**2020** #### DEFENSE OF JAPAN ----- **2020** #### DEFENSE OF JAPAN ----- **On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2020** Minister of Defense KONO Taro Thank you very much for taking a look at the 2020 version of the Defense White Paper. The Defense White Paper was fi rst published exactly 50 years ago, in 1970, based on then Defense Agency Director-General NAKASONE Yasuhiro’s strong conviction that “more than anything else, it is the understanding, active support, and cooperation of the people that is essential to the defense of the nation,” at a time when the general public still had a strong negative perception of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Since then, as the international situation has changed dramatically and the uncertainty over the security environment surrounding Japan has grown rapidly, the role and the fi eld of activities of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF have broadened to cover the space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains. Although dramatic changes unimaginable half a century ago have occurred, widespread understanding and support from the Japanese people continue to be essential in any era in order to defend their peaceful lives and Japan’s territorial land, seas and airspace. We believe that Mr. Nakasone’s conviction lives on in the current Defense White Paper, which marks the 50th anniversary of publication. We are looking forward to your reading it. In compiling the 2020 version of the Defense White Paper, we pursued ease of understanding and user-friendliness. Below, let me explain the notable features of the white paper. ----- First, in order to provide an overall picture, we summarized important international developments and the MOD/SDF’s activities that we would like you to understand in the Special Feature “Defense Chronology” and “Digest.” These include North Korea’s repeated ballistic missile launches; China’s persistent continuation of the unilateral attempt to alter the status quo; the MOD/SDF’s dedicated contributions to bringing the outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease under control; disaster relief operations conducted in response to large-scale natural disasters; the start of information gathering activity in order to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East; and defense cooperation and exchange with the United States and other countries. In addition, in the current white paper, we introduce to readers around 50 SDF personnel, a higher number than previously, in order to convey the voices of SDF personnel engaging in various activities inside and outside of the country with a strong sense of mission so that you can feel more familiar with the MOD/SDF. In addition, in a new departure, we have prepared more than 50 videos related to the contents of the main text and placed QR codes linked to them in the main text. As you can easily play various videos via a smartphone, we hope that you will enjoy watching them. We also changed the coverage period of the white paper. Previously, the white paper covered a period of approximately one year to around June, but the period was changed to approximately one year to the end of March, namely the end of a fiscal year. As a result, the 2020 version of the Defense White Paper mainly covers activities and incidents in FY2019. However, it also covers some important incidents, such as those related to the novel coronavirus, that occurred by June this year. Furthermore, while the Defense White Paper can be accessed through the MOD’s website, the 2020 version for the first time contains editable data in the Reference section at the end. I hope that this will be very useful for readers. As indicated above, I expect that more people, including security experts and ordinary people, will find the 2020 version of the Defense White Paper enjoyable and satisfying to read. I sincerely hope that by using the white paper as a convenient reference, you will deepen your understanding of matters related to the security of Japan and activities of the MOD/SDF. ----- **Table of Contents** **of** **Special** **Feature 1** **Defense Chronology** …………………………………………………………… 001 **Feature 2** **New Domains** ………………………………………………………………………… 011 **Special** **Feature 3** **50 Years of the Defense of Japan** ………………………………… 013 Special Feature Digest The content of Part I to Part IV of the main text is summarized in 24 pages. ……………………………………………………………… 015 **Chapter 1 Overview** 1. Current Trends in Security Environment ……………………………………… 41 2. Regional Security Environment Surrounding Japan …………………………… 42 **Chapter 2 Defense Policies of Countries** **Section 1 The United States …………………………………………………… 45** 1 Security and Defense Policies ………………………………………………… 45 2 Military Posture ……………………………………………………………… 53 **Section 2 China ………………………………………………………………… 56** 1 General Situation …………………………………………………………… 56 2 Military Affairs ……………………………………………………………… 57 3 Relations with Countries and Regions ………………………………………… 80 4 Military Capabilities of Taiwan ……………………………………………… 86 **Section 3 Korean Peninsula …………………………………………………… 90** 1 North Korea ………………………………………………………………… 91 2 The ROK and the U.S. Forces Korea …………………………………………… 109 **Section 4 Russia ………………………………………………………………… 113** 1 General Situation …………………………………………………………… 113 2 Security and Defense Policies ………………………………………………… 114 3 Military Posture and Trends ………………………………………………… 115 4 Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan ……………………………………… 120 5 Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories………………………………… 122 6 Relations with Other Countries ……………………………………………… 123 **Section 5 Oceania ……………………………………………………………… 129** 1 Australia …………………………………………………………………… 129 2 New Zealand ………………………………………………………………… 132 **Section 6 Southeast Asia ……………………………………………………… 134** 1. General Situation …………………………………………………………… 134 2. Security and Defense Policies of Each Country ……………………………… 134 3 Military Modernization in the Region ………………………………………… 139 4 Intra-and Extra-Regional Cooperation ………………………………………… 140 **Section 7 South Asia …………………………………………………………… 142** 1 India ………………………………………………………………………… 142 2 Pakistan …………………………………………………………………… 144 3 Disputes over the Sovereignty of Kashmir …………………………………… 145 **Section 8 Europe ………………………………………………………………… 146** 1 General Situation …………………………………………………………… 146 2 Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks ………………………… 146 3 Security/Defense Policies of European Countries ……………………………… 149 **Section 9 Middle East, North Africa, and Other Regions ………………… 153** 1 Overview …………………………………………………………………… 153 2 Situation in the Gulf Region ………………………………………………… 153 3 The Situation Surrounding Middle East Peace ………………………………… 156 4 Situation in Syria …………………………………………………………… 156 5 Situation in Yemen …………………………………………………………… 157 6 Situation in Libya …………………………………………………………… 158 7 Situation in Egypt …………………………………………………………… 159 8 Situation in Afghanistan ……………………………………………………… 159 9 Situation in South Sudan …………………………………………………… 160 **10 Situation in Somalia ………………………………………………………… 161** **Chapter 3 Trends Concerning New Domains including Outer Space,** **Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Relevant** **Challenges Facing the International Community** **Section 1 Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology ………… 163** 1 Military Science and Technological Trends …………………………………… 163 2 Trends Concerning Defense Technological and Industrial Bases ……………… 167 **Section 2 Trends in Space Domain …………………………………………… 169** 1 Space Domain and Security ………………………………………………… 169 2 Various Countries’ Outer Space Initiatives …………………………………… 170 **Section 3 Trends in Cyber Domain …………………………………………… 174** 1 Cyberspace and Security …………………………………………………… 174 2 Threats in Cyberspace ……………………………………………………… 174 3 Initiatives against Cyberspace Threats ……………………………………… 177 **Section 4 Trends in Electromagnetic Domain ……………………………… 180** 1. Electromagnetic Domain and Security ……………………………………… 180 2 Each Country’s Electronic Warfare Initiatives ………………………………… 181 **Section 5 Developments regarding the Novel Coronavirus Disease** **(COVID-19) …………………………………………………………… 183** **Section 6 Maritime Trends …………………………………………………… 186** 1 Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” …………… 186 2 National Maritime Security Initiatives ………………………………………… 187 3 Trends in the Arctic Ocean …………………………………………………… 189 **Section 7 Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** **(WMDs) ……………………………………………………………… 191** 1 Nuclear Weapons …………………………………………………………… 191 2 Biological and Chemical Weapons …………………………………………… 192 3 Ballistic Missiles and Other Missiles ………………………………………… 193 4 Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies … 193 **Section 8 Trends in International Terrorism ………………………………… 195** 1 General Situation …………………………………………………………… 195 2 Trends in ISIL-related International Terrorist Organizations …………………… 195 3 Movements of International Terrorist Organizations Other Than ISIL-Affi liated Groups … 197 **Chapter 1 Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense** **Section 1 Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security …………………………… 199** **Section 2 Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy …………………… 200** 1 Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense …………………………………… 200 2 The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution ……………………… 200 3 Basic Policy ………………………………………………………………… 202 **Chapter 2 Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense** **Section 1 National Security Council ………………………………………… 204** **Section 2 Organization of the MOD/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) ………… 205** 1 Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability ……………………… 205 2 Joint Operations System of the SDF ………………………………………… 211 **Chapter 3 Japan’s Security and Defense Policy** **Section 1 Outline of the National Security Strategy (NSS)………………… 213** 1. Japan’s National Security Policy Framework ………………………………… 213 2. Outline of the NSS: Proactive Contribution to Peace …………………………… 213 **Section 2 Outline of NDPG ……………………………………………………… 215** 1 Basic Approach—Building a Multi-Domain Defense Force …………………… 215 2 Japan’s Basic Defense Policy ………………………………………………… 216 3 Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability ………………………………… 217 4 Organization of the SDF ……………………………………………………… 217 5 Elements Supporting Defense Capability ……………………………………… 220 **Section 3 Outline of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) ………………………… 221** 1 Program Guidelines ………………………………………………………… 221 2 Quantities of Major Procurement …………………………………………… 222 3 Expenditures ………………………………………………………………… 222 **Chapter 4 Build-up of Defense Capability, etc.** **Section 1 Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2020 ……………………… 224** **Section 2 Defense-Related Expenditures …………………………………… 226** 1 Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures …………………………………… 226 2 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures ………………………………… 226 3 Initiatives for Increasing the Effi ciency of Procurement ………………………… 229 4 Comparison with Other Countries …………………………………………… 229 **Chapter 5 Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the** **Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Activities since Legislation’s** **Enforcement** **Section 1 Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others ……………… 231** 1 Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations … 231 2 Responses to Situations that Will Have an Important Infl uence ………………… 233 3 Maintenance of Public Order and Responses to Aggression that Do Not Amount to an Armed Attack ……………………………………………………………… 234 4 Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others………………………………………… 236 5 Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community … 236 **Section 2 SDF Activities since Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and** **Security ……………………………………………………………… 239** 1 Promotion of Various Preparations for New Missions Based on the Legislation for Peace and Security … 239 2 Dispatch of Staff Offi cers to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) ……… 239 3 The Operationalization of the Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the Armed Forces of the United States and Other Countries (SDF Law Article 95-2) ……… 240 4 Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) … 241 5 Assignment of New Mission for the South Sudan PKO ………………………… 241 **ⅠPart** **ⅡPart** ----- D E F E N S E O F J A P A N 2 0 2 0 D E F E N S E O F J A P A N 2 0 2 0 **Chapter 1 Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** **Section 1 Response from Peacetime to Grey Zone Situations……………… 243** 1 Persistent ISR in the Area Surrounding Japan…………………………………… 244 2 Measures against Violation of Japan’s Sovereignty… …………………………… 247 **Section 2 Defense of Japan including its Remote Islands………………… 252** 1 Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands… ………………………………………… 252 2 Response to Missile Attacks… ………………………………………………… 255 3 Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others… ……… 261 4 Readiness against Invasion… ………………………………………………… 264 5 Initiatives Related to the Protection of Civilians… ……………………………… 265 **Section 3 Responses in the Domains of Space, Cyberspace and** **Electromagnetic Spectrum…………………………………………… 266** 1 Responses in Space Domain… ………………………………………………… 266 2 Response in Cyber Domain… ………………………………………………… 270 3 Response in Electromagnetic Domain…………………………………………… 273 **Section 4 Efforts of the MOD/SDF in response to the Spread of Novel** **Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)… ………………………………… 275** 1 Dispatching Nursing Officers to the Chartered Airplane Leaving Wuhan…………… 275 2 Disaster Relief in Response to COVID-19………………………………………… 275 3 Activities at the SDF Hospital, etc.… …………………………………………… 277 4 Activities for Sending Out and Sharing of Information at Home and Abroad… …… 280 5 Efforts of the MOD/SDF to Prevent the Spread of COVID-19 Infection… ………… 281 6 Other Efforts…………………………………………………………………… 281 **Section 5 Response to Large-Scale Disasters, etc.…………………………… 282** 1 Response to Large-Scale Disasters, etc.………………………………………… 282 2 Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.………… 291 **Section 6 Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of** **Japan-related Vessels in the Middle East… ……………………… 292** 1 Background of the Deployment of the SDF to the Middle East… ………………… 292 2 Outline of the Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (Cabinet Decision)……………………………………………… 293 3 Communication and Cooperation with Relevant Countries… …………………… 297 **Chapter 2 Japan-U.S. Alliance** **Section 1 Outline of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements………………… 299** 1 Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements…………………………… 299 2 Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance………………………………… 301 3 Content of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation…………………… 302 4 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States… …………………… 306 **Section 2 Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats…… 309** 1 Cooperation in Space and Cyber Domains… …………………………………… 309 2 Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense………………………………………… 310 3 Bilateral Training and Exercises… ……………………………………………… 310 4 ISR Activities…………………………………………………………………… 312 5 Maritime Security… …………………………………………………………… 312 6 Logistics Support… …………………………………………………………… 312 7 Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale Disaster in Japan… ………………… 313 **Section 3 Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of** **Areas… ………………………………………………………………… 314** 1 Creation of a Desirable Security Environment… ………………………………… 314 2 Initiatives for Leveraging Capabilities…………………………………………… 315 **Section 4 Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning the USFJ… … 317** 1 Stationing of the USFJ… ……………………………………………………… 317 2 Progress of the Realignment of the USFJ……………………………………… 319 3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa………………………………………… 320 4 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa… ………………… 334 5 Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the USFJ… ………… 340 **Chapter 3 Security Cooperation** **Section 1 Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense** **Cooperation… ………………………………………………………… 341** 1 Significance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges etc.… ………………………………………… 341 2 Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges… …………………………… 346 3 Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation… ……………………………… 373 4 Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building… ……………………… 380 **Section 2 Ensuring Maritime Security… ……………………………………… 383** 1 Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security… ……………………………… 383 2 Counter-Piracy Operations……………………………………………………… 383 3 Training-Centered Initiatives… ………………………………………………… 387 4 Cooperation in Maritime Security… …………………………………………… 387 **Section 3 Cooperation in Use of Space and Cyber Domains………………… 388** 1 Cooperation in the Use of Space Domain………………………………………… 388 2 Cooperation in the Use of Cyber Domain………………………………………… 388 **Section 4 Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation… … 390** 1 Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation… … 390 2 International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction…… 391 **Section 5 Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities… … 393** 1 Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities… …………………… 393 2 Initiatives to Support UN PKO, etc.… …………………………………………… 394 3 International Disaster Relief Activities…………………………………………… 399 **Chapter 1 Human Resource Base that Sustains the Defense Capability** **Section 1 Reinforcing Human Resource Base… ……………………………… 403** 1 Recruitment and Employment… ……………………………………………… 403 2 Daily Education and Training… ………………………………………………… 408 3 Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources… ……………… 408 **Section 2 Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women’s** **Participation… ………………………………………………………… 416** 1 Working Style Reform… ……………………………………………………… 416 2 Reform to Combine a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care……… 417 3 Reform for Promoting the Careers of Female Personnel… ……………………… 418 **Chapter 2 Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology** **Section 1 Reviewing Equipment Structure… ………………………………… 422** 1 Initiatives for Construction of Optimized Equipment Structure… ………………… 422 2 Initiatives to Make the Most of Limited Human Resources (Manpower Saving and Automation)… ………………………………………………………………… 423 **Section 2 Reinforcing Technology Base………………………………………… 424** 1 Necessity of Reinforcing Technology Base… …………………………………… 424 2 Defense Technology Strategy and Related Documents…………………………… 424 3 Initiatives for Research and Development… …………………………………… 426 4 Active Utilization of Civilian Technology… ……………………………………… 427 **Section 3 Optimizing Equipment Procurement……………………………… 430** 1 Project Management throughout Equipment Life Cycle…………………………… 430 2 Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters… …………………… 431 3 Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement, and Other Related Initiatives… …………………………………………………………………… 433 4 Promoting Initiative towards Streamlining of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement…………………………………………………………………… 434 **Section 4 Strengthening Defense Industrial Base… ………………………… 435** 1 Current Situation of Japan’s Defense Industrial Base… ………………………… 435 2 The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases…………………… 436 3 Initiatives toward Strengthening of Defense Industrial Base……………………… 437 **Section 5 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation………………… 440** 1 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology……………… 440 2 Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation………………………………………………………… 441 3 Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation… ……………… 442 4 Adapting Defense Equipment for External Use…………………………………… 446 5 Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions… ………………… 446 6 Public-Private Collaboration for Appropriate Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment……… 447 7 Preventing Leakage of Key Technologies for Defense Equipment… ……………… 447 **Chapter 3 Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities** 1 Military Intelligence Collection… ……………………………………………… 448 2 Initiatives towards Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities…………………………… 450 3 Defense Intelligence Headquarters……………………………………………… 450 **Chapter 4 Elements that Sustain Defense Capability** **Section 1 SDF Training… ………………………………………………………… 451** 1 Training and Exercise by Each Self-Defense Forces (SDF)………………………… 451 2 Training Environment…………………………………………………………… 451 3 Initiatives to Safety Management, etc.…………………………………………… 452 **Section 2 Enhancement of Medical Functions………………………………… 453** 1 Enhancing Seamless Medical Care and Evacuation Posture……………………… 453 2 SDF Hospitals Serving as Hub Hospitals with Enhanced Functions… …………… 453 3 Strengthening the Function of the NDMC……………………………………… 454 4 Enhancement of Education of Medical and Nursing Officers……………………… 455 5 Enhancement of Capabilities to Treat War Injury… ……………………………… 455 6 Developing Conditions Necessary for International Cooperation… ……………… 456 **Chapter 5 Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens** **Section 1 Collaboration with Local Communities… ………………………… 457** 1 Supporting Civilian Life… ……………………………………………………… 457 2 Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF……… 457 3 Activities for Securing Understanding and Cooperation of Municipal Governments and Local Residents… ………………………………………………………… 458 4 Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas… … 458 5 Participation in National Events… ……………………………………………… 463 6 Activities for Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games……………………………… 464 7 Other Initiatives………………………………………………………………… 466 **Section 2 Public Relations Activities, Public Records and Archives** **Management, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities… … 468** 1 Various Public Relations Activities… …………………………………………… 468 2 Initiatives for Public Document Management and Information Disclosure… ……… 471 3 Initiatives for Policy Evaluation… ……………………………………………… 471 **ⅢPart** **ⅣPart** ----- **Table of Contents** **of** Column **Chapter 2 Defense Policies of Countries** **Column** Establishment of the Space Force …………………………………… 54 **Column Changing Military Balance between China and Taiwan ………………… 88** **Column North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities (Based on the current state of** **Column** **Column** **Column** miniaturization and warhead technology of nuclear weapons) ……………104 **Column Trends in Military Cooperation Between Russia and China …………………………124** **Chapter 3 Trends Concerning New Domains including Outer Space,** **Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Relevant** **Challenges Facing the International Community** **Column Technology for Coordination between Crewed Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial** Vehicles (UAV) ……………………………………………………… 165 **Chapter 2 Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense** **Column Duties of the Self Defense Forces …………………………………** 212 **Chapter 3 Japan’s Security and Defense Policy** **Column Acquisition of the F-35B Fighter Aircraft ……………………………** 223 **Chapter 4 Build-up of Defense Capability, etc.** **Column Capability Enhancement regarding Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic** Domains as Part of the Buildup of Defense Capability in 2020 ……… 224 **Chapter 1 Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** **VOICE** Voice of Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft Crew in Charge of Warning and Surveillance ……………………………………………………… 247 **Column Scrambling against Aircraft Intruding into Territorial Airspace …………** 250 **VOICE** Working at My New Post at the GSDF Miyako Guard ………………… 255 **VOICE** Activities of Personnel Dispatched to JAXA ………………………… 269 **VOICE** A Private-ship Captain Who Fought Against COVID-19 Virus Together with **Column** **VOICE** **VOICE** **VOICE** SDF Personnel …………………………………………………… 277 **Column** “Fight against an Invisible Enemy (Novel Coronavirus)”–Achieved Zero Secondary Infections ……………………………………………… 278 **VOICE** Response to the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) …………… 279 **Column A Letter of Thanks from a German Couple …………………………** 280 **Column** Launch of the MOD/SDF’s Offi cial Twitter Account (For Disaster Response) …… 284 **Column Use of Drones for Disasters to Convey Information on the Current Status at** **VOICE** **Column** **Column** **Column** the Time of Disasters ……………………………………………… 285 **Column Provision of Allergy-Conscious Meals ………………………………** 286 **VOICE** Activities at Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. (TEPCO) during the Disaster Relief **Column** **VOICE** in Response to the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai)…… 287 Participating in Disaster Relief ……………………………………… 288 Participating in Disaster Relief Activities in Response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) ………………………………………… 288 **VOICE** Engaging in Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East ……… 296 **VOICE** Response from Relevant Industries to the Information Gathering Activities in **VOICE** **VOICE** the Middle East …………………………………………………… 297 **Chapter 2 Japan-U.S. Alliance** **VOICE** Enhancement of Multidimensional Japan-U.S. Bilateral Response Capabilities … 310 **VOICE** Participating in Malabar 2019 ……………………………………… 315 **VOICE** **VOICE** **Chapter 3 Security Cooperation** **VOICE** Voice of SDF Personnel Who Participated in Japan-India bilateral exercise SHINYUU Maitri 19 …………………………………………………………………… 350 **VOICE** Announcement of “Vientiane Vision 2.0”: Voice of Personnel Who Engaged in its Development …………………………………………………… 351 **VOICE** Enhancing the Ability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Respond to Disasters ………………………………………………………… 354 **VOICE** Voice of SDF Personnel Who Participated in the International Fleet Review to Commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy ……………………………………………… 366 **VOICE** Voice of the First Offi cial Trip to Pacifi c Island Countries by State Minister of Defense, One of the political offi cers of the MOD and Support Staff … 369 **VOICE** Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Capacity Building for Lao People’s Armed Forces ……………………………………………………… 382 **VOICE** Voice of SDF Personnel Engaging in the United Nations Project for Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities (RDEC) (renamed United Nations Triangular Partnership Project [UNTPP]) …………………………… 398 **VOICE** Voice of an SDF Personnel Engaged in International Disaster Relief Activities in Response to a Large-scale Bushfi re in Australia ………………… 401 **Chapter 1 Human Resource Base that Sustains the Defense Capability** **VOICE** Voice of an Active SDF Reserve Personnel and His Employer ………… 406 **VOICE** Voice of SDF Personnel Studying at Graduate Schools etc. at Home or Abroad ……409 **Column SDF’s Emergency Rations …………………………………………** 410 **Column Defensive Memorial Cordons, Defensive Meritorious Badges and Medals for** **VOICE** **VOICE** **Column** **Column** Contribution to Unit Merits …………………………………………………… 410 **VOICE** Voice of a Re-employed SDF Personnel and His Employer …………… 413 **VOICE** Voice of a Father Enjoying Child Rearing …………………………… 417 **VOICE** Active Participation of Female Personnel …………………………… 420 **VOICE** **VOICE** **VOICE** **Chapter 2 Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology** **Column Development of F-X ………………………………………………** 427 **VOICE** Defense Industry Supporting Build-Up of Defense Capability ………… 439 **Column** **VOICE** **Chapter 3 Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities** **VOICE** Voice of Defense Attachés ………………………………………… 449 **Chapter 5 Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens** **Column “Disposal of Unexploded Bombs” Contributing to Safety and Security of** People …………………………………………………………… 458 **Column Addressing Issues of perfl uorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and other organic** fl uorine compounds ……………………………………………… 463 **VOICE** Participating in a National Event (Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi, Ceremony of the Enthronement of His Majesty the Emperor at the Seiden [State Hall]) … 464 **VOICE** After the Ceremony to Receive the Olympic Flame ………………… 465 **Column The Drone Act ………………………………………………………** 467 **VOICE** Essay Competition: Impressions upon Reading Defense of Japan 2019 … 469 **VOICE** **Column** **VOICE** - Maps in this White Paper may contain omissions depending on the design and layout and may not necessarily show the entire Japanese territory. The period covered by this White Paper is up to the end of March 2020, in principle. **ⅠPart** **ⅣPart** **ⅡPart** **ⅢPart** **Part** ----- D E F E N S E O F J A P A N 2 0 2 0 D E F E N S E O F J A P A N 2 0 2 0 **Offi cial SNS of the MOD/SDF** You can inspect respective organizations’ research outcomes concerning security policy by accessing the following links. MOD offi cial account MOD offi cial account MOD offi cial channel Check other offi cial SNS from here! **Call for Essays Regarding Defense of Japan 2020** Essay Competition: Impressions upon Reading Defense of Japan 2020 Essay Competition: Impressions upon Reading Defense of Japan will be held just as last year. We are looking forward to receiving impressions upon reading the Defense of Japan from many people. Entry requirements are as below. Please see the website of the Ministry of Defense, too. Book for the essay competition Defense of Japan 2020 Application deadline December 31 (Thu) 2020 (postmark deadline for postal applications) Application method **(1) Postal application** Award - Write only the text of your essay on up to 5 sheets of manuscript Essays will be selected for the following awards and recognized during paper for 400 characters March 2021 at the Ministry of Defense - Write the following on other paper (free style) - title of your essay ○ your address ○ your name with furigana - First Award - your occupation ○ your age ○ your phone number Honorable certificate and extra prize (two tickets to both Fuji Fire - E-mail address Power Exercise and SDF Marching Festival) - Send the two items above to the following address - Award for Excellence Section in charge of Defense of Japan Essay Competition, Policy Planning and Evaluation Division, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Defense Honorable certificate and extra prize (two tickets to either Fuji Fire 5-1 Ichigaya Honmuracho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-8801 Power Exercise or SDF Marching Festival) **(2) Application through the MOD website** - Download the form and write the text of your essay (up to 2,000 characters). - Upload the text using the application form and send the text after entering necessary items. **See Part IV (p. 470) for details.** ----- **Defense Chronology** **1** Medical offi cer collecting PCR samples from a crew member Fight Against the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) The worldwide pandemic of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) poses a critical security threat not only to Japan, but also to the international community as a whole. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are engaged in activities to prevent the spread of infection using all available resources. In January 2020, the MOD voluntarily dispatched SDF personnel in order to implement disaster relief operation for Japanese citizens who returned to Japan due to the spread Reserve SDF member engaged in nursing duties of COVID-19 in China. In addition, SDF Reserve Personnel qualifi ed as doctors and nurses, etc. were mobilized to provide medical support. Life support assistance for returned Japanese nationals SDF vehicles engaged in disaster relief operations for the cruise ship **January 2020** Since March 28, 2020, the SDF has conducted various activities, including support of quarantine at airports to reinforce border control against COVID-19, and education on prevention of infection for employees of private accommodation **March 2020** facilities to prevent the spread of community-acquired infection. The SDF Central Hospital admitted patients infected via community spread of the virus. Training on how to wear protective clothing Training for accommodation Transporting returnees/foreign nationals awaiting PCR test results from airports to facility staff in preventing infection accommodation facilities ----- |Home and Abroad|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||Special pages set up on the MOD and Joint Staf websites| |||| |||| |Col1|Form of Deployment|Period|January|February|Col6|Col7|Col8|March|Col10|Col11|April|Col13|Col14|May|Col16| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Disaster relief operation to prevent the spread of infection|Voluntary relief deployment|January 31-March 16, 2020|Ch s|artered fl ights Quarantine upport (note 1) (deli Returned J health o c (distribution of s Medical support|Cruise ship “Di Medical sup quarantine sup Life support very/sorting of supplies, su Transport supp pa apanese nationals bservation and dis ruise ship passen Temporary acc Life sup upplies, serving of me (patient rounds and||amond Princess” port and port (Note 2) assistance pport for disinfection, etc. ort for disembarking ssengers who required embarking gers ommodation facili port assistance als, collection of med medical care by medi|) ties ical questionnaire, et cal offi cers and nurse|c.) s)||||||| |Disaster relief operations or reinforced border control|Voluntary relief deployment|From March 28 to May 31, 2020-|||Transpor (Narita, H accomm|||||Airpo Qua m airports onal) to Temp Life|rts (Narita and rantine support ( orary accom support assistan|Haneda) note 2) modation facilities ce (distribution of meals|, etc.)||| |||||||Transpor (Narita, H accomm|t support (transpo aneda, Kansai Int odation facilities t|rting returnees/fo ernational, Chubu o await PCR test r|reign nationals fro Centrair Internati esults)||||||| ||||||||||||||||| |Disaster relief operations to combat community- acquired COVID-19|Requests from prefectural governors and other authorities|April 3, 2020-|||||||||Life supp facilities Airlift of emerg|ort assistance at accom ency cases|modation Suppo facility Transpo patients sympto|rt for training to local governme staff (training in preventing infe|nt and accommodation ction)| |||||||||||||||Support f collection support rt between hospital and accom who tested positive (asymptom ms) and were staying at accom|or PCR sample and medical modation facilities for atic or with mild modation facilities| |Activities by SDF hospitals, etc.||||Admission of patie|nts who tested posit||ive|||Presentation of case analyses||Clinical trial of Avigan|(favipiravir)||| Activities in the SDF Central Hospital Among other activities, the SDF Central Hospital admitted and cared for patients suffering from COVID-19. Explaining the X-ray procedure to a patient Patient guidance Letters of encouragement to patients from the hospital PCR testing Sharing Information at Home and Abroad Special pages set up on The MOD/SDF set up special pages on their and the MOD and Joint Staff websites other websites that published detailed measures to prevent and control the spread of COVID-19. In addition, the MOD/SDF shared information, lessons learned, and knowledge obtained through measures to fi ght COVID-19 with other countries via their embassies in Tokyo and also telephone conversations with defense ministers of 15 countries. (As of June 16) Main MOD/SDF Activities Against COVID-19 DeploymentForm of Period January February March April May Chartered fl ights Cruise ship “Diamond Princess” Quarantine Medical support and support (note 1) quarantine support (Note 2) Life support assistance (delivery/sorting of supplies, support for disinfection, etc.) Sharing of Publication of “Keeping Everyone Safe from COVID-19” on the information Joint Staff website about lessons/ Sharing of lessons/fi ndings with other countries (including via telephone fi ndings conversations with other defense ministers) ----- **Defense Chronology** **1** Disaster Relief Operations In FY2019, Japan saw various natural disasters. The SDF provided fl exible support in response to those disasters by appropriately identifying needs as they shifted according to changes in the situation. In the disaster relief operations in response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Habigis), the SDF established a joint task force led by the Commander of the Ground Component Command and mobilized. SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel. Disaster Relief Operations in Response to Heavy Rain Accompanying a Weather Front **August 2019** GSDF personnel going to rescue stranded people Personnel clearing up an oil spill An ASDF C-2 at Saga Airport to deliver supplies Disaster Relief Operations in Response to the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) **September 2019** GSDF personnel covering the roof of a typhoon-damaged house with blue tarpaulins ASDF personnel operating a drone to check the extent of the damage GSDF personnel removing fallen trees to restore power ----- Disaster Relief Operations in Response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Habigis) **October 2019** GSDF personnel assisting in supplying water ASDF personnel using a rescue helicopter to save lives GSDF personnel rescuing a stranded person ASDF personnel searching for missing persons GSDF personnel providing bathing support ASDF water tankers being fi lled up with water from the MSDF JS “Uraga” to assist in supplying fresh water GSDF personnel disposing of disaster waste GSDF personnel providing meals support ASDF personnel covering the roof of a typhoon-damaged house with blue tarpaulins ----- **Defense Chronology** **1** Launches of Ballistic Missiles by North Korea North Korea is proceeding with ballistic missile development at an extremely rapid pace and launched more than 30 missiles **July 2019** and other objects, including what are presumed to be new short range ballistic missiles and a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) since May 2019. These short-range ballistic missiles presumed to be new types are distinctive in that they use solid fuel and fl y at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. North Korea is therefore believed to be trying to breach missile defense networks by making it more diffi cult to detect signs of a launch and making Short-range ballistic missiles (described by North Korea as “new type of tactical guided weapon”) early detection harder. There are concerns that such advanced technologies will be applied to longer-range missiles. 【JANES】 North Korea is relentlessly pursuing increasingly complex and diverse modes of attack and is steadily strengthening and improving its attack capabilities. These enhancements in its **August 2019** capabilities make early detection of the signs of a launch and the interception of the missiles more diffi cult, thereby posing new challenges for the intelligence gathering, early warning, and interception postures of relevant countries, including Japan. Working closely with relevant ministries and agencies, as well as countries including the United States, the MOD/SDF take all possible measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security, sparing no effort in gathering and analyzing the necessary information Short-range ballistic missiles (described by North Korea as “new weapon” or as “tactical guided weapon”) and undertaking warning and surveillance activities. **September 2019** Short-range ballistic missiles (described by North Korea as “super-large multiple rocket launcher”) 【JANES】 **October 2019** Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 【JANES】 Launches of Ballistic Missiles by North Korea (since 2019) |Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Flight distance| |---|---|---|---| |May 4, 2019|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Max. approx. 250 km| |May 9, 2019|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Approx. 400 km/ approx. 250 km| |July 25, 2019|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Approx. 600 km| |August 6, 2019|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Approx. 450 km| |August 10, 2019|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Approx. 400 km| |August 16, 2019|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Approx. 250 km| |August 24, 2019|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Approx. 350 to 400 km| |September 10, 2019|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Max. approx. 300 to 350 km| |October 2, 2019|SLBM “Pukguksong-3”|1|Approx. 450 km| |October 31, 2019|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Approx. 350 to 400 km| |November 28, 2019|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Approx. 380 km| |March 2, 2020|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Approx. 240 km| |March 9, 2020|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Max. approx. 200 km| |March 21, 2020|Short-range ballistic missiles|2|Approx. 400 km| ----- Aegis-equipped Destroyer (DDG) JS “Maya” Commissioned in March 2020. Equipped with BMD capability from the outset. **PAC-3MSE** **FPS-7** Deployment began in March 2020. Offers protection over more than double the area covered by the existing PAC-3. Warning and control radar currently being rolled out. Able to detect and track over long distances and wide areas. ----- **Defense Chronology** **1** Commencement of Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-related Vessels in the Middle East **February 2020** In the Middle East region, amidst rising tensions, attacks took place on ships, including a case in which a Japan-related vessel suffered damage in June 2019. Under these circumstances, Japan has decided to dispatch a Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) vessel for the purpose of information gathering and the utilization of the existing counter-piracy unit as a part of Japan’s An oil tanker ablaze after a June 2019 attack in the Gulf of Oman (EPA/Jiji) **January 2020-** Two MSDF P-3C left Japan on January 11, 2020, along with the replacement of the counter-piracy unit and began information gathering activities on the 20th. JS “Takanami” left port on February 2 and started to engage in information gathering activities in the fi eld on February 26. ----- Sokui-no-rei, Ceremony of the Accession to the Throne The SDF presents ceremonies including guards of honor, lining up and gun salutes to the Emperor, state guests and others at national events. A guard of honor to state guests from foreign countries at their welcome reception is essential for diplomatic procedure. At the Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi (Ceremony of the Enthronement of His Majesty the Emperor at the Seiden [State Hall]), the GSDF fi red salutes in the Kita-no-maru area of the Outer Gardens of the Imperial Palace. At the celebration parade in November of the same year, the GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, the National Defense Academy and National Defense Medical College conducted guards of honor, playing music and lining up. In addition to the members who were assigned to these duties, many other members participated in the event, including preparation for the implementation by the SDF. **November 2019** ----- **Defense Chronology** **1** Japan-US Alliance/Defense Dialogue 60th Anniversary of the Japan-U.S. Alliance Prime Minister Abe, photo shoot with Ms. Mary Eisenhower, granddaughter of former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower **January 2020** [Website of the Prime Minister’s Offi ce of Japan] 2020 marked the 60th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. “Today, more than ever, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is a pillar that is indestructible, a pillar immovable, safeguarding peace in Asia, the Indo-Pacifi c, and in the world, while assuring prosperity therein,” Prime Minister Abe said in his speech at a reception to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Security Treaty, which was held on January 19 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Iikura Guest House. The Prime Minister expressed his determination to continue working to enhance the Alliance, saying, “it is incumbent upon us to make it even more robust, to make it a pillar for safeguarding peace and security in both outer space and cyberspace. Let us keep and enhance [the Alliance], ... to make it a pillar safeguarding freedom, liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law ... sixty years, one hundred years down the road.” [Jiji] P d b th Mi i t f F i Aff i [Website of the Prime Minister’s Offi ce of Japan] [W b it f th P i Mi i t ’ Offi f J ----- Defense Dialogue by Minister Kono After assuming the offi ce of the Minister of Defense, Minister Kono actively held meetings with his counterparts and visited foreign countries. Defense cooperation and exchanges with foreign countries were stepped up to an unprecedented extent in FY2019. **Bilateral Dialogues** **with Many Countries** A number of bilateral dialogues were held, including the fi rst ministerial-level “2+2” meeting with India, the fi rst Defense Ministerial Meeting with Ukraine, and the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting held during the fi rst offi cial of Defense in ten years. Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (December 2019) Japan-India “2+2” (November 2019) Russia Denmark Canada U.K. Germany Ukraine France Italy Bulgaria Mongolia Turkey China United States Jordan Iran Republic of Korea Israel Bahrain Egypt Qatar Saudi Arabia India Myanmar Oman Vietnam Jamaica UAE Thailand Laos Philippines Djibouti Cambodia Sri Lanka Brunei Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Papua New Guinea Brazil Fiji Tonga Australia 5 or more exchanges New Zealand 3 or more exchanges 2 exchanges 1 exchange No exchange Number of bilateral dialogues and consultations (April 1, 2019-March 31, 2020) **Active Utilization of** **Active Participation in** **Telephone Conversation** **Multilateral Conferences** Manama Dialogue (November 2019) Doha Forum (December 2019) The ADMM-Plus (November 2019) Minister Kono participated in the Manama Dialogue and the Doha Forum for the fi rst time as a Japanese Minister of Defense, and also attended the Munich Security Conference for the fi rst time in 11 years, highlighting the presence and the position of the government of Japan to the international community. On the occasion of the ADMM-Plus, Minister Kono introduced the Vientiane Vision 2.0, an updated guideline for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, which had been announced at the Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, thereby further deepening defense cooperation between Japan and ASEAN member countries. Minister Kono has been more proactive in holding telephone conversations than ever and has endeavored to deepen communications with other countries. In FY2019, telephone conversations took place with as many as 12 countries. ----- **New Domains** **2** Nowadays, various kinds of satellites have been launched for observation, communication/broadcasting and positioning, **Space** making outer space key infrastructure for both the public and private sectors in such areas as society, economics and **Domain** science. Also in the security area, major countries have been making proactive efforts to use outer space for maintaining peace and safety. When using outer space, it is necessary to ensure its stable use. However, there has been a rapid increase in the volume of space debris in outer space, raising the risk of signifi cant damage to satellite functions caused by collision between debris and satellite. In addition, it is pointed out that the development and verifi cation test of a killer satellite, which approaches a target satellite to disturb, attack, and capture it, is underway, increasing the threat to the stable use of outer space. Owing to the advancement of information and communications **Cyber** technology in recent years, information and communications networks such as the Internet have become essential **Domain** components across all facets of life. Therefore, cyber attacks against information and communications networks have the potential to seriously impact the lives of individuals. Under such circumstances, cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against information and communications networks of not only government organizations and military forces but also business corporations and academic organizations in various countries. Attacks attempting to steal critical technologies, secrets or personal information have been confi rmed. For the MOD/ SDF, information and communications networks that leverage cyberspace form a foundation for the SDF’s activities in various domains, and any attack against them would seriously disrupt the organized activities of the SDF. In everyday life, electromagnetic spectrum is used for various **Electromagnetic** purposes ranging from television and mobile communications to geolocation information through global positioning systems. **Domain** In the security area, electromagnetic spectrum has been used for command/communication, and warning/surveillance. With the development of the technology, its use has expanded in range and purpose, and it is now recognized as the frontline of the offense-defense dynamic in today’s warfare. Therefore, ensuring superiority in electromagnetic domains such as these is essential for realizing cross-domain operations. ----- Cross-Domain Operations Contemporary warfare combines the traditional domains of land, sea, and air with new domains such as space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum. In such situation, it is essential to block and eliminate attacks by leveraging capabilities in such new domains as space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum so as to effectively deter and counter threats. Cross-domain operations that organically fuse capabilities in the new domains and the traditional domains of land, sea, and air to exercise domain-crossing capabilities have thus become vitally important. **Cross-Domain Operation (image of domain-crossing exercise of capabilities)** **Enemy** **Persistent ISR** **Japan** **Database** **Space domain** *2 Various systems **Prevent enemy’s** Networks of **command** **control/** **Cyber domain** the MOD/SDF **communication** **and use of** **Electromagnetic** **cyberspace** **domain** **Protection of Japan’s** **C4ISR *1** **Land, sea, and air** **domains** Overcome ability differences with other countries by taking advantage of a synergy effect obtained through organically integrating abilities in multiple domains, not by exercising abilities separately in each domain *1 C4ISR: Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and *2 The networks of the MOD/SDF consist of Riku-Shiki, (GSDF command system), Reconnaissance Maritime Self Defense Force Command, Control, and Communication Service Foundation System (MARS), Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) and other systems. ----- General of what was then the Defense Agency, that “more than anything else, it is the understanding, active support, and cooperation of the people that is essential to the defense of the nation.” - 94 pages long The 1977 edition contained no photographs, only illustrations (the one below was used in an **1976** explanation about the GSDF) Defense Chronology fi rst published - Published for the second time - Provided more enhanced content than the fi rst edition. Total number of pages increased to 174 - Took on roughly the same structure it has today - Both Japanese and English editions published annually ever since - Was published in A5 format until 1999, but the total number of pages grew to 498 in the 1999 edition Special Published for the fi rst time in 1970, the Defense Feature of Japan white paper has been published annually since 1976. This year marks the 50th anniversary Years of its fi rst publication. The objective of Defense of Japan is to provide a widespread awareness of **3** the current state of our nation’s defense, as well of the as related issues and initiatives, thereby gaining # 50 the understanding of readers both within Japan and overseas. To achieve this, various approaches have been devised in order to ensure that as many Defense of citizens as possible can obtain a copy of Defense of Japan. Efforts will continue to ensure that this publication is comprehensible, readable, and user- Japan friendly, to promote understanding of the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces. **Look!** **2020** - This year’s edition features columns highlighting the voices of around 50 SDF personnel deployed in various settings both within Japan and overseas (about twice as many voices as last year) - There are also QR codes that you can scan to watch related videos 令和2年版 immediately! 防衛白書 日本の防衛 2 ### Reiwa ----- Photographs (black and white) begin to be used Right: A column about the launch of the Defensive Memorial Cordon system ##### Heisei First use of color diagrams and of feature columns Color photographs fi rst appeared in the 1983 edition CD-ROM included (until 2002) Index fi rst published at the end **2000-** **2003-** - Began to be published in a more - Digest fi rst published readable A4 format - Columns highlighting the voices of - Overall visual appearance enhanced, personnel fi rst published with pictures of equipment on the cover - Publication on the MOD website began - Special features fi rst published at the beginning Compact edition published (until 2009) The digest began to be published at the beginning. The idea was that reading the digest would provide an overview of the whole white paper.paper. The fi rst Defense of Japan The fi rst Defense of Japan special feature, “Towards special feature, “Towards 2000,” was published.2000,” was published. ----- **Ⅰ** Security Environment **Ⅰ** Surrounding Japan **Chapter** **1** Overview **Current Trends in Security Environment** - Uncertainty over the existing order is increasing, and inter-state competition is becoming prominent across the political, economic and military realms. - Complex measures required due to “hybrid warfare” - Prolonged gray-zone situations - Technological progress exerting signifi cant infl uence on security - Importance of domains of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum - Game-changing technologies that could drastically change the conduct of future warfare (artifi cial intelligence (AI), hypersonic, and high-power energy technologies, etc.) - Emergence of security challenges, which cannot be dealt with by a single country alone - Need to secure stable use of new domains: space and cyberspace; need to ensure security of maritime traffic; response to proliferation of weap ons of mass destruction (WMDs); and response to international terrorism - It is necessary to keep an eye on the COVID-19 infection, which is bringing about diverse impacts and restrictions to military activities of respective countries. **Security Environment Surrounding Japan** - Military powers with high quality and quantity are concentrated in Japan’s surroundings, where clear trends such as further military buildup and an increase in military activities are observed. - A regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been suffi ciently institutionalized in the Indo-Pacifi c region and longstanding issues of territorial rights and reunifi cation continue to remain. - Recent years have seen a continued tendency towards the prolongation of “gray zone” situations that are associated with territories, sovereignty and economic interests, and such situations may increase and expand in the future. Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan etc. 1,470 205 689 3,560 33 110 8 68 250 Russia 3,020 United Kingdom11France4010370Italy23 Germany2606 20 13240Israel2 370 50 15 340 124 48 890 98China197 46North KoreaROK2611620550 14Japan50 380 United States67 Territorial disputes over the Northern Territories Iran India Active **Legend** advancements to the Sea of Japan Ground forces Maritime Forces Combat aircraft by China 3 21 170 Issues Issues Territorial disputes Territorial disputes Australia (10,000 troops) (10,000 tons) (aircraft) concerning the concerning the Korean Korean over Takeshima over Takeshima IslandIsland **Large-scale military capabilities** PeninsulaPeninsula **are concentrated surrounding Japan.** China’s attempt to China’s attempt to change the status change the status quo in the East quo in the East China Sea / Rapid China Sea / Rapid expansion and expansion and increase of military increase of military activitiesactivities Active advancements Active advancements Issues Issues to the Pacific Ocean by to the Pacific Ocean by concerning concerning ChinaChina TaiwanTaiwan Issues concerning the Issues concerning the South China SeaSouth China Sea ----- |i|t| |---|---| ||| |i|| - Under the recognition that nuclear capabilities of North Korea, classified as “rogue regimes” in its strategic documents, constitute an **Defense White Paper** D I G E S T **Chapter** **2** United States **Overview** - The United States recognizes strategic competition with revisionist powers, namely China and Russia, as the central challenge to U.S. security. Especially, the United States ranks China at the top of its list of priorities and places the greatest emphasis on the security of the Indo-Pacifi c region to strengthen deterrence against China. extraordinary threat to the United States, it has maintained sanctions and continues to pursue denuclearization of North Korea, while maintaining strong military readiness of the U.S. forces including U.S. Forces Korea. - The United States prioritizes the allocation of military forces to the Indo-Pacifi c region and Europe while reducing forces in the Middle East and Africa. The United States, however, still needs to deal with security issues in the latter regions, which makes it difficult to describe that such transition of the U.S. force posture is smoothly progressing. - The United States has indicated that certain allies, which are pointed out as bearing a small burden, should bear it appropriately. It has requested NATO member states to swiftly achieve their national defense spending goals, and has required the Republic of Korea (ROK) to shoulder a bigger share of the costs associated with U.S. Forces Korea. - Amid rising tensions between Iran, the U.S. military killed the commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iraq. In response, Iran launched ballistic missiles towards Iraq bases where U.S. Forces were stationed. - Against growing tensions in the Middle East, the U.S. military reinforced its posture in the region. Additionally, the United States established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) and conducted activities by naval vessels and other equipment, along President Trump announcing the Iranian ballistic missile attack in Iraq [U.S. DoD] with countries including the United Kingdom. **Trends in Security and Defense Policies** - Based on the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in February 2018, the United States modifi ed a portion of its existing SLBM warheads into lowyield warheads. Additionally, the United States conducted test launches of its intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile and ballistic missile, which had been restricted by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It also mentioned the necessity for arms control that includes China, which has beefed up medium-range missile capabilities outside the scope of the INF Treaty. - The United States founded the Space Command as a Unifi ed Combatant Command and then established the Space Force as the sixth branch of its military, within the Department of the Air Force (a new military service established for the fi rst time in 70 years after the establishment of the Air Force). Unveiling the new US Space Force logo [U.S. DoD] Major organizational chart of the DoD **Secretary of Defense** |Department|of the Army| |---|---| |Secretary o|f the Army| |Army|| |Department|of the Navy| |---|---| |Secretary o|f the Navy| |Navy|Marine Corps| |Department of|the Air Force| |---|---| |Secretary of|the Air Force| |Air Force|Space Force| |Joint Chie|fs of Staff| |---|---| |Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff|| |Combatant|Commands| |---|---| |Northern Command|Strategic Command| |Indo-Pacific Command|Special Operations Command| |European Command|Transportation Command| |Southern Command|Cyber Command| |Central Command|| |Africa Command|| Space Command ----- **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **2** China **Rapid Military Modernization** - In order to fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century, China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget without transparency, engaging in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In doing so, it has attached importance to strengthening its operational capabilities in order to steadily acquire information superiority, and also enhanced its capabilities in the domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. - Bolstering these capabilities will reinforce China’s “Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)” capabilities and lead to the establishment of operational capabilities further afield. - While implementing a policy of civil-military fusion across the board, with the aim of promoting two-way links between military and civilian resources in various fields, China is striving to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies that can be used for military purposes, and improve its operational capabilities. - Chinese forces’ efforts to use artifi cial intelligence (AI) technology under the awareness that "intelligent warfare is on the horizon" Changes in China’s Defense Budget (100 million yuan) 8,000 6,000 2,000 (Year) |on yuan)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |||||||||||| |Approx. 1.2680 trillion yuan (approx. 20.2881 trillion yen) China’s defense budget is increasing at a fast pace:||||||||||| |approx. 44 approx. 11|||times in 30 years, times in 20 years, and|||||||| |approx. 2.4 times in 10 years.||||||||||| |||||||||||| |||||||||Japan’s defense-related expenditures in FY2020: 5.0688 trillion yen||| |||||||||||| |||||||||||| |89|90 91|92 93 94 95 96 97 98||99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09||10|11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19|||20| Launch of China's fi rst indigenous aircraft carrier “Shandong” (December 2019) [Avalon/ Jiji Press Photo] **Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan** - China has relentlessly continued unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands, leading to a grave matter of concern. - The Chinese Navy and Air Force have in recent years expanded and intensifi ed their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, and there are cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities. - China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities for operations in more distant waters and airspace, including those to project armed forces to waters including the so-called second island chain, beyond the fi rst island chain. - China has been continuing activities viewed as training of maritime and air forces making forays into the Pacifi c and the Sea of Japan, being suspected of intending to regularize these activities. - In the South China Sea, China is moving forward with militarization, as well as expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains, thereby continuing unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion to create a fait accompli. Changes in number of days on which Chinese government vessels intruded into the Japanese territorial waters 10 8 6 4 2 0 |mber of days)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |||||||| |||||||| |||||||| |||||||| |||||||| |1 5 9 08|1 5 9 09|1 5 9 1 10|5 9 11|1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 12 13 14 15 1||9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 6 17 18 19 20| Identifi cation in the contiguous zone |Year|Number of days (days)|Total number of identifi ed vessels (vessels)| |---|---|---| |2012|79|407| |2013|232|819| |2014|243|729| |2015|240|709| |2016|211|752| |2017|171|696| |2018|158|607| |2019|282|1,097| |2020|83|289| ----- D I G E S T PLA’s Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image) Examples of the PLA Navy and Air Force confirmed around Japan (photos: MSDF/ASDF) LegendLegend Sea powerSea power Air powerAir power Shang-class submarine Aircraft carrier “Liaoning” H-6 bomber Su-30 fighter Frequent advancement into the Pacific Ocean Advancement of bombers all the way passing between to the area off the Kii Peninsula Okinawa and Miyakojima (August 2017) Island Flight of a carrier-based TokyoTokyo fighter (including estimates) in the Pacific Ocean (April Amami Amami 2018 and April 2020) Oshima IslandOshima Island Miyakojima Okinawa Island Sea of JapanSea of Japan The PLA Navy Yonagunijima IslandYonagunijima Island and Air Force’s Senkaku Islands activities in the TaiwanTaiwan East China Sea Frequent advancement China-Russia joint naval into the Sea of Japan Underwater submarine and exercise “Joint Sea 2017” NingboNingbo destroyer’s intrusions into the contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands (January 2018) Long-distance joint flight of Chinese and Russian bombers from the Sea of Japan to China-Russia joint naval the East China Sea exercise “Joint Sea 2019” QingdaoQingdao 500km *Locations, wakes, etc. include images and estimates. **Activities in Further Distant Seas** - China is steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant seas such as the Indian Ocean in recent years. - China has been promoting its “Belt and Road” Initiative, and China’s support for the construction of port infrastructure in Indian Ocean countries as well as Pacifi c island countries could lead China to secure bases available for its military purpose. The Chinese military is possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via counter-piracy activities and the improvement of counter-terrorism capabilities in coastal states through joint exercises. **Relations with Countries and Regions** - There are various issues between the United States and China, such as trade issues, issues concerning the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, the Hong Kong issue, and human rights issues regarding Uighur and Tibet. - While the United States has been toughening its stance on China, China has maintained an uncompromising stance on its “core interests.” Concerning trade and military issues, mutually keep themselves in check between the United States and China. - While the United States has continued and reinforced its engagement in Taiwan, China has repeatedly expressed its strong protest against Taiwan’s independence. - Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen was reelected with the highest-ever number of votes and has reiterated her opposition to the “One country, Two Systems” principle, which China keeps in check. - The Solomon Islands and Kiribati established diplomatic relations with China, and as a result, the number of countries having diplomatic relations with Taiwan declined to 15 from 22 in May 2016, when President Tsai took offi ce. - The overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China, and the gap appears to be growing year by year. The United States continues selling arms (such as F-16 fi ghters) to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. - Moves to review projects have been seen among some countries cooperating in the “Belt and Road” Initiative, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and due to such factors as their deteriorating financial situation. Director Brent Christensen, American I tit t i T i [AIT] ----- **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **2** North Korea **Overview** - North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests so far, and is assessed to have already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fi t ballistic missile warheads. In addition, North Korea repeatedly launches ballistic missiles in recent years at an unprecedented frequency, aiming to promote the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles and the enhancement of its operation capabilities. Such military trends in North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security. - At the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held in June 2018, Chairman Kim expressed his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but the second U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in February 2019 ended without any agreement being reached between the two countries. - At the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy towards North Korea. **Current Status of the Nuclear Development** Nodong missile [Korean News Service/Jiji] - The possibility cannot be discounted that the sixth nuclear weapons test in September 2017 was of a hydrogen bomb. - Given the technological maturity obtained through the past six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fi t ballistic missile warheads. **Current Status of the Missile Development** - Since 2016, North Korea has launched more than 70 ballistic missiles and others, and the following characteristics have been observed: (i) increase the firing range of ballistic missiles; (ii) enhance the accuracy, continuous fi re capability, and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks; (iii) improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks; (iv) develop ballistic missiles that fl y at low altitudes on irregular trajectories; and (v) diversify the forms of launches. - In particular, North Korea has developed more advanced missile-related technologies in recent years. The three types of new short-range ballistic missiles that have been involved in a series of launches since May 2019 are distinctive in that they use solid fuel and fl y at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. North Korea is thus believed to be trying to breach missile defense networks, and there are concerns that such advanced technologies will be applied to longer-range missiles. - North Korea is relentlessly pursuing increasingly complex and diverse modes of attack and is steadily strengthening and improving its attack capabilities. These enhancements in its capabilities make early detection of the signs of a launch and the interception of the missiles more diffi cult, thereby posing new challenges North Korea when it launched for the information gathering, early warning, and interception postures of relevant short-range ballistic missiles countries, including Japan. (July 2019) [JANES] Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched short-range ballistic missiles (July 2019) [JANES] Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched an SLBM “Pukguksong-3” (October 2019) [JANES] **Current Status of Ship-to-Ship Transfer, etc.** - North Korea is presumed to be evading the UN Security Council sanctions by conducting ship-to-ship transfers on the high seas and other techniques, and it is pointed out that in 2019, North Korea illicitly imported a volume of petroleum products far in excess of the cap set by UN Security Council resolutions. ----- D I G E S T **Chapter** **2** Russia **Overview** - Russia is modernizing its military equipment, including strategic nuclear forces, and is stepping up military activities, so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required. - Regarding conventional forces, Russia is developing fi fth generation fi ghters and heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and is also stepping up its activities in the realms of space and electromagnetic spectrum. Strategic bomber “TU-160” visiting South Africa for the fi rst time; Front: Lieutenant-General Kobylash, commander of Russia's Long-Range Aviation (right) and South African Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, MapisaNqakula [Russian Ministry of Defence] **Advancement in the Military Cooperation with China** - In July 2019, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers carried out joint air patrol with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. - In September 2019, Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu and, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission Zhang, signed a package of documents on military and military-technical cooperation. - The authorities of both countries clearly denied that they would form a military alliance, but attention should be paid to future developments in light of recent advancement in their military cooperation. Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi (June 2019) [Presidential Executive Offi ce of Russia] **Activities in Japan’s Northern Territories and the Vicinity of Japan** - Russia continues to station AFRF in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and has recently been increasing the AFRF’s activities. - In June 2019, two Tu-95 long-range bombers fl ew around Japan, and intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace twice when they fl ew northward over the Pacifi c Ocean. In July, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Takeshima Island. In February 2020, two Su-34 fi ghter-bombers Su-34 fi ghter-bomber deployed to the Far East were observed for the fi rst time. - In October 2019, the Eastern Military District announced that drills to repel landings by a hypothetical enemy assault force were to be held in the Sakhalin and Primorsky regions, involving up to 8,000 personnel, more than 3,000 units of tanks and military equipment, and up to 50 planes and helicopters. - Even amid the spread of the COVID 19 pandemic within the forces military activities have remained active ----- |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||M|i| |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||h| |f|r| |---|---| |Col1|n| |---|---| |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||h| |Col1|n| |---|---| **Ⅰ** **Chapter** **2** Middle East, North Africa, and Other Regions **Overview** - The Middle East is a major source of energy supply for the world and contains major routes for international commerce. Japan is also dependent on the region for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports. Peace and stability in the Middle East region is extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. - On the other hand, the Middle East and Africa region has been experiencing constant confl icts and unrest throughout the 20th century. In recent years, tensions have risen due to the situation in the Gulf region and the Middle East peace process. - In some countries that experienced the Arab Spring, which occurred at the beginning of 2011, civil wars and the activities of terrorist organizations are ongoing. **Situation in the Gulf Region** - Opposing the resumption of sanctions by the United States, Iran has implemented its measures to reduce compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by stages since May 2019. The United Kingdom, France and Germany referred the developments to the JCPOA Joint Commission under the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism. In response, Iran suggested the possibility of considering withdrawal from the NPT, but stated that if Europe observes the agreement, it would return to compliance with the agreement. - Since May 2019, the United States has expanded the number of U.S. troops deployed to the Middle East in response to Iran’s threats. On the other hand, since October 2019, there have been multiple attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq and one American was victimized, which triggered military retaliation between the United States and Iran. However, both countries clearly showed their intent to avoid further escalation. - Since May 2019, sporadic events affecting the navigation safety of civilian vessels have occurred in the waters of the Middle East. The United States and other countries including European countries promote efforts to safeguard maritime security in the region. - The United States advocated the Maritime Security Initiative and subsequently established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), in which seven countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, participate, in addition to the United States. - Eight European countries, including France, Denmark, and the Netherlands, issued a statement to politically support the creation of a European-led maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH). - Iran also presented a plan named HOPE (Hormuz Peace Endeavor) as an independent effort to maintain maritime security. In addition, Iran conducted the Maritime Safety Belt, the fi rst trilateral military exercise with the Chinese and Russian navies in the Gulf of Oman and other areas. Damage to an Iraqi military base hosting U.S. military caused by a ballistic missile attack by Iran [AFP/Jiji] An oil tanker on fi re after having been attacked in the Gulf of Oman in June 2019 [EPA/Jiji] ----- |Col1|F| |---|---| D I G E S T **Chapter** Trends Concerning New Domains and **3** Relevant Challenges Facing the International Community **Military Science and Technology** - As civilian technologies have been rapidly developing, further technological innovation is expected to dramatically change battle scenes in the future. - It has been pointed out that the rapid AI progress has been exerting a great impact on the military fi eld, including the application for autonomous unmanned vehicles and the cyber domain, in addition to the improvement in data processing capacity. - The United States indicates that China and Russia are developing advanced hypersonic weapons that challenge existing missile defense systems. - High-power energy weapons, such as electromagnetic railguns, high-power laser weapons, and high-power microwaves, are being expected as a means to counter various airborne threats. **Space Domain** A manned aircraft and an autonomous unmanned vehicle fl ying in harmony [Russian Ministry of Defence] - Major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) functions. - In outer space, various countries are promoting use thereof in order to maintain their own peace and security. It has also been noted that China and Russia have been enhancing capabilities to impede the Long March 5, which China United States and its allies from using outer space. successfully launched in December - In order to respond to these threats, countries are restructuring space-related organizations within their 2019 [Avalon/Jiji Press Photo] forces. **Cyber Domain** - Information and communications technology (ICT) advancements are further increasing the dependence of military forces on information and communications networks. For this reason, cyber attacks are recognized as an asymmetrical means to impede the military activities of adversaries at low cost. Many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace. - It has been pointed out that China and Russia are bolstering the offensive cyber capabilities of their militaries for the purpose of obstructing the network of adversaries’ military forces and destroying their infrastructure. - Cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against information and communications networks of not only government organizations and military forces but also business corporations and academic organizations in various countries. Attacks attempting to steal critical technologies, secrets or personal information have also been confi rmed. **Electromagnetic Domain** - Securing use of the electromagnetic spectrum is indispensable for the operation of communication equipment and radar systems. Major countries recognize electronic attacks for interrupting adversaries’ use of electromagnetic spectrum as an asymmetrical means to effectively hamper adversaries’ military performance, enhancing electronic warfare capabilities. - China regularly conducts force-on-force exercises to effectively accomplish missions in complicated electromagnetic environments, thereby improving practical capabilities. - It is reported that Russia used various electronic warfare systems in eastern Ukraine and Syria to interrupt adversaries’ command and control traffic and radar systems, LMADIS, which allegedly shot down an improving electronic warfare capabilities. Iranian drone over the Strait of Hormuz in 2019 [U.S. Marines] **COVID-19 Infection** - The COVID-19 infection poses not only sanitary problems but exerts infl uence broadly on society and economy of respective countries, revealing the vulnerability of supply chains and causing serious damage on local economies and concerns over prolonged economic sluggishness worldwide. - Respective countries are utilizing their military forces' sanitary capabilities and transportation capacity to deal with the infection domestically, and have also been contributing to the prevention of global spread of the infection. In the meantime, military training or bilateral/multilateral exercises have been suspended or postponed, and the infection has brought about diverse impacts and restrictions to military activities as well. If the spread of infection is further prolonged, this may exert various impacts on countries' military capability. - It is said that while actively providing medical goods and dispatching medical experts to countries where the infection is spreading, China has been making propaganda efforts in various manners, including the spread of disinformation, amid growing social uncertainties and confusion due to the spread of infection. - The COVID-19 pandemic may expose and intensify strategic competition among countries intending to create international and regional orders more preferable to themselves and to expand their infl uence. We need to closely watch such moves with great concern as security issues. Seafood market in Wuhan city, Hubei Province, China, closed due ----- |Cabinet|Col2| |---|---| |Prime|Minister| |of Defense National Security Council|Col2| |---|---| |er of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to three people) Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two)|| ||Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense| ||Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| ||| ||Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense| |Bureau of Defense Policy Minister’s Secretariat|Bureau of Personnel and Education Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning|Bureau of Local Cooperation|SDF Ethics Review Board|Central Council on Defense Facilities|Defense Personnel Review Board|National Defense Academy|National Defense Medical College|National Institute for Defense Studies| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Defense Council|Joint Staff|Maritime Staff Office Ground Staff Office|Air Staff Office|Defense Intelligence Headquarters|Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance| |---|---|---|---|---|---| **Ⅱ** Japan s Security and **Ⅱ** Defense Policy **Chapter** Organizations Responsible for **2** Japan’s Security and Defense **Organizations of the MOD/SDF** To fulfi ll their mission of defending Japan, the MOD/SDF consists of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces. Location of Principal SDF Units (for illustrative purposes) (As of March 31, 2019) Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense Cabinet **Ministry of Defense; Joint Staff Office;** **Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Office** Prime Minister **Ground Self-** **Defense Force** Rebuntou **Northern Air** Minister of Defense National Security Council Ground Component Command Headquarters (and Eastern Army Headquarters) WakkanaiWakkanai **Defense Force** Army Headquarters **2nd Division** the Minister of DefenseSenior Adviser to State Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to three people) **Maritime Self-Maritime Self-Division Headquarters / Brigade HeadquartersAirborne BrigadesAmphibious Rapid Deployment BrigadeHelicopter Brigades** MakomanaiMakomanaiSapporoSapporoTobetsuTobetsuChitoseChitose7th Division7th DivisionAsahikawaAsahikawaHigashi ChitoseHigashi ChitoseNorthern Northern Army ObihiroObihiro5th Brigade5th BrigadeAbashiriAbashiri NemuroNemuro Administrative Vice-Minister of DefenseVice-Minister of Defense for International AffairsParliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two)Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense **Defense ForceDefense Force** OkushiritouOkushiritou **11th Brigade11th Brigade** ErimoErimo Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters **Ominato DistrictOminato District** Headquarters District OminatoOminato Internal Bureaus Councils, etc. Institutions Attached Organizations Principal Naval Bases AomoriAomori MisawaMisawa Principal Air Bases (Fixed-wing Aircraft Units) HachinoheHachinohe Principal Air Bases (Helicopter Units) **Northeastern ArmyNortheastern Army** **Defense ForceDefense ForceAir Self-Air Self-** KamoKamo **9th Division9th Division** YamadaYamada Air Defense Command Headquarters Air Defense Force Headquarters JinmachiJinmachi SendaiSendai Fighter Units SadoSado Surface-to Air Guided Missile Units **6th Division6th Division** WajimaWajima Aircraft Control and Warning Units (Radar Site)TakeshimaTakeshima **Maizuru DistrictMaizuru District** KomatsuKomatsu SomagaharaSomagahara12th Brigade12th BrigadeEastern ArmyEastern Army OtakineyamaOtakineyama Units and Organizations Cooperative Units Cooperative Organization **Western Air Defense ForceWestern Air Defense Force** KyogamisakiKyogamisaki **10th Division10th Division** **1st Division1st Division** **Yokosuka DistrictYokosuka District** TakaoyamaTakaoyama GifuGifu IchigayaIchigaya **Central Air Defense ForceCentral Air Defense Force** **13th Brigade13th Brigade** MaizuruMaizuruItamiItami MoriyamaMoriyama UnishimaUnishimaMishimaMishima KaitaichiKaitaichi **Middle ArmyMiddle Army** SenzoSenzo KasatoriyamaKasatoriyama OmaezakiOmaezaki IwakuniIwakuni KureKureZentsujiZentsuji **3rd Division** FukuokaFukuoka **SaseboDistrictSaseboDistrict** AinouraAinouraSeburiyamaSeburiyamaKasugaKasuga TsuikiTsuiki **14th Brigade14th Brigade** KushimotoKushimoto *Excluding temporary or special positions FukuejimaFukuejima SaseboSasebo OmuraOmura **4th Division** **Kure DistrictKure District** **Western ArmyWestern ArmyKengunKengun** Kita KumamotoKita Kumamoto **8th Division8th Division** NyutabaruNyutabaru ShimokoshikijimaShimokoshikijima TakahatayamaTakahatayama KanoyaKanoya **Southwestern Southwestern** **Air Defense ForceAir Defense Force** HyakuriHyakuri **Southwestern Southwestern** **Air Defense ForceAir Defense Force** IrumaIruma AsakaAsaka NerimaNerima NarashinoNarashino YokotaYokota IchigayaIchigaya OkinoerabujimaOkinoerabujima AtsugiAtsugi FunakoshiFunakoshi KisarazuKisarazu Senkaku IslandsSenkaku Islands KumejimaKumejima YozadakeYozadake NahaNaha YokosukaYokosuka MineokayamaMineokayama **15th Brigade15th Brigade** TateyamaTateyama YonagunijimaYonagunijima MiyakojimaMiyakojima ----- |l|i| |---|---| well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region from the perspective of a **Defense White Paper** D I G E S T **Chapter** **3** **Japan’s Security and Defense Policy** **National Security Strategy (NSS)** Relationship among the NSS, the NDPG, the MTDP, and the fi scal year budget The NSS developed in December 2013 specifi es, as Japan’s fundamental principle of national security, that Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to NSS Basic Policy on National Security, centered around diplomatic and defense policies the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while committed (approx. 10-year time frame) to continuing the path as a peace-loving nation, and seeking its own security as Based on NSS “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Basic Policy on National Security, centered around diplomatic and defense policies (approx. 10-year time frame) Prescribes future defense force and target levels of defense force that Japan should achieve (approx. 10-year time frame) Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures and quantity of major equipment Examine based on the current situations, appropriate annual budget as necessary NDPG Achieve target defense capabilities prescribed MTDP Appropriate budget, develop specific projects Annual budget **The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and Beyond (NDPG)** - The NDPG was approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2018. - The NDPG establishes the posture of Japan’s defense forces and the level to achieve, envisioning approximately 10 years Changes in NDPG Background 1976 NDPG **○ Détente and Cold War coexisting in global community** Basic ideas in 1976 NDPG (October 29, 1976, the National Defense Council/Cabinet Meeting) **○ ○ the Soviet Union in the vicinity of JapanBalanced relationship among the United States, China, andNeed to show the target of defense force buildup** **・・ The concept of Basic Defense Capability Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat to Japan** Background 1995 NDPG **○ The end of Cold War** Basic ideas in 1995 NDPG (November 28, 1995, the Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) **○ ○ International situation with unpredictability and uncertaintyNational expectations to international contribution** **・・ Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability “Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing to building a** |19 years|Col2| |---|---| |1995 NDPG|| 9 years role of “defense of the nation” Background 2004 NDPG **○ New threats such as international terrorism and ballistic missile attacks** Basic ideas in 2004 NDPG (December 10, 2004, the Security **○ ○ Direct connection between world peace and Japan’s peaceNecessity to convert the policy from putting weight on deterrence to** **・ Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies** |9 years|Col2| |---|---| |2004 NDPG|| Council/Cabinet Meeting) handling the situation Background 2010 NDPG **○ Change in global power balance** Basic ideas in 2010 NDPG (December 17, 2010, the Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) **○ ○ Complex military situation surrounding JapanDiversification of the military role in global society** **・・ Build up of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic Defense Capability) Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it** |6 years|Col2| |---|---| |2010 NDPG|| Background 2013 NDPG **○ Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe** Basic ideas in 2013 NDPG (December 17, 2013, the National Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) **○ ○ the Great East Japan EarthquakeU.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific regionLessons learned from the Self-Defense Forces experience of** **・・ Build up of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force Defense force to be more thorough with the concept of joint operation, which enables the SDF** |3 years|Col2| |---|---| |2013 NDPG|| 5 years activities, such as achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority, seamlessly and flexibly Background 2018 NDPG **○ Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly** Basic ideas in 2018 NDPG |Basic ideas in 1976 NDPG|Col2| |---|---| |・ The concept of Basic Defense Capability ・ Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat to Japan|| |Basic ideas in 1995 NDPG|| |・ Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability ・ “Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing to building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of “defense of the nation”|| |Basic ideas in 2004 NDPG|| |・ Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies ・ Succeeding the effective parts of the concept of Basic Defense Capability|| |Basic ideas in 2010 NDPG|| |・ Build up of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic Defense Capability) ・ Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner|| |Basic ideas in 2013 NDPG|| |・ Build up of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force ・ Defense force to be more thorough with the concept of joint operation, which enables the SDF to respond swiftly to the increasingly severe security environment and carry out various activities, such as achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority, seamlessly and flexibly|| |Basic ideas in 2018 NDPG|| (December 18, 2018, the National severe and uncertain at extremely high speeds **・ Development of “Multi-domain Defense Force”** |5 years|Col2| |---|---| |2018 NDPG|| Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) **○ Rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum** **・ Truly effective defense capability that enables cross-domain operations organically fusing capabilities in all domains by strengthening not only those in traditional domains—land, sea** **○ Clear trends observed in further military build-up and increase in** and air—but also those in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic military activities spectrum ----- **Ⅱ** The following are set forth as national defense objectives: - to create, on a steady-state basis, a security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation’s disposal; - to deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that doing harm to Japan would be diffi cult and consequential; and - should a threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage. Under the basic precept of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan’s own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation. **Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability** In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible. - Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain Operations - Strengthening capabilities in the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum - Strengthening capabilities in the traditional domains, such as capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maneuver and deployment capability - Strengthening sustainability and resiliency by promoting necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure. - Strengthening core elements comprising defense capability - Strengthening core elements of defense capability by reinforcing the human resource base, technology base, and defense industrial base, reviewing equipment structure, etc. **Organization of Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** - Joint Operation to Realize Cross-Domain Operations - The SDF will establish new units in the domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, strengthen its posture, build comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit. - Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) - The GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units furnished with advanced mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions. The GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including persistent steady-state maneuvers. - To be able to counter an invasion of remote islands, the GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense. - Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) - The MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including a new type of destroyers (FFM), minesweeper units, and embarked patrol helicopter units, and will organize surface units. The MSDF will establish patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan. - In order to conduct underwater ISR, and to engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units. - In order to conduct wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain fi xed-wing patrol aircraft units. - Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) - The ASDF will maintain ground-based warning and control units capable of conducting sustained surveillance in the airspace around Japan, and air warning and control units capable of conducting airborne warning, surveillance and control also during situations with heightened tensions, such as “gray-zone” situations. - The ASDF will maintain fi ghter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fi ghter aircraft, and aerial refueling and transport units. - The ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units which enable it to conduct information collection in areas remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions. **Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019–FY2023; MTDP)** - The MTDP sets forth the policy for the build-up of defense capability, and main projects for the fi ve-year period from FY2019 to FY2023. - In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations, the SDF will conduct reorganization of its major units. - The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen capabilities in both new and traditional domains. - The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen core elements of defense capabilities, including reinforcement of the human resource base. ----- D I G E S T |Build-up Chapter|of Defense Ca|pabilit| |---|---|---| **Chapter** **4** Build-up of Defense Capability and Defense-Related Expenditures in FY2020 **Build-up of Defense Capability in FY2020** In FY2020, as the second year of the NDPG and the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will steadily implement initiatives toward building a Multi-domain Defense Force based on the NDPG and the MTDP. Main Projects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities in FY2020 (Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations) |Capabilities that should be acquired and strengthened|Outline| |---|---| |○ Capabilities in space domain ○|Development of systems for Space Operations Squadron etc. ○Procurement of SSA system Procurement of SSA satellites (space-based optical telescopes) ○Strengthening of information-gathering capability using outer space, etc.| |○ Capabilities in cyber domain ○|Enhancement of Cyber Defense Group, etc. ○Enhancement and strengthening of the systems and networks Securing and development of cyber talents ○Utilization of cutting-edge cyber technologies, etc.| |○ Capabilities in electromagnetic ○ domain ○|Research and development of devices to neutralize the radar of opponents who intend to invade Japan, including development of standoff electronic warfare aircraft Strengthening of capabilities to minimize electromagnetic jamming from opponents who intend to invade Japan through procurement of fi ghters (F-35A/B) with superior electronic protection capability, etc. Enhancement of systems of electronic warfare units, etc.| |○ ○ Capabilities in Maritime and Air ○ Domains ○ ○|Procurement of P-1 patrol aircraft (× 3), Procurement of SH-60K patrol helicopters (× 7) Construction of destroyers (× 2), a submarine, and a minesweeping vessel Establish a Temporal Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unit (Tentative name) ○ Establishment of Squadron for Aerial Refueling and Transport Partial refurbishment of Destroyer JS “Izumo” for takeoff and landing by F-35B ○ Establishment of F-35A squadron in Misawa Air Base Japan-led development of F-X ○ Introduction of small UUV for underwater defense, etc.| |Stand-off defense capability ○|Procurement of stand-off missiles, etc.| |Comprehensive air and missile ○ defense capability|Procurement of SM-3 Block IIA ○ Modifi cation to the Patriot system, etc.| |Maneuver and deployment capability ○|Procurement of type-16 mobile combat vehicles (× 33) ○P rocurement of type-19 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers (× 7), etc.| |Sustainability and resilience ○|Procurement of Type-20 5.56mm rifl e (× 3,283) ○ Procurement of SFP9 (× 323), etc.| **Defense-Related Expenditures in FY2020** In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. To this end, in light of the NDPG and the MTDP, defense-related expenditures for FY2020 were increased by 61.8 billion yen from the previous fi scal year to 5.0688 trillion yen (an increase of 1.2% from the previous year). Defense-related expenditures has increased for the eight consecutive years. Change in Defense-Related Expenditures (Past 15 years; Original Budget Basis) (100 million) 51,000 50,000 46,000 **50,688** **50,070** **48,996** **49,388** **48,607** **48,221** **47,903** **47,815** **47,838** **47,426** **47,028** **46,826** **46,453** **46,804** **46,625** 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 (FY) Note: The figures above do not include SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft, and expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience. Including these expenses, total defense-related expenditures were as follows: 4,813.6 billion yen in FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen in FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen in FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen in FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen in FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen in FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen in FY2012, 4,753.8 billion yen in FY2013, 4,884.8 billion yen in FY2014, 4,980.1 billion yen in FY2015, 5,054.1 billion yen in FY2016, 5,125.1 billion yen in FY2017, 5,191.1 billion yen in FY2018, 5,257.4 billion yen in FY 2019, and 5,313.3 billion yen ----- **Ⅲ** Three Pillars of Japan s Defense (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense) **Ⅲ** **Chapter** **1** Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense **Response from Peacetime to Grey Zone Situations** **Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the Area Surrounding Japan** - The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. GSDF personnel engaged in warning MSDF P-3C conducting warning and surveillance activity in ASDF radar site engaging in warning and surveillance and surveillance activities the area surrounding Japan activities 24 hours a day and 365 days a year - As part of its regular warning and surveillance activities in Japanese territorial waters, the SDF is carrying out information gathering on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council sanctions. During the period from 2018 to the end of March 2020, the SDF has observed 24 cases of seaborne rendezvous by (ship-to-ship transfer) North Korean vessels. - In response to these illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels, the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and France carried out early warning surveillance activities with aircraft using the U.S. Kadena Air Base in Japan. In addition, naval vessels of the U.S. Navy, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and France carried out enforcement of United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea in sea areas surrounding Japan. Small ship of unidentifi ed nationality A North Korea-fl agged tanker strongly suspected of committing a ship-to-ship transfer NAM SAM 8 (December 2012) **Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles)** **in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial** **Airspace** Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War (Times) 1,200 800 - The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) detects and identifi es aircraft fl ying in airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early-warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fi ghters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confi rm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. - In FY2019, ASDF aircraft scrambled 947 times, the third largest ever recorded. Breaking this fi gure down, ASDF aircraft scrambled 675 times in response to Chinese aircraft, and 268 times in response to Russian aircraft. **1,168** **999** **943** **947** **944** **873** **904** **812** **810** **464** **851** **567** **415** **571** **500** **638** **675** **425** **386** **306** **311** **299** **96** **156** **220** **158** **19738** **264** **247** **248** **359** **473** **288** **301** **390** **343** **268** **124** 1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (FY) Russia China Taiwan Others Total ----- **Defense White Paper** D I G E S T **Defense of Japan including its Remote Islands** - In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, the SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime and air superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by - In order to strengthen its defense architecture in the southwestern region, a surface-to-air missile unit and a surface-to-ship guided missile unit were deployed to Miyakojima Island in March 2020. The GSDF will deploy an area security unit in charge of the initial response and other units **Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands** employing all necessary measures. also in Ishigaki Island. - As part of measures to enhance the persistent ISR posture, the ASDF established Airborne Warning and Control Wing by upgrading the Airborne Early Warning Group in March 2020 and will establish a temporal unmanned aerial vehicle unit (tentative name) within FY2020. - In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, the MOD established a Tactical Airlift Wing that operates Osprey in March 2020. **Response to Missile Attacks** Establishment ceremony of the Airborne Warning and Control Wing (March 2020) **Response to Missile Attacks** - Currently, Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE). - In order to effectively and effi ciently counter increasingly complex and diverse airborne threats by optimum means and minimize damage, the SDF will establish a structure to conduct integrated operation of various equipment for missile defense and air defense equipment, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection from peacetime and also enhancing the comprehensive air and missile defense capability that can simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. - As for the introduction of the land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore), in June 2020, it was decided to suspend the process. Future direction will be examined based on the discussion at the NSC. Launched Aegis-equipped Destroyer JS “Maya” (March 2020) **Responses in the Domains of Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum** **Responses in Space Domain** - The MOD aims to establish SSA system by FY2022 to monitor and maintain an accurate picture of conditions in space. The MOD is also working to deploy radar to monitor threats to Japanese satellites, such as space debris, and its operating system. - In preparation for full-scale SSA operation and introduction of defense equipment, the ASDF established Space Operations Squadron in May 2020. Establishment ceremony of Space Operations Squadron (May 2020) **Response in Cyber Domain** - The MOD/SDF has taken comprehensive measures to ensure the safety of information and communication systems and respond to cyber attacks by a specialized unit, etc. - The Cyber Defense Group will be further expanded by about 70 personnel to approximately 290 in FY2020 ----- (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense) **Ⅲ** **Response in Electromagnetic Domain** - The MOD/SDF will: enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum; strengthen information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetic spectrum, and develop an information sharing posture; and strengthen capabilities to neutralize the radar and communications of opponents who intend to invade Japan. - In addition to the establishment of the GSDF Electronic Warfare Unit, in FY2020, the SDF will also proceed with development of standoff electronic warfare aircraft for jamming, and R&D aimed at the procurement of potentially game-changing technologies, such as high-power microwave devices and a high-energy laser system (HEL). **Efforts of the MOD/SDF in response to the Spread of Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)** - In order to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the MOD/SDF gathered all their strength to carry out various activities. None of the SDF personnel engaged in the activities got infected (as of May 31, 2020.) - In addition to activities in the cruise ship Diamond Princess, the MOD/SDF implemented disaster relief pertaining to rescue for prevention of the spread of COVID-19, disaster relief for reinforcement of border control against COVID-19, and education on infection protection for employees of the local governments. - The SDF hospitals and the National Defense Medical College Hospital (NDMCH) have been accepting COVID-19 patients. A clinical trial of Avigan (favipiravir) tablets was also started. - The MOD/SDF disclosed protective measures of “JSDF’s standards” in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19. At the same time, through the ministerial telephone conversations, the defense authorities shared information, lessons learned and knowledge obtained primarily while taking infection control measures. A SDF medical offi cer collecting PCR samples from the crew of the cruise ship (February 2020) **Response to Large-Scale Disasters** - The SDF works in collaboration with local governments, engaged in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims and ships and aircraft in distress, and preventing epidemics. In FY2019, the SDF conducted 449 disaster relief operations, including the disaster relief in response to the fl ooding caused by heavy rain accompanying a front in August 2019 (Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain), the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) and the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis). - At the beginning of a disaster, the SDF will maintain response readiness to any damage and need for activities while giving the fi rst priority to life-saving activities. For livelihood support, the SDF will coordinate the division of roles, response policy, activity period, and other matters with relevant parties including the local governments and ministries concerned at the local response headquarters, etc. - The SDF strengthened dissemination of information so that people can easily access the information related to support. ASDF personnel engaging in activities to save lives using a rescue helicopter at the time of Typhoon Hagibis (October 2019) **Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-related Vessels in the Middle East** - In order to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels, as a part of Japan’s independent initiative, the Cabinet decided to dispatch MSDF vessels for the purpose of gathering information and to utilize the existing counter-piracy unit. - On January 11, 2020, two P-3C (fi xed-wing patrol aircraft) left Japan to replace the counter-piracy unit and began information gathering activities on the 20th. Destroyer JS “Takanami” left port on February 2 and began information gathering activities in the fi eld on February 26. On May 10, 2020, Destroyer JS “Kirisame” left Japan to replace “Takanami.” MSDF personnel of Destroyer JS “Takanami” engaging in information gathering activities in the Northern Arabian Sea (February 2020) ----- D I G E S T **Chapter** **2** Japan-U.S. Alliance **Signifi cance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** - The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which marked the 60th anniversary in 2020, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security. - The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a signifi cant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacifi c region and the international community. **Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** The Guidelines manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities Ceremony commemorating the 60th anniversary of the by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (January 2020) [Website of Prime Minister’s Offi ce of Japan] peacetime to contingencies. **Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States** - Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting At the meeting held in New York on September 25, 2019, the leaders reaffi rmed the recognition that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than ever before, and shared the view on continuing to further strengthen the unwavering Japan-U.S. Alliance. - Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting At the meeting held in Washington D.C. on January 14, 2020, Minister of Defense Kono explained the cabinet decision made in December 2019, which is to send the SDF to the Middle East, and Japan and the United States have confi rmed the following points: - The Ministers confi rmed that we have to avoid further escalation of the situation in the Middle East; Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (January 2020) - The Ministers confi rmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions for a complete, verifi able and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges; - The Ministers confi rmed that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and work together to make sure that the rule of law and the freedom of navigation are fi rmly established; - The Ministers confi rmed that they continue to closely work together to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond, and to materialize the aligned strategies of both countries; - The Ministers reaffi rmed that they cooperate with various partners, including conducting joint exercises and capacity building to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacifi c with Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone; - The Ministers confi rmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives, including the acquisition of Mageshima, a candidate site for a permanent FCLP facility; - The Ministers confi rmed that the relocation to Henokosaki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma, and; - The Ministers reaffi rmed that Japan and the United States continue to work together with the shared recognition that understanding and cooperation from the local communities is crucial for the maintenance of operational readiness of the USFJ. **Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats** In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security, Japan and the United States are advancing cooperation in various fi elds, including “Cooperation in Space and Cyber Domains,” “Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense,” “Bilateral Training and Exercises,” “ISR Activities,” “Maritime Security,” “Logistics Support,” and “Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale Disaster in Japan.” Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises (November 2019) ----- (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense) **Ⅲ** **Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas** - In order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacifi c region, Japan and the United States are conducting bilateral activities in such areas as “Maritime Security,” “Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief,” and “Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises,” and promoting cooperation in the areas of “Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation” and “Joint/Shared Use.” **Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning the USFJ** - The presence of USFJ provides deterrence, while on the other hand, given the impacts Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of the local residents, it is Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa necessary to make efforts appropriate for the actual situation of each area in order to mitigate the impacts. 400 **353** **Stationing of the USFJ** 300 **278** **Stationing of the USFJ** - It is necessary to maintain the presence of the USFJ and its readiness to make rapid 250 **249** **242** **235** and agile responses in case of emergency in Japan and its surrounding areas even in 200 **185** peacetime, so that Japan-U.S. Alliance based on Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements 150 **144** provides enough as a deterrence contributing to the peace and stability of the defense 100 **83** of Japan and the region. 50 **46** **43** **38** **31** - Therefore, Japan accepts the stationing of the U.S. Forces based on the Japan-U.S. 0 |353|Area (km2)| |---|---| |278|Facilities/Areas| |249 242 235|| |185 144|| |83|| |46|| |43 38 31|| June 1971 (At May 1972 End of End of SACO Final As of Security Treaty and it is a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. the conclusion of the (On return) FY1980 FY1990 Report January Agreement on (1996) 2020 the Return of **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa** - Approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 8% of the land area of the prefecture and approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints. - Regarding distribution of functions offered by MCAS Futenma, the development of facilities is being promoted to transfer the function of accepting transient aircraft in contingencies to Tsuiki Air Base and Nyutabaru Air Base. - For the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility, the land-fi ll operation has been carried out in the waters south of Camp Schwab. In April 2020, the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted to Okinawa Prefecture an application for change of land-fi ll work related to addition of the work to improve the soil foundation, etc., based on the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface. - The following progress has been made involving the return of USFJ land: March 2015: West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) US Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey fl ew to the Kokubudai maneuver Area, (approximately 51 ha) was returned. Kagawa Prefecture, for exercise (December 2019) December 2016: A major portion of the Northern Training Area (approximately 4,000 ha) was returned. This is the largest of its kind since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland. July 2017: A portion of MCAS Futenma (approximately 4 ha along Ginowan City road 11) was returned. March 2018: A portion of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (approximately 3 ha of land to expand Route 58) was returned. March 2019: A portion of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (approximately 2 ha of land near Gate 5) was returned. March 2020: Portions of land at Camp Zukeran (Warehouse Area of Facilities and Engineering Compound) (approximately 11 ha) were returned. **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa** - In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to secure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces by maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities, such as realignment of USFJ and its facilities and areas. - As a permanent FCLP facility, in December 2019, the MOD acquired more than half of the land on Mageshima in Nishinoomote City, Kagoshima Prefecture, and is conducting various surveys in preparation for the development of SDF facilities. ----- D I G E S T **Chapter** **3** Security Cooperation The MOD/SDF will create a desirable security environment for Japan by promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation. **Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation** **Efforts under the Vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c”** Three pillars of the vision MOD’s Approach to the Vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (i) Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of 1 Securing the stable use of major sea lanes by way of defense cooperation and exchange activities navigation and free trade 2 Preventing contingencies through confidence building and mutual understanding (ii) Pursuit of economic prosperity (improving connectivity, etc.) (iii) Commitment to peace and stability 3 Contributing to peace and stability through active engagement in the region, in cooperation with partner countries home to more than half the world’s population. It is important France In order to promote a “Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c,” the East and India exchanges with countries in the region. South Southeast **Promotion of Defense Cooperation and** **Exchanges** Indian Ocean Australia **Exchanges** Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. The Ministers U.K. Russia Canada France Other European countries China Japan U.S. Middle East and India Africa Pacific Ocean South Southeast Asia Asia Pacific Island Main sea lane countries Indian Ocean Australia New Zealand agreed to deepen and expand bilateral defense cooperation. - **India: In September 2019, a Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. In November of the same** year, a Defense Ministerial Meeting and the fi rst Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting were held. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to advance bilateral security cooperation. - **ASEAN: In November 2019, at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting, Vientiane Vision** 2.0, an updated version of Vientiane Vision, was announced. Meetings with the defense ministers of each country were held. - **ROK: In November 2019, the ROK government announced the suspension of the notifi cation to terminate** the Japan-ROK GSOMIA. In response, Defense Minister commented that Japan-U.S. and Japan-ROK Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (November 2019) bilateral cooperation and Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation are important amid the severe security environment in East Asia, and that he considered that the ROK government made its decision from a strategic perspective taking into account the current security situation in the region. - **European countries, Canada, and New Zealand: Meetings with the defense ministers of European** countries and New Zealand were held on the occasion of the ADMM-Plus in November 2019, and meetings with the defense ministers of European countries and Canada were held at the Munich Security Conference in February 2020. In October 2019, the Chief of Staff, GSDF visited Canada for the fi rst time. - **China: In October 2019, the Chinese vessel visited Japan for the fi rst time in about 10 years. In December** of the same year, Defense Minister visited China for the fi rst time in 10 years and held a meeting with Japan-India “2+2” (November 2019) China’s Defense Minister. - **Russia: In August and September 2019, the GSDF band participated for the fi rst time in the Spasskaya** Tower International Military Music Festival in Moscow. In November of the same year, Commander-inChief of the Russian Navy visited Japan for the fi rst time in 18 years. - **Pacifi c Island Countries: From January to February 2020, State Minister of Defense visited Fiji, PNG, and** Tonga for the fi rst time as a political offi cer of the Ministry of Defense. - **Middle Eastern Countries: Defense Minister attended the Manama Dialogue held in November and the** Doha Forum in December 2019 for the fi rst time as a Japanese Defense Minister. In addition, the Minister visited Jordan and Oman for the fi rst time and held defense ministerial meetings. He also had telephone conversations with defense ministers of various other countries in the Middle East. State Minister of Defense Yamamoto talking with Minister for Defence, National Security and ----- (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense) **Ⅲ** **Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation** - Multilateral framework initiatives, such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have made steady progress and served as an important foundation for dialogue and cooperation and exchanges on the security of AsiaPacifi c. Based on Vientiane Vision 2.0, a guideline for future ASEAN-Japan defense cooperation, in addition to bilateral cooperation, Japan has strengthened cooperation under multilateral frameworks. - Japan has contributed to the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in the region by holding the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and the Tokyo Defense Forum annually. - Moreover, Japan has proactively participated in international conferences hosted by international organizations and private organizations, as well as service-to-service exchange initiatives. **Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building** - Since 2012, the MOD/SDF has provided capacity building in such areas as HA/DR, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and maritime security to 15 countries and one organization in the Asia-Pacifi c and other regions. - In 2019, the number of capacity building programs conducted by means of dispatch was 126 (11 countries, 20 offi cials), and the number of those conducted by means of invitation was 75 (four countries, one organization and six trainees). - Specifi cally, from September to October 2019, Japan has provided guidance on techniques to PNG Military Band, which participated in the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo in Australia, hosted by the United Kingdom. In addition, Japan implemented programs in Laos, Mongolia, Cambodia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Myanmar, Djibouti and other countries. **Ensuring Maritime Security** - For Japan, a maritime nation, strengthening the order based on fundamental norms, such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity, which is extremely important. - The SDF has been dispatching the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement, the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement, and the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement since 2009 in order to protect vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. - In addition to strengthening cooperation with coastal states of the Indo-Pacifi c region through exercises and port calls, the MOD has been implementing capacity building in maritime security of coastal countries, and working on cooperation for maritime security within regional security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM-Plus. **Cooperation in Use of Space and Cyber Domains** ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting (November 2019) Chief of Staff, JS Yamazaki participating in the multilateral forum Raisina Dialogue 2020 (January 2020) GSDF Central Band offi cer providing guidance to the Papua New Guinea Military Band (September 2019) MSDF personnel leaving for counter-piracy operation off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (November 2019) - Regarding cooperation in the use of space domain, the MOD/SDF has taken part in the annual SSA multinational tabletop exercise (Global Sentinel) and the Schriever Wargame, a multinational tabletop exercise on space security, hosted by the U.S. Forces. - Regarding cooperation in the use of cyber domain, the MOD has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and others. In December 2019, Japan formally participated for the fi rst time in the cyber defense exercise hosted by NATO, in which Japan used to participate as observer. Additionally, the SDF is expanding its scope of cooperation such as by holding a follow-up seminar for cybersecurity personnel of the People’s Army of Vietnam. ----- D I G E S T **Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation** - The proliferation of WMDs and missiles that can deliver them, as well as the proliferation of not only conventional arms but also goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use, pose a pressing challenge to the peace and stability of the international community. International discussions related to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) are also under way. - Since April 2018 the MOD/SDF has been sending a personnel as a member of the Group of Experts of the 1540 Committee established pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (adopted in April 2004) to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery to non-state actors. **Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities** The MOD/SDF has been proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of ODA for resolving the fundamental causes of confl icts, terrorism and other problems. **Dispatch to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)** - In April 2019, the Government of Japan decided to dispatch staff offi cers, and later two staff offi cers were dispatched to the MFO headquarters as the fi rst “Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security.” - The dispatched offi cers engage in liaison and coordination between Egypt and Israel, and the MFO as a Deputy Chief of Liaison and an Assistant Liaison Operation Offi cer at the MFO headquarters, which is located in the south camp at Sharm El-Sheikh in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula. **Dispatch to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan** **(UNMISS)** - The peace and stability of South Sudan is not only essential for the country itself; but also for the peace and stability in Africa as a whole, as well as a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community. - Japan currently dispatches four offi cers (logistics, information database, engineering, and aviation operations offi cers) to the UNMISS headquarters. - The UNTPP was founded using funds from Japan as a project to support training for military engineers and the procurement of heavy equipment by the UN DOS. Japan has been dispatching a total of 164 GSDF personnel to Africa to provide nine training sessions for a total of 277 members from eight African countries. - Considering that 30% or more of PKO personnel are from Asia, Japan has been implementing the projects in Asia and the surrounding regions. - In addition, given that strengthening sanitation capacity to ensure the safety of deployed personnel has become an issue in UN peacekeeping operations, medical training was implemented in October 2019 **International Disaster Relief Activities** - To contribute to the advancement of international cooperation, the SDF has engaged in international disaster relief activities proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the global security environment. - In recent years, international disaster relief activities were carried out from November to December 2019 in response to the heavy rains and fl oods in the republic of Djibouti and from January to February 2020 in response to the major bush fi res in Australia. Personnel of the National Institute for Defense Studies providing explanations about UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to lawmakers of Pacifi c Islands in New Zealand (September 2019) GSDF personnel serving on the MFO headquarters (April 2020) GSDF personnel serving on the UNMISS headquarters (December 2019) GSDF personnel providing training on the operation of heavy machinery (February 2020) SDF personnel engaging in international disaster relief activities for heavy rains and fl oods in the Republic of Djibouti (November 2019) ----- **Ⅳ** Core Elements Comprising **Ⅳ** Defense Capability, etc. **Chapter** **1** Human Resource Base that Sustains the Defense Capability **Reinforcing Human Resource Base** - The NDPG specifi es that the core element of defense capability Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF is SDF personnel, and that securing human resources for SDF 20,00021,000 million peopleAbout 18.81 The number of 18-32 year-olds (thousand people) personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an 19,00018,00017,000 million peopleAbout 17.43 million peopleAbout 17.5 million peopleAbout 15.63 The number of 18-26 year-olds (thousand people)The number of 18 year-olds (thousand people) 16,000 imminent challenge in the face of shrinking and aging 15,000 million peopleAbout 13.73 population with declining birth rates. Also in light of the 14,00013,000 million peopleAbout 12.41 sustainability and resilience of defense capability, the SDF 12,00011,000 million peopleAbout 11.05 million peopleAbout 10.02 needs to work even further to reinforce the human resource base that sustains the defense capability. 10,0009,0008,000 million peopleAbout 8.97 million peopleAbout 7.81 million peopleAbout 7.2 7,000 6,000 5,000 **Effective Use of Human Resources** 4,000 The NDPG and others plan to raise the mandatory early retirement 3,0002,000 million peopleAbout 1.84 million peopleAbout 1.21 million peopleAbout 1.06 million peopleAbout 0.91 million peopleAbout 0.83 million peopleAbout 0.75 1,000 age by one year during the period of the MTDP from 2020, and 0 93 94 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 another one year during the period of the next MTDP in stages for (FY) Material sources: The numbers for FY1993 and FY1994 are based on “Population Estimates of Japan 1920 - 2000” and “Current Population Estimates,” Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. each rank. The retirement age of personnel from the rank of Ichii Data from FY2016 onward are based on “Population Projection for Japan” (medium estimates in April 2017), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. (Captain (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant (MSDF)) to Isso (Master Sergeant (GSDF, ASDF)/Petty Offi cer 1st Class (MSDF)) was raised in 2020. In addition, in order to ensure an operating ratio with a limited number of personnel, the crew system was introduced in some MSDF vessels, where some crews take shifts to increase the number of operation days. The introduction of this crew system to new types of destroyers (FFM) is being considered. **Improvement of Living and Work Environment and Treatment** The SDF will steadily renew aged everyday life/workplace fi xtures, secure the necessary quantities of everyday necessities in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing, and proceed with measures against aging and earthquake proofi ng of facilities. In addition, the SDF will improve their treatment based on the special nature of their missions and work environment. Specifi cally, in order to ensure appropriate treatment in accordance with the risk and special nature of their missions and the characteristics of the area of the offi ce, the SDF will make improvements to special work allowance, etc. and procure portable beds and better emergency rations to improve their ability to respond to disasters. **Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women’s Participation** **Working Style Reform** The MOD/SDF is promoting correction of long working hours and encouraging taking leave to ensure proper work-life balance so that every member can exert his/her full potential. **Women’s Participation** In terms of employing and promoting female SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and women and assign the right person to the right place based on the person’s motivation and ability/aptitude. In December 2019, a woman assumed the role of commanding offi cer of an Aegis destroyer for the fi rst time, promoting active participation of female SDF personnel. In addition, the MOD/SDF has been reviewing the restriction of assignment of female personnel. With the removal of the restriction on female assignments in submarines in December 2018, assignment restriction against females was completely removed with the exception of the units where female personnel cannot be assigned for reasons of maternity protection (a part of the GSDF Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit [chemical] and Tunnel Company Units). Captain Otani was appointed as the fi rst female commanding officer of an Aegis destroyer (December 2019) ----- |Col1|M| |---|---| |Col1|n| |---|---| |Col1|n| |---|---| |Col1|i| |---|---| |Col1|m|Col3| |---|---|---| |Col1|n| |---|---| |Col1|h|Col3|n| |---|---|---|---| **Defense White Paper** D I G E S T **Chapter** **2** Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology **Reinforcing Technology Base** - Review of the Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook is now underway in order to ensure Japan’s technological superiority in the strategically important equipment and technology fi eld, including technologies pertaining to new domains and other potentially game-changing important technologies. - As for development of the fi ghter (F-X), improving technological reliability and reducing the development cost, the MOD is pursuing the best approach to realize Japan led development with international cooperation in sight. The fi ghter (F-X) (image) **Optimizing Equipment Procurement** - The MOD has been promoting effective and effi cient equipment acquisition by selecting 18 items for major programs designated for project management. At the same time, the MOD strives to cut equipment procurement costs by making bulk orders utilizing long-term contracts. - To enhance the level of performance management, the MOD makes every effort. The specifi c efforts include constant monitoring of goods and service deliveries from both sides, facilitating the internal management system concerning the execution process of FMS procurement, and strengthening cooperation with the U.S. government through close Japan-U.S. consultations. **Strengthening Defense Industrial Base** - In order to strengthen Japan’s defense industrial base, the MOD identifi es four lines of effort: (1) reforming the existing contract system towards creating a competitive environment among defense companies; (2) strengthening risk management of supply chain for defense equipment; (3) further participation of Japan’s defense industry in sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment, etc.; and (4) promoting appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** - Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of technological and industrial bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of our national security, peace and international cooperation. - Transfer of parts and maintenance equipment of the UH-1H utility helicopters to the Philippines started in March 2019, and was completed in September 2019. - From the viewpoint of promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation, the ATLA has participated in international defense equipment exhibitions. Moreover, the Public-Private Defense Industry Forum was held with the Philippines and other countries. “Defence and Security Equipment International Exhibition and Conference: DSEI Japan 2019” held in Makuhari Messe (November 2019) ----- |n|h| |---|---| |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |I||n|| |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |i|l|i||i| Defense Capability, etc. **Ⅳ** **Chapter** **3** Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities - For formulating defense policy accurately in response to the changes in the situation and for operating defense capabilities effectively in dealing with various situations, it is necessary to grasp medium- to long-term military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and to detect the indications of various situations promptly. To this end, the MOD/SDF is making efforts to collect information swiftly and accurately daily by using various methods. Examples of intelligence collection means used by the MOD/SDF include: (1) collecting, processing and analyzing military communications and signals emanating from electronic weapons in the air over Japan; (2) collecting, processing, and analyzing data from various imagery satellites (including Information Gathering Satellite); (3) surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other assets; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection conducted by defense attachés and other offi cials. Commander IGARASHI, Defense Attaché to Malaysia |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||h| |i|n| |---|---| |Col1|n| |---|---| |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |i|l|i|| **Chapter** **4** Elements that Sustain Defense Capability **SDF Training** Training and exercise conducted by units in each service can be broadly divided into training for individual SDF personnel to improve the necessary profi ciency for their respective fi elds, and training and exercise for units to enhance their systematic capabilities. Training for individuals is conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational specialties and individual ability. Training and exercise for units is conducted depending on the size of unit, from small to large; meanwhile, large-scale comprehensive training including coordination between units is also conducted. In order to effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, based on the NDPG and MTDP, SDF’s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises are to be conducted in a tailored and visible way. While leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, the SDF is conducting regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. **Enhancement of Medical Functions** Newly joined members of the SDF conducting basic training **Enhancement of Medical Functions** For the SDF to perform its mission, SDF personnel must remain in good health through appropriate health management. Also, it is important for the SDF to make continued efforts to enhance and strengthen its capabilities in military medicine for maximally protecting the lives of the personnel who respond to a variety of services. Under the circumstances where the SDF’s missions are becoming more diverse and internationalized, it is important to appropriately and accurately carry out various medical activities, such as medical support in disaster relief and international peace keeping activities, and capacity building in the medical fi eld. Efforts of the MOD/SDF in response to the spread of COVID-19, the SDF hospitals and the National Defense Medical College Hospital (NDMCH) have been accepting COVID-19 patients since February 1, 2020. As of May 31, the SDF Central Hospital, the SDF hospitals in Sapporo, Yokosuka, Hanshin, Fukuoka, and Kumamoto, and the NDMCH accepted 430 COVID-19 patients. ----- D I G E S T **Chapter** **5** Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens The MOD/SDF conducts various cooperation activities to support the lives of citizens, including the disposal of unexploded ordnance and underwater mines. At the Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi (Ceremony of the Enthronement of His Majesty the Emperor at the Seiden [State Hall]), a national event, the GSDF presented ceremonies. As for Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games to be held in 2021, SDF athletes are going to participate in the games. In addition, the MOD/SDF would take security measures, including warning and surveillance over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, including the area around the venues, relief provisions for victims in an event of a large-scale terrorist attack, and response to cyber attacks. SDF personnel defusing unexploded ordnance by hand Gun salutes at the Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi (October 2019) **Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas** In order to promote harmony between defense facilities and surrounding areas, the MOD has taken measures to prevent, reduce or mitigate aircraft noise and other impacts caused by activities or by the establishment/operation of airport and other defense facilities in the surrounding area. For stable stationing of the USFJ, it is essential to develop understanding and cooperation of the local governments and residents in vicinities of U.S. bases. The MOD will work to constantly take various other measures, including coordination for unit operation of the USFJ with the local governments and other parties, provision of subsidies pertaining to the USFJ realignment, immediate report to the local governments in cases of an incident or accident, and exchange promotion between the USFJ and local residents. Moreover, in response to the acceleration of domestic and overseas initiatives to achieve sustainable global environment, the MOD, as a member of the government, also needs to contribute to solving environmental problems, while at the same time implementing measures with more focus on the coexistence of SDF/USFJ facilities and areas with surrounding areas. **Events and PR Facilities** The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise, cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and demonstration fl ights and boarding experiences on aircraft. Furthermore, as part of the commemoration of the SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. In 2019 the festival was held in Gymnasium 1 of the National Yoyogi Stadium due to renovation of Nippon Budokan, and approximately 38,500 visitors in total came. Lieutenant Colonel Fukuda, 11th Squadron, Flight Group, FY2019 SDF Marching Festival who leads the Blue Impulse **Initiatives for Public Document Management and Information Disclosure** The MOD/SDF is working for proper management and response to requests for information disclosure by reforming the awareness of personnel and the organization culture, enhancing the checking framework, for example. ----- **Part** Security Environment Surrounding Japan ## Ⅰ **Chapter 1** Overview **Chapter 2** Defense Policies of Countries **Chapter 3** Trends Concerning New Domains including Outer Space, Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Relevant Challenges Facing the International Community ----- **Overview** ###### 1 **❶ [Current Trends in Security Environment]** What is notable about the current security environment is that, fi rst of all, while interdependency among countries is further expanding and deepening, thanks to further growth of the national power of such countries as China, changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex. In addition, uncertainty over the existing order is increasing. Against such a backdrop, prominently emerging is inter-state competition across the political, economic and military realms, in which states seek to shape global and regional order to their advantage as well as to increase their infl uence. Such inter-state competition occurs on a continuous basis. In conducting inter-state competition, states leverage various means such as undermining another country’s sovereignty using military and law-enforcement entities, and manipulating a foreign country’s public opinion by exploiting social media. In such competition, “hybrid warfare” is sometimes adopted, forcing affected actors to take complex measures not limited to military ones. Also, so-called gray-zone situations, which are neither purely peacetime nor contingency situations, are becoming persistent over a long period of time, playing out as part of inter-state competition. They may possibly further **Chapter** increase and expand. Such gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications. Secondly, technological progress is about to change fundamentally how security should be managed. Against the backdrop of the advance of military technology due to rapid technological innovation in information & communications and other fi elds, contemporary warfare increasingly features capabilities combined across all domains: not only land, sea and air but also new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Aiming to improve overall military capability and acquire asymmetric military capability, states are seeking to gain superiority in technologies that undergird capabilities in new domains. States endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cuttingedge, potentially game-changing technologies that could drastically change the conduct of future warfare, including artifi cial intelligence (AI), hypersonic, and high-power energy technologies. Progress in military technology relies heavily on the development of civilian technologies. It is believed that the development and international transfer of civilian **Column** “Gray-Zone Situations” and “Hybrid Warfare” The so-called gray-zone situations simply represent a wide infl uential operations. The combination of these measures is range of situations that are neither peacetime nor wartime. considered as amounting to hybrid warfare. In hybrid warfare, a In a gray-zone situation, for example, a country that country takes measures that are diffi cult to identify defi nitively confronts another over territory, sovereignty or maritime and as an “armed attack” based on its outward appearance. It is other economic interests uses some forceful organization to said that such an approach is taken with an intent to make it demonstrate its presence in the relevant disputed region in a diffi cult for the target country to address the situation, such bid to alter the status quo or force other countries to accept its as delaying the military’s initial response, while denying the assertions or demands. attacker country’s own involvement. The so-called hybrid warfare represents methods to alter the Amid emerging inter-state competition, hybrid warfare and status quo while intentionally blurring the boundaries between other various measures tend to cause gray-zone situations to the military and non-military realms, forcing affected actors to last for a long period of time. take complex measures that are not limited to military actions. The means of hybrid warfare include operations using military units of unidentifi ed nationality, cyberattacks to affect communications and other critical infrastructure, the spread of false information through the internet and the media, and other ----- technologies will have a major impact on improvements in the military capabilities of each country. Further technological innovations hereafter are expected to make it diffi cult still to foresee future warfare. Thirdly, security challenges, which cannot be dealt with by a single country alone, are prominently emerging. First of all, securing the stable use of new domains such as space and cyberspace has become an important challenge for the security of the international community. In recent years, countries are moving ahead with a reinforcement of their comprehensive ability to combat cyber attacks. There are also moves seen in the international community to promote the rule of law in space and cyberspace, including an establishment of certain norms of behavior. In the maritime domain, there have been cases where a country unilaterally claims its entitlement and takes actions based on its own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order, thereby unduly infringing upon the freedom of navigation in high seas and of overfl ight. In addition, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and of ballistic missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs, and international terrorism are still viewed as signifi cant threats to the international community. Moreover, COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019), which emerged since the end of 2019, has become a challenge that should be addressed through cooperation across the international community. How to deal with the spread of COVID-19 is not only an issue of responding to an infectious disease, but it also affects states’ economic activities. As it is also generating various effects and constraints on states’ military activities, it is necessary to pay attention to the impact on the security front. **Chapter** - **❷ [Regional Security Environment Surrounding Japan]** Military powers with high quality and quantity are and North Korea. Issues are existing concerning Taiwan concentrated in Japan’s surroundings, where clear trends and the South China Sea. Furthermore, with regard to such as further military buildup and an increase in military Japan, territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and activities are observed. Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory States in the Indo-Pacifi c region, including Japan, abound of Japan, remain unresolved. in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity. On top of this, recent years have seen a continued tendency Also, each country has different security views and threats towards the prolongation of so-called gray-zone situations, perceptions. Therefore, a regional cooperation framework in or situations that are neither pure peacetime situations nor the security realm has not been suffi ciently institutionalized, contingencies and are associated with territories, sovereignty and longstanding issues of territorial rights and reunifi cation and economic interests, and such situations may increase and in this region continue to remain. expand in the future. The gray-zone situations harbor the risk In the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have been of rapidly developing into more serious situations without divided for more than half a century, and the faceoff continues any clear forewarning. between the military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) ----- Fig. I-1-1 Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan etc. Military Forces in Major Countries/Regions (Approximate Strength) **Chapter** 1,470 205 689 3,560 33 110 8 68 250 3,020 Russia United Kingdom 6 20 240 98 550 67 11 40 370 Germany 124 197 11 14 50 380 France 370 North Korea 10 23 260 13 2 50 46 620 Japan United States Italy Israel 890 China 26 340 15 48 ROK Iran India **Legend** Ground forces Maritime Forces Combat aircraft 3 21 170 Australia (10,000 troops) (10,000 tons) (aircraft) **Large-scale military capabilities** **are concentrated surrounding Japan.** Military Forces in Major Countries/Regions |Ground forces (10,000 troops)|Col2| |---|---| |1|India 124| |2|North Korea 110| |3|China 98| |4|United States 67| |5|Pakistan 56| |6|Israel 50| |7|ROK 46| |8|Vietnam 41| |9|Myanmar 38| |10|Russia 33| |―|Japan 14| |ted States|689（980）| |---|---| |Russia|205（1,130）| |China|197（750）| |ed Kingdom|68（130）| |India|48（320）| |France|40（260）| |ndonesia|Indonesia| |ROK|26（240）| |Italy|23（180）| |Turkey|22（200）| |Japan|50（140）| |Air forces (aircraft)|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |1 U|nited States|3,560| |2|China|3,020| |3|Russia|1,470| |4|India|890| |5|ROK|620| |6|Egypt|600| |7 N|orth Korea|550| |8|Taiwan|520| |9 S|audi Arabia|440| |10|Pakistan|430| |―|Japan|380| Maritime Forces 1 United States 689（980） 2 Russia 205（1,130） 3 China 197（750） 4 United Kingdom 68（130） 5 India 48（320） 6 France 40（260） 7 Indonesia Indonesia 8 ROK 26（240） 9 Italy 23（180） 10 Turkey 22（200） ― Japan 50（140） (Notes) 1. Figures for ground forces are basically the numbers of Army personnel in “The Military Balance 2020.”* Figures for naval vessels show their tonnages compiled by the MOD based on “Jane’s Fighting Ships 2019-2020.” Figures for combat aircraft are the total numbers of bombers, fi ghters, attack aircraft and surveillance aircraft, etc. compiled by the MOD based on “The Military Balance 2020.” 2. Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2019; the number of combat aircraft (air forces) is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fi xed-wing aircraft only). - Figures are rounded off to the nearest 10,000 personnel. Figures for the United States include 480,000 Army personnel and 190,000 Marines personnel. Figures for Russia include 50,000 airborne unit personnel in addition to 280,000 ground force personnel. Figures for Iran include 150,000 ground force personnel of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in addition to 350,000 Army personnel. ----- Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan **Chapter** **Russia has been increasing military activities** Number of scrambles against Russian aircraft Deployed new equipment also in the Far East region New type of multipurpose fghter Su-35 Approx. 2.3 times Deployed in the Far East region in or after 2014 The SDF confrmed Su-35 in September 2018 for the frst time through scrambles. New type of multipurpose bomber Su-34 Deployed in the Far East in or after 2016 The SDF confrmed Su-34 in February Territorial disputes 2020 for the frst time through scrambles. Territorial disputes over FY2001 FY2019 over the Northern the Northern Territories Territories **North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities** ・First nuclear test in Active 2006 and a total of six nuclear tests thereafter Active advancements to advancements to ・Enhancement of missile the Sea of Japan by Chinathe Sea of Japan technologies, including by China the extension of missile ranges **the state nuclear force in 2017Declared the completion of** Issues Issues Territorial disputes Territorial disputes Territorial disputes Issues concerning concerning the concerning the over Takeshima over Takeshima over Takeshima Island the Korean PeninsulaKorean Korean IslandIsland PeninsulaPeninsula **China’s broad and** **rapid change of military forces** Fourth and ffth generation fghters Modern destroyers and frigates (Aircraft) (Vessels) China’s attempt to China’s attempt to Approx. 12 times Approx. 4 times China’s attempt to change change the status change the status the status quo in the East China Sea /quo in the East quo in the East China Sea / Rapid China Sea / Rapid Rapid expansion and increase of military activitiesexpansion and expansion and increase of military increase of military activitiesactivities (Year) (Year) Active advancements Active advancements Issues Issues Active advancements to to the Pacific Ocean by to the Pacific Ocean by the Pacifc Ocean by China Issues concerning Taiwanconcerning concerning ChinaChina TaiwanTaiwan **In the vicinity of Japan, moves toward strengthening** Issues concerning the Issues concerning the **military forces and increasing military activities are notable.** Issues concerning South China SeaSouth China Sea the South China Sea 〇 Countries in this region abound in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity and views on security and the perceptions of threats are different by country. ・ A regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been suffciently institutionalized. (⇔ NATO’s collective defense in Europe) ・ Longstanding issues of territorial rights and reunifcation in this region continue to remain. (e.g. Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, South China Sea) 〇 Inter-state competition across the political, economic and military realms is prominently emerging in recent years. ・ Gray-zone situations may increase and expand, which harbors the risk of developing into graver situations. (Note) Figures for modern destroyers and frigates for China show the total number of Luhu-class, Luhai-class, Sovremenny-class, Luyang-class, and Luzhou-class destroyers and Jiangwei-class and Jiangkai-class frigates. Additionally, China has 42 Jiangdao-class corvettes (in 2020). ----- **Defense Policies of Countries** ###### 2 **Section** **The United States** **1** **❶** **[Security and Defense Policie][s]** It has been pointed out that the Trump administration, which was inaugurated in January 2017, has signifi cantly changed the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world under the “America First” policy. On the other hand, it can be considered that while the United States is focusing on global competition, the United States has been continuing to play a role for world peace and stability with its comprehensive national power, the largest in the world, based on its belief that the values and infl uence of the United States, bolstered by its power, would make the world freer, safer, and more prosperous. The United States branded China and Russia as revisionist powers in its strategy documents outlining the administration’s national security and defense policies, as well as it has clarifi ed its intention to focus on strategic competition with those two countries and has been moving forward with various initiatives aimed at translating such policies into action. The United States has clearly indicated its willingness to place the greatest emphasis on the security of the Indo Pacifi c region to deter China in particular, and has set out a policy of prioritizing the allocation of military forces to the region. The United States has also clarifi ed its stance that it will build new and stronger bonds with nations that share its values across the region and maintain a forward military presence in the region, in order to advance the U.S. vision of a free and open Indo-Pacifi c. In terms of actions focused on China, it is reported that U.S. naval vessels carried out repeated “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South **Chapter** China Sea and transit through the Taiwan Strait, and that the United States imposed sanctions on a Chinese military organ and a leader. In August 2019, the U.S. government notifi ed Congress of its intention to sell fi ghter jets to Taiwan for the fi rst time in 27 years. The United States is also sharpening its deterrence stance against China through such moves as imposing tariffs on Chinese hi-tech products, heightening scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States, and tightening measures aimed at preventing technology theft and ensuring competitiveness in fi elds where there is a risk of technology being diverted to military uses. Congress is maintaining its bipartisan support for the administration’s stance on China, instructing the U.S. government in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 to update its strategy to counter China’s malign infl uence, as well as expressing its desire to support improvements in Taiwan’s national defense capability, and prohibiting the use and procurement of Chinese-manufactured drones by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). The United States has positioned deterrence against Russia in Europe as the next-highest priority in its national defense strategy after deterrence against China in the Indo Pacifi c region. In December 2018, immediately after Russia detained the crew members of Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait, the United States conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations in the vicinity of Peter the Great Gulf for the fi rst time since 1987. In light of Russian **Column** Freedom of Navigation Operations The U.S. Government explains freedom of navigation operations infringe the freedom of navigation and overfl ight and other as being activities to counter excessive claims that could rights to the legal use of oceans. ----- actions concerning Ukraine, the United States has sought to strengthen involvement in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security and deterrence by deploying U.S. Forces in Eastern Europe and substantially increasing investment in the European Deterrence Initiative—a program intended to increase the U.S. military presence in Europe—compared with the sums invested under the previous administration. The United States is also undertaking initiatives focused on the development and deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons to fi ll the capability gap in relation to Russia’s non strategic nuclear weapons. Under the recognition that actions and policies by North Korea, —named in the strategy documents as a “rogue regime”—to pursue nuclear and missile programs constitute an extraordinary threat to the United States, it has maintained sanctions and continues its efforts to pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea. See 1-3 of this Section (Involvement in the Indo-Pacific Region) See Although the United States has set out a policy of prioritizing the allocation of military forces to the Indo Pacifi c region and Europe, while reducing forces in the Middle East and Africa, it has also been dealing with security issues in the latter regions and it would be hard to describe the transition in the U.S. force posture as a smooth one. In the Middle East, in response to the offensive from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other organizations in Iraq and Syria since 2014, the United States, since August 2014, has led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), a military operation against ISIL that includes airstrikes. The March 2019 announcement that the United States had liberated all the Iraqi and Syrian territory previously controlled by ISIL was followed in October that year by the announcement that ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was dead after an operation by U.S. Forces. Of the forces involved in OIR, the U.S. Forces deployed in Syria are stationed in the east of the country following their withdrawal from the vicinity of the border with Turkey, due to a military operation undertaken by the Turkish army in northern Syria in October 2019. The U.S. contingent has been cut to some 600 soldiers from a reported 1,000 or so prior to the withdrawal. With regard to Afghanistan, in February 2020, the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban that included a conditional phased withdrawal by U.S. Forces. The agreement stipulates that the United States will reduce its military forces from a reported 12,000 to 13,000 troops to 8,600 within 135 days and, if the Taliban complies with the US President Trump making an announcement on the Iranian ballistic missile attack in Iraq [U.S. DoD] agreement, will withdraw all troops, including NATO forces, from Afghanistan within 14 months. Furthermore, the United States has been increasing pressure on Iran from many aspects, stating it is to bring Iran to the negotiation table to conclude a comprehensive deal that addresses activities that destabilize the Middle East region, including the nuclear program. On January 3, 2020, amid rising tensions with Iran, the U.S. military killed Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in Iraq. Five days later, in retaliation, Iran launched 16 ballistic missiles at two bases in Iraq where U.S. Forces were stationed. Although 12 of them hit the two bases, there are believed to have been no fatalities as a result. That same day, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated that Iran had concluded its proportionate reprisal and did not seek additional tension or war. Also on January 8, President Trump announced that the United States did not wish to use military force. It thus became clear that both countries wished to avoid further escalation. In response to growing tensions with Iran and other Middle Eastern countries, the U.S. military has announced a number of troop deployments to the Middle East since May 2019, for such purposes as countering the threat posed by Iran to U.S. troops and interests. In addition to such reinforcements to its posture, in July 2019, the United States advocated the Maritime Security Initiative to promote freedom of navigation and maritime stability in the Middle East. As part of this initiative, it subsequently established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), through which it undertakes activities using naval vessels, along with countries including the United Kingdom. The U.S. DoD is considering what constitutes appropriate forces in Africa and in Central and South America, given the need to secure resources. In January 2020, Secretary of **Chapter** ----- Defense Mark Esper indicated that he wished to achieve some measure of progress in the transition of the U.S. military’s force posture by the October 2020 start of fiscal year 2021. In its security policies, the United States has indicated its view that certain allies which are pointed out as bearing only a small burden of cost and enjoying security guaranteed by the United States should shoulder their fair share of responsibility. As such, the United States has requested that NATO member states swiftly meet their commitments to increase their national defense spending to 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Moreover, in negotiations over host nation support for U.S. Forces Korea, it has demanded that the Republic of Korea (ROK) shoulder a bigger share of the burden. Three years have passed since the inauguration of the Trump administration and most of the policies set out in its strategy document have entered the implementation phase. While even the divided Congress continue to support the administration’s paramount policy of deterrence against China and Russia, attention will focus on how U.S. security and national defense policies allocate resources, as the arenas in which the United States pursues its strategic competition with China and Russia expand across the globe. Within the United States, individual states, territories and the District of Columbia are responding to the novel coronavirus disease that first emerged in 2019 by using the National Guard such as transporting medical supplies and food, while the DoD is supporting domestic measures through a range of efforts such as deploying hospital ships and setting up field hospitals. At the same time, as a number of U.S. Forces personnel have been infected, including crew members on an aircraft carrier, the U.S. military has been taking steps to prevent the infection spreading further, by such means as imposing restrictions on movement and other communicable disease control measures. In March 2020, Secretary of Defense Esper commented that although the virus spreads might have some impact on the readiness of U.S. Forces, routine training was continuing to maintain a high state of readiness and that the virus would not affect the U.S. military’s ability to conduct its missions both at home and abroad. He also stated that the extent of the future impact would depend on the scope of the response to the novel coronavirus and how long it lasts. **1** Perception about Security Environment 2017 indicates that changes in a regional balance of power can have global consequences and threaten U.S. interests. It mentions the three main sets of challengers against the United States and its allies and partners, which are the “revisionist powers” of China and Russia, the “rogue states” of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, including jihadist terrorist groups. Of these, China and Russia are said to challenge American power, influence, and interests and attempt to erode American safety and prosperity, while North Korea and Iran destabilize regions and threaten the United States and its allies. In addition, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) published in January 2018 points out that the primary concern in U.S. security is not terrorism but rather long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. It also mentions that China and Russia are undermining the free and open international order constructed by the United States and its allies, and it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model. In October 2019, Secretary of Defense Esper stated that the NDS positioned China as its first priority and Russia as its second. In September, he expressed a particularly strong sense of caution with respect to China, commenting that while Russia was the greatest near-term challenge, China’s tremendous economic potential meant it posed a major challenge in the long term. Furthermore, regarding the military actions carried out with the United Kingdom and France after determining that Syria’s Assad regime had used chemical weapons in April 2018, President Trump stated that establishing strong deterrence against the production, proliferation, and use of chemical weapons is an important interest for the national security of the United States. In consideration of this recognition, the United States deems as security threats nations and organizations that attempt to undermine the interests of itself and its allies and threaten the international order. The Trump administration is addressing threats posed by China and Russia—with particular emphasis on China—as priority issues and appears to be continuing a policy of dealing with threats posed by North Korea, Iran, radical terrorist groups, and production, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction. **2** Security and NDS **Chapter** The NSS developed by President Trump is rooted in the America First policy and realism in which power plays a The National Security Strategy (NSS) released in December ----- central role in international politics, and stresses the need to rethink the policies of the past 20 years that were based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in the international community would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. Moreover, the NSS sets up a strategic policy to protect four vital interests in this competitive world: (1) Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life; (2) Promote American prosperity; (3) Preserve peace through strength; and (4) Advance American influence. In October 2019, Vice President Mike Pence indicated that the views set out in the NSS remained unchanged at that point, stating that the United States did not believe that economic engagement alone would transform Communist China’s authoritarian state into a free and open society that respects private property, the rule of law, and international rules of commerce. Furthermore, in addition to rebuilding the U.S. military to the strongest armed forces and strengthening capabilities in many areas including space and cyberspace, the United States is also striving to leverage the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. Moreover, while recognizing that allies and partners are a great strength of the United States and close cooperation is necessary, the United States has demanded that its allies and partners demonstrate the will to confront shared threats and contribute the capabilities. It is also pointed out that although the United States is responding to the growing political, economic, and military competition throughout the world, by ensuring American military power is second to none and fully integrating with its allies all instruments of power, the United States will seek areas of cooperation with competitors from a position of strength. The NDS drawn up by then Secretary of Defense Mattis based on the NSS considers the long-term competition with China and Russia as the principal priorities of the DoD because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity and the potential for those threats to increase. Moreover, to expand the competitive space, the following three lines of effort are raised: (1) building a more lethal Joint Force; (2) strengthening alliances and attracting new partners; and (3) reforming the DoD for greater performance and affordability. Among these, (1) Building military power prioritizes preparedness for war and in order to defeat aggression by a major power and deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere, it advances building flexible theater postures and force deployment that offer mobility, resilience, and readiness. It also advocates modernizing key capabilities such as nuclear forces, space and cyberspace, C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), missile defense, and advanced autonomous systems, etc. Further, although indicating its commitment to deter aggression, it also demonstrates the stance that dynamic military force employment, military posture, and operations must introduce unpredictability to adversary decision makers. For (2) Strengthening alliances, the following three matters are emphasized: (i) Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability, (ii) Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning, and (iii) Deepen interoperability. On the other hand, there are expectations that allies and partners contribute an equitable share to mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing their defense capabilities. **3** Involvement in the Indo-Pacific Region **Chapter** The Trump administration has positioned the Indo-Pacific region as the highest-priority region for the United States and has shown a stance of placing importance on the region through the United States’ commitment to the region and strengthening its presence. During his November 2017 trip to Asia, in consonance with Japan’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, President Trump expressed his intention to emphasize compliance with principles such as respecting the rule of law and freedom of navigation, and that he would promote a free and open Indo Pacific region, as well as strengthen alliances in the region. In relation to this, the NSS emphasizes that China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and reorder the region in its favor, as well as having mounted a rapid military modernization campaign to limit U.S. access to the region and to provide itself a freer hand there. Moreover, as part of its Indo-Pacific region strategy, while reinforcing its commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law, the United States will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India and develop a strong defense networks with its allies and partners. In the same way, the NDS points out that China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage and is seeking regional hegemony. It emphasizes that a free and open ----- Indo-Pacific provides prosperity and security, and that the United States will strengthen its alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains. Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) of the U.S. DoD, which was released in June 2019, fleshes out this policy in accordance with the characteristics of the Indo Pacific region while retaining the strategic directions of the NSS and the NDS. Noting first of all that it is necessary to establish a force that is prepared to win any conflict from its onset in order to achieve peace through strength, the IPSR states that the United States will ensure that combat-credible forces are forward-postured in the Indo-Pacific region and will prioritize investments that ensure lethality against high end adversaries. Next, arguing that the network of allies and partners is a force multiplier to achieve deterrence, the IPSR states that the United States will reinforce its commitment to established alliances and partnerships while also expanding and deepening relationships with new partners. The IPSR also indicates that the United States will evolve U.S. alliances and partnerships into a networked security architecture to uphold the international rules-based order. In May 2018, regarding China’s maritime expansion, the U.S. DoD stated that China had deployed anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles to the features in the Spratly Islands, and pointed out that the placement of these weapon system was only military use. As an initial response to China’s continued militarization of areas in the South China Sea, the United States disinvited the Chinese navy to the multilateral Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2018. In a speech about the United States’ policy towards China in October 2019, Vice President Pence remarked that China’s behavior in the region had been increasingly provocative and asserted that no nation has the right to claim the maritime commons as territorial seas. He then stated that the United States had increased the tempo and scope of its Freedom of Navigation Operations and strengthened its military presence across the Indo-Pacific. It is reported that U.S. Forces conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations within 12 nautical miles of the disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea claimed by China and in surrounding waters four times in 2017, five times in 2018, and eight times in 2019. As part of its activities around strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. Forces deployed Marine Corps specification F-35B fighters to MCAS Iwakuni in January 2017. The USS America, an amphibious assault ship with enhanced ability to carry F-35B fighters and other carrier-based planes, arrived in Sasebo in December 2019 to replace the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp. In addition, the amphibious transport dock USS New Orleans was also deployed to Sasebo that month. In Guam, the MQ-4C Triton maritime surveillance unmanned aircraft system underwent its first deployment in January 2020. Between January and November 2019, the U.S. Coast Guard deployed patrol boats on a rotational basis in the western Pacific Ocean while working with the Seventh Fleet. The Army plans to deploy a Multi-Domain Task Force in the region, to undertake operations in all domains. In March 2018, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier in over 40 years in Vietnam. Another port call in the country was made in March 2020, by the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt. The United States reportedly deployed naval vessels on passages through the Taiwan Strait on three occasions in 2018 and 10 in 2019. Given the perceptions of China and regional strategy described above, the United States appears to be undertaking initiatives based on its vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. In contrast, while talks between the United States and North Korea have been continuing since their first summit meeting in history held in June 2018, little material progress has been seen with regard to the dismantlement of North Korea’s missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Responding to that summit meeting, the U.S. DoD suspended the U.S.-ROK command and control exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian and the scheduled Vigilant Ace U.S.-ROK bilateral annual flying exercise, and then decided to conclude the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle series of exercises usually held by the United States and the ROK every spring. Then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan expressed a willingness to maintain U.S. Forces in ROK, stating that close coordination between the Aircraft carrier USS “Theodore Roosevelt” sailing to a port in Vietnam [U.S. Navy] **Chapter** ----- military activities of the United States and ROK will continue to support diplomatic efforts and that the two countries were committed to ensuring the continued combined defense posture of U.S.-ROK combined forces and maintaining firm military readiness. Having rearranged the training elements that had been incorporated into these large-scale U.S.-ROK exercises, the U.S. military determined that the majority were covered off with the ROK military and assessed that readiness was being maintained. Amid this situation, as well as firing at least 20 ballistic missiles from May 2019 onwards, North Korea announced in December 2019 that it would continue to develop strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy. The United States pointed out that, regardless of their range, North Korea’s ballistic missile launches violated United Nations Security Council Resolutions. While demonstrating a sense of caution about advances in North Korean weapons technology, however, the United States indicated its intention to continue with bilateral talks. See Section 3-1-5 (1) of this Chapter (Relations with the United States) See **4** Innovation in the National Defense Field longer afford to focus on development programs that take many years to complete. Commenting that, unlike previous eras where national defense drove technology research and development, the DoD now sees significant innovation in the private sector, he pointed out the need for the U.S. military to integrate game-changing technologies from the private sector into its systems. In addition, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Hyten commented in January 2020 that the DoD has attached greater importance to avoiding risk than to the speed of technology development in recent years and stressed the necessity of learning from failures while moving quickly forward with development, as well as mentioning the need to tap into cutting-edge fields in the private sector. **5** Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy **Chapter** The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in February 2018 stated that, although the United States had reduced the role and number of nuclear weapons based on the aspiration that if the United States took the lead in reducing nuclear arms, other states would follow, the global threat conditions have worsened markedly since the most recent NPR released in 2010 and there now exist unprecedented threats and uncertainty, as China and Russia have expanded their nuclear forces and North Korea continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Given these circumstances, the following were raised as the roles of U.S. nuclear forces: (1) Deterrence of nuclear and nonnuclear attacks; (2) Assurance of allies and partners; (3) Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails; and (4) Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future. Also, while the United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners, the NPR clearly states that extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks against the United States and its allies, and a “no first use” policy is not justified today. It also indicates that the United States maintains a policy of retaining some ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear response. Furthermore, it also revealed that the United States would apply a tailored approach to deterrence across a spectrum of adversaries, threats and contexts, and in addition, would ensure effective deterrence by enhancing the flexibility and range of its nuclear capabilities through nuclear modernization and the development and deployment of new capabilities. Specifically, Although the Trump administration has stopped using the name Third Offset Strategy, which was touted by the Obama administration, DoD innovation initiatives are positioned as one of the top priorities. In fact, the NSS outlines a policy that the United States must harness innovative technologies that are being developed outside of the traditional defense industrial base. The NDS also states that the DoD needs innovation to surpass revisionist powers, and calls for extensive investment in military application of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning (AI/ML), including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military advantages. Giving testimony before Congress in March 2019 about science and technology in the field of national defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin expressed alarm at the pace of Chinese and Russian technological advances, while setting out a policy of regaining and maintaining the United States’ technical advantage through investments in hypersonics, directed energy, space, autonomy, cyber, quantum science, microelectronics, biotechnology, AI/ML, and fully-networked command, control, and communication. In September 2019, Secretary of Defense Esper stated that the United States could no ----- in addition to sustaining and replacing the nuclear triad,[1] as new capabilities, in the near-term, the United States would modify a small number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) warheads to provide a low-yield option,[2] and in the longer term, pursue a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), leveraging existing technologies, as well as incorporate nuclear capability onto F-35A fi ghters as a replacement for the current aging dual-capable aircraft (DCA). Also, the United States has shown its commitment to extended deterrence for its allies and, if necessary, maintaining the forward-deployed capability with DCA and nuclear weapons in regions outside Europe, including Northeast Asia. In October 2018, President Trump expressed his intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia, due to Russia’s material breach, and in February 2019, the United States provided Russia with formal notice that the United States would withdraw from the treaty. The United States also expressed that if Russia does not return to full and verifi able compliance with the treaty in six months, the treaty would terminate.[3] On August 2, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the U.S. withdrawal pursuant to Article XV of the treaty took effect that day because Russia failed to return to full and verifi ed compliance. On the same day, Secretary of Defense Esper announced that the DoD will fully pursue the development of intermediate-range, conventional, ground launched cruise and ballistic missile systems whose test launches, production and possession had been restricted by the treaty. In August 2019, the United States conducted a fl ight test of a conventionally-confi gured ground-launched cruise missile with a range of more than 500 km and subsequently conducted a fl ight test of a prototype similarly confi gured ground-launched ballistic missile that December (See Section 4-3-1).[4] President Trump has mentioned the need for arms control involving China, which has beefed up medium-range missile capabilities outside the scope of the INF Treaty. See Section 4-3-1 of this Chapter (Nuclear Forces) See At the same time, the Missile Defense Review (MDR) published in January 2019 noted that North Korea continues to pose an extraordinary threat to the United States and, with its nuclear missiles, has the ability to threaten the U.S. homeland, as well as U.S. territories, U.S. Forces, and allies in the Pacifi c Ocean. It also pointed out that Russia and China are developing advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles that challenge existing missile defense systems. The MDR sets out three principles governing U.S. missile defense: (1) homeland missile defense will stay ahead of rogue states’ missile threats; (2) missile defense will defend U.S. Forces deployed abroad and support the security of allies and partners; and (3) the United States will pursue new concepts and technologies. It cited the elements of missile defense strategy as (1) comprehensive missile defense capabilities; (2) fl exibility and adaptability; (3) tighter offense-defense integration and interoperability; and (4) importance of space. The MDR then presented a policy of adopting a balanced and integrated approach based on a combination of (1) deterrence; (2) active and passive missile defenses; and (3) attack operations. Under this policy, the United States plans to expand investment in expanding and modernizing U.S. homeland missile defense capabilities by such means as deploying an additional 20 ground-based interceptors by 2023, improving and deploying radar systems, and pursuing efforts to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) using SM-3 Block IIA. For regional defense, on the other hand, the United States will procure additional interceptor missiles for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis, and Patriot systems, as well as increasing the number of Aegis BMD **Chapter** **Column** Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty A treaty abolishing land-based ballistic and cruise missiles and fl ight testing. It was signed by the United States and the with ranges of 500-5,500 km and banning their production Soviet Union in 1987 and ended in August 2019. The nuclear triad consists of Minuteman III ICBM, Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) armed with Trident II D5 SLBM, and strategic bombers B-52 and B-2. In February 2020, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood disclosed that the U.S. Navy had already deployed the W76-2 low-yield nuclear warhead to be carried by SLBMs. This complementary capability is regarded as showing Russia and other potential adversaries that there is no advantage in the limited use of nuclear weapons. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the countries covered by the treaty have increased: the countries covered at present are the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Under Article 15 of the INF Treaty, notifi cation of withdrawal must be made to all signatory countries of the treaty. In August 2019, Secretary of Defense Esper remarked that it was going to take a few years to actually have newly developed ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles to be able to deploy ----- capable ships, and equipping Aegis Ashore sites with the SM-3 Block IIA. Regarding the pursuit of new technologies, the MDR sets out a policy of developing the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) to improve the ability to engage ICBM warheads and decoys, as well as undertaking research and development focused on (1) directed-energy weapons; (2) space-based interceptor systems; and (3) interceptor missiles with which F-35 fighters can be equipped, to enable space based sensors to be deployed and interception to be carried out in the boost phase, with a view to countering advanced threats, including hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs). As far as collaboration with allies and partners is concerned, the MDR indicates a willingness to focus on deepening interoperability, expanding burden sharing, and encouraging investment by allies in missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with those of the United States. **6** FY2021 Budget the sequestration of defense spending in order to rebuild the U.S. military, a defense budget framework was approved that drastically raised the limit set by the sequestration between FY2018 and FY2021. In these circumstances, the defense budget request in the FY2021 Budget Blueprint submitted to Congress in February 2020 allocated US$705.4 billion for the base budget,[5] which excludes emergencies, representing about a 0.1% increase over the previous year. The DoD positioned the budget as a priority initiative supporting operations in all domains, which forms the next step in implementing the NDS, emphasizing (1) the reconstruction of the nuclear deterrent; (2) U.S. homeland missile defense; (3) cyber and space capabilities; and (4) hypersonic, 5G, AI, and other key technologies. It included a request for an unprecedented sum for research and development (approximately US$106.6 billion), while raising around US$5.7 billion for reallocation to priority initiatives from programs that do not accord with the NDS by such means as rethinking programs undertaken by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The goals for military end strength and procurement presented in the FY2021 budget request included securing 1,351,500 personnel, adding 5,500 more troops to the services’ end strength, and procuring 89 upgraded M-1 tanks (165 tanks in the previous year), 8 battle-force ships (12 in the previous year), and 79 F-35 fighters (98 in the previous year). See Fig. I-2-1-1 (Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget) **Chapter** Based on an awareness that the U.S. Government’s budget deficit is deepening, the Budget Control Act enacted in 2011 stipulated a significant cut in government spending by FY2021. In March 2013, the sequestration of government spending including defense expenditure was started based on the provisions of the Budget Control Act. However, sequestration was subsequently eased due in part to the passage of bipartisan budget acts on four occasions. In addition, under the Trump administration’s policy to end **Fig. I-2-1-1** Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget 8,000 20 Defense budget (in $100 million) Year-on-year growth rate (%) 15 6,000 10 5,000 3,000 0 2,000 －5 1,000 (*Estimate) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020（FY） Notes: 1. Figures shown are narrowly defined expenses based on historical tables (outlays). 2. The amount for FY2020 is an estimate. The breakdown is as follows: a base budget of approximately US$636.4 billion, and approximately US$69.0 billion for overseas contingency operations. This represents an increase of about US$0.8 billion from the FY2020 enacted budget level (excluding the approximately US$8.0 billion for emergencies in the FY2020 enacted budget). The total sum of the FY2021 national defense budget request was roughly US$740.5 billion, including defense-related budget requests from other departments of roughly US$35.1 billion (such as the Department of Energy’s nuclear related programs) and the roughly US$705 4 billion of DoD budget request ----- **[Military Posture ]** **❷** In August 2019, the United States founded the Space Command to serve as a geographic unified combatant command and then established the Space Force as the sixth branch of the military within the Department of the Air Force that December. See Fig. I-2-1-2 (Structure of the Unified Combatant Command) Column (Establishment of the Space Force) **1** General Situation The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces; rather it is operated under the command of the Unified Combatant Commands, composed of forces from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands consist of four commands with functional responsibilities and seven commands with regional responsibilities. The U.S. ground forces have about 470,000 Army soldiers and about 190,000 Marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. The U.S. maritime forces have about 980 vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.9 million tons. The 6th Fleet is responsible for the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Second Fleet was reestablished in August 2018 to take responsibility for the U.S. East Coast, North Atlantic Ocean, and Arctic Ocean. The U.S. air forces have roughly 3,560 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK, among others. In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the United States under the former Obama administration proceeded with their reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. It announced that its deployed strategic warheads[6] stood at 1,373, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 655.[7] The United States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation’s new ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, in May 2018, the Cyber Command, which was previously a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command, was elevated to a unified combatant command. See **Chapter** |U.S. Secret|ary of Defense|Col3| |---|---|---| |||Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff| |Fig. I-2-1-2 Structure of the Unified Combatant Command|ed Combatant Command|Col3| |---|---|---| |President ：Functional combatant command ：Geographic combatant command U.S. Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Special U.S. Strategic U.S. Transportation U.S. Cyber Operations Command Command Command Command U.S. Africa U.S. Central U.S. European U.S. Northern U.S. Indo-Pacific U.S. Southern U.S. Space Command Command Command Command Command Command Command|：Functional combatant command ：Geographic combatant command|| |U.S. Africa Command||U.S. Space Command| |U.S. Northern Command|U.S. Indo-Pacific Command| |---|---| Unveiling the new U.S. Space Force logo [U.S. DoD] **2** Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region by deploying the Indo-Pacific Command, a combatant command integrating the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps in the region. The Indo-Pacific Command is a geographic combatant command which is responsible for the largest geographical area, and its subordinate unified commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea. The Indo-Pacific Command consists of the U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and U.S. Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear warheads equipped in deployed heavy bombers (a deployed heavy bomber is counted as one nuclear warhead). The figure as of March 1 2020 ----- **Chapter** |Department|of the Army| |---|---| |Secretary o|f the Army| |Army|| |Department|of the Navy| |---|---| |Secretary|of the Navy| |Navy|Marine Corps| |Department of th|Col2|e Air Force| |---|---|---| |Secretary of the||Air Force| |Air Force|Space Force|| |Joint Chie|fs of Staff| |---|---| |Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff|| |Secretary of Defense|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Department of the Army Department of the Navy Department of the Air Force Joint Chiefs of Staff Combatant Commands Secretary of the Army Secretary of the Navy Secretary of the Air Force Chairman Joint Northern Command Strategic Command Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Space Force Chiefs of Staff Indo-Pacific Command Special Operations Command European Command Transportation Command Southern Command Cyber Command Central Command Africa Command Space Command||| ||Combatant|Commands| ||Northern Command|Strategic Command| ||Indo-Pacific Command|Special Operations Command| ||European Command|Transportation Command| ||Southern Command|Cyber Command| ||Central Command|| ||Africa Command|| ||Space Command|| **Column** Establishment of the Space Force In December 2019, the United States established the Space plan, the Space Force will have approximately 15,000 personnel Force under the Department of the Air Force as the sixth military after space-related personnel of the existing military branches branch, joining the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and are transferred in stages. Coast Guard. It is the fi rst new military service in more than 70 At the ceremony pertaining to the establishment of the years since 1947, when the Air Force was created. Space Force, President Trump expressed his recognition that The Trump Administration has taken a stance to give great “space is the newest warfi ghting domain.” The Trump importance to space as a foundation of economic prosperity administration expressed a sense of crisis that China, Russia and national defense of the United States and as a domain that and other countries were developing strategies and capabilities can provide integral support for this purpose. In this context, in to exploit the vulnerability of the United States in space, which March 2019 Vice President Pence indicated imperfections of had turned space into a warfi ghting domain, where the United the system where space-related projects pertaining to national States could lose its advantage. Based on this recognition, the security were dispersed over 60 departments and agencies, creation of the Space Force is understood as a fundamental which resulted in a lack of leadership and responsibility. Based shift of space initiatives from combat support to competition on this recognition, the Trump administration advocated the and combat. The Space Forces will carry out both offensive and creation of an organization to take charge of the space domain defensive operations for space superiority as a unique in a consolidated manner and created the Space Command as warfi ghting domain in addition to missions such as space a unifi ed combatant command equivalent to other commands situational awareness, satellite operations and support for the such as the Indo-Pacifi c Command in order to enable joint Army, Navy, Air Force and other forces. operations in this domain. The Space Force is expected to play Furthermore, the Trump Administration expressed its a leadership role by consolidating separated authorities to intention to establish the Department of the Space Force to organize, train, and equip space forces, while eliminating control the Space Force. Attention will focus on future initiatives ineffi ciency in force building. According to its establishment of the United States concerning the space domain. Major Organizations of the Department of Defense **Secretary of Defense** Department of the Army Department of the Navy Department of the Air Force Joint Chiefs of Staff Combatant Commands Secretary of the Army Secretary of the Navy Secretary of the Air Force Chairman Joint Northern Command Strategic Command Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Space Force Chiefs of Staff Indo-Pacific Command Special Operations Command European Command Transportation Command Southern Command Cyber Command Central Command Africa Command Space Command Pacifi c Air Forces, which are all headquartered in Hawaii. The Army Pacifi c’s subordinate commands include the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Army Pacifi c assigns approximately 2,500 personnel to commands in Japan, such as I Corps (Forward) and the Headquarters, U.S. Army Japan Command.[8] The U.S. Pacifi c Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacifi c and the Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East Pacifi c and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacifi c Fleet in total controls about 200 vessels. The 7th Fleet mainly consists of a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. An aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers among others are assigned to the 7th Fleet. The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacifi c deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and The fi gures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of December 31, 2019), and could change according to unit deployment ----- **Chapter** |-2-1-3 U.S. Forces Deployment Status|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19|Col20|Col21|Col22|Col23|Col24|Col25|Col26|Col27|Col28|Col29|Col30|Col31|Col32|Col33|Col34| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |European Region U.S. Forces Arm y ：appro x. 26,000 personnel Nav y ：appro x. 8,000 personnel Army ： approx. 473,000 personnel Air Force ：appro x. 29,000 personnel Navy ： approx. 334,000 personnel Air Fo rce ：approx. 328,000 personnel Ma rines ： appro x. 2,000 personnel U.S. European Marin es ：ap prox. 186,000 personnel Command Tot al ：appro x. 66,000 personnel Total ： approx. 1,320,000 personnel （Total in 1987: approx. 354,000 personnel） （Total in 1987: approx. 2,170,000 personnel） Asia-Pacifc Region U.S. Northern U.S. Central Army ：a ppro x. 36,000 personnel Command Command Navy ：a ppro x. 39,000 personnel Air Force ：a ppro x. 28,000 personnel Marines ：app ro x. 29,000 personnel U.S. Indo-Pacifc Total ：a ppro x. 132,000 personnel Command （Total in 1987: approx. 184,000 personnel） U.S. Africa Command U.S. Southern Command|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||m av y|y|：app ：app||ro x. 26 ro x. 8,|,000 p 000 pe|erson rsonne|nel l|||||||||||||||Army|||U. ： appr|S. For ox. 47||ces 3,000|person|nel||| ||r F a ri|orce nes|：app ： app||ro x. 29 ro x. 2,|,000 p 000 pe|erson rsonne|nel l|||||||||||||||Navy Air F Marin|o rce es||： appr ：appr ：ap pr|ox. 33 ox. 32 ox. 18||4,000 8,000 6,000|person person person|nel nel nel||| |||||||||||||U.S. Eur Comm|opean and||||||||||||||||||||| ||t a|l|app||ro x. 66|,000 p|erson|nel|||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||ota|l in 19|： 87: app||rox. 35|4,000 p|ersonn|el）|||||||||||||||Total （Tota|l in 198||： appr 7: app|ox. 1,3 rox. 2,||20,00 170,00|0 pers 0 perso|onnel nnel）||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||A Ar||||||||nnel|U.|||ern nd||||||| ||||||||||||||||||sia-Pa|cifc R|egion||36,000|perso|||U.|S. North Comma|ern nd||||||| ||||||||U.S. C|entral|||||||||my|ap|prox.||||||||||||||| ||||||||Com|mand||||||||Na Air|vy Force|： ：a p ap|pro x. prox.||39,000 28,000|perso perso|nnel nnel||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||c||Ma|rines|： ：ap|p ro x.||29,000|perso|nnel||||||||||| |||||||||||||U.S. Ind|o-Pacif|c|||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||Com|mand||To （T||tal otal in 1|：a p 987: ap|pro x. prox. 1||132,00 84,000|0 pers person|onnel nel）||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||ca nd|||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||U.S. Afri Comma|ca nd|||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||U.S. So|uthern|||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||Comm|and|||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the DoD (as of December 31, 2019), etc. 2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacifc region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam. **Fig. I-2-1-4** U.S. Forces Deployment Status 【Japan】 ・Deploys MV-22 Osprey and F-35B 【ROK】 ・Additionally deploys Aegis BMD destroyers ・Deploys THAAD ・Additionally deploys an amphibious transport dock 【India】 ・Deploys amphibious assault ship USS “America,” capable of ・Provided Apache Longbow attack carrying F-35Bs. helicopters, and C-17 transport aircraft 【Taiwan】 ・Decided to sell arms ・U.S. vessels passed through the Taiwan Strait. 【Vietnam】 ・The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act contains ・A U.S. aircraft carrier visited the Da Nang provisions concerning (i) assistance for arms procurement, Port (for the frst time since the end of the (ii) consideration of U.S. vessel visits to Taiwan, (iii) U.S. Vietnam War). participation in training in Taiwan, and (iv) encouragement of ・U.S. Navy vessels visited the Cam Ranh exchange of high-level offcials. Port. 【Singapore】 ・Rotationally deploys Littoral Combat Ships 【Guam】 (LCS) ・Deploys a maritime surveillance unmanned aircraft system ・Rotationally deploys P-8 ・In June 2017, then Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that 60% of Navy vessels, 55% of the Army, and approximately 2/3 of the Fleet 【Philippines】 Marine Force are deployed in the area for which the then Pacific ・Provides anti-terrorism equipment to the Philippines Command is responsible and that 60% of overseas tactical air assets ・Landing training in multilateral exercise (Balikatan) will be deployed there. In May 2018, these forces were renamed the “Indo-Pacific Command.” ・In August 2018, then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced a 【Australia】 policy to provide approximately 300 million US dollars as security assistance to improve security relationships across the Indo-Pacific ・Rotationally deploys marines region. ・Increases rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft Japan. Of this force, about 21,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which are equipped with F-35B fighters and other aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the Western Pacific.