence in Africa.[3] to withdraw troops from countries such as Mali in the In recent years, Russia has actively conducted arms Sahel region after military takeovers, there is also a trend exports to African countries and further deepened its towards continued involvement in Africa, including the involvement through the activities of private military stationing of troops in Chad and ongoing support to companies. Even after “Wagner”’s “armed rebellion” countries in the Gulf of Guinea. in 2023 and the death of one of its founders, Prigozhin, **3** **Trends in International Terrorism** extremism via Internet or other means. As a result, **1** **General Situation** particularly, terrorist attacks planned and committed There are prominent cases where power vacuums in by individuals or small groups of people who have no some countries with weak governance in the Middle official relations with international terrorist organizations East and Africa have become a hotbed for activities of but have become influenced by them in some ways, have international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda occurred in Western and other countries. Moreover, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This terrorist attacks targeting certain religions or races in a kind of terrorist organizations have instigated fighters to right-wing extremist political context have also occurred conduct terrorist attacks at their home and abroad, and are in Western countries. also spreading violent extremist ideologies via Internet Among international terrorist organizations, ISIL or other means. This kind of terrorist organizations established multiple “provinces” outside of their original have instigated fighters to conduct terrorist attacks at base in Iraq and Syria as “Islamic State” territories, and their home and abroad, and are also spreading violent these “provinces” have been conducting terrorist acts in **3** According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023) **4** The U.S. Forces conduct exercises for the purpose of dealing with extremist organizations and enhancing maritime law enforcement capabilities. For example, the exercise “Flintlock” has been held in the Sahel region annually since 2005 for the purpose of dealing with extremist organizations. In March 2023, the exercise was held in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, and over 1,300 ----- various places. As for Al Qaeda, based primarily in Afghanistan, it is believed to have been weakened, as many of the group’s senior members were killed through U.S. operations. However, they continue some actions such as issuing statements. Concerning international counterterrorism measures, international cooperation has grown even more important as terrorism threats have diffused and deepened on the diversification of terrorist attacks and the improvement of terrorist groups’ attack capabilities. **2** **Trends of Activities in Africa** Organizations related to ISIL and/or Al-Qaeda are active in Africa. For example, in some areas of West Africa such as Mali and other parts of the Sahel region, conflicts between terrorist organizations as well as vigorous terrorist activities are observed. In central and southern Africa, the ISIL’s “Central African Province” had been active since April 2019, mainly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and northern Mozambique. In May 2022, an armed group in Mozambique that had previously issued a statement of criminal activity under the name of the ISIL’s “Central African Province” made a criminal declaration under the name of the ISIL’s “Mozambique Province” and began operating as a new branch of ISIL. In eastern Africa, Al-Shabaab continuously hinders political processes in Somalia. European and other countries have been providing counter-terrorism operations and are supporting training against such terrorist organizations’ actions. For instance, in the Sahel region, the French military took the lead in conducting counterterrorism operations against Islamic extremists from 2013 to 2022. In Mozambique, anti-terrorism operations were conducted by dispatching troops from neighboring countries, and in November 2021, an EU training mission began operations. However, since December 2023, there are signs that ISIL’s activities in “Mozambique Province” have increased. **3** **Trends of Activities in the Middle East** Since 2013, ISIL had become powerful by taking advantage of the unstable situation in Iraq and Syria, and unilaterally declared the establishment of the “Islamic State” in 2014. From that year, the U.S. led Coalition forces conducted airstrikes and education/training missions for local groups in Iraq and Syria. In 2019, the United States announced that it and the Coalition forces had liberated 100 percent of ISIL-controlled areas in the two countries. Although the United States announced the death of ISIL’s leader in February and November 2022, ISIL announced the appointment of a new leader in March and November 2022 respectively and is believed to still be active in Iraq and Syria. Under these circumstances, the U.S. Forces have been continuously stationed in both countries as part of efforts to prevent the resurgence of ISIL. In Afghanistan, while the Taliban are expanding their controlled area, the ISIL Khorasan Province has been continuously conducting terrorist attacks mainly in the capital city of Kabul and eastern Afghanistan since 2015. When the Taliban, which is in a cooperative relationship with Al-Qaeda, took control of Kabul in August 2021, the United States completed the withdrawal of U.S. Forces but declared it would continue counterterrorism operations from afar. Even after the withdrawal of U.S. Forces, the ISIL Khorosan Province is actively continuing terrorist attacks in Kabul and other areas, although the number of attacks is on the decline. The United States announced in August 2022 that it has killed Al Qaeda’s leader with a drone attack in Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- **Community Concerning the Space, Cyber, and** **Chapter** **Electromagnetic Domains and Information Warfare** **4** Risks that hinder free access and usage of cyberspace, the military measures for the accomplishment of military oceans, outer space and the electromagnetic spectrum are objectives will be employed in more sophisticated ways becoming increasingly serious. In particular, the threat of through means such as information warfare, including **Part** cyber attacks has grown rapidly and the theft of sensitive through the dissemination of disinformation prior to **Ⅰ** information, etc., has also been taking place on a routine armed attacks. These trends pose serious challenges to **Chapter** basis, even in the form of state-backed attacks. It is likely the international community, including Japan. **4** that hybrid warfare consisting of both military and non- **Section 1** **Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology That Have Expanded to Information Warfare, etc.** **1** **Science, Technology and Security** The creation of science, technology and innovation is the the use of drones. Technological influence in the field of source of Japan’s own economic and social development security is becoming greater; for example, the technology and the appropriate use of technological capabilities is known as deepfake with which fake videos are created indispensable not only in national security but also in through the application of AI technology is spreading, addressing global issues such as climate change. The while information warfare through the dissemination of nations of the world are focusing their efforts on research, disinformation is constantly taking place. development and military applications of cutting-edge In addition, technology competition among nations technologies that might be game-changers in that they becomes apparent, notably in the fields of next could change the whole situation of future battles, such as generation information communication system (Beyond artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technology and next 5G) and semiconductors. This competition is based on generation information and communication technology. the perception that it is profitable to lead international Our attention needs to be focused on these applications standardization with superiority in the emerging as something that will greatly improve the accuracy and technologies that are to become important for national speed of decision making, as information processing, economy and security. Moreover, it is commonly getting which has so far been limited by the capabilities of human understood that securing supply chains for critical key beings and conventional computers, could become faster products such as semiconductors and rare metals is and automatic. In addition, we need to focus on the fact important from a security standpoint. that high-speed, large-capacity and safe communication In this situation, the concern is that some nations are based on these new technologies will greatly contribute stealing information related to advanced technologies to the need for automation and manpower savings in the developed by private companies, universities and other use of future defense technologies. organizations in other countries using cyberspace, Risks in the cyberspace domain and other areas are also corporate acquisitions, corporate activities including becoming more serious. Above all, these new technologies investments, academic exchanges and covert operatives blur the boundary between military and non-military and using the information for their own military purposes. matters, enhancing the so-called gray zone situation. For this, each nation takes measures for their “economic There are many examples in which diverse means that security,” such as strict export control, reinforcement of are not limited to purely military ones have been used screening for investments from foreign countries and to create chaos in other countries, such as cyber attacks higher independence for technological development and i i i i i f d i ----- **2** **Trends of Military Cutting-edge Technology** **(1) Hypersonic Weapons** since 2021. The United States, China, Russia and others are In response to the threat of such hypersonic missiles, developing hypersonic weapons, including Hypersonic the United States is developing glide phase interceptors Glide Vehicles (HGVs) that would be launched from (GPIs), missiles that intercept hypersonic missiles during ballistic missiles, maneuvered to glide at hypersonic their glide phase. speed (Mach 5 or above) in the atmosphere and hit targets, as well as Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs) **(2) High-power Energy Technology** **Part** using scramjet engines and other technologies that High-power energy weapons, such as railguns, high- **Ⅰ** enable hypersonic flights. It is suggested that hypersonic energy laser weapons and high-power microwave **Chapter** weapons would fly in lower orbits than conventional weapons, are being developed as a means to counter **4** ballistic missiles at hypersonic speed for a longer period various airborne threats. of time and that their high maneuverability would make A railgun is a kind of weapon that shoot bullets using them difficult to be detected and intercepted. a magnetic field generated from electrical energy. Unlike A senior official in the U.S. Department of Defense missiles, the bullets used for railguns have no propulsion (DoD) mentioned a development plan for hypersonic device. For this reason, the bullets are smaller, cost less weapons in February 2021, revealing that the United and require less space for storing. Therefore, railguns States will deploy hypersonic weapons in the early to are said to be capable of coping effectively with attacks mid-2020s and build defense capabilities in the mid to involving a large number of missiles. late 2020s.[1] In the same year, the U.S. Army received the Laser weapons, which use high-power laser energy prototype products of the HGV “Long Range Hypersonic to destroy targets, are being developed by the United Weapon (LRHW)” and is conducting training aimed at States, China, Russia and other countries as low-cost, completing their deployment. The U.S. Navy and Air effective means of intercepting a large number of small, Force are also developing hypersonic weapons. unmanned aircraft and small vessels. In China, the DF-17 ballistic missile, which is viewed The United States is developing several laser weapons. as having the capability to carry HGVs, made its first In 2023, the U.S. Army received prototypes of the 50kW public appearance during the military parade marking the class vehicle-mounted laser weapon “DE M-SHORAD 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019. (Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense)” The U.S. DoD pointed out that China began operating and concluded a contract to develop 300kW-class laser DF-17 missiles in 2020. In 2021, China launched an weapons. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the HGV China unveiled the “LW-30,” a vehicle-mounted carried by it partially entered orbit before landing in laser weapon with a 30 kW power output and designed China. The DoD noted that the missile flew a distance of to counter small, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), at slightly less than 40,000 km for over100 minutes and did the 2022 China International Aviation & Aerospace not hit its target but came close.[2] Exhibition. There are also indications that China has Russia has already deployed the HGV “Avangard” deployed anti-satellite laser weapons that appear to be and plans to deploy the new ICBM “Sarmat” that can designed to interfere with or damage the optical sensors carry the Avangard in 2024. In 2021, Russia successfully of low-earth orbit satellites and that it is developing laser test-launched the HCM “Zircon” from a submarine. In weapons with even higher power output. 2023, a Zircon-equipped frigate embarked on combat Russia has deployed the 10 kW Peresvet laser weapon patrol missions. system and it is reportedly developing a megawatt-class North Korea seems to regard the development of chemical laser weapon system for attacking satellites. hypersonic gliding warheads as one of its priority goals In 2022, Israel successfully tested the “Iron Beam” a and is promoting related research and development. It vehicle-mounted air defense laser weapon with a power has been launching missiles it calls “hypersonic missiles” output of 100kW class, to intercept UAVs, mortar rounds **1** According to the website of the U.S. Department of Defense on February 27, 2021. ----- and other objects. It unveiled a ship board version of Iron High power Operational Responder (THOR) against Beam at the international maritime defense exhibition numerous UAVs simulating a swarm flight, effectively “IMDEX Asia 2023.” disabling many of them. The U.S. Marine Corps is also High power microwave weapons are weapons to assessing the integration of AI-based UAV detection destroy or cause malfunction of electronic equipment and tracking capabilities with high-power microwave in UAVs, missiles and the like. In 2023, the U.S. Air weapons. Force used the high-power microwave weapon “Tactical **3** **Trends of Cutting-edge Technology in the Civilian Field** **Part** **(1) Artificial Intelligence (AI) Technology** was held by the Central Military Commission with the **Ⅰ** AI technology is one of the technological areas where purpose of researching and developing next-generation **Chapter** rapid development is taking place, including generative command information systems. **4** AI, which can generate natural text and images. It has Different nations are also developing unmanned aerial been pointed out that the rapid AI progress has been vehicles equipped with AI. exerting a great impact on the military field, including The United States is engaged in diverse R&D initiatives, the application for unmanned vehicles and the cyber including the automation of air-to-air combat, manned/ domain as well as supporting for command and decision- unmanned aircraft formation flights and demonstrating making and improving data processing capacity, among their capabilities in maritime surveillance missions. other areas. In 2023, the U.S. Air Force tested AI-piloted XQ-58A The United States established a Generative AI UAVs flying in formation with manned aircrafts and in Task Force in 2023 to manage the risks of introducing tactical flights against simulated missions, weapons and generative AI and published a strategy for data, analysis enemies. and AI application to strengthen the organizational China revealed in May 2018 that the China Electronics environment for continued AI utilization to gain decision- Technology Group Corporation successfully performed making advantages. Meanwhile, China announced its a swarm flight of 200 AI-equipped UAVs. It is assumed 14th Five-Year Plan in 2021, stating it would foster and that military operations including such swarm flights expand digital industries, such as AI and strengthen will become difficult to counter with conventional air military-civilian collaborative development in the field defense systems. In 2023, an AI algorithm competition of AI technology. simulating a UAV aerial combat was held in China. As an application of AI, in 2023 the United States tested In 2019, Russia conducted a coordinated flight test data sharing across the Unified Combatant Command between S-70 heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle to enable quick, data-based decision-making in each “Okhotnik” and the fifth-generation fighter Su-57, with department, as well as testing AI-based improvement the aim of delivering them in 2024. At the international of various missions. Meanwhile, China announced in military technology forum “Army 2023,” a Russian July 2020 that an AI Military Simulation Competition company unveiled a UAV equipped with an AI-based target identification function. It has also been pointed out that the military use of AI may develop into Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and this is being discussed in the international community. In 2023, as part of efforts by like-minded countries, the “Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (REAIM) Call to Action,” which confirmed responsible use in accordance with obligations under international law, as well as the “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy,” which confirmed the need to operate AI under a responsible human chain f d d l if ibilit d ----- Japan expressed its support for both. The United Nations General Assembly has adopted a resolution underlining the urgency of addressing the challenges posed by LAWS. **(2) Quantum Technology** Quantum technology is positioned as an important technology which brings innovation to society by applying quantum mechanics, which operates in the microscopic world of atomic nuclei and electrons. In its National Defense Science and Technology Strategy published in 2023, the United States cited quantum technology as key and declared its intention to strengthen collaboration and technological innovation with its allies. Conversely, in its 14th Five-Year Plan published in 2021, China stated its intention to accelerate cutting-edge technologies like quantum computers and communications and enhance military-civilian collaborative development in the quantum technology field. Quantum cryptographic communication, which is considered to be cryptographic communication that cannot be deciphered by a third party, is being studied in many countries. China has built a 4,600 km quantum cryptographic communication network consisting of the quantum cryptographic communication satellite “Mozi” and a ground communication network between Beijing and Shanghai. In 2022, quantum encryption services were provided to the Communist Party and government agencies in Hefei. It has been pointed out that in the future, quantum sensors could be used for tracking missiles and aircraft, as well as for more advanced gyros and accelerometers.[3] In 2023, the United States successfully demonstrated magnetic navigation using quantum magnetic sensors as an alternative to the Global Positioning System (GPS) and has also been developing a satellite equipped with quantum gyros to develop inertial navigation using quantum inertial sensors. Quantum computers are said to be able to calculate problems that would take even a supercomputer an enormous amount of time in a short time and are expected to be applied in fields such as decryption. On the other hand, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which cannot be decrypted by quantum computers, is being researched in many countries. The United States is urging all domestic organizations to prepare for a transition to PQC ahead of the establishment of the PQC standard scheduled for 2024. **(3) Cutting-Edge Information and Communication** **Technology** As a mobile communication infrastructure, the 5thGeneration Mobile Communication System (5G) services have been launched in various countries since 2019 and research on wireless communication technologies beyond 5G is also underway. In the Department of Defense 5G Strategy published in 2020, the United States declared that 5G was a strategic technology and that it would promote its introduction and ensure its safety. The United States has been evaluating 5G at air force bases and elsewhere. In 2022, the United States established a team to handle 5G and next-generation wireless communications and began new initiatives such as Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN)[4] and secure and scalable spectrum sharing[5] for 5G and beyond. Conversely, in its 14th Five-Year Plan for Digital Economy Development announced in 2021, China, announced its intention to expand and match 5G and optical fiber and strengthen research and development into 6G. In 2023, Huawei announced a product with communication speeds ten times faster than 5G (equivalent to 5.5G). **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **(4) Additive Manufacturing Technology** Additive manufacturing technology, as typified by 3D printers, is expected to be applied to each military sector in various countries, due to low manufacturing cost and parts procurement that does not rely on inventory. The United States, in announcing the “Use of Additive Manufacturing Technology” in 2021, stated that it would enhance the independence and readiness of its military services and has installed 3D printers on some of its surface ships and submarines. China is also utilizing 3D printers to manufacture parts for military aircraft. Russia is developing 3D printers for drone production. According to the website of the U.S. Department of Defense on February 23, 2021 A wireless access network that discloses and standardizes specifications for wireless base stations and enables interconnection of multiple suppliers ----- **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **Perspective** **Information Warfare and Intelligence Services: Adaptation to Challenges** **of the State-sponsored Influence Operations and Disinformation** **SETO Takashi, Research Fellow, Cyber Security Division, National Institute for Defense Studies** Liberal democracies have faced serious concerns about state- covert cyber operations and traditional sabotage by adversaries’ sponsored “Influence operations,” such as covertly spreading foreign intelligence apparatus. disinformation on social networking services (SNSs). They are Recent academic literature has pointed out two distinctive recognized as “hybrid threats” short of armed conflict as they advantages of harnessing intelligence services to respond to the undermine the trust of democratic institutions like elections. In challenges of information warfare. One is access to sensitive sources addition, they have been grave national security threats as they and methods and unique analytical insights, which are not always support “hybrid warfare,” a combination of the military and non- available to the OSINT by non-state actors. Leveraging privileged military means for revising the status quo while managing the access to such capabilities enables them to identify and attribute escalation. Digital-enabled influence operations, in nature, exploit covert nation-state sponsorship faster than other stakeholders. This privately owned ICT platforms and exacerbate existing political, aspect is something like placing the intelligence agencies as “early- economic, and social vulnerabilities within the targeted community. warning sensors” against states-sponsored influence operations. In response, Western democracies have pursued a “whole-of- The second aspect is leveraging such unique insights society approach” that convenes inter-agency and cross-sectoral and international media attention generated by strategic cooperation, such as industry and civil society stakeholders, to declassification efforts as a “catalyst” for reciprocal knowledge co- tackle the challenges of influence operations. production and narrative amplification dynamics vis-à-vis industry While the whole-of-society approach comprises a variety of and civil society partners. For example, the US/UK-led intelligence multi-stakeholder efforts, the government’s initiatives constitute a disclosure before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with exceptional critical piece of the puzzle as well. The whole of the government’s international media attention, stimulated the independent OSINT- preparedness for “integrated information warfare with special enabled verification by Bellingcat and other international research regards to cognitive dimension”[1], comprising both intelligence institutes, leading to shared but verified situational awareness of and strategic communication functions, is vital as it shapes shared threats and international solidarity in support of Ukraine. Another situational awareness and helps public-private partnerships and example is the series of the Joint Cyber Security Advisory issued international cooperation to identify and disrupt imminent threats. by the U.S. allies and partners, which aims to scale up the Recent examples highlight two distinctive approaches to the reciprocal sharing of cyber threat intelligence vis-à-vis persistent government’s institutional adaptation toward “information warfare” state-sponsored cyber campaigns beyond the specific jurisdiction. among Western democracies. One is organizing a specialized These developments imply that intelligence services in liberal government body that is responsible for tracking and exposing democracies have struggled to adapt to complex information digital-enabled operations leveraging open-source intelligence environments in the 21st century, where they must build (OSINT), such as VIGINUM under the French General Secretariat collaborative feedback loops between industry and civil society for Defense and National Security. The other is harnessing national partners, as the state’s monopoly of knowledge and narrative has intelligence services to deal with the challenges of information been eroding due to the proliferation of the ICT. Such dynamics warfare. also raise a question about the organizational identity of the The latter approach was exemplified by the relentless national intelligence apparatus between the traditional roles of the declassification of intelligence analysis by the U.S. and UK secretive supporter serving the government decision-makers and intelligence community to expose and preempt Russia’s false the public-facing roles for reaching out to various stakeholders flag operations and disinformation campaign, thereby disrupting as a “whole of society approach.” In conclusion, the relationship Russia’s blitzkrieg military victory like the annexation of Crimea in between information warfare and intelligence agencies symbolizes 2014. Similar initiatives include the U.S. and U.K-led international the challenges of adaptation of secret intelligence in the liberal campaigns, in collaboration with like-minded European allies democracy vis-à-vis the information environment of the 21st such as the Netherlands, in order to publicly expose tradecrafts of century. **1** For initiatives by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, see Part III, Chapter 1, Section 5 of the White Paper. ----- **4** **Diffusion of Information-related Technology and Information Warfare** As has been pointed out in the cases of Russia’s invasion Security issued an advisory on the threat of deepfakes of Ukraine, the 2023 clashes between Israel and the in September 2023. In November the same year, the Palestinian militants as well as the presidential election Department of Defense developed the “Strategy for in Taiwan, concerns over information warfare, such as Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE),” the dissemination of disinformation and the proliferation which stated the need for the Office of the Secretary of of information aimed at eroding trust in the target Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and regional military government or dividing society using social networking forces to collaborate toward the same goal. In Europe, **ⅠPart** services (SNS) and influencers have been growing. It is believed that Russia and China are waging the EU has proposed the concept ofManipulation and Interference” (FIMI) “Foreign Information and is working on **Chapter** information warfare both domestically and abroad, countermeasures. **4** aiming to build an information environment favorable As for technological responses, the U.S. Defense to them. For example, it has been pointed out that China Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is is spending billions of dollars to promote propaganda, developing detection functions to verify the authenticity spread disinformation and conduct censorship by of various information in the media and private investing in the media of other countries. It has also been companies are also developing software that utilize AI noted that China and Russia are collaborating to spread and algorithms to automatically collect and analyze propaganda and disinformation, disseminating their online information. This software is being introduced to convenient narratives to target recipients in countries public institutions in various countries as a new means of like Japan, the United States, Taiwan and Europe, as well gathering information. as third countries in the Global South. **KEY WORD** It has been pointed out that autonomous programs **“Foreign Information Manipulation and** **Interference” (FIMI)** called bots are becoming more commonly used in tactics on social media. Major social media companies This is a concept that refers to “a series of actions by foreign governments are working to remove bot accounts, but there are also or others that have (or may have) the intention of wielding malign influence over the sense of values, procedures, or political processes” of one’s moves to use fake photos generated by AI to avoid being country. EU, NATO and each European country show serious concerns targeted for removal. about the spread of FIMI in the world. FIMI is often carried out legally, Furthermore, advances in AI technology could make deliberately and systematically by foreign countries, non-state actors, or deepfakes and generative AI-created videos, images and affiliated organizations, to wield influence on public opinion of one’s country or disrupt democratic processes such as presidential elections. This kind documents even more of a serious threat, as they are of information manipulation operation disables not only each individual but highly realistic and can be created in a short time with society as a whole from making its own decisions. This is one of the major easily accessible tools. threats to a democratic society based on free and open information. In response, the U.S. Department of Homeland **5** **Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technology Bases** Advanced technologies based on significant technological research expenditure of the United States is paid out advances in the civilian field have so much power that by the DoD. This is in contrast to the situation in Japan they can completely change the way battles happen. in which the research and development budget for the Relative merits in industry and technology greatly Ministry of Defense (the MOD) is only around 5% of influence national security. Under these circumstances, government research expenditure. many countries are taking on a variety of initiatives in The United States also offers large-scale funds to order to maintain and enhance their national defense research conducted by companies and universities. For production and technological bases. example, DARPA, an internal organization of the DoD, First of all, each country enhances investments has requested a budget of US$4,370 million for FY2025 to defense research and development to ensure to continue active investments in innovative research at technological superiority. For example, about half of companies and universities, with the aim of maintaining th l 16 t illi i t d i th t th U S F ’ t h l i l i it I dditi ----- defense industry. They also take on a variety of initiatives to maintain and strengthen their defense production base, such as supporting the participation of domestic companies in government programs and promoting exports. In the National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) announced in January 2024, the United States set out four long-term strategic priorities to build a strong defense industrial base fit for the times: resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition and economic deterrence. The United States also outlined its intention to promote various initiatives to achieve these priorities, such as strengthening cooperation with allies and friendly nations, providing financial support to companies and improving procurement methods. The United Kingdom published its Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS) in order to construct a more productive and strategic relationship with domestic defense industries in 2021. The DSIS orders the government to take on some initiatives such as largescale procurement reforms, toughening of supply chains and accelerating export permissions in order to strengthen defense as a critical strategic asset. Furthermore, the United Kingdom published the Defence Supply Chain Strategy in 2022 and stated to aim to build up robust defense supply chains to enable the military to respond to the current severe security environment. Australia created a new office of Minister for Defence Industry in 2016. Australia also supports small and medium sized enterprises participating in the defense industry and keeps up with financial support through the Office of Defence Industry Support established in 2021 as a One-Stop organization to support the defense industry. Furthermore, in its Defence Industry Development Strategy (DIDS) announced in February 2024, Australia set out seven Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities (SDIPs) and decided to strengthen cooperation with the defense industry, for example by providing vocational training and subsidies to businesses, as well as promoting public-private exchanges, to realize these projects. In March 2024, the EU announced its first European Defence Industry Strategy (EDIS), which sets numerical targets for defense-related trade within the EU and the proportion of joint procurement and presents a series of actions, including financial support and strengthening relationships with other countries, to enhance the competitiveness and readiness of the European defense industry Th R bli f K (ROK) i i t the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) mediates between companies owning innovative technology and the DoD to make the most of cutting-edge technologies from the civilian field in the resolution of challenges in the security sector. The DIU has produced contracts with over 450 companies mainly in six fields, including AI, autonomous technology and the cyber field. In FY2023, the DIU moved 10 consumer solutions suggested by companies from the prototype stage to the production stage. China is promoting Civil-Military Fusion (CMF) as a national strategy. General Secretary Xi Jinping stated in his report to the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October 2022 that China would build up a series of new growth engines such as next-generation information technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, new energy, new materials and such through promoting integrated development of strategic emerging industries and clustered development. In response to the recent utilization of dual-use technologies in defense equipment development, the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia, as well as NATO, have been funding innovative research and development in the private sector to acquire advanced civilian technologies. The United Kingdom is strengthening its investment in the Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), which invests in innovations boosting security in industry and academia. It also established the Advanced Research and Invention Agency (ARIA) in January 2023 with the aim of investing in groundbreaking research with the potential to have a significant impact on society. In Australia, an organization called the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) was established in July 2023 to replace the existing Defense Innovation Hub and the Next Generation Technologies Fund. The ASCA aims to collaborate with Australian industry and research institutions to rapidly provide the capabilities needed by the Australian military. Meanwhile, NATO established the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) in April 2022 with the aim of enabling member states to work with the private sector and academia to make advanced new technologies available for Western security. Furthermore, foreign countries recognize the defense industrial base as an essential element of their national defense and have organized systems to implement their policies through the publication of policy documents d th t bli h t f i ti i h f th **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- of capabilities and higher self containment of domestic defense industry through their Defence Industry Development Act and their Defence Science and Technology Innovation Promotion Act enforced in 2021. Furthermore, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced a policy to procure equipment taking into consideration the ripple effects for domestic industries and a policy to promote cooperation between foreign companies and domestic companies as well as the use of domestic products by foreign companies.[6] Each country exports equipment strategically because trading equipment strengthens the relationship between two trading countries as well as the base for defense technology and the defense industry. For example, the United Kingdom announced in the DSIS that it would support exporting with cross-ministerial effort from different government offices such as the Department for International Trade and the Home Office. The United States, Russia, Europe and China are still the top four in terms of export value of military equipment, while Australia formulated its export strategy.[7] The ROK established an export support organization,[8] and financially supports research and development for export. Various countries proactively promote military equipment export using a variety of measures. **See** Fig. I-4-1-1 (Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms Export (2019-2023)); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 1 (Reinforcing Defense Production Base); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 2 (Reinforcing Defense Technology Base) **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** |Rank|Country or region|Shares in the total global exports of defense equipment (%) 2019-2023|Comparison with 2014-2018 (%)| |---|---|---|---| |1|The United States|42|17| |2|France|11|47| |3|Russia|11|-53| |4|China|6|-5| |5|Germany|6|-14| |6|Italy|4|86| |7|The United Kingdom|4|-14| |8|Spain|3|-3| |9|Israel|2|-25| |10|ROK|2|12| Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional **Fig. I-4-1-1** Arms Export (2019-2023) (Note) Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” Only the top 10 countries by export share for 2019 to 2023 are indicated (figures are rounded to the nearest whole number). The ROK announced the introduction of the Korea Defense Capability policy in 2021, which includes these policies. Australia announced the Defence Export Strategy in 2018. ----- **Section 2** **Trends in Space Domain** **1** **Space Domain and Security** There is no concept of national borders in space, meaning Russia are developing jammers for interfering with that the utilization of satellites enables the observation communications between target satellites and ground of, communication with and positioning over any area stations, as well as high energy technology such as on Earth. laser weapons designed to degrade or damage satellites. Thus, major countries make efforts to enhance the In addition, a Russian cyber-attack on a satellite capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for communication provider in 2022 disrupted satellite **Part** the purpose of enhancing C4ISR (command, control, communications services, raising concerns about cyber- **Ⅰ** communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance attacks on space systems. **Chapter** and reconnaissance), functions. Such satellites include As threats in space continue to rise, many countries **4** information collecting satellites that collect various are increasingly positioning space as a “warfighting activities as images and radio waves, early warning domain” or “operational domain.” These countries are satellites for detecting the launch of ballistic missiles, working on space domain awareness (SDA) to monitor positioning satellites for enhancing the precision of threats to their space assets. weapons systems, communication satellites relays Against this backdrop, the existing international communication and the like. agreements do not have direct provisions on prohibiting On the other hand, anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) to the destruction of space assets or avoiding actions hinder the utilization of space by other countries are also triggering space debris. Accordingly, with peaceful under development. usage and the need to prevent an arms race in mind, the Regarding destructive Direct-Ascent Anti-SATellite United Nations is debating this issue in the Committee (DA-ASAT) missiles, China and Russia conducted on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and tests targeting their own satellites in 2007 and 2021, the First Committee of the United Nations General respectively. As a result, a large amount of space debris Assembly. In recent years, topics related to disarmament, has been generated, raising concerns about the risk of such as “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” such debris colliding with satellites and other space and “Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules assets of various countries. and Principles of Responsible Behaviors,” have also Regarding China, it has been pointed out that the robot been discussed. In 2023, the UN General Assembly also arm technologies being developed by China to inspect adopted a resolution to continue these discussions. and repair on-orbit satellites can be diverted to ASAT In addition, as part of the efforts of like-minded nations, weapons such as satellite-attack satellites (so-called the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO) “killer satellites”). As for Russia, it has been pointed out meetings are being held to discuss space security, with that the ejection of an object from itssatellite against a three new countries, including Japan, joining to discuss nearby satellite was an ASAT experiment.[1] operational cooperation and information sharing. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China and **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-4 (Responses in Space Domain) **2** **Various Countries’ Outer Space Initiatives** its great achievements. The U.S. Forces clearly recognize **1** **The United States** the importance of outer space and are actively utilizing it. The United States is the world greatest space power In 2023, the United States demonstrated an accelerated that has been promoting a variety of space activities in process from satellite payload loading to operation to military, science, resource mapping and other domains. improve the readiness of its satellite launch capabilities. The launch of the first reconnaissance satellite in the The United States is also launching numerous satellites world and the first landing on the Moon are also among to build a satellite constellation called “Proliferated ----- support industry government academia collaboration in the Space Force. On December 15, 2023, the Commander of Space Command declared that Space Command had become fully operational. **See** Chapter 3, Section 2-2-5 (Military Posture) **2** **China** Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) that detects and tracks missile threats, including hypersonic weapons, from space. On the policy front, the National Defense Strategy states that utilizing the space domain will improve the capabilities of monitoring and decision-making systems to achieve combat objectives, regardless of enemy interference or deception, while the National Defense Space Strategy states that its goals are to ensure superiority in space, support national operations and joint and combined operations through space capabilities and ensure stability in space. In 2023, the United States announced a “Strategic Framework for Space Diplomacy,” which stated that it would expand mutually beneficial international cooperation in space activities. The country also published the “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” which assessed China and Russia as threats and stated that the realization of the Department of Defense’s space policy requires highly resilient command and control, space-based fire and protection, flexible electronic warfare operations, enhanced SDA and cyber defense capabilities. In addition, The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office and U.S. Space Command are working on a commercial asset protection framework, including the sharing of space threat information. As for organizations, the United States inaugurated the U.S. Space Command as a new regional unified combatant command based on the Strategic Command’s component in charge of space missions in 2019. The United States created the Space Force under the Department of the Air Force as the sixth military branch, with approximately 16,000 personnel. In 2023, the U.S. Space Force established the U.S. Space Forces Europe and Africa to strengthen space capabilities in the European and African regions, an ISR unit to analyze threats from enemy space forces and the “U.S. Space Forces - Space (S4S)” to conduct integrated space operations on behalf of the Commander of Space Command, as well as provisionally forming mission-specific units to operate electronic warfare and Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) satellites. In addition, to promote the use of commercial services, the United States established a department to coordinate their use in the Space Command and a department to **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** China has been promoting space development since the 1950s and has been further intensifying its space activities, including landing an unmanned probe on the far side of the moon, completing the space station “Tiangong,” and advancing plans for a lunar base. In 2023, China launched a number of satellites, including the positioning satellite “BeiDou” and the earth observation satellite “Yaogan,” and is also working to build a satellite constellation for rapid information gathering and communication. While traditionally emphasizing international cooperation and the peaceful use of space, it is pointed out that China proactively used space for military purposes, including information collection, communications and positioning through satellites. For example, the possibility of military use has been pointed out for “BeiDou” for aircraft and vessel navigation and guidance of missiles, and for “Yaogon” for electronic and image reconnaissance. Regarding carrier rockets such as the “Long March” series, the Chinese state-owned enterprises that developed and produced them are said to be also developing and producing ballistic missiles, and it is believed that the development of carrier rockets could also be applied to the development of ballistic missiles. It is pointed out that China recognizes counter space operations as a means to deter and confront the United States’s intervention to regional conflicts[2] and carries out ASAT weapons development and the like. In addition to the satellite destruction test in 2007 mentioned above and the “non-destructive” test of an ASAT missile in July 2014, it is also pointed out that China continues to acquire and develop various ASAT capabilities and related technologies such as ground-based lasers and space robots.[3] China is thus expected to focus on space development through close cooperation between government, military and private sectors. The United States estimates that According to the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023) ----- China pursues space capabilities the same as or higher than those of the United States.[4] It is also pointed out that the number of Chinese military satellites under operation is larger than that of the United States.[5] In terms of policy, China insists that space is key to international strategic competition and that the safety of space is a strategic safeguard for nation building and social development. It also reveals the principle that it accelerates development of the aerospace domain. In the white paper titled “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective” issued in January 2022, it was emphasized to “build China into a space power” and it stated that China promotes the space industry. Moreover, the policy to “accelerate the construction of space development power” was raised in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th Congress of the CCP in October 2022. In terms of organization, the creation of an information support force was announced in 2024, which has been noted as a reorganization of the Strategic Support Forces established at the end of 2015. Prior to 2024, the Strategic Support Forces was said to have been tasked with space, cyber, and electronic warfare. **3** **Russia** GLONASS. Regarding ASAT weapons, in November 2021, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that it had successfully destroyed a Soviet satellite in orbit in an experiment. In regard to Russian policies, Russia released in 2016 the Federal Space Program for 2016-2025 as a specific future guideline for space activities, including the development and deployment of domestic space satellites and crewed flight programs. From an organizational perspective, ROSCOSMOS is in charge of space activities related to Russia’s scientific and economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defence is involved in space activities for security purposes. The Russian Aerospace Forces, into which the Air Force and the Aerospace Defence Forces were integrated in August 2015, conduct actual space activities for military purposes and manage facilities for launching satellites. **4 �Democratic People’s Republic of Korea** **(North Korea)** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** North Korea has been advancing the development of its reconnaissance satellites. In 2023, North Korea claimed to have successfully launched and put into operation “Malligyong-1,” purported to be a reconnaissance satellite. It has also cited launching three additional satellites as a goal for 2024. In terms of organization, in 2023, North Korea reorganized the National Aerospace Development Administration, which had been in charge of rocket Pyongyang General Control Center of the National Aerospace Technology Administration [Korean Central News Agency - Jiji] While Russian space activity has been reduced since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has continued to be active in space in recent years, even after its aggression against Ukraine. For example, Russia is working on the multi-satellite constellation plan Sfera to complete a constellation of over 600 satellites for observation and communication by 2030. Furthermore, Russia has decided to extend its participation in the International Space Station until 2028 and has revealed a development plan for its own space station, with each module scheduled to be launched between 2028 and 2030. In addition, Russia has used its space capabilities for military operations in Syria. Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu revealed at a meeting of the Ministry of Defence in 2019 that he has become aware of the need to rebuild the country’s military satellites based on this tactical experience. In 2023, Russia launched the military satellite “Lotos-S1,” which is believed to be for electronic reconnaissance, the radar observation satellite “Kondor-FKA,” and the positioning satellite **4** According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (2023) ----- and satellite development, into the National Aerospace Technology Administration. The Reconnaissance Satellite Operation Office, a military intelligence organization, reportedly exists within the National Aerospace Technology Administration’s Pyongyang General Control Center and reports information obtained by reconnaissance satellites to the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party (CMC) and, in accordance with the CMC’s instructions, provides the information to key military units and the Reconnaissance General Bureau. **5** **Republic of Korea (ROK)** The ROK’s space development is promoted based on the Fourth Basic Space Development Promotion Plan announced in December 2022 under the Space Development Promotion Act implemented in 2005. The plan mainly aims to double the space-related budget, promote the space industry and establish an aerospace agency. The Ministry of National Defense has stated that it will acquire surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning satellites to strengthen its space-related capabilities.[6] In May 2023, the ROK conducted the third launch of its domestically produced Nuri rocket. In December 2023, the ROK military’s first reconnaissance satellite was launched in the United States and is scheduled to be operational during the first half of 2024. In addition, civilian commercial satellites have been launched domestically using the Agency for Defense Development’s solid-fuel propulsion space projectile technology. The ROK Ministry of National Defense has stated that the country is close to securing the capability to rapidly put small satellites into low orbit. Among organizations, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute leads research and development as an implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency for Defense Development is engaged in the development and use of various satellites. Also, to secure space surveillance capabilities above the Korean Peninsula, the country created its first space force in 2019 and reinforced and reorganized the unit into the Air Force Space Operation Battalion in 2022. **6** **India** India is promoting space development, such as manned space missions and lunar exploration missions. India unveiled its Space Policy 2023, outlining its intention to focus on providing public goods and services using space technology and building a fair regulatory framework to promote effective use of space by public and private sectors for socio-economic and security purposes. As for bilateral cooperation, the 2021 IndiaRussia Joint Statement announced the strengthening of cooperation with Russia in the fields of space and military technology. In 2023, India and the United States established the India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem for defense technology innovation, with Indian companies signing joint research and development agreements with the U.S. Space Force. India is also operating a regional navigation satellite system called “Navigation Indian Constellation (NavIC)” for the purpose of positioning around the country and launched its second-generation positioning satellite in 2023. Regarding ASAT weapons, Prime Minister Modi announced in 2019 that the country successfully tested a missile to destroy a low-orbit satellite. **7** **Europe** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** The EU allocated 14.88 billion euros to its space policy in its medium-term budget plan from 2021 through 2027. To promote the space industry and strengthen security, the EU is promoting robust PNT, precise Earth observation, enhanced space surveillance and tracking capabilities, and secure satellite communication services. It is also working to develop military PNT and spacebased autonomous situational awareness. In 2023, the EU published its Space Security and Defense Strategy, which stated that it would strengthen the use of space capabilities in security and defense, and it plans to develop new Earth observation services and provide initial SDA services. The EU also announced an agreement not to conduct DA-ASAT missile tests and is conducting penetration tests on satellite-mounted systems to understand the vulnerabilities of satellite systems to cyber-attacks. NATO indicated its recognition that space is the fifth operational domain alongside land, sea, air and ----- cyberspace and that armed attacks in space could trigger NATO’s right to collective self-defense. In its new strategic concept published in 2022, NATO stated that it would strengthen its ability to operate effectively in the space and cyber domains. In 2023, NATO launched an initiative called “persistent surveillance from space,” aiming to strengthen ISR through the integrated use of public and private satellites. Additionally, a NATOcertified Space Center of Excellence (Space COE) began operation and is expected to complement the efforts of the NATO Space Center through means such as education, training, and concept development. In the United Kingdom, the Space Command was officially launched in 2021 and will be responsible for conducting space operations, training and developing space-related personnel, and providing space capabilities. The Defense Space Strategy announced in 2022 stated that the United Kingdom will invest 1.4 billion pounds over the next 10 years in areas such as ISR and satellite communications. In 2023, the United Kingdom established a unit where the Space Command will take on part of the U.S. Space Force’s SDA mission, thereby strengthening the UK’s space operations capabilities and cooperation with the United States. France announced its National Defense Space Strategy in 2019, stating that it aims to establish a space command and strengthen its threat recognition and space situation monitoring capabilities. In the same year, France established a space command under the Air Force. In 2020, the Air Force was renamed the Air and Space Force, adding activities to ensure free access to space and freedom of action in space to its duties. In addition, in the “Military Programming Act 2024-2030” enacted in 2023, France stated that it aims to establish a command, control, communications, and computing center for space operations and introduce patrol satellites. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- **Section 3** **Trends in Cyber Domain** **1** **Cyberspace and Security** The internet is becoming increasingly important as a systems. In addition, the methods of attack are becoming new social domain(cyberspace) with various services increasingly sophisticated; for example, it is pointed out and communities being formed. Therefore, cyber-attacks that the use of AI for cyber-attacks is possible. that compromise information assets and networks in For military forces also, cyberspace forms the cyberspace are real threats to security because they can foundation of command and control, which extend **Part** have serious impacts on society. from central command to ground-level forces. In this **Ⅰ** Types of cyber-attacks include unauthorized access, regard, the dependence of military forces on cyberspace **Chapter** information leakage and functional impairment is further increasing. Since it is not easy to identify the **4** by malware (unauthorized programs), information attackers and ascertain the damage, cyber-attacks are falsification and theft, functional impairment of recognized as an asymmetrical means to impede military networks through the simultaneous transmission of large activities of adversaries at low cost. And it is believed amounts of data and the shutdown or takeover of critical that many foreign armed forces are developing cyber- infrastructure such as electric power systems and medical attack capabilities. **2** **Threat Trend in Cyberspace** Cyber-attacks have frequently been carried out against may have been reorganized into an information support not only government organizations and military forces but force or the like in 2024. The Strategic Support Forces also business corporations and academic organizations prior to 2024 were estimated to be around 175,000-strong, in various countries, targeting their critical technology, of which 30,000 were said to be in the cyber attack force. confidential information and personal data. In addition, The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense recognizes advanced persistent threat (APT), which refers to China as a security threat in cyberspace, pointing out relentless cyber-attacks on specific organizations, is also that the country accurately grasps the targets for cyber- considered to be an organized activity because it requires attacks by information correction and information theft in abundant resources, arrangements and capabilities for peacetime and in war time, aims to injure the capabilities long-term activities. of the government and armed forces by destructing key To respond to such advanced cyber-attacks, Japan is infrastructure and information systems, destabilizing the required to share threat awareness with foreign countries society and creating confusion.[2] China’s 2019 defense for technological and operational cooperation. Amid this white paper, released in July 2019 and titled “China’s situation, the United States has assessed that attackers National Defense in the New Era,” stated that China’s are using malicious cyber activities to gain asymmetric armed forces are accelerating the building of their advantages and target critical infrastructure, thereby cyberspace capabilities. China is thus believed to have undermining U.S. military superiority, citing China, been enhancing its military’s cyber warfare capabilities. Russia, North Korea and Iran as particularly egregious **See** Chapter 3, Section 2-2-5 (Military Posture) offenders.[1] China is suspected of routinely stealing technologies and conducting surveillance of foreign adversaries in cyberspace.[3] In 2023, China’s involvement in the **1** **China** following incidents was noted: In China, it has been believed that cyber warfare units - In April 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted were organized under the Strategic Support Forces, but a Chinese government official for disrupting an online it has been pointed out that the Strategic Support Forces meeting of Chinese dissidents residing in the United **1** According to “Cyber Strategy 2023,” the U.S. DoD (2023) **2** According to Taiwan’s National Defense Report (2021) ----- States by sending a massive transmission of pro Chinese government messages. - In May 2023, the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries announced that “Volt Typhoon,” a cyber actor backed by the Chinese government, had infiltrated critical infrastructure in the United States. It was pointed out that to avoid leaving traces, the Volt Typhoon had used network tools in the infiltrationtarget environment, thereby avoiding detection. - In July 2023, a U.S. IT firm announced that a China based cyber actor, “Storm-0558,” had hacked the email accounts of the U.S. State Department, Commerce Department and others. - In August 2023, a U.S. IT firm announced that a China-based cyber actor, “Flux Typhoon,” had infiltrated Taiwanese government agencies and other organizations to establish and maintain long-term access. - In September 2023, Japan’s National Police Agency, the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, and others issued a warning, saying that the “BlackTech,” a cyber actor backed by China had carried out cyber attacks aimed at stealing information from government, industry, and technology sectors in East Asia, including Japan, and the United States. **2** **North Korea** the critical infrastructure of other countries. The United Nations Security Council Expert Panel 2023 Final Report issued in 2024 alleged that 58 cyber-attacks against cryptocurrency-related companies suspected of North Korean involvement from 2017 to 2023 amounted to approximately $3 billion in damages and that North Korea is earning approximately 50% of its foreign currency income through cyber-attacks and using it for its weapons of mass destruction programs. In 2023, North Korea’s involvement in the following cases was pointed out: - In April 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted executives of the Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on charges of laundering crypto-assets obtained through cyberattacks. - In June 2023, South Korea and the United States issued a warning that a North Korean cyber actor known as “Kimsuky” was collecting diplomatic information through unauthorized access using social engineering. - In July 2023, a U.S. security company announced that cyber actors believed to be affiliated with the North Korean Reconnaissance General Bureau had infiltrated the system of a U.S. software provider and executed malicious scripts against the provider’s customers. - In August 2023, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a warning that North Korean cyber actors had stolen hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of crypto-assets from multiple businesses in June. - In October 2023, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service issued a warning, saying it had detected cyberattacks suspected to be attempts to steal technical information by North Korean hackers against domestic shipbuilding companies and their employees in August and September. **3** **Russia** It is pointed out that in the case of Russia, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, the Federal Security Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service are involved in cyber **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** North Korea has four major intelligence agencies and external intelligence agencies: the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), the Ministry of State Security, the United Front Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the Cultural Exchange Bureau. It is pointed out that their main targets are the ROK, the United States and Japan.[4] Moreover, it is pointed out that their personnel are trained by these agencies.[5] This is led by the RGB of Korean People’s Army and has intensively built-up cyber units, operating some 6,800 people.[6] It also is said that North Korea, which is under sanctions of every kind, uses cyber attacks to acquire foreign currency taking advantage of loopholes of sanctions.[7] It also commits thefts of foreign military secret intelligence and develops attack capabilities for **4** According to “North Korea Military Power,” U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (2021) **5** According to the ROK Defense “2016 Defense White Paper” (2017) **6** According to the ROK Defense “2022 Defense White Paper” (2023) ----- attacks and it became clear that Russia s armed forces have a cyber command unit.[8] The cyber command unit is believed to be responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities, including inserting malware into command and control systems of adversaries,[9] and is said to have approximately 1,000 personnel. Moreover, Russia revealed, in its National Security Strategy released in July 2021, its perception that space and information space are under active development as a new domain for military action and declared to reinforce its sovereignty in the information space as a national priority. In 2019, Russia enacted the so-called Sovereign Internet Law, which aimed to cut off Russian networks from global networks in the event of a cyber-attack and the like, thereby ensuring the continuity of Russian networks. Russia is said to be improving its espionage, influence and attack capabilities[10] and is suspected of being involved in the following incidents in 2023: - In April 2023, Poland warned that it had observed widespread espionage by cyber actors associated with the Russian Federal Security Service targeting government ministries and agencies in EU countries. Poland pointed out that the cyber actors were posing as embassies and sent emails with links to insert malware. - In May 2023, the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries announced that the Russian Federal Security Service had been using the malware “Snake” to conduct intelligence operations in more than 50 countries for nearly 20 years. They noted that computers infected with the malware had established encrypted networks and relayed spoofed communications. - In June 2023, Ukraine issued a warning that the Russian cyber actor “APT28” was conducting espionage activities against Ukrainian government ministries and agencies by exploiting webmail vulnerabilities. - In August 2023, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States warned that the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces had attempted to deploy new malware, “Infamous Chisel,” on terminals used by the Ukrainian military. - In December 2023, the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries accused Russia of conducting spear-phishing attacks using “Star Blizzard,” a cyber actor affiliated with the Russian Federal Security Service, targeting organizations and individuals in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. **4** **Trends Concerning Other Threats** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** In recent years, supply chain attacks via vulnerabilities in products used on a daily basis and business partners with lax security, as well as cyber-attacks on industrial control systems such as critical infrastructure, have also attracted attention. Supply chain attacks by circumventing conventional security measures are a concern because they invade trusted organizations and software during the supply process ranging from procuring product parts to selling them to infiltrate targeted organizations. In 2023, the United States and the United Kingdom issued a warning that the ransomware actor “cl0p” had infiltrated government networks by exploiting vulnerabilities in software used by government agencies. Cyberattacks on industrial control systems are a growing concern for critical infrastructure in particular, as the use of IT has made these systems easier targets for attacks, due to their transition from proprietary specifications and closed systems to open systems. In 2022, European security companies pointed out that in the Russian cyberattack on Ukrainian power transmission and substation facilities, the attackers were attempting to penetrate industrial control systems inside the IT network and deploy destructive malware. As for space systems, satellite communications services were disrupted in 2022 due to a Russian cyberattack on a satellite communications operator. As a result, countries are strengthening security measures through new advisories and guidelines on satellite communications and in Europe and the United States, penetration tests and hacking competitions are being conducted to clarify the vulnerabilities of space systems. According to the statement made by Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu in an information session for Duma, the lower house, in February 2017. He said that the Russian military has a cyber command for countering political propaganda in the context of Russia’s ongoing information war with Western countries. However, the minister fell short of naming the command. According to then the U.S. Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s written testimony on “Worldwide Cyber Threats” at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2015. ----- **3** **Initiatives against Cyberspace Threats** Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various of Defense’s Cyber Strategy 2023 stated that the initiatives are under way. department would track the organizations, capabilities It is believed that the international community has and intentions of attackers, disrupt and degrade malicious diverging views on fundamental matters related to cyber activities and defend against them, as well as cyberspace, including how international law should be support the Unified Combatant Command’s operations applied. For instance, the United States, Europe and in the cyber domain and cooperate with allies and related Japan have called for maintaining a free cyberspace, countries to defend against them. while Russia, China and most emerging countries have At the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting in 2019, the two **Part** sought to strengthen state control of cyberspace. The countries agreed to strengthen cooperation in the field **Ⅰ** United Nations held an open-ended working group of cyberspace, affirming that international law applies **Chapter** meeting from 2021 to 2025 to discuss a wide-ranging in cyberspace and that a cyber-attack could, in certain **4** issue on threat perceptions, norms and the application of circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the international law in cyberspace. purposes of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-5 (Response in the Cyber Domain) The U.S. Forces include Cyber Command, which was elevated to a unified combatant command in May 2018 to control cyberspace operations. The U.S. Cyber **1** **The United States** Command, with 6,200 personnel, comprises teams In the United States, the Department of Homeland that protect the Department of Defense’s information Security is responsible for protecting federal government networks, monitor and defend against adversary cyber networks and critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks activities and support the Unified Combatant Commands’ and the Department’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure operations. The U.S. military also conducts operations to Security Agency (CISA) works to protect the networks defend against and disrupt malicious cyber activities on of government agencies. critical networks in partner nations such as Latvia and The U.S. government has announced a National Lithuania. Cybersecurity Strategy, setting out the need to focus on protecting critical infrastructure and preventing and **2** **Republic of Korea** dismantling threat actors. The government has also announced a “Zero Trust[11] Strategy” to strengthen The ROK has announced a new “National Cyber Security cybersecurity at federal agencies, calling on each ministry Strategy” in 2024, which aims to develop offensive and agency to implement security measures based on cyber defenses and ensure resilience in response to cyber the Zero Trust model. In addition, the government has threats from North Korea and other nations, as well as announced a National Cyber Workforce and Education the evolving cyber landscape. Strategy to secure cyber workforce, which sets out its In terms of national defense, the ROK’s military has intention to address the long-term issue of acquiring established a structure to perform cyber operations led basic cyber skills for the public and reforming cyber by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2019, while developing education. a collaborative system among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Regarding national security, the U.S. government’s Cyber Operations Command and each military branch National Security Strategy states that it will respond in enhancing its cyber operations preparedness and decisively to hostile actions in cyberspace with the aim ensuring effective response to threats in cyberspace. of deterring cyber-attacks. Meanwhile, the National In 2023, a high-level U.S.-ROK consultative body, Defense Strategy prioritizes building resilience in the the “High-Level Steering Group,” was established to cyber domain and cites offensive cyber defenses as a strengthen U.S.-ROK cyber security cooperation. means of direct deterrence. Furthermore, the Department **11 This concept is based on the view that human nature is fundamentally evil, with the principle of “Do not trust even insiders and be suspicious of both outsiders and insiders without** distinction.” This concept recommends suspecting even users and equipment such as terminals. If there is a high possibility of spoofing or similar, proactive suspension of access rights is ----- framework for cyber defense activities by member states’ military cyber response teams for regional cyber cooperation, as well as working to ensure mutual cyber security support among member states. In 2023, an operator-level exercise was held to strengthen information-sharing and situational awareness among member states to cope with cyber-related crises. At the NATO Summit in 2014, an agreement was reached that NATO’s collective defense applies to cyberattacks against member states. In addition, at the 2023 NATO summit, it was decided to integrate political, military and technological aspects of cyber defense to ensure military-civilian cooperation in peacetime, crises and emergency situations and further strengthen national cyber defense, including critical infrastructure. On the organizational front, the NATO Cyber Security Centre is protecting NATO’s own networks and the Cyber Domain Operations Center is coordinating operational actions in the cyber domain, ensuring freedom of action and providing threat resilience. In 2023, NATO launched the Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability (VCISC) to counter malicious and significant cyber activities. Furthermore, in 2008, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was authorized to serve as a research and training institution. The CCDCOE published the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on international law applicable to cyber operations in 2017 and an initiative to revise the manual to version 3.0 is ongoing. In 2023, the CCDCOE held the cyber defense exercise “Locked Shields,” and NATO held the cyber defense exercise “Cyber Coalition,” in which NATO member states as well as Japan participated. In its National Cyber Strategy published in 2021, the United Kingdom set out strategic objectives such as detection, disruption and deterrence of adversaries. Cyber exercise “Cyber Coalition 2023” organized by NATO [NATO] **3** **Australia** In its Defence Cyber Security Strategy released in 2022, Australia stated that it would achieve missionfocused and state-of-the-art cybersecurity adapted to the cyber threat environment through best practices and partnerships and set action goals such as operational model implementation and capability acquisition. In addition, the “2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy,” published in 2023, established a roadmap for Australia to become a global cybersecurity leader by 2030. In its 2023 Defence Strategic Review, Australia stated that it should broadly strengthen its cyber capabilities to support integrated domain operations and in its 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program, it stated that it would improve its defense capabilities, including cyber capabilities, over the 10 years leading up to 2034. On the organizational front, cybersecurity capabilities across the government have been centralized through the establishment of the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), which addresses major cybersecurity issues related to government agencies and critical infrastructure. In 2022, Australia announced the creation of a permanent joint task force of 100 cyber personnel selected from the Department of Communications and the Australian Federal Police to prevent cyber-attacks before they occur. The Minister for Cyber Security has clearly declared to adopt an offensive cyber defense. The Australian Defence Force created the Information Warfare Division under the Joint Capabilities Group in 2017 and established the Defence Signals Intelligence and Cyber Command (DSCC) under the division in 2018. In 2019, the Royal Australian Air Force offered to recruit cyber skills officers to protect networks, data and information systems. **4** **Europe** **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** The EU announced “The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade” in 2020, which set goals such as revising regulations for resilient infrastructure and essential services and establishing a joint cyber unit across the civilian, diplomatic, police and defense sectors. In addition, the EU announced its Cyber Defense Policy in 2022 to strengthen the EU’s ability to protect its citizens and infrastructure. E i l ti th f ----- 2015, France stated that it would protect its fundamental interests in cyberspace and strengthen its response to cybercrimes. In addition, in its “Strategic Review of Cyber Defense” in 2018, it clarified its cyber crisis management process. On the organizational front, France established its Cyber Defense Command under the Chief of the Defence Staff in 2017 and announced a plan to increase the Command’s personnel to around 5,000 by 2025 to strengthen its cyber defense capabilities. In addition, the “Military Planning Law 2024-2030,” enacted in 2023, aims to establish a center of excellence (research base) to develop tactics, methods and procedures for cyber missions. In addition, the National Cyber Force: Responsible Cyber Warfare Practices,” published in 2023, stated that it would disrupt terrorist activities, counter APT threats and mitigate election interference and would pursue efforts to enhance the National Cyber Force’s scale, capabilities and functional integration going forward. On the organizational front, in 2016, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) was newly established under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to promote public-private partnerships for responses to national cyber incidents. Moreover, the 13th Signal Regiment was established in 2020 for the protection of military networks. The National Cyber Force was also established. In its national digital security strategy published in **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** ----- |Radio waves Microwaves|Infrared rays Visible light| |---|---| **Section 4** **Trends in Electromagnetic Domain** **1** **Electromagnetic Domain and Security** Electromagnetic spectrum is used in various “Electronic protection” is to make it difficult to be everyday applications, including televisions, mobile detected by adversaries and to reduce or neutralize communications and global positioning systems (GPS). adversary electronic attacks on communications and In the military field, electromagnetic spectrum is used radar equipment by changing electromagnetic wave for command-and-control communications equipment, frequency for use or increasing its power. **Part** radar systems for detecting enemies, missile guidance “Electronic warfare support” consists of **Ⅰ** systems and other equipment. Securing superiority in activities designed to collect information relating **Chapter** the electromagnetic domain is indispensable for modern to electromagnetic waves used by adversaries. To **4** operations. Activities using the electromagnetic domain effectively conduct electronic attacks and electronic include “electronic warfare” and “electromagnetic protection, it is necessary to continuously monitor and spectrum management.” Electronic warfare means or analyze what kind of electromagnetic waves are used approaches are generally classified into three categories and how by the adversary’s communication equipment, - electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic radar and electronic attack aircraft. warfare support. “Electromagnetic wave management” is to grasp **See** Fig. I-4-4-1 (How to Use the Electromagnetic Domain in the how electromagnetic waves are used in the battle area Defense Field) and to appropriately adjust frequencies, directions and “Electronic attack” involves jamming electromagnetic durations of electromagnetic waves as well as equipment waves emitted from the adversary’s communication used by friendly forces to avoid electromagnetic wave equipment or radar by emitting strong electromagnetic interference. waves or fake electromagnetic waves mimicking those Major countries recognize electronic attacks as emitted by the adversary, thereby reducing or disabling asymmetric means of attack similar to cyber attacks that the adversary’s communications and search capabilities. effectively prevent adversaries from demonstrating their Electronic attacks include electromagnetic interference military capabilities. They are also placing importance (jamming), electromagnetic wave deception and on and enhancing their electronic warfare capabilities, physical destruction using high-power electromagnetic including the ability to launch electronic attacks. waves (such as lasers and microwaves). **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-6 (Responses in the Domain of Electromagnetic Spectrum) **See** Section 1-2 (2) (High-power Energy Technology) Fig. I-4-4-1 How to Use the Electromagnetic Domain in the Defense Field **Electromagnetic waves** Frequency: Low Frequency: High Wavelength: Long Wavelength: Short 300MHz 300GHz 3THz 400THz 790THz 30PHz Radio waves Microwaves Infrared rays Visible light Ultraviolet rays X-rays, γ-rays, etc. Radio waves: Communications, radars Infrared rays: Guidance of missiles Visible light: Reconnaissance satellites Lasers (amplification and radiation of electromagnetic waves) Information sharing through satellite communications Accurate guidance of Monitoring of space through missiles through laser laser distance measurement irradiation Ascertaining of circumstances by an optical satellite Detection of enemies by a radar Accurate guidance by an infrared sensor ----- **2** **Each Country’s Electronic Warfare Initiatives** **1** **The United States and Europe** **2** **China** In its “Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy” The Chinese military considers electronic warfare an announced in 2020, the United States emphasized essential element of modern warfare. To protect its own the importance of ensuring freedom of action in the information networks and prevent adversaries from electromagnetic spectrum for successful operations using the electromagnetic domain, it will attempt to align across all domains. The strategy laid out its objectives electronic warfare and cyber to ensure its information of developing superior electromagnetic spectrum dominance in conflicts.[1] **Part** capabilities and creating a flexible infrastructure that The Chinese military’s electronic warfare strategy is **Ⅰ** integrates all electromagnetic spectrum information. reportedly focused on suppressing, degrading, destroying **Chapter** In 2021, an implementation plan for the strategy was and deceiving enemy’s electronic equipment and its **4** approved, which - the United States says - paves the way electronic warfare unit is said to be regularly conducting for initiatives such as establishing procedures to develop, jamming and counter-jamming exercises against multiple integrate and strengthen integrated electromagnetic communication systems, radar systems and positioning spectrum operations and develop guidance for acquiring systems during exercises.[2] It has also been pointed out electromagnetic spectrum capabilities. that during the exercises, the Chinese military assesses In 2021, the U.S. military deployed a multidomain the results of the research and development of electronic unit having space, cyberspace and electronic warfare warfare weapons.[3] functions in Germany. Furthermore, the U.S. Air Force While the Strategic Support Force has traditionally newly established the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing been responsible for electronic warfare, cyberspace, to operate and maintain electronic warfare. In 2023, and space, it has been pointed out that this Strategic the Strategic Command officially opened the “Joint Support Force may have been reorganized into the Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Center”, which Information Support Force or the like in 2024, and future was intended to serve as the center of the U.S. military’s developments will require attention. electromagnetic spectrum operations, including force Around Japan, Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flew management, planning and situational monitoring. It over the Pacific Ocean in January and October 2023 conducted a space electronic warfare exercise called and in June, a new Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft “Black Sky,” and a command-and-control exercise under was confirmed to have flown over the Pacific Ocean. electromagnetic interference called “Heavy Rain.” In the South China Sea, China has allegedly deployed In 2023, the EU announced the “The 2023 EU radio wave jamming equipment on Mischief Reef in the Capability Development Priorities,” which laid out the Spratly Islands.[4] policy for developing defense capabilities and cited the superiority of electromagnetic spectrum operations and **3** **Russia** the importance of a plan for electromagnetic spectrum operations and linkage capabilities. The EU is also Russia, in its Military Doctrine, places electronic warfare working to develop technology for an alternative PNT equipment as one of the critical equipment in modern system in case the Global Navigation Satellite System military conflicts. Moreover, according to a Russian (GNSS) is jammed or disrupted and to strengthen the military organ’s contributed article of April 2021, electronic attack function for aircraft and communication Russia will ensure superiority in weapon guidance as and radar systems in an electronic warfare environment. well as force command by improving electronic warfare In 2023, NATO conducted electronic warfare exercises technology and expanding equipment, in response to such as “Dynamic Guard” by the Navy and “Ramstein the technological superiority of developed countries Guard” by the Air Force. that have advanced information and communication **1** According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023) **2** According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023) **3** According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023) ----- technology. In the Russian Forces, there are reportedly five electronic warfare brigades.[5] They mainly consist of the Land Forces and possess multiple types of electronic warfare equipment. Furthermore, Russia is further developing and deploying electronic warfare (EW) systems equipped with artificial intelligence (AI) such as the EW system Bylina that controls many EW equipment in an integrated manner and the EW system Palantin that reportedly can interfere with radio communications and electronic reconnaissance systems within a radius of 1,000 km. During the invasion of Ukraine, Russia s electronic warfare equipment appears to have been effective in interfering with the navigation of Ukrainian drones[6] and degrading the guidance accuracy of GPS-guided missiles from Ukraine. In addition, to protect against Ukrainian drones, Russia is installing jammers on armored vehicles and taking measures to suppress drones’ communications. In the air space around Japan, an IL-20 information gathering aircraft flew over the Sea of Japan in April, May, June, September and October 2023 and advanced to the Pacific Ocean also in September of the same year. **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** According to “All Quiet on the Eastern Front: EW in Russia’s New-Generation Warfare,” Jane’s International Defense Review (April 2018) ----- **Section 5** **Maritime Trends** Japan is a maritime nation surrounded by sea and Nevertheless, some countries unilaterally claim their depends on maritime transportation for importing energy rights or take action based on their own assertions that resources. In this sense, securing maritime traffic safety is are incompatible with the existing international order, vital for the nation’s existence. At the same time, ensuring creating situations where the principle of the freedom of the stable use of the maritime domain as infrastructure the high seas is unjustly violated. Attacks on ships in the supporting international logistics is recognized as a Middle East and piracy seen at various locations have primary concern for the international community. become a threat to maritime traffic. **Part** **Ⅰ** **1** **Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas,”etc.** **Chapter** The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)[1] at Sea (CUES).[2] CUES sets forth a code of conduct such as **4** provides for the principles of freedom of navigation in the procedures and communication method to ensure safety for high seas and freedom of overflight. Nevertheless, in the unexpected encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of waters and airspace surrounding Japan, especially in the these countries. In November 2014, the United States and East and South China Seas, it has become increasingly China agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notification common for China to unilaterally assert its rights or take of military activities, together with rules of behavior to action based on assertions that are incompatible with the avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with existing international order, creating situations where CUES and other frameworks. In September 2015, the two these principles are unjustly violated. In addition, North countries announced an agreement concerning an additional Korea’s repeated launches of ballistic missiles into annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert air encounters. the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean, as well as the Between ASEAN and China, official discussions have launches of what it claims to be satellites, not only violate been held for the establishment of the Code of the Conduct related United Nations Security Council resolutions, but of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). In July 2023, are also problematic from the perspective of ensuring the the “Guidelines for Accelerating the Early Conclusion of safety of aircraft and ships. They also threaten the peace an Effective and Substantive COC” was adopted at the and security of Japan, the surrounding region, and the ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. international community. Between Japan and China, the “Maritime and Aerial **See** Chapter 3, Section 2-2-6 (Maritime and Airspace Activities); Communication Mechanism between the Defense Chapter 3, Section 4-1-3 (WMD and Missiles) Authorities of Japan-China ” came into operation in June Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks to 2018. securing the stable use of oceans and airspace, in recent It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed to years progress has been made in efforts to avert and avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies. and skies will supplement the existing international As for multilateral initiatives, in April 2014, navies order and that the countries concerned, including China, of participating countries of the Western Pacific Naval refrain from unilateral actions that add to tension and act Symposium (WPNS), including Japan, the United States, on the basis of the principle of the rule of law. and China, adopted to the Code for Unplanned Encounters **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-14 (China) **2** **National Maritime Security Initiatives** **(1) Maritime Security in the Middle East** In particular, since the clash between Israel and The Middle East has seen intermittent attacks on ships Palestinian armed groups in October 2023, attacks on in recent years. civilian commercial ships have occurred in the waters **1** The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted as a comprehensive treaty on the law and order of the seas in 1982 and entered into force in 1994 (Japan signed it in 1996). ----- surrounding the Arabian Peninsula, including the Red the U.S. Force led Combined Maritime Force (CMF) Sea. As high tensions continue in the Middle East, U.S. based in Bahrain. So far, the United States, Australia, the and the EU initiatives have been conducted to secure safe United Kingdom, Türkiye, the ROK, Pakistan and other navigation. Against the Houthi strongholds in Yemen, which countries have participated in the CTF151, conducting had repeatedly attacked civilian ships and other objects, the zone defense operations to counter piracy. The EU for its U.S. and British forces conducted attacks in January 2024. part has conducted Operation Atalanta to counter piracy **See** Chapter 3, Section 10-1-4 (Situation in the Gulf Region) since December 2008. In the operation, naval vessels and aircraft dispatched by EU member countries escort **(2) Piracy** ships and monitor the waters off the coast of Somalia. It **Part** Piracy seen at various locations has become a threat to has been decided that the operation will continue until **Ⅰ** maritime traffic. The number of piracy and armed robbery the end of 2024. **Chapter** incidents at sea (hereinafter “piracy incidents”)[3] around In addition, some countries have conducted their **4** the world has declined in recent years after peaking at 445 exclusive operations outside the abovementioned incidents in 2010. (There were 120 incidents in 2023.) frameworks. Since December 2008, for example, China The decline has depended heavily on the fall in the has deployed naval vessels and others for counterpiracy number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of operations in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The number of piracy Gulf of Aden. incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Conversely, the root causes of piracy, such as Somalia’s Gulf of Aden rose rapidly from 2008 to 237 incidents in unstable internal security and poverty, remain unresolved, 2011, accounting for more than half of the total number and the threat posed by piracy still exists. According to of piracy incidents worldwide and attracting great the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) of the international concern as a threat to safe navigation. In International Maritime Bureau (IMB), one hijacking recent years, the number of piracy incidents in waters incident occurred in 2023, the first since 2017. The IMB off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has has re-issued a warning regarding the hijacking incident, remained low as a result of various initiatives taken by the saying that although it is a single case, it shows that there international community, including Japan. In December are still entities capable of committing acts of piracy in 2023, however, the first hijacking of a commercial ship this sea area. since 2017 occurred. Moreover, in 2024 and beyond, Meanwhile, in Africa, piracy incidents occurred in pirates have become increasingly active and the situation the Gulf of Guinea (the number of incidents was 22 remains unpredictable. Given the current situation, in 2023). The international community has continued unless the international community further strengthens counter-piracy initiatives in Africa. its ongoing efforts, there is a risk that the acts of piracy The number of piracy incidents in Southeast Asian will even more intensify. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section waters came to 67 in 2023. In particular, piracy incidents 2-2 (Counter-Piracy Operations) for Japan’s initiatives.) in the Singapore Strait have been increasing since 2019, The international counter-piracy initiatives in waters with 37 incidents having occurred in 2023. Although off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden include many of these incidents are minor, such as theft of counter-piracy operations by the Combined Task Force equipment, they account for nearly one-third of all piracy 151 (CTF151), a multinational force that was created by incidents reported worldwide. **3** **Trends in the Arctic Ocean** In recent years, moves towards the utilization of trans- Arctic navigation routes and the development of natural **3** The number of piracy incidents stated herein is based on reports published by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The number includes attempted cases. **4** The CMF is a multinational force that operates for the purpose of promoting maritime security, stability, and prosperity under the U.S. Central Command. Forces from 43 countries participate in the CMF (as of April 2024), and the Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet concurrently serves as the CMF Commander. The CMF is comprised of five combined task forces: the Combined Task Force 150 which is tasked with maritime security operations in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman, the Combined Task Force 151 which is tasked with counter-piracy operations, the Combined Task Force 152 which is tasked with maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf,, and the Combined Task Force 153 which is tasked with maritime security and capacity building operations from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and the Combined Task Force 154 which is tasked with education and training for maritime security (established in May 2023). An ----- the command of the Commander in Chief of the Navy. **See** Chapter 3, Section 5-3-5 (Trends Related to the AFRF (General)) The United States revealed its perception, in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region issued in October 2022, that the competition with Russia and China in the Arctic Region is intensifying.[6] Moreover, on the security front, the U.S. Government stated that it would deter the threats against the U.S. mainland and allies by enhancing the capabilities required to protect national interests in the Arctic Region, and reduce the risk of unintentional escalation through coordinating a common approach with allies and partners. In October 2018, the United States sent an aircraft carrier to the Arctic Region for the first time in 27 years for air drills in the Norwegian Sea. And, in May 2020, United States and United Kingdom warships took part in activities in the Barents Sea for the first time since the end of the Cold War. In March 2021, a B-1 bomber landed for the first time inside the Arctic Circle. In March 2022, the U.S. Navy conducted the exercise “Ice Exercise 2022” that involved the participation of two Los Angelesclass nuclear submarines as well as the Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force and British Royal Navy. Aside from coastal states in the Arctic Ocean, 13 countries including Japan, China, the ROK, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, have observer status in the Arctic Council. China shows a stance to be proactively involved in the Arctic Sea. It is pointed out that China could take advantage of scientific survey and commercial activities to increase its presence including military activities in the Arctic Sea.[7] As of early 2023, China was operating three icebreaking research vessels: “Xue Long,” “Xue Long 2,” and “Sun Yat-sen University Polar.” China is said to have deployed its first autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) in the Arctic Ocean during its Arctic expedition in October 2022.[8] **See** Chapter 3, Section 2-2-6 (Maritime and Airspace Activities) resources in the Arctic Ocean have gained momentum in line with a decline in sea ice. The eight arctic circle nations consisting of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States established the Arctic Council in 1996 to promote cooperation for common challenges such as sustainable development and environment protection.[5] From the perspective of security, the Arctic Ocean has traditionally been used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit route. With the decrease in sea ice in recent years, ships have been able to navigate for a longer period of time and more extensively than before. It has therefore been considered that the region could be used for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military forces using military maritime transport capabilities in future. In this situation, moves to deploy new military capabilities in the ocean are seen. Russia upgraded its Northern Fleet to military district level in January 2021, and its maritime doctrine, announced in July 2022, positioned the Arctic Ocean as an area of vital importance. Russia is promoting efforts to establish a system to protect its national interests in the Arctic region. Its various policy documents clearly state Russia’s interests and the role of the Russian military in the Arctic. Furthermore, Russia is proceeding to develop a radar surveillance network as well as reconstructing airfields and deploying surface-to-air and surface-to-ship missiles along the Arctic coast. In terms of its activities, Russia is intensifying its activities in the Arctic Ocean, such as conducting strategic nuclear deterrence patrols with Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered and patrol flights with long-range bombers. The Pacific Fleet conducted the comprehensive Arctic expedition “Umka2022” in the Chukchi Sea in September 2022 and a tactical exercise “Finnval-2023” in the Bering Sea in addition to the Chukchi Sea in September 2023, in which anti-ship missile launch training was performed under **Part** **Ⅰ** **Chapter** Russia was supposed to be the chair country of the Arctic Council for two years from May 2021. However, in March 2022, the remaining seven Arctic region countries stated that they would stop participating in all the meetings of the Council with Russia as the chair country because of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Norway assumed the chairmanship in May 2023, and an agreement was reached to restart the working group. The United States revealed its perception about Russia that the country made vast investment for its military presence in the Arctic Region in the last decade, while it also built up new economic infrastructure in the region and attempted to limit free navigation through excessive claims to territorial waters. The United States has pointed out that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has heightened geopolitical tensions even in the Arctic Region, created new risks of unintended conflict, and hampered cooperation. It also recognized that China has emphasized its intention to amplify its influence and play greater roles in the Arctic Region through expanding its economic, diplomatic, scientific, and military activities. The United States also pointed out that China doubled its investment for mining of important mineral resources in particular in the last decade, and conducted research of dual use for military application in the Arctic Region. According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2019) According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023). The report has pointed out that China’s expanding ----- |Col1|Col2|The United States|Russia|The United Kingdom|France|China| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Missiles|ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)|400 Minuteman III  400|328 SS-18 40 SS-19 8 SS-25 9 SS-27 (single-warhead) 78 SS-27 (multi-warhead) 121 SS-27 (Yars-S, multi-warhead) 72|─|─|140 DF-（5 CSS-4） 18 DF-3（1 CSS-10） 86 DF-41 36| ||IRBM MRBM|─|─|─|─|212 DF-26 140| |||||||DF-21A/（E CSS-5） 24 DF-1（7 CSS-22） 48| ||SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles)|280 Trident D-5 280|192 SS-N-23 96 SS-N-32 96|48 Trident D-5 48|64 M-51 64|72 JL-（2 CSS-N-14）/ JL-3 (CSS-N-20) 72| |Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered|| 14| 12| 4| 4| 6| |Aircraft||66 B-2 20 B-52 46|71 Tu-95 (Bear)  58 Tu-160 (Blackjack)  13|─|40 Rafale 40|112 H-6K 100 H-6N 12+| |Number of warheads||3,708|4,489 (including 1,816 tactical nuclear warheads)|225|290|410| **Section 6** **Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)** The transfer and proliferation of WMDs such as nuclear, security environment has become complex and severe biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, as well as in recent years, it is concerned that the international ballistic missiles that deliver such weapons, have been community is presented with greater difficulties to rally recognized as a significant threat since the end of the together in taking on common challenges such as arms Cold War. In addition, as competition and confrontation control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. among states have been sharpened and the international **Part** **Ⅰ** **1** **Nuclear Weapons** **Chapter** During the period when the risk of a full-scale nuclear and region as of January 2024, some countries such as **4** war between the United States and Soviet Union, India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to participate as including the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), were widely non-nuclear countries. In addition, North Korea, which recognized, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of has repeatedly conducted nuclear tests and declared Nuclear Weapons (NPT) went into effect in 1970. The its development and possession of nuclear weapons, treaty prohibited countries other than those that had added a provision to its constitution stating that it would detonated a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive “develop nuclear weapons to a higher level” in September devices in or before 1966 (the United States, the then 2023. North Korea claims that it made the development Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, as well as France and possession of nuclear capability a fundamental part and China which acceded to the NPT later in 1992) of its national system. from possessing nuclear weapons. It was agreed that Regarding nuclear capabilities of the United States negotiations would be held in good faith regarding and Russia, the two countries had agreed on a five-year effective measures to reduce nuclear arsenals. extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty While the NPT is concluded in total of 191 countries (New START) in January 2021. However, as Russia Fig. I-4-6-1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country **The United States** **Russia** **The United Kingdom** **France** **China** 400 328 140 Minuteman III  400 SS-18 40 DF-5（CSS-4） 18 SS-19 8 DF-31（CSS-10） 86 ICBM (Intercontinental SS-25 9 ─ ─ DF-41 36 Ballistic Missiles) SS-27 (single-warhead) 78 SS-27 (multi-warhead) 121 SS-27 (Yars-S, multi-warhead) 72 212 IRBM ─ ─ ─ ─ DF-26 140 MRBM DF-21A/E（CSS-5） 24 DF-17（CSS-22） 48 280 192 48 64 72 SLBM Trident D-5 280 SS-N-23 96 Trident D-5 48 M-51 64 JL-2（CSS-N-14）/ (Submarine Launched SS-N-32 96 JL-3 (CSS-N-20) 72 Ballistic Missiles) Ballistic Missile Submarine  14  12  4  4  6 Nuclear-Powered 66 71 40 112 Aircraft B-2 20 Tu-95 (Bear)  58 ─ Rafale 40 H-6K 100 B-52 46 Tu-160 (Blackjack)  13 H-6N 12+ 3,708 4,489 (including 1,816 tactical 225 290 410 Number of warheads nuclear warheads) (Notes) 1 Data is based on “The Military Balance 2024,” the SIPRI Yearbook 2023, etc. 2 In January 2024, the United States announced that it retained 1,419 strategic nuclear warheads and 662 missiles/aircraft as the delivery vehicles for them as numbers as of May 2023 based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (the new START) between the United States and Russia. However, the SIPRI Yearbook 2023 said that, as of January 2023, the United States deployed 1,770 nuclear warheads (including 100 tactical ones) and Russia deployed 1,674 warheads. 3 The Integrated Review by the UK in March 2022 stipulated that the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads. 4 According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2023, the nuclear warhead inventories of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are 164, 170, 90, and around 30, respectively. Among others, North Korea retains fissionable materials enough to produce 50-70 warheads as a whole ----- continued its aggression against Ukraine while repeating nuclear warheads it possesses could exceed 1,000 by words and actions that could be interpreted as threats to 2030 and continue to increase until 2035.[1] use nuclear weapons, talks between the two countries As the post-Cold War international order now at under the framework of the treaty was postponed in stake with serious challenges amidst historical changes November 2022, and Russia announced that it would in the balance of power and intensifying geopolitical suspend the treaty’s implementation in February 2023. competitions, it is necessary to closely monitor relevant Although the United States expresses its intention to trends that could help understand if an effective pursue a framework of arms control with China included, framework of nuclear arms control and disarmament China repeatedly rejects to be involved in the framework will be established in the future. **Part** between the United States and Russia. Meanwhile China **See** Fig. I-4-6-1 (Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country) is said to continuously enhance its nuclear capability, and **Ⅰ** it has been pointed out that the number of operational **Chapter** **4** **2** **Biological and Chemical Weapons** Biological and chemical weapons are relatively demonstrated the threat of terrorism using weapons of inexpensive and easy to manufacture, as well as easy mass destruction in cities. Recent examples include the to disguise because the materials and technologies use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria for manufacture are mostly dual-use. Therefore, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as development and/or acquisition by nations or terrorists well as the attempted poisoning of Russian opposition seeking asymmetrical means for attack[2] is especially leaders in which Novichok, a drug developed by Russia, concerning. Furthermore, if those seeking biological and was allegedly used. There have also been allegations that chemical weapons utilize emerging technologies such as the Russian military used riot control agents during the big data and artificial Intelligence (AI), their ability to fighting in Ukraine. develop weapons will further increase. In recent years, with regard to biological weapons, Biological weapons have the following characteristics: there has been speculation that North Korea and Russia (1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive; (2) there have plans for offensive biological weapons that is usually an incubation period of a few days between violate their obligations under the Biological Weapons exposure and onset of the symptom; (3) their use is Convention (BWC). There is also a concern about hard to detect; (4) even the threat of use can create research and development at China’s military medical great psychological effects; and (5) they can cause mass institutions.[3] With regard to chemical weapons, there casualties and injuries depending on the circumstances is concern about China’s possible nonfulfillment of its of use and the type of weapon. obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention Chemical weapons were used in such incidents (CWC).[4] North Korea does not participate in the CWC as the sarin attack in the subway in Japan, which and is said to still possess chemical weapons. **3** **Ballistic Missiles and Other Missiles** Ballistic missiles are propelled by rockets for parabolic example, newly emerged ballistic missiles fly at lower flights and are capable of attacking distant targets. They altitudes with irregular trajectory than typical ballistic can be used as a means of delivering WMDs. As they fall missiles by controlling wings, aimed at complicating at a steep angle and high speed, highly accurate systems early detection and interception of missiles. are required for intercepting them effectively. Moreover, **See** Fig. I-4-6-2 (Classification of Ballistic Missiles) technologies related to ballistic missiles have been The deployment of ballistic missiles in areas with changing and developing quickly in recent years. For continuous armed conflicts is dangerous because it can **1** According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023) **2** They refer to means of attack to strike an adversary’s vulnerable points and are not conventional means. They include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber-attacks. **3** According to the “Biodefense Posture Review,” the U.S. DoD (2023) ----- |Category|Range| |---|---| |Short-Range Ballistic Missile, SRBM|Under approx. 1,000 km or less| |Medium-Range Ballistic Missile, MRBM|Approx. 1,000 to under approx. 3,000 km| |Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile, IRBM|Approx. 3,000 to under approx. 5,500 km| |Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, ICBM|Approx. 5,500 km or more| intensify existing tensions and make the area unstable. and are able to approach the targets while concealed on Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a means of a ship, therefore they will pose a serious threat when attacking from a distance or threatening another country carrying WMDs with them. that has superior conventional forces. Along with the threat of ballistic missiles, the threat Fig. I-4-6-2 Classification of Ballistic Missiles of cruise missiles is also pointed out as a weapon which is comparatively easy to acquire for non-state actors, **Category** **Range** and has the potential for proliferation. Because cruise Short-Range Ballistic Missile, SRBM Under approx. 1,000 km or less Medium-Range Ballistic Missile, MRBM Approx. 1,000 to under approx. 3,000 km missiles are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile, IRBM Approx. 3,000 to under approx. 5,500 km **Part** missiles as well as easy to maintain and train with, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, ICBM Approx. 5,500 km or more (Note) Ballistic missiles launched from submarines are collectively referred to as submarine-launched **Ⅰ** many countries either produce or modify cruise missiles. ballistic missiles (SLBMs), while a ballistic missile that has a precision guidance system on its **Chapter** Moreover, some cruise missiles have relatively higher warhead necessary to attack aircraft carriers and other vessels is called an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). **4** target accuracy, are difficult to detect while cruising, **4** **Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies** Even weapons that were purchased or developed for self- North Korea is believed to have advanced its ballistic defense purposes could easily be exported or transferred missile development with almost no test launches using once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. Some various resources and technologies transferred from states seeking WMDs do not hesitate to put their land outside during the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, and people at risk, and furthermore, due to their weak it is believed that North Korea continuously proliferates governance, terrorist organizations are active in their technologies, conventional weapons, and items used territories. Therefore, it is conceivable that in general, in the supply chains of Weapons of Mass Destruction the possibility of actual use of WMDs would increase. (WMDs) to acquire foreign currencies and maintain The proliferation of WMDs and other related foreign relations. For example, North Korea is reportedly technologies has been noted in numerous instances. For cooperating with Iran, Syria, Myanmar, Russia, and example, it came to light in February 2004 that nuclear- other countries in areas such as arms trading and weapon related technologies, mainly uranium enrichment technology transfers. technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, It has been pointed out that, in recent years, states of and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in particular concern have sustained their external transfer Pakistan. while skillfully averting international monitoring by There has been significant transfer and proliferation falsifying documentation and diversifying transport of ballistic missiles that serve as means of weapon routes to illicitly export WMDs. Another concern has delivery as well. The former Soviet Union and other arisen that these states are also conducting intangible countries exported Scud-B to many countries and technology transfers. Specifically, these states have regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. obtained advanced technologies that could be adapted China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and for the development and manufacturing of WMDs and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable other technologies through their researchers and students number of countries and other actors now possess dispatched to major companies and academic institutions ballistic missiles. in developed countries. ----- **Section 7** **Impact of Climate Change on the Security Environment and the Military** **1** **General Situation** According to the World Meteorological Organization For the second year in a row, the United States has (WMO), 2023 was the warmest year on record, sent senior Department of Defense officials to the exceeding the pre-industrial 1850-1900 baseline by COP, recognizing the Department’s critical role in the about 1.4°C. Greenhouse gas levels continue to rise, government-wide approach to the climate crisis. Owens, causing record sea surface temperatures and sea level Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations elevations. The maximum area of Antarctic sea ice in 2023 was the smallest on record, 1 million km[2] smaller and Environment, acknowledged that climate change will impact readiness, including warfighter training, **ⅠPart** than the previous lowest area. This reduced area is larger mission execution, tactical planning, the acquisition and **Chapter** than the land areas of France and Germany combined. sustainment of platforms and installations, and national **4** Extreme weather and climate phenomena, including and global security. large-scale floods, heatwaves and droughts and wildfires, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, who participated have had a major global impact. For example, flooding in COP28, also emphasized that climate change matters caused by Cyclone Daniel, which occurred in the for security and therefore it matters to NATO. It is both Mediterranean Sea in September 2023, claimed many forcing people to migrate and intensifying competition lives, especially in Libya. Heatwaves were especially for scarce resources. severe in the second half of July that year, particularly NATO also strongly supports the transition from in southern Europe and northern Africa. Hawaii had the fossil fuels to safe, renewable energy. This is also related highest death toll from a single wildfire. to energy security and in light of Russia’s use of gas as a To address these climate change issues, the coercive tool following its invasion of Ukraine, Secretary international community is engaged in “mitigation” to General Stoltenberg has pointed out that, when making reduce and absorb greenhouse gas emissions that cause the energy transition, the same mistake of relying too climate change and “adaptation” to avoid or mitigate the heavily on unreliable suppliers of critical materials must damage of climate change that has already occurred or is not be repeated. predicted to occur in future. He has further emphasized that NATO should also Climate change is seen as an urgent threat to world achieve net zero[1] greenhouse gas emissions for its peace and security. From November 30 to December 13 military sector by 2050. the same year, the 28th session of the Conference of the In July 2023, NATO released the Secretary General’s Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment. Using Climate Change (COP28) was held in the United Arab specific case studies, the report revealed how extreme Emirates. During it, the decision on the first Global weather conditions create operational stress for military Stocktake, which is a mechanism to review the situation forces, shorten equipment lifecycles and incur additional of implementing the Paris Agreement and assess overall maintenance and replacement costs. progress towards achieving long-term goals. **2** **Impact on Security** livelihoods and food and water insecurity. **1** **Relation to Conflicts** It has been pointed out that tensions in an already Climate change has a major impact on a strategic fragile environment encourage migration and increase the environment. Direct hazards include drought, extreme likelihood of violent conflict. Countries most vulnerable heat, desertification and flooding, which can also have to climate change bear the risks while causing almost no secondary and tertiary impacts like loss of land and impact on climate change themselves. It is estimated that **1** This refers to a state in which an equilibrium has been achieved between the amount of greenhouse gases emitted as a result of human activities and the amount of greenhouse gases ----- by 2050, more than a billion people will lack access to date, requiring substantial amounts of money to rebuild. water and more than 200 million people will be forced In addition, high temperatures and wildfires not only to migrate. disrupt training and logistic support activities, but also Water and food shortages are causing violent conflicts cause failures of communication and various ground in the Sahel Region, the Horn of Africa and other parts installations. of the world. For example, the surface area of Lake Chad NATO is providing training and capacity-building in the southern part of the Sahara Desert has decreased support to the Iraq National Security Forces in Iraq by 90% since the 1960s due to decreased precipitation, (NATO Mission Iraq). According to the aforementioned affecting tens of millions of people who were dependent NATO report, in the short term, temperatures are **Part** on this water source. expected to exceed 50°C for roughly one-fifth of the days **Ⅰ** It has been pointed out that the forced displacement of each year in Iraq. There is concern that extreme water **Chapter** fishermen, farmers and herders not only creates tensions shortages will cause sandstorms and disrupt aviation **4** with their neighbors, but also makes them targets of operations and training. Islamic extremist groups such as Boko Haram and forces Also in oceans, naval vessels will require more frequent them to surrender their own security to armed groups. maintenance due to increased acidification of seawater In addition, marine resources in East Africa, mainly and changes in sea surface temperature. It has been noted along the coasts of Somalia, have drastically decreased that seawater temperatures can affect underwater sound due to the effects of rising sea temperatures and this is speeds and changes in seawater salinity can affect the believed to fuel the incidence of piracy. buoyancy of submarines. Aircraft are said to lose their lift and thrust under extremely high temperatures and changes in weather **2** **Impact on Militaries** conditions, such as lightning and turbulence, can affect Climate change will also affect military equipment, the entire spectrum of military aviation operations. infrastructure and operations themselves. All these effects are related to the issue of military In the United States, air bases nationwide have often readiness. suffered severe damage due to hurricane flooding to **3** **Climate Change in the Indo-Pacific Region** Surface temperatures are also rising in many parts of exercise for post-natural disaster crisis management and the Indo-Pacific region. For example, in Asia, sea levels humanitarian assistance. In the exercise, approximately are exceeding[2] the global average and glaciers in the 3,000 personnel participated from 19 countries and the Himalayan Hindu Kush region continue to melt. In amphibious assault ship “Dixmude” equipped with a addition, sea surface temperatures in the Indian Ocean hospital facility was operated. and near the equator of the western Pacific Ocean are With regard to operational aspects, the United States warming faster than the global average. has important military assets in Guam, the Marshall Rising sea levels and extreme weather events make Islands and Palau, which are considered vulnerable to the security environment in the region complicated and disasters. In August 2023, Deputy Secretary of Defense various exercises[3] are being conducted with the possibility Hicks stated regarding the Indo-Pacific region, “Nations of an increase in military operations related to climate that are most resilient and best able to manage the effects change in mind. The multilateral exercise “Croix Du Sud of climate change will gain a strategic advantage. So the 2023” hosted by the French military stationed in New department must prepare for and adapt to climate change Caledonia was held from April to May 2023 as a training better and faster than its competitors.” **2** It has been pointed out that sea level rises are having a major impact, not only on island countries, but also on the economically important coastal areas of mainland China, for example. **3** In 2022, the U.S. Department of the Navy conducted the first climate-related tabletop exercise (TTX) to study the effects of climate change on missions, combat readiness and warfighting ----- **Part** ## Ⅱ **Japan’s Security and** **Defense Policy** **Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and** **Chapter** **1** **Defense** **The Three Documents, including the National** **Chapter** **2** **Security Strategy** **Chapter** **3** **Defense Buildup and the Budget** **Organizations Responsible for Japan’s** **Chapter** **4** **Security and Defense** **Chapter** **5** **Framework for the SDF Activities** ----- possession of counterstrike capabilities. **and Defense** **Chapter** **1** **Section 1** **Measures to Ensure Security** The independent state of a nation must be protected in **Part** order for it to determine its **Ⅱ** own direction in politics, **Chapter** economy, and society, as **1** well as maintaining its culture, tradition, and sense of values. In addition, peace and security are essential for the people to live with a sense of safety and for Japan to continue to prosper. However, it is necessary for Japan to make its own proactive and autonomous efforts. The first priority in protecting the lives and livelihoods of the people Prime Minister Kishida and Defense Minister Kihara at Air Review (November 2023) of Japan should be the development of active diplomacy. It is essential to cooperate countries is essential. with like-minded countries and promote multilateral From the perspective of creating the ideal security cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance[1]with the environment for Japan and preventing the emergence United States, which shares fundamental values and of threats, the importance of the role played by defense interests with Japan while emphasizing universal values capabilities is increasing in cooperative efforts as a and principles such as freedom, democracy, human rights, member of the Indo-Pacific region and the international and the rule of law. community. At the same time, defense capabilities are required Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities, to back up diplomacy. As its strategic approach, Japan Japan aims to ensure national security, as well as bring will develop diplomacy under the vision of a Free and peace and security to the Indo-Pacific region, and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)[2] and promote the fundamental eventually to the entire world, by exerting its utmost reinforcement of its defense capabilities, including the efforts in a variety of fields, including diplomacy and Japan cannot defend itself on its own. It would be difficult for any one state to defend itself on its own now. Therefore, cooperation with allies and like-minded Japan aims to ensure national security, as well as bring peace and security to the Indo-Pacific region, and eventually to the entire world, by exerting its utmost efforts in a variety of fields, including diplomacy and economics. **See** Fig. III-3-1 (The MOD’s Efforts for the Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (image); Chapter 2, Section 2 [Commentary] (Counterstrike Capabilities) In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and cooperate closely in a range of areas in security, politics, and economics. A vision for improving connectivity between Asia and Africa through a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and thus fostering the stability and prosperity of the whole region. This vision was put ----- **Section 2** **Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy** **1** **Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense** After the end of World War II, Japan was determined not self-defense as a sovereign state. Thus, the Japanese to repeat the ravages of war. Since then, it has worked Government interprets it as a constitutional right to hard to build a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people possess the minimum armed forces needed to exercise desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is that right. enshrined in the Constitution, Article 9, which prescribes Therefore, Japan, under the Constitution, maintains the renunciation of war, the prohibition of war potential, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, and the denial of the right of belligerency of the state. holding its exclusively defense-oriented policy as its Of course, since Japan is an independent nation, basic strategy of defense, and continues to keep it **Part** these provisions do not deny Japan’s inherent right of equipped and ready for operations. **Ⅱ** **Chapter** **1** **2** **The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution** be permitted under the Constitution as measures for **1** **Permitted Self-Defense Capability** self-defense when the following three conditions (Three Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the Conditions for “the use of force”) are met: minimum required self-defense capability. The specific (1) When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or limit is subject to change according to the prevailing when an armed attack against a foreign country that international situation, the level of military technologies, is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear through annual budget and other deliberations by the danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to Diet on behalf of the people. Whether its capability life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; constitutes a war potential that Japan is prohibited to (2) When there is no appropriate means available to repel possess by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its must be considered within the context of Japan’s overall people; military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should (3) Use of force to the minimum extent necessary. be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on **See** Reference 4 (Development of Seamless Security Legislation whether such a possession would cause its total military to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People) strength to exceed the constitutional limit. The possession of so-called “offensive weapons,” **3 �Geographic Boundaries within Which the** which are designed to be used only for the mass **Right of Self-Defense May Be Exercised** destruction of another country, is not permissible under any circumstance as it would directly exceed The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan the definition of the minimum necessary level for self- under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined defense. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is difficult to strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers. give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation. Nevertheless, the Government interprets that, as a **2 �Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under** general rule, the Constitution does not permit armed **Article 9 of the Constitution** troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of It has been concluded in the Cabinet’s decision made other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas on July 1, 2014, “Development of Seamless Security deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its minimum necessary level for self-defense. P l ” th t th f f h ld b i t t d t ----- of course for Japan to be able to use the minimum **4** **Right of Belligerency** necessary level of force to defend itself under its right Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes of self-defense. For example, if Japan were to inflict that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force recognized.” However, the “right of belligerency” does under its right of self-defense, this constitutes a different not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a concept from the exercise of the right of belligerency, general term for various rights that a belligerent nation even if the two sets of actions appear to be externally has under international law, including the authority to equivalent. Occupation of enemy territory, however, is inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military not permissible because it would exceed the minimum force and to occupy enemy territory. necessary level for self-defense. On the other hand, it is recognized as a matter **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** **3** **Basic Policy** **1** Under the Constitution, Japan has efficiently built a **3** **Non-Nuclear Principles** highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic policies of maintaining an exclusively defense- The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of oriented policy and not becoming a military power that not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, poses a threat to other countries, while firmly maintaining and not allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, adhering to the adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed principle of civilian control of the military, and observing line of national policy. the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing and possessing nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy Basic Law.[1] In addition, Japan ratified the Treaty on **1** **Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy** the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that as a nonnuclear weapons state, has an obligation not to defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons.[2] that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the **4** **Securing Civilian Control** defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self- Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the defense. The policy including these matters refers to the military in a democratic state or democratic political posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with control of military strength. Japan has, by giving serious the spirit of the Constitution. reflection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened until the end of World War II, adopted the following strict civilian control system that is entirely different **2** **Not Becoming a Military Power** from the one under the former Constitution.[3] Civilian There is no established definition for the concept of a control aims to ensure that the SDF is maintained and military power. For Japan, however, not becoming operated in accordance with the will of the people. a military power that could threaten other countries The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals, makes means that Japan will not possess and maintain a legislative and budgetary decisions on such matters military capability strong enough to pose a threat to as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and main other countries, beyond the minimum necessary for self- organizations of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF. defense. It also issues approval for defense operations of the **1** Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management.” **2** Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes...not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...” ----- SDF. The function of national defense entirely falls under the executive power of the Cabinet as a general administrative function. The Constitution requires that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control and supervises over the SDF duties. In addition, the National Security Council of Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important matters on national security. At the MOD, the Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages the matters concerning national defense, and as the competent minister also manages and operates the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and political affairs by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. In addition, the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense provides the Minister of Defense with advice on important affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD based on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council consisting of political appointees, civilian officials and uniformed SDF personnel deliberates on basic principles **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** Defense Minister Kihara inspects the special guard of honor at his inauguration (September 2023) concerning affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Through these ways, the MOD aims to further ensure civilian control. As mentioned above, the civilian control system is well established. However, in order to ensure that the system achieves good results, it is necessary to continue making practical efforts in both political and administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in national defense taken by the people. **See** Chapter 4, Section 1 (National Security Council); Chapter 4, Section 2-1-2 (Systems to Support the Minister of Defense) ----- **Section 3** **Security Policy Framework** **Section 3** Japan has three main documents pertaining to Japan’s have been formulated six times since 1976. The NSS and national security policy: the National Security Strategy NDS are mainly designed for the next decade or so. of Japan (NSS),[1] the National Defense Strategy of Japan The first-ever DBP was formulated in December (NDS),[2] and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP).[3] 2022 in accordance with the NDS as a medium- to long The NSS was formulated in December 2013 as Japan’s term plan that establishes the level of Japan’s defense first-ever basic policy on national security with a focus capabilities, the SDF’s structure which is based on the on diplomatic and defense strategies, replacing “Japan’s capability level roughly a decade into the future, and the Basic Defense Policy,”[4] on which Japan’s defense policy total expenditures and the quantity of major equipment had been based until then. As Japan is now facing the to be acquired over a five-year period. The future level most severe and complex security environment since the of Japan’s defense capabilities had been previously start of the postwar period, a new NSS was formulated established in the NDPG, while the total expenditures in December 2022 to provide strategic guidance for for the buildup of defense capability over a five-year policies in a wide range of areas, including not only period were set forth in the MTDP, which was in turn the traditional areas of diplomacy and defense, but also based on the NDPG. However, the level of Japan’s economic security, technology, and intelligence. defense capabilities as well as the total expenditures over Based on the new NSS, the NDS was formulated for a five-year period have now been integrated into a single, the first time in December of the same year as a statement unified defense buildup plan. of the objectives of Japan’s national defense as well as the **See** Fig. II-1-3-1 (Relationship among the NSS, the NDS, the approaches and means to achieve these objectives. The DBP, the Fiscal Year Budget); Reference 1 (National Security Strategy of Japan); Reference 2 (National Defense Strategy); NDS replaces the National Defense Program Guidelines Reference 3 (Defense Buildup Program) (NDPG), which have served as Japan’s basic guidelines for the development, sustainment, and operation of the **II-1-3-1** Relationship among the NSS, the NDS, the DBP, defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and Prime Minister Kishida’s press conference at the time of the Cabinet Examine based on the current situation, decision regarding the Three Documents (December 2022) [Website of the appropriate annual budget as necessary Prime Minister’s Office of Japan] **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** Relationship among the NSS, the NDS, the DBP, **II-1-3-1** the Fiscal Year Budget NSS A strategic guideline will be added to the policies for the NSS-related fields such as diplomacy, defense, Formulating the NDS economic security, technologies, cyber, and intelligence based on strategic (looking the time span of around ten years in mind) guideline for defense To set defense objectives and clarify NDS approaches and means to accomplish them. - Radical enhancement of defense capabilities including seven important ones Giving a concrete - Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country form to defense - Cooperative policy with allies and like-minded countries and others objectives, etc. (Looking the time span of around ten years in mind) DBP A medium-and long-term improvement plan to clarify and accomplish the level of defense capabilities required for Japan, including following details - A new organization of SDF (Looking the one of ten years later in mind) Drawing up the - The gross amount of expenditure and quantity of major equipment annual budget based to be procured in five years (Among them, the R&D business for on concrete form of equipment of paramount importance and target FY to start the undertakings deployment of them, etc. should be included in the body) Examine based on the current situation, Annual budget appropriate annual budget as necessary **REFERENCE : “National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS),” “National Defense Strategy (NDS),” “Defense** Buildup Program (DBP)” **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_policy/basis/index.html** The National Security Strategy of Japan, approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022 The National Defense Strategy of Japan, approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022 The Defense Buildup Program, approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022 ----- |1.Developing Efforts Centered on Diplomacy to Prevent Crises, Proactively Creating a Peaceful and Stable International Environment, and Strengthening a Free and Open International Order a. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance b. Maintaining and Developing a Free and Open International Order and Strengthen Ties with its Ally, Like-minded Countries and Others c. Strengthen Diplomacy with Japan’s Neighboring Countries and Regions as well as Efforts toward Resolution of Various Issues of Concern, including Territorial Issues d. Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-proliferation e. International Counter-Terrorism f. Climate Change Measures g. Strategic Use of ODA and Other International h. Promoting People-to-People Exchanges|3. Deepening Security Cooperation with the United States - Further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S.| |---|---| ||4. Strengthening Efforts to Seamlessly Protect Japan in All Directions a. Cybersecurity b. Maritime security and maritime law enforcement capabilities c. Space security d. Improving security-related technical capabilities and proactively capitalizing on them e. Strengthening intelligence capacities f. Reinforcing response capabilities within Japan with contingencies in mind g. Reinforcing mechanisms for the protection of Japanese nationals h. Protecting Japanese nationals and others overseas i. Securing resources essential for Japan's national security, including energy and food| |2. Strengthening Japan’s Defense Architecture - Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities as the Last Guarantee of National Security a. Reinforcing stand-off defense capabilities, unmanned defense capabilities, and other capabilities in addition to cross-domain operational capabilities b. Possessing counterstrike capabilities c. Taking necessary measures to make the level of Japan's budget—for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives—reach 2% of current gross national product (GDP) in FY 2027 d. Strengthening coordination and cooperation between the SDF and the JCG, including the MOD's control over the JCG in the event of a contingency, among other measures - Reinforcing the comprehensive defense architecture Promoting efforts in four areas that complement, and are inseparable from, the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities under the frameworks of relevant ministries and agencies. These four areas are (i) research and development, (ii) public infrastructure development, (iii) cybersecurity, and (iv) international cooperation with like-minded countries and others. - Reconsidering the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems for possible revisions - Reinforcing the defense production and technology bases and solidifying the human resource base, among other measures|5. Promoting economic security policies - Securing Japan's self-reliance, advantages, and indispensability, among other measures Enhancing Japan's supply chain resilience, including by securing stable supply for critical goods including rare earth Making examinations to bolster Japan's information security, including security clearance| ||6. Maintaining and Strengthening International Economic Order based on Free, Fair, and Equitable Rules - Countering against unfair trade practices and economic coercion Maintaining the high standards of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Promoting development finance in a transparent and fair manner| ||7. Global Efforts for Coexistence and Coprosperity in the International Community - Strengthening ties with the United Nations and other international organizations and frameworks, and working on infectious disease crisis response, humanitarian assistance, human rights protection, and international peace cooperation, among other measures| **National Security Strategy** **Chapter** **2** **Section 1** **Outline of the National Security Strategy (NSS)** The National Security Strategy (NSS)[1] is Japan’s supreme comprehensive national power, including diplomatic, defense, national security policy document. We live in the world of a economic, technological, and intelligence capabilities. This historical inflection point and in the face of the most severe need has led to the formulation of the NSS in December 2022. and complex security environment since the end of WWII. To The strategic guidance and policies under the NSS will protect our national interests in such an environment, Japan dramatically transform Japan’s national security policy **Part** needs to carry out vigorous diplomacy and possess defense after the end of WWII from the aspect of its execution. **Ⅱ** capabilities that bolster the solid footing of such diplomacy. The NSS lays out Japan’s national interests, basic To achieve these objectives, Japan needs a strategy that principles concerning the national security, and the **Chapter** **2** integrates its national responses at a higher level by taking country’s security challenges. On this basis, it sets out a panoramic view of the diverse dimensions of international national security objectives and identifies strategic relations as a whole, where confrontation and cooperation are approaches to achieving them. intricately intertwined and then by taking full advantage of **See** Fig. II-2-1-1 (Outline of the NSS (Structure and Main Components)); Reference 1 (National Security Strategy of Japan) Fig. II-2-1-1 Outline of the NSS (Structure and Main Components) I Purpose II Japan’s National Interests III Fundamental Principles Concerning Japan’s National Security IV Security Environment Surrounding Japan and Japan’s National Security Challenges V National Security Objectives of Japan - Japan will continue to be a nation capable of protecting its sovereignty and independence, autonomously determining its domestic and foreign policies, and defending its territory and the safety of life, person, and the properties of its nationals. Japan will deter contingencies and the like. If by any chance a threat should reach Japan, Japan will defeat the threat and minimize the damage caused, and bring it to an end on a favorable term. - Japan will proactively ensure, through its security policy, an international environment in which its own economy can grow. Japan will work to achieve a virtuous cycle of security and economic growth. - Japan will ensure the self-reliance, advantages, and indispensability of its economy. Japan will achieve a new balance in international relations, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan will prevent the emergence of situations conducive to unilaterally changing the status quo, and redouble efforts to secure a stable, predictable, free and open international order based on the rule of law. - Japan will generate an environment in which the international community can coexist and co-prosper through multilateral cooperation. VI Strategic Approaches Prioritized by Japan (Implementing strategic approaches by harnessing Japan's comprehensive national power, including diplomatic, defense, economic, technological, and intelligence capabilities) 1.Developing Efforts Centered on Diplomacy to Prevent Crises, Proactively Creating a Peaceful and Stable International Environment, and Strengthening a Free and Open International Order 3. Deepening Security Cooperation with the United States- Further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S. a. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance b. Maintaining and Developing a Free and Open International Order and Strengthen Ties with its Ally, Like-minded Countries and Others 4. Strengthening Efforts to Seamlessly Protect Japan in All Directions c. Strengthen Diplomacy with Japan’s Neighboring Countries and Regions as well as Efforts toward Resolution of Various Issues of a. Cybersecurity b. Maritime security and maritime law enforcement capabilities Concern, including Territorial Issues c. Space security d. Improving security-related technical capabilities and proactively capitalizing on them d. Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-proliferation e. Strengthening intelligence capacities f. Reinforcing response capabilities within Japan with contingencies in mind e. International Counter-Terrorism f. Climate Change Measures g. Strategic Use of ODA and Other International g. Reinforcing mechanisms for the protection of Japanese nationals h. Promoting People-to-People Exchanges h. Protecting Japanese nationals and others overseas i. Securing resources essential for Japan's national security, including energy and food 2. Strengthening Japan’s Defense Architecture - Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities as the Last Guarantee of National Security 5. Promoting economic security policies a. Reinforcing stand-off defense capabilities, unmanned defense capabilities, and other capabilities in addition to cross-domain - Securing Japan's self-reliance, advantages, and indispensability, among other measures Enhancing Japan's supply chain operational capabilities resilience, including by securing stable supply for critical goods including rare earth Making examinations to bolster b. Possessing counterstrike capabilities Japan's information security, including security clearance c. Taking necessary measures to make the level of Japan's budget—for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives—reach 2% of current gross national product (GDP) in FY 2027 6. Maintaining and Strengthening International Economic Order based on Free, Fair, and Equitable Rules d. Strengthening coordination and cooperation between the SDF and the JCG, including the MOD's control over the JCG in the event - Countering against unfair trade practices and economic coercion of a contingency, among other measures Maintaining the high standards of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) - Reinforcing the comprehensive defense architecture Promoting efforts in four areas that complement, and are inseparable from, the Promoting development finance in a transparent and fair manner fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities under the frameworks of relevant ministries and agencies. These four areas are Ⅶ Domestic Base that should be Strengthened to Support Japan’s National Security Ⅷ Duration, Evaluation, and Revision of the Strategy Ⅸ Conclusion Note: The term "current gross national product (GDP)" refers to GDP for FY2022. Two percent of it is expected to be 11 trillion yen given that GDP for FY2022 is projected at 560.2 trillion yen in the Fiscal 2023 Economic Outlook and Basic Stance for Economic and Fiscal Management, approved by the Cabinet on December 22, 2022. ----- **Section 2** **Outline of the National Defense Strategy** Until now, the National Defense Program Guidelines times since it was first established in 1976. In light of the (NDPG) has been established as the grand design for most severe security environment since the end of World safeguarding Japan’s peace and security by prescribing War II, the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS)[1] the form of Japan’s approach to and target levels for its was formulated for the first time in December 2022 to defense capabilities based on an ascertainment of changes replace the NDPG as the document that comprehensively in the security environment surrounding Japan and in presented Japan’s defense objectives, approaches to global military trends. The NDPG has been formulated six achieve these objectives, and the means to achieve them. **1** **Transition from the NDPG to the NDS** the end of the Cold War and other major changes to **1** **1976 NDPG** the international situation, as well as the heightened **Part** **Ⅱ** 1976 NDPG[2] was formulated against the backdrop of expectations for the Self-Defense Forces (the SDF), détente[3] in the 1970s based on the recognition that (i) including its role in UN peacekeeping operations and its **Chapter** there was generally a low likelihood of an all-out military response to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. **2** conflict between the Eastern and Western Blocs, and (ii) 1995 NDPG determined that Japan’s buildup of with regard to the area surrounding Japan, the stable defense capability had until then been conducted based balance of power between the United States, China, and on the “Basic Defense Force Concept,” which stated the Soviet Union as well as the existence of the Japan- that Japan was to maintain the minimum necessary U.S. Security Treaty would continue to play a major role basic defense capabilities as an independent nation to in preventing a full-scale aggression against of Japan. prevent itself from forming a power vacuum that would In view of this, the defense capabilities to be possessed destabilize the area surrounding Japan, instead of directly by Japan were determined to include (i) equipping itself countering military threats to Japan. This concept was with various functions that were necessary for its defense basically followed by 1995 NDPG. and (ii) focusing primarily on adopting a balanced On the other hand, the details of Japan’s defense posture in terms of the organization and deployment capabilities as set forth in 1995 NDPG were notable of such functions, including logistical support systems. for the fact that in addition to reviewing the scale and By means of these, Japan could (iii) remain sufficiently functions of defense capabilities, they also emphasized vigilant in peacetime and (iv) be capable of effectively a greater utilization of the SDF’s capabilities not only dealing with situations involving limited and small-scale for the defense of the nation, but also in various other aggression, while (v) retaining the ability to smoothly areas, including dealing with various contingencies such transition to a new posture in terms of its defense as major disasters and contributing to building a more capabilities should circumstances change and such a stable security environment. posture becomes necessary. The “Basic Defense Force Concept” introduced in 1976 NDPG is thus a concept **3** **2004 NDPG** that emphasizes the concept of deterrence with a focus on preventing aggression against Japan. 2004 NDPG[5] was formulated based on the determination that it was necessary to provide new guidelines for Japan’s approach to its national security and defense **2** **1995 NDPG** capabilities in response to new threats and diverse 1995 NDPG[4] was formulated in consideration of contingencies, including the proliferation of weapons **1** “National Defense Strategy” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022) **2** “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1977 and Beyond” (approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet on October 29, 1976) **3** This refers to the easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, which were engaged at the time in a conflict known as the Cold War, following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Détente ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. **4** The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1996 and Beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on November 28, 1995) ----- of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as the activities of international terrorist organizations. 2004 NDPG specified two security objectives: (i) to prevent direct threats from reaching Japan, and should a threat arise, to eliminate the threat and minimize the damage caused; and (ii) to improve the international security environment and ensure that no threats are posed to Japan. To achieve these objectives, Japan would combine three approaches in an integrated manner, namely through (i) its own efforts, (ii) cooperation with the ally, and (iii) cooperation with the international community. The document stated that with regard to Japan’s approach to its defense capabilities, the effective parts of the “Basic Defense Force Concept” would be retained while placing a greater emphasis on Japan’s “response capabilities” and recognizing that “multifunctional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities” were required to respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies. **4** **2010 NDPG** qualities of readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility would be built and supported by advanced technological and intelligence capabilities that took into account trends in the levels of military technologies. **5** **2013 NDPG** 2013 NDPG[7] was formulated against the backdrop of an increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan in which the defense capabilities that underpinned the various activities of the SDF could no longer be guaranteed to be adequate in “quality” and “quantity” in view of the increasing number and longer duration of situations that required a response by the SDF, including so-called “gray-zone” situations. 2013 NDPG took these considerations into account and stipulated the enhancement of Japan’s deterrence and response capabilities by placing greater emphasis on joint operations, improving the operational level of equipment and its employment, and by ensuring that the defense capabilities that underpinned various activities would be adequate both in “quality” and “quantity.” To this end, it was determined that capability assessments would be conducted from the viewpoint of joint operations with a focus on the functions and capabilities of the SDF as a whole, in order to identify the functions and capabilities that should be of particular focus from a comprehensive perspective. Harnessing the results of these capability assessments would allow Japan to adapt to the ever-changing security environment surrounding it and efficiently develop its defense capabilities in a wellbalanced manner. In addition, its logistical support base would be extensively reinforced to establish a posture that ensures its most effective operation. In the above ways, 2013 NDPG sought to develop a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force,” a more effective defense force capable of conducting a variety of activities in a swift and flexible manner. **6** **2018 NDPG** 2018 NDPG[8] was formulated with the aim of building a truly effective defense force by further deepening the approach of a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” in view of the remarkably fast pace at which the security **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** 2010 NDPG[6] was formulated based on the facts that (i) large-scale military forces, including nuclear forces, had continued to exist in the area surrounding Japan, and many states were modernizing their military capabilities and intensifying their various activities; (ii) the period of time from the emergence of signs of a threat to the actual occurrence of a situation had tended to be shorter with the rapid development of military science and technology, and there was a need to respond seamlessly to such situations; and (iii) given that many security issues transcend national borders, ongoing coordination and cooperation between different countries had become increasingly vital, with the roles of military forces diversifying as well, making it more common for military forces to be operating continuously at all times. 2010 NDPG stated that Japan’s future defense capabilities should be “dynamic in form” and focused on the “operation of defense capabilities” as well as the ability to actively carry out various activities to effectively fulfill the assigned roles of such capabilities without being bound by the existing “Basic Defense Force Concept,” which only emphasized the “existence of defense capabilities.” To this end, it was determined that a “Dynamic Defense Force” equipped with the The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) ----- |19 years|Col2| |---|---| |1995 NDPG|| |9 years|Col2| |---|---| |2004 NDPG|| |6 years|Col2| |---|---| |2010 NDPG|| |3 years|Col2| |---|---| |2013 NDPG|| |5 years|Col2| |---|---| |2018 NDPG|| |5 years|Col2| |---|---| |NDS|| Fig. II-2-2-1 Changes in the Roles of Defense Capabilities **[Background]** **[The Role of Defense Capabilities]** 1976 NDPG - ○Détente and Cold War coexisting in global communityBalanced relationship among the United States, China, and the Soviet ・・Basic Defense Force ConceptMaintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a (October 29, 1976, the National Union in the vicinity of Japan power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat Defense Council/Cabinet Meeting) - Need to show the target of defense force buildup to Japan 19 years 1995 NDPG - ○The end of Cold WarInternational situation with unpredictability and uncertainty ・・Basically follow the Basic Defense Force Concept“Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing to (November 28, 1995, the Security - National expectations to international contribution building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of “defense of the nation” Council/Cabinet Meeting) 9 years 2004 NDPG - New threats such as international terrorism and ballistic missile attacks ・Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and diverse (December 10, 2004, the Security - Direct connection between world peace and Japan’s peace contingencies Council/Cabinet Meeting) - Necessity to convert the policy from putting weight on deterrence to ・Succeeding the effective parts of the Basic Defense Force Concept handling the situation 6 years **Part** 2010 NDPG - ○Change in global power balanceComplex military situation surrounding Japan ・Development of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the Basic Defense Force Concept) **Ⅱ** (December 17, 2010, the Security - Diversification of the military role in global society ・Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it Council/Cabinet Meeting) possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the security environment in **Chapter** the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner **2** 3 years 2013 NDPG - ○Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severeU.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region ・・Development of a Dynamic Joint Defense ForceDefense force to be more thorough with the concept of joint operation, which enables the (December 17, 2013, the National - Lessons learned from the Self-Defense Forces experience of the Great SDF to respond swiftly to the increasingly severe security environment and carry out Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) East Japan Earthquake various activities, such as achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority, seamlessly and flexibly 5 years 2018 NDPG - Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe and uncertain at extremely high speeds ・・Development of a Multi-domain Defense ForceTruly effective defense capability that enables cross-domain operations organically fusing (December 18, 2018, the National - Rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, capabilities in all domains by strengthening not only those in traditional domains-land, sea Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum and air-but also those in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic - Clear trends observed in further military build-up and increase in spectrum military activities 5 years NDS - Japan is currently faced with the most challenging and complex security environment since the end of WWⅡ. ・Development defense capabilities with attention to the opponents capabilities and new ways of warfare (December 16 2022, the National - Japan is on the front line of activated military actions of neighboring ・Development defense capabilities to forbid unilateral changes to the status quo by force Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) countries enhancing their military powers. and such attempts as well as deter invasion to Japan by radical enhancement of - Whether Japan will be able to adapt to these emerging new ways of multi-domain defense force; and if the worst comes to the worst and the deterrence does warfare is a challenge when developing its future defense capabilities. not work, to be able to disrupt and defeat the invasion by our own initiative environment surrounding Japan had become increasingly In particular, as capabilities in new domains, which are severe and uncertain. space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, could Specifically, Japan would build a “Multi-Domain substantially enhance the military’s overall capabilities to Defense Force” as a truly effective defense force that conduct operations, states are exerting efforts to improve was capable of (i) carrying out cross-domain operations capabilities in these fields. Japan would also focus on that organically would integrate capabilities in all enhancing such capabilities as well as capabilities domains, generating synergy and amplifying overall to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships, and capabilities; (ii) enabling the sustained conduct of missiles in combination therewith, and enhancing the flexible and strategic activities during all phases from sustainability and resiliency of its defense capabilities, peacetime to contingencies; and (iii) strengthening the including logistical support. Japan-U.S. Alliance and promoting security cooperation. **See** Fig. II-2-2-1 (Changes in the Roles of Defense Capabilities) **2** **Outline of the National Defense Strategy (NDS)** The NDS comprehensively presents Japan’s defense referred to as the “NDPG”), which have served as objectives, approaches, and means by which Japan Japan’s basic guidelines for development, sustainment, accomplishes those objectives. The NDS replaces the and operation of defense capability of the Self-Defense N ti l D f P G id li (h i ft F (h i ft f d t th “SDF”) d h ----- been formulated six times since 1976. The NDS states that the most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihood as well as Japan’s territorial land, waters, and airspace and that it is the very heart of Japan’s national security. It adds that the international community, of which Japan is a member, is facing serious challenges, and has entered into a new era of crisis. The NDS maintains that one cannot rule out the possibility of serious events taking place in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia, that might shake the foundation of the stable post-war international order. It then states that amid the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII, Japan needs to face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities, with a focus on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals. In addition, in April 2023, the Headquarters for the Promotion of Realization of Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities was established under Defense Minister in order to ensure thorough management of the progress of initiatives, etc. to be implemented from FY2023 onward and to ensure effective and efficient budget execution by the MOD/SDF working as one, based on the direction of fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities indicated in the National Security Strategy (hereinafter referred to as the “NSS”) and other related **KEY WORD** **New ways of warfare** In addition to the traditional forms of invasion through air, sea, and land, new ways of warfare have emerged with the combination of massive strikes by missiles with enhanced precision strike capabilities, hybrid warfare including information warfare, asymmetric attacks leveraging the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum and with unmanned assets, and public remarks that could be interpreted as threat using nuclear weapons. Whether or not to be able to respond to these new ways of warfare is a major challenge in building future defense capabilities. documents. The Headquarters held six meetings by April 2024. Under its leadership, the MOD/SDF will forge ahead with the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities through both thorough progress management of projects and shorter and more streamlined processes for procurement and accounting. The NDS states that to protect one’s own country from opponents, it is necessary to have deterrence capability, thereby making them realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult and that it is also necessary to build one’s own defense capability focusing on opponent capabilities. This statement is based on the following recognition. The military background for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was that Ukraine did not possess sufficient capabilities to deter Russian aggression. Also, while no country can defend its own security by itself alone, there is a renewed recognition of the importance of cooperation with allies who have **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** Fig. II-2-2-2 Implementation Architecture for Fundamentally Reinforcing Japan’s Defense Capabilities Promotion HQ for Realization of Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities Head: Minister of Defense General Secretariat Head: Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Comprehensive Coordination Secretariat (General coordination, public relations, etc. regarding the basic policy for fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, etc.) Project Management Secretariat (Progress management of each project) Task Force (Stand-off defense capabilities, sustainability and resiliency, etc.) Accounting/Procurement Systems Secretariat (Comprehensive coordination concerning accounting and procurement procedures) ----- the intention and capability to respond to invasions jointly. Also worth paying attention to in this event is that a country with strong military capability has one day come to possess the intention to launch an aggression. A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so; accurately gauging other’s intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state’s decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threat may materialize. **See** Fig. II-2-2-2 (Implementation Architecture for Fundamentally Reinforcing Japan’s Defense Capabilities); and Reference 2 **See** (National Defense Strategy) **1** **Japan’s Basic Defense Policy** Defense capability, which forms the very foundation of the defense of Japan, is the ultimate guarantor for ensuring Japan’s security. It will deter threats from extending to Japan, and in the case that a threat does reach Japan, it will disrupt and defeat the threat, thereby demonstrating Japan’s resolve and capability to defend itself to the end. The NDS states that Japan must clearly demonstrate the intention that Japan will never tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in any situation. It adds that to this end, Japan must fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities with a focus on opponents’ capabilities and the ways they prosecute warfare and actively adapt to new ways of warfare. Then the NDS sets out three defense objectives for Japan: (i) To shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force (ii) To deter, through cooperation and collaboration with our ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to bring the situation under control at an early stage (iii) To take primary responsibility to deal with invasion of Japan, if any, and to disrupt and defeat it, while receiving support from the ally and others The NDS explains that in dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential. It then states that Japan will defend itself to the end in all situations through the combination of its own efforts to achieve the three defense objectives mentioned above and extended deterrence and others provided by the United States. Th th NDS t t th h t hi i these defense objectives, as well as basic ideas behind them: (i) To fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities, which constitute the core of national defense, and reinforce the defense architecture of the whole country in an effort of strengthening of Japan’s own architecture for national defense (ii) To further reinforce joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by further strengthening cooperation with the United States, our ally (iii) To reinforce collaboration with like-minded countries and others with whom Japan cooperate to uphold and reinforce a free and open international order **(1) First Approach: Strengthening Japan’s Own** **Architecture for National Defense** **a. Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense** **Capabilities** With a fundamentally reinforced defense capability, Japan should be able to take primary responsibility to disrupt and defeat invasion against Japan. This means that Japan will possess a capability that makes the opponent realize that the goal of invasion of Japan is not achievable by military means, and that the damage the opponent will incur makes the invasion not worth the cost. If Japan possesses such defense capability, this capability, coupled with that of the United States, will be able to deter not only an invasion against Japan, but also deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the Indo-Pacific region. This will help foster a security environment where such forcible actions are not tolerated. This is why Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities. In addition, Japan’s fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities must be able to respond to new ways of warfare. As for the functions and capabilities required for this purpose, Japan will first strengthen (i) stand-off defense capabilities and (ii) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, in order to disrupt and defeat invading forces from a long distance, thereby deterring invasion against Japan itself. Should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, Japan will leverage, in addition to capabilities (i) and (ii), manned and unmanned assets and strengthen its (iii) unmanned defense capabilities, (iv) cross-domain operation capabilities, and (v) command and control and intelligence-related functions, in order to ensure asymmetric advantage while gain superiority d i M J ill t th ( i) **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** ----- **Commentary** **Counterstrike Capabilities** **Q. What are counterstrike capabilities? Why are they necessary?** Counterstrike capabilities are the SDF’s capabilities that leverage **Commentary** stand-off defense capabilities and other capabilities. In cases where an armed attack against Japan has occurred and ballistic missiles, etc., have been used as the means of such an attack, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory in accordance with the Three New Conditions for the “use of force” as a minimum necessary self-defense measure that cannot be avoided to prevent such an attack. In recent years, there has been a dramatic improvement in missile-related technologies such as hypersonic weapons and practical missile operational capabilities such as saturation attacks in the area surrounding Japan. As the quality and quantity of missile forces are being significantly enhanced, and missiles are being launched repeatedly, missile attacks on Japan have become a real threat, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to respond to them fully with the existing missile defense network alone. For this reason, it is necessary for Japan to possess counterstrike capabilities in order to prevent further armed attacks by the opponent by means of its counterstrike capabilities while defending against incoming missiles with its missile defense network. Having the counterstrike capabilities will deter armed attacks themselves. Moreover, should missiles be launched by an opponent, Japan will be able to prevent further armed attacks by the opponent by means of its counterstrike capabilities, thereby protecting the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals. **Q. Don’t counterstrike capabilities go against the** **exclusively defense-oriented policy?** The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. It is Japan’s basic strategy of defense. Japan’s counterstrike capabilities are used in cases where an armed attack involving ballistic missiles and the like has occurred against Japan. They are used in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force as a minimum necessary self-defense measure that cannot be avoided to prevent such an attack. The exclusively defense oriented policy and Japan’s counterstrike capabilities are logically consistent in that both allow for a minimum necessary measure for self-defense to be taken in the event of an armed attack. The Japanese Government intends to remain committed to the exclusively defense-oriented policy as Japan’s basic strategy of defense. **Q Doesn’t the use of counterstrike capabilities constitute** Counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of the Constitution, international law, and domestic law; they can be used only when the Three New Conditions for Use of Force are met. Needless to say, preemptive strikes, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, remain impermissible, and Japan will not do so. **Q. Can counterstrike capabilities be used in a Survival-** **Threatening Situations?