[9] The U.S. Pacific Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters and C-130 9 S f t t 8 transport aircraft) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK. See Fig. I-2-1-3 (U.S. Forces Deployment Status) Fig. I-2-1-4 (U.S. Forces Involvement in the Indo-Pacific Region [image]) ----- **Section** **China** **2** **[General Situation]** **❶** to amend an ordinance to allow criminal suspects to be extradited to mainland China. Combined with public concern about the security measures taken by the Chinese central government and the Hong Kong government in light of the series of protests, there is no prospect of the volatility of the situation diminishing. Amid these circumstances, the Chinese Government has been tightening its control over society. While it has been suggested that the development of the Internet and other areas of information and communications technology (ICT) has made it diffi cult to control activities of the masses, it has been noted that rapidly developing ICT technologies are exploited for social control. Since 2014, China has enacted laws based on “a holistic view of national security” that covers not only external threats but also culture and society. Those laws include the Anti-Spy Law enacted in November 2014 to enhance domestic counter-espionage arrangements, a new National Security Law in July 2015, an Anti-Terrorism Law in January 2016 to strengthen state control, the Law on Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas Non-governmental Organizations in January 2017 to enhance control on foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the National Intelligence Law in June 2017. The “anti-corruption” movement following the launch of the Xi Jinping leadership has made inroads under the policy of cracking down on both “tigers” and “fl ies,” targeting both dominant fi gures and junior offi cials. People including former prominent leaders of the Party and military have Chinese President Xi Jinping reviewing the troops at the military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of China’s founding (October 2019)【EPA/Jiji】 China, the world’s most populous country, has a vast landmass surrounded by a long borderline as well as a long coastline. It also has various races, religions, and languages. China’s pride in its unique history of having shaped a distinct culture and civilization, and semi-colonial experience in and after the 19th century are driving its desire for a strong nation and fueling its nationalism. In recent years, China has increased its presence in the **Chapter** international community including the global economy. China takes a proactive stance towards efforts in security areas, contributing to United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and various humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. There continues to be high expectations for China to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner on regional and global issues. China faces various domestic problems including human rights issues. Among the problems emerging are the spread of bribery and corruption among the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and such issues as disparities between urban and rural areas, and between coastal and inland regions, as well as disparities within cities and environmental pollution. More recently, the pace of China’s economic growth has slowed and the country is also expected to face issues associated with the rapid aging of the population, including problems related to pensions and other aspects of the social security system. The range of factors potentially destabilizing government administration has thus been expanding and becoming increasingly diverse. Additionally, there have been protests about human rights violations against ethnic minorities in China and campaigns pursuing separation and independence of the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and elsewhere. The international community has grown interested in human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In 2019, large-scale protest rallies occurred in Hong Kong over such issues as a bill ----- strictly been charged with corruption. General Secretary Xi has stated that “corruption is the greatest threat our Party faces,” indicating that the “anti-corruption” movement will continue. Through these developments, the Party has demonstrated a growing willingness in recent years to further bolster the power base of General Secretary Xi in the CCP. For example, it decided at the 19th National Congress in October 2017 to incorporate “thoughts,” namely the political philosophy, **[Military Affairs]** **❷** under the name of General Secretary Xi Jinping into the Party constitution as a guideline. This was the fi rst time since President Mao Zedong that a leader had his name in a guideline before retirement. Moreover, at the fi rst plenary session of the 13th National People’s Congress held in March 2018, a resolution was adopted to revise the constitution and abolish term limits for China’s president, which indicates that Xi Jinping is further consolidating power as president. - the establishment of operational capabilities further afi eld. China is also prioritizing efforts to increase practical joint operational capabilities through military modernization including reforms. Additionally, while implementing a policy of civil-military fusion across the board, with the aim of promoting two-way links between military and civilian resources in technology development and various other fi elds, China is striving to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies that can be used for military purposes. Cutting edge technologies that China seeks to develop and acquire include game changing technologies that would dramatically change future warfare. China’s 2019 white paper, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” released in July 2019, notes that “intelligent warfare is on the horizon,” indicating that attention should be paid to Chinese forces’ efforts to use artifi cial intelligence (AI) technology. Along with efforts to reinforce its operational capabilities, China is engaging in unilateral and coercive attempts to change the status quo based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order, and has been expanding and intensifying its military activities in **Chapter** **1** General Situation For more than 30 years, China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget without transparency, engaging in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In doing so, it has attached importance to strengthening its operational capabilities for steadily acquiring information superiority as a means of both enhancing operational capabilities throughout the Chinese military and gaining asymmetrical capabilities to effectively impede enemies with overall military superiority from exerting their strength. Specifi cally, China has been increasingly emphasizing endeavors to achieve dominance in new domains. For example, it has been rapidly expanding its capabilities in the cyber domain, enabling it to disrupt enemy communications networks, and in the fi eld of electromagnetic spectrum, which offers the potential to render enemy radar and other equipment ineffective, thereby hampering their ability to exercise their military might. In addition, it continues to build capacity to make it possible to restrict enemies’ use of space. Bolstering these capabilities will reinforce China’s “Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)” capabilities and lead to **Column** Civil-military fusion Civil-military fusion is an initiative promoted by China as a national strategy designed to promote the military use of civilian resources and the civilian use of military technologies in peacetime as well as emergency, in addition to the traditional development of defense mobilization arrangements for emergency. In particular, initiatives in seas, outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence (AI), which are referred to as “emerging areas” for China are viewed as priority areas for civil- military fusion. **Column** Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities The A2/AD capabilities represent a concept given by the United States. Anti-Access or A2 capabilities refer mainly to long-range capabilities to block adversaries from entering some operating zones. Area-Denial or AD capabilities refer to short-range capabilities to limit adversaries’ freedom of action within operating zones. ----- maritime and aerial domains, notably in the East China Sea. China, particularly regarding maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, which includes dangerous acts that could cause unintended contingencies. Additionally, China continues to demonstrate its willingness to realize its unilateral assertions without making any compromises, steadily moving forward with efforts to change the status quo by coercion and to create a fait accompli. The Chinese military leadership has exhibited the “struggle” against the Senkaku Islands, an inherent territory of Japan, the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),” [1] its Navy and Air Force’s “regular patrols,” and others as the achievements of the military forces’ activities and emphasized to continue improving the Chinese military’s operational capabilities. Furthermore, the Chinese military forces have rapidly expanded and intensified activities including those in the areas surrounding Japan, such as the East China Sea, Pacific Ocean and Sea of Japan. Given these facts, there is a high probability that China would not only attempt to make such activities routine but also further expand and intensify them both qualitatively and quantitatively. Such Chinese military trends, combined with insufficient transparency about China’s defense policies and military affairs, have become a matter of grave concern to the region including Japan and the international community and should continue to be closely monitored in the future. **2** Defense Policies nation. China contends that these national defense policies are “defensive” in nature.[2] For the development of national defense and military forces, China has employed a policy of building the “system of modern military power with Chinese characteristics” by sustaining the military development under the party, the military buildup through reforms, military promotion based on science and technology, and law-based military governance, by pursuing practical capabilities that “can fight and win a war” by giving greater priority to the civil-military fusion, by promoting the fusion and development of mechanization and informatization, and by accelerating the intelligentization of military forces. This might have apparently deepened a policy of giving priority to the informatization of military forces based on a military strategy to win informatized local wars in response to the global trend of military development. Such military buildup in China apparently indicates that China has given top priority to dealing with a Taiwan contingency by improving its capabilities to deter or deny Taiwan’s independence and foreign military support for the Taiwanese independence, and has recently considered the improvement of operational capabilities in more distant waters to protect its expanding overseas interests. **Chapter** Furthermore, China seems to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means in military affairs and warfare. It regards the concept of “Three Warfares” — “Media Warfare,” “Psychological Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” — as part of the political work of the military. In addition, China has set forth a policy of coordinating military struggle closely with political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors. As for the future goals of the development of national defense and military forces, General Secretary Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017 and the defense white paper released in 2019 noted that China would try to (1) basically achieve mechanization and make great progress in informatization to dramatically improve strategic capabilities by 2020, (2) basically complete the modernization of national defense and military forces by 2035, and (3) generally transform Chinese forces into world class forces by the mid-21st century. These goals reportedly China has described the objectives of its defense policies and the missions of its military forces as: supporting the CCP’s leadership, China’s characteristic socialism system, and the modernization of its socialism, defending the nation’s sovereignty, unification and security, backing the nation’s sustainable “peaceful development” through protecting its maritime and overseas national interests, building strong national defense and massive military forces commensurate with the interests of the nation’s security and the interests of development, and providing strong assurances for realizing the “Chinese dream” of the great revival of the Chinese On November 23, 2013, China established the “East China Sea ADIZ” including the Senkaku Islands misleadingly indicated as if they were China’s territory. China requires aircraft flying in the zone to abide by rules set by its Ministry of National Defense and claims to take military “defensive emergency measures” against aircraft failing to do so, unduly infringing on the principle of freedom of overflight. Over the move to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, not only Japan but also the United States, the ROK, Australia, and the European Union (EU) expressed concerns. According to the defense white paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (July 2019) ----- indicate that the third stage of the Three Stage Development Strategy” for the basic modernization of national defense and military forces by the middle of the 21st century would be achieved 15 years ahead of schedule. The goals thus might have been based on faster-than-expected progress in the military modernization for China itself. Particularly since late December 2015, China has tackled the military reform to improve practical joint operational capabilities, achieving steady, rapid progress. However, China has recognized a wide gap between the real military modernization level and the level required for national security, and between Chinese and world-class military forces. Based on that recognition, China may further accelerate the military modernization against the backdrop of national power development and General Secretary Xi’s enhancement of his power base in the CCP and expansion of his power as Chairman of the Central Military Commission.[3] **3 Transparency Concerning Defense Policies and** Military Affairs have become increasingly complex. Others opine that the military’s influential power on foreign policy decisions has been changing. Attention is to be paid to such situations in terms of crisis management as well. Explanations that stoke concerns about Chinese military decision-making and actions are also evident in comments about the South China Sea, where China is seeking to unilaterally change the status quo and to create a fait accompli. At the press conference after the U.S.-China Summit Meeting in September 2015, President Xi Jinping stated “China does not have any intention to pursue militarization” in the South China Sea, but in February the following year, Foreign Minister Wang Yi described the facilities in the South China Sea as “necessary self-defense facilities” that China was developing in accordance with international law. In 2017, reports in official media asserted that China had rationally expanded the area of its “islands and reefs” in the South China Sea to “strengthen the necessary military defense.” China has released a defense white paper almost every two years since 1998. Most recently, it released a defense white paper in July 2019 for the first time in approximately four years. The latest one was titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era.” Although defense white papers released in 2013 and 2015 covered specific topics only, with the volume of descriptions reduced, the 2019 white paper covered defense policies in general. China’s influence in the international community has risen politically, economically, and militarily. It has become increasingly important for China to improve its transparency regarding defense policies and military affairs, provide fact-based explanations about its activities, and share and observe international rules as a responsible country in the international community to allay concerns about China. It is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency through such efforts as specific and accurate information disclosure. **Chapter** China has neither set out a clear and specific future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured adequate transparency of its decision-making process in relation to military and security affairs. Moreover, China has not fully disclosed information such as specific weapons in possession, procurement goals and results, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of its national defense budget. Incidents in which Chinese authorities provide factually inaccurate explanations or refuse to admit facts regarding Chinese military activities have been confirmed, inciting concerns over China’s military decision-making and actions. For example, the submerged transit of a Chinese Navy submarine through Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands was confirmed in January 2018, but China did not acknowledge this. In recent years, amid the significant changes in the environment surrounding the military, including advances in specialization of the military and diversification of missions associated with strengthening of operational capabilities, some see that relations between the CCP leadership and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) **4** National Defense Budget China announced that its national defense budget for FY2020 was approximately 1,268 billion yuan (approximately 20,288.1 billion Japanese yen when the value is mechanically converted at 16 yen per yuan).[4] This initial budget amount The Central Military Commission is a leading and commanding organ to China’s armed forces. Formally, there are the CCP CMC and the People’s Republic of China CMC. However, each consists of the same members, indicating both commissions as an organ for the party to control the armed forces. China’s announced defense budget exceeded Japan’s defense-related expenditures in FY2007 and reached approximately four times in FY2020 (automatically converted based on h t f ti fi l ) J ’ d f l t d dit h i d l t h d f d 20 ( i t l 1 2 ti i 30 ) ----- **Fig. I-2-2-1** Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget （％） 25 20 (100 million yuan) 14,000 12,000 10,000 15 10 8,000 6,000 4,000 5 2,000 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 20 Defense budget (in 100 million yuan) Year-on-year growth rate (%) (FY) Note : This basically shows the defense budget within “the central government’s general public budget,” which had been named as “the central fscal expenditures” prior to FY 2014. Year-on-year growth rate compares the budget of a given year against the initial budget of the previous year. Note that FY2002 defense budget was calculated based on the increased amount from the defense budget in the previous FY because only the amount and rate of growth were released. For FY 2016, FY 2018, FY 2019 and FY2020, the amount of “the central government expenditures,” which are part of the central government’s general public budget, are used because only the central government expenditures were announced. **Chapter** represented a growth of approximately 6.6% (approximately 78.1 billion yuan) compared to the initial budget amount for the previous fiscal year. China’s announced national defense budget recorded a double-digit increase almost every year between FY1989 and FY2015. The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget grew approximately 44 fold in the 30 years from FY1990 and approximately 2.4-fold in the 10 years from FY2010. China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development. It is believed that China has continued to invest resources in the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem with its economic development. However, there have been many years in which the announced annual national defense budget increase rate exceeded the economic growth (an increase in gross domestic product). Attention is to be paid to how the slowdown in China’s economic growth would affect its national defense budget. As for a breakdown of the national defense budget, past defense white papers specified personnel, training and sustainment, and equipment expenses for the announced national defense budgets for FY2007, FY2009 and FY2010 2017 (and expenses for active, reserve and militia forces for FY2007 and FY2009). However, no more details have been given. See Fig. I-2-2-1 (Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget) **5** Military Posture China’s armed forces are composed of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP), and the militia. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC). The PLA is defined as a people’s force created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Rocket Force, the Strategic Support Force, the Joint Logistics Support Force, etc. In addition, it is noted that the amount of the announced defense budget is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include foreign equipment procurement costs or research and development (R&D) expenses. According to an analysis of the U.S. DoD, actual defense spending in FY2018 was US$30 billion more than the announced national defense budget amount.[5] The PAP is designed to engage mainly in patrol, emergency response, counterterrorism, maritime rights protection and law enforcement, emergency rescue, defense operations, etc. The militia is planned to engage in economic construction, etc. in peacetime and undertake logistic support missions in emergency. According to “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China ” U S DoD (May 2019) ----- （1）Military Reforms China is currently carrying out military reforms seen as the largest in its history. In November 2015, Chairman Xi unveiled China’s official position on a specific direction of the military reforms for the first time, announcing that the Chairman Xi is attempting to further enhance his leadership in the CMC and the military. There are views that dissatisfaction is growing within the military and among veterans because of the rapid reforms. Given that China plans to promote military reforms until 2020, attention will focus on the outcome of these military reforms. military reforms would be carried out by 2020. By the end of 2016, the so-called “above-the-neck” reforms in the center of the military were reported to have basically been completed. Specifically, they abolished the PLA’s seven Military Regions and created five new Theaters with primary responsibility for command of operations, namely, the Eastern Theater, Southern Theater, Western Theater, Northern Theater, and Central Theater. In addition, they also formed the PLA Army (PLAA) Headquarters— ranked equally with the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Headquarters—, the Rocket Force (PLARF), the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), and the Joint Logistics Support Force. Moreover, the headquarters for the entire PLA were replaced by 15 functional sections under the CMC, including the Joint Staff Department, Political Work Department, Logistics Support Department, and Equipment Development Department. Since 2017, military reforms have been making steady progress with the start of what are called full-scale “below-the-neck” military reforms at the field level. For example, the expansion of the Navy Marine Corps, whose missions include amphibious landing operations, has been confirmed along with the unification of PAP leadership and command system under the CMC, and the reorganization of 18 Group Armies into 13, a reduction of 300,000 soldiers, the transfer of the coast guard to the PAP, etc. It is considered that these series of reforms are designed to build more practical military forces by improving their joint operational capabilities and strengthening the military’s readiness, including the development of military capabilities and organizational management in peacetime. In addition, it has been noted that the reorganization of the headquarters is a means of tackling corruption at the center of the military by decentralizing the leading organs. Since the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017, many members seen as connected deeply to Chairman Xi have been appointed to the CMC. It has been noted that many officers trusted deeply by Chairman Xi have been promoted to senior positions and the rank of general. Given these points, it is thought that （2）Nuclear and Missile Forces China has continued independent efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missiles for their delivery since the mid-1950s, indicating its apparent attempt to ensure nuclear deterrence, supplement its conventional forces with nuclear capabilities and secure its influence on the international community. It is regarded that China’s nuclear strategy is to deter any nuclear attack on its territory by maintaining a nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a limited number of targets such as cities in adversary countries, should China be subject to nuclear attacks. China has explained that it is committed to “no first use” of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, to “unconditional negative security assurance” that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally, and to keeping its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. In recent years, however, doubts have been expressed about the explanation.[6] China is viewed as having given priority to conventional missile capabilities since the 1990s because of the growing significance of precision-strike capabilities in the global military trend. China is expected to continue to attach importance to its nuclear and missile forces. **Chapter** China possesses ballistic missiles of various types and ranges, including ICBMs, SLBMs, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)/medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The update of China’s ballistic missile forces from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant system is improving their survivability and readiness. Moreover, it is believed that China is working to increase their performance by such means as extending ranges, improving targeting accuracy, and employing maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). According to “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China ” U S DoD (May 2019) ----- China s main ICBMs, its strategic nuclear asset, had been the fi xed-site liquid-propellant DF-5 missiles. However, China has in recent years deployed the DF-31, which is a mobile-type ICBM with a solid propellant system mounted onto a transporter erector launcher (TEL). China is developing the new DF-41 ICBM, which is viewed to be able to fl y up to approximately 11,200 km and carry 10 warheads. It made its fi rst appearance in the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 2019. With regard to SLBMs, it is considered that Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to carry the JL-2 SLBMs with the estimated rage of approximately 8,000 km are operational. It is believed that China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve signifi cantly through nuclear deterrence patrols using the Jin-class SSBNs. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China is also developing the JL-3 SLBM with the extended range of 12,000 to 14,000 km and a new SSBN for carrying the JL-3. China’s missile forces have been put outside the framework are viewed as capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. China possesses ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), called “carrier killer,” which carries conventional warheads to attack overwater ships including aircraft carriers. The DF-26, which has a range including Guam and is called “Guam killer,” is considered a “second-generation ASBM” developed on the basis of the DF-21D. It was announced in April 2018 that the DF-21D had “formally joined the order of battle.” China also possesses the CJ-20 (CJ-10) long-range land-attack cruise missile with a range of at least 1,500 km, as well as the H-6 bomber that is capable of carrying this cruise missile. It is deemed that these missiles complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Indo-Pacifi c region including Japan. In the military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of its founding in October 2019, CJ-100/DF-100, which is said to be a supersonic cruise missile, also made its fi rst public appearance. The deployment of these ASBMs and cruise missiles is expected to strengthen China’s “A2/ AD” capabilities. Concerning SRBMs, China has deployed a large number of solid-propellant DF-16, DF-15, and DF-11 missiles facing Taiwan. It is believed that their ranges cover a part of Japan’s Southwestern Islands including the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, China is believed to be rapidly developing several HGVs that would be launched with ballistic missiles to penetrate missile defenses. Their fl ight tests have reportedly been conducted since 2014. In the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019, the DF-17 MRBM viewed as capable of carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle made its fi rst public appearance. In August 2018, China is believed to have tested a hypersonic vehicle featuring the “waverider” design. These vehicles are said to be more diffi cult for missiles to intercept, because they fl y low at very high speeds and are highly maneuverable. **Chapter** of the U.S.-Russia INF Treaty and include numerous ground launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km that had been subjected to the INF treaty. As for the IRBMs/ MRBMs covering the Indo-Pacifi c region including Japan, China has the mobile solid-propellant DF-21 and DF-26, which can be transported and operated on TELs. These DF-41 ICBM Specifications, performance Maximum firing range: 11,200 km Description New intercontinental-range ballistic missile showcased for the fi rst time at the military 【Imaginechina/Jiji Press Photo】 parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019. Viewed as capable of carrying 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and having attack capabilities with high accuracy. JL-2 SLBMs Specifications, performance Maximum firing range: 8,000 km Description Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) viewed as strategic nuclear forces of Chinese 【Avalon/Jiji Press Photo】 Navy. It is considered that China is developing JL-3 SLBMs (maximum range 12,000 km to 14,000 km) with extend ranges for further strengthening strategic nuclear forces. DF-17 MRBMs Specifications, performance Maximum firing range: 1,800 km - 2,500 km Description Medium-range ballistic missiles viewed as having been developed 【Avalon/Jiji Press Photo】 based on DF-16 SRBMs and as being capable of carrying a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV). Showcased for the fi rst time at the military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019. ----- **Chapter** **Fig. I-2-2-2** Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing) (image) New York Washington D. C. Chicago 11,200km Los Angeles 13,000km London San Francisco Paris 5,500km Anchorage 5,000km Moscow 2,800km 2,150km Hawaii Beijing Pyongyang New Delhi Tokyo 2,150km Maximum range of DF-21, DF-21A/B/C/D/E Okinawa Guam 2,800km Maximum range of DF-3, DF-3A 5,000km Maximum range of DF-26 5,500km Maximum range of DF-4 Jakarta 11,200km Maximum range of DF-31, DF-31A/AG 13,000km Maximum range of DF-5, DF-5A/B Canberra Note : The fgure above is for illustrative purpose, showing the range of each missile from Beijing. **Fig. I-2-2-3** Number of China’s Ground-Launched Ballistic Missiles Fired in the Past (Number of launchers) 600 500 400 300 200 100 ICBM DF-41 ICBM DF-5/A/B ICBM DF-31/A/AG IRBM DF-4 IRBM DF-26 MRBM DF-3/A MRBM DF-21/A/B/C/D/E MRBM DF-17 SRBM DF-16 SRBM DF-15/A/B SRBM DF-11/A IRBM ICBM MRBM SRBM 1991 2001 2011 2020 (Year) ※ The numbers of launchers, missiles, and warheads of ballistic missiles possessed by China are not publicized. ※ This data classifes the number of launchers possessed by China into ICBM, IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM according to the general standard based on “The Military Balance” of each year. China is also thought to be devoting energies to the development of missile defense technology. It is believed to have conducted several tests on midcourse missile interception technology since 2010. In October 2019, Russian President Putin noted that Russia was supporting China’s development of “a missile-attack early warning system.” Given that ballistic missile defense technology has the potential to be applied to missiles capable of destroying satellites, attention will focus on future Chinese missile defense trends including ballistic missile defense technology See Fig. I-2-2-2 (Range of Ballistic Missiles from China [Beijing] [image]) Fig. 1-2-2-3 (Number of China’s Ground-Launched Ballistic Missiles Fired in the Past) （3）Ground Forces China has the third largest ground forces in the world, following India and North Korea, with approximately 980,000 personnel. China has sought to improve the ----- Liberation Army [image]) （4）Naval Forces downsizing, multifunctionality, and modularization of military units. Specifi cally, it is believed to be improving ground forces’ mobility using measures such as shifting from theater defense to trans-theater mobility and working to motorize and mechanize infantry units. China is also believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the Air Force), amphibious forces belonging to the Army and Navy, special operations forces, and helicopter units. China has continued to build up the Navy Marine Corps, which is expected to have more than 30,000 troops by 2020 and undertake overseas expedition operations in addition to amphibious assault landing operations and regional defense in the South China Sea.[7] China undertakes efforts to build a command system for improving its joint operational capabilities and operational effi ciency and tackles reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities. China has annually conducted Stride, Firepower, and Sharp The naval forces consist of three fl eets: North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. China’s naval forces are rapidly modernizing, and the Chinese Navy promotes the mass production of its indigenous Yuan-class submarines with improved quietness, as well as surface combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities. In January 2020, the Navy commissioned the fi rst Renhai class destroyer among its largest destroyers. The Renhai class destroyer is said to be equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) with 112 launch cells, almost twice the number of launch cells as the new Luyang III-class destroyer. The VLS is capable of launching long-range land-attack cruise missiles and YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles with a supersonic terminal attack capability. In addition, the Navy is increasing the number of large landing ships and supply ships. Since September 2019, Type-075 large landing ships have been launched in sequence. Since September 2017, Fuyu-class fast combat support ships (comprehensive supply ships) have been in operation for replenishment for the aircraft carrier group. It has also been pointed out that China is developing new submarines capable of carrying land attack cruise missiles. With regard to aircraft carriers, China’s fi rst aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” following its commission in September 2012, reportedly made its fi rst advance to the South China Sea in November 2013 and to the Pacifi c Ocean in December 2016. In the same month of 2016, the “Liaoning” conducted its fi rst comprehensive live action, including live fi ring by carrier based fi ghters, in the Bohai Sea. It was announced that the “Liaoning” participated in a naval review in the South China Sea and advanced to the Pacifi c Ocean for force-on-force **Chapter** Sword maneuver-exercises that cut across multiple regions. They are aiming at verifying and improving the capabilities necessary to deploy army troops to remote areas, such as long-distance maneuvering capabilities of the Army, and logistical support capabilities that include mobilizing militias and public transportation. China has also conducted combined military branch and service exercises under Joint Action since 2014. Furthermore, it has been reported that force-on-force training has been frequently conducted to improve practical operational capabilities. These facts suggest China’s attempt to improve its practical joint operational capabilities. See Fig. I-2-2-4 (Deployment and Strength of the People’s Unmanned underwater vehicles exhibited at the 70th anniversary of China’s founding (October 2019) 【Avalon/Jiji Press Photo】 Aircraft carrier “Shandong” Specifications, performance Full-load displacement: 66,000 tons Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h) On-board aircraft: 36 J-15 fi ghters Description 【Avalon/Jiji Press Photo】 China’s fi rst indigenous ski-jump fl ight deck carrier, an improved version of the Liaoning. Commissioned in Sanya of Hainan Island facing the South China Sea in December 2019. A di t th l t “Milit d S it D l t I l i th P l ' R bli f Chi ” U S D D (M 2019) ----- **Chapter** **Fig. I-2-2-4** Deployment and Strength of the People’s Liberation Army (image) Central Theater (Headquarters: Beijing) Northern Theater (Headquarters: Shenyang) Shijiazhuang Jinan Qingdao Lanzhou Western Theater (Headquarters: Chengdu) Ningbo Southern Theater Fuzhou Eastern Theater (Headquarters: Guangzhou) (Headquarters: Nanjing) Nanning Zhanjiang 50 0km Notes: 1.●Theater headquarters Theater Army organization Theater Navy headquarters 2. Theater boundaries have not been officially announced. The above map is prepared based on U.S. DoD reports, media reports, etc. **China** **Taiwan (Reference)** Total military forces Approx. 2.04 million troops Approx. 0.16 million troops Ground troops Approx. 0.98 million troops Approx. 90,000 troops Ground Type-99/A, Type-96/A, M-60A, M-48A/H and others forces Tanks, etc. Type-88A/B and others Approx. 6,200 vehicles Approx. 700 vehicles Warships Approx. 750 vessels 1,970,000 tons Approx. 230 vessels 200,000 tons Aircraft carriers, Maritime destroyers, Approx. 90 vessels Approx. 30 vessels forces and frigates Submarines Approx. 70 vessels 4 vessels Marines Approx. 30,000 troops Approx. 10,000 troops Combat aircraft Approx. 3,020 aircraft Approx. 520 aircraft J-10 × 468 Su-27/J-11 × 349 Su-30 × 97 Mirage 2000 × 55 Air forces Su-35 × 24 F-16 × 143 Modern fighter aircraft J-15 × 20 Ching-kuo × 127 J-16 × 60 (Fourth generation fighters (total): 325) J-20 × 22 (Fourth and fifth generation fighters (total): 1,080) Population Approx. 1.397 billion Approx. 24 million The last conscripts were enlisted before the end of Reference 2018. However, the obligation to undergo four Term of service 2 years months of military training is being maintained for those born in or after 1994. Note: Data from “The Military Balance 2020,” etc. training including carrier-based fighters from March to April 2018. China’s first indigenous aircraft carrier (its second carrier) was launched in April 2017 and then it was named Shandong and commissioned in Sanya of Hainan Island in December 2019. The Shandong, with a ski-jump flight deck, is an improved version of the “Liaoning,” reportedly carrying a greater number of aircraft than the “Liaoning.” China is reportedly building its second indigenous aircraft carrier, which could be equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system to operate fixed-wing early warning aircraft. It has also been pointed out that China has plans to build nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. China is believed to have been developing and deploying unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned ----- the world s largest maritime law enforcement organizations, possessing 130 ships with full displacement of 1,000 tons or more,[8] including two 10,000-ton-class patrol ships, among the world’s largest ones. Some Coast Guard ships have been confirmed as armed with 76 mm guns that may be as powerful as large-diameter guns on naval ships. The organizational enhancement of the Coast Guard has also been confirmed. China’s maritime surveillance had been conducted by the China Coast Guard Bureau under control of the State Council’s Ministry of Public Security, as a unified body consisting of the China Marine Surveillance (Haijian) of the State Oceanic Administration under the Ministry of Natural Resources, the China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (Yuzheng) of the Fisheries Management Bureau under the Ministry of Agriculture, the Maritime Anti Smuggling Force of the General Administration of Customs, etc. In July 2018, the Coast Guard was transferred to the PAP under unified control and command of the CMC and renamed PAP Coast Guard. After the transfer, former naval officers were reportedly given major Coast Guard posts, indicating enhanced cooperation between the military and Coast Guard. It has been noted that retired naval destroyers and frigates were delivered to the Coast Guard, suggesting that the military has been supporting the Coast Guard in terms of equipment as well as personnel. At a ceremony to give the PAP a flag in January 2018, A 10,000-ton class Coast Guard vessel, the largest of its kind in the world [provided by the Japan Coast Guard] underwater vehicles (UUVs) that are available for military purposes. Such equipment, though being relatively cheap, are viewed as representing an asymmetric force to effectively prevent adversaries from winning maritime supremacy, particularly underwater supremacy. Given these developments concerning the naval forces, China appears to be steadily building up capabilities for conducting operations in more distant waters in addition to near sea defense. The PAP, one of the China’s armed forces other than the military, has the Coast Guard as a maritime law enforcement organization under its umbrella. The Coast Guard consists of three groups: North, East and South Sea Sub-bureaus. Chinese government ships belonging to the Coast Guard have recently been designed to be larger and armed. At the end of 2019, the China Coast Guard was viewed as one of **Chapter** |Gen Adminis of Cu|eral tration stoms| |---|---| |Minis Tran|try of sport| |---|---| ||| |China M Saf Admini|aritime ety stration| ||| |China Maritime Safety Administration Maritime traffic management|| **Fig. I-2-2-5** The Coast Guard’s Transfer to the PAP Central Military Commission State Council (central government) （※1 ） Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of General Ministry of Public Security Natural Agriculture and Administration Transport Militia PLA PAP Resources Rural Affairs of Customs Fisheries China Maritime Management Safety Bureau Administration （※2 ） China Coast Guard China Maritime China China Marine Bureau of General Safety Coast Guard Surveillance Fisheries Administration Administration of Customs Maritime traffic management Protect maritime interests (Crackdown on crime, maintenance of maritime security and protection of safety, resources development, fishery management, crackdown on trafficking, etc.) ※1 Unification of PAP leadership and command system (January 1, 2018) ※2 Transfer of the Coast Guard to the PAP (July 1, 2018) (Reference) The scope of the China Coast Guard that is transferred to the PAP and placed under its command is not published. Units enclosed by a red dotted line belonged to the China Coast Guard before the realignment (2013). According to “Japan Coast G ard Ann al Report 2020 ” Japan Coast G ard ----- as well, the Air Force has increased the number of H-6 bombers, which are believed to be capable of carrying long range land-attack cruise missiles with nuclear capability. In an attempt to improve bombers’ long-range operation capabilities, the Air Force has reportedly begun to operate H-6N bombers that can take advantage of aerial refueling to fl y longer. It is believed to be developing a new long-range stealth bomber called H-20. It is also pointed out that China is developing an air-launched ballistic missile with nuclear capability to be carried by such bombers, and a stealth fi ghter bomber. China is also making continuous efforts to improve capabilities which are essential for operations of modern air power by introducing the H-6U and IL-78M aerial refueling tankers and the KJ-500 and KJ-2000 early warning and control aircraft. Since July 2016, China has promoted the deployment of the indigenously developed Y-20 large transport aircraft, which has reportedly become a base for Chairman Xi stated that the PAP would be incorporated into the military forces’ joint operations system. It has been pointed out that the military forces and the Coast Guard have conducted joint exercises. The military forces and the PAP including the Coast Guard are believed to be attempting to steadily strengthen their joint operational capabilities through the enhancement of cooperation. Given these trends, progress in cooperation between the Coast Guard and the Navy and between the Coast Guard and military services other than the Navy should be watched closely. It is pointed out that, among the militia, whose status is China’s armed force other than the military, the so-called maritime militia is playing the role of the front guard for supporting China’s maritime interests. The maritime militia is said to operate in the South China Sea, etc. and consist of fi shermen and residents of isolated islands. However, the details of the maritime militia have not been revealed. In March 2009, when Chinese naval and other ships intercepted the Impeccable, a U.S. Navy ocean surveillance ship, maritime militia members were reportedly seen aboard a fi shing boat that was trying to remove a sonar from the U.S. ship. In 2019 when Chinese maritime survey ships were operating in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, maritime militia ships were reportedly seen along with Chinese government ships. Given the China’s emphasis on the necessity of “fully exerting the overall power of the military, **Chapter** police and militia” on the seas, attention should be paid to these asymmetrical forces, too. See Fig. 1-2-2-5 (The Coast Guard’s Transfer to the PAP) GJ-11 UAV exhibited at the military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of China’s founding (October 2019) 【Avalon/Jiji Press Photo】 （5）Air Forces China’s air forces consist mainly of the Navy’s air units and the Air Force. As for fourth-generation fi ghters, China has introduced from Russia the Su-27 and Su-30 and the Su 35 latest fourth-generation fi ghter. China is also developing its own domestic modern fi ghters. China has started the mass production of the J-11B fi ghter, a suspected copy of the Su 27, and the J-16 fi ghter, a suspected copy of the Su-30, as well as the domestic J-10 fi ghter. The J-15 fi ghter aboard the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” is viewed as a copy of the Russian Su-33. China has also reportedly begun to deploy the J-20 fi fth-generation fi ghter and been developing the J-31. It has been pointed out that the J-31 fi ghter could be the base for developing the replacement for the J-15 carrier-based fi ghter. J-20 fi ghter Specifications, performance Maximum speed: 3,063 km/h Description A fifth-generation stealth fighter jet. The Chinese Ministr y of National Defense announced in 【Imaginechina/Jiji Press Photo】 February 2018 that the J-20 has started to be delivered to operational units. As China is continuing the modernization of its bombers H-6 bomber Specifications, performance Maximum speed: 1,015 km/h Main armament (H-6K): Air-to- surface cruise missiles (maximum firing range 1,500 km) Description Indigenous bomber. The H-6 can carry cruise missiles (CJ-20) that can be loaded with nuclear warheads. ----- developing aerial refueling tankers and other mission support aircraft. China is rapidly developing a variety of domestic long-endurance (HALE) UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes as well as those capable of carrying weapons such as missiles. Some of these are deployed and actively exported. In fact, it is suggested that the Chinese Air Force has created a UAV unit for attack missions and frequently used UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes in waters and airspace surrounding China. At the military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019, the GJ-11 known as a stealth attack UAV and the WZ-8 claimed to be a high-altitude, high-speed reconnaissance UAV were displayed for the first time. It has been noted that China is improving “Swarm” technology to operate a large number of small low-cost UAVs. Given such modernization of the air forces, it is believed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including high-altitude, **Fig. I-2-2-6** Buildup of Chinese Government Ships (Vessels) 160 120 100 80 40 20 **Chapter** that China is steadily improving not only its defense capabilities for its national airspace but also capabilities for conducting combat operations, and supporting ground and maritime forces in more distant areas. See Fig. I-2-2-6 (Buildup of Chinese Government Ships) See Fig. 1-2-2-7 (Major Chinese Navy and Air Forces) 0 2012 2014 2017 2019 **136136** **130130** **8282** **6666** **6262** **51** **5454** **4040** Japan Coast Guard patrol ships: 1,000 ton-class or more (total tonnage) *1 China’s maritime law enforcement vessels: 1,000 ton-class or more (full-load displacement) *2 ＊1 Number of ships as of the end of FY2019 ＊2 Number of vessels as of the end of December 2019; Estimation based on publicized information (may be altered in the future) ※ According to “Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2020,” Japan Coast Guard **Fig. I-2-2-7** Major Chinese Navy and Air Forces **Modern submarines** **Modern destroyers and frigates** (Number of vessels) (Number of vessels) 60 80 50 60 40 50 30 20 20 10 10 **5252** [0] 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 1920 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 1920 **6767** [0] ※ Total number of Jin-class, Shang-class, Song-class, ※1 Total number of Luhu-class, Luhai-class, Sovremenny-class, Luyang-class Yuan-class and Kilo-class submarines and Luzhou-class destroyers, and Jiangwei-class and Jiangkai-class frigates ※2 Additionally, China also has 42 Jiangdao-class corvettes (2020). **Fourth and ffth generation fghters** (Number of aircraft) 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 **1,080** **0** 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 20 Su-27(J-11) Su-30 Su-35 J-10 J-15 J-16 J-20 ----- （6）Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Spectrum Capabilities Information gathering, and command and communication in the military sector have increasingly relied on satellites and computer networks. As such, China stated that “outer space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights (capture point) in strategic competition among all parties,” indicating that it has recognized the importance of taking on information mastery in wartime when it must protect its own information systems and networks while neutralizing those of its adversaries. In fact, the PLASSF established at the end of 2015 apparently takes charge of outer space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare missions for intelligence support for all military forces. covering both attacks on and defense of command systems. Cyberattacks on enemy networks are likely to bolster China’s “A2/AD” capabilities. The militia as a part of China’s armed forces reportedly includes “cyber militias” with excellent cyber domain capabilities. It has also been pointed out that the Chinese military routinely conducts various force-on-force exercises in an electronic warfare environment. In addition, the presence of aircraft with electronic warfare capabilities has been noted. Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft, which frequently fly near Japan, are pointed out along with J-15 carrier-based fighters, J-16 fighters and H-6 bombers that appear to be equipped with electronic warfare pod systems giving them electronic warfare capabilities. **Chapter** In its white paper titled “China’s Space Activities” and （7）Efforts to Develop Joint Operational Capabilities In recent years, initiatives have been under way to improve joint operational capabilities in areas from the front line to logistics. The CMC Joint Operations Command Center is believed to have been established under the initiatives for the CCP to carry out decision making at the highest strategic level. The five new theaters established in February 2016 are seen as representing permanent joint operation headquarters. Given that the Navy’s Vice-Admiral Yuan Yubai became the first non-Army theater commander in January 2017, it is assumed that progress is being made towards joint operations in the area of human resources. In recent years, China has implemented tri-service joint exercises giving priority to practicality and other drills to improve its joint operational capabilities. These drills are apparently designed to secure the effectiveness of the abovementioned organizational reforms and other initiatives to improve joint operational capabilities. In response to the novel coronavirus disease, which emerged in China from late 2019, China has reportedly implemented not only joint military operations but also the mobilization of civil resources. The Joint Logistics Support Force specialized in logistics has played a core military role in the response while receiving support from each theater and service. In addition, militias and national-defense-mobilized personnel have also reportedly participated in the response, which has attracted attention as a case indicating comprehensive joint released in December 2016, China does not rule out its use of outer space for military purposes. Given that administrative organizations and state-owned enterprises involved in the use of outer space in China are pointed out as having close cooperative ties with the military, it is considered that China is planning to improve its capabilities for military operations in outer space.[9] China is said to have developed its space program in the shortest time in the world. Specifically, China has rapidly increased the number of satellites available for military purposes in recent years. For example, the “BeiDou” global satellite positioning system, which is called a Chinese-version GPS and pointed out as available for ballistic missiles and other guided weapons systems, started its global operation service in late 2018 and has reportedly been continuing to be improved. Moreover, China is thought to be developing weapons including anti-satellite weapons using missiles and laser equipment, as well as killer satellites, in order to restrict and interfere with the use of space-based assets by adversaries in wartime.[10] As for the cyber domain, China sees cyber security as a serious national security threat it faces and vows that China’s armed forces will build cyber defense capabilities, reinforce national cyber border defense, immediately find and block crackers, secure information network security, and unshakably protect national cyber sovereignty, information security, and social stability.[11] It has been noted that current major military exercises always contain cyber operations logistic support capabilities. 9 According to “The Worldwide Threat Assessment,” the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (January 2019) 10 According to “The Worldwide Threat Assessment,” the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (January 2019) 11 According to the defense white paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (July 2019) ----- （2）Military Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and Airspace The Chinese Navy and Air Force have in recent years expanded and intensified their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, including the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. These activities include those allegedly based on China’s unilateral claim on the Senkaku Islands, and cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities, creating a situation of great concern to Japan. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has continued to make frequent scrambles against Chinese aircraft, as indicated by an all-time high of 851 scrambles in FY2016. China has also continued naval ships’ passage through waters near Japan for navigation to distant waters such as the Indian Ocean, as well as activities viewed as training of maritime and air forces making forays to the Pacific and the Sea of Japan. Although China can be suspected of intending to “regularize” these activities, there is a view that China is attempting to take advantage of the “regularization” to alleviate concerns over these activities.[12] At the same time, it appears that China continues to improve the complexity of its activities. Given that Chinese efforts are also seen to improve practical joint operational capabilities, Chinese military activities in Japan’s surrounding waters and airspace should be closely watched with grave attention. a. Activities in the East China Sea (including the Areas around the Senkaku Islands) Given that General Secretary Xi spoke about enhancing joint operational capabilities at the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017 and has reiterated the pursuit of a military that “can fight and win a war,” the abovementioned moves towards joint operations are expected to progress further. **6** Maritime and Airspace Activities （1）General Situation Recently, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities for operations in more distant waters and airspace, including those to project power to waters including the so called second island chain, beyond the first island chain. In such efforts, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the maritime and aerial domains using its naval and air powers. In waters and airspace surrounding Japan, particularly, Chinese naval vessels, and naval and air force aircraft suspected as conducting training and information gathering activities have been observed frequently, along with Chinese naval ships heading for the Pacific and Indian Ocean and numerous Chinese Coast Guard ships and aircraft operating under the name of protecting maritime interests. Their activities include Chinese government ships’ intermittent intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters, Chinese aircraft’s intrusions into Japan’s airspace, and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences, such as the directing of fire-control radar at Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) ships and aircraft, Chinese military fighter jets’ abnormally close approach to Japanese SDF and U.S. military aircraft, and the establishment of the “East China Sea ADIZ” and other activities that could infringe upon the freedom of overflight. These activities have become a grave matter of concern and are very deplorable. In the South China Sea, China is moving forward with militarization, and expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains, attempting to create a fait accompli for unilaterally changing the status quo by coercion. It is strongly hoped that China will act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law and play active roles in the region and the international community in a more cooperative manner. **Chapter** Chinese naval vessels have been conducting operations in the East China Sea continuously and actively. Stating its own position regarding Japan’s Senkaku Islands, China claims that patrols by Chinese naval vessels in the sea areas under its jurisdiction are completely justifiable and lawful. Chinese naval vessels have been continuously operating in the areas near Japan’s Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a Jiangkai I-class frigate became the first ever Chinese Navy combatant vessel to enter Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, in January 2018, a Shang class submerged submarine and a Jiangkai II-class frigate passed into the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands on the same day. This was the first time a submerged Chinese submarine was identified and announced as transiting through the contiguous waters off the Senkaku Islands. In recent years, Chinese Navy intelligence gathering vessels (AGIs) have also been found conducting activities in multiple cases. A Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI 12 According to Taiwan’s 2009 National Defense Report ----- repeatedly navigated back and forth outside of the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands in November 2015. In June 2016, an AGI of the same type sailed in Japan’s territorial waters near Kuchinoerabujima Island and Yakushima Island, and then passed Japan’s contiguous zone north of Kitadaitojima Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly conducted east-west passages outside the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands. This was the first navigation by a Chinese Navy vessel in Japanese territorial waters in the approximately 12 years since 2004. China’s air forces are also actively conducting activities in the East China Sea on a routine basis. Their activities are thought to include warning and surveillance, combat air patrols (CAPs), and training. Chinese military aircraft have recently become more active in airspace closer to Japan’s Southwestern Islands. Their activities have possibly been intended to operate the “East China Sea ADIZ.” In April 2018, an alleged Chinese BZK-005 unmanned reconnaissance vehicle was identified flying over the East China Sea. Furthermore, Chinese military aircraft have been confirmed as operating in airspace close to the Senkaku Islands in recent years. b. Advancements into the Pacific Ocean Chinese Navy combatant vessels continue to transit the waters near Japan to advance into the Pacific Ocean and return to base with high frequency. The advancement routes are multiplying. Chinese naval vessels have been confirmed as transiting the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and have been found passing through the Osumi Strait, the sea area between Yonagunijima Island and Nakanokamishima Island near Iriomotejima Island, the sea area between Amamioshima Island and Yokoatejima Island, the Tsugaru Strait, and the Soya Strait. Through these activities, China has apparently attempted to “regularize” naval ships’ advancements into the Pacific Ocean through waters near Japan and improve its capabilities for accessing the open ocean and conducting operations there. In December 2016, the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” navigated the East China Sea together with other vessels and passed the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to advance to the Pacific for the first time. In April 2018, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” and multiple other vessels passed through the Bashi Channel to advance to the Pacific and conducted force-on-force exercises that included carrier-based fighters. At that time, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), conducting warning and surveillance, confirmed for the first time the carrier used for what were presumed to be carrier-based fighters for take-off and landing in the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” advanced to the Pacific Ocean through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima island in June 2019, together with vessels such as a Fuyu-class fast combat support ship pointed out to be for supplying the aircraft carrier group. Furthermore, in April 2020, a fleet, including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” passed through the waters of the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima island to enter the Pacific Ocean, and deployed through the Bashi Strait to the South China Sea. Later, the fleet again passed through the Bashi Strait and entered the Pacific Ocean. Within the same month it passed through the waters of the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima island to the East China Sea. In this voyage, carrier-based fighters have been seen taking-off and landing in the Pacific too. The activities are worthy of attention as indicating the enhancement of the capabilities of China’s naval forces, including the aircraft carrier, and the improvement of its capabilities to project power to more distant areas. Given a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine’s submerged passage through Japan’s territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands in November 2004 and a Chinese Navy Shang-class submarine’s submerged passage from the Pacific Ocean toward the East China Sea through Japan’s contiguous zone northeast of Miyakojima Island in January 2018, it is thought that Chinese submarines also have conducted some activities in the Pacific. Regarding air forces, the advancement of a PLAN Y-8 early warning aircraft into the Pacific Ocean, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, was confirmed for the first time in July 2013. The advancement of Air Force aircraft into the Pacific was also confirmed in 2015. Since 2017, advances into the Pacific Ocean via this airspace have become more active. The types of aircraft passing through the airspace have also diversified year by year. H-6K bombers and Su-30 fighters were confirmed by 2016 and the first Y-8 EW aircraft in July 2017. At least one bomber was confirmed as carrying objects in the form of missiles. The U.S. DoD has pointed out that such Chinese bomber flights **Chapter** ----- indicated the Chinese forces training targeting the United States and its allies.[13] Flight patterns of Chinese military aircraft have also been changing. Flights from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and from the direction of the Bashi Channel to the Pacific Ocean, both with the return trips on the same shuttle routes, have been repeatedly made. Since November 2016, H-6K bombers and other aircraft were confirmed as flying around Taiwan. In August 2017, H-6K bombers were confirmed as flying to waters off the Kii Peninsula after advancing to the Pacific Ocean via waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island. Through frequent long-distance flights of bombers and other aircraft, including advancements to the Pacific, and their advanced flight paths and composition, China is thought to be demonstrating its presence around areas including those surrounding Japan, and planning further enhancements to more practical operational capabilities. Additionally, activities considered planned to improve sea and air joint operational capabilities in more distant areas, such as what seemed to be air-to-ship attack drills including advancements to the Pacific Ocean, have been seen in recent years. In April 2019 and February 2020, the PLA Eastern Theater Command announced that joint training was conducted in waters east of Taiwan. China is expected to further expand and intensify naval and air activities in the Pacific Ocean. c. Activities in the Sea of Japan China Coast Guard vessels repeatedly intruding into the Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands [provided by the Japan Coast Guard] Prefecture and the Korean Peninsula). **Chapter** Since 2018, China’s sea and air forces have further intensified activities in the Sea of Japan involving passages through the Tsushima Strait. It is considered that the PLA will continue to expand and intensify its activities in the Sea of Japan. （3）Activities of Chinese Ships Including Government Vessels, and Aircraft around the Senkaku Islands, etc. Chinese government vessels have been seen almost every day in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands, Japan’s inherent territory, and intruded into Japan’s territorial waters around the islands three times a month on average. Despite Japan’s strong protests, they continued to intrude into the Japanese territorial waters in FY2019. In May 2020, Chinese government vessels entered Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands for three consecutive days. From May 9 to 10, they continued to cruise in Japan’s territorial waters for more than 26 hours and approached and followed a Japanese fishing boat. While the Chinese Navy has been active in the Sea of Japan during training and on other occasions for some time, its Air Force activities in the area have also intensified of late. “Force-on-force exercises” in the Sea of Japan by Chinese Navy ships were announced for the first time in August 2016. Three aircraft apparently participated in the exercises, including two H-6 bombers that passed through the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of Japan for the first time. In December 2017, Chinese Air Force aircraft (H-6K In December 2008, China Maritime Surveillance vessels intruded into Japan’s territorial waters and hovered and drifted, running counter to international law. Later, China Maritime Surveillance and China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels gradually intensified their activities in the Japanese territorial waters. Such activities have intensified greatly since September 2012, when the Japanese Government acquired the ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsurishima Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island). The number of Chinese government ships intruding into the Japanese territorial waters in a day had been limited to two or three until August 2016. Later, bombers) passed through the Tsushima Strait and advanced to the Sea of Japan for the first time. Then, Chinese fighter aircraft (Su-30 fighters) were confirmed as advancing to the Sea of Japan for the first time. In February 2018, it was confirmed for the first time that the Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft entered the Sea of Japan via the Western Channel of Tsushima Strait (the strait between Tsushima in Nagasaki however, the number has reached four frequently. 13 According to “Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China ” U S DOD (August 2018) ----- China is seen to be steadily strengthening an operational posture intended to use government vessels to intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. Specifi cally, government vessels sent to waters near the Senkaku Islands have grown larger in size. At least one of the government vessels intruding into Japan’s territorial waters has been a 3,000-ton or larger vessel since August 2014. Since February 2015, three 3,000-ton or larger government vessels have been confi rmed as entering Japan’s territorial waters simultaneously. Since December 2015, Chinese government ships armed with what appear to be cannons have repeatedly intruded into the Japanese territorial waters. Cases indicating the improvement of Chinese government vessels’ operational capabilities have been also confi rmed. From April to June 2019, Chinese government vessels were seen in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands for a record 64 consecutive days. In that year, the number of days when Chinese government vessels were seen in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands hit an all-time high of 282. The total number of Chinese government vessels seen in the zone also reached an all-time high of 1,097. Additionally, cases indicating China’s capabilities to send numerous government vessels to waters around the Senkaku Islands simultaneously have also been identifi ed. In early August 2016, approximately 200 to 300 Chinese fi shing boats advanced to the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands. At that time, as many as up to 15 Chinese government vessels were confi rmed in the contiguous zone simultaneously. Over fi ve days, a large number of Chinese government vessels and fi shing boats repeatedly intruded into Japan’s territorial waters. In December 2012, a fi xed-wing aircraft of the State Oceanic Administration was identifi ed as the fi rst Chinese aircraft to intrude into Japan’s airspace around the Senkaku Islands. Until March 2014, aircraft of the State Oceanic Administration were frequently confi rmed as approaching the airspace. In May 2017, it was confi rmed that an object that appeared to be a small drone was fl ying above a Chinese government vessel intruding into the Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. This fl ight also constitutes an invasion of Japan’s territorial airspace. China has thus relentlessly continued attempts to **Chapter** unilaterally change the status quo by coercion in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands, leading to a grave matter **Fig. I-2-2-8** PLA’s Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image) Examples of the PLA Navy and Air Force confirmed around Japan (photos: MSDF/ASDF) LegendLegend Sea powerSea power Air powerAir power Shang-class submarine Aircraft carrier “Liaoning” H-6 bomber Su-30 fighter Frequent advancement into the Pacific Ocean Advancement of bombers all the way passing between to the area off the Kii Peninsula Okinawa and Miyakojima (August 2017) Island Flight of a carrier-based TokyoTokyo fighter (including estimates) in the Pacific Ocean (April Amami Amami 2018 and April 2020) Oshima IslandOshima Island Miyakojima Okinawa Island Sea of JapanSea of Japan The PLA Navy Yonagunijima IslandYonagunijima Island and Air Force’s Senkaku Islands activities in the TaiwanTaiwan East China Sea Frequent advancement China-Russia joint naval into the Sea of Japan Underwater submarine and exercise “Joint Sea 2017” NingboNingbo destroyer’s intrusions into the contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands (January 2018) Long-distance joint flight of Chinese and Russian bombers from the Sea of Japan to China-Russia joint naval the East China Sea exercise “Joint Sea 2019” QingdaoQingdao 500km *Locations, wakes, etc. include images and estimates. ----- **Fig. I-2-2-9** Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships’ Activities around the Southwestern Islands and the Soya and Tsugaru Straits **Fig. I-2-2-10** Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft’s Passage between the Main Island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island **Fig. I-2-2-11** Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships’ Passage through the Tsushima Strait (Times) 25 20 15 10 (Times) 20 15 (Times) 18 16 14 12 10 10 5 0 **1818** **1010** **66** **55** **55** **55** **55** **11** 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 (Year) ※ The fgure for 2020 is as of the end of March. 0 **1717** **1010** **66** **44** **22** **22** **22** **11** **11** **11** **00** **00** **00** 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 (Year) ※ The fgure for 2020 is as of the end of March. **2121** **1414** **1515** **15 1415** **14** **1313** **1212** **1212** **55** **44** **3** **22** **11** 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ※ The fgure for 2020 is as of the end of March. **Fig. I-2-2-12** Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft’s Passage through the Tsushima Strait (Times) 10 (Year) **Chapter** **Fig. I-2-2-13** Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft (Times) 1,000 800 600 400 200 **851** **638 [675]** **571** **500** **415 [464]** **306** **156** **107** **96** **6** **0** **2** **13** **22** **43** **31** **38** 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 **8** **5** **3** **2** **1** 16 17 18 19 20 (Year) ※ The fgure for 2020 is as of the end of March. **Fig. I-2-2-14** Chinese Government Vessels’ Activities around the Senkaku Islands **Changes in number of days on which Chinese government vessels intruded into the Japanese territorial waters** 10 (FY) (Month) (Year) |r of days)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||||| ||||||||| ||||||||| ||||||||| ||||||||| |1 5 9 08|1 5 9 09|1 5 9 1 10|5 9 11|1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 12 13 14 15||1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 16 17 18 1|9 1 9 20| **Identification in the contiguous zone** |Year|Number of days (days) Total numbe| |---|---| |2012|79| |2013|232| |2014|243| |2015|240| |2016|211| |2017|171| |2018|158| |2019|282| |2020|83| Total number of identified vessels (vessels) 407 819 729 709 752 696 607 1,097 289 The figure for 2012 is that from September to December and the figure for 2020 is as of the end of March ----- of concern. Japan cannot accept China s actions to escalate the situation. Among waters other than those around the Senkaku for military purposes, including runways, ports, hangars, and radar facilities, to militarize these features. On Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs, called the Big Islands, Chinese government vessels were confirmed as passing through the territorial waters of Japan around Tsushima Island (Nagasaki Prefecture), Okinoshima Island (Fukuoka Prefecture) and the Tsugaru Strait in July 2017. The same vessels were also confirmed to have sailed in Japan’s territorial waters from Sata Cape to the Kusagaki Islands (both in Kagoshima Prefecture) in August that year. In July 2019, a Chinese government vessel was seen sailing in Japan’s territorial waters around Tappisaki and Omasaki (both in Aomori Prefecture). Three of the Spratly Islands, China has developed batteries for anti-aircraft guns, missile shelters, underground storage facilities pointed out to be munitions storage, large ports capable of accommodating combatant ships and runways available for takeoff and landing of fighters and bombers. On Fiery Cross Reef in April 2016, a Navy patrol aircraft flying over the South China Sea landed for a nominal purpose of evacuating emergency patients. On Subi and Mischief Reefs in July of the same year, China forced aircraft test flights on runways available for the takeoff and landing of large aircraft. Reportedly, a Y-7 transport aircraft was confirmed on Mischief Reef in January 2018 and a Y-8 special mission aircraft on Subi Reef in April that year. Additionally, in April 2018, it was reported that anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles were deployed on Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs for military training and that radar jamming systems were deployed on Mischief Reef. Furthermore, it was reported in May 2020 that China possibly deployed aircraft including Y-8 patrol and Y-9 early warning aircraft and other aircraft to the Fiery Cross Reef in rotation. On the other four features, it is pointed out that the construction of facilities, such as harbors, helipads, and radars, has made progress and that what appears to be large anti-aircraft guns and close in weapon systems (CIWS) may have already been deployed. If these features are used for full-scale military purposes, it could significantly change the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. China carried out the militarization of the Paracel Islands **Chapter** Fig. I-2-2-8 (PLA’s Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan [image]) Fig. 1-2-2-9 (Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships’ Activities around the Southwestern Islands and the Soya and Tsugaru Straits) Fig. 1-2-2-10 (Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft’s Passage between the Main Island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island) Fig. 1-2-2-11 (Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships’ Passage through the Tsushima Strait) Fig. 1-2-2-12 (Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft’s Passage through the Tsushima Strait) Fig. I-2-2-13 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft) Fig. 1-2-2-14 (Chinese Government Vessels’ Activities around the Senkaku Islands) See （4）Trends of Activities in the South China Sea China has also been intensifying its activities based on its own assertions in the South China Sea, including waters around the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, over which territorial disputes exist with neighbors, including some member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). before that of the Spratly Islands. China has reportedly extended the runway to nearly 3,000 m on Woody Island since 2013. In October 2015, October 2017, and June 2019, China was reported to have deployed J-11, J-10 and other fighters on the island. In February 2016 and January 2017, the existence of equipment likely to be surface-to-air missiles was confirmed. It has been noted that the takeoff and landing training of the H-6K bombers in the South China Sea announced by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in May 2018 was carried out on Woody Island. In recent years, Chinese vessels have allegedly been conducting what are likely to be survey activities in Scarborough Shoal, where a standoff took place between Chinese and Philippine government ships in April 2012. It Since 2014, on seven features of the Spratly Islands (Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reefs, Hughes Reef, and Johnson South Reef), China pressed ahead with large-scale and rapid land reclamation. The Philippines-China arbitration award issued in July 2016 denied the “historic rights” as the basis of the “nine dash line” claimed by China, and determined the illegality of China’s activities such as land reclamation. However, China has made it clear that it would not comply with the award and is currently continuing military activities while promoting the development of military facilities, such as batteries, and various kinds of infrastructure that can be used ----- is pointed out that new land reclamations on the shoal might be seen in the future.[14] It is also pointed out that if China conducts land reclamations and installs radar facilities, runways, and other infrastructure on Scarborough Shoal, it could possibly increase its ability for situation awareness and power projection capabilities in the surrounding sea area and ultimately enhance its operational capabilities throughout all the areas of the South China Sea. Attention must continue to be paid to the situation going forward. the China-Russia bilateral naval exercise Joint Sea 2016 was conducted for the fi rst time in the South China Sea. A fi eld training exercise by naval vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” and a naval review ceremony, regarded as the largest since the founding of China, were conducted in the same area from the end of March until April 2018. In 2019, anti-ship ballistic missile tests were reportedly conducted in the South China Sea for the fi rst time. In 2019 and in April 2020, the deployment of the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” accompanied by Fuyu-class fast combat support and other ships in the South China Sea was reported. Furthermore, Chinese government vessels reportedly fi red warning shots at fi shing boats of neighboring countries. When Chinese government vessels interrupted Vietnam’s oil and natural gas development within its exclusive economic zone from July to October 2019, they reportedly visited Fiery Cross Reef for supply. In this way, it appears that China seeks to expand its military and other forms of presence and enhance war-sustaining and other joint operational capabilities in the The activities in sea and airspace are expanding and intensifying as well. In March 2009, December 2013 and September 2018, Chinese naval and other vessels approached and intercepted U.S. Navy vessels navigating in the South China Sea. In May 2016, February 2017 and May 2017, PLA fi ghters allegedly fl ew close to U.S. Forces aircraft. In July and August 2016, after the Philippines-China arbitration award was rendered, PLAAF H-6K bomber aircraft conducted “combat air patrol” in the airspace close to Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese Ministry of National |Defe In D so-c|nse an ecemb alled n -|Col3|nounce er 201 ine-das - -|d that this patrol would “become n 6, H-6 bombers reportedly f lew al h line. In September of the sam China’s Militarization of the South|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|ormal. ong th e year China S|” So e, as ea (image|Col14|uth China Sea. Such activities conducted by China based on its o sertions unilaterally change the status quo and furt ) Example of militarization ughes Reef Fiery Cross Reef February 2010 August 2014 Artillery batteries Radar and communications facilities February 2016 Aircraft hangars and runway t identified on Subi Reef, was allegedly a Chinese atrol aircraft (2018) March 2017 urces) CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / Digital Globe| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Fig. I 2||2 15|||||||||||| ||||||||||||a|||| ||||Overv|iew o||f the||Sout|h Chi|na Se|a|||| |||||Par||||||||H||| ||||||Par|acel I||slands||||||| |||||||||||||||| ||L||Wood|y Island||||Sca|rboroug|h Shoal|Philip|||| ||aos||Vi||||||||pines|||| ||||etnam|||Spr Gave|Spr|atly Isl|ands|es Reef||||| |||||||||n Reef|s Hugh|||||| |||||Subi R||eef||||||Aircraf||| ||Fi||ery Cros Cuarter|s Reef on Reef|||||Mischie Johnso|f Reef n South|Reef|||| |||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||Aircraf|t identified on Subi Reef, was allegedly a Chinese atrol aircraft (2018)| ||South||Luconia|Shoal||B||runei||||which Navy p|which Navy p|| |“|Nine-||dash|line Mala||” ysia||||||||| ||||||||||Indone|sia||||| ||500||km|||||||||||| |※I|mage|||||||||||(Photo so||| **Fig. I-2-2-15** China’s Militarization of the South China Sea (image) **Example of militarization** **Overview of the South China Sea** Hughes Reef Fiery Cross Reef Paracel Islands Woody Island Scarborough Shoal February 2010 August 2014 Artillery batteries Radar and Spratly Islands communications facilities Gaven Reefs Hughes Reef Subi Reef Fiery Cross Reef Mischief Reef Johnson South Reef Cuarteron Reef February 2016 Aircraft hangars and runway Aircraft identified on Subi Reef, which was allegedly a Chinese South Luconia Shoal Brunei Navy patrol aircraft (2018) “Nine-dash line” Malaysia Indonesia March 2017 500km ※Image (Photo sources) CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / Digital Globe 14 A di t th t t t b U S Chi f f N l O ti J h Ri h d i M h 2016 **Chapter** Such activities conducted by China based on its own assertions unilaterally change the status quo and further ----- advance its efforts to create a fait accompli. Japan is deeply concerned about these activities, and the concern is shared with the international community, including the United States and other G7 Member States. China asserts that some of the ASEAN member states including the Philippines and Vietnam are illegitimately occupying features. However, China’s development work on the features is of a scale incomparable to the activities carried out by other countries and is conducted at a rapid pace.[15] In any case, the issues surrounding the South China Sea are directly related to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacifi c region and are a legitimate concern not only for Japan, which has major sea lanes in the South China Sea, but also for the entire international community. Countries concerned, including China, are urged to refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law. See Fig. 1-2-2-15 (China’s Militarization of the South China Sea See [image]) in international counter-piracy efforts. In December 2019, the Chinese Navy conducted its fi rst multilateral exercise with its Russian and Iranian counterparts in the northern Indian Ocean. Activities of Chinese Navy submarines have also been confi rmed continuously in the Indian Ocean. They have been reported to make port calls at Sri Lanka’s Colombo, Pakistan’s Karachi, and Malaysia’s Kota Kinabalu. In January 2020, China reportedly sent a submarine for drills with Pakistan in the northern Arabian Sea. Chinese forces have expanded activities not only in the Indian Ocean but also in other waters. In September 2016, China-Russia “Joint Sea” bilateral naval exercises took place in waters including the Mediterranean Sea. In November 2019, the Chinese Navy conducted its fi rst multilateral exercises with its Russian and South African counterparts in waters around the Cape of Good Hope. China has also deployed a space observation support ship in the southern Pacifi c and dispatched a military hospital ship to waters including the southern Pacifi c as well as those near Latin America under “Mission Harmony.” **Chapter** （5）Trends in the Indian Ocean and Other More Distant Waters The Chinese Navy is considered to be shifting towards “protection missions on the far seas” and has been steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters, such as the Indian Ocean, in recent years. Progress has been seen in the Navy’s development of such equipment as large combatant ships and replenishment ships and in its operational initiatives. For example, since December 2008, Chinese Navy vessels have been deployed off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to take part In September 2015, fi ve Chinese military vessels reportedly sailed in the high seas of the Bering Sea and in U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands. Moreover, in January 2018, China published a white paper entitled “China’s Arctic Policy,” which mapped out a policy of active involvement in Arctic initiatives, including efforts to build a “Polar Silk Road” through the development of Arctic sea routes. It is pointed out that China could take advantage of scientifi c survey and commercial activities to increase its presence including military activities in the Arctic sea.[16] Additionally, China has been remarkably trying to secure overseas outposts such as harbors, which would help support its operations in far seas. For example, in August 2017, China China-Russia-South Africa Joint Naval Exercise (November 2019) 【Avalon/Jiji Press Photo】 **Column** “Belt and Road” Initiative A concept for an economic sphere proposed by President Xi Jinping. The “Silk Road Economic Belt” (“One Belt”) and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (“One Road”) were announced in September and October 2013, respectively. Since then, the two concepts are collectively referred to as the “Belt and Road” Initiative. 15 According to “The Asia-Pacifi c Maritime Security Strategy” U.S. DoD (August 2015). 16 According to “Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China ” U S DOD (May 2019) ----- began to operate a support base for logistics support of the PLA in Djibouti, a strategic point in Eastern Africa facing the Gulf of Aden. Since April 2018, a pier viewed as potentially accommodating large replenishment ships has been under construction on the “support base” coast. In recent years, China has been promoting its “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) whose main purpose is advertised as establishing an economic zone in regions including the Eurasian continent, with the Chinese military possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via counter-piracy activities and the improvement of counter-terrorism capabilities in coastal states through bilateral and multilateral exercises. While it is thought that the initiative includes a strategic intention to expand its influence in the region, it is possible that the initiative will further improve the PLA’s operational capabilities in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean and elsewhere. For example, China’s support for the construction of port infrastructure in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and other Indian Ocean countries as well as Pacific island countries including Vanuatu could lead China to secure outposts available for its military purposes. of force in waters and airspace surrounding these islands. Such activities are considered to also have the purpose of creating a fait accompli as part of the reasons for unilaterally changing the status quo and justifying China’s claims based on its own concept of “legal warfare.” The fourth is to acquire, maintain, and protect its maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying in the East and South China Seas. It has been confirmed that in addition to the existing four platforms, China has built 12 additional offshore platforms on the Chinese side of the Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since June 2013. In late June 2016, the installment of an anti-surface vessel radar and a surveillance camera was confirmed on one of the platforms. Attention is to be paid to matters regarding the platforms, including the purpose of such equipment. Japan has repeatedly lodged protests against China’s unilateral development and demanded the termination of such work. The fifth is to defend its sea lanes of communications. In the background is the fact that its sea lanes, including its oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are essential for the Chinese economy. Given the recent strengthening of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that they have been expanding military capabilities to cover distant waters beyond China’s near seas. Given these objectives of China’s water and airspace activities and recent trends, it is believed that China plans to further expand the sphere of its activities, and further intensify its operations in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, as well as in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. **Chapter** （6）Objectives of Activities in Waters and Airspace The development and activities of Chinese naval and air forces, descriptions in defense white papers, China’s geographical conditions and globalizing economy, and other factors indicate that the recent water and airspace activities of the Navy, Air Force and other Chinese organizations have the following objectives: The first is to intercept operations by adversaries in waters and airspace as far as possible from China in order to defend its territorial land, waters and airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in the effectiveness of long-range attacks due Meanwhile, in recent years, China has shown interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected contingencies in sea areas and airspace. For example, in April 2014, China, together with other countries such as Japan and the United States, adopted the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which sets forth the standards of behavior in the case that the naval vessels or aircraft of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) member states have unexpected encounters. Also, in June 2018, Japan and China started the implementation of their Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities to avoid unexpected collisions between SDF and PLA vessels and aircraft. to recent progress in science and technology. The second is to develop capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. To ensure the prevention of foreign intervention in the Taiwan issue, China needs to enhance its operational capabilities at sea and airspace as Taiwan is surrounded by the sea in all directions. The third is to weaken the control of other countries on islands subject to China’s territorial claims and enhance the claims through various surveillance activities and use ----- including distant ones, as well as night-time exercises and joint exercises with other countries, in order to strengthen its operational capabilities. The new military training regulations in effect since January 2018 referred to the execution of joint and full-spectrum operation based on network information systems, in addition to the definite implementation of practical training as a principle. Moreover, the trial regulation on the supervision of military training that took effect in March 2019 is regarded as China’s first attempt to put in place a system that prescribes measures for rectifying practices that are inconsistent with the requirements of actual combat and criteria for identifying malpractice and discipline violations during military training. In the education spectrum as well, the PLA aims to train **7** International Military Activities In recent years, the PLA has been indicating its positive attitude on nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counterpiracy, dispatching numerous units for such overseas missions. China has vowed to consistently support and actively participate in UN PKO, increasing its presence in UN PKO. According to the Chinese UN delegation, China has sent more than 40,000 military personnel to UN PKO (as of February 20, 2020). According to the UN, as of the end of January 2020, China had a total of 2,544 troops, civilian police and military observers — the largest number of peacekeepers among the permanent members of the UN Security Council — engaged in UN peacekeeping activities, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). China has also largely increased its share of the UN PKO budget. The Chinese share has remained the second largest, after the U.S. share, since 2016. **Chapter** soldiers who have the ability to execute joint operations. In 2003, it launched a human resource strategy project to develop human resources capable of directing joint and informatized operations, and of building joint and informatized armed forces. It was reported in 2017 that the PLA National Defense University began training to develop human resources capable of directing joint operations. China outlined the promotion of the “rule of law” at the fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in 2014, with Chairman Xi referring to the military as being controlled by law, indicating that the PLA is required to thoroughly implement the “rule of law.” In another development for the indication, Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department, and Zhang Shengmin, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, were selected as members of the 19th Central Military Commission, the supreme decision-making body in the military. The issuance of the trial regulation on military supervision work in January 2020 also suggests the rule of law promotion. Moreover, China has been actively participating in counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. In 2011, in view of the deteriorating situation in Libya, China carried out a military evacuation of Chinese nationals for the first time. It is pointed out that factors behind such Chinese attitude include the growing need for protecting and promoting China’s national interests overseas following the expansion of national interests beyond its national borders, China’s attempt to verify military capabilities including units’ long-distance deployment, its intent to raise its status by demonstrating its will to fulfill its responsibilities to the international community, its hope to diffuse the military’s peaceful and humanitarian images, and its attempt to enhance relations with PKO regions including African countries. China has been developing defense mobilization systems in order to effectively utilize private resources in case of emergencies, including wars. It enforced the National Defense Mobilization Law as the basic law for defense mobilizations in 2010 and the National Defense Transportation Law for the transportation area in 2016. The “civil-military fusion” policy that China is currently promoting is believed to have its sights set on the routine military use of civilian resources not only in emergencies but also in peacetime. The military use of civilian resources includes civilian ships’ transportation of military equipment. As such initiative **8** Education and Training In recent years, the PLA under the policy of building a military that “can fight and win a war” has promoted practical exercises including large-scale ones such as joint exercises led by theater commands, force-on-force exercises, landing exercises inter-theater exercises and large exercises ----- generally augments China s forces available for military missions and is expected to proactively be promoted in the future, the initiative’s implications for the Chinese military forces’ operational capabilities should be watched closely. places emphasis on the enhancement of its military industrial sector, including the domestic production of equipment, to modernize its military. It has been pointed out that China is acquiring technologies ambitiously not only through domestic technology research and development and foreign direct investment, but also via illegal means in the form of secret information theft.[18] The trend of the national defense industry sector is directly linked to the modernization of the military and should be closely watched with strong attention. China’s civil-military fusion policy has been evident in **9** National Defense Industry Sector Under the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, a department of the State Council, China’s main national defense industry had consisted of 12 corporations to develop and produce nuclear weapons, missiles and rockets, aircraft, vessels, information systems and other military equipment. The Chinese national defense industry’s arms sales were pointed out as the second largest after those in the United States in 2017.[17] After China State Shipbuilding Corporation merged with China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation in 2019, the industry now comprises 11 corporations including China State Shipbuilding Corporation. While China imports highly sophisticated military equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, it is believed that China the technology area. China promotes two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for developing the national economy while civilian technologies are absorbed for national defense development. It also seems interested in absorbing foreign technologies available both for military and civilian purposes. It is pointed out that China’s civil-military fusion policy gives priority to initiatives in seas, outer space, cyber, AI, and other emerging areas for China. In recent years, China has reportedly promoted the standardization of civilian products for their military adoption from the production stage under the civil-military fusion policy. This initiative is expected to allow the military to more effectively utilize civilian resources. **Chapter** **[Relations with Countries and Regions]** **❸** to influence political decisions in other countries through efforts such as winning over foreign politicians.[19] At the same time, China recognizes that a peaceful and **1** General Situation China, particularly regarding maritime issues over which its interests conflict with others’, continues to demonstrate its attitude of realizing its unilateral assertions without compromise, while promoting assertive actions including those to change the status quo by coercion and create a fait accompli for such changes, based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order. China has been promoting its BRI as a national strategy, but some BRI-participating countries have recently reconsidering BRI projects due mainly to their fiscal deterioration. Furthermore, it has been pointed that there have been moves toward creating China’s own international order, including the establishment of China-led multilateral mechanisms in security, financial and other areas. It has also been noted that China has tried stable international environment is necessary for maintaining sustainable economic development and enhancing China’s overall national power. Based on such recognition, China has advocated building a “community of shared future for mankind” and referred to promoting the building of “a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, equity and justice, and win–win cooperation.” China proactively carries out military exchanges with other countries. In recent years, China has been engaged in active military exchanges not only with major powers such as the United States and Russia and with its neighboring countries including Southeast Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa and Latin America. The objectives of China’s promotion of 17 According to “Insights on Peace and Security, No. 2020/2,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (January 2020). 18 According to “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (May 2019). 19 A di t th t t t b th A t li P i Mi i t M l l T b ll i D b 2017 ----- military exchanges are thought to include alleviating other countries’ concerns regarding China by strengthening its relations with these countries, creating a favorable security environment for China, enhancing China’s influence in the international community, exploring overseas arms markets, securing stable supplies of natural resources, and ensuring foreign bases. pillar. The deal came into force on February 14 of the same year. On the same day, the two countries also reduced some tariffs. The United States has also criticized the initiative of “Made-In China 2025,” which exploits subsidies and other means for promoting China’s high-technology industries, as representing unfair economic practices to unduly hurt U.S. and other economies. Furthermore, the United States has indicated that the **2** Relations with Taiwan re-emergence of long-term strategic competition from revisionist powers including China is a central challenge to its prosperity and security. With this as a backdrop, the United States recognizes that China is pursuing regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific in the near future through the modernization of its military and other efforts.[20] Additionally, in the MDR published in January 2019, the U.S. DoD indicated that it perceives the missile capabilities of China and other states as a threat to the military forces of both the United States and its allies. China has strongly opposed such a perception by the United States. The United States has reiterated that the Japan-U.S. 4-1 of this section (Relations with China) See **Chapter** **3** Relations with the United States There are various issues between the United States and China, such as trade issues, issues concerning the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, the Hong Kong issue, and human rights issues regarding Uighur and Tibet. However, China deems its relationship with the United States as one of the world’s most important bilateral relationships and appears to be aware that a stable U.S.-China relationship is essential in enhancing its national power, including the development of its economy. Accordingly, it is likely that China is trying to further develop relations with the United States through mutual respect and “win-win” cooperation. At the same time, however, it must be noted that China has indicated its attitude of making no compromise regarding its “core interests and major concerns.” Recently, the moves of the United States and China keeping each other in check have been attracting strong attention. Since the start of the Trump administration, the United Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. This was confirmed in a document between the Japanese and U.S. leaders for the first time in February 2017, in the joint statement from the first Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting since the inauguration of the Trump administration, which explicitly referred to the application of Article 5 of the Treaty to the Senkaku Islands. China has shown its strong protest against these stances. With regard to the issues over the South China Sea, the United States is concerned about such dimensions as obstruction to the freedom of navigation in sea lanes, restrictions on the activities of U.S. Forces, and the worsening security situation in the entire region. The United States has requested China to comply with international norms, and has repeatedly criticized China’s unilateral and assertive actions. And the United States also implements the Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea and other waters to counter excessive claims to maritime interests by other countries such as China and calls for demilitarizing the South China Sea. While embracing these differences, the United States and States has made frequent statements on the necessity of cooperation between the United States and China on issues such as North Korea. At the same time, it also called on China to uphold international rules and norms on global issues, including international trade and maritime security. Amid this situation, the Trump administration has been toughening its stance on China since June 2018 through such measures as the phased raising of tariffs, on the grounds of China’s unfair trade practices over many years. China has also responded with countermeasures such as the phased raising of tariffs. In January 2020, however, the United States and China reached the Phase 1 deal, which places China’s expansion of import volumes from the United States as a 20 A di t “U it d St t N ti l D f St t ” (J 2018) China apparently continued military exchanges in a relatively stable manner. As seen in China’s response to the U.S. DoD’s notification of arms sales to Taiwan to Congress, for example, China has recently indicated restrained responses to the ----- United States. In April 2008, a hotline between the defense authorities of the two countries was set up. In November 2014 and September 2015, the United States and China announced that they agreed on confidence-building measures aimed at reducing the risk of unintended encounters. China has also dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and exercises have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on the occasions of mutual port visits. In addition, the U.S. and Chinese forces have engaged in annual humanitarian and disaster relief exercises since November 2013. After the inauguration of the Trump administration, both countries frequently mentioned the importance of bilateral military exchanges, and a series of new dialogue frameworks were launched, including the “Diplomatic and Security Dialogue” and the “Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism.” However, there are movements which indicate changes in the military exchanges that have remained rather stable in recent years. The second dialogue under the Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism, which was due to take place in September 2018, was reportedly postponed. Moreover, the U.S. Defense Authorization Act for FY2019, which includes a clause to prohibit the United States from inviting China to RIMPAC until the demilitarization of the South China Sea is achieved, was enacted. And the United States decided not to send its vessels to the International Fleet Review that China hosted in April 2019. the two countries came to a settlement. The two countries have a common view on promoting the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order and have further deepened their relations. On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including fighters, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China.[21] Although China-Russia arms transactions in value in recent years have been lower than in some past period, China has apparently continued to indicate its strong interests in importing advanced Russian defense equipment and in joint equipment development with Russia. For example, China has introduced what are believed to be the latest fourth generation Su-35 fighters and the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia. China has been reported as the first country to import the Russian S-400 missile system. At the same time, it is pointed out that Russia has differentiated the performance of some of the weapons it exports to China, due to its concerns about China’s reverse engineering and its policy of not providing China having a ground border with Russia with sophisticated weapons that would pose a threat to Russia. It is also suggested that Russia has concerns about competing with China in arms exports taking into consideration China’s improvement of technological power. Military exchanges between China and Russia take place **Chapter** While wanting a better relationship with China, the United States has demonstrated an uncompromising stance on matters concerning its own security. Developments in U.S. China relations will continue to require close monitoring with keen attention. While the United States has mentioned the need for a framework including China to control missile forces, China denies its involvement. in such forms as routine mutual visits by senior military officers and bilateral and multilateral exercises. For example, China participated in the Vostok 2018 exercise, viewed as one of the largest Russian military exercises since the end of the Cold War, and in the Tsentr-2019 exercise. Additionally, the two countries have held the large-scale bilateral naval exercise “Joint Sea” since 2012. The annual exercise for 2016 took place in the South China for the first time, and that for 2017 was held in the Baltic Sea and Sea of Okhotsk for the first time. In 2016 and 2017, the two countries held the “Aerospace Security” missile defense computer simulated exercise. Furthermore, China has held the counter terrorism exercise “Peace Mission” between China and Russia or among the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), established in June 2001 including Russia. China likely regards these exchanges as an opportunity to learn about how to operate Russian-made weapons and the operational doctrine of the Russian Armed **4** Relations with Russia Ever since the so-called China-Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, China and Russia have placed importance on their bilateral relationship. They have emphasized the deepening of their “strategic partnership” since its establishment in the mid-1990s. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was concluded. In 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between 21 According to “Arms Transfers Database ” SIPRI ----- Forces, which have combat experiences. In addition, moves indicating deepened China-Russia relations have been confirmed in recent years. In the two countries’ “first joint strategic flight” of bombers in July 2019, their bombers joined in the Sea of Japan and flew to the East China Sea. In September 2019, China and Russia signed a series of documents on cooperation in the military and military technologies.[22] **5** Relations with North Korea ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and the ROK), East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Furthermore, China has developed bilateral relations through infrastructure development support, etc. under the BRI. On the military front, there seems to be moves that China has made efforts toward military confidence building, such as the first ASEAN-China Maritime Field Training Exercise, which took place in October 2018. Recently, the PLA’s attempt to secure an outpost for its activities in Cambodia has been reported, although the countries concerned denied this. In July 2016, an arbitration award based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adjudicating the Philippines’ case against China in the South China Sea was rendered, accepting most of the Philippine claims. After that, the Philippines was said to have refrained from referring to the arbitration award because of China’s substantial economic support and pressure. In September 2019, however, a Philippine Presidential Office spokesperson noted that the arbitration award was still a subject in bilateral talks. In April 2019, the Philippines announced a protest statement against China over massive Chinese fishing boats confirmed as near Thitu Island under effective Philippine control among the Spratly Islands.[23] In July 2017 and March 2018, the Vietnamese government reportedly made foreign companies, engaged in oil drilling in the South China Sea with the permission of the Vietnamese government, cancel the drilling under the pressure from China. Chinese and Vietnamese government ships staged a standoff over oil and natural gas drilling within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone from July 2019 until Vietnam withdrew its HAKRYU-5 drilling rig in October of that year to end the standoff. China has kept close relations with North Korea under the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. Although Chinese and North Korean leaders’ reciprocal visits have been viewed as decreasing since North Korea’s transition to the Kim Jong-un regime, Xi Jinping in June 2019 became the first Chinese president to visit North Korea in 14 years and held his fifth meeting with Chairman Kim. China has reportedly adopted three principles on the Korea Peninsula – (1) the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, (2) the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and (3) the resolution of problems through dialogue and consultations – indicating that China gives priority to the maintenance of stability and dialogue as well as the denuclearization. Under these principles, China, while agreeing to UN Security Council resolutions to enhance sanctions on North Korea, cooperated with Russia in distributing a draft resolution including a proposal to lift some of the UN sanctions at the council in December 2019. Although China has vowed to have seriously observed its international obligations, it has been pointed out that Chinese ships have been involved in illegal ship-to-ship transfer that has been banned by the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korean sanctions. **Chapter** Indonesia has had frequent disputes with China over Chinese fishing boats’ operations within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and taken strong actions including the explosion of foreign fishing boats engaging in alleged illegal operations. Recently, the Indonesian government filed a strong protest against Chinese fishing boats’ illegal operations near Indonesia’s Natuna Islands from December 2019 to January 2020, rejecting China’s assertion on the nine-dash line anew. China and ASEAN have continued talks to discuss the formulation of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South **6** Relations with Other Countries （1）Relations with Southeast Asian Countries As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, reciprocal summit-level visits and other activities continue to be actively carried out. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), 22 According to the Russian military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (the “Red Star”) on September 6, 2019. 23 According to the ebsite of the Ministr of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines on April 4 2019 ----- China Sea (COC) and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced in November 2018 that he hoped to complete negotiations within three years. In July 2019, China announced at the Chinese and ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting that they had completed the first reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text. China s influence in Pakistan. China and India have not demarcated their borders in areas such as Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. As China and Bhutan, which has close relations with India, have claimed territorial rights over the Doklam Plateau, Chinese and Indian military forces staged a standoff at the plateau from June to August 2017. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that China has recently striven to improve its relationship with India, while giving consideration to a balance between its relations with Pakistan and India. Because China identifies the relationship with India as a strategic partnership, the leaders of the two countries actively conduct mutual visits. In December 2018, China and India resumed their “Hand in Hand” bilateral anti-terrorism drill that had been suspended since the Doklam standoff. The background for progress in China’s relations with India seems to include an emphasis on economic growth of the two countries and a response to closer U.S.-India relations. In recent years, China has also been deepening its relations with Sri Lanka. Initially after taking office, President Maithripala Sirisena, who won the election in January 2015, suspended the Colombo Port City development projects financed by China. However, he subsequently announced the resumption of the projects in January 2016, and new development projects with China have also been showing progress. In July 2017, an agreement was reached to lend interests to Chinese enterprises at the Port of Hambantota, which was being constructed with Chinese loans. Some have noted that these moves constitute what has been described as a “debt trap.” Additionally, China is deepening its relations with Bangladesh through its port development in Chittagong where a naval base is located, arms exports, and other deals. （2）Relations with Central Asian Countries The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. Therefore, China is deeply concerned about the political stability and security situations, such as terrorism by Islamic extremists, in Central Asian states. Such concerns of China appear to be reflected in China’s tightened border control and its engagement in the SCO and the stabilization of Afghanistan. Moreover, China is strongly interested in Central Asia, with a view to diversifying its supply sources and procurement methods for resources. China promotes cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines **Chapter** between China and Central Asian nations. （3）Relations with South Asian Countries China has traditionally maintained a particularly close relationship with Pakistan, and mutual visits by their summit leaders take place frequently. Their cooperation in the military sector, including bilateral exercises, exporting weapons and transferring military technology, is also considered to be deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases for China, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan is rising for China accordingly, partly because of the geopolitical features of Pakistan which faces the Indian Ocean. China has also conducted various bilateral military exercises with Pakistan, including naval search and rescue training and anti-terrorism drills. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a China-supported development plan for power facilities and transportation infrastructure in the region stretching from the Port of Gwadar to Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is a flagship project of the BRI. While some have pointed out that the project has run into difficulties as indicated by delays and partial withdrawals due to Pakistan’s deteriorating financial situation, the project’s progress is expected to further increase （4）Relations with European Countries For China, the European Union (EU) countries have become an important partner especially in the economic field. European countries possess more advanced military technologies than China or Russia regarding information and communication technology, avionics/aeroengines, air independence propulsion (AIP) systems for submarines, and other areas. The EU countries have maintained their arms embargo on China since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and China has requested them to lift the embargo.[24] If the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, sophisticated 24 According to the policy paper on the EU released by China in December 2018 ----- military technologies could be transferred to China and to third countries via China, dramatically changing the security environment in the Indo-Pacific and other regions. Darwin Port has raised debates over security. China has also been boosting its relations with Pacific island countries by providing them with proactive and continuous economic support and medical services deploying a military hospital ship. China has promoted resources development in Papua New Guinea and signed an agreement with the island country on military cooperation. China has also been moving to enhance military relations with Vanuatu, Fiji, and Tonga. While China has been enhancing relations with Pacific island nations, Australia and some other countries have expressed concerns about such Chinese moves. In September 2019, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established such relations with China. China has been striving to further deepen its relations Additionally, China and Ukraine have close ties in the field of arms procurement, as indicated by China’s purchase of the unfinished Ukrainian Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier “Varyag,” which was the basis of the aircraft carrier “Liaoning.” Therefore, the relationship between these two countries will attract attention going forward. China’s recent rise has attracted attention from the NATO as well. The London declaration adopted at a NATO summit conference in December 2019 referred to China’s growing influence as both “opportunities and challenges” and noted necessity to address China as an Alliance. After the summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mentioned China’s deployment of numerous intermediate-range missiles and noted that NATO was considering how China could be included in future arms control. China’s relations with European countries, including EU **Chapter** with Central and South American countries, holding ministerial meetings with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) since 2015. In the military field, China has dispatched senior officials and sold arms to these countries and enhanced relations with them in medical services, counterterrorism and other areas. In Argentina, China operates an outer space observation facility. In June 2017, Panama severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established such relations with China, followed by the Dominican Republic in May 2018 and by El Salvador in August 2018. **7** International Transfer of Weapons discussions on the arms embargo on China and NATO’s China policy related to future arms control, should be continuously watched. (5) Relations with Middle East and African Countries, Pacific Island countries, and Central and South American Countries China has been enhancing its relations with Middle Eastern and African nations in the economic realm. In recent years, it has also strengthened military relations with them. Not only intensive interactions among state leaders and senior military officials but also arms exports and exchanges between military forces are actively conducted. China also actively dispatches personnel to undertake UN PKO in Africa. Some suspect that underlying these movements could be China’s aim to ensure a stable supply of natural resources and to secure overseas bases in the future. In December 2016, São Tomé and Príncipe severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and re-established relations with China, followed by Burkina Faso in May 2018. Australia, while continuing to give priority to economic relations with China, is apparently concerned about China regarding the security area including the information and communications sector. A Chinese company’s agreement with the Northern Territory Government of Australia to lease China's arms exports have surpassed imports since 2013. China has been expanding exports of weapons such as small arms, tanks, aircraft including drones, and ships. China’s major arms export destinations include Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. China has also been reportedly exporting arms to Algeria, Tanzania, Nigeria, Sudan, and other African countries, Venezuela and other Latin American countries, and Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Middle Eastern countries. Recently, Serbia has been reported likely to become the first European country to introduce Chinese UAVs. Some claim that China has transferred weapons to foreign countries in order to strengthen its strategic relationships with friendly nations, enhance its influence in the international community, and secure natural resources. China has not participated in some of the frameworks for international arms export control, and some point out that missile-related and other technologies have been transferred from China to other ----- countries. **[Military Capabilities of Taiwan]** **❹** two systems” model and called for negotiations between “government-authorized agencies.” After winning reelection with the highest ever number of votes in a Taiwanese presidential election in January 2020, President Tsai told a press conference the election results represented the value of Taiwanese people and rejected the “one country, two systems” model. In a manner to check the Taiwanese side, China noted that regardless of how the Taiwanese situation changed, there would be no change to the basic fact that there is only one China in the world, with Taiwan being a part of China. Since around the inauguration of President Tsai for her first term, Taiwanese delegates were refused attendance at or had their invitations deferred from meetings held by international organizations, including ones in which they had participated up to that point.[26] As the Solomon Islands and Kiribati severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established such relations with China in September 2019, the number of countries having diplomatic relations with Taiwan declined to 15 from 22 in May 2016, when President Tsai took office. Taiwan is strongly protesting these actions, claiming them to be “actions taken by China that compress the international space of Taiwan.” Both China and Taiwan have put forth their own assertions regarding the Senkaku Islands, but Taiwan has a negative attitude toward cooperating with China.[27] **2** Military Capabilities of Taiwan **1** Relations with China China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China and that the Taiwan issue is a domestic one. China maintains that the “One China” principle is the underlying premise and foundation for dialogue between China and Taiwan. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Progressive Party, who took office in 2016, has noted that she has never accepted the “1992 Consensus” that China claims as embodying the “One-China” principle.[25] In response, China has criticized the Democratic Progressive Party for destroying the political foundation of the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations by rejecting the “1992 Consensus” unilaterally, emphasizing that the maintenance of the “1992 Consensus” would be the unshakable foundation for peace and stability of cross-Strait relations. China is strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unification of China as well as any move towards the independence of Taiwan and has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force. “The Anti-Secession Law,” enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out China’s policy of not renouncing the use of force, providing that in the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces (those seeking Taiwan’s independence) should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In a January 2019 speech at an event commemorating **Chapter** Under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan has put forth visions such as the military strategy of “resolute defense and multidomain deterrence,” the overall defense concept of “force protection, decisive battle in littoral zone, and destruction of enemy at landing beach,” and the “strengthening of information, communications, and electronic operational capabilities.” The Taiwan National Defense Report 2019, released in September 2019 as the second such report under the 40th anniversary of China’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” General Secretary Xi Jinping advocated a five point proposal for managing relations with Taiwan, stating “the specific form of the ‘one country, two systems’ model in Taiwan will give full consideration to the situation in Taiwan.” In her immediate response to the speech, President Tsai issued a statement firmly rejecting the “one country, 25 The “1992 Consensus” is referred to what represents a common understanding reached between Chinese and Taiwanese authorities in 1992 on the “One-China” principle. The CCP and Taiwan’s Kuomintang Nationalist Party (Taiwan’s ruling party at the time), viewed as parties to the consensus, have reportedly differed over the interpretation of the consensus. Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party has clarified that it has not accepted the “1992 Consensus.” 26 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan on September 24, 2019. 27 A di t th b it f th Mi i t f F i Aff i f T i F b 8 2013 ----- and volunteers.[28] With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present, ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have a total of approximately 93,000 personnel. In addition, it is assessed that approximately 1.66 million reserve personnel of the air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers which were imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses the indigenously built “Tuo Chiang” stealth corvette, among other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 (A/B and C/D) fi ghters, Mirage 2000 fi ghters, Ching-kuo fi ghters, and other assets. President Tsai, followed these visions and clarifi ed Taiwan as an important security partner to the United States in the Indo-Pacifi c region. The United States has made decisions to sell arms to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. Since President Trump took offi ce in 2017, six such decisions have been made. In 2019, the president notifi ed Congress of its plan to sell such weapons as 66 F-16C/D Block 70 fi ghters to Taiwan, the fi rst U.S. fi ghter sales to Taiwan in the 27 years since 1992. Aside from the purchases from the United States, Taiwan is moving forward with its own development of defense equipment, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (2017 QDR) published in March 2017 emphasizes Taiwan’s willingness to promote the development of the defense industry, especially the indigenous production of weapons and equipment. For example, in June 2016, the Taiwan Navy announced a policy to switch over major ships, including submarines, to an indigenous shipbuilding program. The National Defense Report 2019 set forth a target of delivering a prototype of an indigenous submarine by 2025. **Chapter** **3** Military Balance between China and Taiwan While China has continued to increase its defense budget by a signifi cant margin, Taiwan’s defense budget, at 351.2 billion Taiwan dollars for FY2020, has remained almost unchanged for nearly 20 years. China’s announced military budget in FY2020 totals 1,268 billion yuan, roughly 16 times the amount of Taiwan’s in terms of U.S. dollars based on exchange rates announced by the Taiwanese Central Bank. It is pointed out that China’s actual defense expenditure has been larger than the published defense budget, indicating that the China-Taiwan defense expenditure gap could be greater. Amid this situation, President Tsai has ordered an increase in Taiwan’s defense budget.[29] In the National Defense Report 2019, Taiwan acknowledges that China is capable of conducting joint landing operations to take over Taiwan’s offshore islands, of early warning on the western side of the second island Taiwan adopted conscription in 1951, but it has been switching to a volunteer system mainly to improve the expertise of its military personnel, and the last of the conscripts were enlisted by the end of 2018. However, the obligation to undergo four months of military training is being maintained and Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense describes the Taiwanese system of military service as a dual-track mix of conscripts Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and Director Brent Christensen, American Institute in Taiwan 【AIT】 Corvette “Tuo Chiang” Specifications, performance Full-load displacement: 567 tons Speed: 43 knots (approximately 80 km/h) Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum range 200 km), torpedoes. 【Website of the Taiwan Military News Agency】 Description This is Taiwan’s indigenously built corvette. With its stealth design that leaves it relatively undetectable to radar, the corvette is regarded as a form of asymmetrical warfare capability that could strike landing ships and major naval vessels. 28 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan on December 17, 2018. 29 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan on March 31, 2019. ----- **Chapter** **Column** Changing Military Balance between China and Taiwan As for the military balance between the Taiwanese forces and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which face off across the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwanese forces were previously said to possess military superiority in accordance with Taiwan’s superiority in such areas as technological prowess. However, the military balance is considered to have been changing in recent years. China has continuously increased its national defense spending at a high pace against the backdrop of its rapid economic growth in recent years, and based on that, it has rapidly and extensively strengthened its military power in terms of quality and quantity. As a result, since the 2000s, the The Taiwan military’s F-16 fighter military balance between the PLA and Taiwan has changed in (May 2019; Joint Military Exercise “Han Kuang 35 Exercise”) 【AFP/Jiji】 favor of the PLA on the whole, with its lead widening year after year as a trend. For example, “Annual Report to Congress— Taiwan maintain suffi cient self-defense capability. In August Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 2019, the U.S. government notifi ed Congress of a plan to sell Republic of China 2019 (May 2019),” published by the U.S. weapons (including F-16C/D Block 70 fi ghter aircraft) to Department of Defense, offered an analysis indicating that in Taiwan, the fi fth sale of weapons to Taiwan under the Trump addition to naval and air powers vastly numerically superior to administration. This sale is expected to be the largest U.S. sale those of Taiwan, the PLA possesses a missile arsenal including of weapons to Taiwan. In particular, the sale of fi ghter aircraft 750 to 1,500 short-range missiles, whose range is presumed will be the fi rst in 27 years since 1992. In addition, in December to cover all or parts of Taiwan. 2018, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, which includes a Under these circumstances, Taiwan is also making efforts to clause calling for the U.S. government to periodically sell strengthen its self-defense capability while increasing its weapons to Taiwan, was enacted, indicating that interest in national defense spending. However, as Taiwan apparently efforts to maintain Taiwan’s self-defense capability is growing recognizes a gap with China in terms of deployable resources, in the United States, including in Congress. These trends in the it intends to develop the “asymmetric” warfare concept and United States are attracting attention as an example of the capabilities. It has been pointed out that as part of those efforts, country’s strengthening of its commitment to the Indo-Pacifi c Taiwan is strengthening offensive and defensive electronic region. warfare capability and capabilities to promptly deploy and In one view, the “status quo” is being maintained in that the sweep mines, and is introducing high-speed stealth vessels. “political discord” continues to exist between the two sides Meanwhile, the United States, an important actor in the facing off across the Taiwan Strait. From a different point of military balance between China and Taiwan, has opposed any view, it is also said that the “status quo” is already changing unilateral actions intended to change the status quo over the due to historic developments over the Taiwan Strait situation Taiwan Strait, and based on this policy, it has provided hardware occurring in the form of the abovementioned changes in the (including equipment) and software (including training) under military balance. In this situation, future developments are due the Taiwan Relations Act, enacted in 1979, in order to help attention. While the PLA proceeds to expand its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwan military is struggling in the modernization of its equipment. The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are chain, and of implementing air and maritime blockades in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. It also recognizes that China is drastically tilting the cross-Taiwan Strait military balance to its favor, “posing a serious threat to our (Taiwan’s) national defense and security.” In March 2019, Chinese fi ghters reportedly crossed the middle line of the Taiwan Strait for the fi rst time since 2011. Chinese aircraft fl ights across the middle line were also seen in February 2020. generally characterized as follows: (1) Regarding ground forces, while China possesses an overwhelming number of troops, its capability of landing and invading the island of Taiwan is limited at present. In ----- recent years, however, China has been steadily improving its landing and invasion capabilities by building large amphibious ships. Comparison of military capabilities should be made based not only on the troop strength and the performance and quantity of equipment but also on various other factors such as the purpose and aspects of assumed military operations, operational arrangements, the skill level of personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is tilting to China’s favor, and the gap appears to be growing year by year. Going forward, attention needs to be paid to trends such as the strengthening of Chinese and Taiwanese forces, the sale of weapons to Taiwan by the United States, and Taiwan’s own development of its main military equipment. See Fig. I-2-2-16 (Changes in Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense See Budget) Fig. I-2-2-17 (Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan) (2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, which overwhelms Taiwan in terms of quantity, has also been rapidly strengthening its naval and air forces in recent years in terms of quality, where Taiwan used to have superiority over China. In this situation, Taiwan focuses on developing asymmetric forces including stealth corvettes. (3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, Taiwan has been strengthening its ballistic missile defense, upgrading the PAC-2 to the PAC-3 and introducing the PAC-3. However, China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles and other assets with ranges covering Taiwan. Taiwan is **Chapter** deemed to lack effective countermeasures. **Fig. I-2-2-16** Changes in Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense Budget (100 million Taiwan dollars) 4,000 Defense budget (in 100 million Taiwan dollars) Year-on-year growth rate (%) 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 （％） 30 25 20 15 10 －5 －10 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 (FY) Source: the website of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan **Fig. I-2-2-17** Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan (Number of Aircraft) 1,100 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 12 13 China (Su-27/J-11, Su-30, Su-35, J-10, J-15, J-16, J-20) Taiwan (Ching-kuo, F-16, Mirage 2000) Source: “The Military Balance” (of respective years) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 (Year) ----- **Section** **Korean Peninsula** **3** On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the ROK and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.6 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula under such security environment is an extremely important challenge not only to Japan but also to the entire region of East Asia. See Fig. I-2-3-1 (Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula) See **Chapter** |3-1 Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula Orang General Staff Department Navy Headquarters Pyongyang Defense Headquarters Chaho KaechonToksan Mayangdo Air Force Headquarters Taejo Pyongyang Chunghwa Nampo Hwangju Sagot-ri Panmunjom Seoul Mukho U.N. Command Headquarters U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command Headquarters Suwon Headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea Osan U.S. 7th Air Force Headquarters U.S. 2nd Infantry Division Headquarters PyeongtaekPyeongtaek Taegu Kunsan Chinhae Kwangju Mokpo Busan 200km North Korea ROK U.S. Forces Korea|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||eneral Staff Depa Navy Headquart ngyang Defense Hea||rtment ers dquarters|||||||| |||||||||||||| ||||Air Force Headquart|||||||||| |||||||||||||| ||||||||||U.N. Command eadquarters of U. .S. 2nd Infantry Divi|Headquarters S. Forces Korea sion Headquarters||| |||U.S.-RO|K Combined Forces Comman||d Headquarters|||||||| |||U.S. 7|th Air Force Headq||uarters|||||||| ||||||||||2|00km||| ||||||North Kore|a|||ROK||U.|S. Forces Korea| |Total armed forces||||Approx. 1.28 million personnel|||Approx. 600,000 personnel||||Approx. 30,000 personnel|| |Army|Ground troops|||Approx. 1.1 million personnel|||Approx. 460,000 personnel||||Approx. 20,000 personnel|| ||Tanks|||T-62, T-54/55, etc. Approx. 3,500|||M-48, K-1, T-80 etc. Approx. 2,220||||M-1A2SEPv2|| |Navy|Naval vessels|||Approx. 800 111,000 tons|||Approx. 240 255,000 tons||||Supporting corps only|| ||Destroyers Frigates Submarines|||4 25|||12 13 14|||||| ||Marines||||||Approx. 29,000 personnel|||||| |Air Force|Combat aircraft|||Approx. 550|||Approx. 620||||Approx. 80|| ||Third and fourth generation fighters|||Mig-23 × 56 Mig-29 × 18|||F-4 × 30 F-16 × 162 F-15 × 59||||F-16 × 60|| |Reference|Population|||Approx. 25.51 million|||Approx. 51.64 million|||||| ||Term of service|||Men: 12 years Women: 7 years|||Army: 18 months Navy: 20 months Air Force: 21 months|||||| Note: 1. Data from “The Military Balance 2020,” etc. 2. ROK is reducing the mandatory military service period in stages from 2018 to 2021. ----- **❶[ North Korea ]** the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim stated that, since the United States was holding U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, there were no grounds for North Korea to be unilaterally bound any longer by a commitment that no other party honors. He also announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy towards North Korea. In addition, Chairman Kim stated that North Korea should take an offensive for making a breakthrough head-on aimed at neutralizing the sanctions and pressure by the hostile forces and opening a new avenue for socialist construction, declaring the economy to be the key. Moreover, he stated at the same meeting that powerful political, diplomatic and military guarantees would be needed, indicating that North Korea will continue to make efforts to maintain and enhance its military capabilities and combat readiness. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2020, the proportion of the defense budget in the FY2019 budget of North Korea was 15.9%. However, it is believed that this represents only a fraction of the real defense expenditures. North Korea has continued to promote the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles and the enhancement of its operation capabilities, including by conducting six nuclear tests so far and repeatedly launching ballistic missiles in recent years at an unprecedented frequency. In addition, North Korea is assessed to possess large-scale cyber units as part of its asymmetric military capabilities, engaging in theft of military secrets and developing capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of foreign countries. It also retains large scale special operation forces. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly used provocative rhetoric and behavior against relevant countries, including Japan. Such military trends in North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security and significantly undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community. Needless to say, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. At the same time, sufficient attention needs to be paid to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles, the military confrontation on the Korean **1** General Situation North Korea has been advocating the building of a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy, and it adopts “military-first (Songun) politics” to realize this goal. “Military-first (Songun) politics” has been defined as a basic form of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of socialism to victory by giving priority to the military forces in all activities under the principle of military first, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the revolution with the Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting as the central and main force.[1] At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in March 2013, Chairman Kim Jong-un[2] adopted the “Byungjin line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development. At the Seventh KWP Congress in May 2016, he made it clear that he would uphold the “Byungjin line” as well as the “Songun politics.” Between 2016 and 2017, North Korea pushed ahead with three nuclear tests and as many as 40 ballistic missile launches. The international community responded by imposing sanctions under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, while Japan and the United States were among those who strengthened their own sanctions against North Korea. On the other hand, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, Chairman Kim declared that the “Byungjin line” had been successfully carried out as the development of the state nuclear force had been completed. He also announced that the KWP’s “new strategic line” was that the whole of the party and the whole of the state will fully concentrate efforts on the construction of a socialist economy, indicating his policy of concentrating on economic development. In addition, North Korea decided to discontinue “nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire” and to dismantle the northern nuclear test ground, announcing in May 2018 that the nuclear test ground had been blown up. During the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting that June, Chairman Kim expressed the intention to work toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, the February 2019 U.S.-North Korea summit meeting ended without any agreement being reached between the two parties. At the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of **Chapter** According to a written decision of the Seventh Congress of the KWorkers’ Party, “Report on the Work of the KWP Central Committee” (May 8, 2016). In 2013, he held the title of First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. At the Supreme People’s Assembly in June 2016, the National Defense Commission was renamed the State Aff i C i i id d b Ch i Ki J F i t “Ch i f th St t Aff i C i i ” i d f th titl f Ki J i thi hit ----- Peninsula, and the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea. Partly because North Korea maintains its extremely closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the details and intentions of its behavior. However, it is necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them. As for North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals, utmost efforts continue to be made to realize the return of all abductees to Japan as quickly as possible by close cooperation with related countries, including the United States. **2 Military Posture** （1）General Situation North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all soldiers, modernizing all military forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country).[3] North Korea’s military forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with a total troop strength of roughly 1.28 million. While North Korea still maintains substantial military forces, its conventional forces are markedly inferior to those of the ROK’s military and U.S. Forces Korea, and most of its equipment is outdated. Contributory factors to this situation include the reduction in military assistance from the former Soviet bloc due to the collapse of the Cold War structure, limitations on defense spending caused by the weak economy, and the rapid modernization of ROK’s defense capability. North Korea is thought to be attempting to compensate for its consequent disadvantage by focusing its efforts on building up its arsenal of WMDs and ballistic missiles. North Korea also has forces such as a large-scale special operations force that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage, to guerrilla warfare. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military related installations across its territory. personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul. The Navy has about 800 ships with a total displacement of approximately 111,000 tons and is chiefly comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile craft. Also, it has about 20 of the former model Romeo-class submarines, about 50 midget submarines, and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operations forces. The Air Force has approximately 550 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union. However, some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operations forces. In addition, North Korea has so-called asymmetric military capabilities, namely, special operations force whose size is estimated at 100,000 personnel.[4] In recent years, North Korea is seen to be placing importance on and strengthening its cyber forces.[5] See Chapter 3, Section 3-2-3 (North Korea) **3** WMD and Ballistic Missiles **Chapter** In recent years, North Korea has launched ballistic missiles at an unprecedented frequency, rapidly improving its operational capabilities, such as simultaneous launch and surprise attack. In addition, given the technological maturity obtained through a series of nuclear tests, North Korea is assessed to have already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. These military trends in North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security and significantly （2）Military Capabilities The North Korean Army comprises about 1.10 million The Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth plenary meeting of the fourth KWP Central Committee in 1962. James Thurman, then Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, stated, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 60,000” in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Additionally, the ROK Defense White Paper 2018 notes, “Special operation forces are currently estimated at approximately 200,000 strong.” The white paper pointed out that North Korea’s special operations force has become an independent military branch. R di N th K b tt k Ch t 3 S ti 3 ----- undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs. On the other hand, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP held on April 20, 2018, decisions were made to discontinue “nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire,” and to dismantle the northern nuclear test ground. In the subsequent inter-Korean summit meeting held on April 27 and in the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held on June 12, North Korea expressed its intention to work towards denuclearization. Then, on May 24, international press representatives were invited to witness the destruction of the northern nuclear test ground. However, North Korea has not yet carried out the dismantlement of all WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. Having repeatedly carried out ballistic missile launches in breach of relevant Security Council resolutions since May 2019, it seems that North Korea has been striving to develop more advanced technologies and operational capabilities in this field. Japan cannot possibly turn a blind eye to this series of missile launches, which is an issue of serious concern to the international community as well. At the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim stated that, since the United States was holding U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, there were no grounds for North Korea to be unilaterally bound any longer by a commitment that no other party fails to honor. He also announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy towards North Korea. Furthermore, at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the KWP in May 2020 guided by Kim Jong-un, North Korea announced that new policies for further increasing nuclear war deterrence and putting the strategic armed forces on a high alert were set forth and crucial measures for considerably increasing the firepower strike ability of the KPA’s artillery were taken. Looking to the future, it will be necessary to continue to carefully monitor moves by North Korea, including what kind of concrete actions it will take towards the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. （1）Nuclear Weapons a. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the unclear status of past nuclear developments, and considering North Korea has already conducted six nuclear tests including the nuclear test in September 2017, it is conceivable that North Korea has made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program. With regard to plutonium, a fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons,[6] North Korea has suggested its production and extraction on several instances.[7] As for recent activities, in September 2015, North Korea announced that all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including the nuclear reactor and the reprocessing facility, the disablement of which was agreed upon at the fifth and the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in February and September 2007, respectively, had been readjusted and had started normal operation.[8] Because the restarting of the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, those activities are causes of great concern. As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment. In November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this uranium enrichment plant has been suggested in August 2013; in this regard, North Korea could have increased its enrichment capabilities. The series of North Korean behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched **Chapter** Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%). North Korea announced in October 2003 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium, and in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional 8,000 used fuel rods. The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2018 estimates that North Korea possesses around 50 kg of plutonium, retaining the assessment given in the Defense White Paper 2016. The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2016 notes, “North Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its enrichment facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production.” It is said that the reactor was restarted at the end of August 2013. It has been noted th t if th t i t t d N th K ld h th bilit t d h l t i ( i t l 6 k ) t f t i t l l b b i ----- uranium in addition to plutonium.[9] Regarding these nuclear-related activities, activities that are inconsistent with a “commitment to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” which North Korea insists it upholds, have been pointed out. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo testified in the Senate in July 2018 that North Korea was continuing to produce nuclear fuels. In addition, at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, then IAEA Director General Amano pointed out in March 2019 that the IAEA continued to observe signs of North Korea using the enrichment facility at nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. With regard to the development of nuclear weapons, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests on October 9, 2006, May 25, 2009, February 12, 2013, January 6, 2016, September 9, 2016, and September 3, 2017. It is highly likely that North Korea has made strides in its nuclear weapons program, collecting the necessary data through these nuclear tests. It is believed that North Korea seeks to miniaturize nuclear weapons and develop them into warheads that can be mounted on ballistic missiles, as part of its nuclear weapons program. On September 3, 2017, it was announced that Chairman Kim Jong-un had visited North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute and had seen a hydrogen bomb capable of being loaded into an ICBM,[10] in addition to which, following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test that was forced through on the same day, North Korea announced that it “successfully carried out a test of H-bomb for ICBM.” In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity. However, considering, for example, that the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, as well as the technological maturity that is estimated to have been reached through North Korea’s previous six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads.[11] Furthermore, the yield of the sixth nuclear weapons test in 2017 was estimated to be the largest ever, with a maximum yield of approximately 160 kt. Given the size of the estimated yield, the possibility cannot be discounted that the test was of a hydrogen bomb.[12] In any case, North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with North Korean efforts to enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending the range of ballistic missiles that are the delivery vehicles of WMDs, poses grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security, and significantly undermines peace and security of the region and international community. Therefore, it can never be tolerated. b. Background of the Nuclear Program As regards the objective of North Korea’s nuclear development, North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime in light of the following: North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance of the existing regime;[13] North Korea considers that it needs its own nuclear deterrence to counter the nuclear threat of the United States and is in no position at least in the short-term to overturn its inferiority in conventional forces vis-à-vis the United States and the ROK; North Korea asserts that the Iraqi and Libyan regimes collapsed and that Syria was attacked by U.S. Forces in April 2017 due to their lack of nuclear deterrence;[14] and North Korea has reiterated that nuclear weapons will never be traded away at negotiations. With regard to the issue of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, Chairman Kim expressed the desire on a number of occasions—including at the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held on June 12, 2018—to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. **Chapter** 9 The ROK Defense White Paper 2018 assesses that North Korea possesses a substantial amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU). It has been noted that a uranium enrichment facility different from the one in Yongbyon exists in Kangson. 10 On September 3, 2017, in a report on a visit by Chairman Kim Jong-un to North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that North Korea is able to conduct an “ultra-powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack over a wide area.” 11 Over ten years have already passed since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006. Furthermore, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests to date. This timetable for technology development and the number of tests are reaching levels that are by no means inadequate, even when compared to the processes of developing technologies to miniaturize and lighten nuclear weapons in the United States, former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2018 assesses that “North Korea’s ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons seems to have reached a considerable level.” 12 The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2018 noted that the explosive yield of the sixth nuclear test was approximately 50 kt, significantly larger than the yield of the past tests and that this was assessed to be a hydrogen bomb test. North Korea also insisted that its fourth nuclear test, conducted in January 2016, was a hydrogen bomb test. However, given that the yield of that test is estimated at 6 to 7 kt, it is difficult to conceive that this was a hydrogen bomb test as generally defined. 13 According to “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” U.S. DoD (February 2016) 14 For example, a comment in the Rodong Sinmun dated December 2, 2013, contends that the situation in Iraq and Libya teaches an acute lesson that countries under the constant threat of U.S. preemptive nuclear attack have no choice but to become a victim of U.S. state terrorism, unless the countries have powerful deterrent capability. In addition, the “Statement by the Spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” dated April 8, 2017, states with regard to the U.S. attack on Syria two days earlier on April 6 as follows: “S i th US h b i ki l t i ith t l d th T d i i t ti i ti ” ----- **Fig. I-2-3-2** Ballistic Missiles Developed/Possessed by North Korea (m) 30 20 10 **Chapter** |Col1|Toksa|New type SRBM (A)/(B)/(C)|Col4|Col5|Scud B, C, ER, Modified|Nodong Modified|SLBM|SLBM modified for ground launch|SLBM|Musudan|IRBM- class|ICBM- IC class c|BM- lass|Taepodong -2 variant| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Range|Approx. A 120 km 4|pprox. 600 km/ Approx. 00 km/ Approx. 400km*1|||Approx. 300 km/ Approx. 500 km/ Approx. 1,000km/ Under analysis|Approx. 1,300 km/ Approx. 1,500 km|1,000 km or more|1,000 km or more|Approx. 2,000 km|Approx. 2,500 -4,000 km|Approx. 5,000 km|5,500 km 10, or more or|000 km more*2|10,000 km or more| |Fuel / stage|Solid / 1 So|lid / 1|Solid / 1|Solid / 1|Liquid / 1|Liquid / 1|Solid / 2|Solid / 2|Solid / 2|Liquid / 1|Liquid / 1|Liquid / 2 Liq|uid / 2|Liquid / 3| |Operation platform|TEL|TEL|TEL|TEL|TEL|TEL|Submarine|TEL|Submarine|TEL|TEL|TEL|TEL|Launch site| Made by MOD based on Jane’s Note: North Korean names Strategic Weapon Systems, etc. given in blue. 【Hwasong-15】 【Hwasong-14】 【Hwasong-12】 【Modified】 【ER】 【Modified】 【B・C】 【Pukguksong-2】 【Pukguksong】 （A） （C） 【Pukguksong-3】 （B） - 1 Ranges of new type SRBM (A)/(B)/(C) are the largest ones achieved. - 2 Depends on weight of the warhead, etc. However, he is presumed to have done so on the premise that North Korea would continue to possess a nuclear arsenal. In fact, North Korea has frequently asserted to the international community its claim to the status of “a nuclear weapon state” and has repeatedly insisted that it will not agree to unilateral denuclearization. For example, at the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim stated that if the United States persists in its hostile policy, there will never be denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, and that North Korea will maintain a powerful nuclear deterrent capable of guaranteeing its long-term security. In addition, it has been noted that even after announcing a commitment to full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has continued nuclear development[15] and that a uranium enrichment facility not disclosed by North Korea exists. In light of the above, it is now necessary to keep a close watch on what kind of concrete actions it will take towards the dismantlement of all WMDs and all ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. （2）Biological and Chemical Weapons North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition, most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian uses, which in turn facilitates camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to chemical weapons, North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure 15 F l “W ld id Th t A t ” U S Di t f N ti l I t lli (J 2019) ----- |DDee|ppeenn|ddss oonn|wweeiigg|hhtt oo|ff tt|hhee|wwaarr|hheeaa|dd,, ee|ttcc..| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| **Chapter** **Fig. I-2-3-3** Range of North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles Taepodong-2 variant New YorkNew York Washington D. C.Washington D. C. ICBM-class “Hwasong 15” (Range: more than 10,000km*) 10,000km ChicagoChicago *Depends on weight of the warhead, etc.*Depends on weight of the warhead, etc. LondonLondon ParisParis Los AngelesLos Angeles San FranciscoSan Francisco 5,500km MoscowMoscow AnchorageAnchorage 5,000km 4,000km 1,500km HawaiiHawaii 1,300km New DelhiNew Delhi Beijing 1,000km ICBM-class “Hwasong 14” Pyongyang TokyoTokyo (Range: more than 5,500km) OkinawaOkinawa GuamGuam IRBM-class “Hwasong 12” (Range: approx. 5,000km) Musudan (range: approx. 2,500 to 4,000km) JakartaJakarta Nodong (range: approx. 1,300km/1,500km) Scud-ER (range: approx. 1,000km) CanberraCanberra Note 1: The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience. Note 2: Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea. **Fig. I-2-3-4** Major Trends in North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launches Number of Ballistic Missiles Launched by North Korea 30 (as of March 2020) 25 20 Taepodong Taepodong-2 variant SRBM/MRBM (Scud, Nodong, and “Pukguksong-2”) SLBM IRBM-class (Musudan, and “Hwasong-12”) ICMB-class (“Hwasong-14,” and “Hwasong-15”) Unknown (what could have been ballistic missiles or presumed to have failed, etc.) New short-range ballistic missiles 15 10 1998 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 25 23 17 11 8 8 7 2 2 1 Kim Jong-il Kim Jong-un (i) Increase of ranges: Development of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles-class ballistic missiles (since 2017) with a range exceeding 10,000km (ii) Enhancement of the accuracy and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks: Repeated launches from unprecedented locations in the early morning and late hours of the night using TELs, often in multiple numbers (since 2014). Some ballistic missiles are said to be equipped with a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) (since 2017). (iii) Enhancement of secrecy and instantaneity and the ability to conduct surprise attacks: Launches of SLBMs (since 2016) and promotion of the development of solid-fueled ballistic missiles (since 2016) (iv) Irregular trajectories: Launches of short-range ballistic missiles having a shape similar to that of the Russian “Iskander,” which are said to be able to fly at a lower altitude than conventional ballistic missiles and on an irregular trajectory (since 2019) (v) Diversification of the forms of launches: Ballistic missile launches assumed to have used a lofted trajectory have been confirmed (since 2016). ----- **Fig. I-2-3-5** Cases of North Korean Ballistic Missiles Overflying Japan Launches of ballistic missiles allegedly as launches of satellites after reporting supposed falling areas to international organizations (three times) |Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance| |---|---|---|---|---| |2009.04.05|Taepodong-2 or variant|1|Taepodong Area|3,000 km or more| |2012.12.12|Taepodong-2 variant|1|Tongch’ang-ri Area|Approx. 2,600 km (second stage landfall)| |2016.02.07|Taepodong-2 variant|1|Tongch’ang-ri|Approx. 2,500 km (second stage landfall)| Launches of ballistic missiles without prior notice (three times) |Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance| |---|---|---|---|---| |1998.08.31|Taepodong-1|1|Taepodong Area|Approx. 1,600 km| |2017.08.29|IRBM-class “Hwasong-12”|1|Near Sunan|Approx. 2,700 km| |2017.09.15|IRBM-class “Hwasong-12”|1|Near Sunan|Approx. 3,700 km| - After the launch of Taepodong-1 on August 31, 1998, North Korea announced that it was the launch of a satellite. - Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea. **Chapter** |Fig. I-2-3|3-6 Cases of North K|Korean Ballistic M|Missiles Launched on|a Lofted Trajectory|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance|Altitude and flight duration| |2016.06.22|Musudan|2|Wonsan|First: Approx. 100 km (maximum); Second: Approx. 400 km|Exceeded 1,000 km (the second one)| |2017.05.14|IRBM-class “Hwasong-12”|1|Near Kusong|Approx. 800 km|Exceeded 2,000 km; for around 30 minutes| |2017.07.04|ICBM-class “Hwasong-14”|1|Near Kusong|Approx. 900 km|Exceeded far beyond 2,500 km; for around 40 minutes| |2017.07.28|ICBM-class “Hwasong-14”|1|Near Mupyong-ri|Approx. 1,000 km|Exceeded far beyond 3,500 km; for around 45 minutes| |2017.11.29|ICBM-class “Hwasong-15”|1|Near Pyongsong|Approx. 1,000 km|Exceeded far beyond 4,000 km; for around 53 minutes| |2019.10.02|SLBM “Pukguksong-3”|1|Near Wonsan|Approx. 450 km|Approx. 900 km; for around 17 minutes| - Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea. for the production of biological weapons.[16] Possession of sarin, VX, mustard and other chemical weapons, and of anthrax, smallpox, pest and other biological agents that could be used as biological weapons have been pointed out. The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea is able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on warheads. （3）Ballistic Missiles As is the case with WMDs, many of the details of North Korea’s ballistic missiles are unknown, partly owing to the country’s extremely closed regime. It appears, however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities. The ballistic missiles currently deemed to be possessed and developed by North Korea are the following.[17] See Fig. I-2-3-2 (Ballistic Missiles Developed or Possessed by North Korea) Fig. I-2-3-3 (Range of North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles [image]) Fig. I-2-3-4 (Major Trends in North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launches) Fig. I-2-3-5 (Cases of North Korean Ballistic Missiles Overflying Japan) Fig. I-2-3-6 (Cases of North Korean Ballistic Missiles Launched on a Lofted Trajectory) a. Types of Ballistic Missiles Possessed or Developed by North Korea (a) Toksa Toksa is a short-range ballistic missile with a range estimated to be approximately 120 km. It is transported and operated on a TEL.[18] It is deemed that Toksa is the first ballistic missile 16 For example, the ROK Defense White Paper 2018 points out that, following the commencement of production in the 1980s, it is estimated that North Korea has a stock of 2,500-5,000 tons of various chemical weapons stored. It also notes that North Korea likely has the capability to produce a variety of biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, and pests. Moreover, the U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of May 2018 points out that, “North Korea probably could employ CW [chemical weapons] agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles.” North Korea ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987 but has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. 17 According to “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in March 2020) North Korea possesses 700 to 1,000 ballistic missiles in total, 45% of which are presumed to be Scud-class, 45% Nodong-class, and the remaining 10% other intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles. 18 The signs of a launch from a fixed launcher are easy for the adversary to detect and are vulnerable to attack by the adversary. TEL was developed mainly by the former Soviet Union among others in order to make the detection of launch signs more difficult and increase survivability. According to the U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of May 2018, North Korea possesses a maximum of 100 TELs for Scuds, 50 TELs for Nodongs, and 50 TELs for IRBMs (Musudans). As for a TEL-mounted missile launch, it is deemed difficult to detect individual specific signs in advance concerning the detailed location and timing of the launch. This is because it is operated by being mounted and transported on a TEL, and furthermore, military-related underground facilities are thought to exist all over North Korea. Along with activities related to the development of ballistic missiles, developments related to the building of TELs require close watch as they concern the operational capabilities of ballistic ----- tactical guided weapon ) launched in 2019 on May 4 and 9, July 25, and August 6 are all presumed to have the same system and to be of a new and different type from missiles such as Nodong and Scud. Two missiles were launched on each of the aforementioned dates and flew approximately 200-600 km. The launched missiles have a shape similar to that of the Russian short-range ballistic missile “Iskander,” which is said to be able to fly at a lower altitude than conventional ballistic missiles and on an irregular trajectory. (ii) SRBM B The SRBM (described by North Korea as “new weapon” or as “tactical guided weapon”) launched on August 10 and 16, 2019 and on March 21, 2020 are all presumed to have the same system and to be of a new and different type again from the aforementioned A-type. Two missiles were launched on each of the aforementioned dates and flew approximately 250-400 km. (iii) SRBM C The SRBM (described by North Korea as “super-large multiple rocket launcher”) launched in 2019 on August 24, September 10, October 31, and November 28, and on March 2 and 9, 2020 are all presumed to be of a new and different type again from the aforementioned A-and B-types. Two missiles were launched on each of the aforementioned dates and flew approximately 300-400 km. The interval between launches was estimated at about 3 minutes in the case of the October 31, 2019 launches, and less than 1 minute during the launches on November 28, 2019 and March 2, 2020, suggesting that North Korea is trying to improve the continuous fire capability required for saturation attacks and the like. In addition, North Korea carried out two launches of what could have been SRBMs on July 31, 2019 and another two a couple of days later, on August 2. Another two SRBMs were launched on March 29, 2020; analysis of the specific type of shell is still under way. Through such launches, North Korea appears to be pursuing enhancement of related technologies and operational capabilities, including enhancing secrecy and instantaneity, to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch, as well as improving its ability to conduct surprise attacks and its continuous fire capability. Considering the distances flown, it would appear that not only the ROK, but also parts of Japan would be within range of some of the SRBMs launched. There is also a concern that this short-range ballistic missile technology will be applied to longer-range missiles in due course. Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched short-range ballistic missiles (July 2019) [JANES] Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched short-range ballistic missiles (August 2019) [JANES] **Chapter** Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched short-range ballistic missiles (September 2019) [JANES] possessed or developed by North Korea which adopts a solid fuel propellant. (b) New SRBM launched since 2019 Since 2019, North Korea has launched at least three types of short-range ballistic missile that are presumed to be new models. From images published by North Korea, it can be ascertained that these three types of SRBM were launched from a wheeled-drive or continuous-tracked TEL, with the characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel propellant engines identifiable on each of the images. (i) SRBM A The SRBM (described by North Korea as “new type of ----- a MaRV.[19] Given that North Korea announced that Chairman Kim Jong-un had ordered the development of ballistic missiles capable of precision attacks on enemy ships and other individual targets, the intent appears to be to enhance the accuracy of ballistic missile attacks. (d) Nodong The Nodong is a liquid fuel propelled single-stage ballistic missile and is transported and operated on a TEL. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, reaching almost all of Japan. Although the details of Nodong’s performance have not been confirmed, Nodong may not have the accuracy to carry out precise strikes on specific target installations, as this ballistic missile is likely based on Scud technology. However, it has been suggested that North Korea is working to increase the Nodong’s accuracy. In this regard, it had been suggested that there is a type of Nodong aimed at enhancing accuracy by improving the shape of the warhead (whose range is deemed to reach approximately 1,500 km through the weight reduction of the warhead). Against this backdrop, the launch of this type of ballistic missile was confirmed for the first time in the images published by North Korea a day after the launch of one Scud and two Nodong missiles on July 19, 2016. (e) SLBM (i) SLBM “Pukguksong” It has been suggested that North Korea is developing an SLBM and a new submarine which is designed to carry the SLBM (referred to by North Korea as “Pukguksong”). Since it announced in May 2015 through its media that it conducted a successful test launch of an SLBM, it has made public SLBM “Pukguksong” launches on four occasions.[20] Judging from the images and footage that it has made public so far, North Korea may have succeeded in operating the “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air. Moreover, in the launches in April and August 2016, it appears, based on observations such as the shape of the flame coming out of the missile and the color of the smoke, that the solid fuel propellant system was adopted. Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched 4 Scud ERs (March 2017) [JANES] **Chapter** **2** (c) Scud The Scud is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile and is transported and operated on a TEL. Scud B and Scud C, a variant of Scud B with extended range, are SRBMs with ranges estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km, respectively. It is believed that North Korea has manufactured and deployed them, and has exported them to the Middle East and other countries. The Scud ER (Extended Range) is a ballistic missile that has an extended range due to the extension of the Scud’s body as well as the reduction in weight of the warhead, among other factors. The range of a Scud ER is estimated to reach approximately 1,000 km, and it appears that a part of Japan falls within this range. In addition, North Korea is developing a ballistic missile that appears to be an improvement of the Scud missile. This ballistic missile was launched on May 29, 2017. A day after the launch, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted a test launch of a newly developed ballistic rocket incorporating a precision navigation guidance system. In addition, while the images released by North Korea show that the ballistic missile was launched from a continuous track TEL and had what appears to be small wings on its warhead, i.e., characteristics different from those of existing Scud missiles, the shape other than the warhead and length are similar to existing Scud missiles. Another similarity is that it can be confirmed that the missile has straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel-propelled engine. It has also been noted that this ballistic missile is equipped with 19 For example, according to “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in March 2020), the launch on May 29, 2017, was presumed to have been the first launch of a short-range ballistic missile based on a Scud missile, equipped with a MaRV, suggesting that North Korea has made advances in its precision guidance systems. 20 On May 9, 2015, North Korea announced that it had succeeded in a test launch of an SLBM. On January 8, 2016, it released footage of an SLBM test launch that appears to be different from the one unveiled in May 2015. On April 24 and August 25, 2016, it again announced that it had succeeded in SLBM test launches. Moreover, the MOD predicts that North Korea also l h d b lli ti i il d t b SLBM J l 9 2016 lth h N th K h t d t b t th l h ----- test equipment. It is deemed that through developing the SLBM and a new submarine to carry it, North Korea intends to diversify its ballistic missile attack capabilities and improve survivability. (f) Ballistic Missile Modified from the SLBM North Korea launched a ballistic missile on both February 12 and May 21, 2017, both of which appeared to be a modified version of the SLBM “Pukguksong” for ground launch (referred to by North Korea as “Pukguksong-2”). This ballistic missile is estimated to have flown approximately 500 km on Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched an SLBM “Pukguksong-3” (October 2019) [JANES] both occasions, on somewhat higher trajectories than normal. If it were launched on a nominal trajectory, the firing range **Chapter** A ballistic missile presumed to be an SLBM is assessed to surpass 1,000 km. A day after the launch on **2** “Pukguksong” has been confirmed in flight in the February 12, North Korea announced that it was developed direction of Japan, launched from the vicinity of Sinpo, as a ground-to-ground ballistic missile based on the results of on the east coast of North Korea, on August 24, 2016. the August 2016 SLBM launch. It also announced a day after The SLBM flew approximately 500 km. Considering that the launch on May 21, 2017 that it had again successfully this was its first SLBM to fly approximately 500 km, the conducted the test launch of the Pukguksong-2 and that possibility cannot be denied that North Korea had striven Chairman Kim Jong-un had authorized its “operational to solve the problems through the preceding launches and deployment.” Moreover, the launch by a “cold launch system,” achieved certain technological progress. Furthermore, it is in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air predicted that the ballistic missile that was launched at this from a continuous track TEL, and the characteristic radial time flew on a somewhat higher than nominal trajectory. If exhausts of solid fuel propellant engines, can be confirmed it were launched on a nominal trajectory the firing range is from each of the images that North Korea released. It has the expected to surpass 1,000 km. characteristics of appearing to be using “cold launch system” North Korea’s “Pukguksong” SLBMs are believed to and solid fuel propellant engines in common with the SLBM be launched from a Gorae-class submarine (displacement “Pukguksong.” Given that North Korea has made references 1,500 tons). North Korea has one such submarine. It is to its operational deployment, there is a possibility that North also pointed out that North Korea seeks to develop a larger Korea will newly deploy a solid fuel propellant engine that submarine to launch SLBMs.[21] includes Japan within its firing range. (ii) SLBM “Pukguksong-3” (g) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)-class On October 2, 2019, North Korea launched what was presumed to be a new type of SLBM (described by To date North Korea has launched three liquid fuel-propelled North Korea as a “Pukguksong-3”) that differed from the IRBM-class ballistic missiles (referred to by North Korea as SLBM “Pukguksong.” The missile in question flew for “Hwasong-12”). This ballistic missile was launched on May about 450 km and is presumed to have fallen into Japan’s 14, 2017 and based on this flight pattern, it is presumed that exclusive economic zone (EEZ). As the ballistic missile the ballistic missile was launched on a lofted trajectory. Had launched on this occasion reached a maximum altitude of it been launched on a nominal trajectory, the maximum firing about 900 km, it is surmised to have been launched on a range is assessed to be close to approximately 5,000 km. In lofted trajectory. If launched on a nominal trajectory, it addition, the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid is estimated that it could have a range of approximately fuel propelled engine can be confirmed from the images 2,000 km. The characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel released by North Korea a day after the launch, suggesting propellant engines are identifiable on images published that the ballistic missile uses liquid fuel. On August 29 by North Korea. The ballistic missile in question could and September 15, 2017, single missiles of this class were potentially have been launched from underwater launch 21 A di t “J ’ Fi hti Shi 2019 2020 ” t ----- launched and flew over Japan s territory in the vicinity of the Oshima Peninsula and Cape Erimo. These launches were the first cases of North Korea launching what it calls ballistic missiles that flew over Japan’s territory. In view of their flight paths, these missiles appear to demonstrate a certain level of function as an IRBM. Also, the fact that missiles that overflew Japan were launched in succession in a short time period would suggest that North Korea is steadily improving its ballistic missile capabilities. Furthermore, although at the time of launches in May and August 2017 the missiles were confirmed to have been launched after being separated from the wheel-drive TEL, at the time of the September launch the missile was confirmed to have been launched while still attached to the wheel-drive TEL. Considering this point, together with North Korea’s claims at the time of the launch that it was for the purposes of “confirming practical operational procedures” and “realize the potential of the ‘Hwasong-12,’” there is a possibility that North Korea is improving its practical operational capabilities. In 2016 North Korea conducted repeated launches of an IRBM-class ballistic missile that is presumed to be the Musudan,[22] but although the missile launched in June flew for a certain distance on a lofted trajectory, the fact that there were two successive launch failures in October would suggest that there may still be obstacles remaining towards the operationalization of the Musudan and that North Korea may be concentrating on the development and operationalization of the “Hwasong-12” as an IRBM instead. (h) Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-class (i) ICBM-class “Hwasong-14” North Korea has launched ICBM-class ballistic missile (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-14”) on July 4 and 28, 2017. From the flight pattern, it is presumed that the two ballistic missiles were launched on a lofted trajectory. If they were to have been launched on a normal trajectory, it is estimated that they would have a maximum range of at least 5,500 km. On July 4, the day of the launch, North Korea made an “important announcement,” announcing that it had successfully conducted a test launch of a new type of ICBM. Furthermore, on the day following the July 28 launch, North Korea announced that the “nuclear bomb detonation device” had functioned normally, emphasizing that the safety of the warhead in an atmospheric reentry environment had been made maintained. This suggests that North Korea is aiming to operationalize long-range ballistic missiles. Based on images released by North Korea, the ballistic missiles launched on July 4 and 28 have the following in common with the IRBM-class ballistic missile launched on May 14: (1) the engine system consists of one main engine and four auxiliary engines; (2) the shape of the lower part of the propulsion system is conical; and (3) the straight-line flame of liquid-propulsion systems can be confirmed. Based on these facts and the respective ranges that can be estimated for the missiles, the possibility can be deduced that the ICBM-class ballistic missile that were launched on July 4 and 28 were developed on the basis of the new-type IRBM-class ballistic missile that had been launched on May 14. Also based on images published by North Korea, it can be confirmed that the ballistic missiles that were launched on July 4 and 28 had been mounted on the wheeled eight axle TEL similar to KN-08/14 (see (j) below). However, it can be confirmed from the images at the time of the launches that they were launched from simplified launch pads, not TELs. Furthermore, the images suggest that the missile was of two-stage construction. (ii) ICBM-class “Hwasong-15” On November 29, 2017, North Korea launched a single missile that is presumed to have been an intercontinentalrange ballistic missile-class ballistic missile (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-15”) different from the aforementioned “Hwasong-14” missiles. From the flight pattern it is presumed that the missile was launched on a lofted trajectory. On the day of the launch, North Korea made a “government statement,” declaring that it had successfully conducted a test launch of the “Hwasong-15,” a newly developed type of ICBM with the capability to strike all areas of the U.S. mainland, and asserting that it had now completed development of its state nuclear force. The following points would suggest that this missile is an intercontinental-range ballistic missile-class ballistic missile, different from the ICBM-class ballistic missile launched twice in July 2017: (1) its flight distance and altitude; (2) the fact that North Korea announced the successful test launch of a new type of ICBM, the “Hwasong-15;” (3) the fact that the missile was deployed on a previously unseen nine-axle wheel-drive TEL; **Chapter** 22 It has been suggested that, given its range of between 2,500 and 4,000 km, all parts of Japan and Guam may fall within the Musudan’s firing range. Similar to its Scud and Nodong counterparts, it is liquid fuel-propelled and is loaded onto a TEL to transport and operate. It has been noted that Musudan is a revamped version of the Russian SLBM SS-N-6 that North K i d i th l 1990 ----- international organizations. It is assessed that North Korea s long-range ballistic missiles’ technological reliability had been advanced by this launch because it is estimated that (1) it successfully launched two similar types of ballistic missiles in a row; (2) the missile flew in almost the same way as the last launch; and (3) it put an object into orbit around the Earth. Accordingly, it is believed that these test launches of long range ballistic missiles can contribute to the development of shorter-range missiles in such ways as increasing the Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched an ICBM-class “Hwasong-15” range and payload capability and improving the circular (November 2017) [JANES] error probability (CEP). Also, related technology such as the separation technology of multi-stage propelling devices **Chapter** and (4) that the nose of the warhead was more rounded and the technology of posture control and thrust modulation **2** than previous missiles. In addition, according to images of long-range ballistic missiles can be applied to other released by North Korea, the missile was of a two-stage middle-range and long-range ballistic missiles that North design, and it can be confirmed that it was removed from Korea is newly developing. Therefore, the launch may lead the TEL prior to launch and that its straight-line exhausts not only to the improvement of other types of its ballistic are characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine. missiles including Nodong but also to the advancement of Furthermore, based on the flight altitude, distance flown North Korea’s entire ballistic missile program including the and released images, it can be assumed that this missile development of new ballistic missiles and diversification of could have a range in excess of 10,000 km, depending on attack measure. the weight of the warhead deployed, etc., thus renewing North Korea announced twice that it had conducted concerns over the increasing ranges of North Korea’s a “crucial test” in December 2019 at its Sohae satellite ballistic missiles. launching station in Tongch’ang-ri district. It has been In addition, although the wheel-drive TELs possessed suggested that these were ICBM-class ballistic missile by North Korea are thought to be modified versions of engine tests. Russian and Chinese TELs, it is noteworthy that North Korea has claimed to have developed its own TEL. (j) KN-08/KN-14 The details of the new missile “KN-08” which was (i) Taepodong-2 showcased at the military parade in April 2012 and July Taepodong-2 are long-range ballistic missiles launched from 2013 are unknown. However, the missile is believed to be an fixed launch pads.[23] Taepodong-2 is believed to use in its first ICBM. At the military parade in October 2015, a new missile stage, four engines, each of which is developed based on thought to be the “KN-08” was showcased with a different the technologies of Nodong, and the same type of engine in shaped warhead from the previous version. The new missile, its second stage. Its range is estimated to be approximately considered a variant of the “KN-08,” is called the “KN-14.” 6,000 km for the two-stage type, while the range of its three-stage variant can be more than approximately 10,000 b. Major Trends in Ballistic Missile Launches km assuming that the weight of the warhead is not over North Korea has repeatedly launched various types of approximately 1 ton. Taepodong-2 missiles and its variants ballistic missiles. In particular, since 2016 it has conducted have been launched a total of five times so far. more than 70 launches, including launches of what appear to Most recently, in February 2016, North Korea conducted be new types of missiles. a launch of a missile disguised as a “satellite” from As for trends in North Korea’s ballistic missile launches, the Tongch’ang-ri district in the northwest coastline of the following characteristics have been observed. Firstly, it North Korea using a Taepodong-2 variant after notifying appears that the country seeks to increase the firing range 23 Th i l T d 1 hi h h b t it d t f th d l t f T d 2 ----- of ballistic missiles. An intercontinental-range ballistic missile-class ballistic missile launched in November 2017, which could have a range in excess of 10,000 km, depending on the weight of the warhead deployed, etc. Although it is considered necessary for the operationalization of long-range ballistic missiles to further verify technology for protecting the re-entry vehicle from the ultrahigh temperature that is generated during the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead part, North Korea, with announcements such as the one in November 2017 on the day of the launch of what is believed to have been an intercontinental-range ballistic missile-class ballistic missile, claiming that it had re-verified warhead reliability in a reentry environment, is displaying an intention to seek to secure and enhance technology aimed at the operationalization of long-range ballistic missiles. Should North Korea make further progress in the development of ballistic missiles, including the acquiring of reentry technologies, it may come to have a one-sided understanding that it has secured a strategic deterrence against the United States. However, if North Korea has such a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, it could lead to an increase and escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan. North Korea is presumed to have acquired the atmospheric re-entry technologies required for the operationalization of Nodong and Scud-ER ballistic missiles, within whose range Japan lies, suggesting that it already has the ability to attack Japan with nuclear weapons fitted to these ballistic missiles. Secondly, North Korea may be aiming to enhance the accuracy, continuous fire capability, and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks and the like. As for the Scud and Nodong, which are already deployed, since 2014, they have been launched from unprecedented locations, cutting across the Korean Peninsula, in the early morning and late hours of the night using TELs, often in multiple numbers. This indicates that North Korea is capable of launching Scuds and Nodongs from any place and at any time, from which it is deemed that it has increased confidence in the performance and reliability of its ballistic missiles. As for Scuds and Nodongs, since the August 2016 Nodong launch, there have been launches where it is presumed that warheads fell in Japan’s EEZ, posing a major threat to Japan’s security. The four ballistic missiles, apparently Scud ERs, launched on March 6, 2017, were launched simultaneously. It is possible that through these launches, North Korea’s intentions are not only research and development of ballistic missiles but also the enhancement of their operational capabilities. Since Chairman Kim Jong-un has repeatedly instructed the military troops to reject formality and conduct practical training, it can be considered that these instructions underpin the launches of ballistic missiles that have already been deployed. Some have noted that a ballistic missile which appears to have been modified from the Scud missile launched in May 2017 is equipped with a MaRV. Furthermore, images of the 2019 ballistic missile launches published by North Korea show that the missiles were launched from different places and hit the specific target. This suggests that North Korea is aiming to enhance the accuracy of attack by upgrading ballistic missiles that have already been deployed and developing new ballistic missiles. Furthermore, in the short-range ballistic missile launches on November 28, 2019 and March 2, 2020, the interval between launching the two missiles on both occasions was estimated at less than 1 minute, suggesting that North Korea is trying to improve the continuous fire capability required for saturation attacks and the like. In recent years, North Korea also appears to have been striving to improve its practical operational capabilities, conducting target practice using a combination of new SRBMs and various types of artillery. Thirdly, North Korea appears to be seeking to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing secrecy and instantaneity to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch. Using a TEL or submarine, a ballistic missile can be launched from any point, making it difficult to detect signs of a launch in advance. North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles from TELs and SLBMs. In addition, all the ballistic missiles launched in 2019 appear to use solid fuel. It is therefore believed that North Korea is proceeding with the development of solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Generally solid fuel-propelled ballistic missiles are pre loaded with solid fuel, and therefore, they can be launched instantly and the signs of their launch are more difficult to detect. Furthermore, they can be reloaded more quickly, and they are relatively easier to store and handle in comparison to liquid fuel-propelled missiles. In this respect, they are considered to be superior militarily. From these factors, North Korea is deemed to be aiming to enhance its surprise attack capabilities. Fourthly, North Korea could possibly be developing ballistic missiles that fly at low altitudes on irregular trajectories, in an attempt to breach other countries’ missile **Chapter** ----- **Chapter** **Column** North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities (Based on the current state of miniaturization and warhead technology of nuclear weapons) North Korea, which is signifi cantly inferior to the ROK Forces environment test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the U.S. Forces Korea in terms of conventional forces, and announced the successful implementation of the test. This has been promoting the development of nuclear weapons and indicates that North Korea is seeking to acquire technology for ballistic missiles and enhancing operational capabilities in longer-range missiles. order to make up for the inferiority. In light of the above, North Korea is considered to have In order to launch an attack using ballistic missiles fi tted miniaturized nuclear weapons to fi t in ballistic missile warheads with a nuclear weapon, technologically, it is essential to and to possess the capability to launch an attack on Japan with miniaturize a nuclear weapon suffi ciently to be carried by a a ballistic missile fi tted with a nuclear warhead. On the other ballistic missile and to acquire atmospheric reentry technology hand, it is necessary to continue careful analysis as to whether that prevents the deforming, destruction and other damage to or not North Korea has acquired a technology necessary for the warhead due to heat generated at the time of reentry into operationalizing longer-range ballistic missiles. the atmosphere. If North Korea makes further progress in the development For the miniaturization of nuclear weapons, substantial of ballistic missiles and acquires a technology to fi t nuclear technological capability is considered to be required. However, warheads on ICBMs, it may come to have a one-sided considering, for example, that the United States, the former understanding that it has secured strategic deterrence against Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded the United States. Should North Korea have such a false sense of in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, as well as confi dence and recognition regarding its deterrence, this could the technological maturity that is estimated to have been reached lead to increases and the escalation of military provocations by through North Korea’s previous six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea in the region and could create situations that are North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons. deeply worrying also for Japan. Generally speaking, it is considered that the longer the range In light of the above, North Korea’s military activities, of a ballistic missile is, the more diffi cult it is to acquire suffi cient including nuclear and missile development, pose serious and atmospheric reentry technology because of such factors as a imminent threats to the security of Japan and signifi cantly rise in the temperature of the generated heat due to a higher undermine the peace and security of this region and the speed. However, North Korea is presumed to have already international community. Therefore, Japan never tolerates acquired the necessary technology with respect to ballistic the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea, and will missiles whose range covers Japan, such as Pukguksong and continue to support the U.S.-North Korea process and closely Pukguksong-2, in addition to the Nodong and Scud ER missiles, cooperate with countries such as the United States and the which are already deployed. Moreover, in March 2016, North ROK toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Korea conducted a mock ballistic missile atmospheric re-entry Nodong missiles Object claimed to be a hydrogen bomb capable of being loaded into an ICBM [JANES] [Korea News Service-Jiji] defense networks. The SRBMs launched in 2019 on May 4 and 9, July 25, and August 6 have a shape similar to that of the Russian short-range ballistic missile “Iskander,” which is said to be able to fl y at a lower altitude than conventional ballistic missiles and on an irregular trajectory. The prevailing view is that missiles which fl y at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles and on an irregular trajectory, such as the “Iskander,” are designed to breach missile defense networks. ----- Fifthly, North Korea may be attempting to diversify the forms of launches. It has been confirmed that the June 22, 2016, May 14, July 4, July 28, and November 29, 2017, and October 2, 2019 ballistic missile launches used a lofted trajectory, in which missiles are launched to high altitudes at higher angles than normal. Generally, when a launch is made on a lofted trajectory, interception is considered to be more difficult. North Korea is proceeding with ballistic missile development at an extremely rapid pace and is believed already to have the ability to attack Japan with nuclear weapons fitted to Nodong and Scud-ER ballistic missiles, within whose range our nation lies. Furthermore, North Korea has developed more advanced missile-related technologies in recent years. The three types of SRBMs that are presumed to be new models and have been involved in a series of launches since May 2019 are distinctive in that they use solid fuel and fly at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. North Korea is therefore believed to be trying to breach missile defense networks by making it more difficult to detect signs of a launch and making early detection harder. There are concerns that such advanced technologies will be applied to longer-range missiles. Thus, North Korea is relentlessly pursuing increasingly complex and diverse modes of attack and is steadily strengthening and improving its attack capabilities. These enhancements in its capabilities make early detection of the signs of a launch and the interception of the missiles more difficult, thereby posing new challenges for the information gathering, early warning, and interception postures of relevant countries, including Japan. c. Future Outlook for Ballistic Missile Development At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un announced the suspension of ICBM test launches. Then, at the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in June, he clearly expressed the intention to work towards denuclearization. However, at the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim stated that, since the United States was holding U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, there were no grounds for North Korea to be unilaterally bound any longer by a commitment that no other party honors. He also announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy towards North Korea. Given these points, it will be necessary to continue to development program. **4** Domestic Affairs （1） Developments Related to the Kim Jong-un Regime In North Korea, the power base centered on Chairman Kim is being solidified. The constitution was amended in April and August 2019, strengthening Chairman Kim’s authority through such provisions as the stipulation that the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission is “the supreme leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who represents the state.” Since the transition to the new regime, there has been a number of announcements of party-related meetings and decisions, and in May 2016, the Seventh KWP Congress was held for the first time since the last Congress in October 1980, 36 years earlier. These developments suggest that the state is run under the leadership of the party. On the other hand, with senior officials unable to dispute the decisions of Chairman Kim Jong-un due to an atrophy effect created by the frequent executions, demotions, and dismissals of senior officials, it is believed that there is growing uncertainty, including over the possibility of North Korea turning to military provocations without making adequate diplomatic considerations. In addition, it has been suggested that there is declining social control caused by widening wealth disparities and information inflow from other countries. In this regard, attention will be paid to the stability of the regime. **Chapter** （2） Economic Conditions In the economic domain, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and diminishing economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. Especially for food, it is deemed that North Korea is still forced to rely on food assistance from overseas. Furthermore, the strengthening of sanctions by countries including Japan and the United States, and the sanctions of the related UN Security Council resolutions in response to the implementation of nuclear tests and missile launches can be assumed to have had a certain effect, when considered together with the severe economic situation of North Korea. Accordingly, if China, North Korea’s largest trading partner, and other relevant countries continue to rigorously implement sanctions, an even more severe economic situation could ----- number of measures to prevent infection with the novel coronavirus, such as halting the tourism and the operation of international rail and air services, which suggests that it might be suffering economic losses.[24] To tackle a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has made attempts at limited improvement measures and some changes to its economic management systems, and promotes the establishment of economic development zones and the enlargement of the discretion of plants and other entities over production and sales plans. Furthermore, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in December 2019, Chairman Kim stated that North Korea should take an offensive for making a breakthrough head-on aimed at neutralizing the sanctions and pressure by the hostile forces and opening a new avenue for socialist construction, declaring the economy to be the key. It therefore appears that North Korea regards the rebuilding of the economy as being of paramount importance. Nevertheless, as North Korea is unlikely to carry out any structural reforms that could lead to the destabilization of its current ruling system, it faces various challenges in making fundamental improvements to its current economic situation. North Korea is presumed to be evading the UN Security Council sanctions by conducting ship-to-ship transfers on the high seas, which are forbidden under the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions.[25] The final report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee, released in April 2020, pointed out that in 2019, North Korea illicitly imported a volume of petroleum products far in excess of the cap set by UN Security Council resolutions. See Fig. I-2-3-7 (Sanctions based on UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea) strengthening economic sanctions and diplomatic measures. In response, North Korea repeated its previous assertions that developing its own nuclear deterrent capability was necessary in order to respond to the nuclear threat posed by the United States, and continued to engage in provocative rhetoric and behavior, coupled with military provocations such as ballistic missile launches. In June 2018, the historic first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit meeting was held and both sides confirmed that they would join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Chairman Kim Jong un made clear his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and confirmed that negotiations would continue with the United States. However, the second U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in February 2019 ended without any agreement being reached between the two countries. At the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2019, Chairman Kim Jong-un stated that he was ready to hold a third U.S.-North Korea summit meeting on the condition that the United States find out “with a proper attitude a methodology that can be shared with us” and that North Korea would “wait for a courageous decision from the U.S. till the end of this year.” When President Trump visited the ROK in June 2019, he met the North Korean leader at Panmunjom and they agreed to proceed with dialogue at the working level. A working level meeting took place that October, but North Korea subsequently announced that talks had broken down. At the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim stated that, since the United States was holding U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, there were no grounds for North Korea to be unilaterally bound any longer by a commitment that no other party honors. He also announced that there will never be denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, and that North Korea will continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy towards North Korea. Furthermore, Chairman Kim remarked that North Korea would maintain its nuclear deterrence against the United States’ nuclear threat and that the scope and depth of the buildup of the deterrent would be coordinated depending on the future approach of the United States. However, no concrete progress has yet been observed in **Chapter** **5** Relations with Other Countries （1）Relations with the United States The U.S. Trump administration announced that it would deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile issue based on the concept of “all options are on the table” and adopted the policy of exerting pressure on North Korea to abandon plans to develop and proliferate nuclear weapons and missiles by 24 North Korea itself has stated on Uriminzokkiri, the website of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, that it is suffering huge economic losses (dated March 10, 2020). 25 Between the beginning of 2018 and the end of March 2020, MSDF patrol aircraft have observed 24 cases in which a North Korean-flagged tanker and a foreign-flagged vessel were anchored side-by-side on the high seas. As a result of comprehensive judgment by the government, there are strong suspicions that the observed vessels were engaging in illegal ship-tohi t f F d t il f th d i f ti b t J ’ P t III Ch t 1 S ti 1 ----- **Fig. I-2-3-7** Sanctions based on UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea |Main content|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Items|Sanction content|Related resolution| |Crude oil|Restriction of annual supply to 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons|No. 2397 (December 2017)| |Petroleum refined products|Restriction of annual supply to 500,000 barrels|No. 2397 (December 2017)| |Coal|Total ban on imports from North Korea|No. 2371 (August 2017)| |Ship offloading (ship-to-ship transfer)|Banned|No. 2375 (September 2017)| |Date|Resolution|Catalyst event|Main content| |---|---|---|---| |2006.7.16|No. 1695|Seven ballistic missile launches (2006/7/5)|Request transfer prohibition on related goods and funds for nuclear and missile plans| |2006.10.15|No. 1718|First nuclear test (2006/10/9)|Prohibition on export and import of weapons of mass destruction related goods and large weapons| |2009.6.13|No. 1874|Taepodong-2 launch (2009/4/5), second nuclear test (2009/5/25)|Adoption of financial regulations| |2013.1.23|No. 2087|Taepodong-2 launch (2012/12/12)|Addition of six organizations and four individuals to sanctions| |2013.3.8|No. 2094|Third nuclear test (2013/2/12)|Tougher financial regulations and obligation to conduct inspections of goods on ships suspected of transporting banned goods within one’s own territorial waters| |2016.3.3|No. 2270|Fourth nuclear test (2016/1/6), Taepodong-2 launch (2016/2/7)|Ban on air fuel exports and supply and ban on coal and iron ore exports by North Korea (excluding those for personal livelihood or unrelated to North Korea’s nuclear and missile plans)| |2016.11.30|No. 2321|Fifth nuclear test (2016/9/9)|Establishment of an upper limit on coal exports by North Korea (roughly $400 million/7.5 million tons a year)| |2017.6.3|No. 2356|Ballistic missile launches since 2016/9/9|Addition of four organizations and 14 individuals to sanctions| |2017.8.6|No. 2371|ICBM-class “Hwasong-14” launch (2017/7/4 and 7/28)|Total ban on coal imports, total ban on iron and iron ore imports, and establishment of an upper limit on the total number of work permits for North Korean workers for the first time| |2017.9.12|No. 2375|Sixth nuclear test (2017/9/3)|Addition of oil to supply restrictions for the first time, addition of textile products to the import ban, and ban on work permits for overseas workers| |2017.12.23|No. 2397|ICBM-class “Hwasong-15” launch (2017/11/29)|Further supply restrictions in the oil area, expansion of the scope of bans on trade (exports/ imports) with North Korea bans, and return of North Korean workers to North Korea| Summary of recent UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions against North Korea - Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea. **Chapter** the North Korea’s dismantlement of WMDs and missiles. （2）Relations with the ROK Chairman Kim’s remarks in his January 2018 New Year Address on the need for inter-Korean dialogue triggered substantial progress in inter-Korean relations that year. The inter-Korean summit meeting was held in April, resulting in the issuance of the Panmunjom Declaration, which confirmed among other matters that the two parties agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, and confirmed the common goal of realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In addition, in another inter Korean summit meeting held in May, Chairman Kim Jong un reiterated his desire for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, at the inter-Korean summit meeting in September, Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, which referred to an ending of military hostilities, was issued. In addition, the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” which prescribed concrete measures to ease inter-Korean military tensions, was signed. In 2018, North and South Korea conducted activities related to the implementation of the measures based on these documents. The Panmunjom Declaration also notes that the two countries will aim to declare an end to the Korean War, and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 notes that Chairman Kim Jong-un will visit Seoul soon. In March 2020, the ROK presidential office announced that President Moon Jae-in had received a letter from Chairman Kim. However, 2019 saw no major advances in inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation programs, unlike the year before. Moreover, North Korea has frequently issued remarks critical of the ROK of late. For example, it has used statements by the foreign ministry press secretary to criticize ROK’s efforts to upgrade its defense capability and the U.S.-ROK joint military exercises held in March and August 2019. In addition North Korea frequently demonstrates an attitude ----- inimical to dialogue with its southern neighbor, with North Korean media reporting that, although President Moon had asked Chairman Kim to attend the November 2019 ASEAN ROK Commemorative Summit, the North Korean leader had refused, on the grounds that a purely ceremonial face-to-face meeting between the two leaders would be worse than no meeting at all. Future developments in inter-Korean relations will be closely watched. March 2018 the first-ever China-North Korea summit meeting under the leadership of Chairman Kim Jong-un was held. Chairman Kim’s visit to China for this meeting marked the first time that he had traveled abroad since taking over the leadership. Chairman Kim Jong-un made visits to China in May and June 2018, and in January 2019, and held meetings with President Xi. In addition, President Xi visited North Korea in June 2019 for the first time since he was appointed President, and held a meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-un. They reportedly had discussion on the development of the relationship between two countries and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. （4）Relations with Russia Concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue, Russia, along with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six Party Talks. Although Russia endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 2397, adopted in December 2017, it emphasized that pressure on North Korea should make way for dialogue and negotiations. In December 2019, Russia and China together circulated among UN Security Council members a draft resolution proposing adjustments to sanctions imposed by Security Council resolutions. Following the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in June 2018, Russia has continued to demonstrate an active stance in supporting political and diplomatic processes in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula and has called on relevant countries to give consideration to consultations in a multilateral format. In April 2019, Chairman Kim Jong-un visited Vladivostok and held a meeting with President Putin to exchange opinions on the development of the bilateral relationship and the Korean Peninsula situation. In addition, President Putin is said to have accepted Chairman Kim’s invitation to visit North Korea. （3）Relations with China The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is still in force. In addition, China is currently North Korea’s biggest trade partner. In 2018, trade volume between China and North Korea was very large, accounting for approximately 90% of North Korea’s total trade (excluding trade between North Korea and the ROK),[26] suggesting North Korea’s dependence on China. With regard to the situation in North Korea and its nuclear issue, China has expressed support for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and solving problems through dialogue and consultations. While it has endorsed the series of UN Security Council Resolutions, which strengthen sanctions on North Korea. It has also stated that sanctions alone will be unable to achieve a fundamental solution to the nuclear issue and that a solution should be found through dialogue and consultations. In this respect, China has expressed support for the U.S.-North Korea dialogue, including U.S.-North Korea summit meetings. China, as well as North Korea and Russia, insists that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be gradual and simultaneous, with relevant countries taking corresponding measures. In December 2019, China and Russia together circulated among UN Security Council members a draft resolution proposing adjustments to sanctions imposed by Security Council resolutions. China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on the country. Although it has been noted that China-North Korea relations had deteriorated because North Korea did not necessarily take actions that were in accordance with China’s position. For example, North Korea repeatedly conducted nuclear and ballistic missile tests despite opposition from the international community including China. However, in 26 A di t t b th K T d I t t P ti A (KOTRA) **Chapter** （5）Relations with Other Countries Since 1999, North Korea has made efforts to establish relations with a series of West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries and participation in the ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, it has been reported that North Korea has cooperative relationships with countries such as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Cuba in military affairs including arms trade and military technology transfer. ----- In recent years, North Korea is deemed to be strengthening its relations with African countries. The underlying purposes for enhancing relations with these countries include the usual objective of deepening political and economic cooperation. In addition, it appears that North Korea hopes to acquire foreign currency by expanding its arms trade and military cooperation with African countries – activities which are **❷ [The ROK and the U.S. Forces Korea ]** becoming increasingly difficult due to sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions and political turmoil in the Middle East. It is actually the case that transactions that violate the terms of UN Security Council Resolutions have been observed,[27] and the possibility that North Korea’s illegal activities could provide a funding source for nuclear and ballistic missile development is a cause for concern. - the designation of the country as an enemy was eliminated. Instead, the white paper states as follows: “The Republic of Korea’s armed forces regard any forces that threaten and encroach upon our sovereignty, territory, people and assets as our enemies.” In addition, the white paper emphasizes the importance of omni-directional response to security threats. The ROK has continued to undertake reforms of its national defense. In recent years, in July 2018, the ROK released the “Defense Reform 2.0,” which has set the following three main goals: making omni-directional response to security threats, enhancing military power based on advanced science and technology and developing armed forces appropriate for a developed country. This plan calls for continued promotion of efforts to secure combat capabilities necessary for responding to the threat from North Korea and also includes the reduction of the troops and the mandatory military service period. **1 General Situation** **Chapter** With regard to its North Korea policy, the Moon Jae-in administration, which was inaugurated in May 2017, is placing emphasis on improving the inter-Korean relationship and easing tensions based on the Panmunjom Declaration, issued at the inter-Korean summit meeting in April 2018 and Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, issued at the inter-Korean summit meeting in September of the same year. How the North Korea policy of the Moon administration will impact inter-Korean relations will continue to require close attention. The U.S. Forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. Forces Korea have been playing an important role in securing peace and stability of the region such as playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of large scale armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. **2** Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK **3** Military Posture of the ROK The ROK’s military capacity is as follows. The ground forces consist of 21 army divisions and 2 marine divisions, totaling 460,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of 240 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 255,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) consist of approximately 620 combat aircraft. The ROK has been modernizing its military forces— not only its Army but also its Navy and Air Force—in order to establish an omni-directional defense posture to deal with future potential threats, not least threats from North Korea. The Navy has been introducing submarines, large transport ships, and domestically built destroyers. The Air Force is currently promoting a program for the installation of the F-35A as a next-generation fighter with stealth property. In November 2017, the ROK Government announced a The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital Seoul, which has a population of approximately 10 million, is situated close to the DMZ. The ROK has set the National Defense Objective as follows: “to protect the country from external military threats and invasions, to support peaceful unification, and to contribute to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK, in its Defense White Paper, used to designate North Korea as the “main enemy” or state that “the North Korean regime and its armed forces…will remain as our enemies.” In the ROK Defense White Paper 2018, published in January 2019, while continuing to describe North Korea’s WMDs as a threat to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, 27 A di t th fi l t f th UN S it C il’ P l f E t i ti th N th K S ti C itt (A il 2020) ----- **Fig. I-2-3-8** Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget Defense budget (in 1 trillion won) Year-on-year growth rate (%) 55 45 40 15 35 30 20 15 5 10 **Chapter** 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Notes: According to the website of the Ministry of National Defense of ROK (accessed in March 2020) (FY) revision of its missile guidelines, which were agreed by the U.S. and ROK governments in 1979 and stipulate the range of ballistic missiles it possesses; the revision included the elimination of warhead weight limits on ballistic missiles, in order to enhance deterrence against military provocation by North Korea. Furthermore, to address North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as expanding the missile capabilities of the ROK Forces, the ROK is engaging in efforts to build a “strategic strike system,” which would use missiles and other means to launch rapid preemptive strikes directly targeting the North Korean command, and also a missile defense system called Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD). In addition, the focus of defense has changed from responding to the threat of North Korean missiles to an omni directional response to security threats. In terms of ballistic missiles, the ROK appears to have operationally deployed Hyunmoo-2 missiles with an estimated range of 300-800 km and is believed to be developing new ballistic missiles, following the abolition of warhead weight limits in the 2017 revision of the missile guidelines. With regard to cruise missiles, the ROK appears to have operationally deployed the Hyunmoo-3 surface-to surface cruise missile, which is believed to have a range of about 500-1,500 km, and Haeseong series ship-to-ship/ ship-to-surface cruise missiles, which are believed to have a maximum range of 1,000-1,500 km. The Dosan Ahn Changho submarine and the arsenal ship expected to be introduced under the 2020-2024 mid-term defense plan will reportedly be equipped with ballistic missiles in the future. In recent years, the ROK has actively promoted equipment export which reached approximately US$3 2 billion on a contract value basis in 2017. Since 2006, the amount has increased by nearly 13-fold in 11 years. It is reported that export items have diversified to include communication electronics, aircraft, and naval vessels. Defense spending in FY2020 (regular budget) increased by about 7.4% from the previous fiscal year to nearly KRW 50.1527 trillion, marking the 21st consecutive year of increases since 2000. According to the Defense Reform 2.0, the ROK will increase the defense budget 7.5% on an annual average. See Fig. I-2-3-8 (Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget) **4** U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S. Forces Korea The United States and the ROK have taken various steps to deepen the U.S.-ROK Alliance in recent years. While regularly confirming the strengthening of the U.S. ROK Alliance at the summit level, as specific undertakings, the two countries signed the U.S.-ROK Counter-Provocation Plan for dealing with North Korea’s provocations in March 2013, and approved the Tailored Deterrence Strategy, designed to enhance deterrence against North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats, at the 45th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October of the same year. At the 46th SCM in October 2014, the two countries agreed on “Concepts and Principles of ROK-U.S. Alliance Comprehensive Counter missile Operations (4D Operational Concept)” to tackle North Korean ballistic missile threats. At the 47th SCM in November 2015, the implementation guidance on the 4D Operational Concept was approved. Additionally, after North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test in January 2016, the ----- United States and the ROK officially decided to deploy THAAD[28] to U.S. Forces Korea in July 2016, concluding the temporary deployment of it in September. In addition, in a U.S.-ROK summit meeting also held in September, the enhanced deployment of U.S. strategic assets in and around the ROK on a rotational basis was agreed. With regard to U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, the two countries announced in June 2018 that, in light of progress in dialogue with North Korea, the U.S.-ROK joint military exercise “Freedom Guardian” planned for August had been suspended, along with two U.S.-ROK Marine Exchange Program training exercises scheduled to occur within the next three months. In October, they announced the cancellation of the Vigilante Ace, a regular air force exercise conducted in November-December in usual years, in order to provide every possible opportunity to continue the U.S.-North Korea diplomatic process. Furthermore, in March 2019, they announced the “conclusion” of the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercise, which has been conducted in March-April in usual years, and the implementation of Alliance (Dong Maeng), a combined command exercise. They also carried out a combined command exercise in August 2019, but did not clearly disclose its size or name. That November, the United States and the ROK announced the postponement of a U.S.-ROK joint air exercise, as an act of goodwill to contribute to an environment conducive to diplomacy and the advancement of peace. In February 2020, they announced the postponement of U.S.-ROK joint exercises to curb the spread of the novel coronavirus outbreak. At the same time, the two countries have worked to deal with such issues as the transition of operational control (OPCON) to the ROK[29] and the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea. For the transition of OPCON to the ROK, the roadmap for the transfer “Strategic Alliance 2015” was established in October 2010. Aiming to complete the transition by December 1, 2015, the two countries have reviewed the approach of transitioning from the existing combined defense arrangement of the U.S. and ROK Forces, to a new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces and supported by the U.S. Forces. Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the two sides decided at the 46th SCM to re-postpone the transition of OPCON, and to adopt a conditions-based approach, i.e., implementing the transition when conditions such as the ROK Forces’ enhanced capabilities are met. The ROK plans to develop core military competencies for deterrence against and response to the threats from nuclear weapons and missiles, which are required for the transition of OPCON, by 2023. At the 50th SCM in October 2018, it was decided that following the transition of OPCON, an ROK military officer will serve as commander of the Future Combined Forces Command, replacing the current arrangement of a U.S. military officer serving as the commander of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces. It was also decided that regarding the ROK Forces’ operational capabilities, their Initial Operating Capability (IOC) will be assessed in 2019. In August 2019, an IOC assessment was carried out during a combined command exercise. At the 51st SCM in November 2019, the two parties concurred that the exercise had played an important role in verifying IOC and decided to pursue an assessment of Full Operational Capability for the Future Combined Forces Command in 2020. With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces Korea, an agreement had been reached in 2003 on the relocation of the U.S. Forces’ Yongsan Garrison located in the center of Seoul to the Pyeontaek area, south of Seoul, and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north of the Han River to the south of the river. Subsequently, however, the agreement has been partially revised, due to various factors, including: the relocation to the Pyeontaek area being delayed due to logistical reasons such as increases in relocation costs; in relation to the postponement of the transition of OPCON, it has been necessary for some U.S. Forces personnel to remain at Yongsan Garrison; and it was decided that the counter-fires forces of U.S. Forces Korea would remain in their location north of the Han River to counter the threat of North Korea’s long-range rocket artillery. In July 2017 the U.S. Eighth Army headquarters relocated to the Pyeontaek area, and in June 2018 the headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea and UN Command also relocated to the same area. The realignment of U.S. Forces Korea could have a significant impact on U.S. and ROK defense postures on the Korean Peninsula, and as such it will be necessary to follow future developments **Chapter** 28 A ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase from the ground. It captures and intercepts targets at high altitudes outside of the atmosphere or in the upper atmosphere. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 regarding the ballistic missile defense system 29 The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency ----- closely. Concerning defense burden sharing, whereby the ROK government bears a portion of the total stationing costs of the U.S. Forces Korea to ensure a stable stationing environment, the United States and the ROK are engaged in negotiations aimed at concluding the 11th edition of Special Measures Agreement (SMA) (as of May 2020). utilize military channels to reach a mutual understanding relating to China’s concerns about THAAD. In December 2017 President Moon Jae-in made his fi rst visit to China since his inauguration and the two leaders agreed to establish a hotline and continue to maintain close communication, as well as vitalizing high-level strategic dialogue. The ROK Defense White Paper 2018 also makes clear that the ROK will strengthen strategic communication with China. （2）Relations with Russia The ROK and Russia have agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and military supplies. In 2012, the two countries held the fi rst ROK Russia defense strategic dialogue and agreed to regularize the dialogue. In November 2013, President Vladimir Putin visited the ROK, and a joint statement was issued in which the two sides agreed to strengthen dialogue in the areas of politics and security. In June 2018, President Moon Jae-in visited Russia as a state guest, becoming the fi rst ROK president to do so in 19 years. In August 2018, defense strategic dialogue was held, and it was agreed that the dialogue will be upgraded to the vice minister level and that a hotline will be established between the two countries’ air forces. On the other hand, Russia opposes the deployment of THAAD by U.S. Forces Korea for the reason that it is part of the U.S. missile defense network and harms the strategic stability of the region. **5 Relations with Other Countries** （1）Relations with China China and the ROK have made continuous efforts to strengthen their relations. Meanwhile, outstanding issues have emerged between China and the ROK. The “ADIZ” issued by China in November 2013 overlapped in some areas with the ROK’s ADIZ. Furthermore, it included the airspace above the sea areas surrounding the reef, Ieodo (Chinese name: Suyan Rock), regarding which China and the ROK have confl icting claims to the jurisdictional authority over the EEZ. Against this backdrop, the ROK Government announced the expansion of its own ADIZ in December 2013 and enforced it from the same month. The ROK is protesting that Chinese aircraft are repeatedly intruding into the ROK’s ADIZ. China has protested that the deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea would undermine China’s strategic security interests. On this point, in October 2017 the governments of China and the ROK announced that they had agreed to **Chapter** **Column** Defense Burden Sharing Defense burden sharing refers to the ROK government bearing United States has been seeking an increase in the ROK’s share, a portion of the total stationing costs of the USFK to ensure a with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense stable stationing environment for the USFK. The ROK started its Mark Esper penning a joint article headlined “South Korea Is an contribution in 1991 following the SMA. While the 10th SMA Ally, Not a Dependent” in January 2020, the ROK’s stance has was concluded on February 10, 2019, it lapsed at the end of been that they should work towards a “fair and reasonable” 2019 without the 11th SMA having been concluded. While the agreement and talks are ongoing (as of May 2020). ----- **Section** **Russia** **4** **❶ [General Situation ]** President Vladimir Putin, who has been seeking the revival of Russia as a strong and infl uential power, successfully achieved reelection in 2018. In his inaugural address in May of that same year, President Putin stated that Russia is a strong, active and infl uential participant in international life, and that the country’s security and defense capability are reliably secured. He also stated that quality of life, wellbeing, security and health were his main goals, and that Russia has risen like a phoenix a number of times throughout history, and believes it would achieve a breakthrough again. At the annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly of Russia in March of that same year, held prior to the presidential election, President Putin said, “Russia ranks among the world’s leading nations with a powerful foreign economic and defense potential.” At that same time, President Putin talked about modernizing Russia’s military equipment, including its strategic nuclear forces, and emphasized that Russia would be developing new weapons as a measure in response to the deployment of missile defense systems by the United States domestically and abroad. President Putin also expressed the recognition that Russia’s military power helped maintain strategic parity in the world, and remarked that Russia is prepared to negotiate toward construction of a new system for international security and sustainable development of civilization. However, the INF Treaty came to an end in August 2019, following the United States’ notifi cation of its intention to withdraw from the pact—which became the fi rst-ever convention on the abolition of a specifi c type of weapon when it was concluded with the United States during the Soviet era—on the grounds that Russia had violated the treaty. Russia and the United States subsequently each announced their intention to develop intermediate-range missiles. See Section 1 of this Chapter (The United States) Since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, Russia has faced a diplomatically diffi cult situation, with its right to attend meetings of the leaders of the Group of Seven major nations (G7 Summits) being suspended and the country being subject to economic sanctions. However, a phenomenon that could be dubbed “sanctions fatigue”—the inability to continue bearing the economic burden of the prolonged imposition of sanctions—has emerged among some of the countries with a close economic relationship to Russia. On the other hand, Russia’s ability to withstand sanctions has been growing, as it has promoted import substitution, while on the foreign policy front, President Vladimir Putin has taken the stance that “there are other organizations which play an important role in world affairs” and the country has been demonstrating a growing presence in the G20 and multilateral diplomatic forums in which Western countries do not participate, such as the SCO and the association of fi ve major emerging economies (BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). In addition, Russia’s presence in the military fi eld in the Middle East and Africa has been growing. Russia has been conducting military intervention in Syria since September 2015. Russia has indicated that it has the ability to swiftly and continually deploy military assets in remote areas while acquiring bases in Syria. Russia has signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey on the establishment of a DMZ. Russia’s growing involvement in the Syrian situation will attract attention as a move aimed at expanding its infl uence in the Middle East. In September 2019, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that “Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian confl ict signifi ed not only the liberation of Syria, but also Russia’s return to global politics and the multipolarization of the modern world.” That October, Russia dispatched two Tu-160 strategic bombers to South Africa for the fi rst time, and held the fi rst trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China, BRICS Summit 2019 (Brazil in November 2019) 【EPA/Jiji】 **Chapter** ----- and South Africa off the coast of South Africa the following month. In December 2019, the fi rst trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China, and Iran took place in the northern Indian Ocean. Russia has been expanding the range of countries to which it exports weapons, including promoting sales of the latest weapons to NATO member Turkey. Amid this situation, in January 2020, President Putin proposed to the State Duma a constitutional amendment bill that included changes to the president’s term of offi ce. With some remarking that this is an effort by President Putin to lay the groundwork for a regime after the end of his term of offi ce in 2024, developments in Russia will be the focus of attention as the president’s term of offi ce draws to a close. - addition, the doctrine expresses growing alarm, defi ning the following as new military risks: NATO’s military buildup; the realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; rise of global extremism (terrorism); formation of governments in neighboring countries that carry out policies threatening Russia’s interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social, and religious confrontations in Russia. The doctrine positions nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and military confl icts that use conventional weapons, and states that Russia will maintain an adequate level of nuclear deterrent capability. Additionally, it states that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation not only for the use of nuclear or other WMDs, but also in the event of invasion using conventional weapons, where the survival of the country itself is imperiled. Furthermore, defending Russian interests in the Arctic was newly added as one of the military’s tasks in peacetime. The Strategy for the Development of Maritime Activities of the Russian Federation up to 2030, which was revised in August 2019 in accordance with Russia’s Maritime Doctrine (approved in July 2015), makes clear that, as a “key priority for the long-term development of Russia’s maritime activities,” Russia will “strive for the development [of naval units], with the objective of providing them with strategic non-nuclear deterrent capabilities.” As for Russia’s defense budget, whereas the amounts executed for FY2011-FY2016 showed year-on-year double digit growth, the budgets executed since FY2017 have been Strategic bomber “TU-160” visiting South Africa for the first time; Front: Lieutenant-General Kobylash, commander of Russia’s Long-Range Aviation (right) and South African Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Mapisa-Nqakula 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 **[Security and Defense Policies]** **❷** **Chapter** **1** Basic Posture Against the backdrop of foreign policy factors, including the Ukrainian crisis and the military intervention in Syria, Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities of domestic and foreign policies in the “National Security Strategy” revised in December 2015. The National Security Strategy construes that Russia has an increasingly greater role in a multipolarizing world. The Strategy perceives increased activity of NATO and expansion of its member states as threats to national security, and expresses its vigilance against the U.S. deployment of missile defense (MD) systems to Europe and the Asia-Pacifi c region for undermining global and regional stability. In the defense domain, the Strategy commits to giving continued priority to the role fulfi lled by Russia’s military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and preventing military confl ict by maintaining a suffi cient level of nuclear deterrent capability and combat readiness of Russian military forces, including the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF). The Military Doctrine, revised in December 2014 as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere, states the existing view that while the probability of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military risks to Russia are increasing, such as the movement of NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders including the expansion of NATO, and the establishment and deployment of strategic MD systems. In ----- declining, shrinking from a peak of 4.4% of GDP in FY2016 to 2.9% in FY2020, and look set to remain below 3% for the time being.[1] See Fig. I-2-4-1 (Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget) See **2** Military Reform **Fig. I -2-4-1** Changes in Russia’s Defense Expenditure **（％）** **50** **40** **30** **20** **10** (1 trillion rubles) **4.0** **3.5** **3.0** **2.5** **2.0** **1.5** **1.0** **0.5** **0.0** Russia has implemented full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization. Moreover, Russia is advancing measures including troop reductions, structural reform (from the division-based command structure to a brigade-based one), strengthening of combat readiness, and modernization of the AFRF such as the development and introduction of new equipment. Regarding the downsizing of the military forces, it was decided that AFRF would have a strength of one million personnel as of 2016. Since December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts (Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Districts). On this basis, Russia established a joint strategic command in each military district and is carrying out integrated operations of its entire military forces, such as the ground force, naval force, and aerospace forces under the control of the Military District Commander. In December 2014, the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic became operational. Regarding the modernization of the military forces, Russia has been working to increase its percentage of new equipment to 70% by 2020, and announced in December **❸ [Military Posture and Trends]** **－10** **－20** **－30** **2011** **2012** **2013** **2014** **2015** **2016** **2017** **2018** **2019** **2020** (FY) **Chapter** Defense expenditure (in 1 trillion rubles) Year-on-year growth rate (%) Note: The Information on Execution of Budgets of the Russian Federation announced by the Russian Federal Treasury (figures for FY2011-FY2019 are expenditures and figures for FY2020 are the budget amount). 2019 that it had increased said proportion to an average of 60-65% across the whole military. In addition, the share of modern weapons in the nuclear triad (ICBM, SLBM, and strategic bombers) is believed to have reached 82%. Regarding the professionalization of the military forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes the introduction of a contract service system (for noncommissioned officers and soldiers) which selects personnel who would serve under contracts from the conscripted military personnel. In 2015, the number of contract servicemen exceeded the number of conscripted personnel for the first time, and in the future the percentage of contract servicemen is set to increase further. - **1** Nuclear Forces Russia’s military forces are comprised of forces such as the AFRF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation. The AFRF consists of three services and two independent forces: Land Forces; Navy; Aerospace Forces; Strategic Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces. See Fig. I-2-4-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military [image]) 1 A di t d t bli h d b R i ’ Mi i t f Fi d F d l T Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States and to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is making efforts to maintain readiness. Russia still possesses ICBMs, SLBMs, and long range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) comparable to the United States in scale. Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms ----- **Chapter** **Fig. I -2-4-2** Location and Strength of Russian Military (image) (Northern Joint Strategic Command) Baltic Fleet (HQ: Severomorsk) Kaliningrad Northern Fleet Severomorsk Western Military District Black Sea Fleet (Western Joint Strategic Command) Sevastopol (HQ: Saint Petersburg) (in Ukraine) Eastern Military District Central Military District (Eastern Joint Strategic Command) (Central Joint Strategic Command) (HQ: Khabarovsk) (HQ: Yekaterinburg) Southern Military District Caspian Flotilla (Southern Joint Strategic Command) Astrankhan (HQ: Rostov-on-Don) Pacific Fleet Vladivostok Russia Total military forces Approx. 900,000 troops Ground troops Approx. 330,000 troops T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Ground forces Tanks Approx. 2,800 (Not including mothballed tanks. Approx. 13,000 including mothballed tanks) Warships 1,130 vessels, Approx. 2,050,000 tons Aircraft carriers 1 vessel Cruisers 4 vessels Maritime forces Destroyers 13 vessels Frigates 16 vessels Submarines 71 vessels Marines Approx. 35,000 troops Combat aircraft 1,470 aircraft MiG-29 × 142 Su-30 × 133 MiG-31 × 112 Su-33 × 17 Modern fighter aircraft Su-25 × 216 Su-34 × 122 Su-27 × 119 Su-35 × 90 Air forces (Fourth generation fighter aircraft: Total 934) Tu-160 × 16 Bombers Tu-95 × 60 Tu-22M × 62 Population Approx. 141.94 million Reference Term of service 1 year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system) Source: “The Military Balance 2020,” etc. Ground troops include 280,000 ground force personnel and 45,000 airborne unit personnel. ----- pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded with the United States. Russia is working on accelerating the development and introduction of new weapons under the policy to prioritize the modernization of nuclear forces based on the State Armaments Program (GPV: Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya). In 2011, Russia started the deployment of “Yars” ICBM, which is considered a multi-warhead version of the “Topol-M” ICBM. It is currently developing the “Sarmat” heavy ICBM, which is believed to be capable of carrying a warhead with the capability to breach missile defense systems. Three Borey-class SSBN vessels, which carry the new-type SLBM “Bulava,” were commissioned. There are plans to deploy four such vessels each to the Northern Fleet and Pacifi c Fleet in the future. As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the INF Treaty with the United States, and the following year removed tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels for storage onshore. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of other nuclear forces and has in recent years been moving forward with deployments of the “Iskander” ground launched ballistic missile system, which is believed to be capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads, and the “Kalibr” SLCM system. ICBM “Sarmat” Specifications, performance Under development Description New heavy ICBM. Capable of carrying a broad range of warheads 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 such as hypersonic warheads and of attacking targets via the North Pole or the South Pole with no substantial range limitation; Scheduled to be deployed in 2021. **Chapter** Borey-class submarine Specifications, performance Water displacement: 19,711 tons Maximum speed: 25 knots (approximately 46 km/h) Main armament: SLBM Bulava 【JANES】 (maximum firing range 8,300 km) Description Russian Navy’s new type of strategic nuclear-powered submarine carrying ballistic missiles, the fi rst ship being commissioned in 2012. It can carry 16 SLBMs. It has been deployed with the Pacifi c Fleet since 2015. Sea-launched cruise missile system “Kalibr” Specifications, performance Firing range: Submarine-launched type (antisurface) - approx. 2,000 km; Surface ship-launched type (antisurface) - approx. 1,500 km Speed: Mach 0.8 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 Description Once used in the operation in Syria. It can be loaded on various platforms and some suggest that it served as the basis for 9M729, which is a ground- launched intermediate-range cruise missile of the kind whose development and possession has been prohibited under the INF Treaty as alleged by the United States. **Column** “Iskander” The 9K720 Iskander is a Russian tactical surface-to-surface does not contravene the INF Treaty, it has been pointed out that missile system. It can be used with two types of missile: the 9M729 was developed on the basis of the “Kalibr” sea- ballistic (such as the 9M723) and cruise (including the 9M728 launched anti-surface cruise missile, which is believed to have and 9M729). The former variant is called the “Iskander-M” a range of 2,000 km. It is therefore believed that the 9M729’s (U.S. DoD reporting name: SS-26 / NATO reporting name: range could easily be extended. There is also a variant called Stone), while the latter is referred to as the “Iskander-K.” the 9K720 Iskander-E, which is based on the “Iskander-M” The 9M723 ballistic missile outwardly resembles the SRBMs and designed for export, but its capabilities and detailed launched by North Korea in 2019 on May 4 and 9, July 25, and specifi cations have not been revealed. August 6. Unlike conventional ballistic missiles, the 9M723 is Ground-launched missile system “Iskander” believed to fl y at lower altitudes and on an irregular trajectory, and the prevailing view is that such missiles are designed Specifications, performance to breach missile defense networks. At the same time, it Firing range: 200 km - 500 km Guidance system: has been noted that the 9M729 cruise missile is a ground- Inertia + Positioning satellite + Radar, etc. launched intermediate-range cruise missile of the kind whose Propellant system: development and possession has been prohibited by the United Solid propellant system States since 2014 under the INF Treaty. While Russia claims Description [Russian Ministry of Defence] See “Column” that the 9M729 has a range of less than 500 km and therefore ----- As well as commenting on Russia s breaches of the INF Treaty since May 2013, the United States repeatedly demanded that the country return to compliance with the treaty. However, Russia consistently denied violating the treaty and has criticized the United States, saying that it is itself in breach of the INF Treaty, on the grounds that Aegis Ashore is equipped with a system capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles. Thus, with the United States and Russia remaining as far apart as ever, the treaty ended in August 2019. Russia confi rmed that the treaty ceased to have effect due to the United States’ complete withdrawal, and criticized the United States by saying that all the responsibility for escalating tensions across the world will rest with Washington. Furthermore, Russia stated that it is essential to resume full dialogue to safeguard strategic stability and security, and that Russia is open to that. However, Russia declared that they would take steps to counteract the threat if the United States deployed ground-launched intermediate range missiles in the Asia-Pacifi c region. Developments involving the deployment of ground-launched intermediate range missiles will need to be watched closely, as they could have a major impact on the security environment surrounding Japan. **2** Conventional Forces and Other Issues Space Situational Awareness (SSA) through the use of the International Science Optical Network’s (ISON) optical telescopes, while also promoting the development of anti satellite weapons, such as the “Nudol” anti-satellite missile system, for which multiple launch tests are said to have been conducted. Since 2013, Russia has put satellites into both low and geostationary orbits to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), which have repeatedly been observed engaging in frequent RPO with other countries’ satellites on geostationary orbits. Russia is also suspected of stepping up activities using weapons of electronic warfare, with accusations that AFRF based on the Kola Peninsula in the Arctic Circle jammed GPS signals while the major NATO military exercise Trident Juncture was taking place in 2018. **Chapter** Su-35 fi ghter Specifications, performance Speed: Mach 2.25 Main armament: RVV-BD air-to-air missiles (maximum fi ring range 200 km), Kh-59MK air-to-ship missiles (maximum fi ring range 285 km) 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 Description New type of multipurpose fighter of the Russian Air Force, it has been deployed in the Far East since 2014. Russia is developing and procuring conventional forces in accordance with its GPV. It is also moving ahead with the development, procurement, and deployment of new equipment, such as the “Su-57” currently under development as the so-called “fi fth generation fi ghter” and the T-14 Armata tank, in addition to the introduction of the Su-35 fi ghter and the surface-to-surface missile system “Iskander.” In August 2019, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that the heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle “Okhotnik” had successfully completed its fi rst fl ight. As some have remarked that the “Okhotnik” could conceivably breach anti-aircraft defenses in combination with the Su-57 fi fth-generation fi ghter, close attention will need to be paid to developments involving these new items of equipment. The Russian Navy currently has one conventional powered aircraft carrier, but reportedly plans to acquire a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier by the end of 2030. The AFRF has also been stepping up its activities in the realms of space and electromagnetic spectrum in recent years. In addition to its own early warning facilities and other radar equipment, Russia has been increasing its Fifth-generation fi ghter “Su-57” Specifications, performance Under development Total length 20.8 m × Width 15.0 m × Height 5.1 m; Stealth aircraft Maximum takeoff weight: 37 tons Cruising speed: Mach 1.6 Su-57 (below) flying jointly with heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle “Okhotnik” Description 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 It is considered that Russia is now developing an engine to enable supersonic cruise. The fi rst model crashed during a test fl ight in 2019. Anti-satellite missile system “Nudol” Specifications, performance Under development Explanation Anti-satellite missile system launching missiles from a transporter erector launcher (TEL). At least seven launches have been confi rmed so far. In April 2020, the U.S. Space Force announced that Russia conducted a test launch of anti-satellite weapons, which was allegedly for the Nudol. 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 ----- other countries outside its borders. In 2019, it held joint exercises with Laos and South Africa. A plan is underway to construct or rebuild 10 airfi elds in the Arctic, and in November 2019, Russia announced that it had installed radar capable of detecting stealth fi ghters and hypersonic vehicles on the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya. In the Arctic, the AFRF has not only resumed the operation of such military facilities, but has also been conducting such activities as strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN and patrol fl ights by long-range bombers. For example, Tu-95 and Tu-160 long-range bombers have frequently been observed fl ying through international airspace off the Alaskan coast and over the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea. In addition, the AFRF continues to operate several permanent bases within Syria, though in December 2017 it largely terminated the military operations that it had conducted in Syria since 2015. **3** New Weapons Talking about priorities for 2019, President Putin mentioned the need for modern strategic nuclear forces with enhanced missile defense system penetration capabilities, as well as laying emphasis on future mass production of the HGV “Avangard.” That February, President Putin ordered that half-yearly progress reports be provided on the development and deployment of new weapons, including the “Avangard” HGV, the “Sarmat” ICBM, and the “Kinzhal” air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). Additionally, he revealed for the fi rst time that Russia was developing the “Zircon,” a sea launched hypersonic cruise missile that is believed to have a fi ring range of over 1,000 km and be capable of speeds up to approximately Mach 9. In August 2019, an explosion killed several Russian Ministry of Defence personnel and state nuclear energy corporation staff at a Russian military facility near Arkhangelsk in northern Russia. As a special ship for transporting radioactive material was present in nearby waters at the time of the accident, it has been suggested that the AFRF was testing the “Burevestnik” nuclear-powered cruise missile that it is currently developing. **4** Trends Related to the AFRF **Chapter** Since 2010, the AFRF has been conducting large-scale round-robin exercises in each military district, with the objective of verifying the combat readiness of the military districts, etc. These exercises are helping to improve the long-distance mobilization capability of the AFRF. The large-scale Tsentr 2019 military exercise was held in September 2019, primarily in the Central Military District, with the involvement of approximately 128,000 personnel, around 600 aircraft, 15 ships, and more than 20,000 military vehicles. Like the previous year’s Vostok 2018 exercise in the Russian Far East, China also participated, as did India, Pakistan, and a number of Central Asian countries. In October 2019, the Grom strategic command-post exercises took place at training grounds in each region under President Putin’s leadership. During these exercises, ballistic missiles were fi red from nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, and also from the Plesetsk space base. The Russian Ministry of Defence oversaw the exercise and announced that all tasks prescribed in the strategic nuclear deterrence training process had been completed. Russia also conducts joint training and exercises with HGV “Avangard” Description Viewed as capable of fl ying through the atmosphere at a speed exceeding Mach 20 and of avoiding MD systems by changing altitudes and trajectories. Started to be deployed in December 2019. 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 ALBM “Kinzhal” Specifications, performance Speed: Mach 10 or more Firing range: 2,000 km or more Description Air-launched ballistic missile loaded on a fi ghter that can be 【SPUTNIK/Jiji Press Photo】 maneuvered during fl ight. Some point out that ALBM is an air-launched model of a ground-launched short- range ballistic missile “Iskander.” Nuclear-powered cruise missile “Burevestnik” Specifications, performance Under development Description Viewed as capable of fl ying at lower altitudes and on an unpredictable trajectory with no substantial range 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 limitation due to being nuclear- powered. Some point out that the explosion that occurred in a military facility in August 2019 was caused by an experiment in developing this weapon. ----- In June 2019, a detachment from the Northern Fleet visited Cuba. This marked the fourth time in Russia’s history that a Russian warship had visited the Caribbean. Russia thus appears to be stepping up military activities, **[Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan]** **❹** so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required. - all of its combat forces into permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of ten brigades and two divisions with approximately 80,000 personnel in total as well as a marine brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has introduced new equipment, such as the “Iskander” surface to-surface missile system, “Bal” and “Bastion” surface-to-ship missiles, and the “S-400” surface-to-air missile system. **1** General Situation Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010. Land Forces, the Pacifi c Fleet, and the Air Force and Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military District Commander, who conducts unifi ed operation of these services. The current presence of the AFRF in the Far East region is signifi cantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian armed forces in the vicinity of Japan are generally increasing activity, including the trend related to deployment of new units and military facility development. Given that the AFRF set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with confl icts through the intertheater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is necessary to keep our attention on the positioning and trends of the AFRF in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions. **Chapter** **（3）Naval Forces** The Pacifi c Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. The fl eet is comprised of approximately 260 ships with a Surface-to-ship missile “Bal” Specifications, performance Maximum firing range: 130km Description Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc., it has been deployed to the Pacific Fleet since 2016. An improved missile with a maximum range of 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 260 km also exists (the 3M-24U). **（1）Nuclear Forces** As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, one Delta III-class SSBN and two Borey-class SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk, and approximately 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers are deployed in Ukrainka. Russia is prioritizing the reinforcement of its maritime strategic deterrence posture which had been greatly scaled-down compared to the former Soviet Union, and as part of these efforts, it plans on deploying four Borey-class SSBNs to the Pacifi c Fleet by 2020. Surface-to-ship missile “Bastion” Specifications, performance Maximum firing range: 300km Description Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc. It has been deployed to the Pacific Fleet since 2014. 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 **（2）Ground Forces** As part of its military reforms, Russia is thought to have mostly completed its reorganization of the command structure from a division-based to a brigade-based one, while also shifting Anti-air Missile system S-400 Specifications, performance Maximum firing range: 250km (anti-aircraft); 60 km (anti-ballistic missiles) Maximum altitude: 27km Description This missile has the capability to intercept ballistic missiles and act 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 as an air-defense missile. It was deployed in the Eastern District in 2012. It has been pointed out that a missile with a maximum range of 400 km also exists (the 40N6). ----- total displacement in the region of approximately 610,000 tons, including approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately 20 submarines (approximately 13 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 290,000 tons. It also plans on deploying four multipurpose Steregushchiy-class frigates, and the “Gremyashchiy”—an improved version of the Steregushchiy class frigate that could soon be deployed—is believed to be the fi rst vessel in the Pacifi c Fleet to be armed with Kalibr cruise missiles. long distance voyages have been carried out by Pacifi c Fleet vessels, along with assigned missions involving operations in Syria and patrols by nuclear-powered submarines. In September 2018, 28 naval vessels including a Slava-class guided missile cruiser passed through the Soya Strait. This was the largest number of vessels announced by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) as having transited this strait at the same time since the end of the Cold War. Additionally, survey activities have taken place on Matsuwa Island located roughly in the middle of the Chishima Islands, with the objective of studying the feasibility of deploying Pacifi c Fleet’s forces there in the future, and it is said that a new runway has been completed on that island as well. It is also pointed out that bases will be constructed on Matsuwa Island as well as Paramushir Island, located in the north of Chishima Islands, and that there are plans to deploy Bal and Bastion surface to-ship missiles there. Attention must be paid to movement towards the construction of a coastal defense system covering the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands. In August 2019, it was reported that a number of Bastion batteries had been deployed on Matsuwa Island. Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing fl ights by long-range bombers. Also, there were fl ights of Tu-95 long-range bombers refueled in mid fl ight and supported by A-50 early warning and control **（4）Air Forces** In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys approximately 400 combat aircraft from its Aerospace Forces and Navy combined. Existing models are being modernized and new models, such as the Su-35 fi ghters and the Su-34 fi ghter bombers, are being introduced to improve their capabilities. **Chapter** **2** Operations in the Vicinity of Japan In the vicinity of Japan, the AFRF has been generally increasing its activities, including exercises and drills which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as verifying the results of the military reform. In September 2018, Vostok 2018, considered the largest since 1981, was carried out in the Eastern Military District. According to a Russian Defense Ministry announcement, approximately 300,000 personnel, 36,000 tanks and other vehicles, 80 vessels, and 1,000 aircraft participated in the exercise. The participating units undertook long-distance maneuvers over distances of up to 7,000 km, while vessels of the Northern Fleet sailed up to 4,000 nautical miles. The Chinese and Mongolian militaries also participated in the exercise. Vostok 2018 is positioned as an annual strategic military exercise hosted in turn by each of four military districts and is regarded as an initiative aimed at giving the participating military forces the capacity to engage in large scale confl icts with military superpowers over a short period and the ability to wield infl uence over potential enemies. Notable features of this year’s exercise were the size of the units deployed and the participation of countries other than Russia’s allies. The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak. However, its activities are generally increasing. With regard to naval vessels, their activities are generally increasing in recent years. For example, various exercises and Steregushchiy-class frigate Specifications, performance Main armament: SS-N-25 anti-ship missiles (with a maximum firing range of 130 km (or 260 km for the improved version)), 9M96 ship-to- air missiles (maximum fi ring range 60 km) 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 Description Russian Navy’s new frigate, which was fi rst commissioned in 2007. Two frigates of this type have been deployed to the Pacifi c Fleet and more two are scheduled to be deployed. Su-34 fi ghter-bomber Specifications, performance Speed: Mach 1.6 Main armament: R-27ER1 air-to-air missile (maximum firing range 100 km), and Kh-59ME air-to-surface missile (maximum firing range 200 km) Description New type of fi ghter-bomber of the Russian Air Force, it has been deployed in the Far East since 2016. Confi rmed for the fi rst time in February 2020 through scrambles. ----- aircraft and Su-27 fighters as well as flights of Tu-160. While the number of scrambles against Russian aircraft fell from the previous year, Russian aircraft continued to be active in 2019, with one flight around Japan and three incursions into Japanese airspace confirmed to have occurred. In June 2019, two Tu-95 long-range bombers flew around Japan, and intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace twice when they flew northward over the Pacific Ocean. In July of the same year, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers carried out “first Russia-China joint air patrol” with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. In addition, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft allegedly supporting Tu-95 long-rage bombers intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Takeshima Island in Shimane Prefecture. In February 2020, two Su-34 fighter bombers were observed flying over the Sea of Okhotsk for the first time. See Fig. I-2-4-3 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against See Russian Aircraft) Changes in the Number of Scrambles against **Fig. I -2-4-3** Russian Aircraft (Times) 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 **Chapter** 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (FY) **❺ [Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories]** Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia has redeployed ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan. While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times, one division is still stationed in Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti air missiles are deployed. Russia has been proceeding with the development of military facilities in the Northern Territories in recent years. In November 2016, Russia announced that it deployed coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. In January 2018, the new civilian airport built in 2014 in Etorofu Island in addition to Tennei military airfield was opened up to joint military and civilian use, with three Su-35 fighter aircraft reportedly deployed to the new airport in August 2018. Russia also continues to carry out military exercises on islands that can include the Northern Territories. In October 2019, the Eastern Military District announced that drills to repel landings by a hypothetical enemy assault force were to be held in the Sakhalin and Primorsky regions, involving up to 8,000 personnel, more than 3,000 units of tanks and military equipment, and up to 50 planes and helicopters. It was also reported that in April 2020, a tactical exercise involving about 30 naval and other vessels of the Pacific Fleet was held in waters including the vicinity of Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. As described above, Russia continues to station AFRF in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and has recently been increasing the AFRF’s activities in the territories under de facto occupation. Some point out that such developments reflect the Russian people’s heightened awareness of territorial integrity due to the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the rising military importance of the Northern Territories adjacent to the Sea of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN. During the Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) held in May 2019, Japan stated that the military build-up in the Northern Territories by AFRF is inconsistent with Japan’s legal positions. In addition, Japan expressed a concern about the vigorous activities of Russian military aircraft around Japan and called for a calm response from Russia. Closer attention must be paid to Russian military movements in the Far East, including the Northern Territories. ----- **❻ [Relations with Other Countries]** **1** General Situation weapons that are said to be capable of reliably penetrating missile defense systems. However, since the United States suspended military exchanges with Russia in March 2014 over the Ukrainian crisis, there have been frequent instances of both countries’ aircraft and ships coming into close proximity with each other. In June 2019, a near-miss occurred in the Philippine Sea between a U.S. Forces ship and an AFRF ship, after which the United States and Russia criticized each other for their dangerous actions. The United States is also demonstrating increasingly vigilance over Russian activities in space. In February 2020, United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) commander Gen. John Raymond described recent Russian satellite behavior as “unusual and disturbing” and criticized Russia for activities that “do not reflect the behavior of a responsible spacefaring nation.” In addition, in April 2019, he announced that Russia had conducted an anti-satellite weapons test, noting that this was “further proof of Russia’s hypocritical advocacy of outer space arms control proposals designed to restrict the capabilities of the United States while clearly having no intention of halting its own counterspace weapons programs.” See Chapter 3, Section 6 (Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) **3** Relations with China Russia considers the realization of its national interests as a guiding principle of its foreign policy, recognizing the multipolarization of international relations, the shift of global power to the Asia-Pacific region, and the growing importance of force in international relations.[2] Moreover, based on its National Security Strategy, Russia engages in open, rational, and pragmatic diplomacy to protect its national interests. It aims to pursue multidirectional diplomacy by ruling out futile confrontation and acquiring as many partners as possible around the world. Furthermore, Russia aspires to deepen its relations with the Asia-Pacific countries, seen as drivers of the global economy, and in recent years, has attached importance to China and India. Moves to strengthen collaboration with China in particular have been seen since the Ukrainian crisis, seemingly in inverse proportion to the deepening of Russia’s conflict with Western countries. Meanwhile, Russian efforts to strengthen its cooperative relations with the West are still facing challenges after the Ukrainian crisis. However, with regard to the Syrian situation, Russia is exploring the possibility of cooperation with other countries towards stabilizing Syria and countering international terrorist organizations, including ISIL. Attention will be paid to how Russia would balance its posture of economic-centered and benefit-focused foreign policy with Russia’s politics and diplomacy including security in order to develop its relations with other countries. **2** Relations with the United States **Chapter** Russia continues to advance close military cooperation with China. Export agreements on new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and Su-35 fighter jets were concluded in 2015, and since 2012, Russia and China have been conducting joint naval exercise “Joint Sea.” Most recently, in July 2019, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers flew with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. Russia and China called this joint flight the “first Russia-China joint air patrol” conducted in line with the annual military cooperation plan between the two countries. A package of documents on military and military-technical cooperation were signed at a meeting of the Russia-China Intergovernmental Joint Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation held in Moscow September President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative relations with the United States in the economic domain, while opposing the United States on any action Russia considers as “a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia’s strategic interests.” On the military front, feeling that the United States’ installation of missile defense systems both at home and abroad—including in Europe and the Asia-Pacific— undermines global and regional security, Russia has criticized these moves for upsetting the strategic balance. Russia is also moving forward with the development of new strategic 2 A di t Th F i P li C t f th R i F d ti (N b 2016) ----- **Chapter** **Column** Trends in Military Cooperation Between Russia and China In the past, the relationship between Russia (USSR) and China been implemented almost every year since 2012 is raising the had worsened over a long period of time due to conflicting level year by year. In 2018, China and Mongolia for the first ideologies and border disputes that had led to armed confl ict. time participated in the annual large-scale military exercise However, after reaching the fi nal agreement in 2004 to resolve carried out by Russia to inspect the mission potentials and the border issue, the two countries, despite their mutual posture of its forces. Further in July 2019, two Russian Tu-95 distrust, have built a strategic relationship called a “marriage long-range bombers fl ew with two Chinese H-6 bombers from of convenience” against a background of global criticism the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea as their fi rst joint air against Russia for the Ukraine Crisis and China for the South patrol. Because formation flying usually requires close China Sea issue, as well as the unipolar domination by the alignment, it seems that this flight was carefully planned United States. Recently the two countries are in a honeymoon beforehand. period under President Putin and President Xi. Military There are also moves toward deepening of the military cooperation between the two countries has also progressed cooperation. For example, the Russia-China Summit Meeting as a result of the identity of interest between China, which is in June 2019 announced a joint statement that expressed promoting military buildup supported by rapid economic “raising of the relationship of the two forces to a new level,” development, and Russia, which is planning to recover its and in September 4 of the same year, the two countries military industry from the decline after the collapse of the signed a new “document on military and military technology USSR. cooperation” in place of the military cooperation agreement A notable case is arms exports by Russia to China. In the signed in 1993 (the contents of which are not disclosed). In past, China was the largest customer of made-in-Russia this regard, because President Putin described the relationship weapons, but it is believed that Russia restrained export of the with China as an “alliance of a strategic partnership in all latest weapons to China partly as a result of China’s illegal aspects” in October 2019, for a while there was a view that copying of Russian Su-27 fighters in 2007. However, the Russia-China Military Alliance was restored (the two influenced by the economic sanctions by Western countries countries had a military alliance setting up Japan and its allies against Russia since the Ukraine crisis, seemingly there is a as hypothetical enemies for the period from 1950 to 1980), tendency that military technology cooperation between the but this was officially denied by the foreign affairs and two countries has been increasing and the latest weapons are defense authorities of the two countries. exported to China. For example, 24 new-model Su-35 fi ghters Improvement of the equipment performance and operation had been delivered to China by 2018 and Russia selected capability of Chinese forces through the military/technology China as the first importer of surface-to-air Missile System cooperation of the two countries can increase concern over S-400s, which receives inquiries from many countries. security around Japan. It is necessary to pay close attention to Cooperation in exercise also seems to be expanding. The the trend of military partnership of the two countries. content of the joint naval exercise “Joint Sea,” which has Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi at the signing ceremony Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu and Vice Chairman of for the joint statement (June 2019) [Presidential Executive Office of Russia] the Chinese Central Military Commission Zhang 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 issued the Joint Statement on Developing Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Interaction Entering a New Era. As the statement extolled the “upgrade of Russia-China military relations to a new level,” some suggested the possibility that 2019, which was attended by Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu and Vice Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission Zhang. At the Russian-Chinese Summit that preceded this meeting in June, the leaders of both countries ----- **Fig. I -2-4-4** Russia-China Joint Air Patrol (July 23, 2019) **Chapter** ①Chinese H-6 bomber ③Russian early warning aircraft A-50 Sea of Japan Takeshima Island East China Sea ① ③ ② Takeshima Island Senkaku Islands ②Russian Tu-95 bomber Miyakojima Island ①：H-6×2 ②：Tu-95×2 ③：A-50×1 the two countries had concluded a “military alliance,” but the authorities of both countries both clearly denied that they had formed a military alliance. Amid the emergence of such examples indicative of advances in the military cooperation between Russia and China and with the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation signed in July 2001 set to expire in 2021, attention will focus on the future trends. See Fig. I-2-4-4 (Russia-China Joint Air Patrol (July 23, 2019)) **4** Relations with Ukraine facto rule over the Crimean Peninsula, opening the Crimean Bridge to serve as a direct link between the Russian mainland and the Crimean Peninsula in May 2018. Amid this situation, Volodymyr Zelensky became President of Ukraine in May 2019 and expressed the desire to resolve the dispute with Russia and improve the relationship between the two countries, whereupon a spokesperson for the Russian president took the position that the normalization of their relations was up to Ukraine. That December, a four-party summit involving Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany, aimed at resolving the confl ict in eastern Ukraine, took place for the fi rst time in three years in Paris and the parties agreed to a complete ceasefi re and the exchange of captives within the year. Russia and Ukraine exchanged captives in September and December 2019. Following Russia’s “annexation” of Crimea, sporadic clashes between Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces have continued in eastern Ukraine, with over 10,000 people reported to have died since April 2014. Progress in respect of most of the provisions in the Minsk Protocol[3] signed by the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine with a view to peace has remained elusive, while Russia is gradually extending its de **5** Relations with Other Countries **（1） Relations with Former Soviet Republics** Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 consists of the following items: (1) ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons; (2) ensure monitoring and verifi cation by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the regime of non-use of weapons; (3) enact the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local selfgovernment in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Luhansk regions” (Law on Special Status); (4) ensure monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verifi cation by the OSCE, together with the creation of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (5) immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; (6) prohibit the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; (7) conduct an inclusive national dialogue; (8) adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Donbas; (9) ensure the holding of early local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk regions; (10) remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine; (11) adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbass and the recovery of economic ti it i th i d (12) id l it t f th ti i t f th lt ti ----- cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as one of its most important foreign policy objectives. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS, and deploys its troops in Moldova (Transnistria), Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), which withdrew from the CIS in August 2009 announced its withdrawal from CIS. Through the conclusion of an alliance and strategic partnership treaty with Abkhazia in November 2014, the conclusion of an alliance with South Ossetia in 2015, and other efforts, Russia has been working to ensure its military influence. Due to increasing activities by Islamic armed insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia has been pursuing military cooperation primarily on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[4] Furthermore, in June 2009, a permanent joint rapid reaction force was established to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force. President Putin once remarked, “The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century,” and he has been working to unify and strengthen the sphere of the former Soviet Union through such as the CIS, the CSTO, and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015. missile system and Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates. The two countries have completed joint development of the “BrahMos” supersonic cruise missile and are now jointly developing the hypersonic cruise missile “BrahMos-II.” In March 2019, the two countries signed a deal for the lease of another Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, joining the other Akula-class submarine that India has been leasing since 2012. Another example of the ongoing wide ranging military cooperation between Russia and India is the joint exercise “INDRA,” which has been taking place since 2003 with the involvement of the armies and navies of both countries, with their air forces also taking part in recent years. Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, in December 2019, Russia and China together circulated among UN Security Council members a draft resolution that included the partial lifting of sanctions based on Security Council resolutions. In addition, Russia has been moving ahead with defense cooperation with Laos in the field of procurement of equipment and mine and unexploded ordnance disposal in recent years. In December 2019, Russia held Laros 2019, its first joint army exercise with the country, with the involvement of more than 500 personnel, including tank regiments from both countries. Regarding the relationship with Japan, Russia states that it will develop mutually beneficial cooperation and is intensifying its approach in many fields including politics, economy and security. **Chapter** **（2） Relations with Asian Countries** Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and considers it strategically important to strengthen its status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic development in Siberia and the Far East, and security. To achieve strategic stability and equal strategic partnerships, Russia places particular emphasis on developing a comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with China as a key factor in maintaining global and regional stability, and also intends to assign an important role for the privileged strategic partnership with India. In 2018, Russia concluded agreements to supply India with new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air **（3） Relations with European Countries** Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner in the areas of common interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia, including that in the military domain, except for the NRC’s ambassador-level meetings. Although NATO has issued statements criticizing Russia over the Ukrainian situation and has deployed additional military capacity in Eastern Europe In May 1992, leaders of six countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Toshkent, Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the treaty, which came into effect in April 1994. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999 without renewing it. In May 2002, the CST was reorganized into the CSTO. Uzbekistan returned to the CSTO in August 2006 but gave notice to suspend its participation in the CSTO in June 2012, effectively ithd i f th i ti ----- and the Baltic states, there are differences among member countries in their enthusiasm for NATO’s response to Russia. Nevertheless, Russia has maintained its assertive diplomatic behavior, with President Putin stating during a July 2019 official visit to Italy that there are “always chances” to restore relations, but “many things will also depend on Europe.” Russia is also stepping up the pace of dialogue, with the 2+2 joint foreign and defense ministerial consultations between Russia and France taking place for the first time in seven years in Moscow in September 2019. Russia revealed that it has deployed two army divisions near the border with Ukraine, and one army division near its border with Belarus, and Russia conducted the strategic command and staff exercise Zapad 2017 in its Western Military District and Belarus in September 2017. That exercise was brought up at the NRC meeting held in October of that same year, where it was pointed out that the number of actually participating soldiers and the area used for the exercise were larger than indicated in the announcement made by Russia prior to the exercise. However, there were no invasions into other countries by Russia, and no Russian units stayed in Belarus following the exercise, which were points of concern. Russian military aircraft have stepped up their activities in the airspace surrounding the Baltic states, where NATO has deployed military capacity. In July 2019, the U.K. Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshal Stephen Hillier disclosed that the U.K. fighters frequently scramble in response to Russian activity over the Baltic Sea. Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force David Goldfein, too, acknowledged that AFRF activity around the Baltic states is on the rise. by promoting initiatives that aim for political resolutions in the future. In December 2017, President Putin visited a Russian military base in Syria, where he announced that the fight against terrorism in the country had been largely resolved, that Russia would continue to operate two permanent bases within Syria, and that he had decided that most of the Russian forces in Syria would be redeployed back to Russia. Russia continues to maintain a presence in Syria, with the Russian Ministry of Defence announcing in November 2019 that it had deployed helicopter units at Qamishli airport in northeastern Syria, as well as at its Khmeimim Air Base. See Chapter 3, Section 8 (Trends in International Terrorism) See The objectives of Russian military intervention may include: (1) to sustain the Assad administration which is friendly to Russia; (2) to defend Russian interests including its military bases in Syria; (3) to address the threat of international terrorist organizations including ISIL; and (4) to secure influence in the Middle East. Thus far, Russia seems to have contributed to the recovery of the Assad administration’s areas of control and protecting Russian interests. Additionally, operations in Syria using cruise missiles and strategic bombers have provided the ideal setting to demonstrate Russia’s long-range precision strike capabilities. Considering the significant influence of Russia’s military intervention on the course of the Assad administration, coupled with the expanding partnerships between Russia and surrounding countries such as Turkey and Iran, Russia’s influence on future stability in Syria and on the political settlement process cannot be ignored. While supporting opposing sides in the Syrian conflict, Russia and Turkey coordinate their interests to avoid direct confrontation. When U.S. Forces announced their withdrawal from northern Syria in October 2019, the two countries agreed that Russian military police and the Turkish army would carry out joint patrols in northern Syria. In January 2020, the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries held a meeting in Moscow to discuss the Libyan situation. During this meeting, representatives of the interim Libyan Government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Sarraj and the powerful military organization that opposes it, the Libyan National Army (LNA), attended peace talks. Russia is thus increasing its influence over both the Syrian situation and peace in Libya, while at the same time coordinating its interests with Turkey. In October 2019, Russia held the first Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi and also dispatched two Tu-160 strategic **Chapter** **（4） Relations with Middle Eastern and African Countries** Since September 2015, while acquiring Tartus Naval Base and Khmeimim Air Base as bases of its operations in Syria, the Russian military has conducted aerial bombing using fighter-bombers and long-range bombers as well as red cruise missiles from surface vessels and submarines deployed to the Caspian Sea and Mediterranean. In December 2016, a nationwide ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia and Turkey took effect between the Assad administration and opposition forces. While Russia has continued to fight ISIL and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS; formerly the “al-Nusra Front”) since January 2017, it has also held Syrian peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan together with Turkey and Iran. Russia has been increasing its presence in the Middle East ----- bombers to South Africa under a military cooperation agreement that it had signed with South Africa in 1995. The following month, it held the fi rst trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China, and South Africa off the coast of South Africa. In December of that year, the fi rst trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China, and Iran took place in the northern Indian Ocean. Thus, in partnership with China, Russia is expanding the breadth of its activities in multilateral exercises as well. **6** Arms Exports Russian President Putin introducing Su-57 to Turkish President Erdogan at the MAKS-2019 【SPUTNIK/Jiji Press Photo】 air missile systems to China. It has been pointed out that this deal was made possible because the interests of China and Russia coincided: while China promotes indigenous weapons production, it still needs Russian technology for state-of-the-art equipment, whereas Russia aims to avoid diplomatic isolation caused by the Ukrainian crisis and to gain economic profi t through arms exports. In recent years, Russia has been aggressively marketing its arms to allies and partners of the United States, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, in addition to traditional export destinations. In particular, the export of S-400 to Turkey, a member country of NATO, has met with strong opposition from the United States. Furthermore, Russia has revealed that it is prepared to export to Turkey not only Su-35 fi ghters, but also the Su-57 fi fth-generation fi ghter. **Chapter** Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profi t, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years.[5] In January 2007, the Russian Government granted the exclusive authority to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev. Russia exports equipment such as fi ghters, vessels and surface-to-air missiles to countries including Asia, Africa, and Middle East. In recent years, Russia has exported 24 Su-35 “4++ generation” fi ghters and two S-400 surface-to **Column** Fourth/Fifth-Generation Fighters While there are no clear criteria for defi ning jet fi ghter manufactured since the 2000s, which feature an array of generations, the term “fourth-generation jet fi ghter” generally the latest technologies, including stealth capabilities and indicates those manufactured since the 1980s, which networked electronic instruments. (Russia’s Su-57, the United demonstrate excellent maneuverability thanks to their engine States’ F-35, and China’s J-20, for example, all fall into power and are equipped with high-performance weapon- this category.) Russia uses the unique classifi cation “4++ targeting radar. (Russia’s Su-27, the United States’ F-15, generation” for jet fi ghters undergoing a two-stage upgrade and China’s J-16, for example, all fall into this category.) from the fourth generation, such as the S-35 and the Mig-35, “Fifth-generation jet fi ghter” refers to advanced jet fi ghters which is currently under development. According to the SIPRI, Russian arms exports between 2015 and 2019 decreased by 18% compared to that of the period between 2010 and 2014. Russia has the second largest share of t i th ld (21%) ft th U it d St t ----- **Section** **Oceania** **5** **❶ [Australia ]** **1 General Situation** security environment over the next two decades, it outlines the direction of Australia’s defense strategy for dealing with this environment, and the development of the defense force pursuant to this strategy. Specifi cally, the white paper maintains that while there is little prospect of a military attack on Australian territory in the period to 2035, Australia will face new complexities and challenges. Based on this understanding, three strategic defense interests are identifi ed, namely: a secure, resilient Australia (including the security of sea lanes); a secure nearer region; and a stable Indo-Pacifi c region and a rulesbased global order. Additionally, the following three strategic defense objectives are given: (1) Deter, deny, and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests; (2) Make military contributions to support the security of maritime Southeast Asia and support the governments of Pacifi c Island countries to build and strengthen their security; and (3) Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. To maintain the ADF’s high level of capability needed to achieve these objectives, the Government will make important investments. In addition to increasing the troop strength by approximately 4,400 personnel, Australia will acquire high performance equipment, including 12 new submarines, three air warfare destroyers (Aegis vessels), 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and seven MQ-4C unmanned patrol aircraft. Simultaneously, Australia will seek to strengthen intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, and cybersecurity capabilities, as well as strengthen the functions of its bases in northern Australia and elsewhere. To support these programs by funding, the white paper also presents the concrete target of increasing defense funding to reach 2% of GDP by 2020. **3 Relations with Other Countries** Australia maintains a special strategic partnership with Japan and shares universal values, such as strategic interests, respect for freedom and human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Japan’s relationship with Australia is becoming more important than ever before. The Defence White Paper released in February 2016 sets out a plan to continue to increase troop strength and acquire high performance equipment over the next two decades, to maintain the high level of capability of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The white paper states explicitly that defense funding would be increased over the next decade, setting a specifi c target of 2% of Australia’s GDP to be reached by 2020. With regard to Australia’s international relationships, the white paper sets forth that Australia would aim to mature and deepen practical engagement with partners across the Indo-Pacifi c, including Japan, while continuing to give highest priority to its alliance with the United States. To achieve its strategic defense objective of contributing military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order, Australia makes proactive contributions to the peace and stability of the international community through the deployment of ADF to overseas operations, among other efforts. **2 Security and Defense Policies** **Chapter** The Australian Government launched its fi rst National Security Strategy in January 2013. The Strategy provides a blueprint for national security over the next decade, presenting the recognition that responding to the economic and strategic changes in the Asia-Pacifi c region is vital to the national security of Australia. The Strategy defi nes four objectives for the country’s national security: (1) to ensure a safe and resilient population; (2) to protect and strengthen Australia’s sovereignty; (3) to secure Australia’s assets, infrastructure and institutions; and (4) to promote a favorable international environment.[1] The Defence White Paper released in February 2016 sets out the Australian Government’s future plans for national defense and the means by which they will be implemented. After presenting an outlook of Australia’s In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia subscribed to the view that Australia’s security and prosperity are directly linked to the development of the nearer region, the IndoPacifi c region, and the global strategic environment. Based on this view, Australia will build and maintain international security relationships to achieve its strategic defense Alth h th N ti l S it St t i t t b i d fi d t d h t t b ----- objectives. In particular, Australia will aim to mature and deepen practical engagement with partners across the IndoPacifi c region, including Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, India, and China, while continuing to give the highest priority to its alliance with the United States. On November 2017, Australia published the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper for the fi rst time in 14 years. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-1 (Australia) See （1）Relations with the United States In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its alliance with the United States pursuant to the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS)[2] is based on shared values and will continue to be the centerpiece of Australia’s defense policy. Australia notes that the United States, which remains the preeminent global military power over the next two decades, will continue to be its most important strategic partner, and the active presence of the United States will continue to underpin the stability of the region. It is stated that Australia thus welcomes and supports the critical role of the United States in ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacifi c region. Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly convening the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) to discuss major diplomatic and security issues. In their joint statement at the AUSMIN held in July 2018, the United States and Australia made their commitment to work together to shape an “Indo-Pacifi c that is open, inclusive, prosperous, and rules-based,” welcomed the recent U.S.-Australia-India-Japan consultations on the IndoPacifi c, reaffi rmed their commitment to strengthen trilateral dialogue with Japan. At the AUSMIN in July 2019, serious concerns about continued militarization in the South China Sea and the Pacifi c were also expressed. In addition, both sides emphasized the importance of Australia-U.S. defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacifi c region, indicating the policy to deepen cooperation with Japan, India, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other countries. Furthermore, they committed to further support Southeast Asian and the Pacifi c Island countries, and cooperation to maintain pressure on North Korea. The military forces of the United States and Australia strive to improve interoperability through bilateral exercises. Exercise Talisman sabre is the Australian-U.S. bilateral military exercise conducted biennially since 2005, with the objective of enhancing combat readiness and interoperability. The 2019 exercise was the biggest to date, with more than 34,000 personnel participating from not only the United States and Australia, but also Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, as well as the SDF. It included amphibious operations and ground combat training. In November 2011, the United States and Australia announced the Force Posture Initiatives, which encompass the rotational deployment of U.S. Marines in northern Australia, the enhancement of access to Australian military facilities and areas by U.S. Air Force aircraft, and the expansion of opportunities for joint exercises and training. Under these initiatives, the rotational deployment of U.S. Marines in northern Australia began in April 2012, with approximately 2,500 Marines deployed in the region as of 2019. It is also reported that under these initiatives, U.S. Air Force B-52 strategic bombers and F-22 fi ghters deployed to Australia as needed to participate in training. Australia is in the process of formulating and implementing plans to enhance facilities, airfi elds, and training grounds at bases used by U.S. Forces, including Darwin and Tindal. （2）Relations with China In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its relationship with China is crucial in different ways from its relationship with the United States, and that it welcomes China’s continued economic growth and the opportunities this is bringing for Australia and other countries in the IndoPacifi c. It goes on to say Australia is committed to continuing the development of Australia’s defense relations with China, and working to enhance mutual understanding, facilitate transparency, and build trust. Based on such policy, Australia and China continuously hold dialogues among their defense authorities, along with exchanges to develop the cooperative relations between their defense forces, including joint exercises and mutual visits by vessels. Meanwhile, Australia has been showing its wariness toward China, by, among other ways, making Australia’s position on China very clear. The Australian government expressed strong concerns over China’s recent land reclamation and construction activity in the South China Sea, and called on all claimant states to halt militarization, while also clearly expressing its intention to continue to exercise its rights to free navigation and fl ight. Furthermore, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper contained statements to the effect that China is challenging the position of the United States in the Indo-Pacifi c, the most important region for Australia. **Chapter** A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Z l d d t it d ti f l li Th t t i th ff ti l b t A t li d th U it d St t d b t A t li d N Z l d ----- People within and outside Australia expressed their concerns over the acquisition by Chinese businesses of Australian facilities, including Port Darwin, a port that has been used by Australian and the United States fleets among others. In January 2017, the federal government of Australia announced the establishment of the Critical Infrastructure Centre to serve as a dedicated body that will identify facilities requiring surveillance and carefully manage the risks for advising related institutions in order to block the sale of important infrastructure related to national security, including specific ports and harbor facilities, to companies from other countries. The Centre manages the risks arising from foreign involvement by assessing the risks of sabotage, espionage and coercion in Australia’s critical infrastructure sectors, including telecommunications, electricity, gas, water and ports. With China’s perceived influence on Australia growing larger, including cases of political figures and parties receiving huge political contributions and bribes, the Australian Parliament passed a bill to prevent interference in domestic affairs by foreign actors. The Australian government announced that an Australian company would receive government support and accept an underwater telecommunication cable network project that was to be partially conducted by a Chinese telecommunication company Huawei previously. Moreover, in August 2018, Huawei revealed that the company and ZTE were banned from bidding in an Australian 5G (advanced telecommunication system) network project by the Australian government. （3）Relations with India In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that it welcomes India’s increasingly active role in the IndoPacific region, and that it sees India as a key security partner. Australia notes that it aims to further mature its defense relationship with India in support of their shared strategic interests. The Australia-India relationship was elevated to a strategic partnership in November 2009, and the two countries have regularly conducted strategic dialogues, mutual visits by senior military officers, interactions among military services, and mutual dispatches of students to military educational organizations. In November 2014, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi visited Australia, marking the first visit to Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. The two leaders agreed to extend defense cooperation to cover research, development, and industry engagement, to hold regular meetings at the level of Defense Minister and conduct regular maritime exercises, and to convene talks between each of their military services. Since then, mutual exchanges between Australia and India have steadily progressed through such initiatives as mutual visits of naval ships and joint navy training exercises. See Section 7-1-2 of this Chapter (Military Affairs of India) See （4）Relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island Countries In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia regards a secure nearer region encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and South Pacific as its strategic interest. In particular, Australia considers that instability and conflicts in Southeast Asia have the potential to threaten Australia’s security and economic relations with countries. Furthermore, Australia depends on maritime trade with Southeast Asian countries and maritime trade that transits Southeast Asia. In this regard, Australia perceives that the security of these sea lanes must be ensured alongside freedom of navigation. Based on this understanding, Australia seeks to make military contributions to support the maritime security of Southeast Asia and support the governments of Pacific Island and other countries in building and strengthen their security. Australia has been deepening its relations with Indonesia in the security and defense fields following the signing of the Lombok Treaty—a security cooperation framework concerning cooperation in a wide range of defense fields— in November 2006, the elevation of their relationship to a strategic partnership in March 2010, and the September 2012 conclusion of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement, which included the enhancement of cooperation in the fields of antiterrorism measures and maritime security. The two countries’ cooperative relations in the security and defense fields have stalled intermittently. However, since mutual visits by ministers and higher-level officials resumed in the second half of 2015, the bilateral relationship has been improving through many initiatives, including regular Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meetings (2+2) and the signing of an agreement on maritime security and terrorism, and of a Maritime Cooperation Plan of Action in 2018. With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries out regular joint combined exercises in the South China Sea and other areas under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA; entered into force in 1971) framework, whereby Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom would consult each other in the event or threat of an armed attack on Singapore or Malaysia, to decide on their response. Australia considers that Singapore is its most advanced defense partner, and that they share Australia’s interest in a secure maritime trading environment. Defense cooperation is also deepening, including the signing of a memorandum of **Chapter** ----- （5）Overseas Activities In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia identifies the following strategic defense objective: to contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. In line with this objective, the ADF is deployed overseas to conduct operations. Australia has deployed one E-7A airborne early warning and control aircraft and one KC-30A aerial refueling aircraft to the Middle East to provide support for anti-terrorism operations being conducted by the United States, among others. In Iraq, it is engaged in advising and assisting, as well as providing capacity building assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces on the military front. In Afghanistan, ADF personnel train, advise, and assist NATO-led Afghan forces. Australia also deploys aircraft and naval vessels to conduct maritime surveillance in the Strait of Hormuz and other parts of the Middle East, as well as in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and around Pacific Island countries. Since 2018, ADF patrol aircraft and vessels engaged in patrolling and monitoring activities against illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean ships, which is prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution. - other priorities, including capabilities to operate effectively with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, and the maintenance of the scale and quality of New Zealand’s military contributions. Moreover, the Statement was the first document that mentioned the impact of climate change and the role of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) regarding this issue, which reflects the new administration’s Pacific Reset strategy, which makes a commitment to support the Pacific Island countries that have been exposed to disasters. As for the issues in the South China Sea, New Zealand had refrained from referring to China by name in order to maintain its neutral position in this matter. However, in the Statement, the country made a comment on China’s militarization in the South China Sea, stating, “China’s more confident assertion of its interests has at times raised tensions with neighboring states and with the United States.” As for diplomatic relations, New Zealand has maintained close relationships with the United States and Australia based on the ANZUS Treaty In particular New Zealand understanding concerning military training and training area development in Australia under the comprehensive strategic partnership in October 2016. As regards Malaysia, Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth, and contributes to maintaining regional security and stability through patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern Indian Ocean. Australia plays a leading role in assisting Pacific Island countries, and Timor-Leste in fields such as security maintenance, coping with natural disasters, and maritime patrol. In particular, in the field of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF assets to the South Pacific to assist with patrol activities. It also plans to supply the Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste with 21 new Guardian-class patrol boats by 2023. In November 2018, Australia announced its largest ever financial package of up to AUS$3 billion for infrastructure development in Pacific Island countries, with the intent of further strengthening relations. In May 2019, immediately after forming his Cabinet following the general election, Prime Minister Scott Morrison expressed his intention to continue active engagement with the Pacific Island countries, called “Pacific Step-up”. He made his first official trip overseas after the cabinet forming to Solomon Islands in June 2019, showing his stance of placing importance on the Pacific Island countries. Section 5-2 of this Chapter (New Zealand) Section 6 of this Chapter (South East Asia) **❷ [New Zealand]** In July 2018, New Zealand announced a new defense policy, the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018. This document refers to major changes in the strategic environment since the publication of the previous Defence White Paper in 2016, including intensifying competition among powers, climate change, and cyber and space. The Statement then presented New Zealand’s security objectives, specifically, ensuring public safety, preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity, protecting lines of communication and the like, strengthening international order, sustaining economic prosperity, maintaining democratic institutions and national values, and protecting the natural environment. In order to achieve these objectives, New Zealand prioritizes the securing of operational capabilities in the primary operation area that stretches from the South Pole to the Equator. The country believes that challenges to the existing order of the Asia-Pacific region could impact its security and prosperity and that it is important to have defense capabilities that can globally support the maintenance of the international rule based order The Statement also mentioned **Chapter** ----- sees Australia as its closest partner. The United States has suspended its defense obligation to New Zealand since 1985, when New Zealand refused the entrance of a U.S. ship following New Zealand’s ban on nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the two countries have strengthened their relationship in the diplomacy and defense fields through the Wellington Declaration (2010), which primarily focuses on strengthening strategic relations in the fields of foreign policy and military affairs, and the Washington Declaration (2012), which mainly deals with expanding defense cooperation. New Zealand has thus established the United States as a very close strategic partner. While New Zealand has deepened its relationship with China through such initiatives as cooperation for the “Belt and Road” Initiative and joint air exercises, it also looks at China with a cautious eye as shown in the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018. The NZDF has 9,400 personnel.[3] It has contributed to 3 A di t “Th Milit B l 2020” the peace and stability of the region through such activities as engaging in monitoring and surveillance activities by patrol aircraft against illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korean-flagged vessels prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution, and dispatching its personnel to the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) in the ROK, and to other operations in the Middle East and the South Pacific. In June 2019, the New Zealand government published “Defence Capability Plan 2019,” which sets out planned investments of NZ$20 billion until 2030. Investments under the Plan are: strengthening of the relationship with the Pacific Island countries; response to the climate crisis; and acquisition of vessels, helicopters, transport aircraft and others to strengthen the maritime surveillance capability. **Chapter** ----- **Section** **6** **Southeast Asia** **❶ [General Situation ]** Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traffi c, linking the Pacifi c and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. It is an important region for Japan, which relies on maritime transport for many of the supplies needed for economic activities and the lives of the Japanese people. Such economic development has deepened interdependence within the region and with countries outside the region. In late 2015, the establishment of the ASEAN Community was declared as an outcome of the strides made in ASEAN cooperation towards its integration. Meanwhile, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial disputes over the South China Sea, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are incidents, such as piracy, by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed. In order to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are working to build military forces for national defense and maintenance of domestic public security, as well as for addressing new security issues such as terrorism and piracy. They are also pursuing cooperation with such countries as the United States, China, Russia, Australia, and India to this end. Recently, against the backdrop of economic development, the countries have been modernizing their military forces, mainly their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening their maritime law enforcement capacities. **Chapter** - **❷ [Security and Defense Policies of Each Country ]** well as a policy to bolster its deployment of assets to the **1** Indonesia Natuna Islands, in the South China Sea, and other locations. Indonesia is a country of importance in Southeast Asia, with In December 2018, it was reported that Indonesia deployed the world’s largest Muslim population. At the same time, an army composite battalion, Indonesian National Air as it is the largest archipelago country in the world, it has Defense Forces Command’s radar squadron, and Indonesian vast land and territorial waters and strategic importance for Marines composite battalion on the Natuna Islands for an maritime traffi c. opening ceremony of a military base with piers which can Under the banner of the maritime nation concept, also accommodate submarines, and hangars for unmanned President Joko Widodo, who fi rst took offi ce in October vehicles. The Indonesian military established three Combined 2014, strives to revive maritime culture, address territorial Defence Area Command (Pangkogabwilhan), in September disputes through maritime diplomacy, and build maritime 2019. Kogabwilhan is a representation of the concept of defense power supported by satellite technology and drone Indonesian Military’s interoperability, which is currently a systems. President Joko was reelected in the April 2019 priority policy for Indonesian Military. Kogabwilhan serves presidential elections and appointed Prabowo Subianto, who as an initial action in the event of a confl ict in its area for war had stood against him, as Minister of Defence when forming military operations and military operations other than war the cabinet for his second administration in October. Defence and as a deterrent force in the event of external threats. Minister Prabowo fi rstly visited neighboring Malaysia in Concerned about the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, November 2019, and the following month he made visits to which overlaps with Indonesia’s EEZ in the vicinity of the countries including Australia, China, and the ROK, where he Natuna Islands, Indonesia has enhanced its patrol activities in held talks on bolstering bilateral defense cooperation. the area. In December 2019, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign As part of its military force reform, Indonesia aims to Affairs issued a note of protest on the grounds that a China meet the requirements for minimum defense capabilities— Coast Guard vessel had been found to have operated illegally what it calls “Minimum Essential Force (MEF).” However, in Indonesia’s EEZ around the Natuna Islands by escorting Indonesia has indicated that its maritime defense capabilities, their fi shing fl eet. The Indonesian military announced that it in particular, are still very much inadequate. Accordingly, had tightened its monitoring of the surrounding waters and Indonesia has announced a defense budget increase as airspace, and President Joko visited the Natuna Islands later ----- that month. Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries, and adopts a free and active foreign policy. In relation to this, at the June 2019 ASEAN Summit, President Joko Widodo played a leading role in the adoption of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which focuses on ASEAN Centrality. With the United States, it is strengthening its cooperative relationship in such fields as military education and training and military equipment procurement, and is carrying out joint training, including “Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)”[1] and the “Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT)” [2 ]exercises. **2** Malaysia which focuses on the promotion of regional stability via the expansion and enhancement of defense cooperation with other countries as a highly credible partner. On the other hand, in connection with the recent continued anchoring of Chinese government vessels around South Luconia Shoal, over which Malaysia claims sovereignty, Malaysia has announced that its Navy and maritime law enforcement agencies would conduct around-the-clock monitoring, and that Malaysia would defend its sovereignty. Along with this strengthening of its maritime defense force, Malaysia also has striven to bolster its defense posture in eastern Malaysia, constructing a new naval base in April 2017 in Bintulu, close to James Shoal and South Luconia Shoal. In July 2019, the Air Force carried out live-fire missile exercises in Sabah state, on Borneo in eastern Malaysia. In December 2019, Malaysia made a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, aimed at setting the limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Malaysia and the United States hold joint exercises such as CARAT and SEACAT, and promote military cooperation including capacity-building in the maritime security field. The Mahathir administration formed in May 2018 has been pushing forward reconsiderations of large-scale infrastructure projects as a part of fiscal reconsolidation efforts. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad informed China that Malaysia would cancel or postpone the long-distance railway project that started in August 2017 with China’s cooperation. However, in April 2019, the two countries agreed to resume the long-distance railway project after making cost reductions, and the Malaysian and Chinese companies involved signed a supplementary agreement. In February 2020, the Malaysian king appointed Muhyiddin Yassin as the country’s next prime minister, after receiving a letter of resignation from Prime Minister Mahathir. Muhyiddin was sworn in as prime minister that March. **3** Myanmar **Chapter** Malaysia’s first defense white paper, which was published in December 2019, highlights the country’s geography as a nation with two territories—Peninsular Malaysia, and Sabah and Sarawak, on the island of Borneo—located between the vast Pacific and Indian Oceans. The document identifies Malaysia’s potential to serve as a bridging linchpin between the two oceans, and also demonstrates an awareness of the fact that, while Malaysia’s strategic location and natural resources are a blessing, they also pose a challenge. Given these attributes, Malaysia has historically been affected by the political dynamics of major powers. Even today, Malaysia sees in its defense white paper that uncertain big power relations, which refers to the U.S.-China, is the most important strategic factor for Malaysia. Moreover, the white paper also demonstrates an awareness that Malaysia faces increasing non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, cyberthreats, piracy, and natural disasters. Based on this recognition, Malaysia’s defense policy aims to defend national interests in each of three concentric areas of interest, consisting of the Core Area, which includes both the country’s land masses and its territorial waters; the Extended Area, which encompasses the surrounding waters and airspace; and the Forward Area, which incorporates locations beyond the extended area where Malaysia’s national interests are affected. The policy consists of three key pillars: (1) “Concentric Deterrence,” which aims to deter all forms of external intrusion or conflicts by enhancing the capability of the nation’s armed forces; (2) “Comprehensive Defense,” which seeks to build resilience as a nation throughout society, including among the people; and (3) “Credible Partnerships,” Myanmar shares borders with China and India and is a gateway to the Indian Ocean for China and some ASEAN countries. In light of these factors, Myanmar is noted for its strategic significance. In Myanmar, the armed forces had control over the government following the collapse of the socialist regime in 1988. However, with an economic slowdown caused by the economic sanctions imposed by A general term that refers to a series of bilateral exercises that the United States conducts with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste. A l t th t f t t t i j i t i th t th U it d St t d t ith B i I d i M l i th Phili i Si d Th il d ----- the West, transition to civilian rule based on the road map to democracy was completed.[3] Including the release of political prisoners and ceasefire agreements with ethnic minorities, the Government of Myanmar has actively taken steps toward democratization. The international community has shown some level of appreciation for these steps, with the West, including the United States, easing economic sanctions on Myanmar. However, following an August 2017 attack on a police station by Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), forces including Myanmar’s military launched mop-up operations in Rakhine state and more than 600,000 refugees—primarily Muslims—fleeing to the neighboring country, Bangladesh, in two months. The international community denounced Myanmar for the purported massacre and human rights violation. Myanmar faced criticism from Western countries over the situation, with the United States announcing in August 2019 that it would tighten sanctions against the commanding officers of Myanmar’s military forces. In addition, the Gambia brought a case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for breaching the Genocide Convention, with the aim of preventing all acts under Article 2 of the Convention. In January 2020, the ICJ issued provisional measures which indicated that Myanmar should use all means to prevent oppression.[4] In terms of foreign policy, Myanmar continues to uphold a policy of neutrality and non-alignment, while for its national defense policy, continues to emphasize the three national causes of Non-disintegration of the Union, Non disintegration of National Solidarity, and Perpetuation of Sovereignty, as well as resolutely repelling foreign invasions and interference in domestic matters. China has maintained a good relationship with Myanmar since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1950 and is regarded as a major supplier of equipment. Myanmar has also received Chinese aid for pipeline construction and the development of Kyaukpyu Port. In January 2020, President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to visit Myanmar for 19 years and affirmed China’s policy of promoting economic cooperation through the BRI. Myanmar has maintained a cooperative relationship with Russia in the military field, including during the military regime, and Russia has been a destination for students from Myanmar and a supplier of major defense equipment. As for India, since the transition to civilian rule, Myanmar has deepened cooperative relations in the fields of the economy and military, which has developed into defense cooperation and exchanges such as the hosting of various seminars and friendly visits to Myanmar by Indian naval vessels. Cooperative relations with North Korea, including weapons trades, were maintained under Myanmar’s military regime. Following the transition to democracy, although Myanmar denies that it has military ties to North Korea, the report issued by the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea in March 2018 reported that the country has received a ballistic missile system and other weapons from North Korea. **4** The Philippines **Chapter** The Philippines considers that its archipelagic attributes and geographic location are a source of both strength and vulnerability. Moreover, the country sees that its strategic location and rich natural resources have also provided a strong temptation to expansionist powers. Based on this perception, although resolving internal armed conflicts remains its top security concern, rising tensions in the South China Sea have prompted the Philippines to give the same attention to territorial defense as it does to internal security threats. The Philippines, with a historically close relationship with the United States, has maintained a cooperative relationship with the United States under their mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992. The two countries conduct a number of bilateral exercises, including Balikatan, KAMANDAG, and Maritime Training Activity Sama Sama. In March 2016, the two countries agreed on five locations for carrying out defense cooperation under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) they signed in April 2014 for strengthening cooperation in such areas as the capacity enhancement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and disaster relief: Antonio Bautista Air Base, Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay, Lumbia Air Base, and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base. During his visit to the Philippines in March 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made it clear that the South China Sea is part of the Pacific Ocean and thus any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea would trigger mutual defense obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty. In September 2019, the The National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi won the general election in November 2015. However, Aung San Suu Kyi was not eligible for the position of President according to the Constitution, as some of her family members have foreign citizenship. Therefore, she has led the administration as the newly created State Counselor and as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The country’s second general election since the restoration of democracy is due to take place in 2020. A li ti f th C ti th P ti d P i h t f th C i f G id (Th G bi M ) 2020 I C J ----- United States and the Philippines held the Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board (MDB-SEB), at which they reaffi rmed the importance of their defense cooperation. However, President Rodrigo Duterte hinted in January 2020 that he intended to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which prescribed the legal status of U.S. military personnel when U.S. Forces undertook joint military exercises or other activities in the Philippines, and notifi ed the United States of its termination in February. Attention will be paid to further action by the two countries moving forward. The Philippines and China have competing claims over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Seeking a settlement under international law, in January 2013, the Philippines launched arbitral tribunal proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS against China. In July 2016, a fi nal award was rendered, accepting nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions. The Government of the Philippines released a statement that it welcomed the award by the arbitral tribunal and strongly affi rms its respect for the decision. Also, President Duterte stated in his State of the Nation Address held in the same month that the Philippines would strongly affi rm and uphold the award handed down for the arbitration case between the Philippines and China. In September 2019, the Offi ce of the President of the Philippines revealed that China had vowed to adopt a 60 40 sharing scheme favoring the Philippines in the proposed joint development of resources in the South China Sea in exchange for setting aside the arbitral court ruling. The Offi ce of the President of the Philippines, however, made it clear that it would not abandon the ruling. In April 2019, the Philippines criticized China when it confi rmed the presence of more than 200 Chinese vessels near and around Thitu Island (Filipino name: Pag-asa Island), which is occupied by the Philippines. In June, in response to a claim that the Chinese aircraft carrier “Liaoning” and other ships had passed through the Sibutu Strait, Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana said that it was not innocent passage. See Chapter 3, Section 6-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the See Freedom of the High Seas”) **5** Singapore **Chapter** Given its limited land area, population, and resources, Singapore’s existence and development depend on the peace and stability of the region in a globalized economy. Singapore gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about one-fi fth of its national budget. Singapore identifi es deterrence and diplomacy as twin pillars of its national defense policy. Because it is a very small country, Singapore’s armed forces make use of the training facilities of other countries, including the United States and Australia, while continually dispatching military personnel to take part in training exercises overseas. Singapore emphasizes the importance of cooperative relations with ASEAN and the FPDA,[5] and has concluded **Column** The South China Sea Arbitration Ruling The South China Sea Arbitration Ruling is the decision made In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration released its on July 12, 2016 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration fi nal ruling. Specifi cally, the Tribunal concluded that there was adjudicating the Philippines’ case against China in the South no legal basis to the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, that China Sea. As well as having occupied Mischief Reef in 1995, none of the features in the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly China took effective control of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, Islands generates an EEZ or continental shelf, and that the creating a tense relationship with the Philippines, which claims obstruction of Philippine fi shing boats’ access to Scarborough territorial rights over these reefs. Annex VII to Part XV of the Shoal by Chinese law enforcement vessels breached both the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides for an arbitral Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing procedure, enabling disputes concerning the interpretation or Collisions at Sea and the UN Convention on the Law of the application of the Convention to be submitted at the request of Sea. Although the Philippines welcomed this ruling and issued any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal with jurisdiction a statement that it intended to abide by it, the day after the to seek a legally binding decision. In January 2013, the arbitral award, China issued a white paper on the South China Philippines brought a case against China with the Permanent Sea, in which it reasserted the legitimacy of its claim and Court of Arbitration, in accordance with the arbitral procedure complained of the unfairness of the arbitral award. provided for under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Entered into force in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of aggression towards or th th t f tt k M l i Si Th fi t i t i i b d th t ----- of political, economic, and other national strengths; and effective defense aimed at increasing the readiness of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and developing the defense industry. The submission of an amnesty bill intended to pave the way for the pardon and return of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra by ruling parties to the National Assembly in 2013 exacerbated domestic disorder. In May 2014, then Commander-in-Chief Prayut Chan-o-Cha of the Royal Thai Army issued a declaration of martial law nationwide, and then seized power via the National Council for Peace and Order, which mostly comprises the Thai military. Subsequently, under the interim administration led by Prayut, who was selected as interim Prime Minister, the government worked towards a transition to a new administration based on the road map to civilian rule. The new constitution was promulgated and entered into force in April 2017. In March 2019, a general election was held for the fi rst time in approximately 8 years. In June 2019, King Maha Vajiralongkorn approved the appointment of Prayut as prime minister and the following month granted approval for the new cabinet. Prime Minister Prayut concurrently serves as defense minister. Under its fl exible omni-directional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries. Exercise Cobra Gold, which is co-sponsored by the U.S and Thailand and has been implemented since 1982, is currently one of the largest multilateral exercises in the Southeast Asia. Since the conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950, Thailand and its ally the United States have maintained a cooperative relationship. However, following the coup d'état in 2014, the U.S. suspended some military aid. After the coup, the United States scaled down the size of U.S. forces participating in the Cobra Gold. However, this was restored under the Trump Administration. In addition, the two countries have continued their bilateral naval training CARAT and counter-piracy and traffi cking exercise SEACAT. Thailand and China have conducted joint exercises such as Blue Strike among their marines and Falcon Strike among their air forces. It has been pointed out that Thailand’s military relationship with China has become closer after the freezing of U.S. military assistance following the coup. In September 2019, Thailand and the ROK signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Singapore, Indian and Thai Navy Exercise Participants at the Opening Ceremony of the Singapore-IndiaThailand Maritime Exercise (SITMEX) on September 6, 2019 [Ministry of Defence Singapore] defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region. With the aim of contributing to peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacifi c and permits it to use military facilities in Singapore. Since 2013, U.S. littoral combat ships (LCSs) began their rotational deployments. In December 2015, the P-8 patrol aircraft of the U.S. Forces were deployed to Singapore for around one week for the fi rst time. The two countries have committed to continuing to carry out similar deployments routinely. In addition, Singapore conducts joint exercises with the United States, such as CARAT and SEACAT. In September 2019, the two countries signed the Protocol of Amendment to the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding United States Use of Facilities in Singapore. Singapore has strong economic ties with China. Both countries also conduct joint naval exercises. In October 2019, the two countries signed the enhanced Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation (ADESC). On the other hand, diplomatic relations with China have been strained partly due to Singapore’s belief in following the arbitration award when it comes to the resolution of the South China Sea disputes and partly due to Singapore’s defense relationship with Taiwan. Singapore concluded the Bilateral Agreement for Navy Cooperation with India in November 2017 and the two countries undertake Exercise Bold Kurukshetra, a bilateral armor exercise, and the Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX). In addition, Singapore, India, and Thailand held their fi rst trilateral joint exercise in September 2019, which took place near the Andaman Islands. See Section 5-1-3 (4) of this Chapter (Relations with Southeast Asia and Pacifi c Island Countries) **6** Thailand **Chapter** Thailand’s defense policy includes: strengthening defense cooperation through ASEAN, international organizations, and other entities; defense that makes comprehensive use ----- **7** Vietnam Vietnam recognizes that, while the Asia-Pacific region continues to be a center for dynamic economic development and occupies an increasingly important geo-economic, geopolitical, and strategic location, the region still remains the ground for major powers’ rivalry and influence intensification, harboring destabilizing elements. Based on its viewpoint that the sea is closely associated with the national construction and defense, Vietnam has established the objective of becoming a strong marine country, particularly prioritizing the modernization of its military forces and law enforcement forces at sea as well as ensuring the capability to properly handle sea situations, maritime independence, sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and national interests at sea. Vietnam and the United States have strengthened their military relations in recent years. This has taken such forms as joint exercises with the U.S. Navy and port calls by U.S. Navy vessels in Vietnam. In 2017, mutual visits were conducted by the leaders of both countries, and an agreement was reached on the deepening of defense cooperation. March 2018 marked the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier to Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam war. In addition, the U.S. aircraft carrier and cruiser made a call at Da Nang in March 2020. Vietnam and Russia continue to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense, with Vietnam dependent on Russia for the majority of its defense equipment. In April 2018, the two countries signed a military and technical cooperation roadmap, while in July 2019, a Vietnamese naval vessel visited the port of Vladivostok for the first time. In December 2019, a submarine rescue vessel from Russia’s Pacific Fleet visited the port of Cam Ranh and participated in the first bilateral joint submarine rescue exercise. See Section 4-6-5 (2) of this Chapter (Relations with Asian Countries) Vietnam and China, under their comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership relations, proactively conduct exchanges among their senior government officials. However, the two countries have competing claims concerning issues such as sovereignty over the South China Sea. In summits and many other occasions, the two countries have agreed to process the differences in their opinions on maritime issues and to refrain from activities that would complicate the matters. However, they have disputes regarding resources development and the operation of fishing boats. The defense white paper published in November 2019 demonstrates an awareness that Vietnam and China need to be settled with precaution, avoiding negative impacts on general peace, friendship, and cooperation for development between the two countries. As such, it recognizes that the two countries should continue negotiations and consultations to find peaceful solutions on the basis of international law. Between July and October 2019, a standoff took place between Vietnamese and Chinese government ships over an oil development project that had been taking place off the coast of Vietnam since May. Vietnam and India have been deepening their cooperative relationship in a broad range of areas, including security and economy. In the area of defense cooperation, it is noted that the Indian Armed Forces support the training of Vietnam’s Navy submarine personnel and Air Force pilots, and Indian Navy vessels make friendly visits to Vietnam. In September 2016, Prime Minister Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Vietnam in 15 years. During the visit an agreement was reached on raising the status of the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, while an announcement was made concerning a loan of US$500 million for deepening defense cooperation. See Chapter 3, Section 6-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas”) - was reportedly produced in Indonesia and completed diving trials in January 2020. In January 2016, the two countries also concluded a detailed agreement on cost sharing and bilateral cooperation in the joint development of the 4.5 generation KF-X/IF-X fighter. Indonesia plans to receive 14 ScanEagle UAVs from the United States by March 2022. As well as showcasing Chinese CH-4 UAVs at an October 2019 celebration for Indonesian National Armed Forces Day, in December 2019 Indonesia unveiled the prototype Black Eagle UAV, a domestically produced unmanned aerial vehicle **Chapter** **❸ [Military Modernization in the Region ]** In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased their defense spending against the backdrop of economic development and other reasons, and are modernizing their military forces, focusing on inducting equipment such as submarines and fighters, including fourth-generation modern fighters. In February 2018, Indonesia concluded an agreement to purchase an additional 11 Su-35 fighters from Russia. With the ROK, Indonesia concluded an agreement to purchase three ROK-made 209-class submarines, the third of which ----- that has incorporated several aspects of China s CH-4 UAV. Malaysia announced a plan to build six indigenous LCSs. The first of these vessels was launched in August 2017. Furthermore, in November 2016, Malaysia concluded an agreement with China to purchase four littoral mission ships (LMSs). In June 2019, Malaysia announced that it was to receive 12 ScanEagle UAVs from the United States by March 2022. Myanmar’s December 2019 procurement of its first submarine—a Kilo-class submarine received from India—is attracting attention from neighboring countries. The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to modernize its defense equipment against the backdrop of conflicts over territorial rights in the South China Sea. In terms of air force capabilities, between November 2015 and May 2017, the Philippines successively introduced 12 FA-50PH light fighters purchased from the ROK. It is currently planning to initiate a multi-role fighter program. In addition, the Philippines plans to receive eight ScanEagle UAVs from the United States by March 2022. As for naval forces, the Philippines received three Hamilton-class frigates from the United States by 2016. The Philippines introduced two Indonesian-made landing dock vessels by 2017. In October 2016, the Philippines concluded an agreement to purchase two frigates from the ROK. The August 2019 commissioning of a Pohang-class corvette received from the ROK marked the restoration of the antisubmarine capability that the Philippines had long lacked. That September, the Philippines conducted the DAGIT-PA multi-service military exercise involving the Army, Navy, and Air Force, during which the four AAV-7 assault amphibious vehicles that it had commissioned the **❹ [Intra-and Extra-Regional Cooperation ]** previous June were operated. Singapore is actively striving to modernize its forces. Today, it is one of the largest arms importers in the world. It introduced 24 U.S.-made F-15 fighters by 2012 and also participates in the F-35 JSF Program. In January 2020, the U.S. Government officially approved the sale of F-35B fighter jets to Singapore and delivered the required certification notifying Congress of the sale. As for Thailand, in July 2014, the country established the Submarine Squadron Headquarters. In April 2017, the Royal Thai Navy drew up a plan to purchase three Yuan-class submarines from China over the next 11 years, and the Thai Cabinet approved the purchase of one vessel. In addition, the Cabinet approved in September 2012 a plan to introduce two frigates. The first frigate was received from the ROK in December 2018. In September 2019, Thailand signed an agreement to purchase a Type 071 landing platform dock from China. In addition, by 2013, Thailand had introduced 12 Swedish-made JAS-39 Gripen fighters. In September 2019, it received the first 10 of 60 Stryker armored vehicles purchased from the United States. By January 2017, Vietnam successively introduced six Russian-made Kilo-class submarines. By February 2018, Vietnam started the operation of four Russian-made Gepard class frigates. As for its air force capabilities, Vietnam started to successively introduce Russian-made Su-30 fighters in 2004, and to date, the total number of delivered Su-30 fighters came to 36. In January 2020, it was reported that Vietnam had ordered 12 Yak-130 training aircraft from Russia. It is also due to receive six ScanEagle UAVs from the United States by March 2022. - States held their first ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise (AUMX) in September 2019. With China, ASEAN held the first naval table-top exercise in August 2018, and the first naval field training exercise in October 2018. In relation to this, it was reported that China requested during the meeting for the formulation of COC of Parties in the South China Sea to include a clause on regular implementation of China ASEAN joint military exercises and a clause stating that no military exercises shall be held jointly with countries from outside the region, unless the parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no objection. At the June 2019 ASEAN Summit, ASEAN announced the AOIP, which is based on such principles as ASEAN C li d id d i i **Chapter** ASEAN member states utilize ASEAN as the multilateral security framework of the region. ASEAN holds mechanisms such as the ARF and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM), which provide opportunities for dialogue on security issues. Furthermore, ASEAN has made efforts to improve the security environment in the region and promote mutual trust, for example, by holding the ASEAN Militaries’ Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHR). In addition, ASEAN attaches importance to expanding its relations with countries outside of the region. It holds the ADMM-Plus, a platform that adds eight non-ASEAN countries including Japan to ADMM, under which humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) i h b d d ASEAN d h U i d ----- the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, and expresses the intention to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Moving forward, ASEAN member states are expected to further develop initiatives to build trust with non-ASEAN countries, in accordance with the principle and concepts of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). Representatives of the U.S. Navy and ASEAN member state maritime forces gather for a photo during the ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise in 2019 [U.S. Navy] **Chapter** ----- **Section** **7** **South Asia** **❶ [India ]** **1** General Situation **2** Military Affairs As a part of the efforts to modernize its naval and air forces, India is expanding procurement of equipment from foreign countries as well as joint development with them, and has emerged as the world’s second-largest arms importer.[1] Furthermore, under the “Make in India” initiative, the administration is promoting expansion of foreign companies’ direct investment in India’s defense industry and the domestic production of equipment through enhancing technological cooperation with other countries. With respect to its naval capabilities, India operates the Russian-built conventional powered aircraft carrier INS “Vikramaditya,” and is also building one indigenous conventional powered aircraft carrier INS “Vikrant” with aid from France and Italy. With regard to submarines, India acquired one Russian-built Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine INS “Chakra” in April 2012 under a lease arrangement and the two countries signed a deal in March 2019 for the lease of another Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine. It also reportedly placed into service its fi rst indigenous ballistic missile and nuclear submarine INS “Arihant,” which was built with support from Russia, in August 2016. In January 2020, India test-fi red a K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile from an underwater platform. Furthermore, India is making progress with the indigenous production of six conventional submarines in collaboration with France, commissioning the fi rst of six license-built submarines, INS “Kalvari,” in December 2017, and the second, INS “Khanderi,” in September 2019. In January 2019, India decided to move forward with a project to produce another six conventional submarines locally in partnership with a foreign company. It has deployed the eight P-8I patrol aircraft purchased from the United States to a base in southern India and, in July 2016, concluded a purchase agreement for an additional four P-8Is. With respect to its air force capabilities, India signed an agreement to purchase 36 Rafale fi ghter aircraft from France in September 2016 as part of India’s plan to introduce medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). Handover of the fi ghters began in October 2019. See Fig. I-2-7-1 (Military Forces of India and Pakistan [approximate]) With a population of more than 1.3 billion on its vast land, India is the world’s largest democratic country. It has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and has signifi cant infl uence in the South Asian region. Also, it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of strategic and geopolitical importance in terms of sea lines of communication, connecting the Asia-Pacifi c region with the Middle East and Europe. With the permeation of the concept of “Indo-Pacifi c” in the international community, India has increased its presence as a geopolitical player, while the international community in return has increasingly high expectations for the country’s role. On the diplomatic front, the second Modi administration that was inaugurated in May 2019 has maintained the neighborhood fi rst policy, which emphasizes strengthening relations with South Asian countries, while expanding the focus of strengthening India’s external relations to the AsiaPacifi c region, in accordance with the “Act East” policy. In addition, the administration has carried out proactive foreign policy, placing priority also on India’s relations with the United States, Russia, Europe, among other areas. In the defense domain, too, the administration has attached importance to ensuring maritime security, especially in the Indian Ocean, and deepened collaboration with other countries. As well as attaching importance to the Indian Ocean, on which India depends for its trade, the Indian Maritime Security Strategy published in October 2015 defi nes the nation’s primary areas of maritime interest as an extensive marine area centered on India, encompassing the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Strait of Malacca. In addition, the strategy states that India will become a “net security provider” in the maritime neighborhood. India has non-demarcated border issues with China and Pakistan. India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and languages, and there are concerns about the activities of ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements, as well as the movements of Islamic extremists stationed across the India-Pakistan border. 1 A di t th t ti ti f 2014 t 2018 i SIPRI YEARBOOK 2019 dit d b SIPRII **Chapter** ----- Japan taking part, on a regular basis. In addition, in recent years, the United States has become one of India’s major equipment procurement destinations.[4] When Prime Minister Modi visited the United States in June 2016, the United States recognized that India is a “Major Defense Partner.” In August 2016, in a joint statement of the U.S. and Indian defense ministers, the United States agreed to elevate defense trade and technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with its closest allies and partners. Also, a memorandum was signed concerning logistics support cooperation. In June 2017, Prime Minister Modi visited the United States. At his first summit meeting with President Trump, the two sides agreed to continue to strengthen their strategic partnership. In September 2018, the first U.S.-India “2+2” **Fig.I-2-7-1** Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate) Approx. 560,000 troops Approx. 70 vessels Approx. 90,000 tons Approx. 430 aircraft Pakistan Approx. 1.24 million troops Approx. 320 vessels Approx. 480,000 tons Approx. 890 aircraft 【Legend】 India Ground forces (200,000 troops) Naval vessels (100,000 tons) Combat aircraft (200 aircraft) 500km Notes:1 Figures based on “The Military Balance 2020,” etc. 2 Combat aircraft include naval aircraft. Meeting was held. In this meeting, the two countries signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), which aims to promote access to advanced defense systems and ensure the optimal use of a U.S.-made platform owned by India. In November 2019, the two countries held their first tri-service exercise “Tiger Triumph,” with the participation of India’s Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. （2）Relations with China See Section 2-3-6 (3) of this Chapter (Relations with South Asian Countries) |2-7-1|Col2| |---|---| |2 7 1|| |Approx. 560,0 Approx. 70 ves Approx. 90,00 Approx. 430 ai|00 troops sels 0 tons rcraft| |Pakistan|| |end】 Ground forces (20 Naval vessels (100 Combat aircraft (2|| ||| |Appr Appr Appr Appr|ox. 1.24 million troo ox. 320 vessels ox. 480,000 tons ox. 890 aircraft| |---|---| |India y Balance 2020 aircraft.|,” etc.| **Chapter** Based on the nuclear doctrine of 2003, India adheres to the following policies: credible minimum deterrence, the no-first-use nuclear policy, no use against non-nuclear weapon nations, and maintaining the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test in 1998. India promotes the development and deployment of various ballistic missiles. As well as conducting the test launches of “Agni 5” in December 2018 and “Agni 2” in November 2019, India has reportedly started developing “Agni 6,” which is believed to have a range of up to 10,000 km. It is deemed that the country aspires to extend the ranges of ballistic missiles and make other performance improvements. In regard to cruise missiles, India has deployed the supersonic cruise missile “BrahMos” jointly developed with Russia and is also developing the hypersonic cruise missile “BrahMos II” and a ballistic missile defense system.[2] **3** Relations with Other Countries （1）Relations with the United States India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States. In line with the expansion of the relationship derived from the economic growth of India, the United States is also promoting engagement with India. It sees India as a partner that shares universal values and strategic interests with the United States in the region. The two countries conduct the exercises, such as Malabar[3] with （3）Relations with Russia See Section 4-6-5 (2) of this Chapter (Relations with Asian Countries) （4）Relations with South Asian and Southeast Asia Countries In the “Transformational Diplomacy” published in June 2015, India clearly set out the neighborhood first policy, aimed at strengthening relations with other South Asian countries. Based on this policy, India agreed in November 2019 to provide Sri Lanka with US$4.5 billion in aid to fund anti-terrorism measures, and agreed in December 2018 to provide the Maldives with US$4.7 billion in support for economic development. In the case of Bangladesh, India agreed in April 2017 to provide US$4.5 billion to support economic development and also concluded a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation, which included US$500 million in defense-related aid. Reports specify these missiles as follows. Agni 5: a mobile, three-stage solid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 5,000-8,000 km. Agni 6: a three-stage solid/liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 8,000-10,000 km. BrahMos: a solid/Ramjet supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 300-500 km. Also, India is reportedly developing a ballistic missile defense system. According to reports, it is a two-stage intercept system consisting of a missile for high altitude interception (PAD) up to 80 km in altitude and a missile for low altitude interception (AAD) up to 30 km in altitude. The Malabar was initially a bilateral maritime exercise between the United States and India. Japan has participated in the Malabar since 2007, and Malabar 17, Malabar 18 and Malabar 19 were conducted as trilateral exercises among Japan, the United States and India. A di t th t ti ti f 2014 t 2018 i SIPRI YEARBOOK 2019 dit d b SIPR ----- Based on its Act East policy, India continues to engage with Southeast Asian nations and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a bilateral, regional, and multilateral basis, promoting economic and cultural relations, as well as pursuing the development of strategic relationships. **❷ [Pakistan ]** Leveraging its experience of using Russian equipment, India provides Vietnam, Malaysia, and other users of such equipment with support for capacity building. In September 2019, India, Singapore, and Thailand held their first trilateral maritime exercise. first test launch of the ballistic missile “Ababeel,” which is capable of delivering multiple warheads, using Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, in January 2017. Like it did in the previous year, it conducted another test fire of the submarine launched cruise missile “Babur” in March 2018. Pakistan is thought to be steadily increasing the capabilities of its missiles, firing the “Shaheen 1” ballistic missile in November 2019, following India’s launch of a ballistic missile.[5] Pakistan is the world’s 11th-largest importer of weapons, and it is pointed out that approximately 60% of its weapons are imported from China.[6] Pakistan jointly developed the AlKhalid tank and the JF-17 fighter aircraft with China. It is currently using the 85 indigenously produced JF-17 Block I and Block II aircraft, and has begun manufacture of the JF17 Block III. Pakistan is reportedly also planning to purchase from China eight submarines, which Pakistan is positioning as the “backbone of the Navy.” Four will be built in China, with the remainder to be built in Pakistan. **3** Relations with Other Countries （1）Relations with the United States Besides supporting the activities of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan cooperates with the war on terror by launching mop-up operations against Islamic extremists in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Meanwhile, Pakistan urges the United States to immediately end its drone attacks on Islamic extremists in Pakistani territory, and the Pakistan Government has protested repeatedly. The United States, on the other hand, has condemned Pakistan for allowing Islamic extremists in Afghanistan to take haven, which poses a threat to the United States. In August 2017, “No partnership can survive a country’s harboring of militants and terrorists who target U.S. Service members,” President Trump said. The same month, the United States announced the suspension of $205 million in **1** General Situation Wedged between the powerful South Asian nation of India and politically-unstable Afghanistan, and sharing borders with China and Iran, Pakistan is placed in a geopolitically significant and complex position. In particular, Islamic extremists conduct activities across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and Pakistan’s attitude towards the war against terrorism draws much attention from the international community. While supporting the United States’ war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the Government of Pakistan has been struggling as its domestic security situation has worsened, with issues such as growing anti-U.S. sentiment and retaliatory terrorism by Islamic extremists. Although the Pakistan Armed Forces’ reinforced operation to crackdown on militant groups has reportedly drastically decreased terrorism, terrorist attacks have continued to occur sporadically. Against such backdrop, the Pakistani government has continued its counter-terrorism operation, “Radd-ul-Fasaad,” since 2017, while also working on the construction of fences and guarding stations along the border with Afghanistan to prevent the entrance of extremist groups. **2** Military Affairs **Chapter** Pakistan takes the position that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense. It is believed to have begun nuclear development in the 1970s and conducted its first nuclear test in 1998. Pakistan has been actively proceeding with the development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and has conducted a number of test launches in recent years. In 2015, Pakistan conducted two test launches of the ballistic missile “Shaheen 3” in March and December, and a test launch from an aircraft of the cruise missile “Raad” in January 2016. Pakistan also conducted its Reports specify these missiles as follows. Shaheen 3 (Hatf 6): a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,750 km. Ababeel: a new ballistic missile with a range of about 2,200 km. Raad (Hatf 8): a cruise missile with a range of about 350 km. Babur (Hatf 7): a supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 750 km. A di t th t ti ti f 2014 t 2018 i SIPRI YEARBOOK 2019 dit d b SIPRI ----- Foreign Military Assistance to Pakistan, which was provided by the Department of State (DOS). Following this, it also announced the suspension of DOS’ security assistance to Pakistan in January 2018 and the suspension of $300 million of the Coalition Support Funds in September 2018. Amid ongoing tense relations between the two countries, Prime Minister Imran Khan visited the United States in July 2019 and held his first summit with President Trump. During these talks, they exchanged views on anti-terrorism measures and peace in Afghanistan, as well as discussing ways of restoring the two countries’ relationship. Just before Prime Minister Khan’s visit to the United States, Pakistan sought to highlight its anti-terrorism efforts to the United States by **❸ [Disputes over the Sovereignty of Kashmir ]** India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty of Kashmir,[7] and have had three armed conflicts of significant scope. The territorial dispute over Kashmir has long been in contention between India and Pakistan, with dialogues arresting Hafiz Saeed, a co-founder of the Pakistan-based Islamist extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, on whom the U.S. Government had placed a bounty for being a ringleader of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. After the talks, Prime Minister Khan disclosed his feeling that the two countries had gained a deeper understanding of each other, stressing that “Pakistan will do everything possible to ensure that this [Afghan] peace process goes forward.” With the desire for an improvement in relations evident in such developments, the response by both countries will be the focus of attention. （2）Relations with China See Section 2-3-6 (3) of this Chapter (Relations with South Asian Countries) See - repeatedly resuming and suspending due to frequent crossborder attacks along the Line of Control (LOC). **Chapter** India asserts the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document by which the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan’s independence, and contends that this matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement (an agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the withdrawal of their military forces that was reached following a summit meeting held in Simla in northern India). On the other hand, Pakistan declares that this should be decided through a f d i li ith 1948 UN l ti Th t t i h t k i ifi tl diff t f d t l t t d th l ti f th di t ----- **Section** **8** **Europe** **❶ [General Situation]** With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize the need to address diverse security challenges, such as outbreaks of regional confl icts within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and the growing seriousness of cyber threats. At the same time, these countries had recognized that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries had disappeared. Nevertheless, since the heightening of tensions in Ukraine in February 2014, there is a growing need to revisit existing strategies and plan new concepts in order to deal with Russia’s changes to the status quo with force in the background and “hybrid warfare.” With regard to international terrorism, the incidents of terrorism occurring within European nations have made counterterrorism efforts an urgent task. In addition, border security problems remain a challenge, including those regarding refugees and migrants that have rapidly increased due to Middle East turmoil such as the prolonged civil war in Syria. To respond to such challenges and situations, Europe has sought to further strengthen and expand multilateral frameworks, such as NATO and the EU. At the same time, it is working to contribute to the security and stability of the international community by proactively participating in activities outside the European region. Moreover, steps are taken at the national level by reviewing security and defense strategies, reforming national defense systems, and strengthening bilateral and **Chapter** multilateral defense and security cooperation. See Fig. I-2-8-1 (Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States) See **❷ [Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks]** to confl ict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War. **1 NATO** Founded for the core task of collective defense among member states, NATO has expanded the scope of its activities **Fig. I-2-8-1** Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States **Current members** In the NATO Summit in November 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept for the fi rst time in 11 years to **Expansion situation of the member states** |Col1|Joined the EU in May 2004 n July 2013 y 1982 Joined NATO in 1999 April 2009| |---|---| |Original EU members Joined the EU by 1995 Joined the EU in January 2007 Joined the EU i Original NATO members Joined NATO b Joined NATO in March 2004 Joined NATO in|| ||| Joined NATO in June 2017 Joined NATO in March 2020 |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||NATO (30 countries)|| **NATO (30 countries)** Austria France Germany U.S. Finland Italy Belgium U.K.[Note] Sweden Netherlands Luxembourg Canada Ireland Spain Portugal Norway Malta Greece Czech Republic Iceland Cyprus Hungary Poland Turkey Denmark Slovakia Albania Lithuania Estonia Montenegro Latvia Romania North Macedonia Bulgaria Slovenia Croatia **EU (27 countries)** (*As of March 2020) Note: The United Kingdom left the EU on January 31 2020 ----- Plan (RAP) for enhancing existing readiness forces.[1] Based on this plan, NATO has continued to maintain its presence in eastern allies, while steps have been taken to significantly improve the readiness of the existing multinational NATO Response Force (NRF) and create the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that can be mobilized within two to three days. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in July 2016, members decided to deploy four multinational battle groups to the three Baltic nations and Poland on a rotational basis. These became fully operational in 2017. At the NATO Summit in July 2018, members decided to put in place a readiness initiative called the “Four Thirties,” to maintain a situation in which, by 2020, 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 combat vessels can be ready to be used within 30 days or less. They also decided on reforms of the command headquarters, establishing the Joint Force Command Norfolk in the United States with the objective of strengthening the defense of Atlantic sea lines of communications between the United States and Europe, as well as establishing the Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, to expedite the transport of troops and equipment within and outside Europe. Views on Russia differ between NATO member states against the backdrop of their different geographical distances from Russia and others. While taking measures to address Russian influence, NATO members have maintained opportunities for dialogue with Russia to narrow their differences in views and increase predictability. Alongside collective defense, NATO’s core tasks include propose a guideline for the next decade for the creation of a more efficient and flexible alliance. The document cites major threats such as proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles, terrorism, conflict or instability beyond NATO borders, and cyber attacks, and prescribes three core tasks as follows: (1) collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty; (2) crisis management including conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction assistance; and (3) cooperative security including active contribution to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Defense spending has been trending downwards in recent years, but in light of changes in the security environment, and the expanding gap of defense expenditure between the United States and other member states, NATO member states in 2014 agreed on the goal to allocate 2% or more of their GDP to defense spending by 2024. The London Declaration was adopted at NATO’s 70th anniversary summit in December 2019. The participating leaders reaffirmed therein their solemn commitment to collective defense as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and stated that they will increase defense expenditure further. Acknowledging that NATO faces not only the challenges of Russia and terrorism, but also cyber and hybrid threats, they also affirmed that NATO will address Russia’s deployment of intermediate range missiles and declared space an operational domain. China’s rise to prominence was discussed for the first time and the Declaration explicitly states that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that NATO members need to address together as an Alliance. With member countries highlighting a diverse array of issues, including matters concerning 5G and other critical infrastructure, discussions are continuing with a view **Chapter** crisis management operations both within and outside the region. In the Mediterranean, a permanent maritime force has been deployed to the Aegean Sea since February 2016 due to the influx of illegal immigrants transiting the Mediterranean. This force monitors the influx of illegal immigrants and shares information with Turkey, Greece, and other countries. Also, in November 2016, Operation Active Endeavor, focused on collective defense held since 2001, was succeeded by Operation Sea Guardian, focused on crisis management, resulting in a wider array of missions including counterterrorism and capacity building assistance, among others. to strengthening NATO unity. Following Russia’s development of “hybrid warfare” as well as the frequent “unusual flights” of Russian Armed Force aircraft over northern and eastern Europe, including the Baltic states, NATO and member states have recognized anew the threat posed by Russia and are working to bolster deterrence. At the NATO Summit in September 2014, leaders adopted a joint declaration demanding Russia to retract its “annexation” of Crimea and adopted the Readiness Action Since January 2015, NATO has been leading the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), whose primary tasks are to provide The RAP was approved as one of the concrete efforts of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). The CFI is intended to provide a framework for conducting joint training and exercises among b t t F th it i d i d t t th j i t t i i b t t d ith t t i h i t bilit d k f d d t h l ----- training, advice, and assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). At the NATO Summit in July 2018, NATO decided to maintain its presence in Afghanistan until seeing signs of changes in the local situation and enhance support for Afghanistan by extending financial assistance for ANDSF until 2024. It has stationed 17,000 personnel in Afghanistan. defense cooperation in Europe, including the establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF). In December 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched as a defense cooperation framework for 25 countries among the member countries. Under this framework, the participating countries finance and cooperate in joint projects including the joint development of equipment and infrastructure that will contribute to developing readiness. It is expected that the framework would strengthen the EU’s defense capabilities. In this way, the EU is trying to enhance capabilities for undertaking security and its strategic independence by responding to the With regard to ISIL, while taking the stance of emphasizing prevention over intervention, NATO has affirmed that it would activate its collective defense if any member state were attacked by ISIL. Furthermore, the Warsaw Summit Communiqué of July 2016 set forth the decision to dispatch early warning and control aircraft forces to fight against ISIL. Under the decision, NATO surveillance and reconnaissance missions started October 2016. NATO announced the commencement of the new NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) at the NATO Summit in July 2018, providing training and capacity building assistance for Iraqi security forces. At the February 2020 meeting of NATO defense ministers, participants agreed to enhance NATO’s training mission in Iraq, to contribute to **Chapter** present and future security demand in Europe. In response to the crisis in Ukraine, the EU has condemned the military measures of Russia and implemented economic sanctions against Russia. In addition, to support the economic and political reforms in Ukraine, the EU continues its engagement in nonmilitary affairs, including the provision of large-scale financial assistance to Ukraine. To deal with the threat of ISIL, the EU extends funds to carry out humanitarian assistance for Syria and Iraq. Additionally, the EU works with countries in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa to provide capacity building assistance in counterterrorism measures, among other activities. In November 2015, in accordance with a request from France after the terror attacks in Paris, the EU, for the first time, activated the “mutual assistance clause” stipulating a mutual defense obligation, and EU member the stabilization of the situation in the Middle East. NATO is also carrying out missions in Kosovo and other countries. **2 EU** The EU seeks to enhance its security initiatives under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),[2] and in June 2016, Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy detailing the EU’s fundamental approach to foreign and security policy was adopted by the European Council for the first time in approximately 10 years. This document calls for initiatives towards enhancing the EU’s internal and external resilience against threats to order in Eastern Europe, and the threat of terrorism or other events in the Middle East and Africa, in accordance with the principles of rules-based order and democracy. In November 2016, the European Commission released an action plan for reinforcing states provided their support to France. Since 2003, the EU has proactively undertaken both military operations and nonmilitary missions under the CSDP. [3] Operation Atalanta, the EU’s first maritime mission to combat piracy, has been under way off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden since December 2008. Under this mission, vessels and aircraft dispatched from each country protect ships in the area and conduct surveillance in these waters. In addition, those vessels and aircraft conduct joint exercises with SDF units. In May 2015, the EU started Operation Sophia conducted by European Union Naval The EU, although it has a property of non-binding multilateral cooperation, introduced the CFSP, which covers all areas of foreign and security policy based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to offer peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP to CSDP and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP. These are called Petersberg tasks. They consist of: (1) humanitarian assistance and rescue mission; (2) peacekeeping mission; and (3) combat mission in crisis management, including ki ----- Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFORMed) due to the surge of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe. The operation’s main mission is to block smuggling and human trafficking, with its adjunctive mission being to train the Libyan Navy Coast Guard and enforce the UN arms embargo on the high seas. Since July 2017, the scope of activities has been expanded through the assignation of new missions, including reconnaissance on illegal transactions in crude oil exported from Libya and information sharing with relevant organizations on human trafficking. The EU Foreign Affairs Council agreed at a February 2020 meeting to undertake a new maritime operation in the Mediterranean, Operation IRINI, whose primary mission is to monitor the arms embargo against Libya. Operation Sophia was therefore concluded in March 2020. to the degree of the United Kingdom s engagement in EU security initiatives. **3 Cooperation between NATO and the EU** Advancements have been seen in cooperation between NATO and the EU in addressing unprecedented challenges efficiently. At the NATO Summit in July 2016, a joint declaration was released citing hybrid threats, cybersecurity and other fields in which NATO and the EU should prioritize cooperation. The NATO Summit in July 2018 issued a joint declaration that identified substantial progress in NATO-EU cooperation and cited the mobility of military forces, counterterrorism and other fields for further cooperation. Based on these declarations, NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and the EU’s Operation Sophia are now mutually collaborating through information support in the Mediterranean. The EU’s PESCO includes a project for developing arrangements for smooth movement of military personnel and assets inside and outside the EU and is expected to contribute to NATO’s quick military deployment in emergency. In this way, NATO and the EU are advancing their cooperation in a manner to complement each other for the purpose of enhancing security **Chapter** The United Kingdom left the EU on January 31, 2020, about three and a half years after the June 2016 referendum. Even after its exit from the EU, the United Kingdom is expected to retain the recognition of NATO as the cornerstone of security in Europe and pursue new security relations with the EU in which it would participate in the PESCO permanent EU defense cooperation framework open to non EU countries if cooperation in research and development is concluded as benefiting both the country and the EU. Given the notion that the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU would reduce the EU’s influence on security, attention will be paid initiatives. **[Security/Defense Policies of European Countries ]** **❸** NSS-SDSR2015 sets out the challenges that the United Kingdom should address in the coming decade as follows: terrorism and extremism; resurgence of state-based threats; technological developments including cyber threats; and the erosion of the rules-based international order. While the previous SDSR2010 committed to cutting the troop strength, reducing key equipment, and reviewing procurement plans due to pressure to decrease defense spending, the NSS-SDSR2015 calls for ending the defense spending cuts and explicitly proposes to increase the defense force in order to develop capacities to address the entire list of expanded threats. The NSS-SDSR2015 lays out that the United Kingdom would continue to be a key player in the international community, and promote procurement of equipment and formation of units with high readiness and **1 The United Kingdom** After the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom, perceiving that there is no direct military threat against the country, has advanced national defense reform with particular focus on improving its overseas deployment capability and readiness, in order to deal with new threats such as international terrorism and proliferation of WMDs. Against this backdrop, in November 2015, the Cameron administration released the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (NSS-SDSR2015) in the face of destabilization in the Middle East, including the rise of ISIL, the crisis in Ukraine, and the threat posed by cyber attacks. Recognizing that the United Kingdom confronts threats from both states and non-state actors, the ----- Navy frigate HMS Argyll conducted patrol and monitoring activities in the seas around Japan, including the East China Sea, in December 2018 and January 2019, while the frigate HMS “Montrose” did the same between late February and early March 2019. Japan and the United Kingdom have also been cooperating in the sharing of information, with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of UN Security Council resolutions. Such Royal Navy deployment in the Asia-Pacific region is viewed as unprecedented since the Korean War. Future developments in the United Kingdom’s involvement in the region are set to attract attention. HMS “Montrose “(U.K.), which came to Japan to monitor illegal ship-to-ship transfer mobility, in view of dealing with threats such as terrorism and cyber security.[4] **Chapter** **2 France** Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence of its defense policies, while having led initiatives to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military capacity by streamlining and integrating military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, as well as enhancing its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment required in the Since September 2014, the United Kingdom has conducted airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. In addition, it carries out ISR activities using UAVs, provides education and training to forces engaged in ground warfare such as the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, a military organization of the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as extends humanitarian assistance to refugees. Furthermore, following the terror attacks in Paris, the United Kingdom decided in December 2015 to extend the scope of the airstrikes from Iraq to Syria, and commenced airstrikes in Syria on the day future. The Defence and National Security Strategic Review after the Parliament gave its approval. In the NSS-SDSR2015, the United Kingdom recognizes announced by the Macron administration in October 2017 states that the threats that France faces, including domestic terrorism, the refugee issue, and the Ukraine crisis, are diversifying, increasing in complexity, and rapidly becoming more violent, and amidst the increasingly multipolar international system, competition is intensifying among major military powers and the danger of escalation is growing. Under these conditions, France will fulfill its duties within NATO, including for collective defense and contributing to security, and will take a leading role in efforts to strengthen the EU’s defense capabilities. In June 2018, the Military Planning Law for 2019-2025 was enacted, consisting of four pillars—human resources, equipment modernization, contributions to Europe’s strategic independence, and technological innovation—to materialize the national security strategy given in the Strategic Review. The law confirms a plan to allocate a total of approximately 300 billion euros to defense by 2025 to fulfill President Macron’s the Asia-Pacific region as offering significant economic opportunities for the country and as exerting considerable influence on the future integrity and credibility of the rules based international order, indicating its commitment to attaching importance to working with security partners in the region. In particular, the United Kingdom considers Japan as its closest security partner in Asia, conducting exercises with Japan. It has also participated in the multilateral exercise RIMPAC and deployed naval ships in the region, enhancing its engagement in regional security. In February 2019, Gavin Williamson, then Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, announced that the aircraft carrier HMS “Queen Elizabeth” was to be sent to the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Pacific. Recently, to assist in international efforts to monitor illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to ship transfers involving North Korea-flagged ships, the Royal The “NSS-SDSR2015” will maintain the size of the British Army personnel and increase the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force by 700 personnel combined. It also decided to build two aircraft carriers, introduce nine new maritime patrol aircraft, and maintain a fleet of four strategic nuclear submarines. Underpinned by a stable economy, the NSS-SDSR2015 is to maintain ----- commitment to the goal of raising defense spending to 2% of France’s GDP by 2025. Furthermore, France dispatched Falcon 200 reconnaissance aircraft to conduct warning and surveillance operations against illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to ship transfers involving North Korea-flagged ships. In 2019, the frigate “Vendémiaire” conducted patrol and monitoring activities in the seas around Japan, including the East China Sea. From the viewpoint of enhancing the effectiveness of the UN Security Council resolutions, Japan and France engaged in cooperation activities, including information sharing. Having positioned the fight against ISIL as one of its top national defense priorities, France has been conducting airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq since September 2014 and in Syria since September 2015. The aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle” supported anti-ISIL operations while at sea in the eastern Mediterranean in April 2019 and was among the naval task force dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean for a month in January 2020 to provide similar operational support. In addition, France has continued to provide education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, as well as humanitarian assistance for refugees. In January 2020, France and seven other European nations, including the Netherlands and Denmark, issued a political statement supporting the creation of the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) surveillance mission, which has been launched in response to a series of incidents affecting the safe passage of civilian vessels in the Gulf of Oman since May 2019. Before the month was out, France dispatched a frigate to the gulf, where it has been **3 Germany** **Chapter** While Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction of its military personnel since the end of the Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany has advanced the reform of its armed forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conflict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the UN. However, following a worsening in the security environment, in May 2016 Germany changed policy and announced that it would increase military personnel by around 7,000 by 2023. The country’s defense white paper released in July 2016 conducting warning and surveillance operations. Since France has territories in the Indo-Pacific region, it places importance on its commitment to the region. The Strategic Review points out the potential for a threat to interests, such as the freedom of navigation, due to the worsening strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region, and clearly states that France will maintain its stance of protecting the sovereignty of its overseas territories in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. France’s Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, which was published in June 2019, states that China’s growing influence is shifting the balances of power in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the importance of strengthening partnerships with the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. In addition, France has proactively organized the multilateral exercises Croix du Sud and Equateur in the South Pacific. In February 2018, France had the frigate “Vendémiaire” make a port call in Japan and conduct joint exercises with the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF). In March 2019, a carrier strike group including the aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle” left France, and conducted a multilateral exercise with Australian, U.S. and Japanese ships including MSDF Destroyer JS “Izumo” in May 2019, when the group was deployed in the Indian Ocean. for the first time in about 10 years explains that Germany’s security environment has grown more complex and unstable, causing gradually rising uncertainty, citing specific threats such as international terrorism, cyber attacks, interstate conflict, and the influx of refugees and immigrants. The white paper also states that Germany would continue to emphasize multilateral cooperation and cross-government approaches, while striving to realize rules-based international order. Furthermore, with regard to the number of military personnel, the white paper notes that although an upper limit was in place following the end of the Cold War and Germany has continually worked to reduce personnel, it would shift to a policy with no upper limit and perform regular reviews of its military force plan to adjust the number of personnel flexibly. In Iraq, Germany has provided support for capacity building, including providing education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces since 2015. In December 2015 following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, Germany expanded logistics support missions, such as ----- reconnaissance and aerial refueling, for the Coalition that was conducting counter-ISIL military operations. In September 2019, the German cabinet decided to extend the nation’s capacity building support mission until October 31, 2020, and its logistical support missions until March 31, 2020. In March 2020, the German cabinet reviewed the logistical support missions and decided to conclude the reconnaissance mission, but extended the aerial refueling mission until October 31, 2020. population and economic strength, and expresses the view that the region plays a central role in international politics. However, Germany has allocated most of its military assets for NATO and EU missions outside the Asia-Pacific region and limited its military engagement in the region to disaster relief missions and goodwill visits, failing to participate in joint exercises involving naval ships in the region. Given that Germany is attempting to enhance its naval power by launching four new frigates by 2020, the German Navy’s future engagement in the region will attract attention. With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, Germany considers it to be important from the standpoint of its large **Chapter** ----- **Section** **Middle East, North Africa, and Other Regions** **9** **❶[ Overview]** The Middle East and Africa has long been one of the world’s centers of civilization, religion, and trade, as well as a geopolitical bastion connecting Asia and Europe. Today, the Middle East is a major source of energy supply for the world and contains major routes for international commerce. Japan is also dependent on the region for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports. Peace and stability in the Middle East region is extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. **❷[ Situation in the Gulf Region ]** On the other hand, the Middle East and Africa region has been experiencing constant confl icts and unrest throughout the 20th century. In recent years, tensions have risen due to the situation in the Gulf region and the Middle East peace process. In addition, the Arab Spring that occurred at the beginning of 2011 prompted regime change in some countries, but due to the turmoil that followed, almost a decade later, civil wars and the activities of terrorist organizations are ongoing in some of those countries. - the JCPOA. Accordingly, the United States suspended its nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. In addition, the EU terminated some of its sanctions, and the provisions imposed by previous UN Security Council resolutions concerning the nuclear issues of Iran ended, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Subsequently, the IAEA has repeatedly confi rmed that Iran is complying with the agreement. However, in May 2018, President Trump pointed out that with the current agreement, Iran can still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in a short period of time even if Iran fully complies with the agreement, and also the agreement fails to address Iran’s development of ballistic missiles. He then announced that the United States would withdraw from the agreement. In November 2018, the Trump administration resumed all sanctions that had been lifted under JCPOA[2] and emphasized its readiness to cut a more comprehensive deal with Iran, urging Iran to sit down on the negotiating table. Meanwhile, Iran opposed the resumption of sanctions by the United States and announced in May 2019 that it would not observe **Chapter** With Hassan Rouhani winning the presidential election in Iran in June 2013, the discussions with the E3+3 (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States, China, and Russia) were advanced, resulting in the announcement of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) towards the comprehensive resolution of nuclear issues in November 2013. The execution of the fi rst step measures of the JPOA commenced in January 2014. On July 14, 2015, the fi nal agreement concerning the nuclear issues of Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was announced. Following this, on July 20, 2015, UN Security Council Resolution 2231 approving the JCPOA was adopted. In the agreement, it was decided that Iran would reduce its enriched uranium stockpile and the number of centrifuges, ban the production of weapons grade plutonium, and accept IAEA inspections, among other measures, in exchange for ending the sanctions of previous UN Security Council resolutions and the U.S. and EU’s nuclear-related sanctions.[1] On January 16, 2016, the IAEA released a report confi rming Iran’s completion of the necessary preparatory steps to start the implementation of The major nuclear-related restrictions on Iran in the JCPOA include the following: with regard to uranium enrichment, limiting the number of centrifuges for uranium enrichment to 5,060 or less, keeping the level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and restricting Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg; and with regard to plutonium production, redesigning and rebuilding the Arak heavy water reactor to not produce weapons grade plutonium, and shipping spent fuel out of Iran, and not engaging in reprocessing spent fuel including R&D and not constructing reprocessing facilities. According to then U.S. Secretary of State Kerry, with this agreement, Iran’s breakout time (the time it takes to accumulate the amount of fi ssile material needed for a single nuclear weapon) will be extended from 90 days or less before the JCPOA to a year or more. Furthermore, the JCPOA is an agreement pertaining to nuclear issues and does not suspend or lift sanctions related to international terrorism, missiles, human rights, among other issues. The sanctions include a ban on the Iranian government’s purchases of U.S. dollars, a prohibition on purchases of oil, petroleum products and petrochemical products from Iran, and a ban on transactions with Iranian fi nancial institutions, including the central bank. In May 2019, Signifi cant Reduction Exceptions, which relate to a ban on some countries and regions’ purchase f I i il t l b li h d ----- the restrictions on the storage of enriched uranium and heavy water prescribed under JCPOA, while denying an intention to withdraw from JCPOA. Iran announced the suspension of its commitment to the uranium enrichment limit in July as the second step of reducing compliance with JCPOA, the promotion of unrestricted research and development of advanced centrifuges in September as the third step, and the commencement of uranium enrichment activities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in November as the fourth step. In January 2020, as the fi nal step of reducing compliance with JCPOA, Iran announced that it would waive its commitment to the restrictions on enrichment capacity. In the same month, Britain, France and Germany referred the developments to the JCPOA Joint Commission under the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism and called for Iran to once again fully fulfi ll its obligations under JCPOA. In response, Iran said that it would consider withdrawing from the NPT if the nuclear agreement issue is referred to the UN Security Council, and that if Europe observes the agreement, Iran would return to compliance with the agreement. In the meantime, since May 2019, the United States has announced the dispatch of carrier strike groups and bomber units in response to Iran’s threats to its own troops and interests. In June, Iran announced that it had shot down a U.S. drone with a surface-to-air missile in its territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. acknowledged the fact that it was shot down, but claimed it was in international airspace, and revealed that U.S. President Trump had called off the retaliatory attack at the brink of execution. In July 2019, the U.S. revealed that a U.S. amphibious assault ship had shot down an Iranian drone over the Strait of Hormuz as a defensive measure. Furthermore, in May 2019, an oil pipeline facility in central Saudi Arabia was attacked by drones, temporarily halting the transportation of crude oil. In September, an oil facility in eastern Saudi Arabia was attacked, temporarily halving the country’s oil production. The Houthis, a Yemeni anti government armed group allegedly supported by Iran, initially issued a statement of responsibility for these attacks, but the United States and others have pointed to Iranian involvement in the September attacks. Iran has consistently denied this. Damage to an Iraqi military base hosting U.S. military caused by a ballistic missile attack by Iran [AFP/Jiji] In response to this situation, the United States has expanded the number of U.S. troops deployed to the Middle East since May 2019 to reinforce its stance against Iran. For example, in July, it stationed troops in Saudi Arabia for the fi rst time in nearly 16 years since 2003. In September and October, it announced the deployment of additional troops, including air defense missile forces. On the other hand, since October 2019, there have been multiple attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq. In December, a rocket landed on a base in northern Iraq, killing one American. The U.S. claimed Iranian involvement in the attack and bombed the stronghold of Kata'ib Hezbollah, one of the four Shiite[3] armed groups allegedly supported by Iran. In addition, in January 2020, the United States killed Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who was operating inside Iraq with the organization’s leaders, as a deterrent to further attack plans. The United States has long viewed the activities of the Quds Force as problematic for supporting terrorist organizations abroad. In April 2019, it designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization. Iran carried out a ballistic missile attack on Iraqi bases hosting U.S. military in retaliation for the killing of Commander Soleimani. However, the attack reportedly did not result in any deaths, and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif expressed that Iran had completed commensurate retaliatory measures and did not want further tensions or war. President Trump also said the same day that he did not want to use military force against Iran. Both the **Chapter** One of the two major sects of Islam. The division with the Sunnis originated in differences in views on the successors (caliph) to the Prophet Muhammad (died in 632), the founder of Islam. At present, Shia Islam is the state religion in Iran, and Shiites make up about 60 percent of the population in Iraq. The largest sect, the Sunnis, have a majority in most of the Muslim t i i th Middl E t d N th Af i i ----- the vessel, and testimony from the parties concerned, Japan believes that the damage to the vessel is highly likely to have been caused by limpet mines.