** A situation will not be unconditionally confirmed as Survival-Threatening Situations whenever an armed attack on another country having a close relationship with Japan occurs. It will be confirmed as such when such an attack threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger in terms of fundamentally overturning people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Japan is allowed to use force if there are no other appropriate means available to repel the attack, ensure Japan’s survival, and protect its people and if such a use of force is limited to the minimum extent necessary as a measure for self-defense. If a survival-threatening situation is confirmed, the Japanese Government will decide on the use of counterstrike capabilities on a case-by-case basis. Such a decision will be made in view of the actual situation, in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force, and from the perspective of what measures to be taken as long as they are the absolute minimum measures that are unavoidably necessary to prevent attacks by guided missiles, etc. if no other means are available. (Reference) *1: Unified opinion of the Japanese Government (answer read by Defense Agency Director General FUNADA Naka on behalf of Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro (February 29, 1956)) If Jpan were in imminent danger of an illegal invasion, and the method of invasion were a missile attack against Japan’s national territory, I simply cannot believe that the spirit of the Constitution requires that we merely sit and wait to die. In such a case, I believe that we should take the absolute minimum measures that are unavoidably necessary to defend against such an attack, so that in defending against a missile attack, for example, if no other suitable means are available, striking the missile base should be legally acceptable and falls within the range of self-defense. **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** **Counterstrike capabilities (image)** (1) In case where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, Japan will protect itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network. (2) At the same time, an effective counterstrike against the opponent will be made from Japan to prevent the opponent's further armed attacks as an minimum necessary measure for self-defense in accordance with the Three New Conditions for the “Use of Force.” By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attacks itself. **No preemptive strikes will be made** **(1) Ballistic missiles** **(1) ASDF Patriot PAC-3** **(2) Aircraft** **(1) MSDF Aegis-equipped** **destroyer SM-3** **(2) Vessels** **(2) Launcher** **(1) Hypersonic weapons** ! ----- mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection and (vii) sustainability and resiliency to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner to crush to the opponent’s will to invade. Japan will need to promptly realize the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities as when and how unilateral changes to the status quo occur is hard to predict. First, by FY2027, five years after the formulation of the NDS, Japan will strengthen its defense capability to the point where Japan is able to take primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against this nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats with the support of its ally and others. The top priorities for the next five years are twofold: first, to maximize effective use of its existing equipment, Japan will improve the number of operationally available equipment, secure sufficient ammunitions and fuel, and accelerate investment in improving the resiliency of key defense facilities; and second, Japan will fundamentally strengthen its core capabilities for future operations. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will make further efforts for achieving these defense objectives and will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point where Japan is able to disrupt and defeat invasion much earlier and at places further afield. A key to deterring invasion against Japan is counterstrike capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In recent years, in Japan’s surroundings, there have been significant improvement of missile forces in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. Missile attacks have become a palpable threat. Under these circumstances, Japan will continue its steadfast efforts to both qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its missile defense network; however, it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing network alone. For this reason, Japan needs counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of missile defenses. Counterstrike capabilities are the SDF’s capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against th t’ t it C t t ik d minimum necessary measure for self defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force. By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attack itself. If an opponent ever launches missiles, it will be able to prevent the opponent’s further armed attacks by counterstrike capabilities, while protecting itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network, thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals. As counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of Japan’s Constitution and international law they do not change Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy; and, they can be used only when the above-mentioned Three New Conditions are fulfilled. Needless to say, preemptive strikes, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, remain impermissible. While the basic division of roles between Japan and the United States will remain unchanged, as Japan will now possess counterstrike capabilities, the two nations will cooperate in counterstrikes. **b. Reinforcing the Defense Architecture of the Whole** **Country** To defend Japan, the SDF needs to be strong. National defense cannot be achieved without a whole-ofcountry approach. For this reason, in addition to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will build an overall national defense architecture by integrating Japan’s national power – diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and technological – as well as by systematically combining all policy means. To enhance the whole-of-government undertaking, it is essential to break down sectionalism within the Government. Japan will enhance the comprehensive defense architecture that draws upon Japan’s national power. This undertaking is an indivisible part of the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities. The national government will also promote cooperation with local governments and private entities. **(2) Second Approach: Joint Deterrence and Response** **by the Japan-U.S. Alliance** The second approach is to further strengthen the JapanU.S. Alliance. The Alliance with the United States is a key pillar of Japan’s security, and fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities will lead to more effective employment of U.S. capabilities and will further strengthen deterrence and response capabilities f th J U S Alli B d t ti h j i t **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** ----- resolve and capabilities, Japan and the United States will deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. In addition, if an invasion against Japan occurs, Japan-U.S. joint response will disrupt the invasion. The first measure to this end is to strengthen Japan U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities. Japan’s NDS and the United States’ National Defense Strategy are well aligned in prioritizing the prevention of unilateral changes to the status quo by force through integrating all approaches and means. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of reinforcing readiness and resiliency, imposing cost on opponents, and deterring invasion against Japan, Japan will further deepen discussion with the United States on their roles, missions, and capabilities and further reinforce joint deterrence capabilities of both countries in an integrated manner. The next is to reinforce alliance coordination functions. To conduct aligned joint response of Japan and the United States, Japan will further upgrade the overall coordination functions centered on the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM). In addition, in order to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others centered around the Japan-U.S. Alliance, Japan will promote closer operational coordination by leveraging the ACM and others. Furthermore, as efforts to reinforce the foundation for allied response, Japan will reinforce the foundational elements that support effective allied response in all phases, including information security, cybersecurity, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. The last is measures to support the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan. Japan will promote various measures to provide stable support for the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan, such as steady implementation of the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and the initiatives to reinforce the readiness and resiliency of the U.S. Forces in Japan, while optimizing the bilateral joint posture to respond to the severe security environment. **(3) Third Approach: Collaboration with Like-minded** **Countries and Others** The third approach is to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others. In order to respond to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to ensure Japan’s security, it is extremely important to reinforce collaboration with not only our ally but also as many countries as possible. From such perspective, Japan will promote efforts to contribute to realizing the vision of a FOIP. Moreover, Japan will proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, taking into account characteristics and other factors of the region and each country. In doing so, while promoting collaboration with like-minded countries and others, Japan will pay attention to communication with China and Russia. **2** **Key Capabilities for Fundamental** **Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities** **(Seven Priority Areas)** The NDS lays out the basic concepts and contents of the seven functions and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan, which are derived from the basic policies and the comprehensive operation concept in line with them. The seven functions and capabilities are (i) stand-off defense capabilities, (ii) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, (iii) unmanned defense capabilities, (iv) cross-domain operation capabilities, (v) command and control and intelligence-related functions, (vi) mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection, and (vii) sustainability and resiliency. The NDS notes that Japan will need to promptly realize the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities. It states that by FY 2027, five years after its formulation, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining the support of its ally and others. In studying ways to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities, the Government has considered, from many different angles, whether it can protect the lives and livelihoods of the people of Japan to the end. In so doing, it has examined gaps in the country’s defense capabilities and compiled a list of the necessary defense capabilities. As priorities for the next five years, the list includes improving the number of operationally available equipment, securing sufficient ammunition and fuel, and investing in improving the resiliency of key defense facilities to maximize effective use of the existing equipment, as well as fundamentally strengthening its core capabilities for future operations, such as stand-off defense capabilities and unmanned defense capabilities. **See** Fig. II-2-2-3 (Seven Functions and Capabilities on which to Focus in Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities and Their Images) **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** ----- Fig. II-2-2-3 Seven Functions and Capabilities on which to Focus in Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities and Their Images Inside the opponent's threat envelope Japan **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** |① Stand-off Defense Capabilities|Inside the opponent's threat envelope Japan ・Strengthening the defense capabilities to oppose invading forces from a safe distance where we will not be attacked| |---|---| |Integrated Air and ② Missile Defense Capabilities|・Strengthening our capabilities to respond to increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats such as missiles Shipbuilding of an Aegis System-Equipped Vessel (Note)| |③ Unmanned Defense Capabilities|・Strengthening our capabilities, e.g., via intelligence gathering and combat support with unmanned assets Preparation of UAV for reconnaissance (for mid-range) (Note)| |④ Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities|・Strengthening space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, land, sea and air capabilities necessary for combat by fusing all capabilities Development of Stand-off Electronic Warfare Aircraft (Note)| |Command and Control and ⑤ Intelligence-related Functions|・Strengthening command and control and intelligence-related functions to accelerate and refine decision-making Acquisition of Signals Intelligence Aircraft (RC-2)| |Mobile Deployment Capabilities/ ⑥ Civil Protection|・Strengthening maritime and air transport capabilities to quickly Acquisition of transport maneuver and deploy the necessary forces vessels (Note) ・Implementing civil protection by utilizing the above capabilities| |⑦ Sustainability and Resiliency|・Preparation of necessary and sufficient ammunition, guided missiles and fuel from an early stage ・Securing expenditures for acquiring equipment parts, equipment repairing and improving the resiliency of facilities Securing the ammunition storage facilities (Note)| Acquisition of Signals Intelligence Aircraft (RC-2) The (note) in the figure is an image. ----- the joint operations system based on these roles, and the development of the architecture of each service of the SDF. Given the need for strategic and agile defense policy planning and making, the NDS states that the SDF will fundamentally reinforce its functions concerned. **See** Fig. II-2-2-4 (Concept for Developing the SDF’s Architecture) **3** **Future of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** The NDS lays out basic concepts with regard to a number of aspects, including the roles of each service of the SDF in the seven priority areas of key capabilities for fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** |Fig. II-2-2-4 Concept for|Developing the SDF’s Architecture| |---|---| |Strengthening the joint operations system|・Reorganizing the existing structure and establishing a permanent Joint Headquarters ・Considering defense equipment systems that contribute to joint operations| |Ground Self- Defense Force (GSDF)|・Developing a system that places importance on stand-off defense capabilities, rapid maneuver and disperse deployment capabilities, and command and control and intelligence-related functions ・Contributing to cross-domain operations mainly in the cyber domain| |Maritime Self- Defense Force (MSDF)|・Reinforcing air defense capabilities, information warfare capabilities, stand-off defense capabilities, etc. ・Promoting labor-saving and automation measures ・Developing a system that will allow acquiring and sustaining superiority in underwater| |Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)|・Reinforcing mobile and dispersed operations and stand-off defense and other capabilities ・Renewing the ASDF as the Air and Space Self Defense Force, thereby developing a system to ensure superiority in use of space| |Defense Intelligence Headquarters|・Assuming the central role of responding to Integrated Information Warfare ・Fundamentally reinforcing capabilities to grasp military activities of other countries and analyzing and disseminating them| (Note) The SDF as a whole will reinforce its capabilities to contribute to the reinforcement of cybersecurity of the entire country. personnel, the core element of defense capability, to demonstrate their abilities. **See** Figure II-2-2-5 (Measures, etc. for Protection of the Life, Person, and Property of Japanese Nationals); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7 (Measures for Protection of the Life, Person, and Property of Japanese Nationals); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3 (Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 4 (Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation); Part Ⅳ, Chapter 1 (Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability itself); Part Ⅳ, Chapter 2 (Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities) **4** **Measures for Protection of Life, Person, and** **Property of Japanese Nationals** Other aspects about which the NDS lays out basic concepts include measures for protection of the life, person, and property of Japanese nationals; measures for security cooperation against global challenges; and the reinforcement both of defense production and technology base as a virtually integral part of defense capability itself and of human resource base for SDF Fig. II-2-2-5 Measures, etc. for Protection of the Life, Person, and Property of Japanese Nationals **Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals and Measures for International Security Cooperation** Measures for protection of life, person and property of Japanese nationals ・Not only an invasion of Japan, but also large-scale terrorist attacks, attacks on critical infrastructure including nuclear power plants, large-scale disasters, and infectious disease crises are serious threats, and Japan will respond to them with its utmost efforts. Measures for security cooperation against global challenges ・For the peace and security of Japan, and from the perspective of proactive contribution to peace, Japan will make efforts toward resolving conflicts and confrontations around the world, provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the event of large-scale international disasters caused by climate change, and proactively respond to global challenges such as non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. **Defense Production and Technological Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capabilities** ・Defense production and technology bases constitute an indispensable foundation for securing the stable research, development, production, and procurement of equipment in Japan and for incorporating cutting-edge technologies necessary for new ways of warfare into defense equipment. These bases are virtually defense capabilities themselves, and their reinforcement is essential. ・Japan will promote initiatives such as building a strong and sustainable defense industry necessary for a new way of warfighting, dealing with various risks, and expanding sales channels. **Strengthening the Foundation for Uniformed SDF Personnel, the Core of Japan’s Defense Capabilities, to Demonstrate Their Abilities** Reinforcing the human resource base ・The MOD/SDF will secure necessary uniformed SDF personnel, the core of Japan’s defense capabilities, and create an environment that enables them all to demonstrate their own abilities to their fullest while maintaining high morale and pride. Transforming the medical function ・The MOD/SDF will transform the SDF medical force—which has been placing importance on sustaining the health of uniformed SDF personnel—into an organization that saves the lives of unformed SDF personnel who carry out their missions in a contingency in spite of danger. ----- **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** **Perspective** **Significance of Deterrence** **TAKAHASHI Sugio Head, Defense Policy Division, National Institute for Defense Studies** Deterrence is to prevent what should be defended from being countries are likely to continue building their own capabilities in attacked. If a country is to make deterrence succeed, it needs to an endless spiral. meet some conditions. First, the country has the capabilities to This is known as the security dilemma. In such as situation, successfully respond and defend what should be defended when deterrence is more likely to fail. Still, that does not hold true it is attacked. Second, the country has the intention to employ for every state-to-state relations. The security dilemma does these capabilities if the country is attacked. Third, a potential not apply to situations where one of two opposing countries is challenger correctly recognizes such capabilities and intention and building its capabilities with the intention to challenge the existing then concludes that it will not be able to achieve its objectives at international order. The term “dilemma” is used because hostility any acceptable cost or achieve them physically in the first place. deepens although neither country has the intention to challenge The simplest situation in which deterrence fails is where a the status quo. In other words, security dilemma can be avoided if challenger underestimates the capabilities and intention of the either country successfully convinces the other that it values the deterring country. Deterrence is most likely to fail if a country current international order and that it has no intention to threaten with a clear intention to challenge the current international order the survival of the other. This is why it is deemed important for any underestimates the capabilities and intention of a neighboring country to make clear the concrete ideas behind its security policy country and thinks it will win if it attacks that country. to other countries for greater transparency in order to avoid the Simply put, for deterrence to succeed, it is important not to security dilemma. let the challenger think that it can win if it attacks. What matters Japan is on the side of maintaining the current international here is to build capabilities. If a country does not have sufficient order in the Indo-Pacific region. This position has been underpinned capabilities, it cannot defend what should be defended. In addition, by Japan’s past actions and track record. Meanwhile, the security capability development itself conveys the intention to use such environment is becoming more and more severe by the day. To capabilities. maintain peace and security in such a severe security environment, Deterrence fails in other situations as well. The security dilemma deterrence is essential as capabilities to maintain the status quo. is one such typical situation. Take relations between Country A and Japan’s plan to spend ¥43 trillion for its defense over a period of Country B. Let us assume that neither country has the intention five years, as well as the country’s move to fundamentally reinforce to challenge the current international order or attack the other. its defense capabilities, including counterstrike capabilities, is of Yet, Country A’s act to build capabilities to defend what should great significance in that regard. be defended may seem to be an act of threating the survival of As Russia’s aggression against Ukraine clearly shows, once Country B in the eyes of Country B. Then Country B may build their the line is crossed, it is extremely difficult to return to the status own capabilities for its security. This in turn may seem to an act of quo ante. The role of deterrence in maintaining peace is more threating Country A in the eyes of Country A. If this happens, both important than ever before. (Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher’s academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position. ----- **Section 3** **Outline of the Defense Buildup Program** The Defense Buildup Program (DBP)[1] sets out, among as well as the total expenditures and the quantity of other things, the level of defense capability Japan should major equipment needed to achieve that level.[2] possess to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense **See** Reference 3 (Defense Buildup Program) capabilities under the National Defense Strategy (NDS), **1** **Program Guidelines** The DBP states that five years after the formulation that supports our defense capability. of the Strategy, Japan will strengthen its defense Secondly, in procuring equipment, the MOD/SDF capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take will properly combine the introduction of new, high the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions performance equipment, along with life extension and against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats improvement of existing equipment, to efficiently secure **Part** while gaining the support of its ally and others. It adds necessary and sufficient quantity and quality of defense **Ⅱ** that in approximately 10 years from now, Japan will capability. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strengthen make further efforts to better attain this defense objective its project management throughout its equipment life- **Chapter** **2** and will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point at cycle and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost- which it will be possible to disrupt and defeat invasions effectiveness. In addition, by using advanced civilian against its nation much earlier and at a further distance. technologies and other means, the MOD/SDF will In accordance with the NDS, the DBP sets out that steadily realize acceleration of defense equipment the MOD/SDF will effectively and efficiently build, deployment for areas that could directly affect the SDF’s maintain and operate defense capabilities based on the current and future ways of warfare and are particularly following guidelines. urgent and significant from a policy perspective. Firstly, in terms of its seven key fields, Japan will Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will comprehensively reinforce (1) stand-off defense capabilities and (2) promote various measures to reinforce the human integrated air and missile defense capabilities to disrupt resource base, such as strengthening recruitment efforts, and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby utilizing SDF Reserve Personnel and others, promoting deterring invasion itself. Should deterrence fail and women’s participation, utilizing diverse and high- invasion of Japan occur, Japan would need to ensure quality personnel, improving the living and working asymmetric advantage by leveraging, in addition to these environments, developing human resources, and capabilities, manned as well as unmanned assets and gain improving their treatment. superiority across domains such as underwater, surface Moreover, to further reinforce the joint deterrence of the water, and air, and to this end, Japan will reinforce capabilities of Japan and the United States in an integrated (3) unmanned defense capabilities, (4) cross-domain manner, Japan will promote cooperation, improved operation capabilities, and (5) command and control/ interoperability, etc. related to cross-domain operations. intelligence related functions. Furthermore, to operate in In order to reinforce the infrastructure to support effective a swift as well as persistent manner so as to force the joint response capabilities, Japan will also reinforce opponent to give up invasion, Japan will reinforce (6) efforts related to information security and cybersecurity, mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection and (7) as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation. sustainability and resiliency. Additionally, Japan will In addition, measures to support the stationing of place emphasis on the defense production and technology U.S. Forces in Japan will be steadily implemented. bases as a virtually integral part of defense capability Furthermore, in line with the vision of a Free and Open itself, as well as areas such as the human resource base Indo-Pacific (FOIP), to strategically promote multifaceted **1** The Defense Buildup Program, approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022 **2** Because building up necessary defense capability takes time, defense buildup must be carried out continuously and systematically based on a concrete outlook. In this context, following the formulation of the 1976 NDPG, the then Defense Agency prepared the “Mid-Term Defense Estimate” in 1978 and 1981, which were the agency’s estimates for major programs to build up defense capability each fiscal year under the NDPG.1 In FY1986 onward, the government formulated the five-year Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) to indicate the direction of the ----- and multilayered security operations, Japan will further and build approach, optimize the SDF s organization promote establishing policy frameworks, while also and authorized strength as well as equipment. We will promoting defense cooperation and exchanges including also further our ongoing efforts toward more efficient bilateral/multilateral training and exercises and defense procurement, which have achieved significant cost equipment and technology cooperation. reductions. In addition, to account for Japan’s aging Lastly, in fundamentally reinforcing defense population with a declining birth rate, Japan will robustly capabilities, Japan will, while adhering to the scrap- promote automation, labor-saving and optimization. **2** **Organization of Self-Defense Forces** Based on the DBP’s guidelines, each SDF service is MOD/SDF will abolish units mainly composed of the structured mainly as follows. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and allocate the regular uniformed SDF personnel belonging to the units to fulfill the personnel requirements. In addition, the MOD/ **Part** **1** **Joint Operations System** **Ⅱ** SDF will manage SDF Ready Reserve Personnel as A Permanent Joint Headquarters will be established as replacements. **Chapter** soon as possible in order to build a system capable of **2** seamlessly conducting cross-domain operations at all **3** **Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force** stages from peacetime to contingency, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations among To conduct persistent and multilayered information the SDF services. In addition, the SDF will examine how gathering and surveillance, and to respond to an each unit, including joint units, should be structured. increasing volume of activities, such as ensuring security For further improvement of capabilities in the cyber of maritime traffic and conducting overseas deployment domain, including constant and continuous monitoring for security cooperation with other countries, MSDF of the MOD/SDF’s network and systems as well as the will reorganize the existing Escort Flotilla and Mine capability to disrupt an opponent’s use of cyberspace for Warfare Force into “Surface Vessels Units” to serve as an attack against Japan, the SDF will possess a cyber a central force provider for patrol vessels and destroyers defense unit as a joint unit, in order to fundamentally introduced in the future. In addition, MSDF will procure reinforce cyber defense capability. Aegis System Equipped Vessels that will primarily In addition, a new maritime transport unit will conduct BMD operations. be established as a joint unit to improve the mobile Furthermore, to organically consolidate information deployment capabilities to the southwestern region. warfare capabilities in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Headquarters and GSDF/ASDF intelligence units, MSDF will review the existing unit structure and **2** **Japan Ground Self-Defense Force** newly establish an Information Warfare major unit. In order to strengthen the defense architecture in the southwestern region, the 15th Brigade, which is in charge **4** **Japan Air Self-Defense Force** of Okinawa, will have an additional infantry regiment and be reorganized into a division. Additionally, in order To reinforce air defense capability in terms of both to strengthen stand-off defense capabilities, surface- quality and quantity, ASDF will possess more fighters to-ship missile units equipped with Upgraded Type- (also consider replacement with UAVs) and build a 12 SSM will be retained. Furthermore, units equipped system for carrying out mobile and dispersed operations with hyper velocity gliding projectile for the defense to continue the battle tenaciously. of remote islands, and a long-range guided missile unit In addition, ASDF will enhance its space domain equipped with upgraded hyper velocity gliding projectile function by, among other measures, establishing a new for the defense of remote island and hypersonic missiles specialized space domain missions unit led by a general- will be newly established. Moreover, in order to secure level commander. In view of the growing importance of the increased personnel necessary to strengthen stand- the space domain and the qualitative and quantitative ff d f biliti b biliti t th h t f ti biliti ----- |Fields|By 5 years until FY 2027 (*)|Approx. 10 Years Later| |---|---|---| ||If an invasion of Japan occurs, Japan will respond with primary responsibility and buildup defense capabilities to disrupt and defeat the invasion while gaining support from its ally and others|Further efforts to ensure the defense concept described on the left (buildup defense capabilities to disrupt or to defeat invasion at an earlier and more distant location)| |Stand-Off Defense Capabilities|● Acquire practical capability to operate stand-off missiles|● Acquire capabilities to operate more advanced stand-off missiles ● Secure required sufficient quantities| |Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities|● Reinforce capability to respond to Hypersonic Weapons ● Reinforce capability to respond to miniature Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)|● Reinforce wide-area air defense capabilities ● More efficient and effective UAV countermeasures| |Unmanned Defense Capabilities|● Expand the use of UAV to strengthen capabilities to practically operate|● Reinforce capability to control multiple unmanned assets simultaneously, etc.| |Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities|● Reinforce Space Domain Awareness (SDA), cybersecurity capabilities, and electromagnetic domain capabilities, etc. ● Reinforce ground, sea, and air domain capabilities that become basis of cross- domain operations|● Further reinforce space operation capability ● Reinforce supports in terms of cybersecurity for entities other than SDF ● Strengthen ground, maritime, and air capabilities to work with UAV| |Command and Control/Intelligence- related Functions|● Accelerate decision-making through the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), etc., while strengthening the resiliency of the network ● Strengthen information acquisition and analysis in both strategic and tactic information, including responses in the cognitive dimension|● Reinforce persistent information gathering and sharing postures, while enhancing information gathering and analysis capabilities by application of AI, etc.| |Mobile Deployment Capabilities|● Reinforce the SDF’s transportation and supply capabilities (deployment/civil protection), including enhancement of the SDF’s transportation assets and use of PFI vessels, etc.|● Further enhancements of transportation capability ● Accelerate transportation and supply capabilities by improving supply centers, etc.| |Sustainability and Resiliency|● Increase quantity of ammunitions and missiles ● Ensure maximum operational availability of equipment except those under maintenance ● Improve the resiliency of defense facilities for contingencies ● Secure required ammunition depots, etc.|● Maintain and ensure adequate inventory of ammunitions and missiles ● Maintain the operational rates ● Further improve the resiliency of defense facilities ● Further secure ammunition depots and other facilities commensurate with ammunition requirements| |Defense Production and Technology Bases|● Establish strong defense production base through measures to strengthen the supply chain, etc. ● Focused investment in equipment areas directly linked to future warfare, and a significant reduction in research and development periods|● Maintain robust defense production base capable for realizing innovative equipment ● Acquire technologies for securing technological superiority in the future| |Human Resource Base|● Secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources from a wide range of sources, including the private sector, by strengthening recruitment capabilities and establishing a new SDF personnel system ● Reinforce education and research (cyber and other domains, joint operations, medical) ● Improvement of living and working environments and treatment by taking necessary measures against aging barracks and housing and eliminating equipment shortages|● Even amid a declining population eligible for recruitment, continuously and stably secure the necessary human resources, including those with specialized knowledge and skills ● Further strengthen education and research ● Foster an organizational environment in which all members can demonstrate their individual abilities while maintaining high morale| operations will be positioned as a major mission and ASDF, respectively, will be reviewed as necessary alongside air operations within ASDF. Therefore, the to optimize organizational capacity. In addition, the “Air Self-Defense Force” will be renamed the “Air and capacity necessary to strengthen the joint operation Space Self-Defense Force.” structure will be adjusted between the SDF services, and GSDF personnel will be transferred to MSDF and ASDF to meet their increased personnel requirements. To this **5** **Optimizing Organizational Capacity** end, approximately 2,000 GSDF uniformed personnel The target number of uniformed SDF personnel for the will be transferred to joint units, MSDF, and ASDF, end of FY2027 is the level at the end of FY2022. The respectively. number of uniformed personnel in the GSDF, MSDF, **3** **Quantities of Major Procurement** The DBP sets out the targets to be achieved in five approximately ten years as shown in Appendix Table 3. **Part** years and approximately in ten years for the defense **See** Fig. II-2-3-1 (Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 1 (Targets for Fundamentally Reinforced Defense Capabilities **Ⅱ** capabilities to be fundamentally reinforced as shown in Appendix Table 1. It also specifies the scales of specific and Timeline for Achievement)); Fig. II-2-3-2 (Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 2 (Procurement Quantities **Chapter** of Major Defense Equipment)); Fig. II-2-3-3 (Defense Buildup **2** programs for major defense equipment as shown in Program Appendix Table 3 (Each SDF Service’s Formation and Equipment Quantities in Approximately Ten Years)), Fig. II-2-3- Appendix Table 2. In addition, the DBP defines each 4 (The NDPG’s Annex Tables and the DBP’s Appendix Table 3) SDF service’s formation and equipment quantities in Fig. II-2-3-1 Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 1 (Targets for Fundamentally Reinforced Defense Capabilities and Timeline for Achievement) **Fields** **By 5 years until FY 2027 (*)** **Approx. 10 Years Later** If an invasion of Japan occurs, Japan will respond with primary responsibility and Further efforts to ensure the defense concept described on the left (buildup defense buildup defense capabilities to disrupt and defeat the invasion while gaining support capabilities to disrupt or to defeat invasion at an earlier and more distant location) from its ally and others - Acquire capabilities to operate more advanced stand-off missiles Stand-Off Defense Capabilities - Acquire practical capability to operate stand-off missiles - Secure required sufficient quantities Integrated Air and Missile Defense - Reinforce capability to respond to Hypersonic Weapons - Reinforce wide-area air defense capabilities Capabilities - Reinforce capability to respond to miniature Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) - More efficient and effective UAV countermeasures Unmanned Defense Capabilities - Expand the use of UAV to strengthen capabilities to practically operate - Reinforce capability to control multiple unmanned assets simultaneously, etc. - Reinforce Space Domain Awareness (SDA), cybersecurity capabilities, and - Further reinforce space operation capability Cross-Domain Operation electromagnetic domain capabilities, etc. - Reinforce supports in terms of cybersecurity for entities other than SDF Capabilities - Reinforce ground, sea, and air domain capabilities that become basis of cross- - Strengthen ground, maritime, and air capabilities to work with UAV domain operations - Accelerate decision-making through the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), etc., Command and Control/Intelligence- while strengthening the resiliency of the network - Reinforce persistent information gathering and sharing postures, while enhancing related Functions - Strengthen information acquisition and analysis in both strategic and tactic information gathering and analysis capabilities by application of AI, etc. information, including responses in the cognitive dimension - Reinforce the SDF’s transportation and supply capabilities (deployment/civil - Further enhancements of transportation capability Mobile Deployment Capabilities protection), including enhancement of the SDF’s transportation assets and use - Accelerate transportation and supply capabilities by improving supply centers, etc. of PFI vessels, etc. - Increase quantity of ammunitions and missiles - Maintain and ensure adequate inventory of ammunitions and missiles - Ensure maximum operational availability of equipment except those under - Maintain the operational rates Sustainability and Resiliency maintenance - Further improve the resiliency of defense facilities - Improve the resiliency of defense facilities for contingencies - Further secure ammunition depots and other facilities commensurate with - Secure required ammunition depots, etc. ammunition requirements - Establish strong defense production base through measures to strengthen the - Maintain robust defense production base capable for realizing innovative Defense Production and supply chain, etc. equipment Technology Bases - Focused investment in equipment areas directly linked to future warfare, and a - Acquire technologies for securing technological superiority in the future significant reduction in research and development periods - Secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources from a wide range of sources, including the private sector, by strengthening recruitment capabilities - Even amid a declining population eligible for recruitment, continuously and and establishing a new SDF personnel system stably secure the necessary human resources, including those with specialized - Reinforce education and research (cyber and other domains, joint operations, knowledge and skills Human Resource Base medical) - Further strengthen education and research - Improvement of living and working environments and treatment by taking - Foster an organizational environment in which all members can demonstrate their necessary measures against aging barracks and housing and eliminating individual abilities while maintaining high morale equipment shortages - Accelerate investment in improving operational availability, securing ammunition, and fortifying key defense facilities to maximize the use of existing equipment, while focusing on fundamentally strengthening core areas of future ----- **Fig. II-2-3-2** Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 2 (Procurement Quantities of Major Defense Equipment) **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** |Classification|Equipment Type|Procurement Quantity| |---|---|---| |(1) Stand-off Defense Capabilities|Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surface-, ship-, and air-launched variants) Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) Hypersonic Missile Tomahawk|Surface-type 11 Units ― ― ―| |(2) Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities|Upgraded Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (modified) Aegis System-Equipped Vessels Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (E-2D) Interceptor Missiles for Ballistic Missile Defense (SM-3 Block IIA) Interceptor Missiles with Upgraded Capabilities (PAC-3MSE) Long-Range Ship-to-Air Missiles SM-6|14 Units 2 ships 5 aircraft ― ― ―| |(3) Unmanned Defense Capabilities|Various UAVs USV UGV UUV|― ― ― ―| |(4) Cross-Domain Capabilities|Destroyer Submarine Patrol Vessel Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Fighter (F-35A) Fighter (F-35B) Fighter Upgrade (F-15) Stand-off Electronic Warfare Aircraft Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS)|12 ships 5 ships 10 aircraft 19 aircraft 40 aircraft 25 aircraft 54 aircraft 1 aircraft 2 sets| |(5) Command and Control/Intelligence- related Functions|Signals Intelligence Aircraft (RC-2)|3 aircraft| |(6) Mobile Deployment Capabilities and Civil Protection|Transport Vessels Transport Aircraft (C-2) Aerial Refueling and Transport Aircraft (KC-46A, etc.)|8 ships 6 aircraft 13 aircraft| ----- Fig. II-2-3-3 Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 3 (Each SDF Service’s Formation and Equipment Quantities in Approximately Ten Years) **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** |Classification|Future Posture|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Joint Units|Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units||1 squadron 1 group| |Ground Self-Defense Force|Active-Duty Personnel||149,000 people| ||Major Unit|Basic Operational Units|9 divisions 5 brigades 1 armored division| |||Airborne Units Amphibious Units Air Transport Units|1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Stand-off Missile Units|7 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| ||||2 battalions (hyper velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands)| ||||2 long-range guided missile units| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups| |||Electronic Warfare Units (incl. anti-aircraft electronic warfare units)|1 electronic warfare operations unit (incl. anti-aircraft electronic warfare unit)| |||Unmanned Vehicle Units|1 multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicle unit| |||Information Warfare Units|1 unit| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Major Units|Surface Vessels Units (Destroyers and Minesweeper vessels) Submarine Units Patrol aircraft Units (Fixed-wing Patrol aircraft Units) Unmanned Vehicle Units Information Warfare Units|6 groups (21 divisions) 6 divisions 9 divisions (4 divisions) 2 divisions 1 unit| ||Major Equipment|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Aegis System Equipped Vessels Patrol Vessels Submarines Combat Aircraft|54 (10) 2 12 22 Approx. 170| |Air Self-Defense Force|Major Units|Air Warning & Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units Space Domain Mission Units Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units Operational Intelligence Units|4 Aircraft Control & Warning Wings 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 4 air defense missile groups (24 fire squadrons) 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 squadron| ||Major Equipment|Combat Aircraft (Fighters)|Approx. 430 (Approx. 320)| Note 1: 14 out of the 15 divisions/brigades are operated on the basis of rapid deployment. Note 2: Regarding the number of fighter aircraft units and fighters, necessary studies will be conducted by FY 2027 and necessary measures will be taken in order to further advance the quantitative enhancement of air capability. In this regard, the possibility of utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles will be studied. ----- Fig. II-2-3-4 The NDPG’s Annex Tables and the DBP’s Appendix Table 3 **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** |Col1|Category|Col3|1976 NDPG|1995 NDPG|2004 NDPG|2010 NDPG|2013 NDPG|2018 NDPG|DBP| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Cooperative Units|Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units|||||||1 squadron 1 group|1 squadron 1 group| |Ground Self-Defense Force|Authorized Number of Personnel (Note 1) Active-Duty Personnel Ready Reserve Personnel (Note 1)||180,000|160,000 145,000 15,000|155,000 148,000 7,000|154,000 147,000 7,000|159,000 151,000 8,000|159,000 151,000 8,000|149,000| ||Major Units|Basic Operational Units (Note 2)|12 divisions 2 combined brigades 1 armored division|8 divisions 6 brigades 1 armored division|8 divisions 6 brigades 1 armored division|8 divisions 6 brigades 1 armored division|5 divisions 2 brigades 1 armored division|5 divisions 2 brigades 1 armored division|9 divisions 5 brigades 1 armored division| |||Airborne unit (Note 3) Amphibious rapid deployment unit (Note3) Airborne rapid deployment unit (Note 3)|1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade|1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade|||1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade|1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade|1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Rapid Deployment Units (Note 4)|1 training group||Central Readiness Force|Central Readiness Force|3 rapid deployment divisions|3 rapid deployment divisions|| ||||1 artillery brigade||||4 rapid deployment brigades|4 rapid deployment brigades|| |||Stand-off Missile Units (Note 5)|||||5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments|7 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| |||||||||2 battalions|2 hyper velocity gliding projectile battalions intended for the defense of remote islands| ||||||||||2 long range guided missile units| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups| |||Electronic Warfare Unit (Anti-air Electronic Warfare Unit)|||||||1 electronic warfare operations unit (1 anti-air electronic warfare unit)| |||Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units|||||||1 utility unmanned aerial vehicle unit| |||Information Warfare Unit|||||||1 unit| |||Ballistic Missile Defense Units||||||2 squadrons (Note 11)|| ||Major Equipment|Tanks (Note 6) Artillery (Main artillery) (Note 6)|(approx. 1,200) (approx. 1,000/vehicle)|approx. 900 (approx. 900/vehicle)|approx. 600 (approx. 600/vehicle)|approx. 400 approx. 400/vehicle|(approx. 300) (approx. 300/vehicle)|(approx. 300) (approx. 300/vehicle)|| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Major Units|Surface Ship Units (Destroyers Units, Mine Sweeper Units) Destroyer and minesweeper vessels (Note 7) For mobile operations (Note 7) Regional deployment (Note 7) Submarine Units Patrol Aircraft Units (Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft Units) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units Information Warfare Unit Minesweeper Units (Note 7)|4 flotillas (Regional units) 10 units 6 divisions (Land-based) 16 2 flotillas|4 flotillas (Regional units) 7 units 6 divisions (Land-based) 13 1 flotilla|4 groups (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 9 squadrons 1 flotilla|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 4 flotillas 6 divisions 9 squadrons 1 flotilla|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 flotillas 6 divisions 9 squadrons 1 flotilla|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 2 groups (13 divisions) 6 divisions 9 squadrons|6 groups (21 divisions) 6 divisions 9 squadrons (4 divisions) 2 divisions 1 unit| ||Major Equipment|Destroyers (Aegis-equipped Destroyers) Aegis System Equipped Vessel Patrol Vessels Submarines Combat aircraft|approx. 60 16 approx. 220|approx. 50 16 approx. 170|47 16 approx. 150|48 22 approx. 150|54 22 approx. 170|54 12 22 approx. 190|5（410） 2 12 22 approx. 170| |Air Self-Defense Force|Major Units|Air Warning & Control Units|28 warning groups 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|28 warning groups 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)|28 warning groups 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)|4 aircraft control and warning wings 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)| |||Fighter Units Fighter-Interceptor Units Support Fighter Units|10 squadrons 3 squadrons|9 squadrons 3 squadrons|12 squadrons|12 squadrons|13 squadrons|13 squadrons|(Note 12) 13 squadrons| |||Air Reconnaissance Units|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron|||| |||Aerial Refueling/Transport Units|||1 squadron|1 squadron|2 squadrons|2 squadrons|2 squadrons| |||Air Transport Units|3 squadrons|3 squadrons|3 squadrons|3 squadrons|3 squadrons|3 squadrons|3 squadrons| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|6 air defense missile groups|6 air defense missile groups|6 air defense missile groups|6 air defense missile groups|6 air defense missile groups|4 air defense missile groups (24 fire squadrons)|4 air defense missile groups (24 fire squadrons)| |||Space Domain Mission Units||||||1 squadron|1 squadron| |||Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units||||||1 squadron|1 squadron| |||Operation Intelligence Units|||||||1 squadron| ||w|Combat aircraft (Fighters)|approx. 430 (Note 9) (approx. 350)|approx. 400 approx. 300|approx. 350 approx. 260|approx. 340 approx. 260|approx. 360 approx. 280|approx. 370 approx. 290|approx. 430 (Note 12) approx. 320| |Major Equipment/ Units that may also serve for BMD missions (Note8)||Aegis-equipped Destroyers|||4|(Note 10) 6 ships|8|8|| |||Air Warning & Control Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|||7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons 3 air defense missile groups|11 warning groups/units 6 air defense missile groups|||| (Notes) 1 Not included in DBP Appendix Tables but shown here for comparisons with Appendix Tables of NDPGs from 1995 to 2018. 2 The Basic Operational Units were units designated as the “units deployed in peacetime” in up to 2010 NDPG, as the “Basic Operational Units” in up to 2018 NDPG (excepting 1 armored division which was defined as “Rapid Deployment Unit”), and as the “Rapid Deployment Units” in DBP. 3 The units that are designated as “Rapid Deployment Units” in up to 2018 NDPG. 4 Not included in DBP Appendix Tables but shown here for comparisons with Appendix Tables of NDPGs from 1995 to 2018. 5 In Stand-off Missile Units, Surface-to-ship Missile Regiments were called “Surface-to-ship Guided Missile Units” and Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Units Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands were called “Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Units,” respectively in NDPGs up to 2018. 6 Not included in 1976 NDPG, 2013 NDPG, 2018 NDPG, and DBP Appendix Tables, but shown here for comparisons with Appendix Tables of NDPGs from 1995 to 2010. 7 Not included in DBP but shown here for comparisons with DBP Appendix Tables. Destroyers Units were expressed as Anti-submarine Surface Units (for mobile operations) and Anti-submarine Surface Units (regional units) in 1976 NDPG, as Destroyers Units (for mobile operations) and Destroyers Units (regional units) in the 1995 NDPG, and as Destroyers Units (for mobile operations) and Destroyers Units (regional deployment) in 2004 NDPG. 8 Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions were included in MSDF’s major equipment or ASDF’s major units in 2004 and 2010 NDPGs, but those newly procured are included in the categories of Aegis-equipped destroyers, Air Warning & Control Units, and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units in 2013 and 2018 NDPGs. In addition, this is not included in DBP Appendix Tables but shown here for comparisons with Appendix Tables of NDPGs from 1995 to 2018. 9 Not included in Appendix Tables of the 1995 NDPG but shown here for comparisons with 2007 NDPG to DBP Appendix Tables. 10 In the 2010 NDPG, Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD functions are allowed to be additionally procured within the limited number of destroyers above, when separately determined in light of the progress in BMD technologies and financial circumstances. 11 With the deployment of two land-based Aegis systems (Aegis Ashore) two ballistic missile defense units were to be added but the Cabinet decided in December 2020 to replace the land-based Aegis System (Aegis Ashore) with two Aegis system-equipped ----- |Defense capability buildup level 43 trillion yen ①+②+③ Material expenses paid after he period based on the contract concluded within the period 5 trillion yen…③|Personnel & food provisions 11 trillion yen…① Material expenses paid within the period based on the contract concluded before the period 27 trillion yen…②|Contract amount for newly required programs (material expenses) 43.5 trillion yen ②+④ Material expenses paid after the period based on the contrac concluded within the period 16.5 trillion yen…④| |---|---|---| |Field|Col2|Defense Buildup Program (FY2023 - FY2027)|Reference: Previous plans (FY2019 - FY2023)| |---|---|---|---| |Stand-Off Defense Capabilities||Approx. 5 trillion yen|Approx. 0.2 trillion yen| |Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities||Approx. 3 trillion yen|Approx. 1 trillion yen| |Unmanned Defense Capabilities||Approx. 1 trillion yen|Approx. 0.1 trillion yen| |Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities (Space, Cyber, SDF equipment)||Approx. 8 trillion yen|Approx. 3 trillion yen| |Command and Control/Intelligence-related Functions||Approx. 1 trillion yen|Approx. 0.3 trillion yen| |Mobile Deployment Capabilities/Civil Protection||Approx. 2 trillion yen|Approx. 0.3 trillion yen| |Sustainability and Resilience|Ammunitions and Missiles|Approx. 2 trillion yen (Approx. 5 trillion yen incl. other fields)|Approx. 1 trillion yen| ||Sustainment and Maintenance for Equipment, and Securing Operational Availability|Approx. 9 trillion yen (Approx. 10 trillion yen incl. other fields)|Approx. 4 trillion yen| ||Improving the Resiliency of Facilities|Approx. 4 trillion yen|Approx. 1 trillion yen| |Reinforcing Defense Production Base||Approx. 0.4 trillion yen (Approx. 1 trillion yen incl. other fields)|Approx. 1 trillion yen| |Research and Development||Approx. 1 trillion yen (Approx. 3.5 trillion yen incl. other fields)|| |Other (education and training, fuel, etc.)||Approx. 6.6 trillion yen|Approx. 4.4 trillion yen| **4** **Expenditures** The expenditure aiming for the implementation of to approximately ¥43,500 billion (excluding the amount defense capability buildup described in the DBP for corresponding to payments for the period outside of the the next five years from FY2023 to FY2027 amount to program that contribute to improving project efficiency, approximately ¥43 trillion. such as maintenance). The annual defense budgets for FY2023 to FY2027 Finally, to secure financial resources for the stable under the DBP amount to approximately ¥40,500 billion sustainment of defense capabilities after FY2027 as in total (approximately ¥8,900 billion in FY2027), on the well as for covering the DBP from FY2023 to FY2027, assumption that a number of additional measures will be necessary measures will be implemented in both taken. These measures include (i) further accelerating the expenditure and revenue areas, such as the reform in improvement of SDF facilities in an agile and flexible government expenditure, using settlement surplus, manner in view of the progress of each project; (ii) creation of defense buildup funds utilizing non-tax utilizing settlement surplus in the general account when revenues, and tax measures. **Part** the surplus is larger than the expected settlement surplus; **See** Fig. II-2-3-5 (Structure of Expenditures for the DBP); Fig. II- 2-3-6 (Breakdown of Expenditures Needed for the Next Five **Ⅱ** and (iii) thoroughly implementing further optimization and rationalization of defense buildup. Years); Chapter 3, Section 2-5 (Secure Financial Resources to Reinforce Japan’s Defense Capabilities) **Chapter** **2** The expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement the DBP amount Fig. II-2-3-5 Structure of Expenditures for the DBP Defense capability Contract amount for buildup level Personnel & food provisions newly required programs 43 trillion yen①+②+③ 11 trillion yen[…][①] 43.5 trillion yen(material expenses) ②+④ Material expenses paid after the Material expenses paid after period based on the contract the period based on the contract Material expenses paid within the period based on the contract concluded within the period concluded within the period concluded before the period 16.5 trillion yen[…][④] 5 trillion yen[…][③] 27 trillion yen[…][②] FY2023 FY2027 Fig. II-2-3-6 Breakdown of Expenditures Needed for the Next Five Years **Defense Buildup Program** **Reference: Previous plans** **Field** **(FY2023 - FY2027)** **(FY2019 - FY2023)** Stand-Off Defense Capabilities Approx. 5 trillion yen Approx. 0.2 trillion yen Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Approx. 3 trillion yen Approx. 1 trillion yen Unmanned Defense Capabilities Approx. 1 trillion yen Approx. 0.1 trillion yen Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities Approx. 8 trillion yen Approx. 3 trillion yen (Space, Cyber, SDF equipment) Command and Control/Intelligence-related Functions Approx. 1 trillion yen Approx. 0.3 trillion yen Mobile Deployment Capabilities/Civil Protection Approx. 2 trillion yen Approx. 0.3 trillion yen Approx. 2 trillion yen Ammunitions and Missiles Approx. 1 trillion yen (Approx. 5 trillion yen incl. other fields) Sustainment and Maintenance for Equipment, and Approx. 9 trillion yen Approx. 4 trillion yen Securing Operational Availability (Approx. 10 trillion yen incl. other fields) Improving the Resiliency of Facilities Approx. 4 trillion yen Approx. 1 trillion yen Approx. 0.4 trillion yen Reinforcing Defense Production Base (Approx. 1 trillion yen incl. other fields) Approx. 1 trillion yen Approx. 1 trillion yen Research and Development (Approx. 3.5 trillion yen incl. other fields) Other (education and training, fuel, etc.) Approx. 6.6 trillion yen Approx. 4.4 trillion yen Expenses required over the next 5 years FY2019-FY2023 planned amount Approx. 43.5 trillion yen (contract amount) Approx. 17.2 trillion yen (contract amount) ----- **Defense Buildup and the Budget** **Chapter** **3** **Section 1** **Buildup of Defense Capability in FY2024** The DBP calls for organically integrating capabilities and has entered a new era of crisis, the MOD/SDF has in all domains, including the space, cyberspace and secured a budget that is necessary and sufficient for electromagnetic domains, in accordance with the NDS to FY2024 to achieve the goal of fundamentally reinforcing fundamentally reinforce Japan’s multi-domain defense Japan’s defense capabilities within the period of the DBP capabilities for the continuous implementation of flexible in accordance with the NDS and the DBP. and strategic activities at all phases from peacetime to The MOD/SDF will continue to focus on the seven contingencies, and to focus on its opponents’ capabilities fields of the fundamental reinforcement of defense **Part** and new ways of warfare. This would allow Japan to capabilities. Specifically, it will work to fundamentally **Ⅱ** take primary responsibility by FY2027, five years after reinforce core areas of its defense capabilities, such as the formulation of the DBP, for countering any invasion stand-off defense capabilities and integrated air and **Chapter** of Japan that occurs and disrupt and defeat the invasion missile defense capabilities; increase the number of **3** while receiving support from its allies and other partners. operationally available equipment; secure ammunition; With the basic understanding that the international enhance the resiliency of defense facilities; solidify community is facing the greatest post-war trial yet, the human resource base; enhance medical functions; **Examples of equipment and other items to be acquired over the next 5 years (images)** **Sustainability and resilience** **15** **trillion yen** **Stand-off defense capability** **5** **trillion yen** **Built in 1966** **Built in 1942** Medium-range multi-purpose guided missile Type 17 ship-to-ship guided missileAIM-120 (image)(image) **Upgraded Type12 SSMUpgraded Type12 SSMDevelopment of** **Acquisition of Tomahawk missilesAcquisition of Tomahawk missiles** **Development of hypersonic missilesDevelopment of hypersonic missiles** **gliding missiles for island defensegliding missiles for island defenseDevelopment of high-velocity Development of high-velocity** **Early acquisition of the required quantities of various types of ammunition necessary for the continued operation of troops** **GSDF Camp Higashi-Chitose (troop office building)** **GSDF Camp Kurihama (warehouse)** **Diversification of platforms** **Operational** **An F-2 fighter with some parts removed** **A P-1 engine with some parts removedA P-1 engine with some parts removed** **Introduction of JASSMIntroduction of JASSM** **Introduction of JSMIntroduction of JSM** **Under maintenance** **Equipment Operation Equipment Operation State ClassificationState Classification** **Non-operational** **Resolving the issue of having non-operational aircraftResolving the issue of having non-operational aircraft** **Integrated air and missile defense capabilities** **3** **trillion yen** **Mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection** **2** **trillion yen** **acquisition of radar sitesacquisition of radar sitesReplacement and Replacement and** **Building of Aegis System Equipped VesselsEquipped VesselsBuilding of Aegis System** **Acquisition of utility helicopter (UH-2)Acquisition of utility helicopter (UH-2)** **transport vesselstransport vesselsAcquisition of Acquisition of** **Acquisition of transport aircraft (C-2)Acquisition of transport aircraft (C-2)** **Acquisition of air refueling and transport aircraftAcquisition of air refueling and transport aircraft** **interceptor missile (PAC-3MSE)interceptor missile (PAC-3MSE)Acquisition of improved Acquisition of improved** **medium-range surface-to-air guided medium-range surface-to-air guided Development of upgraded Type 03Development of upgraded Type 03missile (improved type) (image)missile (improved type) (image)** **missile defense interceptor missile missile defense interceptor missile Acquisition of ballistic Acquisition of ballistic (SM-3 Block IIA)(SM-3 Block IIA)** **Acquisition of long-range Acquisition of long-range ship-to-air missile (SM-6)ship-to-air missile (SM-6)** **Command and control and intelligence related functions** **1** **trillion yen** **Unmanned defense capabilities** **1** **trillion yen** **Utilization of images using AI technologies (image)AI technologies (image)Utilization of images using** **Acquisition of signals intelligence aircraft (RC-2)intelligence aircraft (RC-2)Acquisition of signals** **Acquisition of middle range Acquisition of middle range reconnaissance UAVs (image)reconnaissance UAVs (image)** **Acquisition of multipurpose/Acquisition of multipurpose/attack UAVs (image)attack UAVs (image)** **Use of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft (Global Hawk)aircraft (Global Hawk)Use of unmanned reconnaissance** **Acquisition of mine hunting Acquisition of mine hunting unmanned underwater vehicle (OZZ-5)unmanned underwater vehicle (OZZ-5)** **Cross-domain operation capabilities** **8** **trillion yen** **Space domain** **Electromagnetic Domain** **Cyber domain** **Land, sea and air domains** **Development of the SDA satellite (image)Development of the SDA satellite (image)** **Acquiring a vehicle-mounted laser device (image)Acquiring a vehicle-mounted laser device (image)** **electronic warfare aircraft (image)electronic warfare aircraft (image)Development of stand-off Development of stand-off** **Electronic Warfare System (NEWS)Electronic Warfare System (NEWS)Acquisition of the Network Acquisition of the Network** **and strengthening of research baseand strengthening of research baseDevelopment of cyber workforceDevelopment of cyber workforce** **Acquisition of wheeled armored vehiclesAcquisition of wheeled armored vehicles** **patrol helicopters (upgraded)patrol helicopters (upgraded)Acquisition of SH-60KAcquisition of SH-60K** **Construction of destroyers (FFM)Construction of destroyers (FFM)** **Acquisition of fighter jets (F-35)Acquisition of fighter jets (F-35)** Examples of equipment and other items to be acquired over the next 5 years (images) Excerpt from reference “Why is the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities necessary now?” **REFERENCE : Why is the Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities Necessary Now?** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_policy/index.html** **REFERENCE : Overview of FY2024 Budget** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/index.html** ----- and maintain and reinforce defense production and technology bases. For details of the necessary defense-related expenditures, see the next section. **See** Fig. II-3-1-1 (Major Programs for the Buildup of Defense Capability in FY2024 (Seven Areas to be Focused on in the Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities)) Major Programs for the Buildup of Defense Capability in FY2024 (Seven Areas to be Focused on in the Fundamental **Fig. II-3-1-1** Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities) Hypersonic weapons (image) **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** |Stand-off defense capability|○Development of Upgraded Type12 SSM (surface-, ship-, and air-launched variants) and mass-production of the ground-launched type. ○Research and mass-production of hyper velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands ○Development of upgraded velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands Upgraded Type-12 surface-to- Hyper velocity gliding Hypersonic weapons (image) ○Development of hypersonic weapons ship missile models (image) projectile (image) ○Development of new surface-to-ship and surface-to-surface precision guided missiles ○Acquisition of JSM and JASSM ○Acquisition of Tomahawk New surface-to-ship and surface-to- JASSM (image) Tomahawk (image) surface precision guided missiles etc. *All are images.| |---|---| |Integrated air and missile defense capabilities|○Building of Aegis System Equipped Vessels ○Development of upgraded type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (modified) ○Acquisition of SM-3 Block IIA and SM-6 ○Improvement of capabilities of FPS-5, FPS-7 and JADGE ○Acquisition of TPS-102A mobile warning and control radars ○Japan-U.S. cooperative development of GPI etc. Aegis System (im E aq gu eip )ped Vessel SM-6 lo an ig r mra in sg sie le ship-to- FPS-7| |Unmanned defense capabilities|○Acquisition of enhanced functions type UAV (medium-range) (x 6 sets) ○Acquisition of UAV (short-range) (Type 41) ○Trial operation of USV (test equipment) ○Research on combat support multipurpose USVs ○Demonstration of a transport UAVs (medium size) Unmanned amphibious vehicle ○Development of unmanned amphibious vehicles UAV (mid-range) Combat support multipurpose USV etc. *All are images.| |Cross-domain operation capabilities|○Technical demonstration needed to improve capabilities to counter HGVs such as detecting and tracking them by utilizing satellites ○Geostationary orbit optical data relay demonstration ○Acquisition of SDA satellites ○Implementation of the Risk Management Framework (RMF) ○Expansion of cyber units ○Reinforcing educational foundations for cyber workforce ○Acquisition of Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS) (x 1 set) ○Acquisition of counter air electronic warfare system (x 2 sets) AMV (armored personnel carrier) New FFM (image) ○Research on High-Power Microwaves (HPMs) ○Acquisition of signals intelligence aircraft (RC-2) (x 1) ○Acquisition of AMV (armored personnel carrier) (x 28) ○Acquisition of type-16 mobile combat vehicle (x 19) ○Acquisition of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) (x 3) ○Acquisition of patrol helicopter (SH-60L) (x 6) ○Building of destroyer (x 2), submarine (x 1), and supply vessel (x 1) ○F-35A (x 8) and F-35B (x 7) fighter jets SH-60L patrol helicopter F-35A fighter ○Upgrade of F-15 fighter jets etc.| |Command and control / intelligence-related functions|○Enhancement of command-and-control functions ○Strengthening of functions such as intelligence collection and analysis ○Responding to Integrated Information Warfare with Special Regard to the Cognitive dimension etc.| |Mobile deployment capabilities / civil protection|○Building of mobile boat (x 3) ○Acquisition of cargo helicopter (CH-47) (x 17) ○Acquisition of utility helicopter (UH-2) (x 16) ○Private transport capacity utilization project (PFI vessels) ○Acquisition of various trucks Mobile craft (image) Private transport capacity utilization project etc. (Current PFI vessel: Hakuo)| Unmanned amphibious vehicle UAV (mid-range) Combat support multipurpose USV - Procurement of various ammunition necessary for continuous unit operation - Sustainment and maintenance for equipment - Securing ammunition storage facilities - Improvement of resiliency of SDF facilities and others Sustainability and resilience (Current PFI vessel: Hakuo) *All are images ----- |Category|Col2|FY2023|FY2024 Fiscal YOY growth|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |||||Fiscal YOY growth|| |Annual expenditure Personnel and food provisions Material expenses||66,001|77,249|11,248|17.0%| ||Personnel and food provisions|21,969|22,290|320|1.5%| ||Material expenses|44,032|54,960|10,927|24.8%| |Future obligation New contracts Existing contracts||99,186|135,006|35,819|36.1%| ||New contracts|70,676|76,594|5,918|8.4%| ||Existing contracts|28,511|58,412|29,901|104.9%| **Section 2** **Defense-Related Expenditures** **1** **Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures for FY2024** Under the NDS and the DBP, the fundamental or 4.6% for DBP-related expenditures. Its aim is to reinforcement of defense capabilities will proceed allow for an early launch of programs spanning multiple through the systematic buildup of capabilities across the years to acquire equipment and develop SDF facilities following seven fields: (i) stand-off defense capabilities, and others. This budget allocation, when combined (ii) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, (iii) with allocations under the original and supplementary unmanned defense capabilities, (iv) cross-domain budgets for FY2023, accounts for 42% of the total operation capabilities, (v) command and control and contract amount needed to implement the DBP, which intelligence-related functions, (vi) mobile deployment amounts to ¥43.5 trillion. capabilities/civil protection, and (vii) sustainability In allocating the budget, as in the FY2023 budget, and resiliency. For the defense-related expenditures programs will be classified into 15 categories in view for FY2024, the MOD/SDF secured a budget that of the DBP for meticulous progress management. is necessary and sufficient to achieve the goal of Amid higher prices and a weaker yen, the MOD/SDF **Part** fundamentally reinforcing Japan’s defense capabilities will thoroughly implement further optimization and **Ⅱ** within the DBP period. rationalization of defense buildup. It will also thoroughly On an annual expenditure basis,[1] the government scrutinize expenses and further promote efficient **Chapter** secured a budget to steadily implement the contracts, the equipment acquisition through such bulk purchases, **3** amount of which significantly increased in FY2023. For long-term contracts among other means. DBP-related expenditures, the government has allocated **See** Fig. II-3-2-1 (Comparison between Defense-Related ¥7,724.9 billion, up by ¥1,124.8 billion or 17.0% from Expenditures (Original Budget) of FY2023 and FY2024); Fig. II-3-2-2 (Trends in Defense-Related Expenditures (Original the previous year. Budget)); Fig. II-3-2-3 (Budget Allocation for FY2024 (15 categories)); Subsection 3 (Breakdown of Defense-Related On a contract basis,[2] the government has allocated Expenditures); Reference 8 (Trends in Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget)) ¥9,362.5 billion, a year-on-year increase of ¥410 billion Fig. II-3-2-1 Comparison between Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget) of FY2023 and FY2024) (Unit: 100 million yen) **FY2024** **Category** **FY2023** **Fiscal YOY growth** 66,001 77,249 11,248 17.0% Annual expenditure Personnel and food provisions 21,969 22,290 320 1.5% Material expenses 44,032 54,960 10,927 24.8% 99,186 135,006 35,819 36.1% Future obligation New contracts 70,676 76,594 5,918 8.4% Existing contracts 28,511 58,412 29,901 104.9% (Notes) 1 The figures above do not include SACO-related expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), etc. If these are included, the total amounts of defense-related expenditures are 6,821.9 billion yen for FY2023 and 7,949.6 billion yen for FY2024; and for future obligation, 10,717.4 billion yen for FY2023 and 14,192.6 billion yen for FY2024. 2 The budget amounts include expenditures pertaining to the Digital Agency. 3 Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding. **REFERENCE : Overview of FY2024 Budget** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/index.html** **REFERENCE : How the Defense Budget Is Spent (Graphical Summary)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/guideline/pamph/graphicalsummary.html** **1** The total amount paid during the fiscal year in question for programs for equipment acquisition, facility improvement, and the like. ----- Fig. II-3-2-2 Trends in Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget) (Unit: 1 trillion yen) 7.80 7.30 6.80 6.30 5.80 5.30 4.80 4.30 **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** 3.80 7.95 （+16.5％） Excluding SACO, reorganization, government aircraft, and building national resilience 7.72 Including SACO, reorganization, government aircraft, and building national resilience （+17.0％） 6.82 （+26.3％） 6.60 （+27.4％） **Average growth rate in MTDP in 2019** **+1.1%** 5.40 **Average growth rate in MTDP in 2014** 5.31 5.34 **+0.8%** 5.26 5.13 5.19 4.954.94 4.944.93 4.93 4.92 [4.94]4.92 4.964.94 4.964.94 4.954.93 4.904.88 4.864.83 4.814.79 4.804.78 4.784.74 4.774.70 4.794.68 4.784.66 4.714.65 4.754.68 4.884.78 4.984.82 5.054.86 4.90 4.94 5.01Exceeded 1997 budget 5.07 5.12 5.18 **Original maximum amount** **for the first time** **Decrease for 10 consecutive years** **Increase for 12 consecutive years** (Notes) 1. Expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft are included in the budget for FY2015 to FY2022. 2. Expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation, and national resilience are included in the budget for FY2019 andFY2020. |Category|Area|Total program expenses for five years|Program expenses for FY2023|Program expenses for FY2024| |---|---|---|---|---| |Stand-off defense capability||Approx. 5 trillion yen|Approx. 1.413 trillion yen|Approx. 712.7 billion yen| |Integrated air and missile defense capabilities||Approx. 3 trillion yen|982.9 billion yen|1.2284 trillion yen| |Unmanned defense capabilities||Approx. 1 trillion yen|179.1 billion yen|114.6 billion yen| |Cross-domain operation capabilities|Space|Approx. 1 trillion yen|152.9 billion yen|Approx. 98.4 billion yen| ||Cyberspace|Approx. 1 trillion yen|236.3 billion yen|202.6 billion yen| ||Vehicles, ships, aircraft, etc.|Approx. 6 trillion yen|1.1763 trillion yen|1.3391 trillion yen| |Command and control/intelligence-related functions||Approx. 1 trillion yen|305.3 billion yen|424.8 billion yen| |Mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection||Approx. 2 trillion yen|239.6 billion yen|565.3 billion yen| |Sustainability and resiliency|Ammunition, guided missiles|Approx. 2 trillion yen (Approx. 5 trillion yen including other areas)|212.4 billion yen (828.3 billion yen including other areas)|401.5 billion yen (924.9 billion yen including other areas)| ||Sustainment and Maintenance for Equipment, and Securing Operational Availability|Approx. 9 trillion yen (Approx. 10 trillion yen including other areas)|1.793 trillion yen (2.0355 trillion yen including other areas)|1.9094 trillion yen (2.3367 trillion yen including other areas)| ||Improving the Resiliency of Facilities|Approx. 4 trillion yen|474 billion yen|631.3 billion yen| |Reinforcing Defense Production Base||Approx. 0.4 trillion yen (Approx. 1 trillion yen including other areas)|97.2 billion yen (146.9 billion yen including other areas)|83 billion yen (92 billion yen including other areas)| |Research and development||Approx. 1 trillion yen (Approx. 3.5 trillion yen including other areas)|232 billion yen (896.8 billion yen including other areas)|225.7 billion yen (822.5 billion yen including other areas)| |Base measures||Approx. 2.6 trillion yen|514.9 billion yen|513.8 billion yen| |Education and training expenses, fuel expenses, etc.||Approx. 4 trillion yen|943.7 billion yen|911.8 billion yen| |Total||Approx. 43.5 trillion yen|8.9525 trillion yen|9.3625 trillion yen| Fig. II-3-2-3 Budget Allocation for FY2024 (15 categories) (Note) Figure have been rounded off and may not add up to the total ----- **2** **High-Priority Focuses** glide vehicles (HGVs) and missiles flying with irregular **1** **Procuring various types of stand-off missiles** trajectories. This points to the urgent need to reinforce In order to protect Japan’s territory, which extends integrated air and missile defense capabilities, including approximately 3,000 kilometers along both the north- ballistic missile defense capabilities. For the primary south and east-west axes, Japan needs capabilities to purpose of defending Japan from threats of ballistic deal with vessels and landing forces invading Japan, missiles and other weapons systems that are thus including its remote islands, from locations outside of increasingly sophisticated, the MOD/SDF will begin threat zones. Such threats include anti-aircraft missile constructing Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs) capabilities. Also, it is essential for Japan to possess during FY2024. It aims to commission them early (the capabilities that are necessary and sufficient to block first ASEV in FY2027 and the second in FY2028). and eliminate the opponent’s vessels, landing forces, These ASEVs will be equipped with Standard Missile and the like from various locations in our country in a (SM)-6 capable of responding to HGVs and others multilayered manner no matter which region an invasion at the terminal phase, as well as with various warfare may initiate. and mobile capabilities equivalent to or above those of **Part** Against this backdrop, Japan can force the opponent existing Aegis-equipped destroyers. They will also be **Ⅱ** to complicate its measures if it diversifies its launch designed to be resistant to rolling, more habitable with platforms and respond with a combination of various personal spaces, and expandable so as to enable them **Chapter** stand-off missiles with various features. To this end, the to operate future equipment. In addition, the ASEVs **3** MOD/SDF will secure a necessary and sufficient amount will save the necessary number of crew by some 20% of stand-off missiles by procuring foreign-made missiles compared with existing Aegis-equipped destroyers. early on while supporting the expansion of the domestic **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-2 (Response to Missile Attacks) capacity to manufacture missiles. The MOD/SDF will also expedite R&D and mass production efforts for early acquisition of capabilities to operate more advanced stand-off missiles. For early acquisition of stand-off missiles, the MOD/ SDF will start deploying domestically-made, Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surface-launched variant) in FY2025, one year earlier than planned, in light of an increasingly severe security environment. It will also begin acquiring U.S.-made Tomahawks in FY2025, one year earlier than planned. Through these measures, the MOD/SDF will promptly secure sufficient capabilities prior to the establishment of increased production of domestic Aegis System-Equipped Vessels (image) missiles. At the same time, the MOD/SDF will advance efforts to establish a series of functions necessary for **3** **Improving the resiliency of existing SDF** the operation of stand-off missiles, including target **facilities such as SDF camps and bases** information gathering functions and command and **across Japan** control functions. **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-1 (Responses to Invasion of SDF facilities are the foundation for the sustainability Japan, Including Its Remote Islands) and resiliency of Japan’s defense capabilities; therefore, it is important to ensure their sufficient functioning. Because about 40% of SDF facilities were built during **2 Procuring Aegis System Equipped Vessels** periods when the old earthquake resistance standards Recent years have seen rapid changes and developments were in effect, it is urgently required to improve the i i il l t d t h l i t t bl h i ili f i ti f iliti t th f t ----- of SDF personnel on a daily basis and prevent the easy MOD/SDF plans to start making such improvements in loss of operational capabilities even in a contingency. FY2024. In the process, improvements will also be made For this reason, the MOD/SDF already began in to the living and work environments for uniformed SDF FY2023 to work on developing a master plan for personnel. improving the resiliency of more than 20,000 SDF **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 6-4 (Improving the Resiliency of buildings across Japan. Under this master plan, the Facilities) **3** **Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures** Personnel and food provision expenses as well as **1** **Classification by expenses** obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related “personnel and food provision expenses,” which covers budget. The remaining 20% of the budget includes items such as wages and meals for SDF personnel, and spending for repairing equipment and for implementing “material expenses,” which finance the procurement, measures to mitigate the impact on local communities repair and maintenance of equipment, the purchase of hosting U.S. bases in Japan. As such, a high percentage fuel, the education and training of SDF personnel and of the budget is allocated for maintenance purposes. **Part** others. Material expenses are further classified into **Ⅱ** “obligatory outlay expenses,”[3] which are paid based on **Chapter** **2** **Classification by purpose of use** contracts concluded in previous fiscal years, and “general **3** material expenses,” which are paid under current- By purpose of use, defense-related expenditures are year contracts. Material expenses are also referred to broadly classified into “personnel and food provision as “program expenses,” and since general material expenses,” which cover items such as wages and meals expenses include repair costs for equipment, education for SDF personnel; “equipment procurement expenses,” and training expenses for personnel, and the purchase of which cover the procurement of new equipment (e.g., fuel, they are referred to also as “activity expenses.” tanks, destroyers, fighter aircraft, etc.); “maintenance Fig. II-3-2-4 Classification of Defense-Related Expenditures by Purpose of Use (FY2024) R&D R&D **3.4% (260.6 billion yen)** Others **3.3% (220.1billion yen)** Investment in advanced technologies **3.3% (256.2 billion yen)** Others Facility improvements Facility improvements **3.2% (214.1 billion yen)** **3.9% (304.4 billion yen)** **3.7% (246.5 billion yen)** Construction of hangars, buildings, etc. Base measures Base measures Personnel and **6.5% (499.5 billion yen)** food provisions **7.4% (487.2 billion yen)** Support for local governments **28.9％** Personnel and Procurement of equipment, etc. **7,724.9** (2,229 billion yen)Expenses relating to wages Procurement of **6,600.1 billion yen(Reference)** food provisions33.3％ **22.3%** **billion yen** for personnel, retirement equipment, etc. (FY2023 original budget) (2,196.9billion yen) (1,726.2 billion yen) (FY2024 original budget) allowance, meals in barracks **20.6%** Procurement of new equipment (8,165billion yen) Maintenance, etc. (tanks, destroyers, fighters, etc.) Maintenance, etc. **28.4%** (1,873.1billion yen) **31.7%** (2,449.1 billion yen) (Notes) 1. Excluding U.S. Forces realignment-related epenses, etc. Education and training for personnel, 2. The figures have been rounded off and may not add up oil for vessels, aircraft, etc., equipment repair to the total. **3** Some projects for the buildup of defense capabilities extend over multiple years. In these cases, the fiscal year in which the contract is concluded is different from the fiscal year in which the payment to the contractor is made. Therefore, the maximum obligation over later fiscal years is first allocated to the budget as a contract resulting in a Treasury obligation (a type of budget that only grants the authority to incur obligations; the contracts can be concluded, but payment cannot be made). Based on such budgeting, in the fiscal year in which the construction is completed or the equipment is procured, the expenses necessary for payment are in principle allocated as a budget expenditure (a type of budget that grants the authority to incur obligations and to make payment; the contracts can be concluded and payment can be made). Budget expenditure for payments incurred under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years ----- expenses, which cover items such as training and obligations concerning new contracts (the new future education of SDF personnel, fuel for vessels and aircraft, obligations arising in the applicable fiscal year) indicates and equipment repairs; “facility improvement expenses,” payments for the following year and beyond. In the build- which cover the construction of buildings such as aircraft up of defense capabilities, it is common to take multiple hangars and barracks; and “research and development years from contract to delivery or completion, in areas expenses,” which cover investments in cutting-edge such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other technologies. In the defense-related expenditures for major equipment, as well as the construction of buildings FY2024, as in those for FY2023, the combined total such as aircraft hangars and barracks. Concerning these of expenses for equipment procurement and research projects, while contracts covering multiple fiscal years and development exceeds 20% of the total defense- are concluded in applicable the fiscal year in question, related expenditure, while the percentage of equipment and payments for the next fiscal year and beyond (in maintenance and other expenses has also increased. principle, within five years) are promised in advance at **See** Fig. II-3-2-4 (Classification of Defense-Related Expenditures the time of concluding the contract (the total of general by Purpose of Use (FY2024)) material expenses and future obligations concerning new contracts is equal to the total amount of the contract concluded in that fiscal year (scale of projects), which is **3** **Future obligations concerning new contracts** **Part** referred to as the “contract basis”). **Ⅱ** Apart from the annual budget expenditure, the future **See** Fig. II-3-2-5 (Structure of Defense-Related Expenditures) **Chapter** **3** **4** **Optimization Efforts** In the DBP, substantive funds will be secured by contracts will be expanded. (cost reduction of ¥99.0 means such as thoroughly ensuring greater efficiency billion) and streamlining of the buildup of defense capability. ・ Procurement time and life cycle costs will be reduced by The FY2024 budget aims to realize a cost reduction of narrowing down the SDF’s proprietary specifications approximately ¥276.4 billion through initiatives shown through modularization, communalization, and the below: use of civilian goods. (cost reduction of ¥7.3 billion) ・ The operation of equipment of declining importance ・ In addition to reviewing projects with low cost- due to obsolescence, etc., will be suspended and its effectiveness, the cost of each project will be carefully use terminated. (cost reduction of ¥1.3 billion) managed, and the utilization of external personnel ・ Prices and procurement costs will be reduced by from private contractors will be expanded. (cost increasing companies’ predictability and encouraging reduction of ¥64.4 billion) their efficient production through bulk purchase of ・ Prices of equipment and others will be reduced through equipment, including through long-term contracts. At such means as closer scrutiny of manufacturing the same time, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), in processes and person-hours involved as well as of which consideration for the equipment is linked to the related expenses. (cost reduction of \104.5 billion) maintenance outcomes achieved, and other umbrella **See** Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 4 (Equipment Optimization Efforts) **5** **Secure Financial Resources for Reinforcing Defense Capabilities** Fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities must be and revenue, such as government expenditure reforms, maintained and further reinforced into the future. Stably the use of settlement surplus, creation of the Defense supporting such efforts requires solid financial resources. Buildup Fund utilizing non-tax revenues, and tax To secure financial resources for the stable sustainment of measures. defense capabilities after FY2027 as well as for covering The Defense Buildup Fund has been created under the DBP from FY2023 to FY2027, the DBP calls for the Defense Financing Act,[4] which was enacted in June implementing necessary measures in both expenditure 2023. ----- Fig. II-3-2-5 Structure of Defense-Related Expenditures (Fiscal year) |Before FY2019|FY2020|FY2021|FY2022|FY2023 FY2025 FY2024|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|FY2026|FY2027|Col12|FY2028|Col14|After FY2029| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |FY2019 E re Contracts||||M Expenses relati education and t lighting, heating cost-sharing for the impact on lo 2,229 billion yen Expense FY2023 Gene Expense FY2024||||||||||FY2029| ||||||2,229 billion yen|||||||||| |||||||M Expenses relati education and t lighting, heating cost-sharing for the impact on lo Expense FY2023 Gene Expense FY2024|||aterial expe|nses (progr||am expense||s) purchase of oil; es such as opment; res to mitigate e before nses) ade in| ||||||||||ng to procurement raining of staff; fac, water and suppli the stationing of cal communities|; repair and upgra ilities improvemen es; technological r USFJ; and expense hosting U.S. bases||ding of equipment; t; barracks expens esearch and devel s related to measu in Japan||| ||Personne xpenses relatin tirement allowa|l and food|provisions personnel, barracks, etc.|||||||||||| |||g to wages for nce, meals in||||||||||||| ||before FY2019|||||||||||||| ||||||||Expense FY2023||Ob s paid in FY20|ligatory outl||ays contracts mad||e before| |||||||||||24 based on||||| |||||||||||||||| ||||||||Gene Expense FY2024||ral material|expenses (||activity expe||nses) ade in| ||||||||||s paid in FY2|024 based o||n contracts m||| |||||||||||||||| ||||||(Note 3)|||||(Note 3)||||| |||||||||||||||| ||Con|tracts in FY20|20|||||||||||| |||||||||||||||| |||||||||||(N|ote 3)|||| ||Material ex 9, [General mat|||||||||Fut (exi Expenses p the contract||||n cts) 5 based on 23| |||||||||||||ure obligatio||| |||||||||||||||| ||||Contracts in FY|2021||||||||sting contra||| ||||||||||(Note 3)|||aid after FY202 s before FY20||| |||penses (co||||||||||||| ||||||3,792.8|||||||||| ||||Contracts i|n FY2022|billion yen|||||||||| |||||||||||(N|ote 3)|||| ||||ntract basis)|||||||||||| |||||||||||||||| |||||Contracts in|FY2023|||||||||| |||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||(|Note 3)|| |||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||| |||||||7,659.|||4 billion yen|||||| |||||||||||||||| |||362.5 billion y erial + new fut|en ure obligation]||Contracts in|FY2024||||||||| ||||||1,703.2 billion yen|Expe FY20||Expe FY20|Ne nses paid afte 24 (within 5 ye|w future obl||igation ed on the co )||ntracts in| |||||||||||r FY2025 bas ars in principle||||| |||||||||||||||| Annual budget expenditure7,724.9 billion yen 【Personnel, food provisions + obligatory outlay + General material expenses】 (Notes) 1 In the SACO-related and U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses, the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities is excluded. 2 This is a conceptual diagram and the lengths of the graph do not necessarily correspond to the actual data. 3 Part of expenses, such as long-term contracts for the procurement of equipment, is paid for over five years. **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** ----- |9,000|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0|Defense budget (100 million USD) Defense budget as % of GDP||||||||| ||Japan|The United States|China|Russia|ROK|Australia|The United Kingdom|France|Germany| |Defense budget|697|7,759|4,040|2,126|716|373|756|783|823| |Defense budget as % of GDP|1.12|2.84|1.24|3.75|2.55|1.95|1.89|1.89|1.42| |(Reference) The percentage of GDP based on defense budget published by NATO|－|3.24|－|－|－|－|2.28|1.90|1.66| |Defense budget per person (approx. US$〇)|565|2,282|283|1,473|1,382|1,411|1,117|1,209|988| |Defense budget per person (approx. 〇 ten thousand yen)|5|22|3|14|13|13|11|11|9| Also, tax measures have been addressed by the such tax measures will be taken in accordance with the FY2023 Tax Reform Outline.[5] The Outline calls for FY2023 Tax Reform Outline. According to the outline, incremental measures on corporate tax, income tax, and the supplementary provisions of the 2024 tax reform law tobacco tax over several years to secure a little more than will provide that necessary legislative measures will be \1 trillion yen for FY2027. It states that these measures taken at an appropriate time. will be implemented at an appropriate time from FY2024 **See** Chapter 2, Section 3 (Outline of the Defense Buildup Program) onward. The FY2024 Tax Reform Outline[6] stated that **6** **Comparison with Other Countries** It is difficult to accurately make an international would be as shown in Fig. II-3-2-6 (Comparison with comparison of defense budgets due to a number of Defense Budget of Major Countries [FY2023]). factors: there is no internationally unified definition of a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) member defense budget in the first place; even if defense budgets countries and other countries have committed to are publicly disclosed, their overall amount or their appropriate their defense budget that is commensurate breakdown is sometimes unclear; and the budget system with their respective economic capabilities in order to **Part** varies by country. maintain the security environment.[8] In the case of Japan, **Ⅱ** On such basis, if Japan’s defense-related expenditures looking at its defense budget as a percentage of GDP has a and the defense budget of other countries officially certain significance as an indicator for the reinforcement **Chapter** published by each government were converted into of its defense capabilities in light of changes in the **3** dollar amounts using the purchasing power parity[7] of security environment in the international community. each country reported by the Organization for Economic Accordingly, in FY 2027, as per its own judgement, Co-operation and Development (OECD), and if a Japan will take the necessary measures to make the level comparison was made in terms of the ratio of the defense of its budget, for both the fundamental reinforcement budget to GDP (gross national product), the results of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives, Fig. II-3-2-6 Comparison with Defense Budget of Major Countries (FY2023) Defense budget (100 million dollars) Defense budget as % of GDP (%) (Notes) 1 This defense budget are based on those officially published by each country (DoD budget for 9,000 6.0 the United States) and are converted to US dollars, using each country’s purchasing power parity for FY2023 as published by the OECD (officially published rate as of April 2024). (1 US 8,0007,000 Defense budget (100 million USD)Defense budget as % of GDP 5.0 dollar = 94.702005 yen = 3.846155 yuan = 30.128977 rubles = 796.170147 won = 1.369873 Australian dollars = 0.673315 pound = 0.678008 euros (France exchange rate) = 0.710865 euros (Germany exchange rate) 6,000 4.0 2 The amounts of defense budget published by China appear to be only part of its actual 5,000 3.0 expenses for military purpose. According to analysis from the U.S. Department of Defense, China’s actual defense budget much more than in its published defense budget. 4,000 3 The percentage of GDP is calculated based on defense budget officially published by each 3,000 2.0 country (in local currency) using the GDP of each country published by the IMF (in local currency). 2,000 4 As defense budget published by NATO (which include pensions for retired veterans, etc.) may 1.0 differ from those officially published by each country, the percentage of GDP based on 1,000 defense budget published by NATO (in March 2024) does not necessarily coincide with the 0 Japan The United States China Russia ROK Australia [The United ]Kingdom France Germany 0.0 5 Defense budget per person are calculated using the populations published by the UNFPA percentage of GDP calculated based on defense budget officially published by each country.(State of the World Population 2023). Defense budget 697 7,759 4,040 2,126 716 373 756 783 823 6 According to a SIPRI Fact Sheet (published in April 2024), global defense budget represented 2.3% of global GDP in 2023, and defense budget represented 1.2% of Japan’s GDP. Defense budget as % of GDP 1.12 2.84 1.24 3.75 2.55 1.95 1.89 1.89 1.42 (Reference) The percentage of GDP based on defense budget published by NATO － 3.24 － － － － 2.28 1.90 1.66 person (approx. US$Defense budget per 〇) 565 2,282 283 1,473 1,382 1,411 1,117 1,209 988 Defense budget per person (approx. thousand yen)〇 ten 5 22 3 14 13 13 11 11 9 **5** The FY2023 Tax Reform Outline (Cabinet Decision on December 23, 2022) **6** The FY2024 Tax Reform Outline (Cabinet Decision on December 22, 2023) **7** A gauge that measures each country’s ability to purchase goods and services by taking into account their respective price levels. Although there also exists a method of converting their defense budget into dollar amounts at respective currency rates, their dollar-based defense budget calculated in this way do not necessarily reflect the precise value based on each country’s price levels. ----- reach 2% of the current GDP, through building on the contents of necessary defense capabilities under the NSS, and by taking into account indexes of international comparison, with a view to coordination with its ally, likeminded countries and others.[9] In addition, Fig. II 3 2 7 (Trends in Defense Budget of Major Countries) shows the trends in the defense budget of major countries since 1998. **See** Reference 9 (Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries) Fig. II-3-2-7 Trends in Defense Budget of Major Countries 1.0 0.5 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 |illion USD)|Col2| |---|---| |U.S. 8 (3.1 times)|6.0 3.3 5.8 .2 .5 .9| |4 China|| |(9.8 times) 3 Russia|| |(18.5 times) ROK (3.9 times) 8|| |7 Japan (2.8 times) 3|| |Australia|| |(5.3 times)|| ||| Japan The United States China ROK Russia Australia (Notes)1 Regarding the defense budget of the six countries, figures officially published by the government of each country were converted into US dollars amounts, using the purchasing power parity for each year (published by the OECD as of April 2024). Incidentally, the values for 2024 were converted into USD with the purchasing power parity for 2023, because the one for 2024 has not been published yet for now. 2 Japan’s defense-related expenditure shows its original budget (excluding SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), and expenses for the three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and building national resilience, etc.) 3 The amount and year-on-year growth rate (figures rounded to one decimal place) for FY1998-FY2024 are indicated. **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** The aggregate of DBP-related expenditures and expenditures for complementary initiatives for FY2024 amounts to \8.9 trillion which represents about 1.6% of GDP for the fiscal year in ----- **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** **Commentary** **Security-related Expenses** In the National Security Strategy of Japan, which was formulated by relevant ministries and agencies involves the moot issue of in December 2022, Japan has decided to take the necessary which specific expenditures contribute to Japan’s defense. Yet measures to make the level of its budget, for both the fundamental the government has calculated this portion based on the items reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary the past administrations have adopted to provisionally estimate initiatives, reach 2% (about \11 trillion) of the current GDP security-related expenditures while using the NATO definition (estimated at some \560 trillion for fiscal 2022), through building for reference. The calculation assumes that this portion includes on the contents of necessary defense capabilities, and by taking (i) expenditures related to military and civilian veterans and into account indexes of international comparison, with a view to the weapons of the former Japanese military, such as pension coordination with its ally, likeminded countries and others. expenditures and expenditures related to ammunition disposal; NATO member countries and other countries have committed (ii) PKO-related expenditures, such as contributions to the U.N.’s to spending under their defense budget that is commensurate PKO; (iii) expenditures for security-related organizations, such as with their respective economic capabilities in order to maintain the the JCG and the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center; (vi) SDF- security environment. In the case of Japan, looking at its defense related expenditures, such as personnel expenses for defense budget as a percentage of GDP has a certain significance as an attaches; and (v) expenditures related to the stationing of the U.S. indicator for the reinforcement of its defense capabilities in light Forces in Japan, such as base subsidies. of changes in the security environment within the international Of the measures to reinforce the comprehensive defense community. With this understanding, the government has decided architecture, the government will promote R&D of science to set a 2-percent target for FY2027 for the combined budget and technology that contributes to the enhancement of the level for the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities comprehensive defense architecture by matching R&D needs and other supplementary measures (security-related expenses). based on the views of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with the Of the combined budget, DBP-related expenditures as part appropriate technological seeds possessed by relevant ministries of expenditures for the fundamental reinforcement of defense and agencies. capabilities are expected to amount to some \8.9 trillion yen for With regard to public infrastructure development, the FY2027. Expenditures for complementary initiatives are calculated government will develop airports and seaports as necessary based on the items the past administrations have adopted to based on the needs of the SDF and the JCG to ensure their smooth provisionally estimate security-related expenditures while using utilization and deployment on a steady-state basis for effective the NATO definition for reference. Of such expenditures, SACO- response in light of the security environment. related expenses and the portion of U.S. Forces realignment- As for cybersecurity, the government plans to improve its overall related expenses that is aimed at mitigating the impact on local response capabilities to or above the levels of leading Western communities are estimated at about \0.2 trillion. The portion countries. This involves the introduction of active cyber defense. borne by relevant ministries and agencies is estimated at around The government is now considering what specific measures to \0.9 trillion given the JCG budget and PKO-related expenses. take, with the Cabinet Secretariat playing the central role. Expenditures for measures to reinforce the comprehensive Measures for international cooperation are best represented defense architecture—R&D, public infrastructure development, by Official Security Assistance (OSA), a new grant aid framework cybersecurity, and international cooperation not least for that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created to help like-minded enhancing the deterrence of Japan and like-minded countries— countries reinforce their security capabilities and deterrence. The are approximately estimated at \1 trillion. MOD/SDF will work closely with OSA in such areas as the transfer Estimating the portion of security-related expenditures borne of defense equipment and technology. ----- |Structure to Support the National Security Council (image)|Col2| |---|---| |National Security Council|| |4-Minister Meeting|Emergency Situations Minister Meeting| |◆Serves as a control tower for foreign, defense, and economic policies concerning national security|◆Strengthens the response to serious emergencies| |Related Ministries and Agencies|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Ministry of Defense|Ministry of Foreign Affairs|etc...| **Japan’s Security and Defense** **Chapter** **4** **Section 1** **National Security Council** Japan’s security environment is the most severe and coordination of basic guidelines and important matters complex since the end of World War II, and the security with regard to foreign, defense, and economic policies challenges that it needs to address are becoming more pertaining to national security. The Secretariat is provided serious. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to carry with human resources and information by the ministries forward the policies pertaining to national security from and agencies closely related in terms of policy. There are a strategic perspective under strong political leadership many civilians and uniformed personnel seconded from with the Prime Minister at its core. For this reason, the the Ministry of Defense (MOD) engaging in the planning National Security Council, which was established in the and design of policies, with their expertise. In addition, Cabinet to provide a platform to discuss important matters information on global military trends and other matters is with regard to Japan’s security, has been serving as a provided from the MOD/SDF in a timely manner. control tower for foreign, defense, and economic policies The enhanced ability to formulate national security **Part** pertaining to national security. Since its establishment policies has led to the systematic alignment of Japan’s **Ⅱ** in December 2013, the Council has met 338 times (as national security, and to the provision of a direction for **Chapter** of the end of March 2024). The NSS, NDS, and DBP policies with regard to new security challenges. Furthermore, **4** formulated in December 2022 have also been deliberated individual defense policies are formulated and efforts to and approved in this National Security Council. accelerate decision-making are made based on the basic The National Security Secretariat established within guidelines discussed at the National Security Council, and the Cabinet Secretariat provides constant support to the this is contributing significantly to improved development National Security Council as its secretariat. The Secretariat and implementation of policies within the MOD/SDF. is also tasked with the planning, design, and overall **See** Fig. II-4-1-1 (Organization of the National Security Council) Fig. II-4-1-1 Organization of the National Security Council Structure to Support the National Security Council (image) National Security Council 4-Minister Meeting 9-Minister Meeting Emergency Situations Minister Meeting - Serves as a control tower for foreign, defense, and economic policies concerning national security - Maintains the civilian control function of the former Security Council - Strengthens the response to serious emergencies Support Other Agencies within the Cabinet Secretariat Close National Security Secretariat within the Cabinet Secretariat coordination (Situation response/crisis management)Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary - Functions as a secretariat to provide constant support to the National Security Council - Planning and designing, and overall coordination of basic guidelines and important matters pertaining to foreign diplomacy, defense and economic policies with regard to national security National Center of Incident Readiness and - Provision of necessary advice when responding to contingencies from a national security viewpoint Strategy for Cybersecurity Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office Provision of data, information and personnel etc... Related Ministries and Agencies Ministry of Defense Ministry of etc... Foreign Affairs **REFERENCE : Meetings of the National Security Council** **URL : https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyoukaigi/kaisai.html** ----- |Cabinet|Col2| |---|---| |Prime|Minister| |Minister|of Defense| |---|---| |State Minist|er of Defense| |---|---| |Minister’s Secretariat|Bureau of Defense Policy|Bureau of Personnel and Education Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning|Bureau of Policies for Regional Society|SDF Ethics Review Board|Central Council on Defense Facilities|Defense Personnel Review Board|National Defense Academy|National Defense Medical College|National Institute for Defense Studies| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Defense Council|Joint Staff|Ground Staff Office|Maritime Staff Office|Air Staff Office|Defense Intelligence Headquarters|Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Units and organizations of the Ground Self-Defense Force|Units and organizations of the Maritime Self-Defense Force|Units and organizations of the Air Self-Defense Force|SDF Intelligence Security Command|SDF Cyber Defense Command| |---|---|---|---|---| |SDF Physical Training School|SDF Central Hospital|SDF Regional Hospitals|Provincial Cooperation Offices| |---|---|---|---| **Section 2** **Organization of the MOD/Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** **1** **Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability** **1** **Organization of the MOD/Self-Defense** the administrative aspects of the organization, which **Forces (SDF)** manages and operates the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, To fulfill their mission of defending Japan, the MOD/SDF the term “SDF” refers to the operational aspects of the consists of various organizations, mainly the Ground, organizations whose mission is the defense of Japan. Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces. **See** Fig. II-4-2-1 (Organizational Chart of the MOD/SDF); Fig. II- The MOD and the SDF refer to the same organization. 4-2-2 (Outline of the MOD/SDF); Fig. II-4-2-3 (Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces); Fig. II-4-2-4 (Location Whereas the term “Ministry of Defense” refers to of Principal SDF Units (for illustrative purposes) (As of March 31, 2023)) Fig. II-4-2-1 Organizational Chart of the MOD/SDF Cabinet Prime Minister Minister of Defense National Security Council **Part** State Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense (up to three people) **Ⅱ** Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) **Chapter** **4** Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense Internal Bureaus Councils, etc. Institutions Attached Organizations Units and Organizations Joint Units Cooperative Organization (Notes) 1 As of May 2024. 2 Excluding temporary or special positions. 3 Units and Organizations, Joint Units, and Cooperative Organizations are categorized under Attached Organizations in the National Government Organization Act. ----- Fig. II-4-2-2 Outline of the MOD/SDF **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** |Organization|Outline| |---|---| |Internal Bureaus|● Responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the MOD and SDF (defense and security affairs, basic conduct of the SDF [political and administrative affairs such as planning and drafting of laws and regulations or government-level policies], personnel affairs, budgets, etc.) ● Composed of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, Bureau of Personnel and Education, and Bureau of Policies for Regional Society, in addition to the Minister’s Secretariat| |Joint Staff|● A staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF ● Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs concerning joint operation and making action plans ● The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF are delivered through the Chief of Staff, JS and orders concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the Chief of Staff, JS.| |Ground Staff Office Maritime Staff Office Air Staff Office|● Staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning the duties of each SDF unit ● Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs of each SDF unit and making plans on buildup of defense capabilities, education and training.| |Ground Self-Defense Force|● Ground Component Command • Composed mainly of airborne brigades, amphibious rapid deployment brigades, etc. • Realization of unified command over GSDF troops. ● Regional Armies • Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and antiaircraft artillery groups) • There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions ● Divisions and Brigades Composed of combat units, combat support units, logistics support units and others| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|● Self-Defense Fleet • Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Fleet Submarine Force • Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations ● Regional Districts There are five regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet| |Air Self-Defense Force|● Air Defense Command • Composed of four air defense forces • Primarily responsible for general air defense duties ● Air Defense Force Composed of key units such as air wings (including fighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others)| |National Defense Academy of Japan|● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel ● Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to master’s or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses)| |National Defense Medical College|● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel ● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF officers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel ● Offers a graduate medical course equivalent to PhD programs at medical universities based on the School Education Law| |National Institute for Defense Studies|● National security-related academic research and education institute ● Conducts basic research and study related to the administration and operation of the SDF • Conducts research and study on security • Conducts research and study and compiles data on military history • Management and publication of data on military history ● Educates and trains SDF personnel and other senior officials| |Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance|● Organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position| |Regional Defense Bureau (eight locations nationwide)|● Local Bureaus in charge of comprehensive defense administration in regional areas • Conducts cost audit, supervision, and inspection related to the procurement of equipment by ensuring understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and acquiring, managing, building and constructing defense facilities, and taking measures concerning neighborhood of the base • Consists of eight Regional Defense Bureaus (Hokkaido, Tohoku, North Kanto, South Kanto, Kinki-Chubu, Chugoku-Shikoku, Kyushu and Okinawa)| |Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency|● An external bureau in charge of effective and efficient procurement of defense equipment and international defense equipment and technology cooperation • Implementation of constant project management throughout the life cycle of defense equipment from an integrated perspective • Smooth and prompt reflection of each unit’s operational needs in equipment procurement • Proactive initiatives in new areas (further internationalization of defense equipment and investments in advanced technological research, etc.) • Achievement of procurement reform and, at the same time, maintenance and strengthening of defense production and of the technological and industrial bases of defense| ----- Fig. II-4-2-3 Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces Northern Air Defense Force Northern Air Defense Force Headquarters (Misawa) 2nd Air Wing (Chitose) 3rd Air Wing (Misawa) Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Misawa, Each region) Northern Air Defense Missile Group (Misawa, Each region) Northern Air Civil Engineering Group (Misawa, Chitose) Other units Central Air Defense Force Central Air Defense Force Headquarters (Iruma) 6th Air Wing (Komatsu) 7th Air Wing (Hyakuri) Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Iruma, Each region) Central Air Defense Missile Group (Iruma, Each region) Central Air Civil Engineering Group (Iruma, Each region) Other units Western Air Defense Force Western Air Defense Force Headquarters (Kasuga) 5th Air Wing (Nyutabaru) 8th Air Wing (Tsuiki) Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Kasuga, Each region) Western Air Defense Missile Group (Kasuga, Each region) Western Air Civil Engineering Group (Ashiya, Each region) Other units Southwestern Air Defense Force Southwestern Air Defense Force Headquarters (Naha) 9th Air Wing (Naha) Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Naha, Each region) Southwestern Air Defense Missile Group (Naha, Each region) Southwestern Air Civil Engineering Group (Naha) Other units Airborne Warning and Control Wing (Hamamatsu, Each region) Air Rescue Wing (Iruma, Each region) Air Tactics Development Wing (Yokota, Each region) Reconnaissance Group (Misawa) Other units **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** Air Development and Test Command Headquarters (Fuchu) Air Communications and Systems Wing (Ichigaya, Each region) Minister of Defense Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Joint Staff Chief of Staff, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, ASDF Ground Staff Office Maritime Staff Office Air Staff Office Ground ComponentCommand Ground Component Command Headquarters (Asaka) Self-Defense Fleet Fleet Escort Force Escort Flotilla 1 (Yokosuka) Air Defense Command Northern Air Defense Force 1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino) Escort Flotilla 2 (Sasebo) Air Defense Command Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (Ainoura) Escort Flotilla 3 (Maizuru) Headquarters (Yokota) 1st Helicopter Brigade (Kisarazu) Escort Flotilla 4 (Kure) System and Signal Brigade (Ichigaya) Fleet Training Command (Yokosuka) Central Readiness Regiment (Utsunomiya) Other units Special Forces Group (Narashino) Electronic Warfare Operations Unit (Asaka) Fleet Air Force Fleet Air Wing 1 (Kanoya) Central Air Defense Force Other units Fleet Air Wing 2 (Hachinohe) Northern Army 2nd Division (Asahikawa) Fleet Air Wing 4 (Atsugi) 5th Brigade (Obihiro) Fleet Air Wing 5 (Naha) 7th Division (Higashi Chitose) Fleet Air Wing 21 (Tateyama) 11th Division (Makomanai) Fleet Air Wing 22 (Omura) 1st Field Artillery Brigade (Kita Chitose) Fleet Air Wing 31 (Iwakuni) 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Higashi Chitose) Other units Western Air Defense Force 3rd Engineer Brigade (Minami Eniwa) Northern Army Combined Brigade (Higashi Chitose) Fleet Submarine Force Submarine Flotilla 1 (Kure) Northern Air Group (Okadama) Submarine Flotilla 2 (Yokosuka) Other units Other units Northeastern Army 6th Division (Jinmachi) Minesweeper Squadron (Yokosuka) 9th Division (Aomori) Fleet Intelligence Command (Yokosuka) Northerneastern Artillery Regiment (Iwate) Southwestern Air Defense Force Oceanography ASW Support Command (Yokosuka) 4th Surface-to-ship Missile Regiment (Hachinohe) 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Hachinohe) Fleet Research and Development Command (Yokosuka) 2nd Engineer Brigade (Funaoka) Northeastern Army Combined Brigade (Sendai) Yokosuka District Northeastern Air Group (Kasuminome) Other units Kure District Eastern Army 1st Division (Nerima) 12th Brigade (Somagahara) Sasebo District Eastern Artillery Regiment (Kitafuji) 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Matsudo) Maizuru District 1st Engineer Brigade (Koga) Air Support Command Headquarters (Fuchu) Eastern Army Combined Brigade (Takeyama) Air Support Command 1st Tactical Airlift Wing (Komaki) Eastern Air Group (Tachikawa) Ominato District 2nd Tactical Airlift Group (Iruma) Other units 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing (Miho) Middle Army 3rd Division (Senzo) Air Training Command Air Training Group Shimofusa (Shimofusa) Air Traffic Control Group (Fuchu, Each region) 10th Division (Moriyama) Air Training Group Tokushima (Tokushima) Air Weather Group (Fuchu, Each region) 13th Brigade (Kaitaichi) Air Training Group Ozuki (Ozuki) Flight Check Group (Iruma) 14th Brigade (Zentsuji) Other units Special Airlift Group (Chitose) Middle Artillery Regiment (Himeji) Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Komaki) 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Aonogahara) Training Squadron 4th Engineer Brigade (Okubo) Air Training Command Headquarters (Hamamatsu) Middle Army Combined Brigade (Otsu) Communications Command (Ichigaya) Air Training Command 1st Air Wing (Hamamatsu) Middle Air Group (Yao) Maritime Materiel Command (Jujo) 4th Air Wing (Matsushima) Other units Other units and organizations 11th Flying Training Wing (Shizuhama) 12th Flying Training Wing (Hofu-kita) Western Army 4th Division (Fukuoka) 13th Flying Training Wing (Ashiya) 8th Division (Kita Kumamoto) Air Basic Training Wing (Hofu-minami, Kumagaya) 15th Brigade (Naha) Fighter Training Group (Nyutabaru) Western Field Artillery Unit (Yufuin) Other units and organizations 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Iizuka) 5th Engineer Brigade (Ogori)Western Army Combined Brigade (Kurume) Air Development andTest Command Air Development and Test Wing (Gifu) Western Army Tank Unit (Kusu) Electronics Development and Test Group (Fuchu) Western Air Group (Takayubaru) Aeromedical Laboratory (Iruma) Other units Space Operations Group (Fuchu, Hofukita) Training Evaluation Research and Development Command (Meguro) Ground Material Control Command (Jujo) Aero Safety Service Group (Iruma) Other units and organizations Air Materiel Command (Jujo, Each region) Other units and organizations ----- Fig. II-4-2-4 Location of Principal SDF Units (for illustrative purposes) (As of March 31, 2023) **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** **Ministry of Defense; Joint Staff Office;** **Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Office** **Ground Self-** **Defense Force** Rebuntou **Northern Air** Ground Component Command Headquarters (and Eastern Army Headquarters) WakkanaiWakkanai **Defense Force** Army Headquarters **2nd Division** Division Headquarters / Brigade Headquarters AsahikawaAsahikawa AbashiriAbashiri TobetsuTobetsu Airborne BrigadeAmphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade SapporoSapporo **Northern Northern Army** **5th Brigade5th Brigade** NemuroNemuro MakomanaiMakomanai ObihiroObihiro Helicopter Brigade ChitoseChitose Higashi ChitoseHigashi Chitose **Maritime Self-Maritime Self-** **7th Division7th Division** **Defense ForceDefense Force** OkushiritouOkushiritou **11th Brigade11th Brigade** ErimoErimo Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters **Ominato DistrictOminato District** Headquarters District OminatoOminato Principal Naval Bases AomoriAomori MisawaMisawa Principal Air Bases (Fixed-wing Aircraft Units) HachinoheHachinohe Principal Air Bases (Helicopter Units) **Northeastern ArmyNortheastern Army** KamoKamo **Air Self-Air Self-** YamadaYamada **Defense ForceDefense Force** **9th Division9th Division** Air Defense Command Headquarters JinmachiJinmachi Air Defense Force Headquarters SendaiSendai Fighter Units SadoSado Surface-to Air Guided Missile Units **6th Division6th Division** WajimaWajima Aircraft Control and Warning Units (Radar Site) OtakineyamaOtakineyama **12th Brigade12th Brigade** TakeshimaTakeshima **Eastern ArmyEastern Army** **Maizuru DistrictMaizuru District** KomatsuKomatsu SomagaharaSomagahara **Western Air Defense ForceWestern Air Defense Force** KyogamisakiKyogamisaki **10th Division10th Division** **1st Division1st Division** **Yokosuka DistrictYokosuka District** TakaoyamaTakaoyama IchigayaIchigaya **Central Air Defense ForceCentral Air Defense Force** MaizuruMaizuru **13th Brigade13th Brigade** ItamiItami MoriyamaMoriyama UnishimaUnishimaMishimaMishima KaitaichiKaitaichi **Middle ArmyMiddle Army** SenzoSenzo KasatoriyamaKasatoriyama OmaezakiOmaezaki IwakuniIwakuni KureKure **3rd Division** ZentsujiZentsuji FukuokaFukuoka **SaseboSasebo** AinouraAinouraSefuriyamaSefuriyama TsuikiTsuiki **14th Brigade14th Brigade** KushimotoKushimoto **DistrictDistrict** KasugaKasuga FukuejimaFukuejima SaseboSasebo OmuraOmura **4th Division** **Kure DistrictKure District** KengunKengun Kita KumamotoKita Kumamoto **Western ArmyWestern Army** **8th Division8th Division** NyutabaruNyutabaru ShimokoshikijimaShimokoshikijima TakahatayamaTakahatayama KanoyaKanoya **Southwestern Southwestern** **Air Defense ForceAir Defense Force** HyakuriHyakuri **Southwestern Southwestern** **Air Defense ForceAir Defense Force** IrumaIruma AsakaAsaka NerimaNerima NarashinoNarashino YokotaYokota IchigayaIchigaya OkinoerabujimaOkinoerabujima AtsugiAtsugi FunakoshiFunakoshi KisarazuKisarazu KumejimaKumejima YokosukaYokosuka MineokayamaMineokayama Senkaku IslandsSenkaku Islands NahaNaha YozadakeYozadake **15th Brigade15th Brigade** TateyamaTateyama YonagunijimaYonagunijima MiyakojimaMiyakojima ----- the operations of the SDF for the Minister of Defense **2** **Systems to Support the Minister of Defense** from a military expert’s perspective. The Ground Staff, The Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages Maritime Staff and Air Staff are the staff organizations the matters related to the defense of Japan as the for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective competent minister, and is in overall charge of the SDF services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs duties in accordance with the provisions of the SDF of Staff for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Law. The Minister is supported by the State Minister of Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self- Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense Defense Force (ASDF) acting as the top ranking expert (two), and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. advisers to the Minister of Defense regarding these There are also the Special Advisers to the Minister of services. Defense, who advise the Minister of Defense, and the In this manner, the MOD has ensured that the support Defense Council, which deliberates on basic principles for the Minister from a policy perspective and the support concerning affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. for the Minister from a military expert’s perspective are Furthermore, there are the Administrative Vice- provided in a well-balanced manner like the two wheels Minister of Defense, who organizes and supervises the of a cart, so to speak, in order for the Minister of Defense administrative affairs of each bureau and organization to to appropriately make decisions. support the Minister of Defense, and the Vice-Minister of **See** Chapter 1, Section 2-3-4 (Securing Civilian Control) Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as those related to **3** **Base of Defense Administration in Regional** **Part** international affairs. **Areas** Moreover, the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, Joint **Ⅱ** **Chapter** Staff, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, The MOD has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight Air Staff Office, and the Acquisition, Technology & locations across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai **4** Logistics Agency (ATLA), as an external bureau, have City, Saitama City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, been established in the MOD. The Internal Bureaus of Hiroshima City, Fukuoka City, and Kadena Town) as the MOD are responsible for basic policy relating to the its local branches in charge of comprehensive defense duties of the MOD/SDF. The Minister’s Secretariat and administration. the Directors-General of each Bureau within the Internal In addition to implementing measures to promote Bureaus, along with the Commissioner of ATLA who is harmony between defense facilities and regional societies in charge of defense equipment administration, support and inspecting equipment, the Regional Defense Bureaus the Minister of Defense by providing assistance from a adopt various measures to obtain the understanding policy perspective. and cooperation of both local governments and local The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister residents towards the activities of the MOD/SDF. of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF. The **See** Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 1 (Measures to Harmonize with Chief of Joint Staff provides centralized support for Local Communities and the Environment) **2** **Joint Operations System of the SDF** In order to rapidly and effectively fulfill the duties of the develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, SDF, the MOD/SDF has adopted the joint operations and centrally supports the Minister of Defense on system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective. are operated integrally. Furthermore, it works towards The Minister of Defense’s commands concerning the building an architecture that is capable of realizing cross- operations of the SDF are delivered through the Chief domain operations in domains such as space, cyberspace of Joint Staff, and the Minister of Defense’s orders and the electromagnetic spectrum. concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the The Joint Staff is responsible for joint operations of Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Defense Minister’s the SDF. It is headed by the Chief of Joint Staff, who commands and orders are delivered through the Chief of ----- |Col1|Col2|Pr|ime Ministe|r|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||| ||Mi|nis|ter of Defe|ns|e| ||||||| |Line||Tro|ops||| |Commander, JSDF Joint||Operat|ions Command (C-JJOC)||| |her than operations|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Responsibility for Duties other than Unit Operations||| |Chief of staff of the Ground Self-Defense Force|Chief of Staff of the Maritime Self-Defense Force|Chief of staff of the Air Self-Defense Force| |Ground Staff Office|Maritime Staff Office|Air Staff Office| |Line Troops|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Commanding General, Ground Component Command|Commander of the Self-Defense Fleet|Commander, Air Defense Command|Commander, JSDF Cyber Defense Command| ||||Space Operations Group Commander| Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force is operations of the SDF, while the Ground, Maritime organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is and Air Staff Offices undertake functions for unit employed to respond. maintenance, such as personnel affairs, building-up The Joint Staff undertakes functions relating to the defense capability, and education and training. **3** **SDF Joint Operations Command** The NDS and DBP call for the establishment of a services. To this end, the MOD/SDF will establish the permanent Joint Headquarters that facilitates the SDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) in Ichigaya as centralized command of each SDF service. The aim is to a permanent Joint Headquarters, which will be headed build a system that is capable of seamless cross-domain by the Commander, SDF Joint Operations Command operations at all phases from peacetime to contingencies, (C-JJOC). with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint **See** Fig. II-4-2-5 (Operations System of the SDF and SDF Joint operations of the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDF Operations Command(JJOC)) Fig. II-4-2-5 Operational System of the SDF and the JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) New Self-Defense Forces' Operations System (image) **Part** Chain of command for Chain of command for operations Prime Minister Chain of command for unit assignment Chain of command for unit assignment other than operations **Ⅱ** Minister of Defense **Chapter** Responsibility for Unit Operations Responsibility for Duties other than Unit OperationsChief of staff of Chief of Staff of Chief of staff of **4** Joint Chief of Staff Line Troops Self-Defense Forcethe Ground Self-Defense Forcethe Maritime Self-Defense Forcethe Air Ground Maritime Joint Staff Office Commander, JSDF Joint Operations Command (C-JJOC) Staff Office Staff Office Air Staff Office Line Troops Commander, Commanding General, Commander of Commander, JSDF Cyber Defense Command Ground Component the Self-Defense Fleet Air Defense Command Command Space Operations Group Commander the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF from peacetime. Its ability **1** **Significance** to train cross-domain operations from peacetime will Two or more units from GSDF, MSDF, and/or ASDF are improve the effectiveness of joint operations and enable temporarily organized as an ad hoc joint task force, as prompt response to contingencies and decision-making needed, under the current absence of a permanent Joint constantly. Headquarters to conduct joint operations. Under such an Currently, the Chief of Joint Staff coordinates with arrangement, however, the SDF cannot quickly develop the U.S. counterparts, namely the Chairman of the Joint a flexible defense posture in response to the state of the Chiefs of Staff, who is in charge of longer-term military situation and its developments. It is also difficult to put strategies, as well as the Commander of the U.S. Indo- in place a posture needed for cross-domain operations Pacific Command, who is in charge of joint operations from peacetime. between the SDF and U.S. Forces. The JJOC will enable The JJOC will centrally command joint operations by closer coordination with U.S. Forces and stronger Japan- **1** This applies to cases in which a special unit is organized to carry out a specific duty or when the required troops are placed partly under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure based on the stipulations of Article 22, paragraphs 1 or 2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, and refers to units made up of two or more units from the GSDF, MSDF, or ASDF. In order to swiftly and effectively execute various missions such as responding to ballistic missiles and large-scale disasters, it is necessary to operate the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF in an integrated manner. To achieve this, a joint task force spanning the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF is organized under a single commander. In order to deal simultaneously with a contingency ----- U.S. joint response capabilities. **2 �Relations between the JJOC and the Joint** **Staff** Joint Staff whereas the orders of the Minister of Defense are executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. Even after the JJOC is established, the Chief of Joint Staff will continue to convey the commands and orders of the Minister of Defense regarding the operation of the SDF to the JJOC and other units and give detailed guidance within such purview. In this way, clear lines of responsibility will be drawn between the JJOC and its commander on one hand and the Joint Staff and its chief on the other. The establishment of the JJOC and its new function of centrally operating GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF units across the country from peacetime will improve the effectiveness of joint operations and enable prompt response to contingencies and decision-making constantly. The Joint Staff is a staff organization that supports the Minister of Defense with regard to the operation of the SDF from a military expert’s perspective. The JJOC, on the other hand, is a unit designed to centrally command GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF units across Japan from peacetime, which was not a permanent function of the SDF until now. Thus, the JJOC and the Joint Staff are organizations with different purpose and position, and the role of the Joint Staff will not change with the establishment of the JJOC. As to the current operation of the SDF, the commands of the Minister of Defense are conducted via the Chief of **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** ----- **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** **Commentary** **Deepening the SDF’s Joint Operations System** Aiming for a comprehensive and effective administration of the system, a posture in which joint operations are the norm. This shift SDF for joint SDF operations, the Joint Staff Council comprising integrated the functions of supporting the Minister of Defense from a Chairman and the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF a military expert’s perspective. At the SDF unit level, however, the was established in July 1954 at the time of the foundation of the joint operations system translated into a joint task force organized Defense Agency and the SDF. Based on this, the Internal Bureau to carry out a specific duty under Article 22, paragraph 1 or 2 of the Defense Agency assisted the Minister of State for Defense of the Self-Defense Forces Law. The SDF had yet to be able to in his command responsibilities mainly from policy perspective, adopt a posture in which the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF can conduct while each Chief of Staff and the Joint Staff Council did so mainly operations in a systematic and coordinated fashion during normal from military perspective. However, the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, conditions. MSDF, and ASDF all provided their own expert military advice to This was where the Medium Term Defense Program (FY the Minister of State for Defense independently, with the Joint Staff 2019 - FY 2023) came in. This program stated: “For the future Council providing coordination as a council organization when framework for joint operations, SDF will take necessary measures necessary. In other words, it was a posture in which operations by after considering how to conduct the operation of organizations each SDF service were the norm. in which the functions in the new domains are operated unitarily, After that, there were changes in the environment surrounding and come to conclusions after considering how the integrated the SDF. For example, the SDF was required to deal with new structure should be during steady-state to appropriately execute threats and diverse contingencies. Recognizing that, in order instructions from the Minister based on the posture of the to swiftly and effectively respond to these changes, the SDF must strengthened Joint Staff.” Based on such consideration, the adopt a posture in which the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF can conduct Defense Buildup Program endorsed by the Cabinet in December operations in a systematic and coordinated fashion during normal 2022 stated: “a permanent Joint Headquarters will be established conditions, the government established the posture required for in order to build a system capable of seamlessly conducting cross- joint operations, including the creation of the Joint Staff , the domain operations at all stages from peacetime to contingency, transfer of operational functions from the Staff Offices of the with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to the Joint Staff, and the integration of among each SDF services.” This was how the Joint Operations intelligence functions into the Defense Intelligence Headquarters. Command came to be established. In March 2006, the SDF posture was shifted to the joint operations The Joint Staff Council held the first meeting in 1954. Lieutenant General MASSAKI Hajime, the first Chief of Staff, Joint Chief of Japan (right) ----- **Framework for the SDF Activities** **Chapter** **5** **1** **Duties of the Self-Defense Forces** Article 3 in the Self-Defense Forces Law divides the are jointly known as “primary missions.”[1] duties of the Self-Defense Forces into main duties (item **See** Fig. II-5-1 (Overview of the Self-Defense Forces’ Duties); 1 of the same article) and secondary duties (items 1 and 2 Reference 10 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority of the same article). Defense Operations to defend Japan for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces) correspond to main duties, which only the Self-Defense Forces can carry out. Fig. II-5-1 Overview of the Self Defense Forces’ Duties Secondary duties consist of “duties for maintaining Defense of Japan public order as necessary” (secondary duties under item Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’s peace, Main duty independence, and national security 1) and duties defined by other laws “to an extent that does not interfere with performance of the main duties” Maintaining public order (secondary duties under item 2). The former includes Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’s public peace public security operations that police entities cannot and protects the lives and assets of Japanese people Primary Missions handle alone, maritime security operations, destruction Responding to Important Influence Situations **Part** Activities that contribute to Japan’s peace and security through responses to Secondary duties measures against ballistic missiles and other weapons, Important Influence Situations **Ⅱ** disaster relief dispatches, and measures against intrusion International peace cooperation activities **Chapter** of territorial airspace. The latter covers responses to Activities that contribute to maintaining peace and security in international **5** Important Influence Situations and international peace society, including Japan, through promotion of international cooperation cooperation activities. These main and secondary duties **2** **Defense of Japan** Armed Attack Situations, and Survival-Threatening **1 �Armed Attack Situations/Anticipated Armed** Situations. **Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening** The Government will take action in accordance with the **Situations** Act in the event of an armed attack, such as a missile attack The Armed Attack Situation Response Act[2] is aimed on Japan or an invasion of its remote islands as described at establishing a system to respond to **Armed Attack** below in Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4, or an armed attack **Situations or** **Anticipated Armed Attack Situations and** against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with **Survival-Threatening Situations, thereby contributing** Japan, which as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and to the peace and independence of Japan as well as the poses a clear danger of fundamentally overturning Japanese safety of the country and the people. The Act specifies people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. items that should be stipulated as basic principles and When an Armed Attack Situation /Anticipated Armed basic policies (the Basic Response Plan), as well as Attack Situation or a Survival-Threatening Situation the responsibilities of national and local governments, occurs, the Government will make a Cabinet decision on a for responding to Armed Attack Situations/Anticipated Basic Response Plan based on the Armed Attack Situation **1** Activities to be performed by the SDF to leverage its skills, experience, and organizational functions developed over years are known as “side duties” to distinguish them from primary missions. They include transportation for national guests who visit Japan to attend a Summit meeting, consignments of public park ground-leveling and road constructions performed as part of education and training, and cooperation with athletic events, such as Olympic Games, Paralympic Games, and the National Sports Festival. **2** Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations /Anticipated Armed Attack Situations, and Survival- ----- to Be Dealt with: - Sequence of events of the situation, the confirmation of occurrence of an Armed Attack Situation /Anticipated Armed Attack Situation or a Survival-Threatening Situation, and the facts that support this confirmation - The reason why there are no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and the use of force is necessary to respond to the situation when the situation is confirmed as an Armed Attack Situation/Anticipated Armed Attack Situation or a Survival-Threatening Situation (2) An Overall Plan Related to the Response (3) Important Matters Related to the Response Measures Important matters related to the response measures include the issuance of Defense Operation orders or requests for Diet approval to issue such orders, as described below, in the event of an Armed Attack Situation, or a Survival-Threatening Situation. **See** Fig. II-5-2 (Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations /Anticipated Armed Attack Situations and SurvivalThreatening Situations) **KEY WORD** **Armed Attack Situations and Anticipated** **Armed Attack Situations** “Armed Attack Situations” refers to situations in which an armed attack against Japan from outside occurs or in which it is recognized that clear danger of an armed attack against Japan from outside is imminent. “Anticipated Armed Attack Situations” refers to situations that are not yet an armed attack situations but in which circumstances are critical and an armed attack against Japan is anticipated. **KEY WORD** **Survival-Threatening Situations** “Survival-Threatening Situations” means situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger of fundamentally overturning Japanese people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. Response Act. Such a plan must stipulates the following items, which are subject to approval by the Diet. (1) The Following Items concerning Situations that Need **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** Fig. II-5-2 Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations / Anticipated Armed Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations Occurrence of armed attack |Creation of a draft basic response plan (1) Formulation of the draft basic response plan by the Prime Minister The Government National Security Council (2) The draft basic response plan sent to Deliberation of the draft basic response plan Consultation the National Security Council for deliberation (3) Recommendation by the National Security Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning Recommendation Council to the Prime Minister concerning Specialized assistance to National Security Council the draft basic response plan Cabinet decision on the basic response plan (4) Cabinet decision on the basic response plan The Diet Request for the approval of the Diet (5) Approval of the basic response plan by Diet Task Force for Armed Attack and other Situations Approve Rejection ・Comprehensive promotion of response measures Terminate immediately ・Formulation of usage guidelines for specific public facilities, etc.|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||| |||| Response according to the basic response plan and usage guidelines Designated government institutions Local governments Designated public institutions ----- of the national and local governments as well as measures for evacuating residents, providing relief to evacuated residents, and responding to armed attack disasters in order to protect the lives, bodies, and property of the people and to minimize the impact on the livelihood of the people in an Armed Attack Situation/Anticipated Armed Attack Situation and during an emergency response[4]. If the Minister of Defense deems it unavoidable after receiving a request from prefectural governors or a request from the Task Force Chief,[5] the Minister of Defense may order SDF units and organizations[6] upon approval from the Prime Minister, to implement civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures (including assisting with the evacuation of residents and immediate restoration). **See** Fig. II-5-3 (Flow of Civil Protection Dispatches);Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-8 (Initiatives Related for Civil Protection) **2** **Responses of the SDF** The Prime Minister can issue a Defense Operation order to the whole or part of the SDF when it is deemed necessary for the defense of Japan in Armed Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations. Prior Diet approval is required for a Defense Operation order in principle. The SDF under Defense Operation duty is allowed to exercise the use of force only when the Three Conditions for “the Use of Force” are satisfied. **See** Chapter I, Section 2-2-2 (Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution); Part III, Chapter 1, Section **See** 4 (Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Missile Attacks) **3** **Civil Protection** The Civil Protection Law[3] specifies the responsibilities Fig. II-5-3 Flow of Civil Protection Dispatches **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** (When a dispatch request cannot be sought) Ask for dispatch Report Approve Act Concerning the Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc. A situation where actions that may kill or injure a large number of people through methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack have occurred or where it is deemed a clear and present threat that such actions may occur, and which necessitates an emergency response by the state. The Prime Minister assumes the position of the Director of the Crisis Management Headquarters, but these positions are regulated as separate entities. ----- **3** **Maintenance of Public Order and Responses to Aggression that Do Not Amount** **to an Armed Attack** **1** **Public Security Operations** **4** **Destruction Measures against Ballistic** **Missiles or Other Objects** **(1) Public Security Operations by Order** In the event of an indirect aggression[7] or other emergency In cases where ballistic missiles or other objects are situations, the Prime Minister can order the whole or flying to Japan as an armed attack or flying to Japan in part of the SDF to deploy if it is deemed impossible to a Survival-Threatening Situation, and where the “Three maintain public security with the general police force. In Conditions” are met, the SDF can respond with the this instance, in principle, the Prime Minister must bring defense operation. In cases where ballistic missiles or the order to the Diet for deliberation, and request for its other objects are flying to Japan but which are not found approval within twenty days from the day the order has as an armed attack, the Minister of Defense can take the been given. following measures: (1) If the Minister of Defense judges that ballistic **(2) Public Security Operations by Request** missiles or other objects are likely to fly to Japan and The governor of a prefecture, upon consulting with the that it is necessary to prevent damage to human lives Public Safety Commission of the prefecture, can request and property due to its fall in the territory of Japan, the Prime Minister to dispatch units and organizations of the Minister, upon the approval of the Prime Minister, the SDF if it is deemed unavoidable as the situation will can order the SDF units to take measures to destroy have a serious influence on public security. Following the ballistic missiles or other objects actually flying to such a request, the Prime Minister can order the SDF to the country in the airspace over the territory of Japan **Part** mobilize when the situation calls for such action. or the high seas. **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-7 (Responses to Large-Scale (2) In addition to the cases of (1), there may be cases **Ⅱ** Terrorism and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure) where the situation suddenly changes with little **Chapter** information available on the launch, for example, and **5** the Minister of Defense cannot have time to obtain **2** **Maritime Security Operations** approval from the Prime Minister. In preparation for When there is a special need to protect lives or property or such cases, the Minister of Defense may create an maintain public security at sea,[8] the Minister of Defense emergency response manual beforehand and obtain can order the SDF units to take necessary actions at sea approval from the Prime Minister. Following the upon approval by the Prime Minister. emergency response manual, the Minister of Defense **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3-2 (Measures against Violations of can order, for a specified period of time, the SDF units Japan’s Sovereignty) to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects in the airspace over the territory of Japan or the high seas when such objects are actually flying to **3** **Counter-Piracy Operations** the country. When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy,[9] **See** Fig. II-5-4 (Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles or Other the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to conduct Objects); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-2 (Responses to Missile Attacks) operations under the Counter-Piracy Measures Act to deal with piracy acts at sea upon approval by the Prime Minister. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Counter-Piracy Operations) **7** A major internal riot or disturbance caused by the instigation or intervention by a foreign country **8** Cases where it is extremely difficult or impossible for the JCG to respond ----- Fig. II-5-4 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects Constituting an armed attack An Armed Attack Situation is confirmed A Defense Operation order is issued In the framework of defense operation Responding as the use of force Not constituting an armed attack When a ballistic missile or When a ballistic missile or the like is unlikely to fly to Japan the like is likely to fly to Japan but in an emergency The Minister of Defense orders Upon approval of the Prime Minister, destruction measures in advance the Minister of Defense orders as provided in the emergency destruction measures response procedure Destruction measures against ballistic missiles and the like Responding with the use of weapons In cases where emergency patients need to be transported from the sea, remote islands or elsewhere but both the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the local governments concerned have difficulty in dealing with the situation, the SDF conducts an emergency airlift of such patients under the framework of disaster relief dispatches. **(2) Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch and** **Nuclear Disaster Relief Dispatch** When a warning declaration is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes,[13] or when a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order the dispatch of units upon the request of the Director of the Seismic Disaster Warning Headquarters or the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister in either case). **See** Fig. II-5-5 (Flow of a Disaster Relief Dispatch); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7-1 (Response to Large-Scale Disasters, etc.); Reference 18 (Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)) **5** **Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others** **(1) Disaster Relief Dispatches** Prefectural governors or other officials[10] may request the Minister of Defense, or an officer designated by the Minister,[11] to dispatch SDF units, etc., in the event of a disaster[12] if they deem such a dispatch necessary in order to protect lives or properties. Upon such a request, the Minister or the designated officer will, in principle, make a judgment based on a comprehensive evaluation of three conditions— urgency, non-substitutability, and public nature—and dispatch the units if it is deemed necessary for the SDF to respond to the disaster. This procedure is based on the idea that prefectural governors and other officials should grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster relief capabilities first, and then decide whether to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch. However, under circumstances of particular urgency when there is no time to wait for a request, the Minister of Defense or the designated officer may discretionarily dispatch units, etc. without waiting for such a request. **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** **10 The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Office may request a disaster relief** dispatch. With regard to disaster relief dispatch, earthquake disaster prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for the dispatch may take measures such as evacuation (Article 4 of the Police Duties Execution Law) based on Article 94 of the SDF Law (Authority in Disaster Relief Dispatch, etc.); (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster relief dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake disaster prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster relief dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary. **11 Most notably, the commanding officers of SDF units, etc. across Japan are designed as such in consideration of convenience for prefectural governors, etc. when they make such a request.** **12 Disasters include not only natural disasters such as storms, torrential rains, tremendous snowfalls, floods, storm surges, earthquakes, and tsunamis, but also human-caused disasters such** as fires, maritime accidents, aircraft crashes, and train accidents. **13 The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake prediction is reported by the Director-General of the Japan Meteorological** ----- Fig. II-5-5 Flow of a Disaster Relief Dispatch |The outbreak a disaster Make a DRO request to the prefectural governor Request a DRO|Col2| |---|---| ||| ||| |Request a DR|| |Request a DRO|Col2| |---|---| ||| |Dispatch units|, etc. Dispatch units, etc. (discretionary dispatch)| and property of people within Japanese territory as well as the safety of aircraft flying along air routes, such use of weapons can be permitted even if such use does not fall under the requirements of legitimate self-defense or necessity. **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3-2-1 (Warnings and Scrambles in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace) **7 �Rescue and Transportation of Japanese** **Nationals and Others Overseas** **6** **Measures against Intrusion of Territorial** **Airspace** The Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take the necessary measures to make the intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (by guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, using weapons, etc.) when a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international law, the provisions of the Aviation Law, or other relevant laws and regulations. It is a violation of Japanese airspace when objects of foreign countries, even if they are unmanned aircraft (including balloons), intrude into our airspace without permission. The Japanese Government has traditionally considered that the use of weapons during scrambles responding to intrusions into Japanese airspace is permissible only when such measures fall under the requirements of legitimate self-defense or necessity, assuming that such intrusions are made by manned and military aircraft. Given that the use of weapons against unmanned aircraft, including balloons that intrude into Japanese airspace, would not directly harm people, the Japanese Government in February 2023 clarified its interpretation of Article 84 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, which concerns the use of weapons against unmanned aircraft, as follows: In such a case where the safety of aircraft cannot be ensured if the situation left as it is, and when deemed necessary to t t t l l i t t h th li **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** The Minister of Defense can transport Japanese nationals and others in need of life or physical protection to a safe area if requested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the event of emergency situation in a foreign country. To date, the Japanese Government has amended the SDF Law three times. The latest amendment—which was made in 2022 considering the experiences including the transportation of Japanese nationals and others from Afghanistan—involved removing restrictions on the means of transportation, reviewing the safety requirements for implementation, and expanding the scope of primary transportation recipients. The Minister of Defense can also rescue Japanese nationals and others by protecting or recovering them upon request from and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs if there is a threat of harm to life or body and all of the following are satisfied: C t t th iti f th t d ----- currently working on maintaining public safety and order, and no acts of combat are confirmed to take place in the areas where rescue measures are taken; - The country concerned[14] provides consent for the SDF to take the rescue measures (including the use of weapons); and - Coordination and cooperation with the competent authorities of the country concerned is expected to be ensured to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to anticipated dangers. **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7-2 (Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas); **See** Reference 19 (Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas by the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 20 (Record of Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas) **8** **Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and** **other Forces** **(2) Activities that Contribute to the Defense of Japan** “Activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” are determined on a case-by-case basis and may include the following: (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities including ballistic missile surveillance; (2) transportation and logistics activities in Important Influence Situations; and (3) bilateral/multilateral exercises to enhance capabilities required for defending Japan. **(3) Decision on Protection Missions** When the Minister of Defense receives a request from the U.S. Forces, and other forces, the Minister makes a decision on his/her initiative whether the relevant activities fall under “activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” and whether protection is necessary, by considering the objective and details of the activities, capability of the unit, and surrounding circumstances as well as the impacts on the SDF’s regular duties. Based on Article 95-2 of the SDF Law, SDF personnel is authorized to protect weapons and other equipment[15] of the units of the U.S. Forces and other forces[16] currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF. The basic principles of this Article, and the involvement of the Cabinet in applying this Article are set forth in the Implementation Guidelines,[17] which is outlined below: **(1) Purpose of Article 95-2** Protection under this Article can be applied to weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces and foreign armed forces, and other such organizations currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF (including bilateral/multilateral exercises but excluding activities carried out in places when combat activities are currently occurring). This Article allows very passive and limited use of weapons to the minimum extent necessary to protect what can be evaluated as important material means which constitute the defense capability of Japan from infringements not amounting to an armed attack. **(4) Involvement of the Cabinet** Requests for protection from the U.S. Forces, and other forces should be deliberated by the NSC prior to the decision by the Minister of Defense in the following cases. However, in urgent cases, the Minister should promptly report to the NSC. - First request from the U.S Forces and other forces. - Request for protection in the territory of a third country. - Other requests deemed particularly important. In addition, in case it is recognized that an asset protection is necessary in Important Influence Situations, the Basic Plan which stipulates its necessity should be approved by the Cabinet upon the deliberation in the NSC. **See** Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2-4 (Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-1 (Australia); Reference 11 (Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law); Reference 22 (Track Record of Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces (SDF Law Article 95-2)) **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** **14 It includes the organization, if any, that administers the country concerned in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN.** **15 Weapons, ammunition, explosives, vessels, aircraft, vehicles, wired telecommunications equipment, wireless telecommunications equipment or liquid fuels..** **16 “Other forces” include armed forces of foreign countries and other similar organizations (organizations of foreign countries similar to armed forces such as coast guards are assumed).** ----- **4** **Responses to Important Influence Situations** The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Important Influence Situations. Security of Japan in **Important Influence Situations[18]** While the provision of weapons is not allowed, aims to strengthen cooperation with foreign countries “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and to respond to Important Influence Situations by carrying maintenance of aircraft preparing for combat operations” out measures such as logistics support activities and are allowed. thereby contributing to the peace and security of Japan **b. Search and rescue activities** in the event of such situations. The Law provides the **c. Ship inspection operations[19] (those set forth in the** coverage and response measures as follows: **Ship Inspection Operations Law[20])** **d. Other measures necessary to respond to Important** **Influence Situations** **1** **Support Target** It is possible to implement response measures in The armed forces and other services, responding to foreign territories, but only with the consent of the Important Influence Situations, which the SDF may foreign country concerned. support, are (1) U.S. Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the **3 �Measures to Avoid Forming an Integrated** Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, (2) armed forces of other **Part of the Use of Force** foreign countries engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the UN Charter and The following measures are set forth in order to avoid (3) other similar organizations. integration with the use of force by other countries and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel: **KEY WORD** **Important Influence Situations** - Japan does not implement support activities in the areas **Part** “Important Influence Situations” refers to situations that have an important where a combat is actually taking place. Regarding **Ⅱ** influence on Japan’ s peace and security including situations that could search and rescue operations, however, when a victim **Chapter** result in a direct armed attack on Japan if left unattended. has already been found and rescue operations have **5** commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities as long as their safety is ensured. **2 �Response Measures to Important Influence** - The commanding officers or others directing activities **Situations** of the SDF units, order a temporary suspension of The following measures can be taken to respond to support activities if combat activities occur or are Important Influence Situations: expected to occur at the site of their activities or in its **a. Logistics support activities** vicinity. Provision of goods and services (supply, transportation, - The Minister of Defense designates the area for the repair and maintenance, medical services, activities, and promptly changes the area or order to communications, airport and seaport services, base suspend the activities if it is deemed difficult to carry services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, and training out activities smoothly and safely in all or part of the services), conveniences, and other support measures to area. the armed forces and other organizations, responding to **18 Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Important Influence Situations.** **19 Operations to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others ) and to request, if necessary, a change in sea route, destination port, or destination,** for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade and other economic activities to which Japan is a party, conducted based on UN Security Council resolutions or with the consent of the flag state (the state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). ----- standards such as the likelihood of Japan being embroiled **4 �Relationship between Important Influence** in a war or the extent of damage to Japanese nationals. **Situations and Survival-Threatening** Therefore, Survival-Threatening Situations may be **Situations** conceptually subsumed under Important Influence While both Important Influence Situations and Survival- Situations. Accordingly, depending on how a situation Threatening Situations are different legal concepts that evolves, Important Influence Situations may also satisfy are determined separately based on the requirements the requirements of Survival-Threatening Situations and set forth in the respective laws, they share common be determined as such. **5** **Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community** **(2) Response Measures** **1 �Response to Joint International Peace** The following response measures can be implemented in **Response Situations** Joint International Peace Response Situations. Under the International Peace Support Act,[21] in order to **a. Cooperation and Support Activities** ensure peace and security of the international community, Provision of supplies and services to the armed forces Japan can cooperate with or support the armed forces of of other countries (supply, transportation, repair and foreign countries engaged in operations for international maintenance, medical services, communications, airport peace and security in Joint International Peace Response and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use **Situations. From the perspective of enabling seamless** of facilities, training services, and construction) responses to any situation, the International Peace Support While the provision of weapons is not allowed, as in Act, enacted as a general law, enables Japan to conduct the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and **Part** operations more expeditiously and effectively, making it Security of Japan in Important Influence Situations, the **Ⅱ** possible to proactively contribute to international peace law allows the“provision of ammunition” and “refueling **Chapter** and security on Japan’s own initiative. and maintenance of aircraft preparing for combat **5** **KEY WORD** operations.” **Joint International Peace Response** **b. Search and Rescue Activities** **Situations** **c. Ship Inspection Operations (Those Set Forth in the** Situations that threaten peace and security of the international community **Ship Inspection Operations Law)** and that the international community is collectively addressing in accordance with the objectives of the U.N. Charter to remove the threat, **(3) Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force** to which Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute. The following measures are set forth in order to avoid integration with the use of force by other countries and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel: **(1) Requirements** - Japan does not implement support activities in the areas Either of the following UN resolutions (by the General where a combat is actually taking place. Regarding Assembly or the Security Council) are required for Japan search and rescue operations, however, when a victim to cooperate with or support the armed forces of other has already been found and rescue operations have countries. commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue (1) Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or search and rescue activities as long as their safety is authorize the country of support recipient to respond ensured. to situations that threaten the peace and security of the - The commanding officers or others directing activities international community of the SDF units, order a temporary suspension of (2) Other than (1), resolutions that acknowledge the support activities if combat activities occur or are situations as a threat to or disruption of peace and call expected to occur at the site of their activities or in its on United Nations (UN) member states to respond to vicinity. the situations concerned - The Minister of Defense designates the area for the ----- activities, and promptly changes the area or order to suspend the activities if it is deemed difficult to carry out activities smoothly and safely in all or part of the area. **See** Reference 12 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities) deemed to be consistently maintained, the use of weapons in defense of the mission mandate is allowed in accordance with specific requirements. **b. Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and** **Security** Japan can participate in Internationally Cooperated Operations for Peace and Security whose nature or details are similar to those of UN PKO, when the Five Principles for participation are met and one of the following exists. (1) Resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council of the UN (2) Requests of any of the following international organizations: - The UN - Organs established by the UN General Assembly or Specialized Agencies of the United Nations including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and those specified by a Cabinet Order - Regional organizations prescribed in the Article 52 of the UN Charter or organs established by multilateral treaties including the European Union and those specified by a Cabinet Order, acknowledged to have the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the activities. (3) At the requests of the countries to which the activities belong (limited to only those cases that are supported by any of the principal organs of the UN prescribed in the Article 7 (1) of the UN Charter). **(2) Description of Major Tasks** - Ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian relief operations for affected people - Monitoring, stationing, patrols, inspections at checkpoints, and security escorts to ensure the security of specified areas, including prevention and suppression of injury or harm against the lives, bodies, and property of local residents, affected people, and other populations in need of protection (so-called “safety-ensuring” operations) - Protection of the lives and bodies of parties engaged in international peace cooperation operations or providing support for such operations in response **See** **2 �International Peace Cooperation Assignments** The International Peace Cooperation Act[22] is aimed at active contribution by Japan to international peace efforts centered on the United Nations. The Act serves to set forth a framework for the implementation of International Peace Cooperation Assignments so that Japan can promptly make contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO)[23] and Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security.[24] The Act also sets forth procedures for taking measures to extend contributions in kind to these operations. **(1) Requirements for Participation** **a. UN PKO** The so-called Five Principles as follows for Participation in PKO constitute Japan’s basic policy for participating in UN PKO. (i) Agreements on a ceasefire have been reached among the Parties to Armed Conflict (ii) Consent for the conduct of UN PKO as well as Japan’s participation in such operations has been obtained from the countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs as well as the Parties to Armed Conflict (iii) The operations shall be conducted without partiality to any of the Parties to Armed Conflict (iv) Should any of the requirements in the above mentioned principles cease to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps dispatched by the Government of Japan may terminate International Peace Cooperation Assignments. (v) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect of the lives and bodies of personnel. When the consent for acceptance is **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** **22 Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations** **23 “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” refer to operations that are conducted under the governing framework of the United Nations to respond to conflicts and maintain international** peace and security, which are implemented by the United Nations and two or more participating countries at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with the consent of the disputing parties. **24 “Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security” refer to operations under a framework not overseen by the UN to respond to conflicts and maintain international peace and** ----- units of the SDF to undertake operations to cope with large-scale disasters, to the extent it does not interfere with International Peace Cooperation Assignments and other activities of the SDF. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-2 (Initiatives to Support UN PKO and other activities); Reference 12 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 60 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Assignments) **3** **International Disaster Relief Activities** to urgent requests when unexpected dangers to the lives and bodies of such individuals related to these operations occur or are imminent (so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations) - Provision of advice or guidance for establishing or reestablishing organizations of the Government related to national Defense and other organizations - Essential work for the organizations undertaking the supervision and coordination of the activities, including planning, coordination, and the collection and organizing of information at the Headquarters Office **(3) Others** **a. Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel to the UN** **(Dispatch of UN PKO Force Commanders)** Uniformed SDF personnel may be dispatched to be engaged in tasks of the UN duties performed by SDF units or units of other armed forces at the request of the UN and with the consent of the Prime Minister.[25] **b. Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Forces** **and other forces for their operations to cope with a** **large-scale disaster** The SDF can provide the U.S. Forces, the Australian Defence Force, or the Armed Forces of the U.K., France, Canada, India or Germany with supplies or services upon their request when they are located in a same area as the The Japan Disaster Relief Team Law[26] stipulates the measures necessary for dispatching the Japan Disaster Relief Team to undertake rescue activities and provide medical services in response to large-scale disasters overseas, especially in developing regions. The Minister for Foreign Affairs may consult the Minister of Defense with regard to the operations of SDF units if there is a special need. The Minister of Defense may order SDF units to carry out rescue and medical activities as well as transportation of personnel and supplies and other activities based on the consultation above.[27] **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-3 (International Disaster Relief Activities); Reference 12 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 60 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Assignments) **Part** **Ⅱ** **Chapter** **25 The dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel is limited to cases where the consent for UN PKO from the hosting countries and the disputing parties, if any, are expected to be maintained stably** throughout the period of dispatch and where circumstances are unlikely to cause the suspension of the dispatch. **26 Law Concerning the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team** **27 The Japan Disaster Relief Team is not to be dispatched if the use of weapons is necessary in order to protect the lives and bodies of personnel and necessary equipment engaged in** international disaster relief activities or related transportation when dangers exist due to the security situation and other factors in the affected country. Therefore, members of the team will ----- **Part** ## Ⅲ **Three Approaches to Achieve** **the Defense Objectives** **Chapter** **1** **Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** **Chapter** **2** **Japan-U.S. Alliance** **Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries** **Chapter** **3** **and Others** ----- **National Defense** **Chapter** **1** **Section 1** **Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense ** **Capabilities and Reinforcing the Defense Architecture** **of the Whole Country** **1** **Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities** The most consequential responsibility of the Government Japan needs to directly face up to the grim reality and of Japan and the basis of Japan’s national security, is fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, with a to resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese focus on the capabilities of its opponents and new ways nationals and their peaceful livelihoods as well as Japan’s of warfare, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods territorial land, airspace and waters. of Japanese nationals. When threats materialize through a combination of Defense capabilities are the foundation of the defense capability and intention, difficulties arise in accurately of Japan and the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s national ascertaining another party’s intention from an outside security. They serve to deter threats to Japan and should perspective. In addition, if a nation’s decision-making a threat to Japan arise, to block and eliminate the threat, process is opaque, there will always exist conditions thereby demonstrating Japan’s will and ability to defend **Part** under which threats may materialize. In order to defend itself to the end. **Ⅲ** one’s own country from a nation with powerful military Based on this recognition, the National Defense Strategy **Chapter** capabilities and the intention to launch aggression, it is of Japan (NDS) presents three defense objectives and three **1** necessary to have deterrence capabilities that make the approaches to achieve them, as shown in Fig. III-1-1. other nation realize the difficulties of achieving unilateral **See** Fig. III-1-1-1 (Three Defense Objectives and Three Approaches changes to the status quo by force. It is also necessary to to Achieve Them (image)); Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Outline of the National Strategy) build one’s own capabilities, namely, defense capabilities, by focusing on the other nation’s capabilities and ensuring In Part III, chapters are divided based on these three it does not harbor the intention to commit aggression. approaches and the initiatives of the Ministry of Defense In addition to traditional forms of invasion through (MOD) /Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are stated. air, sea and land conducted through now, new ways of Chapter 1 is entitled “Strengthening Japan’s Own warfare have emerged that combine large-scale missile Architecture for National Defense,” with the fundamental attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles with enhanced reinforcement of defense capabilities stated in Section precision strike capabilities; hybrid warfare, including 2 and thereafter. The reinforcement of Japan’s defense information warfare such as false flag operations[1]; the architecture as a whole will also be stated mainly in this domains of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum section (next item). as well as asymmetric means of attack that leverage Chapter 2, strengthening the ability of the “Japan-U.S. unmanned assets; and rhetoric that could be interpreted Alliance” to deter and counter threats, describes initiatives as open threats involving the use of nuclear weapons by regarding the Japan-U.S. Alliance with the United States, nuclear weapon states. which is the cornerstone of Japan’s security policy. Amid the most challenging and complex security Chapter 3, “ Reinforcing Collaboration with Like- environment since the start of the postwar period, minded Countries and Others,” explains initiatives ----- Fig. III-1-1-1 Three Defense Objectives and Three Approaches to Achieve Them (image) 1 Strengthening of Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense (Part III, Chapter 1) - Fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities Shaping a security - Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) conducting landing training (February 2023) 2 Strengthening Deterrence and Response Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance (Part III, Chapter 2) Deterring and Revealing the will and capabilities of Japan and the United States addressing to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, and bringing the situation under control as soon as possible. The MSDF destroyer “Ise” sailing with a U.S. aircraft carriers (January 2024) 3 Reinforcing collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others (Part III, Chapter 3) Reinforcing collaboration with as many countries as possible Japan takes primary responsibility to disrupt and defeat invasions of Japan. Japan-Italy Formation Flight in Japan-Italy Bilateral Training (August 2023) The U.S. Extended deterrence (Nuclear Deterrence) to ensure the peace, stability and prosperity of the security cooperation and those to ensure maritime security international community as a whole, including those and for international peace cooperation activities, arms **Part** to strategically promote multilateral and multilayered control, disarmament and non-proliferation. **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **1** **2** **Reinforcing the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country** The SDF must be strong in order to protect Japan, but framework of relevant government agencies. national defense cannot be achieved without a whole-of- **See** Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-6 “Commentary”(Security-related country approach. For this reason, besides the fundamental Expenses) reinforcement of its defense capabilities, Japan will develop a defense architecture for the whole country by integrating its **1** **Research and Development** national power, which includes its diplomatic, intelligence, economic and technological capabilities and systematically State-of-the-art science and technology is advancing combining various policy means. To strengthen such at an ever-faster rate, making it extremely difficult to whole-of-government efforts, it is essential to break down distinguish between technologies for civilian and security the stove-piping approach within the Government. applications. Worldwide, technology has developed in As part of this initiative, the government of Japan a context of interaction between innovation in civilian is reinforcing its comprehensive defense architecture applications and defense applications respectively. as a complement to and an inseparable part of the Accordingly, in Japan as well, it is crucial to leverage fundamental enhancement of its defense capabilities R&D achievements being actively pursued by both and is promoting initiatives in four areas: (1) research government and private sectors for defense purposes. and development (R&D), (2) public infrastructure With this in mind, the decision has been made to development, (3) cybersecurity and (4) international promote R&D in science and technology that helps cooperation to enhance the deterrence capabilities of strengthen the comprehensive defense architecture by J d it lik i d d t i d th d th t hi R&D d b d MOD i i ith ----- technological seeds possessed by the relevant ministries and agencies under a cross-governmental mechanism. In December 2023, a matching project to be implemented in FY2024 was approved based on important technological challenges organized from among research for civilian use by relevant ministries and agencies, which will be promoted for the time being as those that will also help consolidate the comprehensive defense architecture. For approved projects, the relevant ministries and agencies will communicate with the MOD on research findings and other matters while implementing these projects in their initiatives and through such communication, identify and nurture projects with considerable potential to be linked to the MOD’s R&D efficiently. **See** Fig. III-1-1-2 (Overview of Matching Projects to be Implemented in FY2024) |Important technological challenge|Overview of matching projects| |---|---| |Energy|・ R&D on solar power transmission technology ・ R&D on high-performance energy storage technology ・ R&D on high-power laser technology etc.| |Sensing|・ R&D on high-precision technology for PNT ・ R&D on electromagnetic wave measurement technology for environment ・ R&D on ultra-high sensitivity sensing technology ・ R&D on technology for fusing information from multiple sensors etc.| |Computing|・ R&D on quantum computers ・ R&D using high-speed edge systems ・ R&D using photonics-electronics convergence technology etc.| |Information processing|・ R&D on prediction and extraction technology for big data ・ R&D on situational awareness support using AI ・ R&D on effective visualization technology for sensor data etc.| |Information communication|・ R&D into high-speed, large-capacity, low-latency communication technology ・ R&D on high-speed optical communication devices ・ R&D into secure communication technology using quantum technology etc.| |Information security|・ R&D on the sophistication of cyber attack observation technology ・ R&D on cyberspace security technology ・ R&D of security technology using secret computation etc.| |Material|・ R&D on materials using AI ・ R&D on self-repairing functional materials ・ R&D on advanced processing technology for heat-resistant materials etc.| |Unmanned, autonomous|・ R&D on environmental recognition technology for drones ・ R&D on brain-machine interfaces ・ R&D on drone group control technology etc.| |Machinery (structure, design, propulsion, etc.)|・ R&D on safety and reliability in harsh environments ・ R&D on design and manufacturing processes using numerical analysis ・ R&D on next-generation flight technology etc.| **See** Overview of Matching Projects to be Fig. III-1-1-2 Implemented in FY2024 **2** **Public Infrastructure Development** the southwestern region and also in other regions, Government of Japan (GoJ) will establish frameworks with each facility administrator, so that Japan SelfDefense Forces (JSDF) and Japan Coast Guard (JCG) can use necessary airports and seaports smoothly in peacetime, and the airports and seaports where the framework is established are specified as “Specific Use Airport and Seaport”. At the “Specific Use Airport and Seaport”, necessary development or promotion of existing projects will be carried out, which contributes to primarily civilian use and also smooth use by vessels and aircraft of JSDF and JCG. **See** Fig. III-1-1-3 (Specific Use Airport and Seaport (as of 1 April 2024)) Specific Use Airport and Seaport (as of April 1, Fig. III-1-1-3 2024) Nagasaki (the Japanese Government) Fukue (Nagasaki Prefecture) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Government) Ishigaki (Ishigaki City) Rumoi (Rumoi City) Ishikari Bay New Port ( Ishikari Bay New Port Authority) Muroran (Muroran City) Kushiro (Kushiro City) Kitakyushu (the Japanese Hakata (Fukuoka City) Government) Tomakomai Takamatsu (Tomakomai Port (Kagawa Prefecture) Authority) Kochi (Kochi Prefecture) Susaki (Kochi Prefecture) Sukumowan (Kochi Prefecture) [Legend] Miyazaki (the Japanese ：Airport Government) ：Seaport ( ）facility administrator **3** **Cybersecurity** Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), the government of Japan as a whole intends to improve its cybersecurity response capabilities to a level equal or superior to those of leading Western countries. This includes introduction of active cyber defense in cases where there is a threat of a serious cyber attack that does not necessarily lead to an armed attack but raises national security concerns. In FY2024, projects are being planned to implement policies to ensure cybersecurity of information systems of government agencies, etc. The cybersecurity budget will be increased to a certain extent and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) will be fundamentally strengthened by newly assigning several senior officials and reinforcing the chain of command. Further, regarding projects related t th t i ti b d f th th t To effectively implement our necessary response t f th it i t i l i ----- Fig. III-1-1-4 Strengthening Security of Government Organizations - Strengthen and refine the existing constant security monitoring framework (GSOC: Government Security Operation Coordination team). - To respond to cyber attacks, which are becoming increasingly severe in both quality and quantity, evaluate the systems of government organizations constantly and in a cross-sectoral manner, and introduce a mechanism to fix system vulnerabilities as necessary with the aim of creating information systems that are less susceptible to cyber attacks. Various IT assets exposed to the Internet Cloud e-Mail Ministry Ａ Sensor Internet Website Staff PC Core system Remote devices B (IAA) VPN device Ensure security through Strengthen IT asset management and Business system constant sensor monitoring security in interorganizational collaboration IOT camera ① Real-time cross-sectoral monitoring IOT router C (DC) Cross-sectoral 24/7 monitoring and ① Constant risk assessment of reporting IT assets DNS server Monitoring and analyzing security ② Provision of information incidents with dynamic evaluation based on collected threat information Accurate and rapid sharing of information to improve ministries' Raising the standard of responding capabilities ② As needed base correction of government security talent vulnerabilities ③ Malicious program analysis Correcting system vulnerabilities based Collecting various threat information on a government-wide assessment through program analysis Strengthen and refine GSOC should be implemented will continue to be closely examined while taking the progress of discussions on relative legislation into account. **See** Fig. III-1-1-4 (Strengthening Security of Government Organizations), Section 4-5 (Responses in the Cyber Domain) **See** **4** **International Cooperation to Enhance the** **Deterrence Capabilities of Japan and Its** **Like-minded Countries and Others** monitoring and surveillance capabilities in the maritime security field. **See** Fig.III-1-1-5 (OSA Results in FY2023) |Nation|E/N(Note) signed/ exchanged|Amount|Equipment|Recipient| |---|---|---|---|---| |Philippines|November 3, 2023|600M yen|Coastal surveillance radar|Navy| |Bangladesh|November 15, 2023|575M yen|Patrol boat|Navy| |Malaysia|December 16, 2023|400M yen|Rescue boat|National army| |Fiji|December 18, 2023|400M yen|Patrol boat|Navy| Fig. III-1-1-5 OSA Results in FY2023 (Note) E/N is a document exchanged between the Government of Japan and the Government of the recipient country. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) has established a new grant assistance framework, the Official Security Assistance (OSA), in addition to Official Development Assistance (ODA), to help strengthen the security and deterrence capabilities of like-minded countries. The government of Japan is proceeding with this framework, working closely alongside not only the MOFA, but also related ministries and agencies, including the MOD. In FY2023, it was decided to equip the armed forces of four countries - the Philippines, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Fiji – as part of efforts to help improve their E/N Signing and Exchange Ceremony in the Philippines (November 2023) 【Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan】 ----- **Section 2** **Shaping a Security Environment that does not Tolerate ** **Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force** The primary object of the National Defense Strategy desirable security environment. (NDS) is to shape a security environment that does not As a maritime nation, it is extremely important for tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force. Japan to reinforce the maritime order and ensure the An important part of measures to prevent unilateral freedom and safety of navigation and overflight. changes to the status quo by force is diplomatic efforts For this reason, Japan implements necessary measures backed by the strengthening of Japan’s own defense for the safety of Japan-related vessels in order to ensure architecture. Coupled with diplomatic efforts, the the stable use of its vital sea lanes. Ministry of Defense (MOD) /Self Defense Forces (SDF) **See** Chapter 2 (Japan-U.S. Alliance); Chapter 3 (Collaboration with will promote cooperation with the ally and multilayered Like-Minded Countries and Others); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Promoting Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation coordination with like-minded countries to create a and Transfer of Defense Equipment) **1** **Response to Illicit Ship-to-Ship Transfers** During the period from 2018 onward to the end of **1** **Basic Concept** March 2024, MSDF vessels and other assets have so far Under the UN Security Council resolution No. 2375 observed 24 cases of seaborne rendezvous between North adopted in September 2017, UN member states are Korean-flagged tankers and foreign-flagged tankers, etc. prohibited from facilitating or engaging in the transfer of on the high seas of the East China Sea. The information goods at sea to or from North Korean-flagged vessels (so- was shared with relevant agencies and ministries each called “illicit ship-to-ship transfers”). This is intended to time. prevent North Korea from smuggling to evade sanctions As a result of comprehensive judgment across the **ⅢPart** imposed based on the UN Security Council resolution. Government, the vessels concerned are strongly suspected Toward the common goal of the complete, of having engaged in “illicit ship-to-ship transfers” with **Chapter** verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the North Korean-flagged vessels, which is prohibited by **1** Korean Peninsula, Japan needs to work closely with UN Security Council resolutions. Japan reported this to the international community, including China and the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Russia, as well as the United States and South Korea, Korea, shared the information with relevant countries, to ensure the effectiveness of the UN Security Council gave information to the relevant countries regarding the resolutions, including responses to “illicit ship-to-ship tankers concerned and made public announcements on transfers”. the subject. In recent years, there has been growing international concern about these illicit maritime activities, including **2** **Response by the MOD/SDF** “illicit ship-to-ship transfers” with North Korean- The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces flagged vessels. Since April 2018 as of the end of March (SDF) has the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 2024, not only the United States, but also Australia, (MSDF) gather information on vessels suspected of Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, France and violating the UN Security Council resolution as part of Germany have dispatched naval vessels and aircraft in its regular monitoring and surveillance activities in the the waters surrounding Japan, including the East China waters surrounding Japan and cooperates closely with Sea, to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities. relevant ministries and agencies, relevant countries and The MOD/SDF will continue their close cooperation relevant international organizations. with concerned countries to ensure compliance with the **REFERENCE: Japan’s Initiatives to Ensure the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council Resolution** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_architecture/un-s-council/s-s-transfer/index.html** ----- UN Security Council resolution. approached the Australian frigate Toowoomba, which had been conducting monitoring and surveillance activities against “illicit ship-to-ship transfers” with North Korea **3** **Related Event** in the waters surrounding Japan. The Chinese destroyer According to the Australian government, in November activated its sonar, causing an Australian Navy diver to 2023, there was an incident in which a Chinese destroyer get injured. **2** **Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-related Vessels in the Middle East** with the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Land, **1** **Background of the Deployment of the SDF** Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), Ministry **to the Middle East** of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and other relevant ministries Peace and stability in the Middle East are crucial to the and agencies, as well as with relevant industries through peace and prosperity of the international community, public-private liaison meetings, to be used for the including Japan. In addition, for Japan as well, it is very government’s navigation safety measures. important to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, one of the world’s major energy **2** **Activities by the MOD/SDF** sources, on which Japan depends for about 90% of its crude oil imports. **(1) Information gathering activities by the MOD/SDF** In the Middle East, amidst rising tensions, there were The MOD/SDF’s information gathering activities are incidents of attacks on ships. In June 2019, Japan-related part of the government’s navigation safety measures and vessels suffered damage. Under these circumstances, the are aimed at collecting information necessary to ensure United States, European countries and other countries the safety of Japan-related vessels. are taking steps to ensure the safety of navigation in the The activities are to be conducted in accordance with region by utilizing ships and aircraft. the provisions of Article 4, paragraph (1), item (xviii) To ease tensions and stabilize the situation in the of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, **Part** Middle East, the Japanese Government has actively as they would need smooth decision making and order **Ⅲ** promoted diplomatic initiatives. In addition, following issuance in relation to maritime security operations as **Chapter** deliberations within the Government, in December 2019, measures for unforeseen circumstances or other changes **1** the Cabinet approved governmental efforts to ensure the in the situation, which are provided in Article 82 of the safety of Japan-related vessels. In this context, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces Law. own initiatives to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels are as **(2) Results of the SDF’s Activities** follows: (1) further diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in In January 2020,P-3C patrol aircraft of the counter-piracy the Middle East and stabilize the situation; (2) thorough unit began information-gathering activities, followed implementation of navigation safety measures, including by a destroyer of the Deployment Surface Force for close information sharing with relevant industries; and information-gathering activities in February 2020. (3) conduct information gathering activities via the use Based on the November 2023 Cabinet decision, one of SDF assets. destroyer and one patrol aircraft are conducting both The areas of operation of these information gathering counter-piracy operations and information-gathering activities consists of the high seas of three areas of activities. water: the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea and **a. Surface Force (Deployment Surface Force for Counter** the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait **Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) has been concurrently** (including the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the **served since February 2022.)** coastal states) is to utilize P-3C patrol aircraft of the DSPE operates in the high seas of the Gulf of Oman and in Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement the high seas of the northern Arabian Sea. The total number (DAPE), as well as destroyers of the Deployment Surface of confirmed vessels as of March 31, 2024, is 90,577. Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE). **b. Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement** I f ti th d b th MOD/SDF i h d DAPE t i th hi h f th G lf f Ad ----- and in the high seas of the western side of the northern Arabian Sea. The total number of confirmed vessels as of March 31, 2024, is 82,686. **(3) Extension of the Activity Period** **3** **Communication and Cooperation with** **Relevant Countries** **(1) United States** As a result of a comprehensive review of what measures Japan should take to ensure the safe navigation of Japanrelated vessels in the Middle East, Japan has started to implement efforts as Japan’s independent initiative without participating in the International Maritime Security Construct led by the United States, considering the need for ensuring a stable supply of crude oil, relations with the United States and relations with Iran. At the same time, to ensure safe navigation in the Middle East region, the SDF has been cooperating closely with the United States in various ways. In the information gathering activities, the SDF will also appropriately cooperate with the United States as an ally, while observing the government’s policy of conducting navigation safety measures independently from any other country’s initiatives. For this reason, an MSDF officer has been dispatched to the U.S. Central Naval Command in Bahrain as a liaison officer to share information with the U.S. Forces. In addition, in November 2023, when a ballistic missile was launched from the Houthi-controlled area of Yemen toward the Gulf of Aden at the time of the temporary hijacking of the Liberian-flagged tanker Central Park operated by a British company, the U.S. promptly shared information with Japan about the launch. Crew members of DAPE engaged in information gathering activities In the Middle East, high tensions persist and, based on the fact that each country is continuing its own activities, including the “International Maritime Security Construct” by the United States and other countries, since 2020, the Japanese Government has been extending the SDF’s activity period by about one year every year. In light of the need to ensure the safety of navigation for Japan-related vessels, if it is deemed before the expiration of the period that activities by the SDF are no longer necessary, then, in addition to concluding these activities at that point and without waiting for the end of the activity period, the National Security Council will consider how to respond if there is a significant change in the situation. **See** Fig. III-1-2-1 (Units Engaged in Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East); Fig. III-1-2-2 (Information **See** Gathering Activities by the SDF (Image)); Reference 13 (Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(2) Coastal States in the Middle East** It is important to gain the understanding of the coastal states, including Iran, regarding the information gathering activities that Japan is undertaking as an independent initiative and Japan has been explaining these activities to them with transparency. In addition, the coastal states play an important role in ensuring safe navigation in the Middle East region. Japan has been reaching out to the coastal states to gain their understanding of Japan’s efforts. **REFERENCE: The Government’s efforts to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_architecture/m_east/index.html** ----- Fig. III-1-2-1 Units Engaged in Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East SDF Chief of Staff NAVCENT[ (Note1)] Liaison Officer (Note) 1 United States Naval Forces Central Command Commander, Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Commander, Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Command center Command center 1 destroyer Squadron P-3C (x1) Support and logistics units Total approx. 200 personnel[ (Note2)] Equipped with 1 or 2 patrol helicopters Total approx. 60 personnel (Note) 2 Including command center officers; The number of personnel may vary depending on ships dispatched. |Bab- e スルタン|l-Madeb| |---|---| |・ Purpose: Gather information necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels as part of the government’s navigation safety measures (Note)1 When further action of the SDF is found to be necessary due to unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, maritime security actions will be ordered (vessels to be protected are Japan-related ones (Note), and action will be taken depending on the circumstances). ・ Assets used: 1 destroyer (equipped with 1 or 2 patrol helicopters) and 1 P-3C patrol aircraft (using vessels and aircraft of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement) ⇒It is possible to continuously gather information on navigation of vessels in the relevant waters, situation of the surrounding waters, and presence of any unusual events. ・ Areas for informatio4n0 g°aEthering activities: The three high seas of t5h0e° GEulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea and6 t0h°eE Gulf of Aden on the eastern side of the Bab7-0e°l-EMandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones (EEZ))|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||||||||| ||Jordan Egypt||Iraq Kuwait S B Saudi Arabia (Air unit) P-3C patrol aircraft|||Iran traits of Hormuz H ahrain Qatar UAE Oman (x1)||Afghanistan igh seas of the Gulf of Oman パキスタン (including EEZ) Pakistan High seas of the northern Arabian (including EEZ) イ||Sea ンド India|| |||||(Air unit) P-3C patrol aircraft||(x1)|||||| ||Sudan Eritrea Bab- e ヌルスルタン Ethiopia||●Conducting information gathering seas of the Gulf of Aden and the w northern Arabian Sea, centered on Recommended Transit Corridor w mission has been performed. Yemen l-Madeb Djibouti Djibouti ase (P-3C patrol aircraft (x1)) Somalia|●Conducting information gathering seas of the Gulf of Aden and the w northern Arabian Sea, centered on Recommended Transit Corridor w mission has been performed.||activities in the high estern side of the the Internationally here counter-piracy||||n r oses|| |||||||||(Surface unit) Destroyer (x1) ●Conducting information gathering activities i the high seas of the Gulf of Oman and the northern Arabian Sea, where navigation of Japan-related vessels is concentrated therefore information gathering activities are considered to be necessary for ensuring thei navigation safety in particular.|||| |||||||||The figure is for illustrative purp|||| ||||||||||||| ||Air unit operation b||||||||||| Fig. III-1-2-2 Information Gathering Activities by the SDF (image) (Note) In addition to Japanese vessels and foreign vessels with Japanese nationals onboard, it also refers to vessels that are important to the stable economic activities of Japanese citizens, including foreign vessels operated by a Japanese ship operator, and foreign vessels transporting Japanese cargo. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **Section 3** **Responding to Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo ** **by Force and Such Attempts** The second objective of the National Defense Strategy of options (FDO)[1] and strategic communication (SC)[2] with Japan (NDS) is for Japan to deter, through cooperation a whole-of-government approach, as well as with its with our ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral allies, like-minded countries and others. changes to the status quo by force and such attempts that Moreover, from peacetime, it is important to detect concern Japan’s peace and security. In addition, in the indications at an early stage of situations by implementing event of such a situation, Japan will swiftly take action persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in response, using all possible methods to prevent an (ISR) as well as analysis while cooperating with relevant invasion of our country and bring the situation under ministries and agencies and for the Government as a control from an early stage. whole to conduct rapid decision-making depending on To continue demonstrating Japan’s will and capability the situation with related organizations. Due to this, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and Japan is reinforcing its responses by the Government as such attempts and to influence the actions of opponents, a whole. it is necessary for the nation to improve and reinforce training and exercises conducted as flexible deterrent **1** **Persistent ISR surrounding Japan** **1** **Basic Concept** **2** **Response by the MOD/SDF** Japan comprises just over 14,000 islands, surrounded The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) by wide sea space, which includes the sixth-largest[3] monitors ships navigating in the waters surrounding **ⅢPart** territorial waters (including inland waters) and Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea in Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) worldwide. The SDF peacetime, using patrol aircraft[4] and others. The Japan **Chapter** is engaged in intelligence collection and monitoring and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) uses radar sites at each **1** surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s territorial location nationwide and early warning and control waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and aircraft[5] amongst others, to conduct monitoring and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding immediately and seamlessly. airspace. These activities of the MSDF and ASDF happen 24 hours a day. Monitoring and surveillance activities in major channels are also conducted around the clock by MSDF guard posts, the Japan Ground Self-Defense **REFERENCE: Movement of foreign naval vessels in FY2023** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/domestic/keikai2023.html** **1** Carefully-considered deterrent actions to influence the opponent’s behavior. **2** The government of Japan makes day to day SC efforts as part of its initiatives to create a desirable security environment for Japan. The MOD makes public releases on the MOD/SDF activities and their objectives by selecting its delivering methods and messages that enable effective communication, and by collaborating with the ally and like-minded countries through various languages and media. **3** This is the eighth largest in the world if sea areas in overseas territories of various countries are considered as belonging to the countries concerned. **4** Aircraft purposed to patrol for gathering information to prevent surprise attacks by enemy forces, and for other purposes. MSDF possesses P-3C patrol aircraft and P-1 patrol aircraft as fixed-wing patrol aircraft and SH-60J patrol helicopters, SH-60K patrol helicopters and SH-60L patrol helicopters as rotary-wing patrol aircraft. **5** Aircraft with warning control systems and radar capable of monitoring omnidirectionally. Being excellent in speed performance and boasting long cruising time, the aircraft is able to fly to distant areas to engage in warning for a long time. Moreover, as it is also able to engage in warning at high altitude, it has outstanding flight performance and the monitoring and surveillance ----- Force (GSDF) coastal surveillance units and other assets.[6] Furthermore, to respond to various situations surrounding Japan flexibly, monitoring and surveillance activities are carried out with the flexible use of vessels, aircraft and so on as required. The information obtained through such monitoring and surveillance activities is shared with the related ministries and agencies, including the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), to strengthen coordination. In addition, the JCG began operation of the MQ 9B (SeaGuardian) at the MSDF Hachinohe Air Base (Aomori Prefecture) in October 2022. In addition, the JCG plans to move their operation base to Kitakyushu Airport in FY2025 and beyond. MSDF began trial operations using the SeaGuardian at the Hachinohe Air Base in May 2023 to verify Third Global Hawk newly arrived at ASDF Misawa Air Base The destroyer “Hyuga” conducting surveillance and information gathering against Chinese and Russian naval vessels **Commentary** **Senkaku Islands, Inherent Part of the Territory of Japan** The Senkaku Islands (Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture) are clearly Senkaku Islands, are a violation of international law in the first place. an inherent part of the territory of Japan, both historically and under Japan strongly urges China to improve its actions in response international law. Japan actually has effective control of the islands. to such unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force. The Therefore, there is no territorial issue to be resolved in the first place. MOD and the SDF will continue to deal with this situation calmly and After carefully confirming that there were no signs of any other resolutely, taking all possible measures to monitor the situation in country’s control in 1895, the Japanese government decided to put close cooperation with the relevant ministries and agencies, in order the Senkaku Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture by to protect the lives and property of the people and the territory, legitimate means under international law at a Cabinet meeting and territorial waters, and airspace of Japan. officially incorporated the islands into the territory of Japan. China began to make its own claims regarding the Senkaku Islands in the 1970s, after a UN agency pointed out possible oil reserves in the East China Sea in 1968. It had not raised any objections until this point. Nor had it given any explanation for not raised any objections. However, since Chinese government vessels intruded into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time in 2008, such vessels and others have repeatedly intruded into our territorial waters despite our strong protests, which is utterly unacceptable. The activities of Chinese maritime patrol vessels, which are asserting their own claims in our territorial waters around the The Senkaku Islands, an inherent territory of Japan [Website of the Cabinet Secretariat] Article 4(1)18 of the Act for Establishment of the MOD (Investigation and research required for the performance of duties within jurisdiction) provides the legal basis for monitoring and **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- whether unmanned aerial vehicles can in future serve as replacements for some of its missions, such as monitoring and surveillance currently conducted by piloted aircraft. With this background, MSDF will further promote the study, such as planning to verify its takeoff and landing at the MSDF’s Kanoya Air Base (Kagoshima Prefecture) after April 2024, for full-scale introduction of unmanned aerial vehicle in the future. The MSDF and JCG have been sharing information acquired by unmanned aerial vehicles as required and will continue to promote measures to further strengthen cooperation. Besides, in December 2022, in order to reinforce such capabilities as constant surveillance, etc., ASDF newly organized the Reconnaissance Group which operates RQ-4B (Global Hawk) aircraft in ASDF Misawa Air Base (Aomori Prefecture). In June 2023, the third Global Hawk arrived, completing the initial planned structure. In recent years around Japan, Chinese military vessels have become increasingly active in the waters around the Senkaku Island, and China Coast Guard vessels have repeatedly intruded into Japan s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. In addition, Chinese military vessels navigate in the Japan’s territorial and contiguous waters. Additionally, the aircraft carriers of the PLA have also continued their activities and in April 2023, three ships, including the aircraft carrier “Shandong” were confirmed as navigating in the waters around Hateruma Island (Okinawa Prefecture). This was the first time that the “Shandong” was confirmed navigating in the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, it was confirmed that after implementing various exercises in the Sea of Japan in July 2023, Chinese and Russian military vessels had jointly navigated in the waters near Japan, such as passing through the Soya Strait and the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island (Okinawa Prefecture) from late July to August. The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will continue to take all measures, including monitoring and surveillance, with a strong sense of urgency to staunchly protect Japan’s territorial land, Fig. III-1-3-1 Monitoring and Surveillance of the Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan (Conceptual Image) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Etorofu IslandEtorofu Island Early warning aircraftEarly warning aircraft Fixed-wing patrol Fixed-wing patrol aircraftaircraft GSDF: Coast observation unit Airborne warning and Airborne warning and control systemcontrol system ASDF: Rader site (FPS-5 BMD response) Takeshima IslandTakeshima Island ASDF: Radar site (BMD response) ASDF: Radar site Hachijojima Island Early warning aircraft Ichigaya Building, Ministry of Defense (Note) Only a schematic image of a surveillance range, Fixed-wing patrol aircraftFixed-wing patrol aircraft not an exact representation of the actual range. DestroyersDestroyers Ogasawara Islands Senkaku Islands Minami Torishima Island Yonagunijima Island Okidaitojima Island Territorial waters Okinotorishima Island Extended continental shelf EEZ ----- waters and airspace. **See** Fig. III-1-3-1 (Monitoring and Surveillance of the Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan (Conceptual Image)) **See** **3** **Whole-of-Government Responses** the JCG, but in cases that cannot be handled by the JCG, the SDF will also respond through maritime security operations and public security operations in coordination with the JCG. In the event of an armed attack by other countries, the SDF will respond through defense operations, which are its main duty. As the situation in the waters surrounding Japan intensifies, it is becoming even more critical to reinforce coordination between the SDF and JCG to respond seamlessly to any circumstances. The MSDF and JCG conduct joint training on a Coast guard patrol vessel “Okushiri” (foreground) and Japan Coast Guard missile boat “Kumataka” conducting joint training with the Japan Coast Guard **(1) General Situation** To never tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force, it is important for the related organizations to cooperate to take action based on decision-making by the Government as a whole during peacetime. For this reason, the Government as a whole will conduct simulations and integrated training and exercises to improve the effectiveness of responses, while establishing coordination procedures on a regular basis. In addition, with regard to the protection of critical facilities such as nuclear power plants and response to infringements that do not lead to external armed attacks or armed attack situations in areas surrounding remote islands, Japan will conduct training and exercises between the police, JCG and the MOD/SDF on a regular basis with contingencies in mind. **(2)** **Reinforcing Coordination with the Japan Coast Guard** Maintaining maritime security is primarily the mission of **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** |Minister o|f Defense| |---|---| |The Minis|ter of MLIT| |---|---| Fig. III-1-3-2 Guidelines for the Minister of Defense’s Control of the Japan Coast Guard under a Defense Operation Order in Armed Attack Situations) Command Procedure - Following Cabinet decision, the JCG will be placed under the control of the Minister of Defense. Relationship between MOD/SDF and JCG Prime Minister Minister of Defense Cabinet decision (control of the JCG) The Minister of MLIT JCG under control (Note 1) Commander in Chief MOD/SDF JCG Center - Site Coordinate/Contact (Note 2) (Notes) 1 The Minister of MLIT directs and supervises the Commandder in Chief with regard to personnel, accounting and other administrative matters. 2 The commander of the field unit of the MSDF will not command or control the field forces of the Japan Coast Guard. Actions to be taken by MOD/SDF and JCG (examples) ・Evacuation and rescue of residents ・Provision of information to ships, evacuation support ・Search and rescue, life saving ・Terrorism alert at port facilities ・Response to a large-number of evacuees (Note 3) The JCG operates as a police agency within the scope of its responsibilities as stipulated in the Japan Coast Guard Act. ----- |1,1|68| |---|---| |999 1,004|| |943 947 944 904 873 812 810 778|| |725 464 851 669 638 567 500 722|| |675 415 571 425 458 386 575 306|| |479 311 299 96 156 220 473|| |158 38 264 247 248 359 288 301 390 343 268 258 266 197 124 150 174|| regular basis to improve their skills and enhance their SDF continues to strengthen cooperation between the joint response capabilities. In addition, reinforcing JCG through joint training. coordination, including in response to gray zone and In May 2023, a tabletop exercise assuming armed armed attack situations, is also crucial in building a attack situations were conducted for the first time in structure that can respond to all types of situations. the Ichigaya area of the MOD and other locations to Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law states that confirm information communication procedures in both when the Prime Minister orders defense operations or organizations. Based on this tabletop exercise, in June, a public security operations by order, the Prime Minister practical exercise was conducted in the sea and airspace “when there is a special need to bring all or part of the east of Izu Oshima to confirm the communication of JCG under the control of the Minister of Defense.” In information and on-site response by both organizations. response to the establishment in April 2023 of “control **See** Fig. III-1-3-2 (Guidelines for the Minister of Defense’s Control guidelines” regarding coordination between the two of the Japan Coast Guard under a Defense Operation Order in Armed Attack Situations); Part 1, Chapter 3, Section 2-6 organizations in the event that an order is issued for (2) (Military Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and Airspace); Reference 14 (Number of Days and Total Incursions defense operations, including specific procedures for into the Territorial Waters Around the Senkaku Islands by control of the JCG by the Minister of Defense, the MOD/ Ships Belonging to the China Coast Guard Bureau, etc) **2** **Measures against Violations of Japan’s Sovereignty** provisions of Article 84 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. **1** **Warnings and Scrambles in Preparation** **against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace** **(2) Responses by the MOD/SDF** **(1) Basic Concept** The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in Under international law, countries have complete and airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control exclusive sovereignty over their territorial airspace. radars as well as early warning and control aircraft. If Measures against aircraft intruding into territorial any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial **Part** airspace are conducted as an act to exercise the right airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble **Ⅲ** of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike to approach them to confirm the situation and monitor the **Chapter** measures taken on land or at sea, these measures can be aircraft as necessary. Furthermore, in the event that this **1** taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily suspicious aircraft has actually intruded into territorial responsible for conducting the actions based on the airspace, a warning to leave the airspace would be issued, Fig. III-1-3-3 Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War (Times) 1,200 **1,168** **999** **1,004** 1,000 **943** **947** **944** **904** **873** **812** **810** **778** 800 **725** **464** **851** **669** **638** 600 **567** **500** **675** **722** **415** **571** **425** **458** **386** **575** 400 **306** **479** **311** **299** **96** **156** **220** 200 **158** **38** **264** **247** **248** **359** **473** **288** **301** **390** **343** **268** **258** **266** **197** **124** **150** **174** 0 1984[(Note)] 1989 1993 1998 2003 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 (FY) (Note) Peaked during the Cold War Russia China Taiwan Others Total ----- Example Flight Patterns of Russian and Chinese Fig. III-1-3-4 Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded (FY2023) Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and Fig. III-1-3-5 Those of Neighboring Countries/Regions (image) Northern Territories Japanese territorial airspace ROK ADIZ Takeshima Islands East China Sea ADIZ (Note) Taiwan ADIZ Japan ADIZ Ogasawara Islands Senkaku Islands Yonagunijima Island 500km Philippines - East China Sea ADIZ was established by China based on its own ADIZ claims, where aircraft flying within the airspace are subject to the regulations set forth by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, and in case of non-compliance, the Chinese military will take emergency defensive measures, which inappropriately infringes on the fundamental principle of freedom of flight over international waters stipulated in international law. Philippines ADIZ Chinese aircraft Russian aircraft among other responses. In FY2023, ASDF aircraft scrambled 669 times (479 times in response to Chinese aircraft, 174 times in response to Russian aircraft and 16 other times). Flight patterns of Chinese military aircraft in recent years have changed and now their range of activities are extending to not only the East China Sea, but also the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. In addition, joint flights by Chinese and Russian bombers have been conducted around Japan a total of seven times since the joint flight in July 2019. In June 2023, joint flights were conducted over a two-day period for the first time, and flights involving a total of 20 fighter Personnel engaged in scramble (missions) jets were also confirmed, showing the diversification of their activities. In this way, Chinese and Russian aircraft continue to be active in the vicinity of Japan. The MOD/SDF will take all possible measures against intrusions into Japan’s territorial airspace while continuing to closely monitor the increasingly active movements of the Chinese and Russian militaries in future. **See** Fig. III-1-3-3 (Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War); Fig. III-1-3-4 (Example Flight Patterns of Russian and Chinese Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded (FY2023)); Fig. III-1-3-5 (Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and Those of Neighboring Countries/Regions (Image)); Part I, Chapter 3, Section 2-2-6 (2) (Military Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and Airspace); Part I, Chapter 3, Section 5-5 (Relations with China); Part II Chapter 5, Section 3-6 (Measures against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace) **2** **Response to Submarines Navigating** **Underwater in Japan’s Territorial Waters** **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(1) Basic Concept** With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters,[7] an order for maritime security operations will be issued. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japan’s territorial waters. ----- **(2) Response by the MOD/SDF** The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water areas by detecting, identifying and tracking foreign submarines navigating under the territorial waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating under Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands (Okinawa Prefecture). In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations and continued to track the submarine with MSDF vessels until it entered the high seas. In addition, in January 2018, underwater navigation by a Chinese submarine was confirmed for the first time through Japan’s contiguous zone in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands (Okinawa Prefecture). Furthermore, on September 2021, a submarine presumed to be Chinese was confirmed to be navigating underwater through the Japanese contiguous zone in the vicinity of Amami Oshima Island (Kagoshima Prefecture) and monitoring and surveillance operations were carried out by MSDF destroyers and patrol aircraft. Although this submarine did not intrude into territorial waters, such submarine activity should be closely monitored by Japan. Under international law, a foreign submarine must display its flag while navigating in the territorial waters of a coastal state. The SDF will maintain a vigilant monitoring and surveillance posture to ensure that activities in violation of international law are not permitted. MSDF vessels and Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels conducting in training for dealing with suspicious vessels **3** **Response to Armed Special Operations** **Vessels** **(1) Basic Concept** The JCG, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the JCG to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in cooperation with the JCG. **(2) Responses by the MOD/SDF** In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an unidentified vessel off the Noto Peninsula (Ishikawa Prefecture) in 1999, an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001 and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF have been making various efforts. In particular, the MSDF has been taking steps such as establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit[8] and equipment of destroyers with machine guns. In addition, based on “the manual for jointly dealing with suspicious vessels” formulated by the then Defense Agency and the JCG in 1999, the MSDF has regularly conducted joint training with the JCG to strengthen coordination. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **MOVIE: UNIT-1 Aircraft warning and control** **URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DKd7UEU73rM** **REFERENCE: Aircraft scrambles in FY2023** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/domestic/Scramble2023.html** Special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of boarding inspections of the suspicious vessels ----- **Section 4** **Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Missile Attacks** The third defense objective of the National Defense including missile attacks, Japan will intercept missiles Strategy (NDS) is, should deterrence fail and invasion on the high seas and over our territory through missile of Japan occur, to rapidly respond to the invasion defense. In addition, as a measure for self-defense to the in a tailored and seamless manner; to take primary minimum required level to prevent attacks in cases where responsibility to deal with the aggression; and, while no other means are clearly available, Japan will utilize receiving support from our ally and others, to disrupt and capabilities including stand-off defense capabilities defeat the invasion. to enable conducting effective counterstrikes in the In response to an invasion of Japan, including our opponent’s territory and together with missile defense, remote islands, Japan would block and eliminate the deter missile attacks. invading forces from a long distance. Japan will also Furthermore, in the event of a large-scale terrorist acquire superiority across domains and conduct cross- attack or an attack on critical infrastructure that poses a domain operations that organically integrate capabilities serious threat to the lives, health and property of Japanese in the domains of space, cyber and electromagnetic citizens, Japan will cooperate with related organizations spectrum as well as in the ground, maritime and air to take effective countermeasures. Moreover, if there domains to secure asymmetrical superiority and block were to be a predicted invasion of Japan, Japan will make and eliminate the invading forces. Japan would also sure that it is possible to smoothly implement measures continue persistent actions to crush the opponent’s will for civil protection, including the issuance of evacuation to invade. guidance for residents. Moreover, in response to an invasion of Japan, **1** **Responses to Invasion of Japan, Including Its Remote Islands** Japan would organically integrate our capabilities in the **1** **Basic Concept** domains of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum **Part** Japan possesses numerous remote islands spanning a as well as the ground, maritime and air domains and **Ⅲ** broad national territory which extends approximately overcome any inferiority in individual domains through **Chapter** 3,000 kilometers along both the north-south and east- cross-domain operations that amplify our overall **1** west axes, across which the Government must protect capabilities through synergy effects. Japan would also the lives, health and property of its citizens, as well conduct flexible and sustained activities through joint as its territory, territorial waters, airspace and various operations, continue swift and persistent actions, secure resources that are widely dispersed. our territory and crush the opponent’s will to invade. To precisely respond to invasions of Japan, which **See** Fig. III-1-4-1 (Future Cross-domain Operations (image)) has such geographic characteristics, it is necessary to station units and so forth in accordance with the **2** **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** security environment and also to maintain a readiness to detect signs at an early stage through persistent **(1) Strengthening of Stand-off Defense Capabilities** intelligence gathering and surveillance, etc. by the Some foreign countries have significantly improved Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Moreover, it is important their radar detection coverage as well as the range and to ensure maritime superiority[1] and air superiority[2] as performance of various missile. This means that the well as swiftly maneuver and deploy them according to range of these threats would be over several hundred situations. kilometers around an invading force. If our deterrence were to fail and an invasion of Japan To protect and defend the territory of Japan, it is occurred, to eliminate any violation of our territory, necessary to improve the level of deterrence against **1** Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by the opposing force. ----- armed attacks on our country by fundamentally strengthening our **stand-off defense capabilities, such** as anti-aircraft missiles and deal with naval vessels and landing forces invading our country, including islands, from outside the threat zone. Therefore, no matter which region of Japan an invasion might begin in, firstly the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will equip itself with the necessary and sufficient capabilities to block and eliminate the opponent’s vessels, landing forces and the like from various locations in our country in a multilayered manner. Also, the MOD/SDF will, while diversifying launch platforms like enabling them to launch missiles from ground-based launchers, aircraft and naval vessels, respond to the situation by combining stand-off missiles with various different characteristics, forcing the opponent to make a complex response. In addition, the MOD/SDF will, while acquiring necessary and sufficient quantities of foreign-made stand-off missiles at an early stage, encourage the expansion of the Fig. III-1-4-1 Future Cross-Domain Operations (image) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Inter-satellite optical communication and on-board processing Small satellite SDA satellite HAPS (ISR & communication relay) F-2 capability improved F-35A F-15 capability improved F-35B Izumo-class Patrol vessel destroyer SM-6 Wheeled armored personnel carrier Aegis-equipped GPI destroyers and other ships Upgraded Type-12 SSM P-1 PAC-3MSE Data C2 system Data (Cloud/distributed processing) Upgraded Type 03 Medium-Range Next-generation information SH-60L Surface-to-Air Missile (modified) communication base (Beyond 5G/6G) FFM High Power Laser Weapons Situational awareness through Real-Time Digital Twin System, and UAV (mid-range), education/training and equipment development high-performance type in the same virtual environment Miniature Attack UAV ----- **KEY WORD** **Stand-off Defense Capabilities** The capabilities to deal with naval vessels and landing forces that invade our country, including islands, from outside the threat zone. To conduct anti-ship and anti-ground attacks from outside the threat zone, these capabilities include guided missiles with a longer range and high survivability, capable of avoiding interception and effectively disrupting an attack on Japan while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel. domestic manufacturing system of made-in-Japan standoff missiles to acquire necessary and sufficient quantities as soon as possible. Further, the MOD/SDF will promote initiatives to secure a series of functions necessary to operate stand-off missiles, including the collection of targeting information and command and control. After building a practical operational capability for standoff missiles, the MOD/SDF will accelerate research, development and mass production initiatives and swiftly acquire the capability to operate more advanced standoff missiles. Specifically, in FY2023, the MOD/SDF began the mass production of Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surfacelaunched variant) for early deployment to troops. The initial plan was to deploy them in FY2026, but this has been accelerated by one year and the deployment is to begin in FY2025. Further, to ensure survivability, the Upgraded Type-12 SSM that withstood various tests on the ground (Prototype) 【Courtesy of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.】 development of Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surface-, shipand air-launched variants) is continuing so that they can be launched from various platforms (ground, naval ship and aircraft). With their delivery expected to begin in FY2026, the mass production of hyper velocity gliding projectiles for the defense of remote islands began in FY2023 and the research project continues. In addition, the development of Upgraded hyper-velocity gliding projectiles for the defense of remote islands, which began in FY2023, continues. Further, research into hypersonic missiles[3] has been conducted since FY2023. From FY2024, their manufacturing system has been expanded to acquire mass production and others from an early stage and in an effort to extend the range of various guided **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Fig. III-1-4-2 Future Operation of Stand-off Defense Capabilities (image) Satellite constellationSatellite constellation Collection of target informationCollection of target information F-15F-15 JASSMJASSM Hypersonic missilesHypersonic missiles TomahawkTomahawk Ground forcesGround forces Range of opponent’sRange of opponent’s Hyper Velocity GlidingHyper Velocity Gliding anti-air missiles anti-air missiles Projectiles for the defenseProjectiles for the defense of remote islandsof remote islands F-35F-35 Target detectionTarget detection SubmarinesSubmarines F-2F-2 Target trackingTarget tracking Unmanned Aerial Target observation roundsTarget observation rounds Vehicle (UAV) JSM Naval vesselsNaval vessels Hypersonic missilesHypersonic missiles Dealing with threats from outside Dealing with threats from outside Naval vesselsNaval vessels Upgraded Type-12 SSMUpgraded Type-12 SSM the threat zone with stand-off missilesthe threat zone with stand-off missiles Range of opponent’s anti-air missiles Launcher ----- **(2) Strengthening of Unmanned Defense Capabilities** Compared to manned equipment, unmanned assets have major advantages, such as minimizing casualties and allowing for long-term continuous operation. Furthermore, combining these unmanned assets with artificial intelligence (AI) and manned equipment can be a game-changer that fundamentally transforms force structure and ways of warfare, enabling Japan to gain asymmetrical superiority in the air, sea and underwater domains. For this reason, these unmanned assets will be effectively utilized not only for information gathering and monitoring and surveillance, but also for a wide range of missions including combat support. The acquisition of RQ-4B (Global Hawk) began in FY2015 to enhance the constant surveillance capability over a wide area and the third RQ-4B arrived at ASDF Misawa Air Base (Aomori Prefecture) in June 2023, completing the initially planned system. In addition, since May 2023, a MQ-9B (Sea Guardian) has been on trial operation at the Hachinohe Air Base (Aomori Prefecture) of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and from April 2024, its takeoffs and landings are to be verified at the Kanoya Air Base (Kagoshima Prefecture) of the MSDF. Other demonstrations are underway for transport Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and reconnaissance UAV (for mid-range) (upgrading) with upgraded capabilities. In February 2024, transport UAV were used to demonstrate the transportation of supplies to the ship. In the FY2024 budget, the MOD/SDF will acquire upgraded UAV (for mid-range)[6] to enhance intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT) capabilities as well as obtaining USV with proven operational records in various countries as test equipment to quickly acquire knowledge of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) operations and promote the development of domestically produced USV. The MOD/SDF will also conduct research into multi-purpose combat-support USV with low observability that selectively carry functions such as monitoring and surveillance and antiship missile launch to support manned naval vessels. In addition, the MOD/SDF will begin to develop unmanned amphibious vehicles, as unmanned assets capable of landing on any shore of islands, transporting supplies LOA signing ceremony to advance Tomahawk acquisition (January 2024) missiles. Besides, while utilizing the ground equipment of Upgraded Type-12 SSM, the MOD/SDF will begin to develop new stand-off missiles with improved anti-ship and anti-surface capabilities, such as long-range flying performance, precision guidance performance, etc. As well as acquiring mass-produced ammunition for these domestically produced stand-off missiles, the introduction of foreign-made stand-off missiles will be implemented and continued. In this case, given a certain amount of time required to maintain the necessary quantity of domestically produced stand-off missiles, the U.S.-made Tomahawk, which is already in mass production, are to be acquired as soon as possible. The initial plan was to acquire up to 400 Tomahawks from Block V[4] in FY2026 and FY2027, but given the more severe security environment, negotiations were held with the U.S. side to accelerate the acquisition. As a result, some Block V will be changed to Block IV,[5] which will be acquired from FY2025, one year earlier than originally planned and by adding Tomahawk launch capabilities to naval vessels and promoting personnel training, sufficient capabilities will be swiftly secured before establishing a system to boost the production of domestically produced stand-off missiles. In terms of command and control, the MOD/SDF plans to promote the development of functions, such as those necessary to smoothly implement centralized command activities, with stand-off missile operations as the core. **See** Fig. III-1-4-2 Future Operation of Stand-off Defense Capabilities (image) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **See** The latest-model Tomahawk Block IV has the same warhead, guidance system and range as Block V, but Block V uses a newer communication system. ----- and performing other missions from the sea to ground units. Japan is also co-developing the next-generation fighter aircraft with the United Kingdom and Italy, aiming to complete its development by 2035 and also planning to begin developing UAV that will collaborate with this next-generation fighter aircraft and support it autonomously. In December 2023, Japan and the United States agreed to conduct joint research into AI technology, which is expected to be applied to this UAV. Japan will cooperate with the United States and other countries concerned to enhance its unmanned asset defense capabilities. **(3) Strengthening of Mobile Deployment Capabilities** Given the geographical characteristics of Japan, which stretches 3,000 km from east to west, north to south and includes numerous islands, for responding to an invasion of Japan, Japan needs to build the capacity to ensure that its routinely deployed units remain operational at all times and that the necessary units (personnel, equipment, supplies, etc.) are swiftly maneuvered and deployed and air superiority and disrupt the access and landing of units invading Japan. To this end, Japan will reinforce the SDF’s maritime and air transportation capabilities by acquiring various transportation assets such as transport vessels, transport aircraft, transport helicopters, etc. and also maximize its use of civilian transportation capabilities, including Private Finance Initiatives (PFI). Specifically, the SDF Maritime Transport Group (tentative name) will be newly formed as a joint unit to improve the capability of mobile deployment to the southwest region. Moreover, the acquisition of transport assets like transport ships and helicopters, etc. to be used for rapid transport of troops and supplies to the islands in the southwestern region and elsewhere will be promoted. Furthermore, PFI vessels will continue to be secured to avoid creating a vacuum in the transportation system utilizing civilian vessels and the integrated transportation system will be strengthened by using civilian vessels. In addition, to ensure smoother and more effective transport and supplies for units by the aforementioned capabilities, Japan will strengthen its integrated logistics infrastructure to make this possible, to secure maritime seaport facilities and the like as operational infrastructure Fig. III-1-4-3 Establishment Status of Major Units in Kyushu/Southwestern Region (since 2016) (conceptual diagram) **ⅢPart** Establishment of GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade in 2018 (Ainoura) **Chapter** Establishment of GSDF electronic warfare unit in 2022 (Ainoura) (Deployment scheduled) GSDF air transport squadron (Saga) **1** (Establishment scheduled) GSDF surface-to-ship guided missile unit (Yufuin) Establishment of GSDF surface-to-air guided missile unit in 2022 (Takematsu) Establishment of GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, 3rd Amphibious Rapid Development Regiment in 2024 (Takematsu) Establishment of GSDF electronic warfare unit in 2021 (Kengun) Establishment of GSDF Surface-to-ship Guided Missile Unit in 2022 (Kengun) Established GSDF Electronic Warfare Unit in 2023 (Sendai) Establishment of GSDF Amami Area Security Force, Amami Oshima Island surface-to-ship guided missile unit and surface-to-air guided missile unit (Amami, Setouchi) in 2019 Establishment of GSDF electronic warfare unit in 2022 (Amami) Okinoerabujima Island Establishment of GSDF Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit in 2016 (Yonaguni) Main island of Okinawa Deployment of part of the ASDF 53rd Warning Squadron in 2022 Establishment of ASDF 9th Air Wing in 2016 (Naha) Establishment of GSDF electronic warfare unit in 2024 (Yonaguni) Kumejima Island Establishment of ASDF Southwestern Air Defense Force in 2017 (Naha)Establishment of Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing in 2017 (Naha) Senkaku Islands Establishment of GSDF electronic warfare unit in 2022 (Naha, Chinen) Establishment of GSDF 7th Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Regiment in 2024 (Katsuren) Ishigakijima Miyakojima Island Yonagunijima Island Island Establishment of GSDF Miyako Guard in 2019 (Miyakojima Island) Transfer of GSDF 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Group in 2020 (Miyakojima Island) Establishment of GSDF surface-to-ship guided missile unit in 2020 (Miyakojima Island) (Establishment scheduled) GSDF electronic warfare unit (Miyakojima Island) Establishment of GSDF Yaeyama Area Security Force, [Legend] Surface-to-ship Guided Missile Unit, Surface-to-air Guided Missile GSDF Units MSDF Units ASDF Units Unit in 2023 (Ishigaki) (As of April 1, 2024) ----- warfare units at GSDF Camp Yonaguni (Okinawa Prefecture). In addition, the 15th Brigade (Okinawa Prefecture) is planned to be reorganized into a division in the future. With regard to the operation of the GSDF V-22 (Ospreys), the MOD/SDF has determined that Saga Airport is the best airfield for deployment and the governor of Saga Prefecture expressed acceptance of this arrangement. In May 2023, the MOD/SDF signed a real estate purchase contract with the Saga Prefecture fishery cooperative federation and acquired the planned camp location.[7] The MOD/SDF began construction of the GSDF Camp Saga (tentative name) in June 2023 and will continue to work on the early deployment of the GSDF Ospreys to a site adjacent to Saga Airport in an effort to strengthen capabilities for the defense of remote islands, which is an urgent issue, thereby establishing a structure that enables integrated operation with the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade located in Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and others. On the other hand, the MOD/SDF has newly created an airlift wing equipped with V-22 Ospreys at Camp Kisarazu (Chiba Prefecture) in 2020 or later with consideration of the time needed to deploy the aircraft to Saga Airport and has begun provisional deployment of V-22 Ospreys. **See** Fig. III-1-4-3 (Establishment Status of Major Units in Kyushu/ Southwestern Region (since 2016) (conceptual diagram)) Mobile boat to be deployed in the SDF Maritime Transport Group (tentative name) (image) and improve supply capabilities. Japan will also actively promote the improvement of supply bases located throughout the country. **See** Section1-2-2 (Public Infrastructure Development) **See** **(4)** **Strengthening Defense Architecture in Southwestern** **Region** To strengthen the defense architecture in the southwestern region, the MOD/SDF has conducted new establishment of units in the Kyushu/southwestern region. In March 2023, the Japan Gound Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) established a new camp on Ishigakijima Island, where an area security unit, surface-to-air guided missile unit and surface-to-ship guided missile unit are stationed. In March 2024, the MOD/SDF newly formed the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade’s 3rd Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment at the GSDF Camp Takematsu (Nagasaki Prefecture) and the 7th Land-to-Ship Missile Deployment Regiment at Camp Katsuren (Okinawa Prefecture) and deployed electronic **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** At Saga Airport, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 V-22 Ospreys and approximately 50 ----- **Commentary** **Reinforcing the Defense Architecture in the Southwestern Region** The southwestern region is a vast area with a total length of (Kagoshima Prefecture) in March 2019, and GSDF Camp Ishigaki approximately 1,200 km, and although necessary readiness, Island was established in Ishigakijima Island (Okinawa Prefecture) including surveillance and reconnaissance, has been maintained all in March 2023. A new surface-to-ship missile unit was deployed in of the time, none of the GSDF units had been deployed in that region Katsuren Branch (Okinawa Prefecture) in March 2024, and the 15th until GSDF Camp Yonaguni (Okinawa Prefecture) was established in Brigade in Okinawa Prefecture is scheduled to be reorganized into March 2016. In order to fulfill a void in terms of SDF deployment a division to reinforce the defense architecture in the southwestern in the southwestern region, GSDF camps were established in region based on the Defense Buildup Program, which will visibly Miyakojima Island (Okinawa Prefecture) and Amami Oshima Island strengthen the defense architecture of the south western islands. State Minister of Defense Oniki presenting the corps flag at the 7th Surface-to-Ship Members of the 7th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment giving a salute at the Missile Regiment (Katsuren Branch) Organization Event (March 2024) Organization Event (March 2024) **Part** **Ⅲ** **2** **Responses to Missile Attacks** **Chapter** **1** **Japan’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense** capabilities by establishing a system capable of centrally **1** and optimally operating various sensors and shooters **Capabilities** through a network. **(1) Basic Concept** In response to a missile attack on Japan by an As Japan is surrounded on all sides by water, responding opponent, Japan would first intercept the missile flying to airborne threats is extremely important. In recent towards Japan over the high seas and in its territorial years, airborne threats to Japan have been becoming airspace by means of its missile defense system. Also, as increasingly diverse, complex and enhanced, including a minimum necessary self-defense measure that cannot capability enhancements of ballistic missiles equipped be avoided to prevent an attack by ballistic missiles and with multiple[8]/maneuverable warheads,[9] higher-speed the like in cases where it is recognized that no other and longer-range cruise missiles and stealth and multi- means are available, Japan would utilize its stand-off role[10] manned and unmanned aircraft, as well as the defense capabilities and other capabilities to mount emergence of anti-ship ballistic missiles and hypersonic effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory. glide vehicles (HGVs). By equipping itself with such effective counterstrike Therefore, Japan will fundamentally enhance its capabilities, Japan will constrain missile launches by detection, tracking and interception capabilities, as opponents and facilitate interceptions by its missile well as strengthen integrated air and missile defense defense, thereby deterring the launch of missile attacks **8** One ballistic missile with multiple warheads **9** A warhead that can maneuver autonomously via wings, rudder, or rocket propulsion to avoid interception or increase hit probability during reentry into the atmosphere ----- themselves when coupled with its missile defense. **See** Fig. III-1-4-4 (Intercepting Part of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) (image)); Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2 **See** (Commentary: Counterstrike Capabilities) **(2) Responses by the MOD/SDF** Cases involving ballistic missiles launched against Japan as an armed attack will be dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack situations. On the other hand, if such a situation is not yet acknowledged as an armed attack, Japan will take destructive measures against ballistic missiles, etc. Currently, Japan’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) is basically an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and the lower tier by PAC (Patriot Advanced Capability) 3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).[12] As a response against ballistic missiles, the Joint Task Force-BMD will be formed with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander and effective defenses will be taken under a unified command through JADGE. North Korea has forcefully conducted three nuclear tests since 2016. Especially since the beginning of 2022, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and other missiles with unprecedented high frequency and in new ways. In 2023, as well as continuing to launch ballistic and other missiles, North Korea launched a total of three Fig. III-1-4-4 Intercepting Part of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) (image) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Early warning satellite of Satellite constellation the United States JADGE [Legend] Flight trajectories and others (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment) : Ballistic missile : HGV SM-3 (MSDF) GPI [(Note)] (MSDF) Commander, Joint Task Force ASDF Air Control and Warning Radar BMD SM-6 (MSDF) (FPS-7, FPS-5, FPS-3 Upgraded) Aegis-equipped destroyers PAC-3MSE (ASDF) and other ships (MSDF) Upgraded Type 03 Medium Range SAM (modified) (GSDF) (Note) GPI: Glide Phase Interceptor **①Detect by the U.S. early warning satellites** **②Detect and track by Aegis-equipped destroyers** **②Detect and track by warning and control radars** Grasping the indication by **satellite constellation** **③Aggregate information to JADGE, and the Commander of Joint Task Force-BMD allocates interceptor weapons** **and others** **④ ・ ・Intercept by SM-3 against ballistic missilesGPI and SM-6 against HGVAegis-equipped destroyers** **④Upgraded Medium-Range PAC-3MSE PAC-3MSEIntercept with** **④Upgraded Medium-Range SAM (modified)Intercept with** **11 One of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly intercepts aircraft and other targets, the PAC-3** missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles. **12 A core system for command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes information regarding aircraft captured by radar equipment installed nationwide and** provides fighter aircraft with instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls PAC-3, ----- satellite launches in May, August and November. It was also confirmed that the object launched in November was now orbiting the Earth. In response, the MOD/SDF issued a shoot-down order for ballistic missiles, etc.,[13] deployed PAC-3 units in Okinawa Prefecture and took other necessary measures to prepare for any contingency. In addition, the MOD promptly shared information about the launches with the government of Japan and related agencies and has taken other measures including collecting and analyzing related information. The MOD/SDF continues to carefully monitor the concrete actions of North Korea toward the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and missiles and conducts the necessary collection and analyses of information, monitoring and surveillance activities and other necessary activities while closely cooperating with the United States and other countries. Further cooperation with the U.S. Government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is essential for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting). Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by means such as receiving Shared Early Warning (SEW)[14] from the U.S. Forces and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces. **(3) Initiatives to Reinforce Integrated Air and Missile** **Defense Capabilities** Japan began developing the BMD system in 2004 to be fully prepared for the response against ballistic missile attacks and other attacks and necessary amendments were subsequently made to the Self-Defense Forces Law in July 2005. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying PAC-3. To deal with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missile attacks, Japan and the United States have jointly developed advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA),[15] the successor to Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA to be mounted on Aegis-equipped destroyers and acquired them since FY2017. In addition, the interception capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA have been enhanced against ballistic missiles equipped with interception avoidance measures such as a decoy and ballistic missiles launched with an intention to avoid being intercepted by taking a higher than normal trajectory (lofted trajectory).[16] In November 2022, the MSDF conducted its first SM-3 Block IIA launch test and the Aegis destroyer Maya successfully intercepted the target. Furthermore, the Cabinet approved the development of two Aegis system-equipped vessels instead of the land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore) in December 2020, to respond more flexibly and effectively to the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. These vessels are to be maintained by the MSDF, which will have capabilities equivalent to or above those of the most advanced Aegis-equipped destroyers, such as SM-3 Block IIA for ballistic missiles and SM-6 for HGVs, etc. and have improved seaworthiness and habitability while reducing manpower. The construction of these vessels is to begin in FY 2024. With regard to PAC-3, the MOD has been working for procurement of the enhanced capability type, PAC3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) and started its deployment at the end of FY2019. Introduction of PAC3 MSE will realize the extension of interception altitude from less than 20 km to tens of km, meaning that the coverage of protection (area) will expand more than twice compared to the conventional PAC-3. On the other hand, to use optimum means to effectively and efficiently counter airborne threats, which are growing increasingly diverse, complex and enhanced including the emergence of HGV and minimize damage, it is necessary to establish a structure to conduct integrated operation of various equipment for missile defense and air defense equipment that each SDF **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **13 In May 2023, the Minister of Defense issued an Operation Order for the Self-Defense Forces concerning implementation for destructive measures against ballistic missiles, etc.** **14 Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and** conveyed to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time just after the launch (the SDF started to receive the information in April 1996). **15 In comparison with SM-3 Block IA, SM-3 Block IIA have not only extended interceptable altitude and coverage of protection, but also enhanced defeating capability and simultaneous** engagement capability. **16 By taking a higher trajectory than minimum energy trajectories (trajectories that enable efficient flying of a missile and maximize its range), it takes a shorter range than the maximum range,** ----- Fig. III-1-4-5 Capabilities of Aegis System-Equipped Vessels **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Capabilities of Aegis System-equipped vessels SPY-7 Radar SM-3 Block II A ・Deals with lofted trajectories and multiple ・Equipped with interceptor missiles with simultaneous ballistic missiles with five high interception capabilities against ballistic missiles. times the tracking capability of SPY-1 SM-6 CEC ・Deals with hypersonic glide vehicles ・Cooperative engagement capability (HGVs) at the terminal stage (CEC) allows a fleet of ships to fire in addition to cruise missiles etc and guide anti-aircraft targets tracked by the fleet VLS ・Increased to 128 cells by improving various response capabilities (96 cells in Maya class) ・Provided with scalability to future HGV (glide phase) corresponding equipment ★ Possesses capabilities equal to or greater than those of the most advanced Aegis-equipped destroyers Equipment planned to be installed after 2032 (scalable) ・Upgraded Type-12 SSM In anti-surface warfare, deals with opponent ships from outside their threat range ・Tomahawk Deals with ground forces from outside the opponent's threat range for island defense, etc. ・High-power lasers, etc. Deals with drone saturation attacks (Note) Details may be subject to change service has separately used, thereby providing nationwide protection and also enhancing integrated air and missile defense capabilities that can simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strive to standardize and streamline the means for interception that each SDF service possesses, including their maintenance and supply systems and, to enhance the detection and tracking capabilities of HGVs and the like, the ground the Patriot surface-to-air guided missile system will be upgraded and a new radar (Lower Tier Air Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS))[17] will be introduced to improve the PAC-3MSE’s capability to respond to HGVs and the like. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will develop the Upgraded Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (modified) to continue to improve capabilities to enable the response to HGVs and ballistic missiles. based air surveillance, warning and control radar (FPS) In addition, various types of interceptor ammunition and the like will be procured and given enhanced such as SM-3 Block IIA, SM-6, PAC-3 and Type 03 capabilities and will be replaced and upgraded with the Medium-Range Surface-to-Air missile (modified) will next-generation warning and control radar. In addition, be prepared. **REFERENCE: Missile defense** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_architecture/missile_defense/index.html** **MOVIE: UNIT-4 (Air Defense Artillery)** **URL: https://youtu.be/coZf5SbfC-M** ----- In this way, Japan is taking measures necessary to strengthen its defense structure and will continue these efforts. **See** Fig. III-1-4-5 (Capabilities of Aegis System-Equipped Vessels); Reference 15 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan) **See** **2** **Missile Defense of the United States and** **Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation** **(2) Japan U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation, etc.** The Government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative technical research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. In FY2006, Japan-U.S. cooperative development[19] of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD began, leading to the deployment of SM-3 Block IIA. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting in January 2023, the two countries agreed several matters including beginning discussions on potential joint development of a future interceptor. Based on this, Japan and the United States decided to jointly engage in developing a Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) as an asset that will help ensure intercept opportunities and secure interception by dealing with HGVs as far away as possible. **See** Fig. III-1-4-6 (Overview of GPI and Benefits of Japan-U.S. Joint Development); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-3-1 (Joint Research and Development, etc.) Fig. III-1-4-6 Overview of GPI and Benefits of Japan-U.S. Joint Development Overview of Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) - Aegis-launched guided missile for intercepting hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) in glide phase - GPI ensures interception opportunities by dealing with the target as far away as possible contributing to reliable interception - The interception rate will be improved by building a multi-layered defense system with upgraded interception capability in glide phase combined with the interception capability in terminal phase by PAC-3MSE, etc. GPI image （by U.S. Missile Defense Agency) **(1) Missile Defense of the United States** The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country.[18] Fig. III-1-4-6 Overview of GPI and Benefits of Japan-U.S. Joint Development Overview of Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) - Aegis-launched guided missile for intercepting hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) - GPI ensures interception opportunities by dealing with the target as - The interception rate will be improved by building a multi-layered defense system phase combined with the interception capability in terminal phase by PAC-3MSE, etc. Image of an HGV interception by GPI **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** |Terminal phas PAC-3M|e SE, etc.| |---|---| Aegis system equipped vessel Glide phase Terminal phase HGV Upgraded intercept capability in glide phase PAC-3MSE, etc. GPI Aegis-equipped destroyers Dramatic progress of missile technologies including hypersonic missiles / Significant upgrade of missile capability in both quality and quantity ⇒ Upgrade of interception capability against hypersonic missiles is an urgent issue **18** Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called X-band radar) for BMD was deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site (Aomori Prefecture) in 2006. In October 2006, PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) was deployed in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site (Kyoto Prefecture) in December 2014. In October 2018, the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade Headquarters was deployed in Sagamihara (Kanagawa Prefecture). In addition, BMD-capable Aegis ships of the U.S. Forces were deployed at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture) in October 2015, March 2016 and May 2018. **19 With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD-related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s** statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” in June 2011. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before this decision, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in ----- |Warning|and contro|l radars| |---|---|---| efforts and began sharing missile warning data on **3** **Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperation** North Korea in real time on December 19, 2023. This All three countries: Japan, the United States and the mechanism has enabled the three countries to share Republic of Korea, confirmed their intention to share warning data of missiles launched by North Korea on an North Korean missile warning data in real time at the ongoing basis at all times. Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in November 2022, In the increasingly severe environment surrounding as part of efforts to improve each country’s capabilities Japan including North Korea, cooperation among to detect missiles flying from North Korea and assess the three countries is essential for regional peace and their threat. stability and will continue to be strengthened. Subsequently, the three countries coordinated their **See** Chapter 3, Section 1-2-4 (Republic of Korea) **3** **Responses in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Domains** The aspects of ways of warfare have changed drastically and landing of invading forces. from those of the past. In addition to large-scale missile In the event of a military attack on Japan, the SDF attacks and hybrid warfare including information will respond with defensive mobilization. Their warfare, it is necessary to respond to the traditional operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial forms of warfare such as invasion through air, sea and air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting land. Japan’s ground defense capabilities, maritime waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the defense capabilities and air defense capabilities form the land and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime basis of its cross-domain operations. For invasions of communication, based on the characteristic of their Japan, including our remote islands, we will secure and purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces maintain our maritime and air superiority to block access will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and Fig. III-1-4-7 Example of Air Defense Operations **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Interception order **1** Detect Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)(Note 1) Destroy Combat air patrol (CAP)(Note 2) Aerial refueling/transport aircraft Intercept (KC-767, etc.) Detect Detect Destroy Warning and control radars Destroy Cruise missile launched by an enemy Scrambling fighters Intercept Identification of friend or foe Flow of air defense operations Interception order Air Defense Direction Center (DC) Air wing command post (Notes) 1 Aircraft with airborne warning and control functions in waters distant from its national land and with alternative control capabilities for defense ground environments 2 Keeping armed fighters on an airborne alert so that they can immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft ----- deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the Guidelines). **1** **Air Defense Operations** Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is surrounded by the sea and the features of modern wars,[20] it is expected that at first, a sudden attack against Japan will be exercised by aircraft and missiles and such aerial attacks are assumed to be conducted repeatedly, in the case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs. Operations for aerial defense aim to quickly deal with enemy aerial attacks at as far airspace from our land area as possible, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the citizens and the F-35B fighters To this end, the acquisition of F-35A fighters with superior electronic warfare capabilities and F-35B fighters capable of short takeoff and vertical landing will be continued and a temporary F-35B squadron (tentative **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will name) will be established at the ASDF Nyutabaru Air be made to inflict significant damage on the enemy, thus Base (Miyazaki Prefecture). making the continuation of their aerial attack difficult. **See** Fig. III-1-4-7 (Example of Air Defense Operations) Fig. III-1-4-8 Example of the Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan Airborne warning and control system Anti-air warfare Fighters Fixed-wing patrol aircraft Air defense in the surrounding waters Enemy aircraft Response in the main channels Enemy surface vessels Anti-surface warfare Mine deployment warfare Patrol helicopter Surface-to-ship Surface ship missile Response in the waters Fixed-wing patrol aircraft Minesweeper Anti-mine warfare Anti-submarine warfare Response in coastal waters Submarines Enemy submarine ----- **2** **Defense Operations Protecting Waters** **Surrounding Japan** If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is an island country, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory. Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We will protect the waters around our country by combining these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities. Accordingly, the construction of new FFM with improved maritime operational capabilities, including long-range missiles and enhanced antisubmarine New type FFM（Image) capabilities, submarines with improved detection capabilities and similar and new-model supply ships with enhanced logistical support capabilities at sea as well as other efforts are all underway. **See** Fig. III-1-4-8 (Example of the Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan). Fig. III-1-4-9 Example of Operations Protecting the Land **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Mobile of troops Fighters Response in coastal waters Assault helicopter Surface-to-ship missile Surface ship Unmanned Unmanned reconnaissance reconnaissance aircraftaircraft Surface-to-air missile Response in sea waters Response to enemy heliborne units Electronic warfare equipment Mobile Combat Vehicles Surface-to- air missile Surveillance radar Tanks Response in sea waters Armored Artillery Vehicles Response in urban areas Response to enemy airborne unit Guiding evacuees ----- Based on this, the MOD/SDF are working to acquire **3** **Operations Protecting the Land** common tactical vehicles (infantry combat vehicles and To invade the islands of Japan, invading countries are mobile mortar combat vehicles) for coping with forces expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by invading Japan with mobility in coordination with the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne mobile combat vehicles and others as well as amphibious troops from the air. minefield clearing system, etc. For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to **See** Fig. III-1-4-9 (Example of Operations Protecting the Land) be difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right **4** **Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime** before or after they land in our territory. As we protect **Transportation** our land, we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or Japan depends upon other countries for the supply at landing points as much as possible and attack them at of much of its resources and food, making maritime an early stage. transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country comes under armed attack, etc., maritime transportation routes will be the foundation to maintain war sustainability and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan. In operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation, the SDF will combine various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol,[21] defend ships and protect straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes[22] to directly defend Japanese ships, etc. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes will **Part** Common tactical vehicle (Mobile Mortor combat vehicle) (Image) be conducted by destroyers and support from fighter jets **Ⅲ** and other aircraft is provided as required. **Chapter** **1** **4** **Responses in the Space Domain** Space utilization for communications, positioning space is becoming a warfighting domain. It is now of vital and other purposes now serves as basic infrastructure importance for nations to ensure the stable utilization of for people’s lives. At the same time, it forms the outer space. core of military operational command and control **See** Part I, Chapter 4, Section 2 (Trends in the Space Domain) and information gathering infrastructure and major countries are focusing on strengthening the capabilities **1** **The Whole-of-Government Approach** and increasing the number of various satellites with early warning, communications, positioning and In June 2023, based on the National Security Strategy reconnaissance functions. The recent increase in Chinese of Japan (NSS), the Strategic Headquarters for military satellites has been remarkable, with the number National Space Policy formulated the Space Security of such satellites surging approximately 4.9 times in the Initiative for the first time, which concretized issues 11 years since 2012. and policies in the field of space security, including In this context, some nations have been increasing the use of civilian technology in the defense sector and their activities to interfere with other nations’ space also decided on the Basic Plan of Space Policy, which systems to secure their own military superiority and reflects this initiative. **21 The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.ii** ----- Formulated based on the Basic Space Act, the Basic Plan on Space Policy is the most fundamental plan for space development and utilization in Japan and aims to strengthen the comprehensive infrastructure that supports Japan’s space activities. The Space Security Initiative states that the goal of space security is for Japan, together with its allies, likeminded countries and others, to maintain the stable use of and free access to outer space, while promoting national peace and prosperity and the safety and security of its people through outer space. It also states that, based on the needs of the MOD/SDF, government research and development will be actively linked to the fundamental strengthening of defense capabilities by using government research and also developing advanced technologies conducted by government agencies for defense purposes as well. Subsequently, in October of the same year, based on the Space Security Initiative and others, a publicprivate council on strengthening the stability of the space system was established to first accurately identify and analyze the situation, then respond appropriately through public-private cooperation in the event of an unforeseen space-related incident. Additionally, in March 2024, issues related to the maintenance and development of the technological, industrial and human resource base across the security and civilian sectors were examined to identify technologies for which Japan should promote development and then the Space Technology Strategy, including a technology roadmap indicating a timeline to develop such technologies, was formulated. In addition, led by the Cabinet Office’s National Space Policy Secretariat, which is in charge of planning, formulating and coordinating policies for the utilization of space development for the entire government, space policy is being promoted based on Space Activities Act,[23] Remote Sensing Data Act[24] and Space Resources Act[25]. **2** **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** In the space domain, the MOD/SDF will further reinforce Japan’s operational capabilities in the ground, maritime and air domains by actively incorporating novel forms of space utilization, including satellite constellations and providing functions such as information gathering, communications and positioning from space. At the same time, to counter threats to the stable utilization of space, surveillance capabilities from space will be developed and a Space Domain Awareness (SDA)[26] system will be established and the resiliency of Japan’s space assets will be bolstered to allow missions to be continued in response to various situations. In addition, the MOD/SDF will further reinforce capabilities to disrupt opponents’ command and control, and telecommunication, etc. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will strengthen cooperation and collaboration, including research and development, with related organizations and private businesses, including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). They will also strengthen cooperation in areas such as human resource development through exchanges with our ally and like-minded countries such as the United States. **See** Fig. III-1-4-10 (Utilization of Space in the Security Field (conceptual image)) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **MOVIE: ASDF begins SDA.** **URL: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=qoBwBWBR0-8** **23 Act on Launching of Spacecraft, etc. and Control of Spacecraft** **24 Act on Ensuring Appropriate Handling of Satellite Remote Sensing Data** **25 Act on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources** **26 In addition to Space Situational Awareness (SSA) (understanding the position and orbit of space objects (including understanding the space environment)), understanding the operation and** ----- Fig. III-1-4-10 Utilization of Space in the Security Field (conceptual image) Types of military satellites owned by countries and the number of satellites in operation 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 132 |Col1|Col2|Col3|23| |---|---|---|---| ||||97| ||||| ||||| ||||| |||11|3366| |||7|| |||82|| |||1188 5|| |40|33|11 2277|5| |2266|||4455| |1100|33|15 11 9 3322|| 136 45 97 82 30 10 18 4583 5 5 5 30 40 31 27 27 45 26 15 47 5 24 10 31 9 32 5 4 24 11 Communication Positioning Early warning Surveillance Quasi-Zenith Satellite (image) Source: Military Balance 2012, 2023（excluding Japan） Geostationary orbit Altitude: approx. 36,000 km Early warning satellite Communications satellite (remain stationary to the earth) Positioning satellite Meteorological satellite Medium altitude orbit Altitude: Approx. 20,000 km Altitude up to 1,000 kmLow earth orbit Reconnaissance satellite Altitude 100 km [Early warning satellite][ DSP, SBIRS (U.S.), etc.] ・ For early detecting launches of ballistic missiles [Communications satellite][ X-band defense communications satellite (Japan), WGS (U.S.), etc.] ・ For communicating with troops at a long distance [Meteorological satellite][ Himawari (Japan), etc.] X-band defense communications satellite (image) ・ For ascertaining and predicting weather conditions [Positioning satellite][GPS (U.S.), Quasi-Zenith Satellite (Japan), Hokuto (China), etc.] ・ For ascertaining exact locations and synchronizing time for the system [Reconnaissance Satellite][ Intelligence gathering satellites (Japan), commercial satellites (including microsatellites), etc.] ・ Used for information gathering, etc. Quasi-Zenith Satellite (image) operations. Going forward, to respond to the increase in communications requirements and to further strengthen resiliency, the MOD is aiming for a system of three X-band defense communications satellites by launching Kirameki-3 in FY2024. The MOD will also procure more receiver equipment and enhance broadband ground station communications to expand equipment and related ground facilities capable of communicating with Kirameki. Further, the MOD will develop and produce the next generation defense communications satellite, which will succeed the 1st and 2nd satellites and conduct technical demonstrations regarding technologies and others with jamming resiliency, with a view to installing them on the next-generation defense communications satellite. Also, regarding Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) Communications Satellite Constellation Services, the MOD conducts demonstrations, etc. of their use at respective units. In addition, the MOD develops and demonstrates communications equipment towards joining Protected Anti-jam Tactical SATCOM (PATS), a framework for sharing satellite communications bandwidth among member countries, centered on the United States. **(1) Improvement of Capabilities by Leveraging** **Space Domain Including Information-Gathering,** **Communications and Positioning** **A. Information Gathering** With regard to information gathering, the MOD/SDF will build a seamless information gathering system through acquisition of multilayered satellite images, such as by using Information Gathering Satellites (IGS),[27] and civilian satellites such as small satellite constellations that enable frequent imaging. In particular, from the perspective of ensuring the effectiveness of Japan’s standoff defense capabilities, it is necessary to fundamentally strengthen our information gathering capabilities. In addition to strengthening cooperation with the United States, Japan will build a satellite constellation to acquire the capability to detect and track targets, which will be supplemented by various initiatives, including the use of civilian satellites. **B. Communications** Regarding communications, the MOD currently owns and operates X-band defense communications satellites called Kirameki-1 and Kirameki-2 to use them for information and communications such as command and control, which is extremely important for unit **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **27 Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) of the Japanese Government are operated by the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD, along with other ministries and agencies, utilizes the** ----- **C. Positioning** With regard to positioning, the MOD/SDF mount global position system (GPS) receiving terminals on a large amount of equipment and use them as important means to support advanced troop movement, including highly accurate self-positioning and improvement of missile guidance. In addition to these efforts, the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS)[28] of the Cabinet Office started service in November 2018. With this in mind, the MOD/ SDF will secure redundancy[29] by using positioning signals, including those of QZSS. **D. Response to HGV Detection and Tracking, etc.** Small satellite constellations are attracting attention as a technological trend related to missile detection, tracking functions and others. The MOD believes that infrared observation from space using satellite constellations may be effective as a means of early detection and tracking of HGVs being developed and deployed by various countries and will, while considering the possibility of collaboration with the United States, utilize the space demonstration platform planned for the new H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV-X) to conduct space demonstrations of infrared sensors and other equipment. In addition, the MOD will promote research on future sensors, such as high-sensitivity wideband infrared detection elements. **(2) Efforts to Ensure Stable Utilization of Space** While utilization of satellites plays a vital role as the basic infrastructure for security, some countries appear to be developing anti-satellite weapons, including killer satellites, anti-satellite missiles and jamming weapons that interfere with electromagnetic waves. In addition, the rapid increase in debris from anti satellite destruction experiments and the emergence of satellite constellations are causing orbital congestion. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the resiliency of SDA and space utilization. The MOD/SDF have been working to strengthen their capabilities to secure superiority in space utilization. As part of these efforts, they have been working to enhance Space Situational Awareness[30] (SSA). Going forward, the MOD/SDF will continue to strengthen SSA, which enables learning the position, orbit and other information of space objects, while also working to enhance SDA, which enables grasping the operational status, aims and capabilities of satellites. In FY2023, the MOD/SDF began the production of the SDA satellite (scheduled to be launched in FY2026). In addition, various initiatives, including a study on the further operation of more than one SDA satellite, will be promoted. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will develop a space operations command and control system, etc. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Fig. III-1-4-11 Initiatives for Developing the Space Domain Awareness (SDA) System Geostationary orbit Altitude: approx. 36,000 km **SDA satellites** Low Earth Orbit **JAXA** Altitude: up to 1,000 km **System of operations** **Laser** **range finders** **Radar** **United States** **Private business** **Armed Forces** **Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** **operators** **28 This refers to satellites set into orbit so that the satellites are capable of staying nearly right above one specific area for a long time by tilting the orbit and adopting an elliptical orbit, while** ordinary stationary satellites stay in circular orbit on the equator. Multiple satellites are usually launched since a single satellite cannot stay online for 24 hours by itself. Users are able to receive signals from such satellites without being affected by obstacles, such as mountains and buildings, since the satellites pass nearly right above the users. **29 Having a backup means to cover it and maintain its original function even if something goes wrong with a particular means.** ----- VOICE **The Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Mission** **NAKATANI Kaname Staff Sergent, Analysis Staff, 1st Space Operations Squadron, Space Operations Group, ASDF** The Space Operations Group began its space domain awareness and learning through interactions with these people. mission from March 16, 2023. I will continue to carry on the mission of the stable utilization of Space utilization is now indispensable for economic and social space through my space domain awareness. activities, and it also plays an important role in command and control as well as intelligence in the defense field while there are growing threats for stable space utilization, such as increasing space debris and the existence of so-called “killer satellites.” Our mission is to understand what is happening in space to cope with these threats. “Space Domain Awareness” sounds like a grand image of something seen in science fiction movies, but in reality, it involves down-to-earth tasks, such as analyzing and evaluating orbital information that is based on huge amounts of data, such as sensor data. We also cooperate with JAXA, the space forces of the ally and like-minded countries, and others to understand the vast domain of space, and I feel that I am growing every day with new discoveries A work scene in the 1st Space Operations Squadron to strengthen the operational infrastructure for space operations. With regard to the strengthening of resiliency of space utilization, Japan will ensure resiliency against jamming and other interference through the demonstration of technology with enhanced resiliency for satellite communications and will also ensure cybersecurity for SSA systems, etc. towards future Japan-U.S. space system cooperation. In addition, Japan will build capabilities to disrupt C4I of opponents in coordination with the electromagnetic domain. **See** Fig. III-1-4-11 (Initiatives for Developing the Space Domain Awareness (SDA) System) **See** **(3) Strengthening of Organizational Systems** To strengthen the Space Domain Mission Units, in FY2023, the 1st Space Operations Squadron (Fuchu) and the 2nd Space Operations Squadron (Hofu Kita) responsible for sustainment and maintenance of spacerelated equipment, etc. under the Space Operations Group were newly organized. In FY2024, the system for stable operation of equipment for SDA will continue to be strengthened through expansion of personnel. In addition, as securement of the stable utilization of space becomes vital, the MOD/SDF will promote the development of the SDA system to ensure space i it d t th J ’ ti capabilities through the establishment of new Space Domain Mission Units under the command of a general and other measures. For this, given the growing importance of the space domain and the qualitative and quantitative improvements that will be made to its space operation capabilities, the ASDF shall be renamed the Japan Air and Space Self-Defense Force in view of the future positioning of space operations alongside air operations as its core tasks. To strengthen the organizational systems and human resources base in the space field, Japan will continue to strengthen cooperation, including human resources development, through exchanges with related organizations such as JAXA as well as our ally and likeminded countries such as the United States. Japan will also work to secure human resources in the space domain, including the establishment of a system to effectively utilize knowledge of the space field accumulated among relevant ministries and agencies. **(4) Strengthening of Cooperation with Related** **Organizations and Space-Related Industries** With regard to outer space, it is of vital importance for both the lives of Japanese citizens and defense to ensure stable utilization of space for purposes such as information gathering, communications and positioning. Th MOD/SDF t th i ti d **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- collaboration, including research and development, with related organizations including JAXA and the private businesses with regard to outer space. In doing so, the MOD/SDF will promote investment in technological development in the private sector by further utilizing civilian technology in the defense field and enhance Japan’s overall capabilities in space. In addition, in March 2023, with the start of the operation of the SSA system, the MOD began providing information on SSA, including orbit information on space objects, to the private businesses and others that operate satellites. Furthermore, in October 2023, the ASDF opened the Space Collaboration & Innovation Office in a private shared office to actively exchanging opinions with private space operators and for other purposes. The ASDF will station several ASDF personnel in this office and reflect knowledge gained in future equipment introduction and from other activities. Working at the Space Collaboration & Innovation Office (6 members of ASO on the right) announcements were made by Canada, New Zealand, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, Australia, France and others. Furthermore, at a plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly held in December of the same year, under the leadership of the United States, 11 countries, including Japan, made a joint proposal for not conducting the “Direct-Ascent Anti-SATellite (DA-ASAT) missile testing” resolution, which was adopted at the plenary session of the UN General Assembly with the support of 155 countries. At the same time, to avoid risks from misunderstanding and miscalculation, it is necessary to communicate the importance of strengthening communication among relevant countries and of implementing Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBM) in outer space. **A. Cooperation with the United States** From the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space domain between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States, the two countries established the Japan-U.S. Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) at the Deputy Director General level in April 2015. The SCWG holds wide-ranging talks on space cooperation, including collaboration on space policy and strategy, cooperation between U.S. and Japanese space operations forces including SDA informationsharing and education and discussions on LEO satellite constellations. Meetings of the SCWG have been held nine times through now, most recently in July 2023. In addition, the Japanese and U.S. governments hold the Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Space Dialogue (CSD) and the Japanese and U.S. security authorities hold the Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue (SSD). The MOD participates in these meetings, in which there are exchanges of information regarding the space policies of both countries as well as discussions on future cooperation. With regard to recent high-level exchanges, in the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting in January 2023, both sides confirmed that they consider attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance and that such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the JapanU.S. Security Treaty. In addition, in September 2023, General Saltzman, the Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force, paid a courtesy call on Defense Minister Kihara and they confirmed that Japan and the U it d St t t th i ti i th **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(5) Strengthening Cooperation with Our Ally, Like-** **Minded Countries and Others** To ensure the sustainable and stable utilization of outer space, which is essential to the security of Japan, it is essential to strengthen cooperation with our ally, likeminded countries and others. Japan is also conducting cooperation towards reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors in space. In September 2022, Japan decided not to conduct satellite destruction testing with destructive, directascent missiles, with the intention of actively promoting discussions in the international arena towards the formation of norms for responsible behaviors in outer space. This decision was announced in response to an announcement to the same effect by the United States i A il f th I dditi t J i il ----- **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** |Technologies to actively utilize satellite constellations and expand space utilization|- Advancement of design, manufacturing and verification technologies with an eye on mass production - Network optimization of satellite constellations| |---|---| |Technologies to meet increasing communication requirements|- Full digitalization and software definition of satellites - Utilization of the EHF band| |Technologies contributing to SDA and mission assurances, etc.|- Reduction in the size and weight of various types of buses and sensors - Autonomous satellite operations and decentralization of ground systems - Securing space demonstrations and recovery opportunities| **Commentary** **The Space Security Initiative and Efforts of the Ministry of Defense** The key points of the Space Security Initiative, which was (3) For realizing a virtuous cycle of security and fostering space formulated in June 2023, include the following three approaches: industrial base, it was decided to use the R&D of cutting-edge First of all, as a future vision, (1) Radically Expand the Use of Space technologies created by government organizations for defense Systems for National Security (Security from Space) and (2) Ensuring purposes to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, and Safe and Stable Use of Outer Space (Security in Space) that shows the resultant space-related technologies of importance have the whole picture of the “space architecture for national security.” been presented in the initiative (Figure 1). In addition, some of To implement (1) and (2) at an early stage, it is necessary to realize these technologies have been included in the Space Technology (3) a Virtuous Cycle of Security and Fostering Space Industrial Base. Strategy that was formulated in March 2024. The MOD/SDF will The efforts of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Self- promote efforts for effective R&D and the early installation of space Defense Forces (SDF) since the formulation of the Initiative include systems that are related to national security by orchestrating the the following: comprehensive power of the private sector and the government. (1) Demonstrations of infrared ray sensors and other devices have begun using a New Space Station Resupply Vehicle (HTV Technologies to actively utilize - Advancement of design, manufacturing and verification technologies with an eye on mass [H-II Transfer Vehicle]-X) as a space demonstration platform for satellite constellations and production expand space utilization improving HGV detection and tracking capabilities in cooperation - Network optimization of satellite constellations with JAXA to realize “security from space.” In addition, efforts to Technologies to meet increasing - Full digitalization and software definition of satellites build an intelligence constellation are also underway. communication requirements - Utilization of the EHF band (2) The SDA satellite has been tuned in preparation for the - Reduction in the size and weight of various scheduled launch in FY2026 to reinforce the SDA capabilities for Technologies contributing to types of buses and sensors - Autonomous satellite operations and security in space. Japan has already participated in the Combined SDA and mission assurances, decentralization of ground systems etc. Space Operations Initiative (CSpO), a multilateral framework - Securing space demonstrations and recovery opportunities made up of like-minded countries, including the United States, in December 2023 with the intention of strengthening international Figure 1: Examples of common fundamental technologies in building a “space cooperation for stable space utilization using these frameworks. architecture for national security” (an excerpt from the “Space Security Initiative”) space domain as it was becoming increasingly important in terms of the space domain security. In terms of operations, because cooperation with the United States is indispensable for effective operation of the SSA system by the ASDF, Japan is working to materialize information-sharing with the United States. Furthermore, Japan continues to participate in the Schriever Wargame, a multilateral tabletop exercise on space security organized by the U.S. military and the Global Sentinel, a multilateral SSA tabletop exercise, to share recognition of threats in space with multiple countries, cooperate on SDA and work to accumulate knowledge on ensuring the functions of space systems. In addition, SDF personnel are dispatched to the U.S. Space Command’s Multinational Space Collaboration (MSC) Office. **B. Cooperation with Like-Minded Countries, Etc.** Japan has been cooperating and collaborating with lik i d d t i i i fi ld i l di strengthening relations among defense authorities, cooperation related to SDA information and cooperation among space operations forces, through consultations, information sharing and participation in multilateral exercises. In December 2023, the MOD/SDF joined the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO) as a participating country. This is a multilateral framework including the United States and other like-minded countries and intended to discuss space security. Moreover, the MOD/ SDF participated in a CSpO general-level meeting held in Germany the same month and explained Japan’s space policy and initiatives in the space field. By joining the CSpO, the MOD/SDF will further strengthen our relations with allies and like-minded countries in the space field, while actively participating in international initiatives to ensure stable space utilization. With regard to Australia, consultations (at the director l l) ti th J d ----- French Air and Space Forces, strengthening cooperation between Japan’s Space Operations Group and the French Space Command, strengthening information sharing arrangements related to SDA and other efforts. In addition, the MOD participates in the Japan- France Comprehensive Space Dialogue between the governments of Japan and France. With regard to Germany, Japan and Germany have been holding expert meetings on space cooperation between forces and will develop coordination by holding a meeting of their SWG to deepen cooperation between space operations forces. With regard to Canada, Japan and Canada held the first Participants in the CSpO from various countries (front row, left General Uchikura, Chief of Japan-Canada space forces tabletop exercise in March Staff, ASDF) 2023 and will advance promotion of cooperation among space operations forces and cooperation for information Australian space authorities have been held since May sharing. 2021. In addition, in November 2022, Japan and Australia signed the Letter of Intent Concerning a Defence Space Partnership, which will deepen space cooperation. Furthermore, Japan and Australia established a Space Working Group (SWG) to discuss specific cooperation among space operations forces. With regard to the United Kingdom, the Japanese and U.K. defense authorities have been holding **Part** space consultations since August 2022 and have been **Ⅲ** coordinating on collaboration on space policy and **Chapter** strategy, promotion of cooperation and exchanges among **1** space operations forces, information sharing related to SDA and other matters. Tabletop Exercise with the Canadian Armed Forces With regard to France, Japan and France have been conducting consultations (at the director level) on space With regard to Japan and the European Union cooperation between the Japanese and French defense (EU), their governments hold the Japan-EU Space authorities since December 2021. The two countries Policy Dialogue. In addition, the Japanese and Indian are also coordinating on the promotion of unit-to-unit governments hold the Japan-India Space Dialogue. The exchanges including participation by the SDF in the MOD participates in both these dialogues. multilateral space exercise (AsterX) organized by the **5** **Responses in the Cyber Domain** In the cyber domain, it is important to gather and share field will be centrally and comprehensively coordinated information at all stages from peacetime to emergencies throughout the Government, the MOD/SDF will through cooperation with other countries, relevant promote initiatives that contribute to strengthening ministries and agencies and the private sectors, as well cooperation with related ministries and agencies, critical as to strengthen Japan’s overall response capabilities in infrastructure operators and the defense industry, while the cybersecurity field. enhancing its own level of cybersecurity. In light of the fact that policies in the cybersecurity **See** Part 1, Chapter 4, Section 3 (Trends in the Cyber Domain) ----- is implemented, primarily on critical systems, etc. and significantly increasing the number of cyberspace workforce capable of performing such tasks as well as utilizing highly-skilled external human resources. The MOD/SDF will protect itself from all cyber threats with its high level of cybersecurity capabilities and also will use these capabilities to strengthen the national cybersecurity as a whole. To this end, the MOD/SDF will establish a posture that can protect its command and control capabilities as well as its high-priority equipment systems even under cyber attacks[31] along with a posture for supporting cyber defense for the defense industry by FY2027. By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will have established a posture to safeguard its command and control capabilities, force projection capabilities and operational bases to assure missions to be executed even under cyber attacks and strengthened its posture for supporting the cybersecurity of entities other than the SDF. **See** Fig. III-1-4-12 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks) ; Reference 16 (Efforts in Recent Years by the MOD on Cybersecurity) **(1) Establishing a System for Ensuring Cybersecurity** **A. Expansion of the Cyber Units Organization** The JSDF Cyber Defense Command was newly formed in March 2022 as a joint unit and deals with cyber attacks. It also provides support for training of cyber units of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF and maintains and operates the Defense Information Infrastructure[32] (DII), a common network for the MOD/SDF. From FY2023 onward, Japan has continued to expand the systems of the JSDF Cyber Defense Command and other cyber units of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF and promote the transition of personnel engaged in cyber-related works to **1** **The Whole-of-Government Initiatives** Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), the government of Japan as a whole intends to improve its response capabilities in the field of cybersecurity to the same level or higher than those of major Western countries, including the introduction of active cyber defense in cases where there is a threat of a serious cyber attack that does not necessarily lead to an armed attack but raises security concerns. In FY2024, among others, projects are being planned focusing on policies to ensure cybersecurity of information systems of government agencies, etc. In addition, the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) is to be fundamentally strengthened. **See** Section 1-2-3 (Cybersecurity) **See** **2** **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** The cyber domain is not only core infrastructure in the daily lives of the people of Japan, but also of vital importance for carrying out cross-domain operations to defend Japan. In light of the severe situation in cyberspace in recent years, the NSS calls for the introduction of active cyber defense to prevent, as far as possible, a serious cyberattack that does not necessarily lead to armed attacks but raises security concerns and prevent the spread of damage if such an attack has occurred. The MOD/SDF will coordinate with whole-of government initiatives in the field of cybersecurity, including active cyber defense. In doing so, the MOD/ SDF will achieve a high level of cybersecurity by shifting to a posture where persistent risk management **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE: The MOD/SDF’s “I Want to Know About This!”: How the SDF responds to cyber attacks** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/shiritai/cyber/index.html** **REFERENCE: Important information about cyber security** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/cyber/index.html** **31 Illegal intrusion, information theft, alteration or destruction, operation stop/malfunction of information systems, execution of unauthorized program, distributed denial of service (DDoS)** attacks, etc., which are made through cyberspace by abusing information communication networks, information systems, etc. **32 Common network for the entire SDF, the information and communications infrastructure necessary to perform the SDF’s duties, which is composed of data communications networks and** voice communications networks and uses various lines such as self-operated micro lines owned by the MOD, external lines rented from telecommunications carriers and satellite lines. ----- Fig. III-1-4-12 MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks Reinforcing cyber units posture Introduction of cutting-edge architectures ・Reinforce cyber units of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF including JSDF Cyber ・Implement security measures of the standards equivalent to ones of the United States Defense Command (approx. 4,000 personnel strong) (Implementation of RMF) ・Promote specialization of personnel in cyber-related tasks such as system ・Implement Zero Trust concept that all the accesses are verified procurement maintenance and operations as “cyber workforce” Security measures for all systems including equipment and (Approx. 20,000 strong including the 4,000 mentioned above) facility infrastructure Utilize human resources from the private sector ・Development of Cyber Protection Analysis Equipment and Security ・Recruit the chief cybersecurity advisor Surveillance System for SDF Base Infrastructures ・Utilize SDF Reserve Personnel with cyber skills Enhance cybersecurity for defense industries ・Establish the new recruitment system for SDF personnel **System** ・Support and promote each company’s initiative to apply the Standards on ・Utilize public-private personnel Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry by taking budgetary steps exchange **Education** **Initiatives of** **Enhance** **and** **the MOD/SDF** **cybersecurity** **research** Enhancement of in-house education Collaboration with private sectors ・Reorganize GSDF Signal School into GSDF System Signal /Cyber School ・Promote initiatives to enhance collaboration with government agencies ・Enhance cyber education in GSDF High Technical School, National Defense and private critical infrastructure business operators who have knowledge Academy, other schools of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and the like **Collaboration** and technologies related to cyberspace ・Expanding the range of cyber personnel by providing literacy education Collaboration with the United States and other foreign Utilization of external education countries ・Education in external educational institutes such as domestic and ・Holding Japan-U.S. Cyber Defense Policy foreign universities Working Group (CDPWG) ・Having defense cyber dialogues and Enhancing research capabilities trainings with Australia, the United Kingdom, ・Establish the Cyber Security Division (tentative) in National Institute Germany, France, and NATO, and providing for Defense Studies capacity building support to ASEAN etc. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** professional cyber workforce. In addition, in July 2023, the MOD/SDF strengthened its planning and drafting function for developing cyber policies by reorganizing the Information and Communications Division of the Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning to establish the Cyber Buildup and Planning Division and Councilor (Director) to the Minister’s Secretariat. Advertisement for Cyber Contest 2024 **B. Utilization of Private-sector Human Resources** The MOD/SDF recruits those with cybersecurity expertise and experience as uniformed SDF personnel and technical defense officials, and also promotes personnel exchanges between the public and private sectors. In addition, since July 2021, the MOD/SDF has been hiring personnel with advanced knowledge and skills as well as abundant experience and achievements in the cyber domain as “Chief Cybersecurity Advisor.” In addition, the MOD/SDF is also working on a publicprivate personnel exchange system to employ people with practical experience in the private sector, as well as utilizing external personnel through service contracts and other means. Since 2021, the Ministry of Defense Cyber Contest has been held with the aim of uncovering talented individuals with cybersecurity expertise. Additionally, since 2022, the MOD/SDF has been hiring the candidates for SDF reserve personnel equipped with cybersecurity skills. ----- **(2) Security Enhancement** **A. Introduction of Latest Architecture** As threats in the cyber domain are becoming more advanced and sophisticated every day, Japan has shifted its approach to information system security measures from temporary “risk elimination” to continuous “risk management,” and has implemented from FY2023 the Risk Management Framework (RMF), which continuously analyzes and evaluates risks and implements necessary security measures even after the start of the information system operation. Additionally, the MOD/SDF will transition from the traditional idea that perimeter security is sufficient to maintain the organization’s network safety and will promote the introduction of the new security functions based on the “Zero Trust” concept. These will improve the cybersecurity level of the MOD/SDF and establish a posture that can promptly detect and respond to any intrusion into the organization’s network. **B Security Measures including Equipment and Facility** **Infrastructure** To appropriately respond to the latest cyber attack threats, which are becoming more advanced and sophisticated every day, it is necessary to strengthen the posture for protection of information systems. To this end, the MOD/ SDF will develop a cloud system that integrates and standardizes MOD/SDF systems, implement centralized cybersecurity measures, strengthen the protective **KEY WORD** **Zero Trust** The concept of maintaining the safety of organization’s information assets (data, devices, applications, etc.) by dynamically verifying and controlling the authenticity of all access from inside and outside the organization’s network, without taking the security inside the network for granted. posture of equipment systems and facility infrastructure systems and enhance the threat hunting function that continuously hunts for and detects potential internal threats based on the assumption that threats have already penetrated inside the network. **C Strengthening Defense Industry Cybersecurity** In March 2022, the MOD/SDF developed the Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry, the new information security standards that include the same level of control measures as NIST SP800-171[33] of U.S. standards. In response to this, defense-related companies have been upgrading their information systems since April 2023. **See** Fig. III-1-4-13 Enhanced Security Functions based on Zero Trust Concept (Image); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 1-2-4 (Strengthening Defense Industrial Security) **(3) Education and Research** To fundamentally strengthen the SDF’s cyber defense capability, developing human resources who possess sophisticated and wide-ranging knowledge on cybersecurity is an urgent issue. Proactive efforts, including the expansion of education and the utilization **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Fig. III-1-4-13 Enhanced Security Functions based on Zero Trust Concept (Image) Traditional Perimeter Defense Zero Trust In-house network (trusted) No trusted network IT systems Cloud Verification Website In-house terminals Remote terminals All internal and external communications are distrusted and every access is verified Cloud Website In-house terminals IT systems Remote terminals Access from outside is blocked by firewalls and VPNs ----- of knowledge of private sectors, are necessary. In this context, the MOD/SDF has developed cyber workfore by continuously and by stages assigned to cyber-related positions and providing them with both in-house and external education to acquire and maintain advanced knowledge and skills. As general cyber education course for all SDF services to learn general and advanced knowledge of cybersecurity has started since FY2019 at then GSDF Signal School. It is also dispatching personnel to College of Information and Cyberspace International Fellows at the National Defense University of the United States and the U.S. Army’s Coalition Cyber Operations Planner and establishing a specialized course in system and cyber engineering at the GSDF High Technical School. Moreover, in March 2024, the GSDF Signal School was reorganized into the GSDF System and Signal/Cyber School and newly established the Cyber Education Department, expanding the educational infrastructure for training cyber personnel. In FY 2024, the National Defense Academy also expanded its cyber literacy education and reorganized its Department of Information Engineering to the Department of Cyber and Information Engineering. Furthermore, since cybersecurity depends on the literacy of personnel who use networks and systems, not just specialized personnel with advanced knowledge, the MOD/SDF is promoting literacy education for general SDF personnel. In terms of research, the MOD/SDF is strengthening the research structure of the Cyber Security Division newly established in the National Institute for Defense Studies in FY2023 and Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency Future Capabilities Development Center is conducting research into cyber protection technology for equipment systems to prevent the spread of damage caused by cyber attacks and enable various equipment systems to remain in operation in the event of a cyber attack. **(4) Cooperation with Private Companies and Other** **Countries** To respond to cyber attacks in a swift and appropriate manner, it is necessary to keep abreast of the latest information, including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, through cooperation with the private sector and strategic talks, joint training and other opportunities with allies and other parties. For thi th MOD/SDF ill ff ti l t with private companies and foreign countries, including the United States, which is Japan’s ally. **a. Cooperation with Private Companies and Others** In July 2013, the Cyber Defense Council (CDC) was set up with its members consisting of around ten companies in the defense industry with a high interest in cybersecurity. With the MOD serving as the hub for information sharing among companies in the defense industry, information is aggregated and efforts are made to grasp the overall picture of cyber attacks. In addition, a joint training takes place annually, simulating a situation where the MOD/SDF and defense industry are under cyber attacks as part of efforts to improve both of their cyber response capabilities. **b. Cooperation with the United States** To strengthen the foundation that supports effective Japan-U.S. joint responses at all levels, Japan will further strengthen information sharing at all levels and fundamentally strengthen efforts related to information security and cybersecurity to enable both Japan and the United States to fully exercise their capabilities. In October 2013, the Japanese and U.S. governments set up the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) as a framework for policy consultations between the defense authorities of the two countries. In this framework, specialized and specific considerations were conducted on a wide range of fields, such as the promotion of policy consultations on cyber issues and closer information sharing. The Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in 2015 cited the prompt and appropriate establishment of an information sharing structure and the protection of the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the U.S. Forces depend to accomplish their missions as examples of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. governments. In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their respective networks and systems and the implementation of educational exchanges and joint exercises were also cited. In addition, at their “2+2” in April 2019, Japan and the United States confirmed that international law applied in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Furthermore, at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting in January 2023 and the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in October 2023, the two countries agreed to t th ti i th b fi ld d J ’ **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** VOICE **Studying at GSDF High Technical School** **KADOWAKI Tsubasa, third year, High Technical School, GSDF** I have been interested in the cyber field since I was an elementary and providing services by themselves, through which they learn school pupil, so I decided to enter the GSDF High Technical School possible routes taken by cyber attackers and how to counter them. when I learned that the System/Cyber Specialized Course was In recent years, we have been constantly exposed to the threat scheduled to be launched at the school. I have been studying the of cyber attacks, not only in times of emergency but also in normal System/Cyber Specialized Course since FY2023. Immediately after times, and I feel a sense of crisis as I see many government entering the school, I was struck with the number of confusing things agencies and private companies being affected. Given this situation, I had to deal with due to the unfamiliar group life, but I was soon able I will try hard to further refine my knowledge and skills I learned in to get used to it by cooperating with my classmates. Thanks to what this course and do my best to contribute in the unit I am assigned I learnt in this specialized course, including basic knowledge on after graduation. cyber technology, C language, and Linux, I could obtain the national At GSDF High, students start learning about cyber technology qualification of the Fundamental Information Technology Engineer. At while still in school. Enroll in GSDF High and protect Japan’s future the end of this course, students do an exercise of building a server together. The author presenting the final assignment of the System/Cyber Specialized Course A group discussion (the analysis results using a system constructed by the students) cooperation with the United States is to be further strengthened by such means as participation in the Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue, a whole-of-government framework by both nations, continuously holding the Japan-U.S. IT Forum, a framework between defense authorities. In terms of operational cooperation, cyber response capability training has been conducted as part of the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise (field training exercises) and the Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Command Post Exercise to improve Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities. **C. Cooperation with Like-Minded Countries, Etc.** Japan will enhance its partnership and cooperation with l t t i th th U it d St t th h measures such as sharing views on threat awareness, exchanging views on response to cyber attacks and participated in multilateral exercises. Japan has participated in the Japan-NATO Cyber Dialogue, a whole-of-government framework and organized the Japan-NATO Expert Staff Talks on Cyber Defense, etc., with the respective defense authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and others to exchange opinions on various issues related to cyberspace and participated in the CyCon International Conference on Cyber Conflict organized by NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) established in Estonia. The MOD has been dispatching personnel to the CCDCOE since March 2019 I O t b 2022 J l t d th f ----- in the multilateral cyber defense exercise Locked Shields 2023” hosted by CCDCOE by teaming up with Australia in April 2023. In February 2024, the SDF also participated in Defence Cyber Marvel 3 hosted by the United Kingdom, as it did last year. Furthermore, in February 2024, the GSDF hosted Cyber KONGO 2024, a multilateral cyber protection competition, with a total of 16 participating countries, including the United States, Australia, Germany, France, Lithuania, Vietnam and Philippines, to strengthen capabilities in the cyber domain. Personnel of the GSDF Cyber Protection Unit participating in “Defence Cyber Marvel 3”, a cyber exercise hosted by the United Kingdom (February 2024). **(5)** **Contribution to the Whole-of-Government Approach** signing an arrangement for participation in CCDCOE Along with the National Police Agency, the Digital activities and the MOD officially participated in the Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and CCDCOE’s activities. Communications, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and In addition, Japan has held cyber talks between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the MOD/ defense authorities with Australia, the United Kingdom, SDF, as one of the government agencies that are members Germany, France and Estonia. Moreover, Japan holds of the Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters, contributes the IT Forum with the defense authorities of Singapore, to the cross-government initiatives led by the NISC, Vietnam and other countries to exchange views on including participating in cyber attack response training initiatives in the information communications area and personnel exchanges and providing information including cybersecurity and current trends in technology about cyber attacks as well as sending personnel to the and provides ASEAN countries with capacity building in Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT).[34] the field of cybersecurity. In addition, the MOD/SDF is cooperating by applying **Part** With the aim of strengthening the SDF’s cyber domain the knowledge and experience of the SDF to penetration **Ⅲ** capabilities and cooperation with other countries, tests of the IT systems of Government ministries and **Chapter** the SDF participated in a joint Japan-Australia team agencies conducted by the NISC. **1** **6** **Responses in the Domain of Electromagnetic Spectrum** The domain of electromagnetic spectrum is at the forefront encountering communication jamming by opponents. Also, of offense and defense in modern combat, with the scope the entire SDF will utilize the electromagnetic spectrum of its utilization and applications expanding to include more efficiently by strengthening its electromagnetic the land, sea, air, space and cyber domains.[35] Therefore, spectrum management functions. securing superiority in the electromagnetic domain is The MOD/SDF will closely cooperate with relevant extremely important for strengthening of deterrence and ministries and agencies to strengthen capabilities in the the realization of cross-domain operations. electromagnetic domain so that the SDF can ensure stable The SDF will steadily promote strengthening of its and flexible use of radio waves, balancing civilian use capabilities in the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, of frequencies with the SDF’s use of frequencies for the including effectively operating its electronic warfare command and control and intelligence gathering activities. capabilities and related support capabilities while impairing **See** Fig. III-1-4-14 (Electronic Warfare Capabilities and opponents’ operational capabilities in this area even under Electromagnetic (Image)); Part I, Chapter 4, Section 4-1 (Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Capabilities challenging electromagnetic environments, such as when Domain and Security)) **34 Team that provides technical support and advice to prevent the spread of damage, engage in recovery, investigate the cause and obviate recurrence when an information security-related** event occurs in need of a unified response by the government. **35 One of the attacks using electromagnetic waves is an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack, which places an extreme burden on systems and electronics by generating instantaneous** powerful electromagnetic waves through nuclear explosions and other means, leading to their malfunction or destruction. Since this type of attack would impact not just the defense field ----- Fig. III-1-4-14 Electronic Warfare Capabilities and Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Capabilities (image) In order to effectively and proactively utilize electromagnetic spectrum, the following capabilities need to be enhanced. ① Electronic warfare capabilities: capabilities to effectively and proactively utilize electromagnetic spectrum ② Electromagnetic spectrum management capabilities: capabilities to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum by ascertaining the status of electromagnetic spectrum in the theater and preventing interference with the aim of securing electronic warfare capabilities [Electronic attack] - Emit radio waves to communication devices and radars of an enemy, thereby reducing or [Electronic protection] - Reduce or nullify the impact of electromagnetic spectrum used by an enemy [Electronic warfare support] - Collect and analyze such information as electromagnetic spectrum used by an enemy ？ [Electromagnetic spectrum management] - Ascertain the status of electromagnetic spectrum in the theater - Appropriately manage and coordinate electromagnetic spectrum used by SDF units The figure is for illustrative purposes electromagnetic domain, thereby ensuring air superiority, the MOD/SDF is promoting the acquisition of F-35As fighters with superior electronic protection capability. In addition, to improve flexibility in fighter operations, the MOD/SDF will acquire F-35Bs fighters with their superior electronic protection capability and short takeoff and vertical landing capabilities and continue to improve the capabilities of F-15 fighters. **3** **Strengthening of Electronic Warfare** **Support Capabilities** **1** **Enhancement of Electronic Jamming** **Capabilities (Communications and Radar** **Jamming capabilities), etc.** It is effective as a means to defend Japan to neutralize the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, including radar and communications of an opponent that intends to invade Japan, based on information gathering and analysis in peacetime, to overcome the inferiority in capabilities in other domains and to accomplish the defense of Japan. The MOD/SDF is working to strengthen this capability. In FY2024, the MOD/SDF will acquire the Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS), which functions to conduct gathering and analysis of information from radio waves on a regular basis and neutralize the use of radio waves by opponents during emergencies and counter air electronic warfare system, as well as carry out research on low-power communications jamming technology and future electromagnetic pulse (EMP) equipment technology. The MOD/SDF will also conduct research on directional energy technologies such as high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves (HPM) to improve the capabilities to deal with small unmanned vehicles. **2** **Strengthening of Electronic Defense Capabilities** **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** To gain an advantage in fighting in the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, it is important to gather and analyze information on electromagnetic spectrum at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies and appropriately share those among SDF units. In FY2024, the MOD/SDF will acquire RC-2 signals intelligence aircraft and develop an electronic warfare aircraft to enhance the capabilities to collect information on electromagnetic waves, which is necessary for electronic jamming and electronic protection. **4** **Enhancement of Electromagnetic** **Spectrum Management Function** To localize the effects of interference, etc. in the To gain an advantage in warfare by using electromagnetic ----- spectrum proactively and effectively, in addition to During the SDF joint exercise conducted in improving electronic warfare capabilities, it is necessary November 2023, the electronic warfare units of to establish an electromagnetic spectrum management the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF gathered at Iruma Air posture that centrally grasps and coordinates wave Base (Saitama Prefecture) to coordinate training for frequencies and status of use and appropriately allocates integrated electromagnetic wave operations. In addition, frequency resources to units, etc. from September to October of the same year, MSDF For this reason, the electromagnetic wave management dispatched multipurpose EP-3 aircraft to the United function will be developed to enhance the capabilities States to conduct electromagnetic maneuver warfare to understand and manage the usage situation of training with the U.S. Navy to improve interoperability electromagnetic waves by understanding and visualizing with the U.S. Navy. on monitors the status of electromagnetic waves used by equipment communication devices, radars, electronic warfare devices, etc. **5** **Training/Exercise and Human Resources** **Development** To strengthen the SDF’s capabilities in the electromagnetic domain and to develop personnel with specialized knowledge, in addition to conducting integrated electromagnetic spectrum operations training, the MOD/SDF is collecting the latest knowledge and expertise in the electromagnetic domain by dispatching personnel to participate in educational programs on Electronic warfare units of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF gathered at ASDF Iruma Air Base for joint electromagnetic wave operation training during the SDF joint exercise. electronic warfare in the United States and other means.[36] **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **7** **Responses to Large-Scale Terrorism and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure** **1** **1** **Basic Concept** pose a serious threat against the country’s peace and security. Such cases would involve various modes and Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and forms including illegal activities by infiltrated armed such attempts as well as invasion of Japan are not the agents,[37] etc. and sabotage carried out by guerillas or only situations that Japan needs to prepare for. Large- special forces, which can be deemed to be armed attacks scale terrorism and accompanying attacks on critical against Japan. infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants, are serious To respond to such cases, the MOD/SDF would utilize threats to the lives, health and property of Japanese its fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities and citizens and would require Japan to respond with all- closely cooperate with the police, JCG, fire departments, out efforts. On the other hand, Japan also has a large local governments and other related organizations to concentration of its industry, population and information effectively respond to large-scale terrorism and attacks infrastructure in urban areas, as well as the presence of on critical infrastructure. a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear power In the stage where the actual situation of intruders and plants, in coastal areas. Thus, protecting Japanese the details of the ongoing case are not clear, the police citizens and critical facilities from various threats is also primarily respond to the situation, while the MOD/ a challenge. SDF will collect relevant information and reinforce In Japan, where most of the towns and cities are highly the security of the SDF facilities. In addition, when urbanized, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks can the situation is clearer and can be dealt with by the **36** In addition, the MOD/SDF are advancing the multiplication of the communications network required for information sharing among the SDF services across Japan and conducting research in light of EMP protection. ----- Fig. III-1-4-15 Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Patrol helicopter Enemy aircraft Fixed-wing patrol aircraft Search and destruction a t Fighter Observation helicopter sea by MSDF and ASDF Destroyer Submarine Guerillas and special forces landing Depot ship Enemy submarines Base for underwater vehicles used in landing operations Underwater scooters used Monitoring and in landing operations Search and destruction at the water's edge surveillance Light armored vehicle Protection of Air defense Reconnaissance unit important facilities Infantry unit Mobile Combat Vehicle Search and destruction Short range Tank Obstacle in mountainous areas Assault helicopter surface-to-air Multipurpose helicopter missile Base Search and destruction in urban areas Shovel car Mobile Combat Vehicle Tank Bulldozer Mortar Establishment Consequence Infantry unit Wheeled armored of positions management personnel carrier Base Guiding evacuees Police NBC NBC attack reconnaissance Howitzer vehicle Rescuing hostage Special operations unit Mortar Decontamination vehicle general police force, various forms of assistance such as transportation of police officers and provision of equipment to the police force will be carried out. If the case cannot be dealt with by the general police force, then public security operations by the SDF will be implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confirmed that an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order. In addition, in response to ballistic missile attacks, Aegis ships will be deployed to protect the entire territory of Japan and PAC-3s of the ASDF, which are dispersed throughout the country to protect bases, will be moved and deployed flexibly according to the situation. Furthermore, Japan would respond to cruise missiles and the like with various anti-aircraft missiles launched from aircraft, naval vessels and ground-based assets. **2** **Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and** **Special Operations Forces** Typical forms of attacks by guerrillas or special forces include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks against people and assassinations of dignitaries. In dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces, the MOD/SDF will respond with a particular emphasis on the establishment of a relevant information gathering posture, monitoring and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, protection of key facilities and search and destruction of invading guerrillas or special forces. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and indications through monitoring and surveillance and, as required, the SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities, such as nuclear power plants and the necessary posture for protection will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an infiltration of our territory by ill i l ti f th ill b h d ----- for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to destroy them. **See** Fig. III-1-4-15 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces) **See** **3** **Response to Armed Agents** mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons. The sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used. In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed group and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical and medical protection units of the GSDF and other units will cooperate with relevant organizations in information gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured and medical activities through disaster relief and civil protection dispatches. The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF Central Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit and is also increasing the number of chemical and medical protection unit personnel, to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also, the GSDF has designated initial response personnel who remain ready to mobilize quickly in the event of extraordinary disasters. The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. If this happens, it is important for the SDF to cooperate with the police force. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations of the SDF, the Basic Agreement[38] concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police, as well as local agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded.[39] In addition, the GSDF has been conducting joint field training exercises nationwide with the prefectural police, in an effort to strengthen such collaboration by conducting field exercises at the premises of nuclear power plants throughout the country since 2012. Joint training with police at Tsuruga Nuclear Power Station (February 2023) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **4** **Response to Nuclear, Biological and** **Chemical Weapons** In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate **38 The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the then Defense Agency and the National Public Safety** Commission (concluded in 1954 and fully revised in 2000). **39 In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated between the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency concerning dealing jointly with public security operations in the event of armed** ----- **8** **Initiatives Related to Civil Protection** Guidelines for the Protection of the People. It anticipates **1** **Basic Concept** four types of armed attack: (1) a land invasion, (2) an There has recently been heightened interest in civil attack by guerrillas or special forces, (3) a ballistic protection as well as expectations for the MOD/SDF due missile attack and (4) an air attack. It also lays out to North Korea’s repeated launches of ballistic missiles, points to consider in taking measures to protect civilians especially with the communication of information via depending on the type of attack. J-Alerts due to the launch of ballistic missiles over the As measures for civil protection during armed Japanese archipelago. Civil protection is one of the attack situations and the like, the MOD/SDF will take pillars of the fundamental reinforcement of defense measures to confirm the damage, save lives and assist in capabilities in the NDS and the MOD/SDF are actively the evacuation of residents, while cooperating with the working on it. police, fire departments, JCG and various other relevant In March 2005, based on Article 32 of the Civil ministries and agencies. Protection Act, the Government established the Basic The Government is conducting consideration from **Commentary** **Transmission of Ballistic Missile Information via J-ALERT (Notice from the Cabinet Secretariat)** In 2023, North Korea launched at least 25 ballistic missiles for the Ministry of Defense (the MOD) to provide the Cabinet (including potential ballistic missiles), during which the National Secretariat with various types of information on the ballistic missile Early Warning System (J-ALERT) was issued four times. It has in a timely and appropriate manner. For this reason, the process of continued to launch missiles repeatedly into 2024. information transfer between the two parties has been systemized To protect the life, person, and property of Japanese nationals and automated to ensure speed and certainty. from the threat of ballistic missiles from North Korea, the Government In April 2023, additions and changes were made to information **Part** of Japan is steadily strengthening its ballistic missile defense transmission messages, including information about missiles that **Ⅲ** capabilities and continues to maintain a heightened surveillance have passed through Japanese territory and the lifting of evacuation posture. Accordingly, if there is a possibility of a ballistic missile orders when there is no longer a possibility that a missile will pass **Chapter** 1) falling into Japan’s territory, or through. **1** 2) passing over Japan, The Government will continue to strive to reliably communicate the Cabinet Secretariat will provide emergency information, while also working to constantly strengthen J-ALERT’s information through the National Early Warning information transmission function. System (J-ALERT) to everyone in areas where precautions must be taken against the ballistic J-ALERT is a system that instantly transmits information from the national government on situations that require immediate action, missile and encourage them to take action to such as ballistic missile information, Earthquake Early Warnings, and Tsunami Warnings, to residents via emergency messages transmitted to mobile phones, municipal ad-ministrative radio systems for disaster prevention, and other means. increase the possibility of mitigating damage as much as possible, such as by taking shelter in a nearby building. Mobile phone operators route emergency messagesArea Mail / **Earthquake Early Warning, Tsunami Warning, Major Tsunami Warning** Mobile phone / When J-ALERT is used, administrative radio **Civil protection information, etc.** smartphone systems for disaster prevention are automatically Earthquake Early Warning, Japan MeteorologicalAgency **transmis-sion systemManagement Agency Fire and Disaster** Mobile phone operators activated and a distinct siren and message will Tsunami Warning, etc. Satellite Administrative radio system Outdoor speakers be broadcast over the loudspeakers outdoors. **Cabinet Secretariat** for disaster prevention Municipal Emergency information will also be transmitted to Civil protection government information, etc. buildings, etc. residents through various means of information Landline Local Government transmission, including through registration-based Wide Area Network Outdoor receivers, emails.When transmitting information through J-ALERT, it is important Local government route(LGWAN) / Internet J-ALERT receiver Automatic activation device TVs, radios, internet terminals, etc. Overview of the National Early Warning System (J-ALERT) ----- the perspective that development of evacuation facilities equipped with the necessary functions to protect the lives and health of citizens from armed attack situations where ballistic missiles and the like are used is a measure for preventing damage and leads to deterrence against ballistic missile attacks and other attacks. In March 2024, the government of Japan presented the basic concept of initiatives to secure necessary evacuation facilities, including the development of “Specific Temporary Evacuation Facilities”[40] as solid evacuation facilities that can be used for a certain period of time in areas where evacuation would be difficult, due to reasons such as severely restricted transportation and no evacuation sites in the vicinity. The Government also formulated the “Technical Guidelines for Specific Temporary Evacuation Facilities” to specify the technical specifications that should be provided and other matters. **2** **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** of civil protection measures utilizing civilian vessels and aircraft used by the SDF and various SDF transport assets. The MOD/SDF will also promote various measures such as strengthening SDF units that can also provide civil protection and utilizing SDF reserve personnel. **(2) Daily Collaboration with Local Governments** The MOD/SDF has established departments responsible for regular and close liaison and coordination with local governments and other bodies in its main Headquarters and Commands as well as in Provincial Cooperation Offices, etc., and has stationed the Assistant Director for Civil Protection (civilian official) at the GSDF divisions/ brigade headquarters since FY2023. Civil protection councils are established in prefectural and municipal governments for comprehensive implementation of civil protection measures. Representatives of each branch of the SDF and Regional Defense Bureau have been appointed to the councils. Moreover, local governments are recruiting retired SDF officers to serve as crisis managers. For example, they act as coordinators with the MOD/SDF, as well as developing and implementing joint response plans and exercises. **(1) Enhancement of Posture for Civil Protection** To counter invasions of Japan while protecting the lives of Japanese citizens, it is imperative for national government institutions, local governments, public institutions and private businesses to cooperate and work together in an integrated manner. To implement swift evacuation of residents, including those in the southwestern region, well in advance of an armed attack, the Government will promptly formulate plans for smooth evacuation, secure means of public and private transportation, develop public infrastructure such as airports and seaports and coordinate its use, secure various types of evacuation facilities and coordinate with international organizations. In addition, to enhance the effectiveness of such efforts, the Government will conduct and verify various types of training, including evacuation of residents and then consider necessary measures, including institutional aspects, while promoting cooperation among the national government, local governments, designated public institutions and others. Moreover, in addition to participating in and cooperating with these measures, the MOD/SDF will also coordinate and cooperate in the planned implementation **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Civil Protection Expert (the Assistant Director for Civil Protection) of the 3rd Division Headquarters coordinating with related organizations during the Kobe City Civil Protection Practical Exercise in 2023 (2nd and 3rd from left) **(3) Civil Protection Exercises** To accurately and swiftly implement civil protection measures, it is essential to establish cooperation with relevant organizations from peacetime. The Government **40 For municipalities that meet the following two requirements: (1) If a wide-area evacuation of residents and others were necessary, it would prove difficult given that the means of** transportation for wide-area evacuation of residents would be limited to aircraft or ships and the evacuation destination area is located on a remote island where evacuation beyond the coastal zone is necessary when transporting by ship due to the long distance; and (2) the patterns of evacuation implementation guidelines for wide-area evacuation of all residents, etc., have been prepared and publicized and utilizing said patterns, central and prefectural governments have conducted joint civil protection exercises, such municipalities are supposed to prepare evacuation facilities in the basement of public/official facilities (used for purposes other than evacuation facilities such as meeting rooms, parking lots, etc. during normal times) ----- as a whole is strengthening its civil protection exercises assuming armed attack situations or expected armed attack situations. The MOD/SDF, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, host exercises with the participation of local governments and others and actively participate and cooperate in civil protection exercises conducted by relevant ministries and agencies and local governments. **See** Reference 17 (Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (FY2023)) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** VOICE **Voice of an SDF Member Who Participated in a Civil Protection Exercise** **NAGANUMA Takayuki, Major, Flight Section Member,** **MIURA Hiroshi, Civil Protection Specialist and Defense** **Nyutabaru Rescue Squadron, ASDF** **Official, Western Air Defense Force Headquarters, ASDF** In the 2023 Kagoshima Prefecture and Kumamoto Prefecture In this training, I was assigned to liaise and coordinate with Joint Civil Protection Field/Map Exercise that I participated in, it related organizations, and I was dispatched as a civil protection was assumed that an evacuation order was issued for the entire specialist to the Kagoshima Prefectural Response Headquarters, Yakushima Town (Kagoshima Prefecture) due to the prediction of an which was established at the Kagoshima Prefectural Office. armed attack on Japan and that more than 1,000 residents were The training went like this: A request was received from to be evacuated. The mission of the Nyutabaru Rescue Squadron in Kagoshima Prefecture for assistance with the evacuation of a this training was to transport a person requiring special care who person requiring special care, and in collaboration with the ASDF was staying at a hospital in Yakushima Town to Kagoshima City Nyutabaru Rescue Squadron, we made the necessary adjustments using a UH-60J rescue helicopter. Under normal circumstances, to dispatch a UH-60J rescue helicopter. the Nyutabaru Rescue Squadron carries out emergency airlifts I believe that we were able to make this training meaningful from over 20 inhabited remote islands within Kagoshima Prefecture by building face-to-face relationships with local governments and to helipads in Kagoshima City. In this training, we accomplished other organizations from the coordination stage. In a situation like our mission by leveraging our experience in cooperation and this, I have once again realized that in order to smoothly cooperate coordination with local governments and other organizations. We will with related organizations and protect the public, relationships of continue to participate in such exercise and work hard to strengthen trust on a daily basis are important. cooperation with local governments and other organizations so that we can accomplish the missions we are assigned any time in the future. A UH-60J landed at Miyanoura Athletics Stadium in Yakushima Town The author (in front of the entrance of a government building) A person requiring special care was brought onto the UH-60J. ----- **Section 5** **Initiatives to Strengthen Intelligence Capabilities,** **Including Responding to Integrated Information Warfare** **1** **Strengthening of Functions Such as Intelligence Collection and Analysis** (2) collecting, processing and analyzing data from various **1** **Military Intelligence Collection** imagery satellites; (3) surveillance activities by ships, With security environment is changing in a rapid, aircraft and other assets; (4) collecting and organizing complex manner, high-quality and timely intelligence a variety of open-source intelligence (OSINT); (5) collection and analysis are essential for the Government to information exchanges with defense organizations of conduct accurate decision-making. As military activities other nations; and (6) intelligence collection by defense in the vicinity of Japan become increasingly active, the attachés and other. Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) In addition to strengthening the system for dispatching is to build a seamless intelligence collection system Defense Attachés, from the perspective of implementing through the appropriate use of various means. effective intelligence collection activities in their assigned The MOD/SDF is making efforts to collect intelligence countries, the MOD is to improve its support for Defense swiftly and accurately on a daily basis by using various Attachés by enhancing and strengthening pre-dispatch methods. Examples: (1) collecting, processing and trainings, ensuring their career paths and strengthening analyzing military communication signals and signals the intelligence cycle including accumulation of relevant emanating from electronic weapons in the air over Japan; intelligence. Fig. III-1-5-1 Dispatched Defense Attachés (image) AustriaAustria SwedenSweden UkraineUkraine Iran **Part** Germany Poland Jordan KazakhstanKazakhstan Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva) Finland Lebanon **Ⅲ** LithuaniaLithuania Netherlands **Chapter** Belgium RussiaRussia France **1** Canada The United Kingdom RomaniaRomania Mongolia ItalyItaly TürkiyeTürkiye U.S. ROK SpainSpain India China Permanent Mission of JapanPermanent Mission of Japan Vietnam Myanmar to the United Nations to the United Nations (New York)(New York) PhilippinesPhilippines MalaysiaMalaysia SingaporeSingapore Morocco Thailand Indonesia AlgeriaAlgeria BrazilBrazil NigeriaNigeria Pakistan EgyptEgypt Israel AustraliaAustralia Saudi Arabia Ethiopia UAEUAE South AfricaSouth Africa Djibouti Qatar New ZealandNew Zealand Chile Kenya [Legend] Countries with a defense attaché dispatched Jointly administered country Countries with six defense attachés dispatched Countries with two defense attachés dispatched Countries with three defense attachés dispatched Mission **REFERENCE: The MOD/SDF’s “I Want to Know About This!”: Defense attachés** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/shiritai/chuuzaikan/index.html** ----- With regard to Defense Attachés, in FY2023, the MOD, in order to strengthen intelligence collection in Europe in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, dispatched one additional Defense Attaché to each country in Romania, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine, as well as newly dispatched one in Qatal. In FY2024, the MOD plans to newly dispatch Defense Attaché to Cambodia, Estonia, and Sri Lanka, as well as increase the number of Defense Attachés in Vietnam. **See** Fig. III-1-5-1 (Dispatched Defense Attachés (Image)) **See** **2** **Initiatives towards Enhancing Capabilities** **Such as Intelligence Analysis** directions including recruitment, education, training and personnel allocation to strengthen comprehensive intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will promote cooperation and collaboration with relevant domestic organizations related to intelligence and take necessary measures to make more effective use of intelligence collected by IGS in SDF operations. **3** **DIH** **(1) Mission of the DIH** The DIH is the central intelligence agency of the MOD and the largest intelligence agency of Japan. It was established in 1997 to develop a framework for sophisticated and comprehensive intelligence collection and analysis in the increasingly complicated security environment following the Cold War. The Headquarters gathers SIGINT, IMINT, GEOINT, OSINT, etc. and analyzes international and military situations and other matters related to Japan’s swiftly changing security environment. In addition to intelligence collection and analysis, the Headquarters is also considered in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) to play a central role in responding to Integrated Information Warfare for the defense of Japan and is to fundamentally strengthen the capabilities to collect, analyze and disseminate information on international military situations and other issues. **(2) Activities of the DIH** The DIH is an organization consisting of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel and administrative and technical officials (specialized in language, technology, administration or general office work). The SDF personnel use the knowledge based on their experience in their own unit, etc., whereas administrative/technical officials use their expert knowledge in language, technology and other fields, to work together for their mission. Specifically, they conduct comprehensive analysis on international situations that change day by day from diverse perspectives, including military, political and economic factors, based on information received from a wide range of sources including SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT (newspapers, internet, etc.) and opinion exchange with relevant parties. The DIH is also strengthening information gathering and analyzing functions in new domains such as space, b d th l t ti t F As the character of warfare becomes more rapid and complex moving forward, to win battles, Japan needs to establish a system that enables real-time intelligence sharing by making maximum use of various means, including artificial intelligence (AI) and further strengthening the capabilities such as intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. Japan also needs to continuously and accurately grasp the intentions and capabilities of our surrounding countries and others more than ever before. Therefore, to effectively collect, organize, analyze, share and preserve intelligence and to contribute to policy decisions and force operations, Japan will strengthen its capabilities by function for signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT) and OSINT, centered on the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), while fundamentally enhancing our integrated analysis capabilities, including the use of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). To this end, the budget is to be acquired for the maintenance of the intelligence systems of the DIH as well as the Japan Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces (the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF); the maintenance and improvement of various intelligence collection assets and intelligence collection equipment at each communication station and coastal surveillance unit; and the collection and organization of various intelligence materials, so that intelligence analysis and other functions can be strengthened. In order for the intelligence division to respond appropriately to increasingly diversified intelligence requirements, the MOD/SDF is promoting the securing and training of highly capable personnel handling intelligence collection and analysis. Moreover, the MOD/SDF i t ki t d i i **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- example, it conducts the collection and analysis of necessary information regarding trends in threats in cyberspace through such means as collecting OSINT and exchanging information with other countries. In addition, the DIH increased the number of personnel in FY2022 to strengthen its system for gathering and analyzing information on the economic security of other countries. Results of the DIH’s intelligence service are provided as analysis products to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, as well as GSDF, MSDF and ASDF units in a timely and appropriate manner to support policy decision and unit operation. The DIH also actively exchanges information with relevant ministries and agencies and foreign counterparts. **4** **Initiatives for Information Security** significant decrease in operational efficiency and others. Accordingly, it was decided to improve the operation of recurrence prevention measures while maintaining their effectiveness from January 2024 onward. Specifically, the following measures were implemented to improve operations: (1) For officials engaged in related work such as recruitment/support work and procurement who have daily contact with former officials, only when a former official made an unusual request were such requests reported to the head of the respective organization, etc.; and (2) As a general rule, the meetings and briefings should be conducted by multiple officials, but in cases where more than one official is not available, such as when it interferes with operations, a single official may conduct the meeting or briefing independently with the prior approval of the senior official in charge of his or her duties. On June 2022, it was found that then commanding officer of MSDF destroyer JS “Inazuma” designated his crew newly assigned to the ship by personnel transfer as an official handling specially designated secrets, even though he/she had not undergone an security clearance assessment for specially designated secrets, and that the former commanding officer had such personnel handle specially designated secret information at the Combat Information Center (CIC) during the two-month mission operation before the ship had an accident off Suo-oshima in Yamaguchi Prefecture on January 2023, thereby violating Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, and others. In addition, on July 2023, it was found that the commander of a unit under the command of the GSDF Northern Army, when giving instructions and communicating at a training exercise held at the Kamifurano Training Area, divulged specially designated secret information to 15 personnel of the unit who were not in a position to know the specially designated secret information, thereby violating the Act on the Protection of Specified Secrets, and others. The MOD/SDF took the occurrence of this incident seriously, and on April 2024, announced the results of the investigation and disciplinary action, and at the same time issued an instruction from the MOD regarding the prevention of recurrence, In addition, the Defense Vice Minister has decided to intensively study more effective measures to prevent recurrence of such incidents and to further ensure information security. The MOD/SDF has been working to ensure a system necessary for information security in accordance with the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets[1] and other relevant laws and in cooperation with relevant ministries, agencies and bureaus, to appropriately protect various types of highly classified information. However, it came to light that the Commander of the MSDF Fleet Intelligence Command intentionally disclosed without authorization specially designated secrets and other information to his former superior, who was not eligible to handle classified information, in a situation briefing conducted in March 2020, thereby violating the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets and Article 59, Paragraph 1 (duty of confidentiality) of the Self-Defense Forces Law. In response to this, in March 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada established measures to prevent recurrence (Minister’s circular notice), including guidelines for meeting and briefing former officials and institutionalization of maintenance training for managers and retired officials and made all officials thoroughly aware of such measures. Subsequently, taking the opportunity of about six months having elapsed since implementing recurrence-prevention measures, the effectiveness of the measures was verified after October 2023 and it emerged that some departments had experienced a **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **2** **Responding to Integrated Information Warfare with Special Regard to the** **Cognitive Dimension** through various means and (3) deterring and responding to **1** **Integrated Information Warfare with** unilateral changes to the status quo by force and building **Special Regard to the Cognitive Dimension** a more desirable security environment, while protecting In the international community, emphasis is being placed Japan’s decision-making through measures such as on information warfare, in which countries attempt to the rapid and strategic dissemination of appropriate create a favorable security environment for themselves information at every opportunity in cooperation with at a stage when no conflict has arisen by disinformation our ally, like-minded countries and others. Furthermore, and strategic information dissemination to influence Japan will not implement efforts that damage our public opinion and decision-making in other countries credibility (such as dissemination of disinformation via while protecting the impact on their own decision- social media and other means, manipulation of public making. In light of this situation, Japan will build a opinion, conspiracy, etc.). system and posture that can reliably deal with Integrated In the MOD/SDF, the DIH plays a central role in Information Warfare with special regard to the cognitive responding to such Integrated Information Warfare and dimension. the MOD as a whole will develop intelligence capabilities **See** Part I, Chapter 4, Section 1-4 (Diffusion of Information-related that can reliably deal with Integrated Information Warfare Technology and Information Warfare) with special regard to the cognitive dimension by 2027. The DIH takes the necessary measures at all stages of collection, analysis and dissemination, while working **2** **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** closely alongside the policy and operations divisions, With the increasingly severe security environment and including developing a function that automatically the rapid progress of technological innovation, including collects social media and other information to determine information technology (IT), it is important to respond the veracity of information dissemination by each to new “ways of warfare,” including in the cognitive country. **Part** dimension. In particular, in light of Russia’s aggression In the FY2024 budget, to strengthen the system for **Ⅲ** against Ukraine and the clashes between Israel and information collection, analysis and dissemination **Chapter** the Palestinian militants , from the perspective of the related to responding to Integrated Information **1** defense of Japan, there is an urgent need to respond to Warfare. Defense Intelligence officer and a specialized Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to department in the DIH is established. This position and the cognitive dimension, with a focus on detecting and department is exclusively responsible for the task. In analyzing disinformation and promptly and appropriately addition, Integrated Information Warfare Coordination disseminating information. Section is to be established in the Internal Bureau of the Due to various acts being committed in the international Ministry as the commanding function where the number community in the name of information warfare, it is of administrative officials and others is to be secured. important to clearly state the outer limits for responding Also, the Ministry as a whole is to increase the number to Integrated Information Warfare to be implemented of the necessary GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel and from the perspective of the defense of Japan to ensure civilian officials and others to take necessary measures credibility both domestically and overseas. to strengthen the system. Moreover, an AI-based Specifically, Integrated Information Warfare with automatic collection and analysis function for open special regard to the cognitive dimension refers to the souse information, especially SNS, will be developed following three measures undertaken during emergencies and future forecasting services related to information as well as the current stage from the perspective of the estimation will be brought into. defense of Japan: (1) acquiring diverse intelligence Furthermore, in the units of the GSDF, MSDF and collection capabilities by strengthening intelligence ASDF as well, the Government intends to establish a functions, (2) determining the veracity and intentions solid system by reviewing major units and reorganizing of all threats, including disinformation spread by other units. t i d t li i th t ki th Additi ll th G t ill t i t f th ----- strengthen Japan s capabilities in light of trends in the international community by sharing information and conducting joint training with our ally, like-minded countries and others. In addition to the various measures mentioned above, to ensure that SDF personnel, who are the core element of our defense capability, are not misled by disinformation and prevented from making appropriate decisions, each personnel member must understand the dangers of disinformation and develop an attitude that enables them to calmly perceive and objectively examine matters on a daily basis. Therefore, Japan will work to further strengthen the information security system by having personnel learn necessary professional qualities, improving their cyber/media literacy, etc. through provision of education and self-improvement opportunities. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **Section 6** **Sustainability and Resiliency Enhancement Initiatives ** **to Ensure War Sustainability** To defend Japan in future, the current warfighting variety of issues related to these matters. sustainability of the SDF is not necessarily sufficient To this end, in the National Defense Strategy of in terms of ammunitions and fuel and the number of Japan (NDS), Japan will improve production capacity of operationally available equipment. It is necessary to ammunition, storage commensurate with the amount of squarely address these realities and strive to ensure ammunition produced, promptly acquire the necessary and maintain sufficient war sustainability so that the and sufficient ammunition, promptly secure the necessary SDF can continue persistent activities in contingencies, and sufficient amount of fuel and establish a system to which serves as an effective deterrent. Furthermore, to enable all equipment to be operational except that under ensure the safety of SDF personnel on a daily basis and planned maintenance by FY2027. In addition, Japan prevent the easy loss of operational capabilities even will promote measures to construct major underground in a contingency, Japan will promote measures such as command headquarters, relocate and consolidate making major command headquarters underground and facilities in bases and camps, as well as improve the reinforcing their structures, relocate and consolidate resiliency of facilities and infrastructure against disasters facilities to ensure stand-off distance and steadily such as tsunamis. construct barracks and housing and maintain aging One of the top priorities by FY2027 is to improve the buildings. Moreover, Japan will conceal and camouflage number of operationally available equipment, secure equipment to improve resiliency. In addition, the issue sufficient ammunitions and fuel and accelerate improving of climate change, including responses to future energy the resiliency of defense facilities. The expenditures for shifts, will inevitably further impact future the MOD/ enhancing sustainability and resiliency exceed 40%[1] SDF operations, including various plans, facilities, of the approximately 43.5 trillion yen (contract-based defense equipment and the security environment amount) that the Defense Buildup Program (DBP) **Part** surrounding Japan, which requires Japan to deal with a indicates is necessary over the next five years. **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **1** **Securing Ammunition** **1** there have been cases of prolonged initial manufacturing **1** **Status of Securing Ammunition** periods and higher manufacturing costs that made it even The SDF possesses a wide variety of ammunition, more difficult to secure ammunition. including bullets used in rifles and pistols, shells fired by In addition to lacking the necessary and sufficient tanks and artillery, missiles used by fighter aircraft and ammunition storage facilities, some areas do not have naval vessels, as well as bombs, torpedoes, land mines enough room to flexibly operate deployed ammunition and sea mines. because of the increasing size of missiles and other Although the budget for ammunition has remained ammunition. There have been cases, for example, of generally flat over the past 30 years, it is difficult to ammunition to be carried by vessels in the Maizuru area say that the budget to secure ammunition has always for missions being transported overland from the Sasebo been sufficient, due to price increases associated with area. the advancement of technology. Moreover, some ammunition manufacturing companies withdrew from **2** **Efforts to Secure Ammunition** the market due to a decrease in orders from the MOD/ SDF. Although other companies have made up for the The NDS calls for resolving the shortage of required parts manufactured by the companies that withdrew, quantities of ammunition by FY2027. Regarding high- **1** Expenditures for enhancing sustainability and resiliency total approximately 19 trillion yen, comprising approximately 5 trillion yen for costs of ammunitions and guided missiles, including those accounted for in other fields such as stand-off defense capabilities (approximately 2 trillion yen if not including these other fields); approximately 10 trillion yen for costs of sustainment, maintenance and ensuring the operational availability of equipment, etc. (approximately 9 trillion yen if not including other fields); and approximately 4 trillion yen for costs of ----- priority stand off missiles, Japan began acquisition of Upgraded Type-12 SSM from FY2023 and will begin acquisition of Tomahawk in FY2025, one year earlier than originally planned. Japan will also promptly procure the required quantities of various ammunitions that strengthen integrated air and missile defense capabilities, including interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IIA), interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 MSE), Long-Range Shipto-Air Missiles (SM-6) and Upgraded Type 03 MediumRange Surface-to-Air Missiles (modified). Specifically, ammunition development costs, which were approximately 1 trillion yen in the previous Medium Term Defense Program, will be increased fivefold to approximately 5 trillion yen in five years during the period of the DBP. On this occasion, Japan will also procure the required quantities of various ammunition necessary for continuous unit operations, including small arms and firearms other than those related to the stand-off defense capabilities and integrated air and missile defense capabilities described above, as well as various ammunition required for continuous unit operations such as ship-to-ship guided missiles, ship-toair guided missiles and air-to-air guided missiles. To mass-produce ammunitions quickly and stably, the MOD/SDF will encourage the defense industry to expand its domestic manufacturing capacity and strengthen the maintenance posture for the various ammunitions. In addition, to accommodate the increasing ammunition size and meet the increasing storage requirements for ammunitions, the MOD/SDF will promote the expansion Fig. III-1-6-1 Examples of Major Ammunition and Magazines Intermediate-range multi-mission missiles **Part** **Ⅲ** 155mm howitzers ammunition **Chapter** (SM-3 Block IIA)BMD missile Ship-to-air missile **1** (SM-6) 5.56mm fire arms ammunition Type-17 Ship-to-Ship Missile (image) Surface-to-air missile Surface-to-ship missile (Type 03 Medium-Range SAM (modified)) (Type-12 SSM) New ship-to-air missile (image) AIM-120 (image) BMD missile Magazine (PAC-3 MSE) AAM-4B (image) ASM-3A (image) ----- of ammunition storage facilities and the disposal of **See** Fig. III 1 6 1 (Examples of Major Ammunitions and unused ammunitions. Magazines); Section 4-1-2 (1) (Strengthening of Stand-off Defense Capabilities) **2** **Securing Fuel** To secure the necessary amount of fuel for the SDF make up for fuel for ships, private tanks with the capacity operations quickly and stably, the MOD/SDF will build to handle storage as well as acceptance and delivery new fuel tanks while also renting private fuel tanks. operations throughout the year will be rented. For example, maintenance of fuel tanks in the MSDF In addition, the MOD/SDF will secure the necessary has been carried out in stages based on actual use and quantities of food and clothing. existing tank capacity, etc. and further, as a measure to **3** **Improving the Operational Availability of Equipment** **1** **Current Status of the Number of** Fig. III-1-6-2 Equipment Operation State Classification **Operationally Available Equipment** Equipment Operation State Classification Equipment used by the SDF emphasizes performance **Operational** over durability and is used under harsher conditions than The state in which the equipment can perform its full capabilities civilian products. It thus has characteristics that result in more frequent maintenance and parts replacement **Under Maintenance** compared to equipment for general use. Therefore, it is The state in which the equipment cannot be operated due to periodic maintenance, etc.. necessary to maintain a certain quantity of spare parts in anticipation of parts replacement. **Non-Operational** **Part** The state in which the equipment is not in operational status On the other hand, as equipment has become more **Ⅲ** over a period due to lack of spare parts inventory and/or a advanced and achieved higher performance, the unit budget for repairing **Chapter** procurement cost of parts and costs for maintenance **1** have risen and while there have also been increases in sustainment and maintenance budget, such increases have not always been sufficient, resulting in equipment A P-1 engine with some parts being unable to operate due to parts shortages. For some An F-2 fighter with some parts removed removed equipment, parts are removed from equipment that is not operational and diverted to other equipment, which requires twice as much maintenance work as normal **2** **Increasing the Number of Operationally** parts replacement due to the removal and installation **Available Equipment** of parts, thereby imposing an excessive burden on units in the field. Based on this, as was the case in FY2023, **(1) Securing Parts** the MOD/SDF intends to secure a substantial budget By securing the necessary budget for maintenance for sustainment and maintenance in FY2024 to resolve and materials, with lead time taken into consideration, equipment non-operational situations due to parts while dealing with the increasing sophistication and shortages and maximize the number of operationally complexity of defense equipment, the MOD/SDF will available equipment by FY2027, aiming to quickly resolve equipment non-operational situations due to parts establish a system that can fully demonstrate the shortages and maximize the number of operationally capabilities of the equipment in its possession. available equipment by FY2027. To this end, the precision **See** Fig. III-1-6-2 (Equipment Operation State Classification) of supply and demand forecasts will be improved by upgrading logistics-related systems, such as by adding f ti t l t t t ti t ----- the demand for parts using artificial intelligence (AI) conducted through digital transformation (DX), including while the time it takes for units to receive parts will be the development of the latest digital. In addition, the shortened by distributing parts efficiently throughout the MOD/SDF will promote the introduction of DX in SDF through the maintenance of adequate inventory. In the logistics support field to optimize sustainment and addition, major supply warehouses will be renovated to maintenance. Specifically, in addition to the introduction become automated, manpower-saving and systematized of AI-based supply management systems, the MOD/ to enable accurate inventory control and prompt supply SDF will optimize its sustainment and maintenance of parts according to the needs of the units. posture in the logistics support field by improving the efficiency of inventory control and other aspects by using **(2) Promotion of Outsourcing** the results of demonstration tests for the introduction of In increasing the number of operationally available Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), an automatic equipment, the MOD/SDF will promote the outsourcing authentication technology that uses radio waves to read of sustainment, maintenance and other operations to and write information on integration circuit (IC) tags outside parties to make effective use of limited resources. in a contactless manner to allow the inventory status of For some equipment, the MOD/SDF is conducting parts and other items to be grasped more accurately, as outsourcing efforts aimed at reducing the number well as 3D printers, which can be used for the emergency of inspection and maintenance items by analyzing manufacturing of equipment parts and other items. maintenance plans, collecting the necessary data and other such actions. The MOD/SDF will further promote **(4) Expansion of Performance Based Logistics (PBL)[2]** efforts for more efficient sustainment and maintenance, **and Other Comprehensive Contracts** such as unit maintenance and parts repair of equipment After concluding a PBL contract for aircraft from that utilize the results of such outsourcing efforts. FY2012, the MOD/SDF has been expanding the Through these efforts, the MOD/SDF will improve the scope of such contracts beyond aircraft, including the number of operationally available equipment while conclusion of a PBL contract for gas turbine engines for reducing the burden on units, especially on personnel naval vessels in FY2021. The MOD/SDF will work to **Part** engaged in sustainment and maintenance work. expand the scope of PBL contracts, which will improve **Ⅲ** the number of operationally available equipment, while **Chapter** **(3) Introduction of Digital Transformation (DX)** verifying their cost-effectiveness to achieve effective To efficiently carry out various types of operations, it is and efficient sustainment and maintenance. **1** necessary to drastically transform the way operations are **4** **Improving the Resiliency of Facilities** It is important to ensure sufficient functioning of SDF maintenance such as updating existing facilities in facilities, which are the foundation for the sustainability priority order. and resiliency of Japan’s defense capabilities. Because Besides, as disaster countermeasures, flood prevention approximately 40% of SDF facilities were built during measures, slope collapse[3] prevention measures and periods when the old earthquake resistance standards others are being taken. were in effect, it is necessary to transform these facilities In addition, in conjunction with the acquisition of into ones that can ensure the safety of SDF personnel various types of ammunition required for continuous on a daily basis and prevent the easy loss of operational unit operations, it is necessary to secure ammunition capabilities even in a contingency. The MOD/SDF storage facilities. At the same time, the MOD/SDF is evaluating the performance of 20,000 or more SDF will adopt various measures to improve resiliency in a facilities owned by camps and bases as a whole (283 multi-layered way by dispersing the infrastructure for districts), preparing a master plan (MP) for consolidation SDF operations as well as by restoring and replacing and reconstruction, etc. and efficiently carrying out infrastructure when it is damaged. **2** Comprehensive contracts to improve the number of operational availability and to achieve long-term cost containment ----- Furthermore, to properly execute the increasing budget for facility maintenance, including the maintenance of facilities provided by the SDF as well as the maintenance of SDF facilities, the MOD/SDF plans to further optimize the bidding and contracting system by newly establishing the Construction System Planning Division in an internal bureau of the Ministry in FY2024. **1** **Securing Ammunition Storage Facilities** fighter aircraft, the hardening of shelters for fighter aircraft,[4] and essential utilities such as electricity and water. In addition, the base security function will be strengthened while reducing the number of personnel. **3** **Development of Facilities Required for** **Formation of New Units and Introduction of** **New Equipment** During the period of the DBP, the MOD/SDF will continue to develop the facilities necessary for the formation of new units and the introduction of new equipment. Specifically, this will include the development of facilities for the GSDF’s new Camp Saga (tentative name), the development of facilities in Sasebo (Sakibe East Area (tentative name)) for the MSDF and the development of facilities for receiving the ASDF’s F-35 (A and B) aircraft. Facilities for receiving F-35A and F-35B fighters (image) In conjunction with the acquisition of various types of ammunition, including stand-off missiles, the SDF will secure the necessary ammunition storage facilities. In securing the ammunition storage facilities, the SDF will pursue and promote efficient joint operations between the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF; joint use of U.S. ammunition storage facilities; and dispersed deployment to islands from the viewpoint of ensuring the resiliency of ammunition. **2** **Improving the Resiliency of SDF Facilities** To protect major equipment and command posts, etc. and ensure a tenacious fighting posture, the MOD/SDF will establish underground basing, reinforce facilities and take measures against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, such as installing filters on power lines and others, for major command posts. Additionally, the MOD/SDF plans to multiplex and renew aging facilities in conjunction with the renewal of existing facilities, also regarding the construction of dispersal pads for dispersedly deploying Before After An improved aircraft shelter for F-15 fighters at the ASDF Chitose Air Base **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **4** **Structural Reinforcement, Relocation,** **Consolidation, etc., of Facilities** When renovating existing facilities, protective measures against explosives, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, electromagnetic waves and guerrilla attacks shall be provided. Structural reinforcement of facilities in accordance with their functions and importance as well as the relocation and consolidation of facilities to ensure stand-off distance shall also be implemented in conjunction with maintenance measures for aging buildings, thereby ensuring that the facilities are fully functioning. ----- Specifically, the MOD/SDF will take measures such as locating transforming equipment on high ground and installing watertight panels at entrances and exits. In future, the SDF will improve the resiliency of defense facilities and infrastructure in bases and camps to adapt and respond appropriately to various challenges associated with climate change and to fulfill the SDF’s missions and roles. **5** **Maintaining and Strengthening the** **Functions of Camps, Bases, etc., that Serve** **as Bases for Disaster Response** To prevent the functional decline of SDF facilities in the event of large-scale disaster, the MOD/SDF will promote countermeasures against disasters such as tsunamis for bases and camps that are expected to be damaged. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **Section 7** **Measures for Protection of the Life, Person and ** **Property of Japanese Nationals** **1** **Response to Large-Scale Disasters, etc.** **1** **Basic Concept** Large-scale disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons, infectious disease crises such as COVID-19 and other such issues are serious threats to the lives, health and property of Japanese citizens and require Japan to respond with all-out efforts. In the event of a large-scale disaster, etc., the MOD/ SDF closely cooperate with the police, fire departments, JCG, local governments and other related organizations to effectively carry out life-saving activities, emergency reconstruction, livelihood support, etc. Since the damage situation is unclear at the beginning of Airlift of personnel and supplies for disaster relief related to Typhoon Khanun (Izena Village) a large-scale disaster, the MOD/SDF will maintain response issued a disaster relief request to the GSDF to airlift readiness to any damage and need for activities. In addition, personnel and supplies to Izena and Iheya villages due while giving first priority to life-saving activities, the to Typhoon and the airlift of personnel and supplies was MOD/SDF will conduct livelihood support by coordinating carried out by 5 personnel and 1 aircraft. with relevant parties, including local governments and the On September 9 the same year, the Governor of ministries and agencies concerned, on the division of roles, Ibaraki Prefecture issued a disaster relief request to the response policy, activity period, activities with private GSDF for search and lifesaving operations associated **ⅢPart** companies and other matters. Furthermore, with regard to with the landslide disaster due to Typhoon and a total support for local governments in particular, based on the of 246 personnel and 38 vehicles were dispatched to **Chapter** premise that there will be confusion in local governments conduct search and lifesaving activities. **1** immediately after a disaster and also based on lessons **b. Disaster Relief in Response to Heavy Rain** learned in past disaster relief efforts, the MOD/SDF will On July 10 2023, amid continuing record-breaking propose specific support and later shift to activities based heavy rain caused by a linear precipitation band over the on the needs of local governments. For this purpose, the Kyushu region due to the impact of 2023 rainy season SDF is strengthening dissemination of information so that front, the governors of Saga and Fukuoka prefectures people who truly need support by the SDF can easily access issued a disaster relief request on the same day to the the information related to support. GSDF to rescue people and remove debris in Karatsu In addition, the SDF has the “FAST-FORCE” unit on and Kurume cities, whereupon a total of 474 personnel, standby at camps and other locations throughout Japan 181 vehicles and four aircraft were dispatched to conduct to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted lifesaving activities. promptly. On July 16 the same year, as heavy rainfall that had **See** Part II, Chapter 5, Paragraph 3-5 (Disaster Relief Dispatches been occurring since July 14 caused landslides and and Others) other disasters in Akita Prefecture, the governor issued a disaster relief request to the GSDF for water supply activities in Happo Town, Oga City and Gojome Town; **2** **Response by the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF** and patient transportation and the removal of disaster **(1) Responses to Natural Disasters, Etc.** waste in Akita City and patient transportation and the **a. Disaster Relief in Response to Typhoon August,** removal of disaster waste were carried out. The scale of **September in 2023** dispatch for these activities amounted to a total of about ----- **e. Disaster Relief in Response to Classical Swine Fever** **Outbreaks** During the period from April 2023 to the end of March 2024, in Saga Prefecture, support was provided for culling and others (removing and driving out pigs and carrying them out of pig houses) in pig farms with classical swine fever outbreaks. These missions engaged a cumulative total of 1,529 personnel. Support for culling and other activities in disaster relief efforts related to the swine fever outbreak Search and Rescue by ASDF personnel search dogs **c. Disaster Relief in Response to Heavy Snow** On September 9 the same year, the Governor of Ibaraki Prefecture issued a disaster relief request to the GSDF for search and lifesaving operations associated with the landslide disaster due to Typhoon and a total of 246 personnel and 38 vehicles were dispatched to conduct search and lifesaving activities. **d. Disaster Relief in Response to Bird Flu Outbreaks** In Hokkaido and Gunma Prefecture where bird flu outbreaks occurred between August 31, 2023 and September 5, 2023, in response to disaster relief requests from the governors of each prefecture, the SDF provided support for culling in poultry houses with bird flu outbreaks and other things. These missions engaged a cumulative total of around 5,000 personnel. **f. Disaster Relief in Response to Forest Fires** Of the forest fires that broke out between April 2023 and the end of March 2024, local authorities conducted firefighting operations but were unable to extinguish fires in five prefectures (Gunma, Nagano, Ehime, Hiroshima and Wakayama Prefectures). Based on disaster relief requests issued by the governors of each prefecture, the SDF conducted aerial firefighting and other operations. The SDF dispatched a cumulative total of about 950 personnel, about 100 vehicles and about 80 aircraft. **See** Reference 18 (Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)) **(2) Transportation of Emergency Patients** The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2023, out of a total of 387 cases of disaster relief, 352 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo) and remote islands of Nagasaki Prefecture representing the majority of such cases. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Support for culling and other activities in disaster relief related to bird flu outbreaks ----- **(3) Response to Search and Rescue of U.S. Forces** **Osprey** On November 29, 2023, a U.S. Air Force CV-22 (Osprey) crashed at sea. In response to this, aircraft, naval vessels and ground forces of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF were voluntarily dispatched to conduct search and rescue operations from the same day to December 2. A cumulative total of about 790 personnel, about 50 aircraft, and about 10 vessels were dispatched for these operations. Following the voluntary dispatch, support for search activities was provided until the 23rd of the same month. Such operations were carried out with the cooperation of the Japan Coast Guard, local governments, local fishermen, and others. Crew members on their way to search from the minesweeper JS Bungo to confirm the effectiveness of municipal governments evacuation plan and to strengthen cooperation with relevant agencies in a nuclear disaster emergency. **(5) Formulating Plans for Responding to Various** **Disasters** The MOD/SDF establish basic items for actions to be taken by the SDF in the event of various disasters based on the Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan in order to take all possible measures for the initial response by promptly transporting and deploying units as well as to respond to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration by the Central Disaster Management Council.[2] With this, the MOD/SDF formulate various contingency plans to respond to such earthquakes with the aim of implementation of swift, systematic disaster relief. Based on the damage assumptions for a megaquake in the Japan Trench or the Chishima Trench as well as the Basic Plan for Promotion of Disaster Management for Trench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima Trenches announced by the Cabinet Office, the contingency plan[3] for this earthquake was formulated in FY2022. **(6) Collaboration with Local Governments and Other** **Relevant Organizations** It is important for the MOD/SDF to strengthen collaboration with local governments and other relevant organizations under normal circumstances for the purpose of conducting disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF implements various measures including: (1) Assignment of the post of Liaison Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Management (administrative official) at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices; (2) Temporary assignment of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and mutual exchange between administrative officials of both the GSDF **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Chapter 2, Section 5-2-7 (2) (Training Relocation for MV-22 (Osprey) etc.); Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Initiatives for Safety Management, etc.); Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 1-4-2 (3) (Crash of the U.S. Osprey); Reference 33 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces) **See** **(4) Responses to Nuclear Disasters** In order to respond to nuclear disasters, the MOD/SDF has formulated “The SDF Nuclear Disaster Response Plan.” The SDF also participates in general nuclear disaster prevention drills jointly implemented by the government, local governments and nuclear operators, **REFERENCE: Disaster relief operations** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/index.html** **REFERENCE: The MOD/SDF’s (disaster management)** **URL: https://twitter.com/ModJapan_saigai?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw** As one of the councils in the Cabinet Office, this council comprises the Prime Minister, all cabinet ministers, representatives of designated public organizations and academic experts and is responsible for preparing the basic plan for disaster prevention, deliberation on important matters related to disaster prevention and so on. ----- On January 1 2024, an earthquake with a maximum intensity of 7 (M7.6, depth of approximately 16 km) occurred with its epicenter in the Noto region of Ishikawa Prefecture. The governors of Ishikawa and Toyama prefectures issued a disaster relief request to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) the same day and January 4, 2024, respectively and it provided life-saving work, sanitation, transportation, food, water, bathing, road clearing and other services. In response, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) launched the aircraft immediately after the disaster to assess the damages, and organized a joint task force under the command of Commanding General of the Middle Army on the second day the same month, which carried out various activities using up to around 14,000 personnel. In this disaster relief operation, under circumstances where it was difficult to access the disaster areas from land due to their location at the tip of a peninsula where the road network had been cut off, the MOD/SDF dealt with the situation by mobilizing its integrated operational capabilities, including the intensive air mobility operation of the GSDF, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), as well as the use of the SDF vessels as bases at sea. In the operation in Ishikawa and Toyama prefectures (operations ended on January 9 in Toyama prefecture), in addition to lifesaving activities immediately after the disaster, the task force transported police, firefighters and DMAT personnel, etc. using the SDF aircraft, vessels and other means; conducted road-clearing work to allow traffic to pass through the road and other work; and did its best to provide detailed livelihood support activities close to the victims, including visits to evacuation centers to understand the requests from the victims and the operation of rest facilities using PFI ships. (As of March 31: (1) Transportation of supplies (about 4.3 million Members of the 23rd Squadron (ASDF Wajima Air Station), commonly known as the “Wajima 40s”, who began provided support to nearby residents and conducted search and rescue operations, etc. immediately after the disaster. (January 2024) Force (MSDF) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), as rations and about 2.3 million bottles of drinking water), (2) School well as the use of the SDF vessels as bases at sea. lunch support (about 250,000 rations), (3) Water supply support In the operation in Ishikawa and Toyama prefectures (operations (about 6,000 tons), (4) Bathing support (about 370,000 people, etc.) ended on January 9 in Toyama prefecture), in addition to lifesaving On January 5 the same year, with the approval of the Prime activities immediately after the disaster, the task force transported Minister, up to about 100 SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready police, firefighters and DMAT personnel, etc. using the SDF aircraft, Reserve Personnel were called up and a total of about 200 personnel, vessels and other means; conducted road-clearing work to allow including replacement personnel, engaged in activities to support traffic to pass through the road and other work; and did its best to livelihoods and hygiene in the affected areas. provide detailed livelihood support activities close to the victims, In terms of transportation of relief supplies and livelihood including visits to evacuation centers to understand the requests support, while the government of Japan as a whole worked to from the victims and the operation of rest facilities using PFI ships. provide “push-type” support, the relief supplies were first collected (As of March 31: (1) Transportation of supplies (about 4.3 million at one location (Kanazawa) by SDF trucks and other vehicles, then transported to each collection point and elsewhere **Various Operations in the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake** by helicopters and vehicles and later transported to respective evacuation centers. As for transportation by naval vessels, although the use of ports was difficult due to tsunami damage, etc. and roads were damaged, a Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) boat was launched from the transport ship “Osumi” to transport heavy equipment, including bulldozers and relief supplies. In addition, the U.S. Forces in Japan provided support for the transportation of relief supplies to Life-saving activities Landing of heavy machinery and other equipment by LCAC the disaster victims by air. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- Prime Minister Kishida encouraging SDF personnel and others at the site (January 2024) Defense Minister Kihara assessing the damages from above (January 2024) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** VOICE **Voice of an SDF Ready Reserve Member Engaged in Disaster Relief Operations in** **the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake** **MORIMURA Hiromu, GSDF** Since witnessing the active role of the Self-Defense Forces days off from work and was sent off with many kind words from during the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, I have been colleagues, superiors, and partner companies, who would have considering anything I could do to help in the event of disasters trouble because of my absence. This made me think of how big or emergencies in the future. When a path to the SDF Ready the expectations of Japanese people were while I prepared for the Reserve Personnel was opened in 2019, I immediately applied, handover and dispatch. Although there were times of bad weather and I now participate in training with the help of my workplace at the disaster-stricken area, I think I could help the disaster and family. Immediately after the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake victims to the best of my ability while remembering my original on January 1, I started preparing myself for the possibility of feeling of 13 years ago. I will continue to train my mind and body being dispatched to the disaster relief operations, and I could and strive to balance work and training so that I can respond to the respond promptly to the actual call for disaster relief. I took 10 task entrusted to me in an emergency. The author in his workplace (Boost Co., Ltd., Osaka City) Activities the author participated in the disaster area (transporting supplies by helicopter) **REFERENCE: Disaster relief for the Noto Peninsula Earthquake of 2024** **URL: http://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/domestic/2024notohantou.html** ----- Middle Army and Hyogo Prefectural Government; and resilience were approved by the Cabinet. Under the (3) Recommendation of retired SDF personnel with measures, the MOD intensively focuses on measures for knowledge in disaster prevention in accordance with mechanical equipment materials, etc., at SDF airfield requests from local governments. facilities and others, measures for enhancing the SDF’s As of the end of March 2024, 665 retired uniformed infrastructure and measures for strengthening the SDF’s SDF personnel are working in disaster prevention buildings, etc., from the perspective of maintaining and crisis management sections, etc. in 476 local and strengthening functions including important governments in 46 prefectures throughout the country. infrastructure for disaster prevention. Such cooperation in human resources is a very effective way of strengthening collaboration between **3** **Impact on Various Trainings due to** the MOD/SDF and local governments and its efficacy **Disaster Relief Activities** was confirmed through the responses to various kinds of disasters. In particular, each GSDF regional army Large-scale and long-term disaster relief activities have headquarters establishes a forum for interaction with been increasing in recent years and originally planned senior directors for crisis management and other officials training cannot be conducted during these disaster relief from local governments and shares information and activities, which sometimes hinders the training plans. exchanges opinions to strengthen collaboration with In the future, the MOD/SDF will make the utmost those local governments. effort to respond to life-saving activities during the In the event of a disaster, liaison officers are sent initial response and with regards to the various types quickly from the units to the local governments in order of emergency assistance, etc., the MOD/SDF will to ensure smooth coordination. coordinate the role sharing, response guidelines, activity periods and utilization of private companies, etc., with **(7) Actions Based on the Five-Year Acceleration** the relevant parties such as local governments and the **Measures for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and** relevant ministries and agencies. The posture will be **Building National Resilience** shifted as needed and activities will be carried out at an **Part** In December 2020, the five-year acceleration measures appropriate posture and scale. **Ⅲ** for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national **Chapter** **1** **2** **Responses to Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas** **1** **Basic Concept** **2** **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** In the event of natural disasters, turmoil and other For prompt and appropriate implementation of rescue emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense may order or transportation of Japanese nationals and others SDF units to protect and rescue or transport Japanese overseas, the SDF has prepared to dispatch its units nationals and other people overseas upon request from swiftly. Specifically, each SDF designates the necessary the Minister for Foreign Affairs and upon subsequent personnel and units for dispatch: helicopter units and consultations with the Minister. personnel for ground transportation units from GSDF; **See** Part II, Chapter 5, Paragraph 3-7 (Rescue and Transportation vessels such as transport vessel (including ship-based of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas); Reference 19 (Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas aircraft) from MSDF; and aircraft units and personnel by the Self-Defense Forces). from ASDF. Since these activities require close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, the MOD/SDF **4** In light of the increasingly severe and frequent occurrence of weather disasters due to climate change, the imminence of large-scale earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, as well as the aging of infrastructure that was intensively developed from Japan’s period of rapid economic growth, it is necessary to accelerate and deepen efforts for disaster prevention and mitigation as well as building national resilience. It is also essential to utilize digital technology to efficiently promote measures for building national resilience. To this end, efforts are being made for further acceleration and deepening of measures in the fields of “countermeasures against increasingly severe wind and flood damage, imminent large-scale earthquakes, etc.,” “acceleration of aging countermeasures towards a shift to preventive maintenance of infrastructure,” and “promotion of digitization, etc. to efficiently advance measures related to national ----- conducts joint exercises on a regular basis. From August to September 2022, the MOD/SDF conducted training in Japan with related organizations for the transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas to practice the entire process of the actions of units and coordination with the related organizations, which improved integrated operational capabilities and strengthened cooperation with the related organizations. Furthermore, from February to March 2024, the MOD/SDF took advantage of the opportunity of the annual multilateral joint exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand to rehearse on a series of activities for rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas in cooperation with the relevant ministries and agencies, the Embassy of Japan in Thailand and other organizations. The exercises strengthened the collaboration between the MOD/SDF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MOD/SDF has conducted the transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas in seven cases, two of which were carried out in 2023. The first case was the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in the Republic of Sudan. In April 2023, considering the situations in the Republic of Sudan and at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the MOD/SDF dispatched two C-130 transport aircraft, two C-2 transport aircraft and one KC767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the Republic of Djibouti. One C-2 transport aircraft transported 45 Japanese nationals and their families from Sudan to Djibouti. The second case was the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in Israel. In October 2023, considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the MOD/SDF dispatched one KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft and two C-2 transport aircraft to Jordan and other areas. One KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft transported 83 people[5] on October 21 and 46 people[6] on November 3 from Israel to Japan, respectively. **See** Reference 20 (Record of Transport of Japanese nationals and others overseas) After landing at Haneda Airport for the transportation of Japanese nationals and others from Israel **3** **Initiatives to Ensure the Safety of Japanese** **Nationals and Others Overseas in the** **Middle East and Africa Regions** The MOD/SDF has utilized the operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti used by the SDF units operating under the Counter-Piracy Measures Act[7], under circumstances such as the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in South Sudan in 2016 and the dispatch of an investigation team to Ethiopia in response to the worsening situation there in 2021. In light of this experience as well, the National Security Strategy (NSS) indicated a direction by stating that “…while gaining understanding from the Government of Djibouti, the SDF facility there, which has been in operation for counter-piracy activities, will be also utilized to protect Japanese nationals and others overseas.” On December 22 2023, the Cabinet approved the “Government Initiative to Ensure the Safety of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas in the Middle East and Africa” in order for the government of Japan to take all possible measures to rescue and transport Japanese nationals and others overseas. In response, a new mission establishing temporary arrangements for the possible rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas was newly assigned to counter-piracy units, such as the accumulation and management of equipment, defense cooperation and exchange utilizing the facility in Djibouti and the regular collection and analysis of information to ensure the rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **See** A total of 83 people comprising 60 Japanese nationals and their four foreign national family members, as well as 18 Korean nationals and their one foreign national family member. A total of 46 people comprising 20 Japanese nationals and their two foreign national family members, as well as 15 Korean nationals, four Vietnamese nationals, one Taiwanese and their four foreign national family members ----- others overseas. The MOD/SDF will take all possible measures to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals and others overseas. Reference 21 (Government Initiative to Ensure the Safety of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas in the Middle East and Africa) **See** **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **Japan-U.S. Alliance** **Chapter** **2** The National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) states that In addition, if an invasion against Japan occurs, Japan- the Alliance with the United States is the cornerstone for U.S. joint response will defeat the invasion. To this end, Japan’s security policy. The fundamental reinforcement both Japan and the United States will constantly modernize of Japan’s defense capabilities will lead to more effective the Alliance and strengthen joint capabilities by aligning employment of U.S. capabilities and further strengthen strategies and prioritizing goals together. In doing so, by the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan- building upon the fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s U.S. Alliance. By representing such joint resolve and own defense capabilities, Japan will play a larger role in capabilities, Japan and the United States will prevent the defense of Japan and the peace and stability of the the escalation of emergencies from gray-zone situations region under the Japan-U.S. Alliance. to an invasion with conventional force and eventually This chapter explains activities related to the the use of nuclear weapons, as well as deter unilateral enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. account of the concepts of the NDS. **Section 1** **Outline of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **1** **Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan will provide facilities **1** **Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security** and areas for the U.S. Forces, based on the provisions of In the current international community, a robust defense Article 6 of the treaty. If a nation plans to attack Japan, system capable of responding to every contingency, the attacker must be prepared to confront not only the **ⅢPart** ranging from all types of aggression, including the use of defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but nuclear weapons, to coercion or intimidation by military also the overwhelming military strength of the United **Chapter** power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and States, due to the U.S. obligation to defend Japan. As a **2** sovereignty of the nation. result, the opposing nation clearly recognizes that it will However, it is not easy even for the United States to suffer grievously if it carries out an invasion, and such guarantee its security on its own. Much more than that, it desires will be abandoned at the planning stage. In other would be difficult for Japan to ensure its national security words, this serves as deterrence against attacks. solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, Japan intends to create a seamless posture and land, and economy. secure its peace and security by effectively utilizing the Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace, deterrence capabilities of the U.S. military together with security, and independence centered on the Security Japan’s own national defense architecture. Arrangements with the United States, the world’s dominant military power, with which it shares basic **2** **Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the** values such as democracy, respect for human rights, the **Region surrounding Japan** rule of law, and a capitalist economy as well as interests in maintaining the peace and security of the world and Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that has strong economic ties. the purpose of the use of facilities and areas by the U.S. Specifically, Japan and the United States will take Forces in Japan is to contribute to the security of Japan bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against and the maintenance of international peace and security J b d h i i f A i l 5 f h J i h F E Thi i i i b d h i i ----- that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs. including politics, economy, and society. In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. states and the like with massive military power, Security Arrangements at its core, also forms the axis of including some that retain nuclear weapons or continue Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability nuclear development. In addition, uncertainty over the to implement positive efforts to maintain the peace existing order is increasing due to changes in the balance and security of the international community, including of power. The so-called gray-zone situations harbor the the promotion of multinational security dialogue and risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations. showing clear indications. Currently, we are confronted with global security In such security environment, the presence of U.S. challenges that are difficult for any countries to tackle forces in Japan provides deterrence against unexpected alone, including risks concerning stable use of the seas, contingencies caused by various security issues or outer space and cyberspace, acts of piracy, proliferation destabilizing factors, not only protecting the interests of of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, Japan and the United States but also providing a great and international terrorism, and it is important for sense of security to the nations in the region and thus countries to work together from peacetime. The strong fulfilling a role of public goods. bonds forged between Japan and the United States are Also, the close cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. also playing an important role in the efforts implemented Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges. United States’ commitment to the peace and stability In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security of the region surrounding Japan. These arrangements, Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are complemented by the alliances established between working together in peacetime from a variety of areas to the United States and other countries in the region such strengthen their cooperation. This close coordination lays as the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, the foundation for various forms of global collaboration and the Philippines, and also by the friendly relations such as counter-piracy, undertaken by the SDF and the developed with other countries, play an indispensable U.S. Forces, and leads to enhancement of the operational role in maintaining the peace and stability of the region. effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The peace and prosperity of the international **Part** community are closely linked to those of Japan. **Ⅲ** **3** **Responding to Global Issues** Accordingly, by advancing initiatives for resolving **Chapter** The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the global issues in cooperation with the United States, **2** foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative which has remarkable operational capabilities, Japan relationship between Japan and the United States, will be able to further ensure its security and prosperity. **2** **Content of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** The “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” The Guidelines define that Japan and the United States (the Guidelines), which show the general outline and will work on a variety of measures during peacetime, policy direction of roles and cooperation between Japan including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and the United States, were formulated in 1978, and (ISR) activities, air and missile defense, maritime successively revised in 1997 and 2015. security, training and exercises, asset protection, and The current Guidelines, which were revised in 2015, logistics support, and cooperate in such activities as update the general framework and policy direction for response to a large-scale disaster in Japan to seamlessly the roles and missions of the two countries, as well as ensure Japan’s peace and security. modernizing the Alliance. The Guidelines also manifest The Guidelines also require both countries: to a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater cooperate in international activities and promote and shared responsibilities by enhancing its deterrence and improve trilateral and multilateral cooperation for response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to regional and global peace and security; to cooperate ti i d b d t d l d h ----- bilateral enterprise through defense equipment improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. and technology cooperation as well as intelligence **See** Reference 23 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense cooperation and information security for further Cooperation); Reference 24 (Chronology of the Japan-U.S. Alliance) **3** **Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States** Japan and the United States have maintained close **KEY WORD** coordination at multiple levels, including the summit **Japan-U.S. “2+2”** level and ministerial level, and have continually The common name for the framework under which the Minister of Foreign strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the U.S. Secretary of State, and the U.S. the peace, stability and prosperity not only for the two Secretary of Defense gather to discuss security issues. Its official name countries but also for the entire international community, is the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC). In recent years, Japan has also held consultations under the “2+2” framework with including the Indo-Pacific region. countries other than the U.S., such as European countries, Australia, India, Close policy consultations on security are conducted Indonesia, and the Philippines. between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at various levels in the Governments of Japan and the **1** **Recent Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting** United States through meetings such as the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC, or **Japan-U.S.** In April, 2024, Prime Minister Kishida made the first **“2+2”), the Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee (SSC),** official visit to the United States by a Japanese prime and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). minister in nine years.[1] During the official visit, Prime As the ministerial consultations among the top officials in Minister Kishida held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, and delivered a speech at a Joint Meeting of the U.S. the “2+2” Meeting represents such policy consultations, Congress, in which he set out a message for the future and functions as an important consultative panel. regarding what Japan and the United States, as global In addition, seizing several opportunities, the Ministry partners, intend to leave to future generations, and what of Defense (MOD) organizes Japan-U.S. defense efforts will be made to achieve it. ministerial meetings where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective **Part** governments and defense cooperation, and furthermore, **Ⅲ** MOD officials, including the Administrative Vice- **Chapter** Minister of Defense and respective Chiefs of Staff of **2** the SDF, have working-level meetings and exchange necessary opinions, etc. on a regular basis. For example, Defense Minister Kihara and U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin met face-to-face in October 2023 and May 2024, and by telephone in September 2023, December 2023, and March 2024. In order to further improve the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the MOD is actively conducting such consultations and other activities to Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 2024) share information and views between Japan and the 【Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan】 United States, and to discuss specific measures to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. After the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, a United States- Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement titled “Global Partners for the Future” was issued. Regarding the strengthening ----- of defense and security cooperation, the two leaders announced that to enhance the interoperability of the SDF and the U.S. Force, the respective command and control frameworks of Japan and the United States would be upgraded; a Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) to promote codevelopment, co-production, and co-sustainment would be established. They reaffirmed the critical importance of continuing to enhance extended deterrence and statement called for the in-depth discussions on extended deterrence on the occasion of the next security “2+2” meeting. **2** **Recent Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting** In May 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held a defense ministerial meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin in Hawaii, where they reaffirmed that unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts should not be tolerated in any region, including the IndoPacific, and that the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond need to be strengthened to that end. The two sides also affirmed that they would work closely together to realize the initiatives to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of Japan-U.S. Alliance announced at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April of the same year, and that they would continue Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (May 2024) to strengthen cooperation with like-minded regional partners to realize Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). In particular, the two sides agreed to continue discussions on upgrading their respective command and control framework and other issues for the purpose of enhancing interoperability between the U.S. force and the SDF, to further deepen equipment cooperation between Japan and the United States through the DICAS framework while making preparations for the early convening of DICAS, and to deepen ministerial-level discussions on extended deterrence on the occasion of the next “2+2” meeting. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** |Consultative Forum|Participants|Col3|Purpose|Legal Basis| |---|---|---|---|---| ||Japanese Side|U.S. Side||| |Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”)|Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense|U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense (Note 1)|Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security|Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty| |Security Subcommittee (SSC)|Participants are not specified (Note 2)|Participants are not specified (Note 2)|Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States|Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others| |Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) (Note 3)|Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director-General of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense, and Representative of Joint Staff|Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: the U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, USINDOPACOM|Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies|Established in the 16th “2+2” Meeting on July 8, 1976 as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Reorganized in the Japan- U.S. vice-ministerial level consultation on June 28, 1996| |Japan-U.S. Joint Committee (JC)|Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Director-General of the Bureau of Policies for Regional Society, Ministry of Defense, and others|Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister at the U.S. Embassy, and others|Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement|Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement| Fig. III-2-1-1 Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues (Notes) 1 The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990. 2 Meetings are held from time to time between working level officials of the two Governments such as officials corresponding in rank to vice minister or assistant secretary ----- Fig.Ⅲ 2 1 1 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning JapanU.S. Security Issues), Section 2 (Strengthening the Joint Deterrence and Response Capabilities of Japan and the United States); Reference 25 (Japan-U.S. Consultations (Since 2020)); Reference 26 (Joint Statement of the JapanU.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) (Provisional Translation) (January 2023); Reference 27 (Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Ministerial Meeting (Outline) (January 2023) **See** **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **Commentary** **Measures to Strengthen the Alliance** The Japan-U.S. Alliance, coupled with Japan’s own defense serving as the army’s top uniformed official, the Chief of Staff of system, is a key pillar of security in Japan and the cornerstone the Army, and General Smith, serving as the top marine corps, the of peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Its Commandant of the Marine Corps, made their first visit to Japan importance has never been greater, as the security environment after taking office. While the United States is Japan’s only ally, the surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe. For this reason, Unite States has many allies around the world, including NATO the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) member states. In this situation, what the former U.S. Ambassador and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Forces are to Japan Mike Mansfield once said, “The U.S.-Japan relationship working together to strengthen the Alliance through cooperation is the unparalleled, most important bilateral relationship,” still rings in various fields. true today. In recent years, there has been renewed momentum As part of efforts to strengthen the Alliance between Japan for defense cooperation between Japan and the United States in and the United States, face-to-face and non-face-to-face line with the formulation of national security strategies and the communications have been conducted at various levels between fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s own defense capabilities. the two countries, aside from policy consultations such as the Ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region based on Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) and the the Japan-U.S. Alliance is also receiving increasing attention in Defense Ministers’ Meeting. The related departments at the MOD the United States. The MOD/SDF will continue to work closely and their U.S. counterparts, including those at the DoD such as with the United States to strengthen the deterrence and response section chiefs and persons in charge, exchange opinions all the capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to realize a free and open time via e-mail and telephone. Video conferences are also held Indo-Pacific (FOIP). when face-to-face, openhearted discussions are necessary. In addition, proactive face-to-face dialogues allow the two countries to share information and their understanding in real time and provide an opportunity to show the strong human relationships between Japan and the Unites States domestically and internationally. In 2023, there was a series of changes in the commanders of military services in the United States, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest-ranking U.S. military officer. What is noteworthy is that many of the newly assigned commanders chose Japan as their first destination after assuming office and met with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF. For example, General George, A meeting with the U.S. Department of Defense ----- **Section 2** **Strengthening the Joint Deterrence and Response ** **Capabilities of Japan and the United States** Japan’s NDS and the United States’ National Defense improve allied response capabilities, including readiness Strategy are well aligned in prioritizing the prevention and interoperability of the Alliance, through more of unilateral changes to the status quo by force through advanced and practical training and exercises. integrating all approaches and means. In addition, in order to ensure that U.S. **extended** Accordingly, from the viewpoint of reinforcing **deterrence with nuclear deterrence at its core remains** readiness and resiliency, imposing costs on opponents, credible and resilient, Japan will further actively and deterring invasion against Japan, Japan will engage in and deepen bilateral discussions on extended further deepen discussion with the United States on deterrence, including those at the ministerial level. their respective roles, missions, and capabilities, and In order to deter unilateral changes to the status quo further reinforce the joint deterrence capabilities of both by force and such attempts as well as to deter various countries in an integrated manner.[1] contingencies from occurring, Japan further expands and Specifically, Japan will further deepen cooperation evolves operations such as bilateral flexible deterrent with the United States to smoothly implement allied options (FDO) and joint intelligence, surveillance and cross-domain operations including space, cyberspace reconnaissance (ISR) as to the joint measures between and the electromagnetic spectrum as well as to improve Japan and the U.S. in peacetime. In order to effectively interoperability. Regarding Japan’s counterstrike conduct these operations, Japan will actively make such capabilities, Japan will work with the United States to efforts as promoting the participation of like-minded establish a cooperative posture, including information countries and others and the SDF protecting U.S. assets gathering, in order to employ their joint capabilities such as vessels and aircraft. more effectively. Furthermore, Japan will reinforce Furthermore, as part of efforts to strengthen allied collaboration in such areas as air-defense; anti-surface deterrence and response capabilities, Japan will, on a warfare; anti-submarine warfare; mine warfare; regular basis, increase the joint/shared use of Japanese amphibious operations; airborne operations; intelligence, and U.S. facilities and promote the mutual deployment of **Part** surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT); both countries’ units to both Japanese and U.S. facilities **Ⅲ** protection of assets and facilities; and logistics support. for training or other purposes. In order to effectively realize the division of roles **Chapter** and missions between Japan and the United States **KEY WORD** **Extended Deterrence** **2** in light of the fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s Referring to the provision of a country’s deterrence capabilities to its allies defense capabilities, Japan will ensure close operational and others. The purposes include to prevent invasion by hostile countries, coordination with the United States through Japan- etc. and provide reassurance to allied nations and others. Japan receives extended deterrence from its ally, the United States. U.S. bilateral planning. In addition, Japan will work to **1** **Cooperation in the Space and Cyber Domains** The National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) states Japan-U.S. SCC (“2+2”) that both sides consider that that Japan and the United States will further deepen attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge efforts to enhance cooperation and interoperability for to the security of the Alliance, and that affirmed such the smooth implementation of Japan-U.S. joint cross- attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the domain operations, including in the space, cyber, and invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. electromagnetic spectrum domains. In September the same year, Defense Minister Kihara In particular, it was confirmed at the January 2023 received a courtesy call from Gen. Saltzman, the Chief **1** It should be noted that there is no change in the facts that all activities of the SDF will be conducted pursuant to The Constitution of Japan, domestic laws and regulations, etc. under the ----- of Space Operations, United States Space Force and both parties confirmed that the two countries would accelerate cooperation between their respective defense authorities, including SDA (Space Domain Awareness), to ensure the stable use of outer space amid an increasingly severe security environment. In addition, Japan and the United States have continued to exchange information on topics such as the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the area of security and multilateral challenges. **See** Chapter 1, Section 4-4 (Responses in the Space Domain); Chapter 1, Section 4-5 (Responses in the Cyber Domain); Chapter 1, Section 4-6 (Responses in the Domain of Defense Minister Kihara and Gen. Saltzman, the Chief of Space Operations, Electromagnetic Spectrum) United States Space Force (September 2023) **2** **Integrated Air and Missile Defense** Regarding the response to airborne threats coming to are cooperating in the event of North Korea’s repeated Japan, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and ballistic missile launches by utilizing the Alliance aircraft, Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have Coordination Mechanism (ACM). been enhanced by conducting Japan-U.S. joint air In the Missile Defense Review (MDR) released in defense/missile defense exercises in addition to sharing October 2022, the United States clearly indicated the operational information and establishing response importance of cooperation with allies, including Japan. procedures. In addition, Japan and the United States **See** Chapter 1, Section 4-2 (Responses to Missile Attacks) **3** **Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities** With regard to joint ISR activities, it is important to 2022. In addition, the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Information implement such activities broadly in the Asia-Pacific Analysis Cell (BIAC) was established at Yokota Air Base region with cooperation between Japan and the United (Tokyo) in order to jointly analyze information collected **Part** States to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the by Japanese and U.S. information gathering assets, **Ⅲ** activities of both countries. including MQ-9. At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial **Chapter** The expansion of these bilateral ISR activities Meeting held in June 2023, it was confirmed that MQ-9 **2** will function as deterrence, and will also ensure and BIAC play a significant role in strengthening the information superiority over other nations and enable ISR capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Based on the the establishment of a seamless cooperation structure results of operations for about a year at MSDF Kanoya throughout all phases from peacetime to contingencies. Air Base the U.S. Forces began operating MQ-9 at the As part of these efforts, the temporary deployment Kadena Air Base (Okinawa Prefecture) in October of the of the U.S. Forces’ MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicles to same year to further enhance ISR activities in the region to Kanoya Air Base of the Maritime Self-Defense Force meet intelligence gathering needs in the sea and airspace (MSDF) (Kagoshima Prefecture) began in November surrounding the southwestern region. **4** **Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces** Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law states that surveillance and reconnaissance activities, including the the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is authorized to protect surveillance of ballistic missiles; SDF vessels provided the assets for the U.S. Forces and other forces engaged protection for the U.S. Forces vessels on 13 occasions in activities to help defend Japan in cooperation with the during bilateral/multilateral exercises and SDF aircraft SDF. In 2023, the SDF vessels provided protection for provided protection for U.S. Forces aircraft five times. th U S F l f ti d i i t lli ----- |Disaster relief|Transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas| |---|---| |International disaster relief activities|| |U.S. Forces staying temporarily at Self-Defense Forces facilities for regular duties|| |Guarding operation|Counter-piracy operations| |Destruction of ballistic missiles, etc.|Removal of underwater mines| |Rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas|Warning and surveillance activities| |U.S. Forces staying temporarily at U.S. Forces facilities for regular duties|| |Important Influence Situations|Armed Attack Situations| |---|---| ||Anticipated Armed Attack Situations| ||Survival-Threatening Situations| **See** Part II, Chapter 5, Paragraph 3-8 (Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2 (Australia); Reference 22 (Track Record of Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces) (SDF Law Article 95-2)) Fig. III-2-2-1 Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Significance of reciprocal provision of supplies and services In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by the units themselves. However, in such cases where allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services on site would enhance the flexibility of the operations. Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Image of the circumstances and preconditions for the situations Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises Multilateral exercises with Japan & U.S. participation Armed Attack Situations Disaster relief nationals and others overseasTransportation of Japanese International disaster relief activities Anticipated Armed Attack Situations U.S. Forces staying temporarily at Self-Defense Forces facilities for regular duties Important Influence Situations Guarding operation Counter-piracy operations Destruction of ballistic Removal of Survival-Threatening Situations missiles, etc. underwater mines Rescue of Japanese nationals Warning and and others overseas surveillance activities U.S. Forces staying temporarily at U.S. Forces facilities for regular duties UN Peacekeeping Operation Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security Joint International Peace International humanitarian assistance Response Situations From SDF conducting international peace cooperation assignments to U.S. Forces responding to disasters (Notes) 1 Activities that became applicable following the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security. 2 Provision of ammunition for all activities and situations other than Armed Attack Situations / Anticipated Armed Attack Situations falls under the scope of the new agreement. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **2** **5** **Logistics Support** Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted other party to provide supplies or services, the Agreement, through logistics support based on the Japan-U.S. in principle, allows the requested party to do so.[2] Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Following the passage of the Legislation for Peace and signed in 1996 and revised in 1999 and 2004. The Security in September 2015, the new Japan-U.S. ACSA Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the was signed in September 2016, ratified by the Diet in smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. April 2017, and entered into force. This has enabled the Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace same framework as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA, such taken under the leadership of the United Nations (UN). Its as settlement procedures, to be applied to the provision scope of application includes various occasions such as of supplies and services that had become possible under bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief the Legislation for Peace and Security, so that since April activities, international peace cooperation assignments, 2017 food and fuel have been provided to the U.S. Forces international disaster relief activities, and armed attack engaged in information collection and other activities. situations. If either the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the **See** Fig. III-2-2-1 (Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)) **2** The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlifts); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage services; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance services; airport and seaport ----- **6** **Bilateral Training and Exercises** Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises in peacetime not only contribute greatly to maintaining and enhancing bilateral response capabilities by improving interoperability, including mutual understanding of tactics and communication, but are also beneficial for improving tactical skills for each participant. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Japanese side learns from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities. In addition, conducting bilateral exercises at effective Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise in Southern Okinawa (January 2024) times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises. commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United **See** Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these Reference 28 (Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2023) perspectives, the MOD/SDF is continuing its initiatives **7** **Extended Deterrence** The Japanese and U.S. governments established the Japan- administrative level, during the Japan-U.S. “2+2” U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) in 2010 as an meeting in January 2023, extended deterrence was one enduring venue to discuss ways to sustain and strengthen of the agenda items, and in-depth discussions were held extended deterrence, which is at the core of the Japan-U.S. at a ministerial level. Alliance. The EDD was held at Whiteman Air Force Base Efforts to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence will in Missouri in June 2023 and in Japan in December 2023. continue to be promoted through the EDD and various high- In addition to the EDDs that have been held at the level discussions such as the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting. **Part** **Ⅲ** **8** **Joint/Shared Use** **Chapter** The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas States are proactively engaged in consultations, and **2** also means increasing bases for the SDF’s activities such as specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enables the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) has been using closer operational coordination, enhanced interoperability, and Camp Hansen since March 2008 for training. Moreover, improved flexibility and resiliency during bilateral activities. the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, Headquarters to Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation including Naha Air Base of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), of the then GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, operational limitations. The joint/shared use of facilities and the development of training ranges in Guam and the areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) in Okinawa will Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island) for shared use greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration. and facilitate implementation of bilateral training and exercises Moreover, securing ammunition storage is an as well as enhance interoperability between the SDF and the important issue for acquiring the various types of U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and contribute to ammunition necessary to ensure and maintain sufficient ensuring the safety of local people in case of a disaster. war fighting sustainability, and specific coordination Thus, while taking into account the SDF defense posture has begun for additional joint/shared use of ammunition in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, and storage by the SDF within the Kadena Ammunition l ti ith l l iti J d th U it d St A f ilit d f th USFJ ----- **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **Commentary** **Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue** Japan is facing the most severe and complicated security fundamental reinforcing of Japan’s own defense capabilities, environment since the end of World War II, and particularly in areas based on the current security environment surrounding Japan. surrounding Japan, the arms buildup, including nuclear and missile For this reason, the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) has forces, is progressing rapidly. Against the backdrop of a high level been held between Japan and the United States on a regular of increased defense budget, China has rapidly and extensively basis since 2010 as the first consultation regarding U.S. extended strengthened its military capabilities, including nuclear and missile deterrence in the East Asian region to discuss efforts to sustain and forces, and it has been pointed out that China may possess more strengthen extended deterrence, including nuclear deterrence. In than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. North Korea is considered 2023, the EDD was held in the United States in June and in Japan to have the technical ability to attack Japan with ballistic missiles in December with attendance of the divisions in charge of security equipped with nuclear weapons and also believed to be working on policy and arms control of both countries as well as the Self- establishing an institutional system for nuclear weapons, such as Defense Forces, the U.S. Strategic Command, the U.S. Indo-Pacific adopting laws and regulations that stipulate the conditions for the Command, and the U.S. Forces in Japan, etc. In these dialogues, use of nuclear weapons. Russia continues its attack on Ukraine, Japan and the United States held in-depth discussions on extended repeating words and actions that could be interpreted as nuclear deterrence and consulted on measures to further enhance relevant threats, and in February 2023, it announced its suspension of the bilateral cooperation. They assessed the security environment in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which sets an Indo-Pacific region and reviewed conventional and U.S. nuclear upper limit on strategic nuclear forces between the United States capabilities contributing to regional deterrence, and highlighted the and Russia. There is a possibility that dependency on nuclear forces importance of optimizing the Alliance’s force posture and activities will increase in Russia, given a large loss of its conventional forces to bolster deterrence effectiveness. They also exchanged views in the invasion of Ukraine. Amid a trend toward military buildups in on efforts to further enhance bilateral discussions on extended countries surrounding Japan, extended deterrence of the United deterrence, measures to further improve concrete bilateral States, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential to counter cooperation, and approaches to arms controls. Furthermore, the the threat of nuclear weapons. two sides conducted tabletop exercises which have regularly been The United States has confirmed on numerous occasions its conducted, and the delegations toured critical deterrence assets defense obligations to Japan and extended deterrence under the for both countries, such as the B-2 strategic bomber in the United Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan has the utmost confidence States and the amphibious aircraft of the GSDF Amphibious Rapid that the United States will fulfill its treaty obligations using all Deployment Brigade (AAV7) in Japan, and deepened common of its might, including its nuclear capabilities. It is important to understandings on the abilities of Japan and the United States and prevent the escalation of situations to the point of using nuclear the importance of defense of the Southwestern Islands. weapons and to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by Extended deterrence was also discussed at the ministerial level force and such attempts through the promotion of efforts between in Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting in January 2023. Japan and the United States to maintain and further strengthen In this way, efforts to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence will the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, coupled with the be promoted through the EDD and discussions at various levels. Touring the B-2 strategic bomber at the EDD in June Discussions at the EDD in December [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense] ----- |Joint Committee (JC)|Col2|Col3|Alliance Coordination Group (ACG)|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan Side Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Representative)|U.S. Side Deputy Commander of USFJ (Representative)||Director General-level|Japan Side Representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat (including the National Security Secretariat), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies* *Representatives may participate as needed|U.S. Side Representatives from the National Security Council*, Department of State*, American Embassy in Japan, Office of the Secretary of Defense*, Joint Staff*, United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)*, U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies* *Representatives may participate as needed| ||||Director- level||| ||||Action Officer level||| |Policy coordination on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement|||○ Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces ○ To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC.||| |all matters requiring mutual the implementation of orces Agreement ○ Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of the SDF and ○ To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC. Mutual coordination and information exchange|Col2| |---|---| |Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC)|| |Japan Side Representatives from Joint Staff and Staff Offices of each SDF service|U.S. Side Representatives from USINDOPACOM and USFJ| |Primary element responsible for conducting operational coordination related to activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces|| |Mutual coordination and information exchange|Col2| |---|---| |Component Coordination Centers (CCCs)|| |Japan Side Representatives from each component of the SDF|U.S. Side Representatives from each component of the U.S. Armed Forces| |○ CCCs will facilitate component-level bilateral coordination. ○ As appropriate, if either Japan or the United States, or both, establish Joint Task Forces (JTFs), JTFs may further establish CCCs.|| **Section 3** **Reinforcing Alliance Coordination Functions** **1** **Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)** In November 2015, based on the “Guidelines for (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” (the Guidelines), the Japan as well as for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region Japanese and U.S. governments established the Alliance and globally; and (3) it enables whole-of-government Coordination Mechanism (ACM) in order to seamlessly coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant and effectively implement a well-aligned Japan-U.S. Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics response to address any situation that affects Japan’s enable the Japanese and U.S. Governments to peace and security or any other situation that may require respond appropriately and promptly when the need an Alliance response. for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a Based on the framework shown in Fig. III-2-3-1, largescale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a the ACM coordinates policy and operational aspects diversity of coordination in the policy and operational related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S. aspects related to activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. Forces. The utilization of the ACM makes it possible This mechanism also contributes to timely information to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the sharing as well as to the development and maintenance involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations of common situational awareness. at various levels. The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) Since the establishment of the ACM, Japan and the it is the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime; United States have been utilizing the ACM to coordinate Fig. III-2-3-1 The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) Higher levels between the two nations including the Minister/Secretary level As needed Joint Committee (JC) Alliance Coordination Group (ACG) **Part** Japan Side U.S. Side Director Japan Side U.S. Side **Ⅲ** Representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat Representatives from the National Security Council*, Director-General of Deputy Commander General-level (including the National Security Secretariat), Department of State*, American Embassy in Japan, **Chapter** the North American of USFJ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Office of the Secretary of Defense*, Joint Staff*, Director- Affairs Bureau, (Representative) level Defense/Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and other relevant ministries, departments, United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)*, U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant ministries, **2** Ministry of Foreign Affairs and agencies* departments, and agencies* (Representative) Action Officer level *Representatives may participate as needed *Representatives may participate as needed Policy coordination on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of - Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement - To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC. Mutual coordination and information exchange Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC) Japan Side U.S. Side Representatives from Joint Staff and Staff Offices of each SDF service Representatives from USINDOPACOM and USFJ Primary element responsible for conducting operational coordination related to activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces Mutual coordination and information exchange Component Coordination Centers (CCCs) Japan Side U.S. Side Representatives from each component of the SDF Representatives from each component of the U.S. Armed Forces - CCCs will facilitate component-level bilateral coordination. - As appropriate, if either Japan or the United States, or both, establish Joint Task Forces (JTFs), JTFs may further establish CCCs. ----- closely, including in response to the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake[1] and the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake[2], the ballistic missile launches by North Korea, and VOICE **What Was Felt from Coordination between Japan and the United States** **Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division, Bureau of Defense Policy** **Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan** **Jeremy Gardinier, Army Major** **TAKAHASHI Akihiro, Commander** Since July 2022, I have been serving as the Deputy Chief of I have been working in the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Government Relations in USFJ Headquarters located at Yokota Air Base. Division of the Bureau of Defense Policy since March 2022 and The primary role of USFJ is to deter and counter threats to am in charge of coordination between Japan and the United States Japan and to strengthen the Japan-U. S. Alliance in order to in the Alliance Coordination Group (ACG). maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific. The ACG was set up with the aim of seamlessly responding to The most important function I believe to be assigned in USFJ is my all situations, from ordinary times to times of emergency, and in role as an officer in charge of the Alliance Coordination Group (ACG). reality, it works closely with the Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan ACG is a working level framework of the Alliance Coordination located at Yokota Air Base on a daily basis regarding various kinds Mechanism (ACM), which was established based on the 2015 of coordination between Japan and the United States. Guidelines for Japan-U. S. Defense Cooperation, and is a framework In the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake, the U.S. military gave established to respond flexibly, promptly, and effectively to various significant support based on the prompt Japan-U.S. coordination situations in a severe environment where a rapid response is required. immediately after the disaster through the Alliance Coordination In the aftermath of the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake, Mechanism (ACM). I would like to take this opportunity to express NSS, MOFA, and other relevant ministries and agencies gathered my heartfelt gratitude to the members of the U.S. military who together to make the necessary coordination based on the ACM were engaged in the disaster relief efforts. and were able to demonstrate the utility of the ACM in a highly Through this work, I was able to realize that even the meaningful way. “alliance adjustment mechanism” stems from people-to-people I am very pleased to have been able to coordinate US support connections. I would like to continue working side-by-side with my much faster than in the past and to contribute to its success, so U.S. counterparts to further strengthen Japan-U.S. cooperation in that our support can reach those who need it. the ACG. I would like to continue to contribute to smoother bilateral coordination. The authors participating in a meeting (innermost) The authors standing together **1** A series of seismic activities that occurred mainly in Kumamoto Prefecture in April 2016. Chinese activities in the waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands. The National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) calls **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- |Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC)|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Foreign Minister|Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC)|State Secretary| |Defense Minister||U.S. Secretary of Defense| |Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan Side ○ DG of the North American Affairs Bureau MOFA DG of the Defense Policy Bureau MOD ○ Joint Staff|U.S. Side ○ Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense ○ U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, INDOPACOM| ||| |Assist SCC develop planning guidance in close coordination with BPC; advise SCC throughout the bilateral planning; coordinate the actions of all the elements of BPM; discuss procedures and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters|| |Interagency Coordination Forum (IACF)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan Side Japan Representatives of the Cabinet Secretariat, NSS, MOFA, MOD|U.S. Side U.S. Representatives of the U.S. Embassy JP, USINDOPACOM, USFJ| |Coordination among relevant ministries and agencies (RMAs) of both countries, explanation provided by RMAs, provision of additional information etc.|| |Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan Side Representatives of SDF|U.S. Side Representatives of USINDOPACOM, USFJ| |Conduct Bilateral Planning|| for Japan to further upgrade the overall coordination enhance collaboration with like minded countries and functions between Japan and the United States others centered around the Japan-U.S. Alliance. centered on the ACM and to promote closer operational **See** Fig. III-2-3-1 (The Framework of Alliance Coordination coordination by leveraging the ACM and others to Mechanism (ACM)) **2** **Closer Operational Coordination** Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to Japan’s governments recognize the importance of collocating peace and security. In the development of bilateral plans, operational coordination functions. The SDF and the U.S. the BPM performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial- Forces exchange personnel to ensure robust information level directions and supervision and the involvement of sharing, to facilitate smooth coordination, and to support relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as international activities. conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral governments established the Bilateral Planning plans. The two governments are supposed to conduct Mechanism (BPM) in November 2015 for the purpose bilateral planning through the BPM. of implementing the development of bilateral plans in **See** Fig. III-2-3-2 (The Framework of the Bilateral Planning peacetime in line with the Guidelines to enable effective Mechanism (BPM)) Fig. III-2-3-2 The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) Prime Minister President **Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM)** Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Foreign Minister State Secretary Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Defense Minister U.S. Secretary of Defense Interagency Coordination as necessary Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) Japan Side U.S. Side **Part** - DG of the North American Affairs Bureau MOFA - Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Interagency Coordination Forum (IACF) DG of the Defense Policy Bureau MOD Secretary of Defense **Ⅲ** Japan Side U.S. Side - Joint Staff - U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, INDOPACOM **Chapter** Japan Representatives U.S. Representatives of **2** of the Cabinet Secretariat, the U.S. Embassy JP, Assist SCC develop planning guidance in close coordination with BPC; advise SCC throughout NSS, MOFA, MOD USINDOPACOM, USFJ the bilateral planning; coordinate the actions of all the elements of BPM; discuss procedures and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters Coordination among relevant ministries and agencies (RMAs) of both countries, explanation provided by Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC) RMAs, provision of additional information etc. Japan Side U.S. Side Representatives of SDF Representatives of USINDOPACOM, USFJ Conduct Bilateral Planning Legend: Coordination Command under the BPM SDF/USF chain of command ----- **Section 4** **Reinforcing the Foundation for Allied Response** The National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) states that Japan will reinforce the foundational elements that support effective allied response in all phases. **1** **Information Security and Cybersecurity** In order to further reinforce information sharing at all both sides emphasized the foundational importance of levels, Japan will fundamentally reinforce efforts related cybersecurity and information security for the Alliance, to information security and cybersecurity so that Japan and concurred to intensify collaboration to counter and the United States can fully employ their capabilities. increasingly sophisticated and persistent cyber threats. In the January 2023 Japan-U.S. SCC (“2+2”), **2** **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** In order to ensure the Alliance’s technological edge, technologies, including military technologies related to interoperability, readiness, and warfighting sustainability, joint technological research on BMD. In addition, at the Japan will further reinforce defense equipment and Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting in January 2022, Japan and technology cooperation through joint analysis and joint the United States concluded the framework Exchange research in cutting-edge technology, joint development of Notes on Cooperative Research, Development, and production of defense equipment, improvement in Production and Sustainment as well as Cooperation mutual interchangeability, shared use and reinforcement in Testing and Evaluation. Based on this Exchange of of various networks, expansion of production and Notes, Japan will advance cooperation with the United maintenance capabilities of U.S. military equipment in States on emerging technologies. Both countries consult Japan, and reinforcement of supply chains. with each other at forums such as the Systems and Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct cooperative equipment and technology with the United States based research and development regarding the specific projects **Part** on the mutual cooperation principle under the Japan- agreed upon at these forums. In September 2023, the **Ⅲ** U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Defense Science and Technology Cooperation Group **Chapter** Agreement between Japan and the United States of (DSTCG) was newly established to focus on discussion **2** America, while bearing in mind the maintenance of the about technology policy between Japan and the United technological and industrial bases. In view of the progress in technology cooperation system between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. Instead, in 1983, Japan signed the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America,[1] later superseded by the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America signed in 2006.[2] Under these frameworks, Japan has decided to provide the Signing of Terms of Reference to establish the Defense Science and Technology United States with 20 items of arms and military Cooperation Group (DSTCG) **1** Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America ----- At the Japan U.S. Summit Meeting held in April 2024, it was announced that a Forum on Japan-U.S. Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) convened. This forum is based on the existing Japan-U.S. Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) to restructure developmentally. The purpose of DICAS is to identify priority areas for partnering Japan and the U.S. industry, including co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment, considering the industrial capabilities. This initiative aims to promote mutually beneficial cooperation which will satisfy requirements for critical capabilities in the long run. Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-3 (Deepening Relationships with the United States Regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains the production, sustainment and maintenance of common equipment (F-35 fighter aircraft and Ospreys) between Japan and the United States. **See** Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-1 (Systems Regarding Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-3 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation); Reference 29 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects) States and the first Executive Level meeting was held. Additionally, Japan concluded a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Arrangement with the United States[3] in June 2016, and the defense ministers of the two countries later signed a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding[4] (RDP MOU) at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in the same month. The MOU promotes measures based on reciprocity (providing information necessary to tender bids for businesses of the other country, protecting submitted corporate information, waiving restrictions on participation by businesses of the other country, etc.), concerning the procurement of equipment by Japanese and U.S. defense authorities. The expiration of the Arrangement and the MOU was extended in May 2021. At the “2+2” and the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in January 2023, the Ministers signed a framework for (1) accelerating joint research and development[5] and (2) strengthening supply chain cooperation,[6] and (3) confirmed substantial progress in the framework for streamlining foreign military sales (FMS). **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Exchange of Notes between Japan and the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Projects between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Department of Defense of the United States of America ----- **Section 5** **Efforts Concerning the Stationing of the USFJ** Under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the presence a very important initiative for mitigation of the impact on of the United States Forces of Japan (USFJ) functions as local communities, including those in Okinawa, and further deterrence, while on the other hand, given the impacts of strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of the the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Therefore, the MOD will steadily local residents, it is necessary to make efforts appropriate advance the realignment and other initiatives and make for the actual situation of each area in order to mitigate continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation the impacts. In particular, the realignment of the USFJ is of the local communities hosting USFJ facilities and areas. **1** **Stationing of the USFJ** **1** **Significance of the Stationing of the USFJ** **2** **Measures concerning the Stationing of the USFJ** Given the increasingly severe security environment The Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)[1] surrounding Japan, it is necessary to maintain the presence stipulates matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas of the USFJ and its readiness to make rapid and agile actions and the status of the USFJ, including the furnishing of in case of emergency in Japan and the surrounding areas facilities and areas for use by the USFJ (USFJ facilities even in peacetime, so that the Japan-U.S. Alliance based and areas), and satisfying the labor requirements of the on Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements functions enough as USFJ. In addition, the Supplementary Agreement on the a deterrent power that contributes to the peace and stability Environment[2] enhances cooperation for environmental of the defense of Japan and the region. stewardship relating to the USFJ, and the Supplementary Therefore, Japan accepts the stationing of the U.S. Agreement on Civilian Component[3] clarifies the scope Forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and it is of the civilian component, etc. a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Also, it is essential to realize the stable stationing of **(1) Furnishing of USFJ Facilities and Areas** the USFJ in order to make a swift joint response to an Japan furnishes USFJ facilities and areas under the armed attack on Japan based on Article 5 of the Japan- provision of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements **Part** U.S. Security Treaty. In addition, the actions of U.S. reached through the Joint Committee between the **Ⅲ** Forces for the defense of Japan are conducted not only governments of Japan and the United States. **Chapter** by the USFJ but also by timely reinforcements. The The Government of Japan concludes lease contracts **2** USFJ is supposed to be the basis for them. with owners of private and public lands of USFJ While Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty facilities and areas to ensure the stable use. However, if stipulates the duty of the U.S. to defend Japan, the U.S. there is no approval by the landowners, the Government is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan based obtains usage rights[4] under the Act on Special Measures on Article 6 for the purpose of maintaining the security for USFJ Land Release,[5] by compensating any loss by of Japan and international peace and security in the Far the landowners. East. Therefore, though the duties of each side are not There are some facilities and areas temporarily the same, they are balanced overall. furnished to the USFJ in accordance with the SOFA when the U.S. Forces use SDF facilities for a limited period, **1** Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan **2** Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship Relating to the United States Armed Forces in Japana, Supplementary to Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan **3** Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation with regard to Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan **4** The term “title” means a legal cause that justifies a certain act. **5** Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of ----- for example, during Japan U.S. bilateral exercise. **(2) Satisfying Labor Requirements of the USFJ** The SOFA stipulates that the manpower (labor) required by the USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan. As of the end of FY2023, there were 25,779 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “USFJ employees”) at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as clerks at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security guards and fire departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They support the smooth operations of the USFJ. The Government of Japan hires these USFJ employees in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA. The MOD supports the stationing of the USFJ by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc. criteria used in evaluating contractor employee positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the civilian component, and stipulates the procedures for notification and review, etc., together with the exclusion of ordinary residents from the civilian component. **3** **USFJ-Related Costs** USFJ-related costs include Host Nation Support, or HNS (cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ),[6] costs for implementing the stipulations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report to mitigate the impact on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that contribute to mitigating the impact on the local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. Forces. **4** **HNS (Cost Sharing for the Stationing of** **USFJ)** HNS (Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ) plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economic situation, Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs for USFJ local employees in FY1978. Then in FY1979, it started to bear costs for the Facilities Improvement Program, or FIP. In addition, as labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions surrounding both countries, there arose a concern that the employment stability of the employees would be undermined, and then the activities of the USFJ could be affected. Therefore, in 1987, Japan and the United States concluded an agreement that sets forth special measures regarding Article 24 of the SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement, or SMA)[7] as exceptional, limited, and provisional measures relating to the cost sharing principle of the SOFA. Based on this SMA, Japan started to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance). As the SMA was revised later on, the costs shared by Japan have expanded to cover labor costs including base pay, and utilities costs from FY1991, training relocation costs **(3) Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the** **Field of Environmental Stewardship** In September 2015, the governments of Japan and the United States signed the Supplementary Agreement on the Environment, which came into force on the same day. This supplementary agreement represents an international commitment with legal binding force and sets forth provisions concerning the issuance and maintenance of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) and the establishment and maintenance, etc., of procedures for access to USFJ facilities and areas in the event of actual occurrence of an accident (leakage) that affects the environment and in the event of a field survey (including cultural property survey) related to the return of a facility or area. **See** Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 2-2 (Initiatives Related to USFJ Facilities/Areas) **See** **(4) Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component** In January 2017, the governments of Japan and the United States signed the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component, which came into force on the same day. This Supplementary Agreement clarifies the scope of the civilian component, which is addressed only by a general provision in SOFA, in addition to developing **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Based on the consensus that these costs will build the foundation to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a result of the negotiations over this SMA (Act on New Special Measures for Article 24 of the SOFA), the Japanese side has decided to refer to this budget by a Japanese phrase that points to its goal of enhancing Alliance readiness and resiliency. Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and ----- |billion|Col2|Col3|Col4|initiatives: ¥41.6 Total: ¥| |---|---|---|---|---| |Co|st|s|haring under the SMA (¥158.3 billion|)| |||||| Fig. III-2-5-1 USFJ-Related Costs (Budget for FY2024) Costs for the stationing of USFJ SACO-related costs Realignment-related costs (MOD-related budget: ¥431.1 billion (1) + (2)) (¥11.6 billion) (¥213 billion) Host Nation Support ・Projects for land returns: ¥0.3 billion ・Projects for relocation of the U.S. [Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ] ・Projects for training improvement: Marines inOkinawa to Guam: ¥0.6 billion ¥0.2 billion ・Projects for realignment in Okinawa: (212.4 billion yen (1)) ・Costs for measures to improve ・Projects for facilitating SACO: ¥104.9 billion the living environment in areas ¥9.8 billion ・Projects for the relocation of surrounding the USFJ facilities: ・Costs for Facilities Improvement Carrier Air Wing: ¥55.9 billion ¥66.9 billion Program (FIP): ¥39.1 billion ・Projects for contingency use: ¥1.1 billion ・Rent for facilities: ¥106.1 billion ・Projects for training relocation ・Relocation costs: ¥9.3 billion ・Labor costs Total: ¥10.3 billion (local task force-related cost): ¥0.1 billion ・Other costs (welfare costs, etc.): ¥25.1 billion (compensation for fisheries, etc.): ・Projects for facilitating realignment ¥36.3 billion Total: ¥64.3 billion initiatives: ¥41.6 billion Total: ¥204.2 billion Total: ¥218.6 billion (2) Cost sharing under the SMA (¥158.3 billion) Non MOD-related budget ・Labor costs (base pay, etc.): ・Training relocation costs ・Expenditures borne by other ¥125.2 billion (one of the projects aimed at ・Training relocation costs: ministries (base subsidy, etc.) ・Utilities costs: ¥15.1 billion improving training): ¥1.3 billion ¥8.9 billion ・Estimated costs of ・Training equipment and materials government-owned land procurement costs: ¥6.5 billion ・Artillery live-fire training over ・Aviation training relocation provided for use as USFJ Highway 104 as a part of realignment facilities (Note 3) ・Training relocation costs (NLP): ¥1.3 billion ・Parachute training initiatives Total: ¥148.2 billion (Notes) 1 Training relocation costs under the SMA extend into HNS (Cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ) as well as SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs. 2 The SACO-related costs refer to the costs for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on the people of Okinawa, while the realignment-related costs refer to the costs relating to the measures that contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as a part of the realignment initiatives. On the other hand, since HNS (Cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ) is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately. 3 The costs for the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.: ¥40.6 billion, FY2023 budget) and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥164.4 billion, FY2023 estimate). 4 Numbers may not add up due to rounding. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** |SMA|Effective Period|Five years (FY2022 to FY2026)| |---|---|---| ||Labor Costs|23,178 people out of all the workers.| ||Utilities Costs|23.4 billion yen for FY2022 and FY2023, 15.1 billion yen for FY2024, and 13.3 billion yen for FY2025 and FY2026.| ||Training Equipment and Materials Procurement Costs|Up to 20 billion yen over the five years will be borne for costs related to the procurement of training equipment and materials that will contribute not only to the readiness of the USFJ, but also to the enhancement of interoperability between the SDF and USFJ.| ||Training Relocation Costs|While maintaining the current framework and standards, Alaska will become a permissible training relocation site for the Aviation Training Relocation program. The annual training relocation costs funded by Japan will be approximately equal to the budget amount FY2021, which is approximately 11.4 billion yen.| |FIP||Up to 164.1 billion yen over the five years, with focus on projects that contribute to the readiness and resiliency of the USFJ.| Fig. III-2-5-2 Japan’s Cost Sharing Under the SMA for HNS (Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ), etc. ----- from FY1996, and training equipment and materials **See** Fig. III 2 5 1 (USFJ Related Costs (Budget for FY2024)); Fig. procurement costs from FY2022. III-2-5-2 (Japan’s Cost Sharing under the SMA for HNS (Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ), etc.) **2** **Efforts for the Realignment of the USFJ** **(2) Readjustment of the USFJ Realignment Plan** **1** **USFJ Realignment Plan** In order to further strengthen the deterrence and response **(1) Background and Overview** capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in response to the “The United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment increasingly severe security environment, during the Implementation” (Roadmap) was set forth in May “2+2” Meeting in January 2023, Japan and the United 2006. Subsequently, the following factors were set States decided to optimize the posture of the U.S. forces forth: (1) the necessity of implementing measures to by further enhancing the force posture of the USFJ to realize visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa have more versatile, resilient, and mobile capabilities, promptly and steadily; (2) the necessity of balancing the and by readjusting the Realignment Plan that was Realignment Plan and the strategic rebalance to the Asia- adjusted in 2012. Specifically, it was agreed that the Pacific region, which was set out in the U.S. Defense 3rd Marine Division Headquarters and the 12th Marine Strategic Guidance released in January 2012; and (3) Regiment will remain in Okinawa, and that the 12th the reduction in the cost associated with the relocation Marine Regiment will be reorganized into the Marine of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam demanded by the Littoral Regiment (MLR) by 2025. U.S. Congress. The Realignment Plan was coordinated In readjusting the Realignment Plan, the basic tenets during the April 2012 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative of the current Realignment Plan are being maintained, Committee (“2+2” Meeting) in light of those factors. and maximum consideration is being given to mitigating The 2006 Roadmap stated that among the III Marine the impact on Okinawa. Specifically, Japan and the Expeditionary Force (MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the United States have confirmed that (1) the number of main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the U.S. Marine Corps personnel in Okinawa after the command elements. However, the United States decided realignment will continue to be approximately 10,000; to alter the composition of the units and to deploy the (2) the realignment will not affect the lands scheduled to Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), consisting be returned in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, nor will **Part** of command, ground, aviation and logistics support it affect the progress of the FRF at Camp Schwab; and **Ⅲ** elements, in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in (3) there will be no change in the commencement of the **Chapter** Australia as a rotational unit. In addition, the governments relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to **2** of Japan and the United States decided to delink both Guam, which will begin in 2024. the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Combined with the enhanced capabilities and posture Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of the SDF, this initiative will greatly enhance the of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Replacement Facility (FRF). Alliance. Japan will continue to hold close consultations **See** Reference 30 (United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment to further optimize the posture of the USFJ. Implementation (tentative translation)) **REFERENCE: Policies regarding U.S. Forces in Japan** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/index.html** **REFERENCE: Facility development on Mageshima** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/mage/index.html** ----- Fig. III-2-5-3 Progress of Force Structure Realignment of the USFJ and SDF Described in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (1) |1 R|Col2|ealignment i|n the Kanto Ar|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| |[Yok||ota related]||| |○Es (B ○Pa co (st||tablishment of the b JOCC) at Yokota Air rtial return of airspa llocating ASDF air tr arted on May 18, 2||| |○St co||udy of civilian-milita nditions and modali||| |||||| |[U.S. ○Es he (O De co ○Pa 17 ○Jo (st||Forces Sagami Gen tablishment of facilit adquarters in Japan perations of the trai velopment of the tr mpleted.) rtial return of the la ha) int use of open spa arted on December||| ||||20km|| ||||n Okinawa [Legend] Completed|| |2 R||ealignment i||Continuing Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base| |||||| |[Join||||| |||||e consolidation plan. See Fig. III-2-5-7 and III-2-5-8 for the current status on dena Air Base)| |||mp Hansen is used for GSDF training||| **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** - Implemented on March 17, 2008 SDF bases in mainland, etc. - ASDF uses Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities [Land Returns] - Formulated a detailed plan (Consolidation Plan) for returning of significant land area south of Kadena Air MCAS Futenma (total return, approx. 481 ha) Base by consolidating the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa [Relocation within Okinawa] - Announced the Consolidation Plan on April 5, 2013 Camp Operation capability for Ospreys and others Schwab Replacement →Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areasReplacement facilities constructed in Camp Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 Camp facility (total return, approx. 16 ha) Hansen [Relocation of operations outside Okinawa] Naha Port (total return, approx. 56 ha) - Operations of air-refueling aircraft → MCAS Iwakuni A replacement facility will be constructed in Kadena Air Base - Relocation to MCAS Iwakuni completed on August the Urasoe-Pier district under the Naha Port Replacement 26, 2014 and Harbor Plan facility - Contingency use function for aircrafts →Tsuiki and Nyutabaru Air Bases Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (total return, approx. 274 ha) Futenma - Return of lands along eastern side - Return of north access road Air Station (approx. 4 ha) on July 31, 2017 (approx. 1 ha) on August 31, 2013 To Guam, etc. - Return of lands around Samashita Gate - Return of lands along national route 58 (approx. 0.1 ha) on December 20, 2020 (approx. 4 ha) on March 31, 2018 20km - Return of area near Gate 5 (approx. 2 ha) Camp Zukeran [Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps] on March 31, 2019 (Camp Foster) III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), approx. 9,000 personnel and their dependents will relocate to Guam (partial return, approx. 153 ha+) - The Makiminato Service Area (lands along and other areas national route 58) includes the laundry area - Return of West Futenma Housing (0.2 ha) that was returned on May 31, 2021. Area (approx. 51 ha) on March 31, 2015 Camp Kuwae - Return of a portion of Facilities and (Camp Lester) Engineering Compound (approx. 11 (total return, approx. 68 ha) ha) on March 31, 2020 ----- |TPY-2 Radar: d “X-band Radar (completed in|eployment of so-called System” June 2006) rovided by the U.S. Department of Defense]| |---|---| |TPY-2 radar [Photo p|| |Deployment of (completed in D|| |Rotational deployment of the squadron to MSDF Kanoya A Guam|KC-130 ir Base and| |---|---| **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** |Relocation of th contingency us|e functions of aircraft for e to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru| |---|---| |Distribution of training for the U.S. Forces aircraft deployed at Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni to Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru SDF facilities as well as to overseas (Guam, Alaska, etc.)|Col2| |---|---| |Relocation of carrier-based aircraft squadrons to Iwakuni (completed in March 2018) F/A-18 [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense] E-2D [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense]|| ||| |Relocation (co KC-130 [Phot|of the KC-130 squadron to Iwakuni mpleted in August 2014) o provided by the U.S. Department of Defense]| ||| |Development of civil air facility at MCAS Iwakuni/MSDF Iwakuni Air Base (Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport opened in 2012.)|| Fig. III-2-5-4 Progress of Force Structure Realignment of the USFJ and SDF Described in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (2) 3 Relocation of Aircraft, etc. TPY-2 Radar: deployment of so-called “X-band Radar System” (completed in June 2006) Distribution of training for the U.S. Forces aircraft deployed at Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni to Chitose, Chitose Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and [Legend] Nyutabaru SDF facilities as well as to overseas (Guam, Alaska, etc.) TPY-2 radar [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense] Shariki Completed Misawa Relocation of carrier-based aircraft Deployment of a TPY-2 radar Continuing squadrons to Iwakuni (completed in December 2014) (completed in March 2018) Iwakuni Kyogamisaki Komatsu Hyakuri Tsuiki Nyutabaru Atsugi F/A-18 [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense] Kanoya Mageshima Relocation of the training of MV-22 Osprey and others to maneuver areas in Japan and overseas (Guam) Kadena Futenma E-2D [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense] Relocation of the KC-130 squadron to Iwakuni Constructing Mageshima Base (tentative name) (completed in August 2014) that will be also used as an FCLP facility Rotational deployment of the KC-130 squadron to MSDF Kanoya Air Base and Guam Relocation of the functions of aircraft for contingency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru KC-130 [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense] Development of civil air facility at MCAS Iwakuni/MSDF Iwakuni Air Base Relocation of the CH-53D squadron to Guam Saipan (Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport opened in 2012.) (Japan and the United States confirmed that the CH-53D squadron will be relocated to the U.S. mainland and then to Guam Guam. Relocation to the U.S. mainland has been completed) CH-53D [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense] 500km ----- **2** **Progress of the Realignment of the USFJ** **4** **Relocation and Return of MCAS Futenma** Although over 25 years have passed since Japan and the United States agreed on the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma, it has not been achieved yet. The Government of Japan believes that the return must not be postponed any longer. The fundamental idea shared by the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa is that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses and schools, in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture. The Government of Japan’s view is that the current plan to relocate MCAS Futenma to Henoko, Nago City is the only solution to avoid continued use of the Air Station. This has been confirmed by the Japanese and U.S. governments on repeated occasions, including joint statements at Japan-U.S. summit meetings and the “2+2” Meetings. In order to achieve the total return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible, the Government of Japan will continue to make all efforts while providing careful explanations to local residents in Okinawa building upon years of persistent dialogue. The return of MCAS Futenma is expected to eliminate danger in the area and to contribute to the further growth of Okinawa, including Ginowan City, through the reuse of the area (approximately 476 ha, a land area around 100 times larger than Tokyo Dome). Various efforts have been made for the realignment of the USFJ, including the relocation of carrier-based aircraft from Naval Air Facility Atsugi (Kanagawa Prefecture) to MCAS Iwakuni (Yamaguchi Prefecture), and the relocation of KC-130 air refueling aircraft from MCAS Futenma (Okinawa Prefecture) to MCAS Iwakuni, as well as their rotational deployment to Kanoya Air Base (Kagoshima Prefecture). The MOD is continuing promotion of efforts to improve the SDF facilities on Mageshima (Nishinoomote City, Kagoshima prefecture) that will be used for fieldcarrier landing practice (FCLP), return of land south of Kadena including MCAS Futenma, and relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel stationed in Okinawa to Guam. **See** Fig. III-2-5-3 and 4 (Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in the United States **See** Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (1) and (2)) **3** **Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP)** The May 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. The MOD has acquired most of the land on Mageshima, and has been explaining the facility development to the local communities of Kagoshima Prefecture, Nishinoomote City, Nakatane Town, and Minamitane Town. The United States also welcomed the Government of Japan’s decision to develop SDF facilities on Mageshima in the “2+2” Meeting joint statement issued in January 2022. In January 2023, the MOD released the environmental impact assessment report prepared based on the view of the Governor of Kagoshima Prefecture, who had taken into account the opinions of the mayors of Nishinoomote City, Nakatane Town and Minamitane Town, and others, and started the construction work within Mageshima. In March of the same year, construction work also began on the maritime area around Mageshima, and the development of facilities are steadily progressing in close cooperation with local municipalities. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(1) Relocation of MCAS Futenma and Mitigation of the** **Impact on Okinawa** The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it involves reduction in the base’s functions and area in Okinawa, and contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa. **a. Distribution of Functions Offered by MCAS Futenma** The relocation of MCAS Futenma involves the return of the entire area by relocating three functions: (1) operation of MV-22 (Osprey) and other aircraft, (2) operation of air refueling aircraft, and (3) accepting transient aircraft in contingencies. Of these three functions, (2) and (3) involve relocation out of Okinawa Prefecture, while (1) involves relocation to Camp Schwab. The relocation of (2) operation of air refueling aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni was completed in August 2014. With regard to (3) accepting transient aircraft in contingencies, Japan d th U it d St t d i O t b 2018 t d l ----- facilities that would be necessary for relocating the function to Tsuiki Air Base (Fukuoka Prefecture) and Nyutabaru Air Base (Miyazaki Prefecture). The construction work was completed by March 2023 except for the runway extension at Tsuiki Air Base. The MOD is moving forward with procedures for reclamation of public waters and others related to the runway extension work at Tsuiki Air Base. **b. Reduction in Area** The area required for the land reclamation to build the FRF is approximately 152 ha, less than one-third of the approximately 476 ha of MCAS Futenma, and the FRF will be equipped with a significantly shorter runway at 1,200 m (1,800 m including the overruns) compared to the current runway length of 2,740 m at MCAS Futenma. **c. Reduction in Noise and Risks** Two runways will be constructed in a V-shape, which enables the flight path for takeoff and landing to be located over the sea, in line with the requests of the local community. In MCAS Futenma, flight paths used daily for training and other purposes are located over residential areas, whereas flight paths in the FRF will be changed to over the sea, thereby reducing noise and risks. For example, while more than 10,000 households are located in areas requiring housing noise insulation near MCAS Futenma, there will be zero households requiring such insulation around the FRF. **(2) Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement** **Facility** **a. Consideration of Relocation Site** Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on the realignment have been made towards realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the concern of the residents living in the vicinity. The “2+2” joint statement compiled in October 2005 calls for locating the FRF in an L-shaped configuration. However, after that, based on consultations and agreement with the local governments including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the May 2006 Roadmap that the FRF be located in a V-shaped configuration. With regard to construction of this replacement facility, a Memorandum of Basic Understanding was exchanged between then Governor of Okinawa Inamine and then Minister of State for Defense Nukaga in the same month. After the change of government in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. After reviews conducted by the Committee, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May 2010, the governments of Japan and the United States confirmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting |Item|Area|Runway| |---|---|---| |Replacement facility|Approx. 152 ha (landfill area)|Approx. 1,200 m (1,800 m including Overrun)| |MCAS Futenma|Approx. 1/3 Approx. 476 ha|Approx. 2/3 Approx. 2,740 m| Fig. III-2-5-5 Comparison between the Replacement Facility and MCAS Futenma (image) **Part** **Ⅲ** Replacement facility (Henoko Cape) Camp Schwab **Chapter** N Runway **2** Henoko Nagashima Toyohara Overrun Hirajima Naha N Okinawa Item Area Runway Approx. 1,200 m Replacement Approx. 152 ha (1,800 m facility (landfill area) including Overrun) Approx. 1/3 Approx. 2/3 MCAS Approx. 476 ha Approx. 2,740 m Futenma MCAS Futenma ----- held in June 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a V shape. During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, first of all, it was determined that, from a security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, including that of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa that is located in a crucial area for the security of Japan, cannot be lessened while there remains instability and uncertainty in the security environment in East Asia. Furthermore, concern was expressed that the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps, such as mobility and readiness, would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marines units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. This is because the U.S. Marine Corps conducts integrated operations of air, ground, logistics support, and command elements. Therefore, it was concluded that the FRF had to be located within Okinawa Prefecture. **b. Beginning of Landfill Work** An environmental impact assessment was conducted for approximately five years from 2007 for the FRF Project. For this assessment, the MOD received 1,561 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa, made all the required revisions, and appropriately reflected them in the content of the environmental impact assessment report. The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted the Landfill Permit Request on public waters to Okinawa Prefecture in March 2013, and then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima approved this in December 2013. After the construction began, then Governor of Okinawa Onaga revoked the landfill permit, which led to litigation between the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture. However, landfill work began in the waters of the Henoko side in December 2018. By the end of September 2023, progress to reclaim the Henoko side of the waters was at around 99.5%, leaving only areas that cannot be reclaimed at this time, such as those that need to be reclaimed in conjunction with the adjacent unbuilt areas. At present, in the reclamation area on the Henoko side, stockpiling landfill materials to be used for reclamation on the Oura Bay side is underway. (As of May, 2024) **c. Consideration on Soil Improvement Work, Etc.** Regarding the soil foundation of the landfill area, a study was conducted on the stability of seawalls and other structures in the waters of Oura wan area in light of the results of a boring survey, etc. As a result, it was confirmed that it is possible to implement the construction of seawalls and landfill work while ensuring the required stability through soil improvement work via prevailing and adequately proven construction methods[8] used for construction projects such as Tokyo International Airport and Kansai International Airport. This was also confirmed by the Technical Review Committee that has been held since September 2019 consisting of experts in the fields of geotechnical, structural, hydraulic, and pavement engineering. In addition, in December 2019, the Okinawa Defense Bureau announced that, based on the results of studies conducted to date, it would take nine years and three months from commencement to completion of construction according to the revised plan. Around 12 years would be required to complete the admin procedures described in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, and the cost of the Futenma Air Station Replacement Facility Construction Project was estimated at about 930 billion yen. Similarly, in terms of the environment, the Environmental Monitoring Committee, comprising experts in various fields related to the natural environment and others, which was held from January to April 2020, confirmed that the degree of impact on the environment caused by the change in the plan would be the same or less than that before the change. **d. Landfill Permit Revision Request on Public Waters** As explained above, hearing experts’ insights on the environment and other aspects, after due consideration, in April 2020, the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture the Landfill Permit Revision Request given the additional implementation of the soil improvement work, etc. However, in November 2021, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture disapproved the Permit Revision Request on the grounds that surveys of the soil foundation and environmental protection measures at the planned landfill area were inadequate. In response, in December 2021, the Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau filed a request for review with the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism under the Administrative Complaint Review Act. In April 2022, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism determined revocation of the disapproval by **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** The standard methods are the sand compaction pile method, the sand drain method, and the paper drain method. Among examples of projects in which these methods were used is the ----- the Governor of Okinawa, and also issued an instruction for correction against Okinawa Prefecture based on the Local Autonomy Act to approve the Permit Revision Request. In response to this determination and the directive for correction, in August the same year, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed lawsuits at the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch to revoke the government’s involvement. As for these lawsuits, in August 2023, the Supreme Court decided against the Okinawa Governor’s petition to accept the appeal regarding the determination, and in September the same year, the Supreme Court issued a judgment to dismiss the Okinawa Governor’s appeal regarding the directive for correction, and accordingly the judicial judgment that the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism’s directive to approve the Permit Revision Request was legitimate was finalized. Based on this judgment, the same month, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a recommendation and instruction under the Local Autonomy Act to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to approve the Permit Revision Request, but the approval remained pending. Therefore, in October the same year, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a subrogation lawsuit at the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch for substituted execution under the Local Autonomy Law. Subsequently, in December the same year, a judgment was made ordering the governor of Okinawa Prefecture to approve the Landfill Permit Revision Request by a deadline, but since no disposition of approval had been made by that deadline, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued approval under the law. The same month, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition for acceptance of an appeal to the Supreme Court regarding this lawsuit, but, in February 2024, the Supreme Court decided to reject the petition, whereupon the judgment of the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch ordering the governor of Okinawa Prefecture to approve the Landfill Permit Revision Request became final. In addition, in September 2022, due to dissatisfaction with the determination of the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit with the Naha District Court to revoke the determination based on the Administrative Case Litigation Act. In November 2023, the Naha District Court made a judgment to dismiss Okinawa Prefecture’s lawsuit, but Okinawa Prefecture has appealed to the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court, and there is one lawsuit is pending between the government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture regarding the Landfill Permit Revision Request (as of May 2024). **See** Fig. III-2-5-5 (Comparison between the Replacement Facility and MCAS Futenma (image)); Reference 31 (Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility); Reference 32 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena) **(3) Construction Based on the Plan after Approval of** **the Landfill Permit Revision Request** **a. Status of Construction** After receiving approval of Landfill Permit Revision Request, the Okinawa Defense Bureau began construction work based on the revised plan on January 10, 2024. Specifically, in the waters on the Oura Bay side, the construction began to develop an offshore yard that will serve as a temporary storage area for caissons (box-shaped structures made of reinforced concrete, etc.) to be used for future seawall construction. Additionally, construction of the K-5, K-6, and K-7 seawalls began in February, March, and April the same year, respectively. **b. Environmental Protection Initiatives** The environmental impact assessment report states that because corals inhabiting the landfill area will be lost due to the landfill work, corals will be transplanted to the extent possible as a preservation measure. Some of the targeted corals for preservation have already been transplanted with the permission of the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, and other preservation measures will also be taken for the remaining targeted corals in the future. The FRF Project expand a scope for preservation to be more careful in transplanting corals compared to landfill work to construct the second runway at Naha Airport.[9] Hermit crabs designated as a national natural treasure, as well as shellfish and crustaceans listed as endangered species, have also been appropriately moved to a surrounding location suitable for habitat in time for the construction. Furthermore, as part of measures for habitats that will be lost due to the landfill work, measures have been taken to transplant corals grown in land-based facilities to the waters surrounding Oura Bay and expand the growth area of seagrass beds. These environmental preservation measures **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Specifically, in relation to the construction of the second runway at Naha Airport, around 37,000 clusters of small corals were transplanted. If the same standard as the one applicable to ----- Progress of landfill work (November 2018) Progress of landfill work (April 2024) have been taken based on the guidance and advice of the Environmental Monitoring Committee, and the construction of the FRF is proceeding with due consideration for environmental preservation. **c. Consideration for Surrounding Residents** The progress of the construction work is expected to increase construction vehicle traffic in future. Construction work will proceed while giving due consideration to the impact on the natural and living environment of the local communities of the noise and traffic congestion that may be caused as the construction work progresses. Targeting the earliest possible total return of the MCAS Futenma, the construction work will proceed steadily in terms of relocation to Henoko, while continuing to provide detailed explanations to local residents. **5** **Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air** **Base** thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the relocation to the FRF from both the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three categories, namely (1) land eligible for immediate return; (2) land eligible for return once the relocation of functions is completed; and (3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad. **(1) Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in** **Okinawa** Since the change of administration at the end of 2012, Japan and the United States have continued consultation under the basic policy to dedicate all strength toward mitigating the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an early return of land areas south of Kadena, including Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) in Urasoe City of which Okinawa has particularly made a strong request for the return and coordinated with the United States. As **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** The May 2006 Roadmap stated that, following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, **REFERENCE: Comparison of the scales of MCAS Futenma and the FRF** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/frf/index.html#kibohikaku** **REFERENCE: Soil improvement methods** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/frf/index.html#kouhou** **REFERENCE: Environmental protection** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/frf/index.html#kankyohozen** ----- local community. This has resulted, for example, in the opening of the entire stretch of Ginowan City road 11 in March 2021 on land along the east side of MCAS Futenma, which has improved local traffic. Furthermore, in May 2022, Prime Minister Kishida visited the Lower Plaza Housing area of Camp Zukeran and announced that Japan and the United States will agree to open the area as a green space for public use ahead of its return to Japan, and its public use began in March 2024 as the “Lower Plaza Green Square”. All-out initiatives are being continuously made by the Government to steadily implement the return of land areas south of Kadena Air Base under the Consolidation Plan in a manner that visibly mitigates the impact on Okinawa. **See** Fig. III-2-5-7 (Results of the Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base); Fig. III-2-5-8 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base (Image)); Reference 32 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena) **6** **Relocation of the Marine Corps to Guam** Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Fig. III-2-5-6 Okinawa (Unit: ha) 1,500 1,000 500 |a)|Col2| |---|---| ||| |1,491ha Six U.S. facilities for exclusive use located south of Kadena in|Decrease| |densely populated areas in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa|by around 70%| |492 January ha－α 2013|| 1,491ha January 2013 492 ha－α At the time of making At the time of completing the Consolidation Plan the Consolidation Plan a result, both countries announced the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (Consolidation Plan) in April 2013, which stipulated the return schedule, including the specific years of return. The return of all land according to the plan will enable the return of approximately 70% (approximately 1,048 ha, the equivalent of 220 Tokyo Domes) of six USFJ facilities for exclusive use[10] located in densely populated areas in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa. In the Consolidation Plan, it is confirmed between Japan and the United States that this plan will be implemented as soon as possible, and that the Government will continue to make the utmost efforts to return the land south of Kadena, at an early date. **See** Fig. III-2-5-6 (Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa) p Kinser), MCAS p Lester), and Army Since the Roadmap was announced in May 2006, the governments of Japan and the United States held a series of consultations on the reduction of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa. **(1) Timing and Size of Relocation** The 2006 Roadmap stated that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III MEF and their approximately 9,000 dependents would relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, but the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements set the timing of the relocation for the earliest possible date after 2014. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land return south of Kadena from the progress on the FRF and to adjust the composition of the units and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam. As a result, the MAGTF is to be located in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, with approximately 9,000 personnel relocated to locations outside of Japan. Meanwhile, the end-state for the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa is to be consistent with the level of approximately 10,000 personnel envisioned in the Roadmap. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **See** **(2) Progress in the Return of Land** Since the announcement of the Consolidation Plan in April 2013, efforts have been made to return the land. By March, 2020, the return of all areas that were designated as land areas to be returned as soon as required procedures are completed based on the Consolidation Plan (shown in red in Fig. III-2-5-8) was realized. The use of returned lands is being promoted incrementally. For example, at the former site of the West Futenma Housing Area, which was returned in March 2015, the formation of Okinawa Health Medical Center requested by the local community is being promoted. In addition, returns have been realized ahead of the schedule in the Consolidation Plan for some areas where there were strong demands for return by the ----- **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** |Category|Name|Returned|Transferred|Area (ha)| |---|---|---|---|---| |Areas eligible for immediate return in the consolidation plan|Makiminato Service Area (entrance road on the north side)|August 2013|August 2013|Approx. 1| ||Camp Zukeran (Nishi Futenma residential area)|March 2015|March 2018|Approx. 51| ||Makiminato Service Area (area near Gate 5)|March 2019|March 2021|Approx. 2| ||Camp Zukeran (a portion of the facility engineering department district)|March 2020|(Note)|Approx. 11| |Areas eligible for return after relocation of functions within Okinawa in the consolidation plan but returned in advance as a result of a separate Japan- U.S. agreement.|MCAS Futenma (Lands along the east side)|July 2017|March 2019|Approx. 4| ||Makiminato Service Area (Lands along national route 58)|March 2018|September 2019|Approx. 3| ||MCAS Futenma (Lands near Samashita Gate)|December 2020|December 2020|Approx. 0.1| ||Makiminato Service Area ((Lands along national route 58) laundry area)|May 2021|May 2021|Approx. 0.2| **Commentary** **Joint Use of the Lower Plaza Housing Area** The Lower Plaza Housing area (Kitanakagusuku Village, after being returned, it was decided that additional development of Okinawa City, Okinawa Prefecture), which is part of Camp Zukeran, the area was to be kept to a minimum by utilizing existing roads, is scheduled to be returned to Japan after the conditions set in fences, softball fields, etc. the Okinawa Consolidation Plan are met. The Ministry of Defense The former Lower Plaza housing area is located in a privileged (MOD) is currently working towards meeting the conditions for its environment, where an arterial road connecting the east, west, return. At the same time, in response to Prime Minister Kishida’s north, and south of Okinawa prefecture intersects, and it is also announcement in May 2022 that the area will be made available adjacent to large commercial facilities and hospitals. Now that to Okinawa citizens for their convenience until the return of the the area has been developed as a green square, many people, area is realized, a joint use agreement was concluded between including Okinawa citizens, are using the area for recreation and Japan and the United States, and the area was opened to the socializing. public as a green space in March 2024. The MOD will continuously and steadily implement its efforts While the U.S. military houses were being removed, the vacant toward the return of land based on the Okinawa Consolidation lot was developed as a green space by taking advantage of the Plan, and it will do its best to reduce the impact of the bases on natural scenery of the hills, with parking lots, benches, lavatories, Okinawa. etc. installed, but as the area is expected to be used by local people Scenes from the opening ceremony (March 2024) Lower Plaza Green Square Fig. III-2-5-7 Results of the Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base (Note) Scheduled transfer in the future ----- Fig. III-2-5-8 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base (image) Okinawa-minami I.C. Okinawa City Hall Army POL Camp Kuwae Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 FY2025 68 ha (Lower Plaza Housing Area)Camp Zukeran (Foster) FY2022 16 ha Chatan Town Office or later (0.68 km[2]) or later (0.16 km[2]) FY2024 23 ha or later (0.23 km[2]) (Note 7) Camp Zukeran (Foster) The area was opened to the public from (A portion of Facilities and Engineering Compound) March 31, 2024 as a green square March 31, 2020Returned on (Note 5) (0.11 km11 ha [2]) Smart I.C.Kishaba Kitanakagusuku Village OfficeCamp Zukeran (Foster) (A part of Kishaba Housing Area) Camp Zukeran (Foster) Kitanakagusuku I.C. FY2024 5 ha (Industrial Corridor, etc.) Camp Zukeran (Foster) Ginowan City Hall or later (0.05 km[2]) FY2024 62 ha (Additional portion) or later (0.62 km[2]) Makiminato Service Area αha (Note 3) Southern part of Industrial Corridor Camp Zukeran (Foster) (Remaining portion) (Note 8) (West-Futenma Housing Area) FY2024 142 ha Nakagusuku Village Office Returned on 51 ha or later (1.42 km[2]) March 31, 2015 (Note 4) (0.51 km[2]) Makiminato Service Area March 31, 2019Returned onMakiminato Service Area(Area near Gate 5)(0.02 km2 ha [2]) Makiminato Service Area August 31, 2013Returned on(north access road)Urasoe City Hall(0.01 km1 ha Nishihara I.C.[2]) FY2022or laterFutenma Air Station(4.76 km476 ha [2]) July 31, 2017Returned on(Lands on the eastern boundary)Futenma Air Station(Note 6) (0.04 km4 ha [2]) (Area along Route 58) Yui Rail Returned on 4 ha Nishihara Town Office Futenma Air Station Naha Port March 31, 2018 (Note 6) (0.04 km[2]) Makiminato Service Area (Lands near Samashita Gate) FY2028 56 ha (Portion of MSA, including the preponderance of the storage area) Returned on 0.1 ha or later (0.56 km[2]) Okinawa Prefectural Office Naha I.C. FY2025or later (1.26 km126ha [2]) December 20, 2020(Note 6) (0.001 km[2]) Naha City Hall Naha Airport Legend : Returned immediately (73 ha) : Returned after the relocation of functions within the prefecture (834 ha) : Returned after the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps overseas (142 ha or more) Total : 1,048 ha or more (Notes) 1 The time and year seem to be optimal. The time may, however, be postponed depending on the progress of overseas relocation. 2 The area of each land is an approximate figure and may be slightly modified based on the results of future surveys. Total may not match due to rounding off of each figure to the nearest unit (ha). 3 Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to determine the feasibility of additional land returns. 4 The area to be returned at Camp Foster (West-Futenma Housing area) was listed as 52 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 51 ha according to actual measurements. 5 The area to be returned at Camp Foster (a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound, etc.) was listed as 10 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 11 ha based on the area to be returned in the JC agreement of September 2013. 6 MCAS Futenma (lands along the east side and near Samashita Gate) and Makiminato Service Area (lands along national route 58) were returned ahead of schedule as a result of a separate Japan-U.S. agreement. Note that the Makiminato Service Area (lands along national route 58) includes the laundry area (0.2 ha) that was returned on May 31, 2021. 7 Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed in May 2022 that the two countries will prepare the transformation of the Lower Plaza Housing Area of Camp Foster into a green square for public use before the return, agreed on the joint use of the area for public use as the green square in January, 2024. The area was opened to the public on March 31, 2024. 8 Efforts will be made for the return of the southern part of Industrial Corridor as early as possible with gradual return in mind **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Accordingly, the “2+2” Meeting held in October 2013 agreed that, under the relocation plan described at the 2012 “2+2” Meeting, the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam is to begin in the first half of the 2020s. The plan is expected to facilitate progress in implementing the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa of April 2013. In addition, at the “2+2” Meeting in January 2023, it was confirmed that the relocation from Okinawa to Guam would begin in 2024 and others. **(2) Costs of the Relocation** Under the Roadmap, the two sides reached an agreement that, of the estimated US$10.27 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 price) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide US$6.09 billion, including US$2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the United States would fund the remaining US$4.18 billion. In February 2009, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the ----- III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement).[11] The Agreement legally guarantees and ensures actions taken by Japan and the United States for projects to which Japan provides direct cash contributions. As part of measures based on this Agreement, the Government of Japan has been providing cash contributions to the U.S. Government in relation to the projects for which Japan has provided financial support since FY2009.[12] Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam were adjusted and it was agreed that the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation was US$8.6 billion (in U.S. FY2012 price). With regard to Japan’s financial commitment, it was reaffirmed that it was to be the direct cash contribution of up to US$2.8 billion (in U.S. FY2008 price) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam International Agreement. It was also confirmed that Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized.[13] Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been provided to the U.S. Government under the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a portion of the direct cash contribution of US$2.8 billion mentioned above would be used to develop training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by Japan and the United States. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the United States, and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown. At the 2+2 Meeting in October 2013, a Protocol Amending the Guam International Agreement was also signed to add the stipulations concerning the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the use of these training areas by the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions remains unchanged at US$2.8 billion (in U.S. FY2008 price). **(3) Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment** **Procedures** As for the environmental impact assessment for Guam, the required procedures were conducted to reflect the revisions to the project made by the adjustments to the plan for realignment, and the assessment was completed in August 2015. Furthermore, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Joint Military Training Environmental Impact Statement (CJMT-EIS), is now being implemented. **(4) Progress of the Guam Relocation Project** While the environmental impact assessment for Guam was being conducted, the Government of the United States implemented infrastructure development projects at the Andersen Air Force Base and the Apra area of the Naval Base Guam as projects unaffected by the assessment. The U.S. Government is currently implementing relocation construction work in all project areas, following the lifting of the freeze on the Guam relocation funds pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act and the completion of the environmental impact assessment for Guam. **See** Fig. III-2-5-9 (Progress of the Guam Relocation Project (image)) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **11 Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force** Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam **12 As for projects for which Japan provides financial support, cash contributions totaling approximately 373 billion yen (including the use of interest generated from the funds provided) have** been provided to the U.S. side using the budgets as of April 2024. **13 In line with this, the special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (investment and loan) that had been prescribed by the Act on Special Measures on** ----- Fig. III-2-5-9 Progress of the Guam Relocation Project (image) U.S. Marines Firing Range (the U.S. budgeted project) (1) Andersen AFB (2) Marine Corps Base in Finegayan (Camp Blaz (main camp)) (3) Marine Corps Base Andersen South (4) Naval Base Guam in Apra 10km Construction of facilities in Finegayan As of January 31, 2023 **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** |Relocation Project Areas|Status of Progress of GOJ Funded Projects| |---|---| |1) Andersen AFB Th|e on-base infrastructure project (Note 1) is in progress.| |2) Marine Corps Base in Finegayan Th (Camp Blaz (main camp)) qu|e on-base infrastructure project (Note 1) is in progress. The construction project for enlisted arters (Note 2) and other works are in progress.| |3) Marine Corps Base Andersen South Th|e construction project for training areas (Note 3) is in progress.| |Th 4) Naval Base Guam in Apra cli Th|e construction projects for infrastructure (Note 1), headquarters building (Note 4), and medical nic (Note 5) are completed.| ||e construction project for the embark facility (Note 6) is in progress.| (Notes) 1 The on-base infrastructure project includes site preparation and development of roads, water supply and sewerage system and telecommunication system for construction of facilities such as office buildings for the Marine Corps. 2 The construction project for enlisted quarters is to develop enlisted quarters for Marine Corps. 3 The construction project for training areas is to develop facilities for the Marine corps to conduct basic training such as urban combat and driving vehicles. 4 The construction project for the headquarters building is to develop a headquarters building for the Marine Corps. 5 The construction project for the medical clinic is to develop a medical clinic for the Marine Corps. 6 The construction project for the embark facility is to develop the facilities used for boarding of Marine Corps. **7** **Other Realignment Initiatives** **(1) Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)** Based on the decision that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas – Kadena, Misawa (Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni – would participate for the time being in bilateral training at SDF facilities, the Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)[14] has been underway since 2007. The MOD has been improving its infrastructure, as required, for the training relocation. The ATR contributes to enhancing interoperability between the two countries, and also to relocating part of air-to-ground training conducted by using Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will help with noise abatement around Kadena Air Base, thereby contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa. In addition to assisting the USFJ, the MOD/SDF is making efforts to ensure the safety and security of the local residents, such as the establishment of liaison offices, facilitating communication with related government agencies, and addressing needs of the ----- local residents. These efforts have been contributing to successful training relocation. |Time of reaching agreements|Overview| |---|---| |May 2006|In the “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” it is confirmed that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas-Kadena, Misawa and MCAS Iwakuni-would participate in bilateral training with the SDF at SDF facilities in Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru.| |January and October 2011|At the Joint Committee, both governments agreed to include Guam as a new training relocation site and to expand the scale of training.| |March 2014|At the Joint Committee, both governments agreed to add air- to-ground training using the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range (Misawa City and Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture).| |July 2023|At the Joint Committee, both governments agreed to include Alaska as the relocation site.| Overview of the Background to the Aviation Fig. III-2-5-10 Training Relocation **See** Fig. III-2-5-10 (Overview of the Background to the Aviation Training Relocation) The Government plans to continue decreasing MV 22’s amount of time deployed and training in Okinawa by relocating the exercises to mainland Japan and Guam, and will continue to promote initiatives that contribute to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa. Furthermore, with regard to the safety of MV-22s, prior to the deployment of MV-22s to MCAS Futenma in 2012, the Government established an analysis and assessment team composed of aircraft pilots and experts from inside and outside the Government and confirmed the safety of MV-22 by conducting its own survey, etc. In addition, when Japan made the decision to introduce Ospreys in 2014, the Government reconfirmed their safety by collecting and analyzing all kinds of technical information, not only in the preparation phase, but also after the decision of introduction was made. Furthermore, since 2016, the Government has dispatched GSDF Osprey personnel to the U.S. Marine Corps’ training programs, in which they pilot and maintain the aircraft. The Government has reaffirmed that the Osprey is a reliable aircraft that allows for stable maneuvering and maintenance. Additionally, the CV-22s (Osprey) have the same propulsion system as the MV-22 and both aircraft also have the basic structure in common. Therefore, the safety of both aircraft is at the same level. In addition, after the crash of the CV-22 in November 2023, an unprecedented level of exchange took place regarding technical information in the verification process between Japan and the United States. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) has come to the recognition that the cause of the accident was a materiel failure of a specific part in the components necessary for the aircraft to perform its functions, and believes that various safety measures corresponding to this cause can be taken to prevent and address accidents caused by the same type of failure. In this context, with regard to the said materiel failure, the United States side has explained that there is no need to change the design of the aircraft itself, nor is there any problem with the safety of the aircraft itself, and that there are no structural deficiencies that affect flight safety. The MOD has confirmed, at all levels in Japan and the United States, that flight safety remains the top priority for the resumption of operations, and that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate and take all possible measures to ensure safety. **See** **(2) Training Relocation for MV-22 (Osprey) etc.** The Government of Japan and the United States Government decided in the “2+2” joint statement of October 2013, to utilize the opportunities to participate in various operations in mainland Japan and across the region to reduce the amount of time that MV-22s are deployed and used for the training in Okinawa, so that training outside of Okinawa Prefecture, including mainland Japan, can be increased while maintaining the deterrence of the Alliance. Based on the above, both governments have been moving forward with conducting training of the MV-22 deployed at MCAS Futenma outside of Okinawa Prefecture and so on. In September 2016, it was agreed at the Joint Committee to relocate the training activities of TiltRotor/Rotary Wing aircraft, such as AH-1, CH53, and the MV-22 that are currently deployed at MCAS Futenma, out of Okinawa Prefecture at Japan’s expense in order to further promote training outside of Okinawa and mitigate the impact of training activities there. In FY2023, the MV-22 and other aircraft were incorporated into Japan-U.S. bilateral training upon being relocated to maneuver areas and other locations in Oita, Kumamoto, Miyazaki and Kagoshima prefectures in October 2023, and in Nagasaki, Kumamoto, and Kagoshima prefectures from February to March 2024. From the date of the agreement up to March 2024, a total of 20 exercises, in addition to the ones mentioned above, have been conducted in Guam as well as in Japan at the maneuver areas in Hokkaido, Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Gunma, Kanagawa, Nii t Shi k Shi d K f t **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **(3) Usability of Osprey Deployed by the U.S. Forces in** **Case of Disaster** In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the central part of the Philippines in November 2013, 14 MV22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for Chapter 1, Section 7 1 2(3) (Response to Search and Rescue of U.S. Forces Osprey); Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Initiatives for Safety Management, etc.); Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 1-4-2(3) (Crash of the U.S. Osprey); Reference 33 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces) **See** Fig. III-2-5-11 Usability of Osprey Aircraft (image) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** 3,000km 2,000km BeijingBeijing 1,500km SeoulSeoul TokyoTokyo 1,000km Izu IslandsIzu Islands ShanghaiShanghai CH-46 radius of action MV-22 range Approximately 140 km Approximately 3,900 km TaipeiTaipei Ogasawara IslandsOgasawara Islands Hong KongHong Kong MV-22 radius of action Approximately 1,100 km (1 aerial refueling) SaipanSaipan CH-46 range ManilaManila GuamGuam Approximately 700 km MV-22 radius of action Approximately 600 km (no refueling) |■ Comparison MV-22 CH-46|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||| |Maximum speed|About two times Approximately 520 km/h Approx|imately 270 km/h| |Cruising speed|the maximum speed Approximately 490 km/h Approx|imately 220 km/h| |Range|Approximately 3,900 km Appro|ximately 700 km| |Radius of action|Approximately 600 km About four times Appro (With 24 troops on board) the radius of action (With|ximately 140 km 12 troops on board)| |Number of troops carried|24|12| |Number of crew|3 ～ 4|3 ～ 5| |Cargo (inside)|Approximately 9,100 kg Appro|ximately 2,300 kg| |Cargo (outside)|About three times Approximately 5,700 kg Appro the payload|ximately 2,300 kg| |Rotor diameter|Approximately 11.6 m Appro|ximately 15.5 m| |Angle of flight|Approximately 7,500 m Appro|ximately 3,000 m| |Own weight|Approximately 16,000 kg Appro|ximately 7,700 kg| |Measurement|MV-22 and CH-46 are not much different in size. 6.7m 5.1m 17.5m 25.7m|| (Note) The MV-22 is the successor to the CH-46. ----- humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to **See** Fig. III 2 5 11 (Usability of Osprey Aircraft (Image)); Reference 33 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces) support Operation Damayan. The MV-22s were deployed promptly to affected areas that were difficult to access, and transported several hundred isolated victims and **8** **Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of** about six tons of relief materials in a day. In April 2014, **the Realignment of the USFJ** an MV-22 aircraft deployed in Okinawa was dispatched for search and rescue activities when a passenger ship In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the sank in an accident off the coast of Jindo in the ROK. USFJ based on the May 2006 Roadmap, the Act on Furthermore, in response to the large earthquake that hit Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Nepal in April 2015, four MV-22s deployed in Okinawa Realignment of United States Forces in Japan (USFJ were dispatched to the country to transport personnel Realignment Special Measures Act)[15] was enacted in and supplies. August 2007. Realignment grants, Special Subsidy Rates In Japan as well, when the Kumamoto Earthquake for Public Projects, and other systems were established occurred in 2016, MV-22s were dispatched to deliver based on the law. daily necessities to the disaster-stricken areas. In addition, under the U.S. Forces realignment, some In this manner, the MV-22 is capable of conducting USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S. humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. immediately and over a large range when large-scale Since these developments may affect the employment disasters occur because of its high performance and of USFJ employees, the Government of Japan will take multifunctionality. It has also been used for disaster measures to include education and skills training, which prevention drills since 2014. In September 2016, two is to help retain their employment. MV-22s participated in the comprehensive disaster The Realignment Special Measures Act was supposed prevention drills of Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and to cease to be effective as of March 31, 2017. However, conducted delivery drills for isolated islands. Like the since there remain realignment projects that require MV-22, the CV-22 can conduct humanitarian assistance implementation, on March 31, 2017, an act revising part and disaster relief activities, including search and rescue of the Act including a 10-year extension of the time limit missions, both immediately and over a large range, in the to March 31, 2027 was enacted. case of a large-scale disaster. **See** Reference 34 (Outline of the Act on Special Measures on **Part** As such, it is expected that the superior capabilities Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan) **Ⅲ** of the Osprey deployed by the U.S. Forces can be **Chapter** showcased in a variety of operations in the future as well. **2** **3** **Measures Concerning the Stationing of the USFJ** capabilities, logistics support capabilities, and Intelligence, **1** **Optimization of the Posture of the USFJ** Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. **(1) Reorganization of the Marine Littoral Regiment** **(MLR) of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Okinawa** **(2) Establishment of the Composite Watercraft** As part of the optimization of the posture of the USFJ, **Company at Yokohama North Dock** the 12th Marine Regiment located at Camp Hansen in In April 2023, the U.S. Army’s Composite Watercraft Okinawa will be reorganized into the 12th MLR by 2025. Company was established at Yokohama North Dock As part of this effort, the unit was renamed in to strengthen the maritime mobility of the U.S. Forces November 2023. While the 12th Marine Regiment mainly in emergency situations, including disasters, and it has artillery firepower as an artillery unit, the reorganized began operations as the 5th Transportation Company in MLR will have a variety of capabilities, including anti- February 2024. The established company will contribute ship strike capabilities with anti-ship missiles, air defense to strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance transportation ----- capabilities in Japan and improve the mobility of the U.S. Forces in the region. **2** **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa** Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, including the U.S. Marine Corps, which can deal with a wide range of missions with high mobility and readiness, along with the above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens deterrence, and contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. On the other hand, Okinawa has many USFJ facilities and areas such as air bases, maneuver areas, and logistics facilities. As of January 1, 2024, approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 8% of the land area of the prefecture and approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints. **(1) Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and** In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to potential conflict areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but at the same time has the advantage of having a certain distance from these areas that would not heighten military tension there unnecessarily. In addition, Okinawa, comprising a large number of small islands, is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands having a total length of some 1,200 km and close to key sea lanes for Japan, which depends on marine transportation for over 99% of its overall international trade. Furthermore, its location is extremely important from the perspective of security, as Okinawa serves as a strategically important target for neighboring countries **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** in both making access to the Pacific from the continent **Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa** and rejecting access from the Pacific to the continent. When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Fig. III-2-5-12 The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa (image) Okinawa holds a position of great strategic importance Geographical Advantage of Okinawa Beijing - The main island of Okinawa is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands and also close to key sea lanes (Note 1) for Japan, and thus its location is extremely important from the perspective of Japan’s Seoul security. - Okinawa is located close (but not overly so) to potential conflict areas that could affect Japan’s peace and Access from continental Tokyo security, including the Korean Peninsula and the Asia to the Pacific Taiwan Strait. Izu Islands → Okinawa is located at a distance that makes it possible to expeditiously send units to potential conflict areas and at the same time has sufficient Approximately 1,250 km distance so as not to heighten military tension unnecessarily and is not overly close in terms of Approximately Okinawa protecting units. Taipei 650 km - In the eyes of neighboring countries, Okinawa’s Hong Kong Ogasawara Islands location is strategically important in both enabling access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting Approximately 3,200 km access from the Pacific to the continent. (Note) 1 Japan is dependent upon marine transportation for at least 99% of the total volume of its trade. Japan’s sea lane The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa Approximately 2,750 km Manila The stationing of the U.S. Marine Corps [(Note 2)], which is capable of high mobility and rapid response and also has Saipan readiness for a wide variety of missions ranging from armed conflicts to natural disasters, in Okinawa, which features such geographical advantages plays an important Guam role in ensuring not only the security of Japan but also the peace and safety of East Asia. 500 km (Note) 2 The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of any kind of situation. ----- Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km[2] for exclusive use as USFJ facilities and areas. On the other hand, USFJ facilities and areas were strongly requested to be realigned, consolidated and reduced, on the grounds that their concentration in Okinawa seriously affect the lives of the people in Okinawa. Both countries have continued their initiatives to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, centering on those subject to strong local requests, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues,[16] it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the required coordination and procedures toward the return of land. Moreover, it was agreed in 1995 that efforts would also be made to resolve the so-called Three Okinawa Issues: the return of Naha Port (Naha City), the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104. Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that Fig. III-2-5-13 Location of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Okinawa (As of March 31, 2023) **US Army** **US Marines** Camp Hansen **US Air Force** **US Navy** **12th Marine Regiment (Artillery)** **31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Headquarters** Torii Communication Station Kadena Air Base **10th Area Support Group** **18th Wing** **1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne)** - F-15 fighter - KC-135 air refueling aircraft Camp Schwab - HH-60 **4th Marine Regiment (Infantry)** - E-3 early warning and control aircraft - MQ-9 and others **Fleet Activities Okinawa** **Patrol Squadron** - P-8A and other patrol aircraft **1-1 Air Defense Artillery** Camp Courtney - Patriot PAC-3 **III Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters** **3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit Headquarters** Camp Zukeran (Foster) **1st Marine Aircraft Wing Headquarters** White Beach Area - Port facility - Oil storage facility Futenma Air Station **Marine Aircraft Group 36** - CH-53 helicopter Makiminato Service Area - AH-1 helicopter 20km - UH-1 helicopter **3rd Marine Logistics Group Headquarters** - MV-22 Osprey, etc. (Note) Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources. occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, as well as the SACO, and the socalled SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996. **See** Fig. III-2-5-12 (The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa (Image)); Fig. III-2-5-13 (Location of Major U.S. Forces Stationed in Okinawa (As of March 31, 2024)); Reference 35 (Outline of 23 Issues) **(2) Outline of the SACO Final Report** The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, noise reduction, and the improvement of operational **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- procedures regarding the SOFA procedures, and also refers to the related facilities and areas covered. The land to be returned based on the implementation of contents included in the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km[2]) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km[2]. **See** Fig. III-2-5-14 (Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report (image)); Fig. III-2-5-15 (Changes in Number and Area of the **See** USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa); Reference 36 (The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)); Reference 37 (Progress of the SACO Final Report); Reference 38 (Consultative Bodies on the Mitigation of Impact of Bases on Okinawa) **(3)** **Return of a Major Portion of the Northern Training Area** The condition for returning the Northern Training Area was to relocate seven helipads in the area to be returned to the preexisting training area. However, the Government of Japan reached an agreement with the U.S. side to give considerations for the natural environment and to relocate not all seven but the minimum number of six helipads necessary, and proceeded with the construction work. The relocation of the helipads completed in December 2016, and the return of approximately 4,000 ha, a major portion of the Northern Training Area located in the villages of Kunigami and Higashi, was achieved based on the SACO Final Report. The returned land accounts for approximately 20% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Okinawa. The return is the largest one since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland, and had been an issue for 20 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996. Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces, the MOD took measures to remove obstacles (such as soil contamination survey, etc.) so that the landowners, etc., could use returned lands effectively and appropriately, and transferred the land to the landowners in December 2017. In addition, in July 2021, the northern part of the main island of Okinawa, including the returned lands, was inscribed in the World Natural Heritage Site as part of the AmamiOshima Island, Tokunoshima Island, Northern part of Okinawa Island, and Iriomote Island. |Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield|Col2| |---|---| ||Northern Training Area| Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Fig. III-2-5-14 Report (image) Northern Training Area Camp Hansen Senaha Communication Station Aha Training Area Sobe Communication Site Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield Offshore Camp Schwab Torii Communication Gimbaru Training Area Station Kin Blue Beach Training Area Kadena Air Base Camp Zukeran (Foster) Camp Kuwae Futenma Air Station Makiminato Service Area : Facilities and areas involved in land return Naha Port : Facilities and areas involved in land return (Cancellation of joint use) : Destination sites of other facilities relocation programs Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Fig. III-2-5-15 Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** |353|Area (km2)| |---|---| |Facilities/Areas 278|| |249 242 235 185|| |144|| ||| |83 46|| |43 38 31|| **144** **83** **46** **43** **38** **31** June 1971 May 1972 End of End of (At the conclusion of (On return) FY1980 FY1990 the Agreement on the Return of Okinawa) SACO Final Report (1996) As of January 2024 **3** **The USFJ in Kanagawa Prefecture** **(1) Deployment of the U.S. Aircraft Carrier to** **Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka** The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in ensuring maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S. aircraft carrier provides the core capabilities of the Fleet. The U.S. Navy affirms that it will continue to ensure that all of its nuclear-powered vessels anchoring in Japan’s ports, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier[17] which is forward-deployed at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa **17 Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not need refueling and they are able to maintain high speeds necessary for the operations of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational** ----- Prefecture), adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactors will normally be shut down while the vessels are anchored, and repair of the nuclear reactors and refueling will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan will also continue to take all possible measures to ensure safety. The nuclearpowered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan departed from Yokosuka in the spring of 2024, and is scheduled to be replaced by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington later that year. **(2) Realignment, etc. of USFJ Facilities and Areas** With regard to the realignment of facilities and areas of the USFJ in Kanagawa Prefecture, the release of facilities and areas including Kamiseya Communication Station and Fukaya Communication Site has already been realized based on the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of October 2004. Meanwhile, more than 10 years have passed since the initial agreement, and security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe. Therefore, there have been changes in the U.S. Navy’s posture and capabilities, as represented by the increased operations of the U.S. vessels at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. In light of such circumstances, the following were agreed at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting in November 2018: (1) development of facilities for satisfying the U.S. Navy’s facility requirements; (2) start of negotiations on joint use of Negishi Dependent Housing Area to conduct site restoration works; and (3) cancellation of the construction of family housing units in the Yokohama portion of Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex. Subsequently, joint use of Negishi Dependent Housing Area was agreed upon at the JapanU.S. Joint Committee meeting in November 2019. **See** Fig. III-2-5-16 (Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan (Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2024)); Fig. III-2-5-17 (Realignment of Facilities and Areas of the USFJ in Kanagawa Prefecture (image)) Fig. III-2-5-16 Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan (Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2023) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **US Army** **US Navy** Shariki **US Air Force** **US Marines** **10th Missile Defense Battery** - TPY-2 radar ( “X-band radar” ) Misawa **35th Fighter Wing** - F-16 fighter Kyogamisaki Iwakuni **14th Missile Defense Battery** **Naval Air Facility, Misawa** **Patrol & Reconnaissance Force, 7th Fleet** **Carrier Air Wing 5 (carrier-based aircraft)** - TPY-2 radar ( “X-band radar” ) - P-8A anti-submarine patrol aircraft, etc. - F/A-18 strike fighter - EA-18 electronic warfare aircraft - E-2 airborne early warning aircraft **Joint Tactical Ground Station** - C-2 transport aircraft Yokota-U.S. Forces, **Marine Aircraft Group 12** Japan Headquarters - F/A-18 strike fighter **5th Air Force Headquarters** - KC-130 tanker/transport aircraft **374th Airlift Wing** - F-35B fighter - C-130 transport aircraft - C-12 transport aircraft, etc. - C-12 transport aircraft - UH-1 helicopter - CV-22 Osprey Sagami General Depot **38th Air Defense Artillery** Yokosuka-Commander, Sasebo Naval Forces Japan **Brigade Headquarters** **Commander Fleet Activities** **Commander Fleet Activities,** Zama-U.S. Army, Japan **Sasebo 7th Fleet** **Yokosuka** Atsugi **I Corps (Forward)** - Amphibious assault ship (U.S.) - Aircraft carrier (USS Ronald Reagan) - Transport landing ship **Naval Air Facility, Atsugi** - Cruiser - Landing ship **Carrier Air Wing 5** - Amphibious command ship (USS Blue Ridge) - Minesweeper, etc. - MH-60 helicopter - Destroyer, etc. 500km (Note) Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources. ----- |ttee agreement of|October|2004| |---|---|---| |Location|Area (ha)|Plan for land return, etc.| |Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 53 ha|Returned in December, 2005| |Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 3 ha|Returned in May, 2009| |Izumi Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 77 ha|Returned in June, 2014| |Seya Ward and Asahi Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 242 ha|Returned in June, 2015| |Naka Ward, Minami Ward and Isogo Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 43 ha|To be returned when the construction of family housing etc. is completed at Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex| |Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 1 ha|Return procedures to begin upon completion of the current use| |Yokohama City Area|―|Construction of family housing, etc.| **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** |Location|Details| |---|---| |Yokosuka City|Bachelor enlisted quarters| |Yokosuka City|A wharf| |Zushi City Area|Living support facilities, fitness center, maintenance shop and fire station| |Tsurumi Ward, Yokohama City|A fire station| |Location|Area|Details| |---|---|---| |Naka Ward, Minami Ward and Isogo Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 43 ha|A Japan-US consultation concerning joint use of the Negishi Dependent Housing Area will commence with the aim of promptly carrying out site restoration work. Consultation on the specific return date will be held between the two governments depending on the progress of the site restoration work.| |Location|Details| |---|---| |Yokohama City Area|Cancellation of construction of family housing, etc.| Fig. III-2-5-17 Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture (image) Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of October 2004 Area Name Location Plan for land return, etc. (ha) Kanazawa Ward, Approx. ① Koshiba POL Depot Yokohama City 53 ha Returned in December, 2005 Kanazawa Ward, Approx. ④ ② Tomioka Storage Area Yokohama City 3 ha Returned in May, 2009 Fukaya Izumi Ward, Approx. ③ Communication Site Yokohama City 77 ha Returned in June, 2014 Seya Ward and Yokohama City, ④ Communication StationKamiseya Asahi Ward, Approx. 242 ha Returned in June, 2015 Kanagawa Prefecture Yokohama City To be returned when ③ Naka Ward, the construction of family Tsurumi Negishi Dependent Minami Ward and Approx. Ward ⑪ ⑤ Housing Area Isogo Ward, 43 ha housing etc. is completed at Ikego Housing Area and Yokohama City Navy Annex Asahi Seya Ward ⑤ Detached part of Kanazawa Ward, Approx. Return procedures to begin Ward ⑥ Ikego Housing Area Yokohama City 1 ha upon completion of and Navy Annex the current use Izumi Minami Ward Naka Ward ⑦ Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex Yokohama City Area ― Construction of family housing, etc. Ward ② Totsuka Ward : Returned ① Isogo Ward Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of November 2018 [Development of facilities] ⑦ Kanazawa Ward ⑥ Location U.S. Fleet Activities, Name Location Details ⑧ Yokosuka Yokosuka City Bachelor enlisted quarters ⑩ ⑨ ⑨ Urago Storage Area Yokosuka City A wharf Living support facilities, Ikego Housing Area Zushi City ⑧ ⑩ and Navy Annex Zushi City Area fitness center, maintenance shop and fire station Tsurumi Ward, ⑪ Tsurumi POL Depot Yokohama City A fire station [Joint use and return] Yokosuka City Location Name Location Area Details A Japan-US consultation concerning Naka Ward, joint use of the Negishi Dependent Negishi Minami Housing Area will commence with ⑤ Dependent Housing Isogo Ward, Ward and Approx. 43 ha the aim of promptly carrying out site restoration work. Consultation on Area Yokohama the specific return date will be held City between the two governments depending on the progress of the site restoration work. [Cancellation of construction] Location Name Location Details ⑦ Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex Yokohama City Area Cancellation of construction of family housing, etc. ----- **Countries and Others** **Chapter** **3** In situations where the need for international cooperation **KEY WORD** **Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA)** in the security and defense fields is increasing in an unprecedented manner, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/ Its purpose is to facilitate the implementation of cooperative activities between Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is required to actively the forces of the two countries, such as joint training and disaster relief, by establishing procedures for the cooperative activities conducted by defense contribute to ensuring the security of Japan, the peace force of one country while visiting the other country, and to define the status of and stability of the region and the peace, stability and the visiting force. prosperity of the entire international community. As of April 2024, it has been concluded with Australia and the United Kingdom. The first defense objective of the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) is to shape a security **KEY WORD** environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes **Acquisition and Cross-Servicing** **Agreements (ACSA)** to the status quo by force, in cooperation with Japan’s ally, like-minded countries and others. Therefore, the It establishes the basic terms and conditions for the mutual provision NDS calls for Japan to promote efforts that contribute to of goods and services necessary for joint training, UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), humanitarian international relief operations, operations to realizing the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) deal with major disasters, and others. from the perspective that it is extremely important to As of April 2024, it has been concluded with the United States, Australia, the reinforce collaboration with not only its ally but also as United Kingdom, Canada, France and India and signed with Germany. many countries as possible. In addition, it is essential to deepen cooperation and coordination with its ally and like-minded countries to **KEY WORD** **Agreements concerning the Transfer of** counter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such **Defense Equipment and Technology** attempts and to safeguard the security environment of Japan. An international agreement that establishes a general legal framework Furthermore, Japan will also more actively advance for the transfer of defense equipment and technology between signatory its efforts to solve global security issues and others, countries. Specifically, it establishes procedures for deciding and confirming individual transfers and obligates them to properly use and manage including securing the freedom and safety of maritime transferred defense equipment and technology. **Part** navigation and overflight, coordination and cooperation As of April 2024, Japan has concluded the agreement with the United States, **Ⅲ** with relevant countries in relation to the use of the space and cyber domains, international peace cooperation the United Kingdom, Australia, India, the Philippines, France, Germany, Malaysia, Italy, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Thailand, Sweden, Singapore, and the **Chapter** United Arab Emirates (UAE). (*Arrangement on Transfer of Arms and Military activities, cooperation on climate change and maritime **3** security, arms control and disarmament and non- Technologies to the United States and Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Northern Ireland concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies) For the implementation of these efforts, Japan will, ----- **and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA) and Agreements** **concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and** **Technology from the perspective of effectively promoting** the strengthening of collaboration with like-minded countries and others. **See** Fig. III-3-1 (MOD’s Approach Under the Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) (image)) while placing the Japan U.S. Alliance as the key pillar of its security policy, proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, taking into account characteristics of the region as well as situation of each country. In doing so, Japan will further promote the establishment of institutional frameworks such as Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA), Acquisition **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE: Multilateral and multilayered security cooperation** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/index.html** **MOVIE: The MOD’s Efforts under the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”** **URL: https://youtu.be/HQB-WaQXXAI** **REFERENCE: The official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: A new plan for Free and Open** Indo-Pacific [Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] **URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/page3e 001336.html** ----- Fig. III-3-1 MOD’s Approach Under the Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) (image) MOD's Approach under the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) **Background** 〇 In August 2016, then Prime Minister Abe unveiled the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept in his keynote speech in the 6th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) held in Kenya. 〇 Japan’s fundamental aim is to foster regional stability and prosperity by improving connectivity between Asia and Africa through a free and open Indo-Pacific region. - Prime Minister Kishida announced Japan’s new plan for a FOIP in his policy speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) held in India in March 2023. **Basic concepts of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”** 〇 The Indo-Pacific region is the center of the world vitality and home to more than half the world population; realizing the stable and autonomous development in this region is crucial for the stability and prosperity of the world. 〇 The goal of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Vision is to facilitate free and robust economic activity throughout the Indo-Pacific, and to realize the prosperity in the entire region. **New Pillars of Cooperation for FOIP** (1) Principles for peace and rules for prosperity (2) Addressing challenges in an Indo-Pacific way (3) Multilayered connectivity (4) Extending efforts for security and safe use of the “sea” to the “air” **✓✓ Japan is pursuing the “Free and Open Indo Pacific (FOIP)” Vision through a coordinated whole-of-government approach.** **Characteristics of the Indo-Pacific Region** 〇 The Indo-Pacific region is at the center of global economic dynamism and home to the largest share of the world’s population. Key sea lanes are located in the Indo-Pacific area; as a result, regional stability is essential to Japan’s security and prosperity. 〇 Meanwhile, there are various challenges within the region, including rapid military modernization and intensified military activities. 〇 All countries in the region are taking measures to respond to these rapid changes in the environment. **Aspects of MOD’s Approach** 〇 Securing the stable use of major sea lanes by defense cooperation and exchange activities 〇 Preventing contingencies through confidence-building and mutual understanding 〇 Contributing to peace and stability through active engagement in the region, in cooperation with partner countries **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **✓ There are many security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region** **✓ Creating a favorable security environment for Japan by leveraging defense cooperation and exchange activities** European Countries Canada NATO and EU The United States Japan Middle East India and Africa Southeast Pacific Ocean South Asia Asia Latin America Pacific Island countries Indian Ocean Australia **New Zealand** Major sea lane *Maps, etc., are for illustration purposes only. 〇 The MOD/SDF is enhancing defense cooperation and exchanges with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. This enhanced engagement encompasses Southeast Asia, South Asia and Pacific Islands, in which several key sea lanes are located; Middle East, a key region in terms of energy security; and Africa and Latin America. 〇 The MOD/SDF is collaborating positively with Indo-Pacific countries such as the United States, Australia, India, Canada, New Zealand, and also countries in Europe including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, all of which share values inherent to the FOIP Vision and have ties to the region. **✓ As “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” is an inclusive vision, Japan welcomes cooperation with all countries that share its values.** ----- **Section 1** **Strategic Promotion of Multilateral and Multilayered Defense Cooperation** **1** **Significance, etc. of Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others** including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, **1** **Significance and Changes of Collaboration** capacity building, defense equipment and technology **with Like-Minded Countries and Others** cooperation and the development of institutional The peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region is frameworks such as RAA and ACSA. closely related to Japan’s security. In addition, with In addition, multilateral security cooperation and increasingly changeable and complicated global power dialogue are in the process of evolving from those that dynamics and escalation of interstate competition focus on dialogue to those that focus on cooperation that encompassing political, economic, military and other seeks to maintain and strengthen international order. aspects, they are also becoming a more important issue It is important to promote bilateral and multilateral for the international community. defense cooperation and exchanges in a multifaceted Thus, taking into account the international situation, and multilayered manner to create an ideal security regional characteristics and situations and security issues environment. that other nations face, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the At the G7 Hiroshima Summit chaired by Prime Self Defense Forces (SDF) intends to strategically promote Minister Kishida in May 2023, the leaders agreed on the multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and importance of the rule of law and the principles of the exchanges, so that each country can build mutual trust and UN Charter in a session that included the leaders of the work together to solve regional security issues. invited countries and President Zelenskyy of Ukraine. It is also necessary to further coordinate with each They also agreed that the G7 will take the lead in other even in peacetime to deter unilateral changes to the addressing the global economy, including energy and status quo by force and such attempts and to be able to food security and global challenges like climate change, receive support from the ally, like-minded countries, etc. health and development as well as strengthening its in various contingencies. involvement in what is called the Global South. Defense cooperation and exchanges have been At the Presidency Press Conference following the delivered in the forms of high-level meetings; Hiroshima Summit, Prime Minister Kishida stated that “Cooperation and exchanges among people” introducing Japan would continue to lead the discussions in the G7 from working-level talks, bilateral/multilateral training and the perspective of upholding the free and open international exercises; “cooperation and exchanges by assets” such order based on the rule of law and strengthening Japan’s **Part** as strategic port calls; “capacity building” in which engagement with its international partners. **Ⅲ** human resource development and technical support are **See** Fig. III-3-1-1 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges); Fig. III-3-1-2 **Chapter** (Number of High-level Bilateral Dialogues and Consultations (April provided to other countries in security and defense fields; 2023-March 2024)); Fig. III-3-1-3 (Visit to Ports and Airports by SDF **3** “defense equipment and technology cooperation” which (April 2023-March 2024); Reference 39 (Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements); Reference 40 (International Student is conducted to secure homeland security and promote Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2023)) contribution to peace/international cooperation, etc.; and others. The MOD/SDF has long strived to alleviate any feelings of confrontation and tension, and to foster a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere by building face-to-face relationships through human cooperation and exchanges including bilateral dialogues. In addition, the MOD/SDF has recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means, ----- Fig. III-3-1-1 Defense Cooperation and Exchanges **Defense cooperation and exchanges** “Defense cooperation and exchanges” refers to efforts to strengthen bilateral and multilateral defense relations by using various tools, which are significant initiatives for securing the peace and stability of Japan and the international community. **Purpose of defense cooperation and exchanges** 〇 To create a security environment desirable for Japan 〇 To deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential 〇 To prevent contingencies through promoting confidence-building and mutual understanding **Tools for defense cooperation and exchanges** **Tool ① Cooperation and exchanges among people** … On such occasions as “2+2” Meetings, defense ministerial meetings, chief of staff-level meetings or other high-level meetings, working-level consultations among defense authorities, and multilateral international conferences, participants frankly exchange views on defense policies, regional affairs, defense cooperation and exchanges, etc., thereby developing mutual understanding and confidence-building among them and further promoting defense cooperation and exchanges thereafter. Exchanges of students and interchange in education and research aim to facilitate understanding of defense policies and statuses of military units of other countries and promote relations of trust through network building. Japan-U.K. “2+2”Meeting Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference hosted by Japan-Viet Nam mid-level officer exchange Senior Level Seminar Royal Australian Navy **Tool ② Cooperation and exchanges among assets** … Through goodwill exercise, mutual visits of naval ships and aircraft (calling at ports and airports), exchange events among units, and other measures, mutual trust with partner countries is developed and cooperative relationships are promoted. In joint training and exercises, the SDF will enhance the skills of each unit and strengthen nation-to-nation defense relationships through by increasing collaborative capacity with foreign military assets. U.S.-Australia bilateral exercise with Multilateral exercise hosted by the U.S. Army and Japan-U.S.-Australia multilateral exercise Japan-U.S.-Canada trilateral exercise multinational participation Tentara National Indonesia (Indonesian Army) “Cope North 24” [Courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense] “Noble Stingray” “Talisman Sabre 23” “Super Garuda Shield 23” **Tool ③ Capacity building** … Capacity building aims to improve the capabilities of partner countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time, and help their military forces play roles in contributing to international peace and regional stability. It is conducted through activities such as seminars and practical training in various fields, the provision of technical guidance, opinion exchanges, and the observation of education and training programs, etc. Engineering Military band training HA/DR (search and rescue, military medicine) Cybersecurity (Cambodia) (Papua New Guinea) (Laos) (ASEAN countries) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **Tool ④ Defense equipment and technology cooperation** … Through overseas transfers of equipment, joint research and development, participation in international exhibitions, and holding of the Defence Industry Forum, Japan seeks to maintain and strengthen its industrial base, enhance capacity of both the SDF and military forces of partner countries, and strengthen and maintain defense cooperation with those partner countries. Transfer of air surveillance radar International exhibition International exhibition International exhibition systems to the Philippines (LIMA’23) （DSEI London） (INDO PACIFIC 2023) **(Reference) Conclusion of agreements regarding defense cooperation** … Through concluding such agreements as Reciprocal Access Agreements, Agreements concerning Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), the framework of cooperation has been materialized and institutionalized with the aim of promoting defense cooperation and exchanges more smoothly and consistently. Signing of Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement Signing of Japan-UK Reciprocal Access Agreement Establishment of a joint organization to develop Signing of Japan-Germany ACSA [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan] [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan] next-generation fighter jet by Japan, UK and Italy [Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] ----- Fig. III-3-1-2 Number of High-level Bilateral Dialogues and Consultations (April 2023-March 2024) “High-level bilateral dialogues and consultations” refers to bilateral meetings of the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and Chiefs of Staff with their respective counterparts. High-level bilateral dialogues and consultations were conducted with the following countries between April 2023 and March 2024, but had also been conducted with other countries prior to that period together with other types of defense cooperation and exchanges. It is clear from this figure that Japan has conducted high-level dialogues and consultations with various countries across the globe. 5 times or more 3 to 4 exchanges Twice Once Sweden Finland Norway Estonia Netherlands Germany Lithuania Poland The United Ukraine Canada Kingdom France Romania Mongolia The Republic Spain of Korea The United States China Italy Türkiye India Nepal Oman Bangladesh Jordan Laos Viet Nam Cambodia Saudi Arabia UAE Thailand Philippines Kiribati Sri Lanka Brunei Malaysia Indonesia Papua New Guinea Singapore Peru Brazil Tonga Timor-Leste Fiji Australia Chile New Zealand Fig. III-3-1-3 Visit to Ports and Airports by SDF (April 2023-March 2024) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** 5 times or more 3 to 4 exchanges Twice Once Canada France The Republic of Korea The United States India Bangladesh Viet Nam Cambodia Mexico Philippines Sri Lanka Thailand Palau Brunei Columbia Maldives Papua New Guinea Indonesia Malaysia Solomon Islands Peru Brazil Singapore Tonga Australia French Fiji New Caledonia Chile Argentina ----- Leaders Meeting held at the same time, they reaffirmed **2** **Efforts under the Vision of Free and Open** their strong commitment to the common vision of FOIP. **Indo-Pacific (FOIP)** The MOD/SDF is also promoting defense cooperation **(1) Characteristics of the Indo-Pacific Region** and exchanges to realize FOIP and is working to maintain A free and open maritime order, which relies on the rule the stable use of sea lanes by establishing good relations of law, is the foundation for the stability and prosperity with coastal countries in the aforementioned regions and of the international community. The Indo-Pacific region ensuring that the SDF has stable access to their ports and is at the core of the world’s vitality and home to half airports. The MOD/SDF is also promoting initiatives, the world’s population. It is important to establish this such as joint training and capacity building, to enable region as a “free and open global property’ to ensure the these countries to play a more effective role for the peace and prosperity of the entire region. stability of the Indo-Pacific region. On the other hand, a range of challenges exist for The United States, which is the ally of Japan, Australia, realizing FOIP in the region, including the vicinity of India, European countries such as the United Kingdom, Japan, such as a rapid modernization of military forces France and Germany, Canada and New Zealand, are and intensified military activities. countries that not only share fundamental values with Japan but also have geographic and historical ties **(2) Direction of the MOD’s Initiatives** to the Indo-Pacific region. The MOD/SDF has been Given this situation, the MOD/SDF is, for example, encouraging these countries to engage more in the promoting defense cooperation and exchanges to Indo-Pacific region and promoting defense cooperation ensure that Japan can continue stable use of major sea and exchanges so that more effective initiatives can be lanes. In addition, the MOD/SDF is promoting mutual achieved than unilateral efforts by Japan. understanding and building trust with countries that Japan’s vision of FOIP is inclusive and the MOD/SDF modernize their military forces and intensify their will continue to promote cooperation with all countries military activities to prevent contingencies and ensure that endorse it. Japan’s security. Furthermore, for countries in the region that are taking steps to respond to changes in the **(4)** **Promotion of Mutual Understanding and Trust Building** environment, the MOD/SDF is trying to contribute to With regard to China, the MOD/SDF will, through regional peace and stability by supporting their efforts defense exchange opportunities, continue to encourage through defense cooperation and exchanges. to comply with international norms of conduct and assume a responsible and constructive role for peace and **(3) Expansion of FOIP** stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In doing so, by frankly **Part** **Ⅲ** With the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone, Japan’s conveying its concerns about the increased military policy is to further deepen cooperation with like- activities and military expansions around it, Japan will **Chapter** minded countries and further promote efforts toward promote mutual understanding and confidence-building **3** realizing FOIP through frameworks, including Japan- and avoid unforeseen circumstances, thereby ensuring Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) partnership. With respect its security. to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Pacific Island countries, As for Russia, while condemning its aggression the Middle East, Africa and Latin American countries, against Ukraine to the maximum extent possible, based cooperation will be strengthened to realize FOIP while on the belief that unilateral changes to the status quo by utilizing wide-ranging means. For examples, in the G7 force are unacceptable, Japan will keep in touch with Hiroshima Summit in May 2023, the leaders of each Russia as necessary to avoid unforeseen circumstances country reiterated the importance of FOIP and in Quad and unnecessary friction alongside it. **2** **Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Various Countries** In promoting security cooperation and exchanges, it is of various cooperative means, while taking matters such important to enhance bilateral and multilateral defense as regional affairs, the situations of partner countries and cooperation and exchanges using optimal combinations their relationships with Japan into account. ----- supported the Defence Strategic Review announced by Australia the same month as it would contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region by strengthening Australia’s deterrence capabilities. The two ministers also agreed to continue actively promoting defense cooperation and exchanges to deepen JapanAustralia defense cooperation into an entity that would contribute more actively to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (October 2023) **1** **Australia** **(1) Significance** **of** **Defense** **Cooperation** **and** **Exchanges with Australia** For Japan, Australia is a special strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region as both Japan and Australia are allied with the United States and share not only fundamental values but also security strategic stakes and interests. Previously, the foundations for cooperation have been formed, including the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA), the Japan-Australia General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology and the JapanAustralia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) (signed in January 2022, coming into force in August 2023). In addition, based on the new Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC)[1] signed in October 2022, the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) states that the two countries will further deepen their defense cooperation and build a closer relationship second only to the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. Based on the new JDSC as well, the two countries have been consulting Japan-Australia cooperation in contingencies and promoting cooperation in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), asset protection for the Australian Defence Force[2] (ADF), and bilateral and multilateral exercises to improve interoperability. They also promote support for capacity building in third countries, cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR), defense equipment and technology cooperation and others. **See** Part II, Chapter 5, Paragraph 3-8 (Asset Protection for the U.S Forces and other Forces); Reference 22 (Track Record of **See** Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces (SDF Law Article 95-2)) In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held an informal conference with Prime Minister Albanese on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. During the conference, Prime Minister Kishida stated that it was clear that Japan and Australia shared a common strategic awareness and a direction of the way forward, which was encouraging. The two leaders also welcomed the progress in security cooperation between the two countries based on the new Japan-Australia JDSC signed October 2022 and expressed their expectations for the early entry into force of Japan-Australia RAA, which will contribute to the implementation of the Declaration. In June 2023, at the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, then Defense Minister Hamada met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles and signed “the trilateral Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Projects Arrangement”. The two Ministers agreed to promote science and technology cooperation in various fields, share strategic **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(2) Recent** **Major** **Achievements** **in** **Defense** **Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.** In April 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada held a teleconference with Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles, where he welcomed and This Agreement reaffirms the special strategic partnership between Japan and Australia and states that cooperation between Japan and Australia, as well as between Japan, the United States, and Australia, will be consolidated across the board to maintain rule-based order and peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, specifying the strengthening of defense cooperation in the fields such as enhanced interoperability between the SDF and the Defence Force of Australia, cooperation in ISR, HA/DR, capacity building of regional partner countries, advanced defense science and technology and cyber and space. It also states that response measures will be considered in the event of contingencies that may affect the security interests of both Japan and Australia or the surrounding region. It was conducted 5 times in total in 2023. Announced in April 2023 in light of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. Priorities were identified as improving deterrence by acquiring nuclear submarines, developing longrange precision strike capabilities, improving operational capabilities from northern Australia, deepening diplomatic and defense partnerships with key partners in the Indo-Pacific region, ----- awareness, enhance interoperability and further promote effectiveness of the defense cooperation. In September 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Australia Summit meeting with Prime Minister Albanese and welcomed the progress made in JapanAustralia defense cooperation under the Australia-Japan RAA, which came into force in August 2023. They also agreed to strengthen concrete cooperation under the new Japan-Australia JDSC. In October 2023, Defense Minister Kihara met with Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles in Tokyo, where they confirmed the importance of steadily implementing the new JapanAustralia JDSC and promoting trilateral defense cooperation across the board, including with mutual ally the United States. Both countries also confirmed the importance of defense equipment and technology cooperation and welcomed the Australian Department of Defence’s announcement[4] of concluding a contract for a joint development project with Mitsubishi Electric Corporation Australia. In May 2024, Defense Minister Kihara met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles in Hawaii. During the meeting, the two ministers confirmed that advancing concrete cooperation and enhancing each other’s capabilities under the aligned strategies of each country was important and that the direction of substantial cooperation between Japan’s counterattack capabilities utilizing its stand-off defense capabilities and Australia’s long-range precision strike capabilities would be considered. The two ministers also confirmed that in addition to ISR cooperation, their operational cooperation and joint trainings were deepening, including through the participation of ADF for the first time in the Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise “Yamasakura” (YS-85) and the Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercise “Keen Edge 24”, and agreed to continue strengthening cooperation in the Pacific Island region. **(3) Initiatives of Each Service** Since April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan has held six meetings with General Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force of Australia. During the meetings, the two sides agreed to further improve the effectiveness of defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries based on aligned strategies of each country and to strive to make this the core of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Since April 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) has met five times with Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, Chief of the Australian Army. In August 2023, he attended the Chief of Army Symposium (CAS) hosted by the Australian Army and exchanged opinions with Chiefs of Army of the participating countries in addition to the Chief of the Australian Army. As part of various types of bilateral/multilateral training, the GSDF has continued to conduct field training between the GSDF Special Operations Group and the Australian Army’s Special Operations Command. In addition, it has dispatched liaison officers to the Australian Army and vice versa, promoting the strengthening of cooperation. Since April 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has had three meetings with Lt. Gen. Hammond, Chief of the Royal Australian Navy. At the meetings, they agreed to further strengthen cooperation between Australia and Japan, including cooperation with Pacific Island countries. The MSDF is working to strengthen cooperation Liaison officers aboard the destroyer JS “Shiranui” (from foreground, India, Australia, and the United States) during the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise “Malabar” (August 2023) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **MOVIE: Field Training Exercise in Australia 2023** **URL: https://youtu.be/kn9inxgNUgs?si=zrNdpvwaCRoyOi7w** A joint development project to enhance the monitoring capability and survivability of the equipment of Australian forces by utilizing Mitsubishi Electric Corporation’s electronic and optical ----- and improve interoperability, including high end contents, with the Royal Australian Navy and Air Force through bilateral/multilateral exercises, such as the Japan-Australia bilateral exercise “Nichi-Gou Trident,” the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise “Malabar,”[5] and the Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK multilateral exercise “Pacific Vanguard.” In addition, both countries have enhanced cooperation in strengthening defense cooperation with Pacific Island countries and supporting capacity building in the maritime security field, such as the Japan Australia Kiribati Goodwill Exercise conducted in June 2023 with the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) Mobile Cooperation Team (MCT) and the Australian Maritime Service Advisor. In April 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, Japan Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) met with Air Vice-Marshal Roberts, Australian Space Defence Commander at the Space Symposium organized by the United States. In November 2023, he also met with Air Marshal Chipman, Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force at the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS) held in the United States. After the RAA came into effect, the ASDF conducted a mobile deployment training of F-35A aircraft to the United States and Australia in August 2023 and the JapanAustralia bilateral exercise “Bushido Guardian 23” in September 2023. During the deployment training, F-35A fighter aircraft were deployed to Guam and Australia to strengthen cooperation among air force services with a view to future rotational deployments. An ASDF F-35A fighter lands at Tyndall Air Force Base, Australia and receives a welcoming water spray. (August 2023) Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3 4 1 (1) (Australia); Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 41 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (FY2020 and Beyond)) **See** **(4) Cooperative Relationship, etc., among Japan,** **Australia and the United States** Japan and Australia share fundamental values and cooperate closely to resolve the various challenges the Indo-Pacific region and the international community face. To ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation and to contribute to the peace and stability of the region, it is important for Japan and Australia and their common ally, the United States, to proactively promote trilateral cooperation. In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada attended a Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, during which the ministers committed to continue to take concrete and practical measures to improve interoperability and deepen cooperation across the spectrum among Japan, the United States and Australia, as well as to further strengthen cooperation with ASEAN countries, Pacific Island countries and others. They also committed to further strengthen cooperation among the three countries in conducting trilateral F-35 Joint Strike Fighter training in Australia, increasing complex and high-end exercises in northern Australia; regularizing asset protection by the SDF for the U.S. Forces and ADF; and information-sharing, equipment and technology cooperation and response to regional challenges. On the same day, the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Defense Ministers’ Meeting was also held for the first time with the Philippines. The four ministers discussed common regional issues and expansion of cooperation among the four countries and confirmed their intention to work together to realize FOIP. In May 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held a Japan U.S.-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting in Hawaii. At the meeting, the ministers underscored the deep strategic alignment and shared values of the three countries and reiterated their strong opposition to any attempt by China to unilaterally change the status quo by fore or coercion in the South China Sea and East China Sea. They also affirmed the critical role of the trilateral partnership in realizing FOIP and committed to expanding defense cooperation, including conducting trilateral F-35 **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** It began in 1992 as a bilateral exercise between the United States and India, and the MSDF has participated continuously since being invited in 2007. The year of 2022 saw the addition of ----- Joint Strike Fighter trainings in all three countries, an inaugural joint and combined live fire air and missile defense exercise, and increased Japanese participation in Australia-U.S. force posture activities. Furthermore, they signed “the trilateral Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Projects Arrangement”, agreeing to further discuss opportunities for science and technology cooperation. On the same day, the second Japan-U.S.-Australia Philippines defense ministers’ meeting was held and the four ministers emphasized the importance of collaboration to advance their shared vision of free, open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. Japan, the United States and Australia has continued to engage in cooperation among each force, including the Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises as well as multilateral exercises involving other countries. In June 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan had a Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Meeting with Admiral Aquilino, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and General Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force of Australia on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue. At the meeting, they agreed that the Indo-Pacific region was a focal point of international security and resolved to further strengthen cooperation between Japan, the United States and Australia for regional peace and stability. Additionally, at a CHOD Meeting conducted in August 2023, the participants discussed the future direction of Japan-U.S.-Australia defense cooperation to realize FOIP. The GSDF and the MSDF participated in the multilateral exercise “Talisman Sabre 23” hosted by the United States and Australia from July to August 2023 in Australia, to improve interoperability with U.S. and Australian forces and strengthen cooperation with participating countries. In February 2024, the ADF participated for the first time in the Japan-U.S. joint exercise “Keen Edge 24” to enhance joint operations capabilities of Japan, the United States and Australia. In September 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF conducted the first Japan-U.S.-AustraliaROK multilateral talks on the occasion of the IndoPacific Armies Chiefs Conference (IPACC) and in December 2023, co-hosted the Land Forces Summit (LFS) with U.S. Army Pacific to hold a Japan-U.S.Australia-ROK multilateral talks and the first JapanU.S.-Australia-Philippines multilateral talks with the heads of the Philippine Army and Marine Corps. F J t J l 2023 th GSDF d t d th An operation meeting at the multilateral exercise “Talisman Sabre 23” (August 2023) “Southern Jackaroo 23” field training exercise with the U.S. Marine Corps and the Australian Army in Australia to improve operational capabilities and interoperability with the United States and Australia regarding counterguerrilla commando operations. In December 2023, the Australian Army participated for the first time in the Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise “Yamasakura” (YS-85) to improve cross-domain interoperability between Japan, the United States and Australia. The Philippines participated as an observer for the first time in the exercise, which also sought to strengthen cooperation among the four countries: Japan, the United States, Australia and the Philippines. In May 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF attended a Japan-U.S.-India-Australia quadripartite meeting on the occasion of International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference (IMDEX) 2023 hosted by Singapore, where views were exchanged on strengthening cooperation, including “Malabar”, among the four countries. In September 2023, he also attended a Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Chiefs of Defense Meeting in Hawaii to share their understanding of the strategic environment and discuss the direction of cooperation among the four countries. The MSDF carried out the Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise in June 2023 and February 2024 and its units for the Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD23) conducted the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada multilateral exercise “Noble Wolf”, the Japan-U.S.-AustraliaROK multilateral exercise “Pacific Vanguard 23” and the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise “Malabar 23” from June to August 2023. Additionally, in August 2023, following the results of the Japan-U.S.Australia-Philippines Defense Ministers’ Meeting held i J 2023 th fi t J U S A t li Phili i **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- multilateral exercise and the inspection of situations in the South China Sea by the commanders of the four countries’ fleets and others were conducted. In October 2023, the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada-New Zealand multilateral exercise “Noble Caribou” was conducted in the South China Sea and in November, the MSDF Annual Exercise 2023 was carried out with the participation by the Philippines for the first time as an observer, in addition to the U.S., Australian and Canadian navies. Furthermore, progress was made to strengthen the effectiveness and interoperability of Japan-U.S.Australia defense cooperation and deepen JapanU.S.-Australia cooperation as the core of multilateral partnerships, represented by the implementation of the Japan-U.S.-Australia joint ISR in November 2023 and the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Maritime Cooperative Activity in the South China Sea in April 2024. In December 2023, the ASDF conducted the Japan U.S.-Australia trilateral base defense exercise to share operational procedures. In February 2024, the ASDF also conducted various tactical exercises and joint HA/ DR training collaborating with the MSDF during the Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise “Cope North 24” based in Guam, to further improve interoperability. As just described, Japan has been continuing its efforts to improve interoperability while coordinating views on the situation and policy direction through various opportunities with the United States and Australia. **See** Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 52 (Recent multilateral high-level exchanges **See** (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) **2** **India** Japan-India Summit Meeting on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit (May 2023) [the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan Website] Moreover, Japan and India signed the “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India”, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the Japan-India General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Japan-India ACSA. These agreements have strengthened the relationship between the two partners, which are capable of dealing with regional and global issues, as well as the foundation of this partnership. **(2) Recent** **Major** **Achievements** **in** **Defense** **Cooperation and Exchanges** In April 2023, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka held a vice ministerial level defense policy dialogue with Indian Defence Secretary Aramane in Delhi, where they exchanged views on security strategies of Japan and India and regional affairs, and discussed wide range of topics, including defense cooperation between the two countries. In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan India Summit Meeting with Prime Minister Modi on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Both leaders emphasized the points such as the importance of upholding the principles of the UN Charter including sovereignty and territorial integrity, that unilateral change of the status quo by force must not be tolerated anywhere in the world and the maintenance of a free and open international order based on the rule of law and concurred to cooperate toward achieving peace. The two leaders also discussed bilateral relations. They shared a recognition on the importance of FOIP and confirmed to advance cooperation in various fields, including security. In September 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-India Summit M ti ith P i Mi i t M di th i f **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(1) Significance** **of** **Defense** **Cooperation** **and** **Exchanges with India** India is increasing its influence with its population (the world’s largest), its high economic growth and its latent economic power. Located in the center of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, India is an extremely important country for Japan. Furthermore, Japan and India share fundamental values as well as common interests in the peace, stability and prosperity of the Indo-pacific region and the world and have established the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” In this context, Japan and India have promoted cooperation in maritime security and various other areas, while utilizing f k i l di th “2+2” ti ----- cooperation between the armies. In September 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF had a Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Chiefs of Defense Meeting in Hawaii, where the participants shared an understanding of the situation in the IndoPacific region and agreed to further expand exercises and cooperation, such as the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise “Malabar.” Additionally, Admiral Sakai had a bilateral conference with Admiral R Hari Kumar, Chief of the Naval Staff of India. Since April 2023, MSDF has conducted a total of three Japan-India bilateral field training exercises and in July 2023, carried out the Japan-India bilateral field training exercise “JIMEX 2023,” which aimed to strengthen interoperability through various tactical drills such as anti-submarine warfare. In June 2023, in the Japan-U.S.India-Italy multilateral MCM/EOD exercise, MSDF worked to strengthen cooperation with the navies of the participating countries, including the Indian Navy and in August 2023, carried out the first Japan-U.S.-IndiaAustralia multilateral exercise “Malabar” in Australia to improve interoperability among the four countries through high-end exercises. In addition, since 2022, MSDF has continuously participated in the multilateral exercise “MILAN” hosted by the Indian Navy, and at “MILAN 2024”, in which MSDF participated in February 2024, MSDF sought to strengthen cooperation with the Indian Navy, and navies of participating countries, including the United States and Australia. In November 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF met with Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari, Chief of the Air Staff of India in the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS) held in the United States. **See** Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 42 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 52 (Recent multilateral high-level exchanges (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) **3** **European Countries** the G20 New Delhi Summit, where they agreed to work together in maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order based on the rule of law, as well as in advanced technology fields, including space. **See** Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-4-1 (2) (India) **See** **(3) Initiatives of Each Service** Since April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan has held four meetings with Gen. Chauhan, Chief of Indian Defence Staff, the first of which in December 2023 was the first official visit by Gen. Chauhan, Chief of Indian Defence Staff to Japan since assuming his post. During the meeting, the two countries exchanged views on their perceptions of the strategic environment and agreed to further strengthen multilateral and multilayered efforts in Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges. The first “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India” was also held in September 2023, advancing Japan-India defense cooperation, which had previously been at the military service level, to the integrated level. In September 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with Chief of the Army Staff Pande of India on the occasion of IPACC held in India. During the meeting, they shared the recognition that strengthening relations between the two countries, which are geopolitically located on the east and west sides of the Indo-Pacific Ocean, is essential and agreed to further deepen cooperation between the two military services. In addition, the GSDF conducted the “Dharma Guardian 23” bilateral field training exercise in Japan from February to March 2024 to further strengthen **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** European countries share fundamental values with Japan and play a central role in initiatives to address common challenges to global security, with a primary focus on non-traditional security areas, such as counter-terrorism and response to “illicit ship-to-ship transfers” as well as Gen. Chauhan, Chief of Indian Defence Staff, inspects the guard of honor, which is an official invitation to the MOD (December 2023) **MOVIE: JIMEX2023 (Note) Facebook** **URL: https://fb.watch/q5s5riXk4q/** ----- international peace cooperation activities. In this regard, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with these countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in dealing with these challenges and this is important for both Japan and European countries. **See** Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 43 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges **See** with European Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)), Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) **(1) The United Kingdom** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with the United Kingdom** The United Kingdom, being a major power that has influence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests as the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation with the United Kingdom by working together on global issues, such as international peace cooperation activities, counterterrorism, counterpiracy operations and cybersecurity as well as by exchanging information on regional affairs. Additionally, in recent years, the United Kingdom has made important contributions to ensuring a rule-based maritime order by dispatching a Career Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific region and permanently deploying two patrol vessels to the region to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities against illicit maritime activities, including “ship-to-ship transfers” with North Korean-flagged vessels. Accordingly, it is important for Japan to deepen cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom to realize FOIP. The strategic partnership with the United Kingdom has been further facilitated and strengthened through the holding of Japan-U.K. “2+2” meetings, as well as the signing of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the Japan-U.K. General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), and the Japan-U.K. ACSA. In addition, the Japan-U.K. RAA signed between Prime Minister Kishida and Prime Minister Sunak of the United Kingdom in January 2023 took effect in October 2023. The RAA will facilitate the implementation of cooperative activities between the forces of both countries, further promote bilateral security and defense cooperation and strongly support peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In March 2024, the number of Defense Attachés was increased by one. Furthermore, the Global Combat Air Programme[6](GCAP) launched with a joint statement by the leaders of Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom in December 2022, is a project that could also serve as a cornerstone of stability and prosperity for the international community linking the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. In this way, Japan and the United Kingdom are strengthening their ties as each other’s closest security partner in Asia and Europe. **See** Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-4-1 (3) (United Kingdom) **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** At the Japan-U.K. Leader’s Working Dinner held between Prime Minister Kishida and U.K. Prime Minister Sunak on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023, the two leaders discussed the usage of the cooperation opportunities provided by the joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft, the expansion of bilateral exercises and other activities utilizing the Japan-U.K. RAA to increase interoperability, the enhancement of bilateral activities to a higher level with a view to the possible application of the SDF’s asset protection measure and the important regional and global security issues. The two countries issued the joint statement entitled “Japan-U.K. Hiroshima Accord” stating that they would address such issues cooperatively, etc. Based on of this document, the two leaders concurred to deepen Japan-U.K. relations in wide-ranging areas and affirmed to make further efforts in security and defense cooperation as each other’s closest security partners in Asia and Europe. Japan- U.K. “2+2” (November 2023) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- Also, prior to attending the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023, U.K. Prime Minister Sunak visited Destroyer JS Izumo anchored in Yokosuka, attended a honor guard ceremony on the flight deck of Destroyer JS Izumo and toured inside the vessel. In November 2023, the 5th Japan-UK “2+2” meeting was held and it was confirmed that specific cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom, including in the field of maritime security, would be promoted to realize FOIP. In addition, with the entry into force of the Japan-U.K. RAA, the two countries agreed to ensure the application of the agreement to improve interoperability and achieve even more ambitious plans for more frequent and complex exercises. They also agreed to work closely together in fields, such as the advancement of GCAP; cooperation in domains of cyber, space, etc.; economic security; information warfare; and women, peace and security (WPS). On the occasion of the Japan-U.K. “2+2” meeting, Defense Minister Kihara met with the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps and confirmed that in light of the “Japan-U.K. Hiroshima Accord,” cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom in the security field is closer than ever before. They also agreed to work closely together to further improve cooperation and interoperability between Japan and the United Kingdom via the Japan-U.K. RAA and to further deepen defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and the United Kingdom, including GCAP. In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara met with the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps and Italian Defence Minister Crosetto in Tokyo, issuing a joint statement and signing the Convention on the Establishment of the “Global Combat Air Programme – GCAP International Government Organisation” to establish an efficient intergovernmental collaboration structure for GCAP. Additionally, during his visit to Japan, the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps announced that the U.K. Carrier Strike Group, scheduled to be deployed to the Indo-Pacific in 2025, would call on Japan. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In April and August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan had a video conference with Admiral Radakin, the U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff. At the August video conference, General Yoshida received an explanation from Admiral Radakin about the Defense Command Paper (DCP) that had been released i th U it d Ki d i J l 2023 d d hi welcome for its emphasis on cooperation with Japan. A meeting held in September 2023 emphasized both countries’ commitment to further security and defense cooperation in wide-ranging fields as each other’s closest security partners in Asia and Europe. In May 2023, at the Land Force Pacific Symposium and Exposition (LANPAC) event 2023 held in Hawaii, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with General Sir Sanders, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army to discuss future defense cooperation and others. In addition, during the official visit of General Sir Sanders, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army to Japan in February 2024, he signed the revised “roadmap for Japan-British army defense cooperation.” In November 2023, the GSDF conducted the “Vigilant Isles 23” bilateral field training exercise on island defense with the British Army, during which the JapanU.K. RAA was applied for the first time. In August 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF paid an official visit to the United Kingdom, where he met with Admiral Sir Key, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval staff. During the meeting, he welcomed the Royal Navy’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific, including the deployment of U.K. aircraft carriers and confirmed the further deepening of cooperation and collaboration with the Royal Navy based on the “ Japan-U.K. Hiroshima Accord.” MSDF participated in the U.S.-Philippinesled multilateral exercise “SAMA SAMA 2023,” to strengthen cooperation with the participating navies, including the Royal Navy. In October 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF met with Air Chief Marshal Sir Knighton visiting Japan. In November 2023, they also met at the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS) held in the United States to exchange views on international affairs and the security environment, etc. **(2) France** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with France** France is a major power that has influence not only in Europe and Africa, but also around the world. It is the only EU member state that maintains a constant military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, with territories across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It also historically has had a close relationship with Japan and is positioned as Japan’s special partner. In addition, cooperation with France, which has influence in the African region, is ti l f th d t t ti f J **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- nationals and others overseas in the region. Japan and France have continued high-level exchanges such as the Japan-France “2+2,” and have concluded the Japan-France General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), the Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment, and Technology and the Japan-France ACSA. In addition, the two countries agreed to further accelerate the discussion on measures to improve each other’s administrative, policy and legal procedures for joint operations and exercises between the units of both countries on a permanent basis. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-France summit meeting with French President Macron on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. At the meeting, they agreed to advance concrete cooperation in areas such as cyber and space, as well as to advance concrete cooperation such as joint training. Regarding the situation in East Asia, they also affirmed that they would continue to coordinate in addressing issues related to China and in dealing with North Korea, including on the nuclear and missile issues as well as the abductions issue. The Seventh Japan-France “2+2” Meeting was held in the same month, during which the ministers praised the regularity and quality of operational interactions between the French Armed Forces and the SDF, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, through bilateral and multilateral port calls and exercises. They also agreed to strengthen Japan-France cooperation for Pacific Island countries and to accelerate discussions on a permanent framework to mutually improve administrative, policy and legal procedures for joint operations and exercises among the forces. In December 2023, the “Roadmap on Japan-France Cooperation under the Exceptional Partnership (20232027)” was issued at a teleconference between the leaders of Japan and France. With regard to security and defense, it promotes cooperation between Japan and France in bilateral and multilateral training and exercises and port calls by military aircraft and naval vessels, etc., as well as further strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and France, such as cooperation in the fields of the space, cyberspace and electromagnetic; maritime security; defense equipment and technology; support for capacity building in third countries and protection of their citizens. In addition, at the Japan-France Summit Working L h h ld i M 2024 th t t i d t start negotiations for the Japan France RAA and make steady progress in the negotiations. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In June 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video conference with General Thierry Burkhard, French Chief of the Defence and expressed his intention to strengthen mutual engagement on issues in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. In August 2023, at the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD) held in Fiji, he met with then Vice Admiral Nicolas Vaujour, the Chief of Operations of the French Joint Staff and expressed his gratitude for France’s support for the evacuation of Japanese nationals in the Republic of Niger that month. He also stressed the inseparability of the security of Europe and the IndoPacific region and shared his understanding on the future direction of cooperation and exchanges between Japan and France. In April 2023, the SDF participated in the multilateral HA/DR exercise “Croix du Sud 2023,” hosted by the French Armed Forces in New Caledonia, France, to promote mutual understanding and strengthen trust with France and the participating countries. In September 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with General Pierre Schill, Chief of the Staff of the French Army at IPACC held in India. In addition, during his official visit to France in November 2023, General Morishita met with Mr. Schill and others and they agreed on the importance of further cooperation between Japan and France to maintain a rule based international order, without allowing attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force. In September 2023, in French New Caledonia, the GSDF conducted the bilateral exercise “BrunetTakamori 2023” for the first time as Japan-France army services. In September 2023, at the International Seapower Symposium (ISS) hosted by the United States, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Admiral Vaujour, Chief of the Staff of the French Navy and the two discussed cooperation between Japan and France in the Indo-Pacific region. The MSDF annually conducts the Japan-France bilateral exercise “Oguri-Verny 23” with French forces stationed in French Polynesia and French New Caledonia and participates in the multilateral exercise “La Pérouse 23” hosted by the French forces and others. Since April 2023, the Japan-France bilateral exercise “O i V ” h b d t d f ti d i **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- involvement in the Indo Pacific region based on the Indo-Pacific Guidelines formulated in 2020 and since the German naval frigate called on Japan in 2021 to conduct joint training and other activities, has regularly dispatched its ground, maritime and air forces to the region. Japan and Germany have concluded the JapanGermany Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology and the Japan-Germany General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), and Japan-Germany ACSA was substantially agreed in November 2023 and signed in January 2024. In addition, high-level and other exchanges between the two countries are progressing, such as the Japan-Germany “2+2”. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held talks with Chancellor Scholz of Germany on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Regarding the situation in East Asia, the two leaders affirmed that they would continue to closely coordinate in addressing issues related to China and in dealing with North Korea, including on the nuclear and missile issues as well as the abductions issue. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In June 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with General Breuer, Chief of Defence of the German Armed Forces on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore. During the meeting, General Yoshida emphasized his intention to strengthen mutual engagement on issues in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region and further promote defense cooperation and exchanges with Germany. In July 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF officially invited Lieutenant General Alfons Mais, Inspector of the Germany Army. In December 2023, he held a video conference with Lieutenant General Alfons Mais to discuss the progress and future direction of defense cooperation and exchanges between the Japanese and German army services. In February 2024, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF made an official visit to Germany, where he met with Vice Admiral Jan Christian Kaack, Inspector of the German Navy and other high-ranking officials and attended the Munich Security Conference as the first MSDF officer. The MSDF participated with the GSDF in the The bilateral exercise “Brunet-Takamori 2023” for the first time as Japan-France army services (July 2023) June 2023, as part of the “ Large Scale Global Exercise (LSGE) 23[7]” hosted by the United States, the Japan-U.S.Canada-France multilateral exercise “Noble Typhoon,” the Japan-U.S.-France multilateral exercise “Noble Buffalo,” etc. were held in the waters surrounding Japan and the South China Sea, etc., to strengthen cooperation and deterrence through high-end training. In January 2024, the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) conducted a counter-piracy exercise with the French Navy in the Gulf of Aden to strengthen cooperation with the Japanese and French navies. In June 2023, having accepted an invitation from General Stéphane Mille, Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF attended the Paris Air Show and met with him. In July 2023, on the occasion of the first bilateral exercise between the ASDF and the French Air and Space Force conducted in Japan, General Mille visited Japan to inspect the exercise, hold meetings and do other work. The ASDF had its fighter aircraft participate in “Multi Big-Deck Event” and “Oguri-Verny” conducted in June and July 2023, conducted its first bilateral exercise with the French Air and Space Force in Japan. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(3) Germany** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Germany** Germany is a partner with which Japan shares fundamental values and cooperates in addressing issues in the international community as a member of the G7 and other organizations. Germany is increasing its It is an exercise framework that incorporates multiple exercises and activities of the SDF and U.S. and like-minded forces and is intended to strengthen cooperation and improve ----- and other channels. Regarding the situation in East Asia, they affirmed to continue to coordinate closely in addressing issues related to China and in dealing with North Korea, including on nuclear and missile issues as well as the abductions issue. At the meeting in December 2023, they concurred to work positively on bilateral cooperation in the security and defense areas. In October 2023, then Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Wada visited Italy and had discussions on GCAP with Italian Defence Minister Crosetto and the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps. In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara held a meeting in Tokyo with Italian Defence Minister Crosetto and the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps and signed the Convention on the Establishment of the “GCAP International Government Organisation.” In addition, the Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting was held, where it was agreed that they would further promote various defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Italy, including GCAP and to realize FOIP, and that they would work closely together to further deepen bilateral relations. In February 2024, Prime Minister Kishida held a summit meeting with Prime Minister Meloni of Italy and welcomed the progress of cooperation in the field of defense and security such as joint naval exercises and port calls by naval vessels as well as the joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft by Japan, Italy and the U.K., which is proceeding as planned. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In November 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF visited Italy for the first time in 41 years as the Chief of Staff, GSDF, meeting with Camporeale, Commander of the Operational Land Forces Command, Italian Army and visiting units. In June 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Admiral Credendino, Chief of the Italian Navy, who visited Japan on the occasion of the port call of an Italian naval frigate in Yokosuka and they agreed to promote further strengthening of relations between the two countries. In June 2023, the MSDF strengthened cooperation with participating navies, including the Italian Navy, which participated for the first time in the Japan-U.S.India-Italy multilateral MCM/EOD exercise. In July 2023, the MSDF also conducted a bilateral exercise in the East China Sea with the Italian navy frigate that had completed a port call in Yokosuka, and in September 2023 DSPE d t d t i i i A meeting between General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF and Lieutenant General Alfons Mais, Inspector of the Germany Army (July 2023) multilateral exercise “Talisman Sabre 23” hosted by the United States and Australia that took place from July to August 2023 in Australia and strengthened cooperation through multilateral amphibious operational exercises, including with the German Navy. In June 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF participated in the Distinguished Visitors Day of the “Air Defender 23” multilateral exercise organized by the German Air Force and attended by NATO member states and others and met Lieutenant General Ingo Gerhartz, Inspector of German Air Force. During the meeting, both sides shared their recognition of security issues in the region and agreed to further strengthen cooperation. **(4) Italy** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Italy** Italy and Japan are G7 member countries and Italy is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. The two countries have been promoting institutional development for facilitating defense cooperation, including concluding the Japan-Italy General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA) and the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, as well as signing the Japan-Italy Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida met Prime Minister Meloni of Italy on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit, during which the two leaders shared the view to deepen discussions on concrete ti th h th P liti l Milit Di l **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- Joint Staff officially invited General Eichelsheim, the Netherlands Chief of Defence. Additionally, in June 2023, at a meeting held on the occasion of ShangriLa Dialogue, General Yoshida stressed his intention to further promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries to maintain and strengthen the rule-based free and open international order. In August 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met Lieutenant General Martin Wijnen, Commander of the Royal Netherlands Army on the occasion of CAS hosted by the Australian Army with a view to future defense cooperation. The Royal Netherlands Army also participated for the first time in the “New Year’s jump training” to be conducted by the GSDF 1st Airborne Brigade in January 2024. In July 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met Vice-admiral Tas, Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy visiting Japan and agreed to further develop the relationship between the two countries. In November 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF met with Lieutenant General Steur, Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force at PACS held in the United States and they agreed to advance defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. **(6) Spain** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Spain** Spain is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. The two countries have agreed to further enhance the relationship between their defense authorities based on the Japan-Spain Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges signed in 2014. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** In September 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Rear Admiral Sánchez, Chief of Staff of the Spanish Navy on the occasion of ISS hosted by the United States to exchange views on future defense cooperation. In July and October of the same year, DSPE conducted a counter-piracy exercise with EUNAVFOR (Spanish Navy) in the Gulf of Aden to strengthen cooperation. The first Japan-Italy bilateral exercise in Japan by their air force services (August 2023) the Gulf of Aden with EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) (Italian Navy). General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF met with Lieutenant General Goretti, Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force at the Space Symposium held in the United States in April 2023 and at the international Aerospace Power Conference hosted by Italian Air Force in May 2023. Following the first Italian stopover by aerial refueling/ transport aircraft in 2022, the ASDF conducted the first Japan-Italy bilateral exercise in Japan in August 2023. Italian Air Force F-35A fighters and other aircraft participated in the exercise to strengthen cooperation between air force services. **(5) Netherlands** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Netherlands** The Netherlands has a historical relationship with Japan that is over 400 years old and is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. Based on the Japan-Netherlands Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges signed in 2016, the two countries have agreed to further strengthen relations between defense authorities. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In May 2023, on the occasion of his visit to the Netherlands, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda met General Eichelsheim, the Netherlands Chief of Defence. During the meeting, Onoda welcomed the growing interest of the Netherlands and other European countries in the Indo-Pacific region and they agreed to continue close cooperation between the two countries **c. Initiatives of Each Service** I A il 2023 G l Y hid th Chi f f St ff **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(7) NATO** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with NATO** N th Atl ti T t O i ti (NATO) i t ----- that shares fundamental values and responsibility for global security challenges with Japan. Based on Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between Japan and NATO[8] (IPCP) (revised in 2018 and 2020) formulated in 2014, female SDF personnel were dispatched to NATO Headquarters as part of the Japan-NATO cooperation in the field of women, peace and security (WPS). Furthermore, the MOD/SDF staff participate in the annual meeting of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP). Currently, uniformed SDF personnel is dispatched to the NATO Headquarters International Military Staff, Cooperative Security Division (NHQIMSCS) as a staff member for cooperation with international organizations/ Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), where she has been involved in coordinating cooperation projects between NATO and the United Nations, African Union (AU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NGOs and others. In addition, the MOD sent liaison officers to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and a liaison officer to the NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), and in 2018, the Mission of Japan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established as an additional role of the Embassy of Japan in Belgium. In terms of cooperation in the cyber domain, the MOD staff has been dispatched to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) since 2019 and from that year onwards, the MOD has been participating in NATO’s Cyber Defense Exercise “Cyber Coalition”. In addition, since 2021, the MOD has been officially participating in the NATO CCDCOE Cyber Defense Exercise (Locked Shields). The “NATO Strategic Concept” adopted in June 2022 stated that the Indo-Pacific region was an important region for NATO which could have a direct impact on the security of the Euro-Atlantic region and that dialogue and cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea should be strengthened. Additionally, in light of the current international security environment and with a view to further promoting practical cooperation between Japan and NATO in a wide range of areas, such as information warfare including cybersecurity and disinformation countermeasures, and maritime security, in July 2023, the two sides agreed on the “Japan-NATO Individually Tailored Partnership Programme[9] (ITPP),” which is a revised version of IPCP. Japan and NATO agree on the need to further deepen cooperation based on ITPP in future. **See** Part I, Chapter 3, Section 9-2 (1) NATO **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** In July 2023, Prime Minister Kishida attended the NATO Summit held in Lithuania, where discussions were conducted on future cooperation between NATO and partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region and others, in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the increasingly severe security situation in the region. He also met with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg and welcomed the agreement reached for ITPP. In November 2023, NATO and the Government of Japan held the First Japan-NATO Cyber Dialogue in Brussels, where the two sides confirmed that they would continue to work closely together in the field of cyber. In February 2024, Defense Minister Kihara received a courtesy call by General Cavoli, Commander of NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and confirmed that Japan would further strengthen its cooperation with NATO based on ITPP. In April 2023, the MOD formed a joint team with Australia to participate in “Locked Shields 2023” to understand cybersecurity trends and respond to cyberattacks more effectively. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video conference with NATO Military Commander Chair Bauer and agreed that Japan and NATO would strengthen cooperation in international rule-making and security in the Indo-Pacific region. In the meetings, held in June and August 2023, they stressed their intention to make the Japan-NATO defense cooperation and exchanges, which had been making rapid progress, even more effective, reaffirmed that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** The IPCP stipulates the promotion of cooperation, such as enhancing high-level dialogue and promoting defense cooperation and exchanges, with the aim of further developing cooperation between Japan and NATO and specifies priority areas for working level cooperation. The IPCP was revised in June 2020, adding “human security” as a priority area for working level cooperation. A new framework cooperation document between Japan and NATO designed to take NATO-Japan cooperation to new heights to respond to the challenges of a new era, covering the four ----- were inseparable and then confirmed that they would further promote Japan-NATO defense cooperation and exchanges based on ITPP. In a video conference in January 2024, the two sides shared their interests toward the NATO Military Committee in the Chiefs of Defense Session (MCCS) (attended by Vice Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office on his behalf). In August 2023, during his visit to the United Kingdom, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Vice Admiral Maleterre, Deputy Commander, NATO’s Maritime Allied Command (MARCOM) and they agreed to further strengthen cooperation between NATO and Japan. In November 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF attended the NATO Partner Air Chiefs’ Conference via online format and stated that under ITPP, Japan would strengthen cooperation with NATO and NATO member states for practical cooperation and mutual understanding on space security. A meeting between General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan and NATO Military Commander Chair Bauer (June 2023) that includes a policy of increasing the frequency of naval exercises and port calls and patrols with partner countries. Amidst this, the MOD/SDF is actively and independently advancing cooperation to ensure that the EU’s commitment to the region is irreversible. **See** Part I, Chapter 3, Section 9-2-2 (EU) **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** In March 2023, then State Minister of Defense Ino attended the Schuman Security and Defence Forum held for the first time by the EU. At the plenary session, he spoke as a panelist and expressed that he would like to strengthen cooperation with the EU in the fields of security and defense, under the recognition that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific is now inseparable. DSPE is strengthening its cooperation with EUNAVFOR based on the “Administrative Arrangement between EU Naval Force Atalanta and Japan’s Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden for Communication and Coordination on Joint Counter-Piracy Exercises” signed in the same month between General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan and Vice Admiral Núñez, EUNAVFOR Somalia Atalanta Operation Commander. In July and October 2023, counter-piracy exercises were conducted with EUNAVFOR (Spanish Navy) and in September 2023, with EUNAVFOR (Italian Navy). **4** **Republic of Korea (ROK)** **(1) Significance of Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** The ROK is an important neighboring country that Japan should cooperate with as a partner in addressing various issues in the international community. In the fields of security and defense, the cooperation between Japan and the ROK is increasingly important as the security environment surrounding the two countries is becoming severe and complex, including the nuclear and missile issues of North Korea, requirement to response to largescale natural disasters, counterterrorism, counter-piracy and maritime security. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(8) EU** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with the EU** Japan shares fundamental values such as freedom, democracy and the rule of law with the European Union (EU). Since the provisional application of the Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement began in 2019, Japan and the EU have been steadily expanding cooperation in the fields of security and defense. The EU is strengthening its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, such as with the announcement of the Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in 2021 ll th St t i C i M h 2022 **(2) Recent** **Major** **Achievements** **in** **Defense** **Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.** In March 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a JapanK S it M ti ith P id t Y S k l f ----- the ROK in Tokyo. At the meeting, the two leaders agreed to activate communication between their governments in wide-ranging fields, including politics, economy and culture. Specifically, they agreed to resume the Security Dialogue, etc. at an early date and advance Japan-ROK as well as Japan-U.S.-ROK security cooperation in light of North Korea’s recent intensification of nuclear and missile activities In May 2023, the two leaders held the Japan-ROK Summit Meetings in Seoul and the G7 Hiroshima Summit, where they welcomed the fact that dialogue and cooperation between the two governments were moving forward in wide-ranging areas in line with the result of their meeting in March, including the resumption of the Japan-ROK Security Dialogue. They concurred on close Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation in dealing with issues regarding North Korea and advancing deterrence and response capabilities and also affirmed that they will promote cooperation to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Prime Minister Kishida held the Japan-ROK Summit Meetings at the NATO Summit in July 2023, the JapanU.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in Camp David in August, the G20 Summit in September and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Week in November. During these meetings, the two leaders decided to communicate closely on various fields, including maintaining and strengthening of a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific, the situation in the Middle East and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, as well as response to North Korea. The two leaders also confirmed that they would work closely together bilaterally and trilaterally among Japan, the ROK and the U.S. on the response to North Korea. In April 2023, the MOD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) held the first Japan-ROK Security Dialogue in about five years, based on the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting held in March 2023. The two countries deepened the understanding of the strategic environment and their security and defense policies, exchanged views on the response to North Korea and the strengthening of Japan-ROK bilateral and JapanU.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation, including cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and agreed to communicate closely to strengthen Japan-ROK security and defense cooperation. In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada held Defense Minister Kihara (left) and ROK Defense Minister Shin (right) and representatives of Japanese and ROK naval services at the Japan-ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting in Shangri-La Dialogue (June 2024) a Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting with then ROK Defense Minister Lee Jong-Sup on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore. At the meeting, the ministers concurred on the importance of promoting Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation based on the necessity of responding to the severe security environment in the region such as North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, as well as global challenges. They also concurred on accelerating consultations between Japan-ROK defense authorities for recurrence prevention measures with regard to pending issues, including the incident of an ROK naval destroyer directing its fire-control radar at an SDF aircraft,[10] to advance cooperation between the JapanROK defense authorities. In October 2023, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Serizawa held a Japan-ROK Vice Ministers’ Meeting with then Vice Defense Minister Shin Boem-chul of the ROK during the Seoul Defense Dialogue held in Seoul. At the meeting, the two sides affirmed the importance of promoting Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation and concurred continuing close communication between the JapanROK defense authorities based on the outcomes of the Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting held in June 2023. In June 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held a Japan ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting with ROK Defense Minister Shin Won-sik on the occasion of the ShangriLa Dialogue held in Singapore, where they shared the recognition that a security cooperation relationship **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **10 In December 2018, a destroyer of the ROK Navy, directed a fire control radar at a MSDF patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance activities off the coast of the Noto Peninsula** ----- States and the ROK, in line with the commitment to share a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism, expressed at the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting (November 2022). The representatives also discussed concrete ways to deepen U.S.-Japan-ROK security cooperation, such as the regularization of missile defense exercises and anti-submarine exercises to deter and respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and the resumption of trilateral exercises, including maritime interdiction and counter-piracy exercises. In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida exchanged views for a short time with President Biden of the United States and President Yoon of the ROK, who were visiting Japan for the G7 Hiroshima Summit. During this exchange of views, the three leaders concurred on bringing JapanU.S.-ROK coordination to a new height, building on their respective strengthened bilateral relationships. The leaders also concurred on further enhancing strategic coordination among the three countries not only to respond to North Korea but also to maintain a free and open international order based on the rule of law. They then concurred on advancing concrete cooperation among the three countries in various areas, including trilateral security cooperation, such as a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism, strengthening of dialogue on the Indo-Pacific, economic security and engagement with Pacific Island countries. In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada held a Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and then ROK Defense Minister Lee on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue. At the meeting, they confirmed the importance of deepening trilateral cooperation on key issues to promote FOIP, including information-sharing, highlevel policy discussions and trilateral exercises. They also confirmed trilateral efforts to launch a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism by the end of 2023 and discussed measures to promote defense cooperation among the three countries, including regularization of missile defense exercises and antisubmarine warfare exercises. In August 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting with President Biden of the United States and President Yoon Suk-yeol of the ROK at Camp David in the United States. At the Meeting, under the common objective of FOIP, they agreed to strengthen strategic cooperation among the Japan-U.S. and U.S.-ROK alliances, raise Japan-U.S.-ROK security ti t h i ht d h ld i i t i l l l between Japan and the ROK is beneficial for both countries, which share fundamental values and strategic interests, also serves as a foundation for robust Japan U.S.-ROK security cooperation, and is essential not only for deterring North Korean threats, but also for realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific. They also concurred resuming high-level exchanges between the SDF and the ROK Armed Forces in order to activate the dialogue between defense authorities, and concurred on discussing details of future Japan-ROK security cooperation. Regarding pending issues between JapanROK defense authorities, as a result of discussions at the working level, including naval services of both sides, based on the fact that a document had been formulated between Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF, and the Chief of Naval Operations, the ROK Navy, which includes adhering “Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)”, improving communication at the unit level such as communication procedures, and strengthening communication at the headquarter level, the two ministers concurred that items confirmed at the working level will be implemented, and that safety will be ensured in the event of encounters between the MSDF and the ROK Navy at sea in peacetime. Through this meeting, the MOD/SDF has concluded that measures to prevent a recurrence of the incident of an ROK naval destroyer directing its fire-control radar at an SDF aircraft, which was a long-standing issue and safety of the unit are ensured. Accordingly, in order to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific, as concurred at the Japan-ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting, the MOD/SDF will continue to enhance Japan-ROK and Japan-ROKU.S. security cooperation, while promoting cooperation and exchanges in various fields. **See** Reference 44 (Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges (FY2020 and Beyond)) **See** **(3) Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Relationship** Japan, the United States and ROK, have common interests in peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and it is important for the three countries to work closely together at every opportunity to address various security challenges, including response to North Korea. In April 2023, the 13th Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) were held in the United States. During the Talks, the three representatives reaffirmed ongoing work to fully leverage the existing intelligence frameworks, including the Trilateral Information-Sharing Arrangement (TISA) th d f th iti f J th U it d **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- will and capability of the three countries to respond to threats in the Indo-Pacific region. In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara, along with U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin and ROK Defense Minister Shin, issued the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers Joint Press Statement announcing that a realtime DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism had been activated and that a multi-year plan for trilateral exercises had been jointly formulated. Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers Joint Press Statement (December 2023) meetings and others, including defense ministers, at least once a year. With regard to a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism, they confirmed that initial measures had been conducted, taking an important step toward launching the mechanism by the end of 2023. They also announced the implementation of annual trilateral exercises covering multiple domains. Furthermore, to realize FOIP, the three leaders agreed to promote cooperation among Japan, U.S. and ROK and cooperate in capacity building in the field of maritime security, etc., especially in ASEAN and Pacific Island countries. In September 2023, then Minister of Defense Hamada held a Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference and based on the results of the Summit Meeting in August, the three countries agreed to work more closely together, including further accelerating cooperation toward the realization of a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism as well as formulating and implementing a multi-year exercise plan to regularize trilatera exercises. Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in Camp David (August 2023) **(4) Initiatives of Each Service** In July 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a Japan-U.S.-ROK Chiefs of Defense Meeting in Hawaii. At the meeting, the participants shared their recognition of security challenges such as North Korea’s activities and agreed to promote cooperation among the three countries for regional peace and stability and the realization of FOIP. In September 2023, on the occasion of IPACC held in India, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held the first Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK Quadripartite Meeting with General Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, Lieutenant General Stuart, Chief of the Australian Army and General Park Jeong-hwan, then Chief of Staff of the ROK Army and they agreed to build a close network among the four countries’ army services. Also, in December 2023, at the Japan-U.S.-AustraliaROK Quadripartite Meeting (ROK attended it in a VTC format) held on the occasion of LFS co-hosted by U.S. Army Pacific, where they agreed to create a roadmap for promoting defense exchange steadily for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole, while promoting mutual understanding among Japan, United States, Australia and ROK. I A il J l A t O t b d N b 2023 **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** In November 2023, Defense Minister Kihara held a Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference with U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and ROK Defense Minister Shin Won-sik. At the meeting, they emphasized that the coordination for a real-time missile warning data sharing mechanism had been progressing smoothly and reached the final stage for its launch by the end of 2023 and agreed to accelerate coordination to develop a multi-year plan for trilateral exercises by the end of 2023 to conduct such exercises more systematically. In addition, noting the steady progress of the trilateral exercises, they stressed the importance of ti i h ti iti d d t ti th t ----- and in January 2024, the MSDF conducted Japan U.S. ROK trilateral exercises to strengthen cooperation through various tactical exercises such as joint ballistic missile countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare and electronic warfare by the three countries. Additionally, in May 2023, the MSDF dispatched its destroyer to the “Eastern Endeavor 23,” a multilateral PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) exercise[11] hosted by ROK. In July 2023, the MSDF conducted the Japan-U.S.-AustraliaROK multilateral exercise “Pacific Vanguard 23” to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation with navies of other countries, etc. In April 2023, the ASDF conducted the Japan-ROK Middle-level Officer Exchange Program (visiting ROK). In October and December 2023, the ASDF also carried out joint training with U.S. Air Force and ROK Air Force. These Japan-U.S.-ROK exercises promote trilateral cooperation to address security challenges in the region. They also demonstrate the commitment of Japan, the United States and ROK to protect their common security and prosperity and to strengthen the rules-based international order. **See** Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 52 (Recent multilateral high-level exchanges **See** (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) The first Japan-U.S.- ROK trilateral aerial exercise (October, 2023) [Courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense] **(5) Japan-ROK GSOMIA** In light of the increasingly serious situation surrounding North Korea, in November 2016, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was concluded between Japan and the ROK to further promote bilateral cooperation to exchange and share classified information regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. This agreement serves as a framework to appropriately protect classified military information shared between the Japanese and ROK governments. In August 2019, the Government of the ROK notified the Government of Japan of its intention to terminate the GSOMIA in writing. However, in November 2019, the ROK Government notified Japan that it would suspend the effect of its notice. In March 2023, the Government of the ROK withdrew its notice of termination and officially notified Japan of confirmation that the agreement remained in force. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **5** **Canada and New Zealand** Canada and New Zealand share fundamental values with Japan and play a central role in initiatives to address common challenges to global security, with a primary focus on non-traditional security areas, such as counterterrorism and response to “illicit ship-to-ship transfers” as well as international peace cooperation activities. Promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with these countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in these challenges and this is important for all of Japan, Canada and New Zealand. **11 This is an initiative to examine and practice measures that can be taken jointly by participating countries to prevent the transfer and transport of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and** related materials which are threats to international peace and stability, within the scope of international and national laws, to prevent their proliferation. Based on this, PSI exercises are ----- Canadian Armed Forces would greatly contribute to peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Also, at the meeting held in June 2023 when General Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada was officially invited to Japan, the two sides agreed to promote more effective defense cooperation to ensure peace and stability in the region by maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order based on the rule of law. In September 2023, at the ISS hosted by the United States, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Vice-Admiral Topshee, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy to exchange views on defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. As for the MSDF, its Training Squadron made a port call to Canada (Victoria) in June 2023 to conduct the Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KAEDEX23” with the Royal Canadian Navy. In addition, from June to October 2023, its IPD23 unit and others carried out the JapanU.S.-Australia-Canada multilateral exercise “Noble Wolf”; the Japan-U.S.-Canada-France multilateral exercise “NobleTyphoon”; the Japan-U.S.-Canada trilateral exercise “Noble Raven 23,” “Noble Chinook,” and “Noble Stingray”; and the Japan-U.S.-AustraliaCanada-New Zealand multilateral exercise “Noble Caribou” in the sea area around Japan, East China Sea and South China Sea to strengthen cooperation through various tactical exercises such as antisubmarine warfare and antisurface warfare. Additionally, in October 2023, DSPE participated in the U.S.-Philippines-led multilateral exercise “SAMA SAMA 2023” to strengthen cooperation with participating navies, including the Royal Canadian Navy. Furthermore, the Royal Canadian Navy and Air Force participated in MSDF Annual Exercise 2023 conducted in November 2023. In April 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff An official visit to Canada by General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF **See** Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 45 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges **See** with Canada and New Zealand (FY2020 and Beyond)), Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) **(1) Canada** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Canada** Japan and Canada are G7 members, fellow Pacific nations, and strategic partners that share fundamental values. The relationship between Japanese and Canadian defense authorities has deepened dramatically over the past few years, as exemplified by the 2019 joint statement on defense cooperation, the entry into force of the Japan-Canada ACSA, the Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KAEDEX” that has been conducted annually since 2017 and other multilateral training. Canada has been increasing its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region in recent years, including releasing its Indo-Pacific Strategy in November 2022 and increasing the number of assets that it dispatches to the Indo-Pacific region to support FOIP. **See** Part I, Chapter 3, Section 9-3-4 (Canada) **See** **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Canada Summit Meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023 and the APEC Summit Meeting in November 2023. During the Meetings, the two leaders exchanged their views on the situation in East Asia and concurred that they would continue close coordination between Japan and Canada in addressing issues related to China and responding to North Korea, including the nuclear and missiles issue and the abductions issue. They also welcomed the steady progress on implementing the “Japan-Canada Action Plan for contributing to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region,” (announced in 2022) such as holding the official negotiation on the Japan-Canada General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA) and expressed appreciation for Canada’s deployment of its military assets, including monitoring and surveillance activities against “illicit shipto-ship transfers” with North Korean-flagged vessels. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with General Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada, and agreed to further strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges t d th li ti f FOIP ti ith th **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- made an official visit to Canada and met Lieutenant General Kenny, Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force. At the meeting, they agreed to work on mutual understanding between air force services and further deepening and developing defense cooperation and exchanges, including in the space domain. **(2) New Zealand** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with New Zealand** New Zealand shares fundamental values with Japan and is an important strategic cooperative partner in the Indo-Pacific region, where the strategic environment is becoming increasingly severe. The defense authorities of Japan and New Zealand actively conduct high-level exchanges, joint training and unit-to-unit exchanges. At the Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in April 2022, the two leaders announced that they agreed to launch formal negotiations for the Japan-New Zealand General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA). The coordination is underway among the relevant authorities. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada signed the “Statement of Intent on Defence Cooperation in Maritime Security, Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief and Climate Change in the Pacific Islands Region” with then Minister of Defence of New Zealand. Little at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Both countries concurred on further promoting defense cooperation in the Pacific Islands Region under the Statement. Around the same time, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka held a Vice Ministers’ Meeting with New Zealand Secretary of Defence Bridgeman and they concurred strengthening cooperation between the two countries and communicate more closely between the defense authorities to realize FOIP. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with Air Marshal Short, Chief of Defence Force of New Zealand on the occasion of the Indo-Pacific CHOD held in Fiji, where they agreed to take the opportunity to pursue bilateral exercises to realize FOIP. In August 2023, at the CAS hosted by the Australian Army, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met Brigadier King, Deputy Chief of Army of New Zealand th f t d f ti In May 2023, on the occasion of IMDEX Asia 2023 hosted by Singapore, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Rear Admiral Proctor, Chief of Navy of New Zealand, and exchanged views on defense cooperation and exchanges in the Pacific Island countries. In October 2023, the MSDF conducted the Japan-U.S. Australia-Canada-New Zealand multilateral exercise “Noble Caribou” in the South China Sea to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation with the navies of participating countries. **6** **Northern Europe and the Baltic States** **(1) Sweden** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Sweden** Sweden is a partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. December 2022 marked the signing and entry into force of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the first such agreement with a Nordic country, promoting the defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. In addition, as the relationships between NATO and our country have strengthened in recent years, progress in defense cooperation and exchanges with Sweden, which has become a new member of NATO in 2024, is expected. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In May 2023, during a visit to Sweden, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda discussed with State Secretary to Minister for Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden Sandwall on regional affairs and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges and concurred to continue working closely together. In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada held a meeting with the Minister for Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden Jonson, who visited Japan. At the meeting, then Defense Minister Hamada stated that Japan supports for Sweden’s decision to apply for NATO membership and confirmed that they will continue to cooperate closely towards closely further deepening the Japan-Sweden relationship and realizing FOIP. In February 2024, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake made a courtesy call on Defence Minister Jonsson on the occasion of the Munich Security Conference and exchanged views on the regional affairs and JapanS d bil t l d f ti d h **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In November 2023, on the occasion of the Royal Australian Navy Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference (IP23), Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Rear Admiral Haslum, Chief of the Royal Swedish Navy to share information on the security environment and exchange views on defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. **(2) Denmark** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Denmark** Denmark is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan and the two countries have accumulated a series of defense exchanges, including high-level talks and research exchanges. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In October 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a meeting with Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen visiting Japan. At the meeting, recognizing the inseparability of EuroAtlantic and Indo-Pacific security, they agreed to work to consolidate bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. They also agreed to hold discussions between defense authorities and maintain and develop cooperation in the field of maritime security. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In October 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan received a courtesy call from visiting Major General Hellebjerg, Chief of Joint Operations, Defence Command Denmark and emphasized the increasingly severe security environment in the IndoPacific region. They also exchanged views on the recognition sharing of strategic environments and defense policies through a working-level exchange at Joint Staff, the direction of defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries and others. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In May 2023, during a visit to Finland, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda paid a courtesy call on then Defence Minister Antti Kaikkonen of Finland and expressed the intention to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in various fields to further deepen the relationships between the two countries. Additionally, at a meeting with Permanent Secretary at Ministry of Defence of Finland Pulkkinen, Onoda stated that Japan supported Finland’s major strategic decision to join NATO and celebrated the accession of Finland to NATO. They also concurred to continue working closely together. In February 2024, on the occasion of Munich Security Conference, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake paid a courtesy call on Defense Minister Häkkänen of Finland and exchanged views on the regional affairs and defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. **(4) Estonia** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Estonia** Estonia is a partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. Estonia is implementing advanced initiatives as one of the world’s leading IT countries and cooperation with the MOD/SDF is progressing in the field of cyber defense. In addition, Estonia takes an important role in the view of Japan-NATO cooperation, including being the location of the CCDCOE. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** In July 2023, the first Japan-Estonia Military to Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on the regional affairs and defense policies of both countries and they deepened the discussions on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. In February 2024, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake made a courtesy call on the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Estonia Pevkur during the Munich Security Conference. They welcomed the advance in cyber defense cooperation and discussed defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Estonia. In March 2023, PVM Miyake met with General Herem, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces and they concurred to continue working closely together. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(3) Finland** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Finland** Finland is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan and in 2019, Japan signed the JapanFinland Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges. In addition, as the relationships between NATO and Japan have been strengthened in recent years, defense cooperation and exchanges with Finland, which became a new member of NATO in 2023, is expected to ----- **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In September 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan officially visited Estonia. He made a courtesy call on Mr. Salm, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Estonia and held a meeting with A meeting attended by General Herem, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces and Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake (March 2024) **(6) Lithuania** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Lithuania** Lithuania is a strategic partner of Japan and the two countries are deepening their cooperation to uphold and reinforce the free and open international order based on the rule of law. Additionally, in October 2023, the two countries signed the Japan-Lithuania Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** On the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore in June 2023, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka held a meeting with Deputy Minister of National Defence of Lithuania Tomkus. At the meeting, they exchanged views on the regional affairs, including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and confirmed that in addition to bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, the two countries would work together to promote cooperation as well through NATO and the EU. In October 2023, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Serizawa signed the JapanLithuania Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges with Deputy Minister of National Defence of Lithuania Tučkutė, and at the following meeting, they shared the view to further strengthen the defense cooperation and exchanges under the Memorandum. In February 2024, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake met with Deputy Minister of National Defence of Lithuania Tučkutė during the Munich Security Conference, where they welcomed the signing of the Japan-Lithuania Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges and discussed Japan-Lithuania defense cooperation and exchanges and regional affairs. **See** Reference 43 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)) **7** **Central and Eastern European Countries** General Herem, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces. At the meeting, they agreed that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region are inseparable and agreed to strengthen mutual engagement not only on global security issues, but also on European and IndoPacific challenges. In March 2024, General Herem, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces was officially invited to Japan, reaffirming their commitment to further promote Japan-Estonia defense cooperation. **(5) Latvia** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Latvia** Latvia is a partner that shares values and principles with Japan. With growing recognition among like-minded countries that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific are inseparable, collaboration toward the realization of FOIP and cooperation through the EU, NATO and others are becoming increasingly important. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** In October 2023, the first Japan-Latvia Military to Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on issues such as defense policies of the two countries and regional affairs including Ukraine, and Israel/Palestine. They also deepened the discussion on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(1) Ukraine** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Ukraine** Ukraine is a partner that shares fundamental values such as freedom, democracy and the rule of law with Japan. With Ukraine, in 2018, Japan signed the Japan-Ukraine Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges and held the Japan-Ukraine Security Meeting. R i ’ i i t Uk i hi h b ----- in February 2022, violates Ukraine s sovereignty and territorial integrity, is a serious violation of international law, including the UN Charter prohibiting the use of force, shakes the very foundations of the international order and is absolutely unacceptable. Based on this position, Japan has been taking decisive measures by uniting with the international community. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** Japan has been providing non-lethal equipment and goods, such as bulletproof vests, protective masks and protective clothing, vehicles, small drones and emergency rations, sequentially after March 2022, responding to the request of the Government of Ukraine for the provision of equipment, etc. after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan Ukraine Summit Meeting with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, who was visiting Japan to attend the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Prime Minister Kishida conveyed Japan’s intention to newly provide SDF vehicles such as trucks and approximately 30,000 emergency rations to Ukraine, based on the request from the Ukrainian side, as well as Japan’s decision to accept injured Ukrainian soldiers at the SDF Central Hospital. In response, President Zelenskyy expressed his gratitude. Following the meeting, also in May, based on a request from Ukraine, Japan announced that it would accept two injured Ukrainian soldiers with lower leg amputations (in which the leg was amputated from the knee down) to provide them with the necessary medical treatment at the SDF Central Hospital, with the Japanese side bearing Prime Minister Kishida paying floral tribute at Cenotaph for the A-bomb Victims with President Zelenskyy (May 2023) [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan] the costs in principle. In addition, since June 2023, approximately 30,000 emergency rations and a total of 101 SDF vehicles (small trucks, high mobility vehicles and material handling vehicles) have been provided. In June 2023, at the Shangri-La Dialogue meeting held in Singapore, then Defense Minister Hamada met with then Ukrainian’s Defense Minister Reznikov and stated that unilateral changes to the status quo by force would not be accepted and that Japan would unite with the international community to respond with resolute determination. In October 2023, Defense Minister Kihara held a video teleconference with Ukrainian’s Defense Minister Umerov and told him that the MOD/SDF would continue to support Ukraine as much as possible in cooperation with the international community. The MOD regularly participates in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group organized by the U.S. Department of Defense and works with participating countries to share information on assistance to Ukraine. In December 2023, based on a request from the government of Ukraine and others, the MOD has decided to provide assistance in the areas of IT and demining via the IT Coalition for Support of Ukraine and the Demining Coalition for Support of Ukraine, in which European and other volunteer countries participate. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In January 2024, Colonel General Koval, the Commandant of the National Defence University of Ukraine and ten others visited the Joint Staff College and the National Institute for Defense Studies to give lectures and exchange views with students on the current situation in Ukraine and other issues. During the visit, the Commandant of the Joint Staff College and Colonel General Koval, the Commandant of the National Defence University signed a “Letter of Intent in the Fields of Education and Scientific Research” and agreed to further deepen exchanges between the two schools. **See** Section 3-2-6 (Cooperation for the Activities Helping Ukrainian Victims); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-4-1 (8) (Ukraine) **(2) Czech Republic** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with the Czech Republic** The Czech Republic is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. In 2017, the first Japan-Czech Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges with a Central or Eastern European t i d Th NDS l ifi th t J **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **(4) Romania** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Romania** Romania is a strategic partner of Japan and in response to the increasingly severe security environment, including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the two countries are going to consolidate dialogue in the security field. In addition, in July 2023, for the first time in about 20 years, Defense Attaché was dispatched to Romania. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In August 2023, during her visit to Romania, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda paid a courtesy call on Mr. Tilvar, Romanian Defence Minister and they agreed to promote defense cooperation and Cooperatio in various fields. Onoda also met with Mrs. Cojocaru, Romanian State Secretary of the Ministry of National Defense and exchanged views on the regional affairs including Ukraine, defense cooperation and exchanges, as well as WPS and agreed to continue close cooperation. **See** Reference 43 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)) **8** **Association of South-East Asian Nations** **(ASEAN)** will strengthen cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In July 2023, the first Japan-Czech Military to Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on the regional affairs and defense policies of the two countries and deepen discussions on future defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. **(3) Poland** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Poland** Poland is a strategic partner that shares values and principles with Japan. Cooperation with Poland is being advanced in accordance with the “Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategic Partnership,” including in the areas of politics and security. In February 2022, the Japan-Poland Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges was signed. The NDS also specifies that Japan will strengthen cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In July 2023, during her visit to Poland, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda met with Mr. Wiśniewski, then Undersecretary of State in the Polish Ministry of National Defence and acclaimed the progress in exchanges between the defense authorities of the two countries. They also exchanged views on the regional affairs, including Ukraine and defense cooperation and exchanges and agreed to continue working closely together. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with General Rajmund T. Andrzejczak, then Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, where they exchanged views on strategic environment awareness and agreed to continue working closely together to maintain and strengthen a free and open international order. In September 2023, General Yoshida paid an official visit to Poland. Then, he paid a courtesy call on Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland Błaszczak and met with General Rajmund T. Andrzejczak, then Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces to discuss the future direction of defense cooperation and Cooperatio b t J d P l d **(1) Significance** **of** **Defense** **Cooperation** **and** **Exchanges with ASEAN Countries** Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries have high potential as the world’s “open growth center” with continuous high economic growth, etc. In addition, they are situated in strategically important areas that occupy key points on Japan’s sea lanes and they play an important role in ensuring peace and prosperity for both Japan and whole of the region. Given such importance of ASEAN countries, there is great significance in the MOD/SDF strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges with each ASEAN country while supporting efforts to reinforce ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience as the foundation for regional cooperation from the view of realizing FOIP. This will also lead to the creation of a desirable security environment for Japan. Based on this principle, Japan is facilitating confidence building and mutual understanding through high-level and working-level exchanges as well as promoting capacity building, bilateral/multilateral training and d f i t d t h l ti ith **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- ASEAN countries. In addition to bilateral cooperation, Japan also conducts cooperation within multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The “Vientiane Vision”, which Japan announced in 2016 was the first guideline for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, which presented an overall picture of the priority area of the future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in a transparent manner. In 2019, at the 5th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Thailand, then Defense Minister Kono announced the “Vientiane Vision 2.0”, an updated version of the “Vientiane Vision” and the ASEAN ministers welcomed it. At the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Indonesia in November 2023, Defense Minister Kihara affirmed that the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)”, adopted by ASEAN and FOIP shares fundamental principles such as openness, transparency and a rules-based framework and presented the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE) to advance the JapanASEAN defense cooperation to a new level. The MOD will continue to actively promote such bilateral and multilateral cooperation going forward. **See** Paragraph 3 (Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation); Paragraph 4 (Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity **See** Building); Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 46 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Member States (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 52 (Recent multilateral high-level exchanges (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 56 (Vientiane Vision 2.0); Reference 57 (Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (Since FY2020)) **(2) Indonesia** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Indonesia** Indonesia is a major regional power that exercises leadership in ASEAN and is a comprehensive and strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. Indonesia is located in the Strait of Malacca and other key areas of maritime transportation and since the JapanIndonesia Summit in 2015 when the two countries agreed to strengthen the Strategic Partnership underpinned by sea and democracy, they have been actively engaging in defense cooperation and exchanges at various levels and fields, such as holding a Japan-Indonesia “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministers’Meeting. In addition to signing the Agreement concerning the T f f D f E i t d T h l i 2021 Japan and Indonesia agreed in the 2 2 meeting 2023 to improve also held that year their capacity in maritime surveillance and maritime law enforcement, strengthen maritime cooperation, including the provision of fishery surveillance vessels, and strengthen cooperation in the region around the Sulu and Celebes Seas. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** Prime Minister Kishida held a Summit Meeting with Indonesian President Joko on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Prime Minister Kishida mentioned the importance of defending a free and open international order based on the rule of law, while President Joko stated that he agreed with Prime Minister Kishida’s views. During summit meetings held in September and December 2023, the two leaders confirmed that they would continue to work together on regional issues. In November 2023, then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa held a meeting with H. E. Lt Gen. Herindra, Vice Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia on the occasion of ADMM-Plus. In July 2023, to strengthen the Japanese language education course at the Defense Language Education and Training Center of the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, the MOD provided capacity building to improve the Japanese language skills of the Center’s instructors and course students. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with Admiral Yudo, the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. At the meeting, they agreed to further cooperation on various regional and international issues, including efforts to realize FOIP. In August 2023, on the occasion of the CAS hosted by the Australian Army, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with then General Dudung, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army and they agreed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation through expert exchange and multilateral training. From August to September 2023, the GSDF participated in multilateral exercise “Super Garuda Shield 23” hosted by the U.S. and Indonesia and strengthened cooperation with the participating countries through various tactical exercises, including to recapture islands. Additionally, in October 2023, the MOD/SDF shared its knowledge with the Indonesian National Armed Forces in support of capacity building for HA/DR, including guidelines for ti b t th SDF d l l t i **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- the event of a disaster. In May 2023, the MSDF latest destroyer JS “Kumano” called at Jakarta as part of the IPD 23 unit and conducted a ship tour for the Minister of Defense and other highranking Indonesian officials, as well as goodwill exercises with the Indonesian Navy. In June 2023, it attended an international maritime security symposium and a medical assistance program during the multilateral naval exercise “Komodo 2023” hosted by the Indonesian Navy. In June 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF, officially invited Air Chief Marshal Fadjar Prasetyo, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force to exchange views on defense cooperation and exchanges, etc. among air force services. **(3) Cambodia** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Cambodia** In 1992, Cambodia became the first country to which Japan sent an SDF unit for UN (Peacekeeping Operations) PKO. As indicated by Japan’s capacity building for Cambodia since 2013 and other programs, defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries have made steady progress. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In September and December 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held summit meetings with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet. During the meetings, the two leaders welcomed the development of cooperation between the naval services, including port calls by naval vessels, in addition to personnel exchanges between the army services and agreed to establish the Vice Ministers’ Meeting and strengthen cooperation in the security field. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Vong Pisen. During the meeting, they agreed to continue strengthening Japan-Cambodia defense cooperation and exchanges, which have made steady progress in various fields such as UN PKO and capacity building, for the sake of peace and stability in the region and the international community. In September 2023, on the occasion of IPACC held in India, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met ith G l M S h C d f th R l Cambodian Army and they agreed to strengthen bilateral relations through multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges. The GSDF provided capacity building to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces on PKO (engineering) from November to December 2023. In May 2023, on the occasion of IMDEX Asia 2023 hosted by Singapore, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF had a meeting with Vice Admiral Tea Sokha, Deputy Commander of the Royal Cambodian Navy to discuss future defense cooperation, including port calls by MSDF vessels. In April 2023, the MSDF Indo-Pacific and Middle East Deployment (IMED23) unit made a port call at Sihanoukville, where the commanding officer paid a courtesy call to Admiral Tea Vinh, Commander of the Royal Cambodian Navy and carried out goodwill exercises and exchange events, including a demonstration of emergency equipment to the Royal Cambodian Navy and sports exchanges. In addition, in February 2024, the Training Squadron made a port call at Sihanoukville to conduct goodwill exercises with the Royal Cambodian Navy. **(4) Singapore** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Singapore** Singapore was the first Southeast Asian country to sign a memorandum on defense exchanges with Japan in 2009 (revised in June 2022). Since then, based on this memorandum, various cooperative relationships have been progressing steadily, including the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology that took effect in June 2023. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada witnessed the signing ceremony of the Japan-Singapore Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with Singapore Defence Minister Ng. In August 2023, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kimura visited Singapore and held a meeting with Mr. Heng, Singapore Senior Minister of State for Defence. At the meeting, they exchanged views on regional affairs, including North Korea and the East and South China Seas, and agreed to continue strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges. During the meeting with Mr. Chan, Singapore Permanent Secretary (Defence), Kimura also expressed their expectations to t d d f ti l ti b t th t **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- countries, including the materialization of equipment transfer projects. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** At the Shangri-La Dialogue meeting held in Singapore in June 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with Admiral Beng, Chief of Defence Force, Singapore Armed Forces and emphasized the intention to further promote defense cooperation and exchanges for the sake of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In May 2023, on the occasion of LANPAC 2023 held in Hawaii, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a meeting with Major-General Neo, Chief of Army, Singapore Army, and they agreed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation through exchanges of experts and multilateral exercises. In May 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF made an official visit to Singapore to attend IMDEX Asia 2023 hosted by Singapore and had a discussion with Rear Admiral Wat, Chief of Navy, Republic of Singapore Navy. During the meeting, they agreed to strengthen cooperation between the two countries to realize FOIP and contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In November 2023, the two countries also held discussions on defense cooperation and exchanges at IP23 hosted by the Royal Australian Navy. In April 2023, the MSDF IMD 23 unit made a port call at Changi, where it conducted a naval ship tour and goodwill exercises with the Singapore Navy. In May 2023, the latest destroyer JS “Kumano” of MSDF participated in IMDEX Asia 2023 hosted by Singapore, where MSDF’s strength, technological capabilities and manpower-saving initiatives were introduced to the participating navies, including Singapore, such as opening the destroyer Kumano to them. **(5) Thailand** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Thailand** With Thailand, Japan has longstanding defense cooperation and exchanges based on the traditionally good relationship between the two countries, including the dispatch of Defense Attachés and consultations between their defense authorities from early years. At the National Defense Academy, a Thai student became the first foreign student to be accepted in 1958. Since then, Thailand has sent the largest cumulative number of students to the academy. With th A t i th T f f Defense Equipment and Technology entering into force in May 2022, in November 2023, Japan and Thailand upgraded their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, accelerating talks on deepening security cooperation between the two countries. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In August 2023, during his visit to Thailand, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kimura held a meeting with Gen. Sanitchanog Sangkachantra Permanent Secretary for Defence and General Thitichai Tiantong, Chief of Joint Staff, the Royal Thai Armed Forces to discuss regional affairs, including the East and South China Seas and to further promote bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. In November 2023, then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa paid a courtesy call on Thai Minister of Defence Sutin on the occasion of ADMM-Plus. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** SDF has continued to participate in the “Cobra Gold” Multilateral exercise. During the exercise held in February 2024, SDF improved its integrated operational capabilities related to protection measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas and international peace cooperation activities and strengthened cooperation with the participating countries. In May 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a meeting with then General Narongpan Jitkaewthae, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army at LANPAC 2023 held in Hawaii and they agreed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation through expert exchanges and multilateral exercises. In November 2023, on the occasion of IP23 hosted by the Royal Australian Navy, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF had a meeting with Admiral Adung Phaniam, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy to discuss Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) fishing and defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. **(6) The Philippines** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with the Philippines** The Philippines faces important sea lanes for Japan, such as the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait and cooperation with the Philippines and strengthening of its coastal surveillance and maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities are important to ensure the security f th l I dditi t hi h l l h **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- with the Philippines, also a U.S. ally, there are frequent mutual visits by naval vessels, working-level exchanges including Military-Military Consultation and service-toservice exchanges. In 2016, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology came into force and in 2022, the two countries held the first “2+2” meeting, where they agreed to start considering a framework to facilitate reciprocal visits and reciprocal provision of supplies and services in the field of logistical support. Also, in February 2023, “the Terms of Reference (TOR) between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines concerning the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Activities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in the Republic of the Philippines”[12] was signed and in November 2023, the two countries agreed to begin negotiations on the RAA and others, deepening security cooperation between the two countries steadily. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In June 2023, then Minister of Defense Hamada held the first-ever Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Quadripartite Defense Ministers’Meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles, and then Philippine Senior Undersecretary and Officer-in-Charge of the Department of National Defense Galvez on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore. The four ministers discussed common challenges in the region and expansion of cooperation among the four countries and confirmed their commitment to work together to realize FOIP. In November 2023, Prime Minister Kishida visited the Philippines and held a summit meeting with Philippine President Marcos. At the meeting, Kishida welcomed the signing of the exchange of notes on the provision of coastal radar systems, the first cooperation project under Official Security Assistance[13] (OSA) and expressed his intention to strengthen cooperation on defense equipment and technology including the transfer of air surveillance radar systems, and cooperation in enhancing maritime security capabilities including the provision of patrol ships. In addition, the two leaders welcomed the agreement to begin negotiations on the RAA and decided to proceed with coordination to steadily implement bilateral consultations in the security and defense fields. They also agreed to promote USJapan-Philippines cooperation and further cooperation in fields such as cybersecurity and economic security. In the same month, then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa paid a courtesy call on the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Teodoro, on the occasion of ADMM-Plus held in Indonesia. With regard to the transfer of defense equipment, a contract was concluded in 2020 between Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Inc. for the delivery of four air surveillance radar systems. Prior to the delivery, the ASDF and the GSDF provided education for the Philippine Air Force radar personnel. As Japan’s first case of an overseas transfer of finished equipment, the first and second air surveillance radar systems were delivered to the Philippine Air Force in October 2023 and March 2024, respectively, and the Acceptance, Turnover, and Blessing Ceremonies were held in December 2023 and April 2024 with the attendance of the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Teodoro. In April 2024, Prime Minister Kishida attended a Japan-U.S.-Philippines summit meeting in the United States. The leaders of the three countries agreed to continue strengthening security and defense cooperation through Military to Military (MM) Dialogues and trilateral exercises. In May 2024, Defense Minister Kihara met with the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Teodoro in Hawaii. In the meeting, Secretary Teodoro expressed his appreciation for the delivery of air surveillance radar systems to the Philippines, and they exchanged views on the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Maritime Cooperative Activity conducted in the South China Sea in April 2024 and the Japan-Philippines RAA, for which negotiations were announced to begin in November 2023. The RAA is expected to contribute to the facilitation of cooperative activities between Japanese and Philippine units, such as joint training and exercises, and the two countries agreed to work together further toward its early conclusion. During the same period, Defense Minister Kihara held **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **12 It simplifies the procedures for the SDF to visit the Philippines for activities related to HA/DR.** **13 A new framework for grant assistance established in FY2023 in which military forces and others are beneficiaries, for the purpose of strengthening security cooperation with Japan, creating** a favorable security environment for Japan and helping maintain and strengthen international peace and security by consolidating the security capabilities and deterrence of the countries ----- Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and they agreed to further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in the future. They also held a Japan-U.S.-Philippines Chief of Staff-level meeting attended by Admiral Aquilino, Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. In a Japan-Philippines video teleconference held in December 2023, the two countries shared an understanding of the situation in the South China Sea, emphasized their strong opposition to any action that would increase tensions and agreed to work closely together. In May 2023, on the occasion of LANPAC 2023 held in Hawaii, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a discussion with General Brawner, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, regarding future defense cooperation and other issues. In December 2023, during the LFS co-hosted by the U.S. Pacific Command, General Morishita held a trilateral meeting with General Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Lieutenant General Jurney, Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, Major General Rojas, the Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps. During the meeting, they shared their perceptions on the strategic environment and the future direction of cooperation among the three countries’ army services and discussed a roadmap to guide cooperation over the next five years. Furthermore, for the first time, a quadripartite meeting was held with Lieutenant General Stuart, Chief of Army of Australia to exchange views on defense cooperation among the four countries. In October 2023 and in March 2024, as part of its support for capacity building in the field of HA/DR, the GSDF shared its knowledge on how to respond to disasters with the Philippine Army and provided the General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF holding a Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines meeting (December 2023) A U.S.-Japan-Australia-Philippines defense ministers’ meeting (May 2024) a U.S.-Japan-Australia-Philippines defense ministers’ meeting, where the four ministers expressed serious concern about the situation in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and expressed strong objection to the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels in the South China Sea. They also emphasized that defense cooperation among the four countries had never been stronger, such as the Maritime Cooperative Activity conducted by Japan, the United States, Australia, and the Philippines in April 2024, and discussed opportunities to advance defense cooperation among the four countries, including cooperative activities and enhanced capacity building in the South China Sea. **See** Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-4-1 (9) (Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Countries) **See** **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with then General Centino, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as a Japan-U.S.-Philippines video teleconference also attended by Admiral Aquilino, Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. At the meetings, they agreed to further promote Japan-Philippines bilateral and JapanU.S.-Philippines trilateral cooperation for the realization of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, various issues of the international community and FOIP. In June 2023, the three countries shared their understanding of issues in the Indo-Pacific region and reaffirmed the importance of JapanU.S.-Philippines defense cooperation during a trilateral meeting in Shangri-La Dialogue. In August 2023, at the Indo-Pacific CHOD held in Fiji, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with General Brawner, **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **MOVIE: IPD23 1st Surface Force activity records (the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines multilateral exercises)** **URL: https://youtu.be/geFXHik9eY4?si=v8HNi4wYVnLufpK8** ----- Army with technical guidance and advice on and how to use lifesaving equipment. In May 2023, at IMDEX Asia 2023 hosted by Singapore, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Flag Officer-in-Command, Philippine Navy Vice Admiral Adaci to discuss strategic environment awareness and future defense cooperation. Additionally, in November 2023, during IP23 hosted by the Royal Australian Navy, Admiral Sakai met with Rear Admiral Valencia, Philippine Navy Vice Commander to discuss the situation in the South China Sea, maritime law enforcement activities and other areas of cooperation in maritime security. In August 2023, the MSDF IPD 23 unit, along with the U.S. Navy, Royal Australian Navy and Air Force, and Philippine Navy, conducted the first multilateral exercise among the four countries. At that time, the U.S., Australian and Japanese navies made a joint port call in Manila, where the commanders of the U.S., Japan, Australian and Philippine fleets inspected the situations in the South China Sea and a meeting of the U.S.-JapanAustralia-Philippine fleet commanders was held for the first time. In October 2023, the MSDF, along with the navies of the United Kingdom and Canada, attended a meeting of experts on MDA, international law and medical care during the “Exercise SAMA SAMA 2023,” a multilateral exercise hosted by the United States and the Philippines and conducted search and rescue training at sea to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries’ navies. In November 2023, in addition to the U.S., Royal Australian and Canadian navies and air forces, the MSDF carried out the multilateral “Annual Exercise 2023” with the participation of the Philippine Navy as an observer for the first time. Moreover, in February 2024, it provided the Philippine Navy with practical training in vessel engine maintenance as part of its capacity building on vessel maintenance. Furthermore, in April 2024, as the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Maritime Cooperative Activity, the MSDF conducted multilateral exercises in the South China Sea with the U.S. Navy, the Royal Australian Navy and Air Force, and the Philippine Navy. In August 2023, the ASDF participated for the first time in the multilateral “Pacific Airlift Rally” exercise hosted by the United States and the Philippines and conducted a joint Japan-Philippines humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise to improve HA/DR capabilities and strengthen cooperation with participating countries’ air forces, including the Philippines. **(7) Brunei** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Brunei** With Brunei, Japan signed a memorandum of defense cooperation and exchanges in 2023, agreeing to further strengthen relationships between the defense authorities of the two countries through various exchanges, including high-level exchanges, port calls (navigation) of naval vessels, etc., joint training programs and others. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In June 2023, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka held the first Japan-Brunei Defense Policy Dialogue with Haji Adi Ihram bin Dato Paduka Haji Mahmud, then Deputy Permanent Secretary (Policy and Strategy) of the Ministry of Defence Brunei Darussalam to exchange views on defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Brunei, as well as regional affairs, etc. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with Major General Dato Paduka Seri Haji Muhammad Haszaimi bin Bol Hassan, Commander of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces on the occasion of the CHOD meeting held in Fiji and shared recognition on Japan-Brunei defense cooperation and exchanges for the realization of FOIP and AOIP. In the same month, at the Australian Army’s Chief of Army Staff Symposium (CAS), General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with Brigadier General Haji Mohammad Shanonnizam bin Sulaiman, Royal Brunei Land Force Commander, and they agreed to strengthen bilateral relations through multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges. In November 2023, at IP23 hosted by the Royal Australian Navy, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Captain Haji Mohamad Sarif Pudin bin Matserudin, Acting Commander of Royal Brunei Navy to discuss future defense cooperation and exchanges. In April 2023 and in February 2024, the MSDF Training Squadron made a port call in Muara and conducted goodwill exercises with the Bruney Navy. In addition, from April to May 2023, the MSDF IMED23 unit called at Muara and carried out various exchange events, including opening its vessel to the Bruneian Navy and conducting joint beach cleanup volunteer activities. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **(8) Viet Nam** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Viet Nam** Viet Nam is a coastal country facing the South China Sea. Japan and Viet Nam have developed cooperation and exchanges between their defense authorities. The 2021 Defense Ministers’Meeting was an opportunity to promote high-level exchanges and others under “JapanViet Nam Defense Cooperation at the New Level” to contribute more actively not only to Japan- Viet Nam bilateral relations but also the peace and stability of the region as well as the international community. In November 2023, the two countries decided to develop their relationship into a comprehensive strategic partnership for peace and prosperity in Asia and the world and in the security field, they agreed on the importance of steadily advancing procedures for transfer of defense equipment, discussing OSA and others, further expanding defense cooperation and exchanges. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In May 2023, on the occasion of G7 Hiroshima Summit, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Viet Nam summit meeting with Prime Minister Chính, and they confirmed their collaboration in responding to the situation in the East and South China Seas and North Korea. In addition, Prime Minister Kishida held Japan-Viet Nam summit meetings with then Viet Namese President Thuong during his visit to Japan in November 2023 and with Prime Minister Chính during his visit to Japan in December 2023, respectively, where they agreed to promote cooperation toward further expansion of defense cooperation and exchanges and defense equipment transfer between the two countries. In November 2023, then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa paid a courtesy call on General Giang, Minister of National Defence of Viet Nam on the occasion of his participation in ADMM-Plus held in Indonesia. Also, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Serizawa met with Senior Lieutenant General Chien, Deputy Minister of National Defence of Viet Nam on the occasions of the 13th Japan-ASEAN Defense ViceMinisterial Forum and Deputy-Secretary Level Talks in January and February 2024, respectively. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with Senior Lieutenant General Cuong, Chief of the General Staff f th Vi t N P l ’ A d th d t continue to strengthen cooperation for peace and stability in the region and in the international community. In October 2023, General Yoshida officially invited Senior Lieutenant General Cuong, Chief of the General Staff to visit Japan to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and they agreed to further strengthen and enhance the defense cooperation and exchanges. In August 2023, at CAS hosted by the Australian Army, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with Lieutenant General Nghia, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Viet Nam People’s Army and they agreed to strengthen bilateral relations through multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges. In May 2023, the MSDF provided capacity building on underwater unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance to the Viet Nam. Additionally, in June 2023, the IPD 23 unit made a port call at Cam Ranh to conduct various exchange events and goodwill exercises with the Viet Nam People’s Navy. In November 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF officially invited Major General Hien, Commander of the Air Defense-Air Force of Viet Nam to exchange views on defense cooperation and exchanges. The ASDF agreed to conduct an exchange of middle level officers with Viet Nam in 2022 and dispatched the first exchange mission to Viet Nam in November 2023. Japan- Viet Nam Middle-level Officer Exchange (November 2023) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(9) Malaysia** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Malaysia** Malaysia is located at an important place for maritime transportation facing the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. In 2018, the Japan-Malaysia Memorandum D f C ti d E h ll th ----- **(11) Laos** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Laos** In 2019, Japan signed the Japan-Laos Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges and the two countries intend to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in wide-ranging fields, including HA/DR. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In November 2023, on the occasion of ADMM-Plus held in Indonesia, then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa paid a courtesy call on Gen. Chansamone Chanyalath, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence of Laos **c. Initiatives of Each Service** From September to October 2023, the GSDF invited the Lao People’s Army to Japan to support capacity building in the field of HA/DR and conducted practical training, etc. in civil engineering for disaster response. In December 2023, GSDF personnel advised the Lao People’s Army on their disaster-response training based on a flooding scenario. **9** **Mongolia** Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with Malaysia came into effect. In December 2023, the two countries decided to upgrade their relationship to a comprehensive and strategic partnership to further promote security cooperation between them. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In December 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a summit meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar, who was visiting Japan. During the meeting, they welcomed the signing of the Exchange of Notes on OSA for the Malaysian Armed Forces and agreed to promote training and exchanges between the SDF and the Malaysian Armed Forces. **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In May 2023, at LANPAC 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a meeting with Malaysian Army Chief General Tan Sri Mohammad Ab Rahman regarding future defense cooperation and other issues. In November 2023, the GSDF invited Malaysian military officials to support their capacity building in the field of HA/DR, including various programs at the MOD, equipment displays and exchanges of opinions with local authorities. In April 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron made a port call at Port Klang and conducted goodwill exercises with the Malaysian Navy. In May 2023, the MSDF latest destroyer JS “Kumano” participated in the Langkawi International Maritime Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA ’23) hosted by Malaysia and introduced MSDF’s strength, technological capabilities and manpower saving efforts, etc. to a wide audience. The MSDF also promoted friendship and goodwill with the navies of participating countries through various exchange events such as the international fleet review, multilateral maritime exercises and sport exchanges. In February 2024, the DSPE made a port call at Port Klang and conducted joint training with the Malaysian Navy for the first time. **(10) Myanmar** In response to the coup d’état by Myanmar’s armed forces that occurred in 2021, in the same year, Japan issued a statement jointly with the chiefs of staffs of 12 countries, including the United States, condemned the use of military force by the national armed forces and related security agencies against the civilian population and calling for the national armed forces to stop the violence. **(1) Significance** **of** **Defense** **Cooperation** **and** **Exchanges with Mongolia** Relations with Mongolia were elevated to a special strategic partnership for peace and prosperity in 2022 and progress is being made in wide-ranging fields of defense cooperation and exchanges. **(2) Recent** **Major** **Achievements** **in** **Defense** **Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.** In October 2023, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Serizawa paid a courtesy call on Mongolian Defense Minister SAIKHANBAYAR on the occasion of the Seoul Defense Dialogue held in Seoul and exchanged views on further promoting defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. In February 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held a Defense Ministers’Meeting with Defense Minister SAIKHANBAYAR, who was visiting Japan for the first time in about five years as the Mongolian Defense Minister. During the meeting, the two ministers agreed to continue promoting defense cooperation and exchanges in various fields, including defense equipment and technology cooperation and signed a revised copy of the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges between Japan and Mongolia. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **(3) Initiatives of Each Service** On the occasion of the Indo-Pacific CHOD held in Fiji in August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with Major General Ganbyamba, Chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces to welcome the progress of exchanges between air force types in the recent past and share recognition of future defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Mongolia. In May 2023, on the occasion of LANPAC 2023 held in Hawaii, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with Mr. Tsogt Jungle, Commander-in-Chief of the Mongolian People’s Army, and they agreed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation through expert exchanges and multilateral exercises. In June 2023, the GSDF participated in the multilateral exercise “Khaan Quest 23”, the world’s largest multilateral training exercise on PKO, organized by the Mongolian Armed Forces. In April, June and October 2023, as part of capacity building on PKO (civil engineering), the GSDF also provided education and educational guidance to the Mongolian Army Engineering unit. In May and October 2023, as part of capacity building in the field of HA/DR, the GSDF provided advice and guidance to the Central Military Hospital of the Mongolian Armed Forces in the Mass Casualties Response Exercise (MCRE) in cooperation with related organizations, including the National Emergency Management Agency. Besides, in January 2024, two Mongolian military personnel participated in the Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise “North Wind 24” as observers for the first time. In July 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made an official visit to Mongolia, the first visit by General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF exchanging gifts with the Commander of Air Force the Chief of Staff, ASDF since the establishment of the ASDF. The visit was realized at the invitation of Air Force Commander Ganbat, Air Force Command, Mongolian Armed Forces, who made his first official visit to Japan in November 2022. During the visit, General Uchikura and Commander Ganbat shared their understanding of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region and agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. Based on a memorandum of understanding with the Mongolian Air Force, the ASDF has been conducting educational and research exchanges and expert exchanges. Specifically, the ASDF conducted a research exchange with the National Defense University of Mongolia in July 2023, carried out an expert exchange in the field of air traffic control with the Mongolian Air Force in October 2023 and implemented an expert exchange in the field of air surveillance in December 2023. **See** Reference 47 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Asian Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) **10** **Pacific Island Countries** **(1) Significance** **of** **Defense** **Cooperation** **and** **Exchanges with Pacific Island Countries** Pacific island countries share with Japan, a maritime nation, the recognition of the importance of a free, open and sustainable maritime order based on the rule of law and are important countries that have deep historical relationships with Japan. It is also located at a strategic point where the sea lane connecting Japan and Australia and the sea lane from the Indian Ocean through the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean intersect. Japan holds Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) with Pacific Island countries on a regular basis and at PALM9 in 2022, Japan announced the “Pacific Bond (KIZUNA) Policy” to strengthen relations with Pacific Island countries. The MOD has been promoting defense cooperation and exchanges among defense authorities, including hosting the Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD) for the first time in 2021 and the NDS calls for Japan, as an important partner, to work with the ally, like-minded countries and others to cooperate in capacity building and other cooperation, including with organizations other than military forces such as coast guards. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **(2) Recent** **Major** **Achievements** **in** **Defense** **Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.** In December 2023, the MOD participated as an observer in the 8th South Pacific Defence Ministers’Meeting[14] (SPDMM) held in New Caledonia, France. In March 2024, the MOD hosted the 2nd JPIDD in Tokyo. At the meeting, which was the first face-toface meeting, Defense Minister Kihara presented the “Cooperation Concept for United Security Efforts in the Pacific Islands Region” to further promote cooperation in the fields of defense and security in the Pacific Islands Region. He also paid a courtesy call on the Crown Prince of Tonga, who attended the meeting and held meetings with the Ministers of Defense of Fiji and Papua New Guinea. **(3) Initiatives of Each Service** In August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with Brigadier Lord Fielakepa, Chief of the Defense Staff of His Majesty’s Armed Forces of the Kingdom of Tonga on the occasion of the IndoPacific CHOD meeting held in Fiji. During the meeting, General Yoshida reiterated his heartfelt sympathy for the damage caused by the volcanic eruption that occurred in the Kingdom of Tonga in January 2022 and shared their understanding on defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries toward the realization of FOIP. At the same time, he also met with Major-General Kalouniwai, Commander of Republic of Fiji Military Forces and participated in a mangrove planting project in Fiji as part of the Pacific Partnership hosted by the U.S. Forces, together with the crew of LST JS “Shimokita” of the MSDF IPD 23 unit as well as GSDF personnel, to contribute to environmental protection in the country. Furthermore, the same month, General Yoshida attended the Joint Heads of Pacific Security held in Palau in an Fig. III-3-1-4 Main Activities in Pacific Island Countries (April 2023 - March 2024) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Palau (Koror) Kiribati area  7.24-7.27 (JS "SHIRANUI") Palau and Micronesia area  6.21(Destroyer JS "Shiranui")  On-board lunch meeting: Vice President  11.29-12.12（ASDF C-130H transport aircraft)  Goodwill exercise with the Kiribati Coast  Goodwill exercise with the Palau Coast Guard patrol vessel  Christmas Drop (cooperation with U.S. Forces) Guard patrol vessel (in cooperation with the Christmas Drop Japan Coast Guard and Australian Maritime Services Advisor ) Japan-Palau Goodwill Exercise PIC and Timor-Leste  8.6-8.13 (Destroyer JS "Izumo")  Ship Rider Cooperation Program  Brisbane to Darwin - Held simultaneously with the Japan-ASEAN **Philippine Sea** Japan-Kiribati Goodwill Exercise Ship Rider Cooperation Program Tonga(Nukualofa)  8.28-8.30 (Destroyer JS "Shiranui") **Arafura Sea**  On-board lunch meeting: Crown Prince, Prime Minister  Goodwill exercise with the Tongan Navy patrol vessel (in collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard) **Coral Sea** Participants from various countries shaking hands with the Izumo crew Papua New Guinea ( Port Moresby) Solomon Islands (Honiara)  7.7-7.11 (Destroyer JS "Izumo")Capacity building (military band training)  8.3-8.4 (Destroyer JS "Shiranui") Fiji( Suva )  First goodwill exercise with the  Goodwill exercise with Solomon Maritime Police  8.17-8.20 (Landing ship tank JS "Shimokita") Papua New Guinea Defence Forces  Support for the remains collection project (MHLW)  On-board reception: President, Vice Prime Minister  Capacity buildup (Unexploded ordnance (UXO) disposal )  Mangrove planting (in collaboration with the U.S. forces)  Capacity Buildup assistance (military medicine) On-site inspection training with the Royal Tonga Navy Inspection Unit Papua New Guinea Defence Force Goodwill exercise with the Solomon Islands Support for the remains collection Mangrove planting program in Fiji welcomes JS "Izumo" arrival Maritime Police On-site Inspection Team program in the Solomon Islands **14 Comprising seven countries: Australia, Chile, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga (Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States are observers). SPDMM is the only** ----- online format and demonstrated the SDF s commitment to security in the region to the military chiefs of South Pacific countries. From June to July 2023, the GSDF invited maintenance personnel from the Papua New Guinea Defence Force Engineer Battalion to Japan to provide education on the basics of heavy engineering equipment maintenance as part of its capacity building in the field of HA/DR. In July 2023, the GSDF provided capacity building on military band training for the Papua New Guinea Defence Force military band. Furthermore, in January 2024, as the first capacity building to the Solomon Islands, the GSDF implemented a project in the field of unexploded ordnance disposal for the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Department of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. In June 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF attended a naval service multilateral video conference hosted by the U.S. Pacific Fleet, where he reaffirmed that IUU fishing, which is rampant in the Pacific Island region, is a security threat, expressed active support for its control and called on the naval chiefs of each country and others to strengthen cooperation to eradicate IUU fishing. During IPD 23 held from April to September 2023, the MSDF vessels made port calls in Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Fiji and Tonga. In addition, for the first time as the MSDF, it conducted goodwill exercises with the Republic of Kiribati Police and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, as well as with the Palau Coast Guard Agency, the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force Maritime and the Royal Tonga Navy. The goodwill exercise with Kiribati was conducted jointly with the Coast Guard MCT and the Australian Maritime Service Advisor. The ASDF participated in the Operation Christmas Drop in the Federated States of Micronesia and other countries. **See** Fig. III-3-1-4 (Main Activities in Pacific Island Countries (April 2023 - March 2024); Paragraph 3 (Promotion of Multilateral **See** Security Cooperation); Paragraph 4 (Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building); Section 2-3 (Cooperation in Maritime Security); Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 48 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pacific Island Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) **11** **Indian Ocean Coastal Countries and Middle** **Eastern Countries** **(1) Significance** **of** **Defense** **Cooperation** **and** **Exchanges with Indian Ocean Coastal Countries** **and Middle Eastern Countries** Since peace and stability in Indian Ocean coastal countries and the Middle East are extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan, from the perspective of stable use of sea lanes as well as energy and economy, the MOD/ SDF has been promoting high-level exchanges and unitto-unit exchanges to build and strengthen cooperative relations with countries in these regions. The MOD/SDF conducted the FY2022 IMED23 from January to May 2023 involving MSDF minesweepers, demonstrating Japan’s deep commitment to the stability and prosperity of the region. **See** Reference 49 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Middle Eastern Countries (FY2020 and Beyond); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) **(2) Sri Lanka** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Sri Lanka** Sri Lanka is an important country located at a key point on the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. In recent years, Japan has strengthened bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges with Sri Lanka. **b. Initiatives of Each Service** DSPE called at Colombo in June 2023 and Trincomalee in October 2023 and conducted goodwill exercises and exchange events with Sri Lanka Navy. In July 2023, the MSDF IPD 23 unit made a port call at Colombo to inspect and maintain the hull and other parts of the ship by the Colombo Dockyard[15] as part of work to verify the maintenance of naval vessels overseas. In addition, various defense exchanges were conducted with the Sri Lanka Navy, including sport exchanges and goodwill exercises, to promote mutual understanding and friendship. In October 2023, MSDF personnel participated in the Galle Dialogue International Maritime Conference hosted by the Sri Lanka Navy and held discussions on maritime security with representatives of Sri Lanka Navy, India and other participating countries’ navies. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **(3) Pakistan** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Pakistan** Located at the junction of South Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia, Pakistan is an important state for stability in the Indo-Pacific region and it faces an important sea lane for Japan. Pakistan is a pro-Japanese country that has traditionally had a friendly relationship with Japan. Building on this relationship, the two countries have promoted defense cooperation and exchanges. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In September 2023, the 12th Japan-Pakistan Military to Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on regional affairs and defense policies of the two countries and deepen discussions on future defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Pakistan. A JapanPakistan Security Dialogue was also held, during which views were exchanged on wide-ranging matters, including security and defense areas and regional affairs. **(4) Bangladesh** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Bangladesh** Located at the junction of South Asia and Southeast Asia, Bangladesh is an important state for stability in the Indo-Pacific region and it faces an important sea lane for Japan. In April 2023, the two countries decided to further strengthen security cooperation by upgrading their relationship to a strategic partnership and signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges to begin negotiations on the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, etc. to further consolidate security cooperation. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** In April 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a summit meeting with Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister of the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. During the meeting, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the realization of FOIP and agreed to continue to promote mutual visits by naval vessels and aircraft, exchanges between units and goodwill exercises. They also welcomed OSA-based cooperation as well as the start of negotiations of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and agreed to strengthen dialogue among defense authorities. Furthermore, in November 2023, the exchange of notes OSA i d **c. Initiatives of Each Service** In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with visiting Lieutenant General Waker, then Principal Staff Officer, Armed Forces Division, Bangladesh to exchange views on the perception of the strategic environment and defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. In May 2023, on the occasion of LANPAC 2023 held in Hawaii, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with General Ahmed, Chief of Army Staff of Bangladesh and they agreed to further develop the relationship between the two countries’ army services. In April 2023, the MSDF IMED23 unit made a port call in Chittagong, where it held various exchange events, including a naval ship tour, goodwill exercises with the Bangladesh Navy, a seminar on mine warfare and sports exchanges. **(5) Maldives** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Maldives** The Maldives is an important country for the stability of the Indo-Pacific region, as it is located at a strategic point in the Indian Ocean and faces an important sea lane for Japan, etc. For more than 20 years, the Maldives has served as a transit point for SDF forces participating in UN PKO and cargo transport for counter-piracy deployment forces, and has also been an important refueling point for the deployment and return of counter-piracy surface forces and air force units. Japan and the Maldives intend to promote exchanges among defense authorities in the field of maritime security and other areas. **b. Initiatives of Each Service** From March to April 2023, the MSDF IPD 23 unit made a port call in Malé and conducted various exchange events, including a courtesy call by the unit commander to the Commander of the Maldives National Defence Force and the Commander of its Coast Guard, goodwill exercises (diving training), naval ship tours, and sports exchanges. In July 2023, the IPD 23 unit made a port call at Malé, where the unit commander paid a courtesy call to the Commander of the Maldives National Defence Force and the Commander of its Coast Guard and the unit also held various exchange events such as sports exchanges and joint beach cleanups to promote friendship and goodwill. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **(6) United Arab Emirates (UAE)** Japan and the UAE signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges in 2018. Since then, the two countries have continued to deepen bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, through high-level exchanges by defense ministers and chiefs of staff, periodical holding of military-to-military dialogues and air-to-air cooperation. May 2023 marked the signing of the Agreement between Japan and the UAE concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the first time such agreement was concluded with a country in the Middle East region, which took effect in January 2024. In October 2023, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Serizawa discussed bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, including inter-air force service cooperation as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation, with HE Major General Staff Pilot Al-Alawi, Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense of UAE on the occasion of the Seoul Defense Dialogue held in Seoul and they agreed on the importance of closer communication among defense authorities. **(7) Israel** Japan and Israel signed the revised Japan-Israel Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges during the Japan-Israel Defense Ministers’ Meeting held in August 2022, confirming to continue strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries, including defense equipment and technology cooperation and service-to-service cooperation. **(10) Oman** Japan and Oman signed a memorandum on defense exchanges in 2019. In addition to high-level exchanges, Japan and Oman have been continuing navy-to-navy cooperation, including MSDF ships’ port calls and trainng. In June 2023, the first Japan-Oman Military to Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on defense cooperation between Japan and Oman and the regional affairs. In August of the same year and January 2024, DSPE conducted a goodwill exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman in the Arabian Sea, and other areas. DSPE utilizes the port of Duqm in Oman as its main port of supply and when calling at the port, it conducts various defense exchanges with the Royal Navy of Oman, including goodwill exercises, to deepen mutual understanding and friendship. In February 2024, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF paid an official visit to Oman and had a conference with Rear Admiral Rahbi, Commander of the Royal Navy of Oman regarding future defense cooperation and exchanges. A meeting between Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF and Rear Admiral Rahbi, Commander of the Royal Navy of Oman (February 2024) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(8) Iran** Through opportunities for high-level exchanges among defense ministers and other officials, Japan explained to Iran about the extension of information gathering activities by SDF to ensure the safety of Japanese-related vessels in the Middle East region and the two sides agreed to continue communication between the defense authorities. **(9) Egypt** Japan has confirmed the importance of promoting bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in fields including PKO with Egypt through high-level exchanges, including the visit to Egypt by the State Minister of Defense and others. **(11) Qatar** Japan and Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges in 2015. Since the first Defense Ministers’ Meeting in 2019, the two countries have continued to deepen defense cooperation and exchanges, including high-level exchanges by defense ministers and chiefs of staff. Regarding Qatar, Defense Attaché was newly dispatched in June 2023, where the Defense Attaché in Kuwait had concurrently served. I N b 2023 th fi t J Q t Milit t ----- Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on defense cooperation between Japan and Qatar and the regional affairs. **(12) Saudi Arabia** Japan signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges with Saudi Arabia in 2016. The two countries have continued to deepen defense cooperation and exchanges, including video teleconference by the defense ministers during the COVID-19 pandemic. In July 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada held a meeting with His Royal Highness Prince Khalid, the Minister of Defense, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the meeting, the two sides explained their defense policies and confirmed that they would not tolerate any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force. They also discussed bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, including in the fields of defense equipment and technology and agreed to further close exchanges between defense authorities in future. Mina Salman and conducted goodwill exercise for the first time with the Royal Bahrain Naval Force. **(15) Jordan** Japan signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges with Jordan in 2016 and the two countries continue to hold Politico-Military (PM) dialogues. In December 2022, the SDF conducted its first integrated deployment and action training (training for rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas) in the Middle East region in Jordan. In April 2023, then Minister of Defense Hamada paid a courtesy call on His Majesty King Abdullah II during the king’s visit to Japan and expressed his gratitude for the cooperation in exercises conducted in 2022 on protective measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas and they agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. In the same month, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with General Hnaity, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Jordan. During the teleconference, the two sides agreed that defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries, including training for rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas in Jordan, were making steady progress and that further progress should be made. From October 2023 to January 2024, ASDF transport aircraft performed their mission by standing by in Jordan to transport Japanese nationals and others in Israel. In February 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held a meeting with visiting Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Al-Khasawneh and expressed appreciation for Jordan’s support for the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in Israel and agreed to continue close communication among defense authorities while utilizing working-level consultations. **12** **African Countries** **（1） Significance** **of** **Defense** **Cooperation** **and** **Exchanges with African Countries** African countries are becoming increasingly important and influential in the international community. While multilateral frameworks such as the African Union (AU) are making positive efforts toward regional peace and stability, challenges such as serious inequality and poverty and political instability remain. Moreover, i t th i fl f l i **(13) Türkiye** In 2012, Japan and Türkiye signed a Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges. In October 2023, the GSDF held a staff meeting with Turkish Army and they agreed to initiate an exchange of experts in the field of HA/DR and consider mutual general officer-level visits between the two countries’ army services in relation to the earthquake in southeastern Türkiye that occurred in February 2023. In September 2023, at ISS hosted by the United States, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Admiral Tatlıoğlu, Commander of the Turkish Navy to exchange views on future defense cooperation and exchanges, including port calls by MSDF vessels to Türkiye. In October 2023, the MSDF held a staff meeting with the Turkish Navy to discuss regional affairs, defense cooperation and exchanges and other issues. **(14) Bahrain** Japan had signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges with Bahrain in 2012 and the two countries had conducted high-level exchanges and other activities. In November 2023, the memorandum was revised to further promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. DSPE made a port call at Mina Salman in July 2023 and conducted various exchanges with the Royal B h i N l F I M h 2024 it l ll d t **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- consisting of the pandemic and Russia s aggression against Ukraine, and those of climate change (natural disasters, food crises, etc.) continue. In the face of these global challenges, cooperation with African countries is becoming increasingly important to maintain a free and open international order. The MOD/SDF is conducting activities to contribute to peace and stability in Africa, by such means as international peace cooperation activities in the African region and counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden from the SDF facility in Djibouti, such as sending uniformed SDF personnel as instructors to PKO training centers in Africa to support African countries’ self-help efforts in peacekeeping operations. **See** Section 2-2 (Counter-Piracy Operations); Section 3-2 (Initiatives to Support UN PKO and other activities); **See** Reference50 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (FY2020 and Beyond) **(2) Djibouti** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Djibouti** Djibouti is an important country as it is the only country where the SDF has an overseas facility that is used for counter piracy. The facility has been used to transport supplies to the unit dispatched to United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) as well as for trainings as part of Japan’s disaster response capacity building for Djibouti. Additionally, the SDF facility in Djibouti was used as a standby location for transportation of Japanese nationals and others in the Republic of Sudan in April 2023 and Israel in October 2023. The National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS) and other documents state that Japan will, while obtaining the understanding of the government of Djibouti, utilize this operation facility on a long-term and stable basis to strengthen operational bases in African countries, etc., including the rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas. In December 2023, Japan concluded an exchange of notes with the government of the Republic of Djibouti enabling Notes between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Djibouti concerning the status of the SelfDefense Force of Japan in the Republic of Djibouti[16] to apply mutatis mutandis to secure the status of the SDF in Djibouti responsible to rescue and transport Japanese nationals and others overseas as well as responsible for improvement readiness for such operations. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges, etc.** From October to December 2023, the GSDF educational sessions for the Djibouti Armed Forces on civil engineering and other activities as part of the disaster response capacity building program for Djibouti. In November 2023, DSPE conducted goodwill exercise with the Djibouti Navy. On that occasion, the officers of the Djiboutian Navy were invited to visit a MSDF naval vessel, where they were briefed on shiphandling techniques and exchanged information with young DSPE officers. The disaster response capacity building program for Djibouti (November 2023) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(c) Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and** **Exchanges with Other African Countries** Japan held the first Japan-Kenya military to military (MM) Dialogue with Kenya in January 2024 to discuss the regional affairs and defense cooperation and exchanges, and in February 2024, the Statement of Intent on Japan-Kenya Defense Cooperation and Exchanges was signed between the two countries. **MOVIE: Training cruise conducted in FY2023** **URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4lKHVOiRZc** ----- **13** **Latin American Countries** **(1) Significance** **of** **Defense** **Cooperation** **and** **Exchanges with Latin American Countries** Many Latin American countries border the Pacific Ocean and share fundamental values with Japan and Japan is promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with such countries. **14** **China** **(1) Significance** **of** **Defense** **Cooperation** **and** **Exchanges with China** Japan will comprehensively promote a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” and build a constructive and stable relationship with China through communication at various levels, in which Japan asserts its position and calls for responsible actions while continuing dialogue, including on issues of concern and cooperation on matters of common interests. The MOD/SDF will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international codes of conduct and improve transparency regarding its strengthening of military capabilities buildup and its defense policies, while also conveying the concerns Japan has in a candid manner. Japan will also make use of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of JapanChina, including the hotline, to avoid unexpected contingencies between the two countries. **(2) Recent** **Major** **Achievements** **in** **Defense** **Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.** With Argentina, in August 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron conducted goodwill exercises with the Argentine Navy off the coast of Buenos Aires. With Colombia, in December 2016, Japan and Colombia signed a memorandum on defense exchanges. Additionally, in September 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron carried out goodwill exercises with the Colombian Navy and the U.S. Navy in the waters surrounding Cartagena. In July 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron conducted goodwill exercises with the Chilean Navy off the coast of Valparaiso. Also, in March 2024, ADM Juan Andrés DE LA MAZA Larraín, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Navy was officially invited to Japan. With Brazil, in 2020, the first Japan-Brazil Defense Ministers’ Meeting was held online. At the meeting, the two sides signed the Japan-Brazil Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges and agreed to further develop defense cooperation and exchanges. Additionally, in August 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron conducted goodwill exercises with the Brazilian Navy off the coast of Recife and elsewhere. With Peru, in July 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron carried out goodwill exercises with the Peruvian Navy off the coast of Callao. In September 2023, at ISS hosted by the United States, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Admiral Luis Polar, Commander in Chief of the Peruvian Navy and expressed his gratitude for their response to the sickness occurring in the MSDF Training Squadron. With Mexico, in June 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron called at Manzanillo and conducted various exchanges, including sports exchanges with Mexican naval officers and training on naval vessels. **See** Reference 50 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 **See** (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) **(2) Recent** **Major** **Achievements** **in** **Defense** **Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.** Japan and China have resumed face-to-face dialogue and exchange between the defense authorities of the two countries, including a Japan-China Security Dialogue held in Tokyo in February 2023 for the first time in about four years. In May 2023, then Minister of Defense Hamada made the first call with then State Councilor and Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu via the Hotline between Japanese and Chinese Defense Authorities established on March 31 2023. The two sides welcomed the operation of the Hotline and confirmed that the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the JapanChina Defense Authorities,” including the Hotline, plays an important role in building mutual trust and avoiding unexpected contingencies between the two countries. They also confirmed that the Hotline would be operated appropriately and reliably going forward and agreed to continue communication between the defense authorities of Japan and China. In June 2023, then Minister of Defense Hamada held a meeting with then Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore. At the meeting, then Minister of **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- numerous security concerns between Japan and China, it was important to have candid discussions between the defense authorities of the two countries and Minister of National Defence Li expressed the same view. Regarding the regional affairs, then Minister of Defense Hamada reiterated serious concerns about the situations in the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea and expressed grave concerns about the continued joint military actions by China and Russia in the vicinity of Japan. In addition, Minister Hamada re-emphasized the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Besides, regarding communication between the defense authorities of Japan and China, the two ministers reaffirmed that the Hotline between Japanese and Chinese Defense Authorities, which began operating in May 2023, would operate appropriately and reliably and agreed to continue to promote dialogue and exchange going forward. In November 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a summit meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the occasion of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting held in the United States. At the meeting, the two leaders confirmed the comprehensive promotion of a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” and Prime Minister Kishida spoke about the importance of communication in the security field, while welcoming the start of operation of the Hotline between Japanese and Chinese Defense Authorities under the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Japan-China Defense Authorities”. **(3) Initiatives of Each Service** In July 2023, the Japan-China Field Officer Exchange Program implemented by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation resumed face-to-face exchanges for the first time in four years after its discontinuance due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors. The SDF field officer-level delegation to China visited a think tank under the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to exchange views on Japan-China relations as well as issues in the security field between the two countries, paid a courtesy visit to senior PLA officers and visited Chinese military facilities, etc. **(4)** **Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism** **between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China** Utilization of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism began in June 2018. The “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China” has been developed (1) to promote mutual understanding and confidence between Japan and China and to enhance bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges; (2) to avoid unexpected collisions; and (3) to prevent unforeseen circumstances in the sea and air from developing into military clashes or political or diplomatic issues. The mechanism’s main components include (1) annual and expert meetings between the two countries’ defense authorities; (2) a hotline between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities; and (3) on scene communication measures between vessels and aircraft of the SDF and the People’s Liberation Army. **See** Reference 51 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (FY2020 and Beyond)) **15** **Russia** Russia’s aggression against Ukraine that began in February 2022 clearly undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, is a serious violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations which forbids the use of force and is an absolutely unacceptable act. Such unilateral changes to the status quo by force shake the foundations of the international order and under this position, the Government of Japan condemns Russia to the utmost degree. The Government of Japan handles the relationship with Russia appropriately while emphasizing the solidarity of the G7 and taking the Ukrainian situation into account. At the same time, it is also necessary to maintain the minimum essential contacts with Russia, as it is one of Japan’s neighbors, to avoid unforeseen circumstances or unnecessary conflicts. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **3** **Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation** natural disasters and issues brought about by the impact **1** **Multilateral Security Framework and** of climate change as well as international terrorism. **Dialogue Initiatives** He also expressed Japan’s support for the ASEAN Multilateral framework initiatives in the Indo-Pacific centrality and unity and its intention to support various region, especially the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ ADMM-Plus initiatives and to make efforts to realize Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional FOIP and the “the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific Forum (ARF),[17] have made steady progress and served (AOIP),” which shares fundamental principles with the as an important foundation for dialogue and cooperation FOIP and the AOIP. Furthermore, he expressed Japan’s and exchanges on the security of the Indo-Pacific region. commitment to maintaining maritime order governed Japan places importance on such multilateral frameworks by the rule of law, not force or coercion, through the and is contributing to the strengthening of cooperation Experts’ Working Group (EWG) on Maritime Security,[19] and mutual confidence with countries in the region. which Japan and the Philippines will co-chair from 2024 **See** Reference 53 (Record of Major Multilateral Security Dialogues to 2027. In addition, he welcomed the adoption of the (Indo-Pacific Region, FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 54 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Organized by the Ministry of Joint Statement on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Defense); Reference 55 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues) at the 10th ADMM-Plus and expressed Japan’s intention to continue to attach importance to the WPS agenda and **(1) Security Dialogue in the ASEAN Region** double its effort in the field. **a. Initiatives under the ADMM-Plus** Under the ministerial level ADMM-Plus, there are ASEAN holds the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (1) the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM), a ministerial level meeting among defense (ADSOM-Plus), (2) the ADSOM-Plus Working Group authorities in the ASEAN region and the ADMM- (ADSOM-Plus WG) and (3) the Experts’ Working Plus, which includes eight other countries outside of Groups (EWGs). During the fourth term of EWG (2021- ASEAN,[18] including Japan (so-called “Plus Countries”). 2024), Japan has co-chaired the PKO EWG with Viet The ADMM-Plus is an invaluable framework that Nam and held the Competency Evaluation Program for brings together defense ministers from all ASEAN Prospective UN Peacekeepers (CEPPP) in Viet Nam member states and Plus Countries to discuss security in September 2023 as the flagship event of the term. issues and defense cooperation and exchanges in the In December 2023, Japan held the final EWG meeting region and the international community. The MOD/SDF and WPS seminar in Tokyo, and handed over the co- **Part** has been actively participating in this framework. chairmanship to Brunei and China. In November 2023, then State Minister of Defense **See** Fig. III-3-1-5 (Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN **Ⅲ** Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)) Miyazawa attended the 10th ADMM-Plus held **Chapter** in Indonesia. At the meeting, Miyazawa strongly **b. The ASEAN Direct Communications Infrastructure** **3** condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, North **(ADI)** Korea’s launch of ballistic missiles and unilateral changes The ASEAN Direct Communications Infrastructure to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East (ADI) is a permanent hotline to facilitate communication and South China Seas. He communicated the importance between the defense ministers of ASEAN countries, of cooperation toward a peaceful resolution of the including during emergencies. Use of the hotline has situation in Myanmar, and cross-border cooperation on been extended to Plus Countries as well. **17 A forum aimed at improving the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region through dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, has been held since 1994. The ARF** currently comprises 25 countries, one area and one organization (EU) as members and holds various inter-governmental meetings that are attended by both foreign affairs and defense officials to exchange opinions on the regional affairs and the security area. The 25 countries and one area are comprised of the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam m and Cambodia (since 1995); and Myanmar (since 1996)) as well as Japan, Australia, Canada, China and India (since 1996); New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the ROK, Russia, the United States. and Mongolia (since 1998); North Korea (since 2000); Pakistan (since 2004); Timor-Leste (since 2005); Bangladesh (since 2006); and Sri Lanka (since 2007). **18 The ADMM-Plus was founded in October 2010. Other than Japan, Australia, China, India, New Zealand, the ROK, Russia, and the United States participate in the Meeting as Dialogue Partners.** **19 Japan served the co-chair of the EWG on Military Medicine in the first cycle (2011 to 2013), co-chair of the EWG on HA/DR in the second cycle (2014 to 2016), actively participated in each** EWG in the third cycle (2017 to 2019) and served as co-chair of the EWG on PKO with Viet Nam in the fourth cycle (2021 to 2024). Japan is going to co-chair the EWG on Maritime Security ----- Fig. III-3-1-5 Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) **ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)** The ASEAN government-hosted official meeting of the defense ministers in the Indo-Pacific region that includes countries outside the ASEAN region - Participating countries: 10 ASEAN member states + 8 countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia, and the U.S.) The Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) established under the framework of the ADMM-Plus take practical actions, such as joint exercises, to address security issues in the Indo-Pacific region, which is a unique feature of the ADMM-Plus. **ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)** ...Defense Minister-level meeting; Held every year The 10th ADMM-Plus (November 2023) **ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM-Plus)** ...Vice-Minister or Director-General-level meeting; Held every year **Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs)** were established under the ADSOM-Plus and the ADSOM-Plus WG. **ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting Plus Working Group** **(ADSOM-Plus WG)** ...Director-level meeting; Held every year **Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs)** EWGs are established in seven fields. Each EWG is co-chaired by one of the 10 ASEAN member states and one of the 8 Plus Countries for a term of three years. - Seven fields: (i) counter-terrorism, (ii) HA/DR, (iii) maritime security, (iv) military medicine, (v) PKO, (vi) humanitarian mine action, and (vii) cybersecurity **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** EWGs respectively take practical actions such as sharing information, holding workshops and seminars, conducting joint exercise, and submitting recommendations and reports concerning respective areas. Japan served as the co-chair of the EWG on PKO with Viet Nam in the fourth cycle of EWGs, which is from 2021 to 2024. For the fifth term (2024-2027), Japan will co-chair the Maritime Security Expert Group with the Philippines. ----- In December 2021, Japan expressed its intention to join the ADI and became the first among the Plus Countries to operationalize it. Because the ADI is useful for building confidence and managing crises in the region, the MOD/SDF intends to utilize the ADI to promote closer communication with ASEAN and contribute more actively to peace and stability in the region with all parties. **C. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)** Regarding the ARF, in which mainly diplomatic authorities are engaged, concrete efforts[20] have been made in recent years for specific initiatives in nontraditional security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security and peacekeeping and peace building. The MOD/SDF has been making active contributions to this forum. **D. Multilateral Security Dialogues Organized by the** **MOD/SDF** **a. ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting** The MOD/SDF has attended the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting since 2014 in conjunction with ADMM-Plus to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations with ASEAN countries. In November 2023, Defense Minister Kihara participated in the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Indonesia via online format (then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa participated in person). Also taking into account the fact that the year of 2023 marked the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, participants exchanged views on Defense Minister Kihara participating online in the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting (November 2023) how to further strengthen the ASEAN Japan Defense Cooperation under the theme of the “Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: History and Way Forward.” During the meeting, Defense Minister Kihara affirmed that the AOIP and FOIP share fundamental principles such as openness, transparency and a rulesbased framework and presented the “Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE)” to advance ASEAN-Japan defense cooperation to a new level, which the Ministers of ASEAN countries welcomed. **b. Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum** Since 2009, the MOD has hosted the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum to strengthen bilateral and multilateral ties by establishing personal connections on a Vice-Ministerial level between ASEAN countries and Japan. The 12th meeting was held in Tokyo in March 2023 for the first time in about four years, after being suspended since 2020 due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the 13th meeting[21] held in Tokyo in January 2024, the Vice Minister-level defense authorities of each country revisited the “JASMINE” presented by Defense Minister Kihara at the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting and exchanged views toward implementing the new projects. ASEAN countries expressed their support for this initiative and Japan received their inputs for advancing the initiative further. Japan and ASEAN countries also agreed to further contribute to the peace and stability of the region by advancing Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation to a new level. **c. Guidelines for Japan-ASEAN Security Cooperation** (1) Vientiane Vision 2.0 During the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting in 2016, Japan presented the “Vientiane Vision”, the guideline for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, and in 2019, Japan updated and presented “Vientiane Vision 2.0”. The “Vientiane Vision 2.0” presents an overall picture of the priority areas of the future direction of ASEANwide defense cooperation in a transparent manner. It retains the basic framework of the initial Vision, including its objectives, direction and means of cooperation but introduces three new principles for ASEAN-Japan defense **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **20 In addition to the Ministers’ meeting at the foreign minister level, the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held each year, as well as meetings of the** Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Ministers’ meeting in 2002, the ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogues (DOD) has been held ahead of the main meeting. ----- cooperation: (i) heart to heart cooperation, (ii) tailored and lasting cooperation and (iii) equal and open cooperation. It also introduces contribution to ASEAN’s centrality, unity and resiliency as well as the perspective of pursuing synergies between AOIP and FOIP, as new pillars. Based on this vision, Japan has accumulated practical cooperation through the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on HA/DR, the seminar on international maritime law, the Japan ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program, the Professional Airmanship Program,[22] and the JapanASEAN Capacity building on Cybersecurity. The Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program conducted in August 2023 included various seminars for naval officers of ASEAN countries aboard Destroyer JS “Izumo” and presentations on maritime security by naval officers of participating countries as well as **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** VOICE **Voice of a Staff Member of the Internal Bureau of the Ministry of Defense who** **Participated in the Ship Rider Cooperation Program** **WATANABE Ryoei, Defense Official of Indo-Pacific Regional Policy Division, Bureau of Defense Policy,** **Ministry of Defense** Among the international exchanges undertaken by the Ministry Strengthening regional unity and mutual understanding between of Defense (MOD), the Ship Rider Cooperation Program is one of the people is essential for a stable security environment. I believe that most unique projects in that participants from multiple countries the Ship Rider Cooperation Program will continue to serve as a get on board an MSDF vessel and conduct various programs bridge to the countries in the Indo-Pacific region. while sharing meals and accommodations. I participated in this This project also provided “capacity building” for myself. After program as a member of facilitators and had various experiences. graduating from university, I was assigned to the Internal Bureau In the FY2023 program, seminars on international maritime of the MOD as a new recruit in 2023. This was my first overseas law and the observation of exercises were conducted for eight assignment and my first participation in an international exchange days in the Destroyer JS Izumo, the MSDF’s largest helicopter- program in my first year in the MOD. Therefore, the preparations carrying destroyer, as it sailed near the offshore of Australia. The were quite hard, but it was a priceless experience. In particular, I most memorable program for me was the presentations given by believe that listening directly to participants from various countries participants from other countries. After participants presented the about the security issues that their countries are facing and maritime security issues of their countries, the Self-Defense Forces working together to resolve these issues will be an important personnel on board and other participants asked questions and bridge to these countries. Based on this belief, I have firmly made made comments, which deepened the discussions. Participants up my mind to engage in this issue proactively. I will continue to enthusiastically delivered presentations, trying to deepen the contribute in the field of security while keeping in mind of what I understanding of their country’s initiatives and challenges. I learned during this program. was actively involved in translating presentation materials and interpreting conversations for foreign participants and felt very rewarded to see Japanese participants and the participants from other countries deepening their friendships and interchanges through my translations. Together with this program for ASEAN member countries, the 1st Pacific Island Countries and Timor-Leste Ship Rider Cooperation Program was carried out for the first time, and it is of great significance that two programs were held at the same time. Through this project, I was able to contribute to helping participants from various countries acquire important and practical knowledge and share insights about maritime security, as well as deepening the understanding of each other and building friendly relationships. The author having a meal with participants from various countries (third from the right) **22 Exchange program inviting ASEAN air force officers and ASEAN secretariat officers to some seminar, for the promotion of mutual understanding, confidence building, and contribution to the** ----- other events. In November 2023, the Program invited ASEAN cybersecurity personnel to carry out practical training on cybersecurity and conducted Japan-ASEAN Cyber International Law Seminar. [24] (2) JASMINE In November 2023, at the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting, Defense Minister Kihara newly presented the “JASMINE” to advance JapanASEAN defense cooperation to a new level. Taking the current security environment into account and in line with the spirit of the “Vientiane Vision 2.0,” JASMINE proposed specific defense cooperation that Japan would like to pursue together with ASEAN to realize the shared vision of the future for the Indo-Pacific region[25] Its four pillars are: (1) Japan-ASEAN to carry out efforts to create a security environment that does not allow any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, (2) to continue and expand the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, (3) to pursue further friendship and opportunities between Japan and ASEAN defense officials and (4) to support defense cooperation between ASEAN, Japan, and the Pacific Island countries. The specific initiatives proposed and announced include: the first seminar between Japan and ASEAN on the rule of law and security in the space domain; further support for confidence building and improvement of situational awareness in both maritime and air domains; seeking synergies between the Official Security Assistance (OSA) and existing projects such as the transfer of defense equipment and technology as well as capacity building in both hardware and software; cooperation between ASEAN, Japan and Pacific Island countries through the Ship Rider Cooperation Program and others, and the launch of a new Japan-ASEAN Capacity Building programs on WPS. **See** Reference 56 (Vientiane Vision 2.0); Reference 57 (Japan ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation **See** (JASMINE)) **(2) Security Dialogues in the Pacific Islands Region** **a. South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting (SPDMM)** SPDMM is an important framework for the security of the Pacific Islands Region, where defense ministers from seven countries, including three Pacific Island countries (Tonga, Papua New Guinea and Fiji) that have their own militaries and others gather, and Japan has been attending this meeting as an observer since 2022. The 8th meeting, held in December 2023 discussed the impacts of strategic competition on the stability of the South Pacific, as well as traditional and non-traditional security challenges such as climate change, IUU fishing and threats in cyberspace. **B. Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the MOD/** **SDF, etc.** **a. Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD)** Since 2021, the MOD has been hosting the JPIDD and inviting both Pacific Island countries and regional partner countries to further promote defense and security cooperation and strengthen cooperation among Japan, Pacific Island countries and partner countries in addressing regional security challenges. Although the first meeting in 2021 was held online due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, in March 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held the second meeting in Tokyo, the first face-to-face meeting. The 2nd Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD) (March 2024) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** During the second meeting, the participants exchanged wide-ranging views on common security issues and the efforts of each country to address them and had a lively discussion on future cooperation and partnership in the Pacific Islands Region. During this meeting, Defense Minister Kihara presented the “Cooperation Concept for United Security Efforts in the Pacific Islands Region” as a pointer for future cooperation in the region and the participating countries expressed their welcome to this concept. **23 This Program was held concurrently with “1st Japan-Pacific Island Countries and Timor-Leste Ship Rider Cooperation Program.”** **24 SDF personnel serve as instructors in capacity building for ASEAN countries’ cybersecurity personnel with the aim of enabling them to respond more appropriately to cyber incidents.** **25 Japan and ASEAN have confirmed their “shared view to promote a rules-based Indo-Pacific region that is free and open.”** **26 In addition to the Pacific Island countries with military forces, Australia, Chile, New Zealand and France are member countries, with Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom** ----- **b. Concept of Cooperation for Integrated Security** **Initiatives in the Pacific Islands Region** At the second JPIDD in March 2024, Defense Minister Kihara presented the “5 Point Cooperation Concept,” which combines three principles and two coordination points that Japan values in further promoting cooperation in the fields of defense and security in the Pacific Islands Region. The three principles are (1) Respecting Centrality, Unity and Ownership of Pacific Island Countries, (2) Strengthening Equal, Mutually Beneficial and Supportive Relationships and (3) Supporting Collaboration among the Pacific Island Countries, Japan and ASEAN. Two coordination points are (1) Strengthening Coordination between JPIDD and SPDMM and (2) Strengthening Coordination between JPIDD and PALM. Based on this concept, the MOD/ SDF will further promote defense and security cooperation in the Pacific Islands Region. **(3) Others** **a. International** **Conferences** **Hosted** **by** **Private** **Organizations and Others** International conferences on security include not only intergovernmental conferences but also meetings organized by private organizations in which various people, such as government officials, scholars and journalists, participate to discuss medium- to long- term security issues. Major international conferences organized by private bodies include the IISS Asia Security Summit (ShangriLa Dialogue)[27] and IISS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)[28] organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Munich Security Conference,[29] one of the most prestigious meetings on security in Europe and the United States. By actively participating in these conferences, Japan’s Defense Minister and MOD officials build trust and share understanding with high-level officials of various countries and send out positive messages through meetings with defense ministers and representatives from other countries and delivering speeches at plenary sessions. In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada attended and gave a speech at the 20th Shangri La Dialogue. In his speech, Minister Hamada first mentioned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and as the lessons from it, underlined the importance of preventing confrontation and the importance of a free and open international order based on maritime law. He also insisted that the international community should unite to deter unilateral changes to the status quo or such attempts by force or coercion. After pointing out that in the Indo-Pacific region, especially regarding the East China Sea and the South China Sea, unilateral changes to the status quo or such attempts by force or coercion have been made, then Defense Minister Hamada explained that to prevent confrontation and uphold the free and open international order based on the rule of law, Japan has been promoting various initiatives, such as fundamentally reinforcing its defense capabilities based on the National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS) and other measures and strengthening cooperation with the ally and like-minded countries. Furthermore, he asserted that the enhancement of regional deterrence by Japan as well as its ally and like-minded countries would provide countries with a position of strength that does not succumb to force and would provide a solid footing for diplomatic efforts to resolve differences in interests and opinions through dialogue. It would also send out a message that Japan would work with other countries to create an era toward a world of “Cooperation and Harmony”, while continuing to emphasize the opportunities for dialogue provided by ASEAN-led multilayered cooperative frameworks that exist in the region, such as the ASEAN-led East Asia Summit, ARF and ADMM-Plus. **b. Initiatives of Each Service** In August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan attended the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference co-hosted by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Republic of Fiji Armed Forces and the South Pacific Chiefs of Staff and Others meeting hosted by the Republic of Fiji Armed Forces to share awareness on the situation and security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, the same month, **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **27 This is a multilateral conference hosted by IISS, a private U.K. think tank, in which defense ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defense-related** issues and regional defense cooperation. It has been held in Singapore every year since 2002 and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, named after the hotel where it takes place. **28 An international conference hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), where foreign and defense authorities and other stakeholders mainly from Middle Eastern** countries exchange views on security issues. It is held annually in Manama, Bahrain. **29 This is one of the most prestigious international security meetings organized by private bodies in Europe and the United States and has been held annually (usually in February) since 1962.** Usual participants in the meeting include officials at the ministerial level from major European countries as well as top leaders, ministers and lawmakers from countries in the world and ----- he participated in the Pacific Security Conference in Palau online, demonstrating the SDF’s commitment to security in the region. Furthermore, in November 2023, he attended the Indo-Pacific CHOD Online Conference to discuss security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region as well as the importance of the rule of law and multilateral cooperation. General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan delivering a speech at the Indo Pacific CHOD Conference (August 2023) General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF participating in a discussion at Land Force Pacific Symposium and Exposition (LANPAC) 2023 In May 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF participated in the International Maritime Defense Equipment Symposium (IMDEX Asia 2023). He discussed common issues in maritime security with the naval staff chiefs of each country and made a speech on the theme of “Safe Ocean” to share the importance of a free and open ocean with participating countries. At the naval species multilateral televised meeting hosted by the U.S. Pacific Fleet in June 2023, he reaffirmed that IUU fishing, which is rampant in the Pacific Island region, is a security threat, expressed active support for its control and called on the naval staff chiefs and others in each country to strengthen cooperation to eradicate IUU fishing. At the International Sea Power Symposium (ISS) hosted by the U.S. Navy in September 2023 and the Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference (IP23) hosted by the Royal Australian Navy in November 2023, the need for multilateral cooperation for legitimate maritime use, the protection of sovereignty and interests of each country and other topics were discussed. Furthermore, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF participated in the Land Force Pacific Symposium and Exposition (LANPAC) 2023 held in Hawaii in May 2023 and the Chief of Army Staff Symposium (CAS) hosted by the Australian Army in August 2023. In September 2023, he also participated in the Indo-Pacific Regional Army Chiefs of Staff Conference (IPACC) held in India, where allies and like-minded countries acknowledged the need to build a network of concerned countries to collaborate and deter instability in the region. Furthermore, in December 2023, the GSDF co-hosted the Land Forces Summit (LFS) with the U.S. Army Pacific, and agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges of multilayered land forces services among allies and likeminded countries to realize the FOIP. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF attending the International Sea Power Symposium ----- in February 2024, Admiral Sakai participated in the Munich Security Conference, where he held discussions on the security environment of the Indo-Pacific region with participants from various countries. In April 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF attended the Space Symposium hosted by the United States in April 2023 and the International AeroSpace Power Conference hosted by Italian Air Force in May 2023. During various meetings with participating countries and other occasions, he exchanged views on issues, including the Indo-Pacific region and the space domain and promoted defense cooperation and exchanges among air and space forces. Additionally, in November 2023, he participated online in the NATO Partner Air Chiefs’ Conference and stated that Japan would strengthen cooperation with NATO and NATO member countries for practical cooperation and mutual understanding on space security. Furthermore, General Uchikura attended the Pacific Air Force Chiefs Symposium (PACS) held in the United States in the same month and the Combined Space Operations Initiative[30] (CSpO) General-Level Conference in December 2023, of which Japan became an official member from 2023 and exchanged views with participants from various countries on the promotion of responsible space utilization and security. General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDFASDF participating online in the NATO Partner Air Chiefs’ Conference (November 2023) **2** **Promoting Practical Multilateral Security** **Cooperation Initiatives** **(1) Pacific Partnership** The Pacific Partnership (PP)[31] is an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide medical care, conduct facility repair activities and engage in cultural exchange to strengthen cooperation between countries participating in the initiative and facilitate international peace cooperation activities through cooperation with governments, military forces, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in those countries. In FY2023, in Solomon Islands, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Palau and Fiji, the Initiative succeeded in strengthening ties with participating countries through exchanges such as mangrove planting, on-site inspection training, medical support on a U.S. Navy hospital ship, etc. and musical performances. Medical support in Pacific Partnership 2023 (October 2023) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **(2) Multilateral Exercises** The multilateral relationships have recently shifted from the phase for building trust to the phase for developing more concrete and practical cooperative relationships. Various multilateral training and exercises have been actively conducted as important initiatives to effectively help this shift. In particular, in the Indo-Pacific region, the MOD/ SDF has actively participated in multilateral training and exercises in non-traditional security fields, such as HA/DR and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations Chapter 1, Section 4-4-2 (5) (Strengthening Cooperation with Our Ally, Like-Minded Countries and Others) **See** **30 A multilateral framework comprising the United States and other like-minded countries that conduct various discussions on policy, operational, regime and legal issues necessary for space** security. Launched in 2014 by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, it has been later joined by New Zealand, Germany and France. ----- (NEO), in addition to traditional training conducted in preparation for combat situations. It is important to participate in such multilateral exercises so as not only to the skill level of the SDF, but also to create a cooperative platform with relevant countries. In light of this perspective, the MOD/SDF intends to continue to actively engage in such training. In 2017, the MSDF began the Indo-Pacific Deployment “IPD” and has been promoting initiatives to realize the FOIP, including joint training with coastal states in the region as well as the ally and like minded countries, etc., port calls to important ports and support for capacity building in cooperation with other ministries and agencies as well as like-minded countries, etc. The IPD is highly significant as it embodies Japan’s will to continuously engage in the Indo-Pacific region and Japan’s positive pacifism. **See** Part IV Chapter 3, Section 1-5-2 (1) (FY2023 Indo-Pacific Deployment “IPD23)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** VOICE **Voice of a Staff Member of Indo-Pacific Deployment 2023 (IPD23) Fleet Escort Force** **HAYASHI Daisuke, Commander, Operational Staff, Escort Flotilla 1 Headquarters, MSDF** The MSDF is proactively working to maintain and strengthen deployment. regional peace, stability and maritime order to contribute to In IPD23, multiple units were dispatched for simultaneous realizing Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). operations over the largest area in IPD history, extending from The Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD), which began in 2017 the Maldives in the Indian Ocean to Tonga in the South Pacific with two destroyers, has now become a representative event of from east to west and from Australia to the vicinity of Japan from the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces with the north to south. Through large-scale bilateral/multilateral exercises, participation of the GSDF and the ASDF, in addition to the MSDF, defense cooperation and exchanges, Japan was able to strengthen and it has developed into an important mission in collaboration ties and build extremely good relationships with the ally and like- with the related ministries and agencies, such as the Ministry of minded countries. In addition, the projects such as the Ship Rider Foreign Affairs and Japan Coast Guard. Cooperation Program (SRCP) facilitated interchanges, including Although my former assignment (Maritime Staff Office) was a exchanges regarding maritime security and climate change, at sea division related to IPD planning, I was on the side of operations this with naval and maritime law enforcement officers from ASEAN and time in a dispatched unit as an operational staff, which heightened Pacific Island countries, and it increased mutual understanding in my resolution and gave me a sense of fulfillment during the response to the issues faced by the participants. The author (far right) giving a presentation at the Ship Rider Cooperation Program With the U.S. Navy liaison officers on board (the author is fourth from the left in the last row) during exercises **MOVIE:【Exercise】FY2023 Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD23) / 1st Surface Force Activity Record** **URL: https://youtu.be/ssV5GrGDcfo?si=kMPC-jKER98v9AWa** ----- **4** **Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building** partner country’s officials are invited to the MOD/ **1** **Significance of Capacity Building** SDF’s units and organizations to improve their capacity Capacity building is an initiative to actively create regional and to share knowledge of current human resources stability and enhance the global security environment by development efforts by the MOD/SDF through seminars, improving recipient countries’ own capacities through lectures, practical exercises and training programs. In continuous human resource development, technical addition, online lectures and practical training have been support, etc. on a steady-state basis in fields related to introduced as a new means of capacity building from security and defense. 2021, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. By implementing these programs with other countries, In FY2023, a total of 24 dispatch and invitational and in particular those in the Indo-Pacific region, the MOD/ online programs were conducted for 13 countries, one SDF will encourage the partner countries’ forces, etc., to organization and one region. adequately fulfill their roles in maintaining international Specifically, as dispatch programs, the MOD/SDF peace and regional stability to create a desirable security conducted knowledge sharing, practical skill-building environment for Japan. support, etc. in the following fields: underwater Such activities also have the effects of (1) unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance to Viet Nam, HA/ strengthening bilateral relationships with partner DR to the Philippines and Indonesia, PKO (engineering) countries, (2) enhancing relationships with countries to Cambodia, HA/DR (military medicine) and PKO (civil such as the United States and Australia by providing engineering) to Mongolia, Military band training to Papua capacity building through cooperation with them and (3) New Guinea, Engineering and vehicle maintenance to improving trust in the MOD/SDF and Japan as a whole Timor-Leste and HA/DR (search and rescue, and military by raising awareness at home and abroad of Japan’s medicine/engineering) to Laos, Military medicine to Fiji proactive and independent efforts to realize regional and UXO disposal to Solomon Islands. peace and stability. The implemented invitational programs included In doing so, the MOD/SDF will make effective use of knowledge sharing and practical skill-building support the knowledge that the SDF has accumulated to date and in the following fields: PKO (civil engineering) for will work efficiently to maximize effectiveness through a Mongolia, HA/DR (engineering equipment maintenance) combination of various means, while fully coordinating for Papua New Guinea, HA/DR (engineering) for Laos, with diplomatic policies. HA/DR for Malaysia, Japanese language training for Indonesia, cybersecurity for ASEAN and HA/DR for the **Part** Philippines. **2** **Specific Activities** **Ⅲ** Furthermore, in Africa, Japan has been supporting The MOD/SDF has provided capacity building in such the Djibouti Armed Forces with its capacity building **Chapter** areas as HA/DR, PKO and maritime security to 17 program for strengthening disaster response capacity, **3** countries, one organization and one region mainly in the including training on the operation of engineering Indo-Pacific region. equipment. From October to December 2023, 14 SDF The MOD/SDF’s capacity building are aimed at personnel were dispatched to train 16 members of improving the capabilities of partner countries in a Djibouti’s engineering unit. concrete and steady manner over a certain period of **See** Fig. III-3-1-6 (Recent Capacity Building Initiatives (from April 2023 to March 2024)) time. Some programs are carried out by dispatching MOD/SDF officials to the partner country, by inviting the partner country’s officials to Japan, or a combination **3** **Collaboration with Related Countries** of both. With the dispatch method, SDF officials with technical The MOD/SDF conducts capacity building for third knowledge are dispatched to the partner country to help party countries in collaboration with the United States, said country’s forces and their related organizations Australia and other countries. improve their capacity through seminars, lectures and Specific quadrilateral cooperation by Japan, the t h i l id With th i it ti th d th U it d St t A t li d N Z l d i l d ----- Fig. III-3-1-6 Recent Capacity Building Initiatives (from April 2023 to March 2024) **Capacity Building** Capacity building … Project aiming to improve the capabilities of partner countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time through the dispatch of SDF personnel, and invitation of personnel from recipient countries, etc. Dispatch … Dispatch SDF personnel or others with expert knowledge to partner countries to conduct seminars, exercises and lectures, and provide technical guidance, etc., with the aim of improving the capabilities of military forces and related knowledge of recipient countries. Invitation … Invite officials of partner countries to the MOD, SDF units or other related organization to enhance the capacity of partner countries’ officials through training such as seminars, exercises, lectures, education drills, etc., while sharing knowledge about MOD and SDF personnel development initiatives. Some examples of countries and fields in which capacity building has been provided (April 2023-March 2024) are collaborative projects with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. HA/DR PKO (civil engineering) Underwater unexploded ordnance clearance Viet Nam Philippines Mongolia Training to handle life-saving equipment (rope launcher) Lecture on surveying techniques Training to retrieve mock bombs Vehicle maintenance and engineering Military band training Unexploded ordnance (UXO) disposal PNG Solomon Islands Concrete work (setting up formwork) Performing technique lesson Explanation of former Japanese military ammunition types **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- participation by the SDF, U.S. forces and others in the “Hari’i Hamutuk” capacity building exercise for Timor- Leste organized by Australian Defence Forces, during which technical guidance on engineering and vehicle maintenance was provided to logistic support units of the Timor-Leste Defence Forces. In June 2023, the MSDF IPD 23 Unit, in cooperation with the Japan Coastguard Mobile Cooperation Team (MCT)[32] and the Australian Maritime Services Advisor, provided capacity building to the Republic of Kiribati Police, helping strengthen the country’s maritime law enforcement capabilities. As such, it is important for Japan to effectively and efficiently work on capacity building by closely Cooperation in capacity building to the Republic of Kiribati Police (Japan Coast Guard and Australia) (June 2023) [partially provided by Japan Coast Guard]. coordinating with and mutually complementing concerned countries. **5** **Initiatives to Promote Women, Peace and Security (WPS)** in 2000. This was the first Security Council Resolution **1** **What is Women, Peace and Security (WPS)?** focusing on the issues surrounding women in conflict. Women, Peace and Security (WPS), is a concept that The resolution requires gender mainstreaming[33] in encapsulates the idea that peace is more sustainable when all efforts of its four pillars: Participation, Prevention, women take the lead and actively participate in all levels of Protection, and Relief and Recovery. Since then, nine conflict prevention, reconstruction, and peacebuilding, as Security Council Resolutions related to WPS have well as disaster prevention, response and reconstruction, been successively adopted, complementing UNSCR while recognizing the importance of protection and relief 1325. The efforts described in these ten resolutions are for women and girls, and those in need, as they are more collectively referred to as the “WPS agenda.” vulnerable during conflicts and disasters. In recent years, given increasing uncertainty in the In the 1990s, the large-scale of sexual violence in international situation, the concept of WPS has increased conflict as seen in former Yugoslavia, the civil war in in significance. **Part** Rwanda, and other conflicts drew worldwide attention. **Ⅲ** Furthermore, the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action was adopted at the Fourth World Conference **2** **Initiatives of Japan** **Chapter** on Women in 1995. Increasing the participation of In 2015, Japan adopted its first National Action Plan to **3** women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels implement the Security Council Resolutions on WPS. and protecting women living in situations of armed or The action plan has been since revised, and the initiatives other conflicts or under foreign occupation was stipulated are currently progressing in line with the third National as one of the key strategic objectives in the document. In Action Plan, which was adopted in April 2023. addition, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal A unique feature of Japan’s National Action Plan, is Court adopted in 1998 stipulated sexual violence in that it expands its scope to not only conflicts but also conflict as a war crime. disasters. It is based on the experiences that Japan has Against this international backdrop, the United overcome numerous large-scale natural disasters, such Nations Security Council unanimously adopted as the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, and has resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) recognized the importance of incorporating a **gender** **32 A dedicated division formed in the JCG in 2017 to provide capacity building to foreign coastguard agencies. Initially, the Team had seven members and mainly supported Japan’s sea lane** coastal states. As of April 2024, the Team has 18 members and is expanding its support to the Indo-Pacific region, including Pacific Island countries. This was the first initiative for the JCG and the MSDF to assist Kiribati and also the first time for Japan and Australia to jointly assist a patrol vessel provided by Australia. ----- perspective into all stages of disaster prevention, disaster response, climate change, and reconstruction. The action plan prescribes not only international but also domestic initiatives, and states that the ministries and agencies of Japan, including the MOD, will promote the appointment and participation of women in decision-making related to diplomacy, security, disaster prevention, and disaster response, and promote the development and implementation of policies and measures with gender perspectives.[34] **3** **MOD/SDF and WPS** Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Matsumoto at the 3rd meeting of the HQ for WPS Promotion in MOD Promoting WPS will produce an environment where diverse individuals, including women, can demonstrate their abilities. Diversity is also important for improving operational efficiency. Accordingly, promoting WPS is essential for reinforcing defense capabilities as it will lead to the development of human resources and organizational capacity building in the MOD. Third, with regards to contributing to international peace and stability, the New Plan for a “FOIP” announced by Prime Minister Kishida in 2023 clearly states that the principles for peace and rules for prosperity is the backbone of FOIP, and therefore it prescribes response from a perspective of WPS, in order to create an international environment where the weak are not beaten by force. WPS perspectives are essential to ensure more effective implementation of the SDF’s overseas activities, including PKO and international disaster relief activities. As a responsible member of the international community, the MOD will also promote WPS and contribute to peace and stability, while cooperating with defense authorities of other countries pursuing respect for fundamental human rights and ensuring the rule of law. **(1) Rationales and Significance of Promoting WPS** Promoting WPS contributes to the protection of life, person, etc., of Japanese nationals and fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities as well as international peace and stability. With this standpoint, the MOD/SDF must promote WPS. Specifically, first, with regards to the protection of life, person, etc., of Japanese nationals, there are increased opportunities in recent years to conduct operations, such as the transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas, as well as tailored livelihood support for affected population by disaster. In this context, the MOD/SDF will directly protect the life, person, etc., of Japanese nationals by systematically responding to situations by incorporating WPS perspectives, based on the needs of women and girls who compose half of the population and who are put in particularly vulnerable situation in conflicts and such. Second, regarding the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, the WPS Agenda includes the promotion of the participation of women in decisionmaking processes. This includes in the field of security, and is closely related to the measures that MOD has been taking to promote the active engagement of female personnel. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **KEY WORD** **(2) Strengthening the WPS Promotion Structure in the** **MOD/SDF** The MOD/SDF has been promoting a number of While the term of “sex” defines differences of biological and physiological initiatives to support female personnel actively engage in characteristics, gender defines socially and culturally constructed activities in Japan and abroad, and also been conducting characteristics of women and men including stereotypes, roles and norms. activities incorporating gender perspectives as a main actor in peacekeeping operations and large-scale disaster **KEY WORD** **“Gender”** Gender refers to “the socially and culturally constructed differences that society attributes to sexes.” While the term of “sex” defines differences of biological and physiological characteristics, gender defines socially and culturally constructed characteristics of women and men including stereotypes, roles and norms. **34 Focusing on differences arising from gender-based status and power relations to examine how such differences affect the formation of men’s and women’s immediate needs and long-term** ----- response. Meanwhile, there was an overall challenge of failing to make each and every personnel fully aware of WPS and appreciate the significance of reflecting gender perspectives in policy planning and development. Given this challenge, the HQ for WPS Promotion in MOD was established in 2023, headed by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, to raise awareness among all SDF personnel and strengthen international cooperation efforts. In addition, Director for International Cooperation on WPS was newly appointed. The first meeting of the HQ for WPS Promotion in MOD, headed by then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda, was held in August 2023. The second meeting, headed by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Matsumoto was conducted in January 2024. In April 2024, the third meeting was convened, and based on previous discussions at the HQ, the MOD adopted a WPS Promotion Plan for the first time. The MOD WPS Promotion Plan sets forth items to be implemented by FY2028 for the MOD to promote WPS, and is based on the National Action Plan for WPS. It lists four specific initiatives: (1) change of mindset, (2) structural development, (3) international cooperation and (4) reflection of gender perspectives in SDF activities. It also prescribes a follow-up system to evaluate the implementation status of the initiatives by convening an annual meeting of the HQ for WPS Promotion in MOD. Based on the MOD WPS Promotion Plan, the MOD will strongly promote WPS as a whole of Ministry effort, and contribute to protecting Japanese nationals and international peace and stability by conducting activities incorporating gender perspectives. **(3) Recent Major Initiatives and Activities on WPS** From 2021 to 2024, Japan co-chaired the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM-Plus) Experts’ Working Group (EWG) on Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) with Viet Nam and led on the promotion of WPS initiatives. As the co-chair, Japan set the promotion of WPS as one of the main objectives of the EWG activities, and established a WPS platform.[35] Japan also invited experts from the U.N. to participate, including in four WPS seminars, to contribute to raising awareness on WPS in each country. At the Competency Evaluation Program for Prospective UN Peacekeepers (CEPPP) flagship event held in Viet Nam in September 2023, women from each country were encouraged to participate. Training on WPS was provided to all participants, and coordination procedures for UN military observers, engineer personnel and medical personnel, requiring WPS seminar conducted by SDF personnel during a capacity building program on HA/DR (Laos) (December 2023) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Courtesy call on Vice-Minister of Defense Masuda by U.S. WPS Congressional Caucus member and U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues, U.S. Department of State (April 2024) Participation of Director for International Cooperation on WPS to an Annual Conference for the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (Belgium) (October 2023) **35 Established in 2021 under the auspices of the 4th ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on PKO, which helped raise awareness on WPS by continuously consolidating the knowledge and** ----- VOICE **The Initiative and Efforts of the Ministry of Defense for WPS Promotion** **MATSUZAWA Tomoko, Director for International Cooperation on WPS, Indo-Pacific Regional Policy** **Division, Bureau of Defense Policy** The Director for International Cooperation on WPS was set up in experiences and strengths of the MOD and the Self-Defense June 2023, and the HQ for WPS Promotion in Ministry of Defense Forces (SDF), we aim to lead the world as a WPS powerhouse (MOD ) was established in August of the same year. Currently, by steadily promoting WPS in an integrated manner with MOD the efforts of the MOD for promoting WPS are progressing at an officials and SDF personnel working together. unprecedented speed. The MOD has carried out WPS-related activities both domestically and internationally, and now that a WPS structure has been established in the ministry, various activities can be conducted even more efficiently and effectively. We have received invitations and requests for WPS collaborations from many countries and feel that there is a growing attention to WPS in this issue in the international community. Previously, I worked at international organizations where I engaged in the protection and assistance of victims of conflict related sexual violence, the empowerment of women affected by conflicts, and the training and education of military personnel The author (third from the left in the first row) and female SDF personnel participated from various countries on the protection of women and children. in the flagship event of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Experts’ Working Groups on PKO, co-chaired by Japan, which set up WPS as one of the main objectives With these experiences and making maximum use of insights of its activities (September 2023). WPS perspectives were also shared. Since 2023, WPS elements have been newly incorporated into the ongoing capacity building programs for Indo-Pacific countries in the area of PKO and HA/DR by delivering WPS Seminars and opinion exchanges, to raise awareness among defense officials in each country. At the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in November 2023, Defense Minister Kihara announced the launch of a new Japan-ASEAN Capacity Building Program on WPS. Additionally, the Director for International Cooperation on WPS and uniformed SDF personnel are dispatched as presenters to training and international conferences on WPS hosted by other countries and international bodies such as NATO to introduce MOD/SDF initiatives, and gain insights from those countries that are promoting WPS. The outcomes of these activities are referred in charting the direction of WPS promotion in the MOD/ SDF. In Japan, WPS perspectives have been applied during disasters response and similar incidents. Disasters th t th li f ll l b t it i k th t **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Female SDF personnel in action during the disaster relief operations for 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake (bathing support) different people are affected in different ways depending on their gender, age, etc. Japan is responding to the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake promptly and appropriately, for example, by involving female SDF personnel interviewing female victims, taking into consideration various needs, including sensitive details such as the kinds of infant milk required. M th f J ’ di t ----- beyond domestic disasters. In the event of a large scale natural disaster in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has conducted emergency humanitarian assistance activities including the dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR). Disaster response by the SDF can be expected both domestically and internationally. The MOD/SDF, as a whole-of-ministry, will reflect WPS perspectives in its disaster relief activities. This will enable the MOD/SDF systematically respond to the situations with understanding and consideration to the needs of affected people, including women, in disaster relief and other activities. **See** Part Ⅳ, Chapter 2, Section 3-2 (Reform to Promote Women’s Participation) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE: Ministry’s Website: Initiatives on Women, Peace and Security（WPS）** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/wps/index.html** ----- **Section 2** **Ensuring Maritime Security** The National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) states together with coastal states in the Indo-Pacific. that for Japan, a maritime nation, reinforcing the free To secure the stable use of sea lanes, Japan will and open maritime order and ensuring the freedom and make the necessary efforts to conduct counter-piracy safety of navigation and overflight are essential for peace operations and ensure the safety of Japan-related and security. vessels in cooperation and collaboration with relevant To this end, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense organizations. Force (SDF) will promote maritime security cooperation to **See** Chapter 1, Section2-2 (Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-related Vessels in the Middle realize the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) East); Part I, Chapter 4, Section 5 (Maritime Trends) **1** **Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security** **(1) The Fundamental Idea of the Government** with allies, like-minded countries and others. The National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS) states Concerning the Code of Conduct in the South China that, as a maritime nation, Japan will work with its ally, Sea (COC), which China and ASEAN are continuing like-minded countries and others to promote efforts to to discuss, Japan has expressed its position that the ensure the freedoms of navigation and overflight and COC should be effective and substantial, conform with to ensure safety, as well as maintain and develop the international law including the UN Convention on the international maritime order based on universal values, Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and respect the legitimate including the rule of law. Specifically, the NSS calls for rights and interests of all parties of the South China Sea. Japan to enhance maritime surveillance, bilateral drills and exercises and overseas port calls, as well as conduct **(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** counter-piracy and information gathering activities. The MOD/SDF is conducting counter-piracy operations Furthermore, the NSS states that Japan will ensure to secure stable use of sea lanes and information freedoms of navigation and overflight in the South China gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related Sea and other waters, promote peaceful settlement of vessels in the Middle East. In addition, the MOD/SDF disputes based on international law, strengthen relations has also taken opportunities to appeal to the international **Part** with coastal states along the sea lanes, actively utilize the community on the importance of strengthening the **Ⅲ** Arctic sea route and continue to actively utilize the SDF international maritime order and freedom of navigation facility in Djibouti and address other things. and has been consistently appealing to ensure the “rule **Chapter** The fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy[1], approved by of law” in maritime areas, which are essential to human **3** the Cabinet in April 2023, continues to take a broad view prosperity. In particular, the MOD/SDF also points out on ocean policy from the perspective of maritime security. that the unilateral change of the status quo by force and It promotes government-wide efforts for “comprehensive attempts to achieve it are continuing in the East China maritime security.” Therefore, it also promotes measures Sea and the South China Sea and also emphasizes the necessary for the “maintenance and development of an importance of all parties making efforts towards the international maritime order,” mainly through Japan’s peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea own efforts to “secure our national interests in our based on international law, including the UN Convention country’s territorial waters” and by strengthening ties on the Law of the Sea. ----- **2** **Counter-Piracy Operations** Force 151 (CTF-151) and European Union Naval Force **1** **Significance of Counter-Piracy Operations** (EUNAVFOR) responsible for counter-piracy measures Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on to deter piracy outside the territorial waters of the coastal the seas. In particular, for Japan, a maritime nation states in the area of operation. that depends on maritime transportation to secure most Although the number of piracy incidents off the coast of resources and food necessary for its survival and of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden stayed low due to prosperity, it is a problem that cannot be ignored. Japan’s such successful efforts by the international community, primary response to piracy is by the Japan Coast Guard in November 2023, a hijacking incident of the merchant (JCG) , which is a law enforcement agency, and the SDF vessel (Central Park) occurred, similar incidents had not if the JCG is unable or finds it extremely difficult to cope seen obserb ered since 2017. Pirate activities increase in with the piracy. 2024 and the situation remains unpredictable. In addition, For Japan and the international community, the waters given the current situation where Somalia’s piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are control capability is still insufficient, the situation could extremely important sea lanes, connecting Europe and easily become serious if the international community the Middle East with East Asia. UN Security Council reduces its counter-piracy efforts. Resolution 1816 was adopted in 2008 in response to the **See** Fig. III-3-2-1 (Piracy and Other Incidents Off the Coast of high number and rapid increase in piracy incidents armed Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden and in Other Nearby Areas (Including Attempted Piracy)); Part I, Chapter 3, Section 10-1- with machine guns and rocket launchers in these waters 4 (2) (Maritime Security in the Gulf Region); Part I, Chapter 4, Section 5-2 (National Maritime Security Initiatives) with purposes such as receiving ransoms by detaining hostages. Thereafter, following relevant resolutions additionally adopted that called for action by countries, **2** **Japan’s Initiatives** particularly dispatching warships and military aircraft to deter piracy in these waters, and about 30 countries **(1) Legislation Concerning Counter-Piracy Operations** including Japan and the Unites States have dispatched In 2009, the order for Maritime Security Operations was their warships and other assets to the waters off the coast issued for the purpose of protecting Japan-affiliated vessels of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. As a counter-piracy from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia initiative, Japan is working with the Combined Task and in the Gulf of Aden. Responding to this, two destroyers[2] began providing direct escort to Japan-affiliated vessels, Fig. III-3-2-1 Piracy and Other Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden and in Other Nearby while two P-3C patrol aircraft[3] also commenced warning **Part** Areas (Including Attempted Piracy) and surveillance operations in the same year. **Ⅲ** Further, Japan subsequently enacted the Counter- (Number of incidents) **237** Piracy Measures Act[4] in the same year. This act allows **Chapter** 250 **218218** Piracy and other Incidents Off the SDF to protect the vessels of all nations from acts of **3** Coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of 200 **219** Aden, and in Other Nearby Areas piracy, and to use weapons to a reasonable extent if no (Including Attempted Piracy) other means were available to stop vessels engaged in 150 piracy, such as approaching private vessels. **111** **See** Reference 10 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the 100 Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority **75** for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the **48** Self-Defense Forces) 50 **22 51** **11** **1515** **11 0 2 9 3 0** **0** **1** **0 1** 0 050607080910 11121314151617181920 212223 (Year) (Note) The data is based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). **2** The number of destroyers was changed to one from December 2016. **3** The number of aircraft was changed to one from December 2023. ----- **(2) Activities by the SDF** **a. Dispatch of the Deployment Surface Force for** **Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) and Other Units** The MOD/SDF dispatches the DSPE, the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) and the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DGPE) to carry out counter-piracy operations. The DSPE strives to ensure the safety of ships navigating in the area by using destroyers (one destroyer dispatched) in two different manners - direct escort of private vessels across the Gulf of Aden and zone defense in allocated areas in the Gulf of Aden. There are JCG officers aboard the destroyer.[5] The DAPE conducts counter-piracy activities using the P-3C patrol aircraft (one aircraft dispatched). The DAPE conducts warning and surveillance operations in the flight zone that is determined in coordination with the CTF151 Headquarters and confirms any suspicious boats. At the same time, the unit also provides information to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers, the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels, responding by such means as confirming the safety of the surrounding area immediately, if requested. The information gathered by the MSDF P-3C is constantly shared with other related organizations and contributes significantly to deterring acts of piracy and disarming vessels suspected as pirate ships. To improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the DAPE, the DGPE carries out activities such as maintenance of the installation set up in the northwest district of Djibouti International Airport. Additionally, the Airlift Squadron and other units, organized as needed, operate ASDF transport aircraft to carry out air transport of materials required mainly by Destroyer JS “IKAZUCHI” Engaged in Direct Ship Escort in the Gulf of Aden (November 2023) the DAPE and the DGPE. The NDS and other documents state that the SDF operation facility in Djibouti, which is being operated for counter-piracy operations, will be utilized for the rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas, while obtaining the understanding of the Djibouti government. In December 2023, the Cabinet of Japan approved the “Government Initiative to Ensure the Safety of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas in the Middle East and Africa.” and added a new mission for counter-piracy unit to maintain a temporary posture for the possible rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas, including accumulating and managing equipment. **See** Chapter 1, Section 7-2 (Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas) **b. Dispatch of Personnel to the CTF-151 Headquarters, Etc.** To strengthen coordination with the units of other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations and enhance the effectiveness of the SDF’s counter-piracy operations, the MOD has dispatched SDF personnel to **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE: Counter-piracy efforts** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/overseas.html** **MOVIE: Defend the sea from pirates** **URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9-VlPG_jsMc** **MOVIE: Couter-piracy operations in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden** **URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0GvdTkufJwU&feature=youtu.be** ----- |[Structure of the Deployed Forces] SDF Chief of Staff Organized from MSDF units Organized from GSDF, MSDF and ASDF units|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |||||||||| |Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement||Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement||Deployment Su Counter Piracy|pport Group for Enforcement|CTF-151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters||CMF Deployed Unit at the Headquarters| |○ MSDF personnel approx. 200 ○ Japan Coast Guard 8 officers aboard ○ Destroyer x 1 - Patrol helicopters x 1-2 - RHIB (SB) x 1-2||○ MSDF personnel Approx. 60 ○ ○ P-3C x 1 ○ ○ ⇒ *T||GSDF personnel Approx. 90 MSDF personnel Approx. 40 ASDF personnel A few Total Approx. 130 personnel he figures are rounded up, so the total may not mat||○ MSDF personnel 1 (Dispatch up to 15 personnel when Japan is the commanding country) ch||○ MSDF personnel 2| |〇 Conducts escort missions for private vessels and zone defense missions 〇 Temporary posture for rescue and transportation Japanese nationals and others overseas||〇 Conducts surveillance air patrols in the 〇 Gulf of Aden 〇 Temporary posture for rescue and transportation 〇 Japanese nationals and others overseas||Liaison and coordination with related agencies and the like of Djibouti, support for the air patrol squadron and other units mentioned in left column Temporary posture for rescue and transportati Japanese nationals and others overseas||〇 Liaison and coordination with foreign units taking part in CTF-151 on||〇 Liaison and coordination between CMF and CTF-151| |cort (by Naval Vessels)|National Tasking|Japan, China, India and other countries| |---|---|---| |ne Defense y Naval Vessels)|CTF-151|Japan, ROK, Pakistan and other countries| ||EUNAVFOR|Spain, Italy and other countries| |rveillance air patrol y Patrol Aircrafts)|CTF-151|Japan| ||EUNAVFOR|Spain| Fig. III-3-2-2 Structure of the Deployed Forces・SDF’s Counter-Piracy Operations (image) [Structure of the Deployed Forces] SDF Chief of Staff Organized from MSDF units Organized from GSDF, MSDF and ASDF units Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Counter Piracy EnforcementDeployment Air Force for Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement CTF-151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters CMF Deployed Unit at the Headquarters - MSDF personnel approx. 200 - MSDF personnel Approx. 60 - GSDF personnel Approx. 90 - MSDF personnel 1 - MSDF personnel 2 - Japan Coast Guard 8 officers aboard - P-3C x 1 - MSDF personnel Approx. 40 (Dispatch up to 15 personnel when - Destroyer x 1 - ASDF personnel A few Japan is the commanding country) - Patrol helicopters x 1-2 ⇒Total Approx. 130 personnel - RHIB (SB) x 1-2 *The figures are rounded up, so the total may not match 〇 Conducts escort missions for private vessels and zone defense missions 〇 Conducts surveillance air patrols in the Gulf of Aden 〇 Liaison and coordination with related agencies and the like of Djibouti, support for the air patrol 〇 Liaison and coordination with foreign units taking part in CTF-151 〇 Liaison and coordination between CMF and CTF-151 squadron and other units mentioned in left column 〇 Temporary posture for rescue and transportation 〇 Temporary posture for rescue and transportation 〇 Temporary posture for rescue and transportation Japanese nationals and others overseas Japanese nationals and others overseas Japanese nationals and others overseas (In addition, Airlift Squadron comprised of C-130H transport aircraft under Air Support Command will provide air transport of supplies and others when necessary) Yemen [Escort] A single destroyer directly escorts private vessels in the escort route [Activities by other countries] Djibouti Escort (by Naval Vessels) National Tasking Japan, China, India and other countries Zone Defense CTF-151 Japan, ROK, Pakistan and other countries SDF Facility Patrol aircrafts provide information from[Surveillance air patrols] (by Naval Vessels) EUNAVFOR Spain, Italy and other countries [Zone Defense] air space above escort routes and others Surveillance air patrol CTF-151 Japan Warning and surveillance activities within specific waters (by Patrol Aircrafts) EUNAVFOR Spain (Note) The scale of deployed forces depends on the timing as the operations are carried out by all the participating countries in rotation. Somalia “Akebono” were rushed to the scene. The counter-piracy unit conducted vigilant monitoring and information gathering, while quickly providing the CTF-151 with information obtained in the field. **See** Fig. III-3-2-2 (Structure of the Deployed Forces・SDF’s Counter-Piracy Operations (image)); Part I, Chapter 4, Section 5-2 (2) (Piracy) **(3)** **Tense Middle East Situation and the SDF’s Response** Due to the clashes between Israeli and the Palestinian militants, in October 2023, amid the tense situation in the Middle East due to military clashes between Israel and Hamas, the Houthi rebel group in Yemen, which stands in solidarity with Palestine, has repeatedly attacked civilian merchant ships and other vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, causing some civilian casualties. In November of the same year, a ship operated by Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha was seized.[6] In the same month, at least one ballistic missile was launched toward the CTF-151 and CMF headquarters since August 2014. Of these, the SDF dispatched a CTF-151 commander for the first time in 2015, followed by respective dispatches in 2017, 2018 and 2020. **c. Achievements** As of March 31, 2024, the DSPE has escorted 4,076 vessels (including 121 vessels escorted based on orders for maritime security operations). The DAPE is also responsible for most of the countries’ warning and surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden. As of the same date, it has flown 3,267 times, totaling approximately 23,360 flight hours and provided information 16,299 times to ships and other countries engaged in counterpiracy operations. In November 2023, upon receiving information that the Liberian-flagged tanker “Central Park,” operated by a British company, had been hijacked by someone in the Gulf of Aden, MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft of the counter-piracy unit and Destroyer JS **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** The seized “Galaxy Leader” is a Bahamian-registered car carrier owned by a British company and operated by Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha and did not have any Japanese crew members on board. The Houthis justified the seizure by claiming that the ship belonged to Israeli. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and other relevant ministries and agencies of Japan are working with the countries concerned to ensure the early release of the ship and its crew members. In January 2024, UN ----- the Gulf of Aden from Houthi controlled areas in Yemen highly praised by the international community. For during the temporary takeover of “Central Park” in the example, national leaders and others have expressed Gulf of Aden.[7] their gratitude and the SDF has also been repeatedly Under such circumstances, the MOD/SDF will well-received by the UN Security Council Resolution. continue to properly conduct counter-piracy operations Moreover, the MSDF destroyers, which are engaging off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden while in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia taking all possible measures to ensure the safety of and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many messages its units and will work closely with the international from the captains and ship owners of the vessels that its community, including units of other countries, to ensure units have escorted, expressing their gratitude that the the stable use of sea lanes in the Middle East. ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace of **See** Part I, Chapter 3, Section 10-1 (Middle East); Part I, Chapter 4, mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there. Section 5-2 (1) (Maritime Security in the Middle East) Additionally, the Japanese Shipowners’ Association and other groups expressed appreciation for protection of Japan-related vessels and asked for continuation of **3** **Praise for Japan’s Endeavors** efforts in fighting against piracy. The counter-piracy operations by the SDF have been **3** **Cooperation in Maritime Security** The fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy states that security training with the navies and police forces, etc. maritime security cooperation with other countries of coastal states in the same region. In particular, Pacific will be strengthened through bilateral and multilateral Island countries have an urgent need to strengthen their security dialogue and defense exchanges among defense maritime security capabilities due to illegal, unreported authorities at various levels to maintain and develop the and unregulated (IUU) fishing[9] and crime at sea. In “free and open ocean.” response, the MSDF Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD) In response to this, the MOD/SDF has been working Unit 23 conducted maritime security training in Kiribati, on cooperation for maritime security within regional Palau, Solomon Islands and Tonga,[10] in cooperation security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM- with the JCG, the United States and Australia in some Plus and the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime training exercises. Security (ISM on MS) and will co-chair with the In addition to the counter-piracy operations, the DSPE Philippines the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group and DAPE promote defense exchanges with the forces **Part** **Ⅲ** on Maritime Security from 2024 to 2027. of other countries located in Djibouti such as making In addition, the MOD/SDF provides capacity building port calls at ports of the coastal states in the Middle East **Chapter** for maritime security to the Indo-Pacific coastal states,[8] and conduct bilateral/multilateral exercises with the **3** helping them improve their Maritime Domain Awareness EUNAVFOR and other units[11] and the Gulf of Aden, (MDA) capabilities and strengthening cooperation with off the coast of Somalia, and other areas for the purpose the ally and like-minded countries in maritime security. of improving their tactical skills and strengthening In cooperation with the navies and other stakeholders cooperation with the armed forces of each country. in the Indo-Pacific region, the MSDF conducts maritime Strengthening cooperation with coastal states of the **7** The launched ballistic missile landed in the surrounding waters more than 10 nautical miles away from the “Central Park,” the U.S. vessels and the Destroyer JS “Akebono” that responded, causing no damage. **8** To date, the MOD/SDF has provided capacity building on maritime security to Indonesia, Viet Nam, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Brunei and Sri Lanka. **9** Fishing activities which do not comply with the domestic laws of each country or international operation rules, including unauthorized, unreported, or falsely reported operations; proscribed operations by stateless fishing vessels, fishing vessels from countries that are not members of regional fisheries management organizations; or similar operations, posing a serious threat to the sustainable use of marine resources and directly affecting food security **10 In Palau, IPD Unit 23 conducted training with the Palau Coast Guard Patrol Vessel (KEDAM) provided by Japan and in Kiribati, it carried out training with the Republic of Kiribati Police in** cooperation with the JCG and the Australian Maritime Service Advisor. In Tonga, as part of the Pacific Partnership 2023 organized by the U.S. Navy, IPD Unit 23 carried out on-site inspection training, etc. together with the U.S. Coast Guard’s IUU fisheries enforcement-related advisors and the Tongan Maritime Force’s on-site inspection unit, to help strengthen Tonga’s maritime security capabilities. **11 The DSPE conducted counter-piracy joint naval exercises with EUNAVFOR (Spanish Navy) in July 2023, EUNAVFOR (Italian Navy) in September 2023, EUNAVFOR (Spanish Navy) in October** ----- Indo Pacific region through such defense exchanges and cooperation contributes to maintaining maritime security, which has extremely high significance. **See** Section 1-2-10 (3) (Initiatives of Each Service); Section 1-4-3 (Collaboration with Related Countries); (Reference 58 **See** (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) Exercise with the Palau Coast Guard Patrol Vessel (KEDAM) provided by Japan (July 2023) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** ----- **Section 3** **Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities** **1** **Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities** **1** **Frameworks for International Peace** **2** **Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and** **Cooperation Activities** **Accurately Carry Out International Peace** **Cooperation Activities** The Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (MOD/ SDF) is proactively conducting international peace To be a proactive contributor to world peace, it is cooperation activities and other activities in tandem with important for the SDF to be fully prepared for any diplomatic activities. future operations. For this reason, all the three branches International peace cooperation activities as primary of the SDF, namely the Japan Ground Self-Defense missions[1] by the MOD/SDF include international Force (GSDF), the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force peace cooperation assignments such as cooperation in (MSDF) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO), designate dispatch stand-by units and always maintain international disaster relief activities in response to a state of readiness. In addition, engineering units, staff large-scale disasters overseas and cooperation and officers and others as well as C-2 transport aircraft and support activities in response to Joint International Peace C-130H transport aircraft are registered with the UN Response Situations. Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) to **See** Fig. III-3-3-1 (International Peace Cooperation Activities enable the UN Headquarters to grasp the PKO dispatch Conducted by the SDF); Part II, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5 (Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others); Reference 10 preparation status of each country more specifically. (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense The SDF is also enhancing information-gathering Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense capabilities and protection capabilities, which are Forces); Reference 12 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 60 (The required for the SDF units to carry out their missions SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Assignments) while ensuring the safety of personnel and units in international peace cooperation activities and other International Peace Cooperation Activities similar ones. Furthermore, in order to respond to various Fig. III-3-3-1 Conducted by the SDF mission environments and prolonged missions, the SDF International Peace Cooperation Assignments is improving its capabilities for transport, deployment Activities based on the “Act Concerning Japan’s Cooperation in and information communication, as well as developing a **Part** the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations” structure of logistics and medical support for conducting **Ⅲ** International Disaster Relief Activities smooth and continuous operations. Activities based on the “Act Concerning the Dispatch of With regard to the education necessary for engaging **Chapter** International Disaster Relief Teams” in international peace cooperation activities, the GSDF **3** Cooperation and Support Activities for the Armed Forces of Foreign Countries International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Activities in accordance with the “Act Concerning Cooperation Unit, which belongs to the Ground Component and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, in Situations that the International Community is Collectively Command, provides training for GSDF personnel to be Addressing for International Peace and Security” deployed to international peace cooperation activities, Cooperation in Efforts toward the Reconstruction of Iraq as well as supports their training. In addition, the Japan Activities based on the “Act Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Support Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) of Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq” (Ended in February 2009) the Joint Staff College offers not only basic education Activities to Respond to International Terrorism courses on international peace cooperation activities, but Activities based on the Act Concerning the Special Measures on the also specialized education to train personnel who can Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities (Ended in January 2010) be appointed as contingent commanders of UN PKO Legend: Activities based on time-limited acts Activities based on permanent acts missions and staff officers of mission headquarters. These specialized courses are conducted by using UN **1** Missions as the combination of “main duties” and “the secondary duties” defined in the Article 3 of the SDF Law. “The primary mission” is defense of Japan while “the secondary missions” ----- standard training materials and foreign instructors. Based they may go through during the dispatch. For example, on the current situation of more multi-dimensional and depending on the characteristics of the duties of the unit complicated international peace cooperation activities, to be dispatched, the MOD/SDF provide SDF personnel JPC has also provided education for personnel from with necessary measures such as the following: (1) foreign militaries and other Japanese ministries and education before the dispatch on necessary knowledge agencies. The initiative aims to promote the coordination on how to reduce stress; (2) mental health checks before and cooperation and contribute to more effective and during the dispatch as well as after returning to international peace cooperation activities. Japan; (3) counseling on anxieties and concerns during the dispatch, conducted by staff specially trained for carrying out mental health care; (4) dispatch of a mental **3** **Welfare and Mental Health Measures for** health care team mainly including a medical officer with **Dispatched SDF Units** expertise on mental health care; (5) stress reduction The MOD/SDF is implementing various family support education upon returning to Japan; and (6) special and mental health support measures for dispatched SDF medical checkup after returning to Japan. personnel and their families to alleviate any anxieties **2** **Initiatives to Support UN PKO and other activities** As a means to promote peace and stability in conflict peace cooperation activities through such activities as regions around the world, UN PKO have expanded their dispatch of personnel to mission headquarters, capacity missions in recent years to include such duties as the building in Japan’s fields of expertise and dispatch of Protection of Civilians (POC), the promotion of political SDF personnel to the UN Headquarters, while using processes, providing assistance in Disarmament, accumulated experience so far and working on human Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) into society resource development. of former soldiers, Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rule of law, elections, human rights and other fields, **1** **Dispatch to the MFO** in addition to such traditional missions as ceasefire monitoring. **(1) Significance of Dispatch to the MFO** International organizations, such as the Office of The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), established by the Protocol to the Egypt-Israel Peace respective governments and NGOs conduct relief and Treaty (August 1981) as an organization to undertake the **Part** restoration activities for the victims of conflicts and tasks and responsibilities of the UN force and observer **Ⅲ** large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective mission stipulated in the treaty. The MFO is tasked with and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries. monitoring the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel and **Chapter** Japan has been promoting international peace since its inception in 1982, has contributed to peace and **3** cooperation assignments in various regions, including stability in the Middle East, which is a foundation of Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal and peace and prosperity for Japan, by helping to facilitate South Sudan for more than 30 years and these activities dialogue and confidence building between the two have been highly praised both inside and outside of countries. Japan. Amidst this, the MFO requested that Japan send Currently, Japan dispatches staff officers to the staff officers to its headquarters, and, with a view to United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan making proactive contributions to international peace (UNMISS) and the Multinational Force and Observers efforts, Japan has dispatched staff officers to the MFO (MFO). as Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Japan will actively contribute to international Security since April 2019. **Reference: 30th anniversary of participating in UN PKO: The journey and development of the GSDF’s** international activities **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/about/pko30/index.html** ----- **(2) Activities by Staff Officers and Others** Currently, four uniformed GSDF personnel are engaged in the operations at the MFO Headquarters (Liaison branch and Force Engineering Office, Support branch) located in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula. Dispatched SDF personnel operating in MFO Fig. III-3-3-2 MFO Relevant Maps The Liaison branch has been staffed with two staff officers since April 2019, with staff who are working on liaison and coordination with Egypt and Israel, as well as preparing medium- and long-term operational policies related to the same. Since June 2023, two staff officers have been dispatched to Force Engineering Office, Support branch to work on planning and progress management related to the renewal of various facilities at the MFO. Additionally, one liaison staff member has been dispatched to Cairo to liaise and coordinate with the relevant organizations in order to help the officers dispatched to the MFO carry out activities smoothly and effectively. These activities demonstrate Japan’s more active involvement in the peace and stability of the Middle East. This is also expected to promote collaboration with the U.S. and other countries dispatching officers, and to provide opportunities for human resources development. **See** Fig. III-3-3-2 (MFO Relevant Maps); Fig. III-3-3-3 (Organizational Chart of MFO) |Representative office in Egypt (Cairo)|Representative office in Israel (Tel Aviv)| |---|---| **Relevant maps** MFO Headquarters Palestine The Mediterranean Sea Rome North camp El Gorah Israel Jordan [Legend] : MFO camp Egypt Saudi Arabia South camp, Sharm El-Sheikh 100 km (staff officers are dispatched) Fig. III-3-3-3 Organizational Chart of MFO **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** |Command center|Col2| |---|---| ||center| ||Chief of Staff| **See** MFO Headquarters (Rome) Director General Representative Military sector (Shinai Peninsula) office in Israel (Tel Aviv) Force Commander Advisory group Advisory group Command Operation units Coast patrol unit center Chief of Staff Infantry battalion x 3 Operations branch Civilian observer unit Plans branch Logistics support battalion Force Support branch Engineering Office Liaison branch (Note) Red line indicates a department/division in which Japanese personnel are placed. **Reference: The Sinai Peninsula international peace cooperation assignments (Internationally Coordinated** Operations for Peace and Security) **URL: https://www mod go jp/j/approach/kokusai heiwa/pko/201904 egy html** ----- **2** **UNMISS** **(1)** **Significance of the Dispatch of Personnel to UNMISS** In July 2011 following South Sudan’s independence, with the objective of consolidating peace and security as well as helping South Sudan to establish necessary conditions for the development, the UNMISS was established. In response to requests from UN for cooperation with UNMISS, particularly for dispatching GSDF engineering units, Japan has dispatched units and personnel including staff officers to the Headquarters and SDF engineering units. South Sudan shares borders with six countries and is positioned in a highly important location, connecting the African continent on all four points of the compass. The peace and stability of South Sudan is essential not only for the country itself; but also for the peace and stability in its neighboring countries, which leads to those of the whole Africa, as well as a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community. Based on the experiences gained through past PKO, the MOD/SDF has contributed to the peace and stability of South Sudan by providing personnel cooperation in infrastructure development, which is highly expected by the UN. UNMISS is the only UN PKO to which Japan currently dispatches its personnel and the dispatch of staff officers supports the progress of the peace process in South Sudan together with the international community. It is significant for Japan to continue dispatching its staff officers from the perspectives of maintaining close involvement in the UN, cooperation with neighboring African countries, and securing opportunities for human resource development. **See** Part I, Chapter 3, Section 10-2 (Africa) Fig. III-3-3-4 Organizational Chart of UNMISS |Chief o|f Staff| |---|---| |For Comm|ce ander| |---|---| |Deputy Ch (Personnel and Tr|ief of Staff, Evaluation aining)|Deputy of S (Sup|Chief taff port)| |---|---|---|---| |Deputy Chief of staff(PET) Personal Assistant (PA)|||| |Assignment of Japanese Personnel|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |United Nations Headquarters Secretary-General of the United Nations Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General||||||| |Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary- General (Political)|||||Direct Miss Supp Divis|or of ion ort ion| |||||||| |||||||| ||Military Headquarters Logistics (1 Logistics Staff Officer)|Civil Engineering Section (1 Engineering Staff Officer)||Aviation Section (1 Aviation Operation Staff Officer)||| (Note) Red lines indicate a department/division in which Japanese personnel are placed. and aviation operation staff officer) have been carrying out their duties. Specifically, the logistics staff officer procures and transports necessary supplies for UNMISS activities; the intelligence staff officer collects and compiles information on public safety conditions; the engineering staff officer plans and proposes UNMISS engineering activities; and the aviation operation staff officer prepares flight plans for aircraft operated by UNMISS. Of the two additional uniformed GSDF personnel dispatched in 2024, the DCOS (PET) operates and supervises the personnel, evaluation and training divisions at the UNMISS force headquarters, while the PA provides support to the DCOS (PET) to ensure smooth implementation of the duties. Additionally, one liaison staff member has been dispatched to the liaison office in the Embassy of Japan in South Sudan to support the activities of Japanese staff officers. This member liaises and coordinates with the South Sudan Government and the International Peace Cooperation Corps in South Sudan to ensure Japan’s smooth and efficient cooperation with UNMISS. In this way, Japan will continue to contribute to UNMISS activities. **See** Fig. III-3-3-4 (Organization Chart of UNMISS) **3** **Dispatch of MOD Personnel to the UN Secretariat** **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **See** **（2） Additional Dispatchment of Staff Officers** Following the UN’s call for applications for the position of Deputy Chief of Staff (O-6 level) in charge of Personnel, Evaluation, and Training (DCOS (PET)) in UNMISS and a request for the dispatch of his/her Personal Assistant (PA), Japan decided to dispatch two additional personnel from the GSDF, Colonel and a Sergent First Class. The dispatch to the O-6 level post is the highest rank ever as a command staff from Japan. **(3) Activities by Staff Officers and Others** At the UNMISS Headquarters located in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, four GSDF personnel (logistics staff iii The MOD/SDF dispatches personnel to the UN Secretariat for the purpose of actively contributing to ----- purpose of utilizing their experiences in Japan s PKO activity. As of March 2024, three SDF personnel (chief level and action officer level) are involved in the military planning for UN peacekeeping mission and competency assessment of each personnel member of various countries at the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and one SDF personnel and one administrative official (both action officer level) are working on the United Nations Triangular Partnership Programme[2] (UNTPP) at the UN Department of Operational Support (DOS). **See** Reference 59 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations) **See** **4** **Dispatch of Instructors to PKO Training Centers** Considering that 30% or more of PKO personnel are from Asia, Japan has been conducting the program in Asia and the surrounding area since 2018. In June 2023, 24 GSDF personnel were dispatched to the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre to contribute to the acquisition of knowledge and skills necessary for infrastructure development and building camps in PKO for the military engineers of Indonesia and neighboring countries. From the start of the program until March 2024, a total of 116 GSDF personnel were dispatched to provide a total of 5 training sessions for 95 personnel from 10 countries in Asia and the surrounding regions. Additionally, the UN decided to extend the scope of support under the UNTPP to the field of sanitation and established the UN Field Medical Assistant Course[3] (UNFMAC), given that strengthening sanitation capacity to ensure the safety of deployed personnel has become an issue in UN peacekeeping operations. In July 2023, the MOD/SDF dispatched one GSDF personnel as the instructor to said course held at the UN Regional Service Centre Entebbe in Uganda, providing education to 25 personnel dispatched. SDF personnel serving as the instructor in UNTTP Field Medical Assistant Course To support the self-help efforts of African countries and others in PKO, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel as instructors to PKO training centers in Africa and other countries that provide education and training for UN peacekeepers to contribute to peace and stability by enhancing the capacity of the centers. **See** Reference 59 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations) **See** **5** **Support to the UNTPP** Japan has so far earned unquestionable trust in the areas of engineering and transport that are essential for promoting smooth peacekeeping operations. To continue to support the rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions and implement high quality activities, Japan expressed its active support at the PKO Summit in September 2014 and it was embodied by the UNTPP. The UNTPP was founded using funds from Japan as a project to support training for military engineers and the procurement of heavy equipment by the UN DOS. From the start of the program to March 2024, a total of 184 GSDF personnel have been dispatched to the African region to provide 10 training sessions for a total of 312 members from 8 African countries. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Besides, as part of the UNTPP, the MOD/SDF holds an online Construction Process Management Course for engineering personnel. This course provides education **Reference: United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_heiwa/pko/201111_ssd.html** A cooperative framework for training and providing necessary equipment for PKO personnel deployed to UN PKO through cooperation among the UN as well as countries dispatching the personnel and supporting UN PKO (third countries providing technology and equipment) ----- on construction management and problem solving 2022, UNHCR requested assistance in transporting methods for UN PKO missions. In November 2023, 5 humanitarian relief supplies. In response, from May to GSDF instructors provided education for 25 engineering June the same year, as the International Peace Cooperation personnel from Mongolia, Thailand and Viet Nam, Assignments Helping Ukrainian Victims, humanitarian as well as for 26 engineering personnel from Kenya, relief supplies at UNHCR’s warehouse in Dubai, United Tanzania and Uganda in December of the same year. Arab Emirates were transported by the SDF aircraft to countries around Ukraine (Poland and Romania). UNHCR expressed gratitude for this cooperation and **6** **Cooperation for the Activities Helping** Ukrainian government officials expressed gratitude and **Ukrainian Victims** high appreciation. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in **3** **International Disaster Relief Activities** In recent years, the role of military has become more SDF’s international disaster relief activities encompass diverse and opportunities to leverage military capabilities (1) medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment for Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/ and epidemic prevention; (2) transportation of supplies, DR) are growing. The SDF has also been proactively patients and personnel by helicopter and other means; engaged in international disaster relief activities from the (3) water supply activities using water-purifying viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improving devices; (4) cooperation in search and other activities the global security environment. by MSDF fixed-wing patrol aircraft. In addition to such To this end, the SDF maintains its readiness to take cooperation, (5) the SDF may use transport aircraft and any necessary actions based on prepared disaster relief ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to operation plans. The SDF has proactively conducted the affected area. international disaster relief activities in consultation with GSDF units including those of the Ground Component the Minister for Foreign Affairs, leveraging its features Command and regional Armies are always in readiness and capabilities, while considering specific requests for such operations autonomously. The Self Defense by the governments of affected countries and disaster Fleet of the MSDF and Air Support Command of the situations. ASDF are always in readiness as well to transport personnel and supplies to affected areas. **1** **Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief Team** **Part** **Law** **3** **International Disaster Relief Activities for** **Ⅲ** Since the enforcement of the Japan Disaster Relief Team **the Earthquake Disaster in the Republic of** **Chapter** Law[4] in 1987, Japan has been engaged in international **Türkiye** **3** disaster relief activities upon requests from the The earthquake with epicenter in southeastern Türkiye governments of affected countries or the international on February 6, 2023 caused significant damage in the organizations. In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief country, with more than 50,000 people killed. Team Law was partially amended to allow the SDF to At the request of the Government of Türkiye, Japan participate in international disaster relief activities and dispatched the Japan Disaster Relief and Rescue Team, to transport its personnel and equipment for this purpose. a medical team and others. The MOD transported equipment and other items necessary for the Japan Disaster Relief and the medical team operating in the **2** **International Disaster Relief Activities by** affected area from Japan to Türkiye from February 13 to **the SDF and SDF’s Posture** 17 by a B-777 special transport aircraft. Considering specific requests by the governments of Furthermore, upon a request from the Government affected countries and the scale of disaster situations, the of Türkiye and NATO, one KC-767 aerial refueling/ ----- transport aircraft transported emergency relief supplies from Pakistan to Türkiye. The Minister of Defense issued an order on March 24, 2023 to terminate the international disaster relief activities, in which about 60 personnel were engaged. This was the first international disaster relief activity undertaken by the SDF in cooperation with NATO. The Government of Türkiye and NATO expressed high appreciation and gratitude for this activity, which resulted in further deepening relations not only with Türkiye but also with NATO. **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **Reference: International Disaster Relief Activities** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_heiwa/kokusai_enjyo/** ----- |Category|Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.|Col3|Col4|Col5|Conventional Weapons| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Nuclear Weapons|Chemical Weapons|Biological Weapons|Delivery Systems (Missiles)|| |Conventions on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, etc.|Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)|Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)|Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)|The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)|Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on Cluster Munitions Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms U.N. Report on Military Expenditures Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)| |Export Control Frameworks Aimed at Non-Proliferation|Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)|Australia Group (AG)||Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)|Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)| |New International Initiatives Aimed at Non- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction|Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540||||| **Section 4** **Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation** The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction improve the effectiveness of international organizations (WMDs) and missiles that can deliver them, as well as and multilateral export control regimes. the proliferation of not only conventional arms but also **See** Fig. III-3-4 (Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and goods and sensitive technologies of potential military Non-Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.) use, pose a pressing challenge to the peace and stability of the international community. Moreover, many countries **KEY WORD** are working on the regulation of certain conventional **Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-** **Proliferation** weapons, considering the need to maintain a balance between humanitarian perspectives and defensive needs. **Arms Control** In order to deal with these issues, the international Regulation and verification/inspection of armaments or weapons, confidence-building, regulation of transfers of conventional weapons, etc. frameworks for **arms control, disarmament and non-** **Disarmament** **proliferation have been developed under which Japan has** Reduction or elimination of specific armaments or weapons under played an active role. international agreements The National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS) **Non-Proliferation** describes arms control, disarmament and non- Prevention of the proliferation of weapons that pose a threat to Japan and the international community (weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, proliferation, including for weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical weapons, as well as missiles and conventional etc., as one of the key measures among efforts to weapons that carry such weapons) and related materials and technologies strengthen a free and open international order. In used in their development addition, the NSS also states that Japan will cooperate to Fig. III-3-4 Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc. **Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.** **Category** **Delivery Systems** **Conventional Weapons** **Nuclear Weapons** **Chemical Weapons** **Biological Weapons** **(Missiles)** Convention on Certain Conventional Treaty on the Non- Weapons (CCW) Proliferation of Nuclear The Hague Code of Convention on Cluster Munitions Conventions on Arms Weapons (NPT) Chemical Weapons Biological Weapons Conduct Against Ballistic Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Control, Disarmament and Convention (CWC) Convention (BWC) Missile Proliferation (Ottawa Treaty) Non-Proliferation, etc. Comprehensive Nuclear- (HCOC) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) U.N. Report on Military Expenditures **Part** Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Export Control Frameworks Nuclear Suppliers Group Missile Technology Control Australia Group (AG) Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) **Ⅲ** Aimed at Non-Proliferation (NSG) Regime (MTCR) New International **Chapter** Initiatives Aimed at Non- Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) **3** Proliferation of Weapons of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Mass Destruction **1** **Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-** **Proliferation** Japan actively participates in international initiatives dispatched eight Japan Ground Self-Defense Force for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in (GSDF) experts on protection against chemical weapons regard to WMDs, in the form of nuclear, chemical and to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical biological weapons, as well as missiles that can deliver Weapons (OPCW), which was established to continuously them and associated technologies and materials. implement verification measures. In addition, small Japan has contributed to the Chemical Weapons quantities of the chemical substances under the Convention (CWC) by offering its knowledge in the regulation of the CWC are synthesized for protection field of chemical protection since the negotiating stage. research at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City). F ll i th t f th CWC i t f J h Th i d ith th CWC l ti th ----- school has submitted annual reports and undergone inspections 13 times in total since the establishment of the OPCW and it has been confirmed that there are no problems. Moreover, Japan is also working on projects to destroy abandoned chemical weapons in China, Personnel dispatched to the OPCW (at the time of based on the CWC.[1] the inspection) The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self Defense Forces (SDF) has seconded GSDF and other personnel to the Cabinet Office to be in charge of this project and since 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise in chemicals and ammunitions have been dispatched to conduct excavation and recovery projects on a total of 20 times (As of September, 2023). In addition, MOD officials are dispatched to major meetings such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group (AG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which are international export control regimes and have made proposals to contribute to non-proliferation of key technologies from security perspectives. Moreover, Japan has been cooperating to enhance the effectiveness of regulations and decisions, such as by dispatching SDF personnel to training conducted by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Japan has concluded various conventions on the regulation of conventional weapons such as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), based on humanitarian perspectives and security needs. In addition, Japan has signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention),[2] which was adopted outside the framework of the CCW. With the entry of this Convention, the disposal of all cluster munitions possessed by the SDF was completed in February 2015. In addition, the MOD/SDF dispatches its personnel also to the Group of Governmental Experts meetings related to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and other events as necessary under the CCW framework. Discussions related to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) are under way from the perspectives of their characteristics, human involvement, international law and other matters. Japan is continuing its active involvement in the discussions, while also considering the standpoints of national security. Additionally, international discussions about the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the military domain have been intensifying in recent years, and in February 2023, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka attended the “Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM)” Summit 2023 held in the Netherlands. Regarding the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, Japan has actively cooperated in the initiatives of the international community that focus on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines by submitting annual reports that include data on Japan’s exceptional stocks to the Secretariat of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty).[3] Japan also submits an annual Confidence-Building Measures report in relation to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and reported on the facilities of the National Defense Medical College and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) in that report. In addition, the MOD/SDF provide an annual report under the frameworks of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the UN Report on Military Expenditures and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT),[4] which aim to increase the transparency of military preparedness and military expenditure. The MOD/SDF also dispatch personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings and other meetings for reviewing and improving these systems. **See** Reference 59 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** Abandoned chemical weapons from the former Japanese army have been confirmed in a wide-ranging areas from Heilongjiang Province in northern China to Guangdong Province in southern China and Japan has been promoting excavation, recovery and disposal projects in various regions. The United States, China, Russia and others as major producer and holder of cluster munitions have not yet concluded the Convention. A convention prohibiting the use, production, transfer, etc. of anti-personnel landmines. The United States, China, Russia, the ROK, India and others have not yet concluded the Convention. A treaty regulating the international transfer of conventional weapons that could be used to undermine peace and security or commit serious violations of international humanitarian law ----- **2** **Destruction** Deeply concerned about the development of WMDs Based on the proliferation cases in the areas and missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, surrounding Japan and from the perspectives of the United States announced its Proliferation Security preventing the proliferation of WMDs and improving the Initiative (PSI)[5] in May 2003 and sought the participation response capability of the SDF, the MOD/SDF strive to of other countries therein. Various initiatives are being strengthen nonproliferation frameworks including PSI, undertaken based on PSI, including PSI interdiction including by holding various relevant training exercises exercises aimed at improving the ability to thwart the and meetings and participating in the same kind of proliferation of WMDs and related items and meetings activities which other countries hold. to consider issues on policies and legislations. **See** Reference 61 (Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction The MOD/SDF collaborates with relevant Exercise (Since FY2013)) organizations and countries, dispatching MOD officials including uniformed SDF personnel to various meetings, as well as engaging in ongoing participation in these exercises. In May 2023, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) Destroyer JS “Hamagiri” participated in the PSI exercise[6] “Eastern Endeavor 23” held in South Korea. Vessels and aircraft from the U.S., Australian and South Korean navies, coastguards and maritime police also participated in this exercise, which aimed to improve skills related to PSI and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries. Personnel participating in the PSI maritime interdiction exercise (May 2023) **Part** **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **3** **Reference: Initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation** **URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/dialogue/fukakusan/index.html** **5** An initiative that considers measures that participating countries can jointly take while complying with existing domestic and international laws in order to prevent the proliferation of WMDs/ missiles as a threat to international peace and stability as well as their related materials and at the same time seeks to strengthen the relevant domestic laws of respective countries to the maximum possible extent. **6** A PSI exercise in the Indo-Pacific region has been hosted annually by six countries on a rotating basis since 2014: Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore and the United States. ----- **Part** ## Ⅳ **Reinforcing Common** **Bases, etc.** **Reinforcing Defense Production and** **Chapter** **1** **Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral Part** **of Defense Capability itself** **Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel,** **Chapter** **2** **the Core Element of Defense Capability, to** **Demonstrate their Abilities** **Chapter** **3** **Measures Related to Training and Exercises** **Initiatives to Live in Harmony with Regional** **Chapter** **4** **Societies and the Environment** ----- **Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral** **Chapter** **Part of Defense Capability itself** **1** Rapid advances in science and technology in recent defense production and technology bases have been years have brought about fundamental changes in the exposed to challenging conditions, such as increased nature of national security. Countries are accelerating costs due to technological advances and the emergence research and development to ensure their technological of supply chain risks due to the complex and unstable superiority, especially through the acquisition of cutting- international situation. These conditions, combined edge technologies that could become so-called “game with particular characteristics of defense equipment, **changers” which dramatically alter the future character** such as limited demand and unique specifications, led of warfare. to low profitability and a negative outlook for business New technologies such as Artificial Intelligence continuity and growth, mainly in the defense industry. (AI), quantum technology, and technology for utilizing Recently, companies deciding to withdraw from defense new forms of energy are being applied to equipment[1], businesses are appearing intermittently, and even if they expanding the character of warfare not only in the are not withdrawing, companies have been reluctant to conventional domains such as ground, maritime, and air make new investments, causing concerns that this could but also into space, cyber and electromagnetic domains, affect the operational availability of defense equipment including the cognitive dimension. In addition, the rapid and interfere with the operation of the SDF. advancements of information-related technologies and Currently, the SDF can fully demonstrate its capabilities information infrastructure, such as AI and SNS (Social and accomplish its mission of defending Japan only by Networking Services), has dramatically increased the using equipment that incorporates advanced technologies. risk of hybrid warfare, in which military and non-military In the National Security Strategy formulated in December means are combined, and the expansion of information 2022 and other documents, the Government of Japan warfare through the spread of disinformation or by other clearly stated its policy of tackling the current severe means. situation surrounding defense production and technology Even in Japan, there is now an urgent need to quickly bases, which are essential infrastructures for securing acquire superior equipment that will support new ways of superior defense equipment in Japan, making these bases warfare, which can only be achieved through long-term, virtually an integral part of defense capability itself, and constant efforts to accumulate technological knowledge making efforts to reinforce these bases fundamentally. **Part** in Japan, develop highly skilled human resources, and **KEY WORD** **Ⅳ** maintain manufacturing equipment and facilities that **Game changers** **Chapter** meet our country’s particular needs. Therefore, the MOD This word regards to cutting-edge technologies that could drastically alter the has generally regarded Japan’s defense production and future way of warfare, such as artificial intelligence (AI), hypersonic and high **1** technology bases are essential infrastructures for securing power energy technologies, quantum technology. Countries are focusing on superior equipment and makes efforts to maintain and developing such technologies as some advanced technologies in the civilian sector have been converted to military technologies. reinforce these bases. However, in recent years, Japan’s **Section 1** **Reinforcing Defense Production Base** Japan’s defense production base has several unique heavily relies on private companies to play an important characteristics. As a premise, Japan, which does not have role in producting defense equipment. Therefore, arsenals (state-run factories for defense equipment), amid the demand for fundamental reinforcement of ----- defense capabilities, the role of the defense industry is defense businesses or downsize their operations are becoming increasingly important in securing equipment appearing intermittently. Consequently, this not only for the SDF to carry out its missions. Especially when interferes with the stable procurement of defense manufacturing defense equipment[2], it is necessary to equipment essential for SDF operations, but also causes meet the high level of performance requirements and the loss of a proper competitive environment and security measures. From the perspective of economic innovation in the long term, resulting in Japan losing its rationality, indicating a certain degree of predictability technological superiority in security. is required for companies to step into investments in In addition, the risk of information theft due to cyber this sector. In addition, opportunities for companies to attacks, as well as the risk of disruption to the supply of recover investments are limited since their customers are raw materials due to the imposition of export restrictions basically limited to the MOD / SDF. by other countries have become apparent in recent years. Due in part to the above characteristics, our defense In light of this environment surrounding our bases, production base has been weakening. Under such the MOD will take various measures to maintain and circumstances, companies deciding to withdraw from reinforce them. **1** **Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases and its Basic Policy** Japan’s defense industry is responsible for each stage of the life cycle of defense equipment (research, development, production, sustainment and maintenance, supply, decommissioning, etc.). In this context, defense equipment and the defense industry are inseparable. The Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases[3] was enacted in June 2023 and enforced in October of the same year in order to take necessary measures to maintain and enhance the ability of the defense industry to produce advanced equipment and ensure high operational rates. Under this Act, the Minister of Defense is supposed to establish a basic policy,[4] which was announced in October 2023. This Launching ceremony of the Mogami class destroyer JS “Yubetsu” (November 2023) basic policy prescribes the matters necessary to ensure adequate implementation of the measures stipulated in the perspectives of ensuring Japan’s independence in the Act. Also, it indicates the new direction on how to the security environment, enhancing its deterrence, maintain and reinforce the bases in the future, replacing and contributing economically and technologically **Part** the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological to domestic industries. That domestic bases play an **Ⅳ** Bases” that was formulated in 2014. important role in acquiring advanced defense equipment **Chapter** **See** Reference 62 (Basic Policy on Enhancing Defense Production at an early stage and in maintaining and securing and Technology Bases) **1** sufficient war sustainability of the SDF, but also because the defense industry is composed of a wide range of suppliers, ranging from prime contractors which have **1 �Main Direction for Maintaining and** direct contracts with the MOD to subcontractors like **Enhancing Bases** small and medium-sized enterprises. **（1） Significance of Maintaining and Enhancing Bases** In addition, in recent years, countries have been The significance of maintaining and enhancing increasingly hoarding technology from the economic domestic bases has been pointed out in the past from security perspective, and supply chains have been **2** Manufacturing, research and development, repair, and provision of other related services. **3** Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases ----- principle that bases related to defense equipment, which should not be dependent on other countries, should be maintained and enhanced domestically. Therefore, it is necessary to promote international joint research and development in addition to active international cooperation and licensed production, contributing to incorporating the excellent technologies of various countries into Japan’s defense equipment. The transfer of defense equipment and technology is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, create a desirable security environment for Japan, and provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat by force. Accordingly, the government and private sector will make joint efforts to promote the smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high-security significance and international joint development in various fields. disrupted due to the spread of COVID 19. Under these circumstances, the need to maintain and reinforce bases in Japan has become even greater from the perspective of ensuring stable manufacturing of defense equipment directly concerning the defense of Japan, as well as securing technological superiority. **(2) Approach to Procurement of Defense Equipment** On the premise of acquiring defense equipment which meets required performance for the defense of Japan, it is necessary to decide how to acquire defense equipment according to the necessity to ensure continuous acquisition, sustainment and maintenance of the defense equipment in terms of expenses, and from the viewpoints of nurturing sectors in which Japan has a comparative advantage and complementing sectors in which Japan is falling behind or lacking, in addition to the growing need to maintain and reinforce bases in Japan. Specifically, when acquiring new defense equipment, domestically produced equipment will be pursued, focusing on the following areas: (a) Defense equipment that can meet various conditions, such as operational concepts, performance, acquisition cost, life cycle cost, schedule, etc., with domestic technologies (b) Defense equipment that is essential in maintaining war sustainability in the event of a contingency as well as in ensuring for the ability to improve operations and maintenance in peacetime (e.g., ammunition and ships) (c) Items that should not be dependent on foreign countries from the perspective of confidentiality (e.g., communications, cryptography) (d) Defense equipment that is indispensable for realizing operational concepts that consider Japan’s geographical and policy peculiarities (e) The latest technologies from foreign countries that are hard to obtain (f) Potential target of external threats through economic means **(4) Ideal State of the Defense Industry** It is of utmost importance that the defense industry maintain the capacity to manufacture the necessary defense equipment and support high operational rates. In addition, to make the Japanese defense industry internationally competitive like the defense industries of foreign countries including European countries and the U.S., it is important to review the industrial structure and build a defense industry led by companies with a high degree of defense demand dependence (the ratio of defense-related sales). **（5） Roles of the Government and Defense** **Equipment Manufacturers in Ensuring Stable** **Manufacturing of Defense Equipment** While the government emphasizes creating an environment in which the defense equipment manufacturers can work on defense projects and determine to continue such projects further, defense equipment manufacturers[5] are expected to proactively act on the government’s initiatives to maintain and enhance the bases, newly recognizing that they are essential entities responsible for national defense. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **(3) Approach to International Cooperation** As countries these days compete fiercely in R&D in the military field and make remarkable technological progress, it is difficult for each country to maintain necessary bases without cooperating with other countries. Promoting international cooperation in defense equipment and technology is essential, keeping in mind the basic ----- manufacturer for the specific initiatives after approval of the plans and pay compensation without delay following “Kimishika-Oran” sign sticker is given to defense equipment manufacturers who have received plan certification and are implementing specific initiatives. (Shimizu Nozzle Inc.). **2 �Measures Based on the Act on Enhancing** **Defense Production and Technology Bases** **(1) Specific Initiatives (reinforcing supply chain** **resilience, improving manufacturing process** **efficiency, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting** **business succession, etc.)** Various risks are assumed to impede the stable manufacturing of defense equipment, such as the risk of difficulty in importing raw materials because of export restrictions imposed by a foreign government, the risk of delay in delivery or failure to meet the performance requirements because of sluggish productivity and technological standards caused by aging facilities that have not been renewed, the risk of major concerns for any parts infected with malware or spyware in the manufacturing process, the risk of leakage of information on performance due to cyber attacks, and the risk of withdrawing from defense projects because it has become challenging to continue the business. The following specific initiatives need to be taken by defense equipment manufacturers to respond to such risks effectively and ensure the supply chain consisting of prime contractors and suppliers functions more effectively and efficiently, thereby contributing to stable manufacturing of designated defense equipment.[6] (a) Reinforcing supply chain resilience - Domestic production and stockpiling of raw materials - Research and development of alternate materials and products (b) Improving manufacturing process efficiency - Introduce state-of-the-art equipment and technologies - Automate inspection processes by introducing AI (c) Enhancing cybersecurity - Enhance information systems - Employee training (d) Support for business succession, etc. - Maintain manufacturing facilities - Employee training (acquisition of technology and know-how), etc. Following the Basic Policy, the Minister of Defense shall approves plans for specific initiatives submitted by defense equipment manufacturers. The MOD then enters into a contract directly with the defense equipment the contract’s provisions. In fiscal 2023, 36 projects with a total value of approximately ¥9.9 billion were approved. **（2） Facilitation of Equipment Transfer and the Designated** **Equipment Transfer Support Corporation** When transferring defense equipment and technology, the defense equipment manufacturer may be required to make appropriate adjustments to specifications and performance from the national security perspective. In particular, it is necessary to appropriately address concerns of losing Japan’s technological superiority over other countries in the defense sector by securing information on advanced technologies used in Japan’s defense equipment. The necessary grants are provided when the Minister of Defense requires a defense equipment manufacturer to adjust specifications and performance. On February 16, 2024, the Minister of Defense designated the Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation to provide the necessary grants from the fund and to ensure that equipment transfer conducted by defense equipment manufacturers is carried out smoothly and under appropriate management, in line with the policy objectives of the MOD. The MOD delivered 40 billion yen in FY2023 and 40 billion yen in FY2024 to the Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation to establish the fund. **See** Section 3-2 (Efforts to Promote the Transfer of Defense Equipment) **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** Defense equipment essential for the SDF to carry out its missions as designated by the Minister of Defense, appropriate procurement of which by the MOD would be hindered if its ----- **(3) Protecting the Confidential of Defense Equipment** In manufacturing defense equipment, the MOD provides contractors with classified information on defense equipment, such as advanced technologies, for steady procurement of higher-quality defense equipment. On the other hand, in recent years, the threats of leakage of classified information in defense equipment including cyber attacks and corporate acquisition by countries of security concern, has become higher. With this in mind, the classified information provided by the government to contractors has been re-designated as “Confidential of Defense Equipment,” explicitly indicating to contractors and their employees that handling such classified information requires strict management. In addition, the same penalties currently imposed on SDF personnel will be applied to persons who intentionally leak these confidential, which will prevent leakage more effectively. **(4) Government Ownership of Designated Defense** **Equipment Manufacturing Facilities by the** **Minister of Defense, etc.** If it is determined that stable procurement of designated defense equipment by the MOD is not possible through the various efforts described in (1) and (2) above, the MOD may acquire the designated equipment manufacturing facilities or equipment that manufacture such designated defense equipment. The acquired defense equipment manufacturing facilities will be managed by contractors commissioned by the MOD for the manufacture of **Fig. IV-1-1-1** Overview of Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** Overview of the Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases Act No. 54 of 2023 1 Clarification of the defense industry’s positioning 2 Supply chain survey ・ Clarifies the increasing importance of maintaining and ・ Government implements surveys to directly identify risks in enhancing bases for developing and producing defense the supply chain. equipment. ・ Defense equipment businesses are obligated to make a (3-(3) Reference) Strengthening of cybersecurity ・ The MOD formulated and announced the basic policy on sincere effort to respond to the surveys. (4 Reference) Defense equipment transfer Measures for enhancing bases (image) enhancing bases. → Utilizing survey results for measures to enhance bases. Air defense radar that may be subject to transfer 4 Smooth transfer of defense 3 Measures to enhance the bases equipment and technology 5 Lending of funds ・ Upon certifying the initiatives of businesses that ・ Manufacturers are funded for expenses necessary for adjusting ・ The Japan Finance Corporation (JFC) considers lending contribute to enhancing the bases, expenses are paid the specifications, performance, etc., of the defense equipment to funds necessary to manufacture defense equipment. directly (including to supplier companies). be transferred at the request of the government for the purpose of →Responding to supply chain risks and promoting the equipment transfer. Request by MOD enhancement of the bases. Considerations for lending Budget Grant MOD (1) Responding to supply chain risk(2) Streamlining of the manufacturing processCertified business operator MOD Japan Finance Corporation Defense equipment manufacturers (3) Strengthening cybersecurity The Designated Equipment Transfer Certified business operator (4) Business succession, etc. Support Corporation (fund) 6 Government ownership 7 Protect classified information concerning of manufacturing facilities contracts for defense equipment and technology ・ When there are no other means even after taking other ・ The contractual confidentiality obligation has been measures, the government will take over the manufacturing shifted to a legal confidentiality obligation to enhance facilities and outsource their management to business operators. the protection of sensitive information concerning → Ensuring manufacturing and appropriate procurement of defense equipment and technology. defense equipment. Contractual confidentiality obligation Operations MOD Outsourcing of management MOD Acquisition (3-(2) Reference) Streamlining of the manufacturing process Legal confidentiality obligation (6 Reference) Examples of government-owned Above: Previous manual manufacturing process manufacturing facilities, etc. in the U.S.. Below: Automation by introducing a metal 3D printer (image) Above: Air Force United States Air Force Plant4 Below: Army Joint Systems Manufacturing Center **REFERENCE : Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/hourei_dpb.html** ----- **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** VOICE **①Initiatives for Strengthening the Development and Production Bases of Equipment** **Eiji Nakamatsu, Director, ANS Supply Chain Management Department, ANS Business Promotion Division, NEC Corporation** Our company specializes in equipment development, production, and equipment, guided by the Grand Design that envisions the and system integration, with our primary facility located at the future of the Fuchu Plant. We aim to balance “advanced security Fuchu Plant in Tokyo. Through our sensor business, which includes measures” with “flexible work styles”, creating an integrated products like surveillance radars and underwater acoustic devices; production hub that unites employees, customers, partners, and our network business, encompassing outdoor communication the local community. systems and satellite communication systems; and our IT system By consistently implementing these measures, we will further business, featuring automated surveillance and control systems, enhance the development of defense capabilities that are the we leverage our advanced technological capabilities and solutions cornerstone of Japan’s national security. to provide products and systems across a wide range of fields— from undersea to outer space—contributing to the enhancement of defense capabilities. We are enhancing our production infrastructure to accommodate the growing demand for equipment. This includes upgrading and expanding facilities and significantly increasing our workforce with plans to hire approximately 1,000 additional employees by the end of fiscal year 2025. Furthermore, we are constructing a new eight- Excerpt from the Grand Design for the Fuchu Plant [Photo provided by NEC story building at the Fuchu Plant, scheduled for completion in Corporation] fiscal year 2024. This is the initial phase of renovating our facilities **②Transitioning to a Key Supplier of Equipment Through the “Kimishika-Oran” System** **Hirotsugu Inoue, Senior Managing Director, Chukin Co., Ltd., Kazuaki Teranishi, Managing Director** -Advancing cutting-edge technological capabilities in aluminum take pride in contributing to Japan’s national security as a key surface treatment to foster societal development and enhance supplier of defense equipment and a “Kimishika-Oran” company. human enrichment - With this objective, our company has subcontracted the surface treatment of aluminum components for various equipment from prime contractors (companies contracted with the Ministry of Defense). In light of the government’s efforts to significantly reinforce defense capabilities, prime contractors are strengthening their production systems for defense equipment. As a result, our company has taken over the surface treatment processes previously handled by these companies. To facilitate this transition, we have utilized the Ministry of Defense’s “Kimishika-Oran” system (a measure to strengthen the industrial base under The Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases). A stable production system can be established through this New surface treatment line is being set up with the support of the “Kimishika-Oran” system. Photo of the authors. system, which provides direct financial support to companies. We ----- designated defense equipment. Therefore, being private activities, even when this system is applied. companies, the business entities are expected to operate **See** Fig. IV-1-1-1 (Overview of Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases); Section 3-1 (Systems efficiently, no different from their regular business Regarding Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) **2** **Main Efforts in Addition to the Act on Enhancing Defense Production and** **Technology Bases** Minister of Defense Wada explained the importance **1** **Making the Defense Business More Attractive** of reinforcing the defense production and technology The defense business requires a considerable investment bases. In Tokyo, then-Senior Adviser to the Minister of of management resources to meet the high level of Defense Takami touched upon the same topic. performance requirements and information security measures. On the other hand, profitability tended to be **(2) Joint Promotion Conference for the Start-Up** less than under the procurement system standards. In **Utilization to Defense Industry** calculating prices in the cost accounting system, the MOD The MOD/SDF will work with startups to encourage will establish a system for the fair evaluation of business the early deployment of defense equipment by actively efforts and appropriate profit calculation, as well as incorporating the results of research on cutting edge implement a continuous review of contractual systems to technology research into defense equipment R&D, encourage greater efficiency in the procurement system. while utilizing existing civilian technologies and off- the-shelf products. As part of these efforts, the MOD and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) **2** **Revitalization of the Defense Industry** have collaborated to create opportunities to match **(1) Defense Industry Promotional Exhibition** the needs of the MOD/SDF with startups by utilizing Since 2016, the MOD has held exhibitions to create and METI’s startup support framework and network. Joint promote opportunities for new entrants in the defense Promotion Conference for the Start-Up Utilization to industry by identifying promising domestic small and Defense Industry was established as a framework for the medium-sized enterprises that have not yet entered relevant divisions of the MOD and METI to meet. The the defense industry and matching them with defense- Committee has convened four times, in June, September, related businesses and the MOD / SDF, to maintain and October 2023 and January 2024. reinforce the defense production and technology bases. **See** Fig. IV-1-1-2 (Example of Companies that have Participated in The two-day exhibition has been held twice in total, the Joint Promotion Committee) in Osaka in October 2023 and in Tokyo from January **Part** to February 2024. In Osaka, then-Senior Adviser to the **(3) Industry Day** Since 2022, an exhibition (Industry Day) has been held **Ⅳ** to create matching opportunities with the U.S. Forces in **Chapter** Japan and the U.S. defense industry in order to encourage **1** Japanese companies to participate in the equipment supply chains common to both Japan and the United States as well as in the sustainment and maintenance programs of the U.S. Forces in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2023, the exhibition was held in Tokyo in October. **See** Section 4-6 (Advancing Initiatives Aimed at Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement) **3** **Building a Resilient Supply Chain** In January 2023, the Security of Supply Arrangement Defense Industry Promotional Exhibition (S SA) i d t th J U S D f Mi i t i l ----- Fig. IV-1-1-2 Example of Companies that have Participated in the Joint Promotion Committee Examples of Companies That Participated in the Joint Promotion Committee |Company name|Product and service overview| |---|---| |Innophys Co., Ltd.|Develops assist suits that reduce the strain on lower back during forward-leaning posture or when lifting people and heavy objects, etc. Mainly offers assist suits that use artificial muscles. Features include: no external power required and waterproof, dustproof, lightweight, and easy to wear. The company has developed 5 back support products and 1 arm support product.| |Terra Labo|Information support system for wide-area disaster measures using long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.| |Metro Weather Co., Ltd.|Remote sensing observation of wind conditions using Doppler Lidar, wind condition forecasting simulation, and detection and identification of suspicious drones| |Infostellar|Ground station network services for satellite operators| |Serendix Inc.|Construction of houses with excellent thermal insulation and earthquake resistance using advanced 3D printers| |Mitsufuji Corporation|Silver plated conductive fibers, wearable devices| |TRUST SMITH & COMPANY|Solutions such as factories and warehouses automation using AI/robotics and image processing technologies| |Incubate Fund|An independent venture capital with a competitive edge, for startups during their early-stage| |The University of Tokyo Edge Capital Partners (UTEC Co., Ltd.)|Venture capital fund management operation through investment activities in venture companies that utilize the technology and human resources of universities and research institutions such as the University of Tokyo| |Real Tech Holdings Co., Ltd.|Aims to solve social issues through investment support to deep-tech startups with innovative technologies (real tech) that contribute to solving global and human issues| |JIC Venture Growth Investments Co., Ltd.|A government-backed fund that contributes to solving industrial and social issues and improving Japan’s international competitiveness| (Note) One more company in addition to the above participated in the committee Fig. IV-1-1-3 Security of Supply Arrangement (SoSA) (image) |Col1|Col2| |---|---| |.|S.| |---|---| (Note) DPAS (Defense Priorities and Allocations System): A system under which the U.S. Department of Defense obligates U.S. companies to Request for priority delivery Request for priority delivery Ministry of Dedefense (MOD) U.S. Department of Defense Security of Security of Arbitrary request for cooperation DPAS[(Note)] supply Priority delivery Japanese companies Priority delivery U.S. companies prioritize national defense-related contracts and orders under the U.S. Defense Production Act of 1950. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** Meeting. This Arrangement serves as a framework for the stable and reciprocal supply of defense equipment (including not only final products but also their parts and services) between Japan and the United States. It will contribute to building a resilient and diverse supply chain for defense equipment. **See** Fig. IV-1-1-3 (Security of Supply Arrangement (SoSA) (image)) **See** **4** **Strengthening Defense Industrial Security** sectors through various means, the defense industry has emerged at the forefront of this situation. Defense-related companies are exposed to risks such as intelligence activities involving other states, including cyber attacks. Under these circumstances, defense-related companies need to develop, produce, maintain, and improve defense equipment for the SDF while appropriately protecting Japan’s classified defense information and participating in defense equipment and technical cooperation while protecting the classified information of the ally and likeminded countries. As part of its efforts to promote the enhancement f d f i d t i l it b d i t ti l As the competition among nations for advanced technologies intensifies and nations attempt to acquire t h i l i f ti f th ilit d i ili ----- standards, ATLA joined the Multinational Industrial Security Working Group (MISWG) in May 2023, which aims to standardize industrial security measures among over 30 participating countries, including Europe and the United States. In addition, with foreign governments and companies interested in Japan’s defense industry and domestic companies wishing to participate in the defense industry, the Defense Industrial Security Manual, which lays out the matters to be observed by companies having contracts with the MOD in an easy-to-understand manner, was published in June of the same year to improve the visibility of the defense industry’s security system. Defense-related companies have also been improving their information systems since April 2023 to strengthen measures for information that is not classified but requires appropriate protection. This improvement is based on the Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry, which incorporates security measures at the same level as those applied to companies by the U.S. Department of Defense (NIST SP800 171). **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section4-5-2(2) (Security Enhancement) **5 �Strengthening Sensitive Technology** **Management** When transferring sensitive defense equipment, technological sensitivity is evaluated based on the technology’s importance and superiority, and efforts are being made to prevent leakage of highly sensitive technologies, such as promoting reverse engineering measures. As international competition over cutting-edge technologies has been intensifying in recent years, efforts have been made to collaborate and cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies to prevent technological leaks concerning the Patent Non-Disclosure System, one of the economic security measures, inward direct investment, etc. In addition, to strengthen the management of **Fig. IV-1-1-4** Promotion for Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases through the “Kimishika-Oran Seminar” **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** Call for participants: “Kimi Shika Oran Seminar” on the ATLA website “Kimishika-Oran Seminar” poster “Kimishika-Oran Seminar” held in “Kimishika-Oran” characters displayed at JR Osatsu Station in Tamano-shi, Okayama Hokani-Oran & Nihonni-Kimishika Chitose-shi, Hokkaido (Note) Endangered species of orangutan and Japanese serow. Management of projects to certify and support invaluable businesses that are responsible for Japan’s defense production and technology bases, where supply chain risks are becoming more apparent. **REFERENCE : Formulation of the Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/cybersecurity.html** **REFERENCE : Formulation of the Defense Industrial Security Manual** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/dism.html** ----- **(2)  Kimishika Oran Seminars (Nationwide Briefing** **Session Tour)** For effective measures based on the Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases, the defense industry must be informed of these new systems and utilize them. In particular, since the suppliers that constitute the defense industry are located in every corner of Japan, the MOD has been conducting “Kimishika-Oran seminars” (briefing sessions held from place to place on measures to help reinforce defense production bases) in various parts of the country since December 2023. The title “Kimishika-Oran” was created as a character and a catchphrase to familiarize defense equipment businesses with these measures. As of the end of March 2024, the seminars have been held in 11 locations across Japan, with over 500 participants from approximately 390 companies. The MOD will continue its efforts to promote and inform these measures for reinforcing the defense production and technology bases. **See** Fig. IV-1-1-4 (Promotion for Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases through the “KimishikaOran Seminar”) sensitive technologies, the MOD will analyze cutting edge technologies from the perspective of defense technology experts, strive to identify and understand key technologies, and work with our ally and others to promote collaboration in technology analysis. **6** **Communication and other initiatives** **(1) Exchange of Views with Major Prime Contractors** The MOD has conducted exchanges of views with the defense industry (major prime contractors) since February 2022 and brought together the Minister of Defense with the presidents of major prime contractors on two different occasions since April 2022. In addition, the MOD has continued to strengthen public-private cooperation and coordination through sharing problems and challenges that both sides have identified by holding six exchanges of views between the Commissioner of ATLA and the heads of the defense divisions of various companies. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** ----- **Section 2** **Reinforcing Defense Technology Base** **1** **Necessity of Reinforcing Defense Technology Base** In order to acquire defense equipment required for alter the future character of warfare. the new ways of warfare, the use of our domestic Although Japan’s research and development technologies is extremely important. The development expenditures for the MOD have trailed those of the of scientific technologies and innovations based on the United States and other countries, they have increased country’s advanced technological capabilities is at the significantly in recent years due to their importance. source of Japan’s economic and social development and On the other hand, while the distinction between constitutes a key element of its comprehensive national technologies developed for civilian use and for security power integral to its national security. In addition, the purposes has become increasingly blurred in practice, it active utilization of Japan’s advanced technological is important to work strategically to ensure technological capabilities developed by both its public and private superiority as a nation by actively leveraging the results sectors over the years in the area of national security of research and development in science and technology without being held back by existing approaches is an in Japan’s public and private sectors for the research and essential activity for strengthening Japan’s architecture development of equipment. Therefore, it is necessary to for national defense. further promote research and development domestically As competition among major countries intensifies and develop and strengthen the technology base for the in terms of conducting research on cutting-edge technology areas on which Japan should focus. technologies and leveraging its results for applications In the cases of defense equipment and technology in national security, each country has focused on cooperation, such as equipment procurement and reinforcing its technology base for the purpose of international joint development, it is important to national security by investing heavily in R&D aimed at maintain the leading role by owning important cutting- the early operationalization of technologies that could edge and other technologies. Considering ways to become so-called “game changers” which dramatically keep costs down taking into account the possibility of Fig. IV-1-2-1 Current Status of Research and Development Expenditures As of May 2024 (Hundred million yen) **Trends in the Defense R&D Expenditures of Major Countries** （％）Trends in the Ratio of Defense Expenditures to R&D Expenditures of Major Countries 90,000 12.0 80,000 10.0 70,000 **Part** 60,000 8.0 50,000 **Ⅳ** 5,000 6.0 **Chapter** 4,000 4.0 **1** 3,000 2,000 2.0 1,000 0 0.0 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 The United States Japan Germany The United States Japan Germany The United Kingdom France Italy The United Kingdom France Italy Republic of Korea Australia Republic of Korea Australia Source: “OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators” Source: “OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators” “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database ©SIPRI 2024” (Notes) 1 Defense R&D expenditures of each country are calculated from R&D expenditures and defense-related budget ratios of each country listed under “OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators”. However, the data for China is not included. 2 The figures are according to OECD statistics, and definitions may differ from country to country; therefore, attention is needed when comparing countries using just this data. 3 The data until 2023 is listed for Japan, the U.S., Germany, and Australia, which was available as of May 15, 2024. ----- procurement and transfer of defense equipment after sectors together. development is important. This requires not only research **See** Fig. IV-1-2-1 (Current Status of Research and Development and development by the MOD, but also the promotion of Expenditures); Part I, Chapter 4, Section 1-5 (Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technology Bases) research and development by both the public and private **2** **Direction for Reinforcing Defense Technology Base shown in Defense Technology** **Guideline 2023** The National Security Strategy of Japan, National **2 �Vision for the Future through Reinforcement** Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program all **of Defense Technology Base** state the necessity of reinforcing the defense technology base and call for the active utilization of Japan’s The Ministry of Defense and the Japan Self-Defense advanced technology research results by both its public Forces (SDF) need sufficient defense capabilities and private sectors for the research and development to defend Japan. The purpose of reinforcing the of equipment and to strengthen the framework for the defense technology base is to provide the necessary research and development of new equipment. In June technological support. Therefore, the future vision in 2023, the MOD formulated the Defense Technology Defense Technology Guideline 2023 is always to defend Guideline 2023 to embody the policy of reinforcing the our nation through technology. defense technology base and serve as a guideline for the MOD to promote various initiatives in an integrated and **3** **Approaches to Realize This Vision** powerful manner. The MOD publishes this Guideline to improve the predictability of our partners, foster **(1) 1st Pillar: Accelerating delivery of functions and** a common understanding of reinforcing the defense **equipment necessary for the defense of Japan** technology base, and establish a foundation to promote The MOD will develop the functions and equipment technological cooperation actively. A summary of the necessary to defend Japan, which are directly linked to Guideline is given below. the future ways of warfare, and deliver them in 5 years **See** Reference 63 Defense Technology Guideline 2023 (Executive or within approximately the next 10 years. Summary) **(2) 2nd Pillar: Ensuring technological superiority and** **creating advanced capabilities** **1 �Current Status and Challenges of Defense** Over the next 10 years and beyond, various technologies **Technology Base** will be put into practical and operational use as new Rapid advances in science and technology have added functions and equipment under nationwide collaborations to Japan’s economic and social development. These that gather Japan’s STI capabilities from the public and **Part** changes are also significantly impacting the national private sectors. These efforts will create new value as **Ⅳ** security environment and changing the face of warfare. functions and capabilities to defend Japan in the future, **Chapter** As a result, we may fail to protect Japan’s peace and realizing defense innovation that will transform our **1** independence and maintain national security by simply country’s defense, securing technological superiority, continuing to improve the capabilities of our equipment and achieving advanced capabilities ahead of other systems. To respond to this tense security environment, countries through defense innovation. it is necessary to spin on Japan’s Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) capabilities, maximize their use for **4** **Means to Realize This Vision** security and defense purposes, and spin off the outcomes of the MOD’s R&D back to society. To achieve the To achieve the 1st and 2nd pillars, it is necessary to defense of our nation at all times, R&D at the MOD now “create” the functions and equipment that the MOD/ necessitates taking new approaches and implementing SDF require, “nurture” technologies strategically, and methods different from those used in the past. “understand” various aspects of science and technology. These efforts will be carried within the MOD and with l t i i t i d i h i tit t ----- industry and academia to build an ecosystem that will allow us to continue to grow together, collaborating in a sustainable, autonomous and comfortable manner while creating synergies and ensuring technology preservation. **(1) Create** The MOD will take every possible measure to rapidly strengthen our defense capability, including speeding up the time required for R&D of functions and equipment. The ministry will quickly implement the necessary functions and equipment, demonstrate them in operational fields, and reflect the results and feedback acquired in further improvements. They will also provide functions and equipment quickly and flexibly while actively introducing R&D methods for early deployment. This includes introducing new methods such as manufacturing prototypes of an operational quality that troops can use, trial fielding the prototypes, and demonstrating them in the operational field as soon as possible, leading to improved deterrence. Open innovation that actively utilizes R&D resources and ideas outside the ministry for solving any issues will be promoted. The ministry’s policy, operational, and technical divisions will work together to create the concept of future warfare, the direction for future R&D, and the acquisition of functions and equipment. In addition to predicting technologies and warfare in the future, the MOD will also engage experts from outside the ministry with extensive knowledge of science and technology in the civilian field to examine how technology can be utilized against new threats. Technical knowledge, human resources, facilities and test equipment are the essential foundation of R&D. The MOD will share its goals with ATLA’s research institutes and test centers, which have the R&D infrastructure, as well as with partners that have supported R&D projects, to improve the predictability of industries and implement projects in alignment with our direction for reinforcing the defense technology base. Investments for the continued maintenance and reinforcement of the technology base essential to advancing R&D will be made. The MOD will communicate and collaborate with companies, including start-ups unfamiliar with defenserelated R&D, to establish a system that allows various industries to participate in our projects. A technology base that will enable defense related companies to integrate the technologies of start-ups and other companies into functions and equipment will be built. The Innovative Science and Technology Initiative for Security (ISTIS), which solicits and outsources goaloriented basic research with the expectation that it will contribute to future R&D in the defense sector, focuses on developing technologies in niche areas that find it difficult to gain investments from the civilian sector and on identifying and developing the basic research that will expand the boundaries of the S&T field. This program will continue to be utilized to create the new technology base. To assign personnel who can fulfill diverse roles to the appropriate positions flexibly and quickly, new initiatives for human resource utilization and promotion, such as further strengthening human resource development and expanding the recruitment of experienced personnel, will be actively pursued. **(2) Nurture** The MOD will not limit itself to past R&D experience and will also explore technologies that should be nurtured, actively taking brand-new approaches that differ from conventional R&D methods. The ministry will also encourage challenging research and create an R&D system that can accept unpredictable technological risks. Given the MOD’s limited resources and the fact that the ministry’s R&D investments are just a small part of the S&T investments by the government of Japan, various science and technology activities outside the ministry will be actively utilized for defense purposes. To effectively utilize the results of R&D with different objectives for the defense sector, efforts will be made to concretely communicate the needs of the ministry and the direction of our efforts, create an environment that encourages members of the S&T community to participate in MOD projects, seek new partners, and build and expand networks among researchers. An ecosystem that rewards the efforts of industries and allows businesses to grow naturally will also be developed. The MOD will create new chemical reactions by fusing the defense sector with the non-defense sector to nurture technological solutions based on new ideas. Great efforts will be made to maximize domestic and international STI capabilities **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE : Defense Technology Guideline 2023 - To defend our nation at all times with technologies -** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/guideline2023/en/index.html** ----- to nurture technologies. The outcomes of the MOD’s R&D have also contributed to raising Japan’s capabilities in STI. Various R&D activities at the MOD will be promoted to nurture Japan’s capabilities in STI, with an eye on addressing global issues. Through ISTIS, the MOD will expand the human resources that conduct goal-oriented basic research, secure diverse researchers, pioneer new research areas, and establish and strengthen human connections in emerging research areas to expand STI capabilities. **(3) Understand** The MOD will determine what it should do in the future based on an accurate understanding of the current S&T environment, such as the technological trends in the private sector in Japan and overseas, the current status of R&D in industries including startups in Japan, advanced and innovative technologies held by research institutes and academia, and the results of R&D projects. As various science and technologies are beginning to be used in the actual battlefield nowadays, the MOD will accurately and quickly understand how S&T is being used currently, how new technologies may be used in future warfare, and how this will change the national security environment and our nation’s defense, including MOD and SDF activities. Appropriate measures will be implemented for such S&T changes. The MOD will actively communicate outside the ministry about what it is doing regarding technology, its purpose, and how its efforts affect the national security environment and defense activities. Plans and future R&D projects will be shared with outside the ministry as far as possible to improve the predictability of stakeholders. **5 �Important Technology Areas for the Defense** **of Japan** The MOD is considering the functions and capabilities necessary for defending our nation at all times. It is breaking them down to specify the important technology areas to achieve these functions and capabilities. **See** Fig. IV-1-2-2 (Functions and Capabilities Important for Defending Japan) |Col1|Col2| |---|---| |capabilities to Functions and capabilities to Functions and ca|| Fig. IV-1-2-2 Functions and Capabilities Important for Defending Japan **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** Functions and capabilities to defend Japan in future conflicts Functions and capabilities to Functions and capabilities to Functions and capabilities to gain superiority in the physical domain gain superiority in the information domain gain superiority in the cognitive domain Minimizing burden and damage to SDF personnel while limiting collateral damage to civilians through unmanned and autonomous operations Sensing for faster and more accurate information Utilization of platforms not used previously Advanced computing for instant processing of vast volumes of information Utilization of energy sources not used previously Visualization of previously unseen information Materials and manufacturing methods Capabilities to present virtual and imaginary information as real that realize new functions Strengthening judgment capabilities to predict future scenarios and take preemptive action A network that enables accurate and instantaneous information Enhancement of cognitive capabilities sharing with anyone, anywhere, inside and outside the organization Capabilities to defend cyberspace efficiently and effectively Key technological fields in realizing these = Key technological fields in defending our country ----- **3** **Development of the Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft** For the defense of Japan and to ensure air superiority among the industries of each country but also maintain well into the future, it is vital that Japan continues to and reinforce Japan’s defense industrial and technology employ superior, state-of-the-art fighters. Therefore, bases by increasing the number of mass-produced next- with regard to the next-generation fighter aircraft generation fighter aircraft, nurturing the next generation that would succeed the F-2 fighters scheduled to be of engineers with international experience, and decommissioned starting around 2035, it is imperative introducing advanced development and manufacturing to realize Japan-led development which ensures freedom methods such as digital engineering. of modification for timely and appropriate upgrades In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara met in the future and domestic production and technology with the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps bases for high readiness, etc., on the premise that the and Italian Defence Minister Crossetto in Tokyo to aircraft maintains the capability to effectively counter sign the Convention on the Establishment of the GCAP numerically superior opponents. To achieve this, the International Government Organisation,[2] an international MOD concluded a FY2020 project contract with organization essential to establishing an efficient tri- Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., in October 2020 as a nation cooperation. prime company to be in charge of the holistic integration Furthermore, this cooperation between the three of the fighter, and the development began. countries, which share fundamental values and are allies Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy then conducted of the United States, will serve as the foundation for a a joint analysis on the extent of commonality of the broader cooperation with the United Kingdom and Italy aircraft, and on the basis of the results, the three nations for generations to come and contribute significantly to agreed to develop a common platform. This was officially peace and stability in both the Indo-Pacific region and announced by the leaders of the three nations as the Europe. In December 2022, the United States have Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)[1] in December announced to support Japan’s security and defense 2022. The program enables the three nations to bring cooperation with likeminded allies and partners, together technological advantages and share costs and including with the United Kingdom and Italy on the risks for the joint development of an advanced fighter trilateral joint development of the next generation aircraft which will ensure future air superiority. This fighter aircraft. Japan and the United States have also cooperation will not only encourage further cooperation agreed to launch a concrete collaboration by the end of **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **1** Image of the Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft Defense Ministers from Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy sign the Convention for establishing GIGO (December 2023). **REFERENCE : Development of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2022/12/9f3717bac3e9bca986f2e80ba73f7822065a9f2b.html** **1** Joint Statement on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) (December 9, 2022) ----- 2023 on autonomous systems such as UAVs that could Collaborative Autonomy which is expected to be applied complement Japan’s next fighter program among other to UAVs that will be used in collaboration with the next- platforms. In December 2023, the Japan MOD and the generation fighter aircraft. U.S. Department of Defense signed a project arrangement **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-1-2(2) (Strengthening of for joint research on Overwhelming Response through Unmanned Defense Capabilities) **Commentary** **Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft: Establishment of an International Organization** In 2022, the decision was made among Japan, the United at GIGO. To ensure the program’s progress is effectively managed, Kingdom, and Italy to jointly develop the next-generation fighter coordination will take place daily through face-to-face meetings aircraft, and the leaders of the three nations announced it as the with the companies engaged in the development work. Daily Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). The three countries will consultations with the governments of all three nations are essential establish the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO) to ensure that the program progresses in the right direction. Given to realize a collaborative framework for an efficient execution the considerable distance between Japan and Italy, we will utilize all of this program. This international organization will be center of available methods, including video conferencing, for coordination. GCAP management and administration. GIGO is an international organization founded to advance To carry out GCAP, personnel dispatched from the three nations the shared interests of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy. will gather at the headquarters located in the United Kingdom. Consequently, the team will collaborate beyond their national These personnel will possess diverse areas of expertise. First, perspectives to foster the development of GCAP and create fighter numerous technical officials will be dispatched as technology aircraft that meets the requirements of all three nations. experts. Establishing a sophisticated IT and secure environment is necessary to ensure smooth and reliable development progress. This will require the expertise of personnel beyond mere aviation technology specialists. Furthermore, the expertise of personnel from Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and British and Italian military personnel who will ultimately operate the fighter aircraft is indispensable. Moreover, administrative officials responsible for contracts, accounting, and personnel affairs will be dispatched to ensure the organization’s smooth operation. The workplace will feature a broad assignment of roles, including seniors and junior personnel, creating a highly diverse environment. Coordination with external entities will be a frequent occurrence Collaboration among 3 countries **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **4** **Active Utilization of Civilian Technology** **1** technologies are incorporated and that research and **1 �Technology Cooperation with Relevant Domestic** development is conducted efficiently. **and Overseas Entities and Collaboration with** Domestically, in order to create superior equipment **Relevant Ministries and Agencies** through the utilization of cutting-edge technologies ATLA and domestic research institutes such as national and conduct research and development efficiently and research and development agencies proactively engage effectively, the MOD has been collaborating closely with in research collaborations and technological information the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation[3] exchanges in order to ensure that advanced civilian (CSTI) and other relevant ministries and agencies on a **3** 3 One of the important policy meetings aimed at the planning and general coordination of comprehensive and basic science and technology innovation policies under the leadership of the ----- Outside Japan, the MOD will continue to actively promote technological and engineer exchanges with allies and like-minded countries, as well as consider diverse possibilities through continued exchange of opinions at various opportunities. **See** Fig. IV-1-2-3 (Major Technological Cooperation with National Research and Development Agencies, etc.); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-2 (Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country); Section 5 (Initiatives for Economic Security) **2** **Identification, Development and** **Incorporation of Innovative Cutting-edge** **Civilian Technologies** Major Technological Cooperation with National **Fig. IV-1-2-3** Research and Development Agencies, etc. Active utilization of advanced civilian technology is essential for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals into the future and also beneficial for the development of Japan’s science, technology, and innovation in non-defense areas as well, similar to how investment in innovative science and technology by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the United States facilitated advances in science and technology as a whole, including civilian technology such as the development of the Internet and GPS. From this perspective, the MOD intends to promote relevant measures. Specifically, the MOD has implemented a competitive research funding program called Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security to publicly seek and commission basic research in target areas, which is expected to contribute to future research and development Railgun (electromagnetic gun) under research at the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) |Partner|Primary fields/technologies of cooperation| |---|---| |Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)|Aerospace field ●Hypersonic flight technology ●Ultra-wideband electromagnetic waves measurement technology| |National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT)|Electronics, information and communications field ●Cybersecurity technology ●Quantum cryptography and communication| |Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC)|Marine field ●Marine drone system ●Underwater mobile communication| |Yamaguchi Prefectural Industrial Technology Institute|Unmanned underwater vehicle field ●Sensing technology using underwater imaging| regular basis based on the Integrated Innovation Strategy 2023 (Cabinet Decision on June 9, 2023). The ministry also actively participates in the Council for Integrated Innovation Strategy Promotion[4] established to promote the strategy in order to further enhance collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies, national research and development agencies, industry, universities, and other parties. In addition, it is an effective initiative within the Government to promote communications between the relevant ministries and agencies that promote civilianbased initiatives, and the MOD. The NSS also states that Japan will strengthen the cross-government framework for utilizing funding and information related to research and development, and it is important for the entire Government to work together based on this strategy. Specifically, the Government will intensively offer strong support for cutting-edge technology with multiple applications, such as AI and quantum technology, through programs, such as the Key and Advanced Technology R&D through Cross Community Collaboration Program (K-Program). The research and development results obtained will smoothly reinforce security-related areas. Furthermore, a cross-governmental framework was established to expedite the development of technologies with the potential to contribute to strengthening comprehensive defense architecture by matching the research and development needs of the MOD with the technology seeds possessed by the relevant ministries and agencies. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** Meeting of all Ministers of State under the leadership of the Chief Cabinet Secretary for the checking, sorting, cross-sectoral and substantial coordination, and promotion of items that are ----- development of equipment, the MOD launched its “Efforts to Facilitate the Early Practical Use of GameChangers” starting in FY2022 as an initiative to commission private companies to conduct research and improve their advanced technologies to the point where they can be used in the research and development of equipment. **See** Reference 64 (FY2023 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” Program) **3** **Establishment of a New Research Institutes** in defense areas. From among research proposals widely seeking from universities, research institutes, and startup companies, a total of 165 research projects have been awarded as of FY2023. This program will continue to promote the discovery and development of innovative and emergent technologies in FY2024 as well. In the basic research areas, free thinking of researchers leads to innovative and creative results. For this reason, it is necessary to assign maximum value to freedom of research when sponsoring research, so that, for example, researchers will be able to publish all of their research results to have a wide range of academic discussions. Hence, in this program, the MOD will not intervene in research, restrict contractors’ publication of research results, or designate research results as confidential, never providing any confidential data to researchers. In actuality, some research results have already been published through oral presentations, publications, etc. Also, since cooperation with startup companies and research institutes in Japan is essential for identifying and developing cutting-edge civilian technologies, we will encourage the broad participation of leading researchers, including those from academia, while obtaining the understanding and cooperation from the relevant parties. Advanced Technology Bridging Research was launched in FY2020 to expedite the identification and development of promising, advanced technologies from the results of basic research under the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security and other sources, enhance their level of technological maturity, and apply them to the research and development of equipment. Advanced Technology Bridging Research will continue to be conducted with a vastly expanded scope in FY2024 with the aim of helping to develop equipment that will become game-changers in the future. In addition, in order to accelerate the research and The Defense Innovation Technology Institute (tentative name) will be established under ATLA to enhance defense innovation creation and groundbreaking equipment production capabilities significantly, and will conduct breakthrough research to create innovative functions and equipment from a variety of rapidly evolving science and technology that will significantly change the future of warfare by adopting approaches and methods different from those used in the past with reference to U.S. institutions such as the efforts of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and DIU (Defense Innovation Unit). **4** **New Measures for Early Deployment** For programs that are particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective in areas that could directly affect the SDF’s current and future ways of warfare, while extensively soliciting outstanding proposals from companies, and incorporating innovative civilian technologies, we are working to achieve the early deployment of equipment through demonstrations. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE : Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/funding.html** **MOVIE : [Railgun] ATLA R&D Projects Progress in FY2023** **URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYH1CqhxbdE** **REFERENCE : Initiatives for early deployment of cutting-edge technologies** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/budget/rapid_acquisition/index.html** ----- **Section 3** **Promoting Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation and Transfer of Defense Equipment** Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense and the Komeito Party have held 23 discussions of the Equipment and Technology and the Implementation ruling party’s Working Team[2] (WT) since April 2023, Guidelines formulated in April 2014,[1] Japan promotes including the history of defense equipment transfers and defense equipment and technology cooperation with hearings from experts. In response, in December 2023, other countries in order to contribute to the maintenance the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and strengthening of defense technology and industrial and Technology and its Implementation Guidelines were bases, as well as to the promotion of our national security, revised based on the recommendations of the ruling peace and international cooperation. party WT. Furthermore, a Cabinet resolution was passed The transfer of defense equipment and technology in March 2024 after inter-party discussions between as outlined in the National Security Strategy describes the ruling parties. The Implementation Guidelines were that such transfer is a key instrument to ensure peace and partially revised to establish a stringent mechanism. It stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter is now possible to transfer finished products regarding unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a joint desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide development project among Japan, the United Kingdom assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in and Italy, from Japan to countries other than partner violation of international law, use of force, or threat of countries. force. In addition, to smoothly promote such transfers, Japan From this perspective, the Three Principles on will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its and technology through joint public and private efforts Implementation Guidelines, and other systems will be by establishing a fund and providing corporate support considered for revisions. The Liberal Democratic Party as needed, etc. **1** **Systems Regarding Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** cases. In addition, it has been decided that important **1** **New Three Principles** cases would be deliberated at the National Security **(1) Clarification of Cases Where Transfers Are** Council and along with this, information concerning the **Prohibited (the First Principle)** cases that were deliberated would be disclosed. The cases where overseas transfers of defense equipment are prohibited are clarified as follows: (1) in the case **(3) Ensuring Appropriate Control regarding Extra-** of violating the obligations under treaties and other **Purpose Use or Transfer to Third-Party Countries** **Part** international agreements that Japan has concluded; (2) **(the Third Principle)** **Ⅳ** in the case of violating the obligations based on the Overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology Resolution of the United Nations Security Council; or will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control **Chapter** (3) in the case of transferring to countries in conflict. is ensured, and the Government will in principle oblige **1** the government of the recipient country to gain its prior **(2) Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be** consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third **Permitted As Well As Strict Examination and** parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate **Information Disclosure (the Second Principle)** for the active promotion of peace contribution and The cases where transfers may be permitted are limited international cooperation, cases involving participation to (1) cases that contribute to the active promotion of in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases peace contribution and international cooperation, (2) where parts are delivered to a licenser, appropriate cases that contribute to the security of Japan, or other control may be ensured with the confirmation of the **1** The term “defense equipment” is deemed appropriate for the title of “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” since possible articles of overseas transfers play a role in contributing to peace and international cooperation, as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Similarly, due to the fact that technology is also provided in addition to goods, the term “transfer” was adopted rather than “export.” ----- control system at the destination. **See** Reference 65 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology); Reference 66 (Implementation **See** Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) **2** **Partial Revision of the Three Principles on �** **Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** based on the revised system. In order to achieve this environment, the MOD will further promote the transfer of defense equipment and technology through collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies and by joint public and private efforts. This revision makes it possible to transfer defense equipment in a broad array of fields and at the same time, requires the more strict examination for the transfer. The government will maintain its basic philosophy as a peaceloving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, and promote transfer of defense equipment and technology strictly and carefully in the same manner. A summary of the December 2023 revisions to the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the Implementation Guidelines as follows. **(1) Three Principles on Transfer of Defense** **Equipment and Technology** The current three principles will be maintained, and the significance of transfer of defense equipment and technology and the recognition of the security environment was added and updated in the preamble in accordance with the National Security Strategy. It is also stated that Implementation Guidelines will be amended in a timely manner in response to changes in the security environment and security needs. The National Security Strategy states that the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the Implementation Guidelines will be revised to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. In doing so, the necessity, requirements, and transparency of the related procedures for transfer of defense equipment and technology will be under adequate consideration, while maintaining the three principles themselves. Based on this, the ruling party’s WT was held 23 times after April 2023, discussed the revision of cases where overseas transfers may be permitted, as well as how to ensure appropriate management after the transfer, including strict examination when determining whether a transfer is allowed and prior consent for transfers to third countries, while also taking into account of examples from other countries. In December 2023, the ruling party’s WT consolidated the recommendations for the government. Based on the recommendations, the government partially revised the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the Implementation Guidelines in the same month. This is the first revision since the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology was formulated in April 2014. In addition, this revision of the Implementation Guidelines made it possible to transfer defense equipment and technology in a broad array of fields. The first project after the revision is the transfer of patriot missiles, which Japan is manufacturing under license, from Japan to the U.S. After deliberation at the National Security Council, it was confirmed that the project falls under the category of a case that can be approved for overseas transfers. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) intends to create a desirable safety and security environment for Japan **(2) International Joint Development and Production** This revision makes it possible to transfer parts and technology from Japan directly to countries other than its international joint development and production partner countries. **(3) Transfer of Defense Equipment Related to** **Licensed Products** Defense equipment (including finished products) for licensed products, including those not of U.S. origin, can now be supplied to the license provider country. However, when providing defense equipment that corresponds to licensed products considered as weapons[3] under the SDF Law to countries other than the license provider country, it excludes the case of the provision to countries where combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** Firearms, explosives, swords, and other machines, instruments, and devices intended to directly kill or injure people or destroy property as a means of armed struggle (includes things such as escort ships, fighter planes, and tanks that are equipped with firearms and operate to directly kill or injure people or destroying property as a means of armed struggle, and excludes ----- an armed conflict unless there are special circumstances in consideration of the need in terms of Japan’s security. **(4) Provision of Repairs and Other Services to** **Countries Cooperating with Japan in Security** **Area** This revision makes it possible to provide repairs and other services to countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S. **3 �Direct Transfer of GCAP Finished Products** **to Third Countries** In the proposal consolidated by the ruling party’s WT in December 2023, it was considered that the direct transfer from Japan to third countries other than the partner countries pertaining international joint development and production requires ongoing deliberations. Under these circumstances, in particular the finished GCAP products, to realize aircraft that has the capabilities required to protect our country, it is considered necessary to hold a mechanism that allows direct transfer from Japan to third countries other than the partner countries. In this context, the government has coordinated with the ruling party and provided explanations to the Diet. Based on this, in March 2024, the Cabinet decided that the transfer of finished products regarding the GCAP from Japan to third countries can be permitted. In the future, when Japan transfers the finished GCAP products directly to third countries, a Cabinet decision will be made on each case, which is so-called a “double Cabinet decision”. Furthermore, the Implementation Guidelines were partially revised to include “three restrictions”: (1) At present, direct transfer from Japan to countries other than partner countries is restricted to finished products regarding GCAP; (2) transfers will be restricted to countries that have concluded an international agreement obligating the use of defense equipment transferred from Japan in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and (3) it excludes the case of the transfer to a country where combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of an armed conflict. These strict decision-making process shows clearly that Japan will maintain its basic philosophy as a peaceloving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations. The Ministry of Defense, in light of the current revision, will firmly proceed with discussions with the United Kingdom and Italy, to realize a fighter aircraft suitable for Japan’s security environment to ensure the peace and stability of our country in the future. **(5) Transfer of Parts** This revision makes it possible to transfer parts to countries cooperating with Japan in security area, after clarifying the definition of parts.[4] **(6) So-called Five Categories (Rescue, Transport,** **Warning, Surveillance and Minesweeping)** It was clarified that products to be transferred can be equipped with arms under the Self-Defense forces Law necessary for the performance of their essential duties or for self-protection such as machine guns mounted on minesweeper and transport ships. **(7) Assistance to the country that is subject to** **aggression with equipment (excluding arms)** This revision enables to transfer equipment and technology that does not fall under the category of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law to a country that is subject to aggression in violation of international law, regardless of cooperation with Japan in security area.[5] **(8) Strict Examination** The perspective of strict examination was expanded in light of the diversification of types of transfers, such as transfers of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law and transfers from license provider country to a third country. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **(9) Procedures for Deliberations** Direct transfers of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law and transfers of such arms to third parties are basically deliberated and announced by the National Security Council.[6] Refers to items incorporated as part of a finished product. However, this excludes items that can function as equipment by themselves. Before revision, it was stipulated as “The overseas transfer of defense equipment, which is part of the equipment transferred by the Minister of Defense according to the provisions of Article 116-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law to Ukraine, which has been invaded in violation of international law.” The National Security Council discusses all first-time transfers of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law (direct transfer or transfer to a third country), and similar transfers of arms for ----- **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **“Transfer of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft to Third Countries (Main Points** **Commentary** **Discussed During the Parliamentary Debate)”** **Q Why is it necessary for Japan to acquire the next-** the fighter aircraft Japan wishes to acquire. **generation fighter aircraft?** Therefore, it is considered that having a mechanism for direct Our country, Japan, is an island nation surrounded by sea on transfer to third countries and ensuring a position where Japan all sides, and any invasion will occur via air or sea. Therefore, contributes equally with the United Kingdom and Italy is in the to secure the safety of Japan, which adheres to nonaggressive national interest of Japan. defense, attacks from the air by aircraft or cruise missiles and from **Q Isn’t it necessary to go through strict procedures when** the sea by naval vessels have to be prevented as early as possible **transferring next-generation fighter aircraft to third** while it is still distant. Fighter aircraft have been developed and **countries?** operated as core equipment to carry out these defense missions. Regarding the transfer of next-generation fighter aircraft to third While neighboring countries promote the development and countries, in addition to the cabinet decision on the recent revision deployment of next-generation fighter aircraft, it is indispensable of the current Implementation Guidelines, a new cabinet decision for Japan too to develop cutting-edge fighter aircraft that are will be taken individually each time a fighter aircraft is transferred more advanced than those of the neighboring countries to to a third country in the future. This process, known as the “Double maintain Japan’s peace and stability in the future. cabinet decision”, ensures a more rigorous approach. **Q Why is it necessary for Japan to conduct international** Furthermore, a partial amendment to the Implementation **joint development with the United Kingdom and Italy?** Guidelines poses three restrictions: As equipment becomes increasingly sophisticated and expensive, (1) Direct transfer from Japan to countries other than partner countries worldwide are adopting an approach of joint development countries is restricted to finished products regarding GCAP, through cooperation with partner countries by mutually contributing (2) Transfers will be restricted to countries that have concluded funds and technology to acquire superior equipment. Under such an international agreement obligating the use of defense circumstances, Japan thoroughly examined such possibilities as equipment transferred from Japan in a manner consistent with independent development and joint development with the United the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, States to advance the development of the next-generation fighter (3) It excludes the case of the transfer to a country where aircraft. As a result, international joint development with the United combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of an armed Kingdom and Italy was determined as the most appropriate option conflict. from various perspectives, including the feasibility of realizing the In this way, Japan can clearly show that it is steadfast in observing required performance and schedule. Therefore, it was decided to the UN Charter and its basic principle of being a peace-loving develop an advanced next-generation fighter aircraft by bringing country by establishing more stringent processes and conditions. together the technologies of the three countries, while sharing the Japanese government’s policy regarding the overseas transfer risk and cost. of defense equipment remains steadfast. Japan continues to **Q Why was the transfer of next-generation fighter aircraft** uphold our basic principles as a peace-loving nation abiding by **to third countries allowed?** the UN Charter and the path followed thus far. The process of international joint development involves construction of a common airframe through discussing requirements which reflect each country’s security environment. Under the assumption that all countries will contribute equally each nation advocates their respective preferred performance . While the United Kingdom and Italy consider promoting the transfer of finished products to third countries an important contribution, they also expect a similar response from Japan. If Japan lacks a mechanism for direct transfer to third countries and does not work towards cost reduction, it is likely that the United Kingdom and Italy will not compromise on the performance they seek to achieve. This situation could make it challenging to realize Prime Minister Kishida answering questions related to the transfer of next-generation fighter aircraft to third countries (March 2024) [Jiji Press Photo] ----- **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **Responses from Foreign Countries, Companies, and Others Regarding the Revision of** **Commentary** **the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment** After the partial revision of the Three Principles on Transfer Forces Law when transferring weapons abroad. This includes of Defense Equipment and Technology and its accompanying assessing whether the recipient country or region is engaged in Implementation Guidelines, the Ministry of Defense, in collaboration armed conflict. This amendment signifies a more rigorous review with relevant ministries and agencies, has seized various process for such transfers. The Ministry of Defense has clarified to opportunities to elucidate the revised content to representatives each country that Japan will remain committed to its foundational from foreign countries and companies. These opportunities have principles as a peace-loving nation, adhering to the UN Charter. included briefing sessions for company representatives and It will also highlight its historical commitment to peace to foster military attachés from various nations, reciprocal visits by high- a wide-ranging understanding of Japan’s initiatives. Furthermore, level officials from different countries, and international exhibitions company representatives have expressed their approval of the where the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) has recent revision, which permits the transfer of defense equipment established booths. across various sectors. This change not only facilitates the Representatives from various countries have expressed seamless exchange of such equipment but also promises to appreciation for Japan’s efforts to promote the transfer of bolster the growth potential of the defense industry. defense equipment and technology to create a desirable security Acknowledging the pivotal role that defense equipment transfer environment, among other objectives. They have also expressed plays as a policy tool for deterring unilateral force-based attempts expectations that the revision will broaden the possibilities for new to alter the status quo and for shaping a favorable security defense equipment and technology cooperation between Japan landscape for Japan—especially given the most challenging and and their respective countries. Additionally, following consultations complex security environment since the post-war period—the with the ruling coalition parties, the revision expands the scope Ministry of Defense will persist in advancing defense equipment of defense equipment transfers across various sectors. Moreover, transfers. This will be achieved through rigorous collaboration with it mandates that the potential impact on international peace and public and private sectors to sustain peace and stability across the security must be carefully evaluated under the Self-Defense Indo-Pacific region. Mr. Wada, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense (Note) (then) and participants Mr. Takami, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense (Note) and participants from from the public and private sectors at ATLA booth at “INDO PACIFIC 2023” the public and private sectors at ATLA booth at “Singapore Airshow 2024” (February (November 2023) 2024) (Note) Following the enactment of the Defense Production Base Strengthening Act in October 2023, the position of Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense was created. This role is designed to bolster the support system for the Minister of Defense, ensuring that measures under this new legislation are implemented both vigorously and expeditiously. The primary responsibility of this position is to enhance the nation’s defense production and technology base. Mr. Wada was appointed the first Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense since the introduction of the “Senior Adviser System” in 2014, taking office in October 2023. Subsequently, Mr. Takami has served as the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense since January 2024. ----- **2** **Efforts to Promote the Transfer of Defense Equipment** In the context of transferring defense equipment, to of Defense on February 16, 2024, under the Act on prevent the loss of Japan’s technological superiority in Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases the defense sector over various countries, it is necessary to promote initiatives to make equipment transfers for businesses such as equipment manufacturers, etc., appropriate from a security perspective. The Designated to implement appropriate changes and adjustments Equipment Transfer Support Corporation will allocate to specifications and performance from a security the grants to the Defense Equipment Manufacturers perspective. This is required to preserve information who are required by the MOD to make adjustments about advanced technologies used in Japan’s equipment. to specifications and performance of the equipment Based on an awareness of these issues, a fund was transferred, in accordance with the content of defense established for the Designated Equipment Transfer cooperation with partner countries. Support Corporation, designated by the Minister **See** Section 1-1-2(2) (Facilitation of Equipment Transfer and Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation) **3** **Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment** **and Technology Cooperation** States falls under the category of projects for which **1** **Cooperative Research and Development, etc.** overseas transfers may be authorized. This transfer is Since 1992, Japan has implemented 26 joint research an unprecedented initiative by Japan in response to a projects and one joint development project with the request from its ally, the United States, to replenish the United States. At present, four joint research projects U.S. military’s inventory of Patriot missiles as quickly as ((1) High-Temperature Case Technologies, (2) Next possible and support the readiness of the U.S. military, Generation Amphibious Technologies, (3) Modular since unprecedented level of demand for Patriot missiles Hybrid Electric Vehicle System, and (4) Overwhelming has been experienced by U.S. military and by global Response through Collaborative Autonomy) are in supply chains, exceeding expectations. This step will implementation. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. Defense take security and defense cooperation with the United Ministerial Meeting in September 2022, the two States to a new level and contribute to the security of our countries agreed to start studying the possibility of a country and the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific Japan-U.S. joint research project on counter- hypersonic region. technologies at the level of elemental technology and **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-1-2(2) (Strengthening Unmanned component based on the progress of their joint analysis. Asset Defense Capabilities); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-2 (Response to Missile Attacks); Part III Chapter 2, Section 4-2 Then, following the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting in (Defense Equipment and Technical Cooperation); Section 2-3 (Development of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft); Reference **Part** January 2023 in which the Ministers concurred to begin 29 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects) **Ⅳ** discussion on potential joint development of a future interceptor, as a result of discussions between the MOD **Chapter** **2 �Production, Sustainment and Maintenance** **1** and the U.S. Department of Defense, the two countries **of Common Equipment between Japan and** have decided to initiate a Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) **the United States** Cooperative Development program in August 2023. At the Japan-U.S. summit that same month, the two leaders **(1) Participation of Japanese Industry in the** welcomed the decision. **Production of the F-35A fighter aircraft and the** In addition to this, the National Security Council has **Establishment of Regional Maintenance, Repair,** confirmed that the transfer of PAC (Patriot Advanced **Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Capability** Capability) -2 parts, etc., to the United States since In December 2011, Japan selected the F-35A fighter July 2014 falls under the category of projects for aircraft to be the successor to the F-4 fighter aircraft. which overseas transfers may be authorized. The At the same time, the Government decided to have National Security Council also confirmed in December Japanese industries participate in the aircraft’s 2023 th t th t f f P t i t i il t th U it d d ti id f l l t d i ft hi h ----- would be imported. In light of this decision, Japan has the Asia Pacific region not only maintain, cultivate, and been working to enable the involvement of Japanese reinforce Japan’s defense production and technology industries in the manufacturing process in preparation bases but are also significant from the perspectives of for the acquisition of F-35A fighter aircraft from securing the operational support system for F-35A FY2013 onwards. So far, the Japanese companies have fighter aircraft in Japan, strengthening the Japan-U.S. participated in Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) Alliance, and deepening defense equipment and technical for the airframe and engines, as well as the manufacture cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. of related parts. In light of the severe financial conditions, the MOD **(2) Initiatives towards the Establishment of the** decided in principle that it would resort to importing **Common Maintenance Base for Ospreys of Japan** completed aircraft for procurement in FY2019 and after, **and the U.S.** but this would be reviewed if less expensive means were In October 2015, Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd.[9] was available. Subsequently, however, as a result of cost selected as the maintenance company for the Planned reduction efforts, by the manufacturers and others, it Maintenance Interval (PMI) of the U.S. Marine Corps was confirmed that FACO by domestic companies would Ospreys deployed at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. make the price lower than importing completed aircraft. From February 2017, the PMI has been performed at For this reason, for procurements from FY2019 to GSDF Camp Kisarazu, with the maintenance of seven FY2027, the MOD has decided to procure F-35A fighters aircraft completed as of the end of March 2024 and three for which domestic companies performed FACO.[8] aircraft currently under maintenance. In addition, as F-35 fighter aircraft are operated The MOD intends to establish a common maintenance worldwide, the U.S. Government decided to establish base for both Japan’s and the United States’ Ospreys by maintenance depot (regional MRO&U Capability) allowing the maintenance company to use the hangar at mainly for airframes and engines in the North America, GSDF Camp Kisarazu for aircraft maintenance of the Europe, and the Asia-Pacific regions. U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys and to carry out future aircraft The regional MRO&U in the Asia-Pacific region maintenance of the GSDF Ospreys (V-22) at the same for Japan’s F-35 fighter airframes selected by the U.S. camp in view of the (1) smooth introduction of the V-22 Government in December 2014 began operations at (GSDF Ospreys);[10] (2) smooth and effective operation of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Komaki South Plant the Japan-U.S. security arrangements; and (3) enhanced located in Aichi Prefecture from July 2020. Moreover, efficiency in maintenance. The establishment of a common with regard to the regional MRO&U Capability for maintenance base at GSDF Camp Kisarazu would be engines, operations began at the IHI Mizuho Aero- extremely significant in that it will contribute to mitigating Engine Works in Tokyo in June 2023. the burden on Okinawa as well as to the “strengthening The participation in the production of F-35 fighters of the infrastructure for the repair and maintenance of **Part** by Japanese industries continuously, the establishment common equipment” stated in the Guidelines for Japan- **Ⅳ** of maintenance depots for airframes, engines and others US Defense Cooperation (Guidelines). within Japan, and the contribution to maintenance in **Chapter** **1** **4** **Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** initiative that spans more than half a century from its **1 �Defense Equipment and Technology** conception to retirement, Japan will strengthen initiatives **Cooperation with Other Countries, etc.** for defense equipment and technology cooperation, Considering that cooperation in defense equipment is an including overseas transfer of defense equipment and **7** In December 2018, the number of F-35A fighter aircraft to be procured was changed from 42 to 147, of which 42 can be replaced by fighters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL). **8** In December 2019, December 2020, December 2021, and December 2022, it was decided to opt for manufacturing arrangements involving domestic companies for F-35A fighter aircraft procurements in FY2019 and FY2020, FY2021, FY2022, and FY2023 through FY2027, respectively, as such arrangements were confirmed to be more cost-effective. **9** The company was renamed SUBARU Corporation on April 1, 2017. **10 The GSDF will introduce 17 tilt-rotor aircraft (Osprey (V-22)) that can complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range.** ----- international joint development, and strive to enhance its partners’ military capabilities and strengthen midand long-term relationships with those countries.[11] In particular, Japan will effectively promote these initiatives by combining them with other efforts, such as defense cooperation and exchanges, training and exercises, and capacity building, and other non-MOD measures, such as Official Security Assistance (OSA). In this regard, Japan Fig. IV-1-3-1 Main Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation with Other Countries (image) As of March 2024 - Certification Process of Jet Engines (until February 2020) The United States - ●●●Japan-UK Cooperative Research Programme on the Demonstration of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile (JNAAM) (until June 2023Co-operative Research on the Technology Demonstrator of a Japan and Great Personnel Vulnerability Evaluation (PVE) (until July 2020)Chemical and Biological Protection Technology (since July 2021)） Ukraine - ●●●PAC-2 partsSoftware and parts for Aegis systemsF100 engine partsInertial Navigation Unit for F-15 Britain Universal Advanced RF system (JAGUAR) (since February 2022) - Self-Defense Force vehicles, Bulletproof - SM-3 Block IIA vests, protective clothing, protective masks - Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader The United Kingdom, Italy (until February 2022) The United Kingdom - Joint Development of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft by Japan, the United Kingdom and Italy (since December 2022) - Mission Partner Gateway extended(until September 2023) The Philippines - Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures (until November 2023) - Air Surveillance Radar Systems - Engineers and Scientists Exchange Program - TC-90 airfcraft (since May 2003) France - UH-1H parts - High-Temperature Case Technologies (since July 2018) - Mine Countermeasure - Next Generation Amphibious Technologies Technological Activities Australia (since May 2019) (since June 2018) - Modular Hybrid Electric Vehicle System - Marine hydrodynamics (until November 2019) (since October 2020) - Placement of Scientist and Engineer - Joint research on future networks to ensure Personnel (since November 2019) interoperability of next-generation fighter aircraft India - Marine Hydrodynamics and (since August 2021) - Visual SLAM based GNSS Augmentation technology for Hydroacoustics (since May 2021) - Overwhelming Response through Collaborative Autonomy UGV/Robotics (until March 2024） - Multi-Vehicle Autonomy Research (since December 2023) (since May 2021) - Robotic and Autonomus System for Undersea - Regional MRO&U for F-35 Warfare - Common Maintenance Base for Ospreys of Japan and (since January 2024) the U.S. (Kisarazu) (Note) The gray hatchings indicate ended case [Legend] Finished products International joint research, etc. Parts and components Grant (Article 116-3 of the SDF Law) International joint Maintenance depot (regional depot) and development and production common maintenance base **(1) Australia** With Australia, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[12] went into effect in December 2014, and the Japan-Australia Joint Steering Committee for Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation was first held in October 2017. Since then, regular consultations have been held to will consider transferring equipment that has reached a considerable number of years in service and has limited expandability to like-minded countries through early decommissioning or early removal from service. **See** Fig. IV-1-3-1 (Main Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation with Other Countries); Reference 39 (Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements) As of March 2024 The United States - PAC-2 parts - Software and parts for Aegis systems - F100 engine parts - Inertial Navigation Unit for F-15 Self-Defense Force vehicles, Bulletproof - SM-3 Block IIA vests, protective clothing, protective masks - Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader (until February 2022) - Mission Partner Gateway extended (until September 2023) - Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures (until November 2023) Air Surveillance Radar Systems - Engineers and Scientists Exchange Program (since May 2003) - High-Temperature Case Technologies (since July 2018) - Next Generation Amphibious Technologies (since May 2019) - Modular Hybrid Electric Vehicle System Marine hydrodynamics (until November 2019) (since October 2020) Placement of Scientist and Engineer - Joint research on future networks to ensure Personnel (since November 2019) interoperability of next-generation fighter aircraft Marine Hydrodynamics and (since August 2021) Hydroacoustics (since May 2021) - Overwhelming Response through Collaborative Autonomy Multi-Vehicle Autonomy Research (since December 2023) Robotic and Autonomus System for Undersea - Regional MRO&U for F-35 - Common Maintenance Base for Ospreys of Japan and the U.S. (Kisarazu) [Legend] Finished products International joint research, etc. Parts and components Grant (Article 116-3 of the SDF Law) International joint Maintenance depot (regional depot) and development and production common maintenance base advance defense equipment and technology cooperation between Australia and Japan. In November of 2019, the Letter of Arrangement concerning the Placement of Scientist and Engineer Personnel was signed, creating the framework for the cooperation of scientists and engineers. Based on this framework, Japan began dispatching its scientists and **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **11 As of April 2024, Japan has signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with the following countries: the United States, the United Kingdom,** Australia, India, the Philippines, France, Germany, Malaysia, Italy, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Sweden, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). ----- engineers to the Defence Science and Technology Group of Australia from 2021. In May 2021, the Japan-Australia Joint Research on Marine Hydrodynamics and Hydroacoustics and the Japan-Australia Joint Research on Multi Unmanned Ground Vehicle Autonomy Technology were launched, and they are currently in progress. In June 2023, the Arrangement concerning Research, Development, Test and Evaluation was signed, creating the framework to launch joint projects quickly. In January 2024, this Arrangement was applied for the first time, and the JapanAustralia Joint Research on Robotic and Autonomous System for Undersea Warfare was launched. At the meeting of the Australia-Japan Defense Ministers held in October 2023, Japan Defense Minister Kihara, together with Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Marles, welcomed the announcement by the Australian Department of Defense regarding the signing of a contract with Mitsubishi Electric Australia for a joint development project using laser technology. This project represents the first joint development project between Japan and Australia. It is also the first time that the technology of a Japanese defense-related company has attracted the attention of a foreign government, leading to the implementation of international joint development in the defense field. This is a new step for Japan, which has been promoting the transfer of defense equipment through partnerships of public and private sectors. In November 2023, the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency exhibited a booth at the international exhibition “INDO PACIFIC 2023” in Australia. Mr. Wada, who was then serving as Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense, took part in the exhibition. The public and private sectors collaborated to showcase the appeal of Japan’s equipment and its advanced technological capabilities. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-1 (Australia) **See** **(2) India** Japan considers defense equipment and technology cooperation with India as an important field of cooperation based on Special Strategic Global Partnership between Japan and India. At the Japan-India summit meeting in December 2015, both countries signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology,[13] which entered into force in March 2016. To create a precedent of defense equipment and technology cooperation including dual use technologies, both countries have held the Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation seven times so far. The Cooperative Research on the Visual SLAM Based GNSS Augmentation Technology for UGV (Unmanned Ground Vehicle)[14] /Robotics was launched by Japan and India in July 2018, and completed successfully. Progress has been made in discussions on defense equipment and technology cooperation between the two countries, including the second Japan-India Defence Industry Forum, which was held in Bengaluru in February 2019. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-2 (India) **(3) United Kingdom** With the United Kingdom, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[15] was signed and went into effect in July 2013. The JapanU.K. High-Level Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation Steering Panel held its first meeting in July 2014 and has held regular meetings since then. In July 2013, the two countries also launched the Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project, which was the first time Japan had engaged in such bilateral research with a country other than the United States. The Cooperative Research was completed successfully in July 2017, with four other research projects[16] having been launched and completed successfully as well. The Japan-U.K. Cooperative Research Project on the Demonstration of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile and a new Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project were launched in December 2018 and in July 2021, respectively. The Cooperative Research on the Feasibility of a Japan and Great Britain Universal Advanced RF System (JAGUAR) that launched in March **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **13 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology** **14 Unmanned Ground Vehicle** **15 Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies** Necessary to Implement Joint Research, Development and Production of Defence Equipment and Other Related Items **16 The four projects include: Japan-U.K. Cooperative Research Project on the Feasibility of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile (launched in November 2014, completed in March 2018); the** Cooperative Research on Personnel Vulnerability Evaluation (launched in July 2016, completed in July 2020); the Cooperative Research on the Certification Process of Jet Engines (launched in February 2018, completed in February 2020); and the Japan-U.K. Cooperative Research Project on the Demonstration of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile (launched in December 2018, ----- **(5) Germany** The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[18] was signed between Japan and Germany and went into effect in July 2017. A Japan-Germany defense industry exchange meeting was held in November 2023, and various cooperative activities are progressing. Notably, approval was granted for participation as an observer in the joint development program of the Organization Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement[19] (OCCAR), headquartered in Germany. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (3) (Germany) **(6) Italy** With Italy, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[20] went into effect in April 2019. In December 2023, the two countries held the “Italy-Japan Defence Industry Forum,” and discussions on defense equipment and technology cooperation between the two countries are progressing. With regard to the development of the next-generation fighter aircraft, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy have agreed to develop a common platform. The leaders of the three nations have announced it as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara met in Tokyo with Italian Defence Minister Crosset and the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps. They signed the Convention on the Establishment of the GCAP International Government organisation (GIGO) for the centralized management and administration of GCAP. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (4) (Italy); Section 2-3 (Development of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft) 2018 transitioned into the Cooperative Research on the Technical Demonstration of a Japan and Great Britain Universal Advanced RF System (JAGUAR) in February 2022, which is currently ongoing with a view to applying the system to the next-generation fighter aircraft. With regard to the development of the next-generation fighter aircraft, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy have agreed to develop a common platform. The leaders of the three nations have announced it as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara convened a meeting in Tokyo with the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps and Italian Defence Minister Crosseto and signed the Convention on the Establishment of the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO). This international organization undertakes centralized management and administration of GCAP. At the international exhibition “Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) London 2023”, held in the United Kingdom in September 2023, the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) set up a booth to promote and appeal Japan’s equipment and high technological capabilities through partnership between the public and private sectors. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (1) (The United Kingdom); Section 2-3 (Development of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft) **See** **(4) France** Japan and France established committees on cooperation in the fields of defense equipment and export control, respectively, in January 2014, and the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[17] between the two countries went into effect in December 2016. Moreover, at the Fourth JapanFrance Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”) held in January 2018, the two countries confirmed their intention to expeditiously begin cooperation on the Feasibility Study for Mine Countermeasure Technological Activities, with the cooperative research on this front initiated in June of the same year. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (2) (France) **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **(7) Sweden** The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[21] was signed between Japan and Sweden and went into effect in December 2022. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-6 (1) (Sweden) **(8) Ukraine** In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 and based on the request of the Ukrainian **See** **17 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of France concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** **18 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** **19 The Organization Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement (OCCAR), established in 1998, is an independent international organization that manages a series of processes for** equipment, including the review of program specifications, development, manufacturing, operational support, and disposal, primarily for European countries and others. **20 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Italian Republic concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology** ----- Government to provide equipment, etc., the MOD partially revised the Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology at the meeting of the National Security Council on March 8, 2022, in order to provide non-lethal supplies within the scope SDF vehicles arriving at a transit point in Poland of the Three Principles in accordance with the Self-Defense Forces Law, and provided the Ukrainian Government with bulletproof vests, helmets, winter battle dress uniforms, tents, cameras, hygiene products and medical supplies, emergency rations, binoculars, lighting devices, personal equipment, protective masks, protective clothing and small drones via SDF aircraft and other means. Additional civilian vehicles (vans), etc. were also provided based on the request of the Ukrainian Government. Furthermore, based on President Zelenskyy’s request to Prime Minister Kishida at the Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting in May 2023, Japan has additionally provided a total of 101 SDF vehicles (halfton trucks, high-mobility vehicles, and multipurpose material handling vehicles) as well as approximately 30,000 emergency rations to Ukraine since June 2023. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-7(1) (Ukraine); Reference 65 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and **See** Technology) **(9) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)** **Countries** Japan and ASEAN member states have exchanged views regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation in non-traditional security sectors, such as humanitarian assistance (HA), disaster relief (DR), and maritime security, through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meetings and other occasions. Participating countries have expressed their expectation for Japan’s cooperation in effectively dealing with these issues. In the “Vientiane Vision” announced by Japan at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in November 2016, it was stated that Japan s defense equipment and technology cooperation with ASEAN countries would be promoted with a focus on the following three points: (1) equipment and technology transfer, (2) human resources development, and (3) holding seminars on defense industries. In terms of the specific initiatives implemented, Japan and Indonesia held the second Japan-Indonesia “2+2” in Tokyo in March 2021. The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[22] was signed by both countries and went into effect immediately. With Singapore, at the Shangri-La meeting held in Singapore in June 2023, the two countries signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[23], which came to immediate effect. With Thailand, the two countries signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which went into effect during Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to Thailand in May 2022.[24] With the Philippines, after the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology between Japan and the Philippines[25] went into effect in April 2016, a total of five training aircraft (TC-90) of the MSDF were delivered to the Philippine Navy by March 2018, with pilot training support provided by the MSDF and maintenance and repair assistance provided by a Japanese company. In addition, parts and maintenance equipment of utility helicopters (UH-1H) that became unnecessary for the GSDF were also delivered to the Philippine Air Force by September 2019. These two transfers are cases of applying the provision of the SDF Act that went into effect in June 2017 that enables the MOD to grant equipment which is decomissioned by the SDF. Further, in January 2019, a framework was established for regular consultations of the The first air surveillance radar system Joint Working Group on turnover ceremony hosted by the Philippine Defense Equipment and Air Force (December 2023) **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **22 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** **23 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Singapore concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** **24 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** ----- Technology Cooperation. In August 2020, a contract was concluded between Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Inc., which would supply four air surveillance radar systems for approximately US$100 million. This was the first case of an overseas transfer of finished equipment since the establishment of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in 2014. The first radar system was delivered to the Philippine Air Force in October 2023 and the second radar system was in March 2024. Acceptance, turnover and Blessing ceremonies for the radar systems were held in December 2023 and Aril 2024 respectively, in the presence of the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Teodoro. In addition, ASDF and GSDF also provided education for personnel of the Philippine Air Force along with this transfer project. Japan and Vietnam signed the Terms of Reference (TOR) for regular consultations concerning defense equipment and technology cooperation at the JapanVietnam Defense Vice-Ministerial Level Meeting in ATLA’s booth at LIMA 2023 November 2016. Concerning the specific fields of cooperation, the Memorandum between Japan and Vietnam Defense Authorities on the Orientation of Promotion of Defense Industry Cooperation was signed during the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting in May 2019. Following this, during then Minister of Defense Kishi’s visit to Vietnam in September 2021, **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** VOICE **Acceptance of the Japanese-made Air Surveillance Radar Systems (Voice from the** **Wing Commander, 580th Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Philippine Air Force)** **Brigadier General Ronie D Petinglay, Wing Commander, 580th Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Philippine Air Force** In October 2023 and March 2024, the first and second units the Philippines’ sovereign territory, territorial waters, and airspace of the Japanese-made air surveillance radar system were handed and will improve the maritime and air capabilities of the Philippine over to the Philippine Air Force, and we held the Acceptance, Armed Forces, enabling us to further contribute to peace and Turnover and Blessing Ceremonies. I am pleased that this is stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan is a strategic partner for Japan’s first transfer of finished equipment to overseas, and I view the Philippines, and I hope we can further strengthen cooperation this transfer as a symbol of cooperation between Japan and the between our two countries based on the relationship of trust built Philippines. through this transfer. The successful journey to the commemorative ceremony was made possible by the trust built through close coordination among the Philippine Air Force, the Japanese government, and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Inc., including series of mutual visits and face-to-face discussions between officials from both countries. In addition, JASDF and JGSDF also trained the Philippine Air Force radar personnel, which helped them acquire knowledge about the radar and deepened the relationship between each service. The Philippines need to cooperate with like-minded countries against any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the South China Sea. In this context, I believe that the Japanese- made air surveillance radar systems will contribute to defending Brigadier General Petinglay ----- the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[26] was signed by both countries and went into effect. In December 2023, the delivery of technology of anti-corrosion pre-treatment processing for equipment was completed under a contract concluded between the Vietnamese side and a Japanese company, which was indicated as required by the Vietnamese military. With Malaysia, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[27] was signed and went into effect in April 2018. In May 2023, ATLA exhibited a booth at the Langkawi International Maritime Aerospace Exhibition 2023 (LIMA 2023) and introduced their equipment by cooperation with the MSDF destroyer “Kumano” that participated in this exhibition as well. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-8 (Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)) **See** **(10) Middle Eastern Countries** The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[28] was signed between Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in May 2023, which is the first time for Japan to sign this type of agreement with a country in the Middle East region. The Agreement entered into force in January 2024. Israel and Japan signed a Memorandum on Protection of Information for the Exchange of Classified Information on Defense Equipment and Technology[29] in September 2019 to ensure the appropriate protection of such classified information provided between Japanese and Israeli defense authorities. With regard to Jordan, Japan loaned a retired GSDF Type-61 main battle tank without charge to Jordan in 2019, while an armored vehicle developed in Jordan was donated to the GSDF by Jordan. In response to this exchange, a ceremony was held at the MOD, where a memorandum of understanding was signed and exchanged. The GSDF Type-61 main battle tank loaned to Jordan was then unveiled at the Jordan Royal Tank Museum along with the installation of an explanatory panel. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-11 (6) (United Arab Emirates (UAE)); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-11 (7) (Israel), Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-11 (7) (Jordan) **2** **Provision of Defense Equipment to** **Developing Countries** Surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment, it has become even more important for Japan that the nations which have a cooperative and friendly relationship with Japan in terms of security and defense have appropriate capabilities. It is also critical to develop a foundation that will serve as the basis for the international community to cooperate towards improving the security environment. Among these friendly nations, some have difficulties in acquiring an adequate level of defense equipment on their own because of the scale of their economy and fiscal situation. Some of these states have been requesting to use SDF equipment that is no longer in use. Under these circumstances, to respond to the needs of such friendly nations, the MOD established a special provision under Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act[30] in the SDF Law, which came into force in June 2017. The provision enables the MOD to grant or transfer SDF equipment that is no longer in use to the governments of developing states at a lower price than the current price. Even in the case of granting or transferring equipment at a lower price than the current price as per this provision, whether or not to transfer such equipment, and to which government such equipment is to be transferred, will be determined case-by-case in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and other regulations. In addition, the Government of Japan and partner countries must conclude an international agreement to prevent extra-purpose use and transfer to third-parties without the prior consent of Japan. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **26 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** **27 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Malaysia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology** **28 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Arab Emirates concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** **29 Memorandum on Protection of Information for the Exchange of Classified Information on Defense Equipment and Technology between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of** Defense of the State of Israel **30 Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act (Act No. 34 of 1947) states that governmental assets, unless otherwise provided for, may not be exchanged and used as other means of** ----- ATLA Booth at INDO PACIFIC 2023 ATLA Booth at Singapore Airshow 2024 **5** **Other Initiatives for Defense Equipment and Technical Cooperation** capabilities through the exhibition of ships, their **1 �Participation in International Defense** components, aircraft, radar, satellites, etc. **Equipment Exhibitions** In addition, at “Singapore Airshow 2024” held in ATLA participates in international defense equipment Singapore in February 2024, we exhibited aircraft exhibitions to introduce Japan’s defense equipment models, components, and other related materials. policies and advanced technology. These initiatives help By meeting government and business officials from foreign government officials to better understand Japan’s various countries, we demonstrated our commitment equipment policies and technology, and contribute to to promoting the transfer of defense equipment and build bases for the promotion of defense equipment and technology through joint public and private efforts. technology cooperation. At “LIMA 2023,” held in Malaysia in May 2023, **2 �Public-Private Collaboration for Appropriate** we exhibited ships, their components, and aircraft **Overseas Transfer of Equipment** considering Japan’s cooperative relationship as a neighboring country, and for the purpose to transfer With regard to the overseas transfer of defense equipment in the field of HA/DR based on the past equipment, the DBP states that the Government will take achievements in international disaster relief activities, the lead in promoting the appropriate overseas transfer as well as in the field of transportation (maritime and of defense equipment and technology under further air) and surveillance as a maritime nation in the Indo- cooperation between the public and private sectors. In **Part** Pacific region like our country. In light of the fact that cooperation with trading companies and manufacturing **Ⅳ** international joint development and production of companies, ATLA has conducted Feasibility Studies to equipment has become mainstream, Japan’s exhibition grasp the potential needs of target countries and carried **Chapter** **1** at DSEI London 2023 held in the United Kingdom in out activities to solicit proposals since FY2020. As a September of the same year focused on creating a broader matter of fact, this study realized the transfer of Japan’s appeal through its superior technological capabilities technology of anti-corrosion pre-treatment processing to at the component level, including the components Vietnam in December 2023. of radars, combat vehicles, ships, aircraft, and AI The ATLA has held the Defense Industry Forum, in technology. This concept was created based on the idea which defense authorities and companies from both of actively pursuing cooperation not only through the countries meet to exchange views on the overseas transfer of finished products but also through the supply transfer of defense equipment between Japan and the of components and parts. partner country, with six countries so far: Indonesia Furthermore, at “INDO PACIFIC 2023,” held in (held in August 2017), India, Vietnam, Australia, Italy, Australia in November of the same year, we widely and the Philippines. di i t d i f ti b t hi h t h l i l A t f th ATLA’ ff t t h k l d ----- within the public and private sectors regarding overseas transfers to other countries, it holds webinars on the overseas transfer of defense equipment in Japan to create opportunities for learning about cases from the private business sector involving other countries and the current status of defense equipment and technology cooperation. In 2020-2022, we conducted webinars on business practices in India, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Besides holding webinars for India, Vietnam, and Malaysia since its first webinar in December 2020, the MOD also held a webinar in October 2022 on the systems and experiences of equipment exporters in the western countries with extensive experience in the export of equipment. In December 2023, a webinar was conducted on effectively utilizing international exhibitions. Additionally, the ATLA developed a portal site in March 2022 designed to provide a platform for sharing information on the overseas transfer of defense equipment between the public and private sectors, which has long been requested by the defense industry. The portal site provides information on countries’ procurement systems and Japan’s defense equipment transfer system for defense-related companies that are working on overseas transfers. **3 �Preventing Leakage of Key Technologies for** **Defense Equipment** In promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation internationally, the MOD will work to strengthen defense industrial security and the management of sensitive technologies and intellectual property in order to prevent the leakage of key technologies for defense equipment. **See** Section 1-1-2 (3) (Protecting the Confidential of Defense Equipment); Section 1-2-4 (Strengthening Defense Industrial Security); Section 1-2-5 (Strengthening Sensitive Technology Management) **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE : Guides and promotional videos (in English) disseminated overseas by ATLA to promote defense** equipment and technology cooperation **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/en/policy/defense equipment.html#guides and movies** ----- **Section 4** **Equipment Optimization Efforts** **1** **Initiatives for Construction of Optimized Equipment Structure** In order to acquire sufficient capabilities for cross- islands and for countering guerillas and special forces domain operations in view of the aging population with will be maintained by arming existing helicopters, etc. a declining birth rate and the severe fiscal situation, it The MSDF will review the number of P-1 fixed- is essential to further promote initiatives to optimize wing patrol aircraft to acquire in conjunction with the equipment structure. acquisition of long-endurance UAVs to enhance offshore The DBP stipulates the suspension of use of equipment surveillance capabilities over a wider sea area. The MSDF whose importance has decreased and the review of will also revise the number of SH-60L patrol helicopters projects with low cost-effectiveness. In particular, with to procure due to a review of the shipboard requirements, regard to the GSDF, in order to optimize the air structure, including equipping Izumo-class destroyers with F-35B the air units of divisions and brigades will be abolished fighter aircraft. In addition, the U-36A multi-purpose with some exceptions, and helicopter functions will aircraft will be discontinued since its training support be concentrated in each district unit. In addition, the will be outsourced to private companies. functions of the AH-1S anti-tank helicopter, AH-64D With regard to the ASDF, in order to optimize aircraft combat helicopter, and OH-1 observation helicopter types, the use of the U-125A search and rescue aircraft will be transferred to utility/attack unmanned aerial and other aircraft tasked with initial response will be vehicles (UAVs) and reconnaissance UAVs, and the use discontinued with the introduction of a new type of of these helicopters will be discontinued. In doing so, the emergency locator transmitter that can easily locate minimum functions necessary for the defense of remote survivors. **2** **Initiatives to Make the Most of Limited Human Resources (Labor-Saving and Automation)** In view of the severe security environment surrounding support manned naval vessels will begin in FY2024 Japan and the rapid development of the aging population to enhance operational functions. In addition, the with a declining birth rate, it is important to maximize development of unmanned amphibious vehicles that can defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited act autonomously in amphibious operations and perform human resources to the utmost. In view of the severe missions such as transporting supplies from the sea to security environment surrounding Japan and the rapid the vicinity of troops will begin in FY2024, along with development of the aging population with a declining research and development on combat support UAVs that birth rate, it is important to maximize defense capability will be collaborating with manned aircraft such as the **Part** by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to next-generation fighter aircraft. **Ⅳ** the utmost. **Chapter** **1** **1** **Initiatives for Automation** The DBP calls for reviewing existing equipment systems and personnel assignments in order to promote unmanned and labor-saving defense equipment. Therefore, in the underwater domain, research on stealthy, combat- supporting, multi-purpose unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) that selectively carry functions such as warning and surveillance and launching of anti-ship missiles to Illustration of combat support type multi-purpose USV ----- |Semi-Major Programs Designated|Semi-Major Programs Designated| |---|---| |for Project Management (2017) New ship-to-air missile (Note) New air-to-ship guided missile for patrol aircrafts (Note) 米宇宙軍 Space Situational Awareness System (Note)|for Project Management (2019) New anti-ship missiles for the defense of remote islands (Note) UUV with convertible mission module (Note)| ||| |Semi-Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2020)|| |ASM-3 (Advanced) (Note) Next-generation warning and control radar devices (Note) Type-19 155mm wheeled Type-10 tanks howitzers self-propelled Minesweeper (Awaji-class)|| |Semi-priority controlled equipment (FY 2021) Patrol Vessels (Note) RC-2|| |Col1|Col2|Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2015)|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |SM-3 Block IIA SurfT ay cp ee -- t0 o-3 A M ir e Md ii su sm ile-R (man og de ifi ed) Global Hawk Amphib (Aio Au Vs 7 v )ehicle (N Me ow g ad mes i-tr co laye ssr ) GSDF UH-2 Osprey (upgraS dH ed-6 c0 aL p ability) P-1 C-2 F-35A Future Fighter Aircraft (Note)||||||||| ||Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2018) Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2019) Type-16 mobile KC-46A E-2D Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile for combat vehicles the defense of remote islands (Note)|||||||| |Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2017)|||Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2019) Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile for the defense of remote islands (Note)||||Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2019)|| |FY2017 submarine (Taigei-class)||||||||| |Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2020) F-35B Stand-off electronic Aegis System Upgraded Type-12 SSM warfare aircraft (Note) Equipped Vessel (Note) (surface-, ship-, and air-launched variants) (Note)|Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2020)||||Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2021) F-15 capabilities improvement (Note)|||| |Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2023) Guided missile system Hypersonic missiles (Note) for H thyp e e dr e V fee nlo sc eit y o fG rl eid min og te P ir so laje nc dti sle (Note) for combating HGVs (Note) Tomahawk (Note) Subm Ma ir sin se ile L sa (Nu on tec )hed SuU rp fg acra ed -e tod - ATy irp Me- i0 ss3 i leM (e mdi ou dm ifi- eR da )n ) (g Ne ot e) Target observation rounds (Note) Future Railgun (Note) Controlled test UUV (Note) AMV SDA satellite system (Note) (armored personnel carrier) (Note)||||||||| continuation of research on technologies related to **2** **Initiatives for Manpower Saving** USVs in order to further reduce personnel and achieve The DBP stipulates increasing the number of labor- unmanned waterborne vessels. saving frigates (FFM)[1] at an early date, as well as the **3** **Project Management throughout Equipment Life Cycle** to establish a systematic management to realize the **1 �Acquisition of Defense Equipment through** streamlining in order to efficiently acquire equipment of **Focused Project Management** assured quality at appropriate cost in a required timeline As defense equipment is becoming more sophisticated and as planned. Therefore, since the establishment of ATLA complex, its entire life cycle (concept study, research and in October 2015, ATLA undertakes project management development, mass production, deployment, operation throughout the life cycle of equipment upon selecting and maintenance) cost has a tendency to increase in recent important equipment, and promotes efforts to realize the years. It has become extremely important to streamline optimized equipment acquisition. acquisition throughout the life cycle of equipment and Specifically, the MOD has selected 33 designated Fig. IV-1-4-1 Equipment of Major Programs and Semi-Major Programs Designated for Project Management Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2015) Semi-Major Programs Designated Semi-Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2017) for Project Management (2019) SM-3 Block IIA Surface-to-Air Missile (modified)Type-03 Medium-Range Global Hawk Amphibious vehicle (AAV7) (Mogami-class)New destroyer GSDF UH-2 New ship-to-air missile[ (Note)] the defense of remote islandsNew anti-ship missiles for[ (Note)] New air-to-ship guided missile for patrol aircrafts[ (Note)] 米宇宙軍 UUV with convertible mission module[ (Note)] Osprey (upgraded capability)SH-60L P-1 C-2 F-35A Future Fighter Aircraft[ (Note)] Space Situational Awareness System[ (Note)] Major Programs Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2018) Major Programs Designated Semi-Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2020) Designated for Project for Project Management (2019) Management (2017) ASM-3 (Advanced)[ (Note)] FY2017 submarine(Taigei-class) Type-16 mobile combat vehicles KC-46A E-2D Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile for the defense of remote islands[ (Note)] Next-generation warning and control radar devices[ (Note)] Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2020) Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2021) Type-19 155mm wheeled Type-10 tanks howitzers self-propelled **Part** F-35B Stand-off electronic Aegis System Upgraded Type-12 SSM **Ⅳ** warfare aircraft[ (Note)] Equipped Vessel[ (Note)] and air-launched variants)(surface-, ship-, [ (Note)] F-15 capabilities improvement[ (Note)] Minesweeper (Awaji-class) **Chapter** Major Programs Designated for Project Management (2023) Semi-priority controlled equipment (FY 2021) **1** Guided missile system Hypersonic missiles[ (Note)] for the defense of remote islandsHyper Velocity Gliding Projectile[ (Note)] for combating HGVs[ (Note)] Tomahawk[ (Note)] Submarine Launched Missiles[ (Note)] Surface-to-Air Missile (modified))Upgraded Type-03 Medium-Range [ (Note)] Patrol Vessels[ (Note)] RC-2 Images marked with (Note) are Target observation rounds[ (Note)] Future Railgun[ (Note)] Controlled test UUV[ (Note)] AMV SDA satellite system[ (Note)] computer-generated images. (armored personnel carrier)[ (Note)] **REFERENCE : Project management** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/soubiseisaku_project.html** ----- items for major programs designated for project the MOD promotes the introduction of a management management and 12 items for semi-major programs for method to visualize the progress of work and cost project management[2] as of the end of March 2024. For generated by component (WBS).[3] Since April 2020, major programs designated for project management, the efforts have been made for the public and private sectors MOD designates a Project Manager (PM) dedicated to to jointly manage costs and schedules through the use each specific major program, following which project of an incentivized risk-sharing management contract management for that program is conducted by an system, which allows for the early detection of cost Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is composed of increases and schedule delays and for action to be taken officials from relevant divisions within the MOD. promptly. For each of the 45 major and semi-major programs **b. Method for More Accurate Cost Estimate** designated for project management as of the end of Life cycle cost has been estimated based on actual cost March 2024, the MOD has formulated an Acquisition data of similar equipment developed or introduced in the Strategy and an Acquisition Plan (Designated Item past. However, as a larger amount of cost data is needed Plans), which specify the basic matters necessary to for a more accurate estimate, the MOD promotes the systematically implement project management until the establishment of a cost database by collecting cost data present, such as the purpose of the acquisition program, and accumulating them into a database. acquisition policy, and life cycle cost. **c. Accumulation and Development of Expertise** Furthermore, in principle, ATLA annually reviews the For further improving the management skills of PMs and implementation status of the Designated Item Plans and enhancing human resources among those who engage in endeavors to promote appropriate project management project management, the MOD provides opportunities to that reflects the latest status by conducting analysis study project management methods from overseas and and evaluation, on the basis of which the Designated the private sector on a regular basis. Item Plans are reviewed as necessary. In August 2023, analysis and evaluation of the acquisition program were **(2) Future Initiatives** implemented for the 34 major and semi-major programs In order to further promote effective and efficient which had been designated for project management. equipment acquisition, the MOD needs to enhance the **See** Fig. IV-1-4-1 (Equipment of Major Programs and Semi-Major effectiveness and flexibility of project management Programs Designated for Project Management) throughout equipment life cycles. Therefore, the DBP stipulates that further efforts for effective and efficient acquisition of equipment will include cost reduction **2 �Initiatives to Promote and Strengthen** through planned and stable acquisition of equipment **Project Management** by expanding the application of long-term contracts, **(1) Past Initiatives** improving the predictability of companies and promoting The following initiatives have been implemented to efficient production, procurement in consideration of the **Part** promote and strengthen project management. supply-demand situation of equipment including that **Ⅳ** **a. Cost and Schedule Management Using WBS (Work** of other countries, and narrowing down the SDF’s own **Chapter** **Breakdown Structure)** unique specifications that cause costs to rise. **1** For certain kinds of equipment, etc., produced in Japan, **4** **Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters** surroundings, the MOD has been reviewing acquisition **1** **Reviewing Acquisition Systems** systems through meetings of the Comprehensive In order to promptly respond to changes in the Acquisition Reform Committee since 2007 and the **2** A semi-major program is an acquisition project of a specific equipment with a limited application of project management without the designation of a PM or IPT but which focuses on the risks in functions, performance, costs, schedules, and other risk factors in a manner equivalent to the case of equipment of major programs designated for project management. **3** WBS is a hierarchical structure used to implement project management that systematically divides the project into manageable units, for which the schedule and cost of each deliverable ----- Contract Systems Study Group comprising experts since lower equipment procurement costs by reducing risks 2010. Since FY2016, a special research officer system[4] for the parties taking orders and by promoting the entry has been adopted to properly implement the review of new suppliers, can be obtained. results in practice. In addition, regarding the procurement of certain equipment for which little competitiveness can be expected due to its characteristics, and for companies **2** **Long-Term Contracts, etc.** that work on cost reduction by utilizing the MOD’s The production of defense equipment requires a programs, the MOD ensures transparency and fairness significant amount of time. Therefore, if a certain amount and promotes the appropriate use of limited tendering is to be procured in bulk, a contract for more than five contracts after clarifying and categorizing the targets, years is needed in many cases. With regard to defense with a view to implementing prompt and efficient equipment and services, economies of scale[5] tend not to procurement and enhancing predictability for companies. work mainly due to the following reasons: (1) the MOD is the only customer; and (2) companies that provide **3 �Measures to Lower Procurement Costs and** such defense equipment, etc., are limited. In addition, it **Incentivize Companies to Reduce Cost** is difficult for companies to systematically move forward with their businesses with a high degree of predictability, With regard to the procurement of defense equipment, a trait that is peculiar to the defense industry. the cost is tending to increase because a large variety For these reasons, although the period of expenditure of equipment has no market price. Based on those for acts that incur national debt is limited to five years in characteristics, it is necessary to achieve both the principle under the Public Finance Act, this period has reduction of procurement cost and improvement of been extended to a maximum of ten years for specific companies’ incentives to reduce cost simultaneously. equipment through the enactment of the Long-term In order to achieve this, ATLA has applied the Contract Act.[6] The introduction of this change regarding incentivized risk-sharing management contract system long-term contracts will make stable procurement to the next-generation fighter aircraft project and the possible, leading to the realization of the systematic stand-off electronic warfare aircraft project since April improvement of defense capability. At the same time, for 2020, under which the public and private sectors jointly companies, given that the procurement amount will be manage the performance and progress of the contract and assured, the systematic use of personnel and equipment, the cost, with a certain percentage of any cost reduction as well as cost reductions due to bulk orders, will be achieved awarded to the contractor. In addition, a made possible. system to provide incentives for cost reductions has In addition, by implementing longer-term, multiple- also been implemented from the same month in order year contracts utilizing the Private Finance Initiative to evaluate the companies’ own cost reduction efforts. **Part** (PFI) Act,[7] the planned acquisition and execution of The expansion of its scope of application and other **Ⅳ** budgets is achieved through the equalization of national approaches to encouraging such efforts are constantly expenditure. At the same time, certain benefits, such as being considered. **Chapter** **1** **5** **Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement and Other Related Initiatives** equipment, the MOD has been working to improve **1 �Effective and Efficient Maintenance and** efficiency by extending the maintenance interval, after **Replenishment** making sufficient efforts to ensure safety. Moreover, With regard to periodic maintenance of defense the MOD is working to expand umbrella contracts such **4** This is a system of conducting research that contributes to the procurement system of equipment by inviting experts, such as associate professors from universities specializing in the areas of concern, on a part-time basis to effectively review the procurement system based not only on the viewpoints of MOD personnel involved in actual operations but also on theories proposed in the fields of business administration and economics. **5** “Economies of scale” refer to the cost advantage that arises from an increased output of a product. For example, the cost per unit can be reduced with the bulk purchase of materials. **6** “Special Measures Law Concerning the Term of Expenditure Based on the Obligatory Assurance of National Subsidization for Specific Defense Procurement” (enacted in April 2015. Made permanent by an amendment in March 2024.) ----- as Performance Based Logistics (PBL) with a view to promote the enhancement of fairness and transparency to improving the number of operationally available in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials. equipment and keeping long-term costs under control. As part of its efforts to achieve more appropriate public procurement across the whole government, the MOD continues to carry out the introduction and **2 �Achieving Further Efficiency in the** expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding **Acquisition of Defense Equipment** system[9] and make bidding procedures more efficient. In procuring equipment, by properly combining the In addition to these, based on the lessons learned from introduction of new, high performance equipment, past incidents such as overcharging and falsification along with life extension and improvement of existing of the results of equipment testing by defense-related equipment, the MOD/SDF will efficiently secure companies, measures such as strengthening system necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of defense investigation, reviewing penalties, and ensuring the capability. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strengthen effectiveness of supervision and inspection have been its project management throughout its equipment life- steadily implemented to prevent the recurrence of such cycle, including during its research and development incidents. Through these measures, the MOD strives to activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost- prevent the recurrence of misconduct, enhance fairness effectiveness. In addition, by incorporating advanced and transparency, and ensure proper contracting. civilian technologies, the MOD/SDF will steadily In addition, ATLA carries out multilayered checks realize acceleration of defense equipment deployment on the contracts it administers through both internal for areas that could directly affect the SDF’s current and and external checking systems and checks and balances future ways of warfare and are particularly urgent and within the organization. Specifically, ATLA will further significant from a policy perspective. enhance internal inspections by the Inspection and Audit **See** Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-4 (Optimization Efforts); Section Department as well as defense inspections conducted 2-4-4 (New Measures for Early Deployment) by the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance and deliberations by the Defense Procurement Council, which is composed of external experts. Moreover, ATLA **3 �Efforts to Increase Fairness and** has also improved its education department and strives **Transparency** to enhance compliance awareness by providing thorough The MOD implements measures for making contracts education pertaining to compliance for ATLA personnel. more appropriate and strengthening checking functions **6** **Advancing Initiatives Aimed at Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement** **1** **Streamlining Initiatives** such as late delivery and late case closure. As the FMS **Part** procurement amount is hovering at a high level in recent **Ⅳ** FMS (Foreign Military Sales) is a form of U.S. security years, the governments of Japan and the U.S. have been **Chapter** assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act actively working together to make improvements in **1** (AECA), etc., that enables U.S. allies and partners to these issues. purchase defense equipment and services from the U.S. Specifically, ATLA and Defense Security Cooperation government. the characteristics of FMS include: (1) Agency (DSCA) have held the Security Cooperation prices are estimates, (2) payments are made in advance Consultative Meeting (SCCM) to discuss the issues over in principle and balanced out after fulfillment, and (3) FMS procurement eight times since 2016. delivery dates are estimates. FMS is critical to reinforcing At the 8th SCCM held in January 2024, Japan and the defense capabilities of Japan. the United States agreed to continue strengthening case Meanwhile, there are FMS-related various issues, management between them in terms of late delivery **8** Comprehensive contracts to improve the number of operational availability and to achieve long-term cost containment **9** Unlike the automatic bid system, which focuses only on price, this is a system in which the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of both the price ----- October 2023 to create matching opportunities with the U.S. Forces in Japan and the U.S. defense industry in order to encourage Japanese companies to participate in the equipment supply chains common to both Japan and the United States as well as in the sustainment and maintenance programs of the U.S. Forces in the IndoPacific region. Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake inspects Industry Day (second from left) (October 2023) and late case closures in view of the increase of FMS procurement going forward, and to advance efforts aimed at reducing the number of late deliveries and late case closures while improving the transparency in pricing. In addition, in April 2023, ATLA and the U.S. Department of Defense concluded a framework to confirm reciprocal and free-of-charge quality assurance services for equipment, etc. This framework exempts quality assurance fee for FMS procurement, which reduces FMS procurement costs and strengthens collaborative relations within Japan-the U.S. Alliance in procurement, thereby advancing the effectiveness of FMS procurement. **2** **Other Initiatives** With regard to imported procured equipment, including equipment procured through foreign military sales (FMS), Japan intends to pursue the sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment by Japanese companies and further promote international joint research and development of high-capability equipment with the United States and other countries. As part of these efforts, an exhibition (Industry Day) was held in Fig. Ⅳ-1-4-2 Advancing Initiatives Aimed at Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 Fig. Ⅳ-1-4-2 (Advancing Initiatives Aimed at Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement; Section 1-2-2(3) (Industry Day) **See** (Unit: 100 million yen) **Major equipment acquired through FMS** [Ground Self-Defense Force] V-22 Osprey [Maritime Self-Defense Force] SM-6 SM-3 Block IB SM-3 Block IIA Tomahawk [Air Self-Defense Force] F-15 fighter jet (capabilities improvement) F-35A fighter jet F-35B fighter jet AIM-120 (air-to-air missile) KC-46A aerial refueling/transport aircraft E-2D airborne early warning aircraft Global Hawk **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** 14,768 9,316 7,013 4,713 3,797 2,543 2019 budget 2020 budget 2021 budget 2022 budget 2023 budget 2024 budget **○[Reference] Examples of FMS procurement** - The amount of FMS F-35B fighter jet F-35A fighter jet E-2 airborne early warning aircraft SM-3 Block IIA [Lockheed Martin] [Lockheed Martin] [Northrop Grumman] [Raytheon] FY2024 budget: 112 billion yen FY2024 budget: 128.2 billion yen FY2024 budget: 194.1 billion yen FY2024 budget: 69.9 billion yen ----- **Section 5** **Initiatives for Economic Security** The National Security Strategy states that economic to comprehensively, effectively, and intensively security is to ensure Japan’s national interests, such as execute necessary economic measures to enhance peace, security, and economic prosperity, by carrying Japan’s autonomy and to secure the superiority and out economic measures. In the face of various threats indispensability concerning our technologies and others. imposed through economic means, Japan needs **1** **Developments within the Japanese Government** To date, Japan has promoted initiatives that contribute to K Program implements research and development strengthening economic security within its existing legal projects on advanced technologies, including Artificial framework. Intelligence (AI), quantum technology, and others, to In May 2022, the Economic Security Promotion Act[1] meet the country’s needs. The results of the research are was established to comprehensively and effectively intended for not only for civilian use but also for public promote economic measures related to ensuring national use, including for national security. The key technologies security. The act developed frameworks for strengthening to be supported by the K Program are defined in the the resiliency of supply chains, ensuring the safety R&D vision. In 2023, the Research and Development and reliability of critical infrastructure, public-private Vision (Second Round) was decided to reinforce and collaboration on important cutting-edge technologies, complement the Research and Development Vision and non-disclosure of selected patent applications. (First Round) by particularly strengthening efforts In May 2024, systems for the non-disclosure of in the cyberspace and other areas, and research and patent applications and core infrastructure became development began in sequence. In addition, regarding operational, and all systems stipulated by the law were the security clearance system in the economic security put into operation. Various measures related to economic field, a bill on the protection and utilization of critical security are constantly being reviewed and revised. For economic security information was approved by the example, in December 2022, 11 resources including Cabinet and submitted to the Diet in February 2024, semiconductors and batteries were designated as specific which was enacted as a law in May of the same year. important resources to strengthen the resiliency of Furthermore, interest in economic intimidation has supply chains, and efforts are underway to secure their increased in recent years, and various discussions have stable supply. In February 2024, new initiatives were been held on this topic. At the G7 Hiroshima Summit also implemented, such as the designation of advanced held in May 2023, it was confirmed that a “Coordination electronic components (capacitors, high-frequency Platform against Economic Coercion” would be filters) as important resources (bringing the total to 12) established for responding to economic intimidation, **Part** and adding uranium as a target mineral to the list of and cooperation with allied and like-minded countries **Ⅳ** designated important minerals. would be promoted. **Chapter** The Key and Advanced Technology R&D through **See** Section 2-4-1 (Technology Cooperation with Relevant Domestic and Overseas Entities and Collaboration with **1** Cross Community Collaboration Program (K Program) Relevant Ministries and Agencies) is led by the relevant ministries and agencies. The **2** **Initiatives of the MOD** As inter-state competition intensifies in domains that and fostering advanced technologies as well as cross the border between security and the economy, it maintaining and reinforcing Japan’s defense production is extremely important to enhance Japan’s autonomy and technology bases as a virtually integral part of and safeguard Japan’s superiority and indispensability defense capability in accordance with the NDS. through economic security measures, such as preserving The MOD, as the government agency in charge ----- of security, actively participates in government wide initiatives by sharing its knowledge and needs related to maintaining and reinforcing Japan’s defense production and technology bases, which has been amassed over the years. Specifically, in addition to dispatching personnel to the Office of the Director-General for Economic Security in the Cabinet Office, the MOD contributes to resolve economic security challenges by fundamentally strengthening its internal systems, including the expansion of its staff, to proactively offer its knowledge and needs related to security to government-wide initiatives. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** ----- **of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities** **Chapter** **2** **Section 1** **Reinforcing Human Resource Base** The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. To demonstrate defense capability, the MOD/SDF will secure the necessary personnel and reinforce the human resource base to create an environment that enables all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while maintaining high morale and pride. In light of severe recruitment environment of SDF personnel the changes taking place across the entire society, such as trends in the private-sector labor market and changing attitudes toward working styles, need to be taken into consideration when considering measures to reinforcing the human resource base of the SDF. Given these circumstances, an “Expert Panel on Reinforcing Expert Panel on Reinforcing the Human Resource Base of the MOD/SDF (January 2024) the Human Resource Base of the MOD/SDF” consisting of experts from outside the MOD was established in SDF personnel has to be taken more broadly and in more February 2023 under the purview of the Minister of detail than ever before. Defense, to increase the effectiveness of measures for Based on these recommendations, at the 7th review reinforcing the human resource base. After discussions meeting in January 2024, the MOD made a report on the at six review meetings, a report was compiled in July progress of various measures aimed at securing diverse of the same year which recommended that to ensure human resources, including those from outside the SDF, the sustainability of Japan’s defense capabilities even and promoting active participation throughout the life in a society with a declining birthrate and a declining cycle of SDF personnel. Experts have expressed their population, measures like securing diverse human opinions on future issues, and based on these opinions, resources, including those from outside SDF, and measures to strengthen the human resources base will be effective measures throughout the entire life cycle of proceeded with. **1** **Enhancing Recruitment Efforts** **Part** resources, and the number of recruitments in FY2023, **1** **Recruitment** **Ⅳ** especially for the so-called “shi”(E1-E3) candidates for **Chapter** In order for the MOD/SDF to execute their various uniformed SDF personnel and general candidates for **2** missions properly, it is vital to stably secure excellent enlistment (Upper), decreased by approximately 1,900 human resources even in the severe recruiting compared to FY2022, which is cause for great concern. environment with a decreasing number of people eligible For this reason, it is necessary to recruit those with a for recruitment due to a declining birth rate. There is strong desire to join the SDF by sufficiently explaining an increasingly fierce competition to secure human to potential applicants the missions, roles, and duties of **REFERENCE : The Report of the Expert Panel on Reinforcing the Human Resource Base of the MOD/SDF (Japanese Only)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/meeting/kiban/index.html** ----- the SDF. To strengthen the recruitment capabilities, the MOD/ SDF is promoting digitalization and online dissemination of recruitment PR materials, dissemination of information via SNS, and partial adoption of online recruitment examinations for candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and general candidates for enlistment (Upper). In addition, the Provincial Cooperation Offices based in 50 locations throughout Japan, have been enhancing their recruitment system by increasing the number of part-time staff in FY2023, recruiting and employing uniformed SDF personnel, etc., attentively and perseveringly with the cooperation of obtaining local governments, schools, recruitment counselors, and others. Moreover, local governments carry out some of the administrative activities regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, including announcing the recruitment period and promoting the SDF as a workplace, with the MOD bearing the requisite cost. At the same time, the MOD is strengthening collaboration with local governments to ensure necessary cooperation, including information provision on recruitment targets, which is indispensable for smooth administrative activities regarding recruitment. **2** **Employment** Briefing session on the various duties of the SDF at an SDF Provincial Cooperation Office Defense Force Scholarship System”, and in an effort to enhance and improve the system, the eligible educational institutions and academic fields have been expanded so that qualified human resources can be secured at an early stage based on the DBP. Furthermore, in terms of utilizing human resources from the private sector, efforts have been made to strengthen mid-career recruitment, including recruiting mid-career executives with national qualifications and licenses for specialized skills and recruiting more former uniformed SDF personnel who had retired mid-career. In addition, a bill was submitted to the Diet in February 2024 and passed in May of the same year for the introduction of a Fixed-Term Uniformed SDF personnel System, under which highly skilled individuals from outside the MOD/SDF with specialized knowledge and skills in domains such as cyberspace will be hired as uniformed SDF personnel for a term of up to five years. Personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of general civilian government employees[2] due to the need to maintain the SDF’s strength. With consideration given to the knowledge, experience, physical strength, and other factors necessary to perform the duties of the respective ranks, the SDF has an “Early Retirement System” where the majority of uniformed personnel retire after their mid-50s and a “Fixed-Term System” where one term lasts two or three years. **(1) Uniformed SDF Personnel** Based on a voluntary system that respects individuals’ free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories. The upper age limit for the recruitment of candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and general candidates for enlistment (Upper) was raised in 2018 from “under 27” to “under 33” in order to secure diverse human resources from a broader range, including people with work experience in private companies. Also, the upper age limit for the recruitment of ASDF aviation cadets has been raised from “under 21” to “under 24” starting in FY2024. In addition, the name of the SDF scholarship student system[1] has been changed to “Self **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** A system aimed at securing human resources in academic fields such as science and engineering by providing undergraduate and graduate students who intend to serve in the SDF in the future, and after graduation, will enlist as general officer candidates, with a monthly loan of a fixed amount (54,000 yen/month). In addition to the above requirements, the number of institutions and number of academic fields covered by loans have been expanded, and the name of the system has been changed since FY2024. ----- Fig. IV-2-1-1 Changes in the Number of People Eligible for Recruitment (thousand people) 21,000 18,000 16,000 15,000 13,000 9,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|The number of 27-32 year-olds (thousand people) The number of 18-26 year-olds (thousand people) Approx. 17,430,000 Approx. 17,320,000 The number of 18 year-olds (thousand people) Approx. 15,700,000 Approx. 13,040,000 Approx. 11,130,000 Approx. 10,200,000 Approx. 10,320,000 Approx. 9,170,000 Approx. 7,160,000 Approx. 6,620,000 Approx. 5,970,000 Approx. 1,840,000 Approx. 1,060,000 Approx. 960,000 Approx. 750,000 Approx. 720,000 Approx. 630,000| |---|---| Approx. 10,200,000 Approx. 1,060,000 Approx. 9,170,000 Approx. 960,000 Approx. 7,160,000 Approx. 750,000 Approx. 6,620,000 Approx. 720,000 Approx. 5,970,000 Approx. 630,000 H5 6 R1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 1993 2019 2024 2029 2034 2039 2044 2049 2054 2059 2064 （FY） Material sources: The numbers for FY1993, FY1994 and FY2019 are based on “Population Estimates of Japan 1920 - 2000” and “Current Population Estimates,” Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Data from FY2020 onward are based on “Population Projection for Japan” (medium estimates in April 2024), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. Fig. IV-2-1-2 Status of Recruitment of Candidates for Uniformed SDF Personnel and General candidates for enlistment (Upper) (FY 2014 to FY 2023) Recruitment status of candidates for uniformed SDF personnel Recruitment status of general candidates for enlistment (Upper) Recruitment status of candidates for uniformed SDF personnel Recruitment status of general candidates for enlistment (Upper) Number Plan Number Plan applicants recruits applicants recruits recruits rate recruits rate FY2014 8,595 31,361 8,239 96% FY2014 3,850 31,145 4,436 115% FY2015 8,989 28,137 7,838 87% FY2015 4,420 25,092 4,328 98% FY2016 7,981 29,067 7,610 95% FY2016 4,720 24,312 5,011 106% FY2017 9,404 27,510 7,513 80% FY2017 5,050 29,151 5,044 100% FY2018 9,882 28,145 7,075 72% FY2018 6,300 27,580 6,464 103% FY2019 7,505 28,844 7,359 98% FY2019 6,140 28,310 6,647 108% FY2020 6,280 28,903 6,664 106% FY2020 6,500 29,848 6,744 104% FY2021 6,190 28,272 5,350 86% FY2021 6,510 28,426 6,450 99% FY2022 9,245 23,834 3,988 43% FY2022 6,980 24,841 6,132 88% FY2023 10,628 19,033 3,221 30% FY2023 7,230 19,960 4,969 69% **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** |Col1|Number of planned recruits|Number of applicants|Number of recruits|Plan achievement rate| |---|---|---|---|---| |FY2014|8,595|31,361|8,239|96%| |FY2015|8,989|28,137|7,838|87%| |FY2016|7,981|29,067|7,610|95%| |FY2017|9,404|27,510|7,513|80%| |FY2018|9,882|28,145|7,075|72%| |FY2019|7,505|28,844|7,359|98%| |FY2020|6,280|28,903|6,664|106%| |FY2021|6,190|28,272|5,350|86%| |FY2022|9,245|23,834|3,988|43%| |FY2023|10,628|19,033|3,221|30%| |Col1|Number of planned recruits|Number of applicants|Number of recruits|Plan achievement rate| |---|---|---|---|---| |FY2014|3,850|31,145|4,436|115%| |FY2015|4,420|25,092|4,328|98%| |FY2016|4,720|24,312|5,011|106%| |FY2017|5,050|29,151|5,044|100%| |FY2018|6,300|27,580|6,464|103%| |FY2019|6,140|28,310|6,647|108%| |FY2020|6,500|29,848|6,744|104%| |FY2021|6,510|28,426|6,450|99%| |FY2022|6,980|24,841|6,132|88%| |FY2023|7,230|19,960|4,969|69%| ----- related policy planning in the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, and at the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA),etc.; analysis and evaluation at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH); and administrative works at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country. Technical and engineering officials are engaged in policy planning related to defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.) and physical infrastructure such as defense equipment at the Internal Bureaus of the MOD and ATLA, etc.; analysis and evaluation at the DIH; and constructing various defense facilities, carrying out research and development, efficient procurement, maintenance and development of a range of equipment, providing mental health care for SDF personnel, and other duties at SDF facilities, Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations nationwide. Instructors conduct advanced research on defense and ||Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |General (GSDF, ASDF), Admiral (MSDF) to Second Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Ensign (MSDF)|Officer|||| |Warrant Officer Warrant Officer (Note) 1 Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF) Officer Candidate Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF); Enlisted (upper) Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF); Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF) (Note) 2 Medical Medical Leading Private (GSDF), Major/Chief Division Major/ Division (4 National Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF) Airman First Class (ASDF) Isshi Third year student upon Private Student(3 School High GSDF Personnel system Candidate fixed-term (u)in Personnel SDF two/three Class; Third Airman /Seaman Private as (appoint through Sergeant Class/Staff Third Sergeant/Petty Class; Third Airman /Seaman Private as (appoint enlistment for candidate General 6 about after Ensign Second Class; Third Airman Private/Seaman as (appoint (MSDF, Cadet Aviation graduation) upon Sergeant Master Officer/Senior Petty Sergeant years: (4 student College Defense National Nursing of graduation) upon Sergeant Master Officer/Senior Petty Chief Sergeant years: (6 student College Defense National Medicine of graduation) upon Sergeant Master Officer/Senior Petty Major/Chief Sergeant years: student Academy Defense colleges and universities Civilian Nishi Second year student graduation) years, Technical months] [3 (u) SDF for per years Apprentice/ screening) Officer Apprentice/ (Upper) years) Lieutenant/ Apprentice/ ASDF) term) Leading First year student||||(Note) 1| |||GSDF High Technical School Student(3 years, Lea Private upon graduation||| |First year student||ding )||| Fig. IV-2-1-3 Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel Senior high school, and others **See** Fig. IV 2 1 1 (Changes in the Number of People Eligible for Recruitment); Fig. IV-2-1-2 (Status of recruitment of **See** candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and general candidates for enlistment (Upper) (FY 2014 to FY 2023)); Reference 67 (Authorized and Actual Strengths of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Changes in Them (Over the Past 10 Years)); Reference 68 (Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel) **(2) Civilian officials, Technical and Engineering** **Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel** There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel— civilian officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others—in addition to uniformed SDF personnel in the MOD/SDF.[3] Civilian personnel are mainly recruited from those who have passed the Comprehensive or General Service National Public Employee Recruitment Examinations conducted by the National Personnel Authority (NPA) and those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Ministry of Defense Specialists conducted by the MOD. Civilian officials and others are engaged at defense General (GSDF, ASDF), Admiral (MSDF) to Second Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Ensign (MSDF) Warrant Officer |Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Enlisted (upper)| |---|---| |Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF); Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF); Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)|| Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF) |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Leading Pr Leading Se Airman Firs|iva am t C|te (GSDF), an (MSDF), lass (ASDF)| Isshi Nishi **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** Aged 18 or older and under 33 Junior high school, and others [Legend] : Employment exam : Exam or selection : Non uniformed SDF personnel (not included in authorized strength) (Notes) (1) The graduates from prescribed education and training course are commissioned as a Second Lieutenant (GSDF and ASDF) or an Ensign (MSDF,) while the graduates with master’s degree of civilian universities and colleges passed through the master’s degree graduate exam as well as the graduates from National Defense Medical College School of Medicine, Dental Officer Candidates, and Pharmacist Officer Candidates are commissioned as a First Lieutenant (GSDF and ASDF) or a Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF). (2) Fixed-term enlistees are to engage exclusively in fundamental education and training as non-regular MoD personnel three months from enlistment, in order to enrich their initial education and training from July 2010. Among the employees of the MOD, special national government employees are called “SDF personnel,” including civilian officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others, ----- provide high quality education to SDF personnel at the officials and others necessary to steadily implement the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical DBP. College, National Institute for Defense Studies, and **See** Reference 69 (Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, other organizations. etc.) In addition, efforts are being made to secure the civilian **2** **Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and others** It is essential to secure the required number of uniformed Personnel and take necessary measures to allow such SDF personnel promptly depending on situational employees to attend training sessions for 30 days a changes in the event of a crisis. To secure the required year, by taking into consideration the burden on such number promptly and systematically, the MOD maintains companies. the following three systems[4]: the SDF Reserve Personnel system, the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, and the Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel system. SDF Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel upon issuing a defense call-up order or other orders and carry out logistical support and base guard duties. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel and are assigned to carry out their mission together with active-duty uniformed SDF personnel as part of frontline units following the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders. Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel, some of whom are recruited among those with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel, are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training. The SDF Reserve Personnel in action during the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake Disaster Relief Operations Until now, SDF Reserve Personnel and Ready Reserve Personnel have been summoned during large- Moreover, in order to secure their understanding scale disasters such as earthquakes or typhoons, and the and cooperation regarding the duties of SDF Reserve COVID-19 pandemic. During the 2024 Noto Peninsula Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, companies, Earthquake Disaster Relief Operations, SDF Reserve etc., that employ these personnel are provided with a Personnel and Ready Reserve Personnel qualified as subsidy in the event that (1) SDF Reserve Personnel doctors or nurses were dispatched to provide medical or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel respond to a defense support (mobile medical visits) and daily life support operation call-up order, civil protection dispatch call-up (transportation of goods) in the affected areas. order, or disaster relief call-up order, etc., or if (2) they Since SDF Reserve Personnel and others are engaged have no choice but to leave their regular occupations due **Part** in their respective jobs under normal circumstances, the to injuries during their duties, etc. **Ⅳ** understanding and cooperation of the companies, etc., In addition, a special subsidy for companies that **Chapter** that employ these personnel are essential for them to cooperate with the training of SDF Ready Reserve **2** attend regular training, etc. Personnel is paid to companies, etc., that employ For this purpose, the MOD provides a special subsidy individuals who, after being Candidates for SDF Reserve to the companies that employ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel with no prior experience as uniformed **REFERENCE : Overview of systems related to SDF reserve personnel (Japanese Only)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/reserve/** ----- Fig. IV-2-1-4 Overview of the System for SDF Reserve Personnel and Others **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** |Col1|SDF reserve personnel|SDF ready reserve personnel|Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel| |---|---|---|---| |Basic concept|●Upon the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders, serve as SDF Personnel|●Serve as SDF Personnel in a pre-designated GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability|●Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel in the GSDF or MSDF upon completion of education and training| |Call-up duty and other duties|●Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call- up, training call-up|●Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster callup,training call-up|●Education and training call-up| |Eligibility|●Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel|●Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel|(Common to General and Technical Employment Categories) ●Those with no experience as SDF personnel (including those with less than a year of SDF experience)| |Rank designation|●Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel and former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel; Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle ●Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel • General: Private • Technical: Designated according to skills and length of experience|●Former SDF Personnel and former SDF Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle|●Not designated| |Term of service|●Three Years (continuation of appointment is possible) [Maximum age limit for appointment: Under 65 years] * The age limit has been temporarily lifted for the continuation of appointment of certain SDF Reserve Personnel with specific skills [Common] Medical [GSDF] Maintenance, electricity, construction and radiation management [MSDF] Vessels [ASDF] Language|●Three Years (continuation of appointment is possible [Maximum age limit for appointment: Same as the mandatory retirement age of SDF personnel]|●General: Within three years ●Technical: Within two years| |(Education) Training|●Although the Self-Defense Forces Law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is 5 days per year as a standard|●30 days per year|●General: 50 days within three years (equivalent to Candidate SDF personnel (private level) course) ●Technical: 10 days within two years (training to serve as SDF Personnel by utilizing their special skills)| |Promotion|●Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)|●Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)|●Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion| |Benefits, allowances, and other terms|●Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day* ●SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month * The Training Call-up Allowance of ¥8,300/day supports the training of SDF Reserve Personnel who are former candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel in order for them to become SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.|●Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400-14,200/day ●SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ●Continuous Service Incentive Allowance:  ¥120,000/one term|●Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,800/ day| |Special subsidy for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel|●Special subsidy for companies cooperating with training of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥560,000/ personnel * Provided when an SDF Reserve Personnel who is a former candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as an SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.|●Special subsidy for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month|－| ||●Special subsidy to secure understanding and cooperation from employers regarding the duties of SDF Reserve Personnel: ¥34,000/day||| SDF personnel, are appointed as SDF Ready Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training as SDF Reserve Personnel, and which take the necessary measures to ensure that such employees can attend training sessions with peace of mind. The DBP states that the current system of SDF Reserve Personnel and others will be reviewed so that they can effectively supplement regular uniformed SDF personnel amid the changing operational environment d di if i i i f th SDF Thi ill i l expanding recruitment to include civilians with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel and reviewing age limits, training periods, and other issues. In view of this, the upper age limit for the continued appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel who possess certain skills was abolished in April 2023 on a trial basis, while the age requirement for recruitment of Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel (general), who are recruited among those with no prior experience as uniformed SDF l l d f 18 t 34 t 18 ----- **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** VOICE **Voices from an SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and his Employer** **Ayumi Sou, Sergeant First Class, 13th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Unit, Ready Reserve Self-Defense Force, GSDF** First and foremost, I extend my sincere condolences to all those of special leave designated for training purposes. By coordinating affected by the ‘2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake.’ these days with non-working days and paid leave, I can effectively Prior to my retirement upon completion of service in 2020, I participate in a 30-day training program. Furthermore, my attended a joint job fair for retiring Self-Defense Force personnel. participation in training sessions is accommodatively scheduled The atmosphere of the booth staff was exceptionally positive, and around my shifts, with my branch manager and colleagues the presence of the “Reserve Self-Defense Force Registration demonstrating considerable understanding and support. System” and the “Rent Subsidy System” led me to decide to join While the training is certainly demanding, I maintain that ART MOVING COMPANY. serving as a reserve member of the Self-Defense Force continues After joining the company, I became a Reserve Self-Defense to reinforce the values and significance of caring for others— Force member and then a Ready Reserve Self-Defense Force principles I honed during my active duty. This commitment not member in 2021. only benefits society but also enriches our company. For the annual 30-day training, I avail myself of special leave Thanks to the support of my colleagues, I have been able to under the company’s unique “Training Special Leave System” engage fully in the training program. Having been informed of and participate in training sessions at the Nihonbara Camp for my upcoming promotion to Sergeant in the Ready Reserve Self- 2 to 4 days each month. I can reunite with former colleagues Defense, I am even more determined to diligently balance my and participate in the training with great enjoyment. Thanks to the professional duties and training responsibilities. “Training Special Leave System”, I am eligible for up to 20 days **Takao Honda, Executive Officer, Human Resources Strategy Division, ART MOVING COMPANY** **(Former Sergeant Third Class, 3rd Company, 25th Infantry Regiment, GSDF)** Since our establishment in 1976 as Japan’s first dedicated In 2020, intending to support our employees who are retired moving company, we have attentively heeded our customers’ members of the Self-Defense Force, we implemented a system suggestions, often prefaced with ‘It would be nice if...’ Based on where special leave is granted for training call-ups, and attendance this valuable feedback, we have innovated numerous services, is counted for situations such as disaster dispatches. transforming the moving business from a mere transportation Having been a member of the Self-Defense Force myself endeavor into a comprehensive service industry. In recent years, our and having had various experiences, including ranger training, company has annually recruited approximately 20 new graduates which allowed me to grow, I have a deep attachment to the new from the Self-Defense Force throughout Japan. Currently, we graduates from the Self-Defense Force who join our company. I have six Ready Reserve Self-Defense Force members and eleven will support their achievements after joining, both in terms of their Reserve Self-Defense Force members on our staff. mindset and through our systems. Sergeant So (Ready Reserve Self-Defense Force) expresses his joy after receiving a Mr. Takao Honda, Executive Officer, Human Resources Strategy Division. “thank you” from a customer after completing a moving job. ART MOVING COMPANY ----- |Rank Designation|abbrev.|Retirement Age| |---|---|---| |General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)|Sho|60| |Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)|Shoho|| |Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)|Issa|57| |Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)|Nisa|56| |Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)|Sansa|| |Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)|Ichii|56| |First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)|Nii|| |Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)|Sani|| |Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)|Juni|| |Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Socho|| |Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Isso|| |Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)|Niso|54| |Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)|Sanso|| |Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)|Shicho|－| |Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)|Isshi|| |Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)|Nishi|| to 52 years in January 2024. The appointment of SDF SDF Reserve Personnel and others. Reserve Personnel up to the maximum age allowed Also, the MOD is promoting the use of SDF under the system has also been allowed. The number Reserve Personnel in a wide range of fields, such as the of years within which the completion of education and appointment of retired SDF pilots who are re-employed training for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel in the private sector through the re-employment system can be extended was increased. The government will as SDF Reserve Personnel.[5] continue to review the current system of SDF Reserve **See** Fig. IV-2-1-4 (Overview of the System for SDF Reserve Personnel and Others) Personnel and others to improve the sufficiency rates of **3** **Measures to Achieve Effective Use of Human Resources, etc.** system for Artificial Intelligence (AI) application through **1** **Effective Use of Human Resources** the outsourcing of advisory functions regarding matters With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, the such as the promotion of AI application, etc., while authorized number of uniformed SDF personnel has building a necessary environment for AI application by been on a decline. On the other hand, there has been the need for personnel with skills and expertise in order to Fig. IV-2-1-5 Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel respond to the sophistication of equipment as well as the diversification and internationalization of SDF missions. **Rank Designation** **abbrev.** **Retirement Age** General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General In light of such circumstances, the NDS and DBP (ASDF) Sho call for raising the mandatory early retirement age of Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), 60 Shoho uniformed SDF personnel in order to ensure further Major General (ASDF) utilization of older human resources with rich knowledge, Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF) Issa 57 Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), skills, and experience, while paying attention to their Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF) Nisa 56 military strength. Based on this, the retirement ages Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Sansa of personnel from the rank of Ichii (Captain (Ground Major (ASDF) Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain Self-Defense Force [GSDF], Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) Ichii [ASDF])/Lieutenant (Maritime Self-Defense Force First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade Nii [MSDF])) to Isso (Master Sergeant (GSDF, ASDF)/ (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF) Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Petty Officer 1st Class (MSDF)) was raised by one Sani Second Lieutenant (ASDF) year in 2023, while the retirement ages of personnel Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), 56 Juni Warrant Officer (ASDF) from the rank of Issa (Colonel (GSDF, ASDF)/Captain Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF)) to Sansa (Major (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant Socho (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF) Commander (MSDF)) as well as those from the ranks of Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class Isso Niso (Sergeant First Class (GSDF)/Technical Sergeant (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF) (ASDF)/Petty Officer 2nd Class (MSDF)) and Sanso Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Niso Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF) **Part** (Sergeant (GSDF)/Staff Sergeant (ASDF)/Petty Officer 54 Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class Sanso 3rd Class (MSDF)) will be raised by one year in 2024. (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF) **Ⅳ** **Chapter** of retired uniformed SDF personnel (after their retirement In addition, in order to further promote the reappointment Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF) Shicho Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), **2** age but before reaching the age of 65), a portion of vessel Airman Second Class (ASDF) Isshi － crew operations and aircraft pilotage tasks were made Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Nishi available to uniformed SDF reappointed personnel in Airman Third Class (ASDF) FY2023, as well as cyberspace and flight inspection (Notes)1 The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief tasks were in FY2024. of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ASDF Chief of Staff, is 62. 2 The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold positions such as physician, At the same time, the MOD/SDF is creating a support dentist, pharmacist, musician, military police officer, or information analyst, is 60. **5** The re-employment system for SDF pilots aims to prevent the outflow of active young SDF pilots to civil aviation companies in an unregulated manner. This system is also designed to utilize ----- Fig. IV-2-1-6 Changes in the Number of Suicide Counts among MOD Personnel (Count) 110 100 100 101 101 GSDF personnel 6 8 8 MSDF personnel 89 90 9080 14 14 9 126 837 866 836 868 834 826 73 126 ASDF personnelAdministrative officials, etc. 79 70 16 15 19 9 12 12 15 20 13 693 8 65 11 62 66 11 60 23 16 15 10 11 9 8 5 60 7 58 12 64 14 7 16 5 6 10 5 4 50 12 11 11 5 8 13 12 13 10 10 40 11 7 9 64 64 65 30 61 53 55 52 20 48 51 49 47 43 45 40 35 39 39 38 43 38 10 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 (FY) educating MOD/SDF personnel with outsourced courses, the deceased and a huge loss to the organization. etc., with the aim of promoting manpower saving and In 2022, the MOD developed “The Basic Policy on automation. Mental Health in the Ministry of Defense” and adopted In addition, a crew system of rotating shift duty various measures with a view to preventing suicide among multiple teams of crew has been introduced on among its personnel. some vessels in order to ensure an adequate operating Specifically, the MOD has engaged in improving ratio with a limited number of personnel. the work environments by raising awareness of mental **See** Fig. IV-2-1-5 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel) health checks for all employees and by educating them to make use of counseling services, as well as by promoting measures related to work-life balance. The MOD is also **2 �Initiatives to Prevent Suicide among MOD** strengthening its support system by securing qualified **Personnel** counselors, collaborating with supervisors, counselors, The suicide count among MOD personnel was 64 in and medical institutions, and diversifying consultation FY2023. The fact that MOD personnel have lost their channels. **Part** precious lives to suicide is truly tragic for the families of **See** Fig. IV-2-1-6 (Changes in the Number of Suicide Counts among MOD Personnel)） **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **2** **4** **Improving Living and Work Environments** readiness, the SDF is developing the necessary housing **1 �Initiatives to Improve Living and Work** and is promoting measures against aging and earthquake **Environments** proofing of barracks, government office buildings and The NDS calls for the continued improvement of housing. Additionally, it will work to gradually improve the living and work environments to enable all SDF the living environment to ensure the privacy of SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while personnel, for example, by turning barracks into private i t i i hi h l d id S ifi ll t d t dil t li i d k ----- vessels and submarines, while women s restrooms and Turning barracks into private rooms bathrooms will be built or renovated at training areas and other locations. **2** **Initiatives to Support Families** In addition to exchanges between units and personnel’s Current situation Private rooms for privacy families, as well as between the families, the MOD in cooperation with relevant external groups and Developing housing organizations is also actively working to develop a family support system to be implemented in the event of large-scale natural disasters and other events, which will include receiving cooperation in confirming the safety of the family members of SDF personnel and providing them with assistance in their livelihoods. In addition, the MOD is promoting various types of support measures for the families of SDF personnel. For units dispatched overseas or to vessels for operations expected to continue for an extended period of time, the MOD has been creating a communication environment that allows the personnel and their families to get in direct contact. Moreover, the MOD has been implementing Before After a range of support measures for the families of the Initiatives to improve the living and work environments of SDF personnel (turning barracks into private rooms, developing housing) personnel, including supporting additional shipments of comfort items sent from families to SDF personnel related equipment and secure the requisite amount of deployed overseas, holding briefing sessions and daily consumables. establishing consultation desks (family support centers) In addition, in order to improve the education, living, for families, and creating a website for the families of and work environments for female SDF personnel, SDF personnel. women’s quarters will be set up in buildings and on **5** **Human Resources Development** Enhancing the ability of the individual uniformed art technologies. In order to strengthen the content and SDF personnel who comprise SDF units is essential structure of education and research, including in the cyber for the execution of the units’ duties. For this purpose, domain, the National Defense Academy is providing **Part** the respective SDF training units and schools provide cyber literacy education and education on cross-domain opportunities for phased and systematic education operations for all grades to acquire cyberspace-related **Ⅳ** **Chapter** according to ranks and duties to nurture necessary knowledge. Additionally, from FY2024, the Department qualities and instill knowledge and skills. of Information Engineering will be reorganized as the **2** Based on the DBP, the GSDF High Technical School Department of Cyber and Information Engineering, will be jointly operated by the Ground, Maritime and Air to carry out more specialized education and research SDF as well as transformed into a coeducational school. focused on the cyber domain. The MOD/SDF will strengthen the joint education Furthermore, education requires considerable human, in each SDF service as well as education and research time, and economic commitment, including securing including those of the cyber domain in each SDF service instructors with special skills as well as improving and at the National Defense Academy. At the same time, equipment and educational facilities. In the event that the MOD/SDF will promote standardization of the personnel need to further improve their professional d ti l i l d tili ti f t t f th k l d d kill th t it i diffi lt f th t ----- acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, companies and research institutes. the MOD/SDF commissions education to external **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-5-2(3) (Education and Research) institutions, including those abroad, as well as domestic **6** **Improvement of Treatment and Re-employment Support** perished in the line of duty belonged in order to express **1** **Improvement of Treatment** condolences. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize Because SDF personnel execute their missions in a the achievements of the personnel who perished in challenging environment, efforts have been made to the line of duty and to express the deepest respect and improve their treatment based on the special nature of their condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in missions and work environments. In FY2024, a number various forms, such as the Memorial Service for members of improvements will be implemented, including raising of SDF personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty the allowances paid to crew members of destroyers and conducted with the participation of the Prime Minister. submarines as well as those serving in the JSDF Cyber Achievements of 26 SDF members (20 GSDF, 5 MSDF, Defense Command and the Amphibious Task Force, and and 1 ASDF members) who lost their lives in the line of providing new allowances to personnel working at radar duty were recognized in a Memorial Service in FY2023.[6] sites, snipers, and personnel undergoing ranger training. From FY2023, in accordance with the DBP, surveys **3 �Dealing with Retirement and Re-employment** are being conducted on overtime work performed by **of SDF Personnel and Related Matters** uniformed SDF personnel and the salary systems of military personnel in other countries. In the future, the In order to maintain the SDF’s strength, most uniformed treatment of SDF personnel will be improved in light of SDF personnel retire after their mid-50s, while fixed- not only the special nature of their missions and work term uniformed SDF personnel retire in their 20s or mid- environment but also the increase in the number of new 30s. For many uniformed SDF personnel, re-employment missions, taking into account the results of these surveys. is essential to safeguard their livelihood. Therefore, it At the same time, to ensure that SDF personnel can is of paramount importance to provide re-employment execute their missions with high morale and pride, support for active uniformed SDF personnel in order to measures related to honors and privileges, including relieve their anxiety about the future and allow them to expanding the scope of conferment of decorations and devote themselves to their duties. the appropriate commendation of achievements, will be The DBP also states that it is the responsibility of the promoted. Government to secure the livelihood of uniformed SDF personnel after their retirement. It also calls for the MOD/ SDF to further improve and strengthen re-employment **2 �Commemorating Personnel who Perished in** support such as by enhancing the career guidance **the Line of Duty** system and job training opportunities for SDF personnel Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in scheduled to retire, and by strengthening cooperation **Part** 1950, SDF personnel have endeavored to complete their with local governments, relevant organizations and **Ⅳ** noble missions to protect the peace and independence private companies. **Chapter** of Japan with a strong sense of responsibility, regardless Retired uniformed SDF personnel have excellent **2** of danger. During this time period, however, more than abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness, 2,000 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty. and responsibility gained through their work In the MOD/SDF, funeral ceremonies are carried out performance, education and training. Furthermore, they by the respective units to which SDF personnel who have various qualifications and licenses acquired through **6** The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument with other monuments located in the same area. The MOD holds an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty, led by the Minister of Defense and with the attendance of surviving family members and the Prime Minister. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the MOD, they make offerings of ----- Prime Minister Kishida offers flowers at the FY 2023 Memorial Service for Members of the Self-Defense Forces Who Lost Their Lives on Duty (October 2023) their duties and vocational training. Therefore, they are making positive contributions in a broad range of sectors, including manufacturing and service industries, as well as finance, insurance, real estate, and construction industries, in addition to the disaster prevention and crisis management departments of local governments. Specifically, as of the end of March 2024, a total of 665 retired SDF personnel work as crisis management officers and others at the disaster prevention and crisis management departments of local governments: 46 prefectural bureaus have 109 of them in total, and 476 municipal bureaus have 556 all over Japan. Since strengthening cooperation between the MOD/SDF and local governments will help to reinforce the crisis management capabilities of local governments, efforts are also being made to strengthen re-employment support in this regard. Furthermore, the MOD offers disaster prevention and crisis management education for retiring uniformed SDF personnel seek employment in the disaster prevention and crisis management departments of local governments. An individual who completes the course is certified as a regional disaster prevention manager by the Cabinet Office upon request. The requirement for this certification is a rank of at least Ichii or a rank of Nii (First Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF)) with the effective work experience of an Ichii (Captain (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant (MSDF)). In addition, exchange of opinions regarding re-employment support for SDF personnel scheduled to retire with the security industry, where many SDF personnel are reemployed, will be continued, and in December 2023, Personnel receiving skills training for re-employment the All Japan Security Service Association and the Ministry of Defense agreed to collaborate on initiatives related to securing human resources in the security industry and provide smooth reemployment support for SDF personnel scheduled to retire. Additionally, in order to increase the number of SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, in addition to maintaining and increasing the number of uniformed SDF personnel under the fixed-term system, it is decided that a scholarship would be provided to support the education of individuals who enter a university in Japan after completing their tenure as fixedterm uniformed SDF personnel and who are appointed SDF Reserve Personnel while at university. Meanwhile, with regard to the re-employment of SDF personnel, the following three regulations, as are the cases in other national government employees have been put in place to ensure public trust regarding the fairness of official duties: (1) regulation on requesting re-employment of other personnel and retired personnel and on requesting information; (2) regulation on seeking employment opportunities at companies in which the retired personnel had a stake whilst in office; and (3) regulation on requests (lobbying) by re-employed personnel.[7] Compliance with these regulations is monitored by bodies comprised of academic experts with no history of serving as SDF personnel. Any violation of these regulations will be strictly dealt with through the imposition of penalties. Additionally, for the purpose of the appropriate implementation of centralized management and disclosure of re-employment information by the **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** ----- Cabinet, it has been decided that information on the re-employment status of retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions (equivalent to the position of Senior Coordinator in the MOD or higher) is to be published every fiscal year by the Cabinet. Fig. IV 2 1 7 (Major Vocational Training Provided to Support Re-employment); Fig. IV-2-1-8 (Re-employment Support in FY2023), Reference 70 (Main Measures for Re-employment Support), and Reference 71 (Employment of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Local Government Disaster Prevention Agencies) **See** Fig. IV-2-1-7 Major Vocational Training Provided to Support Re-employment In order to maintain the strength of the SDF, many uniformed SDF personnel retire in their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or in their 20s to mid-30s (uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system). Since supporting re-employment is the responsibility of the Japanese Government (the MOD) as the employer, and is crucial both for resolving any concerns that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future as well as for securing qualified human resources, the MOD conducts support measures such as occupational training useful for their re-employment. **■** **Re-employment support for uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system** Joint job fair for uniformed SDF Occupational Occupational Support for application, the fixed-term service system **■** **Re-employment support for uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age** Business management training Occupational aptitude testing Employment Support for application, placement job interview, etc. **■** **Major Occupational Training Provided to Support Re-employment (Accomplishment in FY2023)** Vehicle operation - Large-sized ● Regular-sized ● Special (large-sized) ● Semi-medium-sized ● Medium-sized Operation of facility machines - Forklifts and shovel loaders ● Boiler engineer ● Heavy-duty vehicle ● Crane - Electrician ● Licensed electrician ● Telecommunication equipment works worker Telecommunication technology - Maritime II-category special radio operator - Hazardous material engineer ● Person responsible for class 3 refrigerating machiner Handling of dangerous materials - Person responsible for manufacturing safety of high pressure gas - Drone operator ● Security guard certification examination ● Operation manager Labor management practice, etc. - Marine technician (Grades 3 to 6) ● Career consultant - Microsoft Office Specialist ● Examination for basic computer skills ● OA equipment ● IT Passport Information processing technique - Fundamental (applied) information technology engineer Social welfare - First-level training for nursing care workers ● Mental health management ● Certified caregiver ● Care fitter Medical affairs - Medical affairs ● Pharmacy administration ● Nursing care administration ● Registered vendor Legal practice, etc. - Real estate transaction specialist ● Administrative scrivener ● Certified professional secretary examination ● Certified coach - Disaster prevention and crisis management education ● Financial planner ● Welding technician(Gas/arc welding, etc.) Others - Preparatory course for civil service examination ● Fire defense equipment officer ● Official Business Skill Test in Book-keeping - Health officer ● Condominium manager ● TOEIC ● Fire prevention manager (Note) The names of the occupational training topics for each category are listed in descending order of the number of participants. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** ----- Fig. IV-2-1-8 Re-employment Support in FY2023 Government service/association 3.4％ Agriculture and forestry/Fishery/Mining 0.7％ Wholesale and retail trade 7.3％ Construction 6.5％ Finance/Insurance/ Real estate Service 9.1％ 39.2％ Manufacturing Transport/Transport/ 15.3％ Communication/Communication/ Electricity, Electricity, gas and water 18.4gas and water 18.4％％ Note: Due to rounding off, figures may not add up to the total. Number of personnel who applied for re-employment **1,171** support Number of personnel who found a job **1,166** Percentage of personnel who found a job **99.6％** **Termination** **of a term** Result of re-employment support for retired personnel **Early age** **retirement** Result of re-employment support for retired personnel Number of personnel who applied for re-employment **3,005** support Number of personnel who found a job **2,992** Percentage of personnel who found a job **99.6％** **REFERENCE : Re-employment support (assistance) by the MOD (Japanese Only)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/reemploy/index.html** **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE : Retired SDF personnel employment guide (GSDF) (Japanese Only)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/retire/index.html** **MOVIE : The GSDF is a rich reservoir of talent – Ready to meet your HR needs! (GSDF)** **URL : https://youtu.be/wnLmn9VwlVY?si=_DbLnb2L2PkX-WL_** **REFERENCE/MOVIE : Retired SDF personnel recruitment guidance (MSDF) (Japanese Only)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/recruit/engo/** **REFERENCE/MOVIE : Re-employment support (assistance) by the MOD (ASDF) (Japanese Only)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/rehire/** ----- **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** VOICE **Voices of Re-employed Personnel and Their Employers/Chiefs** **MIWA Asuka, Senior Manager, Public Sector Sales Section, Tokyo Office, INFINITY Inc.** **(Served in the General Affairs Group of the MSDF Communications Command)** I joined INFINITY Inc. after completing my service with the Japan day, striving to meet the expectations of my supervisors. Maritime Self-Defense Force. I am currently in-charge of sales During my time with the SDF, I served as a deputy adjutant. operations. My main duties were assisting the adjutant, such as in reception, When I first joined INFINITY, I felt quite anxious due to the coordinating with external parties, and preparing documents. This difference in work culture between the SDF and private-sector experience of providing support is still useful today in supporting companies. In the SDF, you follow the instructions of your superior my supervisors with their work. The etiquette I learned in the officers. However, in a private company like INFINITY, once you SDF also applies to my current workplace and still serves as my are entrusted with work, you have to take the initiative to create foundation. and proceed with a schedule on your own. With the advice of my While I was job hunting, I received considerable support from supervisors and senior colleagues, I was able to gradually find the Employment Assistance Office and was able to balance my my way and learn the ropes of the business. I feel a sense of work with my duties at the unit. It was very reassuring to be able accomplishment when I can complete the work I am responsible to consult with them when I was worried about my future career. for and contribute to the company. I am in my third year with I will continue to value the knowledge and experience I gained INFINITY, and my workload has increased. I enjoy working every in the SDF as I pursue my new career. **MURANAKA Akio, Representative Director and President, INFINITY Inc.