[4] Amidst rising tensions in the Middle East, countries launched efforts to safeguard maritime security in the region. The United States proposed the Maritime Security Initiative in July 2019 and established the IMSC with its command center opened in Bahrain in November. In addition to the United States, IMSC has been joined by seven countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Albania, and Lithuania (as of April 2020). In Europe, eight countries (France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Portugal) issued a statement in January 2020 to politically support the creation of a European-led maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH). France and the Netherlands have dispatched their assets so far. On the other hand, in September 2019, Iran presented a plan named HOPE (Hormuz Peace Endeavor) as an independent effort to maintain security in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, and called on the countries concerned to join. In addition, in December, Iran conducted the Maritime Safety Belt, the fi rst trilateral military exercise with the Chinese and Russian navies in the Gulf of Oman and other areas to ensure the safety of maritime traffi c routes. Japan needs to continue to pay close attention to the future developments surrounding the situation in the Gulf region. Front Altair, an oil tanker, on fi re after having been attacked in the Gulf of Oman in June 2019 [EPA/Jiji] **Chapter** **2** United States and Iran made it clear that they wanted to avoid any further escalation. Meanwhile, since May 2019, events affecting the navigation safety of civilian vessels have occurred sporadically in the waters of the Middle East. Specifi cally, in May 2019, four tankers (two Saudi Arabia-fl agged and one each from the United Arab Emirates and Norway) were attacked in the Gulf of Oman. In June, two vessels, including the chemical tanker Kokuka Courageous operated by a Japanese shipping company, were attacked in the Gulf of Oman. With regard to the series of attacks, the United States and others have pointed out that they were committed by Iran, while Iran has consistently denied any involvement. Based on a comprehensive review of the information on the attack on the Kokuka Courageous, technical analysis of the damage to **KEY WORD** The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is part of the symmetric warfare, the IRGC is generally considered to have Iranian national organization established on the occasion of the primary mission of conducting asymmetric warfare and the 1979 Iranian Revolution with the role of defending the operating equipment such as small boats and ballistic missiles. Iranian Revolution and the achievements of the Revolution. It is also noted that the IRGC has the Quds Force under its Together with the regular army and the security forces under wing, which is responsible for overseas operations, and exerts the Ministry of Interior, it constitutes the armed forces of the infl uence in the region through support for pro-Iranian activities Islamic Republic of Iran. Unlike regular forces that conduct abroad and their leaders. A t f d t G ll th l d th h ll f hi d d t d f th f ki it i ibl f th hi t ----- - **❸[ The Situation Surrounding Middle East Peace ]** Since the foundation of Israel in 1948, there have been four Israel in December 2017 and moved the U.S. embassy from wars between Israel and Arab countries. Subsequently, the Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May 2018. In reaction, protests have Oslo Accords, signed between Israel and Palestine in 1993, been repeated mainly in Gaza, with protesters killed and initiated a full-fledged, negotiated peace process. In 2003, injured through their clashes with Israeli forces. Tensions both Israel and Palestine accepted the Roadmap for Peace have increased intermittently as Israel carried out air strikes that laid out a path to the realization of the two-state peace on Gaza to counter rocket attacks from Gaza. In addition, initiative based on peaceful coexistence, but it has not been in March 2019, the Trump administration recognized Israeli implemented. In the Palestinian territories, the moderate sovereignty over the Golan Heights, drawing criticism from Fatah, which governs the West Bank of the Jordan River, and various Middle Eastern countries. In January 2020, the the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas, which effectively controls administration announced a new Middle East peace plan, the Gaza district, are in conflict, splitting the area. Since but the Palestinian side has refused to negotiate, opposing October 2017, the Fatah and Hamas have continued direct the plan’s descriptions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the transfer of the administrative control of border and the possession of Jerusalem. A close eye will the Gaza Strip to the Fatah under Egyptian auspices, but the be kept on future developments regarding the Middle East talks have remained stalled. peace process, including the United States’ engagement, as In such circumstances, the U.S. Trump administration well as the direction of negotiations on the transfer of the announced its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of administrative control of the Gaza Strip. - **❹[ Situation in Syria ]** **Chapter** Violent clashes in Syria since March 2011 pit four parties, the Syrian government forces, opposition forces, Islamic extremist forces, and Kurdish forces against each other. However, the government forces have gained the upper hand overall with support from Russia, recapturing Aleppo, which was once the largest stronghold of rebel forces, the suburbs of the Syrian capital of Damascus and areas close to the Syria-Jordan border. In Idlib, a rebel stronghold even at present, Russia, which had been supporting Syrian government forces, and Turkey, which had been backing up rebels, agreed in September 2018 to establish a DMZ Idlib and withdraw heavy artillery and militant groups from the zone. However, there was no progress with regard to the withdrawal of the militant groups. Since April 2019, Syrian government forces and Russian forces had expanded air and ground operations into Idlib and besieged some of the Turkish military ceasefire monitoring stations set up around Idlib. In February 2020, the Turkish forces dispatched reinforcements to Idlib in response to the advance of the Syrian government forces, but the forces were shelled by the Syrian government forces, against which the Turkish forces retaliated, reportedly causing casualties on both sides. Subsequently, the fighting between the Turkish forces and the Syrian government forces expanded. The Syrian government forces were faced with intensified resistance from the dissidents and the militants, who were reinforced by the Turkish forces. The forces and militants fought back and forth over the key points of traffic through Idlib. In March 2020, Turkey held a summit with Russia, which had been backing Syria, and agreed to a ceasefire in Idlib. Although the Syrian president has expressed his satisfaction with the agreement, Turkey has warned that it will resume operations if Syria violates the agreement, raising a concern about a possible resumption of the battle. Meanwhile, the peace talks have so far made little progress. Since January 2016, there have been talks between the government and opposition forces under UN auspices. However, the fighting between both sides did not abate, disrupting the talks. Under the circumstances, peace talks led by Russia, Turkey, and Iran have continued in Astana (current Nur-Sultan), Kazakhstan, since January 2017. In January 2018, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress was held in Sochi, Russia, where an agreement was reached to establish a constitutional committee towards the enactment ----- of a new constitution. In December 2018, Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed to hold the first meeting of the committee as early as possible in 2019. The first meeting was held in October 2019 under the auspices of the UN, but to date there has been no substantive progress in the political process. In addition, conflicts among the countries and forces involved over the Kurds inside Syria have surfaced. In October 2019, following a telephone summit with Turkey, the United States issued a statement that Turkey would soon begin an operation in the northern part of Syria and that U.S. forces would withdraw from the immediate area of operation. After the release of the statement, Turkey launched a military operation against Kurdish forces, which the country perceives as terrorist organizations, as well as ISIL, in order to eliminate the terrorist threat from the border zone with Syria and establish a “safe zone” that would enable the return of Syrian refugees inside Turkey, and took control of parts of the northeastern region of Syria. Subsequently, Turkey and the United States agreed on the suspension of military operations and the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from the “safe zone.” Turkey also held talks with Russia, and agreed on the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from the border zone and joint patrols by Russian military police and Turkish forces in northeastern Syria. Over these developments, Russia’s growing military presence has been noted, including the reported deployment of a helicopter unit at the airport in the northeastern Syrian city of Qamishli as part of the patrol **❺[ Situation in Yemen ]** In Yemen, following anti-government protests that occurred from February 2011 and international pressure afterward, the then President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to resign in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative. Through the election held in February 2012, the then Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi was elected new President. Meanwhile, the confrontation intensified between the government and the opposition insurgent group Houthis, based in northern Yemen. As the Houthis invaded the Yemeni capital of Sana and the southern Yemeni city of Aden to which President Hadi evacuated, the president requested support from Arab countries. In response, in March 2015, coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia began air strikes against operation. Furthermore, the Syrian government agreed with the Kurdish forces to send the Syrian government troops to the northeast, advancing into Manbij, one of the Kurdish forces’ strongholds, which indicates coordination between the Kurdish forces and the Syrian government to counter Turkey’s military operations. The agreement was allegedly mediated by Russia, suggesting that Russia’s influence is expanding. It has also been pointed out that in the wake of Turkey’s military operations, counterterrorism activities by Kurdish forces, which has played a central role in the fight against ISIL, were suspended, and some ISIL fighters and their families fled from camps controlled by Kurdish forces. Moreover, concerning Iranian presence in Syria, confrontation between Iran and Israel has come to the surface. In January 2019, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced an attack on a weapon storage facility at Syria’s Damascus Airport, expressing his determination to take resolute actions against the Iranians in Syria. It is a concern that the escalation of confrontation between Israel and Iran would affect Syrian and regional stability. Amid the still unstable situation in Syria, the United States said it would leave some of its troops to mop up ISIL. Relations between various forces over the Syrian situation have been complicated, with peace talks being stalled. Further initiatives from the international community towards the stabilization of Syria are required. - the Houthis. In response, the Houthis also launched attacks on the mainland of Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles and other weapons. A series of peace talks mediated by the UN took place between April and August of the same year, but no final peace agreement was reached, with the talks suspended. Peace talks were planned for September 2018 but failed to be implemented with the Houthis refusing to participate. In December 2018, however, peace talks were held in Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, leading to the signing of an agreement on a ceasefire in Hodeidah, which has the biggest port in the country, and the exchange of prisoners. In January 2019, the UN Security Council decided to send a ceasefire monitoring group to Hodeidha. **Chapter** ----- Despite the progress in the peace talks, negotiations on specific measures toward the ceasefire did not go smoothly, with the terms of the agreement, including the ceasefire in Hodeidah, failing to be implemented. On the other hand, the Houthis, stating that they had carried out attacks against Saudi Arabia, including an attack on an oil facility in Saudi Aramco in September 2019, declared in September 2019 that they would cease attacks on the country on the condition that the coalition forces ceased its air strikes. Also, in November 2019, as there were reports that Saudi Arabia and the Houthis were engaged in negotiations behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia announced that it had released 200 Houthi prisoners of war. In addition, in the same month, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen reported that airstrikes by the coalition forces had decreased significantly. Despite the momentum for a ceasefire, Saudi Arabia carried out air strikes against the Houthis after a missile launched by the Houthis landed on a Yemeni government’s military base and killed more than 100 soldiers in January 2020. In retaliation, the Houthis announced that they had carried out drone and missile strikes against oil facilities in southern Saudi Arabia. Since then, there have been sporadic attacks on Saudi Arabia by the Houthis, and the Saudi-led coalition has also continued to **❻[ Situation in Libya ]** In Libya, following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, elections for a General National Congress were held in July 2012, establishing a congress consisting mainly of Islamists. In June 2014, elections for a Council of Representatives were held to establish a new congress to replace the General National Congress. However, since secularists became the majority, the confrontation between Islamic and secular groups over the transfer of power to the Council of Representatives intensified, and consequently, Libya became fragmented between east and west, with two assemblies existing in parallel – the Islamic groups’ General National Congress based in the capital city of Tripoli and the secular groups’ Council of Representatives based in Tobruk in eastern Libya. In December 2015, the UN mediated a political agreement for Libya, and the Government of National Accord (GNA) was established as a national bomb the Houthis. As such, there is no prospect of a ceasefire or eventual peace agreement across Yemen. In addition, it has been pointed out that the Houthis receive weapons supplies from Iran.[5] In fact, in February 2020, the U.S. forces announced that it had boarded and inspected a small vessel in the Arabian Sea and seized a large amount of weapons from the vessel. The U.S. forces affirmed that the seized weapons were made in Iran, concluding that they were intended to be supplied to the Houthis in Yemen, and pointing to them as a violation of the UN Security Council resolution prohibiting the supply, sale and transfer of weapons to the Houthis. While the situation surrounding the Houthis was changing, in August 2019, fighting broke out between the Yemeni government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group in southern Yemen, which led to the STC’s occupation of Aden (Yemen’s interim capital). However, after mediation efforts by Saudi Arabia and others, the Yemeni government and STC signed the Riyadh Agreement in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, in November 2019. The agreement established a new government with the participation of both sides. - consensus government under the agreement. However, as Islamic groups took control of the new government, secular groups turned their back and refused to join the GNA. As a result, Libya remains divided between the east and the west. Furthermore, militias supporting either the east or the west have continued sporadic military clashes. In September 2018, militias active in the west clashed, leading to an emergency declaration. In April 2019, Commander Hafter’s LNA, the largest forces in eastern Libya, advanced into a suburb of the capital city of Tripoli and clashed with militias subordinate to the GNA in western Libya, leading to an exchange of air strikes. Some have pointed out that the fact that both Eastern and Western forces are receiving military support from the countries involved, including UAVs, has also led to the escalation of the war, and the struggle between the two **Chapter** di t I Milit P t l d b th U S D f I t lli A (DIA) i N b 2019 ----- parties has been described as a drone war. [6] It has also been pointed out that mercenaries from a Russian private military company have been dispatched to Libya to support the LNA, while Turkey has dispatched Turkish forces and the Syrian fighters it has been supporting to Libya at the request of the GNA. Amid this situation, an international conference on Libya was held in Berlin in January 2020. The conference was attended by Western countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and Turkey, as well as the UAE and Egypt, which are said to be supporting the LNA. The countries agreed to strengthen cooperation toward a **❼[ Situation in Egypt ]** In Egypt, where then President Mubarak, who had been serving as the president for approximately three decades, resigned in 2011, and then President Mursi, who had been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni political organization founded in 1928 as a mass organization working for the “revival of Islam,” took office. However, in June 2013, large-scale public protests occurred amidst the poor economic situation and the deterioration of security. The military intervened in response and dismissed the president. In May 2014, then Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was inaugurated as president. Since its inauguration, the el-Sisi administration has undertaken economic reforms including a shift to a floating exchange rate system and ceasefire, stop military intervention in Libya, and enforce an arms embargo. However, the agreement has not yet been implemented, and Libya continues to be unable to establish governance and domestic security. Furthermore, ISIL, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations are taking advantage of the unstable situation to expand into Libya, clashing with militias across the country. In particular, ISIL is believed to have been divided into small groups and hiding mainly in the southern desert areas, conducting suicide bombing and other terrorist attacks in such cities as Tripoli, the capital, indicating that terrorist attacks may continue in the future. - the abolition of subsidies. However, enhancing domestic security measures is still a major challenge. In particular, the country’s mainland was subject to sporadic large-scale terrorist attacks from 2013, when political turmoil took place, to 2017, and in November 2018, a terrorist attack occurred in the central part of the country, targeting Egypt’s minority Coptic Christians. Moreover, in the Sinai Peninsula, terrorist attacks on military and police forces have occurred sporadically mainly in the northern part, while the southern part is overall peaceful. Since February 2018, Sinai 2018, a counter-terrorism operation conducted by the Egyptian Armed Forces, has been underway in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula. **Chapter** **❽[ Situation in Afghanistan ]** In Afghanistan, the Taliban intensified its offensive as the NATO-led RSM launched education, training and advice for the ANDSF in the wake of ISAF’s withdrawal in December 2014. Meanwhile, the ANDSF faces challenges regarding logistics, morale, air capabilities, and troop-commander leadership, allowing the Taliban to expand its control in Afghanistan. Furthermore, ISIL–KP (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province) has sustained terrorist attacks mainly in the capital city of Kabul and eastern Afghanistan since 2015. As a result, suicide bombing and assaults in which the Taliban or ISIL is believed to be involved have occurred one after another across the country, leaving Afghanistan in an unstable security situation. According to a report released by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in October 2018, the areas controlled or influenced by the Afghan Government accounted for approximately 55.5% of Afghan territory, the lowest since December 2015, when the survey started. Since the fall of 2018, the United States has conducted peace talks with the Taliban after appointing Khalilzad as di t th fi l t f th P l f E t Lib d UN S it C il R l ti 1973 (D b 9 2019) ----- the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation. The talks had some twists and turns, including a three-month suspension from September 2019, but in February 2020, an agreement was signed between the United States and the Taliban that included the conditional phase-out of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and the start of negotiations among Afghans. In March 2020, the United States announced that it had begun the withdrawal of its forces. Also in the same month, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution in support of the agreement. However, the Taliban **❾[ Situation in South Sudan ]** have continued their attacks on Afghan security forces after the agreement. President Ghani, who was re-elected in the September 2019 presidential election in Afghanistan, held a presidential inauguration ceremony in March 2020. However, another candidate accused Ghani of fraud in the election and held his own presidential inauguration ceremony, causing political turmoil. Under these circumstances, a close eye will be kept on the future progress of the agreement between the United States and the Taliban and the commencement of negotiations between the Afghans. - In response to the situation, in August 2016, the UN Security Council created the Regional Protection Force (RPF) for the purpose of maintaining security in Juba and surrounding areas. The RPF launched its operations in April 2017. In December 2017 and February and May 2018, the High-Level Revitalization Forum was held under the leadership of IGAD, where the government agreed with the pro-Machar faction and others on the cessation of hostilities. As a result of the efforts, in June 2018, President Kiir, former First Vice President Machar and others signed the “Khartoum Declaration of Agreement on South Sudan,” which includes a permanent ceasefire. They agreed on security arrangements in July and on provisional government arrangements in August, before signing the “Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS)” in September 2018. Initially, a new provisional government was scheduled to be established by May 2019. However, the preparations for its establishment were not completed by that time. In May 2019, the government and representatives of the pro-Machar faction agreed on the extension of the pre-transitional period by six months. In November, they further agreed to extend the period for another 100 days. On February 22, 2020, the last day of the pre-transitional period, a provisional government was established. See Fig. I-2-9-1 (Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations) Part III, Chapter 3, Section 5-2-3 (UNMISS) **Chapter** The second North-South civil war in Sudan, which had continued since 1983, came to an end in 2005 with the entry into force of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan was separated and gained independence from the Republic of the Sudan. At the same time, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established. However, after the independence, a political confrontation emerged between a mainstream faction led by President Salva Kiir Mayardit, a Dinka, and a nonmainstream faction including Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer. The “Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (IGAD) assisted by the UN and the AU initiated efforts to start dialogues among South Sudanese leaders and enable their reconciliation. In January 2014, the government and the pro-Machar faction signed an agreement on ceasing hostile activities. In August 2015, the government, the pro-Machar faction and others reached the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), the key elements of which include the establishment of a transitional government. In April 2016, the Transitional Government of National Unity was established, in which Mr. Kiir serves as president and Mr. Machar as first vice president. In July 2016, a shooting occurred in Juba between the security forces of President Kiir and First Vice President Machar. After First Vice President Machar fled the country, and President Kiir dismissed First Vice President Machar, clashes started to occur again between the government and the Machar faction. ----- **Fig. I-2-9-1** Current Peacekeeping Operations **Chapter** ① ⑬ ⑩ ⑫ ⑨ ⑪ ② ⑧ ⑦ ④ ⑥ ⑤ ③ Note: According to the United Nations (as of the end of March 2020). Africa Middle East |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |⑧|United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)|May 1948| |⑨|United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)|Jun 1974| |⑩|United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)|Mar 1978| |Asia|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Mission|Date Established| |⑪|United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)|Jan 1949| Europe/CIS |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |⑫|United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)|Mar 1964| |⑬|United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)|Jun 1999| - years. Even after the establishment of the unified government, Somalia has faced two major issues—terrorism and piracy. Al-Shabaab, a Sunni extremist organization based in the central south, has repeatedly conducted terrorist attacks against the go ernment and other targets In 2007 theAfrican |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |①|United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)|Apr 1991| |②|African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)|Jul 2007| |③|United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)|Jul 2010| |④|United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)|Jun 2011| |⑤|United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)|Jul 2011| |⑥|United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)|Apr 2013| |⑦|United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)|Apr 2014| **❿[ Situation in Somalia ]** Somalia plunged into anarchy on the collapse of its government in 1991, facing a serious humanitarian crisis with massive refugees generated. In 2005, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was inaugurated through the intermediation of the neighboring countries. In 2012, a nified go ernment as established for the first time in 21 ----- Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established with the approval of the UN Security Council. As a result of attacks by the AMISOM forces and mop-up operations by the Somali government forces under reconstruction with support from Western countries, Al-Shabaab lost its control on major cities and weakened to some extent. However, its threat has still existed. Al-Shabaab frequently stages attacks against the bases of the Somali and AMISOM forces and terrorist attacks within Somalia and in AMISOM member countries. It has been pointed out that ISIL fighters have been flowing into Somalia in recent years. In Somalia, especially in its northeastern part, there are believed to be outposts of pirates who are active off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The international community has continued anti-piracy operations and implemented a series of initiatives to enhance the security capabilities of Somalia based on the perception that instability of Somalia has caused the piracy issue. As a result, the number of reported pirate attacks has remained low. With a presidential election anticipated around the end of 2020 or later, we should keep paying close attention to whether the situation in Somalia will start to stabilize, while also looking at the international community’s response. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section -2-2 (Counter-Piracy Operations) **Chapter** See ----- **g** **g** **p** **,** **Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum, and** ###### 3 **Relevant Challenges Facing the International Community** **Section** **1** **Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology** **❶ [Military Science and Technological Trends ]** national AI development strategy through 2030, released in October 2019, cited such targets as the acceleration of AI technology development, support for scientifi c research, and the improvement of human resources development systems. AI-using technologies being studied include situation assessment support systems to display data collected through various sensors in an easy-to-understand manner, as well as decision-making support systems to provide commanders with available options. The United States conducted demonstration tests on the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) in December 2019. The system is reportedly designed to link various systems to networks, analyze collected data with AI, and allow combat troops to promptly access the data. It is noted that China is interested in introducing AI-based decision-making support systems for commanders, allegedly having a plan to develop a decision-making support system for nuclear-powered submarine commanders. The United States, China, and Russia are developing autonomous unmanned vehicles equipped with AI. Autonomous unmanned vehicles would generally combine unmanned vehicles technologies expected to be utilized in dangerous, dirty, and dull missions with AI technology capable of detecting adversary actions and battle situation changes, and enables intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in a wide range of areas over a long time, without risking human lives. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is developing AI-equipped unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including swarms of reusable, air-launched and air-recovered small UAVs for ISR missions, as well as unmanned surface vessels for locating submarines. Under its Gremlins program, for example, DARPA conducted the fi rst fl ight test for the X-61A UAV in November 2019, testing its aerial launching and fl ying it for more than 90 minutes to verify aerial and ground command and control systems **1** General Situation Recent developments in science and technology have impacted a variety of areas, triggering signifi cant and revolutionary changes in many areas such as economy, society, and lifestyle. As civilian technologies have been rapidly developing, further technological innovation is expected to dramatically change battle scenes in the future. In particular, major countries have focused on the aggressive utilization of artifi cial intelligence (AI), high-power energy, quantum technology, and other cutting-edge technologies. **Chapter** **2** Military Cutting-edge Technology Utilization Trends （1）AI Technology AI technology is one of the technology areas that shows rapid progress in recent years. It has been pointed out that the rapid AI progress has been exerting a great impact on the military fi eld, including the application for autonomous unmanned vehicles and the cyber domain as well as supporting for command and decision-making and improving data processing capacity, among other areas. The United States, China, and Russia have formulated their AI strategies and promoted relevant research and development under industry-government-academia collaboration. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) established the Joint Artifi cial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in June 2018 and indicated its policy of using AI in a lawful and ethical manner in “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artifi cial Intelligence Strategy” released in February 2019. The Chinese government announced the “Next Generation AI Development Plan” in 2017, setting a target for China to become a major global AI innovation center by 2030. In Russia, President Vladimir Putin in 2017 acknowledged that AI leaders would rule the world. Its ----- In May 2018, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation successfully performed a swarm fl ight of 200 AI-equipped unmanned vehicles, demonstrating its advanced AI technology. It is assumed that military operations including such swarm fl ights will be diffi cult to counter with conventional air defense systems. The Caihong-7 (CH7), whose prototype was exhibited at the Airshow China, China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, in November 2018, is described as a fi ghter UAV that can perform advanced autonomous fl ights. Russia is developing a nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle (Poseidon) that can carry nuclear warheads, claiming that it has been tested successfully. Some have argued that autonomous unmanned vehicles could develop into so-called Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), discussion on LAWS is continued from the perspectives of their characteristics, human elements, and international law. Meanwhile, some people indicate that UAVs would not acquire the autonomy at the same level as human pilots until 2040. Flight test in November 2019 [DARPA] **Chapter** （2）Hypersonic Weapons The United States, China, and Russia are developing hypersonic weapons, including Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) that would be launched from ballistic missiles, maneuvered to glide at hypersonic speed (Mach 5 or above) after their entry into the atmosphere, and hit targets, as well as Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs) using scramjet engines and other technologies that enable hypersonic fl ights. It is suggested that hypersonic weapons would fl y in lower orbits than ballistic missiles at hypersonic speed above Mach 5 for a longer period of time and have high maneuverability, which makes it diffi cult to be detected and intercepted. The United States, in its Missile Defense Review (MDR) (January 2019), indicates that Russia and China are developing advanced hypersonic weapons that challenge existing missile defense systems. The United States also announced in March 2020 that it had conducted a successful fl ight test on hypersonic weapons. Medium-range ballistic missile “DF-17” showcased at the military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of China's founding [EPA/Jiji] In the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019, the DF-17 ballistic missile viewed as capable of carrying an HGV made its fi rst public appearance, suggesting the possibility that hypersonic weapons would be deployed as early as in 2020. Russia announced its deployment of an HGV called “Avangard.” It is also continuing the development of an HCM called “Zircon.” （3） High-power Energy Technology High-power energy weapons, such as electromagnetic railguns, high-power laser weapons, and high-power microwaves, are being developed as a means to counter various airborne threats. The United States and China are developing **KEY WORD** Swarm fl ight Swarm fl ight technology networks numerous UAVs, leading them to autonomously cooperate with each other for swarm fl ights. The technology is expected to improve warning, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and add to attack capabilities to enable saturation attacks. ----- **Chapter** **Column** Technology for Coordination between Crewed Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Currently, major countries are developing highly autonomous reported that the unit cost of the XQ-58A is several million UAVs capable of concerted actions with crewed aircraft. It is dollars. Details of the performance of the airframe are not believed that such technologies can greatly change future air disclosed, but according to Kratos, XQ-58A is a long-range battle. These autonomous UAVs divide roles with crewed aircraft, subsonic UAV with a total length of 9.4 meters and total width and are tasked with information gathering, reconnaissance and of 8.2 meters, and does not require any runway facilities. In surveillance in a dangerous situation, combat and other tasks. September 2019, Russia announced that the country had They are expected to have advanced functions and capabilities, implemented a cooperative fl ight test of S-70 heavy unmanned including planning tactics to be taken by each plane based combat aerial vehicle “Okhotnik” and the 5th generation fi ghter on the battlefi eld situation and proposing them to the pilot Su-57 for approximately 30 minutes and disclosed a video of of crewed aircraft to reduce the burden on human operators. the fl ight test. Furthermore, the use of UAVs, which have the characteristics It is reported that in this test the S-70 fl ew to the front of of both low costs and no risk to human life, can reduce the risk the Su-57 and communicated the targeting information to its of missions. pilot by using mounted sensors. Australia is developing Boeing The realization of these technologies requires fl ight control ATS (Air Teaming System) jointly with Boeing with a view to technology, airframe control technologies including swarm coordination with F-35A, E-7A early warning and control technology for fl ying in fl ocks, communication technology to aircraft, and other crewed aircraft. As exemplifi ed by the connect UAVs with crewed aircraft, other UAVs, ground-based success in a swarm fl ight of 200 fi xed wing UAVs in 2018, China stations and others, and command and control technology to is believed to be investing a signifi cant amount of budget and analyze collected information and develop, update and present excellent talents in the development of autonomous UAVs in an tactics in a timely manner. UAVs intended for combat role, approach of Civil-Military Fusion while using the ones in the such as XQ-58A Valkyrie, which is being developed by the military sector. The military media expressed the effectiveness United States, require not only a high level of autonomy but of the coordination of crewed aircraft and UAVs and suggested also combat-capable aircraft performance. At the same time, that this could change even the organizational confi guration of such UAVs tasked for high-risk missions are expected to cost militaries in the future. less than crewed aircraft. For this reason, 3D printer and other advanced technologies that can contribute to price reduction XQ-58A Valkyrie are also attracting attention. Description In order to ensure Japan’s technological superiority, the In January 2020 a demo unit MOD published “R&D Vision on Future Unmanned Equipment: of XQ-58A long-range subsonic Focusing on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” in 2016 and has unmanned air vehicle carried [U.S. Air Force] out the fourth fl ight test. been also continuing R&D on technologies for coordination between crewed aircraft and UAVs. The ministry believes that S-70 (Okhotnik) the research can contribute to: automation, labor saving and optimization of command and control; expansion of autonomy Description S-70 heavy unmanned combat range of equipment, and; speeding up and high-precision of aerial vehicle “Okhotnik” (above) information collection and judgment. fl ying together with the 5th generation fi ghter Su-57 (below) [Ministry of Defense of Russia] See Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2-2 (Defense Technology Strategy, etc.) The United States is promoting research that plans to fl y Boeing ATS highly-automated UAVs alongside with crewed aircraft. As a Description part of the research, the Air Force Research Laboratory has Image of multiple Boeing ATSs fl ying together with E-7A early been developing XQ-58A jointly with Kratos, a private company. warning and control aircraft The USAF expects to obtain game-changing fi ghting capability (right in the photo) at low procurement and maintenance/operation costs. It is [Boeing] ----- g g gi generated from electric energy to launch projectiles. U.S. Forces aim to develop a railgun with a range of approximately 370 km, about 10 times that of the existing 5-inch (127mm) guns. Unlike missiles, projectiles for electromagnetic railguns have no propulsion systems and are smaller, less costly, and can be stored in smaller space, which supposedly makes it possible for electromagnetic railguns to efficiently counter massive missile attacks, if they become available for intercepting missiles. The United States has offered plans to mount electromagnetic railguns on warships by 2025 and to use electromagnetic railguns not only for anti-ground and anti-ship attacks but also for anti-aircraft attacks. It is pointed out that China has tested its railguns at sea and would deploy them by 2025. The United States, China, and Russia are developing highpower laser weapons to destroy targets with laser energy. Laser weapons are expected as an effective and less costly means to intercept attacks by multiple small unmanned vehicles and boats. Though it depends on the technological maturity, highpower laser weapons would excel in the speed of response compared with conventional weapons, and they can be free from ammunition constraints. Therefore, laser weapons, if strengthened enough to intercept missiles, would be able to efficiently counter massive missile attacks. The U.S. Air Force acquired an anti-UAV laser system in 2019. The United States has also successfully tested a 30 kW ship-based solid laser weapon system (LaWS) to counter small UAVs in the Persian Gulf since 2014. In a test conducted in the Pacific Ocean in 2020, the U.S. Navy successfully neutralized a flying unmanned vehicle with its shipboard high-powered laser demonstrator. The United States is planning to test mount an Aegis ship with the 100 kW HELIOS solid laser weapon system available for countering projectiles in 2020. China exhibited the 30-100 kW “Silent Hunter” laser weapon system, capable of countering small UAVs, at the IDEX 2017 international defense exhibition. It is pointed out that China is developing higher-power laser weapon systems to attack satellites. It is suggested that Russia has deployed the 10 kW Peresvet laser weapon system and been developing a megawatt-class chemical laser weapon system for attacking satellites. High-power microwave technology can cause destruction and malfunction in the electronic systems responsible for such functions as intelligence-gathering and command & communications aboard UAVs, missiles and other airborne threats. The United States has acquired the Phaser highpower microwave system in 2019. In a U.S. Army drill, the system reportedly countered two to three UAVs at one time and 33 UAVs in total. Test conducted in 2020 [U.S. Navy] **Chapter** Phaser 【Raytheon Technologies Corporation】 （4） Quantum Technology Quantum technology is positioned as an important technology which brings innovation to society by applying quantum mechanics that differs from familiar physics that people sense every day. For example, quantum cryptographic communications is a communication system which utilizes quantum cryptographic technology taking advantage of quantum characteristics, and reportedly cannot be deciphered by third parties. It is pointed out that quantum radar may be able to neutralize the stealth advantage of stealth aircraft by utilizing quantum characteristics. It is pointed out that quantum computers can compute problems in a short amount of time and with less electricity consumption than existing supercomputers and can also be applied to areas such as decryption. China has developed the world’s longest quantum cryptographic communications network, extending over approximately 3,000 km and connecting Beijing and Shanghai. In addition, in August 2016, China launched “Mozi,” the world’s first satellite to test quantum cryptographic communications. In January 2018, China said that it succeeded in using Mozi for long-distance quantum cryptographic communication between China and ----- Austria. Positioning quantum computer development as a key science and technology project, China has also invested approximately 7 billion yuan in a national laboratory for quantum information and technology and other facilities. processing control using AI. The U.S. Defense Innovation Board (DIB) has evaluated 5G as a promising technology that can improve real-time information sharing, communications across military service branches, geographic divergence, and territories, and enhance the ability to connect multiple systems to a broader network.[1] Addictive manufacturing technology as typified by threedimensional printing can produce goods that are too complex to be produced conventionally, at a much lower cost. Given this, 3D printer technology can bring revolutionary changes in logistics, such as not depending on the stock when procuring parts, and nations point out the military use of the technology. For example, the U.S. Army named 3D printer technology as one of the top 10 technologies regarding science and technology development on its website in December 2019, noting that the technology could trigger a real logistics revolution by making the transportation of spare goods unnecessary. In February 2019, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Norway launched a four-year joint project to study potential applications of 3D printer technology. The Australian Navy is considering using 3D printers for producing parts for patrol boats. In India, state-run and private companies agreed in January 2020 to cooperate in a 3D printer project for armed forces. （5） Other Civilian Technologies Seen as Available for Defense Purposes As civilian technological innovation has been remarkable, each major country has been trying to proactively utilize cutting-edge civilian technologies for defense purposes. For example, fifth-generation (5G) mobile communication systems, subjected to commercial services in various countries from April 2019 as a new civilian mobile communication infrastructure, have been attracting attention. The 5G systems achieve far faster speed, less delays, larger capacity and more simultaneous connections than the previous 4G systems. Compared to 4G systems, 5G technology allows for providing services with better quality (high speed, low latency, high capacity, high number of simultaneous connections, and high reliability) despite complicated data processing, by combining advanced information communications technologies, including directional antennas to communicate in higher frequency bands, data processing quality-based segregation and decentralization in the cloud space, and data **Chapter** - **❷ [Trends Concerning Defense Technological and Industrial Bases ]** In recent years, the sophistication of military science and in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. In technology, and the greater complexity of equipment have response to the escalation of development and production caused a steep rise in equipment development and production costs, Western countries are promoting joint development costs and have raised unit prices for equipment procurement, and production of equipment and technological cooperation while Western countries in particular have continued to face among their allies and partners. This move aims for (1) difficulties in increasing defense budgets significantly. Under sharing development and production costs, (2) expanding these circumstances, many countries are taking on a variety demand in all countries participating in joint development of initiatives in order to maintain and enhance their national and production, (3) mutual complement of technologies, and defense technological and industrial bases. (4) raising domestic technology levels by obtaining state-ofWestern countries have set a target to increase the-art technology. competitiveness through the realignment of their defense For example, the joint development and production of the industry, in light of the aforementioned situation related to F-35 fighter jet led by the United States is the largest joint national defense budgets. The United States has experienced program. At present, there is anticipated demand for more than repeated mergers and integrations among domestic 3,300 aircraft.[2] This project will have impacts on the defense corporations, while Europe has experienced cross-border technological and industrial bases of the countries involved, mergers and integrations of the defense industry, especially through the operation, sustainment and maintenance stages 1 According to the U.S. DIB (April 2019) 2 There are nine countries involved in the joint development and production of the F-35 fighter jets: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The other countries acquiring them are Israel, the ROK, Belgium, Poland and Japan, whose defense technological and industrial base is involved in their production d i t H ft T k h d R i S 400 i il t th U it d St t d id d i J l 2019 t i iti t th t f ll T k f th j i t ----- |Country or region|Col2|Shares in the total global exports of defense equipment (%) 2015-2019|Comparison with 2010-2014 export value (%)| |---|---|---|---| |1|United States|36|+23| |2|Russia|21|-18| |3|France|8|+72| |4|Germany|6|+17| |5|China|6|+6| |6|United Kingdom|4|-15| |7|Spain|3|+13| |8|Israel|3|+77| |9|Italy|2|-17| |10|Republic of Korea|2|+143| |Country or region|Col2|Import value (100 million US dollars) 2015-2019|Comparison with 2010-2014 import value (%)| |---|---|---|---| |1|India|134.12|-32| |2|Australia|71.33|+40| |3|China|63.00|+3| |4|Republic of Korea|50.04|+3| |5|Pakistan|38.30|-39| |6|Viet Nam|32.12|-9| |7|Japan|25.74|+72| |8|Indonesia|25.53|-5| |9|Singapore|24.11|-29| |10|Thailand|17.41|67| Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional **Fig. I-3-1-1** Arms Export [2015-2019] Trends in Import Value of Major Conventional Arms **Fig. I -3-1-2** in Asia and Oceania [2015-2019] (Note) Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” Only the top 10 countries by export value for 2015 to 2019 are indicated (figures are rounded to unit). of the aircraft. The European Union (EU) has created the European Defence Fund (EDF)[3] to provide funding for joint research and development by the EU member states in order to promote their cooperation in developing and acquiring defense equipment and facilitate the efficient production of state-of-the-art and interoperable equipment. There is an increasing number of cases where governments provide funding for national defense-related research and development conducted by the private sector. In the United States, for example, approximately US$3.556 billion in research and development funding was requested for FY2020 for DARPA, whose mission is to make investments in breakthrough technologies that will contribute to national security. The U.S. defense authority has long provided substantial funding for the research conducted by companies and universities. In some other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, responding to the recent utilization of dual-use technologies in defense equipment development, the governments have launched initiatives to provide funding for private sector research and development on innovative technologies in order to acquire advanced civilian technologies. [4] Countries have exported equipment overseas since the Cold War era, and still today, many countries are taking (Note) Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” Only the top 10 countries by import value for 2015 to 2019 are indicated. measures to promote exports. While the United States, Russia, European countries and China have remained as leading defense equipment exporters, countries such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Turkey have been expanding exports of affordable equipment, which is an outcome of their success in developing the equipment manufacturing bases, together with their history of importing equipment in the past and improvement of capabilities in science and technology. Defense equipment imports by Asian and Oceanian countries have continued an uptrend in recent years, seemingly against the background of economic growth in the region as well as the expansion of the influence of China, the existence of territorial disputes, and responses to the military buildup in neighboring countries. Some of defense equipment importing countries adopt offset policies[5] in order to keep a good balance between improving defense capabilities through imports and developing domestic defense technological and industrial bases by requesting domestic companies’ participation in parts production and others as conditions for procuring equipment and services from abroad. See Fig. I-3-1-1 (Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms Export [2015-2019]); Fig. I -3-1-2 (Trends in Import Value of Major Conventional Arms in Asia and Oceania [2015-2019]) **Chapter** The EDF was founded in June 2017. In 2016, the United Kingdom launched the Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) to build an innovation network of government, private sector and academics and created a fund for innovative research. In the same year, Australia established a Next Generation Technologies Fund for emerging technologies as well as a fund for innovative technology development. Off t i d f t d d fi d i f i d t i l d i l b fit h d ti li d d ti b t ti t h l t f d ----- **Section** **Trends in Space Domain** **2** **❶** **[Space Domain and Security ]** Approximately 60 years have passed since a satellite was launched into outer space for the fi rst time in the history of mankind. In recent years, technology leveraging outer space has been applied to various areas, growing more important as key infrastructure for both the public and private sectors. As the Outer Space Treaty, which took effect in October 1967, stipulates that outer space is not subject to national appropriation and that all states parties to the treaties shall use it freely for peaceful purposes, major countries have been making proactive efforts to use outer space for maintaining peace and safety in the security area. There is no concept of national borders in outer space, meaning that the utilization of satellites enables the observation of, communication at, and positioning on any area on the Earth. Thus, major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), functions. Such satellites include satellites for reconnoitering military facilities and targets, early warning satellites for detecting the launch of ballistic missiles, satellites for gathering radio signals, communication satellites for communications between military units, and satellites for the positioning, navigation and time synchronization of naval vessels and aircraft and enhancing the precision of weapons systems. In outer space, various countries are thus rapidly developing their capabilities to ensure their military superiority. From the viewpoint of ensuring their military superiority, various countries are also rapidly developing their capabilities to impede each other’s use of outer space. In January 2007, China conducted a test to destroy its aging satellite with a ground-launched missile. Russia also conducted a similar test in April 2020. Space debris caused by directly destroying satellites spread across the satellite’s orbit and came to be seen as a risk against space assets such as satellites owned by various countries. Furthermore, countries including China and Russia are thought to be also developing an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) that does not directly hit and destroy a satellite by a missile, thus creating less space debris. For example, it has been noted that ASATs under development include a “killer satellite” to approach a target satellite and utilize a robot arm to capture the target and disable its functions. On this point, it has been noted that China has carried out experiments in outer space in which they have maneuvered satellites close to other satellites to simulate the movements of a killer satellite. The United States has claimed that a satellite launched by Russia in 2017 fi red a high-speed fl ying object, exhibiting characteristics of a weapon. It has also criticized Russia for launching in 2019 another satellite that actively maneuvers near a U.S. satellite and had an “unusual and disturbing behavior” and condemned that such activity has the potential to create dangerous situations in outer space. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China and Russia are developing not only missiles and killer satellites but also jammers for interfering with communications between target satellites and ground stations, and laser weapons for attacking target satellites with directed energy. It has also been noted that China and Russia have been enhancing capabilities to **Chapter** **KEY WORD** C4ISR C4ISR stands for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. **KEY WORD** Space debris Space debris represents post-operational satellites, upper rocket stages, their parts and pieces, and other unnecessary artifi cial objects remaining on satellite orbits. ----- operate these anti-satellite capabilities and impede the United States and its allies from using outer space.[1] While threats in outer space, including the development of such various countermeasures, are pointed out to be growing, the United States and other countries increasingly position outer space as a warfi ghting domain or an operational domain, making outer space security an urgent challenge. As the above illustrates, the risk to the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security challenges for countries, thus it has become necessary to deal with this risk effectively in an effort to ensure stability in the use of outer space. Against this backdrop, the existing international agreements do not have direct provisions on prohibiting **❷ [Various Countries’ Outer Space Initiatives ]** the destruction of space objects and refraining from actions triggering space debris. Discussion on guidelines has been under way recently by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the InterAgency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). Moreover, countries are working on Space Situational Awareness (SSA) by monitoring the solar activity with a potential impact on satellites and electronic equipment on the Earth, and threats caused by meteors reaching Earth, in addition to threats posed by ASATs and space debris to space assets. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3-1 (Responses in Space Domain) See - Among U.S. government organizations, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under direct control by the President is responsible mainly for non-military space development, while the DoD undertakes research, development, and operation of military observation and reconnaissance satellites. In August 2019, the United States inaugurated the U.S. Space Command as a new geographic unifi ed combatant command based on the Strategic Command’s component in charge of space missions. In December 2019, the United States created the Space Force under the Department of the Air Force as the sixth military branch, with approximately 16,000 personnel. See Chapter 2, Section 1-2 (Military Posture) **1 The United States** Since its fi rst satellite launch in January 1958, the United States has proceeded with a variety of space activities in fi elds including military, science, and resource exploration, such as launching the world’s fi rst reconnaissance satellite and landing on the Moon. Today, the United States is the world’s leading space power. The U.S. Forces clearly recognize the importance of outer space for their actions, and on this point, actively utilize outer space for security purposes. The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) released in December 2017 pointed out that some countries are pursuing a variety of ASATs on the basis of belief that the capability to attack assets in outer space will give them asymmetrical advantages. It also indicated that unlimited access to and freedom in activities in outer space were vital interests of the United States, and that the National Space Council would consider long-term goals in outer space to develop strategies. The United States released its National Space Strategy in March 2018, demonstrating its recognition that its adversaries had turned space into a warfi ghting domain and vowing to deter and defeat threats in the space domain to protect the national interests of the United States and its allies. The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) announced in January 2019 indicated the recognition of threats in the space domain of which the previous NIS made no mention, warning that adversaries were increasing their presence in the space domain with plans to exceed the United States in some areas. The National Military Strategy (NMS) announced in July 2019 introduced the notion of an operational art through the integration of joint capabilities in all domains, giving priority to space and cyberspace in addition to land, sea and air. **Chapter** **2 China** China began working on space development in the 1950s and launched its fi rst satellite “Dong Fang Hong I” in 1970. China has thus far conducted activities such as crewed space fl ight and lunar rover launches. In January 2019, China succeeded in landing unmanned spacecraft “Chang’e 4” on the far side of the moon, the fi rst ever such attempt and landing. It is speculated that China’s space development is intended to enhance national prestige and develop space resources. In its 2019 defense white paper, released in July 2019 and titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” China asserts that outer space is a critical domain in international strategic competition and that outer space security provides strategic assurance for national and social development. “China’s Space Activities in 2016,” China’s white paper on space activities released in December 2016, presented a vision to “build China into a space power” and for “the di t “W ld id Th t A t ” th U S Di t f N ti l I t lli (J 2019) ----- realization of the Chinese Dream. It also gave a schedule to launch lunar, Mars, asteroid, and Jupiter explorers by around 2020. While traditionally emphasizing international cooperation and the peaceful use of space, China has not ruled out its military use of space and proactively used space for military purposes, including information collection, communications, and positioning through satellites. China continues to develop ASATs. In January 2007, China conducted a test using a ground-launched missile for destroying its own satellite. In July 2014, China implemented an anti-satellite missile test[2] without actually destroying any satellite. It is also suggested that China is developing killer satellites, jammers, and directed-energy weapons,[3] including laser beams. It is pointed out that the BeiDou satellite positioning system, which reportedly started global services in December 2018, could be used for military purposes. A Chinese state-owned corporation, which develops and produces launch vehicles, has claimed to continue the launch of new rockets in the Long March series and develop a launch vehicle that can carry a large satellite. However, the corporation has been reported to have been developing and producing ballistic missiles as well, indicating that the technology used in the development of satellite launch vehicles is applicable to the development of ballistic missiles. China is thus expected to focus on space development through close cooperation between government, military, and private sectors. China is considered to have become one of the space powers through investments, research and development, and the introduction of technologies from the United States and other countries. It has been suggested that China could threaten U.S. superiority in outer space in the future.[4] The Strategic Support Force, established in December 2015 as a force under direct control by the Central Military Commission, is considered to be in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic warfare missions, including the launching and tracking of satellites, although the details of its missions and organization have not been published. The Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission is believed to be in charge of crewed space programs. The Ministry of Science and Technology takes charge of planning and making China’s science and technology policy covering outer space. The State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, which belongs to the State Council’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, works out Launch of Long March-5 Y3 on December 27, 2019 [Avalon/Jiji Press Photo] and implements space-related programs. The China National Space Administration takes charge of civilian programs and represents the Chinese Government externally by concluding international agreements. **Chapter** **3** Russia Russia’s space activities have been continuing since the former Soviet Union era. The former Soviet Union successively launched multiple satellites after it launched the first satellite in the history of mankind, Sputnik 1, in October 1957, and had the largest number of launched satellites in the world until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s space activities have declined since the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. However, the country has recently started to expand its space activities once again. Regarding the country’s trends in security, the National Security Strategy, approved in December 2015, states that the opportunities for maintaining global and regional stability are shrinking significantly with the deployment of the U.S. weapons in outer space. In response to the United States’ release of the annual MDR in 2018, Russia expressed concern that the implementation of plans in the MDR would trigger an arms race in space with hugely negative consequences for world peace and stability. In March 2016, Russia released the Federal Space Program for 2016-2025 as a specific future guideline for space activities, including the development and deployment of domestic space satellites and crewed flight programs. Meanwhile, it is pointed out that Russia has used its outer space capabilities for military operations in Syria and reconnoitering globally operating forces of the United States and its allies.[5] It is also noted that Russia has continued According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (February 2015). According to the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (May 2019) According to the annual report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015) A di t “C ti i S ” N ti l Ai d S I t lli C t (D b 2018) ----- ASAT development, repeated tests to fire ground-launched anti-satellite missiles, and has been developing anti-satellite missiles launched from MiG-31 fighter jets, as well as laser weapon systems, such as the Sokol Eshelon system for aircraft. From an organizational perspective, State Space Corporation ROSCOSMOS is in charge of space activities related to Russia’s scientific and economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defence is involved in space activities for security purposes. The Russian Aerospace Forces, into which the Air Force and the Aerospace Defence Forces were integrated in August 2015, conduct actual space activities for military purposes and manage facilities for launching satellites. **4** Europe surveillance center within the Armed Forces Ministry. **5** India India has promoted programs to develop communications, positioning and observation satellites. At the end of January 2019, it released a space mission calling for promoting research and development on a crewed space initiative by 2020. At their second meeting of their foreign and defense ministers in December 2019, the United States and India offered to discuss their potential defense cooperation in outer space in 2020. India is believed to have operated the Navigation Indian Constellation (NavIC) satellite as a positioning satellite that can position locations around India and launched an Earth observation satellite, which is believed to be used for security purposes as well. In February 2017, India successfully launched a satellite launch vehicle loaded with 104 satellites at low cost, marking the largest number ever carried on a single rocket in the world, which indicates its high technological capabilities. In March 2019, Prime Minister Modi announced that the country successfully tested a missile to shoot down a low-orbit satellite. Among organizations, the Space Agency oversees the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), which implements space development policy, develops and launches launch vehicles, and develops and manufactures satellites. It has been reported that the Ministry of Defence approved the creation of the Defence Space Agency (DSA) to control ASATs and other space assets, and to plan defense policies regarding outer space in April 2019. The ministry also approved the establishment of the Defence Space Research Agency (DSRA) to develop weapons and technology for outer space warfare in June 2019. **6** The ROK Regarding European outer space activities, the EU, the European Space Agency (ESA), and European countries are promoting their own unique space activities and are cooperating with each other to implement space activities. France succeeded in launching its own satellite for the first time in 1965, and the United Kingdom in 1971. Italy and Germany used launch vehicles developed by the United States to own satellites in 1964 and 1965, respectively. Meanwhile, the ESA launched its first satellite in 1979. The EU and ESA at their joint ministerial council meeting in 2007 approved the European Space Policy, which noted that it would be important to improve synergy effects between space activities for civil and defense purposes and secure space activities based on coordinated efforts among member states and an internationally competitive space industry, identifying security as one of the policy priorities. In September 2019, before taking office as President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen stated she would establish a defense and space branch to take charge of military fundraising, development and deployment within the commission. A satellite positioning system called “Galileo” and an Earth observation program named “Copernicus” under planning by the EU and ESA, and a reconnaissance satellite project called “Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS)” of the European Defense Agency (EDA) are expected to be utilized for the security field in Europe. In July 2019, France released the Space Defence Strategy as its first document specialized in space defense. The document referred to the creation of a space command and the enhancement of threat identification and space situation surveillance capabilities. In September 2019, France created the space command under the Air Force to integrate functions and personnel of a military space surveillance operation **Chapter** The ROK is considered to have started full-scale space development from the latter half of the 1990s. Current space development is promoted based on the Third Basic Space Development Promotion Plan announced by the Moon administration under the Space Development Promotion Act implemented in 2005. The plan proposes a vision towards 2040, giving priority to (1) the establishment of its own launch vehicle technology, (2) the advancement of satelliteusing services and satellite development, (3) the initiation of space exploration, and (4) the development of the Korean Positioning System (KPS). In November 2018, the ROK, which had traditionally depended on other countries for launching satellites, announced that it successfully tested the “Nuri” domestic ----- launch vehicle under development. Among organizations, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute leads research and development as an implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency for Defense 6 A di t th ROK D f Whit P 2018 (J 2019) Development is engaged in the development and use of various satellites. The Air Force has offered to create a satellite surveillance and control unit to monitor satellite activities above the Korean Peninsula.[6] **Chapter** ----- **Section** **Trends in Cyber Domain** **3** **❶ [Cyberspace and Security ]** Owing to the advancement of information and communications technology (ICT) in recent years, information and communications networks such as the Internet have become essential components across all facets of life. Therefore, cyber attacks against information and communications networks have the potential to seriously impact the lives of individuals. Types of cyber attacks include functional disruption, data falsifi cation and data theft caused by unauthorized access to information and communications networks or through the transmission of viruses via e-mail, functional impairment of the networks through simultaneous transmission of large quantities of data, and attacks intended to shut down or take over a system belonging to critical infrastructure, such as power systems. Also, network-related technologies are constantly evolving, with cyber attacks becoming more and more advanced and sophisticated by the day. For military forces, information and communications ❷ **[Threats in Cyberspace]** capability form the foundation of command and control, which extend from central command to ground-level forces. In this regard, ICT advancements are further increasing the dependence of military forces on information and communications networks. Furthermore, in some cases, military forces need various critical infrastructures, including electricity, to execute their missions. Accordingly, cyber attacks against such critical infrastructures could become a major impediment to their missions. For this reason, cyber attacks are recognized as an asymmetrical means to impede the military activities of adversaries at low cost. It is believed that many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace. It has been pointed out that China and Russia in particular are bolstering the offensive cyber capabilities of their militaries for the purpose of obstructing the networking of adversaries’ military forces and destroying their infrastructure.[1] - their military forces have enhanced their offensive cyber capabilities. **Chapter** Under such circumstances, cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against information and communications networks of not only government organizations and military forces but also business corporations and academic organizations in various countries. Attacks attempting to steal critical technologies, secrets or personal information have been confi rmed. For example, advanced persistent threat (APT) and other relentless cyber attacks focusing on specifi c bodies require abundant resources, arrangements and capabilities, being viewed as organized activities. To respond to such advanced cyber attacks, Japan is required to share threat awareness with foreign countries for technological and operational cooperation. The United States has assessed that China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have been conducting more diverse and aggressive cyber attacks,[2] indicating that 1 According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Director of National Intelligence (March 2018) 2 A di t “W ld id Th t A t ” Di t f N ti l I t lli (J 2019) **1 China** It has been alleged that cyber warfare units have been formed under the Strategic Support Force that was created as part of China’s military reforms in late December 2015. The units are estimated to consist of 175,000 troops, including 30,000 for cyber attacks. In its “National Cyberspace Security Strategy” published in 2016, China recognized sovereignty in cyberspace as an important component part of national sovereignty. Its 2019 defense white paper, released in July 2019 and titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” stated that China’s armed forces accelerate the building of ----- - In Japan, it has been confi rmed that the APT10 group conducted extensive cyber attacks on private enterprises, academic organizations and other targets. - In 2017, a U.S. consumer credit information company came under a cyber attack stealing personal information including names, birthdates, social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, and credit card numbers. In February 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice prosecuted four Chinese military-related persons for their alleged involvement in the cyber attack. **2 Russia** Four individuals indicted for suspected involvement in the cyberattack targeting a U.S. consumer credit information company in 2017 [FBI] their cyberspace capabilities. Given the above, China is believed to have been enhancing its military’s cyber warfare capabilities. See Chapter 2, Section 2-5 (Military Posture) See China is suspected of conducting cyber attacks and other activities to steal confi dential information even in peacetime.[3] For example, its involvement in the following incidents has been pointed out. - In June 2015, the U.S. Offi ce of Personnel Management (OPM) became a target of a cyber attack in which, as it later came to light, personal information of about 22 million people, including U.S. federal employees and U.S. Forces personnel, were stolen.[4] - In January and February 2018, Chinese government hackers hacked a U.S. Navy contractor, leading to a leak of classifi ed information on supersonic anti-ship missiles mounted on submarines. - In December 2018, such countries as the United States announced that the APT10 cyber group related to China’s Ministry of National Security conducted cyber attacks on intellectual and other properties in at least 12 countries. It has been pointed out that the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU) and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) are involved in cyber attacks. It has also been revealed that the Russian military has its own cyber command unit,[5] which is believed to be responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities, including inserting malware into command and control systems of adversaries,[6] with approximately 1,000 personnel. Russia’s “Doctrine of Information Security,” released in December 2016, acknowledged an increase in threats related to the use of information technology for military and political purposes. In November 2019, Russia enforced the so-called sovereign Internet law to secure the continuity of Russian networks by shutting them out from global networks in the event of an incident like a cyber attack. It is pointed out that Russia has taken advantage of cyberspace for intelligence operations not only to steal information and conduct sabotage operations but also to challenge democratic processes[7] and has been involved in the following incidents: **Chapter** **KEY WORD** Malware Malware stands for malicious software, meaning software that takes advantage of various vulnerabilities for cyber attacks. According to “Cyber Strategy,” U.S. DoD (September 2018) According to the Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015). According to a statement made by Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu during a briefing for the lower house in February 2017, that the Russian military has a cyber command for countering political propaganda in Russia’s ongoing information war with Western countries. However, the minister fell short of naming the command. According to then U.S. Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s written testimony on “Worldwide Cyber Threats” at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2015. A di t th “C b St t ” U S D D (S t b 2018) ----- - In 2014, more than 500 million user accounts were leaked from a major U.S. Internet company. In March 2017, the U.S. government indicted four hackers, including two officers of the Russian Federal Security Service, for their alleged cyber attack on the company.[8] - In December 2015, a cyber attack triggered a large-scale power outage in Ukraine. It was reported that military forces of Russia confronting with Ukraine over the Crimea annexation and other issues were suspected of having contributed to the cyber attack. - Cyber attacks to affect the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election.[9] - In June 2017, cyber attacks using the so-called NotPetya ransomware occurred in Ukraine and other countries. In February 2018, the U.S. and U.K. governments attributed the attacks to the Russian military. - In October 2018, the U.S. and U.K. governments announced that the Main Intelligence Directorate of the GRU was responsible for cyber attacks on the World Anti-Doping Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the U.S. Democratic convention, and other targets. - In February 2020, U.S., U.K., Georgian and other governments announced that the GRU was responsible for large-scale cyber attacks on Georgian government agencies and media organizations in October 2019.[10] **3** North Korea infrastructure. It is suspected of having been involved in the following incidents. - In September 2016, cyber attacks occurred in the internal network of the ROK Armed Forces. In May 2017, the ROK Ministry of National Defense was reported to have concluded that the cyber attacks had been conducted by what was believed to be a North Korean hacker group.[12] Moreover, it has been pointed out that documents containing military secrets of the ROK were stolen through the cyber attacks. - In May 2017, a cyber attack used a malware called WannaCry to encrypt and neutralize electronic data held by hospitals, schools, businesses, and other entities in more than 150 countries. Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand announced a statement blaming North Korea for its involvement in the attack. It has been pointed out that this cyber attack succeeded in collecting 140,000 dollars in Bitcoins. - In September 2017, multiple U.S. electric power utilities were inflicted with cyber attacks using spear phishing emails. In October 2017, FireEye, a U.S. cybersecurity company, announced that the attacks had been conducted by a cyber threat group allegedly affiliated with North Korea. - According to the final report released by the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea in April 2020, the Panel concluded, based on information provided by member states and publicly available information, that North Korea has continued to carry out cyber attacks on financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges and that the attacks are becoming more sophisticated. **4** Trends Concerning Other Threats **Chapter** It has been pointed out that the North Korean authority trains hackers[11] and has intensively built up cyber units operating some 6,800 personnel.[12] In September 2019, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced sanctions targeting three cyber groups[13] supported by the North Korean authority responsible for their involvement in malicious cyber activities targeting key infrastructure. North Korea is believed to have been developing capabilities to steal money and secret military information through cyber attacks and inflict such attacks on key foreign Supply chain risks, including products embedded with deliberately and fraudulently altered programs, and the existence of advanced malware designed to attack industrial 8 According to a U.S. Department of Justice release in March 2017. 9 According to the joint statement issued in October 2016 by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence of the United States, and the joint report issued in December of the same year by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the FBI concerning Russian cyber attacks on the United States, as well as the U.S. intelligence community report on Russia’s cyber attacks on the U.S. presidential election released in January 2017. 10 According to a U.S. Department of Justice release in February 2020. 11 According to the ROK’s 2016 Defense White Paper (January 2017) 12 According to the ROK’s 2018 Defense White Paper (January 2019) 13 I th i t b it i d t th N th K APT tt k k L G Bl ff d A d i l ----- control systems are also pointed out. In this respect, the U.S. Congress in August 2018 passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019 including provisions prohibiting government agencies from using products of major Chinese communications equipment manufacturers, such as Huawei Technologies Co. The United States has provided its allies with information about risks accompanying Chinese communications equipment and urged them not to use such equipment. In response, Australia has banned China’s ❸ **[Initiatives against Cyberspace Threats]** Huawei and ZTE Corporation from taking part in its 5G next-generation mobile network development project. Cyber attacks on telecommunication networks of a government and military forces or on critical infrastructure could have a serious effect on the security of states, and it is believed that state-sponsored cyber attacks have been on the rise in recent years. Given this situation, there is a need for continuous monitoring of trends in the threats in cyberspace. - and the continued integration of cyber capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations. Furthermore, the DoD Cyber Strategy (September 2018) points out that the United States is engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia, and that China and Russia have expanded that competition to include persistent campaigns in and through cyberspace that pose long-term strategic risk to the United States as well as to its allies and partners. The strategy presents such approaches as (1) the acceleration of cyber capability development, (2) defense to counter and deter malicious cyber activity, and (3) the promotion of cooperation with U.S. allies and partners. In April 2019, at the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2), the two countries agreed to enhance cooperation on cyber issues and affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The U.S. Forces include Cyber Command, which was elevated to a unified combatant command in May 2018 to control cyberspace operations. The Command consists of the Cyber Protection Force (68 teams), which operates and defends the DoD Information Network, the Cyber National Mission Force (13 teams), which supports the U.S. defense against national-state threats, and the Cyber Combat Mission Force (27 teams), which supports the operations conducted by unified combatant commands on the cyber front (these three Forces are collectively referred to as the Cyber Mission Force, consisting of 133 teams including 25 support teams, with approximately 6,200 personnel). Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various initiatives are under way. It is regarded that the international community has diverging views concerning the fundamental matters of cyberspace, including how international law applies. For instance, the United States, Europe, and Japan have called for maintaining a free cyberspace, while Russia, China, and most emerging countries sought to strengthen state control on cyberspace. Against this backdrop, there has been a movement to promote the rule of law in cyberspace in the international community. For instance, discussions are being held on the establishment of international rules within the framework of global conferences on cyberspace. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3-2 (Response in Cyber Domain) **1** The United States **Chapter** In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting federal government networks and critical infrastructure against cyber attacks, and the Department’s Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) works to protect the networks of government agencies. The U.S. NSS (December 2017) points out that many countries now view cyber capabilities as tools for projecting influence and that cyberattacks have become a key feature of modern conflict. It also notes that the United States would deter, defend, and when necessary defeat malicious actors who inflict cyber attacks on the United States. The U.S. DoD in its National Defense Strategy (January 2018) described a policy of investing in cyber defense, resilience, ----- capabilities to strengthen the functions for identifying and analyzing cyberspace threats. In November 2016, the country announced a new “Cyber Security Strategy” that presents a vision for the United Kingdom, which is to be secure and resilient to cyber threats, prosperous and confident in the digital world. To achieve this vision, the Strategy requires the United Kingdom to deter cyber threats by having effective defensive and offensive means and to “develop” cutting-edge technologies. On the organizational front, in October 2016, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) was newly established under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to promote public-private partnerships for responses to national cyber incidents. **4 Australia** **2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence and its action plan, which were adopted in June 2011: (1) clarify the political and operational mechanisms of NATO’s response to cyber attacks; (2) clarify that NATO would provide assistance to member states to develop their cyber defense, and provide assistance to member states if they are subject to cyber attacks; and (3) set out principles on cooperation with partners. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in September 2014, an agreement was reached that NATO’s collective defense applies to cyber attacks against member states. On the organizational front, in November 2017, an agreement was reached on the creation of a new Cyber Operations Center and the integration of NATO member countries’ cyber defense capabilities into NATO missions and operations. The Cyber Operations Center located in Belgium is expected to be fully operational with cyber attack capabilities by 2023. Furthermore, NATO has conducted cyber defense training exercises annually since 2008 to heighten cyber defense capabilities. In addition, NATO has expanded cooperation with the EU in the fields of cybersecurity and cyber defense. In 2008, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was authorized to serve as a research and training institution, and was established in Estonia’s capital of Tallinn. CCDCOE carries out research on the relationship between cyber activities and international law, creating the “Tallinn Manual.” In February 2017, “Tallinn Manual 2.0” was published as the second edition of the previous manual based on a review of broad discussion points, from peacetime legal regimes, such as laws on state responsibility, human rights, aviation, space, and maritime affairs, to contingency legal regimes, such as laws on armed conflict. In December 2019, NATO held its “Cyber Coalition 2019” exercise, in which Japan officially participated for the first time in addition to 27 NATO member countries and the EU. **3 The United Kingdom** **Chapter** In its first “National Security Strategy” published in January 2013, Australia positions integrated cyber policies and operations as one of the top national security priorities. In April 2016, a new “Cyber Security Strategy” through 2020 was released, which provides that Australia will ensure the safety of the people, that private companies will participate in cybersecurity, and that threat information will be shared. On the organizational front, cybersecurity capabilities across the government were converged to establish the Australian Cyber Security Center (ACSC), which addresses major cybersecurity issues related to government agencies and critical infrastructure. In July 2015, the ACSC issued its first report on cybersecurity, which contends that the number, type, and sophistication of cyber threats to Australia are all increasing. Moreover, the Australian Defence Force created the Information Warfare Division under the Joint Capabilities Group in July 2017 and established the Defence Signals Intelligence and Cyber Command under the division in January 2018. In October 2019, the Royal Australian Air Force offered to recruit cyber skills officers to protect networks, data and information systems. **5 The ROK** In December 2018, the ROK released the “National Security Strategy of the Moon Jae-in Government,” pledging to enhance cyber threat prevention and response capabilities based on cooperation among private government and The United Kingdom, in its “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (NSS- SDSR2015)” released in November 2015, committed to investing £1.9 billion over the next five years in increasing its cyber defense ----- military sectors in responding to cyber threats and to activate relevant international cooperation. The ROK also formulated its first “National Cybersecurity Strategy” in April 2019 to protect the safety of the people and enhance national security, and released the “National Cybersecurity Basic Plan” to materialize the strategy in September 2019. In the national defense sector, the Cyber Measures Technology Team was established by the Ministry of National Defense to respond to cyber and hacking threats. The sector has also worked out procedures for quick response to cyber crises under the “National Cyber Security Strategy” and the “National Cybersecurity Crisis Response Manual.” In 2015, the Joint Chiefs of Staff centralized the cyber attack tactical system mainly around the Joint Chiefs of Staff by newly establishing the Cyber Tactics Department, assigning control authority concerning cyber tactics to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and issuing a field manual on “joint cyber tactics.” **Chapter** ----- **Section** **Trends in Electromagnetic Domain** **4** **❶[ Electromagnetic Domain and Security]** The electromagnetic spectrum is propagated by the oscillations of electric and magnetic fi elds. In everyday life, it is used for various purposes ranging from television and mobile communications to geolocation information through global positioning systems. In the defense fi eld, the electromagnetic spectrum is used for command and control communications equipment, radar systems for detecting enemies, missile guidance systems, and other equipment. Securing superiority in the electromagnetic domain is indispensable for modern operations. Activities using the electromagnetic domain include electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum control. Electronic warfare means or approaches are generally classifi ed into three – electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support. See Figure 1-3-4-1 (How to Use the Electromagnetic Domain in the See Defense Field) “Electronic attacks” are designed to reduce or neutralize adversary communications and search capabilities by sending stronger radio waves or radio waves pretending to be adversary waves aimed at an adversary’s communications and radar equipment to jam waves coming from such equipment. They include radio wave jamming, radio wave deception and physical destruction using high-power electronic waves (such as high-power laser and high-power microwaves). See Section 1-1 (3) of this Chapter (High-power Energy Technology) “Electronic protection” makes equipment stealthy or diffi cult to be detected by adversaries and reduces or neutralizes adversary electronic attacks on communications and radar equipment by changing electronic wave frequency for use or increasing its power. “Electronic warfare support” consists of activities designed to collect information on adversary electromagnetic spectrum for electronic warfare purposes. It is necessary for effective electronic attacks or protection to detect and analyze what electromagnetic spectrum is usually used by adversaries for communications equipment, radar and electronic attack aircraft. It is desirable to be able to conduct electronic warfare effectively even if electromagnetic spectrum used by adversaries is not detected or analyzed in advance. For example, AI may be mounted on or used for equipment to immediately analyze jamming and automatically select frequency bands that are the most invulnerable to jamming. “Electromagnetic spectrum control” means the control and adjustment of electromagnetic spectrum use to facilitate electromagnetic domain activities such as electronic attacks and protection. Specifi c measures for the control include the detection of how electromagnetic spectrum is used in a theater of operation, as well as the adjustment of frequencies, directions and durations of electromagnetic spectrum used for friendly forces and equipment to avoid electromagnetic spectrum interference. At present, research is being conducted on technologies for detecting and visualizing how electromagnetic spectrum is used. **Chapter** **Fig. I-3-4-1** How to Use the Electromagnetic Domain in the Defense Field Wavelength: Long Electromagnetic waves 3GHz 30GHz 300GHz 400THz 790THz 30PHz 3EHz Frequency: High Wavelength: Short |Radio waves Microwaves|Infrared rays|Visible light|Ultraviolet rays|X-rays, γ-rays, etc.| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| Radio waves: Communications, radars Infrared rays: Guidance of missiles Visible light: Reconnaissance satellites Lasers (amplifcation and radiation of electromagnetic waves) Information sharing through satellite communications Monitoring of space through laser distance measurement Ascertaining of circumstances by Accurate guidance of missiles through an optical satellite laser irradiation Detection of enemies by a radar Accurate guidance by an infrared sensor ----- Major countries apparently recognize electronic attacks as an asymmetric means similar to cyber attacks to effectively hamper adversaries’ military performance, emphasizing and enhancing electronic warfare capabilities, including electronic attacks. **❷ [Each Country’s Electronic Warfare Initiatives]** attack, electronic warfare, cyber and other capabilities in the Indo-Pacific and other regions from FY2021. Many other NATO member countries are also developing equipment for severe electronic warfare environments and allegedly conducting electronic warfare-oriented exercises with Russian forces’ electronic warfare equipment in mind.[1] **2 China** **1** The United States and Europe The United States is committed to expanding electronic warfare training and equipment and to enhancing cooperation with its allies under an initiative to aggressively achieve its dominance in the electromagnetic domain. Major U.S. electronic warfare units include the Navy’s 13 electronic attack squadrons armed with EA-18G electronic warfare aircraft as well as Marine Corps flight squadrons with electronic warfare aircraft. As an example of military operations using electronic warfare equipment, there is an assessment that U.S. electronic warfare units used EA-18G aircraft in Libya in 2011 to jam ground radar of the Libyan government forces, preventing their attacks on NATO aircraft. It is pointed out that the LMADIS (Light Marine Air Defense System) counter unmanned aircraft system with electronic warfare capabilities was used for leading an Iranian drone to crash over the Strait of Hormuz in July 2019. The U.S. Air Force activated the 16th Air Force in October 2019 to integrate functions for ISR, cyber warfare, electronic warfare and information warfare. The Army plans to deploy multi-domain task forces integrating long-range precision Counter unmanned aircraft system “LMADIS” 【U.S. Marines】 **Chapter** China has set an initiative to put cyber warfare and other electronic elements, and physical destruction and other non-electronic elements under unified control.[2] Under the initiative, China conducts force-on-force exercises on a routine basis to effectively accomplish missions in complicated electromagnetic environments, improving practical capabilities. It is pointed out that China’s armed forces have taken advantage of such exercises to assess electronic warfare weapon research and development achievements.[3] The Strategic Support Force, established for improving overall military operational capabilities, may be responsible for such domains as electronic warfare, cyber and space. China’s TU-154 intelligence and Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft have been seen flying around the Nansei Islands and the Sea of Japan in the vicinity of Japan. It is also reported that China has mounted electronic warfare pods for jamming missions on J-15 fighters, H-6 bombers, and other aircraft, and deployed a jamming system on Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands.[4] In a military parade to mark the 90th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in July 2017, unmanned aircraft reported as mounted with electronic warfare equipment were displayed. According to “All quiet on the eastern front: EW in Russia’s new-generation warfare,” Jane’s International Defence Review (April 2018) According to “The Military Balance 2019,” U.K. International Institute for Strategic Studies According to “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019,” U.S. DoD A di t “A A ti f Chi ’ D l t t th S tl I l d ” C t f St t i d I t ti l St di (M 2018) ----- **3 Russia** Russia, in its Military Doctrine, positions electronic warfare equipment as important equipment in modern military conflict. It is noted that Russia used electronic warfare equipment in the “Vostok 2018” exercise in September 2018, the “Tsentr 2019” exercise in September 2019 and other exercises. It is also pointed out that Russian forces have positioned electronic warfare as part of offensive means and improved practical electronic warfare capabilities in recent years.[5] Russia’s electronic warfare force reportedly has five brigades led mainly by the Army.[6] It is reported that Russia used various electronic warfare systems in eastern Ukraine to block Ukrainian forces’ command and control traffic and jam GPS waves to interrupt their drone operations, affecting Ukraine’s military performance.[7] It is also reported that Russia used Krasukha-4 and other electronic warfare systems Krasukha-4, electronic warfare system 【Russian Ministry of Defence】 in Syria to interrupt NATO forces’ command and control traffic and radar systems.[8] In the vicinity of Japan, Russian electronic reconnaissance aircraft’s long-range flights over the Sea of Japan have been seen. **Chapter** According to “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025,” Estonian Ministry of Defense According to “All quiet on the eastern front: EW in Russia’s new-generation warfare,” Jane’s International Defence Review (April 2018) According to “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025,” Estonian Ministry of Defense A di t “All i t th t f t EW i R i ’ ti f ” J ’ I t ti l D f R i (A il 2018) ----- **Section** **5** **Developments regarding the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)** COVID-19, which fi rst broke out in China at the end of 2019, specialized in logistics missions on February 2, 2020. The has been posing serious challenges that the international Joint Logistic Support Force played the central role in coping community has to address in close collaboration. The with the COVID-19 infection and engaged in the operation of infection poses not only sanitary problems but exerts temporary hospitals, medical treatment, and transportation of infl uence broadly on society and the economy of respective relief goods. It is said that the Air Force’s Y-20 large transport countries. In a globalized international society with aircraft was deployed for a disaster relief mission for the fi rst increased mutual dependence, governments were pressed time. In this manner, not only the Joint Logistic Support to take countermeasures, such as restrictions on outings and Force, but also the Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, suspension or decrease of corporate activities. The infection and strategic logistics support unit are said to have been has thus been exerting a tremendous infl uence on the daily mobilized. Additionally, militias and personnel mobilized lives of many people, revealing the vulnerability of supply for national defense also engaged in countermeasures against chains and causing serious damage to local economies. the infection and conducted such duties as measurement of Amid concerns over prolonged economic sluggishness citizens’ body temperature, disinfection of vehicles, and worldwide, governments are utilizing their military forces’ assistance of corporate activities. On March 10, President Xi sanitary capabilities, transportation capacity and facilities, in observed Wuhan and announced that the spread of infection addition to functions of medical institutions, to deal with the had been curbed. COVID-19 infection for early resumption of their domestic China seems to consider that the domestic spread of socioeconomic activities, and have been contributing to COVID-19 had basically been curbed, and the Academy of the prevention of the international spread of the infection. Military Medical Sciences of the PLA Academy of Military However, in some countries, military personnel have also Science declared that it will start the second phase of been infected and military training and bilateral/multilateral COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials, ahead of other countries. exercises have been suspended or postponed. The infection Furthermore, China actively provides medical supplies and has brought about diverse impacts and restrictions to military dispatches medical experts to countries where the COVID-19 activities as well. infection is spreading, showing its intention to play a In China, where a large scale and rapid spread of the leading role in countering the infection in the international COVID-19 infection was confi rmed fi rst in the world, under community. On the other hand, the current infection has a signifi cant instruction concerning the People’s Liberation spread worldwide starting from China, and the international Army’s (PLA’s) active contribution issued by President Xi community is strengthening the criticism questioning China’s Jinping, the PLA took full-fl edged countermeasures against responsibility for the infection. Some point out that China has the COVID-19 infection. Huoshenshan Hospital was built been endeavoring to stabilize the surrounding international in around ten days in Wuhan, the epicenter of the infection, environment through such international contribution, and was handed over to the Joint Logistic Support Force and at the same time, seeking to increase its own political and economic interests, create international and regional order to its own advantage and expand its infl uence, while strategically challenging the existing international order, by taking advantage of its assistance regarding countermeasures against the COVID-19 infection. Under such circumstances, the PLA seems to have reviewed the annual operation plan for the Eastern Theater Command Navy and there seems to be a certain impact of the infection on military activities. However, even after the PLA’s full-fl edged operation against the infection started, China has been continuing to expand and increase military activities in the sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan. Against the background that international cooperation and Seafood Market in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, closed due to the COVID-19 collaboration is urgently required due to the global spread **Chapter** ----- of the COVID-19 infection, China is continuously trying to change the status quo in the East China Sea unilaterally by coercion. Chinese Navy vessels regularly carry out activities and Chinese government vessels repeatedly intrude into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands despite protests by the Japanese government. In May 2020, there was an incident in which a Chinese government vessel came close to a Japanese fi shing boat and followed it in the territorial waters. Additionally, the number of scrambles by the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) against Chinese aircraft has remained at a high level. In the South China Sea, it is said that Chinese fl eets including Aircraft Carrier “Liaoning,” which passed through the waters between the mainland of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacifi c Ocean, proceeded to the South China Sea through the Bashi Channel and conducted training in April 2020. In the same month, it was announced that the State Council of the People’s Republic of China approved the establishment of two new districts, the Xisha District governing the Xisha Islands and surrounding waters, and the Nansha District governing the Nansha Islands and surrounding waters, under the Sansha City of Hainan Province, which China had established in the South China Sea. In this manner, China has been trying to unilaterally change the status quo in the South China Sea, employing means beyond military tactics, and create a fait accompli. Such moves of China are triggering protests from surrounding countries, which are now struggling to counter the COVID-19 infection. In the United States, since mid-March, in order to respond to the increase in the number of people infected with COVID-19, states, District of Columbia, and other territories mobilized their National Guards and had them engage in duties including transportation of medical goods, epidemic prevention and medical assistance. The federal troops also supported medical activities in the country by dispatching a hospital ship and operating fi eld hospitals. The DoD (including the U.S. Forces) has been taking measures to prevent a further spread of infection within the department, such as restricting offi cials’ moves in and out of the country, ensuring social distancing and wearing of masks, and introducing remote work. In addition, in order to prevent the spread of infection through military exchanges with other countries, the U.S. Forces has been taking measures to postpone, scale down, and cancel joint exercises with other countries. This includes postponing the ROK-US Combined Forces Command Exercise, and scaling down U.S.-led multilateral joint exercises in Europe. In the meantime, cases of the spread of infection in U.S. troops deployed overseas, in particular within naval vessels, have been reported. The infection was confi rmed among crew members of aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt and other vessels. Under such circumstances, Secretary of Defense Esper and other senior military offi cers, alleging that an enemy is trying to take advantage of this opportunity when the U.S. Forces are coping with the COVID-19 infection, emphasize the signifi cance of maintaining the readiness to take quick actions, and have reiterated that the infection does not affect the readiness and ability to conduce to national security missions of the U.S. Forces as a whole. North Korea repeatedly publicized that there is no one in North Korea who is infected with COVID-19, but is said to have been taking measures to prevent infection by closing borders with China, suspending services of international fl ights and cross-border railway connections, and restricting moves of foreigners and residents. North Korea might be suffering economic losses. In March 2020, General Abrams, Commander of United States Forces Korea, mentioned that he was confi dent that there are people infected with COVID-19 in North Korea, and stated that the North Korean Forces were on lockdown for about 30 days and regular training was just resumed recently. In March, North Korea repeated launches of ballistic missiles four times, and seems to be making efforts to enhance missile-related technologies and operational capability, but some point out that the intention of the regime is to tighten internal control and externally demonstrate the maintenance of its leadership and military force in the face of the global spread of COVID-19. In ROK, Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeongdoo instructed in February 2020 to input all resources for countering the COVID-19 infection, referring to the current situation as being equivalent to wartime. Under such instruction, the ROK Forces offer support in the fi elds of epidemic prevention and transportation. For enhancing effi ciencies and accelerating countermeasures, the National Defense Prompt Support Unit was organized in March 2020. In the meantime, fi eld training was all suspended nationwide in February, and troops under fi eld training were provided with guidance to return to their bases immediately. COVID-19 thus exerted infl uence on military activities. In February 2020, Russia dispatched aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces to China to transport its people back to Russia, and has carried out support activities such as transportation of medical relief goods for other countries since March. Within the country, a countermeasures headquarters was established in the Russian Forces and 49 sanitation and infection units were newly organized to take thorough countermeasures. However, in April for the fi rst time, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation announced the infection case found in the Russian Forces, and the number of infected personnel is increasing. Efforts **Chapter** ----- have been made to increase the number of hospital beds with the aim of also offering medical support to the private sector, such as increasing the number of beds of the hospital ship held by the Pacific Fleet and newly constructing 16 medical centers nationwide. Although President Putin announced the postponement of the military parade, which was scheduled in May 2020, until sometime within the year, drills and training of the Russian Forces seem to be carried out as usual, and active military activities have been confirmed, including launching tests of antisatellite missiles and a near-midair collision with U.S. aircraft above the Mediterranean Sea. Also around Japan, Russian aircraft continue proximate flights, and it was reported that the Pacific Fleet conducted a military exercise in the waters including sea areas near the Northern Territories in April 2020. In countries in Europe, where the infection spread rapidly, military forces are used for countermeasures, such as the establishment of field hospitals, transportation of medical personnel, patients and medical supplies, and assistance with private hospitals by military medical personnel. For example, the U.K. Forces supply logistics and help with the construction of new hospitals, the French Forces offer support at field hospitals and transport patients using their aircraft, and the German Forces transport patients with severe symptoms. In France, it was confirmed in April 2020 that crew members of Aircraft Carrier “Charles de Gaulle” were infected with COVID-19. In this manner, the spread of the COVID-19 infection has not only significantly affected global socioeconomic activities, but has also had influences on the military activities of respective countries. If the spread of infection is further prolonged, this may exert various impacts on countries’ military capability. Furthermore, it is said that while actively dispatching medical experts and providing medical goods to countries where the infection is spreading, China has been making propaganda efforts in various manners, including the spread of false information, amid growing social uncertainties and confusion due to the spread of infection. The COVID-19 pandemic may expose and intensify strategic competition among countries intending to create international and regional orders more preferable to themselves and to expand their influence. We need to closely watch such moves with great concern as security issues. **Chapter** ----- **Section** **6** **Maritime Trends** Japan is a maritime nation surrounded by sea and depends on maritime transportation for importing energy resources. In this sense, securing maritime traffi c safety is vital for the nation’s existence. At the same time, ensuring the stable use of the maritime domain as infrastructure supporting international logistics is recognized as a primary concern for the international community. Nevertheless, some countries unilaterally claim their rights or take actions based on their own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order, leading the principle of the freedom of the high seas to be violated unduly. Attacks on ships in the Middle East and piracy seen at various locations have become a threat to maritime traffi c. - **❶** **[Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas”]** The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)[1] too, have expressed concern about China’s establishment of provides for the principles of freedom of navigation in the high such zone. Increased activities by Chinese military aircraft seas and freedom of overfl ight. Nevertheless, in the waters have been confi rmed in recent years in the airspace close and airspace in the periphery of Japan, especially the East to the various southwestern islands of Japan, including the and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common main island of Okinawa. The expansion of these activities for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, may be an attempt to enforce the ECS ADIZ. Moreover, based on their own assertions which are incompatible with fi ghters of the PLA fl ew abnormally close to aircraft of the the existing international order. This has caused situations of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and U.S. Forces, which undue infringement upon such principles. were fl ying over the East China Sea. Furthermore, in January 2013, a Chinese naval vessel （1）East China Sea directed a fi re-control radar at a Maritime Self-Defense Numerous cases of acts that go against the principles of Force (MSDF) destroyer navigating on the high seas of freedom of navigation and freedom of overfl ight have been the East China Sea on 30th. Moreover, it is believed that recently seen in the East China Sea. Japan is concerned about other Chinese naval vessel directed a fi re-control radar such cases since these are profoundly dangerous that could at a helicopter mounted on an MSDF destroyer on 19th. escalate the situation by unilaterally changing the status quo Projecting fi re-control radar is normally conducted prior to and may cause unintended consequences. fi ring at a target and thus it is a dangerous act that may cause On November 23, 2013, for example, the Chinese unintended consequences. Government announced that it would establish “the East （2）South China Sea China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone (ECS ADIZ),” including the Senkaku Islands as if they were a part of In the South China Sea as well, there are acts to unilaterally China’s territory. China’s Ministry of National Defense change the status quo and advance its efforts to create a fait announced that it would require aircraft fl ying in the zone accompli based on its own assertions have frequently been to follow their instructions and warned that China’s armed seen along with its coercive, dangerous acts that could invite forces would adopt “defensive emergency measures” in the unintended consequences. event that aircraft refuse to follow the instructions. Japan For example, China has gone ahead with land reclamation is demanding China to revoke any measures that could go on seven features on a massive and rapid scale on the Spratly against the principle of freedom of overfl ight. The United Islands since 2014. In July 2016, the “historical rights” States, the ROK, Australia, and the European Union (EU), asserted by China as the basis of the “nine dash line” were 1 Th UN C ti th L f th S (UNCLOS) d t d h i t t th l d d f th i 1982 d t d i t f i 1994 (J l d d it i 1996) **Chapter** ----- denied in the arbitration award between the Philippines and China and the illegality of China’s reclamation activities was acknowledged. However, China has clearly stated its intention not to comply with the award and has continued the militarization of the features by developing military facilities such as batteries and various infrastructure that can be used for military purposes, such as runways, harbors, hangars and radar facilities. Moreover, in July and August 2016 after the arbitration award between the Philippines and China was rendered, an H-6K bomber of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) conducted combat air patrols in the airspace around Scarborough Shoal, with China’s Ministry of National Defense announcing that it would conduct these patrols regularly from now on. This shows the PLA has been intensifying its operations in the South China Sea. Under these circumstances, a further increase in China’s aerial presence in the area could lead to the establishment of a “South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” in the future. Furthermore, Chinese government vessels have obstructed fishing and other vessels of other countries approaching the features by firing warning shots and water cannons at the vessels. Claimants as well as the international community including the United States have repeatedly expressed their deep concerns over such conducts. In a dangerous act that could cause unintended consequences, PLA Navy and other ships approached and obstructed a U.S. Navy ship sailing in the South China Sea in September 2018. （3）Unintended Contingency Avoidance Initiatives Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks to securing the stable use of oceans and airspace, in recent years progress has been made in efforts to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies. First, at the Japan-China Summit Meeting held on May 9, 2018, Japan and China agreed to establish a “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China” with the aim of avoiding unintended confrontations between the naval vessels and aircraft of the SDF and PLA. The mechanism went into operation in June of the same year. As for multi-national initiatives, in April 2014, navies of participating countries of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), including Japan, the United States, and China, adopted the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).[2] CUES sets forth a code of conduct such as procedures and communication method to ensure safety for unexpected encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of these countries. In November 2014, the United States and China agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notification of military activities, together with rules of behavior to avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with CUES and other frameworks. In September 2015, the two countries announced an agreement concerning an additional annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert air encounters. Between ASEAN and China, official discussions have been held for the establishment of the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies will supplement the existing international order and that the countries concerned, including China, refrain from unilateral actions that add to tension and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law. - el-Mandeb. In the Strait of Hormuz and its vicinity, attacks on private sector oil tankers have been seen since May 2019. As tensions including those over U.S.-Iran relations have increased in the Middle East, U.S. and French initiatives have been launched to secure safe navigation. Chapter 2, Section 9-2 (Situation in the Gulf Region) **Chapter** **[National Maritime Security Initiatives ]** **❷** （1）Maritime Security in the Middle East The Middle East has seen intermittent attacks on ships in recent years. Since a coalition force led by Saudi Arabia launched bombing campaigns against the Houthis in Yemen in 2015, sporadic attacks on military and commercial ships have been seen in waters such as those off Yemen and the Strait of Bab Thi d i t l ll bi di d d t d th f th C ti I t ti l Ci il A i ti d th i t ti l t ti ----- In addition, some countries have conducted their exclusive operations outside the abovementioned frameworks. Since December 2008, for example, China has deployed naval vessels for counterpiracy operations in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. While the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has remained low thanks primarily to such international initiatives, Somalia’s unstable security and poverty as fundamental factors behind piracy have not been resolved. Meanwhile, in Africa, piracy incidents occurred in the Gulf of Guinea (the number of incidents was 64 in 2019). The international community has continued counterpiracy initiatives in this region. The number of piracy incidents in Southeast Asian waters came to 53 in 2019. Traditionally, maritime armed robbery incidents, including the theft of cash, crewmembers’ belongings, ship equipment and other items, have accounted for most of piracy incidents in the waters. In recent years, however, they included grave incidents in which crewmembers were kidnapped for ransom purposes in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea off the Philippines. Counterpiracy measures in Asia include international information sharing and cooperation based on the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),[5] which was worked out at Japan’s initiative and put into force in 2006. In addition, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand conduct the Malacca Strait Patrols.[6] The cases of abduction for ransom have been confirmed in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea. In order to respond to this, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines began sea patrols in the area in June 2017 and air patrols in October of the same year. （2）Piracy Piracy seen at various locations has become a threat to maritime traffic. The number of maritime piracy and armed robbery incidents (hereinafter referred to as piracy incidents) in the world[3] came to a peak of 445 in 2010, followed by 439 in 2011, and 297 in 2012, indicating a downtrend (the number stood at 162 in 2019). The decline has depended heavily on the fall in the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden rose rapidly from 2008 to 218 in 2009, 219 in 2010, and 237 in 2011, following a persistent uptrend, accounting for more than a half of the global total and attracting great international concern as a threat to safe navigation. In the recent years, however, the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has remained low as a result of various initiatives taken by the international community including Japan (the number stood at zero in 2019; see Part III for Japan’s initiatives). The international counterpiracy initiatives in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden include counterpiracy operations by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF151), a multinational force that was created in January 2009 by the U.S. Force-led Combined Maritime Force (CMF)[4] based in Bahrain. So far, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Turkey, the ROK, Pakistan and other countries have participated in the CTF151, conducting zone defense operations to counter piracy. The EU for its part has conducted Operation Atalanta to counter piracy since December 2008. In the operation, naval vessels and aircraft dispatched by EU member countries escort ships and monitor the waters off the coast of Somalia. It has been decided that the operation will continue until the end of 2020. **Chapter** The numbers of piracy incidents cited in the main text are based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce. The CMF is a multinational force, which operates to promote maritime security, stability, and prosperity, under the U.S. Central Command. Forces from 32 countries participate in the CMF, and the Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet concurrently serves as the CMF Commander. The CMF is comprised of three combined task forces: Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), which is tasked with maritime security operations; Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) with counter-piracy operations; and Combined Task Force 152 (CTF-152) with maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf. The SDF deploy units to CTF-151. The contracting parties to ReCAAP are the following 20 countries: Australia; Bangladesh; Brunei; Cambodia; China; Denmark; India; Japan; the ROK; Laos; Myanmar; the Netherlands; Norway; the Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; the United Kingdom; the United States; and Vietnam. The Malacca Strait Patrols are comprised of: the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols which commenced in 2004; aircraft patrol activities which commenced in 2005; and information sharing ti iti hi h d i 2006 ----- **❸ [Trends in the Arctic Ocean]** The area north of latitude 66 degrees 33 minutes is called the Arctic Region. The Arctic Region includes Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. These eight are called Arctic countries. In 1996, the Arctic countries established the Arctic Council to promote cooperation in their common challenges, including sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic Region. In recent years, moves towards the utilization of trans Arctic navigation routes and the development of natural resources in the Arctic Ocean have gained momentum in line with a decline in sea ice. From the perspective of security, the Arctic Ocean has traditionally been used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit route. With the decrease in sea ice in recent years, ships have been able to navigate for a longer period of time and more extensively than before. It is therefore considered that the region could be used for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military forces in the future. In this situation, moves to deploy new military capabilities in the ocean are seen. In the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy revised in December 2015, Russia continues to maintain that it would secure its interests in resource development and use of the sea route. Russia has been developing natural gas on the Yamal Peninsula. In 2018, liquefied natural gas produced on the peninsula was transported to China for the first time via an Arctic Ocean route. As for military arrangements, Russia has set up a joint strategic command for each of the four military districts to unify all of ground, maritime, air and other forces. In 2014, Russia created the Northern Joint Strategic Command reportedly to integrate the Northern Fleet with ground and air forces and cover waters, remote islands and the Arctic coast between the Barents Sea and the East Siberian Sea. In the Arctic Region, Russia is constructing 10 airfields. As for military operations, the Northern Fleet has annually conducted a long-distance navigation to the Novo Sibirski Islands since 2012. Russia has intensified other Arctic military operations including SSBN submarines’ strategic nuclear deterrence patrols and long-range bombers’ patrol flights. In its Arctic Strategy published June in 2019, the U.S. DoD expressed concern against actions of China and Russia in the Arctic region[7] and a desire for the Arctic to become a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges.[8] The United States reportedly plans to increase the number of U.S. Marines in Norway on a rotation basis from about 300 to about 700 from 2017. In October 2018, it sent an aircraft carrier to the Arctic Region for the first time in 27 years for air drills in the Norwegian Sea ahead of the NATO exercise “Trident Juncture 2018”. In December 2016, then U.S. President Obama decided to ban new drilling for oil and natural gas in a majority of U.S. territorial waters in the Arctic to protect marine resources, showing a negative stance towards resource development. However, President Trump signed an executive order repealing this decision of then U.S. President Obama in April 2017. Aside from coastal states in the Arctic Ocean, 13 countries including Japan, China, the ROK, the United Kingdom, Germany and France, have observer status in the Arctic Council. Notably, China has shown active involvement in the Arctic Ocean, deploying the polar research vessel Xue Long to the Arctic Ocean for 10 times since 1999.[9] In January 2018, they published a white paper titled “China’s Arctic **Chapter** As for Russia, the U.S. DoD pointed out in its Arctic Strategy that Russia is strengthening its presence above the Arctic Circle by deploying Arctic units and establishing new military bases. Moreover, Russia has reportedly threatened to use force against vessels that fail to abide by Russian regulations. The DoD pointed out that Russia could utilize its military capabilities in an effort to deny access to disputed Arctic waters or resources. As for China, the DoD pointed out in its strategy that its operations of icebreaking vessels and civilian research activities could support a future Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean including deployment of submarines to the region, and also pointed out that it was attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic behavior globally may be repeated in the Arctic. In May 2019, during his visit to Finland, Secretary of State Pompeo made a speech concerning Arctic policy, in which he stated that all relevant parties should follow the same rules and expressed caution against efforts by China and Russia to expand into the Arctic region. In August 2019, U.S. President Trump stated that buying Denmark’s autonomous territory Greenland was “strategically interesting.” In response, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen described the Trump statement as “absurd” and the Greenland government issued a statement noting that Greenland was not for sale. President Trump countered that he would postpone his visit to Denmark as the prime minister was not willing to discuss any Greenland deal. In 2012, Xue Long became the first polar research vessel to sail across the Arctic Ocean. In 2013, the cargo freighter Yong Sheng became the first Chinese commercial ship to cross the Arctic Ocean. Canadian scientists took part in Xue Long’s voyage to the Arctic Ocean in 2017, and they succeeded for the first time in trial navigation of the Arctic Northwest Passage (along th th t f C d ) Chi l h d it d l h l d X L 2 i 2018 ----- Policy in which they claimed to be one of the geographically closest states to the Arctic Circle with rights pertaining to the development of resources. They also announced their intention to build a “Polar Silk Road.” In September 2015, it was reported for the first time that five Chinese naval vessels sailed in the Bering Sea between the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific and sailed in the U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands. The PLA Navy’s future moves in the Arctic Ocean will attract attention. **Chapter** ----- **Section** **Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)** **7** The transfer and proliferation of WMDs, such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a signifi cant threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, **❶ [Nuclear Weapons ]** During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 raised awareness of the danger of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries, other than those that exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device in or before 1966 (the United States, the then Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, as well as France and China, which acceded to the NPT in 1992), from having nuclear weapons, and provided that arms control and disarmament of nuclear forces would be pursued through two-way negotiations. As of January 2020, the NPT had been signed by 191 countries and regions. While some countries that had previously possessed nuclear weapons became signatories to this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states by abandoning these weapons, India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to accede to this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. Meanwhile, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests and declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons. The U.S.-Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is set **KEY WORD** New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) The treaty stipulates that each country would reduce the target by February 2018. As of March 2020, the United States number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and the had 1,373 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 655 number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 in seven years deployed delivery vehicles, while Russia had 1,326 deployed following the treaty’s entry into force. Both the United States strategic nuclear warheads and 485 deployed delivery vehicles. and Russia have claimed that they accomplished the reduction 1 See Chapter 2 Section 2 2 for China’s ballistic missile development there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against which traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use WMDs. - to expire in February 2021 or be extended for up to fi ve years if agreed between the countries. While Russia has proposed an early extension, the United States has not specifi ed its stance on the matter. The treaty’s future course, including its extension, is still uncertain. The United States has indicated its hope to pursue an arms control framework including China. However, China, which is deemed to have increased its inventory of nuclear warheads as well as developed and deployed their means of delivery[1] and continued to enhance the capability of its nuclear force, has reiterated that it has no intention to participate in any U.S.-Russian arms control framework. In the future, it may be important to launch some international arms control and disarmament initiative including not only the United States and Russia but also China and others. Future trends regarding nuclear arms control and disarmament should be closely watched. Fig. I-3-7-1 (Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country) **Chapter** ----- |Fig I-3-7-1|Col2|Number of Nuclear|r Warheads Arsenals and The|eir Major Means of Delivery|by Country|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |||United States|Russia|United Kingdom|France|China| |Missiles|ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)|400 Minuteman III 400|340 SS-18 46 SS-19 30 SS-25 36 SS-27（single-warhead） 78 SS-27（multi-warhead） 150|―|―|88 DF-5（CSS-4） 20 DF-31（CSS-10） 50 DF-41 18| ||IRBM MRBM|―|―|―|―|216 DF-4（CSS-3） 10 DF-26 72| |||||||DF-21（CSS-5） 134| ||SLBM （Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles）|280 Trident D-5|160 SS-N-18 16 SS-N-23 96 SS-N-32 48|48 Trident D-5 48|64 M-51 64|48 JL-2（CSS-NX-14） 48| |Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles||14|10|4|4|4| |Aircraft||66 B-2 20 B-52 46|76 Tu-95 (Bear) 60 Tu-160 (Blackjack) 16|―|40 Rafale 40|104 H-6K 100 H-6N 4| |Number of warheads||Approx. 3,800|Approx. 4,330 （including Approx. 1,830 tactical nuclear warheads）|200|300|Approx. 290| Notes: 1. Data is based on “The Military Balance 2020,” the SIPRI Yearbook 2019, etc. 2. In March 2020, the United States released the following fi gures based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia as of March 1, 2020: the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for the United States was 1,373 and the delivery vehicles involved 655 missiles/aircraft; the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for Russia was 1,326 and the delivery vehicles involved 485 missiles/aircraft. However, according to the SIPRI Yearbook 2019, as of January 2019, the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads was approx. 1,750 (including 150 tactical nuclear warheads) and that of Russian ones was approx. 1,600. 3. In November 2015, the U.K.’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stipulated that the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to be no more than 120, while the number of nuclear warheads possessed is to be no more than 180. 4. According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2019, India possesses 130-140 nuclear warheads, Pakistan 150-160, Israel 80-90, and North Korea 20-30. **Chapter** **❷ [Biological and Chemical Weapons ]** Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture at relatively low cost and are easy to disguise as most materials, equipment, and technology needed to manufacture these weapons can be used for both military and civilian purposes. These weapons are attractive to states and non-state actors, such as terrorists, seeking asymmetric means of attack.[2] Biological weapons have the following characteristics: (1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive; (2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset; (3) their use is hard to detect; (4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects; and (5) they can cause mass casualties and injuries depending on the circumstances of use and the type of weapon. As has been pointed out, advancements in life science could be misused or abused for the development of biological weapons. The United States, United Kingdom, and France launched missile strikes on chemical weapons-related facilities in Syria in April 2018, determining that its Assad regime had used chemical weapons in Eastern Ghouta.[3 ] North Korea is an example of an actor that is still presumed to possess these chemical weapons and has not entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In addition, such incidents as the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995 showed that the threat of the use of WMDs by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities. The United Kingdom criticized Russia over its highly likely involvement in the use of Novichok, a military-grade chemical weapon developed by Russia, in the attack on a former Russian intelligence agent that occurred in the United Kingdom in March 2018. In retaliation, countries including European countries and the United States expelled Russian diplomats. In September 2018, the United Kingdom released its joint statement with the United States, France, and Germany, emphasizing Russia’s involvement in the attack They refer to means of attack to strike an adversary’s vulnerable points and are not conventional means. They include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber attacks. See Part I Chapter 2 Section 9 4 for general information about the Syria situation ----- anew by contending that two suspected participants in the attack were identified as officials of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the **❸ [Ballistic Missiles and Other Missiles ]** Ballistic missiles are propelled by rockets for parabolic flights and are capable of attacking distant targets. They can be used as a means of delivering WMDs, such as NBC weapons. As they fall at a steep angle and high speed, highly accurate systems are required for intercepting them effectively. Fig. I-3-7-2 (Ballistic missiles) The deployment of ballistic missiles in a region where an armed conflict is under way runs the risk of intensifying or expanding the conflict. Additionally, it has the risk of further heightening tension in a region where military confrontation is ongoing, leading to the destabilization of that region. Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a means of attacking from a distance or threatening another country that has superior conventional forces. In recent years, along with the threat of ballistic missiles, analysts have pointed to the threat of cruise missiles as a weapon which is comparatively easy for terrorists and other non-state actors to acquire and has the potential for proliferation. Because cruise missiles are cheaper to produce Russian Administration and that the attack could have been approved by top Russian government officials. - compared to ballistic missiles and are easy to maintain and train with, many countries either produce or modify cruise missiles. At the same time, it is said that cruise missiles have a higher degree of target accuracy and that they are difficult to detect while in flight. Moreover, because they are smaller than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be concealed on a ship to secretly approach a target and present a serious threat if they carry WMDs in their warheads. |Fig. I-3-7-2 Classification of B|Ballistic Missiles| |---|---| |Description|Range| |Short Range Ballistic Missile, SRBM|Under approx. 1,000 km or less| |Medium Range Ballistic Missile, MRBM|Approx. 1,000 to under approx. 3,000 km| |Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, IRBM|Approx. 3,000 to under approx. 5,500 km| |Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, ICBM|Approx. 5,500 km or more| ＊Ballistic missiles launched from submarines are collectively referred to as submarine-launched ballistic  missiles (SLBMs), while a ballistic missile that has a precision guidance system on its warhead necessary to attack aircraft carriers and other vessels is called an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). **Chapter** - **❹ [Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies ]** Even weapons that were purchased or developed for self- materials. Nations across the world share concerns regarding defense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once the acquisition and use of WMDs by terrorists and other nondomestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, state actors. certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred The proliferation of WMDs and other related technologies WMDs and related technologies to other states that cannot has been noted in numerous instances. For example, afford to invest resources in conventional forces and attempt in February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related to offset this with WMDs. Some of these states that seek technologies, mainly uranium enrichment technology, had WMDs do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. and furthermore, due to their weak governance, terrorist A.Q. Khan and other scientists in Pakistan. It has also been organizations are active in their territories. Therefore, it is suggested that North Korea supported Syria’s secret nuclear conceivable that in general, the possibility of actual use of activities.[4] WMDs would increase. Furthermore, there has been significant transfer and Moreover, since it is uncertain whether such states can proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as the means effectively manage the related technology and materials, of delivery of WMDs. The former Soviet Union and other there is a concern that chemical or nuclear substances will countries exported Scud-B to many countries and regions, be transferred or smuggled out from these states with high including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and likelihood. For example, there is a danger that even terrorists North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, who do not possess related technologies would use a dirty respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries bomb to release radioactive materials for pollution as a now possess ballistic missiles. In addition, Pakistan’s Ghauri means of terrorist attack so long as they gain access to such and Iran’s Shahab-3 missiles are said to be based on North 4 A di t “W ld id Th t A t ” U S Di t f N ti l I t lli (J 2014) ----- Korea s Nodong missiles. Furthermore, North Korea is alleged to have provided conventional arms and ballistic missiles to the Houthis of Yemen, have sent ballistic missile engineers to Syria, have transferred special tiles used for chemical weapon production facilities to Syria, and have continued military relations with Myanmar, including ballistic missile system trade.[5] North Korea made rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches in the 1980s and 1990s. It is believed that an underlying factor behind this fact was North Korea’s imports of various materials and technologies from outside of North Korea. It is also noted that North Korea transfers ballistic missile airframes and related technologies and promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured through such transfer.[6] The international community’s uncompromising and decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of WMDs and other technologies has put significant pressure on countries engaged in related activities, leading some of them to accept inspections by international organizations or abandon their WMD and other programs altogether. Meanwhile, it is pointed out that, in recent years, states in which transferring is a concern have sustained their external transfer while averting international monitoring by falsifying documentation, diversifying transport routes, and utilizing multiple front companies and intermediaries to illicitly export WMDs. Additionally, intangible technology transfer has arisen as a cause for concern. Namely, those states have obtained advanced technologies which could be adapted for the development and manufacturing of WMDs and other technologies via their nationals—researchers and students who have been dispatched to leading companies and academic institutions in developed countries. **Chapter** According to reports released by the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee (March 2018 and March 2019) A di t th t titl d “Milit d S it D l t I l i th D ti P l ’ R bli f K ” hi h b itt d b U S D D t C i M 2018 ----- **Section** **Trends in International Terrorism** **8** **❶** **[General Situation]** Confl icts or disputes concerning racial, religious, territorial, resources and other issues are occurring or continuing in various places in the world. Human rights violations, refugees, famine, poverty, or any other consequences of confl icts or disputes can have impacts on not only parties to the confl icts or disputes but also a wide range of other countries. There are prominent cases where power vacuums in some countries with political instability or weak governance have become a hotbed for activities of international terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). These organizations are leveraging inadequate border control to obtain personnel, weapons and funds, and to send fi ghters to various places to carry out organized terrorist attacks or give some instructions to local individuals or groups, expanding and stepping up their operations across national borders. In recent years, they have also been spreading their violent extremist ideologies through the Internet and other means across the world. As a result, there were cases where young people in Western and other developed countries felt sympathy for the violent radical beliefs due to their social discontent, participating as fi ghters in international terrorist groups and carrying out terrorist attacks in their home countries. Terrorist organizations such as ISIL and Al Qaeda have propagated practical tactics of terrorism through their journals and other media and encourage their supporters to implement them. Under the circumstances, what is called “home-grown” terrorism, in which residents are inspired by violent extremism spread by terrorist organizations to conduct terrorist attacks at home, remains a threat. In recent years, particularly, “lone-wolf” terrorist attacks, planned and committed by individuals or groups who have no offi cial relations with international terrorist organizations but have become infl uenced by them in some ways, have occurred in Western and other countries. The characteristics of “lone-wolf” terrorism include that it uses items that are relatively easy for individuals to obtain, such as knives, vehicles, and guns, and that it is diffi cult to detect signs of planned attacks and prevent them from happening. In March 2019, an unprecedented incident occurred in Christchurch, New Zealand, where the perpetrator of a terrorist attack (a shooting) live-streamed the crime on social media and the footage was instantaneously disseminated. Concerning international counterterrorism measures, international cooperation has grown even more important as terrorism threats have diffused and deepened on the diversifi cation of terrorist attacks and the improvement of terrorist groups’ attack capabilities. Currently, countries are cooperating not only in military measures but also in initiatives in various other fi elds to cut off funding sources for terrorist organizations and prevent the international movement of terrorists and the diffusion of violent radical beliefs. **Chapter** - **❷** **[Trends in ISIL-related International Terrorist Organizations]** The objective of ISIL as an organization is to claim the from January 2014. In June 2014, ISIL unilaterally declared establishment of the caliphate[1] based on its own interpretation the establishment of the Islamic State, with Baghdadi as its of Sharia law and the protection of Sunni[2] Muslims. ISIL leader. expanded its presence from 2013 in Iraq and Syria, which had In response to the expansion of ISIL’s reach, the Coalition been destabilized due to religious disputes and civil war, and forces led by the United States have been conducting air took control of northern and eastern Syria and northern Iraq strikes in Iraq and Syria since August and September of the same year, respectively. The coalition forces have also 1 The term means “successor” in Arabic. After Prophet Muhammad died, the term was used to refer to the leader of the Islamic community. Afterwards, monarchs of hereditary dynasties, including the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, utilized this title. 2 One of the two major sects of Islam. The split from the Shia sect originated in the difference in views on the successors (caliphate) to the Prophet Muhammad (died in 632), who founded Islam. Sunni Islam, currently the largest sect, is the majority in most of the Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa region. Shia Islam is the state religion in Iran and Shiites l th j it i I ----- |ISIL Sin Provinc|ai e| |---|---| **Chapter** **Fig. I-3-8-1** Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham The Islamic State of Iraq Maghreb Al-Qaeda (AQIM) (HTS) and the Levant (ISIL) Al-Qaeda Taliban ISIL Libya Hezbollah Province Afghanistan Pakistan Syria Hamas Lebanon Iraq ISIL Khorasan Province Algeria Palestine Egypt ISIL Algeria Libya Province Saudi Arabia Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Mali ISIL Sinai Province ISIL Yemen Province Yemen Multiple ISIL provinces Nigeria Somalia Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam ISIL West Africa ISIL Somalia wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) Province (Boko Haram) Province Al-Shabaab (AS) ：Pakistan ：Al-Qaeda affliated group ：Group with suggested involvement with Al-Qaeda Source: Worldwide Threat Assessment prepared by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (January 2019) and Country Reports on Terrorism 2018 prepared ：Other major Islamic extremist terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department (October 2019), etc. and weapons, and conducting hostage rescue by the special |e Islamic Hay’at Tahrir da (AQIM) (HTS ISIL Libya Province AAllggeerriiaa LLiibbyyaa MMaallii NNiiggeerriiaa l-Islam ISIL West Africa (JNIM) Province (Boko Haram) fliated group suggested involvement with Al-Qaeda Islamic extremist terrorist groups|al-Sham ) Hezbollah Hamas EEggyypptt ISIL Sin Provinc Mult|Col3|The I an SSyyrriiaa LLeebbaannoonn PPaalleessttiinn ai e|slamic State of Iraq d the Levant (ISIL) Talib AAffgghhaannii IIrraaqq ISIL Khorasan Province ee SSaauuddii AArraabbiiaa Tehrik-i-T YYeemmeenn s SSoommaalliiaa Al-Qaed Peni ISIL Somalia Province Al-Shabaab (AS) Threat Assessment prepared by the U.S. e (January 2019) and Country Reports on Terr State Department (October 2019), etc.| |---|---|---|---|---| |||Mult|iple ISIL province|| ||||Source: Worldwide Intelligenc by the U.S.|| |ng local forces with education, training, of some U.S. forces in northeastern||||| forces. In cooperation with such military operations and with support from the United States and other countries, the Iraqi Security Forces and local forces in Iraq and Syria proceeded to recapture ISIL’s strongholds. In March 2019, U.S. President Trump declared in a statement that the United States and coalition forces had liberated 100% of ISIL-controlled areas in Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, with the support from Russia, the Assad administration conquered ISIL strongholds mainly in southern and eastern Syria. In December 2017, Russia declared that Syria’s entire territory had been liberated from ISIL. In October 2019, the United States announced that it had killed ISIL’s leader Baghdadi in northwestern Syria. While anti-ISIL military operations have made progress, it is pointed out that about 11,000 ISIL fi ghters remain in hiding in Iraq and Syria.[3] In this regard, terrorist attacks believed to be conducted by ISIL are occurring in various regions of Iraq and Syria, targeting security forces, the Coalition forces, citizens and others, indicating that ISIL remains still active. In Syria, in particular, it is pointed out that ISIL may regain strength by exploiting the drawdown of some U.S. forces in northeastern Syria and the launch of Turkish military operations against Kurdish forces in October 2019 to reconstitute its capabilities and resources in Syria and strengthen its ability to plan attacks abroad.[4] Meanwhile, after ISIL declared the establishment of the “Islamic State,” multiple “provinces” have been established outside of Iraq and Syria as the “Islamic State” territories, and these “provinces” have been conducting terrorist acts in various places. Fig. I-3-8-1 (Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and theMiddle East) Organizations supporting ISIL exist in Southeast Asia and have conducted terrorist attacks targeting security forces and citizens. Moreover, in South Asia, large-scale explosions occurred simultaneously in Sri Lanka in April 2019, claiming the life of a Japanese national. The Sri Lanka authority exposed a local Islamic extremist organization as the perpetrator while referring to possible support for the organization from a foreign terrorist organization. After the attack, ISIL claimed responsibility for it, and the United According to “U.S. Forces Reset in Syria, ISIS Struggles to Re-form” (November 27, 2019) posted on the website of the U.S. DoD. A di t N b 2019 t b itt d t C b th U S D D Off f th I t G l ----- States points out that the terrorist attacks may have been inspired by ISIL. As ISIL is spreading violent extremist ideologies through social media and other means, there are concerns that the threat is spreading to South Asia and other areas. In addition, there continues to be a concern in Western countries that foreign fighters entering Iraq and Syria will return to their home countries to carry out a terrorist act after receiving combat training and gaining combat experience in the countries. Terrorist attacks in which ISIL fighters with fighting experience in Syria have allegedly engaged have taken place in Europe, including simultaneous attacks in Paris in November 2015 and serial bombings in Belgium in March 2016. Western countries have begun to accept some of these foreign fighters following Turkey’s announcement in November 2019 that it would repatriate as many as the 1,200 ISIL fighters it had detained. The international community will need to continue various efforts to prevent terrorism by foreign fighters. - **[Movements of International Terrorist Organizations Other Than ISIL-Affiliated Groups]** **❸** Al Qaeda, which operates primarily in Pakistan and in neighboring Mali, Tunisia and Libya, and Al-Shabaab Afghanistan, is believed to have weakened as many of the based in Somalia. group’s senior members were killed by U.S. operations. The Taliban, an Islamic extremist organization based However, it continues activities as a central organization, in Afghanistan, continues to conduct armed activities in such as issuing instructions and recommendations to its various parts of Afghanistan. Although an agreement was affiliates in North Africa and the Middle East. In addition, signed between the United States and the Taliban in February the current Al Qaeda leader Zawahiri has repeatedly issued 2020 that included a conditional phase-out of U.S. troops in statements calling for terrorist acts against the West. The Afghanistan and the start of negotiations between Afghans, possibility of Al Qaeda attacks has not disappeared. the Taliban has since carried out attacks on Afghan security Other currently active Sunni Islamist militant forces and there is no denying that it may continue to carry organizations associated with Al Qaeda include Al Qaeda in out suicide bombings and shootings targeting the government the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen, Al Qaeda in and foreigners. the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) based in Algeria and operating **Chapter** ----- **Part** Japan’s Security and Defense Policy ## Ⅱ **Chapter 1** Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense **Chapter 2** Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense **Chapter 3** Japan’s Security and Defense Policy **Chapter 4** Build-up of Defense Capability, etc. **Chapter 5** Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement ----- **Chapter** **Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security** **and Defense** ###### 1 **Chapter** **Section** **Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security** **1** The independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to determine its own direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as maintaining its culture, tradition, and sense of values. In addition, peace and security are essential for the people to live with a sense of safety and for Japan to continue to prosper. However, peace, safety, and independence cannot be secured by simply wishing for them. The essence of national security can be found in creating an international environment that is stable and predictable, while preventing the emergence of threats Prime Minister Abe and Minister of Defense Kono inspecting the Special Guard of Honor before they occur, through diplomacy. peace and security of Japan is ensured through developing Nevertheless, the reality of the current seamless defense measures by coupling Japan’s own defense international community suggests that it is not necessarily capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. possible to prevent invasions from the outside by employing Moreover, from the perspective of improving the security only nonmilitary means such as diplomatic efforts, and in environment surrounding Japan and preventing the emergence the event that the nation were to be invaded it would not of threats to Japan, the importance of the role played by be able to remove such a threat. Defense capabilities are the defense capabilities is increasing in cooperative efforts as nation’s ultimate guarantee of security, expressing its will a member of the Indo-Pacifi c region and the international and capacity to eliminate foreign invasions, and they cannot community. be replaced by any other means. Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities, Japan For this reason, Japan is striving to develop appropriate aims to ensure national security as well as bringing peace and defense capabilities to protect the life and properties of its safety to the Indo-Pacifi c region, and eventually to the entire nationals and to defend the territorial land, sea, and airspace world through making its utmost efforts in a variety of fi elds. of Japan. At the same time, it is strengthening the Japan– U.S. Alliance[1] with the United States, which shares basic values and interests with Japan. This underlines that the **1** In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and cooperate closely in a range of areas in security, politics, and economics. 199 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2020 ----- **Section** **Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy** **2** **❶ [Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense]** Since the end of World War II, Japan made a decision not to repeat the ravages of war and has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifi sm is enshrined in the Constitution, Article 9 of which prescribes the renunciation of war, the prohibition of war potential, and the denial of the right of belligerency of the state. Of course, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan’s inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state. Thus, the Japanese Government interprets this as a constitutional right to possess the minimum armed forces needed to exercise that right. Therefore, Japan, under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, holding its exclusively defense-oriented policy as its basic strategy of defense, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations. **Chapter** - **❷** **[The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution]** the right of self-defense; and (3) When the use of armed force **1 Permitted Self-Defense Capability** is confi ned to be the minimum necessary level. However, it Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the has been concluded in the Cabinet’s decision made on July required minimum self-defense capability. The specifi c limit 1, 2014, “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to is subject to change according to the prevailing international Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People,” that “the situation, the level of military technologies, and various other use of force” should be interpreted to be permitted under the factors, and it is discussed and decided through annual budget Constitution as measures for self-defense when the following and other deliberations by the Diet on behalf of the people. “Three New Conditions” are met: (1) When an armed attack Whether such capability constitutes a “war potential” that is against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan be considered within the context of Japan’s overall military occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to to possess certain armaments depends on whether such life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; (2) When there is no possession would cause its total military strength to exceed appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure the constitutional limit. Japan’s survival and protect its people; (3) Use of force to the The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive minimum extent necessary. The following is the interpretation weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of the measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of another country is not permissible under any circumstance of the Constitution defi ned in the abovementioned Cabinet as it would, by defi nition, exceed the minimum necessary decision. level. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers. forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the **2 Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article** Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right 9 of the Constitution to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the In the past, the Government had interpreted Article 9 of supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution to mean that armed force could be used to the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit exercise the right of self-defense only when the following Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to three conditions (Three Conditions for “Use of Force”) were maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. met: (1) When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they aggression against Japan; (2) When there are no appropriate are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to where the people’s right to life liberty and the pursuit of ----- happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or the so-called basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the government to date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors on October 14, 1972. This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution. To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc., in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc. Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people. Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, it has been concluded that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. The Government has reached a conclusion that although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution, only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words, for defending Japan. **3 Geographic Boundaries within Which the Right of** Self-Defense May Be Exercised **Chapter** The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation. Nevertheless, the Government interprets that, as a general rule, the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level of self-defense. **4 Right of Belligerency** Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” However, the “right of belligerency” does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force and to occupy enemy territory. On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force in exercising its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even though those actions do not appear to be different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and is not permissible. ----- **❸** **[Basic Policy]** Under the Constitution, Japan has efficiently built a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three NonNuclear Principles. **1 Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy** **4 Securing Civilian Control** Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the military in a democratic state or democratic political control of military strength. Japan has, by giving serious reflection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened until the end of World War II, adopted the following strict civilian control system that is entirely different from the one under the former Constitution.[3] Civilian control aims to ensure that the SDF is maintained and operated in accordance with the will of the people. The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals, makes legislative and budgetary decisions on such matters as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and main organizations of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF. It also issues approval for defense operations of the SDF. The function of national defense entirely falls under the executive power of the Cabinet as a general administrative function. The Constitution requires that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control and supervises over the SDF duties. In addition, the National Security Council of Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important **Chapter** The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. **2 Not Becoming a Military Power** There is no established definition for the concept of a military power. For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten other countries means that Japan will not possess and maintain a military capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense. **3 Non-Nuclear Principles** The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed line of national policy. Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing and possessing nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy Basic Law.[1] In addition, Japan ratified the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a nonnuclear weapons state, has an obligation not to manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons.[2] Prime Minister Abe giving instructions upon the departure ceremony for the destroyer dispatched to the Middle East for information gathering [Website of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan] Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management.” Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes...not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...” Th C bi t’ t l ilit tt t i tl li it d ----- matters on national security.[4] At the MOD, the Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages the matters concerning national defense, and as the competent minister also manages and operates the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and political affairs by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. In addition, the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense provides the Minister of Defense with advice on important affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD based on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council consisting 4 S Ch t 2 S ti 1 of political appointees, civilian officials and uniformed SDF personnel deliberates on basic principles concerning affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Through these ways, the MOD aims to further ensure civilian control. As mentioned above, the civilian control system is well established. However, in order to ensure that the system achieves good results, it is necessary to continue making practical efforts in both political and administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in national defense taken by the people. **Chapter** ----- **Organizations Responsible for** **Japan’s Security and Defense** ###### 2 **Section** **National Security Council** **1** As the security environment surrounding Japan grows increasingly testing, Japan faces mounting security challenges that it needs to address. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to carry forward the policies pertaining to national security from a strategic perspective under strong political leadership with the Prime Minister at its core. For this reason, the National Security Council was established in the Cabinet to provide a platform to discuss important matters with regard to Japan’s security, and has been serving as a control tower for foreign and defense policies. Since its establishment in December 2013, the Council has met 224 times (as of the end of April 2020). The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) are also deliberated and approved in this National Security Council. The National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretariat provides constant support to the National Security Council as its secretariat. The Secretariat is also tasked with planning and designing, and overall coordination of basic guidelines and important matters with regard to foreign and defense policies pertaining to national security. Administrative organs that are deeply involved in policies support the Secretariat with both personnel and information. Considering that the coverage of security has been expanding to the economic and technology fi elds in recent years, in order to address challenges to the national security in the economic fi eld, “Economy Group” was set up in the Secretariat in April 2020. The Secretariat has many civilians and uniformed personnel of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with concurrent posts, who are engaged in the planning and designing of policies, as well as the utilization of respective specialized knowledge. In addition, global military trends and other information are shared in a timely manner. The enhanced ability to formulate national security policies has led to the systematic alignment of Japan’s national security, and to the provision of a direction for policies with regard to new security challenges. Furthermore, individual defense policies are formulated and efforts to accelerate decision-making are made based on the basic guidelines discussed at the National Security Council, and this is contributing signifi cantly to improved development and implementation of policies within the MOD. See Fig. II-2-1 (Organization of the National Security Council) **Chapter** **Fig. II-2-1** Organization of the National Security Council |Structure to Support the National Security Council (image)|Col2| |---|---| |National Security Council|| |4-Minister Meeting|Emergency Situations Minister Meeting| |◆Serves as a control tower for foreign and defense policies concerning national security|◆Strengthens the response to serious emergencies| National Security Council - Serves as a control tower for foreign and defense policies concerning national security - Maintains the civilian control function of the former Security Council - Strengthens the response to serious emergencies Close coordination Provide data, information and personnel Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office Other Agencies within the Cabinet Secretariat Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (Situation response/crisis management) National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office etc… Support National Security Secretariat within the Cabinet Secretariat - Functions as a secretariat to provide constant support to the National Security Council - Planning and designing, and overall coordination of basic guidelines and important matters pertaining to foreign and defense policies with regard to national security - Provides necessary advice when responding to contingencies from a national security viewpoint Provide data, information and personnel Related Ministries and Agencies Ministry of Defense Ministry of Foreign Affairs etc… ----- **Section** **Organization of the MOD/Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** **2** - **❶ [Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability]** with the Commissioner of ATLA who is in charge of defense **1 Organization of the MOD/SDF** equipment administration, support the Minister of Defense in accordance with their respective responsibilities, by To fulfi ll their mission of defending Japan, the MOD/SDF[1] providing assistance from a policy perspective – namely, to consists of various organizations, mainly the Ground, ensure that the affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD are Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces. See Fig.II-2-2-1 (Organizational Chart of the MOD/SDF) properly carried out in accordance with laws and regulations See Fig.II-2-2-2 (Outline of the MOD/SDF) in order to accomplish the duty of the MOD. The Joint Staff � �Fig. II-2-2-3 (Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning Forces) Fig. II-2-2-4 (Location of Principal SDF Units [for illustrative the operation of the SDF. The Chief of Joint Staff provides purposes] [As of March 31, 2020]) centralized support for the operations of the SDF for the Minister of Defense from a military expert’s perspective. **2 Systems to Support the Minister of Defense** The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their The Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages the respective services except operations of the SDF, with the matters related to the defense of Japan as the competent Chiefs of Staff for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), minister, and is in overall charge of the SDF duties in the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self accordance with the provisions of the SDF Law. The Defense Force (ASDF) acting as the top ranking expert Minister is supported by the State Minister of Defense, advisers to the Minister of Defense regarding these services. the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and In this manner, the MOD has ensured that the support for the the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. There are Minister from a policy perspective and the support for the also the Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense, who Minister from a military expert’s perspective are provided in advise the Minister of Defense, and the Defense Council, a well-balanced manner like the two wheels of a cart, so to which deliberates on basic principles concerning affairs speak, in order for the Minister of Defense to appropriately under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, there are the make decisions. This existing concept regarding the support Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, who organizes system for the Minister of Defense has been made even more and supervises the administrative affairs of each bureau explicit by Article 12 of the Ministry of Defense Establishment and organization to support the Minister of Defense, and Act, which has been amended to stipulate that the support for the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who the Minister of Defense provided by the Director-General is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Directors-General of those related to international affairs. each Bureau as well as the Commissioner of ATLA shall be Moreover, the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, Joint conducted in cooperation with the support for the Minister by Staff, Ground Staff Offi ce, Maritime Staff Offi ce, Air Staff each Chief of Staff, since 2015, when the Act was amended Offi ce, and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency for the establishment of ATLA and the reorganization of (ATLA), as an external bureau, have been established in the Joint Staff, etc., as part of an initiative for the MOD reform.[2] MOD. The Internal Bureaus of the MOD are responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the SDF. The DirectorGeneral of the Minister’s Secretariat and the DirectorsGeneral of each Bureau within the Internal Bureaus, along 1 The MOD and the SDF form a single organization. Whereas the term “Ministry of Defense” refers to the administrative aspects of the organization, which manages and operates the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, the term “SDF” refers to the operational aspects of the organizations whose mission is the defense of Japan. 2 The Government has made replies regarding civilian control and the role of the civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureaus during the Diet deliberations on the Amendment Act, stating: “Civilian control means prioritizing politics over the military in democratic countries. Civilian control in our country consists of control by the Diet, control by the Cabinet (including the National Security Council), and control within the MOD. Control within the MOD means that the Minister of Defense, a civilian, manages, operates, and controls the SDF. In addition to support from political appointees, such as the State Minister of Defense and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, support from civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureaus also plays an important role in aiding the exercise of civilian control by the Minister of Defense. The role of civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureaus in civilian control is to support the Minister of Defense, and there is no relationship in which civilian officials of the Internal Bureaus issue commands to units ” **Chapter** ----- comprehensive defense administration. In addition to implementing measures to alleviate the impact on local communities hosting bases and inspecting equipment, Regional Defense Bureaus carry out various measures to obtain the understanding and cooperation of both local public entities and local residents towards the MOD/SDF activities. See Part IV, Chapter 5, Section 1 (Collaboration with Local � See Communities) Offi cials meeting held in the offi ce of the Minister of Defense (January 2020) **3 Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas** The MOD has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight locations across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai City, Saitama City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, Hiroshima City, Fukuoka City, and Kadena Town) as its local branch in charge of **Chapter** Offi cials meeting in the form of a video conference (May 2020) Head Offi ce of the Ministry of Defense, wherein the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, Staff Offi ces, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Inspector General's Offi ce of Legal Compliance, and Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, etc. are located (Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo) Video:Overview of SDF activities (record of 2019 by the MOD) URL: https://youtu.be/-QQqerQtxGc ----- |Cabinet|Col2| |---|---| |Prime|Minister| |Minister|of Defense| |---|---| |State Minist|er of Defense| |---|---| **Fig.II-2-2-1** Organizational Chart of the MOD/SDF **Chapter** |Minister’s Secretariat|Bureau of Defense Policy|Bureau of Personnel and Education Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning| |---|---|---| |SDF Ethics Review Board|Central Council on Defense Facilities|Defense Personnel Review Board| |---|---|---| |National Defense Academy|National Defense Medical College|National Institute for Defense Studies| |---|---|---| |Defense Council|Joint Staff|Ground Staff Office|Maritime Staff Office|Air Staff Office|Defense Intelligence Headquarters|Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Units and organizations of the Maritime Self-Defense Force|Units and organizations of the Air Self-Defense Force| |---|---| |SDF Intelligence Security Command|Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Supervised Units of Communication Systems| |---|---| |SDF Physical Training School|SDF Central Hospital|SDF Regional Hospitals|Provincial Cooperation Offices| |---|---|---|---| Cabinet Prime Minister Minister of Defense National Security Council Senior Adviser to State Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to three people) the Minister of Defense Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense Internal Bureaus Councils, etc. Institutions Attached Organizations Units and Organizations Cooperative Units Cooperative Organization *Excluding temporary or special positions Video:GSDF—toward a new dimension URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WzWSOKSknc4 MSDF official PR video ～STRENGTH & READINESS～ URL:https://youtu.be/tqvQCZy9IcY Video:Protecting our Peaceful Sky—six ASDF missions URL:https://youtu.be/QvQxurm0BMQ Video:ATLA official PR video (digest) URL:https://youtu.be/N7iy0vqUUFI ----- **Chapter** |Fig.II-2-2-2|Outline of the MOD/SDF| |---|---| |Organization|Outline| |Internal Bureaus|●Responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the SDF (defense and security affairs, basic conduct of the SDF [political and administrative affairs such as planning and drafting of laws and regulations or government-level policies], personnel affairs, budgets, etc.) ●Composed of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, Bureau of Personnel and Education, and Bureau of Local Cooperation, in addition to the Minister’s Secretariat| |Joint Staff (JS)|●A staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF ●Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs concerning joint operation and making action plans ●The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF are delivered through the Chief of Staff, JS and orders concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the Chief of Staff, JS.| |Ground Staff Office Maritime Staff Office Air Staff Office|●Staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning the duties of each SDF unit ●Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs of each SDF unit and making plans on buildup of defense capabilities, education and training, etc.| |GSDF|●Ground Component Command ・Composed mainly of Airborne Brigades, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigades, etc. ・Assumes unified command over GSDF troops. ●Regional Armies ・Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and antiaircraft artillery groups) ・There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions ●Divisions and Brigades Composed of combat units, combat support units, logistics support units and others| |MSDF|●Self-Defense Fleet ・Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Fleet Submarine Force ・Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations ●Regional Districts There are five regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet| |ASDF|●Air Defense Command ・Composed of four air defense forces ・Primarily responsible for general air defense duties ●Air Defense Force Composed of key units such as air wings (including fighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others)| |National Defense Academy of Japan|●An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel ●Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to master’s or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses)| |National Defense Medical College|●An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel ●An institution for the cultivation of future SDF officers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel ●Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for schools of medicine| |National Institute for Defense Studies|●Organization that functions as a “think tank” of the Ministry of Defense ●Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF ・Conducts research and studies on security ・Conducts research and compiles data on military history ・Management and publication of data on military history ●Educates and trains SDF personnel and other senior officials| |Defense Intelligence Headquarters|●Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects, analyzes and reports on information related to Japan’s national security ・Collects various military information including imagery and geographical information, signal data, and publicized information; comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides intelligence to related organizations within the ministry and relevant ministries and agencies ・Consists of the Directorate for Administration, Directorate for Programs, Directorate for Joint Intelligence, Directorate for Assessment, Directorate for Geospatial Intelligence, and Directorate for Signal Intelligence, as well as six communication sites| |Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance|●Organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position| |Regional Defense Bureau (eight locations nationwide)|●Local Bureaus in charge of comprehensive defense administration in regional areas ・Ensures understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and conducts cost audit, supervision, and inspection related to acquisition of defense facilities, management, construction, taking measures concerning neighborhood of the base, and procurement of equipment ・Consists of eight Regional Defense Bureaus (Hokkaido, Tohoku, North Kanto, South Kanto, Kinki-Chubu, Chugoku-Shikoku, Kyushu and Okinawa)| |Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency|●An external bureau in charge of effective and efficient procurement of defense equipment and international defense equipment and technology cooperation ・Implementation of constant project management throughout the life cycle of defense equipment from an integrated perspective ・Smooth and prompt reflection of each unit's operational needs in equipment procurement ・Proactive initiatives in new areas (further internationalization of defense equipment and investments in advanced technological research, etc.) ・Achievement of procurement reform and maintenance and strengthening of the defense technological and industrial bases at the same time| ----- **Fig. II-2-2-3** Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces **Chapter** Air Development and Test Command Headquarters (Fuchu) Electronics Development and Test Group (Fuchu) Air Communications and Systems Wing (Ichigaya, Each region) Minister of Defense Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Joint Staff Chief of Staff, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, ASDF Ground Staff Office Maritime Staff Office Air Staff Office Ground Component Ground Component Command Headquarters (Asaka) Self-Defense Fleet Fleet Escort Force Escort Flotilla 1 (Yokosuka) Air Defense Command Northern Air Defense Force Command 1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino) Escort Flotilla 2 (Sasebo) Air Defense Command Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (Ainoura) Escort Flotilla 3 (Maizuru) Headquarters (Yokota) 1st Helicopter Brigade (Kisarazu) Escort Flotilla 4 (Kure) System and Signal Brigade (Ichigaya) Fleet Training Command (Yokosuka) Central Readiness Regiment (Utsunomiya) Other units Special Forces Group (Narashino) Other units Fleet Air Force Fleet Air Wing 1 (Kanoya) Northern Army 2nd Division (Asahikawa) Fleet Air Wing 2 (Hachinohe) Central Air Defense Force 5th Brigade (Obihiro) Fleet Air Wing 4 (Ayase) 7th Division (Higashi Chitose) Fleet Air Wing 5 (Naha) 11th Division (Makomanai) Fleet Air Wing 21 (Tateyama) 1st Field Artillery Brigade (Kita Chitose) Fleet Air Wing 22 (Omura) 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Higashi Chitose) Fleet Air Wing 31 (Iwakuni) 3rd Engineer Brigade (Minami Eniwa) Other units Northern Army Combined Brigade (Higashi Chitose) Northern Air Group (Okadama) Fleet Submarine Force Submarine Flotilla 1 (Kure) Western Air Defense Force Other units Submarine Flotilla 2 (Yokosuka) Northeastern Army 6th Division (Jinmachi) Other units 9th Division (Aomori) Northeastern Field Artillery Unit (Sendai) Minesweeper Squadron (Yokosuka) 2nd Engineer Brigade (Funaoka) Fleet Intelligence Command (Yokosuka) Northeastern Army Combined Brigade (Sendai) Oceanography ASW Support Northeastern Air Group (Kasuminome) Command (Yokosuka) Southwestern Other units Fleet Research and Development Air Defense Force Command (Yokosuka) Eastern Army 1st Division (Nerima) Yokosuka District 12th Brigade (Somagahara) 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Matsudo) Kure District 1st Engineer Brigade (Koga) Eastern Army Combined Brigade (Takeyama) Eastern Air Group (Tachikawa) Sasebo District Other units Middle Army 3rd Division (Senzo) Maizuru District 10th Division (Moriyama) 13th Brigade (Kaitaichi) Ominato District Air Support Command Headquarters (Fuchu) 14th Brigade (Zentsuji) Air Support Command 1st Tactical Airlift Wing (Komaki) 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Aonogahara) Air Training Command Air Training Group Shimofusa (Kashiwa) 2nd Tactical Airlift Group (Iruma) 4th Engineer Brigade (Okubo) Air Training Group Tokushima 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing (Miho) Middle Army Combined Brigade (Otsu) (Matsushige-cho, Itano-gun) Air Traffic Control Group (Fuchu, Each region) Middle Field Artillery Unit (Matsuyama) Air Training Group Ozuki (Shimonoseki) Air Weather Group (Fuchu, Each region) Middle Air Group (Yao) Other units Flight Check Squadron (Iruma) Other units Training Squadron Special Airlift Group (Chitose) Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Komaki) Western Army 4th Division (Fukuoka) 8th Division (Kita Kumamoto) Communications Command (Ichigaya) 15th Brigade (Naha) Maritime Materiel Command (Jujo) Air Training Command 1st Air Wing (Hamamatsu) Western Field Artillery Unit (Yufuin) Other units/organizations 4th Air Wing (Matsushima) 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Iizuka) 11th Flying Training Wing (Shizuhama) 5th Engineer Brigade (Ogori) 12th Flying Training Wing (Hofu-kita) Western Army Combined Brigade (Kurume) 13th Flying Training Wing (Ashiya) Western Army Tank Unit (Kusu) Western Air Group (Takayubaru) Fighter Training Group (Nyutabaru) Other units Other units and organizations Training Evaluation Research and Development Command (Meguro) Ground Material Control Command (Jujo) Air Development and Test Command Air Development and Test Wing (Gifu) Other units and organizations Aeromedical Laboratory (Iruma, Tachikawa) Space Operations Squadron (Fuchu) Aero Safety Service Group (Tachikawa) Air Materiel Command (Jujo, Each region) ----- **Fig. II-2-2-4** Location of Principal SDF Units [for illustrative purposes] [As of March 31, 2020] **Chapter** **Ministry of Defense; Joint Staff Office;** **Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Office** **Ground Self-** **Defense Force** Rebuntou **Northern Air** Ground Component Command Headquarters (and Eastern Army Headquarters) WakkanaiWakkanai **Defense Force** Army Headquarters **2nd Division** Division Headquarters / Brigade Headquarters AsahikawaAsahikawa AbashiriAbashiri TobetsuTobetsu Airborne BrigadesAmphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade SapporoSapporo **Northern Northern Army** **5th Brigade5th Brigade** NemuroNemuro MakomanaiMakomanai ObihiroObihiro Helicopter Brigades ChitoseChitose Higashi ChitoseHigashi Chitose **Maritime Self-Maritime Self-** **7th Division7th Division** **Defense ForceDefense Force** OkushiritouOkushiritou **11th Brigade11th Brigade** ErimoErimo Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters **Ominato DistrictOminato District** Headquarters District OminatoOminato Principal Naval Bases AomoriAomori MisawaMisawa Principal Air Bases (Fixed-wing Aircraft Units) HachinoheHachinohe Principal Air Bases (Helicopter Units) **Northeastern ArmyNortheastern Army** KamoKamo **Air Self-Air Self-** YamadaYamada **9th Division9th Division** **Defense ForceDefense Force** Air Defense Command Headquarters JinmachiJinmachi Air Defense Force Headquarters SendaiSendai Fighter Units SadoSado Surface-to Air Guided Missile Units **6th Division6th Division** WajimaWajima Aircraft Control and Warning Units (Radar Site) OtakineyamaOtakineyama **12th Brigade12th Brigade** TakeshimaTakeshima **Eastern ArmyEastern Army** **Maizuru DistrictMaizuru District** KomatsuKomatsu SomagaharaSomagahara **Western Air Defense ForceWestern Air Defense Force** KyogamisakiKyogamisaki **10th Division10th Division** **1st Division1st Division** **Yokosuka DistrictYokosuka District** TakaoyamaTakaoyama GifuGifu IchigayaIchigaya **Central Air Defense ForceCentral Air Defense Force** MaizuruMaizuru **13th Brigade13th Brigade** ItamiItami MoriyamaMoriyama UnishimaUnishimaMishimaMishima KaitaichiKaitaichi **Middle ArmyMiddle Army** SenzoSenzo KasatoriyamaKasatoriyama OmaezakiOmaezaki IwakuniIwakuni KureKure **3rd Division** ZentsujiZentsuji FukuokaFukuoka SefuriyamaSefuriyama **14th Brigade14th Brigade** **SaseboSasebo** AinouraAinoura TsuikiTsuiki KushimotoKushimoto **DistrictDistrict** KasugaKasuga FukuejimaFukuejima SaseboSasebo OmuraOmura **4th Division** **Kure DistrictKure District** KengunKengun Kita KumamotoKita Kumamoto **Western ArmyWestern Army** **8th Division8th Division** NyutabaruNyutabaru ShimokoshikijimaShimokoshikijima TakahatayamaTakahatayama KanoyaKanoya **Southwestern Southwestern** **Air Defense ForceAir Defense Force** HyakuriHyakuri **Southwestern Southwestern** **Air Defense ForceAir Defense Force** IrumaIruma AsakaAsaka NerimaNerima NarashinoNarashino YokotaYokota IchigayaIchigaya OkinoerabujimaOkinoerabujima AtsugiAtsugi FunakoshiFunakoshi KisarazuKisarazu KumejimaKumejima YokosukaYokosuka MineokayamaMineokayama Senkaku IslandsSenkaku Islands NahaNaha YozadakeYozadake **15th Brigade15th Brigade** TateyamaTateyama YonagunijimaYonagunijima MiyakojimaMiyakojima ----- **❷** **[Joint Operations System of the SDF]** In order to rapidly and effectively fulfill the duties of the SDF, the MOD/SDF has adopted the joint operations system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF are operated integrally. Furthermore, in the future, it will work toward building an architecture that is capable of realizing crossdomain operations including new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum. **1 Outline of Joint Operations System** **(2)Relationship between Chief of Joint Staff, and Other Chiefs** **of Staff** The Joint Staff undertakes functions relating to the operations of the SDF, while the Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Offices undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel affairs, building-up defense capability, and education and training. See Fig. II-2-2-5 (Operational System of the SDF and Roles of � See the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces) **2 Strengthening Joint Operational Functions** **(1) Role of Chief of Joint Staff** a. The Chief of Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and centrally supports the MOD on SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective. b. The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF are delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff, and orders concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Minister’s commands and orders are delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force[3] is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to respond. **Chapter** **(1) Past Initiatives** In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operations of the SDF and to make the process swifter, in October 2015, the Bureau of Operational Policy was abolished and some of its functions, such as the planning and drafting of laws and regulations relating to unit operations, were transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to unite affairs concerning actual operations of the units into the Joint Staff. This change has made the Joint Staff assume Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and **Fig. II-2-2-5** Air Self-Defense Forces |Responsibilities for affairs other than force operations (such as human resources, education, training,* buildup of defense capabilities) Force provider|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Chief of Staff, GSDF|Chief of Staff, MSDF|Chief of Staff, ASDF| |Ground Staff Office|Maritime Joint Staff Office|Air Staff Office| Mobilization unit Close coordination among the Chiefs of Staff The Commander of the Ground - Chief of Staff, Joint Staff clearly Joint Task Force Component Command, Commanding indicates the integrated policies for rear - Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF assists in rear support and other activities during operations |Mobilization unit|Col2| |---|---| |Joint Task Force Commander|The Commander of the Ground Component Command, Commanding General, Army and Others| |Commander, Self-Defense Fleet and Others|Commander, Air Defense Command and Others| Prime Minister Minister of Defense Chain of command for operations Responsibilities for force operations Force user Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Joint Staff Basic Rule for Joint Operation - The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff solely assists the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert’s viewpoint Mobilization unit - The Minister of Defense commands The Commander of the Ground Joint Task Force SDF operations through the Chief Component Command, Commanding Commander of Staff, Joint Staff General, Army and Others - The Minister of Defense’s orders to Commander, Self-Defense Commander, Air Defense the SDF are executed by the Chief Fleet and Others Command and Others of Staff, Joint Staff *The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff is responsible for joint training This applies to the case in which a special unit is organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops are placed partly under the authority of a commander outside of their usual d t t b d A ti l 22 h 1 2 f th SDF L d f t it d f th t it f th GSDF th MSDF th ASDF ----- work that the Internal Bureaus had previously conducted, such as external explanations, including replies at the Diet, and communication and coordination with related ministries and governmental agencies. Regarding this work, therefore, the Administrative Vice Chief of Joint Staff, a Vice-Chief of Joint Staff level post for civilian offi cials, and the Joint Staff Councilor, a post for civilian offi cials at the level of a division director and department director general have been established to conduct external coordination duties, etc., taking advantage of the expertise of civilian offi cials concerning actual operations of the units. **(2) Future Initiatives** In order to realize cross-domain operations, the Joint Staff’s posture designed for effi cient SDF operations and for new domains will be strengthened, thereby enabling swift and effective exercise of the SDF’s total capabilities. In addition, the future framework for joint operations will be examined. **Chapter** **Column** Duties of the Self Defense Forces The Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces are national 2). The former includes public security operations that police administrative entities and obviously require a legal basis in entities cannot handle alone, maritime security operations, carrying out their respective duties. The Act for Establishment destruction measures against ballistic missiles and other of the Ministry of Defense defi nes the administrative scope weapons, and measures against intrusion of territorial airspace. of the Ministry of Defense, and Article 5 of the Act states that The latter covers responses to situations that will have an the Self Defense Forces Law determines the duties, actions, important infl uence (logistics support activities), international and authority of the Self Defense Forces. The Self Defense peace cooperation activities (international peace cooperation Forces Law provides a list (similar to an index) of what the Self operations and international disaster relief operations), and Defense Forces are allowed to do in accordance with specifi ed activities related to Internationally Coordinated Operations procedures to address various situations. for Peace and Security (Cooperation and Support Activities, Article 3 in the Self Defense Forces Law divides the duties etc.). These main and secondary duties are jointly known as of the Self Defense Forces into main duties (item 1 of the “inherent duties.” same article) and secondary duties (items 1 and 2 of the same Activities handled by the Self Defense Forces on the article). Defense actions to defend Japan correspond to main basis that it is appropriate to utilize skills, experience, and duties, and only the Self Defense Forces carry out these duties. organizational functions cultivated by the Self Defense Forces Secondary duties consist of “duties for maintaining public over many years are known as “additional duties” (separate order as necessary” (secondary duties under item 1) and duties from inherent duties). These include transportation for national defi ned by other laws “to an extent that does not interfere with guests, education and training consignments, and cooperation performance of the main duties” (secondary duties under item with athletic events. **Overview of the Self Defense Forces’ duties** Defense of Japan (Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’ s peace, independence, and national security) Sustaining public order (Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’ s public peace and protects the lives and assets of Japanese people (including mine disposal and Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas)) Responses to situations that will have an important influence (Activities that contribute to Japan’ s peace and security through responses to situations that will have an important influence) International peace cooperation activities Responding to situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing. (Activities that contribute to maintaining peace and security in international society, including Japan, through promotion of international cooperation) ----- **Japan s Security and Defense** **Policy** ###### 3 **Section** **Outline of the National Security Strategy (NSS)** **1** **❶ [Japan’s National Security Policy Framework]** The NSS approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December of 2013 represents Japan’s fi rst ever basic policy on national security with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy. The NSS defi nes approaches that Japan should follow based on a long-term view of its national interests. It replaces the Basic Policy on National Defense, which had served as the basis for Japan’s defense policies theretofore. The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which was established based on the NSS, defi nes basic policies for Japan’s future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specifi c Self-Defense Forces (SDF) equipment. The NDPG was formulated with a medium-to-long-term outlook because the acquisition of defense equipment and the establishment of troop operational systems cannot be accomplished overnight and requires many years of planning. The NSS and NDPG are mainly designed for the next decade or so. The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) specifi es a maximum budget and the amount of mainstay defense equipment to be acquired over the subsequent fi ve-year period in order to achieve the defense capability targets defi ned in the NDPG. The fi scal year budget is drawn on the MTDP substantiated as projects, and the necessary expenses for each fi scal year will be appropriated based on relevant situations. To date, the NDPG has contained mention of nationwide basic security policies focusing on defense policy to a certain extent. The NSS carries great meaning as the defi nitive statement of the Government’s basic policy on national security, with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy. **Chapter** ❷ **[Outline of the NSS: Proactive Contribution to Peace]** Japan is committed to continuing the path it has followed to date as a peace-loving nation and, as a major player in international politics and business, it also seeks its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region from the perspective of a Proactive Contribution to Peace. Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community. In achieving the aforementioned fundamental principle of national security, the NSS makes national interests and goals clear, and demonstrates a strategic approach that needs to be employed. See Fig. II-3-1-1 (Relationship among the NSS, the NDPG, the MTDP, and the fi scal year budget) Fig. II-3-1-2 (Outline of the NSS) Reference 1 (National Security Strategy [Outline]) ----- Relationship among the NSS, the NDPG, the **Fig. II-3-1-1** MTDP, and the fi scal year budget Basic Policy on National Security, centered around diplomatic and defense policies (approx. 10-year time frame) Prescribes future defense force and target levels of defense force that Japan should achieve (approx. 10-year time frame) NSS Based on NSS NDPG Achieve target defense capabilities prescribed MTDP Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures and quantity of major equipment Examine based on the current situations, appropriate annual budget as necessary Appropriate budget, develop specific projects Annual budget **Chapter** |Fig. II-3-1-2 Outline of the NSS|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Fundamental Principle of National Security = Proactive Contribution to Peace Based on the Principle of International Cooperation|||| |National Interests||◇Maintain Japan’s peace and security, and ensure its survival ◇Consolidate Japan’s peace and security ◇Maintain and protect international order based on universal values and rules|| |Objectives||◇Reinforce necessary deterrence and prevent direct threats to Japan ◇ Improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacifi c region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce threats through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside of the region ◇Improve the global security environment and build a prosperous international community|| |Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security|||| |1|Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles||●Strengthen diplomacy ●Build a comprehensive defense architecture ●Strengthen efforts for the protection of Japan’s territorial integrity ●Ensure maritime security ●Strengthen cybersecurity ●Strengthen measures against international terrorism ●Enhance intelligence capabilities ●Defense equipment and technology cooperation ●Ensure the stable use of outer space and promote its use for security purposes ●Strengthen technological capabilities| |2|Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance||●Further strengthen the security and defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. ●Ensure a stable presence of the U.S. Forces| |3|Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community||●Enhance the cooperative relations with the ROK, Australia, ASEAN countries, and India ●Establish a “Mutually Benefi cial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” with China ●Encourage North Korea to take concrete actions to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missiles issues ●Advance cooperation with Russia in all areas ●Actively utilize regional and trilateral cooperation frameworks ●Cooperate with partners of the Asia-Pacifi c region ●Cooperate with countries outside the Asia-Pacifi c region| |4|Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community||●Strengthen diplomacy at the United Nations ●Strengthen the rule of law ●Lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation ●Promote international peace cooperation ●Promote international cooperation against global terrorism| |5|Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues||● Share universal values; address development issues and realize “human security”; cooperate with human resource development efforts in developing countries; maintain and strengthen the free trade system; respond to energy and environmental issues; enhance people-to-people exchanges| |6|Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding||●Maintain and enhance defense production and technological bases ●Boosting communication capabilities ●Social base ●Enhancing the intellectual base| ----- **Section** **Outline of NDPG** **2** Since it was fi rst formulated in 1976, the NDPG has been established six times. The Current NDPG was formulated as “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (2018 NDPG)” in December 2018. See Fig. II-3-2-1 (Changes in the NDPG) See - **❶ [Basic Approach—Building a Multi-Domain Defense Force]** Japan’s security environment is becoming more testing and is capable of bolstering the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than expected when to deter and counter threats and promoting multi-faceted and the 2013 NDPG[1] were formulated. On such basis, the current multi-layered security cooperation. NDPG indicates that Japan will build a “Multi-Domain In particular, as capabilities in new domains, which are Defense Force” with a truly effective defense capability that: space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, could (i) can execute cross-domain operations, which organically substantially enhance the military’s overall capabilities to fuse capabilities in all domains, including not only traditional conduct operations, states are exerting efforts to improve domains—land, sea and air—but also new domains—space, capabilities in these fi elds. Japan will also focus on enhancing cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum—, to generate such capabilities as well as capabilities to effectively counter synergy and amplify the overall strength; (ii) is capable of attacks by aircraft, ships, and missiles in combination sustained conduct of fl exible and strategic activities during therewith, and enhancing the sustainability and resiliency of all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies; and (iii) defense capability, including logistics support. **Fig. II-3-2-1** Changes in the NDPG Background 1976 NDPG **○ Détente and Cold War coexisting in global community** Basic ideas in 1976 NDPG (October 29, 1976, the National Defense Council/Cabinet Meeting) **○ ○ the Soviet Union in the vicinity of JapanBalanced relationship among the United States, China, andNeed to show the target of defense force buildup** **・・ The concept of Basic Defense Capability Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat to Japan** **Chapter** Background **○ The end of Cold War** **○ International situation with unpredictability and uncertainty** **○ National expectations to international contribution** Background **○ New threats such as international terrorism and ballistic missile attacks** **○ Direct connection between world peace and Japan’s peace** **○ Necessity to convert the policy from putting weight on deterrence to** handling the situation |19 years|Col2| |---|---| |1995 NDPG|| (November 28, 1995, the Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) |9 years|Col2| |---|---| |2004 NDPG|| (December 10, 2004, the Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) Background **○ Change in global power balance** **○ Complex military situation surrounding Japan** **○ Diversification of the military role in global society** Background **○ Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe** **○ U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region** **○ Lessons learned from the Self-Defense Forces experience of** the Great East Japan Earthquake |6 years|Col2| |---|---| |2010 NDPG|| (December 17, 2010, the Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) |3 years|Col2| |---|---| |2013 NDPG|| (December 17, 2013, the National Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) Background **○ Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly** severe and uncertain at extremely high speeds **○ Rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space,** cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum **○ Clear trends observed in further military build-up and increase in** military activities |5 years|Col2| |---|---| |2018 NDPG|| (December 18, 2018, the National Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) |Basic ideas in 1976 NDPG|Col2| |---|---| |・ The concept of Basic Defense Capability ・ Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat to Japan|| |Basic ideas in 1995 NDPG|| |・ Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability ・ “Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing to building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of “defense of the nation”|| |Basic ideas in 2004 NDPG|| |・ Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies ・ Succeeding the effective parts of the concept of Basic Defense Capability|| |Basic ideas in 2010 NDPG|| |・ Build up of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic Defense Capability) ・ Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner|| |Basic ideas in 2013 NDPG|| |・ Build up of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force ・ Defense force to be more thorough with the concept of joint operation, which enables the SDF to respond swiftly to the increasingly severe security environment and carry out various activities, such as achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority, seamlessly and flexibly|| |Basic ideas in 2018 NDPG|| |・ Development of “Multi-domain Defense Force” ・ Truly effective defense capability that enables cross-domain operations organically fusing capabilities in all domains by strengthening not only those in traditional domains—land, sea and air—but also those in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum|| N ti l D f P G id li f FY2014 d b d ( d b th N ti l S it C il d th C bi t D b 17 2013) ----- **❷ [Japan’s Basic Defense Policy]** The NDPG provides the basic policy of Japan’s defense as follows: **1 Basic Policy** science & technology, and also promote measures concerning the formulation of international norms in fi elds such as space and cyberspace. Japan will also further advance steady-state efforts such as strategic communications. In order to address a range of situations including armed contingencies and “gray-zone” situations, Japan further needs to seamlessly deal with various situations in a coherent, wholeof-government manner by way of swift and pertinent decisionmaking under even stronger political leadership, which will be assisted by an enhanced support mechanism. In addition, Japan will also strengthen organization for disaster response and civil protection, build a posture prepared to evacuate Japanese nationals overseas during emergencies and to ensure their safety, and promote measures to protect infrastructure critical to people’s daily lives, such as electricity and communication, as well as to protect cyberspace. In addition to this comprehensive defense system, it is important to build the Multi-Domain Defense Force and fulfi ll various roles during peacetime using the defense force seamlessly and in a combined manner. See Fig. II-3-2-2 (Roles to Be Fulfi lled by Defense Force) See **3 Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance** In line with the NSS and from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” Japan has enhanced its diplomatic strength and defense capability. Japan has also promoted cooperative relationships with other countries, with the JapanU.S. Alliance being a cornerstone. In so doing, Japan under the Constitution has adhered to the basic precept of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, ensured civilian control of the military, and observed the Three NonNuclear Principles. Based on this premise, Japan, even amid the realities of a security environment it has hitherto never faced, must strive to preserve national interests identifi ed in the NSS—defend to the end Japanese nationals’ lives, persons and property, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence. Defense objectives are to create a desirable security environment while deterring threats from reaching, and, should a threat reach Japan, to counter the threat. To this end Japan will strengthen: (1) Japan’s own architecture for national defense; (2) the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and (3) international security cooperation. These efforts, including achieving superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, must be carried out swiftly and fl exibly. In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential: Japan will closely cooperate with the United States. To deal with the threat, Japan will also increase its own efforts. At the same time, Japan will play an active and positive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. **2 Strengthening Japan’s Own Architecture for** National Defense **Chapter** The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security, and the JapanU.S. Alliance plays a significant role for the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. In this context, Japan needs to press ahead with such efforts as bolstering the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats, enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas, and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan. **4 Strengthening Security Cooperation** In order to squarely address the realities of a security environment that it has hitherto never faced and to securely achieve national defense objectives, Japan will build a national defense architecture that will, in all phases, integrate the strengths at the nation’s disposal, enabling not only the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF efforts but also coherent, whole-of-government efforts, as well as cooperation with local governments and private entities. In particular, Japan will accelerate its efforts and cooperation in such fi elds as space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, ocean, and In line with the vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacifi c,” Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account the characteristics and situation specifi c to each region and country. As part of such efforts, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to work on defense cooperation and exchanges which include bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and service-to-service exchanges. Furthermore, Japan will also contribute to address global ----- |Fig. II-3-2-2 Roles|to Be Fulfilled by Defense Force| |---|---| |Role|Outline| |From peacetime to “gray-zone” situations|●The SDF will, in close integration with diplomacy, promote strategic communications including bilateral/multilateral training/ exercises and overseas port visits on a steady-state basis. ●The SDF will conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities around Japan. The SDF will prevent the occurrence or escalation of emergencies by employing flexible deterrent options and other measures. ●The SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies, immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate Japan’s sovereignty including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters.| |Attack against Japan including its remote islands|●The SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime and air superiority. ●Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. ●Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures. ●Against airborne attack by missiles and aircraft, the SDF will respond in a swift and sustained manner by applying optimal means and minimize damage to maintain SDF’s capabilities as well as the infrastructure upon which such capabilities are employed. ●In response to attack by guerrillas or special operations forces, SDF will protect critical facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy infiltrating forces.| |Space, cyber and electromagnetic domains during all phases|●To prevent any actions that impede its activities, the SDF will conduct, on a steady-state basis, persistent monitoring as well as collection and analysis of relevant information. ●In case of an event that impedes its activities, the SDF will promptly take such measures as damage limitation and recovery. ●In case of armed attack against Japan, the SDF will block and eliminate the attack by leveraging capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. ●SDF will contribute to comprehensive, whole-of-government efforts concerning these domains under appropriate partnership and shared responsibility with relevant organizations.| |Large-scale disasters|●The SDF will swiftly transport and deploy requisite units to take all necessary measures for initial response, and, as required, maintain its posture for disaster response for a longer term. ●The SDF will carefully address the needs of affected citizens and local governments. ●The SDF will engage in life saving, temporary repair and livelihood support in appropriate partnership and cooperation with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector.| |Collaboration with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance|●In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, Japan will effectively conduct activities by playing on its initiative its own roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance.| |Promotion of security cooperation|●SDF will strategically promote defense cooperation and exchanges such as joint training and exercises, cooperation in defense equipment and technologies, capacity building assistance, and service-to-service exchange.| security challenges. In implementing these initiatives, Japan will position the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone and will work closely with the countries that share universal **Chapter** values and security interests, through full coordination with its diplomatic policy. **❸ [Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability]** For priority capability areas in strengthening defense reforms. capability, the NDPG sets forth that Japan will develop those See Fig. II-3-2-3 (Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities areas as early as possible, allocating resources flexibly and Necessary for Cross-domain Operations) intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation, and undertake necessary fundamental **❹ [Organization of the SDF]** The NDPG states that, in order to realize cross-domain operations, including in the new domains of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, the SDF will strengthen joint operations as described in 1 and develop the organization of each SDF service as described in sections from 2 to 4. The current Medium Term Defense Program also includes reorganization of the major SDF units based on the above. See Fig. II-3-2-4 (Transition of the NDPG Annex Tables) **1 Joint Operation to Realize Cross-Domain** Operations In order to further promote jointness of the Ground SelfDefense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) in all areas, the SDF will implement such measures as strengthening the Joint Staff Office’s necessary posture. With regard to the space domain, the SDF will establish a space domain mission unit with ASDF, and strengthen its posture for joint operations. ----- **Chapter** |Fig. II-3-2-3 Priorit|ties in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-domain Operations| |---|---| |Capabilities that should be acquired and strengthened|Outline| |Capabilities in space domain|●The SDF will improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities. The SDF will also build a structure to conduct persistent space situation monitoring. To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, the SDF will work to strengthen capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information. ●The SDF will work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies and with the United States and other relevant countries. The SDF will also engage in the creation of units specializing in space and develop human resources.| |Capabilities in cyber domain|●In order to prevent attack against SDF’s command and communications systems and networks, SDF will continue to strengthen capabilities for persistent monitoring of them as well as for damage limitation and recovery in case of attack. ●The SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack. ●The SDF will significantly expand its human resources with specialized expertise and skills, and contribute to whole-of-government efforts.| |Capabilities in electromagnetic domain|●The SDF will work to enhance information and communications capabilities as well as information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetics, and develop an information sharing posture. The SDF will improve capabilities to minimize the effect of opponent’s electronic jamming. ●The SDF will strengthen capabilities to neutralize radar and communications of opponent who intends to invade Japan. ●In order to smoothly perform these activities, the SDF will enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum.| |Capabilities in maritime and air domains|●The SDF will reinforce its posture for conducting persistent ISR at sea and in the air around Japan. ●The SDF will also strengthen surface and underwater operational capabilities including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV). ●By taking measures such as developing a fighter force structure that features Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fighter aircraft, the SDF will improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. ●Japan will take necessary measures to enable STOVL fighter aircraft to operate from existing SDF ships as required.| |Stand-off defense capability|●The SDF will acquire stand-off firepower and other requisite capabilities to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan including remote islands from the outside of their threat envelopes. ●In order to appropriately leverage advances in military technologies, Japan will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive research and development of related technologies.| |Comprehensive air and missile defense capability|●In order to counter diverse airborne threats of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, the SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection and also enhancing the capability to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. The SDF will also study ways to counter future airborne threats.| |Maneuver and deployment capability|●Requisite SDF units need to conduct sustained, persistent activities in appropriate areas on a steady-state basis. In order to maneuver and deploy according to situation, the SDF will strengthen amphibious operation and other capabilities. ●To enable swift and large-scale transport, the SDF will strengthen joint transport capability including inter- and intra-theater transport capabilities tailored to the characteristics of remote island areas. The SDF will also work to collaborate with commercial transport on a steady-state basis.| |Sustainability and resiliency|●The SDF will take necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure. In particular, while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, the SDF will improve sustainability through safe and steady acquisition and stockpiling of ammunition and fuel. ●The SDF will also improve resiliency in a multi-layered way through efforts including dispersion, recovery from damage, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. Further, the SDF will review existing equipment maintenance methods, thereby ensuring high operational availability.| As for the cyber domain, the SDF will maintain a Cyber Defense Unit as a joint unit in order to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capability. In respect to the electromagnetic spectrum domain, the SDF will strengthen the posture of the Joint Staff Office and of each SDF service. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units and ballistic missile defense units, the MSDF will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers, the ASDF will maintain surface-toair guided missile unit, and the SDF will build comprehensive air and missile defense capability comprising these assets. The SDF will maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and be deployed in joint operations. **2 Organization of the GSDF** In order to be able to swiftly respond to various situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. The GSDF will also maintain mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions, in order to effectively perform operations such as: various missions in cyber and electromagnetic domains. The GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats to remote islands by taking measures including persistent steady-state maneuvers and stationing of units. To be able to counter an invasion, the GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense. The GSDF will review their organization and equipment with a focus on tanks, howitzers and rockets. The GSDF will also review their organization and equipment related to aerial ----- **Fig. II-3-2-4** Transition of the NDPG Annex Tables **Chapter** |Col1|Category|Col3|1976 NDPG|1995 NDPG|2004 NDPG|2010 NDPG|2013 NDPG|2018 NDPG| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Joint Units|Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units|||||||1 squadron 1 group| |GSDF|Authorized Number of Personnel Active-Duty Personnel Ready Reserve Personnel||180,000|160,000 145,000 15,000|155,000 148,000 7,000|154,000 147,000 7,000|159,000 151,000 8,000|159,000 151,000 8,000| ||Major Units|Regional Deployment Units1|12 divisions 2 combined brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|5 divisions 2 brigades|5 divisions 2 brigades| |||Rapid Deployment Units|1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training group 1 helicopter brigade|1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade|1 armored division Central Readiness Force|Central Readiness Force 1 armored division|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units|||||5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| |||Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands Units||||||2 battalions| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments| |||Ballistic Missile Defense Units||||||2 squadrons| ||Major Equipment|Tanks2 Artillery (Main artillery)2|(approx. 1,200) (approx. 1,000/vehicle)|approx. 900 (approx. 900/vehicle)|approx. 600 (approx. 600/vehicle)|approx. 400 approx. 400/vehicle|(approx. 300) (approx. 300/vehicle)|(approx. 300) (approx. 300/vehicle)| |MSDF|Major Units|Destroyers Destroyer and minesweeper vessels For mobile operations7 Regional deployment7 Submarine Units Minesweeper Units Patrol Aircraft Units|4 flotillas (Regional units) 10 units 6 divisions 2 flotillas (Land-based) 16|4 flotillas (Regional units) 7 units 6 divisions 1 flotilla (Land-based) 13|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 4 flotillas 6 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 flotillas 6 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|4 groups (8 divisions) 2 groups (13 divisions) 6 divisions 9 squadrons| ||Major Equipment|Destroyers Submarines Patrol vessels Combat aircraft|approx. 60 16 approx. 220|approx. 50 16 approx. 170|47 16 approx. 150|48 22 approx. 150|54 22 approx. 170|54 22 12 approx. 190| |ASDF|Major Units|Air Warning & Control Units|28 warning groups 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons)| |||Fighter Aircraft Units Fighter-Interceptor Units Support Fighter Units|10 squadrons 3 squadrons|9 squadrons 3 squadrons|12 squadrons|12 squadrons|13 squadrons|13 squadrons6| |||Air Reconnaissance Units|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron||| |||Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units|3 squadrons|3 squadrons|1 squadron 3 squadrons|1 squadron 3 squadrons|2 squadrons 3 squadrons|2 squadrons 3 squadrons| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|6 fire groups|6 fire groups|6 fire groups|6 fire groups|6 fire groups|4 frie groups (24 frie squadrons)| |||Space Domain Mission Units||||||1 squadron| |||Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units||||||1 squadron| ||Major Equipmen|Combat aircraft (Fighters)|approx. 430 (approx. 350)3|approx. 400 approx. 300|approx. 350 approx. 260|approx. 340 approx. 260|approx. 360 approx. 280|approx. 370 approx. 290| |Major Equipment/ Units that may also serve for BMD missions4||Aegis-equipped Destroyers|||4 ships|6 ships5|8 ships|8 ships| |||Air Warning & Control Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|||7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons 3 groups|11 warning groups/units 6 groups||| Notes: 1. Units that were categorized as those deployed in a steady state (peacetime) until 2010 NDPG 2. Data on tanks and artillery were not included in 1976 NDPG, 2013 NDPG and 2018 NDPG, but are shown here for making comparisons with Annex Tables for 1995 NDPG up to 2010 NDPG. 3. Data on fighters were not included in 1976 NDPG but are shown here for making comparisons with Annex Tables for 1995 NDPG up to 2018 NDPG. 4. Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions were included in MSDF’s major equipment or ASDF’s major units in 2004 NDPG and 2010 NDPG, but those newly procured are included in the categories of Aegis-equipped destroyers, Air Warning & Control Units, and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units in 2013 NDPG and 2018 NDPG. 5. In 2010 NDPG, Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD functions were allowed to be additionally procured within the limited number of destroyers above, when separately determined in light of the progress in BMD technologies and financial circumstances. 6. Including Fighter Aircraft Units consisting of STOVL aircraft 7. Destroyers were expressed as Anti-submarine Surface Units (for mobile operations) or Anti-submarine Surface Units (regional units) in 1976 NDPG, as Destroyers (for mobile operations) or Destroyers (regional units) in 1995 NDPG, and as Destroyers (for mobile operations) or Destroyers (regional deployment) in 2004 NDPG. ----- firepower. The GSDF will thoroughly implement rationalization and streamlining of these units and appropriately position them to meet the conditions and characteristics of each region. The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at 159,000. **3 Organization of the MSDF** in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units. **4 Organization of the ASDF** The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of ground-based warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units: ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting surveillance in vast airspace on the Pacific side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting sustained airborne warning, surveillance and control also during situations with heightened tensions. The ASDF will reinforce and maintain fighter aircraft units and aerial refueling and transport units. The ASDF will maintain air transport units which enable it to effectively carry out activities such as maneuver and deployment of ground forces. The ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units which enable it to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions. The MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including destroyers with improved multi-mission capabilities (FFM), minesweeper units, and embarked patrol helicopter units. The MSDF will organize surface units composed of these units. In addition, the MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan. In order to conduct underwater Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and to engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units. By introducing a testbed submarine, the MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense **Chapter** - **❺ [Elements Supporting Defense Capability]** The NDPG sets forth that the initiatives related to elements for Japan’s defense capability to demonstrate its true value. supporting defense capability will be emphasized in order See Fig. II-3-2-5 (Elements Supporting Defense Capability) |Fig. II-3-2-5 E|Elements Supporting Defense Capability| |---|---| |Element|Outline| |Training and exercises|●The SDF will expand the establishment and utilization of the domestic training areas and conduct effective training and exercises. ●The SDF will facilitate joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas. ●The SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas such as the United States and Australia. ●The MOD/SDF will reinforce coordination with relevant agencies including police, firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard.| |Medical Care|●The MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture for medical care and onward transfer of patients, seamlessly covering the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations. ●The SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical system through endeavors such as upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. ●The SDF will proceed to improve the management of the National Defense Medical College, enhance its research functions and strive to secure high-quality talents, as well as striving to better secure the number of medical officers.| |Collaboration with Local Communities|●The MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities, and will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities. ●Upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases, the MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics, so as to be able to gain the understanding of the local governments and residents.| |Intellectual Base|●The MOD/SDF will strive to dispatch instructors to educational institutions and hold public symposiums so as to enable the public to recognize knowledge and information about securities policies accurately, and will also endeavor to provide efficient and highly trustworthy information. ●The MOD/SDF will expand networks and institutional collaboration with research and education organizations, universities, and think- tanks in Japan and abroad in order to further strengthen the research system of the MOD/SDF with the National Institute for Defense Studies playing central roles.| ----- **❶ [Program Guidelines]** **Section** **Outline of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023)** **3** The current MTDP formulated in December 2018 indicates that the SDF will endeavor to build up defense capability based on the fi ve basic policies, in accordance with the NDPG. Specifi cally, the SDF will strengthen its structure and capability based on the “Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capabilities” and “Structure of the SDF” of the NDPG. See Fig. II-3-2-3 (Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities See Necessary for Cross-domain Operations) Fig. II-3-3-1 (Five Basic Policies of the MTDP) Fig. II-3-3-2 (Projects pertaining to the Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Essential for Cross-domain Operations) **Chapter** |Fig. II-3-3-1 Five Basic Policies of the MTDP|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Five Basic Policies of the MTDP in accordance with the NDPG||| |1|Acquiring and Strengthening Capabilities Essential for Realizing Cross-domain Operations|●The SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. ●The SDF will strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information (C4I) capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones. ●The SDF will enhance capabilities in traditional domains, such as capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability and maneuver and deployment capability. ●The SDF will enhance sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support.| |2|Improving the Effi ciency of Acquisition of Equipment and Reinforcing the Technology Base|●In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, the MOD/SDF will effi ciently secure defense capability in necessary and suffi cient “quality” and “quantity.” ●The MOD/SDF will strive to reduce the life-cycle costs and improve cost-effectiveness by reinforcing project management. ●The MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in cutting-edge technologies. The MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten R&D timelines by streamlining its processes and procedures.| |3|Reinforcing Human Resource Base|●The MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce human resource base such as securing diverse and high-quality talents including diversifying applicant pool, promoting women’s participation and leveraging SDF Reserve Personnel, improving living and work environment, promoting work style reforms, and improving treatment, etc.| |4|Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and Security Cooperation|●Japan will further promote a variety of cooperative activities and consultations with the United States, in a wide range of areas under “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” Japan will also actively facilitate measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. ●In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacifi c, to strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, Japan will promote defense cooperation and exchanges which include bilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interchanges among military branches.| |5|Greater Effi ciency and Streamlining in the Build-Up of Defense Capability|●With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, the SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills, by achieving effi ciency and rationalization. ●Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and the importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, the MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater effi ciency and streamlining in defense force development while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government.| |Fig. II-3-3-2 Projects pertaining to t|Col2|the Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Essential for Cross-domain Operations| |---|---|---| |Category||Main Programs| |Space, cyber and electromagnetic domains|Space domain|○Establishment of Space Operations Squadron ○Development of the Space Situational Awareness System| ||Cyber domain|○Enhancement of structure for Cyber Defense Group, etc. ○Improvement of the survivability of SDF’s command and communications systems and networks| ||Electromagnetic domain|○Establishment of new specialized units in internal subdivisions and the Joint Staff Offi ce ○Installation of electronic data collectors and ground radio wave measuring apparatuses| |Traditional domains|Maritime and air domains|○Procurement of new types of destroyers (FFM), submarines, patrol vessels, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), patrol helicopters (SH-60K, SH-60K upgraded capability), and carrier-borne unmanned aerial vehicles ○Increase of F-35A, introduction of F-35B, refurbishment of Izumo-type destroyers, and enhancement of abilities of F-15| ||Stand-off defense capability|○Procurement of stand-off missiles (JSM, JASSM, and LRASM) ○Promotion of R&D concerning hyper velocity gliding projectiles intended for the defense of remote islands| ||Comprehensive air and missile defense capability|○Enhancement of abilities of Aegis destroyers and Patriot surface-to-air guided missiles| ||Maneuver and deployment capability|○Procurement of transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA), and introduction of new utility helicopters ○Promotion of efforts to obtain cooperation from related local governments for persistent deployment of GSDF Osprey aircraft (V-22)| ||Securing continuous operations|○Preferential procurement of anti-aircraft missiles, torpedoes, stand-off fi repower, and interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense ○Promotion of efforts for dispersion, recovery from damage, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for the SDF operations| resiliency Ensuring the operational - Securing of a suffi cient budget for maintenance of equipment availability of equipment - Expansion of PBL (Performance Based Logistics) and other umbrella contracts ----- **❷ [Quantities of Major Procurement]** The Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) shows details of the quantities of major procurement. See Fig. II-3-3-3 (Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023) and See Unit Prices of the Equipment Items Listed on the Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023)) |Fig. II-3-3-3 Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023) and Unit Prices of the Equipment Items Listed on (FY2019-FY2023)|Col2|Col3|the Annex Table of the MTDP| |---|---|---|---| |Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023)|||Unit Prices of the Equipment Items Listed on the Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023)| |Service|Equipment|Quantity|Unit prices (*1)| |GSDF|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles New Utility Helicopters Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Land-based Aegis Systems (Aegis Ashore) Tanks Howitzers (excluding mortars)|134 29 34 3 3 companies (*3) 5 companies 2 30 40|Approx. 0.8 billion yen (*2) Approx. 1.8 billion yen Approx. 8.9 billion yen Approx. 5.6 billion yen (*4) Approx. 14.3 billion yen (*4) Approx. 122.4 billion yen Approx. 1.5 billion yen Approx. 0.7 billion yen| |MSDF|Destroyers Submarines Patrol Vessels Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K/K (Upgraded Capability)) Ship-Borne Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Minesweeping and Transport Helicopters (MCH-101)|10 5 4 4 23 (Approx. 66,000 tons) 12 13 3 1|Approx. 47.6 billion yen Approx. 64.7 billion yen (*2) (*5) ― ― Approx. 22.1 billion yen Approx. 7.3 billion yen (*2) (*2) Approx. 7.3 billion yen| |ASDF|Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft (E-2D) Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Upgrade (F-15) Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft (KC-46A) Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Global Hawk)|9 45 20 4 5 4 groups (16 fi re squadrons) 1|Approx. 26.2 billion yen Approx. 11.6 billion yen Approx. 3.5 billion yen Approx. 24.9 billion yen Approx. 22.3 billion yen Approx. 4.5 billion yen (*6) Approx. 17.3 billion yen (*7)| 1. Japan will basically pursue the establishment of 75 Patrol Helicopters and 20 Ship-borne UAVs at the completion of the “NDPG for FY2019 and beyond”, but those exact numbers will be considered during the period of the “MTDP (FY2019-FY2023).” 2. 18 aircraft out of 45 aircraft of Fighters (F-35A) would have STOVLs. *1 Prices are on a contract basis (prices for FY2018) and are the MOD’s estimates as of the time of establishing the MTDP. *2 Information on equipment items under development and equipment items, etc. subject to model selection (including STOVL fi ghter aircraft) is not disclosed, as information disclosure may affect the proper acquisition of these equipment items in the future. *3 The quantity of surface-to-ship guided missiles includes that of improved ones under development. *4 Regarding surface-to-ship guided missiles and mid-range surface-to-air guided missiles, the maximum unit prices are indicated, as unit prices vary by acquisition year due to differences in components. *5 Other ships are minesweeping vessels, ocean surveillance ships, and oceanographic research ships, and their unit prices are approximately 16.2 billion yen, 22.1 billion yen, and 20.3 billion yen, respectively. *6 Assembly cost for 16 fi re squadrons is scheduled to be allocated during the period of the MTDP. The unit price above is for one fi re squadron. *7 Assembly cost for one Global Hawk is scheduled to be allocated during the period of the MTDP. **Chapter** **❸ [Expenditures]** The expenditure target for the implementation of the defense capability build-up described in the MTDP (FY2019– FY2023) amount to approximately ¥27.47 trillion in FY2018 prices. For the duration of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023), in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, substantive funds will be secured by means of thoroughgoing greater effi ciency and streamlining in defense force development, suspending the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, reviewing or discontinuing projects of low cost-effectiveness, optimizing equipment procurement through cost management/suppression and long-term contracts and securing other revenue. The annual defense budgets target for the implementation of this MTDP is expected to be around approximately ¥25.5 trillion over the fi ve years. ----- Concerning the budgetary process for each fi scal year, in order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are different from the past. Moreover, to achieve rapid procurement of defense equipment, Japan must pursue fl exible and swift project management, and the budgetary process for each fi scal year which will be conducted taking into account the economic and fi scal conditions among other budgets. The amount of expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this MTDP will be allocated within the ceiling of approximately ¥17.17 trillion in FY2018 prices (excluding the amount corresponding to payments outside of the program period for contracts that contribute to improving project effi ciency such as maintenance), and the future obligation shall be managed appropriately. **Chapter** |Model|F-35B (Lockheed Martin)| |---|---| |[Courtesy of F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Offi ce]|| |Fuselage dimensions|Length: approx. 15.5 m; span: approx. 10.5 m; height: approx. 4.5 m| |Seat type|Single seat (one pilot)| |Speed|Maximum of Mach 1.6| |Take-off distance|168 m (550 ft)| |Adopting military services|U.S. Marines Corp., U.K. Royal Navy and Air Force, Italian Navy and Air Force, Singapore Armed Force| |Starting year of operation|2015| **Column** Acquisition of the F-35B Fighter Aircraft Model F-35B (Lockheed Martin) [Courtesy of F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Offi ce] Fuselage dimensions Length: approx. 15.5 m; span: approx. 10.5 m; height: approx. 4.5 m Seat type Single seat (one pilot) Speed Maximum of Mach 1.6 Take-off distance 168 m (550 ft) Adopting military services U.S. Marines Corp., U.K. Royal Navy and Air Force, Italian Navy and Air Force, Singapore Armed Force Starting year of operation 2015 The neighboring countries of Japan are making remarkable used by the SDF. progress in the modernization of the air forces, for example In light of the limited number of runways usable for by deploying the so-called fi fth generation fi ghter aircraft and conventional fi ghter aircraft in a small country like Japan, the latest models of the fourth generation aircraft. In order to the SDF has decided to introduce STOVL aircraft in order secure the defense of Japan in this situation, it is extremely to continuously secure air superiority under the Mid-Term important for the SDF to develop a system that enables fl exible Defense Program that was formulated in 2018. operations, including fl ying aircraft from more airfi elds, so that Accordingly, in 2019, the SDF made a model selection and air superiority can be constantly secured through the use of decided to introduce the F-35B fi ghter, which, like the F-35A high-performance fi ghter aircraft. fi ghter, is the most advanced aircraft that possesses high However, out of the 45 air bases and other airfi elds capabilities in terms of networking and stealth performance. (including those that are co-used with civilian aircraft; During the period of the current Mid-Term Defense Program excluding heliports) across Japan that are used by the GSDF, (from 2019 to 2023), the SDF is scheduled to acquire a total of MSDF and ASDF, only 20 have a runway with a length of 2,400 18 F-35B fi ghters. meters, which is usually used by fi ghter aircraft possessed by In addition, in order to deal with the new security environment the ASDF. In particular, in the Pacifi c Ocean, there is only one and to ensure a full-fl edged posture to defend Japan’s sea and such air base, the one on Iwo To, which means that the SDF airspace, which includes part of the vast Pacifi c Ocean, while has limited operational infrastructure in the region. securing the safety of personnel, the SDF will refurbish the In this respect, generally speaking, fi ghter aircraft capable Izumo-class destroyers, which are multi-function destroyers, of Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) are expected so that the F-35B can be operated from them when necessary. to be able to take off from a runway with a length of around The SDF will secure the defense of Japan by steadily hundred meters. In theory, such fi ghter aircraft can take off introducing the F-35B fi ghter and promoting collaboration with from and land at almost all air bases and airfi elds (45 locations) the Izumo-class destroyers. ----- **Build-up of Defense Capability, etc.** ###### 4 **Section** **Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2020** **1** In FY2020, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will steadily implement initiatives toward building a Multi-domain Defense Force based on the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) and the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP). In particular, in order to realize cross-domain operations, the MOD/SDF will acquire and strengthen more capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. In addition, the MOD/SDF will continue to enhance capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maneuver and deployment capability, in order to effectively deal with various situations by employing them in combination with the capabilities in the new domains. Moreover, in addition to enhancing the sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support, Japan gives priority to reinforcing the human resource base in light of the aging population with a declining birth rate and reinforcing the technology base due to advances in military technologies. The MOD/SDF will also strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as security cooperation with other countries in view of changes in the security environment. At the same time, in this process, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past and by allocating resources fl exibly and intensively. Furthermore, the MOD/ SDF will further promote jointness of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces in all areas and, avoiding a stovepiped approach, optimize their organizations and equipment. In addition, considering the increasingly severe fi scal conditions and other factors, Japan will strictly work to achieve greater effi ciency and streamlining. See Fig. II-4-1-1 (Main Projects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities for FY2020 [Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-domain Operations]) **Chapter** Capability Enhancement regarding Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic **Column** Domains as Part of the Buildup of Defense Capability in 2020 Under the fi scal year 2020 budget, the SDF will steadily acquire and development of information gathering equipment, and (iii) dispatch SDF enhance capabilities in new domains, such as the space, cyberspace personnel to study in special courses at the U.S. National War College and and electromagnetic domains, in light of the National Defense Program develop an organizational structure of cyberspace education at the GSDF Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program. Signal School and High Technical School. Regarding the space domain, in order to secure stable use of space, Regarding the electromagnetic domain, in order to acquire superiority the SDF will proceed with activities such as (i) the development of the in the domain, the SDF will implement projects related to training, organizational structure, including the establishment of the new Space exercises and human resource development, including projects to (i) Operations Squadron, (ii) the development of the Space Situational enhance the organizational structure, such as the establishment of a Awareness (SSA) System and SSA satellites (space-based optical new electronic warfare unit, (ii) conduct research and development of the telescopes), and (iii) acquisition of equipment capable of identifying the equipment, such as stand-off electronic warfare aircraft, (iii) strengthen status of electromagnetic interference against Japanese satellites. capability of electromagnetic spectrum management through study on Regarding the cyberspace domain, in order to technologically enhance technology to support the management of electromagnetic spectrum, and the cyberspace defense capability, the SDF will implement projects (iv) participate in international exercises. to secure and foster highly skilled personnel, including projects to (i) Through these activities, the SDF will promote the development of strengthen the organizational structure, including by increasing the staff of truly effective defense capability by acquiring and enhancing capabilities the Cyber Defense Group, (ii) make use of the most advanced technology in these new domains. concerning cyberspace, including the use of artifi cial intelligence and the Observance from the ground Ground-based sensor Additional onboard space Suspicious satellite It is hard to grasp characteristic of a target because of the environment and/or distance of electronic warfare device Observance from outer space Possible to grasp characteristic SSA Satellite of a target by observing from same outer space SSA satellite (image) Implementation of the common course of cyberspace education (image) Stand-off electronic warfare aircraft (image) ----- |Fig. II-4-1-1 M|Main Projects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities in FY2020 (Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations)| |---|---| |Capabilities that should be acqui and strengthened|red Outline| |Capabilities in Space Domain|○Development of systems for Space Operations Squadron, etc. ・Establishment of Space Operations Squadron in the ASDF ・Establishment of Space Domain Planning Group (tentative name) in the Joint Staff ○Development of the SSA system ○Development of SSA satellites (space-based optical telescopes) ○Strengthening of information-gathering capability using outer space, etc.| |Capabilities in Cyber Domain|○Enhancement of systems of Cyber Defense Group, etc. ・Expansion of the system of Cyber Defense Group (from about 220 personnel to about 290 personnel) ・Establishment of Cyber Protection Group (tentative name) in the GSDF ○Enhancement and strengthening of the system and network ○Securing and development of cyber talents ○Utilization of cutting-edge cyber technologies, etc.| |Capabilities in the Electromagne Domain|○Research and development of devices to neutralize the radar of opponents who intend to invade Japan ・Development of stand-off electronic warfare aircraft ・Research on anti-air electronic war devices ○Strengthening of capabilities to minimize electromagnetic jamming from opponents who intend to invade Japan tic ・Procurement of fighters (F-35A/B) with superior electronic protection capability ・Improvement of electronic warfare capabilities of F-15 fighters ○Enhancement of systems of electronic warfare units ・Establishment of Electronic Warfare Unit in the GSDF ○Enhancement of electromagnetic information gathering and analysis capabilities ○Enhancement of capability of electromagnetic management, etc.| |Capabilities in Maritime and Ai Domains|○Procurement of P-1 patrol aircraft (× 3) ○Procurement of SH-60K patrol helicopters (× 7) ○Refurbishment of SH-60K patrol helicopters to rescue specification ○Life extension of EP-3 signal reconnaissance aircraft ○Construction of destroyers (× 2), a submarine, and a minesweeping vessel r ○Establishment of Temporal Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unit (tentative name) ○Establishment of Squadron for Aerial Refueling and Transport ○Partial refurbishment of Destroyer JS “Izumo” for takeoff and landing by F-35B ○Establishment of F-35A squadron in Misawa Air Base ○Japan-led development of F-X ○Introduction of small UUV for underwater defense, etc.| |Stand-off defense capability|○Procurement of stand-off missiles, etc.| |Comprehensive air and missile defense capability|○Procurement of SM-3 Block IIA ○Modification to the Patriot system ○Research and study on the concept of the comprehensive air and missile defense capability, etc.| |Maneuver and deployment capab|○Procurement of type-16 mobile combat vehicles (× 33) ○Procurement of type-19 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers (× 7) ility ○Research on testing device for future amphibious technology ○Maneuver, deployment and field training in remote islands by rapid deployment division and brigade| |Sustainability and resilience|○Procurement of Type-20 5.56-mm rifle (× 3,283) ○Procurement of 9mm pistol SFP9 (× 323), etc.| Type-20 5.56-mm rifle to be newly introduced to the GSDF MSDF Destroyer JS “Izumo,” which is to be partially renovated to F-35B fighter aircraft enable landing and take-off of F-35B fighters **Chapter** Video : Flight Test of ASDF F-35A (courtesy of Lockheed Martin) URL : https://youtu.be/nuK38sIHFfQ Video : Landing of F-35B (STOVL) (courtesy of F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Office) URL : https://youtu.be/iqupeS4VXoA ----- **Section** **Defense-Related Expenditures** **2** - **❶ [Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures]** Defense-related expenditures include expenses for improving increased by 55.9 billion yen from the previous fi scal year to defense capabilities and maintaining and managing the 5.3133 trillion yen. SDF, as well as expenses necessary for the implementation Additionally, the supplementary budget for FY2019 of measures against neighborhood affairs in the vicinity of contains an appropriation of 428.7 billion yen to ensure defense facilities. the stable operation of the SDF in response to the security In comparison with the previous fi scal year, defense- environment surrounding Japan and frequent natural related expenditures for FY2020 were increased by 61.8 disasters. The fi rst supplementary budget for FY2020 billion yen to 5.0688 trillion yen, rising for the eighth contains 12.1 billion yen for medical instruments to accept consecutive year. When including expenses related to SACO infected people in SDF hospitals. The second supplementary and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion budget for the year includes 6.3 billion yen for response to allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), the spread of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft, infection. and expenses for the three-year emergency response plan See Fig. II-4-2-1 (Comparison Between FY2019 Budget and FY2020 See Budget) for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and national Fig. II-4-2-2 (Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures [Initial resilience building, defense-related expenditures were Budget] Over the Past 15 Years) - **❷ [Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures]** Defense-related expenditures are broadly classifi ed into and others. Material expenses are further classifi ed into “personnel and food provision expenses,” which covers items “obligatory outlay expenses,”[1]which are paid based on such as wages and meals for SDF personnel, and “material contracts concluded in previous fi scal years, and “general expenses,” which fi nance the repair and maintenance of material expenses,” which are paid under current-year equipment, the purchase of fuel, the education and training contracts. Material expenses are also referred to as “program of SDF personnel and the procurement of equipment expenses,” and since general material expenses include repair **Chapter** **Fig. II-4-2-1** Comparison between Defense-Related Expenditures( Initial Budget) of FY2019 and FY2020 |Col1|Col2|Col3|(100 million yen)|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Category||FY2019|FY2020 Fiscal YOY growth (▲indicates negative growth)|| |||||Fiscal YOY growth (▲indicates negative growth)| |Annual expenditure (note)||50,070|50,688|618 （1.2％）| ||Personnel and food provisions|21,831|21,426|△405 （△1.9％）| ||Material expenses|28,239|29,262|1,023 （3.6％）| |Future obligation (note)||51,627|52,106|479 （0.9％）| ||New contracts|24,013|24,050|37 （0.2％）| ||Existing contracts|27,615|28,056|441 （1.6％）| Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expense for the introduction of new government aircraft based on “The Policy Concerning Government Aircraft” (August 7, 2013 decision by the Review Committee on Government Aircraft), and expenses for the three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and building national resilience. If these are included, the fi gures are 5,257.4 billion yen for FY2019 and 5,313.3 billion yen for FY2020; and for future obligation, 5,361.3 billion yen for FY2019 and 5,431.0 billion yen for FY2020. Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding. Some projects for build-up of defense capabilities extend over multiple years. In these cases, the fi scal year in which the contract is concluded is different from the fi scal year in which the payment to the contractor is made. Therefore, the future maximum obligation is allocated to the budget as a contract resulting in a Treasury obligation (type of budget that only grants an authority to incur obligations; the contracts can be concluded, but the payment cannot be made). Based on such budgeting, in the fi scal year in which the construction is completed or the equipment is procured, expenses necessary for payment are allocated as budget expenditure, in principle (type of budget that grants authorities to incur obligations and make payment; the contracts can be concluded and the payment can be made). Budget expenditure for payments incurred under contracts concluded in previous fi scal years is called “obligatory outlay expenses,” while expenditure for future fi scal years is termed “future obligation.” For cases where a continued project over multiple years is necessary, there is also a system of continuing expenditure as a means to grant the authority to incur obligations and make t lti l b bt i i l ti f th Di t i t ll f th t t l t d th t f l i t ll t f th j t i d ----- **Fig. II-4-2-2** Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures [Initial Budget] Over the Past 15 Years (100 million) 51,000 50,000 **50,688** **50,070** **48,996** **49,388** **48,607** **48,221** **47,903** **47,815** **47,838** **47,426** **47,028** **46,826** **46,453** **46,804** **46,625** 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 (FY) 49,000 48,000 47,000 46,000 Note: The figures above do not include SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft, and expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience. Including these expenses, total defense-related expenditures were as follows: 4,813.6 billion yen in FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen in FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen in FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen in FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen in FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen in FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen in FY2012, 4,753.8 billion yen in FY2013, 4,884.8 billion yen in FY2014, 4,980.1 billion yen in FY2015, 5,054.1 billion yen in FY2016, 5,125.1 billion yen in FY2017, 5,191.1 billion yen in FY2018, 5,257.4 billion yen in FY 2019, and 5,313.3 billion yen. costs for equipment, education and training expenses for personnel, and the purchase of fuel, they are referred to also as “activity expenses.” The MOD terms this classification method as “classification by expenses.” Personnel and food provision expenses as well as obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related budget. The remaining 20% of the budget includes spending for repairing equipment and for implementing measures to alleviate the impact on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan. As such, a high percentage of the budget is allocated for maintenance purposes. For this reason, the breakdown of the defense-related expenditures cannot be easily altered in a significant manner on a single-year basis. See Fig. II-4-2-3 (Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Concerning New Contracts) In addition to the annual budget expenditure, the amount of future obligations concerning new contracts also indicates payments for the following year and beyond (the amount of future obligation arising in the applicable fiscal year). In the build-up of defense capabilities, it is common to take multiple years from contract to delivery or completion, in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other primary equipment, as well as the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks. Consequently, for such items, a procedure is undertaken whereby a multi-year contract is arranged, and it is promised in advance at the time of the contract that payments will be made in the following fiscal year and beyond (within five years, in principle). The sum of money to be paid in the following fiscal year and beyond, based on such a multi-year contract, is called the amount of future obligation. The amount of future obligation concerning new contracts arising in FY2020 increased from the previous fiscal year by 3.7 billion yen (0.2%). Furthermore, if looked at on a contract basis,[3] which shows the scale of operations, there is an increase from the previous fiscal year of 15.5 billion yen (0.5%). See Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (Project Management throughout Equipment Life Cycle) **Chapter** Personnel and food provision expenses were decreased by 40.5 billion yen from the previous fiscal year, while obligatory outlay expenses for the year increased by 90.5 billion yen. General material expenses increased by 11.8 billion yen from the previous fiscal year.[2] See Fig. II-4-2-4 (Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures [Initial Budget] [FY2020]) Reference 8 (Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures [Initial Budget]) The comparison with the previous year concerns expenditure excluding the SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expense for the introduction of a new government aircraft, and expenses for the three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and building national resilience. The same applies hereinafter in regard to this section. The sum total of general material expenses and future obligation concerning new contracts, which shows the amount of the material expenses (program expenses) that are to be t t d i th li bl fi l d t b id i th fi l d b d Th t i 3 3976 t illi i FY2020 ----- |Amount of|future obligation| |---|---| |Contract ↓ Obligatory outlay expenses paid in part (1 billion yen) General material expenses|Con|tract|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Payment ↓ Remaining sum paid (6 billion yen) Obligatory outlay expenses| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |||||↓ ↓ Obligatory outlay expenses Obligatory outlay expenses paid in part (1 billion yen) paid in part (2 billion yen) Obligatory outlay expenses Obligatory outlay expenses|||| **Fig. II-4-2-3** Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Concerning New Contracts FY2016 FY2017 |Amount of future obligation When improving defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procu the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several years. Consequently, a procedu a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged (five years in principle), and the advance at the time of the agreement to make the payment at a fixed time in the future Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year contracts, which extend for multiple years. Example: A case in which 10 billion yen of equipment is procured under a contract th FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 Contract ↓ ↓ ↓ Obligatory outlay expenses Obligatory outlay expenses Obligatory outlay expenses paid in part (1 billion yen) paid in part (1 billion yen) paid in part (2 billion yen) General material expenses Obligatory outlay expenses Obligatory outlay expenses Future obligation (9 billion Amount of contract (10 billion yen)|rement of equipment and re is undertaken whereby government promises in . and beyond under such at runs for four years FY2023 Payment ↓ Remaining sum paid (6 billion yen) Obligatory outlay expenses yen)| |---|---| Amount of future obligation When improving defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procurement of equipment and the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several years. Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged (five years in principle), and the government promises in advance at the time of the agreement to make the payment at a fixed time in the future. Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond under such contracts, which extend for multiple years. Example: A case in which 10 billion yen of equipment is procured under a contract that runs for four years FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 FY2023 Contract Payment ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ Obligatory outlay expenses Obligatory outlay expenses Obligatory outlay expenses Remaining sum paid paid in part (1 billion yen) paid in part (1 billion yen) paid in part (2 billion yen) (6 billion yen) General material expenses Obligatory outlay expenses Obligatory outlay expenses Obligatory outlay expenses Future obligation (9 billion yen) Amount of contract (10 billion yen) FY2018 FY2019 **Chapter** |FY2016|FY2017|FY2018|FY2019|FY2020|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||| |||||Personnel and food provisions expenses 42.3|| |Contract|||||| ||||||| ||||||| ||||||| |||||Obl exp|| ||Contract||||| ||||||| |||||ig e|| |||||a n|| |||||tory ses|| |||Contract|||| |||||o (3|| |||||u 8|| |||||tl .1|| |||||ay %|| ||||Contract|)|| ||||||| ||||||| ||||||| ||||||| ||||||| |||||G ex ex|| |||||en pe pen|| |||||er ns s|| |||||al material es (activity es) (19.6%)|| |Personnel and food provisions expenses|Col2|Expenses relating to wages for personnel, retirement allowance, meals in barracks, etc.| |---|---|---| |Material expenses (program expenses) Obligatory outlay expenses General material expenses (activity expenses)||Expenses relating to procurement; repair and upgrading of equipment; purchase of oil; education and training of staff; facilities improvement; barracks expenses such as lighting, heating, water and supplies; technological research and development; cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ; and expenses related to measures to mitigate the impact on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan| ||Obligatory outlay expenses|Expenses paid in FY2020 based on contracts made before FY2019| ||General material expenses (activity expenses)|Expenses paid in FY2020 based on contracts made in FY2020| Structure of Defense-related Expenditure Annual expenditure Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into personnel and food provision expenses and material expenses (program expenses). Furthermore, material expenses (program expense) are classified into obligatory outlay expenses and General material expenses (activity expenses). Personnel and food Expenses relating to wages for personnel, retirement provisions expenses allowance, meals in barracks, etc. Expenses relating to procurement; repair and upgrading of equipment; purchase of oil; education and Material expenses training of staff; facilities improvement; barracks expenses such as lighting, heating, water and (program expenses) supplies; technological research and development; cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ; and expenses related to measures to mitigate the impact on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan Obligatory outlay Expenses paid in FY2020 based on contracts made expenses before FY2019 expenses (activity General material Expenses paid in FY2020 based on contracts made in expenses) FY2020 **Fig. II-4-2-4** Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures [Initial Budget] [FY2020] R&D 2.5％ 22.9％（11,589） Other 1.5％ Facility improvements 3.0％ Base measures 9.0％ Personnel and food provisions 42.3％ By purpose of use Procurement of equipment, etc. 16.9％ Other General materials Maintenance, etc. 19.6％（9,926） 24.9％ 16.8％（8,517） GSDF ［1.2％］ 35.9％（18,173） By expense Personnel and food provisions By organization 42.3％（21,426） ASDF ［△1.9％］ 24.5％（12,409） Obligatory outlays 38.1％（19,336） MSDF ［4.9％］ Notes: 1. ( ) is the budget amount; unit: 100 million yen. 2. The above figure does not include SACO-related expenses (13.8 billion yen), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (179.9 billion yen), expense for the introduction of new government aircraft (0.03 billion yen), and expenses for the three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen). 3. Figures in square brackets [ ] indicate year-on-year growth rate (%). ----- - **❸ [Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement]** In order to achieve further streamlining and rationalization review, including suspension of the use of equipment of in the build-up of defense capability, the current MTDP sets lowered priority forth that the MOD will work to secure substantial financial - Reduction of approximately 83.9 billion yen through resources through suspension of the use of equipment whose communalization and optimization of specifications, importance has decreased, review of projects of low cost- including use of convertible modules and civilian goods effectiveness, optimization of equipment procurement such - Reduction of approximately 32.4 billion yen through as thoroughgoing cost management and control and efficient efficiency improvement by bulk procurement and joint procurement including long-term contracts, and securing of procurement other revenues. - Reduction of approximately 5.3 billion yen through making In the FY2020 budget, the MOD aims to realize a cost over five-year long-term contracts reduction of approximately 431.3 billion yen by implementing - Reduction of approximately 117.6 billion yen through the aforementioned streamlining measures. Concrete initiatives scrutiny of prices and related costs of equipment introduced in the FY2020 budget are as follows. The MOD will also study securing of revenues. - Reduction of approximately 192.2 billion yen through project **❹ [Comparison with Other Countries]** It is not possible to accurately compare the amounts of defense expenditures of countries due to a number of factors: there is no internationally unified definition of defense expenditures in the first place; even if defense expenditures were publicly **Fig. II-4-2-5** The Defense Expenditures of Major Countries (2019) Defense expenditures (100 million dollars) Defense expenditures as % of GDP disclosed, their overall amount or their breakdown is sometimes unclear; and the budget system varies by country. On such basis, if Japan’s defense-related expenditures and those of other countries officially published by each government were converted into dollar amounts, using the purchasing power parity[4] of each country reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the results would be as shown in Fig. II-4-2-5 (The Defense Expenditures of Major Countries). See Part I, Chapter 2 (Defense Policies of Countries) Reference 9 (Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries) **Chapter** 5.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 |8,000|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0|Defense expenditures (100 million USD) Defense expenditures as % of GDP||||||||| ||Japan|U.S.|China|Russia|ROK|Australia|U.K.|France|Germany| |Defense expenditures|484|6,540|3,363|1,177|549|262|549|588|583| |Defense expenditures as % of GDP|0.90|3.05|1.25|2.75|2.44|1.94|1.73|1.84|1.26| |(Reference) The percentage of GDP based on defense expenditures published by NATO|‒|3.42|‒|‒|‒|‒|2.14|1.84|1.38| Notes: 1. Defense expenditures are based on those officially published by each country and are in US dollars while referring to each country’s purchasing power parity for FY2019 as published by the OECD (officially published rate as of May 2020) (1 dollar = 103.367215 yen = 3. 538620 yuan =25.468534 rubles = 850.299894 won = 1. 471620 Australian dollars = 0. 689107 pound = 0. 754103 France euros = 0. 741735 Germany euros) 2. The percentage of GDP is calculated based on defense expenditures officially published by each country (in local currency) while referring to the GDP of each country published by the IMF (in local currency). 3. As defense expenditures published by NATO (which include pensions for retired veterans, etc.) may differ from those officially published by each country, the percentage of GDP based on defense expenditures published by NATO (in November 2019) does not necessarily coincide with the percentage of GDP calculated based on defense expenditures officially published by each country. 4. The GDP of each country published by the IMF is an estimate as of October 2019. In addition, Fig. II-4-2-6 (Changes in Defense Expenditures in Major Countries Over the Past Ten Years) shows the changes in defense expenditures of Japan’s neighboring countries over the past ten years. A gauge that measures each country’s ability to purchase goods and services by taking into account their respective price levels. Although there also exists a method of converting their defense expenditures into dollar amounts at respective currency rates, their dollar-based defense expenses calculated in this way do not necessarily reflect the precise value based on h t ’ i l l ----- **Fig. II-4-2-6** Changes in Defense Expenditures in Major Countries Over the Past Ten Years (Times) 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 |Col1|Japan U.S.|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Russia China|Russia 2.58 times| ||ROK Australia|China 2.44 times| |ROK 1.70 times||| |Australia 1.43 times(２) Japan 1.08 times||| |U.S. 1.03 times||| |||| 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Notes: 1. The ratios (rounded to two decimal places) of respective countries’ officially publicized defense expenditures for FY2011 onward when considering their defense expenditures for FY2010 as 1 2. Regarding Australia, the ratios for 2010 up to 2019 are indicated, as the initial budget for FY2020 was not publicized as of May 2020. **Chapter** ----- **Security and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** ###### 5 **Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement** See Reference 10 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the **Section** **Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others** **1** See Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces) This section gives an outline of a full picture of the framework for the Government’s responses to various contingencies as well as the main operations of the SDF. - **❶ [Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations]** The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and established within the Cabinet, to implement these measures. Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in **a. The Following Items concerning Situations that Need to Be** Armed Attack Situations, etc., and a Survival-Threatening **Dealt with:** Situation[1] specifi es items that should be stipulated as (1) Sequence of events of the situation, the confi rmation basic principles and basic policies (the Basic Response of occurrence of an Armed Attack Situation, etc., or a Plan) regarding responses to an Armed Attack Situation Survival-Threatening Situation, and the facts that support and Anticipated Armed Attack Situation (Armed Attack this confi rmation Situations, etc.[2]) and Survival-Threatening Situations[3] as (2) When the situation is confi rmed as an Armed Attack well as the responsibilities of national and local governments Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation, the in order to establish a system to respond to Armed Attack reason why there are no other appropriate means available Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations and to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and the thereby contribute to the peace and independence of Japan as use of force is necessary to respond to the situation well as the safety of the country and the people. **b. An Overall Plan Related to the Response** **c. Important Matters Related to the Response Measures** **Chapter** **1 Armed Attack Situations, etc. and Survival-** Threatening Situations Based on the Law for Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations etc. (Armed Attack Situation Response Law), in situations such as an Armed Attack Situation, etc. or a Survival-Threatening Situation, the Government is required to adopt the Basic Response Plan, which includes the following items, and ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, once the Basic Response Plan is adopted, a temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) is to be See Fig. II-5-1-1 (Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation) **2 Emergency Situations other than Armed Attack** Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations Based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law, the government will also implement appropriate and rapid response measures in emergency situations other than an Armed Attack Situation, etc. and Survival-Threatening Situations[4] in order to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to Offi cial title: Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and a Survival-Threatening Situation “Armed Attack Situations” refers to situations in which an armed attack against Japan from outside occurs or in which it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of an armed attack. “Expected Armed Attack Situations” refers to situations in which an armed attack is not yet made but the tension increased and an armed attack is expected. Both situations are collectively called “Armed Attack Situations, etc.” A “Survival-Threatening Situation” means a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses a clear risk of threatening Japan's survival and of overturning people's rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness fundamentally. A contingency situation, other than an Armed Attack Situation and Survival-Threatening Situation, and a situation that may have a signifi cant impact on the security of the nation and the people, including an emergency response situation (a situation where actions that may kill or injure many people by using methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack, or a it ti h it i i d th t th l t ti t l d t th t th t it t b th t t ) ----- **Fig. II-5-1-1** Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation Occurrence of armed attack, etc. |(1) Formulation of the draft basic response Creation of a draft basic response plan plan by the Prime Minister The Government National Security Council (2) The draft basic response plan sent to the Deliberation of the draft basic response plan Consultation National Security Council for deliberation (3) Recommendation by the National Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning Recommendation Security Council to the Prime Minister concerning the draft basic response plan Specialized assistance to National Security Council Cabinet decision on the basic response plan (4) Cabinet decision on the basic response plan The Diet Request for the approval of the Diet (5) Approval of the basic response plan by Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc. (note) Diet (Task Force Chief: Prime Minister) Approval Rejection ・Comprehensive promotion of response measures Terminate immediately ・Formulation of usage guidelines for specific public facilities, etc.|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||| |||| |Designated government institutions Local governments Designated public institutions||| Note: The Task Force will be established in the Cabinet for the comprehensive promotion of measures to respond to armed attack situations or a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival **Chapter** maintain the security of the country and its people. **3 Responses of the SDF** evacuation, relief, and response to the armed attack induced disasters in order to protect the lives, bodies and property of the people and to minimize the impact on the livelihood of the people in an Armed Attack Situation, etc. and emergency response. If the Minister of Defense fi nds it unavoidable after receiving a request from prefectural governors, or receives a request from the Task Force Chief,[6] upon approval by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense can issue a civil Protection Dispatch Order to the SDF units, etc. to conduct civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures (including assisting with the evacuation of residents, providing relief to the evacuees and immediate restoration). See Fig. II-5-1-2 (Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches), Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-5 (Initiatives Related to the Protection of Civilians) The Prime Minister can issue a Defense Operation order to the whole or part of the SDF when it is deemed necessary for the defense of Japan in Armed Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations. Prior Diet approval is required for a Defense Operation order in principle. The SDF under Defense Operation duty is allowed to exercise the use of force only when the “three conditions for ‘the use of force’” are satisfi ed. **4 Civil Protection** The Civil Protection Act[5] specifi es responsibilities of the national and local governments as well as measures for Offi cial title: Act Concerning the Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc. Th P i Mi i t th iti f th Di t f th C i i M t H d t b t th iti l t d t titi ----- - **❷ [Responses to Situations that Will Have an Important Influence]** The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and foreign countries engaged in activities contributing to the Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important achievement of the objectives of the UN Charter” and “other Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security[7] aims to strengthen similar organizations.” cooperation with foreign countries to respond to the situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s **2** Response Measures to Situations that Will Have an peace and security (Situations that Will Have an Important Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security Influence[8]) with the central focus on contribution to the Measures to respond to situations that will have an important effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty by influence on Japan’s peace and security are: (1) logistics carrying out measures such as logistics support activities and support activities, (2) search and rescue activities, (3) ship thereby contributing to the peace and security of Japan. inspection operations,[9] and (4) other measures necessary to respond to situations that will have an important influence on **1 Coverage** Japan’s peace and security. The armed forces, etc., responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, which the SDF may support, are “U.S. Armed Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” “armed forces of other **3 Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of** Force The law sets forth the following measures in order to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country and also to ensure the safety of the SDF personnel: - The SDF does not conduct activities in “the scene where a combat is actually taking place.” Regarding search and rescue operations, however, when stranded personnel have been located and rescue operations have commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities as long as the safety of these units is ensured. - The commanding officers, etc., of the SDF units order the temporary suspension of activities, etc., if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity. - The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, the Minister must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there. **Fig. II-5-1-2** Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches **Chapter** Municipal mayors Ask for dispatch Communication request (When a dispatch request cannot be sought) (Note 1) Prefectural governors Task Force Chief[1] Armed Attack Situations, etc. Task Request for Force Chief or dispatch Notification Ask for dispatch Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief Report (When communication is established by municipal mayors) Report Minister of Defense Prime Minister Approve Issue an order to Issue an order for gather for civil civil protection protection, etc.[2,3] dispatches (Note 2) If it is particularly necessary to SDF Ready Reserve Personnel respond SDF Reserve Personnel (Note 3) Ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel will be called on if necessary upon Report for duty the approval of the Prime Minister Units Official title: Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security. “Situations that will have an important influence” refers to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, including situations that, if left without response, could lead to a direct armed attack on Japan. Operations to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others) and to request, if necessary, a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party, conducted based on the UN Security Council resolutions or ith th t f th fl t t (th t t th t h th i ht t fl it fl ib d i A ti l 91 f th UN C ti th L f th S ) ----- **❸ [Maintenance of Public Order and Responses to Aggression that Do Not Amount to an Armed Attack]** **1 Public Security Operations** **3 Counter-Piracy Operations** **(1) Public Security Operations by Order** In the event of an indirect aggression or another emergency situation, the Prime Minister can order the whole or part of the SDF to deploy if it is deemed impossible to maintain public security with the general police force. In principle, the Prime Minister must bring the order to the Diet for deliberation, and request for its approval within twenty days from the day the order has been given. **(2) Public Security Operations by Request** Upon consulting with the Public Safety Commission of the prefecture concerned, the governor of that prefecture can request the Prime Minister to dispatch units, etc., of the SDF if it is deemed unavoidable as the situation will have a serious influence on public security. Following such a request, the Prime Minister can order the SDF to mobilize when a situation calls for such action. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3 (Response to Attacks by See Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others) When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to conduct operations at sea against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Counter-Piracy Operations)� See **4 Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles or** Other Objects In cases where ballistic missiles or other objects are flying to Japan as an armed attack or flying to Japan in a SurvivalThreatening Situation, and where the “Three Conditions” are met, the SDF can respond with the defense operation. In cases where ballistic missiles or other objects are flying to Japan but which are not found as an armed attack, the Minister of Defense can take the following measures: (1) If the Minister of Defense judges that ballistic missiles or other objects are likely to fly to Japan and that it is necessary to prevent damage to human lives and property due to its fall in the territory of Japan, the Minister, upon the approval of the Prime Minister, can order the SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles or other objects in the airspace over the territory of Japan or the high seas when such **2 Maritime Security Operations** **Chapter** When there is a special need to protect lives or property or maintain public security at sea, the Minister of Defense can order the SDF units to take necessary actions at sea upon approval by the Prime Minister. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-2 (Measures against Violation of Japan’s Sovereignty) **Fig. II-5-1-3** Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles |SDF takes measures on the order|Col2|SDF takes measures on the order of the| |---|---|---| |of the Minister of Defense||Minister of Defense| Not recognized as armed attack When the possibility that ballistic Although the ballistic missiles are not expected to fly over missiles may fly toward Japan is Japan, a rapid change in circumstances may create an acknowledged emergency situation which makes it difficult to obtain an approval from the Prime Minister in time Minister of Defense orders destruction measures in Minister of Defense orders destruction measures advance as provided in the emergency response upon approval of the Prime Minister procedure (approved by the Cabinet in 2007) Article 76 of the SDF Law (Paragraph 1) Article 82-3 of the SDF Law (Paragraph 3) (Issuance of Defense Operations Orders) (Destruction measures against ballistic missiles) If armed attack is recognized (Declared intent to attack, imminent missile launch) An armed attack situation is recognized and a defense operation order is issued Take measures in the framework of defense operation Article 76 of the SDF Law (Issuance of Defense Operations Orders) Concept of ensuring civilian control of the military - Response against ballistic missiles requires the government to assess the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, interagency actions are required, for example, measures for civil protection such as alert and evacuation, diplomatic activities, information gathering by related agencies, and enhancement of readiness for emergencies. - In view of the importance of the matter and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities upon the Prime Minister’s approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the supervision of the Diet is also d fi d ith i i i th l ti l ti ti t th Di t ----- **(2) Requirements for Implementation** When all of the following conditions are satisfied, the rescue measures may be implemented: a. It needs to be confirmed that in the areas where the rescue measures are taken, the competent authorities of the country concerned are maintaining public safety and order at the time, and no act of combat will be conducted; b. The country concerned[10] consents to the SDF taking the rescue measures (including the use of weapons); and c. It is expected that coordination and cooperation can be ensured between the units of the SDF and the competent authority of the country concerned in order to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to anticipated dangers. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 5-2 (Response to Rescue and See Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.) objects are actually flying to the country. (2) In addition to the cases of (1) above, there may be cases where the situation suddenly changes with little information available on the launch, for example, and the Minister of Defense cannot have time to obtain approval from the Prime Minister. In preparation for such cases, the Minister of Defense may create an emergency response manual beforehand and obtain approval from the Prime Minister. Following the emergency response manual, the Minister of Defense can order, for a specified period of time, the SDF units to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects in the airspace over the territory of Japan or the high seas when such objects are actually flying to the country. See Fig. II-5-1-3 (Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles or Other See Objects), Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2-2 (Response to Missile Attacks) **7** [Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of ] the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of Other Foreign Countries Based on Article 95-2 of the SDF Law, it has been established that the SDF personnel may protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces and the armed forces of other foreign countries actually engaging in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF. The basic principles of the article and the Cabinet’s involvement in its operation are provided by “The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law”[11] decided by the National Security Council. **(1) Coverage** Weapons, etc. of the units of the United States Forces, armed forces of other foreign countries and other similar organizations, that are, in cooperation with the SDF and are, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including bilateral/multilateral exercises but excluding activities in the scene where the combat activities are actually being conducted). **(2) Procedures, etc.** When a request is made by the United States Forces, etc., and only when the Minister of Defense deems it necessary, SDF personnel provide asset protection. **5** Measures against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace The Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take necessary measures to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) when a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international law, the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations. **Chapter** See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-2-1 (Warnings and Scrambles in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace) **6 Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals** Overseas In order to protect Japanese nationals, etc. overseas in emergency situations, the SDF is able to transport those people who need protection of their lives or bodies to a safe place. Moreover, when their lives or bodies can be harmed, the SDF may conduct “rescue measures” that include guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals, etc. if the following requirements are satisfied. **(1) Procedures** Upon a request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and after subsequent consultations between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Defense issues an order following approval by the Prime Minister. See Section 2-3 of this Chapter (The Operationalization of the Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the Armed Forces of the United States and Other Countries (SDF Law Article 95-2)) 10 It includes an organization, if any, that administers the said country in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN. 11 For “The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95 -2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law,” see the website of the Prime Minister’s Office for Japan (https://www.kantei.go.jp/ t t/2016122201 df) ----- **❹ [Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others]** **1 Disaster Relief Dispatches** In principle, Disaster Relief Dispatch is conducted as follows: prefectural governors or other officials ask the Minister of Defense, or an officer designated by the Minister, to dispatch the SDF units, etc., in the event of a natural disaster; the Minister or the designated officer will dispatch the units if it is deemed necessary for the SDF to respond to the disaster.[12] This procedure is based on the idea that prefectural governors and other officials should grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster relief capabilities first, and then decide whether to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch. **2 Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch and** Nuclear Disaster Relief Dispatch When a warning declaration is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for LargeScale Earthquakes[13] or a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order dispatching units upon a request of the Director of the Seismic Disaster Warning Headquarters or the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister). See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 5 (Response to Large-Scale See Disasters) - **❺ [Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community]** of the following UN resolutions (by the General Assembly or **1** **Response to Situations Threatening the** the Security Council). International Peace and Security that the a. Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or authorize International Community Is Collectively Addressing the country, which is subject to Japan’s support operations Under the International Peace Support Act,[14] in order to to respond to situations that threaten the peace and security ensure peace and security of the international community, of the international community Japan is allowed to conduct cooperation and support b. Other than (a), resolutions that regard the situations as a operations for the armed forces of foreign countries engaged threat to peace or a breach of peace and call on United in operations for international peace and security in Situations Nations (UN) member states to respond to the situations Threatening the International Peace and Security that the concerned International Community is Collectively Addressing.[15] **(2) Response Measures** From the perspective of enabling seamless responses to any The following response measures can be implemented in situation, the International Peace Support Law, enacted as situations threatening the international peace and security a general law, enables Japan to conduct support operations that the international community is collectively addressing. more expeditiously and effectively for the military forces **a. Cooperation and Support Activities** of foreign countries operating for international peace and Supplies and services to armed forces of foreign countries security, making it possible to proactively contribute to (supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical international peace and security on Japan’s own initiative. services, communications, airport and seaport services, base **(1) Requirements** services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services The requirement for Japan to offer cooperation and support to and construction) are to be provided. the operations of foreign armed forces is the issuance of one While the provision of weapons is not included as in the 12 The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Office may request a disaster relief dispatch. With regard to disaster relief dispatch, earthquake disaster prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for the dispatch may take measures such as evacuation (Article 4 of the Police Duties Execution Law) based on Article 94 of the SDF Law (Authority in Disaster Relief Dispatch, etc.); (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster relief dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake disaster prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster relief dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary. 13 The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake prediction was reported by the Director-General of the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures. 14 Official title: Law Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, etc. in Situations where the International Community is Collectively Addressing for Peace and Security 15 These refer to situations that threaten the peace and security of the international community, and the international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with th bj ti f th UN Ch t t th th t J b f th i t ti l it d t i d d tl d ti l t ib t t th ti iti **Chapter** ----- **(1) Requirements for Participation** **a. UN PKO** While maintaining the framework of the so-called Five Principles for Participation in PKO,[19] the new law stipulates that the consent for acceptance of countries to which the areas where these operations are conducted belong needs to be recognized as being stably maintained throughout the period of the operations if the SDF conducts so-called safetyensuring operations or so-called kaketsuke-keigo operations. **b. Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and** **Security** Japan is able to participate in Internationally Cooperated Operations for Peace and Security whose nature or details are similar to those of UN PKO, when any of the following conditions is satisfied, in addition to the fulfillment of the Five Principles for Participation. (1) Based on resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council of the UN (2) At the requests of any of the following international organizations: - The UN - Organs established by the UN General Assembly or Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes of the UN such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order - Regional organizations, as prescribed in Article 52 of the UN Charter or organs established by multilateral treaties, acknowledged as having the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the activities of Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security such as the European Union or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order (3) At the requests of the countries to which the areas where those operations are to be conducted belong (limited to only those cases that are supported by any of the principal organs of the UN as prescribed in Article 7 (1) of the UN Charter). **(2) Description of Tasks** - Ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian relief operations for afflicted people Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, the revised law now allows the “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat operations.” **b. Search and Rescue Activities** **c. Ship Inspection Operations[16] (Those Set Forth in the Ship** **Inspection Operations Law)** **(3) Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force** The following measures are set forth in order to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel: - Japan does not implement support activities in the scene where a combat is actually taking place. However, when the personnel having been stranded have already been found and rescue operations have commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities concerning them as long as the safety of these units is ensured. - The commanding officers of the SDF units, etc., order a temporary suspension of support activities if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity. - The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, the Minister must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there. **2 International Peace Cooperation Activities** **Chapter** The International Peace Cooperation Act is to set forth a framework for the Implementation of International Peace Cooperation Assignments, with a view to extending appropriate and prompt cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,[17] Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security,[18] International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and International Election Observation Operations, and to take measures to extend Contributions in Kind for those operations, thereby enabling active contribution by Japan to international peace efforts centering upon the United Nations. 16 Official title: Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations 17 “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” means the operations that are conducted under the control of the United Nations to respond to conflicts and maintain international peace and security, and that are implemented by two or more participating countries at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and with the consent of the Parties to Armed Conflict, etc. 18 “Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security" means the operations other than those implemented as United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to respond to conflicts and maintain international peace and security, provided that such operations are implemented under the coordination of two or more participating countries, and with the consent of the Parties to Armed Conflict, etc. 19 (1) Agreements on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the Parties to Armed Conflict; (2) Consent for the conduct of UN PKO as well as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the countries to which the areas where those operations are to be conducted belong as well as from the Parties to Armed Conflict; (3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, and not favor any of the parties to the armed conflict; (4) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps participating from Japan may terminate the International Peace Cooperation Assignments; and (5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessity f th t ti f th li f l di t h d i i i l ----- with the consent of the Prime Minister.[20] - Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Forces, etc., for their operations to cope with large-scale disaster It is possible for the SDF to provide the U.S. Forces, the Australian Defence Force, or the Armed Forces of the U.K., Canada or France with supplies or services when they request the provision and are located in an area together with the units of the SDF, etc., and is undertaking operations to cope with large-scale disasters, so far as it does not hinder the performance of International Peace Cooperation Assignments, etc., of the SDF. **3 International Disaster Relief Operations** - Monitoring, stationing, patrol, inspections at checkpoints and security escort for the protection of safety of specified areas including prevention and suppression of injury or harm against lives, bodies and property of local population, afflicted people and other populations requiring protection (so-called “safety-ensuring” operations) - Protection of lives and bodies of individuals engaging in international peace cooperation operations or providing support for those operations, in response to urgent requests when unexpected dangers to lives or bodies of such individuals related to operations occur or are imminent (so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations) - Tasks such as provision of advice or guidance related to works for the purpose of assisting in establishing or reestablishing organizations of the Government relating to national defense or other organizations - Tasks conducted at organizations for supervision and coordination of tasks to include planning, drafting, coordination or collection and updating of information in Headquarters Office or coordination offices conducting UN PKO and Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, for the implementation of tasks (of mission headquarters’ operations) **(3) Others** - Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel to the UN (dispatch of Force Commanders of UN PKO) It is possible to dispatch uniformed SDF personnel and have them engage in the tasks of the UN and those concerning overall management of tasks implemented by units of the SDF, etc., or units of armed forces of foreign states participating in UN PKO, at the request of the UN, When large-scale disasters occur in regions overseas, especially in less-developed regions, and the governments of the affected countries or international organizations request assistance, the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall consult with the chief of relevant administrative agencies including the Ministry of Defense (MOD) as well as the National Public Safety Commission regarding the details of such request if dispatch is deemed appropriate. Following such consultation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs may consult with the MOD to ask for cooperation with regard to operations of SDF units if there is a special need. The Minister of Defense can order units of the SDF to carry out rescue and medical activities as well as transportation of personnel and supplies based on the consultation above.[21] **Chapter** 20 The dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel is limited to cases where the consent of the countries hosting the UN PKO for which the dispatched uniformed SDF personnel will conduct operations and of state parties to the conflict regarding the implementation of the UN PKO (when the state parties to the conflict are nonexistent, the consent of the countries where the UN PKO is to be conducted) is deemed to be stably maintained throughout the duration of the dispatch and where circumstances that lead to the suspension of the dispatch are deemed unlikely to occur. 21 The Japan Disaster Relief Team is not to be dispatched if the use of weapons is recognized to be necessary in order to protect the lives and bodies of people engaged in international disaster relief operations or transport, and equipment necessary for such operations due to apparent danger in accordance with the level of security in the disaster-affected country. Therefore, members of the team will not carry weapons in the country concerned for the purpose of protecting the lives and bodies of people engaged in international disaster relief ti d i t f h ti ----- **Section** **SDF Activities since Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and** **2** **Security** - **❶ [Promotion of Various Preparations for New Missions Based on the Legislation for Peace and Security]** based on the International Peace Cooperation Act. In **1 Promotion of Various Preparations** June 2018, moreover, the SDF participated in multilateral Since the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and exercise Khaan Quest 18 and conducted training related to Security[1] in March 2016, the MOD/SDF has undertaken the “joint protection of camps” and so-called “kaketsukevarious preparations for a variety of new missions based keigo” (coming to the aid of a geographically distant unit on the Legislation for Peace and Security, such as activities or personnel under attack) as well as “safety-ensuring to raise awareness of legal systems and intra-unit rules that operations” based on the International Peace Cooperation were established, education of SDF personnel, as well as Act. Also in June 2019, the SDF participated in multilateral development of educational materials necessary for the actual exercise Khaan Quest 19 and conducted training related to training of various units and the nurturing of instructors. In “kaketsuke-keigo” and “safety-ensuring operations.” August 2016, as these preparations were all but completed, In September 2018 in Djibouti, and in Japan in December, each unit of the SDF sets out to implement necessary training the SDF conducted a training on rescue of Japanese nationals in connection with the Legislation for Peace and Security. overseas provided in SDF Law Article 84-3 to improve its Between Japan and the United States, and other bilateral and joint operation capabilities and to strengthen cooperation multilateral joint training, Japan started to conduct necessary with the relevant organizations. training related to the Legislation for Peace and Security Between January and February 2019, the SDF participated after coordinating with the countries concerned. in multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 19 and conducted training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas to improve its joint operation capabilities. In Staff Exercise, the SDF also **2 Training and Exercises** conducted activities including training on cooperation and In July 2017, the SDF conducted the fi rst exercise on the support activities under the International Peace Support Act. protection of U.S. vessels based on SDF Law Article 95-2 In December 2019, the SDF domestically conducted with the intention to enhance the relationship with the U.S. training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas. Moreover, Navy. between January and March 2020, the SDF participated From July to August 2017, the SDF participated in in multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 2020 and conducted multilateral exercise Khaan Quest 17 to improve various training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas. capabilities through conducting exercises on the UN PKO - **❷ [Dispatch of Staff Officers to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)]** In April 2019, Japan decided to dispatch personnel to the Security under the Act on Cooperation with United Nations MFO headquarters, which conducts activities, such as Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations. As a result, monitoring of the ceasefi re between Egypt and Israel in the since the MFO’s activities were determined to satisfy the Five Sinai Peninsula. Principles for Participation and constitute Internationally In making this decision, in accordance with the Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, the dispatch International Peace Cooperation Act, careful study was made of personnel was decided. on whether the MFO’s activities satisfi ed the Five Principles See Section 1-5-2 of this Chapter (International Peace for Participation and whether the activities constituted Cooperation Activities) Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Part III, Chapter 3, Section 5-2-2 (Dispatch to the MFO) **Chapter** The Legislation for Peace and Security, which consists of the Act for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security (Act Concerning Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for Ensuring the Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community; Law No. 76 of 2015) and the International Peace Support Act (Act Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, etc. in Situations where the International Community is Collectively Addressing for International Peace and S it L N 77 f 2015) i t f M h 29 2016 ----- **❸ [The Operationalization of the Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the Armed Forces of the United States and Other Countries (SDF Law Article 95-2)]** etc. and that the SDF personnel never respond to any combat activities by the use of weapons pursuant to the Article. The SDF personnel thus never conduct use of force and this prevents the situation from evolving into combat activities as a result of the use of weapons under the provision of the Article. This use of weapons does not fall under “use of force” which is banned in Article 9 of the Constitution. **b. Activities that Contribute to the Defense of Japan** “Activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” in the Article may include mainly the following ones, while the Government of Japan is to examine each activity on a case-by-case basis: (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities including ballistic missile alert; (2) transportation and replenishment activities in “situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security”; and (3) bilateral/multilateral exercises to enhance capabilities required for defending Japan. **c. Judgment on Whether or Not to Conduct Asset Protection** When the Minister of Defense receives a request from the U.S. Forces, etc., the Minister subjectively should judge whether the activities conducted by the units of the U.S. Forces, etc. in cooperation with the SDF are “activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” and whether asset protection by the SDF personnel is necessary, by considering the objective and content of the activities, capability of the unit, and surrounding circumstances as well as the impacts on performance of the SDF’s regular operations. **(2) Involvement of the Cabinet** Requests from the U.S. Forces, etc. based on Paragraph 2 of the Article should be deliberated in the NSC before the Minister of Defense judges on conducting asset protection if the Minister receives requests in the following cases. However, in case there is no time for dealing with an urgent request by the U.S. Forces, etc., the Minister should promptly report to the NSC regarding judgment of providing asset protection. (1) The U.S. Forces, etc. makes a request for the fi rst time after the operationalization of asset protection. (2) The request is made for asset protection in the territory of a third country. (3) The request is recognized as peculiarly important, although not falling under the above two categories. In addition, in case asset protection under the situations that will have an important infl uence is requested, the Prime Minister should clearly state it in the Basic Plan and should **1 Background** Since the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, the MOD/SDF have been explaining to and coordinating with the United States and also engaged in the work to develop necessary rules and regulations in order to ensure appropriate operation of the system for the protection of weapons, etc., of the units of the U.S. Forces and the armed forces of other foreign countries (SDF Law Article 95-2). Upon completion of these works, in December 2016, at the National Security Council (NSC) the Government decided on the Implementation Guidelines concerning Article 95-2 of the SDF Law, and the Article became ready to be applied to the U.S. Forces operations. This operationalization helps to further strengthen coordinated surveillance between the SDF and the U.S. Forces and also to further enhance deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. **2 The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of** the SDF Law The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law set forth the Government’s basic understanding on the article as well as basic principles on the involvement of the Cabinet and disclosure of information in implementing the article. An outline of the guidelines is as follows: **(1) Basic Principles of Implementing Article 95-2** **a. Purpose of Article 95-2** This Article is to enable SDF personnel to carry out very passive and limited use of weapons to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment (“the weapons, etc.”) of units of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries or other similar organizations (“the U.S. Forces, etc.”), that are concurrently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including bilateral/ multilateral exercises but excluding activities conducted in places where combat activities are actually occurring) in cooperation with the SDF, from infringements which do not amount to an armed attack, because the weapons, etc. can be regarded as an important material means which constitute the defense capability of Japan. Through the provision of Paragraph 1 of the Article that “excluding activities conducted in places where combat activities are actually occurring,” it is ensured that asset protection is not to be, nor to be legally regarded as being integrated (“ittaika”) with the use of force of the U.S. Forces, **Chapter** ----- ask for a Cabinet decision on it after deliberations in the NSC. The NSC Board is to be held flexibly and support the full NSC. In addition, the relevant ministries and agencies are to share information on requests for protection and closely cooperate with each other. **(3) Disclosure of Information** In the implementation of Article 95-2, if an unusual event occurs in conducting asset protection operation, the Government promptly discloses such an event, and releases a basic plan that specifies matters concerning the implementation of asset protection operations in a situation that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. The Government also strives for appropriate disclosure of information in light of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Act No. 42 of 1999). **3 Track Record of Asset Protection Operations in** 2019 In 2019, during ISR activities including ballistic missile alert, SDF vessels conducted asset protection for U.S. military vessels four times, and during joint exercises, SDF vessels conducted asset protection for U.S. military vessels once and SDF aircraft for U.S. military aircraft nine times, totaling 14 times. See Section 1-3-7 of this Chapter (Protection of Weapons and See Other Equipment of the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of Other Foreign Countries) - **❹ [Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)]** In September 2016, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and U.S. the SDF and the U.S. Forces, thereby raising the levels of Ambassador to Japan signed the Japan-U.S. ACSA. ACSA specific on-site cooperation between them. was approved by the Diet and took effect in April 2017. Japan also signed ACSAs with the U.K and Australia The ACSA was prepared as a new agreement to replace other than the United States in light of the Legislation for the previous Japan-U.S. ACSA to enable the application of Peace and Security, etc., which obtained Diet approval along existing settlement procedures to the provision of supplies with the Japan-U.S. ACSA and took effect in the same year. and services from the SDF to the U.S. Forces that become Subsequently, Japan signed ACSAs with Canada and France, possible under the newly enacted Legislation for Peace and both of which obtained Diet approval in May 2019. The Security. Japan-France ACSA and Japan-Canada ACSA took effect in The new ACSA enables the smooth and expeditious June and July 2019, respectively. provision of a broad range of supplies and services between See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2-6 (Logistics Support) - **❺ [Assignment of New Mission for the South Sudan PKO]** Japan deployed engineering units to the UN Mission in the Engineering Unit to be deployed to UNMISS, as well as the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) from January 2012 duty of joint protection of camps. Following the approval to the end of May 2017. Following the enforcement of the obtained at the 9-Minister Meeting of the NSC, the Cabinet Legislation for Peace and Security, after a comprehensive approved the revision of the Implementation Plans for the consideration in light of the local situation and the training International Peace Cooperation Assignment for UNMISS for the new additional mission, the Government decided to on November 15, 2016. assign the duty of so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” to the 11th **Chapter** ----- **Part** Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense (Means to Achieve ## Ⅲ the Objectives of Defense) **Chapter 1** Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense **Chapter 2** Japan-U.S. Alliance **Chapter 3** Security Cooperation ----- **Japan s Own Architecture for** **National Defense** ###### 1 Concerning the strengthening of Japan’s own architecture for national defense, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) states that Japan will build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi-Domain Defense Force,” which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of fl exible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s national security. Defense capability represents Japan’s will and ability to: deter threat from reaching Japan; and should threat reach Japan, eliminate the threat and, as a sovereign nation, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property as well as territorial land, waters and airspace. At the same time, defense capability is essential for Japan to play on its initiative its roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. Strengthening Japan’s defense capability to provide for national security is none other than strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Defense capability is essential also for advancing Japan’s efforts in security cooperation with other countries. **Section** **Response from Peacetime to Grey Zone Situations** **1** Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(1) response from peacetime to ‘gray-zone’ situations” is as follows. The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will enhance its presence on a steady-state basis by actively engaging in, among others, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises and overseas port visits, thereby demonstrating Japan’s will and capability. The SDF will, in close integration with diplomacy, promote strategic communications, including the aforementioned activities by SDF units. The SDF will leverage its capabilities in all domains to conduct wide-area, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter referred to as “persistent ISR”) activities around Japan. The SDF will prevent the occurrence or escalation of emergencies by employing fl exible deterrent Defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self-sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid security environment it has never faced before. Japan must strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative. The NDPG states that, in order to create a security environment desirable for Japan and to deter and counter threats, Japan’s defense capability must be able to serve the following six roles in a seamless and combined manner: (1) response from peacetime to “gray-zone” situations; (2) countering attacks against Japan, including its remote islands; (3) response in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains during all phases; (4) response to large-scale disasters, etc.; (5) cooperation with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and (6) promotion of security cooperation. In particular, in view of protecting the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals, it is all the more important for Japan’s defense capability to fulfi ll diverse roles on a steady-state basis. See Reference 10 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces) **Chapter** options and other measures. Leveraging posture in place for these activities, the SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies, immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate Japan’s sovereignty, including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters. The SDF will provide persistent protection against incoming ballistic missiles and other threats, and minimize damage should it occur. See Section 2-2 of this Chapter (Response to Missile Attacks) Chapter 3 Section 1 (Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation) ----- **❶ [Persistent ISR in the Area Surrounding Japan ]** **1 Basic Concept** Japan is comprised of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth largest[1] territorial waters (including inland waters) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. **2** Response by the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF GSDF personnel engaged in warning and surveillance activities The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) monitors ships navigating in the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea from peacetime, using patrol aircraft[2] and other aircraft. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, and early warning and control aircraft[3] amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace. These activities of the MSDF and ASDF are done 24 hours a day. Warning and surveillance activities in major channels are also conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF guard posts, Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) coastal surveillance units, and other assets.[4] Furthermore, in order to maintain a posture to swiftly respond to various situations, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the fl exible use of destroyers, aircraft, and so on as required. The information obtained through such surveillance activities is shared with the relevant ministries and agencies, including the Japan Coast Guard, in order to strengthen coordination. To show an example of the events that were reported from SDF’s surveillance, following September 2012 when the Government of Japan acquired property rights to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Minamikojima Island, and Kitakojima Island), Chinese government vessels carried out intermittent intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.[5] In June 2016, a Chinese Navy combatant vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone to the north of the Senkaku Islands **Chapter** MSDF P-3C engaging in warning and surveillance activities in the waters around Japan ASDF radar site engaging in warning and surveillance activities 24 hours a day, 365 days a year Excluding overseas territories. The EEZ is the eighth largest in the world if overseas territories are included. Aircraft for monitoring with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force. The MSDF possesses P-3Cs and P-1s as fi xed-wing patrol aircraft, and Sh-H-60Js and SH-60Ks as patrol helicopters. Aircraft with radar capable of monitoring warning control systems omnidirectionally. Being excellent in speed performance and boasting long cruising time, the aircraft is able to fl y to distant areas to engage in warning for a longer time. Moreover, as it is also able to engage in warning at high altitude, it has outstanding flight performance and the warning and surveillance capability, such as a long line-of-sight distance. The ASDF has been operating E-767 based on civil aircraft B-767. Article 4(1)18 of the Act for Establishment of the MOD (Investigation and research required for the performance of duties within jurisdiction) provides the legal basis for early warning ill ti iti b th SDF ----- for the fi rst time. In December 2016, six vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and entered the Pacifi c. This was the fi rst time that the entry of this aircraft carrier into the Pacifi c Ocean was confi rmed. In July 2017, a Chinese naval intelligence collection ship entered Japanese territorial waters southwest of Kojima (Matsumae, Hokkaido) passing east through the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacifi c Ocean. In January 2018, the SDF confi rmed that a Chinese submarine and warship had been navigating through the Japanese contiguous waters of the Senkaku Islands on the same day. Furthermore, in April, in waters some 350 km south of Yonaguni Island, a number of (presumed) fi ghter jets were observed taking off from the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” for the fi rst time. Also in June 2019, the SDF confi rmed that six vessels, including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and entered the Pacifi c. In April 2020, six vessels, including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and entered the Pacifi c. In the same month, the SDF confi rmed that the same vessels passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea. This time again, carrier-based fi ghters were observed taking off and landing on the aircraft carrier in the Pacifi c Ocean. In FY2019 the SDF made public 12 cases of activities involving Chinese naval vessels passing through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island. It has been pointed out that North Korea is attempting to evade United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions through smuggling. As part of its regular warning and surveillance activities in Japanese territorial waters, the SDF is carrying out information gathering on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council sanctions. During the period from 2018 to the end of March 2020, the SDF patrol aircraft have observed 24 cases[6] of seaborne rendezvous between North Korean tankers and foreign-fl agged tankers in the East China Sea. The information was shared with relevant agencies and ministries. In a comprehensive judgment across the government, the vessels concerned are **Chapter** Small ship of unidentifi ed nationality NAM SAN 8 A North Korea-fl agged tanker and a small ship of unidentifi ed nationality confi rmed by MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft, which are strongly suspected of committing a ship-to-ship transfer on the high seas of the East China Sea (December 2019) strongly suspected of engaging in ship-to-ship transfers with the North Korean vessels, which is prohibited by UN Security Council resolution. Japan reported this to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea, shared the information with relevant countries, gave information to the relevant countries regarding the tankers concerned and made public announcements on the subject. In response to these illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean vessels prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution, the United States and other concerned countries are carrying out early warning surveillance activities with aircraft using the United States Kadena Air Base in Japan.[7] Australian, Canadian, Video: Response status to illicit ship-to-ship transfer prohibited by the UN Security Council resolution URL:https://youtu.be/eCOduAxZ374 For a specifi c example, see the MOD website (https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/sedori/index.html) Australia and Canada conducted sanctions enforcement using aircraft from the United States Kadena Air Base in Japan for about one month from late April 2018, followed by Australia, Canada and New Zealand for about six weeks from mid-September of the same year, Australia for about a week from early December of 2018, France for about three weeks from March 2019, Australia for about a month from May 2019, Canada for about three weeks from early June 2019, Australia for about one month from early September 2019, Canada for about one th f l O t b 2019 N Z l d f b t th f id O t b 2019 d A t li b t th f id F b ( f th d f M h 2020) ----- **Fig. III-1-1-1** Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan **Chapter** Etorofu IslandEtorofu Island E-2C Airborne Early Warning AircraftE-2C Airborne Early Warning Aircraft Fixed-wing patrol aircraftFixed-wing patrol aircraft E-767 Airborne E-767 Airborne GSDF: Coast observation unit Warning and Warning and Control SystemControl System ASDF: Rader site (FPS5 BMD response) Takeshima ASDF: Radar site (BMD response) ASDF: Radar site Hachijo IslandHachijo Island Ministry of Defense Fixed-wing patrol aircraftFixed-wing patrol aircraft ※ Only a schematic image of a surveillance range. Not an exact representation of the actual range. DestroyerDestroyer The Senkaku Ogasawara Ogasawara Islands IslandsIslands Okidaitojima Okidaitojima Minami Torishima Island IslandIsland Yonaguni IslandYonaguni Island Territorial waters Okinotorishima Okinotorishima Extended continental shelf IslandIsland EEZ New Zealand and French aircraft made patrol fl ights since April 2018. In addition, naval vessels of the U.S. Navy, the United Kingdom, Canada,[8] Australia and France carried out enforcement of UN Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea in sea areas surrounding Japan.[9] The MOD/SDF intend to continue their close cooperation with concerned countries to ensure compliance with the UN Security Council resolution. See Fig. III-1-1-1 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan); Fig. III-1-12 (Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Coast Guard Ships); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-2 (Military Affairs); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (North Korea) Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around **Fig. III-1-1-2** the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Coast Guard Ships 60 [(Number of times/ships)] 20 44 48 46 35 31 32 25 27 20 11 11 12 12 12 7 8 8 8 3 5 Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Mar. 2017 2018 2019 2020 Number of times Number of ships At the Japan-Canada Summit Meeting held on April 28, 2019, Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, indicated that Canada will extend the period for dispatch of aircraft and vessels for conducting warning and surveillance activities against ship-to-ship transfers of cargo by two years, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed his gratitude. The United Kingdom’s naval frigates (early May, from late May to early June, mid-June and mid-December 2018, and early January and from late February to early March, 2019), the Canadian Navy’s frigates (early and late October 2018, and mid-June and late August 2019), the Royal Australian Navy’s vessels (early October 2018 and early May and late October 2019) d th F h N ’ f i t ( i i 2019) d t d ti f t i th t d J i l di th E t Chi S ( f th d f M h 2020) ----- - **❷ [Measures against Violation of Japan’s Sovereignty ]** **(2) Response by the MOD/SDF** **1 Warnings and Scrambles in Preparation against** The ASDF detects and identifi es aircraft fl ying in airspace Intrusion of Territorial Airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as **(1) Basic Concept** well as early warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious Under international law, countries have complete and aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, exclusive sovereignty over their territorial airspace. fi ghters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order Scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace to confi rm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. is conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing Furthermore, in the event that this suspicious aircraft has intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on actually intruded into territorial airspace, a warning to leave land or at sea, this measure can be taken only by the SDF. the airspace would be issued, among other responses. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting In FY2019, ASDF aircraft scrambled 947 times, which the actions based on Article 84 of the SDF Law. was a decrease by 52 times compared with the previous fi scal year. This is the 3rd highest number of times since 1958, **Chapter** **VOICE** Voice of Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft Crew in Charge of Warning and Surveillance Petty Officer 3rd Class MOTOSHIROMIZU Nanami, Non- identify all ships in waters under the charge of the P-1 and acoustic operator, 3rd Air Patrol Squadron, MSDF (Yamato check for abnormalities, it is not allowed to miss even a small City, Kanagawa Prefecture) change, which often causes strain during fl ight. In addition to I have been on board P-1 as a non-acoustic operator at the cooperation between crew members, we exchange information 3rd Air Patrol Squadron in Atsugi since 2019. with the U.S. and other navies, and also closely coordinate P-1 has a variety of missions, including warning and with the Japan Coast Guard, the Fisheries Agency and others. surveillance flights over waters around Japan, which are When landing after a fl ight mission, I am freed from tension conducted every day. I am engaged in the warning and and feel comfortable tiredness, at the same time, I also fi nd surveillance mission on a daily basis. my job rewarding as I am able to get a sense of accomplishment “Nothing has happened” is the best thing for warning and from contributing to the stability of waters around Japan. surveillance, but it is extremely rare that a notable event is not Nothing can make me happier than improving my skills found at sea, which is constantly changing. My principal role through daily training and further serving Japan. while on a fl ight is to identify ships using radar, etc. In order to The author in prefl ight inspection P-1 taking off for warning and surveillance fl ight in early morning Video:Fixed-wing patrol aircraft engaged in warning and surveillance URL:https://youtu.be/VHmHSCG5Eww ----- **Fig. III-1-1-3** Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War (Times) 1,200 1,000 1,168 999 943 947 944 904 873 812 810 464 851 638 567 500 675 415 571 425 386 306 311 299 96 156 220 158 38 473 264 247 248 359 288 301 390 343 268 197 124 2016 2017 2018 2019 (FY) 800 600 400 200 1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Russia China Taiwan Others Total **Chapter** An ASDF pilot running up to an F-15 fighter aircraft on receiving an order to scramble Russian Su-34 fighter-bomber confirmed for the first time through a scramble (February 2020) when scrambles commenced and the number continues to be kept relatively high. Breaking this figure down, planes were scrambled 675 times in response to Chinese aircraft, an increase of 37 times from the previous fiscal year. Chinese aircraft continue to be highly active, as this is the 2nd highest figure since the number of scrambles by country and region was first made public in 2001. A distinctive example arose in May 2017 when a drone caused an airspace violation as it flew above a Chinese government vessel entering Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. Japan lodged protests against the Chinese government through diplomatic channels. In August that year, six Chinese military bombers were observed in an unprecedented flight from the East China Sea over the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island northeast across the Pacific to an area off the Kii Peninsula before returning. Then in December, five aircraft including two fighter jets 10 Thi th fi t ti th t Chi fi ht h b fi d t i th J S flew over the Tsushima Strait and entered the Japan Sea airspace.[10] Then in April 2018, a (presumed) unmanned Chinese aircraft flew across the East China Sea. With these kinds of acts, China is expanding and intensifying the activities of its air force inside Japanese airspace and one-sidedly escalating its actions in some cases. It is a troubling situation. ASDF aircraft scrambled 268 times in response to Russian aircraft, which was a decrease by 75 times compared to the previous year. As a distinctive example, in June 2019, two Tu-95 long range bombers intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Minamidaitojima Island (Okinawa Prefecture). One of them further intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Hachijojima Island (Tokyo). Japan lodged protests against the Russian government through diplomatic channels. In July 2019, two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 long-range ----- fighter-bomber was confirmed for the first time above the Sea of Okhotsk in a scramble. Due attention needs to be paid to the activities of Russian aircraft. Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)” by Chinese government in November 2013, the MOD/SDF has conducted warning and surveillance activities as before in the East China Sea, including the Chinese ADIZ. The MOD/SDF also engages in strict measures against intrusion of territorial airspace in accordance with international law and the SDF Law. See Fig. III-1-1-3 (Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the See Cold War); Fig. III-1-1-4 (Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded [image]); Fig. III-1-1-5 (Air Defense Identification Zone [ADIZ] of Japan and Those of Neighboring Countries/Regions [image]); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-2 (Military Affairs), Part I, Chapter 2, Section 4-4 (Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan); Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-3-5 (Measures Against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace) Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which **Fig. III-1-1-4** Scrambles Responded (image) **Chapter** FY2019 Flight paths taken by Chinese aircraft Flight paths taken by Russian aircraft **2 Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s** Territorial Waters Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and **Fig. III-1-1-5** Those of Neighboring Countries/Regions (image) Northern Territories Japanese territorial airspace ROK ADIZ Takeshima “East China Sea ADIZ” ※ Japan ADIZ Ogasawara Islands The Senkaku Islands Taiwan ADIZ Yonagunijima Island 500km Philippines - The ROK expanded its ADIZ in December 2013 ADIZ ADIZ: Air Defense Identification Zone bombers carried out long distance joint flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. In addition, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft allegedly supporting Tu-95 long-range bombers intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Takeshima Island in Shimane Prefecture. A Korean fighter fired warning shots to the Russian aircraft. Japan lodged protests against the Russian government which intruded into Japan’s airspace and against the Korean government which fired warning shots to the Russian aircraft through diplomatic channel. In February 2020, a Su-34 **(1) Basic Concept** With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters,[11] an order for maritime security operations will be issued. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japanese territorial waters. See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-3-2 (Maritime Security Operations) **(2) Response by the MOD/SDF** The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign submarines navigating under the territorial waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating under Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations, and continued to track the submarine with MSDF vessels until it entered the high seas. Recently, in January 2018, a submerged submarine was spotted by MSDF assets including a destroyer moving through Japanese contiguous zones of the Senkaku Islands. The submarine was then observed surfacing in international 11 Th t “t it i l t ” l i l d i l ----- **Chapter** |！|Col2| |---|---| **Column** Scrambling against Aircraft Intruding into Territorial Airspace Under international law, countries have complete and In order to effectively implement scrambling against aircraft exclusive sovereignty over their territorial airspace. When a intruding into territorial airspace, it is necessary to accurately foreign aircraft flies over a state’s territorial airspace, it is judge whether or not to scramble fi ghters. As for this, the Air necessary to obtain permission from the state. Intruding into a Defense Identifi cation Zone (ADIZ) has been established in a state’s territorial airspace without the presence of any special way that encloses Japan. Regarding an aircraft that has been circumstance and without permission from the state violates confi rmed to have entered the ADIZ by radar, the ASDF judges international law, known as “intrusion of territorial airspace.” whether or not to scramble fighters after identifying the The ASDF monitors airspace over Japan and the surrounding aircraft’s nationality and assessing the possibility of intrusion areas through radar on a 24-hours-a-day, 365-days-a-year basis into Japanese territorial airspace. and identifi es fl ying aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft which may In recent years, the number of scrambles remains at a high intrude into Japanese territorial airspace is detected, the ASDF level. The number of scrambles in FY2019 (947) was seven scrambles fi ghters kept on stand-by. Scrambled fi ghters monitor times higher than the number in FY2004 (141), which the behavior of the potentially intruding aircraft and, as necessary, represented the lowest level since the end of the Cold War. issue a caution against intrusion. If an intrusion occurs, scrambled The MOD/SDF will devote full-fledged efforts for scrambling fi ghters warn an intruding aircraft to leave the airspace, or forcibly against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace in compel it to land at the nearest airfield. Scrambling against accordance with international law and the SDF Law from the aircraft intruding into territorial airspace is a task comprised of a viewpoint of fi rmly defending Japan’s territorial land, seas and series of activities starting with the monitor of airspace. airspace. Early warning and control aircraft, etc. (Confirmation (Confirmation of the type of the type of aircraft)of aircraft) (3) Confirmation of the situation(4) Monitoring of the behavior (2) Scramble (5) Caution (6) Warning (Detection)(Detection) (7) Guidance (8) Forced Intrusion of landing territorial or leaving airspace Air wing Outside territorial airspace← **→Inside territorial** Air defense direction airspace **！** center control radarscontrol radarsWarning and (1) Detection, identification and order to scramble Procedures for scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace (image) A F-2 fi ghter aircraft defending Japanese territorial airspace the Senkaku Islands. Although international law does not forbid foreign submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone of coastal states, Japan maintains a posture to appropriately deal with such activities. waters of the East China Sea fl ying the Chinese fl ag. In the past, submerged submarines moving through Japanese contiguous zones were spotted in other sea areas.[12] This was the fi rst time that a Chinese naval submarine has been observed operating in the Japanese contiguous zones of Video:Scramble URL:https://youtu.be/pq3GE0f38uE 12 MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft and others confi rmed observations of submerged submarines navigating through the Japanese contiguous zones in waters west of Amamioshima island, south of Kumejima Island and south of Minamidaitojima Island in May 2013, in waters east of Miyakojima Island in March 2014, and in waters southeast of Tsushima Island in February 2016. Th i id t d bli ----- in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF have been making various efforts. In particular, the MSDF has been taking the following steps: (1) deployment of Patrol Guided Missile Boats; (2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit;[13] (3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; (4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells);[14] (5) improving the sufficiency ratio of military vessel personnel; and (6) enhancing equipment for the Vessel Boarding Inspection Team. In addition, based on “the manual for dealing with suspicious vessels” formulated jointly by the then Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, they have regularly conducted the training in order to strengthen coordination. **3 Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels** **(1) Basic Concept** The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard. **(2) Response by the MOD/SDF** In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an unidentified vessel off the Noto Peninsula in 1999, an unidentified vessel **Chapter** 13 A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of vessel boarding inspections under maritime security operations. 14 A b ti h ll l h d f th 76 i d d t th fl t f t f hi h k it f b i ----- **Section** **2** **Defense of Japan including its Remote Islands** Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(2) countering attacks against Japan, including its remote islands” is as follows. In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, the SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime[1] and air[2] superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures. Against airborne attack by missiles and aircraft, the SDF will respond in a swift and sustained manner by applying **❶ [Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands ]** optimal means and minimize damage to maintain SDF’s capabilities as well as the infrastructure upon which such capabilities are employed. In response to attack by guerrillas or special operations forces, the SDF will protect critical facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy infi ltrating forces. In responding to such attacks, the SDF will implement cross-domain operations that organically fuse capabilities in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains to block and eliminate attacks. In view of protecting the life, person and property of the nationals, the SDF will implement measures for civil protection. - and vessels, and then regaining the territory by the landing of GSDF forces. See Fig. III-1-2-1 (Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Remote See Islands) **Chapter** **1** Basic Concept Japan possesses numerous remote islands. In order to respond to attacks on these islands, it is important to station units and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and also to maneuver and deploy them according to situations on a steady-state basis. It is also important to ensure maritime and air superiority by detecting signs at an early stage through persistent ISR conducted by the SDF. If signs of attack are detected in advance, units will be maneuvered and deployed in an area expected to be invaded ahead of the deployment of enemy units, and block access and landing of invading forces. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures such as bringing the enemy under control by ground fi re from aircraft **2** Initiatives of the MOD/SDF In order to strengthen its defense architecture in the southwestern region, the ASDF established the 9th Air Wing in January 2016 and newly formed the Southwestern Air Defense Force in July 2017. The GSDF, in addition to the Yonaguni coast observation unit formed in March 2016 and other newly-formed units, established the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade with full-fl edged amphibious operation capabilities in March 2018. Moreover, the GSDF deployed some units, including an area security unit in Amami Oshima, and an area security unit in Miyakojima Island, in March 2019. A surface-to-air missile unit and a surface-to-ship guided missile unit were deployed to Miyakojima Island in Video: GSDF Amami Guard URL: https://youtu.be/f8XNsMz1vmo Video: GSDF Miyako Guard URL: https://youtu.be/lDN6bt54MOQ Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by the opposing force. Ai i it f t th diti i hi h id t i b ti ith t ff i i ifi t l l f b t ti b th i f ----- **Fig. III-1-2-1** Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Remote Islands **Chapter** Imagery gathering satellite Positioning satellite Secure and maintain maritime and air superiority Overall air defense Aerial refueling Surface vessels Maritime air support Deployment of units to remote islands Mine deployment warfare Anti-surface warfare Operation to recapture remote islands in the case of an invasion Close air support SDF troops are to be swiftly deployed in an area expected to be attacked, ahead of the deployment of enemy units, and Landing by aircraft the troops try to block access and landing of invading forces. Response in the water Landing by amphibious vehicle Anti-submarine warfare Landing by boat Anti-mine Minesweep Submarine Enemy submarine warfare ing by ship E-2D airborne early warning aircraft. The ASDF established Airborne Warning and Control Wing by upgrading the Airborne Early Warning Group in March 2020 and will establish a temporal unmanned aerial vehicle unit (tentative name) within FY2020. In order to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel, the SDF procured stand-off missiles which are capable of responding from the outside of their threat envelopes, and has started research and development (R&D) on technologies required for new anti-ship missiles and Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectiles (HVGPs) for the defense of remote islands to take all initiatives necessary to defend the islands since FY2018, and technologies required for hypersonic weapons since FY2019. Also, in order to secure capabilities for swift and largescale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities through: Commander of the Airborne Warning and Control Wing granted the wing fl ag by Minister of Defense Kono (March 2020) March 2020. The GSDF will deploy an area security unit in charge of the initial response and other units also in Ishigaki Island. As part of measures to enhance the persistent ISR posture, the SDF has acquired a new type of destroyer (FFM) and Video: Aerial refueling from airplane URL: https://youtu.be/GaqmOkoWot8 ----- **Fig. III-1-2-2** Establishment Status of Major Units in Kyushu/Southwestern Region (since 2016) (conceptual diagram) Establishment of GSDF Amphibious Rapid Establishment of ASDF Airborne Warning and Deployment Brigade in 2018 (Ainoura) Control Wing in 2020 (Hamamatsu) **Chapter** **1** Amami Oshima Island Establishment of GSDF Amami Guard, etc. in 2019 (Amami) Okinoerabujima Island Main island of Okinawa Establishment of ASDF 9th Air Wing in 2016 (Naha) Establishment of ASDF Southwestern Air Defense Force in 2017 (Naha) Senkaku Islands Kumejima Island Establishment of Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing in 2017 (Naha) Yonaguniji- Miyakojima Island Establishment of GSDF Miyako Guard in 2019 (Miyakojima Island) ma Island Transfer of GSDF 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Group in 2020 (Miyakojima Island) Ishigakiji- Establishment of GSDF 302nd Surface-to-Ship Missile Defense Battery in ma Island 2020 (Miyakojima Island) Establishment of GSDF Yonaguni Coast (As of April 1, 2020) Observation Unit in 2016 (Yonaguni) [Legend] GSDF Units MSDF Units ASDF Units Chief of the Tactical Airlift Group granted the group flag by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Iwata (April 2020) the improvement of Osumi class LST (Landing Ship, Tank); and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys and C-2 transport aircraft. In particular, for the operation of V-22 Ospreys, the MOD determined that the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT was the best airfield to be used as their deployment site due to positional relationships with the amphibious deployment brigade and relevant units in joint operations, the length of the runway, and potential use as relocation destination of JGSDF Camp Metabaru. In August 2018, the Governor of Saga prefecture expressed their acceptance. The MOD/SDF will continue to work to gain understanding on GSDF amphibious vehicle and U.S. Navy vessel under training in “Iron Fist 20” (February 2020) deployment at the airport from the relevant local authorities and others.[3] Meanwhile, in May 2019, the MOD explained their intention to temporarily deploy V-22 Ospreys at Camp Kisarazu, since there is the prospect that the deployment at KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT will take a certain period of time. In response to the statement of Kisarazu Mayor to cooperate with the provisional deployment plan made in December of the same year, the MOD established a Tactical Airlift Wing that operates Osprey in March 2020. Meanwhile, various types of training to increase the capability for amphibious operations are being undertaken. At the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V 22 O d i t l 50 h li t t f d f C M t b t d t b d l d ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** Working at My New Post at the GSDF Miyako Guard Sergeant First Class IKEHARA Noriaki, little by little through participation in sport events including Public Relations Sergeant, the GSDF Miyako Guard international triathlon meeting at Miyakojima Island and a local (Miyakojima City, Okinawa Prefecture) track meet, as well as through volunteer activities, including coastal cleaning activities and support for local events. In In March 2019, the GSDF Miyako Guard was established, doing so, I started to hear, “We are happy with the SDF,” from and I started to serve here as public relations sergeant to islanders. One year after the establishment, I am feeling happy engage in liaison and negotiation with outside. to have served here. As SDF personnel from Miyakojima Island, I made efforts to I think the gradual building of a relationship and increase actively engage with people of the community and cooperators in the number of people who understand and cooperate with to make ourselves known so that I can act as a bridge between the SDF are desirable not only for the Guard but also for the the SDF and people of the community. I also participated in community. I will value and try to continue this relationship and two disaster relief activities, including “disaster relief for make efforts to further expand the understanding. collection of waste-oil balls,” which was the fi rst disaster relief Lastly, I give thanks that I can serve in Miyakojima Island mission for the guard. I think we were able to be of help for and will make efforts everyday to meet the expectations from the community through these activities. In my private life, I islanders and to set a pattern for other units. was able to share confi dence with people of the community The author providing an explanation of the camp to trainees At the goal of Miyakojima Triathlon Meeting 2020, as well as fi eld exercises with the U.S. Marine Corps in Japan. See Fig. III-1-2-2 (Establishment Status of Major Units in Kyushu/ Southwestern Region [since 2016]) [conceptual diagram]) The SDF endeavored to increase its capability through SDF Joint Exercises (fi eld exercise) in October 2019, fi eld training Iron Fist 20 in the United States and other fi eld training in Japan with the U.S. Marines Corps from January to February **❷ [Response to Missile Attacks ]** in December of the same year, the then Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).[4] **1** [Japan’s Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability] (1) Basic Concept Japan began developing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in FY2004 to be fully prepared for the response against ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Law in July 2005, and The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly intercepts aircraft and th t t th PAC 3 i il d i d i il t i t t b lli ti i il ----- **Fig. III-1-2-3** Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense (image) **Chapter** - Establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces for air defense of each SDF service, not limited to those for missile defense - Ascertain the status of operations in common by linking to JADGE* via a network - Simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats under unifed command and control (allocation and direction of optimal means for interception, etc.) through JADGE Aegis Ashore AWACS Fighters AWACS E-2D MIMO radar FPS Enemy fighters Enemy cruise missiles Aegis destroyers Air refueling aircraft **Radar network without any blind spots** **Air-to-air** **Ship-to-air** **Surface-to-air** E-2D Enemy fighters Enemy cruise missiles Enemy cruise missiles Aegis Ashore Short range surface-to-air FPS Aegis destroyers missiles (SAM) Base air defense SAM Middle range SAM PAC-3 *JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment) is a core system for the command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes the information regarding aircraft captured by radars installed nationwide, and it provides fghters with instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and radar, etc. in response to ballistic missiles. Currently, Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).[5] The upcoming introduction of the land-based Aegis system, Aegis Ashore, will enable our forces to intercept missiles in the upper tier not just from Aegis destroyers but from land. Today airborne threats to Japan are increasingly complex and diverse, including ballistic missiles equipped with multiple/maneuverable warheads, high-speed and longer-range cruise missiles, and stealth and multi-role aircraft. In order to effectively and effi ciently counter these airborne threats by optimum means and minimize damage, it is necessary to establish a structure to conduct integrated operation of various equipment for missile defense and air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection from peacetime and also enhancing the comprehensive air and missile defense capability that can simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. In this regard, the SDF will strive to standardize and streamline the means for interception that each SDF service possesses, including their maintenance and supply systems. In case ballistic missiles or other objects are launched against Japan as an armed attack, it will be dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack situations. On the other hand, when such situation is not yet acknowledged as an armed attack, Japan will take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles. As a response against ballistic missiles or other objects, the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander, and various postures for effective defense are to be taken under a unifi ed command through JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of a fallen ballistic missile. See Fig. III-1-2-3 (Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense [concept]) Fig. III-1-2-4 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD [image]) Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-3-4 (Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles) JADGE is a core system for the command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes the information regarding aircraft captured by radar installed nationwide, and it provides fi ghters instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and d t i t b lli ti i il ----- **Fig. III-1-2-4** Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD (image) Mid-course phase In this phase, the rocket engine burns out and the missile is fying in outer space (exoatmosphere) inertially Detection/Discrimination/Tracking Boost phase In this phase, the rocket Terminal phase engine is burning and accelerating the missile This phase covers atmospheric re-entry to impact ASDF air control and warning radar ASDF Ballistic missile (FPS-5, FPS-3 Upgraded, Patriot PAC-3 FPS-7) GSDF Aegis Ashore JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment) MSDF Aegis BMD destroyer Commander, Joint Task Force-BMD Commander, Air Defense Command (2) Response by the MOD/SDF Since 2016, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and launched more than 70 ballistic missiles and others. These military actions by North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security. North Korea expressed its intention to fully denuclearize the Korean Peninsula at the North Korea-United States summit held in June 2018, and disclosed destruction of its nuclear test ground. However, the second North Korea-United States summit held in February 2019 ended without any agreement and North Korea has not so far dismantled all its weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles in a complete, verifi able and irreversible manner. North Korea is assessed to have already successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons to fi t ballistic missile warheads through repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to date, and it possesses and deploys several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan. Some of the missiles that were launched in 2019 and are presumed to be new models have a shape similar to that of Russian short-range ballistic missile “Iskander,” which can fl y at a lower altitude than conventional ballistic missiles and on an irregular trajectory. It is suggested that the aim is to penetrate missile defense systems. **Chapter** The MOD/SDF continues to carefully monitor the concrete actions of North Korea toward the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and conducts the necessary intelligence, warning and surveillance activities, and other necessary activities while closely cooperating with the United States and other countries. Further cooperation with the U.S. Government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is essential for effi cient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information, and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting). Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by means such as receiving Shared Early Warning (SEW)[6] from the U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces. Maintenance, enhancement and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been actively conducted through training and other activities. Since FY2010, BMD special exercises have been held between the MSDF and the Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and d t th SDF b th U S F i h t i d f ti ft th l h (Th SDF t t d t i th i f ti i A il 1996) ----- U.S. Navy, connecting their ships and other equipment via a network to conduct the integrated air and missile defense exercise. The ASDF participated in 2018, and the GSDF in 2019 in this exercise. The exercise is conducted as an integrated air and missile defense exercise aimed to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation. Beyond Japan-U.S. cooperation, it is significant to bolster the cooperation between Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea. In January, March, October and December 2017, trilateral ballistic missile information sharing exercises were held in waters off Japan with the objective of strengthening coordination. Sensitive information related to ballistic missiles, etc. is adequately shared with relevant countries, including the United States through a secured infrastructure and framework[7] to protect secrets. The SDF engages in various training in peacetime to improve its capability to counter ballistic missiles. It has been conducting PAC-3 maneuver deployment training from June 2017 in an effort to strengthen the SDF’s capability to counter ballistic missiles and generate a sense of safety and security among the public. It has conducted 25 training sessions as of the end of March 2020 including deployments to public facilities. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (North Korea); Chapter 3, Section See 1-2-4 (Republic of Korea); Reference 11 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan) (3) Initiatives towards Strengthening of the BMD System Currently the SDF maneuvers and deploys according to situation Aegis-equipped destroyers for defense of the entire territory of Japan and PAC-3, which is deployed across the country for the defense of stationing locations. On that premise, the SDF has worked to increase the number of Aegis BMD destroyers. So far, the MOD completed refurbishment of two without BMD capabilities, “Atago” and “Ashigara,” to give them BMD capabilities by December 2018. The MOD also decided to acquire two additional Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD capabilities using the FY2015 and FY2016 budgets. These projects will increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD capabilities from the existing six to eight by FY2020. Meanwhile, Japan and the United States are jointly developing advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM3 Block IIA), which will be the successor to SM-3 Block IA to be mounted on Aegis-equipped destroyers, and promoting the project to its deployment, in order to deal with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missile attacks. At the National Security Council 9-Minister Meeting in December 2016, a decision was made to transition to joint production and the deployment phase. Since the FY2017 budget, SM-3 Block IIA acquisitions are ongoing. Acquisition and deployment of SM-3 Block IIA are planned to be implemented in FY2021. In comparison with the previous SM-3 Block IA, SM-3 Block IIA will have not only extended interceptable altitude and coverage of protection, but also have enhanced defeating capability and simultaneous engagement capability. In addition, it is expected that the interception capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA will be enhanced against ballistic missiles equipped with interception avoidance measures such as a decoy and ballistic missiles launched with an intention to avoid being **Chapter** Launched Aegis-equipped Destroyer JS “Maya” (March 2020) Video: Training on maneuver and deployment of PAC-3 Video:Turnover ceremony for Destroyer JS “Maya” and hand-over Video: Training on maneuver and deployment of PAC-3 URL: https://youtu.be/aJ2PQPozQL8 Video:Turnover ceremony for Destroyer JS “Maya” and hand-over ceremony for the SDF ship flag URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vSJAv9ibVAE The enforcement of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets in December 2014 (Act No. 108 of 2013) has established the basis for protection of highly confidential information related to national security. In addition, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Protection of Classified Military Information (the Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement [GSOMIA]) entered into effect on November 2016. GSOMIA serves as a framework for protecting various classified information, including information regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat, shared between Japan and the ROK, which is required for practical and effective responses t i it ti ----- **Fig. III-1-2-5** Major Efforts to Improve Ballistic Missile Response Capabilities **Chapter** |gis As|ho|re| |---|---|---| |Aegis-equ|ipped destroyer PAC-3| |---|---| |Conceptu coverage|al image of of protectio| |---|---| Development of advanced interceptor missiles Introduction of enhanced capability type for BMD (SM-3 Block IB and Block IIA) PAC-3 missiles (PAC-3MSE) Improvement of capabilities to respond to traditional threats Defense by SM-3 Block IA Defense by advanced interceptor missiles PAC-3’s coverage of protection Improvement of response capabilities Response to anticipated interception avoidance measures and diversifcation of trajectories avoidance measures (decoy, etc.)Emergence of interception trajectory (lofted)Diversifed PAC-3MSE’s Conventional trajectory coverage of coverage of coverage of protection (minimum-energy) Distance Improvement of simultaneous engagement capability (image) ・Extension of coverage of protection, and enhancement of Outer space ・ Extension of coverage of protection, and enhancement defeating capability and simultaneous engagement capability of simultaneous engagement capability Inner space Aegis Ashore Aegis-equipped destroyer PAC-3 Capacity enhancement and increase in Introduction of a land-based Aegis system the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers (Aegis Ashore) Conceptual image of Kongo-type destroyer (four vessels) Kongo-type destroyer (four vessels) coverage of protection ＋ Two Atago-type destroyers + Two Maya-type destroyers SM-3 Block Kongo-type IIA-equipped Aegis Kongo-type Atago/Maya-type destroyerKongo-type Ashore Kongo-type SM-3 Block IIA-equipped Aegis Conceptual image Conceptual image Ashore of current structure of future structure ・Continuous enhancement of response capabilities ・Seamless protection ・Maintenance of fexible operation of Aegis-equipped destroyers intercepted by taking a higher than nominal trajectory (lofted trajectory).[8] With regard to Patriot PAC-3, the MOD has been working for procurement of the enhanced capability type, PAC3 (MSE) (Missile Segment Enhancement) and started its deployment at the end of FY2019. Introduction of PAC3MSE will realize the extension of interception altitude from less than 20 km to tens of km, meaning that the coverage of protection (area) will expand more than twice compared with the current PAC-3. In this way Japan is taking measures necessary to strengthen its protection structure and plans to continue the efforts.[9] See Fug. III-1-2-5 (Major Initiatives for Improvement of the Capability to Counter Ballistic Missiles) (4) Introduction of Aegis Ashore In the past, the BMD of Japan was based on deploying Aegisequipped destroyers, etc. in preparation for interception for a required period of time after early detection of signs of missile launch. Under the past posture regarding a possible missile attack on Japan, the MOD has believed that protection of the entire territory of Japan was achievable if about two of the destroyers continued BMD missions in the sea for a certain period of time with a system of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers. Meanwhile, North Korea has improved its practical launch capability using a transporter erector launcher (TEL) and developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), which makes it diffi cult to grasp signs of launch at an early Video: Test launch of SM3-Block IB from Destroyer JS “Atago” URL: https://youtu.be/WRAfkuoQeMQ By taking a higher trajectory than minimum energy trajectories (trajectories that enable effi cient fl ying of a missile and maximize its range), it takes a shorter range than the maximum range, but the falling speed of the missile becomes faster. Th FY2020 b d t i l d f di ti f th P t i t S t t PAC 3MSE i il ----- stage. In light of the changing situation, it is necessary to maintain a persistent 24-hour, 365-day deployment of Aegisequipped destroyers for a long period of over one year. This fact triggered a review of the past Japanese ballistic missile defense posture itself. Furthermore, under the current Aegis equipped destroyer system that requires frequent long-term deployment, the working environment for crew onboard these destroyers is extremely severe. The service requires high level of concentration day and night to cope with ballistic missiles that can be launched anytime. Under these circumstances, with North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles posing grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security, Japan must work to drastically upgrade its ballistic missile defense capabilities in order to ensure constant and sustained protection from peacetime. At meetings of the National Security Council and Cabinet in December 2017, a decision was made to introduce two Aegis Ashore units, to be retained by the GSDF. Aegis Ashore refers to a missile defense system that consists of radars, a command communication system, a vertical launch system (VLS), etc. similar to Aegis-equipped destroyers but deployed on the ground. Aegis Ashore conducts exoatmospheric interception of fl ying ballistic missiles from the ground. It is a piece of equipment with parts other than the ship hull of an Aegis-equipped destroyer on the ground in a fi xed position. The introduction of two units of Aegis Ashore would enable seamless defense of the entire territory of Japan 24 hours a day and 365 days a year, and the burden on personnel is anticipated to be lifted signifi cantly. Under the system of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers, about two of them had to focus on BMD mission only in the sea in order to protect the entire territory of Japan. Once Aegis Ashore is deployed, however, the Aegis-equipped destroyers can be used for missions ensuring maritime security, conducting training to maintain these skills, and ensuring suffi cient rotation of crewmembers, which will be connected to further strengthen Japan’s deterrence capability as a whole. The radar units to be mounted on the Aegis Ashore are state-of-the-art high-performance radar units called SPY-7. This radar will drastically enhance Japan’s capabilities to respond to ballistic missiles, including enhancement of the capability against lofted trajectory launches and response to simultaneous majority attacks compared with Aegis-equipped destroyer of the MSDF. Since GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture were selected as candidate sites for the deployment of two units of Aegis Ashore, the MOD has repeated briefi ng sessions for local governments and residents and provided explanations on the necessary survey and the need for the deployment. However, there has been much inappropriate conduct, such as mistakes in briefi ng material and behavior showing a lack of respect by a defense offi cial at the briefi ng session. The MOD sincerely refl ects on our past conduct. In order to prevent a similar incident from occurring and to fundamentally strengthen the internal study framework, the MOD established “Aegis Ashore Introduction Promotion Headquarters” in June 2019, with the State Minister of Defense as the head of the offi ce. Since October 2019 the MOD has been conducting a feasibility study on deployment at 20 government-owned areas in Aomori, Akita and Yamagata Prefectures and a necessary resurvey at Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture by outsourcing, and it has checked and reviewed the contents of explanation by setting up an “expert council on technical verifi cation of various surveys” in order to obtain technical advice. Then in December of the same year, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Yamaguchi Prefecture and provided the heads of the relevant local governments with explanations anew that Aegis Ashore. (5) Suspension of Aegis Ashore deployment process a. Announcement by the MOD The MOD made the following announcement on June 15, 2020. Regarding the deployment of Aegis Ashore to the Mutsumi Maneuver Area, since August 2018, the MOD explained to the local communities based on the discussions with the U.S. side up to that time that it would take fi rm steps to put measures to control the fl y-out trajectory of the interceptor (SМ-3), to make sure the booster would fall within the Mutsumi Maneuver Area. Meanwhile for Akita Prefecture, since August of the same year, the MOD explained to the local communities that the booster would fall into the sea in the case of the Araya Maneuver Area. However, as a result of continued discussions with the U.S. side and proceeding with the study after that, it was found out in late May 2020 that not only the software but also the entire system, including the hardware, were required to be refurbished in order to control the fl y-out trajectories of SM-3 to surely drop the booster within the Mutsumi maneuver area or at sea, which would require a considerable amount of cost and time. In light of this fi nding of additional cost and time, the MOD decided to suspend the process related to the deployment of Aegis Ashore. The MOD would like to apologize and explain to the local people fi rst, and report the situation to the National Security Council and consider the way forward **Chapter** ----- based on the discussion. b. Public Statement by Prime Minister Abe Regarding this matter, Prime Minister Abe made the following statements on June 18, 2020. We took the decision to suspend the process of deploying the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system. Given that the premise on which our explanations to local communities were based is now different, we must not proceed any further as proposed. That is the decision we reached. Meanwhile, the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming more and more severe. There has been no change whatsoever in the current state of affairs. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are now becoming increasingly strained. We will secure the lives and peaceful daily lives of the Japanese people from the threat of ballistic missiles. That is the most important responsibility of the government. We must never allow a gap to arise in our nation’s defenses. Peace is not something granted to us by others; it is something we earn through our own efforts. The basis of security policy is none other than Japan’s own efforts. What should we do to reinforce our deterrence or our capacity to deal with security matters? What should we do in order to defend Japan to the end? This summer, we intend to thoroughly discuss at the National Security Council our national security strategy, hammer out a new direction, and implement it expeditiously. **2 Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S.** BMD Technical Cooperation system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country in a step-by-step manner.[10] (2) Japan-U.S. BMD Technology Cooperation, etc. The Government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. As the result showed good prospects for resolving initial technical challenges, in December 2005, the then Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a technical basis.[11] The joint development started in June 2006 with a view to expanding the coverage of protection and dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missiles attacks. In February and June 2017, Japan and the United States conducted tests of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in waters off Hawaii. Analysis of the test data confirmed that it meets all performance requirements. Currently, as part of development work, the United States is carrying out validation of the data connection between the Aegis system and the SM-3 Block IIA, and between radars. Japan continues to cooperate as required. **Chapter** (1) Missile Defense of the United States The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense - **❸ [Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others ]** In Japan, where most of the towns and cities are highly **1** Basic Concept urbanized, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat against the country’s peace and security. In the stage where the actual situation of intruders and the These cases refer to various mode and forms including details of the ongoing case are not clear, the police primarily illegal activities by infiltrated foreign armed agents[12] etc., and respond to the situation, while the MOD/SDF will collect sabotage carried out by foreign guerillas or special forces, relevant information and reinforce the security of the SDF which can be deemed as an armed attack against Japan. facilities. When the situation is clearer and can be dealt 10 Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called X-band radar) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site in 2006. In October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) was deployed in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site in December 2014. In October 2018, the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade Headquarters was deployed in Sagamihara. In addition, BMD-capable Aegis ships of the U.S. Forces were deployed at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture) in October 2015, March 2016 and May 2018. 11 With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting) in June 2011. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the Three Principles were decided, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles as allowable under the Three Principles. 12 R f t itti ill l t h b i ti iti i J hil i ith i ifi t di d killi ----- with by the general police force, various forms of assistance such as transportation of police offi cers and provision of equipment to the police force will be carried out. If the case cannot be dealt with by the general police force, then public security operations by the SDF will be implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confi rmed that an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order. **2** [Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces] warning and surveillance, and, as required, the SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, and the necessary posture for protection will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an infi ltration of our territory by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to destroy them. See Fig. III-1-2-6 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by See Guerillas and Special Forces) **3** Response to Armed Agents （1）Basic Concept While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. When this happens, the SDF cooperates with the police force. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations of the SDF, the Basic Agreement[13] concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police, as well as **Chapter** Typical forms of attacks by guerrillas or special forces include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks against people, and assassinations of dignitaries. In dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces, the MOD/SDF will respond with a particular emphasis on the establishment of a relevant information gathering posture, warning and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, protection of key facilities, and search and destruction (1 trillion rubles) of invading guerrillas or special forces. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and indications through **Fig. III-1-2-6** Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces Patrol helicopter Enemy aircraft Fixed-wing patrol aircraft Search and destruction at Observation helicopter Reconnaissance aircraft sea by MSDF and ASDF Destroyer Submarine Guerillas and special forces landing Depot ship Enemy submarine Base for underwater vehicles used in landing operations Underwater scooters used Warning and in landing operations Search and destruction surveillance at the water’s edge Light armored vehicle Reconnaissance unit Protection of Air defense important facilities Infantry unit Mobile Combat Vehicle Search and Tank Obstacle destruction in mountainous areas Fighting helicopter Short range surface-to-air SAM Base Search and Multipurpose helicopter missiles destruction in urban areas Shovel car Mobile Combat Vehicle Tank Bulldozer Mortar Establishment Consequence management Infantry unit Wheeled armored vehicle of positions Base Police Leading local residents for evacuation, etc. NBC attack Howitzer NBC reconnaissance vehicle Rescuing hostage Special operations unit Mortar Decontamination vehicle 13 The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the then Defense Agency and the National Public Safety C i i ( l d d i 1954 d f ll i d i 2000) ----- local agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded.[14] See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-3-1, (Public Security Operations) and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons. The sarin gas attack[16] on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used. （1）Basic Concept In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed group and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and other units will cooperate with relevant organizations in information gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured, and medical activities through disaster relief and civil protection dispatches. （2）Initiatives of the MOD/SDF The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF Central Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit as well as increasing the number of chemical and medical protection unit personnel, in order to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of extraordinary disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. See （2）Initiatives of the MOD/SDF The GSDF has been conducting field training exercises nationwide with the police of each prefecture, in an effort to strengthen such collaboration by, for example, conducting field exercises at nuclear power plants throughout the country since 2012.[15] Furthermore, joint exercises in dealing with suspicious vessels have also been conducted regularly between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard. **4** Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons **Chapter** In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area, and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment Policemen of three Prefectural Polices in Hokuriku (Toyama, Ishikawa and Fukui) and GSDF personnel conducting training according to the joint guideline under the order of Public Security Operations (December 2019) Video:Joint exercises in dealing with suspicious vessels conducted between the Japan Coast Guard and the MSDF URL: https://youtu.be/EQ673fWJypE 14 In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated between the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency concerning dealing jointly with public security operations in the event of armed agent incidents. 15 The GSDF also conducted exercises on the ground at Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at Tomari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013, at Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014, at Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant (Aomori Prefecture) and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Niigata Prefecture) in 2015, at Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2016, at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant (Shizuoka Prefecture) and Shiga Nuclear Power Plant (Ishikawa Prefecture) in 2017, and at Genkai Nuclear Power Plant (Saga Prefecture) and Ohi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2019. 16 An incident in which members of the Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (this number refers to the number of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo)). The SDF conducted decontamination ti th t i d t ti ll t d li f i ----- **❹ [Readiness against Invasion ]** The NDPG states that only the necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces, which was expected primarily during the Cold War, will be retained. In the event of a military attack on Japan, the SDF will respond with defensive mobilization. Their operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. **1** Air Defense Operations are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We will protect the waters around our country by combining these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities. **3** Operations Protecting the Land **Chapter** In order to invade the islands of Japan, invading countries are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air. For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to be difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage. **4** Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is surrounded by the sea, and the features of modern wars,[17] it is expected that at first, a sudden attack against Japan will be exercised by aircraft and missiles, and such aerial attacks are assumed to be conducted repeatedly, in the case where a fullscale invasion against Japan occurs. Operations for aerial defense[18] aim to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the people and the sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to inflict significant damage on the enemy thus making the continuation of their aerial attack difficult. **2** Defense Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country comes under armed attack, etc., maritime transportation routes will be the foundation to maintain continuous warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan. In operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation, the SDF will combine various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol,[19] defend SDF ships, and protect straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes[20] to directly defend Japanese ships, etc. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes will be conducted by destroyers, and support from fighter jets and other aircraft is If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is an island country, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory. Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan 17 Aerial attacks are important elements influencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations. 18 A special characteristic of operations for aerial defense is that initial response is critical and can influence the entirety of operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for a quick initial response on an ongoing basis in peacetime, regularly collect information, and rapidly and comprehensively exert combat capabilities from the outset of operations. 19 The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force. 20 R l ti l f i d fi d t bl th t t ti f hi Th l ti d idth f l h d di th it ti f ifi th t ----- provided as required. - **❺ [Initiatives Related to the Protection of Civilians ]** participated in the preparatory training for an incident during **1** Basic Policy on the Protection of Civilians and the Role an international sports event. of the MOD/SDF See Reference 12 (Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection See Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government In March 2005, based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Bodies [2019]) Act, the government established the Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the People. It anticipates four types of armed （2）Ongoing Collaboration with Local Governments attack: (1) a land invasion, (2) an attack by guerrillas or The MOD/SDF are establishing liaison departments in special forces, (3) a ballistic missile attack, (4) an air attack Regional Armies and Provincial Cooperation Offices and points to consider in taking measures to protect civilians to ensure ongoing and close collaboration with local depending on the type of attack. governments and other bodies. The MOD/SDF, based on the Civil Protection Act and the Civilian protection councils are also being established Basic Guidelines, have developed a Civil Protection Plan in local governments for comprehensive implementation of of the MOD and the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics measures to protect civilians. Representatives of each branch Agency. This plan stipulates that in a situation where Japan is of the SDF and Regional Defense Bureau officials have been under attack, the SDF would make utmost efforts to fulfill its appointed to the councils. basic task of repelling the attack. It also states that, within the Moreover, local governments are recruiting retired SDF scope of no hindrance to the task, the SDF would do as much officers to serve as crisis managers. For example, they act as as possible to protect civilians through support on evacuation coordinators with the MOD/SDF, as well as developing and and disaster relief. See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-1-4 (Civil Protection) implementing joint action plans and exercises. **Chapter** See **2** Initiatives of the MOD/SDF to Facilitate Measures for Civilian Protection （1）Civil Protection Training For sound and expeditious implementation of measures to protect civilians, it is important to conduct training on a regular basis to ensure effective and efficient collaboration with concerned ministries, agencies and local governments. The MOD and the SDF hold exercises in cooperation with concerned ministries and agencies and with the participation of local governments and others. They also participate and cooperate in civil protection exercises held by other ministries, agencies and local governments. For example, civil protection training was hosted by the central government (Cabinet Secretariat and the Fire Defense Agency) and local governments (Hokkaido Prefecture and Sapporo City) in Sapporo City, Hokkaido, in January 2020. Joint Staff and units of the GSDF Northern Army GSDF personnel coordinating with relevant organizations in civil protection training conducted in Hokkaido (January 2020) ----- **Section** **Responses in the Domains of Space, Cyberspace and** **3** **Electromagnetic Spectrum** Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(3) response in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains during all phases” is as follows. In order to prevent any actions that impede its activities in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains, the SDF, on a steady-state basis, conducts persistent monitoring as well as collection and analysis of relevant information. In the event of the above-mentioned interference, the SDF will promptly identify incidents and take such measures as **❶ [Responses in Space Domain]** damage limitation and recovery. In case of an armed attack against Japan, the SDF will, on top of taking these actions, block and eliminate the attack by leveraging capabilities in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains. Furthermore, in light of society’s growing dependence on space and cyberspace, the SDF will contribute to comprehensive, whole-of-government efforts concerning these domains under appropriate partnership and shared responsibility with relevant organizations. - (Remote Sensing Data Act) and Act on Launching of Spacecraft, etc. and Control of Spacecraft (Space Activities Act) in November 2016, and the Remote Sensing Data Act and part of the Space Activities Act went into effect in November 2017. The Space Activities Act fully went into effect in November 2018. The Space Activities Act stipulates matters necessary to secure public safety and provide prompt protection of the victims from damages in Japan’s space development and use, such as a launch permit system, obligation for reparation, and government compensation. In addition, the Remote Sensing Data Act established (1) a license pertaining to use of satellite remote sensing instruments, (2) a certifi cation of persons handling satellite remote sensing data and (3) a system that enables the Prime Minister to issue an order to a satellite remote sensing data holder to prohibit provision of data under certain occasions. **Chapter** **1** The Whole-of-Government Approach The National Space Policy Secretariat[1] established in the Cabinet Offi ce in April 2016 engages in the planning, drafting, coordinating, and other policy matters relating to the Government’s development and use of space. In light of the environmental changes surrounding space policy and the new security policies stated in the National Security Strategy (NSS) that was approved by the Cabinet in 2013, the Basic Plan on Space Policy was decided upon in the Strategic Headquarters for National Space Policy which was established within the Cabinet in June 2020. This Basic Plan was prepared as a 10-year development plan focusing on approximately the next 20 years to suffi ciently secure necessary budgets and strengthen the space policy to which the Government of Japan provides full efforts, including measures seen from the perspective of space security, setting goals of (1) Contributions to a variety of national interest; and (2) Strengthening comprehensive bases that support Japan’s space activities, including industrial and science and technology bases. In particular, concerning the contributions to a variety of national interest, the plan states that Japan should advance: (1) Ensuring space security; (2) Contributing to conducting disaster responses, building national resilience and solving global issues; (3) Creating new knowledge based on space science and exploration; and (4) Realizing economic growth and innovations using space as an impetus. Responding to Japan’s progress in development and use of outer space, the Diet approved the Act on Ensuring Appropriate Handling of Satellite Remote Sensing Data **2** Initiatives of the MOD/SDF Effective use of satellites for such purposes as informationgathering, communication and positioning is essential for realizing cross-domain operations. On the other hand, threats to the stable use of space are increasing. The MOD/SDF has sought to ensure effective and effi cient use of space by strengthening information gathering, C2 (command & control) and communication capabilities by using satellites and through Space Situational Awareness (SSA). In addition to these initiatives, based on the MidTerm Defense Program (MTDP), the MOD/SDF will work I A il 2016 th Offi f N ti l S P li i d i t th N ti l S P li S t i t ----- **Fig. III-1-3-1** Conceptual Image of Utilization of Space in the Security Field **Chapter** |stance to moon: prox. 0,000 km prox. 000 km prox. 1/10 he distance he moon)|Col2| |---|---| ||| [Early warning satellite] [Communications satellite] [Positioning satellite] For early detecting For communicating with For ascertaining launches of troops at a long distance exact locations and ballistic missiles guiding missiles, etc. Geostationary orbit For synchronizing [Meteorological satellite] Altitude: approx. time for the system 36,000 km (remain For ascertaining and predicting stationary to the earth) weather conditions Distance to the moon: approx. Altitude: approx. 380,000 km 20,000 km Approx. 36,000 km [Imagery gathering satellite] (approx. 1/10 For conducting warning and of the distance surveillance operations and to the moon) gathering information Altitude: up to 1,000 km to enhance capabilities to ensure superiority in the use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. The efforts include (1) establishing an SSA system in order to secure the stable use of space; (2) improving various capabilities that leverage space domain including informationgathering, communication and positioning capabilities, and; (3) building the capability to disrupt C4I (command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence) of opponents in collaboration with the electromagnetic domain. In so doing, the SDF will (4) work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies, including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and with the United States and other relevant countries. The SDF will also engage in such organization building as the creation of units specializing in space and a dedicated career fi eld, and develop human resources and accumulate knowledge and expertise in the space domain. In FY2020, a space domain planning section (tentative name) responsible for planning pertaining to joint operation in the space domain will be established in the Joint Staff. See Fig. III-1-3-1 (Conceptual Image of Utilization of Space in the Security Field) （1）Development of the SSA System When using outer space, it is necessary to ensure its stable use. However, there has been a rapid increase in the volume of space debris in outer space, raising the risk of signifi cant damage to satellite functions caused by collision between debris and satellite. In addition, it is pointed out that the development and verifi cation test of a killer satellite, which approaches a target satellite to disturb, attack, and capture it, is underway, increasing the threat to the stable use of outer space. That is why the MOD, based on the Basic Plan on Space Policy and through cooperation with relevant domestic institutions, such as the JAXA, and the United States, aims to establish SSA system by FY2022 to monitor and maintain an accurate picture of conditions in space. It is also working to deploy radar to monitor threats to Japanese satellites, such as space debris, and its operating system for information gathering, processing and sharing. In addition, the ASDF established the Space Operations Squadron in May 2020 as the unit specialized in the space domain to operate the system. In preparation for full-scale SSA operation and introduction of defense equipment, the ASDF is pursuing (1) study of unit operations pertaining to the space domain, (2) development of human resources with knowledge of the space domain, and (3) establishment of a network of cooperation with JAXA, the United States and others. For this to happen, the government agencies and ministries concerned need to work together to build an effective operating system. On this point, JAXA is devising a plan to ----- **Fig. III-1-3-2** Initiatives for Developing the SSA System SSA operation (image) Space debris, etc. Communications SSA satellite satellite, etc. (SDF) SDF Radar Radar Optical telescope Information sharing情報共有 JAXA Operation system Information sharing情報共有 Radar Optical telescope  Share information with the U.S. Forces and Satellite operators Information sharing JAXA to gather Japan’s SSA information U.S. Forces deploy radar able to monitor low Earth orbit (at altitudes of up to 1,000 km) and a ground-based optical telescope to monitor geostationary orbit (at altitudes of around 36,000 km). Combined with the radar of the MOD that will principally be dedicated to geostationary orbit monitoring, Japan is planning an effective SSA program. For its operation system, necessary adjustment is in progress to link the system to the U.S. Forces’ system in addition to JAXA by FY2022. For the future, in addition to radar to monitor threats to Japanese satellites such as space debris as mentioned above, the MOD will introduce SSA satellites that are space-based optical telescopes and ground-based SSA laser ranging devices to measure distance from low earth-orbit satellites. The expenses necessary for acquisition of SSA satellite components are included in the FY2020 budget. See Fig. III-1-3-2 (Initiatives for the Development of the SSA System) **Chapter** （2）Improving Various Capabilities to Leverage Space Domain Including Information-Gathering, Communication and Positioning Capabilities The MOD/SDF has conducted information-gathering, communication and positioning using satellites, but in order to fulfi ll its missions effectively and effi ciently, it is necessary to further enhance these capabilities. For this purpose, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its intelligence and surveillance capabilities through multilayered acquisition of satellite images using Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) and commercial satellites, including microsatellites. It will also continue to use images from the satellite operated by JAXA (ALOS-2) and information from Automatic Identifi cation System (AIS), etc., and conduct research on dual wavelength infrared sensors.[2] Regarding communications, the MOD/SDF launched X-band defense communications satellites called Kirameki-2 in January 2017 and Kirameki-1 in April 2018, owned and operated by the MOD for the fi rst time, to be used for the communications, which is essential for command and control in unit operations. Going forward, in light of the future increase in communication requirements, the MOD will conduct steady development of Kirameki-3 to realize integrated communications as well as high-speed and large capacity communications, thereby aiming for the early realization of a three-satellite constellation with all of the three X-band defense communications satellites. The ministry will also conduct research and surveys on the next defense communication satellites. With regard to positioning, the MOD/SDF has mounted GPS receiving terminals on a large number of equipment and used them as important means to support troop movement, Commander of the Space Operations Squadron granted the unit flag by Minister of Defense Kono (May 2020) Research is underway to mount dual wavelength infrared sensors with excellent detection and identifi cation performance on the Advanced Optical Satellite planned at JAXA and activate th i th i t ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** Activities of Personnel Dispatched to JAXA Tsukuba Space Center, Space Tracking and Communications Center, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Major SAITO Takuya, Defense Plans/Policies and Program Division, Defense Planning and Policy Department, Air Staff Office “Evolution into the Air and Space Self-Defense Force is no longer a pipe dream.” This is a statement made by Prime Minister ABE at the MOD Ichigaya in September 2019. I am working as a member of ASDF personnel at JAXA Tsukuba Space Center. However, unlike the Astronaut YUI, former member of ASDF and my great senior, I am not aspiring The author (second from right) receiving education on SSA systems at a meeting to become an astronaut. with JAXA personnel. Unwanted artifi cial objects orbiting around the earth are called space debris. It is said that there are almost 20,000 of space operation system, I am involved in coordination pertaining to debris that are larger than a softball. In order to prevent crashing data-sharing by the MOD and JAXA and specifi c cooperation of space debris with positioning, communication, broadcasting, procedures, while at the same time gaining specialized weather and other satellites that are closely related to our daily knowledge concerning SSA at JAXA. lives, we need the ability to know what is happening in space Because the ASDF established a new job specialty in right now (Space Situational Awareness (SSA)). the space domain, the development and securing of human Currently, the MOD is working to gain and strengthen resources specialized in space will become essential. If you abilities in new domains, including outer space. For this are inspired by this article, would you like to evolve into space purpose, the ASDF is preparing to establish an SSA operation people with me? “We are aerospace people!” system in cooperation with JAXA. In order to establish the of Japanese satellites, and devices to grasp the state of electromagnetic interference against Japanese satellites. Expenses necessary for acquisition of devices to grasp the state of electromagnetic interference are included in the FY2020 budget. The SDF will build the capability to disrupt C4I of opponents in coordination with the electromagnetic domain capabilities. （4）Enhancing Cooperation with Relevant Agencies and with the United States and Other Relevant Countries For the MOD to promote space development and use effectively, it is essential to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies with advanced knowledge, including JAXA, and with the United States and other relevant countries. Currently the MOD and JAXA are cooperating in the development of SSA described above and technical including highly accurate self-positioning and improvement of missile guidance. In addition to these efforts, the Quasi Zenith Satellite System (QZSS)[3] of the Cabinet Offi ce started service in November 2018. With this in mind, the MOD/ SDF will secure redundancy by using multiple positioning satellite signals, including QZSS. （3）Enhancing Capabilities to Ensure Superiority in Use of Space Utilization of satellites plays a vital role as the basic infrastructure for security, while some countries appear to be developing anti-satellite weapons, including killer satellites and anti-satellite missiles. In this context, the MOD/SDF needs to improve the resilience of the X-band defense communications satellite and other satellites. To this purpose, the SDF will newly introduce training devices to study and train responses to the vulnerabilities This refers to satellites set into orbit so that the satellites are capable of staying nearly right above one specifi c area by tilting the orbit, while ordinary stationary satellites stay on the equator. Multiple satellites are usually launched since a single satellite cannot stay for 24 hours by itself. Users are able to receive signals from such satellites without being affected by b t l h t i d b ildi i th t llit l i ht b th ----- demonstration of dual wavelength infrared sensors. In addition, the ministry exchanges human resources, including the dispatch of ASDF personnel to the JAXA Tsukuba Space Center. Also, from the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space field between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States, the two countries established the “Japan-US Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)” in April 2015 and so far held six meetings. The SCWG continues to promote consideration in broader fields such as: (1) promotion of space policy-related consultation, (2) closer information sharing, (3) cooperation for training and securing space experts, and (4) implementation of tabletop exercises. As part of such initiatives, the MOD has taken part in the Global Sentinel, an annual SSA multinational tabletop exercise hosted by the U.S. Strategic Command since 2016 with the purpose of acquiring knowledge related to the SSA operation as well as of strengthening cooperation with the **❷** **[Response in Cyber Domain]** **Chapter** ASDF personnel participating in Global Sentinel 19 (September 2019) United States and other partner countries. These efforts to enhance the SSA capabilities also contribute to enhancing deterrence against new threats in outer space. Japan engages in space security dialogues not only with the United States but also with France, the European Union (EU), and India. See Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Cooperation in the Use of Space Domain) See - September 2015, the Cybersecurity Strategy was formulated for the comprehensive and effective promotion of measures pertaining to cybersecurity, with the aims to create and develop free, fair and safe cyber space to enhance the vitality of the economy and society and realize their sustainable development, to realize a society in which citizens can live safely and with peace of mind, and to contribute to the peace and stability of the international community as well as the security of Japan. Furthermore, in July 2018 the strategy was reviewed to promote cybersecurity for sustainable development and initiatives from three perspectives ((1) mission assurance by service providers, (2) risk management, and (3) participation, cooperation and collaboration), while sticking with the basic position of the strategy. **1** The Whole-of-Government Approach and Other Initiatives With regard to cybersecurity, the number of cases that were detected as suspicious communication to Japanese governmental organizations and required confirmation as to whether or not they need coping, there were 111 suspicious malware infections and 66 targeted attacks in FY2018. This is a situation which requires sufficient and continuous attention.[4] In order to deal with the increasing threat to cybersecurity, in November 2014, the Cybersecurity Basic Act was enacted. The Act aims to contribute to the security of Japan by comprehensively and effectively promoting the measures regarding cybersecurity. In response to this, in January 2015, the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters was established in the Cabinet, and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC)[5] was established in the Cabinet Secretariat. The NISC is responsible for planning and promotion of cybersecurity-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and responding to significant cybersecurity incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures. Furthermore, in **2** Initiatives of the MOD/SDF Information and communications networks that leverage cyberspace form a foundation for the SDF’s activities in various domains, and any attack against them would seriously disrupt the organized activities of the SDF. The MOD/SDF has engaged in holistic measures including the following: introduction of intrusion prevention systems, in Cybersecurity 2019 (approved by the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters on May 23, 2019) With the enactment of the Basic Act on Cybersecurity in January 2015, the National Information Security Center (NISC) was reorganized as the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC). The NISC is responsible for the planning and promotion of cybersecurity-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and di t i ifi t b it i id t i t i ti d i ll iti l i f t t ----- order to ensure the safety of information and communication systems; development of defense systems, such as the security and analysis devices for cyber defense; monitoring of MOD/SDF communications networks around the clock and response to cyber attacks[6] by the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command and others; enactment of regulations[7] stipulating postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks; research on cutting-edge technology; development of human resources, and collaboration with other organizations. In addition to these initiatives, based on the NDPG, the SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including the capability to disrupt, during an attack against Japan in time of emergency, the opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack. Specifi cally, the MTDP stipulates (1) establishment of the necessary environment for ensuring cybersecurity, (2) keeping abreast of the latest information including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, (3) development and securing of human resources, and (4) contribution to the whole-of government initiatives. See Fig. III-1-3-3 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with See Cyber Attacks); Reference 13 (Efforts in Recent Years by the MOD on Cybersecurity) Member of Cyber Defense Group responding to increasingly sophisticated, skillful cyber attacks **Chapter** |Internet Attacker|Defense Informa Infrastructure (D| |---|---| **Fig. III-1-3-3** MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks 2) Responses by special units to cyber attacks - 24-hour monitoring of networks and information systems as well as advanced measures against 1) Ensuring safety of information systems cyber attacks (malware analysis) by the Cyber Defense Group (Joint Staff), System Protection Unit (GSDF), Communication Security Group (MSDF), and Computer Security Evaluation Squadron (ASDF) - Introduction of firewall and virus detection software - Separation of the network into the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) open system and closed system 3) Maintenance and development of a response posture to cyber attacks - Implementation of system audit, etc. - Implementation of cyber defense exercises - Responses to supply chain risks Internet - Development of response posture at the time of cyber attack occurrence Attacker Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) The Six Pillars of Comprehensive Defensive Measures against Cyber Attacks 6) Coordination with other organizations and agencies - Information sharing with the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy 4) Research of cutting-edge technology for Cybersecurity, the U.S. Armed Forces, and other relevant nations - Dispatch of MOD personnel to NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of - Research on cyber resilience technology Excellence (CCDCOE) - Dispatch of liaison officers to the U.S. Army’s cyber educational institution - Public-private personnel exchange Information Control 5) Development of human acquisition resources - For the purpose of human resources development, implementing studying (ii) Dynamic switching abroad programs at organizations affiliated with Carnegie Mellon University and studying programs at graduate schools in Japan, as well as education at professional courses at the SDF (i) System down due to cyber attack, etc. (iii) Continued operation of key systems - For the purpose of fostering security awareness, offering education at - Implementation of outside training Illegal intrusion, information theft, alteration or destruction, operation stop/malfunction of information system, execution of unauthorized program, DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, etc. which are made through cyberspace by abusing information communication networks, information systems, etc. Th di ti l ti t th i f ti f th MOD (MOD Di ti N 160 f 2007) ----- （1）Establishing an Environment for Ensuring Cyber Security a. Expanding the System of Cyber Defense Group and Other Units The Cyber Defense Group was established under the SDF C4 Systems Command in March 2014. In order to appropriately deal with cyber attacks that are becoming more sophisticated and skillful day by day, the Cyber Defense Group has strengthened the system. The group will be further expanded by about 70 personnel to approximately 290 in FY2020. b. Strengthening Capabilities of Information Gathering, Research and Analysis In order to secure functions of the system and network of the MOD/SDF under any circumstance, it is necessary to strengthen the capabilities of information gathering, research and analysis, and develop a practical training environment. To this end, the MOD/SDF will continue initiatives such as (1) upgrade of information gathering devices for indications and techniques of cyber attacks, (2) enhancing functions of analysis devices for cyber protection taking advantage of AI and other advanced technologies, and (3) development of an environment for cyber exercises carried out as competition between an attacking team and a defense team. Working Group (CDPWG) as a framework between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States. Under this framework, meetings have been held seven times to discuss the following topics: (1) promotion of policy discussions regarding cyber issues, (2) closer sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint exercises incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) matters such as cooperation for training and retaining experts. Moreover, in May 2015, the two countries announced a joint statement on the specifi c future direction of the cooperation. In addition, Japan’s cooperation with the United States is to be further strengthened by such means as participation in the Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue, a whole-of-government approach by both nations, holding of the Japan-U.S. IT Forum, a framework between the defense authorities since 2002, and dispatching liaison offi cers to the U.S. Army’s cyber educational institution. c. Cooperation with Other Countries etc. Japan has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of the United Kingdom, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and others. Furthermore, Japan has participated in cyber defense exercises organized by NATO or the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). In December 2019 the MOD for the fi rst time offi cially participated in “Cyber Coalition 2019,” a cyber defense exercise organized by NATO, to enhance cooperation with NATO. In addition, the IT Forum has been held between the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and other countries to exchange views on initiatives in the information communications area including cybersecurity and current trends in technology. See Chapter 3, Section 3-2 (Cooperation in the Use of Cyber Domain) （3）Development and Securing of Human Resources In order to strengthen the cyber defense capability of the SDF, it is necessary to secure human resources who have advanced and broad-ranging knowledge on cybersecurity. To this end, a common cyber course[8] to learn common and sophisticated knowledge on cyber security has been provided since FY2019. The FY2020 budget includes expenses for sending SDF personnel to universities and educational institutions, both international and domestic, including the National War College of the United States, which provides a course for cyber warfare commanders. It also includes expenses necessary for holding a cyber competition to identify highly skilled cyber talents in the private sector. The MOD/SDF will also work to ensure appropriate treatment for security and IT human resources who work as a bridge **Chapter** （2）Keeping Abreast of the Latest Information Including Risks, Counter Measures and Technological Trends In order to respond to cyber attacks in a swift and appropriate manner, it is necessary to keep abreast of the latest information, including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks, joint exercises and other opportunities with allies and other parties. For this purpose the MOD/SDF will effectively cooperate with private companies and foreign countries, including the United States, which is Japan’s ally. a. Cooperation with Private Companies and Others In Japan, in July 2013, the Cyber Defense Council (CDC) was set up, and its core members consist of around ten companies in the defense industry with a strong interest in cybersecurity. The MOD/SDF and the defense industry have made efforts to deal with cyber attacks through joint exercise and other initiatives. The MOD/SDF will further expand the cooperation. b. Cooperation with the United States Since comprehensive defense cooperation, including joint response, between Japan and its ally the United States is vital, the two countries set up the Cyber Defense Policy it d ti id d f d t f IT l t d th t i id d b h SDF ----- between highly professional human resources and general administration departments in the MOD[9] and consider the utilization of external human resources through a publicprivate personnel exchange system to employ people with practical experience in private companies as well as contracts for service, for example. Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD, as one of the five government agencies that are members of Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters, participates in cyber attack response training and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc. to the cross-sector initiatives led by the NISC as well as sending personnel to the CYber incident Mobile Assistant Team (CYMAT). The MOD is considering applying the knowledge and experience of the SDF to penetration tests of the IT systems of government ministries and agencies conducted by NISC. - For this purpose, the FY2020 budget includes expenses for capacity building in electromagnetic management, which includes the start of research on electromagnetic management supporting technologies that help with grasping and visualizing electromagnetic utilization status in order to effectively conduct electronic warfare, etc. See Fig. III-1-3-4 (Electronic Warfare Capabilities and See Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Capabilities [concept]) （4）Contribution to the Whole-of-Government Approach Along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, **❸** **[Response in Electromagnetic Domain]** Electromagnetic spectrum[10] has been used for command/ communication, and warning/surveillance. With the development of the technology, its use has expanded in range and purpose, and it is now recognized as a major operational domain situated on the frontline of the offensedefense dynamic in today’s warfare.[11] In response, the MOD/SDF, based on the NDPG, etc., will (1) enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum, (2) strengthen information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetic spectrum, and develop an information sharing posture, (3) strengthen capabilities to neutralize the radar and communications of opponents who intend to invade Japan, and thereby acquire and enhance capabilities to ensure superiority in the electromagnetic domain.[12] **Chapter** **2** Strengthening Information Collection and Analysis Capabilities Related to  Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Building an Information Sharing Posture In order to gain an advantage in electromagnetic warfare, it is important to gather and analyze information on electromagnetic spectrum at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies and appropriately share the information among SDF units. To this end, the MOD/SDF plans to enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities through: establishment of electromagnetic operation units to gather information regarding electromagnetic spectrum as subordinate units of the Ground Component Command; and, under the FY2020 budget, implementation of research for improving the capabilities of electromagnetic information gathering units for combatant vessels. In order to share the information among SDF services while ensuring security of the information, the SDF will continue to promote the upgrade of the JADGE system, the connection of each SDF service’s systems, including the Defense Information Infrastructure **1 Enhancing the Ability to Appropriately Manage and** Coordinate the Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum In order to gain an advantage in warfare by using electromagnetic spectrum proactively and effectively, it is necessary to build capabilities to manage electromagnetic spectrum by centrally grasping and coordinating wave frequencies and status of use, and appropriately allocating frequency resources to units, etc. in addition to electronic warfare capabilities to ensure the use and effect of electromagnetic spectrum while interfering with the use and effect by an enemy. 9 Measures based on the Comprehensive Policy for Enhancing the Development of Security and IT Human Resources at Governmental Organizations (Approved by the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters on March 31, 2016) 10 Collective term for radio waves, infrared rays, visible rays, etc. Concerning radio waves used in Japan, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has centralized control over radio wave frequencies, and the MOD/ SDF obtains approval for radio wave frequencies from the Ministry when using them in training and other initiatives. 11 One of the attacks using electromagnetic waves is electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, which place an extreme burden on electronics by generating instantaneous powerful electromagnetic waves through nuclear explosions and other means leading to their malfunctioning or destruction. This type of attack would impact not just the defense field but Japanese people’s lives in general. The Government of Japan as a whole will deliberate on necessary countermeasures. 12 In addition, the MOD/SDF is advancing the multiplication of the communications network required for information sharing among the services, and conducting research in light of the i i t f EMP t ti ----- **Fig. III-1-3-4** Electronic Warfare Capabilities and Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Capabilities (image) Electronic warfare capabilities: Warfare (electronic warfare*) capabilities to effectively and proactively utilize electromagnetic spectrum to ensure the use and effect of electromagnetic spectrum while interfering with the use and effect by an enemy Electromagnetic spectrum management capabilities: Capabilities to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum among SDF units by ascertaining the status of electromagnetic spectrum in the theater and preventing interference with the aim of securing electronic warfare capabilities - In general, the warfare is divided into three categories – electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. [Electronic attack] [Electronic protection] [Electronic warfare support] - Emit electronic waves to communication - Reduce or nullify the impact of electromag- - Collect and analyze such information as devices and radars of an enemy, thereby netic spectrum used by an enemy by using electromagnetic spectrum used by an enemy **Chapter** reducing or disabling their communication stealth technology ？ [Electromagnetic spectrum management] - Ascertain the status of electromagnetic spectrum in the theater - Appropriately manage and coordinate electromagnetic spectrum used by SDF units The �gure is for illustrative purposes (DII)[13] and the improvement of each SDF service’s data links. **3** Strengthening Capabilities to Neutralize Radar and Communications of an Opponent who Intends to Invade Japan surface-to-air electronic war devices. Furthermore, the SDF will also swiftly proceed with studies and R&D aimed at the procurement of potentially game-changing technologies, such as high-power microwave devices that can instantaneously disable a large number of drones, etc., a high-energy laser system (HEL) that responds to such threats as drones and mortar shells at a low cost and with a short reaction time. **4** Training /Exercise and Human Resource Development Neutralizing use of electromagnetic spectrum, including radar and communications of an opponent who intends to invade Japan based on information gathering and analysis in peacetime is effective as a means for the defense of Japan so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished. For this purpose, in FY2020, the SDF will proceed with capability development through the procurement of fi ghters (F-35A/B) superior in electronic countermeasures for selfprotection and network electronic warfare devices, capability enhancement like installation of new electronic warfare equipment on fi ghters (F-15), as well as development of standoff electronic warfare aircraft for jamming from outside of the threat envelopes of the opponent, and research on In order to strengthen the SDF’s capability in the electromagnetic domain, it is also important to enhance training/exercise and education. In the FY2020 budget, in addition to usual training/ exercise and education, the SDF will start to install the latest electronic warfare education devices used by the ASDF. Furthermore, ASDF personnel is planned to be joining to the electronic warfare education course in the United States again this year. 13 This refers to a common network across all SDF as an information communication infrastructure necessary for the SDF to perform its duties, in which the SDF makes use of a variety of communication lines: self-employed micro lines that the MOD owns as well as external lines and satellite lines that it leases from communication carriers, thereby composing data i ti t k d d i ti t k ----- **Section** **Efforts of the MOD/SDF in response to the Spread of Novel** **4** **Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)** A pandemic of COVID-19 is a grave threat to the security of the international community, including Japan. In order to prevent the spread of infection, the MOD/SDF gathered all their strength to carry out various activities.[1] None of the SDF personnel engaged in the activities got infected (as of May 31, 2020.) - **❶ [Dispatching Nursing Offi cers to the Chartered Airplane Leaving Wuhan]** In response to the spread of COVID-19 in China in January on the airplane. Two nurses of the SDF Central Hospital 2020, a chartered airplane was sent to Wuhan. By request of boarded each of the chartered airplanes from the second to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the MOD/SDF the fi fth airplane and provided support. supported the quarantine for Japanese returnees and others - **❷ [Disaster Relief in Response to COVID-19]** the ship. Approximately 1,300 passengers/crew in total **1** Disaster Relief pertaining to Rescue for Prevention of the Spread of COVID-19 returning to their countries by the chartered aircraft prepared by the respective governments (e.g. the United States, In January 2020 the SDF implemented disaster relief for Australia, and Canada) were transported to Haneda Airport. Japanese returnees due to the spread of COVID-19 in The activities on the “Diamond Princess” were huge, China (for 46 days from January 31 to March 16, 2020). complex and unprecedented operations and also involved a Given that supporting for the returnees in order to prevent high risk of infection. However, none of the approx. 2,700 the spread of infection had an overriding emergency, it was personnel who were engaged in the fi eld activities caught the hardly possible to expect the governors and other authorities infection in total. to request the dispatch of the SDF concerning the overall In addition, SDF hospitals accepted patients and situation. Therefore, the SDF conducted the operation by its approximately 10 SDF Reserve Personnel with qualifi cation as judgement without request. doctor, nurse, etc. were called up to provide medical support. Accordingly, the SDF provided life and medical support at the temporary accommodation facilities where Japanese returnees and others stayed and the cruise ship Diamond Princess (approximately 3,700 passengers and crews) where a number of infected persons were identifi ed as well as transportation of people leaving the ship. Specifi cally, SDF medical offi cers and others collected approximately 2,200 PCR samples in total on the ship. In addition, SDF ambulances and motor coaches transported approximately 2,000 passengers/crews including positive patients leaving Medical assistance to passengers of the cruise ship (February 2020). Video: Activities in response to the COVID-19 URL: https://www.facebook.com/jointstaffpa/videos/285657902464800/ 1 A f ifi ti iti th MOD b it (htt // d j /j/ h/d f / i i/2020/ id/i d ht l) **Chapter** ----- This mission involved approximately 8,700 personnel who engaged in the fi eld activities in total (overall approximately 20,000 personnel engaged in the activities[2] in total) and two vessels, including private ship Hakuou under contract with the MOD. **2** Disaster Relief for Reinforcement of Border Control against COVID-19 **3** Disaster Relief in Response to Community-acquired Infection of COVID-19, etc. Since April 3, 2020, after receiving a disaster relief request from the Nagasaki Governor, and in response to disaster relief requests from the governors of 29 prefectures, the SDF sent liaison offi cers to the prefectures in order to prevent the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19. In close coordination, they carried out air transportation of patients, life support in accommodation facilities, support of education on infection protection for employees of the local governments and the private accommodation facilities (approximately 1,700 employees in total) and other support activities (as of May 31, 2020). To the cruise ship Costa Atlantica (approximately 620 crew members) where a mass infection occurred while being moored at a quay in Nagasaki Prefecture, the SDF sent a CT diagnosis vehicle in addition to collection of specimens necessary for PCR tests and medical support for the crew. GSDF personnel providing education on infection prevention to local government officials (April 2020) **Chapter** In March 2020, considering the government’s policy to further reinforce border control for entrants and returnees in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the SDF implemented Disaster Relief Operations for reinforcement of border control against COVID-19 (65 days from March 28 to May 31). Given that supporting for reinforcement of border control required a especially urgent response, it was hardly possible to expect governors and other authorities to request the dispatch of the SDF concerning the overall situation, the SDF conducted the operations by its judgment without request. Specifi cally, the SDF medical offi cers and others supported quarantine at Narita and Haneda airports by collecting specimens from approximately 20,400 of the approximately 46,000 returnees and entrants. The specimens accounted for approximately 44% of all the specimens collected at the airports during the period from March 28 to May 31. The SDF also transported approximately 6,100 returnees and entrants in total from Narita, Haneda, Kansai and Chubu airports to the accommodation facilities[3] where they stayed until PCR test results came out, and provided life support including meal support for approximately 17,200 returnees and entrants in total staying in the accommodation facilities, for example. This mission involved approximately 8,700 fi eld personnel (overall approximately 13,400 personnel) in total but none of them became infected. Number of overall personnel includes maintenance, communication, command, standby/backup and other rear-service personnel in addition to the personnel worked in the fi eld. H t l G d Hill I hi b th MOD t l id i ti l t d 840 t d t t iti f th lt f PCR t t ( f M 31 2020) ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** A Private-ship Captain Who Fought Against COVID-19 Virus Together with SDF Personnel Mr. INOUE Shiro, playing a very important role that directly supported the SDF Captain of Hakuo, Yutaka Shipping K.K mission to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 infection. Since 2016 the company has been operating a passenger During about a month of disaster relief activities at Yokohama ship “Hakuo” for unit training and response to large-scale Port, the SDF personnel were busy leaving Hakuo in the early disasters by the MOD/SDF. The ship has transported SDF morning and returning late at night. We strived to ensure their personnel and equipment, and provided support for victims of recovery from exhaustion and nutrition support through boiler earthquake or wind and fl ood damage. works for bathing late in the night and well-balanced meals Against the spread of the COVID-19 infection, after cooked on the ship for each personnel, for example. None of receiving an emergency request from the MOD to use the the personnel worked on Diamond Princess became infected ship as a temporary accommodation facility for the returnees and we are proud that our support for the activities contributed from Wuhan, the company made an emergency call to seamen to the wonderful achievement. This has become a big asset across the country while preparing Hakuo for departure. The for us. ship left its home port, Aioi (Hyogo Prefecture) on January At fi rst, COVID-19 caused a big concern also for us, but 31, 2020, and arrived at Tokyo Bay on the next day. Usually clear separation of the activity area of the SDF personnel and preparation for departure takes approximately 72 hours but that of the crew members as well as education provided by we were able to complete the preparation in 32 hours or so as SDF medical troops to prevent infection established suffi cient a result of the united efforts by the people involved. infection control measures on the ship, which dispelled the Later, the ship moved to the MSDF Yokosuka Base initial concern and we were able to work without fear. (Kanagawa Prefecture) and was preparing for acceptance of As the spread of the COVID-19 infection is a national crisis returnees by loading bedding, daily commodities and the like, that Japan has never experienced before, we had various when a large number of the COVID-19 infections were found diffi culties but were able to gain a very valuable experience on a large cruise ship Diamond Princess. In response, it was through the activities. I pray for a speedy end to the spread of decided to move Hakuo to Honmoku Wharf of Yokohama Port the COVID-19 infection and wish to serve the SDF well through to use the ship as the activity base of the SDF personnel who a quick departure of Hakuo at the time of a natural disaster provided medical and living support on Diamond Princess. or other emergency based on the knowledge and experience At fi rst we were a little confounded by the sudden change obtained through the activities. in the work contents but we worked thinking that we were Hakuo at Honmoku Wharf on March 15, 2020 The author on the bridge of Hakuo Education before the activities **❸ [Activities at the SDF Hospital, etc.]** The SDF hospitals and the National Defense Medical College Hospital (NDMCH) have been accepting COVID-19 patients since February 1, 2020. The SDF Central Hospital and the NDMCH are designated as medical institutions of Class 1 i f i di ( i h b d h f h d d determined by the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare in a depressurized room that can handle Class 1 infectious diseases) by Tokyo and Saitama Prefectures respectively. The two hospitals had been prepared to accept infectious di i ll i d d d f ----- **Chapter** **Column** “Fight against an Invisible Enemy (Novel Coronavirus)”–Achieved Zero Secondary Infections From January 31 to March 16, 2020, the SDF engaged in or return to their respective units in accordance with the level of disaster relief operations in order to prevent the expansion infection risk. (As a result of the PCR test, no personnel tested of the outbreak of the infectious disease caused by the novel positive. Personnel who tested positive should be hospitalized coronavirus based on an order issued by the Minister of at SDF Central Hospital. In addition to accepting people who Defense. tested positive among cruise ship crew and passengers During this period, the SDF personnel who engaged in the (including foreigners) and returnees from abroad, the SDF disaster relief operations conducted various support activities Central Hospital conducted PCT tests.) for Japanese people who had stayed at government facilities The manual for the improvement of the environment after returning from abroad, and for the crew and passengers prescribes the procedures for implementing disinfection, of the cruise ship Diamond Princess at Daikoku Pier. In this zoning (segregation between the hot zone, where infection risk fi ght against an “invisible enemy” in the form of the new exists, and the cold zone, where safety is assured) and waste coronavirus, the SDF achieved no secondary infections among disposal. the dispatched personnel. Meanwhile, the Ground Component Command included The disaster relief operations were concluded without any personnel from the GSDF’s NBC Countermeasure Medical secondary infections among the dispatched SDF personnel Unit, who are knowledgeable about prevention of infection in because the MOD/SDF constantly reviewed and revised the the dispatched unit. As a result, by taking advantage of those standards for protective gear and other matters in accordance personnel’s knowledge, it became possible to fully ensure with the job duties and the commanders at all levels fully protection against infection and provide education to members enforced the standards, and also because individual personnel of the dispatched unit who came from the MSDF and the ASDF. had a high level of awareness about guarding against infection. Furthermore, MSDF Yokosuka District and Air Defense Here, we explain the standards for protective gear and for Command actively implemented measures to guard against health management, and the manual for the improvement of infection through medical personnel. As a result, the SDF the environment. achieved no secondary infections. The standard for protective gear prescribes the types This achievement represents the synergy of the results of protective gear that should be worn by personnel when of NBC exercises routinely conducted by various units, the engaging in on-site activity according to their job duties. The maintenance of good health due to suffi cient diet, rest and standard requires personnel at the greatest risk to wear full bathing, and efforts made by all personnel who engaged infection protective clothing and personnel at the lowest risk to in on-site disaster relief activities, worked at command and wear only masks, gowns, and gloves. control facilities, or provided logistics support (including GSDF The standard for health management stipulates that all Central Transportation Command, which was responsible for personnel should undergo a PCR test on the premise that supervising activity on the “Hakuo,” on which dispatched following the completion of onsite activity, the personnel should personnel stayed, and the “Silver Queen,” a private ferry). either be subjected to follow-up observation in isolated rooms Zoning at SDF Central Hospital Education about guarding against infection Taking a meal on the “Hakuo” ----- such patients to beds for general patients in response to the increase in patient numbers. The SDF Sapporo Hospital and other district hospitals also started to accept patients according to the requests from the local governments. The SDF Central Hospital accepted the people infected on the Diamond Princess, compiled an analysis of the symptoms of the 104 patients in a short period of time, and published the results on March 19, 2020. The SDF hospitals and NDMCH accepted 430 COVID-19 patients (as of May 31, 2020). The SDF Central Hospital and NDMCH started a clinical trial of Avigan tablets (favipiravir) (developed by FUJIFILM Toyama Chemical Co., Ltd.) concerning COVID-19 infection. Since March 2020, the MOD has been gathering experience in treatment using Avigan tablets within the framework of compassionate use of unapproved drugs and also participated in the process of its validation through clinical trials, which is necessary for the drug to be offi cially approved as a remedy for COVID-19 infection. The MOD/SDF actively fulfi lled their roles in the fi ght against COVID-19 infection not only by treating patients but also through cooperation with the development of therapeutic drugs for the treatment of COVID-19. **Chapter** **VOICEVOICE** Response to the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Captain KODAMA Tatsuya, because many things were unclear about the disease state Medical Officer of Pulmonary Medicine, and treatment of the infection, and there were a risk of the SDF Central Hospital (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo) nosocomial infection and a language barrier in communication I have been treating COVID-19 patients at the SDF Central with foreign patients. Hospital since February 2020 as a member of the COVID-19 However, I was fi lled with a sense of fulfi llment as a medical intense care team from many departments of the hospital. practitioner when seriously ill patients recovered and left the We, as one team, have been working together, while bouncing hospital. As a medical offi cer, I am also proud that I can work ideas off each other, to best provide medical care to critically ill at the front line of the national crisis and that we received a patients who need intense care including a ventilator support. high evaluation for our efforts to publicize new insights on this Since early February the hospital has been accepting infectious disease and to effectively prevent hospital infection. COVID-19 patients, starting from returnees from Wuhan and Hereafter, I would like to share this experience with my juniors, passengers/crew members of the Diamond Princess cruise which would be useful for response to a future spread of the ship. At fi rst, medical practitioners and hospital personnel next emerging or re-emerging infectious disease. were working under signifi cant physical and mental stress Mini conference of doctors handling infections based on electronic medical records The author (left) wearing personal protective equipment for treating a seriously ill patient (author: right in the front line) ----- **Chapter** **Column** A Letter of Thanks from a German Couple As part of the SDF’s disaster relief activities to prevent the patients of many nationalities fl ooded the ward and the spread of COVID-19, the SDF Central Hospital accepted foreign medical stuff faced a diffi cult situation, all members of the passengers and crew members of the Diamond Princess. Units medical team welcomed and provided vigorous support and others engaged in the disaster relief vigorously worked for us who were feeling insecure in the hospital. –snip- We for foreign and other passengers and crew members and made good memories about Japan and Japanese people.” successfully completed the activity. Minister of Defense Kono referred to the letter of thanks at the Let us introduce a letter of thanks from a German couple, Mr. Japan-Germany telephone conversation on April 24, 2020, Janssen and Ms. O'Neal, to the Chief of Staff, GSDF. They were and German Federal Minister of Defence Kramp-Karrenbauer passengers of the ship, admitted to the SDF Central Hospital expressed her gratitude for the SDF assistance. The letter and returned to their home country later. is symbolic of the fact that the disaster relief activities were After returning to their country, the couple sent us a letter of benefi cial not only for Japan but also for other countries too. thanks: “We are especially grateful for the medical team of the The SDF is proud of this. SDF Central Hospital. We will never forget their professionalism The SDF will continue to contribute to the defense of Japan, and empathic support. Support for us was wonderful. When and to the stability and peace of the world. Mr. Janssen and Ms. O'Neal hospitalized in the SDF Central Hospital A Letter of Thanks from the Couple to the Chief of Staff, GSDF **❹ [Activities for Sending Out and Sharing of Information at Home and Abroad]** The MOD/SDF disclosed protective measures of “JSDF’s standards”[4] in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19 infection and also shared through embassies, etc. with the defense authorities the materials compiling the SDF activities in response to the infection, factors that prevented infection of the SDF personnel while working on the Diamond Princess, an outline of symptom analysis at the SDF Central Hospital and other matters. URL: https://youtu.be/F5TbW0G8NQs Video: Introduction on protective measures of JSDF’s standards (Putting masks on/off) URL: https://youtu.be/F5TbW0G8NQs Video: Introduction on protective measures of JSDF’s standards Video: Introduction on protective measures of JSDF’s standards Video: Introduction on protective measures of JSDF’s standards (Washing hands) URL: https://youtu.be/5QXtgrUJnCM Video: Introduction on protective measures of JSDF’s standards (Etiquette when coughing and sneezing) URL: https://youtu.be/4KWZ7bvj21M 4 J i t St ff W b it “I O d t E Y S f t A i t COVID 19” (htt // d j /j /A ti it /G ll /i /Di t li f/2020 id 19/2020 id 19 id 1 df) ----- Since April, Minister of Defense Kono held conference calls with the defense ministers of 15 countries,[5] including the United States, Australia, India, the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries, the United Kingdom, France and other European countries, Canada and New Zealand, and exchanged opinions on the roles of the defense authorities in light of the global expansion of the COVID-19 infection. Japan-US defense minister conference calls, in particular, were made twice in total in April and May. During the calls, the ministers confirmed that the two countries would ensure close coordination and maintenance of their response capabilities amid the current situation in addition to close collaboration to win the battle against COVID-19. Through conference calls with other countries, the defense authorities agreed to share information, lessons and knowledge obtained primarily while taking infection control measures and confirmed the need to share the understanding of the threat based on the current situation and the understanding of the impact of the infection expansion on the countries’ defense policy considering the roles of the defense authorities. The ministers also agreed to continue communication between the defense authorities and strong promotion of defense cooperation and exchange toward maintenance and strengthening of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” In the situation where the COVID-19 infection is spreading, it is important to actively communicate with foreign countries. It is also necessary to pay great attention to the new international order after the end of COVID-19 pandemic. The MOD/SDF recognizes the importance of further cooperation with foreign countries that share values and interests in order to maintain the free and open international order that has supported the world’s peace and prosperity. **Chapter** - **❺ [Efforts of the MOD/SDF to Prevent the Spread of COVID-19 Infection]** With the recognition that the MOD/SDF, whose purpose is to contact with other people in its education/training, working defend the lives and safety of the people, never allows those patterns, holding of events, and visits from outside, for lives and safety to be threatened through its activities, the example. MOD/SDF is powerfully promoting initiatives of reducing - **❻ [Other Efforts]** On May 29, 2020, in order to pay the MOD/SDF’s respect and gratitude to medical professionals handling COVID-19 infection as an organization also responding to the infection, Blue Impulse made a demonstration flight in the sky over central Tokyo. Blue Impulse performing demonstration flights to pay respects and gratitude to healthcare Video: Flight by Blue Impulse to pay respect and gratitude to � medical professionals handling COVID-19 infection URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tP6CFDQTrVs� workers (May 2020) Conference calls were held with 15 countries: France, Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, India, the Philippines, New Zealand, Singapore, Indonesia, Italy, M li th U it d A b E i t (UAE) d P N G i i th d f th i l t ti ( f J 16 ) ----- **Section** **Response to Large-Scale Disasters, etc.** **5** **❶ [Response to Large-Scale Disasters, etc.]** When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with local governments, engaged in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims or ships or aircraft in distress, controlling fl oods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods. **1 Basic Concept** For this purpose, the SDF is strengthening dissemination of information so that people who truly need support by the SDF can easily access the information related to support. Furthermore the SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.” See Fig. III-1-5-1 (Flow from Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal See and Response by the Government); Fig. III-1-5-2 (State of Readiness for Disaster Relief [Standard]); Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-4 (Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others) **Chapter** Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(4) response to large-scale disasters, etc.” is as follows. In the event of a major disaster, all possible measures will be taken to rapidly transport and deploy the SDF units required and if necessary, to sustain the mobilization for a long period. Not only will the SDF units respond to the needs of affected residents and local authorities through care, proper collaboration and cooperation, but they will also be engaged with institutions concerned, local authorities and the private sector to save lives, achieve urgent rehabilitation and provide life support. Since the damage situation is unclear at the beginning of a disaster, the SDF will maintain response readiness to any damage and need for activities while giving the fi rst priority to life-saving activities. For livelihood support, the SDF will coordinate the division of roles, response policy, activity period, utilization of private companies and other matters with relevant parties including the local governments and ministries concerned at the local response headquarters, etc. In addition, based on the “Examination Report on the Initial Response to the Heavy Rain in July 2018” (November 2018), in order to rescue and support more victims in the event of a large-scale disaster and considering possible confusion of the local authorities, the MOD/SDF will not only wait for requests from the authorities but also actively propose specifi c support activities by the SDF. In actual activities, the SDF will provide fl exible support by accurately gathering needs, which change depending on the situation.[1] **2 Response by the MOD/SDF** **（1）Response to Natural Disasters, etc.** a. Disaster Relief in Response to the Flooding Caused by Heavy Rain Accompanying a Front in August 2019 In August 2019 a heavy rain around northern Kyushu caused river fl ooding. In response to disaster relief requests from the governor of Saga Prefecture, the SDF sent liaison offi cers to coordinate closely with local governments to save lives, provide bathing facilities and meals, respond to an oil leak from iron works, support accumulation of disaster waste and epidemic control, distribute goods, supply water at hospitals and music by a band, for example. This mission involved approximately 32,000 personnel in total, 7,500 of whom engaged in the affected area, and 50 aircraft. In total, approximately 150 people were rescued, and 4,200 were provided with bathing facilities. b. Disaster Relief in Response to the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) In September 2019 a violent storm accompanying the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) caused a largescale blackout due to fallen utility poles and other damage. In response to disaster relief requests from the governors of Chiba and Kanagawa Prefectures, the SDF sent up to 50 liaison offi cers to coordinate closely with the Tokyo Video: Disaster relief in response to the heavy rain accompanying a front in August 2019 URL: https://youtu.be/JLvrKDWnAIg Recently, the scale of SDF’s disaster relief operations has become large and the period of the operations has also become long due to record heavy rains and typhoons. As the GSDF played a leading role in disaster relief operations in response to the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai), the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis), and others, approximately 300 training/exercises were cancelled downsized or postponed ----- |Municipal mayor|Col2| |---|---| **Fig. Ⅲ** **-1-5-1** Flow from Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal and Response by the Government **Chapter** Relevant ministries and agencies, etc. Outbreak of a disaster In case of particular urgency with no time to Prime Minister (*3) Prime Minister’s Official Residence Crisis Management Center Ask the prefectural governor to submit a request - Prefectural governors Request for - Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard withdrawal Municipal mayor Direct notification - Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Headquarters• Director of the Airport Administrative Office ・・InstructionCommunication and coordination ・・ReportEmergency team members gather (In case asking request is not possible) Request for dispatch MOD/SDF Relevant ministries and agencies The Minister of Defense or the individuals designated by the Minister Order to dispatch Order to dispatch Call up (*1) Dispatch of units Dispatch of units Call up in such cases as disasters (discretionary dispatch) SDF ready reserve personnel SDF reserve personnel Close cooperation and coordination in relief activities Disaster relief operations - Disbandment order of call up (*2) - Order for withdrawal Disbandment of call up (*2) Withdrawal of units Notes: 1. SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel will be called on by the Minister of Defense as necessary with the approval of the Prime Minister. 2. Disbandment of call-up of SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel must be done by the Minister of Defense. 3. In the event of emergencies, such as a natural disaster, nuclear disaster, or accident, an emergency team consisting of director-general level personnel of respective ministries and agencies is called on. Furthermore, in the event of a disaster of extreme severity, a ministerial meeting is held based on the Prime Minister’s decision, and the government may establish an emergency headquarters or hold the National Security Council, depending on the circumstances. **Fig. Ⅲ** **-1-5-2** State of Readiness for Disaster Relief (Standard) Common to All The state of readiness with which SDF troops can begin gathering information immediately after an earthquake of seismic intensity fi ve-lower or higher occurs. - When an earthquake of seismic intensity fi ve-upper or higher occurs, information is to be collected by using aircraft. FAST-Force (GSDF) First response units throughout Japan (about 3,900 personnel, about 1,100 vehicles, and about 40 aircraft) are on standby aroundthe-clock and will be deployed in an hour upon receiving an order as a standard procedure. Various units including helicopters (video transmission), chemical protection units, and bomb disposal units are on standby in each regional army. FAST-Force (MSDF) Vessels on standby: Designate one response vessel in each regional district Aircraft on standby (about 20 aircraft): Deploy in 15 minutes to two hours in each base as a standard procedure FAST-Force (ASDF) Standby for aircraft rescue and emergency transport duties (about 10-20 aircraft): Deploy within 15 minutes to two hours in each base as a standard procedure Aircraft on standby may commence information gathering as necessary for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace. Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO) Headquarters and six offi ces to supply water, lift patients, remove fallen trees and soil for outage restoration work, provide bathing facilities and help covering with blue sheets, for example. For removal of fallen trees to restore power supply, SDF-TEPCO coordination centers were set up in the TEPCO Headquarters and six offi ces in Chiba Prefecture to respond to the challenge together with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and the TEPCO. During the mission, the SDF fl exibly provided support in response to the needs of the victims: for example, personnel for other activities were temporarily sent to implement blue sheet covering, which became urgent as the forecast said the weather would worsen. This mission involved approximately 96,000 personnel in total, 54,000 of whom engaged in the affected area, and 20 aircraft. In total, approximately 1,300 tons of water was supplied, 28,000 people were provided with bathing facilities and blue sheets were installed at around 1,820 places in 27 cities and towns. c. Disaster Relief in Response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) In October 2019, the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (“Typhoon Hagibis”) was expected to approach East Japan while maintaining its great intensity. Since there was a risk of human damage and infrastructure damage including damage to houses, power and water outage from the Tokai to Kanto regions in particular, due to sediment disaster and fl ooding ----- **Chapter** **Column** Launch of the MOD/SDF’s Offi cial Twitter Account (For Disaster Response) On October 11, 2019, the MOD launched a Twitter account aiming at widely disseminating information on activities related to the MOD/SDF’s disaster response. Regarding the disaster relief operations in response to the East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) in 2019, tweets were sent out on a round-the-clock basis to spread information with respect to locations and time for disaster-affected people to receive support (meals, water supply, and bathing assistance), and reconstruction activities, including clearing of roads and disposal of disaster-related wastes. In order to mitigate the concerns of disaster-affected people, the MOD will continue to disseminate necessary information in the event of various disasters. Please follow the Official Twitter Account (For Disaster Response). https://twitter.com/modjapan_saigai GSDF personnel going to rescue isolated victims of the heavy rain due to frontogenesis in August 2019 (August 2019) GSDF personnel removing fallen trees for restoring power supply after damage due to Typhoon Faxai that hit the Boso Peninsula in 2019 (September 2019) ASDF personnel engaging in activities to save lives using a rescue helicopter at the time of Typhoon Hagibis, which hit east Japan in 2019 (October 2019) Minesweeping tender JS “Uraga” providing bathing facilities at Soma Port at the time of Typhoon Hagibis, which hit east Japan in 2019 (October 2019) Video: Disaster relief in response to Typhoon Hagibis, etc. URL: https://youtu.be/EeCpz8QFNOg ----- **Chapter** **Column** Use of Drones for Disasters to Convey Information on the Current Status at the Time of Disasters In August 2019, GSDF units in charge of regional disaster private residences in areas hit by strong winds. relief operations were equipped with drones for disasters. ・ Took video and photographs of river fl oods Drones for disasters are information gathering equipment ・ Took video and photographs of the whole of the massive that can be expected to play an active role at the time of amount of disaster debris collected various disasters in such activities as surveying disaster- The activity to take video and photographs was conducted affected areas and identifying the damage status in areas that by teams of three members each. are diffi cult to be accessed by land. The video and photographs taken through the above The drone for disasters introduced at this time is composed activity were provided to units engaging in disaster relief of the main body itself, remote controller, and a tablet device operations at the disaster sites and were used to identify the with controlling software installed. It is capable of taking damage status and also used as a reference for those units’ photographs with a resolution of 24 mega pixels (MP) and activities. Some video and photographs were also provided to video at a frame rate of 60 fps. and used by relevant local governments. At the disaster relief activities after the Boso Peninsula In addition, the teams used video transmission equipment Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) and the East Japan Typhoon to distribute real-time or recorded video to senior organizations, (Typhoon Hagibis”) of 2019, which caused severe damage in such as the Joint Staff Offi ce and Ground Staff Offi ce (Camp September to October 2019, following videos and photographs Ichigaya) for the purpose of information sharing. are taken. As explained above, information gathered through drones is ・ Took videos and photographs of the areas that were effective in identifying the damage status at the time of difficult to be accessed by land due to clusters of fallen disasters. Therefore, the SDF will continue to disseminate trees. drones further and will prepare for disasters by enhancing the ・ Took aerial video and photographs of the damage status of drone operation capability. A drone for disasters A photograph taken by a drone caused by heavy rain and strong wind, the SDF established response readiness. In order to ensure an appropriate initial response, the SDF sent liaison offi cers to the prefectural offi ces without waiting for requests from the local authorities, while keeping initial response units and others at the ready for the action. Typhoon Hagibis caused river fl ooding, large-scale inundations and sediment disasters in many places. In response to disaster relief requests from the governors of Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Nagano and Shizuoka Prefectures, the SDF sent approximately 590 liaison offi cers to coordinate closely with up to 272 local governments to save lives, supply water, provide bathing facilities and meals, dispose disaster waste, eliminate load obstacles and control epidemics. Considering that damage caused by Typhoon Hagibis was immense and extremely widespread, it was expected to require various relief activities for a long period of time. To address the challenge, the SDF established a joint task force led by the Commander of the Ground Component Command for the fi rst time. In addition, SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up and approximately 410 such personnel engaged in support activities. This mission involved approximately 880,000 personnel in total, 84,000 of whom engaged in the affected area 100 ships and 1 610 aircraft in total To add ----- **Chapter** **Column** Provision of Allergy-Conscious Meals The responsibility for providing meals at emergency shelters relevant local governments. To be more precise, the in the event of a disaster rests primarily with local governments. dispatched SDF units (i) posted a reminder notice regarding When the SDF has received a request for meal provision food allergies, (ii) indicated food allergy information support from local governments having difficulty providing concerning the food materials used (prepared by local meals themselves, it provides evacuees with meals prepared governments), and (iii) placed the packages and bottles of the using its fi eld cooking appliances based on food materials and food materials and seasonings used in front of the places menus prepared by local governments. where meals were distributed. However, regarding meals provided at emergency shelters Consequently, it became possible for evacuees themselves in the event of a disaster, no information on the ingredients to check on food allergy information regarding the food was indicated. As a result, there were concerns over a lack of materials and seasonings used for the provision of meals, and meals that people with a food allergy could eat without worry. for people with a food allergy to judge whether or not they Therefore, when the SDF conducted disaster relief activities could eat the meals provided without worry. after the East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) of 2019, the The SDF will continue to cooperate with local governments dispatched SDF units, in response to requests for meal in providing meals with due consideration of the needs of provision support, provided meals with due consideration of people with a food allergy. the needs of people with a food allergy in cooperation with Indication of food allergy information concerning the food materials used GSDF personnel providing meals this, approximately 2,040 people were rescued, 7,030 tons of water were supplied, and 70,230 people were provided with bathing facilities in total. d. Disaster Relief in Response to Classical Swine Fever (CSF) Outbreak Between July 2019 and the end of March 2020, the occurrence of CSF was confi rmed in Aichi, Gifu, Mie, and Okinawa Prefectures. As prompt epidemic prevention measures, including slaughter of pigs, were required, the SDF assisted with the slaughter and other measures in response to disaster relief requests from the governors of the prefectures.[2] These missions engaged around 9,250 personnel and 1,440 vehicles. e. Disaster Relief in Response to Forest Fire Over the period from July 2019 to the end of March 2020, local authorities conducted fi refi ghting operations against fi ghting forest fi res but were unable to settle the situation despite their efforts. Based on requests issued by the governors of Hiroshima, Miyazaki and Ibaraki Prefectures, the SDF contributed to aerial fi refi ghting and other resources. The SDF dispatches were conducted three times in total, including a total of some 380 personnel, around 30 vehicles and around 20 aircraft. Approximately 260 tons of water was applied on 45 occasions. Fig. III-1-5-3 (Record of Disaster Relief [FY2019]); Reference 14 (Record of Disaster Relief [Past Five Years]) See As a countermeasure to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak, the MOD/SDF cooperated with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in aerial application of an oral vaccine for wild boars. The MOD/SDF carried out aerial application of the oral vaccine in the national forest in Nikko, Tochigi Prefecture in December 2019, and in Gunma and Tochigi Prefectures in A il 2020 ----- representing the majority of such cases. In addition, the SDF carries out sea rescues upon requests by the Japan Coast Guard on such occasions as transport of emergency patients from vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland where the aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short fl ight range and emergencies of vessels due to incidents such as capsizing. Furthermore, the SDF conducts long-distance transportation for serious-case patients, by the ASDF transport aircraft C-130H utilizing its mobile medical units **（2）Transportation of Emergency Patients** The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insuffi cient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2019, out of a total of 449 cases of disaster relief, 365 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo), and remote islands of Nagasaki Prefecture **Chapter** |Fig. Ⅲ-1-5-3 Record of D|Disaster Relief (FY|Y2019)|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Description|Number of dispatches|Total number of personnel working in the f eild|Total number of vehicles|Total number of aircraft|Total number of vessels| |Responses to storm, f lood, and earthquake disasters|5|8,889|4,279|67|2| |Transporting emergency patients|365|1,960||402|| |Search and rescue|12|1,545|118|30|5| |Assisting f rief ighting|46|6,228|554|179|| |Other|19|24,663|2,646|29|2| |Total|447|43,285|7,597|707|9| |2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai)|1|N wu om rkb ine gr o inf tp he er s fio en ldn :el approx. 54,000 N peu rm sob ne nr eo lf : overall approx. 96,000|19,000 approx.|20 approx.|20 approx.| |2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis)|1|N wu om rkb ine gr o inf tp he er s fio en ldn :el approx. 84,000 N peu rm sob ne nr eo lf : overall approx. 880,000|49,400 approx.|1,610 approx.|100 approx.| - Except for 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon and 2019 East Japan Typhoon. - The number of overall personnel includes maintenance, communication, command, standby/backup and other rear-service personnel in addition to personnel working in the fi eld. **VOICE** Activities at Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. (TEPCO) during the Disaster Relief in Response to the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) Captain KUBOYAMA Nobutoshi, problems, we used common researcher at the Airborne Training Unit, GSDF tools to simultaneously (Funabashi City, Chiba Prefecture) share information on Typhoon Faxai occurred in September 2019, causing much damage location and made damage in Chiba Prefecture. Damage to the power supply was efforts to understand what particularly severe. Power failure due to fallen utility poles and the other party was able The author (right) making coordination with disconnection continued for a long time all over the prefecture. and not able to do with each the power company on removal of fallen Power restoration took time because disconnection, etc. due other. As a result, these trees for power restoration to fallen trees occurred over a wide area. The fallen trees were efforts reduced the time major obstacles for recovery operation. required from identifying damage location to joint operation In order to remove fallen trees and contribute to early power and contributed to effective operation of SDF personnel on the restoration, the SDF units in Chiba and other areas carried site. out disaster relief activities. I was sent as a liaison offi cer to In recent years, natural disasters causing enormous damage Narita branch of TEPCO and engaged in tasks for liaison and have been increasing year by year. In order to meet the high coordination between the branch and SDF units. expectations from the public toward the SDF, I will push At the beginning of the activities, due to the use of different forward with my duties as SDF personnel and the lessons of maps and differences in the operation organizations, we had this disaster relief in mind. diffi culty in sharing recognition of the damage situation and establishing a joint operation manual. In order to solve the ----- **Chapter** Participating in Disaster Relief Lieutenant Commander HATANO Yuka, Disaster Relief Team, in our respective cultures 2nd Operation Section, Operation Department, Joint Staff, and take advantage of our MOD (Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo) respective characteristics The Joint Staff Offi ce is an organization which centrally across the boundaries assists the Minister of Defense in SDF operation. The disaster of the GSDF, MSDF and relief team where I belong has a role to assist the Chief of Joint ASDF to carry out broad- Staff to back up disaster relief activities as a mediator among ranging support activities GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, including coordination for timely input and complete the mission. of personnel and equipment in the event of a disaster. My workplace is not on I joined the disaster relief team in March 2018. At that time disaster sites but the I had little knowledge of the duties and equipment of the GSDF Ministry of Defense. Even and ASDF. However, through disaster relief activities in response so, through disaster relief The author (left of the upper photo) in response to COVID-19 in PFI-contracted to the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake and repeated typhoon activities, I can feel that private boat “Hakuou” disasters, I was able to gain extensive knowledge of their GSDF, MSDF and ASDF organizations and capabilities, which include the capacity of units are tied and working GSDF’s large-scale facility and advanced medical technology, together through disaster relief activities. and the ASDF’s transportation capacity across the country and Recently, some cases require rescue operations, such as high water supply capacity using fresh water generators. livelihood support and other operations that are different from Each of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF have their respective usual disaster relief activities. In such cases, too, I am working views and ceremonial manners that can be expressed with the with the goal of making “cross-cultural communication” word “culture.” When there is a disagreement with GSDF/ASDF smoother and becoming a skillful mediator together with members in the disaster relief team, we may argue, jokingly colleagues of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF in their respective uniform saying, “This is a cultural difference.” However, once a disaster colors. occurs, in any situation, we share our knowledge cultivated Participating in Disaster Relief Activities in Response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) Airman 1st Class FUKUI Keita, 2nd Section, 1st Flight, 2nd Air the sludge and we were Civil Engineering Squadron, Central Air Civil Engineering put back to the beginning. Group, ASDF (Komatsu City, Ishikawa Prefecture) It was not showy activity I participated in disaster relief in response to the 2019 East and, we were in a harsh Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) that occurred last fall. Before situation. I participated in the fi rst disaster relief, I had seen disaster However, the local The author removing driftwood, etc. relief activities only on television news. When I was informed elementary school children in the playground. that I would be sent to the disaster area, I fi rmly resolved to do sang songs between the anything that I could do for victims. activities and sent letters to us. We were able to complete the I was sent to Matsushiro Elementary School in Nagano City, mission thanks to their encouragement. Nagano Prefecture. Its playground was covered with driftwood, I hope that a disaster requiring our relief activity would sludge and waste from the fl ooding rivers, so I strongly wanted never occur again but, if I am called to the mission again, I to restore the site back to its normal state as soon as possible. will be genuinely committed to my duty with a strong sense of It was extremely diffi cult to restore the playground. We responsibility and pride as I did in this mission. removed driftwood and sludge from the ground using a few heavy equipment units and by hand, but no matter how much we dug, we could not see the surface of the ground. When we caught a glimpse of the ground, more heavy rain spread ----- in certain occasions. Furthermore, in FY2019, the SDF carried out 46 dispatches of firefighting support, with 28 cases responding to fire in the areas near SDF facilities. event of a large-scale earthquake to maintain and enhance the SDF’s earthquake response capability. In FY2018 the SDF carried out training in preparation for an earthquake directly hitting the Tokyo area. In FY2019, the SDF carried out training assuming the occurrence of an earthquake directly hitting the Tokyo area during the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games.[3] b. Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX) Joint Disaster Response Exercise with U.S. Forces In February 2020, joint exercises were held with U.S. Forces stationed in Japan in the scenario of the Nankai Trench earthquake. The purpose of the exercise was to maintain and enhance earthquake disaster relief capabilities in collaboration between the SDF and U.S. forces and to strengthen cooperation with relevant local authorities. c. Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise (RIDEX) In September 2019, the SDF participated in general disaster prevention training planned and organized by Okinawa Prefecture and a disaster drill of Ishigaki citizens and conducted a field training exercise to deal with sudden largescale disasters in a remote island to maintain as well as enhance the SDF’s ability to respond to disasters in remote islands and strengthen collaboration with relevant local authorities. d. Drill for medical treatment activities following a large-scale earthquake In September 2019, the SDF participated in a drill organized by the Cabinet Office for medical treatment activities following a large-scale earthquake. In this drill, the SDF practiced various activities for disaster relief and coordination with organizations related to disaster prevention to maintain and enhance the SDF’s disaster response capability. e. Other They also took part in the Ministry of Defense Disaster RIDEX: Transport of Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) to Shimojishima Airport by ASDF C-2 (September 2019) **（3）The MOD/SDF Response to Nuclear Disaster** In order to respond to nuclear disasters, the MOD/SDF has formulated “The SDF Nuclear Disaster Response Plan.” The SDF also participates in general nuclear disaster prevention drills jointly implemented by the government, local governments, and nuclear operators, to confirm the effectiveness of municipal governments’ evacuation plan and to strengthen cooperation with relevant agencies in a nuclear disaster emergency. Moreover, since October 2014, SDF personnel (five personnel as of March 31, 2020) were transferred (on temporary assignment) to a section in charge of nuclear disaster prevention within the Cabinet Office as part of an effort to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear disaster response capabilities. **Chapter** **（4）Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters** In the event of the occurrence of various disasters, the MOD/SDF will take all possible measures such as swift transportation and deployment of sufficiently sized units in their initial response. By establishing a rotating staffing posture based on a joint operational approach, the MOD/ SDF will ensure that it is able to sustain a well-prepared condition for a long-term response. In doing so, the MOD/ SDF will fully take into account the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake and other disasters. The MOD/SDF formulates various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council, based on the Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan to respond to such earthquakes. **（5）Exercises Involving the SDF** In order to respond to large-scale and various other disasters in a speedy and appropriate manner, the SDF carries out various disaster prevention drills, and also actively participates in disaster prevention drills organized by the Japanese Government or local governments and is seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and agencies, and local governments. a. Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) The SDF conducts disaster drills concerning its command and staff activities, and coordination between its major units and with organizations related to disaster prevention in the On March 20, 2020, it was decided that the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games will take place between July 23 and August 8, 2021, and between August 24 and September 5, 2021 respectively ----- **Chapter** |Fig. Ⅲ-1-5-4 List of the Thre|ee-Year Emergency Measures for Disaster Prevention, Disaster Mitigation, and Building National|l Resilience (MOD)| |---|---|---| |Emergency measures|Outline of the measures|Period| |Emergency measures for concrete block walls, etc. of SDF facilities|After the earthquake occurred in Northern Osaka in 2018, safety inspections were conducted with regard to concrete block walls, etc. on the borders of the SDF facilities adjacent to private properties and public roads and it was found that there are approximately 110 old concrete block walls and other structures that do not comply with the current Building Standards Act and pose safety risks. Therefore, the MOD will take emergency measures, such as removal of such dangerous walls and installation of new fences.|By FY2020| |Emergency measures for SDF facilities|After the earthquake occurred in Northern Osaka in 2018, emergency inspections were conducted for the SDF’s significant disaster response bases regarding their resilience to earthquakes, deterioration levels and the status of installation of power generators, and some of these facilities were found likely to cause hindrance to the SDF’s prompt and appropriate performance of duties. Therefore, the MOD will take seismic reinforcement measures for around 10 facilities, countermeasures against deterioration for around 40 facilities, and measures to enhance power supplying capability for around 30 facilities.|By FY2020| |Emergency measures for SDF equipment related to disaster prevention|As it is urgently necessary to develop equipment required for the SDF’s relief activities upon a disaster from the perspective of preventing functional failures due to deterioration and of strengthening such relief activities, the MOD will take emergency measures for securing necessary equipment, communication devices, and vehicles for camps nationwide where old dysfunctional equipment was found.|By FY2020| Management Headquarters drill, the comprehensive disaster prevention drills on Disaster Prevention Day, and more.[4] confirmed through the experiences of the Great East Japan Earthquake and other disasters. In particular, each GSDF regional Army establishes a forum for interaction with senior directors for crisis management and other officials from local governments and share information and exchange opinions to strengthen collaboration with those local governments. In the event of a disaster, liaison officers are sent quickly and effectively from the units to the local municipalities in order to ensure smooth coordination. **（6）Collaboration with Local Governments and Other** Relevant Organizations It is important for the MOD/SDF to strengthen collaboration with local governments and other relevant organizations under normal circumstances for the purpose of conducting disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF implements various measures including: (1) Assignment of the post of Liaison Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Management (administrative official) at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices; (2) Temporary assignment of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and mutual exchange between administrative officials of both the GSDF Middle Army and Hyogo Prefectural Government; and (3) Recommendation of retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in accordance with requests from local governments. As of the end of March 2020, as many as 575 retired SDF personnel are working in disaster prevention and other sections in 398 local governments in 46 prefectures throughout the country. Such cooperation in human resources is a very effective way of strengthening collaboration between the MOD/SDF and local governments, and its efficacy was Reference 56 (Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government) See **（7）Actions Based on the Three-Year Emergency** Measures for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation, and Building National Resilience In December 2018, the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation, and building national resilience[5] were approved by the Cabinet. Under the measures, the MOD is focusing on emergency measures for concrete block walls, etc. of SDF facilities, for SDF facilities and for SDF equipment related to disaster prevention, from the perspective of maintaining functions including important infrastructure for disaster prevention. See Fig. III-1-5-4 (List of the Three-Year Emergency Measures for Disaster Prevention, Disaster Mitigation, and Building National Resilience [MOD]) In addition, the following drills were conducted and participated in, in 2019: (1) government tabletop drills, (2) the Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention Drill, (3) the large tsunami disaster prevention drill, (4) a drill related to the Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Drill of Nine Prefectural and City Governments, (5) a drill related to the joint disaster drill among the Kinki prefectures, (6) comprehensive disaster prevention drills conducted by local governments or other bodies. In recent years, the Heavy Rain in July 2018, Typhoon Jebi in 2018, Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake in 2018 and other natural disasters caused function loss of important infrastructures necessary for living and economic activities of the people, including the occurrence of blackouts and closure of airport terminals, which had a major effect on the activities. Learning from the experience, the Emergency Countermeasures stipulate physical and non-physical measures that individual ministries and agencies should implement intensively for the period of three years from the perspective of maintaining functions including important infrastructure for disaster prevention and important infrastructure supporting the national economy and people’s li ----- **❷ [Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.]** relevant ministries and the Embassy of Japan in Thailand. With the participation of Japanese nationals in Thailand, the exercise strengthened the collaboration between the MOD/ SDF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MOD/SDF has conducted the transportation of Japanese nationals in four cases. Responding to the kidnapping of foreigners and Japanese in Iraq, 10 Japanese evacuated to Kuwait by an ASDF C-130H plane in April 2004. In January 2013, a government aircraft was deployed to bring seven Japanese nationals and the remains of a further nine nationals back to Japan following the kidnapping in Algeria. With respect to the terrorist attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which occurred in July 2016, the bodies of Japanese victims (seven nationals), their families, and other involved parties were transported to Japan by a government aircraft. In relation to the deterioration of the situation in South Sudan in July of the same year, the ASDF transport aircraft C-130H transported four embassy staff from Juba to Djibouti. **1** Basic Concept In the event of natural disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense can order SDF units to rescue or transport Japanese nationals and other people overseas upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to guard, rescue or transport Japanese nationals overseas, etc. and upon subsequent consultations with the Minister, on the basis of Article 84-3 (rescue Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) or Article 84-4 (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) of the SDF Law. **2** Initiatives of the MOD/SDF **Chapter** For prompt and appropriate implementation of rescue or transport of Japanese nationals overseas, the SDF is prepared to dispatch its units swiftly. Specifically, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating personnel to a helicopter unit and a unit responsible for land transportation, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including ship-based aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel for dispatch. Since these activities require close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, the MOD/SDF constantly conducts joint exercises. In December 2019, the SDF carried out an exercise in Japan for the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas to practice the whole process of the actions and coordination with related organizations in order to enhance integrated operational capabilities and to strengthen the coordination with the related organizations. Furthermore, from February to March 2020, the MOD/SDF also utilized the opportunity of the annual multilateral exercise Cobra Gold taking place in Thailand as training in a series of activities to protect Japanese nationals overseas in cooperation with the Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-3-6 (Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas) See Cobra Gold 20: Japanese nationals overseas boarding on an ASDF C-130H in an exercise to rescue Japanese nationals overseas (February 2020) ----- **Section** **Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the** **6** **Safety of Japan-related Vessels in the Middle East** **❶ [Background of the Deployment of the SDF to the Middle East]** Peace and stability in the Middle East are crucial to the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. In addition, it is very important to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, which is the world’s major energy source and on which Japan depends for about 90% of its crude oil imports. In the Middle East, amidst rising tensions, there were incidents of attacks on ships. In June 2019, Japan-related vessels suffered damage. Under these circumstances, the United States, European countries, and other countries are taking steps to ensure the safety of navigation in the region by utilizing ships and aircraft. In order to ease tensions and stabilize the situation in the Middle East, the Japanese government has actively promoted diplomatic initiatives, including Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Iran in the same month, and the Japan-U.S. summit meeting during the UN General Assembly and the Japan-Iran summit meeting in September. In this context, based on the discussions that took place among the Prime Minister and other relevant ministers at the National Security Council and other meetings, Japan has decided to take its own initiative to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels. On October 18, the Chief Cabinet Secretary held a press conference to announce the government’s policies that consisted of the following three pillars: (1) further diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the Middle East and stabilize the situation; (2) thorough implementation of navigation safety measures, including close information sharing with relevant industries; and (3) commencement of specifi c studies on the use of SDF assets to strengthen information gathering posture. On the same day, in response to these policies, the Minister of Defense issued an instruction on the implementation of studies on the dispatch of MSDF vessels for the purpose of information gathering and on the possibility of utilizing the existing counter-piracy unit. Following these instructions, the MOD held discussions on specifi c matters while coordinating with the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and other relevant ministries and agencies. On December 27, following the above studies and the discussions held subsequently among the National Security Council, the Prime Minister, and other relevant ministers, the Cabinet decided on the government’s policy on the efforts to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels (details are given in the next section). While the information gathering activities could have been implemented within the scope of the MOD’s jurisdiction, it was decided to carry out a Cabinet decision not just because comprehensive measures were to be taken under cooperation of different ministries and agencies as a whole-of-government approach, but also in order to clarify the importance of the deployment of the SDF overseas and ensure accountability to the public. For the same reasons, it was stipulated that the Diet is to receive a report whenever a Cabinet decision regarding the activities is made (including any changes to it) and a report on the results of such activities upon termination. At the time of the Cabinet decision, the report to the Diet was made immediately after the Cabinet decision was issued. Following the Cabinet decision on the same day, the Minister of Defense instructed the MOD to begin various preparations, including preparations for the formation of units and education and training. With the participation of the relevant departments of the MOD and other relevant ministries and agencies, the MSDF took all possible measures to ensure the smooth execution of its activities, such as conducting a wargaming exercise on January 8 and 9, 2020, in order to strengthen the capabilities of commanders MSDF Destroyer JS “Takanami” engaging in information gathering activities in the Arabian Sea **Chapter** ----- **Fig. Ⅲ** **-1-6-1** Units Engaged in Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East **Chapter** SDF Chief of Staff Commander, Deployment Commander, Deployment Surface Force for Information Air Force for Counter Gathering Activities Piracy Enforcement Command center Squadron 1 destroyer P-3C×2 Support and logistics units Total approx. 60 personnel ※Carry out information gathering activities using aircraft of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement to the extent that it does not interfere with the counter-piracy mission to replace the counter-piracy unit and began an information gathering task on the 20th of the same month. Destroyer JS “Takanami” left port on February 2 and started to engage in information gathering activities in the sea areas above on February 26.[1] On May 10, 2020, Destroyer JS “Kirisame” left Japan to replace “Takanami.” Information gathered by the SDF is shared with the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), the MOFA, and other relevant ministries and agencies, as well as with relevant industries when necessary through public-private liaison meetings, to be used for the government’s navigation safety measures. |Col1|Total approx. 200 personnel※|Col3| |---|---|---| |Equipped with 1 or 2 patrol helicopters||| ※Including command center officers; The number of personnel may vary depending at different levels to judge the situation and practice unit on ships dispatched. operation and liaison. On January 10, a Defense Council meeting was held. After deliberations based on reports from the Chief of Joint Staff and the MSDF Chief of Staff on the preparations for the dispatch, the Minister of Defense ordered the implementation of information gathering activities necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In addition to the dispatch of a new destroyer for the Deployment Surface Force for information gathering, two P-3C fixedwing patrol aircraft of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) will be utilized to the extent that it does not interfere with the counter-piracy mission. The area of operation includes three waters of high seas: the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states). Two fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) left Japan on January 11 Fig. III-1-6-1 (Units Engaged in Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East) Fig. III-1-6-2 (Information Gathering Activities by the SDF [image]) See **❷ [Outline of the Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (Cabinet Decision)]** The Cabinet decision titled “The Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East” stipulates that the government will promote its own efforts to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels, such as: (1) further diplomatic efforts to ease tensions and stabilize the situation in the Middle East; (2) the thorough implementation of navigation safety measures, including close information sharing with From the start of the information gathering activity to the end of May 2020, no Japan-related vessels have been reported to encounter a distinctive event in the waters of operation. During this period, in the waters of operation, Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) confirmed about 7,617 vessels in total, and DAPE confirmed about 9,150 vessels ----- **Chapter** |ig. Ⅲ-1-6-2 Information Gathering Activities by the SDF (image)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |● Purpose: Gather information necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels as part of the government’s navigation safety measures ※ When further actions of the SDF are found to be necessary due to unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, maritime security actions will be ordered (vessels to be protected are Japan-related ones (in the same manner as in the case of anti-piracy measures by maritime security actions), and actions will be taken depending on the circumstances). ● Assets used: 1 destroyer (equipped with 1 or 2 patrol helicopters), 2 fixed-wing patrol aircraft P-3C (using aircraft of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement) ⇒ It is possible to continuously gather information on navigation of vessels in the relevant waters, situation of the surrounding waters, and existence of any unusual events. ● Areas for information gathering activities: The three high seas of the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden on the eastern side of 40°E 50°E 60°E 70°E the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones (EEZ))|||||||||| |Jorda Egypt Sudan E Air|||||||||| ||n|Iraq Kuwait Str Bahrain Saudi Arabia Qa (Air unit) P-3C×2 ※Using aircraft of the Deployment A Piracy Enforcement ●Conducting information gatherin||Iran aits of Hormuz H tar UAE ir Force for Counter Oman g activities in the||AfghAafngishtaannistan igh seas of the Gulf of Oman パキスタン (including EEZ) Pakistan High seas of the norther Arabian S (including EEZ) イ I||ea ンド ndia|| ||||ir unit) P-3C×2 Using aircraft of the Deployment A Piracy Enforcement Conducting information gatherin|ir Force for Counter g activities in the|||||| ||Eritrea thiopia|high seas of the Gulf of Aden Arabian Sea, centered on t Recommended Transit Corridor w cy mission has been performed. Yemen Bab-el-Mandeb Djibouti Djibouti n base (P-3C×2) Somalia|high seas of the Gulf of Aden Arabian Sea, centered on t Recommended Transit Corridor w cy mission has been performed.|and the northern he Internationally here counter-pira-||(Vessel unit) 1 destroyer ●Conducting information gathering activit in the high seas of the Gulf of Oman and northern Arabian Sea, where navigation Japan-related vessels is concentra therefore information gathering activit are considered to be necessary for ensur their navigation safety in particular.||ies the of ted ies ing|| |||||||※The figure is for illustrative purp|||| |||||High seas of the Gulf of Aden (including EEZ)|||||| ||unit operatio|n base (P-3C|||||||| relevant industries; and (3) the use of SDF vessels and aircraft to strengthen information gathering capabilities. The Cabinet decision was made with an understanding of the signifi cance of these measures, which are to be carried out by the following means. **2 Thorough implementation of navigation safety measures** Japan will thoroughly implement its navigation safety measures, including meticulous information sharing with related industries. Specifi cally, a system of cooperation within the government and between the government and related industries will be established, which will also cover the sharing of information obtained through the SDF’s information gathering activities by related ministries and agencies. In addition, whenever information that suggests the existence of a risk to the safe navigation of vessels is obtained, the government will promptly share such information with related industries to call for vigilance in a timely manner, encouraging them to thoroughly implement navigation safety measures at their own initiative. **3 Information gathering activities by the SDF** **1 Further diplomatic efforts** Japan has built good relations with countries involved in the stability of the Middle East, such as maintaining good relations with Iran for many years while being an ally of the United States. Taking advantage of these relations, Japan will make further diplomatic efforts, including reaching out to the countries concerned at various levels, to ease tensions and stabilize the situation in the Middle East. In addition, Japan will continue to seek cooperation from the coastal countries that play an important role in the safe navigation of vessels. Continued efforts will be made to gain the understanding of the countries concerned in the region regarding the SDF’s information gathering activities. Although there is no immediate need to implement protective measures for Japan-related vessels in the Middle ----- (4) Responding to Unforeseen Circumstances Or Other Changes in the Situation In the event of unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, the relevant ministries and agencies will work together to understand the situation, share information closely and promptly with each other, and strengthen the government’s response. Then, if further measures by the SDF are deemed necessary in response to the situation in question, Maritime Security Operations will be ordered in accordance with Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. When issuing such an order, the MOD will make best efforts for prompt decision making. The measures that can be taken in the course of Maritime Security Operations will be based on international laws, including the flag state principle, and will vary depending on the circumstances, such as whether the protected vessel is a Japanese or foreign-flagged vessel and the type of infringement. **(5) Ensuring the Safety of the SDF Units** In conducting information gathering activities, the SDF units take all possible measures to ensure their own safety, including the collection of sufficient information on the situation in the areas of operation, the installation of equipment necessary to ensure safety, and appropriate prior education and training. East, given the rising tensions in the region, it is necessary to strengthen the information gathering system to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. Therefore, Japan has decided to have the SDF conduct information gathering activities, considering the distance from Japan to the Middle East region, the SDF’s experience in operating in the region, and the importance of cooperation with units and organizations from other countries. The SDF’s information gathering activities are part of the government’s navigation safety measures and are aimed at collecting information necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. The activities are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph (1), item (xviii) of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, as they would need smooth decision making and order issuance in relation to Maritime Security Operations as measures for unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, which are provided in Article 82 of the Self Defense Forces Law. **(1) Information to Be Gathered** **Chapter** The SDF will gather information that directly affects or is necessary for ensuring safe navigation in the waters described in (3) below. **(2) Equipment** After necessary adjustments, one new destroyer will be dispatched. In addition, the SDF will also use fixed-wing patrol aircraft P-3C of the units currently engaged in the Counter-Piracy Operations under Article 7, paragraph (1) of the Acts on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy (Anti-Piracy Measures Act). Information gathering activities by the counter-piracy units will be carried out to an extent that does not interfere with the counter-piracy operation. **(3) Geographical Scope of Activities** **(6) Cooperation among Relevant Ministries and Agencies** In order to ensure the effectiveness of information gathering activities and responses to changes in the situation including the rise of unforeseen circumstances, relevant ministries and agencies will work closely together to share understanding regarding such responses, improve response capabilities through training, and develop a system that allows for a prompt response to the situation. **(7) Cooperation with Other Countries** Although Japan does not participate in any specific framework related to the safety of navigation in the Middle East and the SDF’s information gathering activities are to be conducted at its own initiative, Japan will communicate and cooperate with other countries as necessary. The geographical scope of the information gathering activities by destroyers and fixed-wing patrol aircraft described in (2) consists of three waters of high seas: the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states). For resupply, destroyers will call at a port facing the three seas. ----- **(8) Duration of the SDF’s Activities** The period during which the SDF should engage in the information gathering activities (including preparation and training periods) under the Cabinet decision is from December 27, 2019, to December 26, 2020. If it is deemed necessary to extend the SDF’s activities based on the Cabinet decision, another Cabinet decision or any changes to it will be made in that regard. If, prior to the expiration of the above period, the SDF’s activities are no longer deemed necessary in light of the necessity described in this paragraph,[2] the SDF will terminate such activities at that point. If there is a noticeable change in the situation, the National Security Council will consider a response. **4 Report to the Diet** **Chapter** Destroyer JS “Takanami” crew engaging in information gathering activities in the north of the Arabian Sea Measures Act, the Diet is to receive a report whenever a Cabinet decision or any changes to it is made and a report on the results of such activities upon termination. See Reference 15 (Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East) In view of the fact that matters pertaining to the SDF operations under the Anti-Piracy Measures Act are reported to the Diet in accordance with Article 7, paragraph (3) of the Anti-Piracy **VOICE** Engaging in Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East Captain INABA Yosuke, Escort Flotilla 6 Commander, MSDF As the commander of the Deployment Surface Force for Information Gathering (DSIG), on our unit, Destroyer JS “Takanami,” I have engaged in information gathering in the waters of the Middle East since February 2020. Considering the fact that Japan depends on the Middle East region for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports, it is vital for Japan to ensure the safety of navigation for Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, which is a major energy source of the world. In the open sea of the Gulf of Oman and the northern Arabian Sea where we are working, a large number of tankers laden with crude oil, etc. are navigating from the Gulf countries The author receiving a report on the bridge toward Japan. Through these information gathering activities, all personnel of the Deployment Surface Force are proud of trial and error for the mission. However, we were able to being able to contribute to the safety of Japan-related vessels overcome challenges with significant support from various by gathering information that directly impacts the safety of quarters and unifi ed efforts of all personnel of the DSIG, who navigation of vessels and other information necessary to understand how important the mission is. secure safe navigation. Today, too, we are making full efforts to ensure the safety Since this is the fi rst such activity, we were groping through of Japan-related vessels in this water. Video： Information gathering activities necessary to ensure the safety of Japanese vessels in the Middle East URL：https://twitter.com/ointstaffpa/status/1232620231605899265?s=09 2 R f t “3 I t lli th i ti iti b th SDF” See ----- **❸ [Communication and Cooperation with Relevant Countries]** United States, and relations with Iran. At the same time, to ensure safe navigation in the Middle East, the SDF has been cooperating closely with the United States in various ways. In the information gathering activities, the SDF will also appropriately cooperate with the United States as an ally, while observing the government’s policy of conducting navigation safety measures independently from any other country’s initiatives. For this reason, an MSDF offi cer has been dispatched to the U.S. Central Naval Command in **1 United States** As a result of a comprehensive review of what measures Japan should take to ensure the safe navigation of Japan related vessels in the Middle East, Japan has started to implement efforts as Japan’s independent initiative without participating in the International Maritime Security Construct led by the United States, considering the need for ensuring a stable supply of crude oil, relations with the **Chapter** **VOICE** Response from Relevant Industries to the Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East Based on a cabinet decision made in December 2019, the SDF has been carrying out information gathering activities in the Middle East. In this Column, we introduce responses from the relevant industries (The Japanese Shipowners’ Association, the Petroleum Association of Japan and the All Japan Seamen's Union ) to the activities. Mr. NAITO Tadaaki, (President, the Japanese Shipowners’ Association) The Japanese Shipowners’ Association welcomes the initiative of the Government of Japan that was approved by the cabinet on December 27,2019. As tension has been rising in the Middle East since last year, crew members of ships navigating the waters are conducting operations with concern about safety. In this situation, the provision of information obtained by the SDF will contribute to the safe navigation of Japanese merchant vessels and increase the sense of security for crew members. The ocean shipping industry will closely share Mr. NAITO Tadaaki, (President, the Japanese information with the government to fulfi ll our social responsibility to surely transport goods Shipowners’ Association) necessary for Japan. Mr. TSUKIOKA Takashi (President, the Petroleum Association of Japan) I would like to express my gratitude for the initiative by the government for the safety of the navigation in the Middle East waters, which is an artery for energy supply to the country, as well as the SDF personnel who are gathering information in the fi eld. Crude oil from the Middle East accounts for about 90% of the crude oil imports of Japan. The industry believes that safe navigation in the region is the foundation for Japan’s stable energy supply and the peace of people’s daily lives. The industry will continue to work for the stable supply of Mr. TSUKIOKA Takashi (President, the petroleum. I am grateful to the SDF personnel who are engaging in information gathering Petroleum Association of Japan) activities in the field every day and hope that all of them will safely return home after performing their duty. Mr. MORITA Yasumi (President, All Japan Seamen’s Union) As Japan, an ocean trade nation, transports 99.6% of export/import cargoes that are necessary for the maintenance of daily lives of its people and economic development by sea, in order to maintain stable marine transport, the safety of navigation is absolutely vital. We seamen can work in relief when the safety of the sea and waterways is confi rmed. On behalf of seamen, I would like to offer my genuine appreciation for activities by people Mr. MORITA Yasumi (President, All Japan of the MOD/SDF to ensure the safety of the sea and waterways. Seamen’s Union) ----- Bahrain as a liaison officer to share information with the U.S. Forces. At the Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meeting on January 14, 2020, Defense Minister Kono explained the deployment of the SDF to Secretary of Defense Esper, and the Secretary expressed his gratitude. **2** Coastal States in the Middle East appreciates that Japan is explaining its efforts to Iran in a transparent manner. Iran maintained the same stance as this also at the Japan-Iran foreign ministers’ meeting held on February 15, 2020. In a telephone conference between Defense Minister Kono and Iranian Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Hatami on January 9, 2020, Minister Kono explained the SDF’s information gathering activities and asked Iran to cooperate as a coastal country to ensure the safety of navigation. In January, Prime Minister Abe visited Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman, and held summit meetings with each of these countries. At the summit meetings, the Prime Minister gave an explanation on Japan’s efforts, gaining support from the countries. Defense Minister Kono also explained the SDF’s information gathering activities to Defense Minister Badr during his visit to Oman in December 2019, and to UAE Minister of State for Defense Affairs Bowardi in a telephone conference in March 2020. Japan intends to continue to communicate with the coastal states, including Iran. It is important to gain the understanding of the coastal states, including Iran, regarding the information gathering activities that Japan is undertaking as an independent initiative, and Japan has been explaining these activities to them with transparency. In addition, the coastal states play an important role in ensuring safe navigation in the Middle East. Japan has been reaching out to the coastal states to gain their understanding of Japan’s efforts. At the Japan-Iran Summit Meeting on December 20, 2019, Prime Minister Abe gave a detailed explanation of Japan’s efforts. In response, President Rouhani said that Iran appreciates Japan’s diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions in the region, understands Japan’s intention to contribute to the safety of navigation through its own initiative, and also **Chapter** ----- **Japan-U.S. Alliance** ###### 2 This year marked the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) states that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, as well as Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security, and that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a signifi cant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacifi c region and the international community. The NDPG also explains that, as inter-state competitions prominently emerge, it has become all the more important for Japan’s national security to further strengthen relationship with the United States, with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests, and that the United States also views that cooperation with its allies has become more important. On that basis, the NDPG provides that, while the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been reinforced through activities including those that were made possible by the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan needs to further enhance the Alliance through efforts under the “Guidelines for Japan U.S. Defense Cooperation” in order to achieve its national defense objective as security environment surrounding Japan becomes more severe and uncertain at remarkably fast speeds. At the same time, the NDPG provides that, in further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, it is an essential premise that Japan strengthens its own defense capability on its own accord and initiative. Fulfi lling this premise, Japan needs to press ahead with efforts such as: bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats; enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas; and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ). This chapter explains activities related to the enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking account of the concept of the NDPG. **Chapter** **Section** **Outline of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **1** **❶ [Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements]** centered on the Security Arrangements with the world’s dominant military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and a capitalist economy as well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security of the world, and has strong economic ties. Specifi cally, Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan, based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan will provide facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces, based on Article 6 of the treaty. If a nation plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States, due to the U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed **1** Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security In the current international community, a robust defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks, including the use of nuclear weapons, to coercion or intimidation by military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation. However, it is diffi cult even for the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Much more than that, it would be diffi cult for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not necessarily contribute to regional stability. Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace and security, ----- attack. As a result, the opposing nation clearly recognizes that it will suffer grievously if it carries out an invasion, and such desires will be abandoned at the planning stage. In other words, this serves as deterrence against attacks. Japan intends to create a seamless posture and secure its peace and security by effectively utilizing the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. military together with Japan’s own national defense architecture. **2** Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region surrounding Japan President Trump and Prime Minister Abe shaking hands at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (September 2019) 【Website of Prime Minister’s Office of Japan】 between Japan and the United States, not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, economy, and society. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements at its core, also forms the axis of Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive efforts to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including the promotion of multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations. Currently, we are confronted with global security challenges that are diffi cult for any single country to tackle alone, including risks concerning stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace, the acts of piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and international terrorism, and it is important for countries to work together from peacetime. The strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges. In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This close coordination lays the foundation for various forms of global collaboration such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to enhancement of the operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by advancing initiatives for resolving global issues in cooperation with the United States, which has remarkable operational capabilities, Japan will be able to further ensure its security and prosperity. Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East is the purpose of the use of facilities and areas by the USFJ. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs. In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many states and the like with massive military power, including some states that retain nuclear weapons or continue nuclear development. In addition, uncertainty over the existing order is increasing due to changes in the balance of power. The so-called gray zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications. In such a security environment, the military presence of USFJ provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by various security issues or destabilizing factors, not only protecting the interests of Japan and the United States but also providing a great sense of security to the nations in the region and thus fulfi lling a role as public goods. Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan U.S. Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the United States’ commitment to the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances established between the United States and other countries in the region such as the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and also by the friendly relations developed with other countries, play an indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability of the region. **3** Responding to Global Issues **Chapter** The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship ----- **❷ [Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance]** Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, and the rule of law and common interests. During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country of liberal democracy and contributed to the peace and stability in the region, including the formulation of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”) in 1978 with a focus on responses to an armed attack on Japan. Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the Japan U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of the same year. As part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) held in the following year (1997) approved the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines[1] and expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War. In light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working level and other consultations as a part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to the changing times. As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region (first stage) in February 2005; announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and finalization of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap), a program for implementing specific measures for the realignment of USFJ, (third stage) in May 2006. See Reference 16 (United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation [tentative translation]) See Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2007 reconfirmed and updated their common strategic objectives. In February 2009, based on the Realignment Roadmap the two countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement), which entered into force in May 2009. At the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries reviewed and revalidated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to outer space and cyberspace, and discussed a diverse range of areas, including an expansion of information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities. In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced the decision to adjust the plans outlined in the Realignment Roadmap of 2006, considering significant progress on the realignment of the USFJ since the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. See Reference 17 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) [tentative translation] (April 27, 2012) Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against the stable use of global commons such as oceans, outer space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplified by anti-piracy activities, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and international disaster relief activities. As a result, it had become necessary for the manner of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to **Chapter** The 1997 Guidelines define the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of the two countries under three categories: (1) under normal circumstances, (2) in response to an armed attack against Japan and (3) in situations in areas surrounding Japan They also stipulated that they would review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner ----- |FigⅢ-2-1-1 Chronology of the Japan-U.S. Alliance|Col2| |---|---| |1951 1952 Years of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 1958 1960 Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty|The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed The treaty enters into force Fujiyama-Dulles Talks（ agreement on the revision of the treaty） The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force| |1968 1969 1972 1976 Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines and|（Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan） Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan） （Okinawa is returned to Japan） （Agreement on the establishment of the Sub-Committee-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation）| |1978 expanding Japan-U.S. defense cooperation|Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation（ 1978 Guidelines）| |1991 1996 End of the Cold War and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines|（Collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War） Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security（ Hashimoto-Clinton talks） SACD Final Report| |1997 2001 2003 Japan-U.S. relations since the 2006 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States|Formulation of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation（ 1997 Guidelines） 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global contex（t Koizumi-Bush Talks]） Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |2007 2010 2012 2013 2014 New security environment and the 2015 establishment of the new Guidelines 2017 2018|The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks) The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks) Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance（ Abe-Bush Talks） 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Japan-U.S. Joint Statement: A Shared Vision For the Future（ Noda-Obama Talks） Agreement on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines) The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond （ Abe-Obama Talks） Formulation of the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (New Guidelines) Japan-U.S. Joint Vision Statemen（t Abe-Obama Talks） Japan-U.S. Joint Statemen（t Abe-Trump Talks） Japan-U.S. Joint Statemen（t Abe-Trump Talks）| these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF’s activities and missions. Against such backdrop, both governments decided at the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 to revise the 1997 Guidelines **Chapter** Japan-U.S. Joint Statement: A Shared Vision For the Future （Noda-Obama Talks） Agreement on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines) The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond （Abe-Obama Talks） Formulation of the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (New Guidelines) Japan-U.S. Joint Vision Statement （Abe-Obama Talks） Japan-U.S. Joint Statement （Abe-Trump Talks） Japan-U.S. Joint Statement （Abe-Trump Talks） by the end of 2014. The new Guidelines were approved at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015 after a vigorous review between the two governments. See Fig. III-2-1-1 (Chronology of the Japan-U.S. Alliance) **❸ [Content of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation]** The Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and Minister of Defense Kono attends an honor guard ceremony with U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper at the U.S. DoD missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies. See Reference 18 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015) [tentative translation]) Fig. III-2-1-2 (Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation) **1** Strengthened Coordination within the Alliance (1) Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) In November 2015, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the ACM in order to seamlessly and effectively address any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security ----- **Chapter** |Fig. Ⅲ-2-1-2|Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Item|Outline||| |I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines|The Guidelines provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination. In this way, the Guidelines promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. ○By means of the Japan-U.S. bilateral security and defense cooperation, the following points will be emphasized: －seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses; －synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; －a whole-of-government Alliance approach; －cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and －the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.||| |II. Basic Premises and Principles|A The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, will remain unchanged. B All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law. C All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. D The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures. However, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, in their specific policies and measures.||| |III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination|Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning. A Alliance Coordination Mechanism In order to address issues seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SDF and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises. B Enhanced Operational Coordination The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities. C Bilateral Planning In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through the Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.||| |IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security|⃝ The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners. ⃝ The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism as appropriate, for assessment of the situation, sharing of information, as well as flexible deterrent options and actions aimed at de-escalation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels. A Cooperative Measures during Peacetime ・The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. ・The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to: (1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (2) Air and Missile Defense; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Asset Protection; (5) Training and exercises; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities. B Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security ・The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important infulence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defnied geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. ・In addition to continuing cooperative measures during peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to: (1) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (2) Maritime Security; (3) Measures to Deal with Refugees; (4) Search and Rescue; (5) Protection of Facilities and Areas; (6) Logistics Support; and (7) Use of Facilities. C Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan Bilateral actions remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation. 1 When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. 2 When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs ・ Principles for Coordinated Actions The two governments will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks. The SDF will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the SDF. ・ Concept of Operations Self-Defense Forces (SDF) United States Armed Forces Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan Operations to Defend Airspace Have primary responsibility for conducting air Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF defense operations while ensuring air superiority operations Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF missile defense operations to defend Japan operations Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication Operations to Defend Have primary responsibility for the protection of Maritime Areas major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other operations associated operations||| |||Self-Defense Forces (SDF)|United States Armed Forces| ||Operations to Defend Airspace|Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan|| |||Have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations| ||Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks|Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan|| |||Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations| ||Operations to Defend Maritime Areas|Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication|| |||Have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations| ----- **Chapter** |Item|Outline|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security|||SDF|United States Armed Forces| ||Operations to Counter Ground Attacks||Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces|| ||||Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands, and have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations| ||ISR Cross- Space / domain cyberspace Operations Special operations Strike operations||Conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks|| |||ISR|In cooperation with relevant agencies, strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets|| |||Space / cyberspace|Cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains|| |||Special operations|Special operations forces cooperate during operations, as appropriate|| |||Strike operations|May provide support, as necessary, for the strike operations of the United States Armed Forces|Involve the use of strike power, to support and supplement SDF| |V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security|⃝ In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. ⃝ When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities, the two governments will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. A Cooperation in International Activities ・ The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable. ・ Common areas for cooperation will include: (1) Peacekeeping Operations; (2) International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Partner Capacity Building; (5) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (6) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (7) Training and Exercises; and (8) Logistics support. B Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promote cooperation based upon international law and standards.|||| |VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation|A Cooperation on Space ・ The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. ・ The two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. ・ The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications. B Cooperation on Cyberspace ・ The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions. ・ The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct educational exchanges, ensure the resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to all Japanese and U.S. government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises. ・ In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.|||| |VII. Bilateral Enterprise|The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation: A Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation B Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security C Educational and Research Exchanges|||| |VIII. Processes for Review|Regular evaluations will be conducted on whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and the two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary.|||| ----- **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-1-3** The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) Higher levels between the two nations including the Minister/Secretary level |Col1|Col2|Col3|As needed|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Joint Committee (JC)|||Alliance Coordination Group (ACG)||| |Japan Side Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Representative)|U.S. Side Deputy Commander of USFJ (Representative)||Director General-level|Japan Side Representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat (including the National Security Secretariat), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies* *Representatives may participate as needed|U.S. Side Representatives from the National Security Council,* Department of State,* American Embassy in Japan, Office of the Secretary of Defense,* Joint Staff,* United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPA- COM),* U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies* *Representatives may participate as needed| ||||Director -level||| ||||Action Officer level||| |Policy coordination on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement|||○ Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces ○ To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC.||| |matters requiring mutual consultation regarding an-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement ○ Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of the SDF and ○ To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC. Mutual coordination and information exchange xchange|Col2| |---|---| |Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC)|| |Japan Side Representatives from Joint Staff and Staff Offices of each SDF service|U.S. Side Representatives from USINDOPACOM and USFJ| |Primary element responsible for conducting operational coordination related to activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces|| |Mutual coordination and information exchange|Col2| |---|---| |Component Coordination Centers (CCCs)|| |Japan Side Representatives from each component of the SDF|U.S. Side Representatives from each component of the U.S. Armed Forces| |○ CCCs will facilitate component-level bilateral coordination. ○ As appropriate, if either Japan or the U.S., or both, establish Joint Task Forces (JTFs), JTFs may further establish CCCs.|| or any other situation that may require an Alliance response. Based on the framework shown in Fig. III-2-1-4, this mechanism coordinates policy and operational aspects related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also contributes to timely information sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan as well as for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and globally; and (3) it enables whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. Governments to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a largescale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity of coordination in the policy and operational aspects related to activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The utilization of this mechanism makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels. Since the establishment of the mechanism, Japan and the **Chapter** Mutual coordination and information exchange U.S. Side Representatives from each component of the U.S. Armed Forces United States have been utilizing the mechanism to coordinate closely, including in response to the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, the ballistic missile launches by North Korea, and Chinese activities in the waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands. See Fig. III-2-1-3 (The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism [ACM]) (2) Enhanced Operational Coordination Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the U.S. Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities. (3) Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the BPM in November 2015 for the purpose of implementing the development of bilateral plans in peacetime in line with the Guidelines in order to enable effective bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security. In the development of bilateral plans, this mechanism performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level directions and supervision and the involvement of relevant ----- **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-1-4** The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BMP) Prime Minister President Bilateral Planning Mechanism |Security Consultative Committee (SCC)|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Foreign Minister|Security Consultative Committee (SCC)|State Secretary| |Defense Minister||Defense Secretary| |Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan ○ DG: North American Affairs Bureau MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD ○ Joint Staff|U.S. ○ Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense ○ U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, INDOPA-| ||COM| |Assist SCC develop planning guidance in close coordination with BPC; advise SCC throughout the bilateral planning; coordinate the actions of all the elements of BPM; discuss procedures and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters|| |Interagency Coordination Forum|Col2| |---|---| |Japan Japan Representatives of the Cabinet Secretariat, NSS, MOFA, MOD|U.S. U.S. Representatives of the U.S. Embassy JP, USINDOPACOM, USFJ| |Coordination among relevant ministries and agencies (RMAs) of both countries, explanation provided by RMAs, provision of additional information etc.|| |Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan Representatives of JSDF|U.S. Representatives of USINDOPACOM, USFJ| |Conduct Bilateral Planning|| Prime Minister Interagency Coordination as necessary Interagency Coordination Forum Japan U.S. Japan Representatives U.S. Representatives Defense Minister Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) Japan - DG: North American Affairs Bureau MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD - Joint Staff the bilateral planning; coordinate the actions of all the elements of BPM; discuss procedures and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters Coordination Command under the BPM JSDF/USF chain of command President **Chapter** government ministries and agencies, as well as conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning through this mechanism. See Fig. III-2-1-4 (The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism [BMP]) **2** Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and cooperate in such activities as response to a large-scale disaster in Japan to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security. The Guidelines also require both countries: to cooperate in international activities and promote and improve trilateral and multilateral cooperation for regional and global peace and security; to make cooperation on space and cyberspace; and to develop and enhance bilateral enterprise through defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as intelligence cooperation and information security for further improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. See Section 2 of this Chapter (Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats) Section 3 of this Chapter (Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas) The Guidelines define that Japan and the United States will work on a variety of measures from peacetime, including ISR activities, air and missile defense, maritime security, training and exercises, asset protection, and logistics support, **❹ [Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States]** Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States SCC (“2+2” Meeting), the SSC and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). As the framework for ministerial consultations among the top officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, the SCC (“2+2” Meeting) represents such policy consultations. The SCC functions as an important consultative panel to discuss issues related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security. In addition, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) organizes Japan-U S defense ministerial meetings between the **1** Various Policy Consultations Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summit level and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but also the entire international community, including the Indo-Pacific region. Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the ----- |Fig. Ⅲ-2-1-5 Major|r Consultations on Policies Held between Japane|Col3|ese and U.S. Government Officials c|concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issu| |---|---|---|---|---| |Consultative Forum|Participants||Purpose|Legal Basis| ||Japanese Side|U.S. Side||| |Security Consultative Committee （SCC） (“2+2” Meeting)|Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense|U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense1|Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security|Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty| |Security Subcommittee (SSC)|Participants are not specified2|Participants are not specified2|Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States|Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others| |Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)3|Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff|Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: the U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, USINDOPACOM|Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies|Established on July 8, 1976, as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting reorganized at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation on June 28, 1996| |Japan-U.S. Joint Committee|Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of the Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others|Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister at the U.S. Embassy, and others|Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement|Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement| Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990. 2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary. 3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996. **Chapter** Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese State Minister of Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work together, and MOD officials, including the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have working-level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in the further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively engaging in these initiatives. See Reference 19 (Japan-U.S. [Minister-Level] Consultations [Since 2017]) Fig. III-2-1-5 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning JapanU.S. Security Issues) ----- **2** Recent Major Policy Consultations **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-1-6** Recent Japan-U.S. bilateral meetings **Chapter** |Date|Meeting/Venue|Participants|Summary of the outcome| |---|---|---|---| |August 7, 2019|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo|Then Minister of Defense Iwaya U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper|・The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges. ・The Ministers confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made based on the strategy documents of both countries and to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond.| |August 25, 2019|Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Biarritz|Prime Minister Abe President Trump|・The leaders reaffirmed the recognition that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than ever before as a result of the active mutual visits between the two leaders. The leaders shared the view on continuing to further strengthen the unwavering Japan-U.S. Alliance. ・The leaders confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate closely toward the resolution of issues of concern regarding North Korea, including the abductions, nuclear and missile issues.| |September 25, 2019|Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / New York|Prime Minister Abe President Trump|・The leaders reaffirmed the recognition that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than ever before, and shared the view on continuing to further strengthen the unwavering Japan-U.S. Alliance. ・The leaders exchanged views on the situation on North Korea, including issues of concern such as the abductions, nuclear, and missiles issues, and confirmed that Japan and the United States, as well as Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea would continue to closely cooperate on these issues. ・The leaders shared the view that Japan and the United States would continue to cooperate toward easing tensions and stabilizing the situation in the Middle East. ・The two leaders strongly criticized the recent attacks on the crude oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. ・Prime Minister Abe stated that in light of the capabilities of the Houthis it was difficult to conclude that these attacks had been carried out by the Houthis, while Japan has been undertaking information gathering and analysis to evaluate this incident, and would continue to work together with the countries concerned, including the United States. ・Prime Minister Abe said that he had called on President Rouhani to ensure that Iran exercised self-restraint to ease the situation and to ensure that Iran exercised its influence constructively. Prime Minister Abe also said that he intended to work closely with the United States to bring about peace and stability in the Middle East.| |November 18, 2019|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Bangkok|Minister of Defense Kono U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper|・The ministers confirmed that the recent series of ballistic missile launches by North Korea are a serious threat to regional security. The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. ・The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status- quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that Rule of Law and Freedom of Navigation are firmly established. ・The Ministers confirmed that they continue to closely work together to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond, including promotion of bilateral cooperation in new domains, to materialize aligned strategies of both countries. ・The Ministers reaffirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners including conducting joint exercises and capacity building assistance to maintain and strengthen a Free and Open Indo-Pacific with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone. ・The Ministers reaffirmed that it is important to sustain the operational readiness of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and Japan and the U.S. continue to work together with the shared recognition that understanding and cooperation from local communities is crucial for maintenance of the operational readiness.| |January 14, 2020|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington D.C.|Minister of Defense Kono U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper|・The Ministers exchanged views on the regional situation in the Middle East. ・Minister of Defense Kono explained the cabinet decision to send the SDF to the Middle East. ・The Ministers confirmed that repeated ballistic missile launches by North Korea are a serious challenge not only to Japan but also to the international community. ・The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges. ・The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter illicit “ship-to-ship” transfers of goods by North Korea. ・The Ministers welcomed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance has become stronger than ever before and confirmed that they continue to closely work together to further strengthen the Alliance capability to deter and respond, and materialize aligned strategies of both countries’. ・The Ministers reaffirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners including conducting joint exercises and capacity building assistance with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone. ・The ministers welcomed the recent progress made by the Japanese Government in acquisition of Mageshima, a candidate site for a permanent FCLP facility, and confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives.| ----- **Section** **Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats** **2** The NDPG provides that, for strengthening the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats, in all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as during disasters, Japan will enhance information sharing with the United States, conduct effective and smooth bilateral coordination involving all relevant organizations and take all necessary measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security. For these purposes, Japan will further deepen various operational cooperation and policy coordination with the **❶ [Cooperation in Space and Cyber Domains]** United States. In particular, Japan will expand and deepen cooperation in: space and cyber domains; comprehensive air and missile defense; bilateral training and exercises; bilateral ISR operations; and bilateral fl exible deterrent options. Japan will also promote development and update of bilateral plans and deepen the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In addition, Japan will even more actively conduct activities such as logistic support for U.S. force activities and protection of U.S. ships and aircraft. - in tabletop exercises. See Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Cooperation in the Use of Space Domain) **Chapter** **1 Cooperation on Space** With regard to cooperation on space, based on the agreement at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in November 2009 to promote cooperation in the area of space security as part of initiatives to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the two countries have periodically been working together to discuss how they should cooperate in the future, such as the holding of the 1st Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue in September 2010 with the participation of relevant ministries and agencies. Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April 2012 decided to deepen the space-based partnership for civil and security purposes and to create a whole-of government comprehensive dialogue on space, enabling relevant ministries and agencies to hold the 1st whole-of government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in March 2013. The two countries have been sharing information on their respective space policies and discussing plans for future cooperation on a regular basis. Moreover, based on the instructions given by the Japan U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting of April 2015, the two countries established the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to further promote the cooperation among bilateral defense authorities in the area of space. The SCWG has held six meetings in total since its establishment in October 2015 (the most recent meeting was in February 2020). Going forward, Japan and the United States will leverage this working group to deepen discussions in a wide variety of areas, including (1) promoting space policy dialogue, (2) reinforcing information sharing, (3) working together to d l d t d (4) ti d ti i ti See **2 Cooperation on Cyberspace** Concerning cooperation on cyberspace, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established in October 2013 as a framework between the MOD and the DoD to discuss a broad range of professional and concrete issues, including the sharing of information at the policy level, human resources development, and technical cooperation. The Guidelines released in April 2015 and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in May 2015 cited the prompt and appropriate establishment of an information sharing structure and the protection of the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the U.S. Forces depend to accomplish their missions as examples of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. Governments. In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their respective networks and systems and the implementation of educational exchanges and joint exercises were also cited. Japan and the United States will further accelerate bilateral cyber defense cooperation in line with the direction presented by the Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement. At the “2+2” Meeting in April 2019, Japan and the United States agreed to strengthen cooperation in the fi eld of cyberspace, affi rming that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Chapter 3 Section 3 2 (Cooperation in the Use of Cyber Domain) See ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** Enhancement of Multidimensional Japan-U.S. Bilateral Response Capabilities Major TADA Yuzuru, Training Team Leader, Western Field Artillery Unit, GSDF (Yufuin City, Oita Prefecture) A fi eld exercise with the U.S. Army (“Orient Shield 19”) in Japan in early September 2019 was conducted by the GSDF and the U.S. Army with the aim of enhancing bilateral response capability based on the respective chains of command. I participated in the exercise as a member of the firepower coordination center for cross-domain operations. Cross-domain operations can make overall operations advantageous through synergy effects that blend existing The author attending a meeting for cross-domain operations domains, including land, sea and air, with new domains, such (2nd from right of the front row) as space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum. In this exercise, as part of cross-domain operation, a bilateral combat while deepening cooperation with the U.S. Army exercise was carried out in cooperation between the Multi MDTF and others through the coordination. I believe that a Domain Task Force (MDTF) (its first participation in “Orient basis of mutual trust between Japan and the United States is Shield 19”) of the U.S. Army and the GSDF 1st Electric Warfare necessary to improve Japan-U.S. bilateral response Unit to mutually complement the abilities of Japanese and U.S. capabilities in multiple dimensions, which is indispensable to forces. enable effective deterrence and response. Through this training, I learned about perspectives and This training was a big step into a new domain for the points for utilizing the electromagnetic spectrum domain. The GSDF as well. I will make day-to-day efforts to take advantage training greatly broadened my perspective on anti-ship of the new domain. **❷ [Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense]** Regarding the response to airborne threats coming to Japan, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft, Japan U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been enhanced by sharing operation information and establishing response procedures. For the repeated ballistic missile launches by North Korea, Japan and the United States have conducted coordinated responses utilizing the ACM. Also, in the systems and **❸ [Bilateral Training and Exercises]** technology fi eld, the cooperative development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA) is steadily in progress. In January 2019, the United States released its Missile Defense Review (MDR) in which it clearly indicated the importance of cooperation with allies, including Japan. See Chapter 1, Section 2-2 (Response to Missile Attacks) - understanding of tactics and communication, but is also benefi cial for improving tactical skills for each participant. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Bilateral training in peacetime not only contributes greatly to maintaining and enhancing the Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities by improving interoperability including mutual Video: Field exercise with the U.S. Army in Japan (Oriental Shield 2019) URL: https://youtu.be/Z8Ql1Bh6SE4 ----- Meeting during the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercise in FY2019 Japan-U.S. joint training by MSDF Destroyer JS “Myoko” and USS “Ronald Reagan” Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities. In addition, conducting bilateral training at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD/SDF is continuing its initiatives to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises. Bilateral training has been expanded not only within Japan but also to the United States by dispatching SDF units there. Continuous efforts are being made to enhance interoperability and Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities at the military branch and unit levels, including the Japan U.S. bilateral regional army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and Japan-U.S. bilateral fighter combat training. Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, command post exercises and field training exercises have been conducted alternately as the Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercise. In 2020, a command post exercise was conducted in January in the MOD’s Ichigaya area and other locations. As for recent training and exercises, the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) and the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) participated in a field exercise (Talisman Saber 19) with U.S. forces held in Australia from June to August 2019, which included multinational and bilateral command and staff operations and landing exercises. In December 2019, the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps participated in the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercises, Yamasakura 77 in Japan. In January 2020, the GSDF participated for the first time in a field training exercise **Chapter** Japan-U.S. joint training at the Joint Readiness Training Center in the United States. In addition, Japan and the United States have conducted bilateral training in various sea and airspace areas. In August 2019, the MSDF destroyer JS “Myoko” and the U.S. aircraft carrier USS “Ronald Reagan,” among others, conducted bilateral training in sea and airspace areas from the vicinity of the Bashi Strait to the southern part of the Kanto region. In October 2019, the MSDF destroyer JS “Fuyuzuki” and the U.S. aircraft carrier USS “Ronald Reagan” and other vessels conducted bilateral training in the sea and air areas from southern Okinawa to southern Kanto. In November 2019, the MSDF conducted a field exercise (including Japan-U.S. bilateral maritime exercises) in the seas and airspace around Japan, practicing various maritime operations for the defense of the country. Since 2017, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has conducted various training with U.S. Air Force strategic bomber B-52 in airspace over the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, etc. These series of bilateral training were conducted with the Video: Iron Fist 20 URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Z09vuM-Xdo ----- aim of enhancing the tactical skills of the SDF and bolstering collaboration with the U.S. Forces. It is believed that strengthening Japan-U.S. collaboration and demonstrating the bilateral ties as an outcome will effectively enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the overall Japan U.S. Alliance further and demonstrate Japan’s determination and high capacity towards stabilizing the region in an **❹ [ISR Activities]** increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. In recent years, the USFJ have also participated in disaster drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments. See Reference 21 (Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2019) See - The expansion of these ISR activities will function as deterrence capabilities, and will also ensure information superiority over other nations and enable the establishment of a seamless cooperation structure in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. With regard to bilateral ISR activities, it is important to implement ISR activities in a broad Asia-Pacific region in cooperation between Japan and the United States to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities of both countries. **❺ [Maritime Security]** **Chapter** In accordance with the Guideline and others, the two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The SDF and the U.S. Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts **❻ [Logistics Support]** such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary. - Following the passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security in September 2015, the new Japan-U.S. ACSA was signed in September 2016, ratified by the Diet on April 14, 2017, and entered into force on April 25. This has enabled the same framework as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA, such as settlement procedures, to be applied to the provision of supplies and services that had become possible under the Legislation for Peace and Security, so that since April 2017 food and fuel have been provided to the U.S. Forces engaged in information collection and other activities. See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-4 (Conclusion of the New Japan U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement [ACSA]) Fig. III-2-2-1 (Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement [ACSA]) Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistics support based on the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in 1996 and revised in 1999 and 2004. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace taken under the leadership of the United Nations (UN). Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, UN PKO, international disaster relief activities, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. If either the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the other party to provide supplies or services, the Agreement, in principle, allows the requested party to do so.[1] The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage services; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance services; airport and seaport i d iti ( i i f i t i l d d) ----- **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-2-1** Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Significance of reciprocal provision of supplies and services In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by the units themselves. However, in such cases In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by the units themselves. However, in such cases where allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services on site would enhance the flexibility of where allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services on site would enhance the flexibility of the operations.the operations. Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Image of the circumstances and preconditions for the situations **Chapter** |Disaster relief|Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.| |---|---| |International disaster relief activities|| |U.S. Forces staying temporarily at Self-Defense Forces facilities for regular duties|| |Guarding operation|Counter-piracy operations| |Destruction of ballistic missiles, etc.|Removal of underwater mines| |Protection of Japanese nationals overseas|Warning and surveillance activities| |U.S. Forces staying temporarily at U.S. Forces facilities for regular duties|| |Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security|Armed attack situations| |---|---| ||Situations in which an armed attack is anticipated| ||Survival-threatening situations| Japan-U.S. bilateral drills Multilateral drills with Japan & U.S. participation Armed attack situations Disaster relief Transportation of Japanesenationals overseas, etc. International disaster relief activities Situations in which an armed U.S. Forces staying temporarily at Self-Defense Situations that will have an attack is anticipated Forces facilities for regular duties important influence on Japan’s Guarding operation Counter-piracy operations peace and security Survival-threatening situations Destruction of ballistic missiles, etc. Removal of underwater mines Protection of Japanese nationals overseas Warning and surveillance activities U.S. Forces staying temporarily at U.S. Forces facilities for regular duties Peace Keeping Operation Internationally coordinated Situations threatening operations for peace and security international peace and security International humanitarian assistance that the international community is collectively addressing From SDF conducting international peace cooperation operations to U.S. Forces responding to disasters *1 Activities that came under the scope of the agreement due to the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security. *2 Provision of ammunition for all activities and situations other than armed attack situations, etc., falls under the scope of the new agreement. **❼ [Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale Disaster in Japan]** In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their high-level joint response capabilities based on the strong ties they had developed. The success of the joint response between the SDF and the U.S. Forces through Operation Tomodachi was the result of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the Alliance being deepened further in the future. Operation Tomodachi involved the deployment of a large-scale force at its peak, including troops of approximately 16,000 personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft, resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in scale and contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and reconstruction. Not only those affected but numerous Japanese at large were filled with a deepened sense of appreciation and trust for the USFJ. On the other hand, some issues have emerged, such as clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S. Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining mechanisms for the sharing of information and more effective coordination mechanism. In light of these issues, the December 2013 Response Plan for a Massive Earthquake in the Nankai Trough listed the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan, and the two countries have conducted several bilateral comprehensive disaster prevention exercises aimed at maintaining and enhancing earthquake disaster handling capabilities to be demonstrated through collaboration between the SDF, USFJ, related ministries and agencies, and related local governments in the event of occurrence of a Nankai Trough earthquake. In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, Japan-U.S. cooperation was manifested in the form of the transportation of daily necessities by the Osprey (MV-22) of the U.S. Marine Corps and the transportation of SDF personnel by C-130 transport aircraft. The ACM was utilized on that occasion, including the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Office locally established by the joint task force organized for the earthquake response. ----- **Section** **Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas** **3** **❶ [Creation of a Desirable Security Environment]** The NDPG provides that in order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacifi c region, Japan will conduct bilateral activities. **1 Maritime Security** **2 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief** The SDF has conducted activities in close cooperation with the United States and other participating countries through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act, and international disaster relief activities and international peacekeeping operations in the Philippines and Haiti. Japan and the United States worked closely together at local multilateral coordination centers to respond to the typhoon disaster that hit the Philippines in November 2013. To respond to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease, Japan started to dispatch liaison offi cers to the U.S. Africa Command in October 2014, coordinating efforts and collecting information with relevant countries including the United States, for close cooperation. **3 Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises** **Chapter** Both Japan and the United States have made efforts as maritime nations to maintain and develop “open and stable seas” according to fundamental rules such as securing the freedom and safety of navigation, and the rule of law including peaceful dispute resolution based on international law. For example, Japan and the United States have worked closely together in various multilateral maritime security cooperation frameworks with such countries as those along the sea lanes, including Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) maritime interdiction exercises. In addition, the SDF has dispatched its offi cers to the U.S. Central Naval Command in Bahrain to carry out intelligence gathering activities in the Middle East, which began as a Japan-initiated activity in 2020. The two countries have also been working closely together on providing multilateral capacity building in the maritime domain to countries including those along the sea lanes. See Chapter 3, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security) Chapter 3, Section 4-2 (International Initiatives Aimed at NonProliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) Japan and the United States are promoting and enhancing trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The SDF is participating in trilateral (e.g., Japan-U.S.Australia, Japan-U.S.-India, and Japan-U.S.-ROK) and multilateral training, in addition to bilateral training and exercises between Japan and the United States. Video : Japan-U.S.-India trilateral exercise “Malabar 2019” URL : https://youtu.be/eKuZ1EZFaz4 ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** Participating in Malabar 2019 Lieutenant Commander HATTORI Takayoshi, The main focus of “Malabar 2019” was to conduct anti Air Patrol Squadron 3, MSDF submarine training together. The training convinced me of the As a captain of MSDF P-1, I participated in the Japan- U.S. Navy and the Indian Navy crew’s high degree of expertise U.S.-India trilateral exercise “Malabar 2019” (patrol aircraft and that they are reliable partners. We were also able to cultivate units) held at Atsugi Air Base in September 2019. This was the great friendship with each other by going through the rigorous 8th Malabar held with the participation of Japan and the 3rd training together. I believe that the trusting relationship built Malabar as a Japan-U.S.-India trilateral exercise, but it was the through the exercise is not only a valuable experience for me fi rst time that state-of-the-art patrol aircraft—P-1 of the MSDF, as a pilot but also conductive to security cooperation between P-8A of the U.S. Navy and P-8I of the Indian Navy—lined up at the three countries and directly contributes to the realization of Atsugi Air Base. a “Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c.” The author explaining precautions to the personnel of MSDF P-1 (center), P-8A of the U.S. Navy (left), the U.S. Navy and the Indian Navy on board a P-1 P-8I of Indian Navy and crew members **❷ [Initiatives for Leveraging Capabilities]** The NDPG provides that in order for Japan and the United States to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will enhance and expand cooperation with the United States in such areas as equipment, technology, facility, and intelligence as well as information security. **1 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan established the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America.[1] In 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America[2] was established to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. Under these frameworks, Japan decided to provide the United States with 20 items of arms and military technologies, including military technologies related to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specifi c projects agreed upon at these forums. At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in June Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with the U.S. based on the mutual cooperation principle from the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America, while bearing in mind the maintenance of the technological and industrial bases. In view of the progress in technology cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological Offi cial title: Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America Offi i l titl E h f N t i th T f f A d Milit T h l i t th U it d St t f A ----- 2016, the Ministers signed a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding (RDP MOU).[3] The MOU promotes measures concerning the procurement of equipment by Japanese and U.S. defense authorities based on reciprocity (providing information necessary to submit bids to businesses of the other country, protecting submitted corporate information, waiving restrictions on participation by businesses of the other country, etc.). Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 5-2 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains initiatives for the common maintenance base for the 24 MV-22 Ospreys deployed by the U.S. Marine Corps at MCAS Futenma and the V-22 Osprey deployed by the GSDF as well as initiatives for the maintenance depot (regional MRO&U Capability) in the Asia-Pacific region for F-35 fighter aircraft. See Reference 22 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development See Projects) Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 5-2 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) 2 Joint/Shared Use diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises, and expands the scope and raises the frequency of activities such as ISR. The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of facilities and areas of the USFJ in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of joint training and exercises and increased interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in case of a disaster. Thus, while taking into account the SDF defense posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, and relations with local communities, Japan and the United States are proactively engaged in consultations, and specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, the GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008 for exercises purpose. Moreover, the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command to Headquarter Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the then GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, the development of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration. **Chapter** The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas increases bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enhances the Official title: Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan concerning Reciprocal Defense ----- **Section** **Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning the USFJ** **4** impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa, and maintaining the deterrent capability of the U.S. Forces. Therefore, the MOD will advance the realignment and other initiatives and make continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of the local communities hosting USFJ facilities and areas. - **2** Measures concerning the Stationing of the USFJ Under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the presence of USFJ functions as deterrence, while on the other hand, given the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of the local residents, it is necessary to make efforts appropriate for the actual situation of each area in order to mitigate the impacts. In particular, the realignment of the USFJ is a very important initiative for mitigation of the **❶ [Stationing of the USFJ]** **Chapter** **1** Signifi cance of the Stationing of the USFJ Given the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, it is necessary to maintain the presence of the USFJ and its readiness to make rapid and agile actions in case of emergency in Japan and the surrounding areas even in peacetime, so that Japan-U.S. Alliance based on Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements functions enough as a deterrent power that contributes to the peace and stability of the defense of Japan and the region. Therefore, Japan accepts the stationing of the U.S. Forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and it is a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Also, it is essential to realize the stable stationing of the USFJ in order to make a swift joint response to an armed attack to Japan based on Article 5 of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In addition, the actions of U.S. Forces for the defense of Japan are conducted not only by the USFJ but also by timely reinforcements. The USFJ is supposed to be the basis for them. While Article 5 of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the duty of the U.S. to defend Japan, the U.S. is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan based on Article 6 for the purpose of maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East. Therefore, though the duties of each side are not the same, they are balanced overall. The SOFA[1] stipulates matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of the USFJ, including the furnishing of facilities and areas for use by the USFJ (USFJ facilities and areas), and satisfying the labor requirements of the USFJ. In addition, the Supplementary Agreement on the Environment enhances cooperation for environmental stewardship relating to the USFJ, and the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component intends to clarify the scope of the civilian component, etc. **（1）Furnishing of USFJ Facilities and Areas** Japan furnishes USFJ facilities and areas under the provision of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Joint Committee between the Governments of Japan and the United States. The Government of Japan concludes lease contracts with owners of private and public lands on which USFJ facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of these facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of landowners, it shall acquire title[2] under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release,[3] compensating the landowners for any loss they may have suffered in the process. **（2）Satisfying Labor Requirements of the USFJ** The SOFA stipulates that the manpower (labor) required by the USFJ shall be satisfi ed with the assistance of the Offi cial title: Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan The term “title” means a legal cause that justifi es a certain act. Offi cial title: Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United St t f A i R di F iliti d A d th St t f U it d St t A d F i J ----- Government of Japan. As of the end of FY2019, there were 25,869 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”) at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as clerks at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security guards and fi re departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They support the smooth operations of the USFJ. The Government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA. The MOD supports the stationing of the USFJ by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc. See Part IV, Chapter 5, Section 1-4-3 (Activities of the MOD for Coexistence with the Environment and Society) **（5）The Revision of the Guidelines Regarding Off-Base** U.S. Military Aircraft Accidents In July 2019, the Governments of Japan and the United States agreed on the revision of the Guidelines Regarding Aircraft Accidents in Japan.[4] This revision aims at further refi ning the procedures for access to the site by Japanese and U.S. Government offi cials in the event of off-base U.S. military aircraft accidents that occur in Japan, and so on. The major changes include clarifi cation of expeditious early entry of USG and GOJ representatives into the inner cordon (restricted area) designated in the event of an accident. The revised guidelines also stipulate as follows; entry into the site will be preferentially made by USG and GOJ representatives with responsibilities associated with accident site mitigation to include hazardous material observation, the aircraft accident investigation, or claims investigations; relevant information especially on hazardous materials will be provided to Japanese authorities as soon as possible after an accident; in removing wreckage that has the potential to signifi cantly and negatively affect the condition of the underlying Japanese property, the U.S. Forces will basically coordinate with the landowner through the Regional Defense Bureau of the Ministry of Defense basically; and that when the U.S. authorities, GOJ authorities, or local authorities conduct environmental surveys, the results will be shared within the Joint Committee framework. These changes enable more effective, expeditious and proper response to future U.S. military aircraft accidents. **Chapter** See **（3）Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the** Field of Environmental Stewardship In September 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States signed and effectuated the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship relating to the USFJ, supplementary to the SOFA. This supplementary agreement represents an international commitment with legal binding force and sets forth provisions concerning the issuance and maintenance of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) and the establishment and maintenance, etc. of procedures for access to USFJ facilities and areas. This agreement was the fi rst of its kind created to supplement the SOFA since the SOFA had entered into force and has a historical signifi cance that differs essentially in nature from conventional improvements in the operations of the SOFA. **3** Costs Associated with the USFJ Various costs associated with the USFJ include the costs of stationing USFJ, costs for implementing the stipulations of the SACO Final Report for mitigating the impact on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that contribute to mitigating the impact on local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. Forces. See Fig. III-2-4-1 (U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs [Budget for FY2020]) **4** Host Nation Support (HNS) **（4）Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component** In January 2017, the Governments of Japan and the United States signed the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component, which came in to force on the same day. The agreement clarifi es the scope of the civilian component, which is addressed only by a general provision in SOFA, develops criteria used in evaluating contractor employee positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the civilian component, and stipulates the procedures for notifi cation and review, etc. together with the exclusion of ordinary residents from the civilian component. The initiative to formulate the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component is the second case, following the creation of the Supplementary Agreement on the Environment that supplements the SOFA. HNS plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economic situation, Japan began to bear labor costs such as Offi i l titl G id li R di Off B U S Milit Ai ft A id t i J ----- **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-1** U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY2020) **Chapter** |Total: ¥47.3 billion|Col2|Col3|Total: ¥12.5 billion|・Projects for fac ini Tot| |---|---|---|---|---| |Cost sharing under|t|h|e Special Measures Agreement (|¥162.3 billion)| |||||| Costs for the stationing of USFJ SACO-related costs Realignment-related costs (MOD-related budget: ¥399.3 billion (1)+(2)) (¥13.8 billion) (¥179.9 billion) Cost sharing for the stationing ・Projects for land returns: ・Relocation of the U.S. Marines in ・improve the living environment Costs for taking measures to of USFJ (¥199.3 billion (1)) ¥0.5 billion ・Projects for realignment in Okinawa:Okinawa to Guam: ¥41.0 billion in areas surrounding the USFJ ・Projects for training improvement: ¥80.7 billion facilities: ¥66.4 billion ・Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP): ¥0.1 billion ・Projects for the relocation of Carrier Air Wing: ¥90 million ・Rent for facilities: ¥103.0 billion ¥20.7 billion ・Projects for noise reduction: ・Projects for contingency use: ・Relocation costs: ¥1.4 billion ・Labor costs (welfare costs, etc.): ¥10 million ¥4.7 billion ・Other costs (compensation for ¥26.6 billion ・Project for facilitating SACO: ・Projects for training relocation (Local task force-related cost): fisheries, etc.): ¥29.2 billion ¥11.8 billion ¥80 million ・Projects for facilitating realignment Total: ¥200.0 billion (2) Total: ¥47.3 billion Total: ¥12.5 billion initiatives: ¥44.3 billion Total: ¥170.9 billion Non MOD-related budget Cost sharing under the Special Measures Agreement (¥162.3 billion) ・Expenditures borne by other ・Labor costs (base pay, etc.): ¥128.7 billion ・Training relocation costs: ¥1.3 billion ・Training relocation costs: ministries (base subsidy, etc.) ・Utilities costs: ¥22.3 billion (one of the projects aimed at ¥9.0 billion ・Estimated costs of ・Training relocation costs (NLP): ¥1.0 billion enhancing training) government-owned land provided ・Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 ・Aviation training relocation as a for use as USFJ facilities[3] Total: ¥152.0 billion ・Parachute training part of realignment initiatives Notes 1: Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend into the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs. 2: The SACO-related costs refer to the costs for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on Okinawa, while the realignment-related costs refer to the costs relating to measures to contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as part of the realignment initiatives. Since the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately. 3: The costs for the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.: ¥41.1 billion, FY2019 Budget) and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥164.1 billion, FY2019 Estimated Costs). 4: Numbers may not add up due to rounding. welfare costs in FY1978. Then in FY1979, it started to bear costs for the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP). Furthermore, as labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions that affected both countries, the employment stability of the employees would be influenced adversely, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of the USFJ. Therefore, in 1987, Japan and the United States concluded an agreement that sets forth special measures regarding Article 24 of the SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement)[5] as exceptional, limited and provisional measures under the cost principle in the SOFA. Based on this agreement, Japan started to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance). As the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the costs shared by Japan expanded to cover labor costs including base pay, and utilities costs from FY1991, and training relocation costs from FY1996. Japan has been reviewing HNS, paying full attention to **❷ [Progress of the Realignment of the USFJ]** its tight fiscal conditions, and as a result, HNS has been on a steady decline after peaking out in the FY1999 budget on an expenditure basis. **5** Current Special Measures Agreement As the former SMA was effective until the end of March 2016, the current SMA was intended to “open discussions pertaining to future arrangements for an appropriate level for sharing of the costs of U.S. Forces stationed in Japan” based on the “2+2” agreement of April 2015. Following this agreement, Japan and the United States held consultations on a new SMA, and in December 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States reached agreement as follows: Subsequently, after the current SMA was signed in January 2016 and approval by the Diet, the current agreement took effect in April of the same year. Fig. III-2-4-2 (Outline of the Current SMA) See “The United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap) was set forth in May 2006. 5 Official title: Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual C ti d S it b t J d th U it d St t f A i R di F iliti d A d th St t f U it d St t A d F i J ----- **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-2** Outline of the Current SMA **Chapter** |[SMA]|Effective Period|For five years (from FY2016 to FY2020)| |---|---|---| ||Labor Costs|The upper limit of the number of workers to be funded by Japan will be gradually increased from 22,625 under the previous SMA to 23,178. (Breakdown) Workers at welfare and recreational facilities will be reduced gradually from 4,408 to 3,893 (by 515). Workers engaged in activities such as maintenance of assets and administrative works will be increased gradually from 18,217 to 19,285 (by 1,068).| ||Utilities Costs|The share of utilities costs to be funded by Japan is reduced from 72% to 61%, with the upper limit for utilities costs to be funded by Japan set at approximately 24.9 billion yen.| ||Training Relocation Costs|Unchanged| |[Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP)]||The amount of costs for the FIP will not fall below 20.6 billion yen in each fiscal year during the current SMA period.| Subsequently, the following factors were set forth: (1) The necessity of implementing measures to realize visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa promptly and steadily; (2) The necessity of balancing the realignment package and the strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012; and (3) The reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam demanded by the U.S congress. Full-fledged consultation on the coordination of the realignment package took place between the two countries in light of those factors. The achievements thereof were announced as part of the Joint Statements of the “2+2” Meeting and through other means. The 2006 Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command **❸ [Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa]** elements, but at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, the United States decided to alter the composition of the units and to deploy the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)— consisting of command, ground, aviation and logistics support elements—in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit. In addition, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). See Reference 17 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee [tentative translation] (April 27, 2012)) Fig. III-2-4-3 (Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”-1) - Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, including the U.S. Marine Corps, which can deal with a wide range of missions with high mobility and readiness and is in charge of first response for a variety of contingencies, with the above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens deterrence, and contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, Okinawa has many USFJ facilities and areas such as air bases, maneuver areas and logistics facilities. As of January 1, 2020, approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 8% of the land area of the prefecture and approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to potential conflict areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but at the same time has the advantage of having a certain distance from these areas that would not heighten military tension there unnecessarily. In addition, Okinawa, comprising a large number of small islands, is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands having a total length of some 1,200 km and close to key sea lanes for Japan, which depends on marine transportation for over 99% of its overall international trade. Furthermore, its location is extremely important from the perspective of security, as Okinawa serves as a strategically important target for neighboring countries in both making access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to the continent. ----- **Chapter** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in the “United States-Japan Roa|Col5|n the “United States-Japan Roa|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in the “United States-Japan Ro for Realignment Implementation”-1 in the Kanto Area [Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command ○ Relocation of the Air Defense Command and the bilateral joint operations coordination relevant units (Completed on March 26, 2012) t Yokota Air Base irspace, (returned on September 25, 2008) ASDF air traffic controllers besides the Yokota acility (started on May 18, 2007), etc. Tokyo ivilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base Fuchu [Camp Zama] ns and modalities are considered between ○ Reorganization of the headquarters, U.S. Army, Ja S.) (Reorganized at the end of September 2008) ○ Relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force General Depot] Sagamihara Headquarters (then) acilities due to the realignment of U.S. Army (Completed on March 26, 2013) ers (Facilities including the Training Center) ○ Joint/shared use of heliport (Joint use started on ing Center started in August 2011. Zama March 26, 2013) he Training Assistance Center completed.) ○ Release of portions (5.4 ha) of housing area and he land in front of JR Sagamihara Station others (Land return completed on February 29, 20 Kanagawa Open-air Storage Area (approx. 35 ha) on December 2, 2015) Legend: Implemented Continuing 20km||n the “United States-Japan Ro|| |ig. Ⅲ||||||| |1||Realignment||||| |||||||| |[Yok||ota related]|||f the JASDF Air Defense Command on of the Air Defense Command and units (Completed on March 26, 2012)|]| |○ ○||Establishment of center (BJOCC) a Partial return of a and placing the J Yokota RAPCON f||||| |○||Deliberation on c (specific conditio Japan and the U.|||] zation of the headquarters, U.S. Army, Ja ized at the end of September 2008) n of the GSDF Central Readiness Force rters (then) ed on March 26, 2013) red use of heliport (Joint use started on 6, 2013) of portions (5.4 ha) of housing area and and return completed on February 29, 20|pan 16)| |||||||| |[U.S. ○ (Ope ○ ○||Forces Sagami Establishment of f Japan Headquart rations of the Train Development of t Return of part of t (approx. 17 ha) Joint use of West (Joint use started||||| |||||||| |||||||| ||||in Okinawa|Legend: Implemented Continuing||| |2||Realignment|in Okinawa||Six candidate facilities for land retu located south of Kadena Air Base|| |||||||| |[Joi||||||| |||||(Areas indicated are based on the cons the current status on the returning of la|olidation plan. See Fig. III-2-4-9 for nd south of Kadena Air Base)|| - Implemented on March 17, 2008 - JASDF uses Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities SDF bases in mainland, etc. [Land Returns] - Formulated a detailed plan (Consolidation Plan) for returning of significant land area south of Kadena Air Base by consolidating the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa - Announced the Consolidation Plan on April 5, 2013 Camp SchwabCamp Schwab MCAS Futenma (total return, about 481 ha) [Relocation within Okinawa Prefecture] Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 Camp Hansen Replacement Transport capabilities using helicopters (total return, about 16 ha) Facility Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas Naha Port (total return, about 56 ha) [Relocation of operations outside A replacement facility will be Kadena Air Base Okinawa Prefecture] constructed in the Urasoe-Pier district - Operations of air-refueling aircraft under the Naha Port and Harbor Plan Replacement → MCAS Iwakuni Makiminato Service Area Facility - Relocation to MCAS Iwakuni completed (Camp Kinser) on August 26, 2014 (total return, about 274 ha) MCAS Futenma - Contingency use → Tsuiki/Nyu- tabaru Air Base, etc. - Return of north access road (approx. 1 ha) on August 31, 2013 To Guam, etc. - Return of lands along eastern side (approx. 4 ha) on July 31, 2017 - Return of part of the land (approx. 3 ha) on March 31, 2018 - Return of area near Gate 5 Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) [Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps] (approx. 2 ha) on March 31, 2019 (partial return, about 153 ha+ ) III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), about 8,000 personnel and about 9,000 of their dependents will relocate to Guam Camp Kuwae - Return of West Futenma - “2+2” Joint Statement of April 27, 2012 states that about (Lester) Housing Area (approx. 51 ha) on 9,000 personnel and their dependents would be relocated (total return, about 68 ha) March 31, 2015 outside of Japan and the authorized strength of U.S. Marine 20km Corps in Guam will be about 5,000. - Return of a portion of Facilities and Engineering Compound (approx 11 ha) on March 31, 2020 ----- **Chapter** |The KC-130 squadron will otational basis to MSDF K and Guam|deploy on a anoya Base| |---|---| |The relocation to Guam, etc., was agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in January 2011.