** INFINITY Inc. was founded in 1994 as a cable manufacturer in cultivated in the SDF, such as being able to quickly and appropriately Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture. The Tokyo office was opened provide the required products and services by carefully observing in September 2010, selling products to all ministries and agencies his surroundings, reading the atmosphere, and paying careful (mainly the Ministry of Defense). attention to the situation during negotiations with external parties, We have been supporting the re-employment of retired SDF and contributes greatly to improving the company’s performance. personnel to facilitate business operations for some time now, and He has always maintained good interpersonal relationships at the former soldiers we have hired have received very high praise the workplace and a positive work environment with his natural from outside the company for their courtesy, polite language, and communication skills and cooperativeness. clean appearance, which they inculcated during their service in We will continue to hire retired SDF personnel and strive to the SDF. improve our quality and services further, aiming to make even Among them, Ms. Miwa, who joined the company the year greater strides. before last, is excellent in performing her duties, an ability that she MIWA Asuka, Senior Manager, Public Sector Sales Section, Tokyo Office, INFINITY Inc. MURANAKA Akio, Representative Director and President, INFINITY Inc. ----- **Section 2** **Creating an Organizational Environment of Zero Tolerance for Harassment of Any Kind** The Japanese people have high expectations of the MOD/ enables SDF personnel, who are the core of Japan’s SDF, and it is indispensable for us to gain their support defense capability, to perform their tasks confidently and trust all the time to fully exercise our ability to with high morale and peace of mind. Harassment, in complete our duties. In order to meet their expectations particular, must not be tolerated, as it destroys mutual to this end, the SDF personnel are required to be an trust among the personnel of MOD/SDF, which are invariably disciplined existence more than ever. fundamentally based on unit actions and shakes the very The MOD/SDF has taken various measures such as foundation of the organization. thorough instructions on service discipline in order to Given this understanding, the MOD/SDF is committed foster well-disciplined personnel. However, disciplinary to addressing harassment cases and fundamentally action has been taken in recent years for a number of cases reviewing harassment prevention measures with a sense of harassment. In order to exert organizational strength of urgency to create an environment where harassment is and respond decisively to a wide range of situations, absolutely not tolerated. the MOD/SDF must create a working environment that **1** **Response to Harassment Incidents** The MOD/SDF have established a hotline for consultation disciplinary action of discharge[1] (3 power harassment from SDF personnel. The annual number of consultations cases and 27 sexual harassment cases). was 109 when the hotline was permanently established in Furthermore, as some personnel are reluctant to seek FY2016 and has since increased to 857 in FY2023. advice at the SDF consultation desk, a consultation desk Power harassment, in particular, which accounts for staffed by counselors and other professionals outside about 80% of the total number of such consultations, is a of the SDF on weekends, holidays, and after-hours has major problem; such harassment could lead to a violation been established in addition to the existing consultation of the dignity and human rights of MOD/SDF personnel, desk staffed by lawyers. suicide incidents, and adversely affect the work However, despite the various harassment prevention environment. Power harassment is caused by inadequate measures that have been adopted so far, there have been knowledge of it and the communication gap between cases where harassment has occurred and the response superiors and their subordinates. In order to resolve and was inadequate. For example, there was a case of a prevent these issues, the MOD/SDF has (1) provided former GSDF personnel who had lodged a complaint that classroom training and remote learning to enhance they were subject to sexual harassment during training understanding and raise awareness of power harassment and on a daily basis at their unit, but the information was among MOD/SDF personnel; (2) conducted education not reported to the commanding officer, and the facts of to promote understanding and enhance leadership the case were not properly investigated. Following the **Part** capabilities among MOD/SDF personnel (particularly complaint by the individual, an investigation conducted those in managerial positions); and (3) taken measures by a higher-level unit, it was determined in September **Ⅳ** **Chapter** to improve and strengthen the consultation system. 2022 that sexual harassment, including sexual violence, In order to eradicate disciplinary violations, such had indeed occurred, and disciplinary actions for those **2** as assault and battery, power harassment, and so on, involved were taken in the same year. the standards of disciplinary actions were tightened in Such incidents suggest that the effects of the MOD’s 2020. The number of cases of harassment for which existing harassment prevention measures are inadequate disciplinary actions were taken was 549 in FY2022. in terms of effectiveness, and is extremely serious and Of these, 30 personnel were subject to the heaviest deeply regrettable. **1** Types of disciplinary action include dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in pay, and reprimand. The disciplinary actions taken are determined based on a comprehensive evaluation of the causes, motives, and circumstances of the disciplinary violation, the position and rank of the offender, as well as the impact of the disciplinary violation both inside and outside the ----- |Col1|1| |---|---| |4|1|08| |---|---|---| |1|18| |---|---| |4|5| |---|---| |16 9 1|1 9| |---|---| |Category|FY2019|FY2020|FY2021|FY2022|FY2023| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Power Harassment|519|1,010|1,706|1,217|782| |Sexual Harassment|73|60|82|136|59| |Maternity Harassment|8|7|23|44|16| |Consultation Desk for Each Institution|474|391|500|725|850| |Total|1,074|1,468|2,311|2,122|1,707| **See** Fig. IV-2-2-1 (The Number of the Personnel Subject to Have Taken Disciplinary Action for the Substantiated Harassment Case); Fig. IV-2-2-2 (Changed in the Number of Consultations to the MOD Harassment Hotline) Fig. IV-2-2-1 The Number of the Personnel Subject to Have Taken Disciplinary Action for the Substantiated Harassment Case 200 180 5 19 Dismissal 160 1 Demotion 140 Suspension 120 4 108 A Reduction in pay 100 Reprimand 118 80 2 70 60 45 40 49 20 19 34 30 0 16 9 11 9 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 Fig. IV-2-2-2 Changed in the Number of Consultations to the MOD Harassment Hotline (Unit: No. of Cases) **Category** **FY2019** **FY2020** **FY2021** **FY2022** **FY2023** Power Harassment 519 1,010 1,706 1,217 782 Sexual Harassment 73 60 82 136 59 Maternity Harassment 8 7 23 44 16 Consultation Desk for Each Institution 474 391 500 725 850 Total 1,074 1,468 2,311 2,122 1,707 **2** **Directive, etc., of the Minister of Defense on Measures to Eradicate Harassment** On September of 2022, then Defense Minister Hamada issued a directive on measures to eradicate harassment, in which (1) all personnel once again be informed of harassment consultation helpdesk’s and counselor’s availability and encourage them to seek consultation and **Part** report any harassment accordingly, (2) urgent review of **Ⅳ** the current status of harassment-related consultations and **Chapter** the appropriate follow-up in all cases, (3) special defense **2** inspection of the entire MOD/SDF, and (4) establishment of an advisory panel to conduct a fundamental review of harassment prevention measures. Furthermore, in August 2023, following the recommendations of “The Ministry of Defense Committee Minister of Defense Kihara instructed to eradicate harassment, etc. of Experts on Harassment Prevention Measures” described below, the then Minister of Defense Hamada issued a harassment is not tolerated and that it is urgent to review message to all personnel, emphasizing that each member and create fundamental measures promptly. i ibl f ti i t i hi h I O t b f th i t ----- harassment incidents that occurred in the Maritime Self Defense Kihara issued a message to all personnel and Defense Force, Minister of Defense Kihara issued “The commanders/management personnel, urging each Minister of Defense Instructions on Strict Measures member to be aware of their role, actively work on for Harassment Response.” He directed the immediate harassment prevention, consult without hesitation if they investigation of cases reported through special defense experience harassment, and support victims promptly inspections, urgent review of individual cases, and swift if they witness or receive reports of harassment, taking reporting of unreported cases to ensure strict handling appropriate action without delay. of all harassment incidents. Additionally, Minister of **3** **The Ministry of Defense Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention Measures** Based on the directive of the Minister of Defense in the MOD/SDF is still in the process of fostering an September 2022, “The Ministry of Defense Committee organizational culture that does not tolerate harassment of Experts on Harassment Prevention Measures” was and that efforts in this regard are inadequate. It also established in November 2022. This panel conducted highlighted that the responsibility of the supervisor a fundamental review of harassment prevention (commanders) are unclear regarding harassment measures, which included eight discussions in total, prevention measures and that they lack awareness of on-site inspections at each Self-Defense Force unit, and their duties and outlined strategies that the MOD should interactions with personnel. The panel also exchanged undertake in the areas of (1) preventive measures, (2) views with a former member of the Ground Self- response to incidents, and (3) post-incident measures. Defense Force who was a victim of sexual harassment Specifically, the panel proposed reforms to organizational and considered the results of special defense inspections culture through measures such as regular issuance on harassment prevention status, which will be described of messages from the top management, reviewing of later. In August 2023, after reviewing these issues, the training, improving the qualifications of counselors, panel submitted recommendations to the MOD regarding accelerating the resolution of problems (disciplinary “The Fundamental Review of Harassment Prevention actions), and disseminating information on disciplinary Measures.” measures. The panel pointed out in the recommendations that **4** **The Special Defense Inspection on Harassment Prevention Status** Based on the directive of the Minister of Defense in The Defense Inspection General’s Office of legal September 2022, the Defense Inspection General’s compliance interviewed the complainants to determine Office of legal compliance conducted a special defense the basic facts of the harassment incidents, and inspection on the status of harassment prevention status eventually reviewed regarding the final 1,325 cases that and accepted harassment reports and/or complains from were reported by the end of November 2022 deadline. **Part** MOD/SDF personnel regarding harassment consultation Taking into account the complainants’ preferences, and response. they notified the relevant agencies where the incidents **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE : Ministry of Defense Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention Measures (Japanese Only)** **2** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/meeting/harassment/index.html** **REFERENCE : Results of Special Defense Inspection (August 2023) (Japanese Only)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2023/08/18a.html** **2** In December 2022, a Maritime Self-Defense Force member reported to their superior that they had been subjected to sexual harassment while on duty. Despite the individual’s wishes, the individual was compelled to meet with the perpetrator, another member of the unit, and receive an apology. The perpetrator and the superior received suspensions in November 2023, with ----- occurred and proceeded with detailed investigations. harassment consultation system was effectively fulfilling “Results of Special Defense Inspection” were publicly its intended role. Moreover, numerous complaints were announced in August 2023. voiced about dissatisfaction with the responses received The results of the special defense inspection revealed despite seeking consultation. that the counselors and consultation desk were not being Dissatisfaction with responses to complaints was adequately utilized. More than 60% of the complaints confirmed to potentially contribute to the ineffectiveness alleging inadequate handling of harassment incidents of the harassment consultation system. Therefore, this revealed that the complainants had not even sought Special Defense Inspection indicated a need to improve advice from counselors or consultation desk. There are and thoroughly implement harassment prevention concerns about the adequate response by counselors measures, including the consultation system, as a and consultation desk, and the situation arising after corrective measure. consultations, casting doubts about whether the **5** **The Fundamental Review of Harassment Prevention Measures** As part of its future actions, the MOD, based on the results of the expert committee and the Special Defense Inspection, formed a Harassment Prevention Measures Review Team in August 2023 to examine effective measures, including a review of consultation systems and education. Specifically, the aim is to reform organizational culture that may contribute to harassment, with plans for regular messages from the top management including the Minister of Defense, as well as utilizing educational opportunities to reform personnel awareness. Additionally, there are plans to review harassment prevention education, provide training to improve the qualifications of managers (commanders) Conference on Harassment Prevention convened by the MOD (November 2023) and counselors, standardize and clarify disciplinary action criteria, expand the harassment consultation members of the team. Furthermore, during “The Defense system, and increase awareness of consultation services. Ministry Employee Harassment Prevention Month” In November 2023, Minister of Defense Kihara in FY2023, efforts were made to intensively raise convened “The Meeting on Harassment Prevention.” awareness of harassment prevention measures through He instructed ministry officials to raise the awareness of various educational activities and discussions, including each member, especially supervisors and commanders those conducted by external experts. of the organization, to take leadership in preventing We will continue to ensure that all SDF personnel harassment, to prioritize support for the victim members are thoroughly educated on harassment. We will also **Part** first, and to respond promptly to harassment. He stated continuously review and update our measures to keep **Ⅳ** that team members who had been victimized should up with the times, incorporating insights from external **Chapter** not hesitate to report it to their supervisors or the experts. Our goal is to create an environment in which **2** reporting desk and that any member who witnessed the harassment is not tolerated at all. victimization should report it on behalf of the victimized **REFERENCE : Promotion of harassment prevention measures and consultation desk (Japanese Only)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/harassment/index.html** ----- **Section 3** **Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women’s Participation** Japan is facing the most severe and complex security To this end, the MOD/SDF will promote better environment since the end of World War II, and the work-life balance and the active participation of female situations that require a response by the MOD/SDF are personnel based on the NDS, etc. increasing in number and becoming longer in duration. Specifically, the MOD/SDF established the Action On the other hand, Japan faces rapid declining and Plan in 2015 in order to promote work-life balance of falling birth rate, making it more difficult than ever female personnel and conducted various initiatives. to secure SDF personnel who are the core of defense In 2021, the MOD/SDF established a new action plan capabilities. Under these circumstances, it is expected based around the pillars of (1) reform of promoting that an increasing number of MOD/SDF personnel, both work-life balance, and (2) promoting women’s active male and female, who are responsible for various duties, participation. In March 2023, the MOD/SDF is further will face time and commuting constraints for childcare, advancing initiatives through revising the Action Plan and nursing care and other reason due to major changes focused on the following five items, (1) promotion in the social structure. of work from home, (2) transition to paperless work Amid such challenging circumstances, ensuring environment, (3) rigorous management of working hours, preparedness to consistently respond to various situations (4) promotion of paternity leave, and (5) establishment requires creating an environment that enables staff to of a workplace environment in which all personnel can be sound both mentally and physically, maintain high work comfortably. morale and pride, and fully demonstrate their abilities. **1** **Working Style Reform to Promote Work-Life Balance** culture in which personnel consider specific measures **1** **Value and Mentality Reform** for improving their workplace environment based on In order to promote working style reform, focus needs the actual conditions of their workplace. Based on this to be placed especially on reforming the values and perspective, the MOD has been holding the “Competition mentality of staff in managerial positions regarding for Initiatives to Promote Working Style Reform at working style. The MOD/SDF has been issuing top the Ministry of Defense” with awards presented to management messages and conducting seminars and particularly outstanding initiatives, which are then lectures aimed at raising awareness of working style introduced within the MOD to help other personnel reforms and the concept of work-life balance. With the reform their working styles. increase of personnel facing time/commuting constraints for child/family care, the MOD/SDF is also promoting **3** **Flexible Working Hours and Location** correction of long working hours, encouraging taking leave, and telework to ensure proper work-life balance In light of workload fluctuations and the time constraints **Part** so that all personnel can exert his/her full potential. faced by individuals such as childcare, nursing care, etc., In addition, the MOD/SDF is conducting initiatives the MOD/SDF has introduced an early/late shifts and **Ⅳ** **Chapter** for “management reform” aimed at enhancing the a flextime system to allow for the flexible selection of management ability of administrative staff. working hours. In April 2023, further flexibility is being **2** pursued, including a reduction in core hours under the flextime system. **2** **Working Style Reform in the Workplace** In the MOD/SDF, considering the uniqueness of Efforts aimed at the promotion of work-life balance certain jobs, work from home has now been made possible will lead to effective initiatives and the creation of a at all institutions, except for those jobs where work from **REFERENCE : Ministry of Defense website: Promote active participation and work-life balance of female personnel** (Japanese Only) **URL : https://www mod go jp/j/profile/worklife/index html** ----- home is not feasible. The MOD/SDF will continue to resources department better understand the details of promote digitalization, including the computerization of the situation surrounding their personnel’s childcare. A documents as well as the installation of more terminals, system has also been established to allow SDF personnel in order to establish business processes in which tasks who retired mid-career due to childcare or nursing care can be completed with work from home. commitments to be re-employed. **4** **Rigorous Management of Working Hours** **6** **Ensuring Childcare Services** Through the systemization of working hour management, Developing an environment in which MOD/SDF surveys conducted on overtime work, etc., efforts are personnel are able to devote themselves to their duties being made to rectify the long working hours that may without worrying about childcare or other concerns is be detrimental to the physical and mental health and important in maintaining a permanent state of readiness. welfare of personnel. The MOD/SDF has set up workplace nurseries at camps and bases in eight locations across Japan. In addition, in the event of situations where a quick response is required **5 �Development of an Environment that Enables** such as disaster relief, the MOD promotes support **Personnel to Play an Active Role while** measures to provide temporary childcare in SDF camps **Engaging in Childcare and Nursing Care** and bases for children of SDF personnel. The MOD/SDF has developed various schemes that enable its personnel to balance work with their childcare/ nursing care commitments, such as hiring fixed-term staff who take over those on childcare or other leave. In particular, the MOD/SDF is working to enable all male personnel with a newborn child to take paternity leave or time off work. As part of the efforts, the MOD/SDF is encouraging all male personnel with a newborn child to take paternity leave or time off work for approximately one month or more. The MOD/SDF is also developing an environment that enables its personnel to balance work life with their family life through various initiatives, such as by providing explanations on systems related to childcare and nursing care, introducing role models, and creating Emergency attendance support for SDF personnel engaged in disaster relief during the “childcare forms” to help managers and the human 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake **2** **Reform to Promote Women’s Participation** **Part** **Ⅳ** For the further expansion of the recruitment and participation of women in disaster prevention and disaster **Chapter** promotion of female personnel, the MOD/SDF has response efforts and decision-making for security policy. **2** been making various efforts to promote the activities of The MOD/SDF, which is the main entities in these motivated and qualified female personnel by setting up efforts, is working on promoting women’s participation specific goals under the Action Plan. and conducting various activities related to the WPS Moreover, as part of its efforts related to Women, field both in Japan and overseas. As the importance of Peace and Security[1] (WPS), Japan is promoting the activities considering the needs of women and girls who **1** A concept that encapsulates the idea that peace is more sustainable when women take the lead and actively participate in all levels of conflict prevention, response and reconstruction, and peacebuilding, as well as disaster prevention, while recognizing the importance of protection and relief for women and girls, and those in need, as they are more vulnerable during conflicts ----- are placed in particularly vulnerable situations during conflicts and disasters grows both in Japan and overseas, the MOD/SDF recognizes that all personnel are the main contributors to WPS and aims to further contribute to the promotion of WPS through the promotion of women’s participation, etc. **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-5 (Initiatives to Promote Women, Peace and Security (WPS)) **See** **1 �Expansion of the Recruitment and** **Promotion of Female Personnel** with ten years ago (end of March 2014 when females made up about 23.4% of the total civilian officials and others), this is a rise of 4.2 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female civilian officials and others has been on the rise in recent years. With regard to recruitment, in line with the overall government target, the MOD has set the goal of ensuring that women account for over 35% of recruits in and after FY2021. Regarding promotion targets to be achieved by the end of FY2025 include increasing the proportion of women of the unit chief level at the MOD proper or its equivalent to 35%, division director at local organizations/ division deputy director level at the MOD proper or its equivalent to 10%, the division director level at the MOD proper or its equivalent to 6%, and designated official or equivalent to 5%. **See** Fig. IV-2-3-1 (Women’s Participation at the MOD and Targets and Current Values for the Action Plan); Fig. IV-2-3-2 (Changes in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel); Fig. IV-2-3-3 (Major Technological Cooperation with National Research and Development Agencies, etc.) **2** **Significance of Promoting Active** **Engagement of Female SDF Personnel and** **Personnel Management Policy** The MOD/SDF has set numerical targets in the Action Plan for the systematic expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel. In addition, based on NSS, the MOD/SDF plans to develop an educational infrastructure that supports women’s activities, and to develop women’s quarters in military buildings and naval vessels to increase the number of female SDF personnel. **(1) Female SDF Personnel** As of the end of March 2024, the number of female SDF personnel is about 20,000 (about 9% of the total SDF personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2014 when female SDF personnel made up about 5.6% of the total SDF personnel), this is a rise of 3.3 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female SDF personnel has been on the rise in recent years. Regarding the recruitment of female SDF personnel, the targets for the proportion of newly employed female SDF personnel among total newly employed SDF personnel in and after FY2021 and the proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel by FY2030 have increased to at least 17% and 12%, respectively. In addition, the MOD/SDF is improving education, living, and work environments for female SDF personnel in line with the increasing number of female SDF personnel recruited. With regard to promotion, the MOD/SDF aims to increase the proportion of women among SDF personnel with a rank of field officer or higher to at least 5% by the end of FY2025. With SDF duties becoming increasingly diverse and complex, SDF personnel are required more than ever to have multifaceted capabilities, including higher levels of knowledge, decision-making ability, and skills. In addition, under a severe recruitment environment due to the declining birth rate and continuing trend of higher education, it is anticipated that the number of SDF personnel with time and location restraints, including those involved in childcare, nursing care, and other responsibilities, will significantly increase. In light of these changes, the SDF is required to evolve from a conventional organization with an emphasis on homogeneity among the members, into an organization that is capable of incorporating diverse human resources in a flexible manner. At present, the largest human resource that the SDF has not been able to fully utilize is women, who account for half of the population targeted for recruitment. Promoting the active engagement of female SDF personnel has the following significance: (1) securing useful human resources; (2) utilizing diverse perspectives; and (3) reflecting values of the nation. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has decided to open up a path for female l ith ti ti bilit d tit d t h **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **(2) Female Civilian Officials, Technical and Engineering** **Officials, Instructors, and Others** As of the end of March 2024, the number of female civilian officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others is approximately 5,500 (about 27 6% f th t t l i ili ffi i l d th ) C d ----- |Col1|Items|Target|Current value| |---|---|---|---| |Recruitment and promotion of female SDF personnel|Proportion of newly employed female SDF personnel among total newly employed SDF personnel|17% or more (After FY 2021)|18.0% (FY2023)| ||Proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel|12% or more (By FY 2030)|8.9% (FY2023)| ||Proportion of women among SDF personnel with a rank of field officer or higher|5% or more (By FY 2025)|4.4% (FY2023)| |Recruitment and promotion of female civilian personnel|The proportion of female SDF personnel recruited from those who passed the recruitment examination for national public employees|35% or more (every year)|39.3％(April 1, 2023)| ||Proportion of women at the unit chief level in the MOD (Level (I) Class 3 or 4 personnel working at the MOD (MOD consists of the internal bureau of the MOD and the internal bureau of Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA))|35% (By 2025)|33.2% (July 1, 2023)| ||The proportion of women as director of the regional agency division, equivalent to the assistant director in MOD or its equivalent (Level (I) Class 5 or 6 personnel)|10% (By 2025)|8.2％(July 1, 2023)| ||The proportion of women at the division director level in MOD or its equivalent|6% (By 2025)|4.1％(July 1, 2023)| ||The proportion of women at the designated official level or equivalent|5% (By 2025)|1.8％(July 1, 2023)| Fig. IV-2-3-1 Women’s Participation at the MOD and Targets and Current Values for the Action Plan Fig. IV-2-3-2 Changes in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel (Number) (%) 20,000 11,000 5.0% 3,000 1,000 Female GSDF personnel Female MSDF personnel Female ASDF personnel Total number of female SDF personnel / Total number of SDF personnel(%) Recruitment of women started Recruitment of women for Aviation Cadet of started for students of the MSDF and the ASDF the National Defense Academy Recruitment of Recruitment of women started women started for for students of Recruitment of medical and the National Defense women started in dental officers Medical College the general service area of the MSDF Recruitment of and the ASDF women started in the general service area of the GSDF 54 67 68 69 70 7172 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 8182 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 9192 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2122 23 (FY) (Note) As of the end of March 2023, the total number of female SDF personnel is 19,886 (approximately 8.7% of the total number of the SDF personnel) **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** Major Technological Cooperation with National **Fig. IV-2-3-3** Research and Development Agencies, etc. [Changes in the budget for promoting women’s participation] (Hundred million yen) 〇 Main initiatives to date 200 ・Expansion of recruitment and promotion of female personnel 150 Significant increase due to ・Establishment of women’s highly focused budgets quarters in barracks and on board 100 Approximately naval vessels 2.5 times 146 ・Renovation of men’s restrooms to 50 women’s restrooms 59 64 ・Development of educational 0 infrastructure for female SDF personnel 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ----- opportunities to demonstrate their abilities in various fields, with the aim of doubling the ratio of female SDF personnel. In terms of employing and promoting female SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and women and assign the right person to the right place based on the person’s motivation and ability/ aptitude. **3 �Removal of the Assignment Restriction of** **Female SDF Personnel** The MOD/SDF has completely removed the assignment restriction of female SDF personnel with the exception of units to which female personnel cannot be assigned for reasons of maternity protection (namely, part of the GSDF Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit [chemical] as well as Tunnel Company Units). As a result, the assignment of female personnel to vocations, such as fighter pilots, paratroopers, and submarine crew members, is currently underway. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **MOVIE : Ministry of Defense website: Activities of female GSDF personnel members following their dreams** **URL : https://youtu.be/-bcA9G417vU** **MOVIE : Ministry of Defense website: Female MSDF personnel members who also value their own time while working** **URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tsk6VAV6LP4** **MOVIE : Ministry of Defense website: Activities of female ASDF personnel members** **URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzUcZlTk_bs** ----- |Field Hospital|Self-D s Force Na| |---|---| |Front Line Aid|Regimental Medical Stations and others| |---|---| **Section 4** **Transformation of Medical Functions** The NDS stipulates that, from the perspective of The MOD/SDF, therefore, is enhancing the medical sustainability and resiliency, the SDF medical force, which functions: (i) Strengthing seamless medical care and has been placing importance on sustaining the health of evacuation posture from the frontlines to the destination SDF personnel, will transform into an organization that hospital, (ii) Reinforcement of integrated medical saves the lives of SDF personnel who carry out their operational posture, and (iii) Fundamental management missions in a contingency in spite of danger. reform of the National Defense Medical College as Under circumstances where the SDF’s missions the three pillars to improve the combat trauma care are becoming more diverse and internationalized, it is capabilities. In addition, the MOD/SDF is further important to accurately address the needs of various enhancing and strengthening its medical capabilities so medical activities, such as providing medical support that they can appropriately respond to various emergency in disaster relief operations and international peace events and carry out its multiple missions in Japan and cooperation activities, as well as capacity building on abroad. military medicine. **1** **Fundamentally Strengthen the Combat Trauma Care Capabilities** **1 �Strengthening Seamless Medical Care and** **See** Fig. IV-2-4-1 (Conceptual Image of a Seamless Posture for Medical Care and Evacuation) **Evacuation Posture** In order to improve the life-saving rate of injured SDF **(1) Enhancement of the First Aid at the Front Line and** personnel on the front line, it is necessary to strengthen **Medical Care During Evacuation** the respective functions of first aid at the front line, In response to injured SDF personnel at the frontline, providing emergency measures near the site of injury, Frontline Medics[1] first provide life-saving procedures[2] medical evacuation, and destination SDF hospitals. to the personnel while damage control surgery (DCS)[3] Fig. IV-2-4-1 Conceptual Image of a Seamless Posture for Medical Care and Evacuation MSDF Units ASDF Units Self-Defense Force National Defense Medical Central Hospital College Hospital Medical Room in ships Self-Defense Force Fukuoka Hospital Self-Defense Force Iruma Hospital Air Rescue Destroyers and others Self-Defense Force Yokosuka Hospital Self-Defense Force Kumamoto Hospital Joint Medical Evacuations GSDF Units **Part** Field Self-Defense **Ⅳ** Division or Brigade Hospitals Force Naha Hospital Front Line Aid Regimental Medical Medical Stations **Chapter** Stations and others Medical Information Wounded **2** Patient Fundamental Information Information sharing System **1** Frontline medics refer to those who have been certified as Licensed Assistant Nurses (see “Assistant Nurse” as defined in the Act on Public Health Nurses, Midwives, and Nurses) or Emergency Life-Saving Technicians (see “Emergency Life-Saving Technician” as defined in the Emergency Life-Saving Technicians Act), and who have completed the training curriculum approved by the council stipulated in the Directives Relating to Emergency Life-Saving Actions. **2** First aid treatment for those with symptoms such as airway obstruction and tension pneumothorax caused by injuries, and other treatments such as administration of analgesic for pain relief. **3** Emergency operations to stop hemorrhage by pressing/placing gauze and sutures, etc. on damaged internal organs, and to prevent contamination with intestinal tract contents. The purpose ----- **(2) Enhancing the Functions of SDF Hospitals and** **Establishing Medical Bases** The role of SDF hospitals is to admit and treat injured SDF personnel and other persons transported from their area of activity in various emergency situations. In peacetime, these hospitals also provide medical care to SDF personnel and their families, etc. These hospitals also play the role of educational institutions that train medical personnel to maintain and enhance their skills. In response to the recommendations of this discussion meeting in February 2024, the MOD/SDF is promoting studies to establish a system for administering blood transfusion during combat trauma care. Furthermore, there are plans to provide equipment to stockpile blood products in the FY 2024 budget. **(3) Securing medical materials and equipment such** **as blood products** Most deaths in war are due to exsanguination from bomb wounds, gunshot wounds, and other similar causes. To prevent such deaths, it is extremely important to secure blood products for transfusion. For this reason, to establish an operational posture for the MOD/SDF to autonomously secure and stockpile blood products based on NDS, in October 2023, under Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Matsumoto, the “Expert Panel on Blood Transfusion during Combat Trauma Care of the MOD/SDFs” was established with external experts having specialized knowledge, and a total of five discussion meetings have been held. In response to the recommendations of this discussion meeting in February 2024, the MOD/SDF is promoting studies to establish a system for administering blood transfusion during combat trauma care. Furthermore, there are plans to provide equipment to stockpile blood products in the FY 2024 budget. Joint Logistics and Medical Training during the FY2023 Joint Exercise “05JX” (November 2023) is performed at medical bases equipped with the field operation system,[4] etc. After these measures, the patients are safely and quickly sent back to the Self-Defense Forces Hospitals for specialized treatment and complete cure. For improving the life-saving rate of our SDF personnel, a medical support system and posture is being established that allows for aid to be received within 10 minutes of injury, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF have been educating and training SDF personnel who are licensed as Licensed Assistant Nurses and Emergency Life-Saving Technician so that they are able to provide life-saving procedures4 to SDF personnel who have been injured in the course of executing their missions near the scene of injury while promoting their designation and deployment to units as frontline medics. In addition, for the construction of a rapid and reliable evacuation posture using all means of evacuation, the SDF will enhance education and training tailored to the characteristics of the units and equipment of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, which include medical care during evacuation on board ships and aircraft while promoting the development of training equipment for medical transport by air and teaching materials for improving first aid capability. The SDF will also promote development and integration of medical training infrastructure necessary for combat injury education and common to all SDFs, aiming to improve common knowledge and skills. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **2 �Reinforcement of Integrated Medical** **Operational Posture** Many of the medical functions are common among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and to strengthen the integrated operational posture in the medical field, which is closely involved in supporting unit operations, unification of joint medical training and various medical education is being promoted. Mobile operating room sheltered in a large truck with one of the four functions necessary for operation (operation, operation preparation, sterilization, medical supply vehicles). Thoracotomy, ----- **Commentary** **Initiative to Enhance Combat Casualty Care Capabilities:** **The Blood Transfusion Strategy of the Ministry of Defense for Treatment of Combat Injuries** Most deaths in war are due to exsanguination from bomb wounds protocol, such as human resource development, establishment of a gunshot wounds, and other similar causes. Securing and using system within the ministry, and preparation of safety management blood products for transfusion to prevent such deaths is extremely and utilization procedures, and gave recommendations for solving important. However, it is necessary to gather the opinions of these issues. external experts on measures concerning blood products and Based on the recommendations, the MOD/SDF will formulate medical treatment using blood products from the perspective of a blood transfusion strategy that can be used appropriately and medical efficacy, safety, and ethics. Thus, the Study Meeting on ensures safety so that the lives of as many members as possible Blood Transfusion in Combat Casualty Care by the MOD/SDF was can be saved. established under the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Matsumoto. Based on the common understanding that simple, safe, and speedy use and management of blood transfusion is required in combat casualty care, which is subject to geographical, human, and material constraints, the panel of experts determined that, given the unique environment surrounding combat casualty care, it would be appropriate for the MOD/SDF to prepare a blood transfusion protocol manual that takes every possible measure to improve the survival rate of soldiers, in addition to transfusion procedures based on domestic guidelines prescribed by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The panel of experts also Panel of experts discussing at the Study Meeting identified various issues to be addressed when preparing the Furthermore, an information system will be established to standardize medical supplies and equipment to ensure interoperability among various SDFs and ensure that medical information for each SDF personnel can be accessed on time without distinction. **3** **Strengthening the Function of the NDMC** as well as promoting the necessary research in defense medicine to advance the quality of the SDF’s medical services in areas such as the treatment of trauma, burns, and physical injuries, infectious disease control, and mental health. In particular, research on artificial platelet could be beneficial in treating combat injuries if it can be successfully put to practical use. In addition, in FY 2024, a “Center for Trauma, Burn and Tactical Medicine” will be newly established at the NDMC to train medical and nursing officers capable of providing medical care for combat trauma care. In addition, an operational posture will be established to provide highly advanced medical care at the NDMC Hospital to allow it to play the role of admitting severely injured SDF personnel who cannot be treated at SDF hospitals. The MOD / SDF will drastically reform the operation of the NDMC Hospital, which is a clinical site for medical officers and others who provide treatment for combat injuries. As the only educational institution of the MOD/SDF for the training of SDF personnel who are physicians (medical officers), SDF personnel who are public health and registered nurses (nursing officers), and technical officers, the NDMC plays the role of training and producing primary medical staff as well as maintaining and improving their skills. The DBP stipulates that the NDMC will strengthen education and research, including combat trauma care capabilities improvement. Specifically, it calls for strengthening education for medical and nursing officers in areas such as trauma surgery and treatment, **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** ----- **2** **Strengthening the Medical Function to Respond to Various Situations and** **Diverse Missions** aviation medicine, disaster medicine, and other medical **1** **Securing and Training Medical Personnel** fields for the benefit of various countries, especially in The MOD/SDF is working to secure and nurture medical the Indo-Pacific region. Every year, the SDF participates officers and maintain and improve their medical skills in the Pacific Partnership sponsored by the U.S. by enhancing clinical education at the NDMC and other military and carries out medical support activities in institutions, promoting various initiatives for ensuring various regions. In 2023, the SDF performed medical more opportunities for medical officers to engage in treatment on a U.S. Navy hospital ship and conducted medical practice, and helping them acquire and improve joint Japan-U.S.-UK medical operations in Palau. In specialized knowledge and skills in areas such as addition, SDF members are also deployed to various infectious diseases and emergency medicine. medical training programs held overseas, such as the Similar measures are taken for nursing officers to Medical Civic Actions Program (MEDCAP), which was maintain and improve their knowledge/skills through held on the occasion of the multilateral joint exercise practice at external hospitals, etc. “Komodo 2023” hosted by the Indonesian Navy, and the Moreover, medical personnel and medical staff, multilateral joint exercise “Cobra Gold” etc. such as radiological technologists, clinical laboratory It has been reinforcing its capability to respond technicians, and emergency life-saving technicians, are to infectious diseases by training personnel who can educated and trained at SDF hospitals, schools and other contribute to overseas activities, improving equipment relevant institutions so that the SDF can perform diverse for transporting infectious disease patients, and providing missions and missions under special circumstances, the necessary facilities and equipment to units, the including international peace cooperation activities and NDMC Hospital, and the SDF Central Hospital to treat large-scale disasters. patients suffering from Category I Infectious Diseases,[5] which are classified as the most dangerous among known infectious diseases. **2 �Improving Preparedness Necessary for** Moreover, the MOD/SDF has been developing the **International Cooperation** postures necessary for various international cooperation The MOD/SDF has dispatched instructors for the United initiatives, which include upgrading mobile medical Nations Field Medical Assistant Course (UNFMAC) systems that are effective for overseas medical as a part of the UN Triangular Partnership Programme activities and dispatching SDF personnel to the medical (UNTPP), participated in medical care, etc., in overseas departments of international organizations, the U.S. disaster areas as part of international disaster relief Department of Defense, etc. activities. They have also actively conducted capacity **See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-3-2(1) (Pacific Partnership); Part building and joint exercises in underwater medicine, III, Chapter 3, Section 3-2-5 (Support to the UNTPP) **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **2** **MOVIE : NDMC introduction video: “The Power of Smiles”** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/jieikanbosyu/about/recruit/boueiidai-igaku.html** ----- **Section 5** **Reinforcing Policy-Making Function** The NDS stipulates that, for the SDF to fully exert its ministries and agencies, private research institutions, capabilities and respond to the severe, complex, and fast- and private companies, particularly those in the defense paced strategic environment, strategic and agile defense industry, as well as reviewing and reinforcing the policy planning and making are required, including in research system of the MOD/SDF led by the National domains such as space, cyber, and electromagnetic Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) and reinforcing its spectrum. To fundamentally strengthen these functions, function as an intellectual base. the NDS calls for closely cooperating with relevant **1** **Efforts for Reinforcing Policy-Making Function** It was clearly stated in the NDS that the need to are working to improve the quality of their research fundamentally reinforce strategic and agile defense on a routine basis to produce results that contribute to policy planning functions, a consultation framework Japan’s policy-making and strengthen its function as an will be established to obtain policy advice from experts. intellectual foundation. In addition, from the perspective Based on this policy, the first meeting of the “Advisory of promoting public understanding of knowledge and Panel on the Fundamental Strengthening of Defense information about Japan’s national security policies, Capabilities” was held in February 2024, bringing including the results of such research: together experts and specialists from various fields. (1) review and strengthen the research system of the During this meeting, candid discussions were held on the MOD/SDF by building networking and strengthening fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and institutional collaboration with research and the relationship between security and economic growth. educational institutions, universities, think-tanks, In addition, the National Defense Strategy states etc., in Japan and abroad; that the MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture to (2) provide policy-making departments, etc., with high- comprehensively advance, from a strategic perspective, quality research results backed by advanced expertise the SDF’s future ways of warfare and the utilization and and research capabilities; nurturing of cutting-edge technologies and application (3) disseminate highly trustworthy information based on of those technologies to defense equipment necessary the aforementioned research results, etc.; and for future SDF operations, while closely cooperating (4) contribute to the promotion of security education by with relevant ministries and agencies, private research dispatching instructors to educational institutions, institutions, and private companies, particularly those etc., holding public symposiums, etc., with the defense industry as their core. in order to reinforce its intellectual base through NIDS The MOD’s research and educational institutions, and various schools, among other initiatives. including the National Institute for Defense Studies, **2** **Efforts by the National Institute for Defense Studies** **Part** **Ⅳ** The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) institution equivalent to the National Defense University **Chapter** conducts policy-oriented research and studies primarily of other countries, it also functions as a university-level **2** on security and military history and policy simulations to national defense educational institution for the training promote collaboration with policy-making departments of senior MOD/SDF officials, and employees of other by taking advantage of its unique position as a national ministries and agencies. NIDS manages and publishes academic research and educational institution focused a large volume of data on military history as a facility on national security. In addition, as an educational possessing historical materials, etc. in accordance with **REFERENCE : Advisory Panel on the Fundamental Strengthening of Defense Capabilities (Japanese Only)** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/meeting/drastic-reinforcement/index.html** ----- the Public Records and Archives Management Act , and serves as the largest research center on military history in Japan. In April 2023, the Cyber Security Division was established at NIDS in response to research needs in the increasingly important field of cybersecurity based on the Defense Buildup Program, which calls for a review of the research system to support the augmentation of the functions of strategic and agile defense policy planning and formulation, and reinforcement of its functions as an intellectual foundation. NIDS, an institution that plays a role in defense exchange and security dialogue also emphasizes International Conference on Policy Simulation “Connections Japan 2023/24” held by the international exchange and conducts research exchanges National Institute of Defense Studies (January 2024) with defense universities, security research institutes, “Connections Japan 2023/24” was held under the theme etc., in other countries with the main objective of “Development of Policy Simulation Techniques for the improving the quality of its research and education Security Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region,” and contributing to national security by strengthening This international conference was held as an relations of trust with said countries. Specifically, opportunity to introduce the latest knowledge and activities include mutual dispatch of researchers for discussions held in Japan and abroad on various security lectures, holding study groups and participating in issues, and it will continue focus on timely themes to international conferences, receiving visits from foreign help address policy-related issues and reinforce Japan’s government and military officials, and inviting foreign intellectual base. researchers and experts. Through these exchanges, the In addition, NIDS proactively disseminates information NIDS is improving the quality of its research and studies by publishing major research results on its website and and strengthening its intellectual network. issuing various publications, such as the “NIDS China In FY2023, the International Symposium on Security Security Report” and “Security & Strategy,” which have was held under the theme “New Horizons in the Nuclear been published annually to date. Researchers at NIDS Age,” and the International Forum on War History have also published many books, articles, and essays Studies was held under the theme “Japan’s Security and on their research findings, some of which have received the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War.” In addition, awards for the outstanding research conducted. the International Conference on Policy Simulation **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-5 (Responses in the Cyber Domain) **3** **Efforts by Other Institutions** **Part** The National Defense Academy of Japan (NDA) is improves a high standard of research. In addition, the responsible for training and educating individuals who results of the NDA’s research that is mainly centered on **Ⅳ** **Chapter** are expected to become SDF officers, providing more the themes handled by the Center for Global Security[2] advanced training and education for SDF personnel, etc., are widely disseminated outside the academy through **2** and conducting the research needed to perform these presentations at seminars and colloquia held by the functions. NDA as well as through online publications, such as the In its role, the NDA conducts a large volume of Global Security Seminar Series and the Global Security fundamental research related to general academic Study Series. and defense policy-related research, and upholds and SDF Command and Staff Colleges, etc., periodically **1** Act on Management of Official Documents, etc. **2** The Center for Global Security is a department established within the Institute for Advanced Studies and is responsible for planning, drafting, and implementing research and joint research ----- hold various security related seminars and symposiums that are attended by researchers, including overseas researchers and foreign military personnel, etc., from industry (companies), government (national and local), and academia (universities, etc.), which contributes to research and studies regarding Japan’s national security in the future through discussions and the exchange of opinions from a variety of different perspectives. The colleges also strive to obtain knowledge and information necessary for research and studies to maintain and improve the quality of their education and research by hosting visiting researchers as well as participating in exchanges, etc., with educational and research institutions, etc., in Japan and overseas. The colleges proactively disseminate information[3] by publishing major research results and initiatives on their websites, issuing various publications, and through other means. **Commentary** **National Defense Academy Graduation Ceremony** The National Defense Academy’s graduation ceremony was held strengthening of the defense forces, and that the very existence of on March 23, 2024. Prime Minister Kishida attended the ceremony each graduate will act as a deterrent to war. and addressed the graduates as the Supreme Commander of the Self-Defense Forces. In his address, Prime Minister Kishida quoted the ancient Roman maxim, “If you want peace, prepare for war”, emphasizing the necessity of deterrence to avert wars and safeguard peace. He affirmed that Japan must strive to enhance its diplomatic power and significantly strengthen its defense forces. Prime Minister Kishida motivated the graduates, emphasizing that the strengthening of the defense forces cannot be achieved merely by increasing and renewing the SDF’s equipment, and said the graduates performing important duties to make the defense forces function in the future, themselves form the core Prime Minister Kishida at the graduation ceremony of the National Defense Academy (March 2024) of the defense forces, that their efforts are indispensable for the **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE : Publications issued by NIDS** **URL : https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/index.html** The JGSDF Training Evaluation Research and Development Command publishes “Ground Defense,” the JMSDF Command and Staff College publishes the “Japan Maritime Self-Defense ----- **Exercises** **Chapter** **3** **Section 1** **Training and Exercise Initiatives** In order for the MOD/SDF to fulfil its mission of capabilities and stabilize the security environment defending our nation, it is essential for all personnel surrounding Japan to maintain peace in Japan. To this and every unit, which is the core of the defense force, to end, the MOD/SDF is actively promoting bilateral/ maintain a high level of training and improve upon their multilateral exercises with Japan’s ally, like-minded skills on a regular basis. It can be said that a high level countries, and others in the wider Indo-Pacific region of capabilities and skills is the foundation of our nation’s as part of its efforts to achieve the vision of a “Free deterrence and response capabilities. and Open Indo-Pacific.” In particular, MOD/SDF is The MOD/SDF actively conducts various high- strengthening its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, level bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, and which is closely connected to Japan’s national security, various exercises involving other ministries and local and is working to create a security environment that does governments to further improve deterrence and response not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force capabilities. and such attempts, by maintaining and improving the It is essential to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities and skills of each country through common Fig. IV-3-1-1 Major Training Undertaken by Japan and the Japan-U.S. Alliance **Dealing with North Korea launching ballistic missiles repeatedly** **Japan-U.S. Bilateral** **Field training exercise with** **Joint Exercise** **the U.S. Army “Orient Shield 2023”** **(Keen Edge 23)** Japan-U.S. bilateral ballistic Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise Bilateral anti-ship combat training with the U.S. Army Japan-U.S. joint response to various situations missiles defense exercise **Sea of Japan** **SDF Joint Exercise “05JX”** **ANNUAL Exercise 2023** **Japan-U.S.-ROK** **trilateral exercise** MSDF’s largest exercise South Korea, the U.S., and Japan hold **Part** Amphibious operations The Philippines military participated for the first time as an observer first trilateral aerial exercise [Courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense] **East China Sea** **Ⅳ** **Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise** **Japan, U.S., Australia, and South Korea** **“Resolute Dragon 23”** **Chapter** **multilateral exercise “Pacific Vanguard 23”** **3** JS “Hyuga” training with 2 U.S. aircraft carriers JS “Shiranui” launching ESSM Bilateral field training exercise ----- efforts such as bilateral/multilateral exercise with allied, strengthen cooperation in responding to global security like-minded countries, and by strengthening deterrence challenges and destabilizing factors to which it is difficult and response capabilities through collaboration and for any individual country to respond. cooperation, thereby creating a synergistic effect. In **See** Fig. IV-3-1-1 (Major Training Undertaken by Japan and the Japan-U.S. Alliance) addition to these efforts, the MOD/DF is also working to **1** **Training that Contributes to Reinforcing Japan’s Capability to Respond to** **Various Contingencies** nationwide joint exercise for FY 2023 as a field training **1** **Joint Training of the SDF** exercise. This was the SDF’s largest-scale field training It is of paramount importance that the SDF be prepared exercises, with approximately 30,000 participants to seamlessly and fully demonstrate its deterrence and from the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. The exercise was response capabilities through repeated training involving conducted in a comprehensive manner based on a joint operations of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF on a series of hypothetical scenarios ranging from gray-zone routine basis. situations to armed attack situations in order to respond to To this end, the SDF has been conducting SDF armed attacks in various domains, including in the space, joint exercises since 1979 to rehearse joint operations cyberspace and electromagnetic domains. U.S. forces by alternating between field training exercises and engaged in some exercises to maintain and strengthen command post exercises almost every year. In addition, Japan-U.S. coordination. In addition to ASDF fighter jets in order to respond to large-scale disasters and various using civilian airports for the first time as joint training, other disasters in an expeditious and appropriate manner, the exercise also included maneuver deployment training the SDF organizes various disaster prevention drills of units using civilian vessels and ports, joint use of U.S. while also actively participating in disaster prevention military bases, and disaster drills on remote islands. This drills organized by the Japanese Government and realistic and advanced exercise maintained and improved local governments as part of its efforts to strengthen the SDF’s joint operation capabilities. cooperation with various ministries and agencies, local governments, etc. **(2) Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR)** Furthermore, the SDF has been conducting training In order to maintain and enhance its disaster response regularly so that it can immediately rescue or transport capabilities, the SDF conducts disaster drills revolving Japanese nationals and others overseas, in emergency around its command and staff activities in the event of a situations. large-scale earthquake, the coordination between major units, and its coordination with disaster prevention **(1) SDF Joint Exercise (JX)** organizations as well as the U.S. Forces in Japan. During In November 2023, the SDF conducted “05JX,” a this exercise conducted in June 2023 based on the hypothetical scenario that a Nankai Trough earthquake had occurred, the SDF tested its response plan by conducting drills for emergency transportation of troops and equipment to isolated areas and transportation of supplies to isolated disaster areas along the coast, **Part** assuming a situation where isolated areas have occurred, **Ⅳ** thereby improving its ability to respond to disasters. **Chapter** **3** **(3) Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise (RIDEX) and** **Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX), a Japan-U.S.** **Bilateral Integrated Disaster Response Exercise** The SDF conducts field training exercises on responding to sudden large-scale disasters on remote islands to FY2023 Amphibious Operations during the SDF Joint Exercise “05JX” (November 2023) i t i d h th SDF’ bilit t d ----- to disasters on remote islands as well as strengthen collaboration with the U.S. Forces and relevant disaster prevention organizations. **(4) Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Drill “Disaster** **Prevention Day”** The MOD/SDF conducted an operation drill at the Disaster Response Headquarters of the MOD on September 1, 2023, assuming the occurrence of an earthquake directly under the Tokyo metropolitan area, so that the SDF can be quickly and systematically dispatched when a disaster such as a large-scale earthquake occurs. In addition, participated in disaster drills conducted by local governments. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **Commentary** **2023 Self-Defense Forces Joint Exercise “05JX”** To help achieve a drastic reinforcement of defense capabilities than ever. amid the increasingly tense security environment surrounding Thanks to the deep understanding of residents and the Japan, the SDF conducted their largest-ever military exercise in cooperation of the relevant local governments, the SDF was able November 2023, designated 05JX. to conduct fighter aircraft takeoff and landing training at the The SDF was able to use this exercise to improve operational Okayama, Oita, Amami, and Tokunoshima airports during 05JX. capability by including the space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic The participation of the U.S. armed forces in part of this exercise, domains into ground, maritime, and air operations, such as along with countries like Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, integrated anti-ship attack and integrated air and missile defense, Philippines, the ROK, the UK, Germany, and NATO attending as and through cross-domain training. In addition, where training for observers, also contributed to strengthening cooperation with ground operations and amphibious operations had previously been allies and like-minded countries. conducted by function, these operations were now organically With a strong determination to prevent any unilateral change linked and carried out comprehensively, closely connecting in the status quo or attempts to do so by force, the MOD/SDF are command post activities at the operational command center with committed to further strengthening the deterrence and response the movements of field units to achieve integrated operational and capabilities to protect the peace and security of Japan through tactical levels. 05JX was thus more practical and sophisticated these training exercises. F-2 fighter aircraft deployed at Okayama Airport Aegis Maya-class CIC during Integrated Air and Missile Defense training **REFERENCE : Unit training in the SDF** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/training/index.html** **REFERENCE : Joint exercises and training** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/training.html** ----- **(5) Drills for Medical Treatment Activities Following a** **Large-Scale Earthquake** The MOD/SDF participates in drills organized by the Cabinet Office involving medical treatment activities to be carried out in the aftermath of a large-scale earthquake, and maintains and enhances its disaster response capabilities by rehearsing various actions for disaster relief and coordination procedures with disaster prevention. These drills conducted in September 2023, in which field training exercises were conducted based on the hypothetical scenario that a Nankai Trough earthquake had occurred, saw participation from the MOD/SDF and other relevant organizations (National Police Agency, Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (including Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT)), Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and Japan Coast Guard, etc.), as well as several local governments (Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime, Kochi, Oita and Miyazaki Prefectures). SDF personnel training for disaster response in cooperation with various local governments, DMAT, etc. (September 2023) and the French military was strengthened regarding actions ranging from post-deployment of the dispatched Joint Task Force, to the protection and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas. Furthermore, the lessons learned from this training were utilized in the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in the Republic of Sudan in April 2023 and in the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in Israel in October of the same year. **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7-2 (Responses to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-11 (15) (Jordan); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-12 (2) (Djibouti) **2** **Training of Each SDF Service** A high-level of training by each SDF is a fundamental prerequisite for being able to fully exert joint defense capabilities. As such, each SDF continuously conducts individual training for its troops and organizational training for its units, forming the foundation of a strong SDF. **(1) GSDF** The GSDF conducts field training exercises at the regional army level to improve its response capabilities for various contingencies and other situations. Furthermore, GSDF units from across the country conduct Ground Self-Defense Force exercises. They strive to improve their operation execution capabilities and operational effectiveness by demonstrating various unit actions while contributing to enhancing deterrence and response capabilities. In addition, it conducts parachute drop training from U.S. Air Force and other aircraft in Japan and overseas, training for amphibious operations, and live-fire training for Medium range SAM/SSM (Surface-to-Air Missile / Surface-to-Ship Missile) units to enhance various tactical skills necessary for joint cross-domain operations. **(6) Joint Deployment and Action Training (Middle East** **and Africa), Furnace Darter (FD)** In December 2022, with the cooperation of Djibouti and Jordan, training on protection measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas was conducted in an actual operating environment in the Middle East and Africa region. In this training, the cooperation with related organizations, the U.S. military, the Italian military, **(2) MSDF** The MSDF conducts training between naval units, and between naval vessels, aircraft (including the ASDF) and ground units (including the GSDF), as well as mine warfare training in Japan and deployment training that leverages superior U.S. training infrastructure with the **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE : Overview of GSDF education and training** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/about/training/index.html** ----- ANNUAL Exercise 2023 (November 2023) ASDF patriot live-fire exercises cooperation of the U.S. Navy in order to improve various tactical capabilities. In addition, the MSDF conducts MSDF exercises (field training exercises) in which units all over Japan are mobilized, as part of efforts to enhance readiness. The “ANNUAL Exercise 2023,” conducted in November 2023, rehearsed commanders’ tactical decisions and unit operational procedures, based on a series of hypothetical situations ranging from the gray zone to an armed attack. In this largest-ever exercise by the MSDF, in addition to the U.S., Australian, and Canadian navies and air forces, the Philippine Navy participated as an observer for the first time. Various tactical training exercises, including anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare, were conducted to improve the MSDF’s operation execution capabilities and strengthen cooperation with the navies of participating countries. The MSDF has also strengthened cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard, and in June 2023, conducted field training exercise with the Japan Coast Guard for the first time after the Minister of Defense established the Control Procedures for the Japan Coast Guard. This exercise was conducted under the assumption that the Japan Coast Guard would be placed under the control of the Minister of Defense in an armed attack situation and would evacuate residents, provide information to vessels, and perform evacuation support. Through the exercise, the MSDF rehearsed and verified information communication procedures with the Japan Coast Guard. In addition, bilateral exercises with the Japan Coast Guard were conducted to enhance joint response capabilities, including training related to comprehensive response and strengthening of cooperation, and training to deal with suspicious vessels. **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3-1-3(2) (Reinforcing Coordination with the Japan Coast Guard) **(3) ASDF** The ASDF focuses on enhancing the professional expertise of its personnel in phases in order to fully utilize equipment with cutting-edge technologies, such as fighter aircraft, radars, surface-to-air guided missiles, etc. It also conducts unit-specific training and training on inter-unit coordination procedures involving units, such as fighter units, air warning and control units, and surface-to-air guided missile units, as well as comprehensive training that includes air transport units and air rescue units. For example, the ASDF conducts the field training exercise Air Defense Command Comprehensive Training, in which all relevant units in Japan are mobilized, as well as PAC-3 maneuver and deployment training, overseas flight training, etc., to enhance maneuver and deployment capabilities and responsiveness. In addition, the ASDF **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE : MSDF training and exercise** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/operation/training/** **REFERENCE : ASDF exercises** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/report/cat-kunren/** ----- is strengthening its operation execution capabilities and training that leverages the Advanced Airlift Tactics through Patriot live-fire training in the United States Training Center (AATTC) in the United States. **2** **Training that Contributes to Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance** The Japan-U.S. Alliance is essential to Japan’s participated in this exercise for the first time and rehearsed national security, and Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises command and control to improve the effectiveness of play a significant role in enhancing Japan’s deterrence Japan-U.S.-Australia defense cooperation. In addition, and response capabilities. The SDF has consistently Japan-U.S. joint response drills against ballistic missiles conducted joint training involving different SDF were also conducted to maintain and enhance the SDF’s services as well as Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercises joint operation capabilities and Japan-U.S. joint response (field training exercises and command post exercises) capabilities. to improve the SDF’s tactical skills and strengthen collaboration with the U.S. Forces, demonstrating **2 �Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises of Each SDF** Japan and the United States’ unified commitment to and **Service** capacity for achieving peace and stability in the region. **(1) GSDF** In recent years, the GSDF has strengthened its operational **1** **Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises** and strategic coordination with the U.S. Army and U.S. Since 1986, the SDF has been conducting the Japan-U.S. Marines both centrally and at the Pacific level. Bilateral bilateral joint exercises “Keen Sword” (field training exercises, in conjunction with high-level exchanges, exercise) and “Keen Edge” (command post exercise) to have continued to evolve and develop as part of ongoing rehearse SDF operational procedures and the Japan-U.S. efforts to fundamentally strengthen the Japan-U.S. joint Joint Response Plan for armed attack situations, etc., response posture. as well as to improve the readiness of the SDF and the In FY 2023, Japan and the U.S. worked together to interoperability of Japan and the United States. materialize the coordination procedures and improve In FY 2023, the Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercise for interoperability through bilateral exercises, including FY 2023, “Keen Edge 24” (command post exercise), was “Orient Shield 23” with the U.S. Army and “Resolute conducted to rehearse command and staff activities for Dragon 23” with the U.S. Marines. In addition, for the Japan-U.S. joint response to a variety of contingencies first time in nine years, Japan and the U.S. conducted and joint operations of the SDF. Australian defence forces “North Wind 24,” a bilateral exercise with the U.S. Army **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **3** Joint anti-ship combat exercise (GSDF MLRS) (September 2023) Troopers coordinating with U.S. forces during “Keen Edge 24” (February 2024) **REFERENCE : The evolution of Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/about/japan-us/index.html** ----- in snowy and cold regions, to share know how on tactical operations in snowy regions and improve the ability to cope with all kinds of situations. **a. Field Training with U.S. Army in Japan “Orient Shield** **23”** In September 2023, the GSDF conducted a training aimed at reinforcing Japan-U.S. coordination capabilities in light of its cross-domain operations and the U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations. In this exercises, in addition to the command post training such as JapanU.S. joint anti-ship combat, a field training exercise was conducted, which included anti-ship combat training with live-fire training using the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and joint combat training with U.S. Army infantry units, including live-fire training with anti-tank missiles, artillery and mortars, etc. In addition, the first-ever training exercise was conducted on Amami Oshima Island for the prepositioning and transportation of supplies in cooperation with U.S. small landing craft utility, thereby rehearsing mutual coordination procedures and improving Japan-U.S. mutual response capabilities through field training. **b. Field Training with U.S. Marines in Japan “Resolute** **Dragon 23”** In October 2023, the GSDF rehearsed a series of operations for island defense, with a focus on crossdomain operations and coordination based on the U.S. Marines’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).[1] This exercise, which consisted of a command post exercise and a field training exercise, was the largest-ever exercise with the U.S. Marines in Japan, conducted from Hokkaido and Kyushu to Okinawa. The field training exercise necessary for island defense, such as anti-ship and anti-air combat, anti-landing combat, including joint logistics and medical support services, was conducted utilizing the Surface-to-Ship Missile (SSM), Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and High Mobility Rocket Artillery System (HIMARS) of the U.S. Marines, in conjunction with the combat guidance by Japanese and U.S. command organizations, based on the results of the command post exercise. In addition, the GSDF V-22 (Osprey) participated in this exercise for the first time, conducted patient evacuation training by Japan-U.S. Osprey, and implemented joint Japan-U.S. runway restoration, etc., to improve the sustainability of operations on the islands. Live exercise during Resolute Dragon 23 (October 2023) **(2) MSDF** The MSDF has traditionally conducted bilateral exercises with the U.S. Navy proactively, and is working to enhance the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. joint response as well as cross-domain operation capabilities through Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises with naval vessels and aircraft, anti-submarine special exercises, minesweeping special training, medical special training, and Japan-U.S. medical joint training. For example, the MSDF has consistently conducted bilateral exercises with U.S. navy carrier strike groups and conducted a wide range of Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises in the waters surrounding Japan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, thereby ceaselessly strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In September 2023, the MSDF conducted its first bilateral exercises with the U.S. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **MOVIE : 2024 “Resolute Dragon” live-fire training with U.S. Marines in Japan** **URL : https://youtu.be/rClkaLSKXW4** **MOVIE : Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises “Rescue Flag Okinawa”** **URL : https://youtu.be/2wjXvLuzOwg?si=XFaa8P4RQaUVycJT** Expeditionary Advanced Base Operation. An operational concept in which frontline operations are executed by rapidly dispersing and deploying within the enemy’s firepower zone and ----- **(3) ASDF** The ASDF is working to reinforce the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through “Red Flag-Alaska,” the U.S. Air Force exercise that the ASDF has been participating in since 1996, and the bilateral exercise with the U.S. Air Force “Cope North,” which has been conducted in Guam since 1999. In addition, the ASDF is working to enhance the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. joint response as well as cross-domain operation capabilities through air combat training, intercept training, defensive counter air training, tactical attack training, aerial refueling training, search and rescue training, and navigation and formation training with the U.S. Navy and Marines, as well as other Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises. For example, the exercises conducted in FY2023, including the F-35A/B fighter jets and B-1 and B-52 bombers of the U.S. Forces, affirmed the readiness of the SDF and the U.S. Forces under the robust JapanU.S. Alliance, and demonstrated both domestically and internationally the strong will and close cooperation between Japan and the United States when responding to various contingencies. Navy s unmanned surface ship. In addition, the MSDF is actively conducting Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises involving other services, including bilateral exercises with the GSDF and U.S. Marines, and “Rescue Flag Okinawa,” a search and rescue exercise with the ASDF and the U.S. Air Force, to strengthen comprehensive deterrence and response capabilities. Destroyer JS “ISE” conducting bilateral exercise with the U.S. Navy’s Theodore Roosevelt and Carl Vinson carrier strike groups in southern Okinawa (January 2024) **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** VOICE **Voice from JSDF personnel who participated in the field training exercise** **Resolute Dragon 23 with the U.S. Marine Corps** **Major Kenji Yamada, General Company Commander, GSDF 42nd Rapid Deployment Regiment, GSDF** I participated in Resolute Dragon 23 as a General Company of fulfillment and accomplishment in building good interpersonal Commander of the 42nd Rapid Deployment Regiment, conducting relations and cooperative attitude through the bonds and mutual anti-landing combat training and combined combat shooting trust born from shared values. training with the U.S. joint forces. I will continue to train daily with a strong will and conviction to During this exercise, the joint anti-landing combat training we defend Japan and maintain peace in the nation. participated in with the company under the command of Major McNeil of the U.S. Marine Corps provided many achievements and lessons learned through the combined demonstration of firepower and fluid defensive combat between the U.S. and Japan. Witnessing the noble sense of duty, high level of discipline and morale, and capabilities of the U.S Marines, I felt an unwavering sense of trust in them as comrades-in-arms, and it reminded me once again of the importance of the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. alliance in the defense of the Southwest. We faced many difficulties due to language and cultural differences. However, we overcame the challenges and carried out our operations by communicating our opinions and ideas to the Front-line coordination between U.S and Japanese company commanders U.S. Marines while respecting their input. I am filled with a sense (Author on the left) ----- The SDF and the U.S. Forces will continue to various contingencies. cooperate closely in peacetime to safeguard the defense **See** Reference 28 (Major Achievements in Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises (FY 2023)) of Japan and the peace and stability of the region while maintaining the necessary posture to swiftly respond to **3** **Multilateral Exercises Involving Japan, the United States, and Third-Party Countries** Each SDF service is actively engaged in high-level 2023, is the largest command post exercise between multilateral training exercises with the participation of Japan and U.S. land forces, in which the Australian not only the United States but also third-party countries. Forces participated for the first time this year. By conducting training with Australian and European With the participation of the Japanese and U.S. naval forces, the SDF has been working to enhance its tactical and air forces, the exercise demonstrated command skills and strengthen its coordination and interoperability and staff activities from the strategic to operational with the armed forces of other countries to reinforce levels, and elements such as logistics, medical service, Japan’s deterrence and response capabilities. and personnel, which support operations, were also enhanced. The exercise also demonstrated the Japan- U.S. coordination procedures concerning the SDF’s **1** **GSDF** cross-domain operations, including space, cyber, and **(1) Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in** electromagnetic operations, and the multi-domain **Australia “Southern Jackaroo 23”** operations by the U.S. Army, thereby improving Japan- From June to July 2023, the GSDF participated in a field US joint response capabilities, and strengthening training exercise with the U.S. and Australian forces in cooperation among Japan, U.S., and Australia. Australia, which included gunnery exercises in various In addition, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, terrain conditions, including protection of critical Canada, Singapore, and France participated in the facilities, attack and defense, and artillery and mortar exercise as observers for the first time, strengthening gunnery, to improve the operation execution capabilities mutual cooperation. of GSDF units and strengthen cooperation with the U.S. and Australian forces. **2** **MSDF** **(1) U.S. hosted large scale global exercise “LSGE 23”** As part of the U.S. hosted LSGE to strengthen deterrence, in June 2023, the MSDF conducted the “Multi Big-Deck Event,” a Japan-U.S.-France trilateral exercise in the waters and airspace from east of Okinawa to the East China Sea, with the U.S. Navy, including two aircraft carriers, U.S. Air Force, French Navy and the ASDF F-15 fighter aircraft. In addition, several other multilateral exercises were conducted in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada multilateral **Part** exercise “Noble Wolf,” the Japan-U.S.-Canada-France GSDF exercise with U.S. and Australian forces for Operation Guerrilla Commandos (July 2023) multilateral exercise “Noble Typhoon,” the Japan-U.S.- **Ⅳ** **Chapter** Canada trilateral exercise “Noble Raven 23,” and the **3** **(2) Japan-U.S.-Australia Multilateral Command Post** Japan-U.S.-France trilateral exercise “Noble Buffalo,” **Exercise “YS-85”** through various exercises such as anti-surface warfare YS-85, conducted in Japan from November to December and anti-submarine warfare, thereby seeking to improve **MOVIE : 2023 Field training exercise with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia** **URL : https://youtu.be/FR0-cFToS8I?si=y_yJs_XWpyh_YLC9** ----- cooperation with the participating countries. U.S. aircraft carriers USS “Ronald Reagan” and USS “Nimitz,” the destroyer JS “Izumo,” the newest French frigate “Lorraine,” and ASDF F-15 fighter aircraft participated in the “Multi Big-Deck Event” a Japan-U.S.-France trilateral exercise (June 2023) conducted under the framework of the four countries at the heart of the vision of FOIP, and efforts will be made to continue strengthening the relationships between the participating countries. **3** **ASDF** **(1) U.S.-Australia deployment training** In August 2023, the ASDF conducted a mobile deployment training of the F-35A fighter jets to the U.S. and Australia, the Japan-Australia bilateral exercise “Bushido Guardian 23,” in September of the same year, respectively after the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) came into effect. In the mobile deployment training, the F-35A fighter jets and other aircraft were deployed to Guam and Australia to strengthen cooperation among air forces for future rotational deployment. **(2) Japan-U.S.-Australia** **trilateral** **base** **defense** **exercise** In December 2023, the ASDF conducted the first trilataral base defense exercise among Japan, the U.S., and Australia to strengthen the base defense system by sharing mutual operational procedures and other measures. **(2) Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK multilateral exercise** **“Pacific Vanguard 23”** The MSDF conducted a multilateral exercise in July 2023 with the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marines, the Royal Australian Navy, and the Republic of Korean Navy in the sea and airspace near Guam. The exercise included anti-surface gunnery, anti-ground gunnery, anti-surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare, aimed at improving MSDF’s tactical capabilities and strengthening cooperation with the participating countries. **(3) Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise** **“Malabar 23”** In August 2023, the MSDF conducted a multilateral exercise involving the U.S. Navy, the Indian Navy, the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Australian Air force in the Eastern sea and airspace of Australia and in Sydney. The destroyer “Shiranui” and the special boarding unit of the MSDF participated in the exercise, which included anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, and replenishment at sea, aimed at improving interoperability with the participating countries. Malabar 2023 was hosted for the first time by Australia, which became an official member in 2022. Malabar has major significance as it continues to be **(3) Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise “Cope** **North 24”** In February 2024, the ASDF, during the Japan-U.S.Australia multilateral exercise, “Cope North 24” based in Guam, along with the MSDF, conducted a multilateral HA/DR (Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief) exercise to further improve interoperability. Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise “Cope North 24” [Courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense] **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** ----- **4** **Bilateral Exercises with Like-Minded Countries** with the Royal Canadian Navy. “JIMEX 2023” with the **1** **GSDF** Indian Navy has improved interoperability between the **(1) Field exercise with the French Army in Japan** MSDF and the Indian Navy, including anti-submarine **“Brunet-Takamori 23”** warfare training using Indian submarines. In September 2023, the GSDF conducted the first bilateral exercise of its kind between French Army and the GSDF in the French New Caledonia. In this exercise, combat shooting and comprehensive field training exercises were conducted to improve operation execution and tactical capabilities for counter-guerilla and commando operations, and to promote mutual understanding and trust with the French Army. **(2) Field exercise with the U.K. Army in the United** **Kingdom “Vigilant Isles 23”** In November 2023, the GSDF conducted a bilateral exercise with the British Army in Japan. During this Japan-India Maritime Exercise “JIMEX 2023” (July 2023) exercise, the two countries conducted exercises such as infiltration and reconnaissance, joint fire coordination, **3** **ASDF** combat shooting, and joint fire guidance for island defense, improving operational capability and tactical **(1) Japan-France bilateral training** capabilities and promoting mutual understanding and In July 2023, the ASDF conducted the first-ever bilateral trust with the British army. The RAA, which came into training with the French Air and Space Force in Japan. In effect in October of the same year, was applied for the this training, the F-15 fighter jets of the ASDF and Rafale first time during this exercise. fighter jets of the French Air and Space Force conducted tactical training to promote mutual understanding **(3) Bilateral Exercise with the Indian Army in Japan** between the French and Japanese air forces, further **“Dharma Guardian 23”** deepen defense cooperation, and improve the ASDF’s The GSDF conducted bilateral exercise “Dharma tactical capabilities. Guardian 23” with the Indian Army in India from February to March 2024. The joint exercise was designed to improve operation execution and tactical capabilities for the war against terrorism and to promote mutual understanding and trust with the Indian Army. **2** **MSDF** **Part** The MSDF conducts bilateral exercises and goodwill exercises with other countries, taking advantage of **Ⅳ** **Chapter** port calls by naval vessels and aircraft, and regularly **3** conducts bilateral exercises such as “Trident” with the Royal Australian Navy, “JIMEX” with the Indian Navy, ASDF interacting with participants from the French Air and Space Force during the bilateral training between France and Japan (July 2023) “Oguri-Verny” with the French Navy, and “KAEDEX” **MOVIE : Vigilant Isles 2023** **URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PlCrtAT-rSI** ----- **(2) Japan Italy bilateral exercise** In August 2023, the ASDF conducted the first-ever bilateral exercise with the Italian Air Force in Japan. In this exercise, the F-15 fighter jets of the ASDF and F-35A fighter jets of the Italian Air Force conducted tactical exercises to promote mutual understanding between Italian and Japanese air force services, deepen defense cooperation, and improve the ASDF’s tactical capabilities. VOICE **Comments from a Crew Member who Participated in Japan-France Bilateral Exercise** **Tomoko Kondo, Airman 1st Class, Vehicle and Equipment Maintenance Squadron, Maintenance Supply Group, 9th Wing, ASDF** C’est une grande chance! (= A perfect opportunity!) moved by the fact that I could serve as a bridge between France I participated as a French interpreter in a bilateral exercise and Japan and contribute to the success of this bilateral exercise. between the ASDF and the French Air and Space Force in July In this way, the SDF provides opportunities to fulfill one’s dreams 2023. It was the first time I had been offered a position as an and hopes and maximize one’s abilities. For example, in the field interpreter for this exercise, and I still remember my excitement of languages, the sphere of activities is expanding in bilateral upon receiving this offer. This was because my motive to join the exercises with various countries, including the U.S. military. I military had at last been fulfilled. On one hand, I felt overwhelmed participated in this exercise and was inspired by discoveries by the expectations of those around me, as I had to engage in and encounters, which increased my desire to work hard. I will highly specialized interpretation. However, I wanted to make the continue to hone my language skills and strive to make my dreams most of my friendly nature, the spirit of Japanese hospitality, come true. and my love for the French language and do my best to promote Merci pour tout et à très bientôt! (= Thank you for everything! defense cooperation and exchange. See you soon!) One month before the exercise, I was temporarily assigned to a unit at Nyutabaru Air Base to make various preparations. Since this was the first-ever bilateral exercise during which French Air and Space Force aircraft visited Japan, it was necessary to prepare everything from scratch. This involved various activities, including meetings for each event, preparing menus for luncheons, sharing images of French culture and national identity, arranging Japanese-French bilingual moderators, and preparing commentary manuscripts. I also served as an interpreter at receptions, interprofessional exchanges, tea ceremonies, and welcome parties for VIPs from both France and Japan. At times, I had to think beyond the role of an interpreter and act flexibly Author engaged in interpretation work (Left) according to the situation. Though I had a hard time, I am deeply **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **MOVIE : Japan-France bilateral training** **URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MsUBOUlcqbM** **MOVIE : Japan-Italy bilateral exercise** **URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-jE2KtNAns** ----- **5** **Multilateral Exercises with Like-Minded Countries and Others** including 5 destroyers and 1 submarine for more than **1** **GSDF** four months from April to September 2023, to visit 16 **(1) Exercise Super Garuda Shield 23 (Multilateral** countries and 19 ports of call while sailing in the Indo- **Exercise)** Pacific region, and conducted 17 bilateral/multilateral From August to September 2023, the GSDF participated exercises and 8 goodwill exercises. in Super Garuda Shield 23, a multilateral exercise hosted Some IPD units participated in the U.S.-hosted LSGE by the U.S. and Indonesian armies and participated by and conducted training that included high-end content Australia, the United Kingdom, and Singapore. In this in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition to the “JIMEX exercise, the GSDF jointly conducted through airborne 2023” with the Indian Navy and the “Noble Stingray,”[2] and amphibious operations. In addition, during combat the Japan-U.S.-Canada multilateral exercise with the shooting, the countries demonstrated joint attack U.S. and Canadian navies, the MSDF participated in combat with live fire and live bombs to strengthen multilateral exercises hosted by the Royal Australian their operational capabilities in island recapture and Navy, including the U.S.-Australia hosted multilateral cooperation with the participating countries. exercise “Talisman Sabre 23” and the Japan-U.S.-India- Australia multilateral exercise “Malabar 2023”. **(2) Multilateral Exercise “Khaan Quest 23”** Furthermore, following the first-ever multilateral The GSDF participated in a multilateral exercise exercise by Japan, U.S., Australia, and the Philippines, organized by Mongolia and the United States from June the IPD units made a joint port call in Manila with the to July 2023. This exercise conducted in Mongolia is U.S. and Australian navies, fleet commanders of Japan, one of the world’s largest multilateral exercises aimed at U.S., Australia, and Philippines inspected the situation improving capabilities associated with UN Peacekeeping in the South China Sea, and fleet commanders of Japan, Operations (PKO), and the GSDF has been dispatching U.S. and Philippines held discussions, thus strengthening units for the exercise since 2015. During the “Khaan Japan-U.S.-Philippines and Japan-U.S.-Australia- Quest 23” exercise, the GSDF participated in command Philippines cooperation. post training, convoy escort operations, civilian In the Pacific island countries, the first-ever goodwill protection, and other field training exercises to preserve exercise was conducted with the Papua New Guinea and improve various capabilities that are useful when Armed Forces and the Kiribati Police Force, demonstrating dispatched for PKOs, to acquire and accumulate the Japan’s willingness to continue its involvement in the relevant expertise, and to promote mutual understanding region and promoting mutual understanding through and strengthen relationships of trust with the military various exchanges with the 6 Pacific island countries in forces of various participating countries. which port calls were made. **(2) The Indo-Pacific and Middle East Deployment** **2** **MSDF** **“IMED23”** **(1) FY2023 Indo-Pacific Deployment “IPD23”** From January to May 2023, the MSDF dispatched The MSDF dispatched surface and submarine units, minesweeper carriers and other vessels to the Indo- **Part** **MOVIE : “Super Garuda Shield 23” (GSDF)** **Ⅳ** **URL : https://youtu.be/IPs9uibILOE?si=h8sBleNXVcRQc7VN** **Chapter** **3** **MOVIE : FY 2023 Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD23), 1st surface unit, activity record** **URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x386tnv96MA** **2** This exercise was the first Japan-U.S.-Canada multilateral exercise (anti-submarine warfare) using MSDF submarines, together with the U.S. Navy and the Canadian Navy, which is ----- Pacific region and the Middle East to participate in the International Maritime Exercise/CUTLASS EXPRESS 2023 (IMX/CE23) held in the Persian Gulf (Kingdom of Bahrain and its surrounding waters), and strengthened cooperation with the U.S., which hosted the exercise, and the navies of participating countries (the United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, etc.). Through this dispatch, the MSDF made port calls in India, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and other countries, and demonstrated Japan’s deep commitment to stability and prosperity of the region through goodwill exercises with the navies of various countries including these countries. **(3) “Talisman Saber 23,” a multilateral exercise** **hosted by the U.S. and Australia** The GSDF and MSDF participated in “Talisman Saber 23” held in Australia from July to August 2023. This is the largest multilateral exercise hosted by the U.S. and Australian forces, and this year, 13 countries, including Japan, the U.S., and Australia, participated in the exercise. The GSDF’s Amphibious Task Force and 2nd Anti-aircraft Artillery Group conducted amphibious operations, and anti-aircraft and anti-ship combat exercises, including live firing of missiles.[3] The MSDF participated in the exercise with the IPD units, destroyer Izumo and transport ship Shimokita, and conducted amphibious operation exercises with the U.S. Navy, to improve their tactical capabilities and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries. **3** **ASDF** **(1) U.S.-Philippines hosted multilateral exercise** **“Pacific Airlift Rally”** In August 2023, the ASDF participated for the first time in the “Pacific Airlift Rally,” a multilateral exercise hosted by the U.S. and the Philippines and conducted in the Philippines. This exercise aimed to improve ASDF’s HA/DR capabilities and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries’ air forces, including airdrop exercises and joint loading and unloading drills. In conjunction with the exercise, the JapanPhilippines Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief bilateral exercise was also conducted to improve HA/ DR capabilities and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries’ air forces, including those of the Philippines. **(2) Multilateral HA/DR exercise “Christmas Drop”** **hosted by the U.S. Air Force** In December 2023, the ASDF participated in “Christmas Drop” conducted by the U.S. Air Force in the Federated States of Micronesia, etc. From the ASDF, a C-130H transport aircraft participated in the exercise, during which airdrop training was conducted to drop daily **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** GSDF and MSDF participating in “Talisman Saber 23” (July to August 2023) **MOVIE : Talisman Saber 23** **URL : https://youtu.be/VQd81bYj31k?si=jALGVethhKM-rE9a** During the anti-aircraft and anti-ship combat exercises, the Type 03{MARUSAN} surface-to-air guided missile (medium-range SAM) and the Type 12{HITONI} surface-to-ship missile ----- VOICE **Comments from a Crew Member who Participated in “Talisman Saber 23”, a** **Multilateral Exercise Organized by the U.S. and Australia** **Takashi Matsumura, Petty Officer 1st Class, LCAC Maintenance Chief, Landing ship tank JS “Shimokita”, MSDF** I participated in “Talisman Saber 23” conducted in 2023 as an the exercise and were able to correct the malfunction with their ordnance man for Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC). These support. I appreciate the cooperation of the U.S. Navy LCAC hovercraft-type transport boats carry personnel and equipment maintenance personnel who worked day and night. to sandy beaches inaccessible to conventional boats. LCACs I hope that there are more opportunities for mutual collaboration are indispensable for this exercise, which primarily involves between Japan and the U.S. in the future. This experience has multilateral amphibious operations. There was a malfunction reaffirmed the importance of regular collaboration between in the LCAC on board the transport vessel “Shimokita” during Japan and the U.S., including logistics, to strengthen Japan-U.S. this exercise. However, we worked together with the U.S. Navy cooperation. LCAC maintenance personnel, who were also participating in U.S. Navy maintenance personnel and MSDF LCAC crew and maintenance personnel Housing the LCAC on board the ship (Author (second from the right in the second row)) necessities and other donated goods collected by the U.S. military at sea, to improve the ASDF’s HA/ DR capabilities and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries. **See** Fig. IV-3-1-2 (Major Bilateral/Multilateral Exercises with Like Minded Countries and Others); Reference 58 (Participation in **See** Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)) **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** “Christmas Drop” ----- Fig. IV-3-1-2 Major Bilateral/Multilateral Exercises with Like-Minded Countries and Others **IPD23** **Japan-Italy bilateral exercise** **Japan-France bilateral exercise** **Japan-U.S.-France trilateral exercise** **Japan-U.S.-Canada trilateral exercise** **Multi Big-Deck Event** **“Noble Stingray”** First bilateral exercise of the Air Force in Japan Training of the Air Self-Defense Force with two US aircraft carriers and French naval vessels The First Japan-U.S.-Canada trilateral exercise using MSDF submarine **Christmas Drop** **Japan-India bilateral exercise** **“JIMEX2023”** **Multinational exercise organized** **by the U.S and the Philippines** “Pacific Airlift Rally” Aerial delivery trainings in Micronesia and other places **Bay of Bengal** Multinational HA/DR exercise **Japan-France bilateral exercise“Brunet-Takamori 2023”** High-end training with the Indian Navy **South China Sea** **Philippine Sea** **U.S.-Australia bilateral military exercise with multinational participation** First bilateral exercise between **Indian Ocean** **“Talisman Sabre 23”** Japanese and French ground forces **Multinational exercise hosted** **Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise** **by the U.S. and Indonesia** **“Malabar 2023”** **“Super Garuda Shield 23”** Japan-U.S.-Indonesia joint parachute drop training High-level inter-naval training Amphibious operations Landing operations Conducted for the first time in Australia **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** ----- **Section 2** **Establishing the Respective Training Environments and Safety Management** **1** **Training Environment** Given the increasingly severe security situation surrounding Japan, it is important to work to establish units and other organizations and enhance the quality of the training so that the SDF can exert its capabilities to the fullest. Because of this, SDF training has been planned and conducted under conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat situations, yet it is necessary to further enhance the training environment in order to maintain and enhance the readiness of the SDF. It is against this background that the MOD/SDF is promoting initiatives to enhance the training infrastructure in Japan and abroad to conduct efficient and effective training and exercises. Rising Thunder, a maximum range firing exercise utilizing the extensive U.S. firing training range (November 2023) As part of these efforts, the MOD/SDF is working to expand the establishment and utilization of urbanization of the areas surrounding maneuver areas domestic maneuver areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere. and ranges. Furthermore, the SDF is also facilitating expanded joint/ Due to the circumstance, the GSDF conducts live- shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas located in fire training of surface-to-air guided missile units and Japan by the SDF while accounting for relations with surface-to-ship guided missile units in the United local communities. States and the like, as it cannot be conducted in Japan. Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate the use of In addition, the GSDF is improving its tactical skills places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities through participation in field training by utilizing and areas, and the utilization of excellent training excellent training bases that are not available in Japan, environments overseas, such as the U.S. and Australia, such as multilateral exercises overseas. and introduce simulators actively. In addition, it conducts field training exercises at the Elsewhere, facilities are in the process of being division and regional army levels by maximizing the use established on Mageshima (Kagoshima Prefecture), of limited domestic maneuver areas, and also conducts where the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense more practical training outside of SDF facilities and Forces will be able to conduct training and other areas while obtaining the understanding and cooperation activities. of local communities. Further, to maximize the capabilities of the SDF in any situation, it is necessary to conduct training using **2** **MSDF** civilian airports regularly. Based on this belief, ASDF fighter aircraft trainings are conducted at civilian airports The timing and location for using sea areas for training as part of the SDF Joint Exercise. around Japan are limited by such factors as weather, **Part** **See** Section 1-1-1 (1) (SDF Joint Exercise “JX”) ocean conditions, marine traffic, and fisheries. Because of this, for example, training that must be conducted **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **1** **GSDF** in relatively shallow sea areas, such as minesweeping **3** training and submarine rescue training, is being conducted Maneuver areas and ranges are unevenly located and do in places such as parts of Mutsu Bay and Sagami Bay. not have sufficient space. Thus, it is challenging for the A new minesweeping exercise was conducted at the GSDF is unable to conduct exercises with large units Sea of Sumounada in western Kyushu in March 2024. or artillery training with extended-range cannons for In addition, the MSDF is improving its tactical skills example. These constraints tend to grow as equipment through participation in bilateral/multilateral exercises i d i d Th l t i t i d b th h di i it t th ----- U.S. hosted International Maritime Exercise Cutlass In addition, long trips to and from the training airspace Express (IMX-CE) held in the Middle East. are required in the case of some bases. Furthermore, Furthermore, with the increase in the number of in operating airports, it is necessary to take great care overseas missions, the MSDF also strives to conduct regarding aircraft noise in conducting early morning and training systematically and efficiently so that a large nighttime flight training. number of units will be able to produce training results Because of this, the ASDF strives to ensure that its in a short amount of time. Through participation in training is systematic and efficient. In the Iwo-To training multilateral exercises conducted overseas and entering airspace, for example, aircraft are dispatched successively the same training areas, and bilateral and multilateral from the units to conduct training intensively, focusing exercises etc., when returning to base, we are working on training that cannot be conducted sufficiently on the to improve efficient and effective tactical skills and mainland and other exercises. In addition, it conducts strengthen cooperation and response capabilities with bombing and gunnery training with live ammunition by our ally and like-minded countries. such means as joint use of USFJ bombing and gunnery areas. Other efforts are being made to utilize the overseas **3** **ASDF** training environment such as the live-fire training for Currently, since much of the training airspace surrounding Patriot missiles by anti-aircraft units in the United States. Japan is not broad enough, the performance and features **See** Reference 58 (Participation in multilateral exercises, etc. (FY2020 and Beyond)); reference 72 (List of Maneuver Areas) of aircraft cannot be fully demonstrated in some training. **2** **Initiatives for Safety Management, etc.** The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF constantly strive has been confirmed, except the aircraft conducting as one for safety management, such as by implementing the search and rescue operations. The MOD has also the highest level of safety measures and precautions requested early provision of information regarding the during routine training. circumstances and causes of the accident. Flights of In April 2023, a UH-60JA, a multipurpose helicopter GSDF V-22 (Osprey) have been suspended temporarily (with 10 crew members) from the GSDF Vice-Camp until the circumstances of the accident are clarified. Takayubaru (Kumamoto Prefecture) was involved in an Ospreys of the U.S. Air Force deployed in Japan have accident in which it disappeared from radar when flying not flown since December 1, 2023. From December 7 of over the ocean north-northwest of Miyakojima Island, the same year, the U.S. military suspended operations of Okinawa, during an aerial reconnaissance and all 10 Ospreys by all military services using Ospreys. members died in the line of duty. In March 2024, the On March 8, 2024, the U.S. Forces announced that MOD announced the results of an investigation into it would lift the grounding measures of Ospreys and an accident involving a two-engine aircraft in which a the MOD has received extremely detailed information gradual loss of power in the second engine, followed from the U.S. side regarding the circumstances, causes, by a loss of power in the first engine, occurred, which and safety measures of the accident. Based on the had never been reported before, making it difficult to professional perspectives of the MOD/SDF and from maintain altitude and causing the aircraft to crash. As the stand point of possessing and operating Ospreys, the measures to prevent recurrence, we will conduct more MOD independently assessed that the U.S. Forces’ cause **Part** detailed checks and inspections to identify the causes of analysis and safety measures regarding the accident **Ⅳ** the decrease in the output of both engines and thoroughly are reasonable, and has concluded that operations of **Chapter** implement measures such as training on how to respond Ospreys, including the GSDF Osprey, can be resumed **3** to similar incidents to prevent recurrence and ensure safely. Japan and the United States confirmed that flights flight safety. would resume in sequence. From 14 of the same month, Following the crash of the U.S. Air Force CV-22 Japanese and U.S. Ospreys in Japan will resume flight (Osprey) off the coast of Yakushima in November 2023, operations, starting with flights deemed safe by taking the MOD has requested the U.S. side that the Ospreys necessary safety measures. Regarding the resumption of d l d i J b fl ft th f t f th fli ht O ti J d th U S h fi d t ----- every level that ensuring flight safety is the top priority. Japan and the U.S. will continue cooperating to take all possible measures to ensure safety. Furthermore, in light of the collision between a Japan Airlines aircraft and a Japan Coast Guard aircraft at Tokyo International Airport in January 2024, MOD/ SDF is advancing necessary measures to prevent similar accidents by working closely with the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). In April 2024, during a nighttime anti-submarine warfare training exercise, two MSDF SH-60K patrol helicopters crashed in the ocean east of Torishima Island in the Izu Islands. A search is underway for the crew on board and the aircraft, and an investigation is underway into the cause of the accident. In addition, in June 2023, an incident occurred at the Hino Basic Shooting Range (Gifu Prefecture), during a live-fire training for new personnel, in which one SDF cadet fired at three members, resulting in two members being killed in the line of duty. This incident should never occur in any organization handling weapons, and the MOD/SDF will continue to make every effort to prevent recurrence and thoroughly implement safety management, which includes training the personnel and reviewing the firing procedures. In this way, any accident and incidents that may cause injury to Japanese nationals, damage their property, or lead to the loss of life of SDF personnel, must be prevented at all costs. After thoroughly investigating the causes of these accidents and incidents, the MOD/ SDF will ensure that each and every member of SDF personnel is reminded of the latest safety management guidelines. At the same time, the MOD/SDF as a whole will make every effort to ensure safety in the operation of vessels, aircraft, vehicles, etc., through conducting safety education for SDF personnel and the steady maintenance of equipment, etc., so as to ensure that public confidence is not undermined. **See** Chapter 4, Section 1- 4-2 (3) (Crash of the U.S. Osprey); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7-1-2(3) (Response to Search and Rescue of U.S. Forces Osprey); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 5-2-7(2) (Training Relocation for MV-22 (Osprey) etc.); Reference 33 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces) **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** ----- **Regional Societies and the Environment** **Chapter** **4** Various activities of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/ every person and local governments. Therefore it is Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are hard to implement necessary to further deepen the trust between regional without the understanding and cooperation of each and society and people, and the SDF. **Section 1** **Measures to Harmonize with Local Communities and the Environment** The National Defense Strategy of Japan provides that in SDF will continue to promote measures to improve the order to enable the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan to living environment of areas around defense facilities seamlessly and effectively conduct activities on a daily including those against noise to further strengthen the basis, the MOD will strive to gain understanding and cooperation for the defense of Japan. cooperation of local governments and residents in the Furthermore, in some communities, the existence areas around the SDF and the U.S. Forces facilities. of SDF units themselves are a major contribution to To this end, the NDS provides that the MOD/SDF the communities’ maintenance and, vitalization, and will actively engage in public relations activities on in other communities, the SDF’s emergency patient a regular basis regarding the policies and activities of transportation support the community healthcare. In the MOD/SDF, and also the roles of the U.S. Forces in conducting unit reorganization, establishing as well as Japan on a regular basis, and coordinate to accommodate administering camps and bases, the MOD/SDF will give the requests and situations of local communities, while due consideration to regional characteristics so as to gain fulfilling accountability. At the same time, the MOD/ understanding of local governments and residents. **1** **Supporting Civilian Life** The MOD/SDF conducts activities to support the lives of citizens in a range of fields, in response to requests from local governments and relevant organizations. Such activities contribute to further deepening the trust in the SDF, and provide SDF personnel with pride and confidence. The GSDF handles the disposal of unexploded ordnance and other dangerous explosives found throughout Japan. In FY2023, there were 2,348 cases (approximately 37.5 tons). In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for approximately 19% of the total number of cases. The MSDF clears and disposes of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives; in Experience of “Doran” at Camp Ishigaki 1st Anniversary Commemorative Event (March 2024) **Part** FY2023, there were 197 pieces (approximately 4.1 tons) **Ⅳ** handled. **Chapter** **4** **REFERENCE : Cooperation between the MOD and local communities** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/sesaku/index.html** ----- The SDF not only tries to have interactions with local Furthermore, the MOD/SDF promotes various residents by doing things like opening its camps and measures in line with national and other policies[2] that bases to the public to the extent that they do not interfere contribute to the local economy by ensuring opportunities with unit activities, but also provides transportation for local small and medium-sized enterprises to receive and other assistance at a variety of athletic events. orders while taking efficiency into account. Such In addition, it supports regional medical treatment measures include the promotion of separated/divided efforts by providing general medical care at some SDF ordering,[3] ensuring competition among companies hospitals[1] and National Defense Medical College as well within the same qualification and grade divisions,[4] and as conducting urgent transport for emergency patients the introduction of the open counter method.[5] from isolated islands. **See** Reference 73 (Activities in Civic Life) **2** **Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF** **(1) Cooperation on Recruitment of Uniformed SDF** support and cooperation from the local community are **Personnel and Re-employment Support** indispensable for the SDF to conduct its diverse activities, Amid the harsh recruitment and employment environment, including education and training, and disaster relief. the cooperation from local governments and relevant Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel peace cooperation operations and other duties receive and to support the re-employment of uniformed SDF support and cooperation from the relevant organizations personnel who retire at relatively young ages. for the procedures involved. The MOD/SDF are further strengthening cooperation **(2) Support for and Cooperation with SDF Activities** with relevant entities such as local governments, police The SDF camps and bases maintain close relations and fire services in order to ensure immediate and sure with regional society, and therefore, various forms of activities by the SDF in various contingencies. **3** **Measures for Securing the Understanding and Cooperation of Local Governments** **and Local Residents** Regional Defense Bureaus established in eight local governments and other organizations. locations nationwide make efforts to build cooperative **See** Fig. IV-4-1-1 (Work to Develop Regional Cooperation) relationships with their respective local communities, through collaboration with SDF units and SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices. In FY2023, the bureaus provided local communities with explanations on a variety of training and exercises, including Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises, the deployment of the U.S. Forces’ UAV MQ-9 to Kadena Air Base (Okinawa Prefecture), the development of SDF ammunition storage facilities, etc. In addition, in order to promote understanding of Japan’s defense policy in general, seminars on defense-related issues were held for local residents and explanations Seminar on defense issues in Omitama City, Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan (November 2023) regarding the Defense White Paper were provided to **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **1** As of March 31, 2024, the SDF hospitals that provide general medical care include SDF Central Hospital, SDF Sapporo Hospital, SDF Sendai Hospital, SDF Iruma Hospital, SDF Yokosuka Hospital, SDF Fuji Hospital, SDF Hanshin Hospital, and SDF Fukuoka Hospital. **4** **2** “Basic Policy Regarding Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises on Contracts with the Government, etc., in FY2024” (Cabinet decision on April 19, 2024) **3** For example, this is a method in which grouping of products, etc., takes place when the order is put up for general competitive bidding before a successful bidder is determined for each group. **4** This means that out of the bidding participation eligibility categorized into grade A-D, there is competition between grade C or D only, which comprise mostly small and medium enterprises. ----- Fig. IV-4-1-1 Work to Develop Regional Cooperation 1 Measures concerning coordination with local governments for smoothly implementing projects Coordination with local governments regarding the reorganization, etc., of SDF units and training, etc., of the U.S. Forces 2 Measures concerning responses to incidents and accidents wherein the SDF, etc., are involved Required cooperation in collaboration with the SDF, etc., such as information provision to local governments 3 Measures for the purpose of taking effective actions for various contingencies Required support for those such as SDF units and local governments under large-scale disasters or other events and participation in training 4 Measures with the aim of obtaining understanding of the defense policy in general Holding of sessions to explain the content of Defense of Japan and seminars on defense issues, targeting local governments and residents **4** **Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas** utilization by ensuring harmony between the defense **1 �Features of Defense Facilities and Projects** facilities and the surrounding areas and by obtaining the **Related to Harmony with the Surrounding Areas** understanding and cooperation of local residents. **(1) Measures around Defense Facilities** For that purpose, the MOD has taken measures to Defense facilities are diverse in their use, and often prevent, reduce or mitigate aircraft noise and other require large volumes of land. In addition, as of January impacts caused by activities of the SDF or the USFJ, or 1, 2024, approximately 29% of the land area and 30 by the existence/operations of airfields and other defense of the 76 facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the facilities in the surrounding areas since 1974 based on USFJ are jointly used by the SDF in accordance with the the Living Environment Improvement Act,[6] etc. Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, with the purpose In addition, in order to relieve the impact caused by the of enhancing the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. existence and operation of defense facilities, subsidies are bilateral training and exercises. Meanwhile, problems provided for the development of facilities for stabilizing related to restricted establishment and operations of the everyday lives of residents while Specified Defense defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization Facilities Environment Improvement Adjustment Grants of areas around many of the defense facilities. Also, are given to municipalities around defense facilities another problem is that frequent aircraft operations such that have particularly significant impact on the living as takeoffs and landings cause noise and other issues, environment. Specified Defense Facilities Environment impacting the living environment of local residential Improvement Adjustment Grants are utilized not only communities. for the development of facilities but also for so-called With that being said, defense facilities, as the foundation “soft projects” such as aid for medical expenses. that supports the defense capabilities of Japan and the In 2023, in order to respond with greater precision **Part** Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable to the operational modes of specified defense facilities **Ⅳ** for Japan’s national security. Therefore, in order for and their impact on surrounding areas, the criteria for the **Chapter** the facilities to exert their full function, it is necessary calculation of Specified Defense Facilities Environment **4** to maintain the conditions for their constant and stable Improvement Adjustment Grants was reviewed and ----- Fig. IV-4-1-2 Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots) Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Fig. IV-4-1-3 Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities) (as of January 1, 2024) Distribution by region Distribution by use |Col1|(as of January 1, 2024)|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |n|Others 12% Approx. 137 km2 Kanto region 9% Approx. 104 km2 Tokai (Chubu) region 10% Approx. 107 km2 Kyushu region 13% Approx. 144 km2 Tohoku region 13% Approx. 147 km2|||||||| ||Hokkaido region 42% Approx. 460 km2|||||||| ||(Accounting for approx. otal area: Approx. 1,099 km2 0.3% of Japan’s land area)|||||||| |T|otal area: Approx. 1,099 km2|||||||| |n||||||||| ||Maneuver Areas 74% Approx. 813km2|||||||| ||Airfields 7% Approx. 81km2 Barracks 5% Approx. 56km2 Others 14% Approx. 149km2|||||||| |tribution by region|Others 9% Approx. 22km2 Tohoku region 9% Approx. 24km2 Kanto region 12% Approx. 32km2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Okinawa Prefecture 70% Approx. 185km2|||||| ||a: Approx. 263 km2 (Accounting for approx. 0.07% of Japan’s land area)|||||| |Total are|a: Approx. 26|||||| |stribution use||||||| ||Maneuver Areas 47% Approx. 123km2|||||| ||Airfields 23% Approx. 61km2 Warehouses 15% Approx. 40km2 Others 15% Approx. 39km2|||||| 0 20 40 60 80 100 （％） (Note) Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 0 20 40 60 80 100 （％） (Note) Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding. Joint Use Status of U.S. Forces in Japan Facilities/ Fig. IV-4-1-4 Areas (Dedicated Facilities) with the SDF Costs for Measures in Areas Around Defense Fig. IV-4-1-5 Facilities in FY2024 (Contracts Base) (Unit: 100 million yen) |Project|Mainland|Okinawa| |---|---|---| |Disturbance prevention proje|cts 109|6| |Noise prevention projects|650|148| |Measures related to relocatio|ns 51|5| |Subsidized projects for stabili people’s lives|zing 257|161| |Road improvement projects|62|17| |Specified Defense Facilities Environment Improvement Adjustment Grants|217|38| |Other projects|18|4| governments, the MOD continues to study how the measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas should be in an attempt to make them more suitable, effective and efficient, in consideration of the severe fiscal situation. **See** Fig. IV-4-1-2 (Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots)); Fig. IV-4-1-3 (Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities)); Fig. IV-4-1-4 (Joint Use Status of U.S. Forces in Japan Facilities/Areas (Dedicated Facilities) with the SDF) ; Fig. IV-4-1-5 Costs for Measures in Areas Around Defense Facilities in FY2024 (Contracts Base); Reference74 (List of U.S. Forces Japan Facilities/Areas (including joint use facilities)) (as of January 1, 2024) 300 250 200 150 100 50 263 U.S. Forces in Japan facilities/areas (dedicated facilities) Facilities/areas jointly used by the SDF 75 76 30 Area (km[2]) Number of dispatches (Note) Area figures are rounded. Training Grants for training of the SDF, the U.S. Forces, etc., at defense facilities other than specified defense facilities was established in view of the diversification of training, etc. In addition, the subsidiary framework has been revised to take into account the actual circumstances of the operation of the SDF, impact on the local area, requests from local communities, etc., by further extending the subsidized projects for the development of facilities for stabilizing the everyday lives of residents based on the requests of local governments, etc. I t th t b th l t l l **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **(2) Grants, etc., to Promote the USFJ Realignment** O th f i d f ti b f d ft ----- for municipalities where defense facilities are located (“Adjustment Grants”), both of which are under the defense facilities-related subsidy system under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The Base Subsidy was established in view of the fact that the facilities used by the U.S. Forces and the SDF such as airports have a significant impact on the finances of municipalities. The subsidy generally takes the form of a substitute for fixed property tax and is granted to municipalities where these facilities are located. The Adjustment Grants are provided to municipalities where USFJ properties are located in view of the fact that such properties are exempt from fixed property tax, and U.S. military personnel and civilian employees are exempt from municipal tax, etc. **2 �Efforts to Develop Understanding and** **Cooperation Concerning the Stationing of** **the USFJ** “Sakaiminato Citizens Exchange Center (Minato Terrace)” established as part of an urban development support project (Sakaiminato City, Tottori Prefecture) the implementation of USFJ realignment, Realignment Grants[7] are provided to help cover the expenses of projects[8] that contribute to improving the quality of life of residents in local municipalities affected by the realignment and stimulate local industries. These grants are provided in accordance with the progress of the realignment after the Minister of Defense has designated the specified defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment. As of April 2024, 11 municipalities affected by seven defense facilities are eligible to receive the Realignment Grants. In order to promote the realignment, additional measures are taken with budgetary provision. **See** Reference 75 (Outline of Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas) Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, maintaining the presence of the USFJ and its readiness is vitally important for ensuring the security of Japan. For stable stationing of the USFJ, it is essential to obtain the understanding and cooperation of local governments and residents in the vicinity of defense facilities. Various efforts will continue to be undertaken tirelessly in this regard. **(1) Coordination with Local Governments, etc., for** **Unit Operations of the USFJ** The MOD is working to promote understanding among local communities regarding the maintenance of USFJ facilities and unit operations by providing prior explanation to the relevant local governments and residents in the event of any USFJ realignment, training, unit deployment, new equipment deployment, etc. **See** **(3) Other Measures** (1) Compensation for Fisheries The MOD defines the confined water for training, etc. carried out by the SDF or the USFJ using water surface based on laws or a contract and compensates for losses incurred from the restriction. (2) Base Subsidy, etc. The MOD provides cooperation by doing such things as providing various information also for the subsidy for municipalities where national defense facilities are located (“Base Subsidy”), and the Adjustment Grants **(2) Ensuring Safety during USFJ Operations** Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **REFERENCE : Subsidies and Grants** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/sesaku/hojokin_jigyo.html** The amount allocated is approximately \5.3 billion in the FY2024 budget. The specific scope of the projects is stipulated in Article 2 of the “Enforcement Order of the Act on Special Measures concerning Smooth Implementation of Realignment of United States ----- importance in USFJ operations. The Government has crashed off the coast of Yakushima (Kagoshima been fully communicating its approach to the U.S. side, Prefecture), resulting in the death of 8 crew members. including at summit and ministerial levels, with the two In returning to its flight operations after the accident, countries cooperating to ensure safe operations as a top the MOD has been making efforts to alleviate anxieties priority. and concerns of local communities. The MOD has In the event of a crash or missing parts, etc., of a U.S. been making thorough explanation and appropriately military aircraft, the MOD requests the United States providing information, such as by personally visiting to promptly provide information and adopt rigorous more than 30 municipalities and explaining to them that measures for safety management and recurrence the cause of the accident has been identified, and that prevention. The MOD then promptly explains the it is possible to prevent and address accident resulting obtained information to the relevant local governments, from similar failure by taking various safety measures etc., and adopts measures to ensure prompt and corresponding to the cause. appropriate compensation for the damage incurred. Through such efforts, the MOD plans to provide In addition, Japan and the United States have detailed explanation regarding the circumstances and established guidelines[9] for aircraft accidents and will causes of the accident to relevant local governments take prompt and appropriate action in response to the once the accident investigation report is released. situation in the scenario of a crash of a U.S. military **See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7-1-2 (3) (Response to Search and aircraft outside of the facilities and areas of the U.S. Rescue of U.S. Forces Osprey); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 5-2-7(2) (Training Relocation for MV-22 (Osprey) etc.); Reference Forces within Japan. 33 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces) In addition, with regard to accidents/incidents caused by the consumption of alcohol by U.S. military **(4) Promoting Exchange between the USFJ and Local** personnel, etc., the MOD has requested the U.S. side **Residents** on multiple occasions to tighten discipline and conduct The MOD holds a Japan-U.S. exchange program to personnel education. deepen mutual understanding between Japan and the The U.S. side, for its part, has taken measures such United States with the understanding and cooperation as putting in its place guidelines for off-duty activities of the local governments and U.S. Forces. Under the (liberty policy), including imposing restrictions on the program, residents living near USFJ facilities and areas consumption of alcohol at night as well as curfews for together with USFJ personnel enjoy sports, music and U.S. military personnel under the age of 19. Japan and cultural exchanges. the United States will continue to cooperate to prevent The USFJ also has initiatives to deepen mutual the recurrence of incidents related to drinking. understanding with people of the local communities, which include opening up of its bases (Friendship day) **(3) Crash of the U.S. Osprey** and information provision through websites and SNS In November 2023, a U.S. Air Force CV-22 (Osprey) (Social Networking Service). **5** **Participation in National Events** The SDF presents ceremonies including guards of honor, guests from foreign countries at their welcome reception lining up and gun salutes to the Emperor, state guests is essential for diplomatic procedure. and others at national events. A guard of honor to state **Part** **6** **Support for the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition** **Ⅳ** The SDF has been providing transportation for personnel (MEXT) since 1965, when Antarctic research was **Chapter** and supplies and other cooperation for the scientific resumed, with the icebreaker JS Fuji, since 1983 with **4** research in Antarctica conducted by the Ministry of icebreaker JS Shirase, and since 2009 with the second- Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology generation icebreaker JS Shirase. ----- For the 65th Antarctic Research Expedition from approximately 1,160 tons of supplies, support for sea November 2023 to April 2024, the SDF provided and land observations, and support for base construction. support for the transportation of a total of 75 people and **See** Reference76 (Achievements of Antarctic Research Expedition) **7** **Civil Engineering Consignments from Third Parties** The SDF receives consignments of civil engineering projects from third parties. projects, etc., conducted by the state and local The GSDF is contributing to local disaster prevention governments when the projects conform to the purpose countermeasures and strengthening cooperation with of the SDF training. The GSDF, since its establishment, local communities through these activities. has received 8,272 consignments of civil engineering **See** Reference 77 (External Construction Project Achievements) **8** **Other Initiatives** facilities and areas, which if attacked, would seriously **1 �Response to Laser Irradiation and Kite** affect the function of the national security defense **Flying towards SDF and U.S. Forces Aircraft** foundation. To address such concern, “The Drone Act” There have been cases of SDF and U.S. Forces aircraft came into effect on June 13, 2019, to prohibit small being interfered by laser irradiation and kite flying drones from flying over and around SDF/USFJ facilities during flight operations. These extremely dangerous and and areas designated by the Minister of Defense. As of malicious acts could disrupt a pilot’s ability to operate the end of May 2024, 304 SDF facilities, including areas the aircraft, which could result in a catastrophe, such of SDF Headquarters and 63 USFJ facilities and areas as plane crash. Therefore, the MOD works closely with have been designated as No Drone Zone. relevant local governments to disseminate information to local residents regarding the risks involved in these **3 �Response to the Act on Review and** acts by putting up posters and requesting to report to the **Regulation of Real Estate Usage[10]** police. Additionally, the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Civil Aeronautics Act was revised in December 2016, In line with the previous iteration of the National Security making these interference acts subject to regulation as Strategy formulated in December 2013, which called for well as fines and other penalties. Japan to review issues related to the use of land in areas such as the areas surrounding defense facilities from the standpoint of national security, the MOD has been **2 �Response to Flight Activities over Defense** conducting research since FY2013 to ensure a systematic **Facilities and Surrounding Airspace,** understanding of the situation of land ownership in areas **including Small Unmanned Aerial Systems** surrounding defense facilities. In recent years there have been terror small drones, Under the Act on the Review and Regulation of the including commercial drones, some of which are targeted Use of Real Estate Surrounding Important Facilities at military facilities. Given such circumstances, there is a and on Remote Territorial Islands, the Cabinet Office possibility of drone terror attacks in Japan on SDF/USFJ designates areas around facilities that are important for **REFERENCE : Act on Prohibition of Flight of UASs** **Part** **List of target defense-related facilities of SDF:** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/drone/list.html** **Ⅳ** **List of target defense-related facilities of USFJ:** **Chapter** **4** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/drone/list_zaibeigun.html** ----- national security ( important facilities ) and areas within remote territorial islands as “monitored areas” [12] or “special monitored areas,” **[13] and reviews the use of** real estate and buildings in these areas. If the Cabinet Office identifies any acts that impede the functions of important facilities and remote territorial islands (adverse acts), it recommends or orders the real estate user to stop the adverse acts. So far, zones have been designated four times under the same act. Regarding defense-related facilities, 13 locations were designated with the initial announcement in December 2022, 48 locations in the second announcement in July 2023, 176 locations in the third announcement in December of the same year, and 157 locations in the fourth announcement in April 2024. This Act has major significance from the perspective of ensuring that defense-related facilities, which constitute the foundation of Japan’s national defense, are able to function properly. The MOD will adopt the appropriate measures in this regard in cooperation with the Cabinet Office. **4 �Initiatives to Increase Consumption of** **Marine Products** After the release of ALPS-treated water[14] into the ocean, countries China, etc., have enacted measures such as strengthening regulations on imports of marine products from Japan. In light of this, recognizing the need for supportive measures to protect the Japanese fishery industry, the government has decided to actively promote the increased consumption of domestic seafood. As a result, the MOD/SDF is further committed to actively supporting the expansion of domestic seafood consumption. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **11 Defense facilities (SDF and USFJ facilities in Japan), establishments of the Japan Coast Guard, and life-related facilities.** **12 Areas approximately 1,000 m around important facilities and areas within the border such as remote islands, where special prevention measures are required to prevent the use of land** and buildings for activities that could disrupt their operations. **13 In the monitored areas, priority is given to areas where the functions of important facilities and areas within the border such as remote islands are particularly important or those that can** easily obstruct these functions, and where finding alternatives for these functions from other important facilities or areas within the border such as remote islands can be challenging. **14 Contaminated water containing radioactive substances, generated at the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, which has been purified until the** ----- **Commentary** **Initiatives Aimed at Increasing Consumption of Japanese Marine Products** The MOD/SDF is undertaking various initiatives to increase the of the garrisons. consumption of Japanese marine products. The MSDF is using its new “Kan-me Seafood (connecting In addition to actively disseminating information about menus kanmeshi (a phrase known as “rations for the MSDF”) and and recipes that use domestic marine products on SNS and the seafood)” logo to communicate its efforts to increase domestic websites of various agencies and units, the MOD/SDF are urging marine product consumption and is actively disseminating contract cafeterias and bento stores to use domestic marine information via social media and posting recipes on its official products, and many of the stores are now offering domestic website. In October 2023, the Hokkaido Federation of Fisheries marine products. Cooperative Associations and Hokkaido Scallop Promotion Fishery The GSDF designates days with the number “3” or “7” of each Association presented a letter of appreciation to the MSDF for the month as “Sakana-no-hi (Fish Day. In Japanese, “the 3rd or 7th great encouragement given to the fishermen of Hokkaido who day” can be called as “san ka nana”, respectively meaning, san make their living from the sea. (3) ka (or) nana (7), then twisting the phrase into sakana, which The ASDF displays its original poster on domestic marine means fish in Japanese)”.On those days, each garrison of GSDF products (map of domestic local marine specialities) at each of raises a banner announcing “Sakana no hi” and makes efforts to its bases and sub-bases and has also prepared and distributed actively use domestic marine products in the menu served at each coloring books of the maps to increase consumption among its personnel and their families. In the FY 2024 budget, approximately 1.3 billion yen has been allocated for making menus at garrisons, etc., more appealing, including an increase in the rate of expenditure on food provisions to increase the consumption of Japanese marine products. Domestic marine products being sold using the “Kan-me Seafood” logo at the “Autumn Festa 2023” held at the MSDF Yokosuka District Headquarters (October 2023) (“Kan-me Seafood” logo) **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** ----- **Section 2** **Responding to Climate Change and Environmental Issues** A sense of crisis regarding the sustainability of the the targets for FY2030 are underway. global environment has been mounting internationally. In response to the acceleration of domestic and Countries around the world have been making efforts overseas efforts, the MOD/SDF, as a member of the on this front following the adoption of the Sustainable Government, also needs to respond to various climate Development Goals (SDGs) at the UN and the Paris change and environmental issues and contribute to their Agreement, an international framework on climate resolution while implementing measures with a greater change, in 2015. focus on the coexistence of SDF/USFJ facilities/areas Japan has also formulated the Fifth Basic Environment with the surrounding areas. Plan, which was approved by the Cabinet in 2018, and In addition, it is inevitable that the issue of climate has been working to realize a sustainable society while change will have an even greater impact on future MOD/ expressing its intention to further accelerate initiatives SDF operations, including various plans, facilities, and in Japan and abroad. In addition, the Plan for Global equipment, as well as on the security environment Warming Countermeasures and the Climate Change surrounding Japan, including responses to future energy Adaptation Plan were approved by the Cabinet in shifts, all of which must be addressed in an appropriate October 2021, and specific climate change measures manner. aimed at achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 as well as **See** Part I, Chapter 4, Section 7 (Impact of Climate Change on the Security Environment and the Military) **1** **Efforts Related to The MOD/SDF Facilities** As a member of the Government, the MOD/SDF has **1 �The Ministry of Defense’s Response** complied with the laws and regulations related to the **Strategy on Climate Change** environment and strived to be thorough in protecting the environment and to reduce the burden on the The growing trend toward viewing climate change as a environment. It will work to promote initiatives related security issue is spreading among defense organizations to the environment under the “Policy of the Ministry globally, including the UN Security Council. In May of Defense on Consideration for the Environment.” In 2021, the MOD established the MOD Climate Change FY2021, the MOD established the Environmental Policy Taskforce to evaluate and analyze the impact of climate Division in its Internal Bureau to take charge of the overall change on Japan’s national security and to extensively environmental policy of the MOD/SDF, and in FY2022, study the measures required to address this issue. the MOD/SDF established environmental affairs offices In August 2022, the MOD formulated the Ministry of in Regional Defense Bureaus across Japan as part of its Defense’s Response Strategy on Climate Change. The efforts to develop the necessary infrastructure to address same strategy sets forth 10 specific measures that the environmental issues in a centralized and effective MOD should promote going forward to appropriately manner and to continue working to promote further adapt and respond to the direct and indirect effects measures. of climate change in the future. The MOD/SDF will promote measures aimed at addressing climate change while maintaining and reinforcing Japan’s defense capabilities in line with the document. **Part** **REFERENCE : The MOD’s Response Strategy on Climate Change** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/meeting/kikouhendou/pdf/taishosenryaku_202208.pdf** **4** **REFERENCE : Initiatives concerning environmental measures** **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/kankyo_taisaku/index.html** ----- Based on the same strategy, the government aircraft were operated using Sustainable Aviation Fuel[1] (SAF) during the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023. In June of the same year, F-15 and F-2 fighter jets also utilized Sustainable Aviation Fuel for their operations. **2** **Procuring Renewable Energy Electricity** **3 �Balancing Renewable Energy Electricity and** **Security** The introduction of renewable sources of energy, including wind power, is being promoted in response to the issue of climate change, and wind power generation facilities are expected to increase moving forward. Depending on the location and specifications of these wind power generation facilities, they may potentially impact the activities of the SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan, for example, by interfering with the operations of the warning and control radars making it difficult to detect aircraft and missiles, etc. Because of this potential impact, the MOD/SDF coordinates with project operators and other related parties meticulously from the early stages of project planning. Additionally, in line with the National Defense Strategy,[2] the Bill for Adjustment between Defense and Wind Power[3] was submitted to the regular session of the Diet in 2024 as a legislative measure to institutionalize current efforts, with the act passed and enacted in May 2024. **4** **Response to PFOS[4]** As the largest consumer of electricity among government institutions, the MOD/SDF, which has approximately 250,000 SDF personnel and operates facilities and various equipment all around Japan, has actively promoted the procurement of electricity generated by renewable energy sources (hereinafter “renewable energy electricity”) for the MOD/SDF facilities since FY2020 in order to contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and other goals. In FY2024, the MOD held 968 contracts related to the procurement of electricity for its facilities, etc., nationwide, of which 213 facilities, etc., procured renewable energy electricity. Furthermore, 157 facilities, etc., procured 100% of their electricity from renewable energy sources. The amount of renewable energy electricity procured in FY2024 is expected to be around 560 million kWh (annual electricity consumption of more than 130,000 general households). This means that approximately 43% of all electricity expected to be used by the MOD/SDF in FY2024 (approximately 1310 million kWh) will be procured in the form of renewable energy electricity. Although the amount of renewable energy electricity procured in FY2024 increased significantly from the previous fiscal year, as a member of the Government, the MOD will continue to make efforts to increase the ratio of renewable energy electricity. The MOD has formulated the Action Plan for PFOS Disposal for aqueous film-forming foam containing PFOS and is working. In addition, the analysis results of water in the dedicated tanks of SDF facilities nationwide where aqueous film-forming foam containing PFOS was or may have been used in the past were made public in July 2022. Following this investigation, the water in tanks in which PFOS, etc., has been detected will continue to be managed appropriately, and its disposal has been carried out progressively since FY2022, intending to complete the disposal by the end of FY2024. **REFERENCE : Impact of wind power generation facilities on the operations of the SDF/USFJ and Requests to related** business operators **URL : https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/windpower/index.html** **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** In November 2022, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) utilized Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) for the first time during government aircraft operations. (SAF was also used during operations in January and May 2023.) The National Defense Strategy states that “Japan will establish an effective mechanism to balance defense requirements with socioeconomic activities such as the installation of wind power generation facilities so that the defense-related facilities can fully function through the smooth use of sea, airspace and radio waves.” The bill concerning a measure in securing smooth and safe activities by the SDF, etc. with the use and by avoiding transmission failure of radio wave due to the installation, etc. of wind power generation facilities. PFOS is an organic fluorine compound with water-repellent, oil-repellent, and heat-resistant properties that has hitherto been used in aqueous film-forming foam, anti-reflection agents/ ----- **2** **Initiatives Related to USFJ Facilities/Areas** USFJ is committed to the appropriate environmental replacement of aqueous film-forming foam at all U.S. management to protect the environment in the surrounding Army facilities in Honshu as well as at all U.S. Navy and areas and ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel U.S. Marines facilities in Japan, including Misawa Air and residents in the surrounding areas according to Base (Aomori Prefecture). By the end of September 2024, the Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the it is planned to replace all aqueous film-forming foam Field of Environmental Stewardship[5] and the Japan held by the USFJ across all facilities and areas in Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) established with non-fluorinated foam extinguishing agents that do by USFJ. not contain PFAS[6] or transition to water suppression systems. The MOD/SDF have been briefed to this effect and the USFJ as a whole is progressively replacing the **1** **Efforts to Save Utilities** aqueous film-forming foam in its possession. In USFJ facilities and areas, efforts are made to save When water containing PFOS or similar substances utilities, which include changes to energy-efficient leaks from U.S. military facilities or areas into the heating/ventilation/air-conditioning equipment; surrounding environment, access to facility and sampling installation of motion sensors for lights-out during investigations are carried out in collaboration with absence; installation of solar panels; reduction of the relevant local governments, based on the Supplementary period to use cooling/ heating equipment and review of Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental the preset temperature; and control of lighting and lights- Stewardship. The MOD will continue to cooperate out for night lighting, for example. closely with the relevant ministries and agencies, related local governments, and the U.S. side, and take necessary measures. **2** **Response to PFOS** Also, as of June 2023, the USFJ has completed the **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **5** This is an agreement between Japan and the United States regarding cooperation in environmental management associated with the U.S. forces in Japan. It supplements the agreement between Japan and the U.S. regarding the Status of the U.S. military in Japan pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the U.S. and the **4** Facilities and Areas and the Status of the U.S. military in Japan. The agreement was concluded in 2015 to supplement the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement in the environmental field. It stipulates procedures for gaining access to U.S. military facilities and areas in the event of environmental incidents. Furthermore, it outlines the responsibility of the U.S. side in establishing and upholding environmental standards. **6** A collective term for perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl compounds from among organic fluorine compounds. It includes PFOS, which has water-repellency, oil-repellency, and heat- ----- |（202(a4s年 of3 M月ar3ch1 3日1,現 20在24）)|XX（ (fo旧rmTewr Tiwttietter）r)|FaFacceebbooookk|InInssttaaggrraamm|YoYouuTTuubbee| |---|---|---|---|---| |M防O衛D 省/ S・D自F 衛隊|Ap約pro1x.2 14,2万40人,000|Ap約pro1x6. 1万60人,000|App約ro8x.万 80人,000|App約ro6x.万 60人,000| |J統SO合幕僚監部|Ap約pro3x1. 3万10人,000|App約ro4x.万 40人,000|App約ro3x.万 30人,000|App約ro1x.万 10人,000| |G陸S上O 幕僚監部|Ap約pro8x7. 8万70人,000|Ap約pro2x3. 2万30人,000|Ap約pr1ox0. 万10,人000|Ap約pro2x9. 2万90人,000| |M海S上O幕僚監部|Ap約pro9x1. 9万10人,000|Ap約pro2x5.2万50人,000|Ap約pro1x2. 1万20人,000|Ap約pro3x4. 3万40人,000| |A航SO空幕僚監部|Ap約pro6x9. 6万90人,000|Ap約pro1x0.1万00人,000|Ap約pro1x5. 1万50人,000|Ap約pro1x6. 1万60人,000| **Section 3** **Public Relations Activities, Public Records and Archives Management, Disclosure of Administrative Documents, and Related Activities** **1** **Various Public Relations Activities** As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out in editing the PR magazine “MAMOR,” cooperating without the understanding and support of the Japanese with media coverage, dispatching instructors to give people, public relations activities are important to gain lectures and talks, etc. In addition, as part of our efforts the trust and cooperation of the public. to disseminate information to young people, the MOD/ Hence, the MOD/SDF will be more proactive in SDF will be posting content for young people, including undertaking public relations activities in a variety of videos, on the “Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces ways that are easily comprehensible to the public. KIDS SITE,” and also publish “Maru wakari! (I know In addition, given that understanding and support everything) Japan’s Defense: The First Defense White from foreign countries are also of utmost importance Paper” aimed at elementary school to high school for the SDF to conduct its missions successfully, it is students. essential that the MOD strengthens efforts to provide Furthermore, as MOD/SDF’s activities reach out information to the international community about MOD/ worldwide, it is important to accurately publicize those SDF initiatives, including SDF activities abroad. activities to the international community and secure **See** Reference78 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense the understanding and trust of the respective countries. Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office) To achieve this, the MOD/SDF is disseminating information in English and, in particular, upgrading the MOD’s English website and actively sharing timely, easy-to-understand information through social media in **1 �Providing Information Both Domestically** English. At the same time, it is engaging in PR activities **and Internationally** aimed at the international community through various The MOD/SDF conducts active PR activities using means, such as providing opportunities for interviews the Internet, including through official websites, SNS by overseas media, creating an English version of the (Social Networking Service), and video distribution. Defense White Paper, and issuing the English-language The MOD has also been making great efforts to provide PR pamphlet “Japan Defense Focus” (JDF). accurate information in a more extensive and timely **See** Fig. IV-4-3-1 (Usage Status of Social Media (number of fashion by creating brochures and PR videos, assisting followers) of The MOD/SDF); Appendix: “Make Peace Your Job” Fig. IV-4-3-1 Usage Status of Social Media (number of followers) of The MOD/SDF （2024年3月31日現在）(as of March 31, 2024) X (former Twitter)X（旧Twitter） FacebookFacebook InstagramInstagram YouTubeYouTube MOD / SDF防衛省・自衛隊 Approx. 1,240,000約124万人 Approx. 160,000約16万人 Approx. 80,000約8万人 Approx. 60,000約6万人 JSO統合幕僚監部 Approx. 310,000約31万人 Approx. 40,000約4万人 Approx. 30,000約3万人 Approx. 10,000約1万人 GSO陸上幕僚監部 Approx. 870,000約87万人 Approx. 230,000約23万人 Approx. 10,000約10万人 Approx. 290,000約29万人 **Part** MSO海上幕僚監部 Approx. 910,000約91万人 Approx.250,000約25万人 Approx. 120,000約12万人 Approx. 340,000約34万人 **Ⅳ** **Chapter** ASO航空幕僚監部 Approx. 690,000約69万人 Approx.100,000約10万人 Approx. 150,000約15万人 Approx. 160,000約16万人 **4** MOD ATLA防衛装備庁 Approx. 50,000約5万人 ―― ―― Approx. 50,000約5万人 ----- participated in tours of the MOD s PR facilities in the Ichigaya area (Ichigayadai Tour), where the underground bunker of the Imperial General Headquarters is now open to the public, reached approximately 489,700 persons as of the end of March 2024. In addition, each SDF service also has PR facilities and archives, and these facilities open to the public. **3** **Enlistment Experience Programs** **2** **Events and PR Facilities** The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise,[1] cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and Blue Impulse demonstration flights by the ASDF. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions and unit tours are held on occasions such as the anniversary of the unit’s foundation. Furthermore, as part of the commemorative activities for the SDF’s anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held every year. In addition, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF take turn at conducting either a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review every year. In 2023, an air review was held at the Iruma Base (Saitama) of Air Self-Defense Force. The MOD has also been actively opening its PR facilities to the public. The number of visitors who JSDF Marching Festival (November 2023) The MOD/SDF offers SDF Life Experience Tours for women as well as undergraduate and graduate students,[2] and Enlistment Experience Programs for groups, companies, and other organizations.[3] These programs are intended to promote participants’ understanding of the SDF by offering opportunities to experience the daily life and training of the MOD/SDF, as well as to have direct contact with SDF personnel. Living Experience at Obihiro Garrison (Hokkaido) **MOVIE : Fuji Firepower Review 2023** **URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GY2bqfCaSGk** **MOVIE : 2023 SDF Music Festival** **URL : https://youtu.be/nqy0JOfFq70** **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **MOVIE : The Air Review 2023** **URL : https://youtu.be/sLA7dvZsH2g?si=N9w6_V7dTFbx1H10** The Fuji Fire Power Exercise will be closed to the public from FY 2023. The video footage will be distributed to allow the human resources of the unit to focus on their original purpose of education and training. Members of the general public may apply to participate in various SDF Life Experience Tours on the MOD/SDF website. These tours are designed for participants to experience everyday life in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. They are held upon request by private companies and other organizations through the ----- **Commentary** **The Air Review 2023** On November 11, 2023, the MOD/SDF held the The Air Review aircraft participating in international peace cooperation activities 2023, under the review of Prime Minister Kishida, at the ASDF’s and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas. Iruma Air Base (Saitama Prefecture). During this Air Review, Prime Minister Kishida directly The purpose of this Air Review was to raise awareness of communicated with the personnel and listened to the opinions of the mission and morale of the personnel. The ceremony was personnel from the field. conducted without spectators, with Prime Minister Kishida, the The visuals from the day of the Air Review are available for the Supreme Commander of the Self-Defense Forces, delivering a public to view on the ASDF’s online channel. speech and inspecting the troops. In his speech, the Prime Minister greatly boosted the morale of the personnel by referring to concrete achievements concerning the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in Israel, such as “The sincere manner in which the personnel performed their duties on board the aircraft and at the transit points, and their meticulous attention to the evacuees, significantly eased the anxiety of the evacuees”. In addition, during the inspection of the troops, Prime Minister Kishida was briefed on the duties and activities of the ASDF and inspected ASDF’s main equipment, including F-15J and F-2A fighter jets, as well as C-2 transport Inspection of troops by Prime Minister Kishida **2** **Initiatives for Public Document Management and Disclosure of Administrative** **Documents** **1 �Necessity of Proper Management of Public** **2 �Promotion of Proper Management of Public** **Records and Archives and Proper Operation** **Records and Archives and Proper Operation** **of the Disclosure System of Administrative** **of the Disclosure System of Administrative** **Documents** **Documents** Democracy, which is the most important system of The MOD/SDF takes it seriously that the issues over the country, is founded on the principle that the public daily reports in South Sudan and Iraq brought about the has access to accurate information, thereby making public’s distrust in the MOD/SDF. appropriate judgment and exercise of sovereignty. The MOD/SDF is making every effort to prevent Administrative documents held by the government recurrence based on measures[4] necessary for the proper are of the utmost importance for the public’s access to management of public records and archives by the entire accurate information. For this reason it is an important government. The MOD/SDF is also working on ensuring responsibility for the government, including the MOD/ proper management and responding to disclosure SDF, to manage information in an appropriate manner requests for administrative documents by reforming the and appropriately respond to the public’s disclosure awareness of personnel and the organizational culture, **Part** requests for administrative documents. enhancing the supervisory framework, etc. **Ⅳ** We will promote systematic and efficient management **Chapter** by managing administrative documents electronically, **4** **4** “Measures for Ensuring Appropriate Management of Public Records” (adopted by the Ministerial Council on the Management of Administrative Documents and Related Matters on July 20, ----- from their creation to storage, disposal, and transfer, based administrative documents, contributing to facilitating tracking administrative documents, history improved work environment and work style reforms management, and search. At the same time, we also such as telework. promote improvement in the efficiency of document **See** Reference 79 (Record of Disclosure of Administrative management operations by reducing the use of paper- Documents by the Ministry of Defense [FY2023]) **3** **Initiatives for Policy Evaluation, etc.** **1** **Engagement in Policy Evaluation** **3 �Initiatives for the Personal Data Protection** **System** The MOD has been conducting the evaluation of various policies based on its policy evaluation system. In light of respecting individual rights and interests in line In FY2023, the MOD conducted policy evaluations of with the Act on the Protection of Personal Information[5], research and development (R&D) programs and projects the MOD/SDF has adopted measures to manage the concerning Special Taxation Measures. security of personal information under its control and responds appropriately to requests for the disclosure of such information. **2 �Promotion of Evidence-Based Policy Making** **(EBPM)** **4 �Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower** The MOD, under the supervision of Director-General for **Protection System** Evidence-based Policymaking, practices EBPM through the Administrative Project Review and promotes its The MOD/SDF sets up a system to handle whistleblowing initiatives such as in decision-making process. made by its officials, employees and outside workers, establishing internal and external contact desks to deal with whistleblowing and to protect whistleblowers. **Part** **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **4** ----- **Contents** Reference 1 National Security Strategy of Japan… …………………………………… 1 Reference 2 National Defense Strategy… ………………………………………… 16 Reference 3 Defense Buildup Program… ………………………………………… 31 Reference 4 Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People … …………………………………………… 48 Reference 5 Major Ground Systems (Fire Arms and Armored Vehicles)… …………… 51 Reference 6 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications… …………… 52 Reference 7 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service… ………………… 52 Reference 8 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)……… 53 Reference 9 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries……………………… 54 Reference 10 Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces…………………………… 54 Reference 11 Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law……………… 59 Reference 12 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities………………………………………………… 60 Reference 13 Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related … Vessels in the Middle East… ………………………………………… 61 Reference 14  Number of Days and Total Incursions into the Territorial Waters Around the Senkaku Islands by Ships Belonging to the China Coast Guard Bureau, etc… ………………………………………………… 62 Reference 15 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan… …………………… 63 Reference 16 Efforts in Recent Years by the MOD on Cybersecurity…………………… 64 Reference 17 Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (FY2023)… ……… 65 Reference 18 Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)……………………………… 65 Reference 19 Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas by the Self-Defense Forces… ……………………………………………… 66 Reference 20 Record of Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas…… 67 Reference 21 Government Initiative to Ensure the Safety of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas in the Middle East and Africa………………………………… 68 Reference 22 Track Record of Asset Protection for the U.S Forces and Other Forces (SDF Law Article 95-2)………………………………………… 69 Reference 23 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation… ………………… 70 Reference 24 Chronology of the Japan-U.S. Alliance… ……………………………… 78 Reference 25 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2020)………………… 79 Reference 26  Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) (January, 2023)……………………………………………………… 90 Reference 27  Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Outline) (January, 2023)… …………………………………… 94 Reference 28 Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2023… …………… 96 Reference 29 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects… ……………… 100 Reference 30 United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (tentative translation)… ……………………………………………… 101 Reference 31 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility……………………… 104 Reference 32 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena……………………………………………………………… 107 Reference 33 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces…………………… 108 Reference 34  Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan…………………… 109 Reference 35 Outline of 23 Issues…………………………………………………… 110 Reference 36 The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)…………………………… 111 Reference 37 Progress of the SACO Final Report… ………………………………… 115 Reference 38 Consultative Bodies on the Mitigation of Impact of Bases on Okinawa……………………………………………………………… 117 Reference 39 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements…………………… 118 Reference 40 International Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2023)………………………………………… 119 Reference 41 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (FY2020 and Beyond)………………………………………………… 120 Reference 42 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (FY2020 and Beyond)………………………………………………… 123 ■References https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/index.html Reference 43 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)… …………………………………… 125 Reference 44 Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges (FY2020 and Beyond)………………………………………………… 134 Reference 45 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Canada and New Zealand (FY2020 and Beyond)…………………………………… 135 Reference 46 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Member States (FY2020 and Beyond)… ……………………………… 137 Reference 47 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Asian Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)… …………………………………… 143 Reference 48 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pacific Island Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)… …………………………………… 144 Reference 49 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Middle Eastern Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)… …………………………… 146 Reference 50  Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)… …………………………………… 149 Reference 51  Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (FY2020 and Beyond)………………………………………………… 151 Reference 52  Recent multilateral high-level exchanges (FY2020 and Beyond)… ……… 151 Reference 53  Record of Major Multilateral Security Dialogues (Indo-Pacific Region, FY2020 and Beyond)… ……………………………………………… 152 Reference 54 Multilateral Security Dialogues Organized by the Ministry of Defense …… 153 Reference 55 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues… ……………………………… 155 Reference 56 Vientiane Vision 2.0… ……………………………………………… 158 Reference 57  Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE)… …………………………………………… 159 Reference 58 Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond)… ………… 160 Reference 59 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations …179 Reference 60 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Assignments … …… 181 Reference 61 Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since FY2013)… … 186 Reference 62  Basic Policy on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases… …………………………………………………………… 187 Reference 63 Defense Technology Guideline 2023 (Executive Summary)……………… 199 Reference 64 FY2023 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” Program… ………………………… 201 Reference 65 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology… ……………………………………………………… 204 Reference 66 Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology…………………………………… 205 Reference 67 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Changes in Them (Over the Past 10 Years)… ………………………… 209 Reference 68 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel……… 210 Reference 69 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, etc.……………………… 211 Reference 70 Main Measures for Re-employment Support…………………………… 211 Reference 71 Employment of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Local Government Disaster Prevention Agencies… ………………………… 212 Reference 72 List of Maneuver Areas… …………………………………………… 213 Reference 73 Activities in Civic Life… ……………………………………………… 214 Reference 74 List of U.S. Forces Japan Facilities/Areas (including joint use facilities)… ………………………………………………………… 215 Reference 75 Outline of Measures to Promote Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas……………………………………… 220 Reference 76 Achievements of Antarctic Research Expedition………………………… 221 Reference 77 External Construction Project Achievements…………………………… 222 Reference 78 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)… ………… 223 Reference 79 Record of Disclosure of Administrative Documents by the Ministry of Defense [FY2023]… ……………………………………………… 224 Defense Chronology… ……………………………………………………………… 225 ----- **Index** The numbers written in bold with under line are pages that explain the definition of the terms. DF-41 ／ 65, 66, 67, 68, 203 DIANA ／ 184 DICAS ／ 337, 348 DIDS ／ 184 DII ／ 302 DIU ／ 184, 472 DMAT ／ 329, 530 DMO ／ 53 DMZ ／ 104, 106, 107, 126 DPAS ／ 462 DSIS ／ 184, 185 DSR ／ 146 DTT ／ 395 DX ／ 323 EABO ／ 53, 533 EAS ／ 90 EBPM ／ 561 EDD ／ 342, 343 EDIS ／ 184 EEZ ／ 75, 79, 80, 118, 123, 148, 151, 270, 272, 273, 275 EMASOH ／ 168, 172 EMP ／ 307, 308, 309, 324 EU ／ 47, 75, 91, 97, 163, 165, 167, 168, 177, 183, 184, 189, 193, 195, 198, 201, 301, 375, 387, 391, 393, 401, 421 EUNAVFOR ／ 391, 393, 438, 440, 441 EW ／ 136, 199 EWG ／ 421, 422, 434 **F** FCLP ／ 354, 355 FDO ／ 273, 339 FIMI ／ 183 FPDA ／ 149, 152, 154, 167 FOIP ／ 51, 52, 53, 55, 95, 96, 209, 222, 226, 337, 338, 373, 374, 375, 379, 382, 383, 384, 386, 387, 390, 395, 396, 398, 399, 401, 403, 404, 406, 407, 408, 409, 413, 415, 421, 423, 424, 427, 429, 433, 437, 536 FMS ／ 348, 461, 492, 493 **G** GCAP ／ 386, 387, 390, 469, 470, 473, 475, 476, 482 GDP ／ 64, 132, 146, 164, 165, 168, 214, 241, 242, 243 GIGO ／ 469, 470, 482 GNSS ／ 198, 480, 481 ACE ／ 53 ACM ／ 222, 340, 344, 345, 346 ACSA ／ 341, 373, 374, 376, 377, 380, 384, 386, 388, 389, 398 ADI ／ 421, 423 ADIZ ／ 75, 278 AI ／ 61, 74, 86, 126, 147, 178, 180, 183, 184, 191, 199, 204, 228, 233, 267, 283, 284, 316, 318, 323, 340, 451, 455, 458, 462, 471, 486, 494, 503 ARF ／ 90, 157, 404, 421, 423, 426, 441 ARIA ／ 184 ASAT ／ 186, 187, 188, 189, 299 ASBM ／ 66, 205 ASCA ／ 184 ASW ／ 70, 247 ATR ／ 364 ATACMS ／ 42 AUKUS ／ 51, 52, 58, 95, 146, 147, 167 A2／AD ／ 53, 61, 66, 74, 133, 144, 146 **B** BIAC ／ 340 BMD ／ 58, 112, 119, 227, 231, 275, 287, 288, 290, 321, 347 BPM ／ 346 BWC ／ 204, 450, 451 **C** CAP ／ 291 CARAT ／ 151, 152, 155 CCDCOE ／ 195, 306, 307, 392, 400 CCW ／ 450, 451 CDPWG ／ 303, 305 CIA ／ 48 COC ／ 90, 91, 200, 437 CSpO ／ 186, 300, 301, 428 CTBT ／ 450 CUES ／ 200, 395 CWC ／ 204 C4ISR ／ 186 **D** DA-ASAT ／ 186, 189, 299 DAPA ／ 185 DARPA ／ 183, 471, 472 DASA ／ 184 ----- MFO ／ 444, 445 MINUSMA ／ 174 MIRV ／ 109, 160 MISWG ／ 462 MLR ／ 53, 58, 352, 367 MRBM ／ 66, 67, 112, 203, 205 NATO ／ 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 55, 91, 131, 137, 140, 144, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 174, 183, 184, 189, 190, 195, 198, 206, 207, 241, 243, 303, 306, 338, 375, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 399, 400, 401, 428, 434, 435, 448, 449, 529 NBC ／ 230, 310, 311, 519 NCGP ／ 392 NDIS ／ 184 NDS ／ 50, 52, 54, 55, 59, 93, 95, 146, 213, 215, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222, 224, 226, 233, 235, 244, 250, 265, 269, 237, 280, 312, 316, 320, 334, 339, 345, 347, 373, 380, 402, 403, 412, 437, 439, 494, 503, 504, 515, 520, 521, 524, 546 NGO ／ 392, 428, 444 NISC ／ 267, 302, 307 NIST SP800-171 ／ 304, 463 NORAD ／ 169 NPR ／ 54, 55 NPT ／ 128, 203, 211, 450 NSC ／ 259 NSS ／ 50, 51, 52, 54, 93, 95, 97, 124, 176, 213, 214, 218, 242, 244, 267, 294, 302, 332, 345, 346, 418, 426, 437, 450, 471, 517 **O** OCCAR ／ 482 OECD ／ 241, 242, 465 OPCW ／ 450, 451 OPG ／ 173 OSA ／ 243, 268, 407, 410, 411, 415, 425, 480 OSCE ／ 392 **P** PAC-3 ／ 102, 220, 287, 288, 289, 290, 321, 369, 531 PBL ／ 239, 323, 492 PCRS ／ 443 PFAS ／ 557 PFI ／ 228, 234, 284, 329, 491 PFOS ／ 556, 557 PKO ／ 85, 92, 169, 174, 243, 262, 263, 373, 405, 412, 415, 416, 418, 421, 422, 430, 431, 433, 434, 435, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 539 PMC ／ 42, 145 PSI ／ 397, 450, 452 **Q** QDR ／ 100 HA/DR ／ 377, 380, 384, 388, 404, 407, 408, 409, 411, 412, 414, 417, 421, 422, 424, 428, 430, 431, 434, 435, 448, 486, 536, 540, 541, 542 HALE ／ 73 H-6 ／ 66, 72, 74, 75, 82, 140, 142 HCM ／ 38, 135, 179 HGV ／ 38, 66, 68, 135, 179, 287, 288, 289, 290, 297, 300 HIMARS ／ 40, 41, 100, 533 IAEA ／ 108, 172 ICBM ／ 38, 43, 65, 66, 67, 68, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 133, 179, 203, 205, 210 IMED ／ 405, 409, 414, 415, 539 IMSC ／ 172 INF ／ 55, 66, 95, 140 IPD ／ 405, 409, 410, 413, 414, 415, 429, 432, 441, 539, 540 IPEF ／ 50 IRBM ／ 67, 107, 111, 112, 115, 116, 118, 119, 122, 159, 160, 203, 205 ISAF ／ 174 ISIL ／ 160, 164, 168, 176, 177, 204 ISR ／ 48, 74, 101, 107, 156, 159, 187, 190, 259, 273, 281, 335, 339, 340, 367, 380, 381, 384 ISRT ／ 283, 339 ITPP ／ 392, 393 IUU ／ 406, 414, 425, 427, 441 **J** JADGE ／ 234, 287 JASSM ／ 233, 234, 282 JCPOA ／ 172 JL-2 ／ 66, 203 JPIDD ／ 412, 413, 425, 426 J-20 ／ 72, 73, 102, 103 JX ／ 528, 543 JXR ／ 528 **K** K Program ／ 472, 494 **L** LAWS ／ 60, 80, 83, 94, 169, 180, 181, 246, 253, 258, 261, 262, 263, 317, 339, 343, 397, 441, 443, 451, 452, 550, 555 LCS ／ 58 LTAMDS ／ 289 **M** MAGTF ／ 352, 360 MaRV ／ 114, 118 ⅢMEF ／ 359, 360, 363 MD ／ 131, 135 ----- RAA ／ 373, 374, 376, 380, 381, 382, 386, 387, 388, 407, 536, 537 RDP MOU ／ 348 RMF ／ 234, 303, 304 SACO ／ 235, 236, 240, 242, 350, 351, 369, 370 SAF ／ 154, 556 S&TF ／ 347, 348 SC ／ 273 SCC ／ 336, 337, 339, 346, 347 SCCM ／ 492 SCO ／ 89, 91 SDA ／ 186, 187, 189, 190, 228, 233, 234, 281, 295, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 340, 489 SDC ／ 336, 337, 346 SEW ／ 288 SIPRI ／ 37, 86, 88, 92, 108, 145, 185, 203, 241, 465 SLBM ／ 55, 66, 110, 112, 114, 115, 119, 127, 133, 203 SM ／ 220, 229, 233, 234, 237, 281, 287, 288, 289, 290, 321, 480, 489, 493 SoSA ／ 461, 462 SRBM ／ 67, 106, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 119, 120, 205 SSA ／ 295, 297, 298, 299, 300 SSBN ／ 66, 133, 137, 139 START ／ 40, 41, 43, 46, 47, 48, 55, 56, 65, 95, 97, 126, 136, 140, 141, 143, 173, 203, 213, 237, 238, 265, 299, 304, 306, 343, 371, 388, 407, 415, 420, 447, 461, 467, 478 S-300V4 ／ 139 S-500 ／ 135, 136 **T** TCBM ／ 299 TEL ／ 65, 107, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 127, 170, 445 THAAD ／ 58, 129, 130 **U** UAV ／ 73, 76, 136, 156, 161, 180, 223, 228, 234, 281, 282, 283, 284, 547 UNCLOS ／ 90, 154, 200, 437 UNMISS ／ 85, 174, 175, 418, 444, 446, 447 UUV ／ 229, 489 UGV ／ 229, 480, 481 USV ／ 229, 234, 283, 488 **V** VLS ／ 69, 289 **W** WMD ／ 106, 107, 128, 200 WPNS ／ 200 WPS ／ 387, 392, 403, 421, 425, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 516, 517 ----- **70th Anniversary of the** **SDF’s Establishment** DEFENSE of J A P A N 2 0 2 4 **50th Issue of the** **Defense White** **Paper** -----