|Col2| |---|---| |Relocation of carrier-based aircraft squadrons to Iwakuni (Relocation completed in March 2018)|| ||| |Relocati to Iwak (Relocati|on of the KC-130 squadron uni on completed in August 2014)| ||| |Part of future civilian aviation facilities were established within MCAS Iwakuni (Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport opened 2012)|| Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in the “United States-Japan Roadmap **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-3** for Realignment Implementation”-2 3 Relocation of Aircraft, etc. TPY-2 Rader: deployment of so-called “X-band Radar System” (Deployment completed in June 2006) The relocation of flight training activities from Kadena, Misawa and Iwakuni to ASDF bases, Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Chitose Komatsu, Tsuiki and Nyutabaru, as well Legend: as to Guam. The relocation to Guam, etc., was agreed SharikiShariki MisawaMisawa Implemented upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in Deployment of a TPY-2 radar Continuing January 2011. (Deployment completed in December 2014) Relocation of carrier-based aircraft Relocation of MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons to Iwakuni(Relocation completed in March 2018) TsuikiTsuiki IwakuniIwakuniKyogamisaki KomatsuKomatsu HyakuriHyakuri (“2+2” Joint Statement in 2013 squadrons and other units from Iwakuni to Atsugi confirmed the continued deployment NyutabaruNyutabaru of these units in Iwakuni Air Base) AtsugiAtsugi KanoyaKanoya Relocation of training of MV-22 Osprey, etc. (Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of September 2016) KadenaKadena FutenmaFutenma Relocation of the functions of aircraft Relocation of the KC-130 squadron for contingency use to Tsuiki and to Iwakuni Nyutabaru The KC-130 squadron will deploy on a (Relocation completed in August 2014) rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam MarianaMariana IslandsIslands Relocation of the CH-53D squadron to Guam (Japan and the United States confirmed that the SaipanSaipan Part of future civilian aviation CH-53D squadron will be relocated to the U.S. facilities were established within mainland and then to Guam.) (Relocation to the GuamGuam MCAS Iwakuni U.S. mainland completed) (Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport opened 2012) 500km - JC: Joint Committee： mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints. See Fig. III-2-4-4 (The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa [image]) Fig. III-2-4-5 (Location of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Okinawa [As of March 31, 2019]) **1 Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and** Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km[2] for exclusive use by the ----- **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-4** The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Signifi cance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa (image) **Chapter** SeoulSeoul Tokyo Izu Islands Ogasawara IslandsOgasawara Islands Approximately 3,200 km Approximately 2,750 kmApproximately 2,750 km Saipan GuamGuam 500km sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to U.S. Forces. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment, consolidation and |Okinawa holds a position of gr|eat strategic importance| |---|---| |BBeeiijjiinngg Access from continental Asia to the Pacific AApppprrooxxiimm TTaaiippeeii 665500 HHoonngg KKoonngg JJaappaann’’ss sseeaa llaa MMaanniillaa 500km .S. Forces. However, their c Fig. Ⅲ-2-4-5 Location|| |Geographical A ○ The main island of of the Southweste (*1) for Japan, an from the perspect ○ Okinawa is located conflict areas that including the Kore → Okinawa is loc to expeditious and at the sa to heighten m overly close i ○ In the eyes of neigh strategically impo Pacific from the c Pacific to the cont *1 Japan is dependent of the total volume o|dvantage of Okinawa Okinawa is located roughly in the center rn Islands and also close to key sea lanes d thus its location is extremely important ive of Japan’s security. close (but not overly so) to potential could affect Japan’s peace and security, an Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. ated at a distance that makes it possible ly send units to potential conflict areas me time has sufficient distance so as not ilitary tension unnecessarily and is not n terms of protecting units. boring countries, Okinawa’s location is rtant in both enabling access to the ontinent and rejecting access from the inent. upon marine transportation for at least 99% f its trade.| |---|---| ||| |The Significanc U.S. Marine Co It is essential to ma area of the Southw Okinawa, which is Japan for the secu U.S. Marine Corps response and high a wide variety of m conflicts to natural features such geog important role in e Japan but also the *2 The Marine Corps c sea and air) during providing a rapid re|e & Roles of the rps in Okinawa intain defense capabilities for the estern Islands in the main island of important as a strategic location for rity of Japan. The stationing of the (*2), which is capable of rapid mobility and also has readiness for issions ranging from armed disasters, in Okinawa, which raphical advantages plays an nsuring not only the security of peace and safety of East Asia. onstantly utilizes all combat elements (land, its drills and deployments, so it is suited to sponse in the event of any kind of situation.| |calls for their 31, 2019)|realignment, consolidation an| US Army US Navy Camp Hansen US Air Force US Marines 12th Marine Regiment (Artillery) Torii Station 31st Marine Expeditionary Kadena Air Base 10th Area Support Group Unit Headquarters 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces 18th Wing Group (Airborne) - F-15 fighter - KC-135 air refueling aircraft Camp Schwab - HH-60 4th Marine Regiment (Infantry) - E-3 early warning and control aircraft, etc. Fleet Activities Okinawa Patrol Squadron - P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft - P-8A patrol aircraft, etc. 1-1 Air Defense Artillery Camp Courtney - Patriot PAC-3 III Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters 3rd Marine Division Headquarters Camp Foster 1st Marine Aircraft Wing White Beach Area Headquarters - Port facility - Oil storage facility MCAS Futenma Marine Aircraft Group 36 Camp Kinser - CH-53 helicopter - AH-1 helicopter 20km 3rd Marine Logistics Group - UH-1 helicopter Headquarters - MV-22 Osprey, etc. ----- Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-6** Final Report (image) Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ **Fig.** **Ⅲ** **-2-4-7** Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 |353|Area (km2)|Col3| |---|---|---| |Facilities/Areas 278||| |249 242 235||| |185 144||| |||| |83 46||| |43 38 31||| June 1971 (At the time of concluding the Agreement on the Return of Okinawa) May End of FY 1972 1980 (On return) End of FY SACO 1990 Final Report (1996) As of January 2020 **Chapter** Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfeld Northern Camp Hansen Training Area Senaha Communication Station Aha Training Area Sobe Communication Site Yomitan Auxiliary Airfeld Offshore Camp Schwab Torii Communication Gimbaru Training Area Station Kin Blue Beach Training Area Kadena Air Base Camp Zukeran Camp Kuwae MCAS Futenma Makiminato Service Area ：Facilities and areas involved in land return Naha Port Facility ：Facilities and areas involved in land return (Cancellation of joint use) ：Destination sites of other facilities relocation programs reduction on the grounds that they seriously affect the lives of people in Okinawa Prefecture. Both countries have continued their initiatives to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, centering on those subject to the strong local requests, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the required coordination and procedures toward the return of land. Moreover, it was agreed in 1995 that initiatives would also be made to resolve the so-called Three Okinawa Issues,[6] including the return of Naha Port (Naha City). Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and SACO between Japan and the United States, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996. regarding the SOFA procedures, and also refers to the related facilities and areas covered. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km[2]) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km[2]. See Reference 24 (The SACO Final Report [tentative translation]); See Reference 25 (Progress of the SACO Final Report); Fig. III-2-4-6 (Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report [image]); Fig. III-2-4-7 (Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas [Exclusive Use] in Okinawa) **3** Return of a Major Portion of the Northern Training Area The condition for returning the Northern Training Area was to relocate seven helipads in the area to be returned to the preexisting training area. However, the Government of Japan reached an agreement with the U.S. side to give considerations for the natural environment and to relocate not all seven but the minimum number of six helipads necessary, and proceeded with the construction work. The relocation of the helipads completed in December 2016, and the return of approximately 4,000 ha, a major portion of the Northern Training Area located in the villages of Kunigami and Higashi, was achieved based on the SACO Final Report. The returned land accounts for approximately 20% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Okinawa. The return is the largest one since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland, and had been an issue for 20 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996. Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by See Reference 23 (Outline of 23 Issues) **2** Outline of SACO Final Report The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, noise reduction, and the improvement of operational procedures Th Th Oki I f t th t f N h P t th t f Y it A ili Ai fi ld d th l ti f till li fi t i i Hi h 104 ----- the Stationed Forces, the MOD took measures to remove obstacles (such as soil contamination survey, etc.) so that the landowners, etc. can use returned lands effectively and appropriately, and transferred the land to the landowners in December 2017. **4** Relocation and Return of MCAS Futenma V-shape configuration that combines Henokosaki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays.” With regard to construction of this replacement facility, “a Memorandum of Basic Understanding” was exchanged between the then Governor of Okinawa Inamine and the then Minister of State for Defense Nukaga in May 2006. After the change of government in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. After reviews conducted by the Committee, both governments, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May 2010, confirmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters, and decided that a study by experts regarding the replacement facility's location, configuration and construction method would be completed promptly. The two sides also agreed to take concrete measures to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in June 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a “V” shape. During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, first of all, it was determined that, from a security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, including that of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa that is located in a crucial area for the security of Japan, cannot be lessened while there remains instability and uncertainty in the security environment in East Asia. Furthermore, concern was expressed that the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps such as mobility and readiness would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. Therefore, it was concluded that the FRF had to be located within Okinawa Prefecture. Also at the “2+2” Meetings in April 2012, October 2013, April 2015, August 2017, and April 2019, and in other instances including the joint statement issued at the JapanU.S. Summit Meeting in February 2017, the Governments of Japan and the United States confirmed that the plan to construct the FRF at Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. See Reference 26 (Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility); Reference 27 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena); Fig. III-2-4-8 (Comparison between the Replacement Facility and MCAS Futenma [image]) Along with the initiatives set forth in the Roadmap related to the realignment of the U.S. Forces, measures have been implemented to alleviate the impact on the local communities in Okinawa while maintaining the deterrence capabilities. The Government of Japan believes that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses, schools, etc. in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture, and considers that this is a fundamental idea shared between the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa. As for the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the Government of Japan has not changed its stance that the current plan to construct the FRF at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area (Nago City) and adjacent waters is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Government of Japan will make further efforts to achieve the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible and to mitigate the impact on Okinawa in a speedy manner. The return of MCAS Futenma is expected to eliminate danger in the area and to contribute to the further growth of Okinawa, including Ginowan City, through the reuse of the area (approximately 476 ha with a land area 100 times larger than Tokyo Dome). **Chapter** **（1）Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement** Facility Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on the realignment have been made towards realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the concern of the residents living in the vicinity. In the SCC (“2+2”) document compiled in October 2005, the initiative to “locate the FRF in ‘L’-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was approved. However, since this L-shape meant that U.S. military aircraft would fly over settlements in Nago City and Ginoza Village, a request was submitted to avoid flights over these settlements. In light of this, based on negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a **（2）Relocation of MCAS Futenma and Mitigation of the** Impact on Okinawa The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance ----- **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-8** Comparison between the Replacement Facility and MCAS Futenma (image) **Chapter** |Item|Area|Runway| |---|---|---| |Replacement A facility|pprox. 150 ha (landfill area)|Approx. 1,200 m (1,800 m including overrun)| |MCAS Futenma|Approx. 1/3 Approx. 476 ha|Approx. 2/3 2,740 m| Replacement facility (Henoko Cape) Camp Schwab N Runway Henoko Nagashima Toyohara Birajima オーバーランOverrun Naha N OkinawaOkinawa Item Area Runway Approx. 1,200 m Replacement Approx. 150 ha (1,800 m including facility (landfill area) overrun) Approx. Approx. MCAS 1/3 2/3 Futenma Approx. 476 ha 2,740 m MCAS Futenma than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it involves reduction in the base’s functions and area in Okinawa, and contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa. a. Distribution of Functions Offered by MCAS Futenma MCAS Futenma fulfills the following functions relating to the aviation capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa: (1) Operation of the Osprey and other aircraft; (2) Operation of air refueling aircraft; and (3) Accepting transient aircraft in contingencies. Of these three functions, only (1) “operation of the Osprey and other aircraft” will be relocated to Camp Schwab. As for (2) “operation of air refueling aircraft,” all 15 KC-130 air refueling aircraft were relocated to MCAS Iwakuni (in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture) in August 2014. This marked the completion of a task that has remained unresolved for 18 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996, enabling a vast majority of fixed-wing aircraft located in MCAS Futenma to be moved outside Okinawa Prefecture. This move also led to the relocation of approximately 870 USFJ personnel, civilian employees, and dependents. Moreover, the function of (3) “accepting transient aircraft in contingencies” will also be transferred to Tsuiki Air Base and Nyutabaru Air Base. In October 2018, Japan and the United States agreed on developing facilities that would be necessary for relocating the function, and related work such as construction of the facilities has been carried out. b. Reduction in Area The area required for the land reclamation to build the FRF is approximately 150 ha, less than one-third of the approximately 476 ha of MCAS Futenma, and the new facility will be equipped with a significantly shorter runway at 1,200 m (1,800 m including the overruns) compared to the current runway length of 2,740 m at MCAS Futenma. c. Reduction in Noise and Risks Two runways will be constructed in a V-shape, which enables the flight path for both takeoff and landing to be located over the sea, in line with the requests of the local community. In MCAS Futenma, flight paths used daily for training and other purposes are located over residential areas, whereas flight paths in the FRF will be changed to over the sea, thereby reducing noise and risks. For example, while more than 10,000 households are located in areas requiring housing noise insulation near MCAS Futenma, there will be zero households requiring such insulation around the FRF. This means that the noise levels experienced by all households will comply with the environment criteria applied to exclusive housing areas. In the case that an aircraft encounters any contingency, safety on the ground can be ensured by diverting the aircraft offshore. **（3）The Necessity of Constructing the Futenma** Replacement Facility within Okinawa Prefecture The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consists of air, ground, logistics, and command elements. The interaction of those elements is indispensable for U.S. Marine Corps operations characterized by great mobility and readiness, so the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary ----- wing aircraft stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near the elements with which they train, operate, or otherwise work on a regular basis. immediately suspended the land-fill work while the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued an instruction for correction based on the Local Autonomy Act to then Governor Onaga to repeal the revocation of the land-fill permit. Subsequently, in December 2016, after examination by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council and deliberation by the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court, the Supreme Court set forth the decision that the revocation of the land-fill permit by then Governor Onaga was illegal. b. Judgment of the Supreme Court In the judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that then Governor Nakaima’s decision was not illegal. The court stated that no circumstances could be found indicating that then Governor Nakaima’s decision that the landfill was in compliance with the condition in Article 4 (1) (i) of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface, “that it is appropriate and reasonable as the use of national land,” had no foundation in fact, or clearly lacked reasoning under socially accepted conventions. The reasons given by the court include: (1) the area of the replacement facilities and the landfill area will be significantly reduced from the area of the MCAS Futenma facilities, and (2) aircraft flying over residential areas can be avoided by the land-fill in the coastal area that puts the runway extension out to the sea, and the replacement facilities will be installed using part of Camp Schwab, which is already provided to the U.S. Forces. Moreover, regarding whether the construction of replacement facilities takes environmental protection and other considerations into adequate account, the Supreme Court, finding that construction methods, environmental protection measures and countermeasures that can conceivably be taken at this point in time have been taken and that there is sufficient consideration for disaster prevention, determined that it cannot be said that then Governor Nakaima’s decision was illegal. The court did not find that there was anything particularly unreasonable in then Governor Nakaima’s decision-making process and the content of the decision that the construction met the condition of Article 4 (1) (ii) of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface, “the land-fill gives sufficient consideration to the protection of the environment and prevention of disasters.” c. Retraction of the Revocation of the Land-Fill Permit Following this Supreme Court ruling, in December 2016, then Governor Onaga retracted the revocation of the landfill permit and the Okinawa Defense Bureau resumed the **（4）Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment** Procedures The MOD sent the environmental impact assessment scoping document in 2007 to the Governor of Okinawa and other parties. After the MOD worked on revising the document based on the opinions provided by the governor, the MOD completed the environmental impact assessment procedures by sending the revised assessment document to related parties including the governor in December 2012, while making the assessment document available for public review. Throughout these procedures, the MOD received a total of 1,561 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa on six occasions, made all the required revisions, and reflected them in the content of the environmental assessment. In this way, the MOD had taken steps to comply with relevant laws, asked opinions and ideas from Okinawa Prefecture over a sufficient period of time, and reflected them in the assessment. **Chapter** **（5）Promotion of the Futenma Replacement Facility** Construction Project a. Suits over the Revocation of the Land-Fill Permit The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted the land-fill permit request on public waters to Okinawa Prefecture in March 2013, and then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima approved this in December 2013. However, then Governor of Okinawa Onaga revoked the land-fill permit by then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima in October 2015, leading to the filing of three suits over the revocation of the land-fill permit between the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture.[7] Under these circumstances, the court came up with a settlement recommendation, and the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture reached a court-mediated settlement agreement in March 2016. In the settlement, the Government of Japan and Okinawa mutually affirmed that after the final judicial ruling is handed down by the Supreme Court, they would abide by the ruling and take steps in line with the spirit of the text of the ruling and the reasons conducive to the text, and continue to take responses in good faith by cooperating with each other in accordance with the purpose of the ruling. Pursuant to the provisions of the settlement agreement, the Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau (1) The suit, filed by the Government of Japan as plaintiff based on Article 245-8 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking a court ruling instructing a retraction of the revocation of the land-fill permit by Governor Onaga (the so-called subrogation suit); (2) the suit, filed by Okinawa Prefecture based on Article 251-5 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking to invalidate the decision to suspend the validity of the revocation of the land-fill permit (the decision to stay execution) by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism as the illegal “involvement of the state”; and (3) the suit, filed by Okinawa Prefecture based on Article 3 of the Administrative Case Litigation Act, seeking to invalidate the decision to stay execution by the Minister of Land, I f t t T t d T i ----- replacement facilities construction project. In April 2017, it started the construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation. d. Lawsuit Related to Damage to the Reefs on the Seafloor, Etc. In July 2017, Okinawa Prefecture filed suit in the Naha District Court, requesting that this seawall construction not be allowed to damage the reefs on the seafloor, etc., without permission from the Governor of Okinawa based on the regulations of Okinawa Prefecture. Subsequently, the district court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture’s claim in March 2018, and the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture’s appeal in December of the same year. In the same month, Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition of final appeal with the Supreme Court, but withdrew the petition in March 2019. e. Situation Surrounding the Land-Fill Work In August 2018, Okinawa Prefecture revoked the landfill permit again on the basis of problems concerning environmental protection measures and the soil foundation of the land-fill area. In October of the same year, the Okinawa Defense Bureau filed a request for review and a petition for a stay of execution under the Administrative Complaint Review Act against the revocation of the permit, and the stay of execution was upheld. Following the ruling, the Okinawa Defense Bureau resumed the land-fill operation in December of the same year in the waters south of Camp Schwab. In April 2019, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism determined that the revocation of the land-fill permit by Okinawa Prefecture should be repealed. Dissatisfied with this decision, the Governor of Okinawa filed a request for a review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council in the same month. The Council dismissed this request in June 2019. In July 2019, protesting the dismissal of the Council, the Governor of Okinawa filed a lawsuit with the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court to revoke the government’s involvement (determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism), and in August 2019 filed a lawsuit with the Naha District Court seeking the revocation of the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. In October 2019, the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court dismissed the Governor of Okinawa’s suit. In the same month, the Governor of Okinawa filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed in March 2020. In implementing the relocation, the MOD has conducted environmental impact assessment for about five years, and given the utmost consideration for the natural environment. Throughout the procedures, the MOD received more than 1,500 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa on six occasions, all of which the MOD reflected in the content of the environmental assessment. If the waters are enclosed by the seawall, the coral will be isolated from the surrounding sea with the flow of seawater shut down, a situation which will affect the coral habitat. Therefore, corals living in the land-fill area on the southern side which were designated for conservation were transplanted before the area was enclosed. The standard for conservation of corals is stricter than the standard that was applied to the land-fill related to the second runway of Naha Airport.[8] Regarding coenobita, which are nationally designated protected species, and the shellfish and crustaceans designated as endangered species, relocation from the seashore and seafloors in the construction area on the southern side to other areas is also being appropriately implemented based on instructions and advice from experts. Regarding the soil foundation of the land-fill area, as a result of a study conducted on the stability of seawalls and other structures in the waters north of Camp Schwab in light of the results of a boring survey, it has been confirmed that although the work to improve the soil foundation is necessary, it is possible to implement the construction of seawalls and land-fill while ensuring the required stability through prevailing and adequately proven construction methods.[9] Since September 2019, the Technical Review Committee on Futenma Replacement Facility Construction Project, consisting of experts in the fields of geotechnical, structural, coastal, and pavement engineering, has been held to obtain objective technical recommendations and advice in order to make the design, construction, and maintenance of seawalls and land-fill sites more rational for the future implementation of the project. In December 2019, the Okinawa Defense Bureau announced that, based on the results of the studies that had been conducted, it would take nine years and three months from the commencement to the completion of construction based on the revised plan, and take about 12 years to complete the “admin procedures” described in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and a fund of about 930 billion yen. Hearing experts’ insights on the environment and others, after due consideration, in April 2020, the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted to Okinawa Prefecture a request for revision of land-fill permit due to addition of the soil **Chapter** Specifically, in relation to the construction of the second runway of Naha Airport, around 37,000 clusters of small corals were transplanted. If the same standard as the one applicable to the construction of the alternative facility was applied, the number of clusters of small corals transplanted would have been around 170,000. The standard methods are the sand compaction pile method, the sand drain method, and the paper drain method. Among examples of projects in which these methods were used is the t ti k t d T k I t ti l Ai t (H d Ai t) ----- improvement work, etc., based on the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface. In February 2019, Okinawa Prefecture held a referendum on whether or not to support the land-fill work related to the relocation of MCAS Futenma to the Henokosaki area in Nago City. As a result, 114,933 voters voted for the work, 434,273 voters voted against it, and 52,682 voters voted neither (the total number of votes cast was 605,385 and the voter turnout was 52.48%). The present situation in which U.S. bases are concentrated in Okinawa is in no way acceptable, and it is a grave responsibility of the government to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The government takes the results of the prefectural referendum seriously and will continue to do its utmost efforts to mitigate the impact of the U.S. bases in Okinawa. It is imperative to prevent MCAS Futenma, which is surrounded by houses and schools and which is said to be the most dangerous base in the world, from continuing to be used indefinitely and to pose a danger. The government believes that this view is shared with the people of residents in Okinawa. The relocation to Henoko does not mean that all functions of MCAS Futenma will be relocated there. Of MCAS Futenma’s three functions, two will be moved out of Okinawa while the remaining one will be relocated to Henoko, resulting in the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma. Indeed, from the viewpoint of sharing the impact, progress is being made in implementation of measures to realize the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma based on understanding and cooperation by local public entities outside Okinawa. The measures include the relocation of air refueling aircraft to Yamaguchi Prefecture and the relocation of the function of accepting transient aircraft in contingencies to Fukuoka and Miyazaki Prefectures. Although more than 20 years have passed since Japan and the United States agreed on the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma, it has not been achieved yet. The MOD believes that the return must not be postponed any longer. The MOD intends to continue making efforts to secure the understanding of local residents in Okinawa through years of persistent dialogue, and do its utmost to achieve the total return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible. **5** Force Reduction and Relocation to Guam **（1）Timing and Size of Relocation** The 2006 Roadmap stated that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III MEF and their approximately 9,000 dependents would relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, but the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements set the timing of the relocation for the earliest possible date after 2014. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land return south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the FRF and to adjust the composition of the units and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam. As a result, MAGTF is to locate in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, approximately 9,000 personnel are to be relocated to locations outside of Japan (about 4,000 of whom are to be relocated to Guam), the authorized strength of the U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be approximately 5,000 personnel, and an end-state for the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa is to be consistent with the level of approximately 10,000 personnel envisioned in the Roadmap. Accordingly, the “2+2” Meeting held in October 2013 agreed that, under the relocation plan described at the 2012 “2+2” Meeting, the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam is to begin in the first half of the 2020s. The plan is expected to facilitate progress in implementing the consolidation plan for facilities and areas in Okinawa of April 2013. **Chapter** **（2）Costs of the Relocation** Under the Roadmap, the two sides reached an agreement that, of the estimated US$10.27 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide US$6.09 billion, including US$2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the United States would fund the remaining US$4.18 billion. In February 2009, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement). The Agreement legally guarantees and ensures actions taken by Japan and the United States, such as Japan’s long-term funding for projects to which Japan provides direct cash contributions. As part of measures based on this Agreement, the Japanese Government has been providing cash contributions to the U.S. Government in relation to the projects for which Japan Since the Roadmap was announced in May 2006, the Governments of Japan and the United States held a series of consultations on the reduction of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa. ----- has provided financial support since FY2009.[10] Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam were adjusted and it was agreed that the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation was US$8.6 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2012 dollars). With regard to Japan’s financial commitment, it was reaffirmed that it was to be the direct cash contribution of up to US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam International Agreement. It was also confirmed that Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized.[11] Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been provided to the U.S. Government under the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a portion of the direct cash contribution of US$2.8 billion mentioned above would be used to develop training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by Japan and the United States. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the United States, and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown. At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, a Protocol Amending the Guam International Agreement was also signed to add the stipulations concerning the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the use of these training areas by the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions remains unchanged at US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Both countries also completed work reflecting the breakdown of the associated costs. Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for U.S. Fiscal Year 2015 was enacted in December 2014, which lifted the freeze on the use of funds for the relocation to Guam imposed by the U.S. Congress in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012. Furthermore, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Joint Military Training Environmental Impact Statement (CJMT-EIS), is now being implemented. **（4）Progress of the Guam Relocation Project** While the environmental impact assessment for Guam was being conducted, the Government of the United States implemented infrastructure development projects at the Andersen Air Force Base and the Apra area of the Naval Base Guam as projects unaffected by the assessment. The U.S. Government is currently implementing relocation construction work in all project areas, following the lifting of the freeze on the Guam relocation funds pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act and the completion of the environmental impact assessment for Guam. **Chapter** Fig. III-2-4-9 (Progress of the Guam Relocation Project [image]) See **6** Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air base The Roadmap stated that following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the FRF from both the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three categories, namely (1) land eligible for immediate return; (2) land eligible for return once the relocation of functions is completed; and (3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad. **（1）Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa** Since the change of administration at the end of 2012, Japan and the United States have continued consultation under the basic policy of the Abe administration to dedicate all its strength to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an early return of land areas south of Kadena, including Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) in Urasoe City of which **（3）Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment** Procedures As for the environmental impact assessment for Guam, the required procedures were conducted to reflect the revisions to the project made by the adjustments to the plan for realignment, and the assessment was completed in August 2015. 10 As for projects for which Japan provides financial support, cash contributions of approximately 229.8 billion yen have been provided to the U.S. side using the budgets from FY2009 to FY2019. 11 In line with this, the special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (investment and loan) that had been prescribed by the Act on Special Measures on S th I l t ti f th R li t f U it d St t F i J b li h d b t i i t f th t t th t t d M h 31 2017 ----- **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-9** Progress of the Guam Relocation Project (image) **Chapter** (3) Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station Finegayan (2) Andersen Air Force Base Andersen South Progress of the project to establish the infrastructure in Finegayan (1) Andersen Air Force Base (4) Naval Base Guam in Apra 10km Progress of the project to develop the Headquarters building in the Naval Base Guam in Apra area. As of the end of February 2020 |Relocation Project Areas|Status of Progress of GOJ Funded Projects| |---|---| |Andersen AFB|On-base infrastructure project (*1) is in progress.| |(2) Andersen South Area|Training areas (*2) project is in progress.| |Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station Finegayan|On-base infrastructure project (*1) is in progress.| |Naval Base Guam in Apra|On-base infrastructure project (*1) is complete.| ||Headquarters building (*3) project is in progress. Medical Clinic project (*4) is in progress.| *1 On-base infrastructure project includes site preparation and development of roads, water supply and sewerage system and telecommunication system for construction of facilities such as offi ce buildings for the Marines. *2 Training areas project is to develop facilities for the Marines to conduct basic training such as military operations in urban terrain and driver convoy course. *3 The headquarters building project is to develop a headquarters building for the Marines. *4 Medical clinic project is to develop a medical clinic for the Marines. Okinawa has particularly made a strong request for the return and coordination with the United States. As a result, both countries announced the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (Consolidation Plan) in April 2013, which stipulated the return schedule, including the specifi c years of return. The return of all land according to the plan will enable the return of approximately 70% (approximately 1,048 ha, the equivalent of 220 Tokyo Domes) of six USFJ facilities for exclusive use[12] located in densely populated areas in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa. In the Consolidation Plan, both sides confi rmed that they would implement the plan as early as possible. The Government of Japan will continue to work with all its strength so that land areas south of Kadena would be returned at the earliest possible date. Furthermore, following the announcement of the Consolidation Plan, consultations[13] have been held since April 2013, involving Ginowan City, Ginowan City Military Land Owners Association, Okinawa Prefecture, Okinawa Defense Bureau, and Okinawa General Bureau in a bid to contribute to the promotion of the effective and appropriate use of West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran, and the MOD has also been providing necessary cooperation. 12 Naha Port, Makiminato Service Area, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, Camp Kuwae, and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 13 I dditi t th Mi i t f D f th Mi i t f F i Aff i (Oki Offi ) d th C bi t Offi l ti i t i th lt ti ----- Marine Corps, plays an important role in engaging in a broad range of activities, including transportation of personnel and supplies. The U.S. Marine Corps replaced aged rotary-wing aircraft (CH-46) with MV-22s, which have superior basic performance. In September 2013, all the 24 CH-46s deployed at MCAS Futenma were replaced by MV-22s. The MV-22 is a highly capable aircraft compared with the CH-46; on its flight speed, payload and flight range. Its deployment to Okinawa strengthens the deterrence of the overall USFJ and greatly contributes to the peace and stability of the region. **（2）Progress in the Return of Land** Efforts have been made to enable the early return of land areas, including the land areas that are to be returned as soon as required procedures are completed (shown in red in Fig. III-2-4-11), since the announcement of the Consolidation Plan in April 2013. These efforts resulted in the realization of the return of the north access road of Makiminato Service Area (approximately 1 ha) in August 2013, West Futenma Housing Area of Camp Zukeran (approximately 51 ha) at the end of March 2015 (transferred to the landowners at the end of March 2018), the area near Gate 5 of Makiminato Service Area (approximately 2 ha) at the end of March 2019, and portions of land at Camp Zukeran (Warehouse Area of Facilities and Engineering Compound) (approximately 11 ha) at the end of March 2020. Additionally, in December 2015, Japan and the United States agreed to such measures as the early return of partial land at MCAS Futenma (approximately 4 ha) for a municipal road, and the early return of partial land at Makiminato Service Area (approximately 3 ha) for the purpose of widening National Route to reduce traffic congestion, for which there had been particularly strong demand for return among local people, and the former return was realized at the end of July 2017, whereas the latter return was realized at the end of March 2018. Furthermore, such measures as relocation to Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (Chibana Area), Torii Communication Station, Camp Hansen and Camp Zukeran have been implemented to advance the land return. All-out initiatives are being continuously made to steadily implement the return of land areas south of Kadena Air Base under the Consolidation Plan and to realize the respective returns of land in the shortest possible time for more visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa. See Reference 27 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena) Fig. III-2-4-10 (Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa) Fig. III-2-4-11 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base [image]) **Chapter** **（2）Deployment of CV-22 Osprey by the U.S. Air Force to** Yokota Air Base In May 2015, the United States announced that CV-22, specified for U.S. Air Force, would be deployed to Yokota Air Base (which encompasses Fussa City, Tachikawa City, Akishima City, Musashi Murayama City, Hamura City and Mizuho Town of Tokyo Prefecture). A total of 10 CV-22 Ospreys are scheduled to be deployed in stages by around 2024, with the first five CV-22s deployed to Yokota Air Base in October 2018. The CV-22 deployed to Yokota Air Base plays a role in transporting personnel and supplies of the special operation units of the U.S. Forces to address crises and emergencies in the Asia-Pacific region, including humanitarian assistance and natural disasters. Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-10** in Okinawa (Unit: ha) 1,500 1,000 500 0 1,491ha Six U.S. facilities for exclusive use located Decrease by south of Kadena in around 70% densely populated areas in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa* 492 ha－α January 2013 At the time of making At the time of completing the Consolidation Plan the Consolidation Plan - Six U.S. facilities: Naha Port, Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster), Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester), and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 **7** Deployment of Osprey to Japan by the U.S. Forces **（1）Deployment of U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey to** Okinawa Osprey is an aircraft that combines the vertical takeoff/ landing and hovering functions of rotary-wing aircraft and the flight speed and range of fixed-wing aircraft. As a primary asset of the marine air unit, the MV-22, specified for the U.S. ----- **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-11** Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base (image) **Chapter** Army POL Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 Camp Kuwae Camp Zukeran FY2022 FY2025 68ha (Lower Plaza Housing Area) or later 16ha or later FY2024 23ha Camp Zukeran (A portion of Facilities or later and Engineering Compound) Camp Zukeran Returned on 11 ha[ Note 5] (A part of Kishaba Housing area) March 31, 2020 (0.11[ km2]) FY2024 5ha or later Makiminato Service Area Camp Zukeran (The remainder) (Industrial Corridor, etc.) Camp Zukeran FY2024or later 142ha FY2024or later 62ha (Additional elements)α ha [Note 3] Makiminato Service Area Camp Zukeran(West-Futenma Housing Area ) (Area near Gate 5) Returned on Returned on March 31, 2015 51 ha [Note 4] 2ha March 31, 2019 Makiminato Service Area (north access road) Futenma Air Station(eastern side) Makiminato Service Area Returned on Returned on (Area along Route 58) August 31, 2013 [1ha] Futenma Air Station July 31, 2017 4ha Returned on March 31, 2018 3ha Makiminato Service Area (Elements of MSA, FY2022 476ha including the preponderance of the storage area) or later FY2025 Legend 126ha or later ：Returned or immediate return (72ha) ：Return after the relocation of functions within the prefecture (834 ha) Naha Port ：Return after the relocation of U.S. Marine Crops forces to locations FY2028 outside of Japan (142 ha + more) or later [56ha] Total: 1,048 ha + more Notes: 1. The timing and year are based on the best case scenario. The timing may be postponed depending on the progress of the efforts, including relocation to outside of Japan. 2. Land area of each area is an approximate fgure and may be slightly modifed based on the results of future surveys, etc. Numbers may not add up due to rounding. 3. Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to determine the feasibility of additional land returns. 4. The area to be returned at Camp Zukeran (West-Futenma Housing area) was listed as 52 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 51 ha according to actual measurements. 5. The area to be returned at Camp Zukeran (a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound, etc.) was listed as 10 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 11 ha based on the area to be returned in the JC agreement of September 2013. 6. JC: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee As Japan faces the increasingly severe security environment, the deployment of high-performance CV-22 enhances the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contributes to the defense of Japan and the stability of the region from the perspective of the commitment by the U.S. to the Asia-Pacific region and the building-up of readiness by the United States. Additionally, the CV-22 has the same propulsion system as the MV-22 and the structure of both aircraft is basically in common; therefore, the safety of both aircraft is at the same level. Japan considers that ensuring safety is of prime importance in operations of the U.S. Forces, and on various occasions, Minister of Defense requested Secretary of Defense and other high-ranking officials to give consideration to local communities and ensure safety. The Government of Japan will continue to ask for the maximum consideration for safety. See Reference 28 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces) **（3）Safety of Osprey** Prior to the deployment of MV-22s to MCAS Futenma in 2012, Japan established an analysis and assessment team composed of aircraft pilots and experts from inside and outside the Government and confirmed the safety of MV22 by conducting its own survey, etc. In addition, when Japan made the decision to introduce Ospreys in 2014, the Government reconfirmed their safety by collecting and analyzing all kinds of technical information, not only in the preparation phase, but also after the decision of introduction. The MOD has dispatched the GSDF Osprey personnel to the U.S. Marine Corps’ training programs since the fall of 2016. The personnel who piloted and maintained the aircraft are of the opinion that the Osprey is a reliable aircraft that allows for stable maneuvering and maintenance. **（4）Usability of Osprey Deployed by the U.S. Forces in** Case of Disaster In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the central part of the Philippines in November 2013, 14 MV-22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to support Operation Damayan. The MV-22s were deployed promptly to affected areas that were difficult to access, and transported several hundred isolated victims and about six tons of relief materials in a day. ----- Osprey deployed by the U.S. Forces can be showcased in a variety of operations in the future as well. Fig. III-2-4-12 (Usability of Osprey Aircraft [concept]) See **8 Consultation Structures for Mitigating the Impact** of Bases on Okinawa In order to mitigate the concentrated impact on Okinawa, the Government of Japan has been committed to further mitigating the impact, listening to, for example, the opinions of the local residents through various consultative bodies. See Fig. III-2-4-13 (Consultative Bodies on the Mitigation of Impact of Bases on Okinawa) See **9 Initiatives for the Use of Lands Previously** Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces US Marine Corps MV-22 Ospray flew to the Kokubudai maneuver Area, Kagawa Prefecture, for exercise (December 2019) In April 2014, the MV-22, deployed in Okinawa, was dispatched for search and rescue activities in the wake of an accidental sinking of a passenger ship off the coast of Jindo in the ROK. Furthermore, in response to the large earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015, four MV-22s deployed in Okinawa were dispatched to the country to transport personnel and supplies. In Japan, when the Kumamoto Earthquake occurred in 2016, MV-22s were dispatched to deliver daily necessities to the disaster stricken areas. In this manner, the MV-22 is capable of conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities immediately and over a large range when large-scale disasters occur because of its high performance and multifunctionality. It has also been used for disaster prevention drills since 2014. In September 2016, two MV-22s participated in the comprehensive disaster prevention drills of Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and conducted delivery drills for isolated islands. Like the MV-22, the CV-22 can conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, including search and rescue missions, both immediately and over a large range, in the case of a large-scale disaster. As such, it is expected that the superior capabilities of the **Chapter** The Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces stipulates various measures concerning lands in Okinawa provided for use by the USFJ (“USFJ Land”) agreed to be returned. The MOD mainly conducts the following initiatives, and will continue its initiatives to promote the effective and appropriate use of returned lands by coordinating and cooperating with related ministries, the prefectural government and local municipalities. The MOD: (1) conducts mediation in relation to access for surveys, etc., to be implemented by the prefectural government and local municipalities on the USFJ Land which are agreed to be returned; (2) conducts measures applying to all the returned lands to remove obstacles for use such as soil contamination and unexploded ordnance, not only those caused by the activities of the stationed forces, before handing over the land to the owners and (3) provides financial benefits to alleviate the impact on the owners of the returned lands and to promote use of the land. **❹ [Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa]** In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to secure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces by maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities. **1 Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in** Kanagawa Prefecture With regard to the realignment of USFJ facilities and areas in Kanagawa Prefecture, etc., the return of facilities and areas including the Kamiseya Communication Station and the Fukaya Communication Site has already been realized based ----- **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-12** Usability of Osprey Aircraft (image) **Chapter** 3000km 2000km Beijing 1500km SeoulSeoul TokyoTokyo 1000km Izu IslandsIzu Islands ShanghaiShanghai CH-46 radius of action MV-22 range Approximately 140 km Approximately 3,900 km Taipei Ogasawara IslandsOgasawara Islands Hong Kong Hong Kong [Taipei] MV-22 radius of action Approximately 1,100 km (1 aerial refueling) OkinotorishimaOkinotorishima IslandIsland SaipanSaipan CH-46 range ManilaManila GuamGuam Approximately 700 km MV-22 radius of action Approximately 600 km (no refueling) |■ Comparison of Basic Performance MV-22 CH-46|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||| |Maximum speed|About two times Approximately 520 km/h Ap the maximum speed|proximately 270 km/h| |Cruising speed|Approximately 490 km/h Ap|proximately 220 km/h| |Range|Approximately 3,900 km A|pproximately 700 km| |Radius of action|Approximately 600 km About four times Ap (With 24 troops on board) the radius of action (Wi|proximately 140 km th 12 troops on board)| |Number of troops carried|24|12| |Number of crew|3–4|3–5| |Cargo (inside)|Approximately 9,100 kg Ap|proximately 2,300 kg| |Cargo (outside)|Approximately 5,700 kg About three times Ap the payload|proximately 2,300 kg| |Rotor diameter|Approximately 11.6 m A|pproximately 15.5 m| |Angle of flight|Approximately 7,500 m Ap|proximately 3,000 m| |Own weight|Approximately 16,000 kg Ap|proximately 7,700 kg| |Measurement|MV-22 and CH-46 are not much different in size. 6.7m 5.1m 17.5m 25.7m|| on the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of October 2004. However, more than 10 years have passed since the initial agreement, and Japan’s security environment has become increasingly severe. Therefore, there have been changes in the U.S. Navy’s posture and capabilities, as represented by the increased operation of U.S. vessels at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. In light of such circumstances, the following were agreed at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting in November 2018: (1) development of facilities for satisfying the U.S. Navy’s facility requirements; (2) start of negotiation on joint use of the Negishi Dependent Housing Area to conduct site restoration works; and (3) cancellation of the plan to construct family housing in the Yokohama City area of the Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex. Subsequently, joint use of the Negishi Dependent Housing Area was agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting in November 2019. See Fig. III-2-4-14 (Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan [Excluding Okinawa Prefecture] [As of March 31, 2019]) Fig. III-2-4-15 (Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture [image]) ----- **Chapter** |Fig. Ⅲ-2-4-13 Consul|ltative Bodies on the Mitigation of Impact of Bases on Okina|awa| |---|---|---| |Name (year)|Member|Purpose| |Okinawa Policy Council (1996)|Entire cabinet excluding Prime Minister and Governor of Okinawa|Consultation concerning issues pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa and basic policies relating to Okinawa| |Subcommittee of the Okinawa Policy Council (2013)|Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, and Governor of Okinawa|Responses to various issues relating to the mitigation of the impact of bases on Okinawa and measures to revitalize the economy of Okinawa Prefecture| |Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa (2014)|Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Governor of Okinawa, and Mayor of Ginowan|Consultation concerning the mitigation of the impact of MCAS Futenma| |Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa (2014)|State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Director General of Minister’s Secretariat, Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Director General of Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, Director General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Chief of Staff of Joint Staff, Chief of Staff of GSDF, Chief of Staff of MSDF, and Chief of Staff of ASDF|Deliberation on basic policies regarding the early return of USFJ facilities and areas, and regarding the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa with the aim of smooth and effective implementation of measures based on those policies| |Consultation between the Central Government and Okinawa Prefecture (2016)|Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Governor of Okinawa, and Deputy Governor of Okinawa|Consultation concerning the mitigation of the impact of bases on Okinawa and measures to revitalize the economy of Okinawa Prefecture| **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-14** Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan (Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2019) |Col1|35th Fighter Wing ●F-16 fighter * In addition, rotational deployment of RQ-4 Global Hawk| |---|---| ||| ||Naval Air Facility, Misawa Patrol & Reconnaissance Force, 7th Fleet ●P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft, etc.| ||Joint Tactical Ground Station| ||| |Iwakuni|Col2| |---|---| |Carrier Air Wing Five (carrier-based aircraft) ●F/A-18 strike fighter ●EA-18 electronic warfare aircraft ●E-2 airborne early warning aircraft ●C-2 transport aircraft|| |Marine Aircraft Group 12 ●F/A-18 strike fighter ●KC-130 tanker/transport aircraft ●F-35B fighter ●C-12 transport aircraft, etc.|| ||| |Kyogamisaki|Col2| |---|---| |14th Missile Defense Battery ●TPY-2 radar (“X-band radar”)|| ||| US Army US Navy Shariki US Air Force US Marines 10th Missile Defense Battery - TPY-2 radar (“X-band radar”) Misawa 35th Fighter Wing Kyogamisaki - F-16 fighter Iwakuni - In addition, rotational deployment 14th Missile Defense Battery of RQ-4 Global Hawk Carrier Air Wing Five (carrier-based aircraft) - TPY-2 radar (“X-band radar”) Naval Air Facility, Misawa - F/A-18 strike fighter Patrol & Reconnaissance - EA-18 electronic warfare aircraft Force, 7th Fleet - E-2 airborne early warning aircraft - P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft, etc. - C-2 transport aircraft Joint Tactical Ground Station Marine Aircraft Group 12 Yokota - F/A-18 strike fighter U.S. Forces, Japan Headquarters - KC-130 tanker/transport aircraft 5th Air Force Headquarters - F-35B fighter 374th Airlift Wing - C-12 transport aircraft, etc. - C-130 transport aircraft - C-12 transport aircraft - UH-1 helicopter *In addition, deployment of CV-22 Osprey sequentially starting in Yokosuka October 2018 Commander, Sasebo Naval Forces Japan Sagami General Depot Commander Fleet Activities, Sasebo Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade Headquarters 7th Fleet 7th Fleet Atsugi - Amphibious assault ship (America) - Aircraft carrier (USS Ronald Reagan) Zama - Transport landing ship Naval Air Facility, Atsugi - Cruiser U.S. Army, Japan - Landing ship Carrier Air Wing 5 - Amphibious command ship (USS Blue Ridge) I Corps (Forward) - Minesweeper, etc. - MH-60 helicopter - Destroyer, etc. Note: Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources. **2** Current Situation regarding the Realignment of the USFJ as Stipulated in the Roadmap **(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and** Control Capability Prefecture) was reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) in December 2007. The subsequent reorganization project to improve the capabilities of the U.S. Army Headquarters in Japan is shown in Figure III-2-4-16. The GSDF Ground Component Command HQs has set up the Japan-U.S. Joint Headquarters at Camp Zama to ensure The headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (Sagamihara City and Zama City in Kanagawa ----- **Chapter** |Name|Location|Area (ha)|Plan for land return, etc.| |---|---|---|---| |Koshiba POL Depot|Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 53 ha|Returned in December, 2005| |Tomioka Storage Area|Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 3 ha|Returned in May, 2009| |Fukaya Communication Site|Izumi Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 77 ha|Returned in June, 2014| |Kamiseya Communication Station|Seya Ward and Asahi Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 242 ha|Returned in June, 2015| |Negishi Dependent Housing Area|Naka Ward, Minami Ward and Isogo Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 43 ha|To be returned when the construction of family housing etc. is completed at Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex| |Detached part of Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex|Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 1 ha|Return procedures to begin upon completion of the current use| |Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex|Yokohama City Area|―|Construction of family housing, etc.| |ment of facilities]|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Name|Location|Details| |Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka|Yokosuka City|Bachelor enlisted quarters| |Urago Storage Area|Yokosuka City|A wharf| |Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex|Zushi City Area|Living support facilities, fitness center, maintenance shop and fire station| |Tsurumi POL Depot|Tsurumi Ward, Yokohama City|A fire station| |e and return]|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Name|Location|Area|Details| |Negishi Dependent Housing Area|Naka Ward, Minami Ward and Isogo Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 43 ha|A Japan-US consultation concerning joint use of the Negishi Dependent Housing Area will commence with the aim of promptly carrying out site restoration work. Consultation on the specific return date will be held between the two governments depending on the progress of the site restoration work.| |tion of construction]|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Name|Location|Details| |Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex|Yokohama City Area|Cancellation of construction of family housing, etc.| **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-15** Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture (image) Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of October 2004 Area Number Name Location Plan for land return, etc. (ha) Kanazawa Ward, ① Koshiba POL Depot Approx. 53 ha Returned in December, 2005 Yokohama City ④ ② Tomioka Storage Area Kanazawa Ward, Approx. 3 ha Returned in May, 2009 Yokohama City Izumi Ward, ③ Fukaya Communication Site Approx. 77 ha Returned in June, 2014 Yokohama City Seya Ward and Kamiseya Communication ④ Asahi Ward, Approx. 242 ha Returned in June, 2015 Station Yokohama City, Yokohama City ③ Naka Ward, To be returned when the Kanagawa Prefecture Tsurumi Ward Negishi Dependent Minami Ward and construction of family housing ⑤ Approx. 43 ha ⑪ Housing Area Isogo Ward, etc. is completed at Ikego Yokohama City Housing Area and Navy Annex Asahi Ward Detached part of Kanazawa Ward, Return procedures to begin Seya Ward ⑤ ⑥ Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex Yokohama City Approx. 1 ha upon completion of the current use ⑦ Ikego Housing Area Yokohama ― Construction of and Navy Annex City Area family housing, etc. Minami Ward Naka Ward Returned Izumi Ward ② Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of November 2018 Totsuka Ward [Development of facilities] ① Isogo Ward Number Name Location Details Commander ⑧ Fleet Activities, Yokosuka City Bachelor enlisted quarters Yokosuka ⑦ Kanazawa Ward ⑥ ⑨ Urago Storage Area Yokosuka City A wharf Living support facilities, Ikego Housing Area ⑩ Zushi City Area fitness center, ⑩ ⑨ and Navy Annex maintenance shop and fire station Tsurumi Ward, ⑪ Tsurumi POL Depot A fire station Yokohama City Zushi City ⑧ [Joint use and return] Number Name Location Area Details A Japan-US consultation concerning joint use of Naka Ward, the Negishi Dependent Housing Area will Yokosuka City Negishi Minami Ward and commence with the aim of promptly carrying out ⑤ Dependent Isogo Ward, Approx. 43 ha site restoration work. Consultation on the Housing Area Yokohama City specific return date will be held between the two governments depending on the progress of the site restoration work. [Cancellation of construction] Number Name Location Details Ikego Housing Area Cancellation of construction ⑦ Yokohama City Area and Navy Annex of family housing, etc. close communication and coordination with the USARJ as Therefore, at the end of FY2011, the BJOCC commenced well as swift response to various events. See Fig. III-2-4-16 (Initiatives for Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability and Mitigation of Impact) **(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspace** a. Commencement of the Operation of the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) and the Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command Headquarters (HQ) Enhancement of coordination between the headquarters of both countries, combined with the transition to joint operational posture, is highly important to ensure a response with flexibility and readiness of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. Therefore, at the end of FY2011, the BJOCC commenced its operations at Yokota Air Base and the ASDF Air Defense Command HQ[14] and its relevant units were relocated to Yokota Air Base. These arrangements have made it possible to enhance coordination between the headquarters of the SDF and the U.S. Forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD. b. Yokota Airspace To facilitate the operations of civilian aircraft in Yokota airspace, where the U.S. Forces conduct radar approach control, measures have been taken since 2006 to temporarily transfer the responsibility for air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities, to deploy ASDF 14 The BJOCC functions to contribute to providing a joint response for Japan’s defense. To that end, it works to enhance information sharing, close coordination, and interoperability between the Japanese and U S headquarters ----- |Time|Improvement| |---|---| |December 2007|Reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) at Camp Zama| |June 2008|Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 17 ha) at Sagami General Depot| |September 2008|Reorganization of the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward)| |August 2011|The operation of the Mission Command Training Center commenced| |October 2011|Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama| |June 2012|Agreed on the shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) with Sagamihara City| |March 2013|The GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters was relocated from GSDF Asaka Camp to Camp Zama| |September 2014|Partial return of land (approximately 17 ha) at Sagami General Depot| |December 2015|The shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) commenced| |February 2016|Partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama| **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-16** Initiatives for Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability and Mitigation of Impact **Chapter** **(4) Measures Relating to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and** MCAS Iwakuni a. Relocation of Carrier-Based Aircraft Since Naval Air Facility Atsugi (Ayase City and Yamato City in Kanagawa Prefecture) is located in an urban district, the noise of carrier jets taking off and landing in particular had been a problem for a long time. Thus, after the completion of the runway relocation project[16] at MCAS Iwakuni (Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture), which made aircraft operations possible with less impact on the living environment of the surrounding communities, it was decided that CVW-5 squadrons would be relocated from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni. The relocation began in August 2017 and completed in March 2018. As a result, the noise in areas around Naval Air Facility Atsugi was alleviated to a significant extent, while maintaining the forward deployment of a U.S. aircraft carrier and carrier-based aircraft. In order to mitigate impacts of the increased operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to the relocation, the related measures listed in Fig. III-2-4-17 have been implemented. If all of these measures are fully implemented, the noise problems are expected to be mitigated from the current situation, with the area requiring residential noise-abatement work, or the so-called first category area, decreasing from approximately 1,600 ha to approximately 650 ha. See Fig. III-2-4-17 (Measures Related to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and MCAS Iwakuni and Their Status of Progress, etc.) b. Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) The 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. In December 2019, the MOD acquired more than half of the land on Mage Island in Nisinoomote City, officers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON), and to reduce the airspace by about 40% (i.e., the release of air traffic control from USFJ). c. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it was agreed that the joint civilian-military use of Yokota Air Base would be studied, and a Liaison Conference was then established as a working panel attended by relevant government ministries and agencies and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The Governments of Japan and the United States are also conducting a study on the specific conditions and modalities, with the understanding that both countries will not compromise the military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base. (3) Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in ensuring maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S. aircraft carrier provides the core capability of the Fleet. The U.S. Navy affirms that it will continue to ensure that all of its forward-deployed nuclear-powered vessels, including USS “Ronald Reagan,”[15] which anchored at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repairing and refueling will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan will continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety. 15 Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not need to replenish their fuel and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational capabilities. 16 A project to relocate the runway of MCAS Iwakuni by approximately 1 000 m to the east (offshore) in response to the requests from Iwakuni City etc ----- |Fig. Ⅲ-2-4-17 Measures Related|d to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and MCAS Iwakuni and Their Status of Progress, etc.| |---|---| |Measure|Status of Progress, etc.| |Relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni|After explanation in January 2017 to Yamaguchi Prefecture, Iwakuni City, and other municipalities that the relocation of carrier-based aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni would commence in the latter half of 2017, etc., Yamaguchi Prefecture, Iwakuni City, and other municipalities expressed their approval by June 2017. Started relocation in August 2017. Completed relocation in March 2018.| |Relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc., from MCAS Iwakuni to Naval Air Facility Atsugi|Following bilateral consultations upon request from the local community and from the perspective of the defense system, Japan and the United States confirmed in 2013 that EP-3 aircraft will remain at MCAS Iwakuni.| |Relocation of the KC-130 air refueling aircraft from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni|Relocation completed in August 2014.| |Rotational deployment of the KC-130 to Kanoya Air Base and Guam|○Rotational deployment of the KC-130 to MSDF Kanoya Air Base (Kanoya City, Kagoshima Prefecture) started in September 2019. ○Regarding rotational deployment to Guam, training commencement confirmed.| |Relocation of CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam|Japan and the United States confirmed that CH-53D helicopters, which had been sent to the Middle East, will return to the U.S. mainland without returning to MCAS Iwakuni, and will then be relocated to Guam.| ：Implemented ：Currently under implementation or scheduled for implementation **Chapter** Kagoshima Prefecture, and is conducting various surveys in preparation for the development of SDF facilities. This SDF facility would be used to support operations in response to a variety of situations, including large-scale disasters, as well as regular exercises and other activities, including use by the U.S. Forces as a permanent site for FCLP. In addition, the 2005 SCC document confirmed that the U.S. Forces will continue to conduct FCLP at Iwo-To in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent training facility is identified. c. Resumption of Civil Aviation Operations at MCAS Iwakuni Considering that the local public entities, etc., including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, had been working together to request the resumption of civil aviation operations, it was agreed in the Roadmap that “portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.” Based on this agreement, Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport was opened in December 2012, resuming regular flights of civil aviation aircraft for the first time in 48 years. **(5) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)** Site (Kyotango City in Kyoto Prefecture). The United States deployed Aegis destroyers with BMD capabilities to Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka in October 2015, March 2016 and May 2018. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2-1 (Japan’s Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability) See **(6) Training Relocation** a. Aviation Training Relocation (ATR) Based on the decision that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas—Kadena, Misawa (Misawa City and Tohoku Town in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni— would participate for the time being in bilateral training with the SDF at SDF facilities, the Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)[18] has been underway since 2007. The MOD has been improving its infrastructure, as required, for the training relocation. See Fig. III-2-4-18 (Overview of the Background to the Aviation Training Relocation) The ATR contributes to enhancing interoperability between the two countries, and also to relocating part of air-to-ground training conducted by using Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will help noise abatement around Kadena Air Base, thereby contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa. In addition to assisting the USFJ, the MOD/SDF is making efforts to ensure the safety and security of the local community, such as the establishment of a liaison office, facilitating communication with related government agencies, and response to requirements from the local community. These efforts have been contributing to successful training In June 2006, an AN/TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-Band Radar”) system was deployed to the U.S. Shariki Radar Site (Tsugaru City, Aomori Prefecture).[17] Also in October 2006, U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 units (Patriot Advanced Capability) were deployed to Kadena Air Base (Kadena Town, Okinawa City and Chatan Town in Okinawa Prefecture) and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (Yomitan Village, Okinawa City, Kadena Town, Onna Village and Uruma City in Okinawa Prefecture). In December 2014, the second TPY-2 radar in Japan was deployed to the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication 17 The radar was deployed to ASDF Shariki Sub Base (in Aomori Prefecture) in June 2006, but was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site. 18 USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral and other trainings at SDF facilities etc ----- relocation. b. Relocation of Training for MV-22 The Government of Japan and the United States Government decided in the “2+2” joint statement of October 2013, to utilize the opportunities to participate in various operations in mainland Japan and across the region to reduce the amount of time that MV-22s are deployed and used for the training in Okinawa so that training outside of Okinawa Prefecture, including mainland Japan, can be increased while maintaining the deterrence of the Alliance. Based on above, both the governments have been moving forward with the training of the MV-22 deployed at MCAS Futenma outside of Okinawa Prefecture, etc. In September 2016, it was agreed at the Joint Committee to relocate the training activities of Tilt-Rotor/Rotary Wing aircraft, such as AH-1, CH53, and the MV-22 that are currently deployed at MCAS Futenma out of Okinawa Prefecture at Japan’s expense in order to further promote training outside of Okinawa to mitigate the impact of training activities there. Three bilateral training (field training by the GSDF and U.S. Marines) were conducted in FY2019 (in Shiga and Kagawa prefectures in December 2019, and in Hokkaido, Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima prefectures in January 2020). From the date of the agreement up to March 2020, a total of ten training, including the ones mentioned Overview of the Background to the **Fig. Ⅲ** **-2-4-18** Aviation Training Relocation **Chapter** |Time of reaching agreements|Overview| |---|---| |May 2006|In the “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” it is conformed that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas— Kadena, Misawa and MCAS Iwakuni—would participate in bilateral training with the SDF at SDF facilities in Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru.| |January and October 2011|At the Joint Committee, both governments agreed to include Guam as a new training relocation site and to expand the scale of training.| |March 2014|At the Joint Committee, both governments agreed to add air-to-ground training using the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range (Misawa City and Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture).| above, have been conducted in Guam and in Japan at the exercise sites in Miyagi, Gunma, Niigata, Fukuoka and Oita prefectures. The MV-22’s amount of time deployed and training in Okinawa will continue to be reduced by relocating exercises held in mainland of Japan and Guam, and the Government will continue to promote initiatives that contribute to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa. **❺ [Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the USFJ]** In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the USFJ based on the Roadmap, the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special Measures Act) was enacted in August 2007. Realignment grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc. and other systems were established based on the law. In addition, under the U.S. Forces realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since these developments may affect the employment of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to include education and skills training, which is to help retain their employment. The Realignment Special Measures Act was supposed to cease to be effective as of March 31, 2017. However, since there remain realignment projects that require implementation, on March 31, 2017, an act revising part of the Act including a ten-year extension of the time limit of the Act to March 31, 2027 was enacted. Reference 29 (Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan) Reference 30 (Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan) See ----- **Security Cooperation** ###### 3 In situations where the need and potential for international cooperation in the security and defense areas are increasing unprecedentedly, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SelfDefense Forces (SDF) is required to actively contribute to ensuring the security of Japan, the peace and stability of the region, and the peace, stability, and prosperity of the entire international community from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. In line with the free and open IndoPacifi c vision,[1] and in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG), Japan will strengthen bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges as part of multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation, while paying attention to its partner nations’ regional characteristics and situations. Japan will also actively advance its efforts to solve global security issues, including securing the freedom and safety of navigation and overfl ight, coordination and cooperation with relevant countries in relation to the use of the space and cyber domains, international peace cooperation activities, arms control and disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These efforts will be promoted mainly under the framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and in close coordination with countries that share the same universal values and security interests as Japan. The MOD/SDF further intends to create a desirable security environment for Japan by engaging in the routine activities. **Chapter** **Section** **Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered** **1** **Defense Cooperation** [●] **❶ [Signifi cance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges etc.]** in particular, cause concerns over the maintenance of the rule **1** Signifi cance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and of law at sea, freedom of navigation and overfl ight, and the Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges stability of the Southeast Asian region. Thus, responses to **(1) Signifi cance of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, and** these issues have become an important challenge to ensure **Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** the regional stability. The peace and stability of the Indo-Pacifi c region is closely In order to build mutual trust among nations and establish related to Japan’s security. In addition, with increasingly a foundation for cooperation for solving regional security changeable and complicated global power dynamics, and issues, the MOD/SDF intends to strategically promote escalation of political, economic, and military inter-state multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation, while competition, they are also becoming a more important issue taking into account the international situation, regional for the international community. While nations with large- characteristics, and situations and security issues other scale military power concentrate in the region, no framework nations faced. for regional security cooperation has been suffi ciently institutionalized. As political, economic and social systems **(2) Forms and History of Security Cooperation and Dialogue,** in each nation widely differ in the region, visions of security **and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** vary from country to country. Furthermore, there has been an Defense cooperation and exchanges have been delivered in increasing number of unilateral actions attempting to change the forms of high-level dialogues and exchanges, bilateral/ the status quo by coercion without paying respect to existing multilateral exercises, capacity building for recipient international law. The issues involving the South China Sea, countries (such as human resources development and 1 In his keynote speech at the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) held in Kenya in August 2016, Prime Minister Abe referred to the concept of a FOIP. In the Japan-U.S. Summit in November 2017, the United States expressed its support for the above vision presented by Japan. The leaders of the two countries urged all nations to respect th f d f i ti d fli ht d th l f l d d t b ild lti l d l ti hi ith t i th t t thi h ----- technical cooperation in the security and defense fi elds), and defense equipment and technology cooperation aimed at ensuring Japan’s security and promoting international peace and cooperation. The MOD/SDF has long strived to alleviate any conditions of confrontation and tension, and to foster a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere by building face-to-face relationships through bilateral dialogues and exchanges. In addition, the MOD/SDF has recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means, including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, capacity building, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and the development of institutional frameworks such as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA). In addition, multilateral regional security cooperation and dialogue are in the process of evolving from those that focus on dialogue to those that focus on cooperation that seeks to build regional order. It is important to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in a multilayered, practical manner in order to create an ideal security environment. In response to the cancellation of meetings with foreign countries, such as the Japan Pacifi c Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD, in connection with measures against novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19), the MOD has held more telephone conversations than usual, deepening communication with foreign countries and promoting defense cooperation and exchanges from the government offi ce in Ichigaya, Tokyo. See Reference 31 (Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements) Reference 32 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record [Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2019]) Fig. III-3-1-1 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) Fig. III-3-1-2 (Number of high-level bilateral dialogues and consultations [April 2019–March 2020]) On the other hand, a range of challenges exist for the promotion of FOIP in the region, including Japan’s vicinity, such as a rapid modernization of military forces and an increase in military activities. **(2) Direction of the MOD’s Initiatives** In light of this situation, the MOD/SDF are promoting defense cooperation and exchanges to ensure that Japan can secure the stable use of major sea lanes. In addition, the MOD/SDF are promoting mutual understanding and confi dence building with countries that have modernized their military forces and intensifi ed their military activities to prevent contingencies and ensure Japan’s security. Furthermore, for countries in the region that are taking steps to respond to changes in the environment, the MOD/SDF aim to contribute to regional peace and stability by supporting their efforts through defense cooperation and exchanges. **Chapter** **(3) Areas with Which Japan Will Enhance Cooperation for the** **Realization of FOIP** With respect to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Pacifi c Island countries, the Middle East and Djibouti, the MOD/SDF will enhance cooperation toward the realization of FOIP, utilizing a wide range of means for defense cooperation and exchanges, including cooperation and exchange of personnel, cooperation and exchange of troops, capacity building, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. Specifi cally, the MOD/SDF are promoting defense cooperation and exchanges to help countries in these regions to play more effective roles in achieving stability in the Indo-Pacifi c region, and to secure the stable use of sea lanes by establishing good relations with these countries and ensuring that the SDF has stable access to their ports and airports. **(4) Countries That Japan Works With to Realize FOIP** The United States as Japan’s ally, Australia, India, the United Kingdom, France and other European countries, Canada and New Zealand are countries that not only share fundamental values with us, but also have geographic and historical ties to the Indo-Pacifi c region. The MOD/SDF have been encouraging these countries to become more involved in the Indo-Pacifi c region. At the same time, the MOD/SDF have also been promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with them so that we can work together as partners when promoting efforts for realizing FOIP in the areas listed in (3) above. This way, we aim to achieve stronger effects than when promoting efforts on our own. **2 Efforts under the Vision of a Free and Open Indo-** Pacifi c (FOIP) **(1) Characteristics of the Indo-Pacifi c Region** Free and open maritime order, which relies on the rule of law, is the foundation for the stability and prosperity of the international community. The Indo-Pacifi c region is at the center of the world vitality, and home to more than half the world’s population. It is important to establish this region as a free and open global commons to secure peace and prosperity in the region as a whole. ----- **Fig. III-3-1-1** Defense Cooperation and Exchanges Defense cooperation and exchanges “Defense cooperation and exchanges” refers to efforts to strengthen bilateral and multilateral defense relations by using various tools, which are significant initiatives for securing the peace and stability of Japan and the international community. Purpose of defense cooperation and exchanges 〇 To create a security environment desirable for Japan 〇 To deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential 〇 To prevent contingencies through promoting confidence-building and mutual understanding Tools for defense cooperation and exchanges Tool 1: Cooperation and exchanges among people On such occasions as the “2+2” Meeting, defense ministerial meetings, chief of staff-level meetings or other high-level meetings, working-level consultations among defense authorities, and multilateral international conferences, participants frankly exchange views on defense policies, regional situations, defense cooperation and exchanges, etc., thereby developing mutual understanding and building confidence among them and further promoting defense cooperation and exchanges thereafter. Exchanges of students and interchange in education and research aim to facilitate understanding of defense policies and statuses of military units of other countries and promote relations of trust through network building. **Chapter** Japan-India defense Chief of Staff of the French Army Tokyo Defense Forum Acceptance of foreign students at ministerial meeting visiting GSDF Chief of Staff the National Defense Academy Tool 2: Cooperation and exchanges among troops Through goodwill exercise, mutual visits of naval ships and aircraft (calling at ports and airports), and exchange events among units, mutual trust with partner countries is developed and cooperative relationships are promoted. Bilateral and multilateral exercises aim to enhance SDF’s capability to cooperate with troops of other countries and strengthen defense relations among relevant countries, in addition to improve personnel’s skills. Visit of representatives of ASEAN Japan-India bilateral Joint training with the United States Port call at the Port of Subic member countries to an SDF base exercise in the IPD2019 and Australia (the Philippines) in the IPD2019 Tool 3: Capacity building Capacity building project by holding seminars and field training in various fields, providing technical guidance, and organizing observation of education and training programs and opinion exchanges, etc. aims to improve the capabilities of partner countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time and help their military forces play roles in contributing to international peace and regional stability. Seminar on aviation meteorology Field training for HA/DR Seminar on undersea unexploded Technical education for a military band (Myanmar) (Malaysia) ordnance clearance (Vietnam) (Papua New Guinea) Tool 4: Defense equipment and technical cooperation Through overseas transfers of equipment, joint research and development, participation in international exhibitions, and holding of the Defence Industry Forum, efforts are made to strengthen and maintain Japan’s defense industrial base, enhance capacity both of the SDF and military forces of partner countries, and strengthen and maintain defense cooperation with those partner countries. Transfer of TC-90 training aircraft Joint research with the United Kingdom Paris Air Show Japan-India Defence Industry Forum to the Philippines (Reference) Conclusion of various defense cooperation agreements Through concluding such agreements as Information Security Agreements, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, Agreements concerning Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the framework of cooperation has been materialized and institutionalized with the aim of promoting defense cooperation and exchanges more smoothly and stably. ----- **Fig. III-3-1-2** Number of High-level Bilateral Dialogues and Consultations (April 2019–March 2020) Countries with Which High-level Bilateral Dialogues and Consultations were Conducted (April 2019–March 2020) In this figure, “high-level bilateral dialogues and consultations” refers to bilateral meetings of the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and Chiefs of Staff with their respective counterparts. High-level bilateral dialogues and consultations were conducted with the following countries between April 2019 and March 2020, but had also been conducted with other countries prior to that period together with other types of defense cooperation and exchanges. It should be noted that Japan has conducted high-level bilateral dialogues and consultations with various countries across the globe. **Chapter** 5 or more exchanges 3 or more exchanges 2 exchanges 1 exchange No exchange U.K. Russia Denmark Canada Germany Ukraine France Mongolia Bulgaria Italy Turkey Bahrain U.S. Jordan Iran China Israel Qatar Laos Egypt ROK Jamaica Saudi Arabia India Vietnam Oman Cambodia Thailand Philippines Djibouti UAE Sri Lanka Brunei Myanmar PNG Indonesia Malaysia Fiji Brazil Singapore Australia Tonga New Zealand **(5) Countries with Which Japan Will Promote Mutual** **Understanding and Confidence Building** With regard to China and Russia, the MOD/SDF aim to avoid unforeseen events and ensure Japan’s security by tapping into defense exchange opportunities and conveying Japan’s concerns about the increased military activities and military expansion in Japan’s vicinity to promote mutual understanding and confidence building. See Fig. III-3-1-3 (MOD/SDF’s Efforts under the Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific [image]) ----- **Fig. III-3-1-3** MOD/SDF’s Efforts under the Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c (image) **Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision: FOIP** Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision: FOIP In August 2016, Prime Minister Abe unveiled the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept in his keynote address at TICAD VI in Kenya. Japan’s fundamental aim is to foster regional stability and prosperity by improving connectivity between Asia and Africa through a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Three pillars of the vision (i) Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade. (ii) Pursuit of economic prosperity (e.g. improving connectivity) (iii) Commitment to peace and stability MOD’s Approach to FOIP (Cited from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) MOD’s Approach to FOIP Vision 1. Securing the stable use of major sea lanes by way of defense cooperation and exchange activities 2. Preventing contingencies through confidence building and mutual understanding 3. Contributing to peace and stability through active engagement in the region, in cooperation with partner countries The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond clearly states that in line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation, taking into account characteristics and situation specific to each region and country. **Chapter** MOD’s Specific Efforts for FOIP U.K.U.K. RussiaRussia CANADACanada FranceFrance Other European Other European countriescountries ChinaChina JapanJapan U.S.U.S. Middle Middle East IndiaIndia East and and Pacific Ocean AfricaAfrica Pacific Ocean South AsiaSouth Southeast Southeast Asia AsiaAsia Pacific Pacific IslandIsland countries Main sea lanesMain sea lane countries Indian OceanIndian Ocean AustraliaAustralia New ZealandNZ Southeast Asia, South Asia and Pacific Island countries: Areas where several key sea lanes are located Middle East and Africa: Key region in terms of energy security ➡ Enhance cooperation for achieving FOIP (Concrete initiatives) - Southeast Asia … Announcement of Vientiane Vision 2.0, an updated version of Vientiane Vision, which is a guideline for future ASEAN-Japan defense cooperation, including the strengthening of defense cooperation to support ASEAN’s centrality and unity, continued implementation of capacity building and joint exercise with countries in Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD), granting of decommissioned equipment (transfer of TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippines), and pursuit of synergy between FOIP and ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). - South Asia… Provision of capacity building (air rescue) to the Sri Lanka Armed Forces and promotion of calling at ports and airports by SDF’s assets (aircraft and naval ships) to Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Maldives and Bangladesh - Pacific Island countries… Planning of the first Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue, as the first multilateral defense ministerial meeting for Japan, and provision of capacity building (military band development) to the Papua New Guinea Military Band - Middle East … Active participation in multinational security conferences held in the Middle East, and promotion of calling at ports and airports by SDF’s assets (aircraft and naval ships) to Oman, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain - Africa… Provision of capacity building (enhancement of disaster response capacity) to Djibouti forces The United States, Australia, New Zealand, India, European countries such as the United Kingdom and France, and Canada :Countries sharing values inherent to the FOIP vision and have ties to the region ➡ Collaborate positively for achieving FOIP (Concrete initiatives) - The United States … Provision of capacity building (underwater medicine) to Vietnam under Japan-U.S. collaboration, and implementation of Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise as part of the IPD, etc. - Australia and New Zealand … Participation in capacity building Harii Hamutuk sponsored by Australian Defence Force in Timor-Leste and implementation of Japan-U.S.-Australia airforces’ trilateral exercise Cope North, Multinational HA/DR exercise “Chiristmas Drop,” etc. - India … Implementation of Japan-U.S.-India multilateral naval exercise Malabar, Japan-India bilateral exercise Dharma Guardian, and Japan-India bilateral exercise SHINYUU Maitri, and holding of the first Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, etc. - The United Kingdom and France … Implementation of Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise Guardian North, Japan-France-Australia-U.S. multilateral naval exercise La Pérouse, Japan-U.K. bilateral army exercise Vigilant Isles (the first bilateral exercise between the U.K. and Japanese armies conducted in Japan in 2018), etc. ----- - **❷ [Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges ]** In promoting security cooperation and exchanges, it is Regarding the Japan-Australia ACSA,[3] a new agreement important to enhance bilateral defense cooperation and for expanding the situations in which the provision of supplies exchanges using optimal combinations of various cooperative and services is possible was signed by the two countries in means, while taking matters such as regional situations, the January 2017. The new agreement was concluded in light situations of partner countries and their relationships with of the expansion of cases in which the SDF and the ADF Japan into account. conduct operations together due to the further advances in their defense cooperation and exchanges, and the development of the Legislation for Peace and Security in **1 Australia** Japan. The agreement was approved by the National Diet in **(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with** April 2017 and put into force in September 2017. Relevant **Australia** domestic laws were developed then. Australia is a “Special Strategic Partner” for Japan in the Japan will continue deepening its cooperative relationship Indo-Pacific region as both Japan and Australia are allied with Australia, a “Special Strategic Partner,” that has both with the United States and share not only universal values[2] the intention and ability to contribute to the maintenance of but also security strategic stakes and interests. In recent years, peace and stability in the region with Japan. particularly, Japan and Australia as responsible countries in the Indo-Pacific region are strengthening mutual cooperation **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and** focusing on areas such as humanitarian assistance and **Exchanges** disaster relief (HA/DR) activities and cooperation in capacity In November 2019, a Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial building. Meeting was held between Defense Minister Kono and With the background of the deepening defense cooperation Australian Defense Minister Reynolds. In this meeting, the between Japan and Australia, the two countries in March 2007 Ministers emphasized that as Indo-Pacific security dynamics announced the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security became more challenging, the strategic logic underpinning Cooperation, Japan’s first such joint declaration focusing on Japan-Australia cooperation was only getting stronger, and security with a country other than the United States. Japan and agreed to deepen the special strategic partnership between Australia have also developed the foundation for cooperation the two countries and aimed at contributing to a free, open, such as the ACSA, the Japan-Australia Information Security inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. They also Agreement, and the Agreement between the Government affirmed that they will accelerate defence cooperation in the of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the coming years including in the fields of military exercises, Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology. personnel exchanges, space and cybersecurity policy, defence science and technology, and continue to make efforts towards concluding a reciprocal access agreement which would improve administrative, policy, and legal procedures to facilitate bilateral/multilateral operations and exercises. The two ministers reiterated their determination to work bilaterally to enhance defence and security cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region including in the fields of, capacity building, maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. They also exchanged their views on the regional issues, including the South China Sea, the East China Sea and North Korea, remained committed Minister of Defense Kono holding a meeting with the Australian Defence Minister (November 2019) to efforts to achieve North Korea’s complete, verifiable 2 The National Security Strategy stipulates “freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law” as universal values. 3 Official title: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defense Force. In addition to the activities this agreement currently applies to, the following activities and situations will also be newly subject to the agreement: (1) Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security; (2) Situations threatening international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing; (3) Perilous situations; (4) Armed attack situations, etc.; (5) Activities in situations threatening survival; (6) Rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas; (7) Counter-piracy activities; (8) Elimination of mines and th d bj t d (9) I t lli th i ti iti **Chapter** ----- and irreversible dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges of North Korea. and confirmed the coordination between the two countries on the issue of North Korea, including countermeasures against ship-to-ship transfers of goods to or from North Koreanflagged vessels, which is prohibited by the UN Security Council. In October and December 2019, Defense Minister Kono and Defence Minister Reynolds held a total of three telephone conversations. They agreed that, as the Indo-Pacific region faces a range of challenges, defense cooperation between the two countries, which share universal values and strategic interests in security, is more important than ever, and that they would continue to work closely together to deepen the special strategic partnership. They also exchanged views on defense exchanges between Japan and Australia and the security situation surrounding the two countries. Defense Minister Kono also explained the SDF’s information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. As for bilateral service-to-service cooperation and exchanges, in November 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS met with Chief of the Defense Force Angus Campbell and confirmed the promotion of defense cooperation and exchange between the SDF and Australian forces under the FOIP initiative. In September and October 2019, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Royal Australian Navy conducted the Nichi Gou Trident, a bilateral exercise to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation. From September to October 2019, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) conducted the first Japan-Australia bilateral exercise Bushido Guardian 19 using fighter jets at Chitose Air Base and other locations in Japan to improve tactical skills and interoperability, and to deepen defense cooperation. In the same month, the Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A made its first call at Komaki Air Base and conducted a unit-to-unit exchange by refueling and transport aircraft units between Japan and Australia. In November 2019, Australian Chief of Joint Operations visited the Air Defense Command Headquarters and they exchanged views on the regional situation, defense cooperation and exchanges. See Reference 33 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia [Past Three Years]) Australian Navy vessel “DIAMANTINA” brought alongside MSDF minesweeping tender JS “Uraga” while conducting a Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise (special mine warfare exercise) (November 2019) Japan and Australia are both allied with the United States and share universal values. They cooperate closely to resolve the various challenges the Indo-Pacific region and the international community face. In order to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation, it is important for Japan and Australia to proactively promote trilateral cooperation with the United States, whose presence is indispensable for regional peace and stability. The Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), a Director General-level meeting among the three countries of Japan, the United States and Australia, has been held 10 times since April 2007. In June 2019, a Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue. At the meeting, the Strategic Action Agenda, which articulates their shared long-term vision for trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region was agreed on and released. As for trilateral service-to-service cooperation and exchanges, in August 2019, the Chief of Staff, Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) participated in the Japan-U.S.Australia Senior Leaders Seminar in Hawaii and exchanged views with the top officials of the U.S. Army Pacific, the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, and the Australian Army. They shared a common understanding of cooperation and coordination for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In November 2019, the MSDF hosted a Japan-U.S.Australia trilateral exercise (a special mine warfare exercise) with three minesweepers from the United States and Australia in Hyuga-nada Sea. The ASDF conducted a multilateral HA/ DR exercise Christmas Drop, which included air transport, material packing, and air drop exercises, in the Federal States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, and the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas in December 2019. From February **Chapter** **(3) Cooperative Relationship Etc. between Japan, the United** **States, and Australia.** Video: Japan-Australia bilateral exercise Bushido Guardian 19 URL: https://youtu.be/TxKXkRFk5Rw ----- to March 2020, the ASDF cohosted a Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise “Cope North” which included a trilateral HA/DR exercise. Through various training and exercise opportunities, Japan will continue its efforts to improve mutual understanding and interoperability among Japan, the United States and Australia. In addition, Japan will also work to promote quadrilateral defense cooperation among Japan, the United States, Australia and India. **2 India** Moreover, the two countries signed the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of India in September 2014 and saw the conclusion of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology as well as the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information in December 2015, further solidifying the institutional basis of Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges. In October 2018, Japan and India agreed to begin the negotiations on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). These agreements have strengthened the relationship between the two partners, which are capable of dealing with regional and global issues, as well as the foundation of this partnership. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and** **Exchanges** In September 2019, a Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting was held between then Defense Minister Iwaya and Defense Minister Singh. At the meeting, the two ministers agreed to further deepen strategic and defense cooperation between Japan and India, and affirmed their intention to hold the first-ever India-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) to advance cooperation towards peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. They also welcomed the regular exchanges at all levels between the Japanese and Indian defense authorities, including bilateral exercises between all military services by the end of 2018, and agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges with the aim of further concrete cooperation among all military services. In November 2019, a Defense Ministerial Meeting and the first Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting were held. The four Ministers—Defense Minister Kono, Foreign Minister Motegi, Defence Minister Singh and External Affairs Minister Jaishankar—acknowledged emerging security challenges at the meeting and reiterated their commitment to advancing bilateral security cooperation based on the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and the 2009 Action Plan to advance security cooperation based on the Declaration. They also shared the view to make continuous efforts for holding the bilateral exercises between the defence forces regularly and to expand them for the first Japan-India bilateral fighter aircraft exercise in Japan. The Ministers also appreciated the commencement of exchange of information based on the Implementing Arrangement for Deeper Cooperation between the MSDF and the Indian See Reference 34 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See [Past Three Years]) **(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with** **India** India is increasing its influence against a backdrop of its population—the world’s second largest—, its high economic growth, and its latent economic power. Located in the center of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, India is an extremely important country for Japan. Furthermore, Japan and India share universal values as well as common interests in the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world, and have established the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” In this context, Japan and India have promoted cooperation in maritime security and various other areas, while utilizing some frameworks including the “2+2” meeting. Defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and India have steadily deepened since October 2008, when the two countries signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. Meetings and consultations at various levels such as the ministerial level, as well as service-to-service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises, have been regularly conducted. J I di “2 2” (N b 2019) **Chapter** ----- GSDF Chief of Staff Yuasa holding a meeting with Indian Chief of the Army Staff (October 2019) Navy. With regard to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), the two sides welcomed the significant progress made in the negotiations of the ACSA and expressed their desire for early conclusion of the negotiations. With regard to defense equipment and technology cooperation, they expressed hope for productive discussions at the working-level consultations, and exchanged views on multilateral cooperation and the regional affairs. In light of the first “2+2”meeting, they shared recognition on the importance of continuing exchange of opinions and decided to hold the next “2+2” Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo. In October 2019 and January 2020, Defense Minister Kono held telephone conversations with Defence Minister Singh to exchange views on the situation in the Indo-Pacific region and other topics. As for defense equipment and technology cooperation, Japan and India have conducted the Cooperative Research on the Visual SLAM Based GNSS Augmentation Technology for UGV[4]/Robotics since July 2018. With the aim to launch concrete projects more, Japan and India held the Japan-India Defence Industry Forum in September 2017 and February 2019. As for service-to-service exchanges, in January 2020, the Chief of Staff, JS visited India to participate in the multilateral forum Raisina Dialogue 2020, paid a courtesy call on Defence Minister Singh, and held the first-ever meeting with General Rawat, who became the first Chief of Defense Staff in the same month. At the meeting, the two sides shared an understanding of the regional situation and security environment in Japan and India, and exchanged views on deepening defense cooperation and exchanges. The Chief of Staff, GSDF visited India in October 2019, which was followed by a visit to Japan by then Chief of the Army Staff Rawat in December, realizing an intra-year mutual visit between the top brass of the Japanese and Indian ground service. In addition, in February 2020, the Chief of Staff, GSDF personnel collaborating with the Indian Army in the Japan-India bilateral exercise Dharma Guardian (October 2019) MSDF visited India to exchange views on a wide range of topics, including naval cooperation and exchanges and the regional situation. Japan and India have also conducted service-to-service exchanges through training and exercises. From October to November 2019, the GSDF and the Indian Army had the bilateral exercise, Dharma Guardian 19. In October 2019, the ASDF conducted the bilateral exercise with the Indian Air Force, SHINYUU Maitri 19. The three countries of Japan, the United States, and India have been conducting a trilateral naval exercise “Malabar” since 2017. In September 2019, Japan hosted “Malabar 2019” in the waters near Japan to promote trilateral cooperation. Following the first Japan-U.S.-India Summit Meeting held in November 2018, the second Japan-U.S.-India Summit Meeting was held in June 2019, and the leaders reaffirmed the critical importance of their trilateral cooperation in efforts to maintain and promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, sharing their understanding of an increasingly complex security situation. Furthermore, the three leaders confirmed their views to further promote trilateral cooperation in various fields, such as maritime security, space and cyberspace. **Chapter** **3 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)** ASEAN member states, which continue to experience high economic growth and gather international attention for their potential as an open growth center of the world, and Japan have been traditional partners sharing a history of exchanges and a close economic relationship over the past nearly 50 years. ASEAN nations, located in strategically important areas occupying strategic points on sea lanes of Japan, are also playing an important role in ensuring the peace and prosperity of Japan as well as the entire region. Therefore, it is “UGV” t d f “U d G d V hi l ” ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** Voice of SDF Personnel Who Participated in Japan-India bilateral exercise SHINYUU Maitri 19 First Lieutenant TATEYAMA Masaki, C-130 pilot, 401st Squadron, 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, ASDF I am a C-130 pilot of 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, ASDF. I would like to communicate a small part of what I felt when I participated in the Japan-India bilateral exercise (commonly known as SHINYUU Maitri 19) last fall. SHINYUU is a Japanese word for “best friend” and Maitri is Hindi for “friendship.” This occasion was the fi rst time for me to both participate in an exercise abroad and visit India. When carrying out the bilateral Group photograph taken after the cargo crew fl ight exchange exercise with the Indian Air Force, I was at a loss at first due to differences in weather characteristics and other factors, but Spending time together with Indian Air Force offi cers was also an eventually I could personally experience the difference in operation valuable experience for me. It may be little known that the Indian Air procedures between the two air forces, which was a valuable Force is small for the country’s population. For this reason, its experience for me as a pilot. From the cockpit on the way to the offi cers are true elites and I am impressed by their knowledge and exercise airspace, I saw a great river the width of which is sense of humor. unimaginable in Japan calmly flowing through a vast land. I will Would you like to participate in overseas exercises together with never forget the view. me some day? You would have a truly unique experience. ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Thailand, Defense Minister Kono announced the Vientiane Vision 2.0, an updated version of the Vientiane Vision, and ASEAN ministers welcomed. From the viewpoint of actively promoting such bilateral and multilateral cooperation and stabilizing the security environment of the Indo-Pacifi c region, the MOD will strive to enhance defense cooperation and exchanges with ASEAN member states. See Section 1-3 of this Chapter (Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation) Section 1-4 of this Chapter (Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building) Reference 35 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN member states [Past Three Years]) Reference 47 (Vientiane Vision 2.0) important for Japan to strengthen cooperation in the security and defense areas and promote confi dence with ASEAN member states, while supporting their efforts to enhance the centrality, unity, and resilience of ASEAN, which is the center of regional cooperation. Based on this principle, Japan is promoting confi dence building and mutual understanding through high-level and working-level exchanges as well as practical cooperation, such as capacity building, bilateral/multilateral exercises, and defense equipment and technology cooperation with ASEAN member states. In addition to bilateral cooperation, Japan has strengthened cooperation under multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Vientiane Vision, which was presented as a guideline for future ASEAN-Japan defense cooperation at the second ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting in November 2016, outlined the full picture of the future direction of defense cooperation for ASEAN as a whole in a transparent manner. In November 2019, at the 5th **(1) Indonesia** Indonesia conducts active defense cooperation and exchanges with Japan. During the Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in March 2015, Prime Minister Abe and President Joko agreed Video: The Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program based on the Vientiane Vision URL: https://youtu.be/Mm9w7Y0B1i0 ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** Announcement of “Vientiane Vision 2.0”: Voice of Personnel Who Engaged in its Development Deputy Director ISHIDA Tomonori, International Policy view to upholding ASEAN centrality and unity, the updated Division, Bureau of Defense Policy, Internal Bureau vision sets forth the idea that it is important to contribute to The MOD/SDF, announcing “Vientiane Vision,” a guideline for its resilience so that it can withstand and repel external stress the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation in 2016, has carried out fl exibly without losing its autonomy. initiatives to contribute to ASEAN as a whole with particular In addition, redefi ning the Vision in the much broader context emphasis on the realization of international order based on of Japan’s vision for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c” is another the “rule of law” in the maritime domain. In order to amplify important point of this update. such efforts, “Vientiane Vision 2.0” was set forth at the ASEAN- For the development of the Vision, studies were made by Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting in November 2019. the entire ministry from the Bureau and four Staff Offi ces to The main point of this update is to redefi ne the aim of our experts of the National Institute for Defense Studies. Through efforts to contribute to ASEAN’s resilience. ASEAN, consisting this process, we discussed new initiatives beyond the Vision of diverse member states, is making earnest efforts to show and I am confi dent that solid progress has been made on the its international presence by playing a central role in the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation. development of regional cooperation with its unity. With a The 5th ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers’ Informal The author during a meeting Meeting, where “Vientiane Vision 2.0” was announced to strengthen their Strategic Partnership underpinned by sea and democracy and reaffi rmed their intention to hold a JapanIndonesia “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting. At the fi rst “2+2” Meeting held in Tokyo in December of the same year, the two countries agreed to initiate negotiations over an Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, actively participate in the multilateral naval exercise (KOMODO 2016), and further advance capacity building. The Joint Statement of a JapanIndonesia Summit Meeting in January 2017 confi rmed the importance of continuing dialogues between their foreign and defense authorities at various levels, including the regular Japan-Indonesia “2+2” Meeting and foreign and defense authorities’ meetings. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus held in Thailand. At the meeting, Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan would like to promote cooperation such as port calls by vessels and aircraft, and JSDF’s participation in the multilateral naval exercise KOMODO. In response, Minister Prabowo stated that Indonesia welcomes those proposals. Both ministers agreed to further enhance defense cooperation in broad fi elds including this cooperation mentioned above. In December of the same year, Defense Minister Kono again met with Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto. During the meeting, they exchanged views on the defense policies of both countries and the regional situation, and agreed to promote cooperation in HA/DR, which is a shared priority area for both countries, and to continue to promote personnel exchanges in the fi eld of education. Similarly, at the working level, various exchanges have ----- been carried out, including Politico-Military Consultation, Military-Military Consultation, and other educational and academic exchanges. In November 2019, the SDF started HA/DR capacity building project for Indonesia, and held an HA/DR seminar for about 100 Indonesian military officials in the capital city, Jakarta. In the seminar, the SDF’s lessons in disaster response was shared so that the Indonesian officials could better understand the SDF’s capabilities and improve their disaster response capabilities. **(2) Vietnam** With Vietnam, which is a coastal country facing the South China Sea with a population of approximately 90 million, Japan has developed cooperation and exchanges between their defense authorities. At the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting held in March 2014, the two leaders agreed to elevate the relationship between the two countries to an “Extensive Strategic Partnership.” At the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting in May 2018, both countries confirmed that they would strengthen cooperation in the security and defense areas. At the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting in April 2018, the “Joint Vision Statement on Japan-Vietnam Defense Cooperation (Japan-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement)” was signed to further promote Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchanges into the future. In the meeting, concerning the regional situation, both ministers exchanged opinions and called for self-restraint on militarization and other unilateral actions to change the status quo made in the South China Sea, and agreed on the importance of the peaceful conflict resolutions based on international law and the conclusion of an effective Code Of Conduct in the South China Sea at an early time. In May 2019, then Defense Minister Iwaya visited Vietnam as Japanese defense minister for the first time in about three and a half years. In addition to a Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial meeting with Defense Minister Lịch, he paid a courtesy call to Prime Minister Phuc and exchanged opinions with the Commander of the Navy Nam. At the Defense Ministerial meeting, the Ministers shared the policy to promote Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation in a broad range of fields based on the Joint Vision Statement, which was announced in 2018. Regarding the regional situation, they agreed to cooperate toward denuclearization of North Korea, shared concerns about the unilateral moves in the South China Sea to change the status quo and establish the change as a fait accompli, and agreed that Japan and Vietnam should closely work together on these issues. In addition, the Memorandum on the Orientation of Promotion of Defense Industry Cooperation was signed by the defense authorities of Japan and Vietnam at the vice-ministerial level. The two countries agreed to promote bilateral cooperation on defense equipment and technology based on this memorandum. Furthermore, at the Japan-Vietnam Leaders’ Working Lunch held in July 2019, the leaders agreed on commencing negotiations for an agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology. In November 2019, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Vietnam to pay a courtesy visit to Defense Minister Lịch and hold a vice-ministerial consultation with Vice Defense Minister Vinh to exchange views on the regional situation and on defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. Japan and Vietnam will co-chair framework of the Experts’ Working Group (EWG) in the PKO field held under the ADMM-plus from 2020 to 2023. As for the major service-to-service exchanges, in March 2020, the Chief of Staff, JS visited Vietnam to pay a courtesy call on Defense Minister Lịch. He also held talks with Chief of the General Staff Giang, agreeing to promote defense cooperation and exchanges based on the Japan-Vietnam Joint Vision and sharing their understanding of the security environment surrounding the region. In July 2019, Major General Dũng, Director of the Military Science Academy of Vietnam, and four others visited the GSDF Military Intelligence School. In October 2019, the GSDF and ASDF officials who participated in the Japan-India bilateral exercise Dharma Guardian 19 visited the Vietnamese units in Da Nang to deepen exchanges. In December, the Chief of Staff, MSDF made a visit to Vietnam and held talks with the Commander of the Vietnam People’s Navy Nam, where they agreed to strengthen relations between the two countries’ navies. As for capacity building the ASDF held a follow-up seminar in Hanoi in August 2019 for 18 cybersecurity personnel of the People’s Army of Vietnam in order to check the retention of the cybersecurity training that had been conducted twice in the past. In December 2019, a workshop on the disposal of unexploded ordnance in water was held for about 30 officials from the Vietnam People’s Navy on board the minesweeping tender JS “Bungo,” which was in port in Da Nang. The participants were briefed by the ship’s crew on the system for the disposal of unexploded ordnance in water, which was followed by a briefing by the ship’s underwater disposers on the procedures for disposal. They were also trained on various equipment on board the ship. It remains vital that Japan and Vietnam strengthen their relationship in order to achieve more concrete and practical cooperation, based on the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges. **Chapter** ----- **(3) Singapore** In December 2009, Singapore became the first country in Southeast Asia to sign a memorandum on defense exchanges with Japan. Since then, the cooperative relationship, including port calls, has been progressing steadily based on the memorandum. Singapore and Japan have so far conducted 15 meetings on a regular basis between their defense authorities. Moreover, the two countries actively conduct high-level defense exchanges as Japan’s Minister of Defense attends the Shangri-La Dialogue organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) almost every year to explain Japan’s security policy. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with Defense Minister Ng on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus. Based on Vientiane Vision 2.0, the two ministers agreed to promote cooperation, including high-level exchanges and port calls by vessels and aircraft, while also exchanging opinions on regional situations, including those of North Korea and the South China Sea. In addition, in February 2020, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Singapore and held a meeting with Defense Permanent Secretary Chiang to exchange views on the regional situation and on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. As for the major service-to-service exchanges, a delegation led by the Colonel Koh, Assistant Chief of the General Staff (training) visited Japan in July 2019 and held the 12th JGSDF-Singapore Army Staff Talks in order to share the recognition to the future program on defense cooperation and exchanges between the GSDF and the Singapore Army. As for naval exchanges, the MSDF made four port calls to Singapore during 2019 alone on the way to and back from counter-piracy operations. In May 2019, Destroyers JS “Izumo” and JS “Murasame,” which were on the Indo-Pacific Deployment, called at Singapore during the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Exercise to join IMDEX Asia 2019, a maritime and defense exhibition, which was ongoing at the moment and held an onboard reception and goodwill training. In addition, the Chief of Staff, MSDF visited Singapore to speak at IMDEX Asia 2019 in conjunction with the call of ASDF Chi f f St ff M h i t lk ith th Si Ai F d (O t b 2019) these ships. In October 2019, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made a visit to Singapore, where he met with Singapore’s Air Force Commander Khong and exchanged views on serviceto-service cooperation in defense and security. Additionally, MSDF vessels have made port calls in Singapore during international cooperation operations, such as United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and counter-piracy operations. Also, service-to-service exchanges have been actively conducted. **(4) The Philippines** Between Japan and the Philippines, a coastal state in the South China Sea and an ally of the United States, there are frequent mutual visits by naval vessels, working-level exchanges including Military-Military Consultation, and service-toservice exchanges along with high-level exchanges. At the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting between then Minister of Defense Nakatani and then Secretary of National Defense Gazmin held in January 2015, the two Ministers signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges. This memorandum shows the intention of the two countries to conduct cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as maritime security, in addition to defense ministerial meetings and vice-ministerial consultations on a regular basis, reciprocal visits between the SDF Chief of Staff, JS and the Chiefs of Staff of the each SDF Service, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commander of each service, and participation in training and exercises. At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in November 2015, Prime Minister Abe and then President Aquino reached a consensus in principle on the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which was signed in February 2016. At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in September 2016, Prime Minister Abe and President Duterte agreed on the transfer of MSDF TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippines in order to enhance its capabilities in HA/DR, transportation, and maritime situational awareness. Two TC-90s were delivered in March 2017 and three TC-90s in March 2018, which completed the transfer of a total of five TC-90s to the Philippine Navy. Moreover, at the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting between then Defense Minister Onodera and Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana held on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, Japan confirmed that it would grant GSDF’s decommissioned UH1H parts and maintenance equipment to the Philippine Air Force. The delivery of parts began in March 2019, and was completed in September of the same year. **Chapter** ----- At the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting in April 2019, then Defense Minister Iwaya and Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana welcomed the progress in cooperation, including the grant of TC-90s and UH-1H parts and maintenance equipment, and its contributions to the improvement of HA/DR and surveillance capabilities of the Philippines. They also confi rmed the progress in JapanPhilippines defense cooperation, including port calls, in a broad range of fi elds and agreed that the two countries will further strengthen defense cooperation in the future. High-level exchanges between Japan and the Philippines have also been deepening. Following his boarding on Destroyer JS “Izumo” in June 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte came aboard Destroyer JS “Kaga,” which made a port call at the Port of Subic during the Indo-Pacifi c Minister of Defense Kono holding a meeting with the Secretary of National Defense of the Philippines at the time of the ADMM-Plus (November 2019) **Chapter** **VOICE** Enhancing the Ability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Respond to Disasters Major OKUNISHI Yoshikazu, 2019 (IPD19), was a valuable opportunity of training not only for Commanding Offi cer of the Medical Service Unit, AFP personnel but also for civilian offi cials of the government the 4th Logistics Support Regiment, GSDF of the Philippines. Before leaving Japan, we repeated intensive (Kasuga City, Fukuoka Prefecture) rehearsals on explanation in a limited exhibition place and From June 30 to July 4, 2019, I lectured in a seminar of a time, communication in English, in particular, and how to show capacity building program for the Armed Forces of the Philippines the equipment effectively. We also tried to provide accurate (AFP). At the seminar I exhibited and explained about equipment of explanations because the AFP plans to introduce similar equipment. the lifesaving systems held by GSDF. The lifesaving systems were As a result, the seminar provided a very meaningful deployed to GSDF across Japan, learning from the experiences opportunity as the trainees expressed a lot of interest in the after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and have been used performance, intended usage and specifi c use situation, and we in the ensuing disaster relief activities. As the leader of the fi ve were also able to exchange opinions on disaster relief posture dispatched members, I provided explanations on the activities and lifesaving drills. In order to contribute to effective use of and record of the Western Army’s disaster relief, while the rest of the lifesaving systems in the Philippines, a country vulnerable members demonstrated how to use a variety of equipment and to many natural disasters, I am willing to take any opportunity conducted a rescue drill simulating a disaster site. to engage in education for units to which the equipment will The seminar conducted in the MSDF Destroyer JS “Izumo,” be deployed. stopping in the Philippines as part of Indo-Pacifi c Deployment The author making a presentation Member(s) explaining how to use the equipment ----- Deployment in September 2018, to meet then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ono and exchange opinions on the bilateral relationship. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with Secretary of the National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana of the Philippines at the 6th ADMM-Plus. Minister Kono stated that Japan would like to promote cooperation such as port calls by vessels and aircraft, Japan-PhilippinesU.S. trilateral cooperation including JSDF’s participation in the Philippines-U.S. bilateral exercises, personnel exchanges including high-level talks and defense equipment and technology cooperation based on the “Vientiane Vision 2.0.” In response, Secretary Lorenzana stated that the Philippines welcomes these measures. Both Ministers agreed to further enhance defense cooperation in broad fields including the cooperation mentioned above. In November 2019, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited the Philippines for vice-ministerial consultations with Undersecretary of National Defense Luna to exchange views on the regional situation and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. With regard to the major service-to-service cooperation and exchanges, in December 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS met with then Chief of Staff Clement, Armed Forces of the Philippines at the Ministry of Defense and reaffirmed the importance of promoting FOIP and defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. In October 2019, the GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and others participated in the Philippines-U.S. bilateral exercise “KAMANDAG 19” to improve HA/DR capabilities during the deployment of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR) and to strengthen U.S.-Japan and Japan-Philippines defense GSDF personnel making adjustments with other countries’ military personnel in KAMANDAG 19, a U.S.-Philippines bilateral exercise (October 2019) cooperation. In September 2019, Destroyer JS Asagiri conducted bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy at the Port of Subic Bay and the surrounding sea and airspace in the Philippines to improve tactical skills and promote mutual understanding and trust. In October 2019, two P-3C patrol aircraft participated for the first time in the U.S.-Philippines bilateral exercise Sama Sama to strengthen cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and Philippine navies. In July 2019, the ASDF Air Support Command conducted overseas flight training in C-1 to improve the ability of operation personnel to carry out overseas missions at Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base in the Philippines, and also conducted unit-to-unit exchanges with the Philippine Air Force. As for capability building, the MSDF held an HA/DR seminar in July 2019 on the occasion of its destroyer’s port call to the Philippines during the Indo-Pacific Deployment. See Part IV Chapter 2 Section 5-3 (Building New Defense See Equipment and Technology Cooperation) **Chapter** **(5) Thailand** With Thailand, Japan has a long history of defense cooperation and exchanges based on the traditionally good relationship between the two countries, including the commencement of the dispatch of Defense Attachés and consultations between their defense authorities from early years. As for the acceptance of foreign students at the National Defense Academy, a Thai student became the first one to be accepted in 1958. Since then, Thailand has sent the largest cumulative number of students to the academy. Since 2005, the MOD/SDF, has been participating in the multilateral exercise Cobra Gold cohosted by the United States and Thailand. In 2020, an exercise on rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas was conducted to enhance joint operation capacities during Cobra Gold 20. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with Prime Minister and Defense Minister Prayut on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus. During the meeting, Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan would like to promote cooperation such as port calls by vessels and aircraft, JSDF’s participation in the multilateral exercise Cobra Gold, and holding staff talks. In response, Minister Purayuth stated that Thailand welcomes these measures. Both ministers agreed to further enhance defense cooperation in broad fields based on the Memorandum of Arrangement between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the Video: Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 20 URL: https://youtu.be/-NSkcCEd5Ag ----- Kingdom of Thailand on Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense they had signed. From February to March 2020, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Thailand to inspect Cobra Gold 20 and meet with the Director General of the Office of Policy and Plannning of the Ministry of Defense to exchange views on the regional situation and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. As for recent service-to-service exchanges, in March 2020, the Chief of Staff, JS visited Thailand to see Cobra Gold 20. He also paid a courtesy call on Deputy Defense Minister Chaichan and met with Chief of Defense Forces Pornpipat to share their understanding of the regional situation and the strengthening of bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. As for army exchanges, in August 2019, the 2nd Royal Thai Army – Japan Ground Self Defense Force Staff Working Group was held to make future exchanges between the armies more concrete. As for capacity building programs, the ASDF has implemented seminars on aviation safety and international aviation law for Thailand since 2016. In March 2018, the GSDF conducted a seminar for the Royal Thai Army, which covered the characteristics of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) Command, engineering missions, and other matters. In June 2018, the GSDF engineering unit supported the Royal Thai Army’s preparation for PKO through training on the maintenance and management of the water purification system, which the GSDF transferred to the UN at no charge when it withdrew from the UNMISS. In March 2019, the ASDF provided capacity building in the field of aviation safety. **(6) Cambodia** In 1992, Cambodia became the first country to which Japan sent an SDF unit for UN PKO. As indicated by Japan’s capacity building for Cambodia since 2013 and other programs, defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries have made steady progress. At the JapanCambodia Summit Meeting in December 2013, the bilateral relationship was upgraded to a “strategic partnership.” After the summit, then Defense Minister Onodera signed the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defense of the Kingdom of Cambodia. In September 2017, then Defense Minister Onodera held a ministerial meeting with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Banh. They talked on the regional situation and gave high appreciation to progress in the Japan-Cambodia defense cooperation, including capacity building and service-to-service exchanges. As for recent service-to-service exchanges, in February GSDF Chief of Staff Yuasa holding a meeting with Commander of the Royal Cambodian Army (February 2020) 2020, the Chief of Staff, GSDF visited Cambodia and paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Hun Sen, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Banh, and Commander-in-chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Vong Pisen, and met with Commander of the Royal Cambodian Army Hun Manet to share their understanding of the regional situation and the promotion of bilateral defense cooperation and exchange. The GSDF has worked to enhance bilateral cooperation through capacity building programs, including education programs on engineering activities (to foster land survey instructors) for the engineering unit of the Royal Cambodian Forces, which were held in July 2017, May 2018, and from June to July 2019. The graduation ceremony in July 2019 was attended by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs. In conjunction with his participation in the ceremony, the Vice-Minister paid a courtesy call on Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Banh and met with Secretary of State for National Defense, Ministry of National Defense Neang Phat exchange views on the regional situation and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. **Chapter** **(7) Myanmar** Japan has been promoting exchanges with Myanmar since Myanmar’s transition from military rule to democratic government in March 2011, including the first visit to the country by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and the invitation of Myanmar to participate in multilateral conferences hosted by Japan. In November 2013, the two countries’ defense authorities held their first consultation in Myanmar’s capital of Naypyidaw. In November 2014, then Defense Minister Eto held a meeting with then Defense Minister Wai Lwin of Myanmar and they confirmed their intention to promote defense exchanges, while visiting Myanmar for the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Roundtable ----- Meeting chaired by Myanmar. Under the Japan-Myanmar Military Officials Exchange Program sponsored by the Nippon Foundation since 2014, general officers in Myanmar have been invited to visit SDF facilities in Japan. In October 2019, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces Min Aung Hlaing visited the Chief of Staff, JS for the first time to confirm the promotion of defense cooperation and exchanges between the SDF and the Myanmar Armed Forces under the FOIP initiative. In the same month, during his visit to Japan, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Abe. Prime Minister Abe expressed his wish for further development of cooperation based on the long history of friendship between the Myanmar Armed Forces and the SDF, and the commander called for the SDF’s cooperation for the modernization of the Myanmar Armed Forces. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono held a meeting with Defense Minister Sein Win on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus, and they agreed to further enhance defense cooperation in broad fields and exchanged views on the regional situation. The ASDF supported the establishment of a weather services unit within the Myanmar Air Force through a seminar in the field of aviation meteorology, which was held in October 2018 and January and September 2019. In December 2018, Japan held a seminar on underwater medicine for the Myanmar Navy. In May 2018, Japan started to assist the establishment of a learning environment of the Japanese language for the Japanese Language Department of the Defense Services Academy of Myanmar. **(8) Laos** Since 2014, Japan and Laos have served as co-chairs of the EWG on HA/DR of the ADMM-Plus meeting, while the relationship between the two countries’ defense authorities has made significant strides through cooperation under multilateral frameworks. In November 2016, then Defense Minister Inada became the first Japanese defense minister to visit Laos, exchanging views with Minister of National Defense Lieutenant General Chansamone regarding policies for further defense cooperation, such as high-level exchanges and capacity building, and agreeing with him to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. The two countries also agreed on the signing of a memorandum on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges between the defense authorities. In December 2018, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited the Lao Ministry of National Defense to meet Permanent Secretary of Defense Khamsy Vongkhamsao. In this meeting, they agreed to work together for an early signing of the memorandum. In October 2019, Deputy Defense Minister Yamamoto met with Deputy Defense Minister Onsi, who had been invited as a special speaker at the 11th Japan-ASEAN Defense ViceMinisterial Forum. After the meeting, the Memorandum between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defense of the Laos on Defense Cooperation and Exchange was signed. The two vice ministers agreed that the two countries will promote defense cooperation in a wide range of fields, including HA/DR, based on the memorandum. As for capacity building, the GSDF provided the engineering unit and medical unit of the Royal Lao Army with practical training on HA/DR in November 2018. These units were invited to Japan for the first time in October 2019. In addition to training at a disaster response command post, they received training at the GSDF Matsumoto Camp from GSDF personnel regarding the preparation of training plans for search and rescue and sanitation. Furthermore, in November 2019, GSDF personnel were dispatched to Laos to provide guidance to the Royal Lao Army on education and training in the areas of search and rescue and sanitation. **(9) Malaysia** Japan signed the agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology with Malaysia in April 2018. In September 2018, then Minister of Defense Mohamad Sabu visited Japan and signed with then Minister of Defense Onodera the memorandum on Japan-Malaysia defense cooperation and exchanges. In the Defense Ministerial Meeting held after the signing, the two Ministers confirmed their intention to make defense cooperation more concrete in various fields including service-to-service exchanges based on the memorandum. Also in December 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with then Defense Minister Mohamad on the occasion of the 19th Doha Forum in Qatar. During the meeting, Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan would like to further advance defense cooperation and exchanges with Malaysia, based on the “Vientiane Vision 2.0” that Japan had announced in November of the same year. Then Minister Mohamad welcomed the updated Vientiane Vision. Both Ministers confirmed to move forward defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as personnel exchanges in the education field, following the conclusion of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in April 2018. In February 2020, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs also visited Malaysia to pay a courtesy call on then Deputy Defense Minister Liew Chin Tong to exchange views on the regional situation and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. In October 2019, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made an official visit to Malaysia and met with the then Chief of Air Force Affendi to exchange views on the strengthening of the **Chapter** ----- and missile issues of North Korea, response to large-scale natural disasters, counterterrorism measures, counter piracy measures, and maritime security. On the other hand, issues between the defense authorities of Japan and ROK are affecting bilateral defense cooperation and exchange. Examples include the ROK’s response to the MSDF’s flags[5] at an international fleet review ceremony hosted by the ROK in October 2018, the irradiation of a fire control radar at an MSDF aircraft by an ROK Navy destroyer in December 2018,[6] and the ROK’s response to the JapanROK General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The MOD/SDF will continue to call on the ROK side to appropriately deal with these matters. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and** **Exchanges** a. Overview In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono held a meeting with Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeong-doo on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus. Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan-ROK bilateral relations as well as the trilateral relations between Japan, the ROK and the U.S. are extremely significant in the severe security environment surrounding Japan and the ROK although the defense relations between the two countries have been extremely sour because of various bilateral issues since 2018. The two Ministers agreed that the two defense authorities would continue their communication. b. Japan-ROK GSOMIA Based on the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats Posed by North Korea signed in December 2014, the defense authorities in Japan and the ROK have exchanged and shared classified information regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles via the United States. In light of the increasingly serious situation surrounding North Korea with its frequently repeated ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests, in November 2016, the GSOMIA was concluded between Japan and the ROK to further promote bilateral cooperation. This agreement serves as a framework to appropriately protect classified military information shared between the Japanese and ROK governments. In August 2019, the Government of the ROK notified the Government of Japan of its intention to terminate the GSOMIA in writing. However, in November 2019, the ROK government notified Japan about the ASDF Chief of Staff Marumo having talks with the Malaysian Air Force commander (October 2019) relationship between the two air forces. As for capacity building, an HA/DR seminar was held in May 2019 on the occasion of a port call of a destroyer to Malaysia during the Indo-Pacific Deployment. **(10) Brunei** Regarding Japan’s relations with Brunei, during the Second ADMM-Plus meeting held in Brunei in August 2013, then Defense Minister Onodera held talks with then Brunei’s Minister of Energy Mohammad Yasmin Umar and exchanged views on the ADMM-Plus initiatives. In March 2020, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Brunei and paid a courtesy call on Second Minister of Defence Halbi and met with Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense Shahril for an exchange of views on the regional situation and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. As for recent service-to-service exchanges, in February 2019, the Chief of Staff, MSDF visited Brunei to meet then Commander of the Royal Brunei Navy Norazmi Pengiran Haji Muhammad. The two leaders agreed to further strengthen the navy component relationship through mutual visits of naval ships and other activities. In addition, in February 2020, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Brunei to pay a courtesy call on Second Minister of Defence Halbi, and they agreed to further develop bilateral defense cooperation. **4 Republic of Korea (ROK)** **Chapter** **(1) Significance of Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and** **Exchanges** Both Japan and the ROK confront wide-ranging complex security challenges, including response to the nuclear As for MSDF’s ship flag, see the MOD website (https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/net/shiritai/flag/index.html) In December 2018, Gwanggaeto-daewarg, the Great class destroyer of the ROK Navy, directed a fire control-radar at a MSDF patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance activities off the coast of Noto Peninsula (within Japan’s exclusive economic zone). Taking the incident seriously, in January 2019, the MOD published its final statement, compiling objective facts, and has been urging the Korean side to take recurrence prevention measures. The SDF patrol aircraft was flying while keeping sufficient altitude and distance, and did not fly in a way that could have threatened the Korean navy vessel. The MOD will expend all possible means to monitor the situation and gather intelligence. For details, see the MOD website (https://www. d j / /d t/ d /i d ht l) ----- suspension of this notification.[7] In response, Defense Minister Kono commented that Japan-U.S. and Japan-ROK bilateral cooperation and Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation are important amid the severe security environment in East Asia, and that he considered that the ROK government made its decision from a strategic perspective taking into account the current security situation in the region. See Reference 36 (Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and See Exchanges [Past Three Years]) **(3) Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Relationship** Since Japan, the United States, and the ROK share common interests pertaining to the peace and stability of this region, it is important for the three countries to seize opportunities to promote close cooperation in addressing various security issues, including those regarding North Korea. Japan, the United States, and the ROK have conducted a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. In June 2019, then Defense Minister Iwaya, ROK Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeongdoo, and then U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan convened the Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting. The three Ministers recognized the international community’s shared goal of North Korea’s full compliance with its international obligations in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, which call for North Korea’s complete denuclearization in a verifiable and irreversible manner. They underscored commitment to cooperation and coordination with the international community for fully implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, including sustained international cooperation to deter, disrupt, and ultimately eliminate North Korea’s illicit ship-to-ship transfers. Regarding regional security issues, the Ministers reaffirmed that freedom of navigation and overflight must be ensured, and that all disputes should be resolved in a peaceful manner in accordance with the principles of international law. Based on this view, they shared the recognition of strengthening security cooperation between Japan, the United States and the ROK. At the JapanU.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting held by Defense Minister Kono, ROK Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeong-doo, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus in November 2019, the three ministers committed to further trilateral security cooperation, including information sharing, high-level policy consultation, and bilateral/multilateral exercises, Chief of Joint Staff Yamazaki holding a meeting with U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (October 2019) based on the international community’s shared goal which calls for North Korea’s complete denuclearization as well as the abandonment of ballistic missiles in a verifiable and irreversible manner, North Korea’s full compliance with its international obligations in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, and the importance of a rulesbased order. At the working level, the three countries have coordinated with each other while closely sharing information through such opportunities as Director-General and Director level meetings, video conferences, and chief-of-staff level meetings based on the framework of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT). In May 2020, a plenary meeting of Director-Generals was held in the form of a video-teleconference. The representatives of the three countries engaged in consultation on the North Korean nuclear and missile threat, regional security, the coronavirus pandemic, and substantive ways to strengthen trilateral security cooperation. As for service-to-service exchange, the Chief of Staff, JS visited the United States in October 2019 to participate in the Japan-U.S.-ROK chiefs of staff meeting. At this meeting, the Chief of Joint Staff, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley, and ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Park discussed trilateral defense cooperation from the viewpoint of promoting the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. Also, in July 2019, the Chief of Joint Staff and members of the GSDF Chemical School participated in Eastern Endeavour 19, an ROK-hosted Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) training exercise held in Busan. In addition to the MOD/ SDF, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the National Police Agency, and the Japan Coast Guard participated in the training along with the relevant organizations of other **Chapter** The provision of the GSOMIA on termination of the agreement is as follows: ARTICLE 21 ENTRY INTO FORCE, AMENDMENT, DURATION AND TERMINATION (excerpt) 3. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of one year and shall be automatically extended annually thereafter unless either Party notifies the other in writing through the di l ti h l i t d i d f it i t ti t t i t th A t ----- participating countries. The training included an exercise on operational procedures for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Through this exercise, the participants strengthened cooperation and deepened mutual understanding with the relevant organizations of the other participating countries. The three countries need to enhance their security cooperation in various areas into the future, taking advantage of various available opportunities. **5** European Countries, Canada, and New Zealand Destroyer JS “Teruzuki” conducting goodwill training with the Royal Navy survey vessel HMS “Enterprise” (October 2019) for defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as information sharing between the two countries. At the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in May 2014, prime ministers of both countries agreed to hold a Japan-U.K. “2+2” Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting and begin negotiations on the ACSA in order to enhance bilateral cooperation in the security field. In January 2017, the Japan-U.K. ACSA[8] was signed. After the approval by Japan’s National Diet in April 2017, the ACSA entered into force in August. At the same time, relevant domestic laws were developed. The effectuation of the Japan-U.K. ACSA enables the two countries to implement the mutual provision of supplies and services, such as water, food, fuel and transportation, between the SDF and U.K. Armed Forces through unified procedures in bilateral exercises and large-scale disaster relief operations, further facilitating and strengthening the Japan-U.K. strategic partnership. The Japan-U.K. Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, issued during the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in August 2017, stipulated that the two countries agreed to develop an action plan with specific measures relating to bilateral security cooperation between the relevant authorities. At the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in January 2019, the leaders reaffirmed the above Declaration and confirmed that the bilateral relationship had entered the next phase. At the third Japan-U.K. “2+2” Meeting in December 2017, the two countries issued a joint statement, which referred to bilateral exercises between the GSDF and U.K. Army, British naval ships’ deployment to the Indo-Pacific region and bilateral exercises with the SDF, and progress of the joint research on new air-to-air missiles. In addition, in November 2019, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with Defense Minister Wallace. The two ministers exchanged views on bilateral European countries, Canada, and New Zealand share universal values with Japan and play a central role in initiatives to address common challenges to global security, with a primary focus on non-traditional security areas, such as counter-terrorism and combating illicit ship-to-ship transfers, as well as international peace cooperation activities. In this regard, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with these countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in dealing with these challenges and this is important for all of Japan, European countries, Canada, and New Zealand. See Reference 37 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See with European Countries, Canada and New Zealand [Past Three Years]) **Chapter** **(1) The United Kingdom** The United Kingdom, being a major power that has influence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests as the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation with the United Kingdom by working together on global issues, such as international peace cooperation activities, counterterrorism and counter-piracy operations and by exchanging information on regional situations. With regard to Japan’s relationship with the United Kingdom, the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation was signed in June 2012. Following this, Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology came into effect in July 2013 and the JapanU.K. Information Security Agreement entered into force in January 2014, leading to the development of a foundation The ACSA applies to the following activities: (1) bilateral/multilateral exercises; (2) UN PKO; (3) internationally coordinated peace and security operations; (4) humanitarian international relief operations; (5) operations to cope with large-scale disasters; (6) protection measures for or transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas for their evacuation from overseas; (7) communication and coordination or other routine activities; and (8) any other activity in which the provision of supplies and services is permitted under the laws and l ti f th ti t i ----- Ocean, France is the only European country that maintains a constant military presence in the Indo-Pacific region. It also historically has had a close relationship with Japan and is positioned as Japan’s special partner. The first Japan-France “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting was held in Paris in January 2014, followed by the visit of then Minister of the Armed Forces Le Drian to Japan in July of the same year when the Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges was signed. From 2015 to 2018, four “2+2” meetings were held. At these meetings, Japan and France discussed issues including the following: international terrorism, maritime security, defense equipment and technology cooperation, ACSA, bilateral exercises, cooperation in the space domain, and collaboration in capacity building in developing countries. Following these meetings, Japan and France signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in March 2015. In March 2017, the second meeting of the Japan-France Comprehensive Dialogue on Space was held. In the meeting, Japan and France signed the “technical arrangement concerning information sharing regarding the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) between the relevant authority in Japan and the Minister of Defense of the French Republic.” In July 2018, the Japan-France ACSA was signed. After the approval by Japan’s National Diet in May 2019, the ACSA entered into force in June of the same year. At the fifth Japan-France “2+2” Meeting and the Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Brest, France, in January 2019, the two countries—both as maritime nations and Pacific nations—decided to establish the Japan-France Comprehensive Maritime Dialogue in order to promote specific cooperative measures, especially to materialize cooperation in the maritime field, for the purpose of maintaining and reinforcing FOIP. They also welcomed the commencement of the cooperative research on the Feasibility Study For Mine Countermeasure Technological Activities, and agreed to promote bilateral exercises involving French aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle,” deployed in the Indian Ocean, and to collaborate in capacity building programs for Southeast Asian countries and the Pacific Island countries. Japan and France also agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation in the cybersecurity and space fields through the Japan-France Bilateral Consultations on Cybersecurity and the Japan-France Comprehensive Dialogue on Space. Based on this initiative, the Japan-France-Australia-U.S. multilateral exercise “La Perouse” was conducted in the Indian Ocean in May 2019 with the aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle.” Furthermore, Japan highly appreciated France’s decision MSDF Chief of Staff Yamamura exchanging opinions with U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and U.K. First Sea on board the British aircraft carrier “Queen Elizabeth” (November 2019) defense cooperation and exchanges and the security situation surrounding the two countries. In addition, Defense Minister Kono explained the SDF’s intelligence gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. The security cooperation between the two countries has been steadily deepening. As for service-to-service exchanges, from September to October 2019, the GSDF Central Band supported the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Military Band in participating in the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo hosted by the United Kingdom and held in Australia, contributing to the improvement of the band’s performance and techniques, the strengthening of the relationship between U.K., Japanese, Australian, and PNG forces, and the enhancement of Japan’s credibility in the international community. In May 2019, the SDF supported U.K. Army’s pre-dispatch training on UNMISS, which led to the first ever exchange of experts in PKO between U.K. and Japanese armies. The GSDF and U.K. Army held the bilateral exercise “Vigilant Isles” from September to October 2019 to improve their tactical skills and bilateral coordination. In October 2019, the MSDF conducted goodwill training with the Royal Navy survey vessel HMS “Enterprise.” In November 2019, the Chief of Staff, MSDF visited the United States, and on board U.K. aircraft carrier “Queen Elizabeth,” he exchanged views with the Chief of Naval Operations Gilday and First Sea Lord Radakin on the deepening of trilateral cooperation for leading the international community and maintaining maritime order. Following this talk, they issued a joint statement. In January 2020, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made a visit to the United Kingdom and exchanged views with the U.K. Chief of the Air Staff and other officials. **(2) France** France is a major power that has influence not only in Europe and Africa, but also around the world. Having its overseas territories across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific **Chapter** ----- Defense Minister Kono holding a meeting with the French Minister of the Armed Forces at the time of the Manama Dialogue (November 2019) to dispatch ships and aircraft in the first half of the year to patrol and monitor illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers. The two countries confirmed that they would continue their close cooperation. Defense Minister Kono met with Minister of the Armed Forces Parly at the 15th Manama Dialogue in Bahrain in November 2019 and at the Munich Security Conference held in Germany in February 2020. Both ministers welcomed that Japan-France defense cooperation is advancing, and they confirmed to closely work together for the potential “2+2” meeting to be held in Tokyo. Both ministers also shared views to promote concrete cooperation as partners to promote “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” As for major service-to-service exchanges, the SDF has participated in the HA/DR exercises (“Equateur”) hosted by the French Armed Forces stationed in New Caledonia since 2014. In August 2018, an MSDF training squadron conducted goodwill training with French reprenishment oiler “Somme” in Brest. In September 2018, the Naval Chiefs of Staff of the two countries signed the Strategic Orientation agreeing to strengthen bilateral cooperation not only in the Pacific region, but also in the Indian Ocean. In addition, in August 2019, an MSDF training squadron and the French Navy held a goodwill exercise off the coast of French Polynesia. Furthermore, in June 2019, C-2 transport aircraft participated in the Paris Air Show for the first time. In January 2020, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made a visit to France and exchanged views with the Chief of Staff of the French Air Force. In May 2020, the two chiefs signed the Strategic Orientation and agreed to strengthen cooperation between two air forces. GSDF Chief of Staff Yuasa holding a meeting with the Commander of the Canadian Army (October 2019) approval by Japan’s National Diet in May 2019. At the fourth Japan-Canada “2+2” Foreign and Defense Vice-Ministerial meeting held in December 2018, both sides reaffirmed that they would promote further cooperation. In June 2019, which marked the 90th anniversary of Japan-Canada diplomatic relations, then Defense Minister Iwaya held the first Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting in three years with Canadian Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan. It was the first official visit to Japan by Canadian Defence Minister in 13 years. At the meeting, the ministers welcomed the deepening of the two countries’ relationship, including the signing of the Japan-Canada ACSA and cooperation in warning and surveillance activities against illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea. They agreed that in particular, the MSDF and the Canadian Navy will take various opportunities to conduct bilateral exercises. They also agreed to work out the specifics of cooperation in the field of peacekeeping. The ministers also exchanged views on the regional situation, including issues related to the Korean Peninsula and the East and South China Seas. After the meeting, the ministers announced a joint statement that serves as a concrete guideline for the promotion of future defense cooperation. This was the first joint statement to be issued by the defense authorities of Japan and Canada. In February 2020, Defense Minister Kono met with Defence Minister Sajjan on the occasion of his attendance at the 56th Munich Security Conference. At the meeting, the Ministers welcomed the progress in bilateral defense cooperation in various fields, reviewed recent bilateral cooperation and exchanges, and agreed to foster cooperation in the IndoPacific region. As for major service-to-service exchanges, the Chief of Staff, GSDF made a visit to Canada for the first time in October 2019, where he met with the Commander of the Canadian Army Eyre. In June 2019, the destroyers JS “Izumo,” JS “Murasame,” and JS “Akebono” conducted the bilateral exercise KAEDEX19-1 with the Canadian **Chapter** **(3) Canada** Between Japan and Canada, high-level exchanges, talks between defense authorities, and other exchanges have been conducted, with the Japan-Canada ACSA signed in April 2018, and entering into force in July 2019 after gaining ----- Minister of Defense Kono holding a meeting with the Canadian Defence Minister at the Munich Security Conference (February 2020) Navy ships HMCS “Regina” and MV “Asterix” in the sea and airspace off the coast of Vietnam. In October 2019, the destroyers JS “Shimakaze” and JS “Chokai,” and the Canadian Navy ship HMCS “Ottawa,” conducted the bilateral exercise KAEDEX19-2 in the sea and airspace south of the Kanto region to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation. In February 2020, Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force Meinzinger visited Japan to meet with the Chief of Staff, ASDF and the Commander of the Air Defense Command. They agreed to strengthen cooperation between the air forces in light of the recent developments in the relationship between the Japanese and Canadian defense authorities. Minister of Defense Kono holding a meeting with the Defence Minister of New Zealand at the occasion of the ADMM-Plus (November 2019) high-level exchanges between the two defense authorities. Also, they expressed their strong willingness in pursuing possibilities of bilateral cooperation on Pacific island countries. In addition, the ministers exchanged views on regional situation in Oceania, including Pacific island countries and New Zealand. As for service-to-service exchanges, Chief of the New Zealand Army Boswell visited Japan in September 2019. In November 2019, Chief of Air Force Clark visited Japan. In December 2019, the three countries of Japan, the United States, and Australia held a multilateral HA/DR exercise “Christmas Drop” for the first time with the participation of New Zealand. **Chapter** **(4) New Zealand** In relation to New Zealand, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed in August 2013. During a Summit Meeting in July 2014, the two countries agreed to conduct studies on an ACSA. In addition, at the Summit Meeting in September 2019, the two leaders shared the view that two countries will commence a joint study toward negotiations for an agreement on security information sharing. In June 2019, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Suzuki visited New Zealand and paid a courtesy call to Defence Minister Ron Mark. They exchanged opinions on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges and the defense policies of both countries. Concerning warning and surveillance activities against illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea, they agreed to continue to work together. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with Defence Minister Mark on the occasion of the 6th ADMMPlus. Defense Minister Kono expressed gratitude for New Zealand’s deployment of a patrol aircraft to collect evidence of North Korea’s “ship-to-ship” transfers, which is the second deployment by the country following on from a deployment in 2018. He added that he would like to continue to foster relations with New Zealand. The ministers welcomed active **(5) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** When Prime Minister Abe visited Europe in May 2014, he held a meeting with then NATO Secretary General Rasmussen at NATO Headquarters and signed the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) (revised in May 2018). Based on the IPCP, SDF personnel were dispatched to NATO Headquarters for the first time in December 2014 as part of the Japan-NATO cooperation in the field of women, peace and security. Furthermore, the MOD/ SDF has participated in the annual meeting of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) since 2015. In addition, from December 2019, an ASDF Lieutenant Colonel has been assigned to the NATO Headquarters Consultation, Command and Control Staff (NHQC3S) as staff responsible for managing information and communications for various NATO policies and projects. The MOD also sent a liaison officer to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in February 2017 and a liaison officer to the NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM) in June 2019. In July 2018, the Mission of Japan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was established as an additional role of the Embassy of Japan in Belgium. In the cyber field, since March 2019, the MOD official ----- has been being dispatched to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). In December 2019, Japan participated for the first time in the NATO cyber defense exercise Cyber Coalition 2019 in Estonia. In February 2020, Defense Minister Kono held a meeting with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg at the 56th Munich Security Conference, where they welcomed the progress of cooperation between Japan and NATO, especially in the fields of cyber and maritime security, and exchanged views on regional security issues. **(6) Other European Countries** Japan and Germany signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in July 2017. In the same month, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Germany for the first JapanGermany defense vice-ministerial strategic dialogue, indicating progress in high-level and other bilateral exchanges. In February 2019, Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel visited Japan for the Japan-Germany Summit Meeting. In this meeting, the two leaders welcomed that the negotiations to conclude an agreement on the security of information reached an agreement in principle, and affirmed that they would seize this opportunity to promote bilateral security and defense cooperation. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with Defence Minister Kramp-Karrenbauer to exchange views on bilateral defense exchanges and the security situation surrounding the two countries. He also explained the SDF’s information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In February 2020, Defense Minister Kono met Defence Minister Kramp-Karrenbauer at the 56th Munich Security Conference, where both ministers shared the view that they would promote concrete cooperation to realize the vision of a FOIP, and exchanged views on issues such as security situations in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan and Italy have been promoting institutional development for facilitating defense cooperation and exchanges, including the entry into force of the JapanItaly Information Security Agreement in June 2016 and the signing of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of the Defence Equipment and Technology in May 2017 that came into force in April 2019. In September 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera visited Italy for a bilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting with the Italian Minister of Defence Elisabetta Trenta. In the meeting, the two ministers agreed to further strengthen bilateral coordination in maritime security. In addition, in January 2020, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made his first visit to Italy, exchanging views with the Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force and others on the regional situation and defense policy. Spanish Defense Minister De Cospedal visited Japan in January 2018 for a Japan-Spain defense ministerial meeting, where the Japanese and Spanish ministers agreed to further enhance the relationship between the two countries’ defense authorities based on the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges signed in November 2014. The then Netherlands’ Minister of Defence HennisPlasschaert visited Japan in December 2016 for a JapanNetherlands defense ministerial meeting, where the two ministers signed a memorandum regarding defense cooperation and exchanges. In September 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera visited the Netherlands for the JapanNetherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister of the Netherlands Carola Schouten. In the meeting, the two ministers exchanged opinions on cooperation under the frameworks of the NATO and the European Union (EU). In addition, then Minister of Defense Onodera explained the situation of the illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea and stressed the importance of implementing strict sanctions on these illicit practices under the UN Security Council Resolutions. It was agreed that the Netherlands would work closely with Japan regarding this matter, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and the then chair of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea. In September 2018, Estonian Minister of Defence Jüri Luik visited Japan for the bilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting. Based on what was discussed during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Estonia in January 2018, Japan and Estonia agreed to deepen cooperation in cybersecurity through bilateral and multilateral efforts, which includes the dispatch of the Japanese MOD officials to the NATO CCDCOE. Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defence Anatolii Petrenko visited Japan in October 2018. During this visit, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed and the Japan-Ukraine Security Meeting was held. In February 2020, Defense Minister Kono held the first defense ministerial meeting with Defence Minister Zahorodniuk at the 56th Munich Security Conference. Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan consistently respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that Japan’s position is that it will not accept any attempt to change the status quo by coercion. Both ministers affirmed the importance of bilateral defense cooperation, and shared the view that they would materialize various cooperation based on the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges that they signed in 2018. Both ministers exchanged views on issues such as security situations surrounding both countries. In February 2019, then Finnish Minister of Defence Jussi Niinistö visited Japan. During this visit, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed and the **Chapter** ----- Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. The two countries agreed to further deepen bilateral defense cooperation in various fields, building upon the recent development of bilateral defense exchanges. With Denmark, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with Defense Minister Bramsen in October 2019, where they exchanged views on bilateral defense exchanges and the security situation surrounding both countries. In addition, Defense Minister Kono explained the SDF’s intelligence gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In February 2020, at the 56th Munich Security Conference, Minister of Defense Kono held talks with EU High Representative Borrell, where they welcomed that the cooperation is advancing especially in the field of maritime security, and shared the view that they would continue to promote concrete defense cooperation and exchanges. They exchanged views on issues such as security situations in the Indo-Pacific region. **6 China** Meeting was held for the first time in four years and five months on the margins of the ADMM-Plus meeting between then Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani and then Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan. In addition, in June 2019, following the Defense Ministerial Meeting held during the previous year’s ADMM-Plus, then Defense Minister Iwaya and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe held a meeting during the Shangri-La Dialogue, where both ministers shared the recognition of the importance to realize the mutual visits between the Japanese Defense Minister and the Chinese Defense Minister as soon as possible. Based on this shared understanding, in December 2019, Defense Minister Kono visited China for the first time in 10 years as defense minister. At this meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, Defense Minister Kono conveyed his concerns about the activities of the Chinese military regarding the situation in the East China Sea, including the sea and airspace around the Senkaku Islands. Defense Minister Kono also strongly urged a positive response from the Chinese side. The ministers then welcomed the steady progress of exchanges for mutual understanding and trust between the defense authorities of Japan and China, agreeing to continue such efforts between the two countries. In March 2015, the 13th JapanChina Security Dialogue took place in Tokyo, with the two countries’ diplomatic and defense authorities participating. It was the first such meeting in four years. This Dialogue has been held almost every year since then. In addition, the Japanese and Chinese defense authorities have also participated in the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs. The eleventh consultation was held in Hokkaido in May 2019. As for service-to-service exchanges, in April 2019, Destroyer JS “Suzutsuki” visited China, as the first MSDF ship to do so in about seven and a half years, and participated in the International Fleet Review held by China to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. In the same month, the Chief of Staff, MSDF, who visited China for the first time in about five and Mi i t f D f K h ldi ti ith th Chi D f Mi i t (D b 2019) **Chapter** **(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with** **China** A stable relation between Japan and China is an essential factor for the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. From broad and medium- to long-term perspectives, it is necessary for both countries to strive to build and enhance the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China” in all areas, including security. In the security field, in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust, the MOD/SDF will promote multilayered dialogues and exchanges with China. In doing so, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for peace and stability in the IndoPacific region, comply with international norms of conduct, and improve transparency regarding military capability enhancement in the context of its rapidly increasing defense budget. Moreover, in order to avoid unexpected situations, Japan will utilize the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China in a manner that contributes to building a trusting relationship between the two countries. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges** Japan-China defense exchanges stagnated following the Japanese government’s acquisition of ownership of the three Senkaku Islands (Uotsurijima Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island) in September 2012, but have gradually resumed since the latter half of 2014. In November 2015 Japan-China Defense Ministerial ----- a half years, attended a high-level symposium held on the sideline of the Fleet Review. On this occasion, the MSDF Chief of Staff conveyed the importance of free and open seas. Following this, in October 2019, the Chinese navy guidedmissile destroyer “Taiyuan” became the fi rst Chinese naval vessel to visit Japan in about 10 years, and conducted the third goodwill training with an SDF destroyer, which was the fi rst such training in about eight years. As for unit-to-unit exchanges, a delegation from the Eastern Theater Command, headed by the deputy commander, visited Japan in November 2018, followed by a delegation from the SDF, led by the Western Army commanding General, visiting the Eastern Theater Command and other areas in November 2019. In 2018, the Japan-China fi eld-grade offi cer exchange program hosted by Japan’s Sasakawa Peace Foundation was held for the fi rst time in six years. In April 2018 and September 2019, the Chinese delegation consisting of fi eldgrade offi cers of the People’s Liberation Army visited Japan, in addition, the Japanese delegation consisting of fi eld-grade offi cers of the SDF visited China in September 2018 and April 2019, The Japanese delegate paid courtesy calls to important persons and visited military units etc. In efforts to build a “Mutually Benefi cial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” Japan and China must strive to promote confi dential relations and mutual understanding through dialogue at various levels in various areas and must proactively step up concrete cooperation and exchange in non-traditional security areas, such as counterpiracy measures. **Chapter** Voice of SDF Personnel Who Participated in the International Fleet Review to Commemorate **VOICE** the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy Captain MOTOMURA Shingo, Escort Division 8 Commander, It is very meaningful that a destroyer of MSDF visited China MSDF for the fi rst time in approximately seven-and-a-half years and As Escort Division 8 Commander, I commanded Destroyer JS participated for the first time in a fleet review held by the “Suzutsuki” and participated in the International Fleet Review Chinese Navy. The fact that the maritime exchange between during the FY2018 ocean training exercise (flight). The review the MSDF and the Chinese Navy was resumed with the was held by China to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the participation in the fl eet review was very gratifying for me, as founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. This was I had served as Defense Attache to China. In October 2019, a large-scale event reviewed by President Xi Jinping and with the guided missile destroyer “Taiyuan” of the Chinese Navy participation of approximately 30 Chinese military vessels, became the first Chinese military vessel to call at Japan in including aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” and approximately 20 approximately 10 years, and goodwill training with a MSDF aircraft, as well as 18 military vessels from 13 countries. When destroyer was implemented for the fi rst time in approximately participating in the fl eet review, Destroyer JS “Suzutsuki” had an eight years. I think that continued Japan-China maritime opportunity to call at Qingdao of Shandong. The opening of the exchange will lead to the promotion of mutual understanding destroyer to the public at the place was enormously popular, and trust. attracting many Qingdao citizens. The author participating in the event to welcome the arrival (center) Destroyer JS “Suzutsuki” in full dressing at the Port of Qingdao ----- **(3) Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between** **the Defense Authorities of Japan and China** At Japan-China Summit Meetings in January and April 2007, then Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao agreed to develop a mechanism for communications, particularly maritime communications, between the two countries’ defense authorities. Based on the agreement, their defense authorities held the first Joint Working Group Meeting on the mechanism in April 2008 and accumulated talks. From the fourth Joint Working Group Meeting in January 2015, diplomatic authorities of both countries joined the negotiations. After the eighth meeting of the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs in December 2017 and the seventh Joint Working Group Meeting in April 2018, Japanese and Chinese defense authorities signed the memorandum[9] on the mechanism in the presence of Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on the occasion of the Japan-China Summit Meeting in Tokyo in May 2018, and the operation of this mechanism commenced on June 8, 2018. The “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China” has been developed (1) to promote mutual understanding and confidence between Japan and China and to enhance bilateral defense cooperation and exchange; (2) to avoid unexpected collisions; and (3) to prevent unforeseen circumstances in the sea and air from developing into military clashes or political or diplomatic issues. The mechanism’s main components include (1) annual and expert meetings between the two countries’ defense authorities; (2) a hotline between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities; and (3) on scene communication measures between vessels and aircraft of the SDF and the People’s Liberation Army. Under the mechanism, the first annual and expert meetings were held between the defense authorities in December 2018, and the second annual and experts’ meetings were held in January 2020, to exchange views on the maritime security policies of the two countries, the operational status and improvement of the mechanism, as well as to coordinate the establishment of a hotline. At the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting in December 2019, the ministers also confirmed that the mechanism has been operating appropriately since its inception and has played an important role in building trust between the defense authorities of Japan and China and avoiding contingencies in the field. The ministers also agreed to accelerate efforts to establish the hotline as soon as possible. See Reference 38 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See with China [Past Three Years]) **7 Russia** **(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with** **Russia** Given that Russia is a key security player in the Indo-Pacific region and an important country neighboring Japan, it is very important for Japan to promote confidential relations with Russia through bilateral defense exchanges. As Japan-Russia relations have continuously been developing in a wide range of areas, the MOD/SDF has continuously conducted Japan-Russia “2+2” Meetings and various dialogues with Russian defense authorities according to the Memorandum on Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges signed in 1999 (revised in 2006), annual meetings based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas,[10] and bilateral search and rescue exercises. The Government of Japan deals with the relationships with Russia appropriately while emphasizing the solidarity of the G7 (Group of Seven), taking the Ukrainian situation and other factors into account. At the same time, it is important to maintain constant contacts with Russia, as one of Japan’s neighbors, at the working level to avoid unforeseen circumstances or unnecessary conflicts. The MOD considers these points in a comprehensive manner and advances defense exchanges with Russia accordingly. **Chapter** **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges** At the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in April 2013, the two leaders affirmed the importance of expanding MSDF Chief of Staff Yamamura having talks with the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy (November 2019) 9 Official title: Memorandum on the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense 10 Offi i l titl J R i A t th ti f i id t t b d t it i l t d th i b th ----- cooperation between Japan and Russia in the field of security and defense and agreed to set up the JapanRussia “2+2” Meeting, where the two countries’ defense and foreign ministers participate. At the first Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in November 2013, the two countries agreed to conduct service-to-service unit exchanges between army branches and the mutual dispatch of exercise observers on a regular basis, and bilateral exercises of counter-piracy units of the MSDF and Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden, as well as the regular Japan-Russia Cybersecurity Meeting. At the second Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in March 2017, the two countries exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations among others. Concerning the activities of the Russian Armed Forces, the Japanese side protested against enhancing armaments, including the deployment of surface-to-ship missiles on the Northern Territories and the deployment of divisions on islands that may contain the Four Northern Islands. Japan expressed regret that these activities conflicted with Japan’s stance that the Northern Territory is an inherent part of the territory of Japan. In July 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera became the first Japanese Minister of Defense to pay a visit to Russia. He joined the Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting and the Defense Ministerial Meeting. In these meetings, Japan and Russia agreed on promoting bilateral defense exchanges, including a visit by the Chief of Staff, JS to Russia and mutual visits of naval ships, as well as on cooperation towards the denuclearization of North Korea, which has been a shared goal for the two countries. In May 2019, the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting and the fourth Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting were held in Tokyo. Regarding defense exchange, the Ministers agreed on the first participation by the GSDF Central Band in an international military music festival in Russia held in the summer of 2019. Regarding defense policy, the Japanese side explained that Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system is a purely defensive one and does not pose a threat to Russia. As for service-to-service exchanges, following a visit to Russia by the Chief of Staff, GSDF in May 2019, from August to September of the same year, the GSDF band participated for the first time in the 12th Spasskaya Tower International Military Music Festival in Moscow, deepening mutual understanding and trust between JGSDF and Russian armies. In December 2019, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Yevmenov was invited to Japan. This was the first visit to Japan by a commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in 18 years. This promoted mutual understanding and confidence building between the two navies. In January 2020, the SDF conducted its second bilateral counter-piracy exercise with Russian naval vessels in the Gulf of Aden. See Reference 39 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See with Russia [Past Three Years]) **8 Pacific Island Countries** See Reference 40 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See with Pacific Island countries [Past Three Years]) Pacific Island countries are important countries that share the importance of a free, open, and sustainable maritime order based on the rule of law as maritime nations, as well as bear strong historical relationships with Japan. At the eighth Pacific Alliance Leaders Meeting (PALM8) held in 2018, Japan expressed its intention to strengthen its commitment to the stability and prosperity of the region. In addition, the NDPG published in the same year referred for the first time to Japan’s intention to promote cooperation and exchanges with Pacific Island countries. From January to February 2020, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Fiji, PNG, and Tonga, three Pacific island countries with armed forces, for the first time as a political officer of the Ministry of Defense, and held talks with the defense ministers and other officials of each country. In all of these high-level talks, he exchanged views on a wide range of topics in defense cooperation and exchange, and confirmed their will for further promoting it in the future. Since 2015, Japan has cooperated and strengthened the bilateral relationship with PNG with regard to establishing and training a military band through a capacity building program. After about three years and five months of training, the band gave an excellent performance of the tunes Port Moresby and Kimigayo on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in front of the national leaders in November 2018. When the Chief of Staff, GSDF visited PNG for the first time in March 2019, Commander of the PNG Defence Force Gilbert Toropo expressed his appreciation for the capacity building Japan had provided. The two leaders shared the view that they continue to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in the future. From September to October 2019, the SDF provided guidance on performance and techniques to the PNG Military Band, which participated in the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo, a military music festival hosted by the United Kingdom and held in Australia. In addition to these efforts, the MSDF and ASDF have strengthened Japan’s relationships with Pacific Island **Chapter** ----- countries by calling at ports and airports. Since 2015, the ASDF has conducted the multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise Christmas Drop in the Federated States of Micronesia. In the airdrop exercises, Japan has State Minister of Defense Yamamoto holding a meeting with Minister for Defence, National Security, and Foreign Affairs of Fiji (January 2020) also dropped various donations to the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, and the Northern Mariana Islands. In October 2019, the ASDF U-4 transport aircraft and the JMSDF Training Squadron called at the Republic of Palau. The GSDF also took this opportunity to visit the Republic of Palau, and the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF offi cers participated in the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Palau. Following this visit to the Republic of Palau, the U-4s made its fi rst call to the Federated States of Micronesia, where they handed over donated wheelchairs. As part of the Pacifi c Partnership 2019 led by the United States Pacifi c Fleet, the MOD/SDF personnel were sent to the Marshall Islands to conduct cultural exchanges, including medical activities and musical performances. Moreover, in November 2019, transport aircraft C-130H called at the Republic of the Marshall Islands International **Chapter** Voice of the First Offi cial Trip to Pacifi c Island Countries by State Minister of Defense, One of **VOICE** the political offi cers of the MOD and Support Staff Defense Offi cial HORIMOTO Kumiko, As a person in charge of promoting defense cooperation and International Policy Division, Bureau of Defense Policy, exchange with Pacifi c Island countries, I engaged in preparation Internal Bureau, MOD for the meeting with the ministers of defense held in the countries Pacifi c Island countries are 14 countries located at the center and planning of an entire program including inspection of troops. of the South Pacifi c Ocean. Their importance has also been I also attended the State Minister and assisted him and served as increasing from the strategic viewpoint. Three of them, Fiji, his interpreter at the meetings. On the day of our visit to Fiji, the Papua New Guinea and Tonga have their own military forces. country was hit by a cyclone, but the Minister for Defence, National State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited all three countries Security and Foreign Affairs Seruiratu swiftly arranged a change of from January to February of 2020. This was the fi rst visit to venue to make the meeting possible. these countries by one of the political offi cers of the MOD and I am delighted that through these visits we could build face- could send a clear message of our intent to strengthen the to-face relationships at a high level as the fi rst step to promote relationship with the defense authorities of the Pacifi c Island further defense cooperation and exchange. countries. Meeting with the Minister for Defence, National Defense Minister of Tonga and State Minister of Papua New Guinea military band and the Japanese Delegation Security, and Foreign Affairs of Fiji Defense Yamamoto (The author is at the left end of the front row) (The author is to the left, in the second row) Video: Joint HA/DR exercise Christmas Drop in the Federal States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, and Commonwealth of Northern Marianas URL: https://youtu.be/t-7o82vZHAs ----- Airport on the sidelines of an exercise in the United States. As an inter-agency cooperation project with the MOFA, the ASDF transported materials for dengue fever countermeasures (mosquito nets and repellents, etc.) at the request of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, in light of the epidemic in the region. In addition, in August 2019, Destroyer JS “Ise” and amphibious transport dock ship JS “Kunisaki” called at Port Moresby, and between August and September of the same year, MSDF training ship JS “Kashima” and escort ship JS “Inazuma” called at the port of Suva, Fiji and the port of Rabaul, PNG, to conduct various goodwill events. **9 Middle Eastern Countries** in June 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS visited Israel for the first time as a Chief of Joint Staff of Japan. In September 2019, the defense authorities signed Memorandum on Protection of Information for the Exchange of Classified Information on Defense Equipment and Technology between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel. Through these efforts, Japan and Israel have strengthened their relationship in the security field. At the Japan-Iran Summit in December 2019, Prime Minister Abe gave a detailed explanation of Japan's efforts to ensure the safety of the navigation of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In addition, in October 2019 and January 2020, Defense Minister Kono held the first defense ministerial telephone conversation with Defense and Logistics Minister Hatami, in which the two ministers exchanged views on the regional situation and other issues. During the January telephone conversation, Defense Minister Kono explained the SDF’s information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japanese vessels in the Middle East. Then State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Egypt in September 2017, marking the first visit by one of the political officers of the MOD. Moreover, in June 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS visited the country, and held a meeting with Lieutenant General Mahmoud Ibrahim Mahmoud Hegazy, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces. In March 2019, Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs Sayyid Badr visited Japan and met then Minister of Defense Iwaya and signed a memorandum on defense exchanges. In October 2019, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs Badr. In December 2019, Defense Minister Kono visited Oman for the first time as a defense minister and met with Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs Badr. Both ministers confirmed to continue deepening defense cooperation and exchanges such as cooperation between the naval services under the FOIP vision. In January 2020, Prime Minister Abe visited Oman to exchange views with the new King Haitham and directly briefed him on Japan’s efforts to ensure the safety of navigation of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, gaining his support for such efforts. Japan and Qatar signed a memorandum on defense exchanges in February 2015. In May 2019, Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Attiyah visited Japan and the first defense ministers meeting was held between Minister Attiyah and then Defense Minister Iwaya. In October 2019, a telephone conversation was held between Defense Minister Kono and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Affairs Attiyah, where the two ministers exchanged views on bilateral defense exchanges. In December 2019, Defense Minister Kono attended the 19th Doha Forum hosted by Qatar for the first time as a defense minister and met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister See Reference 41 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See with Middle Eastern Countries [Past Three Years]) Since peace and stability in the Middle East are extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan, the MOD/SDF have been promoting high-level exchanges and unit-to-unit exchanges in order to build and strengthen cooperative relationships with countries in the region. Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have promoted deeper bilateral defense exchanges. The two countries signed a memorandum on defense exchanges in May 2018, and held a meeting between defense authorities in December 2018. In addition, in June 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS made a visit to the UAE as the first Chief of Joint Staff of Japan, and paid a courtesy call to, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed. He also held a meeting with Lieutenant General Hamad Mohammed Thani Al Rumaithi, chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in a broad range of fields. In October 2019 and March 2020, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with Minister of State for Defense Affairs Bowardi, in which they exchanged views on bilateral defense exchanges and regional issues. The SDF sent a C-2 transport aircraft to the Dubai Air Show in November 2019. In January 2020, Prime Minister Abe visited the UAE and met Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed to exchange views and explain Japan’s efforts to ensure the safety of navigation of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, gaining his support for such efforts. Japan and Israel held the first politico-military dialogue in October 2018. This was held in accordance with the agreement reached during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Israel in May 2018. In the first meeting, the leaders exchanged opinions on a wide range of topics, from regional situations to security issues. In November 2018, the fourth Dialogue on Cyber Issues between Japan and Israel was held In addition **Chapter** ----- Between Japan and Jordan, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed when Jordanian King Abdullah II visited Japan in October 2016. In November 2018, the King visited Japan and welcomed the steady progress concerning the defense authorities meetings and unit-to-unit exchanges during then Minister of Defense Iwaya’s courtesy visit to him and during his visit to the GSDF units of Camp Narashino. In addition, Defense Minister Kono, who visited Jordan for the first time as defense minister in December 2019, met with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lieutenant General Yousef Huneiti. During the meeting, Lt Gen Huneiti stated that bilateral defense exchanges are making progress such as the first politico-military dialogue being held for the first time in July 2019, and also stated that he would like to continue advancing cooperation in areas such as training and equipment. In response, Minister Kono stated that he would like to consider cooperation in the fields raised by Lt Gen Huneiti. **10 South Asian Countries** Minister of Defense Kono holding a meeting with the Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs of Oman (December 2019) of State for Defense Affairs Attiyah. At the meeting, both Ministers welcomed that Japan-Qatar defense cooperation and exchanges are moving forward, and confirmed to continue deepening defense cooperation and exchanges in areas such as education and training. Japan signed a memorandum on defense exchanges with Saudi Arabia in September 2016. In addition, in October and December 2019, telephone conversations were held between Defense Minister Kono and Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Mohammed. The two parties exchanged views on bilateral defense exchanges and regional developments. Defense Minister Kono also explained the SDF’s information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In January 2020, Prime Minister Abe visited Saudi Arabia to exchange views with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed, and explained and gained their support for Japan’s efforts to ensure the safety of navigation of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. Japan’s then Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense signed a Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges with Turkey’s then Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense Ümit Dündar in July 2012 during their talk. In June 2019, Commander of the Turkish Land Forces General Ümit Dündar visited Japan, held a meeting with the Chief of Staff, GSDF, and paid a courtesy call to State-Minister of Defense of Japan. In July 2019, Defense Minister Akar accompanied the president to Japan for the G20 and held talks with then Defense Minister Iwaya. With Bahrain, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with the Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force Khalifa to exchange views on bilateral defense exchange and the situation in the Middle East. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with Commander Khalifa on the occasion of the 15th Manama Dialogue held in Bahrain. This was the first ministerial-level meeting between defense authorities of the two countries. At the meeting, both sides agreed to continue high-level exchanges as well as exchanges of mainly naval services. **Chapter** See Reference 42 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See with South Asian Countries [Past Three Years]) **(1) Sri Lanka** Sri Lanka is an important country located at a key point on the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. In recent years, Japan has proactively worked to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges with Sri Lanka. In August 2018, then Defense Minister Onodera made the first visit to Sri Lanka as a Japanese Defense Minister. During this visit, the first-ever Defense Ministerial Meeting between the two countries was also held between then Defense Minister Onodera and then Sri Lankan State Minister of Defence Ruwan Wijewardene, in which they exchanged their opinions on maritime security and safety. The Sri Lankan State Minister of Defence also expressed the country’s hope to improve the capabilities of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces as a whole through capacity building of the three military services in the HA/DR field, for which then Defense Minister Onodera expressed his support. In July 2019, then State Minister of Defense Harada visited Sri Lanka for a meeting with then State Minister of Defence Wijewardene and paid a courtesy call on then President and Minister of Defence Sirisena to share their views on the need to further strengthen the partnership between the maritime states of Sri Lanka and Japan to promote FOIP. As for service-to-service exchanges, the naval forces of the two countries agreed to hold the first staff consultations in February 2019, and to conduct the bilateral HA/DR exercise JA-LAN on an annual basis. In March 2019, a U-4 made a call at the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport to conduct ----- unit-to-unit exchanges with the Sri Lankan Air Force. As for capacity building, in October 2019, six members of the Sri Lankan Air Force were invited to training in search and rescue provided by the ASDF air rescue unit. The invitees boarded the U-125A and UH-60J operated by the Naha Air Rescue Squadron and underwent a series of training such as the search, detection and rescue of search targets at sea. **(2) Pakistan** Located at the junction of South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia, Pakistan is an important state for stability in the Indo-Pacifi c region, and it faces an important sea lane for Japan. Pakistan is a pro-Japanese country that has traditionally had a friendly relationship with Japan. Building on this relationship, the two countries have promoted defense cooperation and exchanges. Since 2004, Japan and Pakistan have conducted DirectorGeneral level dialogues on defense policy on a biennial basis. However, in June 2019, the two countries held a Military-to-Military Talks for the second year in a row, in which they signed Memorandum on Japan-Pakistan Defense Cooperation and Exchange. In February 2019, Deputy Chief of Joint Staff visited Pakistan and held meetings with senior Pakistani military offi cials. As for service-to-service exchanges, the MSDF participated in AMAN, a multinational exercise by Pakistan, while also conducting educational exchanges. **11 African countries** See Reference 43 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See with Other Countries [Past Three Years]) With Djibouti, the only country where an overseas SDF facility is located, the MOD/SDF has been cooperating in counter-piracy operations. The facility was used for transporting goods to the unit dispatched to the UNMISS. From October to December 2019, the facility was used as an accommodation for SDF instructors that attended a training program for Djibouti’s military engineers on the operation of heavy machinery, which was conducted as part of Japan’s disaster response capacity building for Djibouti. In December 2019, Defense Minister Kono visited Djibouti and held a meeting with Defense Minister Burhan. At the meeting, the two ministers confi rmed that they would continue to strengthen cooperation between the defense authorities in order to deepen bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. Minister Kono also expressed his appreciation for the government’s support for the operation of the SDF’s facility in Djibouti, and explained the use of fi xed-wing patrol aircraft of the SDF’s counter-piracy unit based in Djibouti for information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japanese vessels in the Middle East. Japan will work on the stable, long-term use of this facility for security cooperation in the Middle East and Africa. **Chapter** **12 Latin American Countries** See Reference 43 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries[Past Three Years]) In December 2016, Japan and Colombia signed a memorandum on defense exchanges. From April to May 2018, then State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Brazil for talks with then Brazilian Defense Minister Silva e Luna. In addition, in July 2019, General Pujol made his fi rst visit to Japan as Commander of the Brazilian Army and met with the Chief of Staff, GSDF. In the meeting, they agreed that deepening defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries is important for peace and stability in the international community. With Jamaica, in December 2019, Prime Minister and Defense Minister Holness visited Japan and met with Defense Minister Kono. ASDF personnel providing the Sri Lankan Air Force with capacity building regarding the search d di f h t t t (O t b 2019) ----- Minister of Defense Kono holding a meeting with the Defense Minister of Djibouti (December GSDF personnel providing Djibouti’s military engineers with education on Engineer Machines 2019) (October 2019) - **❸ [Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation ]** government which allows defense ministers in the Asia **1 Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue** Pacifi c region, including ASEAN member states to attend. Initiatives Thus, the ADMM-Plus is highly signifi cant from the Multilateral framework initiatives, especially the ADMM- perspective of promoting the development and deepening Plus and the ARF,[11] have made steady progress and served of regional security and defense cooperation. The MOD/ as an important foundation for dialogue and cooperation SDF has been participating in and providing support for the and exchanges on the security of Asia Pacifi c. Japan puts meeting. There are (1) the ASEAN Defence Senior Offi cials’ Meeting (ADSOM)-Plus, (2) ADSOM-Plus Working Group importance on such multilateral frameworks and intends to (ADSOM-Plus WG), and (3) EWGs under the ministerial strengthen cooperation and mutual confi dence with countries level ADMM-Plus.[13] in the region. Moreover, Japan hosts the Japan-ASEAN In November 2019, Minister of Defense Kono attended Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and the Tokyo Defense the sixth ADMM-Plus held in Thailand. He conveyed Japan’s Forum annually, which contribute to the multilateral defense determination to make every effort to uphold and reinforce cooperation. the international order based on the rule of law, in line with our vision for FOIP. See Reference 44 (Record of Multinational Security Dialogues Minister Kono stated that Japan is determined to continue [Indo-Pacifi c Region; Past Three Years]) playing a constructive role, respecting ADMM-Plus, in Reference 45 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the order to support the resilience of the region. Also, he stated MOD) that Japan is strongly opposed to all unilateral attempts to Reference 46 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues) change the status quo. In addition, he reiterated that Japan strongly expects that an effective and substantive Code of **(1) Initiatives under the ADMM-Plus** Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) to be concluded in The ASEAN member states hold the ASEAN Defence accordance with international law. As to international security Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), a ministerial level meeting challenges, he reiterated that solidarity of the international among defense authorities in the ASEAN region, and the society is indispensable to ensure the effectiveness of UN ADMM-Plus comprising the ASEAN member states and Security Council Resolutions, including countering “ship-to eight Dialogue Partner including Japan.[12] ship transfers”. In addition, he stated our determination to The ADMM-Plus is the only meeting hosted by a continue playing our role by assuming a co-chair of the EWG 11 The ARF, a forum aimed at improving the security environment in the Asia-Pacifi c region through dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, has been held since 1994. The ARF currently comprises 26 countries and one organization as members and holds various inter-governmental meetings that are attended by both foreign affairs and defense offi cials to exchange opinions on the regional situation and the security area. The 26 countries are the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995) and Myanmar (since 1996)), Japan, Australia, Canada, China and India (since 1996), New Zealand, PNG, the ROK, Russia, the United States and Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), and Sri Lanka (since 2007). The organization member is the EU. 12 The ADMM-Plus was founded in October 2010. Japan, the United States, Australia, the ROK, India, New Zealand, China and Russia participate in this meeting as Dialogue Partnerss. 13 Japan proactively contributed to the EWGs in 2018, participating in the EWG on HA/DR in February, April, July and September, in the EWG on PKO in April and November, in EWG on Humanitarian Mine Action in April and October, in the EWG on counter-terrorism in August, in the EWG on Cyber Security in May and November, in the EWG on Maritime Security in May and N b d i th EWG Milit M di i i F b d D b **Chapter** ----- on PKO with Viet Nam in the fourth cycle (2020-2023).[14] The ADMM Plus adopted a joint statement on “Advancing Partnership for Sustainable Security”. In addition, various exercises were conducted as a culmination of the third cycle (2017-2019) of the EWG, which provides practical cooperation in seven areas.[15] The MOD/SDF participated in the exercises in HA/DR, maritime security, defense medicine, and PKO. See Fig. III-3-1-4 (Organizational Chart and Overview of the See ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus [ADMM-Plus]) Defense Ministers’ Meeting at the ADMM-Plus (November 2019) 2.0” with a view to accelerating the momentum of JapanASEAN defense cooperation. Ministers of ASEAN member states welcomed “Vientiane Vision 2.0” and expressed their expectations towards promotion of even more practical Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation in future under the updated vision. The Vientiane Vision presents an overall picture of the priority areas of the future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in a transparent manner. Vientiane Vision 2.0 retains the basic framework of the initial Vision, including its objectives, direction, and means of cooperation, but introduces three new pillars: firstly, establishing three principles of Japan-ASEAN cooperation which are “heartto-heart cooperation”, “tailored and lasting cooperation” and “equal and open cooperation”; secondly, introducing the concept of “resilience” to clarify the connection between our efforts and ASEAN’s centrality and unity; and thirdly, pursuing synergies between the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) announced by ASEAN in June 2018 and Japan’s FOIP. In the field of HA/DR, since 2018, Japan has held the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on HA/DR. In February 2019, Japan held the second round of the invitation program, inviting participants from all ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat. In this program, a seminar on the Japanese large-scale disaster response guidelines and the first table-top exercise were conducted. In the field of international law, in November 2018, Japan invited all ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat to the Japan-ASEAN Symposium on International Law titled “Regional Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the Rule of Law.” In the field of international aviation law and security in the air of aviation, the Professional Airmanship Program was **(2) ARF** Regarding the ARF, in which mainly diplomatic authorities are engaged, concrete efforts[16] have been made in recent years for specific initiatives in non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security, and peacekeeping and peace building. The MOD/SDF has been making active contributions to this forum. At an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM on MS) that has been held since 2009,[17] for example, Japan has taken leadership in formulating a collection of best practices concerning assistance for capacity building in the field of maritime security. In the field of disaster relief, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel and aircraft to ARF Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF-DiREx) conducted since 2009. **(3) Multilateral Security Dialogues Sponsored by the MOD/** **SDF** a. ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting and Vientiane Vision 2.0 Based on the proposal by Prime Minister Abe at the ASEANJapan Commemorative Summit in December 2013, the first ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting took place in Bagan, Myanmar, in November 2014. This meeting, in which opinions were exchanged on cooperation in nontraditional security areas such as HA/DR and maritime security, was a breakthrough opportunity bringing defense ministers from Japan and the ASEAN member states together for the first time in the history of nearly 50 years of friendship and cooperation between Japan and ASEAN. This marked an important first step towards strengthening defense cooperation in the future. In November 2019, at the 5th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Thailand, Defense Minister Kono announced an updated version of Japan’s original initiative Vientiane Vision; “Vientiane Vision **Chapter** 14 First cycle: 2011 to 2013; Second cycle: 2014 to 2016; Third cycle: 2017 to 2019; Fourth cycle: 2020 to 2023 15 Expert meetings have been established in the following seven areas: counter-terrorism, HA/DR, maritime security, defense medicine, peacekeeping, mine operations, and cybersecurity. 16 In addition to the Ministers’ meeting at the foreign minister level, the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held each year, as well as meetings of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Ministers’ meeting in 2002, the ARF Defense Officials’ Dialogues (DOD) has been held ahead of the main meeting. 17 I 2011 J I d i d N Z l d h t d th thi d ISM MS i T k I 2017 J th Phili i d th U it d St t h t d th i th i T k ----- **Fig. III-3-1-4** Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) The only government-sponsored official meeting of the defense ministers in the Indo-Pacific region that includes countries outside the ASEAN region - Participating countries: 10 ASEAN member countries + 8 countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia, and the U.S.) The Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) established under the framework of the ADMM-Plus take practical actions, such as joint exercises, to address security issues in the Indo-Pacific region, which is a unique feature of the ADMM-Plus. **ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)** … Defense Minister-level meeting; Held every year **ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting Plus (ADSOM-plus)** … Vice-minister or Director-General-level meeting; Held every year **Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs)** were established under the ADSOM-plus and the ADSOM-plus WG. **ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting Plus** **Working Group (ADSOM-plus WG)** … Director-level meeting; Held every year Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) EWGs were established in seven fields. Each EWG is hosted jointly by one of the 10 ASEAN member countries and one of the additional 8 countries for a term of three years. **Chapter** - Seven fields: (i) counter-terrorism, (ii) HA/DR, (iii) maritime security, (iv) military medicine, (v) peacekeeping, (vi) mine operations, and (vii) cyber security EWGs respectively take practical actions such as sharing information, holding workshops and seminars, conducting joint training, and submitting recommendations and reports concerning respective areas. ----- c. Tokyo Defense Forum, Etc. The MOD has held the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Tokyo Defense Forum) every year since 1996 for senior officials in charge of defense policy (Director-General level officials and general-level officers) from the countries in the region to discuss defense policies of the participating countries and confidence-building measures in the field of defense. In November 219, as an effort to strengthen relations with international students who had graduated from the National Defense Academy (NDA), a gathering was held for the first time with about 50 international students who had graduated from the main course of the NDA. Defense Minister Kono also joined this gathering. Since 2002, Japan has invited people engaging in the field of security policy from Asia-Pacific countries to Japan as opinion leaders, in order to foster understanding of Japan’s security and defense policies and the situation of the SDF. **(4) Others** a. International Conferences Hosted by International Organizations In July 2019, the Chief of Staff, GSDF participated in the UN PKO Chiefs of Defense Conference at UN Headquarters. The conference was attended by 403 people, including the chiefs of staff from 106 countries. At the conference, the GSDF Chief of Staff presented the results of the revision of the Military Engineer Unit Manual and Japan’s efforts to further contribute to the UN Triangular Partnership Project (UNTPP), which won the understanding of the chiefs of staff of the armed forces of all participating countries. The participants also shared an understanding of the challenges of UN peacekeeping operations and the efforts of each country for peacekeeping operations. held for the first time in July 2019, inviting ASEAN from all ASEAN membered air force. During the program, the participants attended a symposium and base visits to promote confidence building among the air components of Japan and ASEAN member states, contribute to ensuring the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region, and bring better impact on the regional stability. In addition, in June 2019, the Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program was conducted on board Destroyer JS “Izumo,” during the Indo-Pacific Deployment, with 10 participants from all ASEAN member state and the Secretariat. In the program, participants experienced a fiveday voyage from Muara in Brunei to Subic in the Philippines, during which seminars on international maritime law and HA/DR at sea and a table top exercise on HA/DR at Sea, were also conducted to improve their knowledge of maritime security. Through these initiatives, Japan has worked to promote capacity building, mutual understanding, and network building with participants from all ASEAN member states through seminars and training programs in various areas, including maritime security and HA/DR, while also fostering a shared recognition about international law, which has contributed to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. See Reference 47 (Vientiane Vision 2.0) **Chapter** See b. Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum Since 2009, the MOD has annually held the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum for the purpose of strengthening bilateral and multilateral relationships through the development of human networks between Japanese and ASEAN vice-ministerial level officials. In October 2019, the 11th Japan-ASEAN Defense ViceMinisterial Forum was held in Tokyo, with the participation of vice ministers from all ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat, to exchange views on the following three themes: 1) Regional Security Situation; 2) Visions for the Indo-Pacific: Towards the Free and Open Regional Order; and 3) ASEAN’s Initiatives for Regional Defense Cooperation. Participants shared the recognition that ensuring the centrality and unity of ASEAN, which is the keystone of regional cooperation, is important to maintain free and open regional order which is the fundamental basis of peace and prosperity of the region in light of current regional trends of immense engagement of external states. See Section 5-2 (Initiatives to Support UN PKO, etc.) b. International Conferences Hosted by Private Organizations International conferences on security include not only intergovernmental conferences but also meetings organized by private organizations in which various people, such as government officials, scholars, and journalists, participate to discuss medium- to long- term security issues. Major international conferences organized by private bodies include the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue),[18] IISS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue),[19] and the Munich Security Conference,[20] one of the most prestigious 18 This is a multilateral conference sponsored by the IISS, a private U.K. think tank, in which defense ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defenserelated issues and regional defense cooperation. It has been held in Singapore every year since 2002 and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, named after the hotel where it takes place. 19 An international conference hosted by the U.K. IISS, where foreign and defense authorities and other stakeholders mainly from Middle Eastern countries exchange views on security issues. It is held annually in Manama, Bahrain. 20 This is one of the most prestigious international security meetings organized by private bodies in Europe and the United States and has been held annually (usually in February) since 1962. Usual participants in the meeting include officials at the ministerial level from major European countries as well as top leaders, ministers, and lawmakers from countries in the world, and k ti f i t ti l i ti ----- meetings on security in Europe and the United States. Defense Minister and MOD officials actively participate in these meetings, holding talks with defense ministers and other representatives from other countries, while making speeches at these meetings, in order to build trust and share mutual recognition with high-level officials and to send out positive messages. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono attended the 15th Manama Dialogue. This was the first time for a Japanese Defense Minister to participate in the event. At the meeting, he delivered a speech and held bilateral talks with the French Minister of the Armed Forces and ministerial-level officials from Jordan, Bahrain, and Yemen. In his speech at the 15th Manama Dialogue in November 2019, Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan has continuously contributed to peace and stability in the Middle East based on an understanding that an open and secure maritime order provides the basis for a stable and prosperous international community, and that the SDF is forging broader and closer ties with this Middle East through human contributions to maritime security in the region, participation in exercises, defense equipment cooperation, person-to-person links, and other initiatives. He also stated that Japan attaches importance to the freedom of navigation and the rule of law at sea, and that in order to ensure the safety of Japan-related ships and also to secure the peace and stability of the Middle East region, Japan has started to consider how we can best utilize the assets of the SDF as our independent efforts to reinforce our information gathering. In December 2019, Defense Minister Kono also attended the 19th Doha Forum organized by the Government of Qatar for the first time as a defense minister. He held bilateral meetings with the Ministers of Defense of Qatar and Malaysia and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Jordan, while also delivering a speech at the main meeting. In his speech on multilateral security cooperation, Defense Minister Kono expressed concern over the strengthening of North Korea’s military capabilities, including its nuclear and missile capabilities. He also stated that it is necessary to reinforce arms control and disarmament and the rule of law in the international community, and that Japan is working with other countries to promote FOIP through bilateral/ multilateral exercises, capacity building, and defense equipment and technology cooperation based on the rule of law. He cited Vientiane Vision 2.0 as an example of Japan’s multilateral security cooperation efforts, and said that Japan would continue to promote multilateral security cooperation. Minister of Defense Kono and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mogi attended the 56th Munich Security Conference in February 2020. On the occasion of the conference, Defense Minister Kono held the first defense ministerial meeting with Ukraine’s Defense Minister, as well as bilateral and other meetings with the defense ministers of Canada, France, and Germany, as well as with the High Representative of the EU and the Secretary General of NATO, where they exchanged views on defense cooperation and exchanges and regional situations. c. Service-to-Service Exchange Initiatives In August 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS attended the Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD) held by the United States Indo **Chapter** Minister of Defense Kono delivering a speech at the Manama Dialogue (November 2019) Minister of Defense Kono delivering a speech at the Doha Forum (December 2019) Pacific Command. In this Conference, he shared with other countries his view on the importance of FOIP, while also ----- promoting an understanding of Japan s and other countries defense policies and situations. In January 2020, the Chief of Joint Staff participated as a panelist at the multilateral forum Raisina Dialogue 2020 in India, together with the Deputy Commander of the Australian Defense Force, the Deputy Director General for International Relations and Strategy at the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff of the Royal Navy, the Chief of Naval of the Indian Navy, and the Chairman of the EU Military Committee, to convey the importance of Japan’s efforts to stabilize the international order for FOIP and of collaboration among nations that share values. In July 2019, the Chief of Staff, GSDF cooperated and participated in the Megacities Conference organized by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army to discuss HA/DR in the event of a natural or man-made disaster in a megacity with the armed forces of other countries, as well as internal and external experts, to promote mutual understanding and strengthen cooperation. In September 2019, he participated in the Indo-Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (IPACC), where he shared his understanding of the importance of service-to-service cooperation for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, developed and strengthened relationships with chiefs of army staff and others through exchanging information and views, and promoted security cooperation. In October 2019, the Chief of Staff, MSDF attended the Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS) hosted by the Italian Navy, promoting mutual understanding and trust, and communicating the MSDF’s efforts to the international community through information sharing and opinion exchange with the chiefs of naval staff of the G7 nations. The Chief of Staff, ASDF attended the Air and Space Power Conference (ASPC) and the RIAT hosted by the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom in July 2019. In November 2019, at the invitation of the UAE Air Force Chief of Staff, he participated in the Dubai Air Show hosted by the UAE. In March 2020, the ASDF Chief of Staff participated in the Air Power Conference hosted by Australia, where he exchanged views on a wide range of topics, including regional and international security issues. **2 Promoting Practical Multilateral Security** Cooperation Initiatives **(1) Pacific Partnership** The Pacific Partnership (PP), which started in 2007, is an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide medical care, conduct facility repair activities, and engage in cultural exchange to strengthen cooperation between countries participating in the initiative and facilitate international peace cooperation activities through cooperation with governments, military forces, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in those countries. Japan has dispatched SDF medical personnel and units under the Pacific Partnership since 2007. In 2019, Japan dispatched medical personnel to the Marshall Islands and Vietnam, in addition to sending its music band members to the Marshall Islands, for medical activities and cultural exchanges. Moreover, Japan also sent lecturers on women’s studies, peace, and security in Timor-Leste. **(2) Multilateral Exercises** a. Significance of Multilateral Exercises in the Indo-Pacific Region In the Indo-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF has actively participated in multilateral training and exercises in nontraditional security fields, such as HA/DR and Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), in addition to traditional training conducted in preparation for combat situations. It is important to participate in such multilateral exercises so as not only to raise the skill level of the SDF, but also to create a cooperative platform with relevant countries. In light of this perspective, the MOD/SDF intends to continue to actively engage in such training. **Chapter** See Reference 48 (Participation in Multilateral Exercise [Past Three Years]) b. Initiatives for Multilateral Exercises The multilateral relationships have recently shifted from the phrase for building trust to the phrase for developing more concrete and practical cooperative relationships. Various multilateral training and exercises have been actively conducted as important initiatives to effectively help this Chief of Joint Staff Yamazaki participating in the Raisina Dialogue 2020, a multilateral forum shifting. (J 2020) ----- GSDF personnel deepening mutual friendship with other countries’ military personnel in the multilateral exercise Cobra Gold (February 2020) To improve the integrated operational capability, the SDF joined the multilateral exercise Cobra Gold from January to March 2020, which included training on rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas. The GSDF has hosted the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP) every year since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperation initiatives, inviting officers from relevant countries. The MSDF participated in the eighth multilateral exercise for submarine rescue drills in the Western Pacific submarine rescue exercise “Pacific Reach 2019” with 20 nations hosted by the Royal Australian Navy in the waters west of Perth, Commonwealth of Australia, from October to December 2019. In addition, from April to July 2019, three destroyers, including Destroyer JS “Izumo,” were dispatched for the Indo-Pacific Deployment. In this Deployment, in addition ASDF personnel packing various donations together with other countries’ military personnel for the multilateral HA/DR exercise Christmas Drop (December 2019) to the ADMM-Plus maritime security exercise, in which 11 countries participated, multilateral exercises such as the Japan-US-India-Philippines multilateral Exercise and the Japan-France-Australia-US quadrilateral Exercise La Perouse were conducted. In December 2019, the ASDF participated in the multinational HA/DR exercise Christmas Drop in the Federal States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, and Commonwealth of Northern Marianas and so on. New Zealand joined the exercise for the first time this round. Christmas Drop is now a quadrilateral exercise between Japan, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. In addition, in February 2020, the ASDF participated in a Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise and the U.S.-Japan-Australia joint HA/DR exercise Cope North. **Chapter** Video: The eighth western Pacific submarine rescue exercise Pacific Reach 2019 URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnB8XzMVcOI Video: The Indo-Pacific Deployment URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wAKdirKVlHc ----- - **❹ [Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building ]** **1 Objectives of Capacity Building** dispatched to the recipient country to help the recipient country’s forces and their related organizations through In today’s security environment, no country can maintain seminars, field training, and technical guidance. With the its peace and stability on its own. It is indispensable for second method, the recipient country’s officials are invited the international community to unite to resolve global to the MOD/SDF’s units and institutions to learn human issues. The defense authorities of Southeast Asian and resources development, education, and training that the other countries have either requested the MOD to undertake MOD/SDF provides through seminars, field training, and capacity building, or expressed their expectations for such observing the education and training programs. cooperation. In response to such expectations, the MOD/ In 2019, the number of capacity building programs SDF started to provide capacity building in the security and conducted by means of dispatch was 126 (11 countries, defense areas in 2012. 20 projects), and the number of those conducted by means Capacity building has the following objectives: (1) creating of invitation was 75 (four countries, one organization and desirable security environment for Japan by supporting six projects). Under the dispatch programs for capacity partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region to develop their building, the MOD/SDF has provided technical cooperation own capacity in a sustainable manner, and enabling the on engineering activities, such as road construction in recipient countries’ forces to undertake adequate roles in Mongolia, and heavy equipment maintenance and surveying maintaining international peace and regional stability; (2) for the Harii Hamutuk training program sponsored by strengthening bilateral relationships with partner countries; Australian forces in Timor-Leste. Japan has also provided (3) strengthening relationships with other donor countries, guidance on techniques to PNG Military Band, which such as the United States and Australia; and (4) promoting participated in the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo in Japan’s proactive and independent efforts to realizing Australia, hosted by the United Kingdom. With regard to regional peace and stability, and to gain trust in the MOD/ the project to support Mongolia in building capacity in the SDF as well as and Japan. field of engineering, Defense Minister Enkhbold, who made The MOD/SDF will implement capacity building programs the first Defense Minister’s visit to Japan in about five and a effectively by carefully coordinating with diplomatic policies half years in December 2019, commented that the technical and combining various means to maximize effects, while guidance provided by the SDF had enabled the Mongolian also tapping into the knowledge accumulated at the SDF. Armed Forces to construct roads, which had contributed significantly to the plan for dispatching facility units to UN peacekeeping operations. These projects have contributed to **2 Specific Activities** making specific and steady improvements in the capabilities The MOD/SDF has provided capacity building in such areas of the recipient nations’ forces. Other programs that have as HA/DR, PKO, and maritime security to 15 countries and thus far been conducted include a workshop on the disposal one organization in the Indo-Pacific region. of underwater unexploded ordnance in Vietnam, and field training on aviation meteorology for the establishment See Fig. III-3-1-5 (Recent Capacity Building Initiatives [from April 2019 to March 2020]) of a weather services unit of the Myanmar Air Force, and field training on search and rescue and medical activities in The MOD/SDF’s capacity building programs are aimed at Laos. In addition, the MOD/SDF held an HA/DR seminar in improving the capabilities of recipient countries in a concrete Indonesia to share its initiatives to increase various disaster and steady manner over a certain period of time. Some response capabilities. In addition, as for invitation programs, programs are carried out by dispatching MOD/SDF officials the MOD/SDF conducted such programs as air rescue to the recipient country, by inviting recipient country’s training for the Sri Lankan Air Force and the Third Japanofficials to Japan, or by a combination of both. With the ASEAN HA/DR Invitation Program. first method, SDF officials with technical knowledge are In addition, as part of capacity building for Africa, the **Chapter** Video: Capacity building in PNG (training for PNG Military Band) URL: https://youtu.be/VII_SO3YPOw ----- **Fig. III-3-1-5** Recent Capacity Building Initiatives (from April 2019 to March 2020) **Capacity Building** **Capacity building … Project aiming to improve the capabilities of partner countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time through dispatch** of SDF personnel, etc. and invitation of personnel from recipient countries **Dispatch … Dispatch SDF personnel or others with expert knowledge to partner countries to provide seminars, exercises, and technical guidance, etc. with the aim** of improving the capabilities of military forces and related organizations of recipient countries **Invitation … Invite officials of partner countries to the MOD, SDF units or other related organizations, and provide them with seminars, exercises, observation of education and** training programs and opinion exchanges, etc. Countries for which capacity building has been provided and fields (April 2019–March 2020) - shows program provided together with the United States and Australia. - Those in red are fields shown in photos. Cambodia HA/DA (search and rescue, first aid) [Underwater medicine* ] PKO (engineering), military (engineering) Cybersecurity, undersea UXO clearance medicine, sanitation Myanmar HA/DR PKO (engineering) Philippines **Chapter** Underwater medicine, Japanese language education, aviation meteorology Sri Lanka Mongolia Myanmar Vietnam Laos Philippines Cambodia Sri Lanka Malaysia PNG Indonesia Timor-Leste Air rescue HA/DR HA/DR Vehicle maintenance [Engineering * ] Military band development MOD/SDF implemented in 2018 a program for supporting the enhancement of disaster response capacity for Djibouti forces, including education on how to operate engineering equipment, such as hydraulic shovels, graders, and dozers, in order to strengthen the bilateral relationship. **3 Collaboration with Related Countries** In efforts to stabilize the regional security environment, collaboration with other donor countries is essential. In particular, collaboration with the United States, and Australia is considered a priority. The joint statement of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” in April 2015 states that the two countries would strengthen their continued close coordination on cooperation including capacity building to realize peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. The two ministers agreed to promote defense cooperation with Southeast Asian countries GSDF Central Band officer providing guidance to the Papua New Guinea Military Band, participaing in the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo (September 2019) ----- Under a Japan-Australia personnel exchange program, the MOD has received four offi cial from the Australian Department of Defense to its International Policy Division’s Capacity Building Offi ce four times since 2013. In exchange, the MOD has dispatched three offi cial to the Australian Department of Defense three times since 2015. In November 2017, Japan and Australia held the fi rst working group on capacity building. Japan has also cooperated with the United States and Australia in providing capacity building to Timor-Leste. The SDF and the U.S. forces participated in the Harii Hamutuk Exercise sponsored by the Australian forces in Timor-Leste fi ve times since October 2015, providing technical guidance on engineering for engineering units of the Timor-Leste forces. It is important for Japan and other countries providing capacity building to conduct such cooperation effectively and effi ciently by closely coordinating with and mutually complementing each other. **Chapter** **VOICE** Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Capacity Building for Lao People’s Army Captain YOSHIDA Tatsuru, Head of the 2nd Division, the 13th Infantry Regiment, GSDF (Matsumoto City, Nagano Prefecture) Capacity building for the Lao People’s Army started in 2016, with the aim of contributing to the enhancement of their disaster response capabilities. Since then, employing the GSDF’s technologies and skills in search and rescue and hygiene activities, the program has conducted education for commanding personnel of the Lao People’s Army and steadily built results. I, as the team leader, explained the disaster relief activities of the JSDF for 12 commanding personnel of the Lao People’s Army who were invited Instruction for preparation of a training implementation plan to Japan in October 2019, and I also provided them with education on planning disaster response training. In November of the same year, I was sent to Laos and provided guidance when the Lao including planning, implementation and evaluation of disaster People’s Army implemented training on search and rescue and response training. fi rst aid activities based on a plan prepared by the commanding The global intensifi cation of disasters in recent years requires personnel. swift and sophisticated disaster response capability. Through The participants from the Lao People’s Army participating this project, I felt that I was contributing to the enhancement of in daily education and training showed a keen sense of the disaster response capability of the Lao People’s Army and responsibility and sincere attitude, which impressed us. development of a friendly and trusting relationship between the They mastered a series of training management procedures two countries. ----- **Section** **Ensuring Maritime Security** **2** The NDPG states that for Japan, a maritime nation, strengthening the order of “Open and Stable Oceans” based on fundamental norms, such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime and air transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity, which is extremely important. From this viewpoint, the MOD/SDF will promote assistance that contributes to improving capabilities pertaining to the maritime security of coastal states in the Indo-Pacifi c region, such as India, Sri Lanka, and other South and Southeast Asian states. Moreover, Japan is promoting such activities as joint training and exercises, unit-to-unit exchanges, and active port visits on these occasions. Japan is also promoting activities such as anti-piracy efforts in cooperation with relevant countries and cooperation for strengthening the capabilities of the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). - **❶ [Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security ]** **(1) The Fundamental Idea of the Government** Concerning the COC, which China and ASEAN are The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that as a continuing to discuss, Japan has expressed its position that maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining the COC should conform with international law including and developing “Open and Stable Sea,” which are upheld by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the not infringe on the legitimate rights and interests of all parties rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and of the South China Sea. overfl ight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law, rather than by force. **(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** The third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was given Cabinet The MOD/SDF is conducting counter-piracy operations approval in May 2018. Taking a broad view of ocean policy to secure stable use of sea lanes and information gathering from the perspective of security on the ocean, the Plan activities to ensure the safety of Japan- related vessels in the states that the government will act as one in undertaking Middle East. In the ADMM-Plus in November 2019, Defense “comprehensive maritime security.” Minister Kono stated his strong opposition to any unilateral For this purpose, the government will undertake securing attempts to change the status quo and intimidation of other of the national interest in the territorial water of Japan and countries, urging for the demilitarization of the disputed terrain stable use of its important sea lanes. and the peaceful resolution of the confl ict in accordance with Furthermore, the government will further strengthen the UNCLOS. Within the framework of the Western Pacifi c its efforts toward enhancement of MDA that collects and Naval Symposium (WPNS), the MSDF has been engaged summarize a variety of maritime information from ships, in initiatives such as cooperation in the establishment of the aircraft, etc. in order to use the information for measures Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). regarding the sea. - **❷ [Counter-Piracy Operations ]** **Chapter** Coast Guard (JCG), one of the law enforcement agencies in Japan, is primarily responsible for coping with piracy. However, in cases where it is deemed extremely diffi cult or impossible for the JCG to cope with piracy by itself, the SDF is to take action as well. For Japan and the international community, the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are extremely **1 Signifi cance of Counter-Piracy Operations** Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime transportation to import most of the resources and food necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored. The Japan ----- important sea lanes, connecting Europe and the Middle East with East Asia. Successive UN Security Council resolutions[1] were adopted, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1816, which was adopted in June 2008 in response to the frequent occurrence of and rapid increase in the piracy incidents with the purpose of acquiring ransoms by detaining hostages caused by pirates, who are armed with machine guns and rocket launchers. These resolutions have requested that various countries take actions, particularly the dispatch of warships and military aircraft, to deter piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. To date, approximately 30 countries, including the United States, have dispatched their warships to the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. As part of its counterpiracy initiatives, the EU has been conducting Operation Atalanta since December 2008, in addition to the counterpiracy operations conducted by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151)[2] that was established in January 2009. Meanwhile, other countries have been dispatching their assets to the area. As these initiatives by the international community have proved to be effective, the number of acts of piracy occurring in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has currently hovered at a low level. However, the assumed root causes of piracy such as terrorism and poverty in Somalia have still remained unsolved. In addition, considering the fact that Somalia’s capability to crack down on piracy is also still insuffi cient, if the international community reduces its counter-piracy efforts, the situation could be easily reversed. Therefore, there is no great change in the situation in which Japan must carry out its counter-piracy operations. Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and **Fig. III-3-2-1** in the Gulf of Aden See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-3-3 (Counter-Piracy Operations) See Fig. III-3-2-1 (Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden) **2 Japanese Initiatives** **(1) Legislation Concerning Counter-Piracy Operations** In March 2009, following the order for Maritime Security Operations for the purpose of protecting Japan-affi liated vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, two destroyers[3] began providing direct escort to Japan-affi liated vessels, while P-3C patrol aircraft also commenced warning and surveillance operations in June of the same year. Japan subsequently enacted the Anti-Piracy Measures Act[4] in July of the same year. This act made it possible to protect the vessels of all nations from acts of piracy, regardless of their fl ag states. Moreover, it also enabled the use of weapons to a reasonable extent, if no other means were available, in order to halt vessels engaging in acts of piracy, such as approaching civilian vessels. Furthermore, the Act on Special Measures concerning the Security of Japanese Flagged Vessels in Areas that Are Highly Susceptible to Acts of Piracy came into force on November 2013, which made it possible to have security guards on board a Japanese ship provided certain requirements are met, enabling them to carry small arms for the purpose of security operations. See Reference 10 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces) **Chapter** 250 200 150 100 50 |er of incidents) 237|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |221188 Number of piracy 219 incidents off the coast of||| ||Number of piracy incidents off the coast of|| ||Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden|| |111111||| |7755 48||| |2222 5511 1155 1111 0 2 9 3 0||| 0 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 (Year) Notes: The data is based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). MSDF personnel leaving for counter-piracy operation off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (November 2019) Other UN Security Council resolutions calling for cooperation in deterring piracy are: Resolutions 1838, 1846, and 1851 (adopted in 2008), Resolution 1897 (adopted in 2009), Resolutions 1918 and 1950 (adopted in 2010), Resolutions 1976 and 2020 (adopted in 2011), Resolution 2077 (adopted in 2012), Resolution 2125 (adopted in 2013), Resolution 2184 (adopted in 2014), Resolution 2246 (adopted in 2015), Resolution 2316 (adopted in 2016), Resolution 2383 (adopted in 2017), Resolution 2442 (adopted in 2018) and Resolution 2500 (adopted in 2019). The Combined Maritime Force (CMF), the headquarters of which is located in Bahrain, announced the establishment of the CTF in January 2009 as a multilateral combined task force for counterpiracy operations. The number of destroyers was changed to one from December 2016. Offi i l titl A t P i h t f d M i t A t f Pi ----- **(2) Activities by the SDF** a. Dispatch of the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) and Other Units The SDF dispatches the DSPE, the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE), and the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DGPE) to carry out counter-piracy operations. The DSPE strives to ensure the safety of ships navigating in the area in two different manners – direct escort of private vessels across the Gulf of Aden, and zone defense in allocated areas in the Gulf of Aden, by using destroyers (one destroyer dispatched). There are JCG officers aboard the destroyer.[5] The DAPE conducts counter-piracy activities using the P-3C patrol aircraft (two aircraft dispatched). The unit conducts warning and surveillance operations in the flight zone that is determined in coordination with the CTF 151 Headquarters and confirms any suspicious boats. At the same time, the unit also provides information to the MSDF destroyers, the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels, responding by such means as confirming the safety of the surrounding area immediately, if requested. The information gathered by MSDF P-3Cs is constantly shared with other related organizations, and contributes significantly to deterring acts of piracy and disarming vessels suspected as pirate ships. In order to improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the DAPE, the DGPE carries out activities such as maintenance of the facility set up in the northwest district of Djibouti International Airport. In addition, the Airlift Squadron regularly operates ASDF transport aircraft to carry out air transport of materials required by the DAPE and the DGPE. In late April, although COVID-19 had spread in Djibouti, in order to conduct regular inspection and maintenance of P-3C patrol aircraft in Japan, a substitute P-3C was dispatched after closely coordinating with related authorities and implementing thorough measures to prevent infection. b. CTF 151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters In order to strengthen coordination with the units of other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations and enhance the effectiveness of the SDF’s counter-piracy operations, the MOD has dispatched SDF personnel to the CTF 151 Headquarters since August 2014. During the period from May to August 2015, the SDF also dispatched a CTF 151 commander for the first time, while between March and June 2017, March and June 2018, and February and June 2020, a CTF 151 commander as well as staff were also dispatched to the Headquarters. c. Achievements As of March 31, 2020, the DSPE has escorted 4,027 vessels. Under the protection of the SDF destroyers, not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates and these vessels have all passed safely across the Gulf of Aden. As of May 31, 2020, the DAPE has conducted the following activities: aircraft have flown 2,486 missions with their flying hours totaling 18,570 hours; and information was provided to vessels navigating the area and other countries engaging in counter-piracy operations on around 14,600 occasions. The activities conducted by the DAPE account for approximately 70 to 80% of the warning and surveillance operations carried out in the Gulf of Aden by the international community. See Fig. III-3-2-2 (SDF’s Counter Piracy Operations [Image]) See Fig. III-3-2-3 (Structure of the Deployed Forces) **Chapter** **3 Praise for Japan’s Endeavors** The counter-piracy operations by the SDF have been highly praised by the international community. For example, national leaders and others have expressed their gratitude and the SDF has also been repeatedly well-received by the UN Security Council Resolution. Moreover, the MSDF destroyers, which are engaging in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many messages from the captains and ship owners of the vessels that its units have escorted, expressing their gratitude that the ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace of mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there. Additionally, The Japanese Shipowners’ Association and other groups expressed appreciation for protection of Japan-related vessels and asked for continuation of efforts in fighting against piracy. Video: Record of activities by the 34th DSPE URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rjVR7dAID2k Ei ht JCG ffi b d th MSDF d t d d t j di i l l f t ti iti i l di ti d i t ti i t i d ----- |Col1|Col2|Activities by other countries|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Naval Vessels|||Patrol aircraft| |Escort National Tasking (Japan, China, India, etc.)|Zone Defense CTF151 (Japan, ROK, Pakistan, etc.) EUNAVFOR (Spain, Italy, etc.)||CTF151 (Japan) EUNAVFOR (Germany, Spain)| |(Note) The scale of deployed forces depends on the timing as the operations are carried out by all the participating countries in rotation.|||| **Fig. III-3-2-2** SDF’s Counter Piracy Operations (Image) **Chapter** |[Zone Defense] (*) Warning and surveillance activities within specific waters|or|[Escort] (*) Escorting private vessels using the direct escort| |---|---|---| Outline of Counter Piracy Operations Deployment Forces for Counter Piracy Enforcement Activities by other countries ■ Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Naval Vessels Patrol aircraft Enforcement (approx. 200 personnel/one Destroyer) Eight Coast Guard Officers aboard Escort Zone Defense ■ Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement National Tasking CTF151 CTF151 (approx. 60 personnel/two P-3C patrol aircraft) (Japan, China, India, etc.) (Japan, ROK, Pakistan, etc.) (Japan) ■ Deployment Support Group for Counter Enforcement (approx. 110 personnel) EUNAVFOR EUNAVFOR (Spain, Italy, etc.) (Germany, Spain) CTF151 (Note) The scale of deployed forces depends on the timing as the operations are carried out by all the participating countries in rotation. [Surveillance flight (P-3C patrol aircraft)] Provision of information regarding the airspace over the escort route Escort Route Yemen （900 ～ 1,100km） Djibouti CTF151 National Tasking [Zone Defense] ( ) [Escort] ( ) - - Warning and surveillance activities or Escorting private vessels using the within specific waters direct escort Somalia (*) One vessel system (one for direct escort and one for zone defense) has been deployed since December 14, 2016. Potions Copyright©2016 GeoCatalog Inc. 0 50 100 200km Source：Esri, DigitalGlobe, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, GeoEye, Getmapping, AeroGRID, IGP, UPR-EGP, and the GIS Community **Fig. III-3-2-3** Structure of the Deployed Forces MSDF personnel |Col1|ment Support Group cy Enforcement|Col3| |---|---|---| |||Headquarter| |||| |||| |Guard units|Military Police units| |---|---| GSDF personnel Commander, Self Defense Fleet MSDF and GSDF personnel Commander, Deployment Surface Force Commander, Deployment Air Force Commander, Deployment Support Group Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) for Counter Piracy Enforcement for Counter Piracy Enforcement for Counter Piracy Enforcement Deployed Unit at the Headquarters Headquarter Headquarter Total of less than 20 personnel Squadron Support and Operation Guard Military Police 1 destroyer (2 P-3Cs) logistics units units units units Total approx. 110 personnel (about 30 maritime, about 80 ground) |Commander, Deplo for Counter Pi|yment Surface Force racy Enforcement| |---|---| |Commander, Depl for Counter Pira|oyment Air Force cy Enforcement|Col3| |---|---|---| |||Headquarter| |||| Total approx. 200 personnel Total approx. 60 personnel Coast Guard Officers: 8 officials aboard - Special Boarding Unit personnel aboard - Equipped with 1 or 2 patrol helicopters, as well as 1 or 2 special boats [Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement] Escort private ships with destroyers and conduct zone defense within CTF 151 [Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement] Conduct surveillance flight over the Gulf of Aden by P-3C patrol aircraft [Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement] Conduct duties related to necessary support for the DAPE to conduct counter-piracy operations [CTF 151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters] SDF personnel serving as CTF 151 commander and command center officers facilitate coordina- tion among units of countries participating in CTF 151 - In addition, Airlift Squadron comprised of C-130H transport aircraft under the Air Support Commander will provide airborne transportation of materials etc. when necessary. ----- **Fig. III-3-2-4** Visit to Ports and Airports by SDF (2019) **Chapter** 5 times or more 3 times or more Twice Once Bourget Vladivostok Visakhapatnam San Diego/ Sigonella Kolkata North Island Oceana Al Maktoum Mumbai Chattogram Pearl Harbor/ Mina Salman Da Nang Kāne‘ohe MuscatDuqm Goa U-Tapao Cam Ranh Manila/Clark/Subic Mazatlán Salalah Tan Son Nhat Kochi Guam Chennai Antonio Bautista Djibouti Trincomalee Koror Quetzal Colombo/Bandaranaike Kota Kinabalu Federated States of Micronesia Rabaul Malé Hambantota Muara Port Moresby Guayaquil Surabaya Suva Papeete Diego Garcia Callao Phuket Brisbane Langkawi/Penang Port Klang/Subang Kuantan Jakarta Stirling Sydney Oakland Changi/Paya Lebar **❸ [Training-Centered Initiatives ]** The MSDF not only endeavors to enhance its tactical skills through joint training with coastal states alongside sea lanes, but also strives to contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, promote mutual understanding, and strengthen relationships of trust. In the Indo-Pacific Deployment which was implemented from April to July 2019, Destroyer JS “Izumo” and other deployed units conducted a total of eleven bilateral/multilateral and friendly drills, including the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Exercise and the Japan-France-Australia-US quadrilateral **❹ [Cooperation in Maritime Security ]** The MOD/SDF has implemented capacity building in maritime security for Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka to help them enhance their MDA and other capabilities. Such program contributes to strengthening cooperation with partner countries that share common strategic interests with Japan. The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which was approved by a Cabinet decision in May 2018, calls for strengthening cooperation related to maritime security with various countries through security dialogue and defense interaction among defense authorities at bilateral and multilateral levels with the aim of maintaining and advancing “free and open exercise La Perouse, while actively making port calls on the way to and back from counter-piracy operations. Strengthening cooperation with coastal states of the IndoPacific region through the bilateral exercise and port calls contributes to the maintenance of maritime security, which has extremely high significance. See Reference 48 (Participation in Multilateral Exercise [Past Three Years]) Fig. III-3-2-4 (Visit to Ports and Airports by SDF [2019]) seas” supported by a maritime order defined by laws and rules. In response to this, the MOD has been working on cooperation for maritime security within regional security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM-Plus and the ISM on MS. ----- **Section** **Cooperation in Use of Space and Cyber Domains** **3** In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. Rapid expansion in the use of space and cyber domains is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which makes the establishment of international rules and norms a security agendum. The MOD/SDF will swiftly achieve superiority in space and cyber domains by strengthening coordination **❶ [Cooperation in the Use of Space Domain ]** Regarding the use of the space domain, Japan will promote partnership and cooperation in various fi elds including SSA and mission assurance of the entire space system, through consultations and information sharing with relevant countries and active participation in multilateral exercises among others. The MOD/SDF has taken part in the annual Space Situational Awareness (SSA) multinational tabletop exercise (Global Sentinel) and the Schriever Wargame, a multinational tabletop exercise on space security, hosted by the U.S. Forces and is working to share the recognition of threats in space among multiple countries and acquire knowledge related to cooperation regarding SSA and mission assurance of the space system. and cooperation with relevant countries through information sharing, consultation, exercise, and capacity building, while promoting measures concerning the development of international norms. See Chapter 1, Section 3 (Responses in the Domains of Space, See Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum) opinions on space policy. With France, based on the agreement to strengthen bilateral dialogue on space at the Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting in March 2015, the two countries decided to start the JapanFrance Comprehensive Space Dialogue. At the 2nd JapanFrance Comprehensive Space Dialogue in March 2017, in order to strengthen bilateral cooperation on SSA, the two countries signed a technical arrangement on information sharing pertaining to space situation awareness between the competent authority of Japan and the Minister of Defense of the Republic of France, and agreed to promote specifi c cooperation initiatives. With the EU, it was decided to start the Japan-EU Space Policy Dialogue at the Japan-EU Summit in May 2014, and four dialogue sessions have been held. At the Japan-India summit meeting in October 2018, the two countries decided to start space dialogue between the governments, and the MOD participated in the fi rst meeting held in March 2019. See Section 1-2 of this Chapter (Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) **Chapter** See Chapter 2, Section 2 (Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats) The MOD/SDF is also working on cooperation with countries other than the United States. For example, the Japan-Australia Space Security Dialogue and Japan-U.S.Australia Space Security Dialogue are held to exchange **❷ [Cooperation in the Use of Cyber Domain ]** Regarding the use of the cyber domain, Japan will enhance its partnership and cooperation with relevant countries through measures such as sharing views on threat awareness, exchanging views on response to cyber attacks, and participating in multilateral exercises. The MOD has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Estonia, and others to exchange views on threat awareness and relevant initiatives taken by each country. With NATO, the MOD carries out initiatives looking at possible future operational cooperation, such as establishing a cyber dialogue between defense authorities called the Japan-NATO Expert Staff Talks on Cyber Defense and in December 2019, offi cially participating for the fi rst time in the cyber defense exercise Cyber Coalition 2019 hosted by NATO, in which Japan had participated as an observer. Furthermore, Japan has participated in the International Conference on Cyber Confl ict (CyCon) and has participated ----- as an observer in a cyber defense exercise (Locked Shields), both organized by the CCDCOE based in Estonia. The MOD is further developing collaborative relationships with NATO in the cyber domain through the dispatch of personnel to the Centre since March 2019. In addition, IT Forums have been held between the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia to exchange views on initiatives in the information communications area including cybersecurity and current trends in technology. The MOD has been expanding the cooperation by implementing cybersecurity human resource development seminars for Vietnamese Forces as part of its capacity building in December 2017, March and August 2019, and January 2020. See Section 1-2 of this Chapter (Promotion of Defense See Cooperation and Exchanges) Section 1-4 of this Chapter (Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building) **Chapter** Considering the fact that cyber attacks occur beyond national borders, it is important to continue to strengthen international cooperation in the cyber field through exchanges of views with defense authorities of other countries and relevant organizations such as the CCDCOE, and active participation in cyber defense exercises. SDF personnel participating in Cyber Coalition 2019, a cyber defense exercise hosted by NATO (December 2019) ----- **Section** **Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation** **4** The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) In order to deal with these issues, the international and missiles that can deliver them, as well as the proliferation frameworks for arms control, disarmament, and nonof not only conventional arms but also goods and sensitive proliferation has been developed under which Japan has technologies of potential military use, pose a pressing played an active role. challenge to the peace and stability of the international See Fig. III-3-4-1 (Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and community. Moreover, many countries are working on the See Non-Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons regulation of certain conventional weapons, considering of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.) the need to maintain a balance between humanitarian perspectives and defensive needs. - **❶ [Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation ]** Japan actively participates in international initiatives for chemical weapons in China, in accordance with the CWC. arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in regard The MOD/SDF has seconded GSDF and other personnel to WMDs, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and biological to the Cabinet Offi ce to handle this project, and since weapons, as well as missiles that can deliver them, and 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise in chemicals and associated technologies and materials. ammunitions have been dispatched to conduct excavation Japan has contributed to the Chemical Weapons Convention and recovery projects on a total of 19 occasions. (CWC) by offering its knowledge in the fi eld of chemical In addition, the MOD has been cooperating in endeavors protection since the negotiating stage and dispatching GSDF aimed at increasing the effectiveness of regulations and personnel who are experts on protection against chemical decisions, by dispatching MOD offi cials to major meetings weapons to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical such as those of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Weapons (OPCW), which was established to continuously as well as international export control regimes in the form of implement verifi cation measures following the entry of the the Australia Group (AG) and the Missile Technology Control CWC into force. In addition, small quantities of the chemical Regime (MTCR). At the same time, SDF personnel were substances under the regulation of the CWC are synthesized dispatched to training to foster surrogate inspectors[1] provided at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), in order to by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive conduct protection research. Thus, the school has undergone Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). inspections 10 times in total since the establishment of the See Reference 49 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to OPCW, in accordance with the CWC regulations. International Organizations) Moreover, the whole of the Japanese Government is also working on projects aimed at disposing of abandoned **Chapter** |Fig. III-3-4-1|Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of|Col3|Col4|Col5|f Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Category|Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.||||Conventional Weapons| ||Nuclear Weapons|Chemical Weapons|Biological Weapons|Delivery Systems (Missiles)|| |Conventions on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, etc.|Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)|Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)|Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)|The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)|Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention) Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms U.N. Report on Military Expenditures Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)| |Export Control Frameworks Aimed at Non-Proliferation|Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)|Australia Group (AG)||Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)|Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)| |New International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction|Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540||||| Experts in relevant fi elds registered with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Organization, in preparation for the implementation of On-site Inspections (OSI) following the ff ti d t f th CTBT Th l t d t b i t h d t OSI ft th CTBT t i t f ----- Japan has signed various conventions on the regulation of conventional weapons such as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW),[2] based on humanitarian perspectives and security needs. In addition, Japan has signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention),[3] which was adopted outside the framework of the CCW. With the entry of this Convention, the disposal of all cluster munitions possessed by the SDF was completed in February 2015. The Ministry dispatches personnel to Group of Governmental Experts meetings related to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and other events as necessary under the CCW framework. International discussions related to LAWS are under way on humanmachine interaction in the use of weapons systems, issues pertaining to international humanitarian law, and other matters. Japan intends to continue its active involvement in the discussions, while also considering the standpoints of national security. Furthermore, the MOD has actively cooperated in the initiatives of the international community that focus on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines by submitting annual reports that include data on Japan’s exceptional stocks to the Secretariat of the Convention on the Prohibition of AntiPersonnel Mines. In addition, the MOD/SDF provides an annual report Personnel of the National Institute for Defense Studies providing explanations about UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to lawmakers of Pacific Islands in New Zealand (September 2019) under the frameworks of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the UN Report on Military Expenditures and Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which aim to increase the transparency of the military preparedness and military expenditure. It also dispatches personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings and other meetings for reviewing and improving these systems. Since April 2018 the MOD/SDF has been sending a Senior Fellow of National Institute for Defense Studies as a member of the Group of Experts[4] of the 1540 Committee established pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540[5] (Resolution 1540). **Chapter** - **❷ [International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ]** Deeply concerned about the development of WMDs and countries, dispatching MOD officials and SDF personnel to missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, the various meetings, as well as engaging in ongoing participation United States announced its Proliferation Security Initiative in these exercises since 2004. (PSI)[6] in May 2003, and sought the participation of other The MOD/SDF has participated in PSI maritime countries therein. Various initiatives are being undertaken interdiction exercises, hosted by Japan, thrice, working in based on PSI; PSI interdiction exercises aimed at improving partnership with relevant organizations such as the MOFA, the ability to thwart the proliferation of WMDs and related the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and items and meetings to consider issues on policies and the Japan Coast Guard, and also participated in the PSI air legislations. interdiction exercise in July 2012, which Japan hosted for the Since the 3rd PSI Meeting in Paris (September 2003), the first time. Japan organized Pacific Shield 18, a PSI maritime MOD/SDF has collaborated with relevant organizations and prevention exercise, in July 2018, to carry out training in 2 CCW: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects 3 Major producers and owners of cluster munitions such as the United States, China and Russia have not signed the Oslo Convention. 4 Group of experts who support implementation of the mandate of the 1540 Committee set up under the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (Resolution 1540). Nine experts (usually their term is two years) handle reviews of reports from UN member countries, respond to technical questions, support implementation, and conduct other activities. 5 Adopted in April 2004 to prevent the proliferation of WMDs (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery [missiles]) to non-state actors. The resolution imposes obligations on all states to (1) refrain from providing any form of support to terrorists, etc. that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction, etc.; (2) adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit terrorists, etc. from developing weapons of mass destruction; and (3) take effective measures to establish domestic controls (protection measures, border and export controls, etc.) to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. 6 An initiative that seeks to strengthen the relevant domestic laws of respective countries to the maximum possible extent, and considers measures that participating countries can jointly t k hil l i ith i ti d ti d i t ti l l i d t t th lif ti f WMD d l t d t i l ----- |Fig. III-3-4-2|Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdict|tion Exercise (Since FY|Y2012)| |---|---|---|---| |Date|Exercise|Location|Participation of the MOD/SDF| |July 2012|PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Japan|Japan|Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Air Staff, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Northern Army, Central Readiness Force, GSDF Seventh Chemical Weapon Defense Unit and Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, Internal Bureau (including two aircraft)| |September 2012|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK|ROK|Joint Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one ship and one aircraft)| |February 2013|PSI exercise co-hosted by the U.S. and UAE|UAE|Dispatch of observer (Joint Staff)| |August 2014|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the United States|United States|Joint Staff (including one ship)| |November 2015|PSI interdiction exercise hosted by New Zealand|New Zealand|Joint Staff| |September 2016|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Singapore|Singapore|Joint Staff| |September 2017|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Australia|Australia|Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one aircraft)| |July 2018|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Japan|Japan|Joint Staff, Ground Defense Command, Self Defense Fleet, Eastern Army, Yokosuka Regional Unit, Chemical School, Internal Bureau (including two vessels, two aircraft and three vehicles)| |July 2019|PSI interdiction exercise hosted by ROK|ROK|Joint Staff and Chemical School| activities to prevent the spread of WNDs with Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore, and the United States. Based on the proliferation cases in the areas surrounding Japan, and from the perspectives of preventing the proliferation of WMDs and improving the response capability of the SDF, the MOD/SDF strives to strengthen nonproliferation frameworks including PSI, as well as holding various relevant exercises and meetings and participating in the same kind of activities which other countries hold. **Chapter** See Fig. III-3-4-2 (Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise [Since FY2012]) SDF personnel having discussions with other countries’ personnel in an opinion exchange with specialists in PSI interdiction exercises hosted by the ROK (July 2019) ----- **Section** **Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities** **5** The MOD/SDF has been proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of the Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental causes of confl icts, terrorism and other problems. - **❶ [Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities ]** this reason, all three branches of the SDF, namely the GSDF, **1 Framework of International Peace Cooperation** MSDF and ASDF, designate dispatch stand-by units, and the Activities and Background to Stipulating Such designated units are always ready to be deployed. Activities as One of the Primary Missions of the SDF In September 2015, the UN launched the Peacekeeping The international peace cooperation activities undertaken by Capability Readiness System (PCRS) to enable the UN the MOD/SDF to date are as follows: (1) international peace Headquarters to grasp the registered items of each country cooperation assignments such as UN peacekeeping operations more specifi cally in order to ensure the fl exibility and (the so-called UN PKO); (2) international disaster relief readiness of international peacekeeping activities. In activities to respond to large-scale natural disasters overseas; light of this change, Japan registered engineering units (3) activities based on the former Special Measures Act on and staff offi cers of mission headquarters in March 2016. Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq; and (4) Additionally, at the Defense Ministers’ Meeting on UN PKO activities based on the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures held in November 2017, Japan announced that it would Act, and the former Replenishment Support Special Measures make arrangements for additional registration of fi xed-wing Act. In 2007, international peace cooperation activities, which aircraft for PCRS to enable air transport assistance for rapid used to be regarded as supplementary activities,[1] were upgraded PKO deployment. to become one of the primary missions of the SDF,[2] alongside the Meanwhile, the SDF is enhancing information-gathering defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order. In March abilities and protection abilities, which are required for the SDF 2016, the Legislation for Peace and Security was enforced, which allows cooperation and support operations in response to International Peace Cooperation Activities situations threatening the international peace and security that **Fig. III-3-5-1** Conducted by the SDF the international community is collectively addressing based on general laws without establishing a special measures act. Activities based on the “Act Concerning Japan’s Cooperation in **Chapter** See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2 (SDF Activities since Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and Security) Fig. III-3-5-1 (International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF) Reference 10 (Requirement to Issue an Order (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 50 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 51 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities) International Peace Cooperation Activities Activities based on the “Act Concerning Japan’s Cooperation in the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations” International Disaster Relief Activities Activities based on the “Act Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams” Cooperation and Support Activities, etc. for the Armed Forces of Foreign Countries Activities in accordance with the “Act Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, in Situations that the International Community is Collectively Addressing for International Peace and Security” Cooperation in Efforts toward the Reconstruction of Iraq Activities based on the “Act Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq” (Ended in February 2009) Activities to Respond to International Terrorism Activities based on the Act Concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for CounterTerrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities (Ended in January 2010) Legend： : Activities based on time-limited acts : Activities based on permanent acts **2 Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and Accurately Carry** Out International Peace Cooperation Activities To be a proactive contributor to world peace, it is important for the SDF to be fully prepared for any future operation. For ： Affairs prescribed in Article 8 of the SDF Law (miscellaneous provision) or supplementary provisions Missions defi ned in Article 3 of the SDF Law. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan (in 2007), and international peace cooperation activities. In accordance with the entry into force of the Legislation for Peace and Security in 2016, “situations in di J ” i d t “ it ti th t ill h i t t i fl J ’ d it ” ----- units to carry out their missions while ensuring the safety of personnel and units in international peace cooperation activities, etc. In addition, in order to respond to various environments and prolonged missions, the SDF is improving its capabilities for transport, deployment, and information communication, as well as developing a structure of logistic and medical support for conducting smooth and continuous operations. With regard to the education necessary for engaging in international peace cooperation activities, the GSDF International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, which belongs to the Ground Component Command, provides training for GSDF personnel to be deployed to international peace cooperation activities, as well as supports their training. In addition, the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) of the Joint Staff College offers not only basic education courses on international peace cooperation activities, but also specialized education to train personnel who can be appointed as contingent commanders of UN PKO missions and staff offi cers of mission headquarters. These specialized courses are conducted by using UN standard training materials and foreign instructors. Furthermore, since FY2014, the JPC has also provided education for personnel from foreign militaries and other Japanese ministries and agencies. This initiative represents the approach taken by the MOD/ SDF, which emphasizes the necessity of collaboration and cooperation with other related **❷ [Initiatives to Support UN PKO, etc. ]** As a means to promote peace and stability in confl ict regions around the world, UN PKO have expanded their missions in recent years to include such duties as the Protection of Civilians (POC), the promotion of political processes, providing assistance in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) into society of former soldiers, Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rule of law, elections, human rights, and other fi elds, in addition to such traditional missions as ceasefi re monitoring. To date, there are 13 UN PKO missions ongoing (as of the end of March 2020). International organizations, such as the Offi ce of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), respective governments, and NGO conduct relief and restoration activities for the victims of confl icts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries. Japan has been promoting international peace cooperation activities in various regions, including Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan for more than 25 years, and the results of these activities have been highly ministries and foreign countries, based on the current situation of more multi-dimensional and complicated international peace cooperation activities. The initiative aims to contribute to more effective international peace cooperation activities by enhancing collaboration in the fi eld of education. **3 Welfare and Mental Health Measures for** Dispatched SDF Units The MOD/SDF has implemented various welfare and mental health support measures for dispatched SDF personnel and their families to reduce their anxiety. Depending on the characteristics of the duties of the dispatched unit, the MOD/ SDF provides dispatched SDF personnel with necessary measures as follows: (1) pre-dispatch training to acquire necessary knowledge on stress reduction; (2) mental health check before, during, and after the dispatch; (3) counseling on anxiety and worries provided by dispatched mental health care personnel; (4) dispatch of a mental health care team with specialized knowledge on dispatched SDF personnel from Japan consisting mainly of medical offi cers; (5) stress reduction training upon returning to Japan; and (6) ad hoc health checkup after returning to Japan. See Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 1-3 (Measures Aimed at Ensuring See Effective Use of Human Resources) **Chapter** praised both inside and outside of Japan. In addition to continuous dispatch of staff offi cers to UNMISS, Japan is able to participate in Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security along with enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security. In April 2019, Japan started to dispatch staff offi cers to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Japan will actively contribute to international peace cooperation activities through such activities as dispatch of personnel to mission headquarters and capacity building in Japan’s fi elds of expertise by using accumulated experience so far and working on human resource development. **1 International Conferences Related to UN PKO** In July 2019, the GSDF Chief of Staff participated in the UN PKO Chiefs of Defense Conference held in New York, the United States. At the conference, he shared the GSDF’s efforts as the chairman for the revision of the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineer Unit Manual and ----- the dispatch of a delegation of instructors to the UNTPP,[3] while also stating Japan’s strong determination to contribute to peace and stability in the international community through highly qualifi ed capacity building programs and intellectual contributions, tapping into Japan’s strengths and experience in PKO. **2 Dispatch to the MFO** **(2) Activities by Staff Offi cers and Others** The two offi cers are engaging in liaison and coordination between governments of the two countries or other relevant organizations and the MFO as a Deputy Chief of Liaison and an Assistant Liaison Operation Offi cer at the MFO Headquarters, which is located in the south camp at Sharm El-Sheikh in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula. Additionally, in order to help the two offi cers dispatched to the MFO carry out activities smoothly and effectively, one liaison and coordination personnel is dispatched to Cairo city, Egypt, to liaise and coordinate with the relevant organizations in the dispatched country. These activities express Japan’s commitment to more active involvement in the peace and stability of the Middle East. It is also expected to promote collaboration with the other countries dispatching offi cers, including the United States, and create new opportunities for human resource development. **(1) Signifi cance of Dispatch to the MFO** one liaison and coordination personnel is dispatched to In August 1981, the MFO was established by the Protocol to Cairo city, Egypt, to liaise and coordinate with the relevant the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty as an organization to undertake organizations in the dispatched country. the tasks and responsibilities of the UN force and observer These activities express Japan’s commitment to more mission stipulated in the treaty. active involvement in the peace and stability of the Middle Since 1982, when its activities started, by facilitating East. It is also expected to promote collaboration with the dialogue and confi dence building between Egypt and Israel, other countries dispatching offi cers, including the United the MFO has contributed to peace and stability in the Middle States, and create new opportunities for human resource East, which is a foundation of peace and prosperity for Japan. development. With rising expectations of Japan’s role in the Middle East, See Fig. III-3-5-2 (Outline of MFO Operations and Relevant Maps) Japan has provided fi nancial assistance to the MFO since See Fig. III-3-5-3 (Organizational Chart of MFO) FY1988. The MFO has expressed appreciation to Japan’s **3 UNMISS** contribution this background, the MFO requested that Japan send staff offi cers to its headquarters. With a view to making **(1) Signifi cance of the Dispatch of Personnel to UNMISS** proactive contributions to international peace efforts, the In July 2011 following South Sudan’s independence, Cabinet decided on the implementation of international with the objective of consolidating peace and security peace operations in the Sinai Peninsula on April 2, 2019, as well as helping establish necessary conditions for and dispatched two staff offi cers to the MFO as Japan’s fi rst the development of South Sudan, the UNMISS was activity for the purpose. established. The Japanese Government was requested by the UN to cooperate with UNMISS, particularly through See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-2 (Dispatch of Staff Offi cers to the dispatch of GSDF engineering units. The Cabinet the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO)) approved the dispatch of two staff offi cers (logistics and database offi cers) to UNMISS in November 2011, and in December it decided to dispatch an SDF engineering unit, Coordination Center, and an additional staff offi cer (engineering offi cer). In addition, the Cabinet also approved the dispatch of one staff offi cer (air operations offi cer) in October 2014. South Sudan shares borders with six countries and is positioned in a highly important location, connecting the African continent on all four points of the compass. The peace and stability of South Sudan is not only essential for the country itself; but also for the peace and stability in its neighboring countries, and by extension, Africa as a whole, as well as a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community. Based on the accumulated experience through past PKO, the MOD/SDF has contributed GSDF personal engaging in operations in the MFO (April 2020) to the peace and stability of South Sudan by providing **Chapter** Acronym for the United Nations Triangular Partnership Project. A partnership for supporting the capability building of the personnel from UN PKO troop contributing countries through ti th UN UN PKO t t ib ti t i d thi d t i th t t h l i d i t ----- **Fig. III-3-5-2** Outline of MFO Operations and Relevant Maps **Chapter** |Representative office in Egypt (Cairo)|Representative office in Israel (Tel Aviv)| |---|---| |Col1|Military sector (Shinai Peninsula)| |---|---| ||Force Commander| |Force Commander’s Headquarters|Col2| |---|---| ||Headquarters| ||Chief of Staff| The deployment of SDF engineering units marked a Outline of the operations (as of March 2020) Relevant maps MFO Palestine Location of Shinai Peninsula, Egypt Headquarters the operation The Mediterranean Sea MFO Headquarters Rome, Italy Rome North camp, El Gorah Force Commander’s Sharm El-Sheikh (in the south camp in the southern Headquarters part of the Shinai Peninsula) Israel Origins of Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (March 1979) the Establishment Protocol of Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty (August 1981) Period From April 25, 1982 Jordan Leadership - Director General: Robert S. Beecroft (U.S.) - Force Commander: Evan G. Williams (New Zealand) [Legend] ：MFO camp Number of staff - Military personnel: 1,156 (from 13 countries) Gulf of Suez (According to the MFO website) Gulf of Aqaba Egypt Saudi *Operating units consist of infantry battalions, coast Arabia patrol unit, aviation units, civilian observer, unit etc. South camp, Sharm El-Sheikh (staff officers are dispatched) 100km **Fig. Ⅲ** **-3-5-3** Organizational Chart of MFO MFO Headquarters (Rome) Director General Representative Representative Military sector (Shinai Peninsula) office in Egypt office in Israel Advisory (Cairo) (Tel Aviv) Force Commander group Force Commander’s Operation Coast Headquarters units patrol unit Chief of Staff Infantry battalion × 3 Operations branch Civilian observer unit GSDF personal engaging in operations in the UNMISS (December 2019) Plans branch Logistics support battalion out activities with great significance, such as repairing Logistics branch roads and constructing facilities for displaced people while Liaison branch ensuring the safety of the personnel. milestone of five years in January 2017 since the dispatch of the first engineering rotation. The major achievements include a total of approximately 260 km of road repair and a total of approximately 500,000 m2 of development. Japan could move on to a new phase regarding engineering activities in Juba that the SDF was in charge of. Considering the above-mentioned issues in a comprehensive manner, on March 10, 2017, the Government of Japan came to the conclusion that the SDF engineering unit would withdraw from Juba around the end of May 2017. SDF personnel engaged in withdrawal work, then sequentially withdrew from South Sudan by the end of May 2017, and terminated the operations by the engineering unit in UNMISS Note: Red line indicates a department/division in which Japanese personnel are placed. personnel-based cooperation in infrastructure development, on which the UN places great expectations. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 9-9 (Situation in South Sudan) **(2) Activities by Dispatched Engineering Units** Since the commencement of its engineering activities within UN facilities in Juba in March 2012, the dispatched engineering unit has steadily expanded its activities. The SDF has continued to dispatch over 300 personnel after the second unit took over in June of the same year, and carried ----- **Fig. III-3-5-4** Organization of UNMISS Assignment of Japanese Personnel United Nations Headquarters António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General David Shearer, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Deputy Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral (Political) |Chief|of Staff| |---|---| |Fo Comm|rce ander| |---|---| |Direct Supp|or of Mission ort Division| |---|---| Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UN Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator Joint Mission Analysis Center (1 Intelligence Staff Officer) Military Headquarters Logistics (1 Logistics Staff Officer) Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Watanabe (right) participating in the departing ceremony for the replacement of personnel joining the International Peace Cooperation Corps in South Sudan (December 2019) See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-5 (Assignment of New Mission for See the South Sudan PKO) Fig. III-3-5-4 (Organization of UNMISS) Engineering Aviation Section Section (1 Aviation (1 Engineering Operation Staff Officer) Staff Officer) Note: Double lines indicate a department/division in which Japanese personnel are placed. In response to a request from the UN to transfer items possessed by the dispatched engineering unit such as heavy machinery, vehicles, and residence-related containers, Japan transferred these items to UNMISS with no charge, intending to make Japan’s cooperation with UNMISS more effective. Prior to this transfer of items, the MOD, responding to a request from UNMISS, provided training on the operation and maintenance of heavy machinery to UNMISS personnel, so that UNMISS would be able to conduct engineering activities in a smooth manner using these heavy machinery and other equipment even after the withdrawal of the Japanese unit. These dedicated activities by the dispatched engineering unit were highly appreciated and valued by the UN and South Sudan. **Chapter** **4 Dispatch of MOD Personnel to the UN Secretariat** The MOD/SDF dispatches personnel to the UN Secretariat for the purpose of actively contributing to the UN efforts to achieve international peace and for the purpose of utilizing experiences of dispatched personnel in Japan’s PKO activity. As of March 2020, one SDF personnel (working level) are involved in the formulation of UN PKO policies and plans at the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO). Since December 2002, including personnel currently dispatched, Japan has sent seven SDF members (one director level, six working level) to the UN DPO and two administrative officials (working level) to the UN Department of Operational Support (DOS). See Reference 49 (Dispatch of MOD Personnel to International Organizations) **(3) Activities by Command Post Staff Officers and Others** Personnel dispatches to the UNMISS headquarters are continuing. Four GSDF members (logistics officer, intelligence officer, engineering officer, and air operations officer) currently carry out duties at the UNMISS headquarters. Specifically, the logistics officer procures and transports goods needed in UNMISSS activities, the database officer collects and compiles information on security conditions, the engineering officer plans and proposes UNMISS engineering activities, and the air operations officer assists in operation of aircraft run by UNMISS. Additionally, liaison staff members have been dispatched to the liaison office in the Embassy of Japan in South Sudan to support activities of the Japanese staff officers. These people help interactions between the South Sudan government and the International Peace Cooperation Corps in South Sudan with the aim of ensuring smooth and efficient cooperation with UNMISS. They will continue to contribute to activities as UNMISS members **5 Dispatch of Instructors to PKO Training Centers** To support PKO undertaken by African and other countries, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel as instructors to PKO training centers in Africa and other countries that provide education and training for UN peacekeepers to contribute to peace and stability by enhancing the capacity of the centers. See Section 1-3-1 of this Chapter (Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue Initiatives) Reference 49 (Dispatch of MOD Personnel to International Organizations) ----- has been dispatching SDF personnel to the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya, as instructors since the trial training in September 2015. At the IPSTC, the SDF personnel effi ciently provided training on facility and equipment operation for trainees from forces of African countries from June to October 2018 according to their level of heavy equipment operation skills. Two training sessions on the operation and maintenance of heavy equipment were provided for the Ugandan Army’s engineers from August to November 2019. This was the fi rst training session held at the Uganda Rapid Deployment Capability Centre. From the start of the project to March 2020, a total of **6 Support to the UNTPP** Japan has so far earned unquestionable trust in the areas of engineering and transport that are essential for promoting smooth peacekeeping operations. To continue to support the rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions and implement high quality activities, Prime Minister Abe expressed Japan’s active support at the PKO Summit in September 2014, and it was embodied by the UNTPP. The UNTPP was founded using funds from Japan as a project to support training for military engineers and the procurement of heavy equipment by the UN DOS. Japan **Chapter** **VOICE** Voice of SDF Personnel Engaging in the United Nations Project for Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities (RDEC) (renamed United Nations Triangular Partnership Project [UNTPP]) Lieutenant Colonel TOUDOU Kouji, the students very ardently worked on the training and made Vice Commandant, the 12th Engineer Group Headquarters sincere efforts to improve their skills, we taught them to the (Iwamizawa City, Hokkaido) best of our ability, which made the training very meaningful In 2019, I was appointed as a leader of an instructor team and fruitful for both the students and instructors. In a survey of the 2nd United Nations Project for RDEC (renamed UNTPP) of students after the completion of courses, almost all and sent to the Republic of Uganda for about three months. answered, “The Japanese instructors are skillful and the way This was the first training conducted in the Republic of of teaching was easy to understand, and they treated students Uganda. We taught military engineers of the republic how to friendly and very well.” This was a moment when we forgot all operate construction machinery. We provided two six-week diffi culties in the past three months: “Not at all. Thank you!” courses and trained 31 operators in total at intermediate level. Lastly, it was a great honor to contribute to this UN project. I They were a variety of students, from chief warrant offi cer to wish to convey my hope, from Japan, that all the students will private, aged from 24 to 50, 30 men and one woman. As all be successful in the future. The author (right) taking about the education procedure with the chief instructor on the site Author (center) inspected by the head of URDCC (Brigadier General Omola) Video: SDF personnel engaged in RDEC (current UNTPP) URL: https://youtu.be/TQLxPy4N63Y ----- 164 GSDF officers have been dispatched to Africa to provide nine training sessions for a total of 277 members from eight African countries. Considering that 30% or more of PKO personnel are from Asia, Japan decided to implement the project for the first time in Asia and the surrounding regions. The project provides training on heavy engineering equipment operation for engineering personnel. Trial training took place in Vietnam from November to December 2018 for 16 personnel from nine countries in Asia and the surrounding regions, including Vietnam and Indonesia. Following this, from November to December 2019 and from February to March 2020, the GSDF provided heavy equipment operation training for 40 personnel from five countries in Asia and the surrounding region, including Vietnam, Indonesia and Nepal. In addition, the UN decided to extend the scope of support under this project to the field of sanitation, given that strengthening sanitation capacity to ensure the safety of deployed personnel has become an issue in UN peacekeeping operations. In response, the UN Field Medical Assistant Course (UNFMAC), which aims to train personnel who can provide first aid before medics or medical personnel provide specialized treatment in areas of PKO operations, was implemented in October 2019. In the course, eight instructors, including two GSDF officers, trained 29 personnel at the UN Regional Service Centre Entebbe in Uganda. **7** Revision of the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineer Unit Manual GSDF personnel providing training on the operation of heavy machinery in Vietnam (February 2020) the working group on the engineer unit manual since 2013 with the aim of supporting the development of UN Military Unit Manuals[4] and contributed to the completion of the manual. The UN asked Japan to serve as the chair of the working group again for revision of the manual. For the MOD/SDF this is a meaningful opportunity to make contributions by using the experiences and capabilities acquired through the past PKO and other missions. Therefore the MOD/ SDF decided to serve as the chair to handle the revision of the manual. The first expert meeting was held in Tokyo in December 2018. Since then, a total of four expert meetings have been held to complete the revision process, and the revised Military Engineer Unit Manual was submitted to the UN in July 2019. The MOD/SDF will support for the dissemination of the manual. **Chapter** In order to play a more leading role in international peace cooperation activities, the MOD/SDF served as the chair of **❸ [International Disaster Relief Activities ]** In recent years, the role of military affairs has become more diverse, and opportunities for military to use their capabilities in HA/DR are growing. To contribute to the advancement of international cooperation, the SDF has also engaged in international disaster relief activities proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the global security environment. To this end, the SDF maintains its readiness to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief operation plans. In consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the SDF has been proactively conducting international disaster relief activities, which fully utilize its functions and capabilities, while taking into consideration specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries. See Reference 51 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities) With the aim of defining the capacity expected of PKO units and promoting understanding by the participating states, the UN has arranged manuals that prescribe the purpose, capacity d i i f h f t fi ld i i ilit li i ti iti i i i l i l f t t l i ti d F H d t (FHQ) t ----- 21 and 23, 2019, caused extensive flood damage. At the request of the Government of the Republic of Djibouti, on November 26, Japan decided to carry out international disaster relief activities with some of the units dispatched for a counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. In addition to drainage using drainage pumps at elementary and junior high schools, emergency relief supplies provided by the Japanese government through JICA were transported to Djibouti. On December 2, 2019, a termination order was issued by the Minister of Defense, ending international disaster relief activities. A total of approximately 230 personnel were dispatched to the site to drain approximately 1,950 tons of floodwater and transport approximately 4.3 tons of emergency relief supplies (tents, blankets, etc.). **4** International Disaster Relief Activities in Response to the Major Bush Fires in Australia **1 Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law** Since the enactment of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (Japan Disaster Relief Team Law) in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations. In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law was partially amended, enabling the SDF to participate in international disaster relief activities and to transport its personnel and equipment for this purpose. See Reference 10 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the See Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces) **2** International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF and SDF’s Posture **Chapter** Responding to specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and the scale of disaster situations in these countries, the SDF’s capabilities in international disaster relief activities encompass (1) medical services, such as firstaid medical treatment and epidemic prevention; (2) transport of relief items, patients and personnel by helicopter and other means; and (3) water supply activities using water-purifying devices. In addition, the SDF uses transport aircraft and ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area. The Ground Component Command regional units of the GSDF and other relevant GSDF units maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief activities in an independent manner anytime when needed. The Self Defense Fleet of the MSDF and Air Support Command of the ASDF also constantly maintain their readiness to transport personnel and their supplies to disaster affected areas. Furthermore, in April 2015, the MOD/SDF also improved its readiness to be able to swiftly respond to a request for search activities using P-3C patrol aircraft. **3** International Disaster Relief Activities for Heavy Rains and Floods in the Republic of Djibouti In response to a request from the Australian government to respond to the large-scale bush fires that had been continuing in Australia since September 2019, Japan decided on January 15, 2020, to have the SDF conduct international disaster relief activities, and dispatched two C-130H transport aircraft and about 70 ASDF personnel. While stationed at Richmond Air Force Base from January 18, the members of the SDF transported personnel and supplies for firefighting and recovery efforts. On February 7, a termination order was issued by the Minister of Defense, ending the 25-day operation of the international disaster relief activities. A total of SDF personnel engaging in international emergency relief operations for heavy rains and floods in the Republic of Djibouti (November 2019) Heavy rains in the Republic of Djibouti between November Video: International disaster relief activities for heavy rains and floods in the Republic of Djibouti URL: https://youtu.be/kkWpSS55gfo ----- approximately 11 tons of goods (vehicles, fi refi ghting equipment, etc.) and approximately 600 personnel were transported during this dispatch. The Australian ambassador to Japan visited the ASDF Komaki Air Base to greet the international disaster relief units upon their return. This mission was very meaningful also in deepening the JapanAustralia relationship. **Chapter** **VOICE** Voice of an SDF Personnel Engaged in International Disaster Relief Activities in Response to a Large-scale Bushfi re in Australia Colonel OTA Masashi, Flight Group Commander, 1st Tactical ensure operation across a broad area, and demonstrate our Airlift Wing, ASDF (Komaki City, Aichi Prefecture) organizational capacity by exercising our capabilities cultivated In January 2020, at the request of the government of through training at home and abroad. At the time of the Great Australia concerning the bushfi re occurred in the country, I was East Japan Earthquake, Australia dispatched all their operable ordered to carry out international disaster relief activities in the C-17 transport aircraft including ones engaged in overseas country. I visited the site as the commander of the air transport missions, excluding aircraft under maintenance. In order to unit of the international disaster relief activities in Australia. repay Australia for the warm help, all team members did their On the day when the order was issued, two C-130Hs departed best to accomplish the mission with all their hearts day and ASDF Komaki Airbase. On our arrival at RAAF Base Richmond night, always thinking, “This is for the Australian people and in Australia, we promptly established an operation system and restoration of the earth.” started air transportation. In a low visibility condition due to the Japan and Australia are special strategic partners combining fi re, we transported Australian military personnel to Kangaroo the will and ability to contribute to the peace and stability of Island as our fi rst mission, and continued transportation the region. I would be happy if this activity contributes to the of fi refi ghters who engaged in fi refi ghting and restoration deepening of the relationship of the two countries, which has activities, military vehicles and fi refi ghting equipment. been built at various levels. I made it a point to carry out prompt activities in response to the needs, which is important in a large-scale disaster, Australian military personnel boarding ASDF aircraft at Hobart International Airport of Aircraft maintenance from early morning to midnight to support the repeated days of fl ight Tasmania on the fi rst day of the air transport mission Video: International Disaster Relief Activities in Response to the Major Bush fi res in Australia URL: https://youtu.be/wa8IhKNi4oY ----- **Part** Core Elements Comprising Defense Capability, etc. ## Ⅳ **Chapter 1** Human Resource Base that Sustains the Defense Capability **Chapter 2** Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology **Chapter 3** Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities **Chapter 4** Elements that Sustain Defense Capability **Chapter 5** Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens ----- **Human Resource Base that Sustains** **the Defense Capability** ###### 1 **1** **Section** **1** **Reinforcing Human Resource Base** The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) specifi es that the core element of defense capability is Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel, and that securing human resources for SDF personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an imminent challenge in the face **❶ [Recruitment and Employment]** of shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates. Also in light of the sustainability and resilience of defense capability, the SDF needs to work even further to reinforce the human resource base that sustains the defense capability. SDF’s measures to reinforce the human resource base including those taken so far are explained below. - of educators and support from recruitment counselors. Moreover, local governments will carry out some of the administrative activities regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, including announcing the recruitment period and promoting the SDF as a workplace, with the MOD bearing the requisite cost. At the same time, the MOD is strengthening collaboration with local governments to ensure necessary cooperation including information provision on recruitment targets, which is indispensable for smooth administrative activities regarding the recruitment. **1 Recruitment** It is vital to secure highly qualifi ed personnel for the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF to carry out various missions appropriately. Expectations from the public for the MOD/SDF have continued to rise. In Japan, however, due to the recent economic and employment upturn, as well as the advancement of declining birthrate and popularization of higher education, the environment surrounding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel is severe. In such a situation, it is necessary for the MOD/SDF to recruit qualifi ed human resources with a strong desire to join the SDF, by suffi ciently explaining to them the missions, roles, duties, welfare programs, and privileges of the SDF. For this reason, the MOD/SDF holds recruiting meetings at schools and also maintains Provincial Cooperation Offi ces in 50 locations throughout Japan to respond to the individual needs of applicants, with the understanding **2 Employment** (1) Uniformed SDF Personnel Based on a voluntary system that respects individuals’ free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories. The upper age limit of general candidate for Newly joined members of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF attending the induction ceremony Video：Advertisement for Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel URL：https://www youtube com/watch?v=Jtxwcm YCCo ----- Fig. IV-1-1-1 Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF 21,000 20,000 19,000 18,000 17,000 16,000 15,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 **Chapter** About 18.81 million people The number of 18-32 year-olds (thousand people) million peopleAbout 17.43 million peopleAbout 17.5 The number of 18-26 year-olds (thousand people) The number of 18 year-olds (thousand people) About 15.63 million people About 13.73 million people About 12.41 million people About 11.05 million people About 10.02 million people About 8.97 million people About 7.81 million people About 7.2 million people About 1.84 million people About 1.21 About 1.06 About 0.91 About 0.83 About 0.75 million people million people million people million people million people 93 94 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 (FY) Material sources: The numbers for FY1993 and FY1994 are based on “Population Estimates of Japan 1920 - 2000” and “Current Population Estimates,” Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Data from FY2016 onward are based on “Population Projection for Japan” (medium estimates in April 2017), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. enlistment (Upper) and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel was raised from “under 27” to “under 33” in 2018 in order to secure diverse human resources from a broader range, including people with work experience in private companies. A review of the examination for candidates for uniformed SDF personnel started in 2020 in order to ensure quality improvement of uniformed SDF personnel in fi xed term system (candidate for uniformed SDF personnel) while at the same time securing human resources with diverse backgrounds and capabilities. See Fig. IV-1-1-1 (Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF) Fig. IV-1-1-2 (Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel) Personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of general civilian government employees,[1] due to the uniqueness of their duties and the need to maintain the SDF’s strength. With consideration given to the knowledge, experience, physical strength and other factors necessary for the duties of the respective ranks, the SDF has“Early Retirement System” where the majority of personnel retire in their mid-50s and “Fixed Term System” where one term is two or three years. After employment, uniformed SDF personnel are assigned their branch of service and duties at units all around Japan, in accordance with their choice or aptitude, following basic education and training at respective training units or schools of respective SDF services. See Reference 52 (Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Changes in Them) Reference 53 (Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel [FY2019]) (2) SDF Reserve Personnel, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel It is essential to secure the required number of uniformed SDF personnel promptly depending on situational changes in the event of a crisis. To secure the required number promptly and systematically, the MOD maintains the following three systems: the SDF Reserve Personnel system, the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, and the Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel system.[2] See Fig. IV-1-1-3 (Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel) SDF Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel upon the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders, and carry out logistical support and base guard duties. SDF Ready Video：Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel URL：https://twitter.com/jgsdf_reserve/status/1247004431922561026?s=09 SDF personnel are designated as special national government employees under Article 2 of the National Civil Service Law. M th t i l h l t ----- Fig. IV-1-1-2 Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel **Chapter** |ergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty fficer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Enlisted (upper)| |---|---| |aster Sergeant (GSDF, Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF); ergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant SDF); Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)|| |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Leadin|g|Private| |||| ||Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |General (GSDF, ASDF), Admiral (MSDF) to Second Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Ensign (MSDF)|Officer||| |Warrant Officer Warrant Officer (Note 1) ergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer Candidate fficer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF) Enlisted (upper) aster Sergeant (GSDF, Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF); ergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (Note 5) (Not SDF); Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF) (Note 3) (Note 2) (Note 6) Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Leading Private Airman First Class (ASDF) (Note 4) Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF) Private (GSDF), Seaman graduation) upon Private Leading years, (3 School Technical High GSDF months) (3 service term (u) Personnel short- in (u) SDF for Candidate Personnel SDF per years two/three Class; Third Airman Apprentice/ /Seaman Private as (appoint screening) through Sergeant Class/Staff Officer Sergeant/Petty Class; Third Airman Apprentice/ /Seaman Private as (appoint (Upper) enlistment for candidate General years) 6 about after Lieutenant/Ensign Second Class; Third Airman Apprentice/ /Seaman Private as (appoint ASDF) (MSDF, Cadet Aviation graduation) upon Sergeant Master Officer/Senior Petty Major/Chief Sergeant years: (4 student Academy Defense National graduation) upon Sergeant Master PettyOfficer/Senior Major/Chief Sergeant years: student(6 College Medical Defense National Medicine of Division graduation) upon Sergeant Master Officer/Senior Petty Major/Chief Sergeant years: student(4 College Medical Defense National Nursing of Division loans) on students (Includes colleges and universities Civilian Apprentice (MSDF), Student term) Third Airman Third Class (ASDF) Aged 18 or older and under 33 Senior high school, and others Junior high school, and others|||(Note 1)| Legend Exam or selection Employment exam Appointment after completing the program Notes:1 Staff candidates for the medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy faculties will be promoted to the position of First Lieutenant if they pass the national examinations in medicine and complete the prescribed education and training. 2 General candidate for enlistment (upper) refers to a candidate who has been enlisted with the premise that he/she will be promoted to a fixed-term position of “Enlisted (upper).” Until FY2006, there were two programs consisting of “Student candidates for enlistment (upper)” and “Enlisted (upper) candidates.” However, these two programs were reorganized and combined, and since FY2007, candidates have been appointed as “General candidates for enlistment (upper).” 3 As for the candidate for uniformed SDF personnel, in order to enhance the initial education of SDF personnel in fixed-term service, in July 2010, it was decided that their status during the first three months of their enlistment would be as non-SDF personnel, and they would engage exclusively in fundamental education and training as non-regular Ministry of Defense personnel. 4 GSDF High Technical School trains people to be SDF personnel who will be capable not only of operating and making full use of equipment in the GSDF but also of conducting missions in the international community. Starting from FY2010 appointments, the status of the school’s students was changed from SDF officer to “students,” which is a new non-regular status. New students receive a high school diploma at the conclusion of a student course (three years) through distance learning. From the FY2011 appointments, a new recommendation system was introduced in which those who are considered appropriate to be a GSDF High Technical School student are selected from among the candidates based on the recommendation of the principal of their junior high school etc., in addition to the conventional general examination. 5 A three-year program ended in FY2013. A new four-year program was established at the Division of Nursing, National Defense Medical College, in FY2014. 6 For Aviation Cadets, the Maritime Self-Defense Force selects from persons 18 or above and under 23 in age and the Air Defense Force 18 or above and under 21 in age. 7. For students on loans, the SDF lends school expenses (54,000 yen per month) to students who major in medicine, dentistry, or science and engineering at a university or a graduate school (excluding professional graduate schools) and have an intention to continue serving as SDF personnel after graduation (completion) by taking advantage of academic knowledge in their specialized fields. |Fig. IV|V-1-1-3 Overview of Systems Related|d to SDF Reserve Personnel|Col4| |---|---|---|---| ||SDF Reserve Personnel|SDF Ready Reserve Personnel|Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel| |Basic concept|●Upon the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders, serve as SDF Personnel|●Serve as SDF Personnel in a pre-designated GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability|●Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel in the GSDF or MSDF upon completion of education and training| |Eligibility|●Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel|●Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel|(Common to General and Technical Employment Categories) ●Those with no experience as SDF personnel (including those with less than a year of SDF experience)| |Age|●Leading privates and lower SDF Reserve Personnel: 18 to under 55 years old ●Offcier, Warrant Offcier, Enlisted (Upper): Under the age of two years added to respective retirement age|●Leading privates and lower SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: 18 to under 50 years old ●Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under the age of three years subtracted from respective retirement age|●General: 18 to under 34 years old; Technical: between the age of 18 and under 53 or 55 depending on technical skills possessed| |Employ ment|●Employed by screening, based on application ●Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training|●Employed by screening, based on application|●General: Employed by examination, based on application ●Technical: Employed by screening, based on application| |Rank designation|●Former SDF Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle ●Former SDF Reserve Personnel and Former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle ●Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel ・ General: Private・Technical: Designated according to skills and length of experience|●Former SDF Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle ●Former SDF Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle|●Not designated| |Term of service|●Three Years/One term|●Three Years/One term|●General: Within three years ●Technical: Within two years| |Education/ Training|●Although the Self-Defense Forces Law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is 5 days per year as a standard|●30 days per year|●General: 50 days within three years (equivalent to Candidate SDF personnel (private level) course) ●Technical: 10 days within two years (training to serve as SDF Personnel by utilizing their special skills)| |Promotion|●Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfliled the service term (actual serving days)|●Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)|●Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion| |Benefits, allowances, and other terms|●Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day ●SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month|●Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400-14,200/day ●SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ●Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term|●Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day ●Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is not paid because defense call-up duty or any other duties are not required| |Special subsidy for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel|－|●Special subsidy for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month ●Special subsidy for companies cooperating with training of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥560,000/personnel|－| ||●Special subsidy to secure understanding and cooperation from employers regarding the duties of SDF Reserve Personnel: ¥34,000/day||| |Call-up duty and other duties|●Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up|●Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up|●Education and training call-up| ----- **Chapter** VOICE Voice of an Active SDF Reserve Personnel and His Employer Mr. INOKUCHI Masataka, President, Chokuwakai Medical Corporation Our hospital opened 17 years ago with the goal of contributing to and enhancing regional medical care in Katsushika Ward, Tokyo. In order to further enhance the emergency care system of the community, and in response to its designation as a disaster base hospital of Tokyo, there is an urgent need to enhance our disaster medicine system. This is why we invited Lieutenant Colonel Ohmomo. It is a great honor for his employer that he was called for disaster relief activities in response to Typhoon Hagibis. Because he plays a central role in the Recent photograph of the author emergency medical care of the hospital, his absence affects the operations of many in the hospital departments, but we adjusted the hospital system during his absence so that he could focus entirely on his activities as SDF personnel without any anxiety. We can expect a positive effect from his love of Japan, discipline and control over staff of other job categories. I am happy that we can serve Japan indirectly by employing an SDF Reserve Personnel who works for the country. Reserve Lieutenant Colonel OHMOMO Taketomo, Tokyo Provincial Cooperation Offices While working as a doctor, I wanted to serve the country through my profession and was appointed as an SDF Reserve Personnel after serving as an SDF Reserve Candidate (technical). It is my irreplaceable asset that I got to know many like-minded fellows through call training of SDF Reserve Personnel and other occasions. At the call for the disaster relief in response to Typhoon Hagibis, the president made adjustment for my absence, saying with a smile, “There Author providing an explanation on medical are things that only you can do. Render service to the country.” In order to meet that support activities during the disaster relief expectation, I made full efforts in the offi ce of medical offi cers, Ground Component Command Headquarters. I would have not been able to carry out the activities without the understanding of my workplace and support by people around me. It could not have been done with my own will alone. I am grateful to all staff involved. I will continue to study hard in preparation for the day when I can support permanent SDF Personnel who are working hard on the front line to protect our beautiful country that has nurtured us.The SDF Reserve Personnel System allows us to contribute to Japan using our occupational ability. There are many like-minded people. Would you take the fi rst step and walk together with us? Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel and are assigned to carry out their mission together with incumbent uniformed SDF personnel as part of frontline units following the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders. Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel, some of whom are recruited among those with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel, are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training. As SDF Reserve Personnel and others work in their civilian jobs under normal circumstances, they need to adjust their work schedule to participate in periodic training exercises. Therefore, understanding and cooperation from the companies that employ these personnel are essential. For this purpose the MOD provides a special subsidy to the companies that employ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and take necessary measures to allow such employees to attend training sessions for 30 days a year, by taking into consideration the burden on such companies. Also, in 2017, the MOD established a framework that allows the MOD/SDF to provide such information as the scheduled term of a training call-up and scheduled term during which SDF Reserve Personnel/SDF Ready Reserve Personnel are called up to perform actual operations and are appointed as uniformed SDF personnel, when requested by their employers. In 2018, the MOD established a system to provide a subsidy which aims to contribute to securing understanding and cooperation from the employers regarding the duties of SDF Reserve Personnel. Under the system the employers are provided with a subsidy if ----- (1) SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel respond to a defense operation call-up order, civil protection dispatch call-up order, or disaster relief call-up order, etc. or (2) if they have no choice but to leave their regular occupations due to injuries during their duties, etc. In addition, a special subsidy to the companies that cooperate with training of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel was established in 2020. The subsidy is paid to companies that employ people who, after being a Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel, are appointed as SDF Ready Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training, and that take necessary measures to allow such employees to attend training sessions. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up at the time of the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake[3], the 2018 July Heavy Rain,[4] and the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake,[5] while SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and SDF Reserve Personnel were called up at the time of the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis).[6] They carried out their missions, including transportation of goods and water supply. In 2020, in a disaster relief mission to prevent infection of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID19) from spreading, SDF Reserve Personnel with medical qualification were called up and handled the situation.[7] The MOD has been implementing various measures to increase and enhance SDF Reserve Personnel and others because SDF Reserve Personnel are anticipated to be called up more often in response to earthquake and other disasters. Specifically, recruitment and appointment were expanded in 2018 to secure a wide variety of human resources from a broader range. The upper age limit for recruitment of leading privates and lower SDF Reserve Personnel was raised from “under 37” to “under 55” and the upper age limit for their continued appointment from “under 61” to “under 62.” An upper age limit is not set for persons with a license for a medical practitioner. Their continued appointment is approved when it is confirmed that they properly maintain their medical techniques and that there is no problem with their duties as SDF Reserve Personnel. The upper age limit for recruitment of leading privates and lower SDF Ready Reserve Personnel was raised from “under 32” to “under 50.” In 2019 a new system was established to appoint SDF Reserve Personnel without experience in the SDF as SDF Ready Reserve Personnel after certain education and training. Also, the MOD promotes the use of SDF Reserve Personnel in a wide range of fields, such as the appointment of retired SDF pilots, who were reemployed in the private sector through the re-employment system, as SDF Reserve Personnel.[8]により 任用するなど、幅広い分野で予備自衛官の活用を進めている。 (3) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel — administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others — in addition to uniformed SDF personnel in the MOD/SDF.[9] Civilian personnel are mainly recruited from those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Comprehensive and General Service National Public Employees conducted by the National Personnel Authority (NPA), and those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Ministry of Defense Specialists conducted by the MOD. After participating in the common training course, civilian personnel recruited in this process work in a wide range of fields. Administrative officials are engaged in defense-related policy planning in the Internal Bureaus of the MOD and at the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA); analysis and evaluation at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters; and administrative works at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country. Technical and engineering officials are working in the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, the ATLA, the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country. They are engaged in constructing various defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.), carrying out research and development (R&D), efficient procurement, maintenance and improvement of a range of equipment, as well as providing mental health care for SDF personnel. Instructors conduct advanced research on defense and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense **Chapter** In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, a call-up order for SDF Ready Reserve Personnel was issued, and approximately 160 Ready Reserve Personnel engaged in activities such as livelihood support to the affected people. In response to the heavy rain in July 2018, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up. From July 12 to 30, approximately 310 SDF Ready Reserve Personnel engaged in life support and activities, including removal of disaster waste. At the time of the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up. From September 8 to 23, approximately 250 SDF Ready Reserve Personnel engaged in life support and other activities. At the time of the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis), approximately 410 SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and SDF Reserve Personnel were called up and carried out life support and other activities, including removal of disaster waste for the period from October 15 to November 9. In a disaster relief mission against COVID-19 in 2020, 10 SDF Reserve Personnel with a medical qualification were called up and worked to prevent the disease from spreading for the period from February 18 to March 12. The reemployment system for SDF pilots aims to prevent the outflow of active young SDF pilots to civil aviation companies in an unregulated manner. This system is also designed to utilize SDF pilots over a certain age as pilots of commercial airlines, and is also significant from the perspective of the development of the airline industry in Japan as a whole. Among the employees of the MOD, special national government employees are called “SDF personnel,” including administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, d th i dditi t if d SDF l ----- Academy, the National Defense Medical College, and other organizations. In response to the “Directive for Organization and Allocation of Personnel Expense in JFY2020 to Proceed with the Core Issue of the Cabinet Office” (decision by the Prime Minister on July 31, 2019), which listed “development of **❷ [Daily Education and Training ]** security arrangement while further improving the efficiency of defense force development” as one of the priority areas, the MOD has increased the number of defense officials in FY2020 in preparation for the implementation of NDPG and The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP). See Reference 54 (Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, etc.) See - for providing education. In the event that personnel need to further improve their professional knowledge and skills, or that it is difficult for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, the MOD/SDF commissions education to external institutions, including those abroad, as well as domestic companies and research institutes. Furthermore, based on the MTDP, in order to promote cross-domain joint operations, the MOD/SDF will strengthen joint education and standardize the curriculum, while at the same time improving the education infrastructure for the utilization of cutting-edge technology and expansion of recruitment including female SDF personnel. **Chapter** **1 Education of Uniformed SDF Personnel** Enhancing the ability of the individual uniformed SDF personnel who comprise SDF units is essential for the execution of the units’ duties. For this purpose, the respective SDF training units and schools provide opportunities for phased and systematic education according to rank and duties to nurture necessary qualities and instill knowledge and skills. A considerable extent of human, temporal, and economic efforts such as securing instructors with special skills, and improving equipment and educational facilities, are necessary - **❸ [Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources ]** of the MTDP from 2020, and another one year during the **1 Effective Use of Human Resources** period of the next MTDP in stages for each rank in order to With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, the authorized ensure further utilization of older human resources who have number of SDF personnel has been on a decline. On the other hand, rich knowledge, skills, and experience. The retirement age there has been the need for more-skilled personnel and personnel with of personnel from the rank of Ichii (Captain (Ground Selfexpertise in order to respond to the sophistication of equipment as Defense Force [GSDF], Air Self-Defense Force [ASDF])/ well as the diversification and internationalization of SDF missions. Lieutenant (Maritime Self-Defense Force [MSDF])) to Isso In light of such circumstances, while ensuring the (Master Sergeant (GSDF, ASDF)/Petty Officer 1st Class robustness of the SDF, the NDPG and others plan to raise the (MSDF)) was raised in 2020. The SDF also continues to mandatory early retirement age by one year during the period expand reenrollment after retirement (up to the age of 65) and further promotes utilization of the skills of retired SDF personnel in fields requiring high levels of expertise. Rank Designation Retirement AgeMandatory In addition, the SDF will promote manpower saving and General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF) Sho automation by leveraging technological innovations such Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF) ShohoIssa 56 as artificial intelligence. In addition, in order to ensure an Colonel (ASDF) Nisa operating ratio with a limited number of personnel, the Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF) Sansa crew system was introduced in some MSDF vessels, where Lieutenant (ASDF) Nii some crews take shifts to increase the number of operation Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF) Sani 55 days. The introduction of this crew system to new types of See Fig. IV-1-1-4 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel) |Fig. IV-1-1-4 Rank and Retire|ement Age of|f SDF Personnel| |---|---|---| |Rank|Designation|Mandatory Retirement Age| |General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)|Sho|60| |Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)|Shoho|| |Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)|Issa|56| |Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)|Nisa|55| |Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)|Sansa|| |Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)|Ichii|| |First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)|Nii|| |Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)|Sani|| |Warrant Offcier (GSDF), Warrant Offcier (MSDF), Warrant Offcier (ASDF)|Juni|| |Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Socho|| |Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Isso|| |Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)|Niso|53| |Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)|Sanso|| |Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)|Shicho|－| |Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)|Isshi|| |Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)|Nishi|| Notes:1 The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), ----- **Chapter** VOICE Voice of SDF Personnel Studying at Graduate Schools etc. at Home or Abroad KINA Satoshi, First Lieutenant, Institute of Urban Innovation, Yokohama National University (Yokohama City, Kanagawa Prefecture) After graduating from the JGSDF Offi cer Candidate School and then working in the SDF for several years, I applied for a graduate school trainee and entered Yokohama National University graduate school. After earning a master’s degree, I am now working on research concerning “rescue activities in the event of a Tokyo inland earthquake” in a doctoral course. At the moment, a dozen or so GSDF offi cers, including myself, are studying in graduate schools at home and abroad to cultivate the ability to think for problem solving, which is required from technical offi cers. After my study, I want to exercise my ability to identify and solve problems in R&D of defense The author analyzing research data equipment, for example. Georgetown University, School of Foreign Services the United States) Lieutenant Commander OKADA Wataru (currently belongs to JMSDF Staff College) I have been studying foreign policy and international relations since September 2019 at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Services in Washington DC. The study is scheduled to run for two years. Teachers include active offi cials of the Department of State and the Department of Defense in addition to scholars. Students of diverse nationalities and social experiences are heatedly discussing all sorts of issues facing the international community, from human rights and development to military affairs, from multilateral viewpoints. I will study hard in friendly rivalry with classmates who aspire to exert themselves for international peace at a government agency, United Nation’s organization, international NGO, etc. after graduation. After returning to Japan, I will contribute to Japan’s defense and stability of the international community. The author at Georgetown University Major NAGAYOSHI Takeshi, Student, Republic of Korea Joint Forces Military University (currently belongs to Operations Division, Operations and Intelligence Department, Air Staff Office) In the one year since January 2019, I have completed an offi cial course at the Joint Forces Military University of the Republic of Korea. The students of the course included 53 international students from 29 countries in addition to 303 Korean offi cers. I have been able to cultivate the knowledge and abilities necessary for a future commander and staff while communicating not only with Korean officers but also officers from other countries. At the time of The author receiving the Joint Forces Military University President Prize graduation, I was the best student and wrote the best research paper among at the graduation ceremony (3rd from the left) 14 students from foreign air forces and ASDF, and I received the Joint Forces Military University President Prize for the achievements. I would be happy if I could bridge the two countries by taking advantage of the bonds that I have built through my study at the university. ----- **Chapter** Column SDF’s Emergency Rations The SDF is routinely stocking emergency rations in preparation losing appetite. While emergency rations currently procured for various contingencies. On the occasions of disaster relief are retort pouch foods, a set of which contains rice and side operations and various exercises, SDF personnel consume the dishes as well as a spoon and a tray, those procured previously rations in order to take in nutrients necessary for maintaining were canned foods. The procurement of canned foods, which and enhancing their physical fi tness. The emergency rations were fi rst adopted in 1954, has been discontinued because, are suitable for long-term storage of three years. They are thanks to technological advances, retort pouch foods currently stored at supply depots across Japan in the fi rst year after available are as suitable for long-term storage as canned foods procurement and at camps in the second year. They are are. While emergency rations provided to units are usually consumed during exercises and on other occasions in the third consumed after being boiled using fi eld cooking appliances, year. The list of emergency rations includes 20 food items, such they can be consumed anywhere and at any time as they can as “chikuzen-ni” (braised chicken and vegetables), pork roast also be warmed using heating agents. The list of rations is chicken, “mabo tofu” (a spicy dish of tofu and minced meat). periodically changed. Items to be procured in the future, which The items are well-balanced between Japanese, Chinese and will be selected from the viewpoints of increasing the nutrition Western foods in order to provide a suffi cient variety to enable volume and better meeting preferences, include pastas and SDF personnel to consume the rations every day without buns. An outer package A heating agent Staple food Side dish An example of emergency rations item: pork roast chicken SDF personnel consuming emergency rations Column Defensive Memorial Cordons, Defensive Meritorious Badges and Medals for Contribution to Unit Merits As one of the important personnel measures for enhancing morale of SDF personnel and harmonizing units, Defensive Meritorious Badges and Medals for Contribution to Unit Merits are awarded to personnel who worked hard on their duties and who contributed to their unit with commendable achievements in carrying out their duties. Recognized personnel may wear Defensive Meritorious Badges and Medals for Contribution to Unit Merits on their left chest at SDF ceremonies and other occasions. In particular, wearing decorations and medals to mark honor and pride is customary in places for exchange with foreign military personnel. Therefore, these medals are useful for SDF personnel who work (Left) Rear Admiral Gregory J. Fenton, former Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan (retired) globally and engage in international exchanges. (Right) Admiral YAMAMURA Hiroshi, Chief of Staff, MSDF ----- **2 Improvement of Living and Work Environment and** Treatment To enable all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise their ability, the NDPG and the MTDP state that the MOD/SDF will improve living and work environment. Specifically, the SDF will steadily renew aged everyday life/workplace fixtures, secure the necessary quantities of everyday necessities in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing, and proceed with measures against aging and earthquake proofing of facilities. Because SDF personnel carry out their missions under a severe environment, the SDF will improve their treatment based on the special nature of their missions and work environment. Specifically, in order to ensure appropriate treatment in accordance with the risk and special nature of their missions and the characteristics of the area of the office, the SDF will make improvements to special work allowance,[10] etc. and procure portable beds and better emergency rations to improve their ability to respond to disasters. To enable SDF personnel to fulfill their missions with high morale and pride, the MOD/SDF will improve their treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges, including the enhancement of the defensive meritorious badges to appropriately acknowledge their achievements. In light of the severe recruitment environment, the Act on Remuneration, etc. of Ministry of Defense Personnel was revised in 2019 to raise salaries with a focus on starting pay. **3 Dealing with Retirement and Re-employment of** SDF Personnel **Chapter** Improvement of living and work environment Retired uniformed SDF personnel have excellent abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness, and responsibility gained through their work performance, education and training. Furthermore, they have various qualifications and licenses acquired through their duties and vocational training. Therefore, they are making positive contributions in a broad range of sectors, including manufacturing and service industries, as well as finance, insurance, real estate, and construction industries, in addition to the areas of disaster prevention and risk management at local governments. Based on the NDPG and MTDP, the MOD/SDF will strive to further improve re-employment support by expanding vocational training subjects and support for step-by-step acquisition of qualifications before their retirement. The MOD also strives to further utilize retired SDF personnel while strengthening collaboration with local governments and related organizations from the perspective of utilizing the knowledge, skills, and experience of retired SDF personnel. Specifically, as of the end of March 2020, a total of 575 retired SDF personnel work as crisis management officers at local governments’ disaster prevention bureaus—46 prefectural bureaus have 102 of them in total, and 398 municipal bureaus have 473. As this strengthens collaboration with local governments and enhances the ability to deal with crisis management, including disaster prevention, the MOD/SDF will continue active support for the utilization of retired SDF personnel in local governments’ disaster prevention bureaus by further enhancing these efforts. In order to maintain the strength of the SDF, many uniformed SDF personnel retire in their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or in their 20s to mid-30s (uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system). Therefore, many of them need to find another job after retirement in order to secure their livelihoods. Since supporting re-employment is the responsibility of the Japanese Government (the MOD) as the employer, and is crucial both for resolving any concerns that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future as well as for securing qualified human resources, the MOD conducts support measures such as occupational training useful for their re-employment. In addition, as the MOD does not have the authority to provide them with employment placement, the Foundation for the SDF Personnel Support Association provides free job consultation services for retired SDF personnel with permission from the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. See Figure IV-1-1-5 (Major Vocational Training Provided to Support Re-employment) Figure IV-1-1-6 (Re-employment Support in the FY2019) Reference 55 (Main Measures for Re-employment Support) Reference 56 (Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government) 10 I 2020 i l i i d f di t di t h ll f l d i di t di t h t t th d f i i f ti ----- **Fig. IV-1-1-5** Major Vocational Training Provided to Support Re-employment In order to maintain the strength of the SDF, many uniformed SDF personnel retire in their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or in their 20s to mid-30s (uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system). Since supporting re-employment is the responsibility of the Japanese Government (the MOD) as the employer, and is crucial both for resolving any concerns that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future as well as for securing qualified human resources, the MOD conducts support measures such as occupational training useful for their re-employment. ■ Re-employment support for uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system Joint job fair for Occupational uniformed SDF personnel Support for application, service system ■ Re-employment support for uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age **Chapter** Occupational Occupational Employment Support for application, Re-employment Business management training ■ Major occupational training for re-employment Vehicle operation - Large-sized - Regular-sized - Semi-medium-sized - Special (large-sized) ● Medium-sized Operation of facility machines - Forklift - Boiler engineer - Heavy-duty vehicle - Crane - Vehicle for high-place work Telecommunication technology - Electrician - Licensed electrician - Telecommunication worker - Special radio communication operator - Hazardous material engineer - Person responsible for handling poisons and deleterious substances Handling of dangerous materials - Person responsible for class 3 refrigerating machinery - Person responsible for manufacturing safety of high pressure gas - Security guard certification examination - Operation manager - Drone operator - Marine technician Labor management practice, etc. - Social and labor insurance consultant Information processing technique - Examination for basic computer skills - Microsoft Office Specialist - IT Passport - Fundamental information technology engineer - First-level training for nursing care workers - Housing environment coordinator for elderly and disabled people Social welfare - Mental health management - Care fitter - Real estate transaction specialist - Administrative scrivener - Certified professional secretary examination Legal practice, etc. - Certified domestic travel service supervisor - Registered customs specialist - Disaster prevention and crisis management education - Medical office work - Course for civil servant examination - Welding technician - Financial planner - Fire defense equipment officer - Health officer Others - Condominium manager - Official Business Skill Test in Book-keeping - Care clerk - Auto technician - Medical clerk - Chef - TOEIC - Dispensing fee calculation - Occupational training in about 150 topics, including those above, are conducted. **Fig. IV-1-1-6** Re-employment Support in FY2019 ■ Re-employment Support in FY2019 Government service/association 3.0% Agriculture and forestry/Fishery/Mining 1.0% Number of personnel who applied for re-employment support Number of personnel who found a job Percentage of personnel who found a job Number of personnel who applied for re-employment support Number of personnel who found a job Percentage of personnel who found a job 1,676 1,669 99.3% 3,605 3,579 99.3% Termination of a term Result of re-employment support for retired personnel Early age retirement Result of re-employment support for retired personnel Wholesale and retail trade 6.3% Construction 8.0% Finance/Finance/ Insurance/Real estateInsurance/Real estate Service 8.1%8.1% 39.2% Manufacturing 15.4% Transport/Transport/ Communication/Communication/ Electricity, gas and water 18.8% ----- **Chapter** VOICE Voice of a Re-employed SDF Personnel and His Employer **Voice of a Re-employed SDF Personnel** **Voice of the Employer** Mr. ABE Asao, Licensed Pilot, Tokyo Bay Licensed Pilots’ Association Mr. FUNAKURA Kazuhisa, Chairman, Tokyo Bay Licensed Pilots’ Association I am working as a With about 170 li- maritime pilot at the censed pilots, ours is Tokyo Bay Licensed the biggest pilots’ as- Pilots’ Association. sociation in Japan and My job is to be on handles pilot operations board and provide over the entire Tokyo advice on the steer- ABE Asao, Licensed Pilot, Bay. The job of licensed FUNAKURA Kazuhisa, Chairman, ing of large ships Tokyo Bay Licensed Pilots’ Association maritime pilots is to Tokyo Bay Licensed Pilots’ Association when they enter and direct steering for cap- leave ports in Tokyo Bay, including Port of Tokyo, Kawasaki, Yo- tains of huge tankers, LNG ships, large container ships and other ships. kohama and Chiba, to ensure safety of the ships and ports. The With the enforcement of the amended Pilotage Act in 2007, not only for- knowledge and experience I have developed in my SDF career are mer captains of ocean-going ships but also captains of coasting vessels helpful in acquiring the national maritime pilot qualifi cation and and public ships may become licensed pilots. There are eight licensed pi- for my job performance as a licensed pilot. Working as a pilot is a lots who are SDF veterans across the country, and one of them is working rewarding job. I will further develop my knowledge and experience at our association. He tirelessly strives for safe and effi cient navigation of so that I can contribute to society. ships taking advantage of his experience as a former ship captain. **Voice of a Re-employed SDF Personnel** **Voice of the Employer** Mr. KURIHARA Kazuto, Section 2, Production Division 1, Mr. HAGIWARA Kunio, Manager of the General Affairs Department, Narita Laboratory, Dainichiseika Color & Chemicals Mfg. Co., Ltd. Narita Laboratory, Dainichiseika Color & Chemicals Mfg. Co., Ltd. After completing my Our company pro- four-year term of duces “colors,” in- service at 3rd An- cluding paints, col- ti-aircraft Company, orant and print inks. GSDF Air Defense Our laboratory pro- School Unit, I joined duces colorants for Dainichiseika Color KURIHARA Kazuto, Section 2, Production Division 1, plastic daily necessi- HAGIWARA Kunio, Manager of the General Affairs & Chemicals Mfg. Narita Laboratory, Dainichiseika Color & Chemicals Mfg. Co., Ltd. ties, home applianc- Department, Narita Laboratory, Dainichiseika Color & Co., Ltd. I was anx- es and automobiles. Chemicals Mfg. Co., Ltd. ious about re-employment, but was able to successfully balance Over 100 out of the my job searching and SDF duties thanks to dedicated support 230 employees are former SDF personnel, forming the core of the from my re-employment supporter. After joining the company, production department. (Almost 500 former SDF personnel are I was assigned to Narita Laboratory, where I am producing col- working in the whole company.) I am pleased to see that, in recent orant for plastics. My products are used for caps of shampoo years, more former SDF personnel have a sense of responsibility and food bottles. I feel greatly satisfi ed with my work when I and a cooperative nature in addition to patience and physical see such products sold in stores. We have many former SDF strength cultivated in the SDF. With a high retention rate, they will personnel in my workplace, and I am working happily and pos- continue to be indispensable members of our company. Actually, itively every day. I myself retired from SDF 35 years ago and have now become a general manager of our company. ----- Meanwhile, with regard to the re-employment of SDF personnel, new regulations about re-employment were introduced in October 2015, replacing the former prior approval system. As are the cases in other national government employees, the following three regulations were put in place in order to ensure the trust of the public regarding the fairness of official duties: (1) regulation on requesting re-employment of other personnel and retired personnel and requesting information; (2) regulation on seeking employment opportunities at companies in which retired personnel had a stake whilst in office; and (3) regulation on reemployed personnel making requests.[11]In order to ensure strict observation of these regulations, bodies comprised of academic experts with no history serving as SDF members (Defense Personnel Review Board’s Separate Meeting for Monitoring Reemployment and Cabinet Office’s Re-employment Surveillance Commission) monitor the situation, and any violation will be met with penalties. Additionally, for the purpose of appropriate implementation of unified management and disclosure of reemployment information by institutionalizing notification and announcement of such information by the Cabinet, it has been decided that information on the re-employment status of retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions (equivalent to the position of Senior Coordinator in the MOD or higher) is to be published every fiscal year by the Cabinet. In response to the introduction of this system in FY2015, notifications of reemployment of the retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions submitted during FY2018 were compiled, and a total of 231 cases were officially announced in September 2019. **4 Initiatives to Support Families** SDF personnel (family support centers), a website for the families of the dispatched SDF personnel and similar facilities have been established to provide consolation for the various questions and concerns raised by the families. **5 Initiatives to Maintain Strong Discipline** The MOD/SDF has gained great expectations from the public and in order for the SDF to perform its maximum ability on duty, it is essential to achieve support and trust from the public. To this end, the SDF is required to always maintain strong discipline. The MOD/SDF has so far strived to foster well-disciplined personnel by impressing in them an awareness of compliance with the law through setting up such campaign periods as the “MOD Anti-Drug Abuse Month,” “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Week,” and “Self-Defense Personnel Harassment Prevention Week” and implemented various measures such as thorough instructions on service discipline. Since 2019 the MOD/SDF has been working to prevent harassment by such means as mandatory education on harassment prevention for newly appointed directors of the ministry and other executives. In addition, under the leadership of Minister of Defense Kono, in order to eradicate disciplinary violations such as assault, injury and power harassment, the standards for disciplinary action have been tightened since March 2020. **6** Initiatives to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel **Chapter** SDF personnel suicides reached a record 101 in FY2005, and have subsequently increased and decreased, with 59 suicides in FY2019. The suicide of SDF members is truly a great tragedy for both the individuals themselves and their bereaved families. It also represents a great loss to the MOD/SDF in terms of the loss of capable personnel, and the MOD/SDF is taking ongoing measures to prevent suicides, including the following initiatives: (1) Expansion and enhancement of the counseling system (internal/ external counselors, a 24-hour telephone counseling hotline, assignment of clinical psychotherapists at camps and bases, etc.); (2) Strengthening of education to raise awareness about mental health for commanders as well as enlisted personnel; and (3) Establishment of a campaign period for enhancing mental health care, close monitoring by commanders of the mental health condition of their subordinates whose working environment has been changed due to personnel transfers, etc., and distribution of various reference materials. In 2019 the In addition to exchanges between units and personnel’s families, as well as between the families, the MOD in cooperation with relevant external groups and organizations is also actively working to develop a family support system to be implemented in the event of large-scale natural disasters and other events, which will include receiving cooperation in confirming the safety of the family members of SDF personnel. All of these are conducted as routine initiatives. The MTDP also includes promotion of various family support measures in order to ensure a sustainable response posture for a long period of time. Specific welfare services for SDF personnel deployed overseas include facilitating direct communication with their families in Japan by means such as e-mail and video conference systems. Support for sending comfort items from their families at a later date is also provided. Moreover, briefing sessions for families of the dispatched SDF personnel are held to provide them with a variety of information, and a consultation desk exclusively for families of the dispatched 11 Sti l t d i P t 2 3 d 4 f A ti l 65 f th SDF L ----- MOD/SDF promoted measures including the establishment of a counseling service by lawyers experienced in harassment cases in order to further improve the effectiveness of suicide prevention measures. **7 Commemorating Personnel who Perished in the** Line of Duty Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950 and through its evolution via the National Safety Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have been devoting themselves unstintingly to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations and trust of Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time period, however, more than 1,900 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty. In the MOD/SDF, funeral ceremonies in order to express condolences are carried out by each unit to which the personnel who perished in the line of duty belonged. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty, and to **Chapter** Memorial Service for members of the SDF personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty, conducted with the participation of Prime Minister Abe express deep honor and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, such as the Memorial Service for members of the SDF personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty conducted with the participation of the Prime Minister. Achievements of 12 SDF members (4 GSDF, 4 MSDF, and 3 ASDF members, and one member of another organization) who lost their lives in the line of duty were recognized in a Memorial Service in FY2019.[12] 12 The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument with other monuments located in the same area. The MOD holds an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty with the attendance of surviving family members, the Prime Minister, high-ranking officials of the MOD/SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Defense Ministers, and others. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the MOD, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel who perished in the line of duty. M i l i l h ld t i di id l SDF t d b ----- **Section** **2** **Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women’s Participation** The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, and both the number and the duration of situations requiring the MOD/SDF’s response are increasing. On the other hand, it is anticipated that a number of MOD staff, both male and female, will face time and commuting constraints for childcare, nursing care and other reasons due to big changes in social structure. Amid such challenging circumstances, ensuring preparedness to consistently respond to various situations requires creating an environment that enables staff to be sound both mentally and physically, maintain high morale, and fully demonstrate their abilities. On the basis of this view, the MOD/SDF promotes initiatives to achieve worklife balance of its staff members. Also, the MOD/SDF has been proactively encouraging **❶ [Working Style Reform]** the active participation of female personnel, and the number of female personnel is on the rise. The MOD/SDF has been conducting a variety of initiatives in order to promote work-life balance and the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel in a unifi ed manner, such as formulating various plans[1] that include three reforms: (1) working style reform; (2) reform to combine a successful career with childrearing and nursing care; and (3) reform for promoting active engagement of female personnel. In addition, the Committee to Promote Working Style Reform of the Internal Bureau Staff has been discussing and implementing initiatives to promote working style reform and reviewing the process of work under the leadership of the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense. - etc. The Minister of Defense and the State Minister of Defense honored particularly excellent initiatives, out of the applications received from various organizations and others, and used them to help achieve work reform at each workplace. (3) Flexible Working Hours and Location Realizing more flexible working hours and work locations is necessary in light of factors such as workload fluctuations and time constraints faced by individuals. For this reason, the MOD/SDF introduced the flextime system in 2016 and enabled its staff to choose Flexible Working Hours by dividing early/late shifts into multiple stages. In addition, telework, a work style that allows working at home, has started in the Internal Bureau of **Chapter** (1) Value and Mentality Reform In order to implement working style reform, focus needs to be placed especially on reforming the values and mentality of staff in managerial positions regarding working style. Since FY2017, the MOD/SDF has been implementing educational initiatives, such as message given by the MOD/SDF leaders, seminars, and lecture meetings aimed at raising awareness concerning working style reform and the concept of worklife balance. With the increase of personnel facing time/ commuting constraints for child/family care, the MOD/ SDF is also promoting correction of long working hours and encouraging taking leave to ensure proper work-life balance so that every member can exert his/her full potential. (2) Work Reform in the Workplace It is important that initiatives for the promotion of work-life balance are implemented in a way which fits the individual workplaces, and that staff members themselves consider specific measures for improving their workplace environment. This approach will lead to developing effective initiatives and workplace climate. Based on this perspective, since 2016, the annual “Competition for initiatives to promote Working Style Reform at the Ministry of Defense” has been held during the campaign period for enhancing work-life balance, An SDF member working at home using remote-work terminal (1) “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance at the MOD” (January 2015), (2) “Action Plan of the MOD Based on the Law to Promote the Role of Women in the Workforce (FY2016-FY2020)” (April 2016), and (3) “Action Plan to Support a Good Work-Life Balance of the Personnel of the MOD based on the Act on Advancet f M t S t R i i N t G ti Child (FY2015 FY2020)” (M h 2015) ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** **Voice of a Father Enjoying Child Rearing** Major KAIGI Hajime, and most of the child rearing tasks were done by my wife. Commander of the 4th Company, the 26th Infantry Regiment, However, I was able to successfully complete my child rearing GSDF (Asahikawa City, Hokkaido) mission during the period thanks to the understanding of my The SDF has a system in which both the mothers and fathers superior and coworkers and the guidance of my wife. of a child can take child care leave until the child reaches the In FY2018, the rate of male SDF personnel taking child care age of 3. In addition, male personnel can take paid leave up to leave was only about 3.5% and the rate of male national civil serv 7 days before and after the delivery. ants doing so was about 12%. The environment may not be friend The Kaigi family was blessed with our second child in De- ly for males to take child care leave. However, the SDF will also cember 2018. Due to my wife’s job on this occasion, I was change in response to the social trend in this regard. As a person able to have the precious experience of devoting myself to who took child care leave, I will cooperate in developing an envi child rearing for about two months from January to March ronment that is friendly for male SDF personnel to take child care 2019 by taking child care leave. I had some concerns because leave and actively help coworkers who take child care leave. I did not take child care leave upon the birth of our fi rst child Photograph of the Kaigi Family (the author is to the right) The author working at his workplace the MOD in FY2017 and it has been expanded to other Defense Bureau. Other organizations that have not organizations such as individual Staff Offices, Inspector started telework are also working to make this work General’s Office of Legal Compliance, and South Kanto system available by FY2020. - **❷ [Reform to Combine a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care]** In order for MOD/SDF staff, both male and female, to ministry is encouraging its male staff to take childcare be successful in their careers while realizing work-life leave to promote their participation in family settings. balance, it is necessary to establish a system that enables Since FY2020, the ministry is strongly working to enbalancing work with childrearing/nursing care, and to able all male staff with a newborn child to take childensure childcare services tailored to the irregular work- care leave or time off work for a total of one month or ing patterns unique to the SDF. more. Also the target rate of childcare leave acquisition by male staff is set at 13% by FY2020. (1) Development of an Environment that Enables Staff to Realize a The MOD/SDF is also developing an environment that Successful Career While Engaging in Childrearing and Nursing Care enables staff to balance work life with their family life by The MOD/SDF has developed various schemes, which distributing e-mail newsletters to help its staff to return enable staff to balance work with childrearing/nursing to work smoothly after childcare leave and encouraging care, such as ensuring substitute personnel for staff who staff to use a “childcare form” to facilitate managers’ and take childcare leave and other leave. In particular, the the human resources department’s thorough and detailed ----- understanding of the situation regarding childcare. The MOD/SDF has a system to rehire SDF personnel who have previously resigned mid-career. It reassessed the system so that former SDF personnel who had resigned in their mid-career due to childrearing and nursing care could be reemployed from January 2017. The MOD/SDF started recruitment based on this system in January 2018. (2) Ensuring Childcare Services To allow SDF personnel who are rearing children to concentrate on their duties, it is important to ensure childcare services tailored to the irregular working patterns unique to the SDF. Since April 2007, the MOD/SDF has set up workplace nurseries at GSDF Camp Mishuku, GSDF Camp Kumamoto, GSDF Camp Makomanai, GSDF Asaka Camp housing district, MSDF Yokosuka Naval Base district, ASDF Iruma Air Base, Ichigaya district, where the MOD is located, and National Defense Medical College. In addition, in the event of emergency operations such as disaster relief, the MOD promotes measures to provide temporary childcare in SDF camps and bases for children of SDF personnel who have no alternative but to attend to duties with their children. **Chapter** - **❸ [Reform for Promoting the Careers of Female Personnel]** For the further expansion of the recruitment and promo- complex, SDF personnel are required, more than ever, tion of female personnel, the MOD/SDF has been mak- to have multifaceted capabilities including higher leving various efforts to advance the careers of motivated els of knowledge, decision-making ability, and skills. and qualified female personnel by setting up specific In addition, under a severe recruitment environment due goals with regard to the recruitment and promotion of to the declining birthrate and continuing trend of higher female personnel under the “Action Plan for Promoting education, it is anticipated that the number of SDF perthe Active Participation of Female Employees and Work- sonnel with time and location restraints, including those Life Balance.” Moreover, the MOD formulated the “In- involved in childcare, nursing care, and other responsiitiative to Promote Active Engagement of Female SDF bilities, will significantly increase. Personnel – Aiming for Attractive SDF that Adapts to the In light of these changes, the SDF is required to evolve Times and Environment” (the “Initiative”) in April 2017 from a conventional organization with an emphasis on to specify its conceptual policy for promoting the active homogeneity among the members, into an organization participation of female SDF personnel. that is capable of incorporating diverse human resources in a flexible manner. (1) Significance of Promoting Active Engagement of Female SDF At present, the largest human resource that the SDF has Personnel and Personnel Management Policy not been able to fully utilize is women, who account for The “Initiative” outlines the significance of promot- half of the population targeted for recruitment. Promoting ing the active participation of female personnel and the the active engagement of female SDF personnel has MOD/SDF personnel management policy. Specifical- the following significance: (1) securing useful human ly, with SDF duties becoming increasingly diverse and resources; (2) utilizing diverse perspectives; and (3) Video：First female paratrooper in the GSDF URL：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AjTaHfAuvMo Video：Female MSDF personnel performing duties while having enough personal time URL：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tsk6VAV6LP4 Video：Female ASDF personnel performing duties while raising kids URL：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUKHaUQkeXM ----- (3) Expansion of the Recruitment of Female Personnel a. Female SDF Personnel As of the end of March 2020, the number of female SDF personnel is about 17,000 (about 7.4% of total SDF personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2010, about 5.2% of total SDF personnel), this is a rise of 2.2 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female SDF personnel has been on the rise in recent years. In order to increase the proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel to over 9% by FY2027, the MOD/SDF aims to ensure that women account for more than 10% of total newly employed SDF personnel in and after FY2017. Specifically, in order to increase the number of recruits through such measures as the elimination of the gender quota and the increase in the scheduled number of female recruits, the SDF will actively recruit women, promote their active participation, and improve education, living, and work environments for female SDF personnel. In addition, with regard to promotion, MDO/SDF aims to increase the proportion of women among SDF personnel with a rank of field officer or higher to over 3.1%. As for the careers of the personnel anticipated to reach a rank of field officer or higher, emphasis is given on assigning them to a commander or assistant commander post at the rank of company officer, with the hope of allowing them to gain experience. **Chapter** Captain Otani was appointed as the first female commanding officer of an Aegis destroyer (December 2019) reflecting values of the nation. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has decided to open up a path for female personnel with motivation, ability, and aptitude to have opportunities to demonstrate their abilities in various fields, and aim for doubling the ratio of female SDF personnel. In terms of employing and promoting female SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and women and assign the right person to the right place based on the person’s motivation and ability/ aptitude. In December 2019, a woman assumed the role of commanding officer of an Aegis destroyer for the first time, promoting active participation of female SDF personnel. (2) Removal of the Assignment Restriction of Female SDF Personnel The MOD/SDF has been reviewing the restriction of assignment of female personnel. With the removal of the restriction on female assignments in submarines in December 2018, assignment restriction against females was completely removed with the exception of the units where female personnel cannot be assigned for reasons of maternity protection (a part of the GSDF Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit [chemical] and Tunnel Company Units). With the removal of the restriction on female assignments, in 2018, the first female fighter pilot appeared. Training of female submarine personnel was started in January 2020. Furthermore, in March 2020, a female SDF personnel completed a basic parachute training course of the Airborne Training Unit and was assigned to the GSDF 1st Airborne Brigade. See Fig. IV-1-2-1 (Changes in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel) b. Female Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Others As of the end of March 2020, the number of female civilian personnel—administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, and instructors, and others—is approximately 3,400 (about 25.2% of total civilian personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2010 when females made up 23% of the total civilian personnel), this is a rise of 2.2 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female civilian personnel is on a rising trend in recent years. With regard to recruitment, in line with the overall government target, the MOD has set up its goal of ensuring that women account for over 30% of recruits in and after FY2016. Regarding promotion, as a goal to be achieved by the end of FY2020, the proportion of women of the DivisionDirector level at local organizations and Assistant-DivisionDirector level at the ministry proper or equivalent would be approximately 5%, and the proportion of women of the Division-Director level at the ministry proper or equivalent would be approximately 2%, and the proportion of women of the Unit-Chief level at the ministry proper or equivalent should be approximately 27%. ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** **Active Participation of Female Personnel** Sergeant HASHIBA Reina, 1st Airborne Brigade Headquarter Company, GSDF (Funabashi City, Chiba Prefecture) I completed the 319th basic parachute training course held by the Airborne Training Unit and was assigned to the 1st Airborne Brigade, which was my heart’s desire from my childhood. For the promotion of a gender equal society, the limitation on the assignment of female SDF personnel was removed. I am happy that opportunities for women’s participation are expand- ed as well as grateful for a warm welcome by members of the 1st Airborne Brigade and enthusiastic coaching by instructors of the Airborne Training Unit. Now I am standing at the start line as a paratrooper, I will enhance my spirit, skills, and physical strength, and devote myself to giving my all every day. The author on the aircraft in parachute training (front) Lieutenant Commander TAKAKI Sayaka, Marine Staff Offi ce (Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo) The Ships and Weapons Division handles ship construction and maintenance. I am in charge of submarines and provide techni- cal support, including checks of drawings and processes during construction, as well as trouble shooting. I’m also a mother of two children. My superior, colleagues and family members are very sympathetic and helpful. For example, my husband is also SDF personnel and took child-care leave for half a year for each child. Thanks to his help, I was able to return to my workplace early. Also my husband takes care of our children when I am absent due to duty or an offi cial trip. My current goal is to work reasonably to create better ships. I will continue to value both family and work. The author and her superior and colleagues working at the Ships and Weapons Division Captain SATO Saori, Special Airlift Group, ASDF (Chitose City, Hokkaido) I work for the Special Airlift Group as a loadmaster offi cer (so- called cabin crew) of the B-777 government aircraft for overseas visits by dignitaries including the prime minister. Carrying digni- taries to their destinations safely and surely is an important task that plays a part in Japan’s diplomacy and thereby contributes to the peace and safety of the country. To this purpose, I undergo hard training on a daily basis so that I can provide safe and com- fortable travel and ensure operation on schedule in cooperation with other crew members. Attending dignitaries puts me under a lot of pressure but smiles and words of appreciations from the passengers are my reward. I am working with pride and motiva- tion in this job, which has been my dream since childhood. The author during training on serving in-fl ight meals. ----- Fig. IV-1-2-1 Changes in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel （%） 8.0 7.0 (Number) 17,000 16,000 15,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 6.0 5.0 **Chapter** 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 Female GSDF personnel Female MSDF personnel Female ASDF personnel Total number of female SDF personnel / Total number of SDF personnel Recruitment of women started for Aviation Cadet of the MSDF and the ASDF Recruitment of women started for students of the National Defense Academy Recruitment of women started Recruitment of women started for students of the National in the general service area Defense Medical College of the MSDF and the ASDF Recruitment of women started in the general service area of the GSDF 546768697071727374757677787980818283848586878889909192939495969798990001020304050607080910111213141516171819 (FY) Note: As of the end of March 2020, the total number of female SDF personnel is 16,863 (approximately 7.4% of the total number of the SDF personnel) ----- **Measures on Defense Equipment** **and Technology** ###### 2 Military technologies in recent years are showing remarkable advances. Against the backdrop of such technological advances, contemporary warfare increasingly features capabilities combined across all domains: not only land, sea and air but also new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Aiming to improve overall military capability, states are seeking to gain superiority in technologies that undergird capabilities in these new domains. They endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge, potentially game-changing technologies. They also engage in research of autonomous unmanned weapon systems equipped with artifi cial intelligence (AI). Further technological innovations in quantum technology including quantum computing and quantum cryptography and the information and communication technology (ICT) sector including the 5th generation mobile communication system (5G) will make it even more diffi cult to forecast future warfare. While Japan is facing severe fi nancial conditions, imports of foreign equipment are increasing due to their highperformance and the complex trends of defense equipment. On the other hand, Japan’s defense industry has been exposed to harsh conditions due to a downward trend in the number of procured equipment from domestic companies and other reasons. Amid such a situation, it is essential to work on (1) reviewing equipment structure, (2) reinforcing technology base, (3) optimizing equipment procurement, (4) strengthening defense industrial base, and (5) promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation in order to ensure a necessary and suffi cient defense capability in terms of both quality and quantity for the construction of a Multi-domain Defense Force. **Chapter** **Section** **Reviewing Equipment Structure** **1** - **❶ [Initiatives for Construction of Optimized Equipment Structure]** In order to acquire suffi cient capabilities for cross-domain building of an equipment structure from the perspective of operations in view of the aging population with a declining joint operation at an appropriate time during the MTDP period. birth rate and the severe fi scal situation, it is essential to further promote initiatives to optimize equipment structure. The Mid- 2 Development of Product Families, Standardization of Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP) provides Specifications, Joint Procurement, etc. that the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will work on the following items to build an effective So far, based on a comprehensive perspective, the MOD has and optimized equipment structure from the perspective of been striving to reduce expenses incurred in development, joint operation. acquisition, and maintenance by the development of product families,[1] standardization of equipment specifi cations, and joint procurement of equipment common to all SDF services. **1 Enhancement of Joint Staff Functions** For the development of product families, for example, the In order to examine the current equipment structure of each MTDP plans to introduce vehicle families of next generation SDF service and build an effective and optimized equipment wheeled armored vehicles of the Ground Self-Defense Force structure from the perspective of joint operation, the MOD/ (GSDF) that include personnel transport type, command SDF will study enhancement of the equipment structure at communication type, and patient transportation type, the Joint Staff, take necessary measures, and undertake the and develop a radar with standardized specifi cations as a 1 This refers to adding different variations to the functions and performance of equipment to enable them to respond to different operational demands, while standardizing their basic ----- successor to multiple types of radar, including coastal radar and low-altitude radar of the GSDF. For joint procurement of equipment common to SDF services, Type-11 short-range surface-to-air guided missiles of the GSDF and surface-to-air guided missiles for air base defense of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) share common specifi cations, potentially facilitating a reduction in unit prices through procurement in one contract. The MOD will examine specifi c effects from this effort. 3 Suspending Operation of Equipment of Lowered Priority The MTDP plans to reduce the number of aircraft types, suspend the use of equipment of lowered priority, and review or terminate projects of low cost-effectiveness. Specifi cally, 203mm self-propelled howitzer and other equipment whose priority is low in light of the security environment surrounding Japan will not be replaced. Biological Reconnaissance Vehicles and other equipment that are procured in a small number with low cost effectiveness will be decommissioned while maintaining the capabilities. **Chapter** - **❷ [Initiatives to Make the Most of Limited Human Resources (Manpower Saving and Automation)]** In view of the severe security environment surrounding of Global Hawk and Ship-Based UAVs of the MSDF, Japan and the rapid development of the aging population and consideration to introduce long-endurance UAVs to with a declining birth rate, it is important to maximize strengthen offshore surveillance capabilities on the vast defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human Pacifi c side, while at the same time promoting AI utilization resources to the utmost. Therefore, the current MTDP plans and related human resource development. In addition, to actively work on manpower saving and automation of the MOD/SDF plans to promote research on UUV with defense equipment. convertible mission modules and research on the detection of suspicious ships based on the analysis of data concerning an automatic identification system (AIS) using AI. **1 Initiatives for Automation** The MTDP plans to actively promote initiatives towards automation through such means as the introduction of AI to data processing and decision making regarding unit operation, the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and R&D of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Specifi cally, the MOD/SDF will actively promote the use of unmanned equipment, which includes the procurement UUV ith tibl i i d l **2 Initiatives for Manpower Saving** The MTDP plans to actively promote initiatives to save manpower through such means as streamlining in the design of new types of destroyers (FFM) and submarines and use of remote control for radar sites and other equipment. Other initiatives include the introduction of patrol vessels that can be operated by a smaller crew (about 30 members) through dedication to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). ----- **Section** **Reinforcing Technology Base** **2** **❶ [Necessity of Reinforcing Technology Base]** As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, it is necessary to ensure technological superiority by effectively utilizing Japan’s advanced technological strength in order to protect the lives and property of Japanese people in any situation. Particularly in recent years, with the rapid advances in technological innovation, it is forecast that we will see the operationalization of so-called game-changing technology that will completely transform combat aspects in the future, and the United States and other countries are proceeding hastily with research and development. See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Trends Concerning Military See Science and Technology) strengthening of the technology base is a pressing issue. The state-of-the-art military technologies in each country are sensitive technologies that must not be easily shared with other countries. From the perspective of Japan, for the areas which should strategically maintain their domestic technology base, it is necessary to promote research and development domestically. In the cases of defense equipment and technology cooperation, such as equipment procurement and international joint development, it is important to maintain the leading role by owning important cutting-edge technology (key technology). This requires not only research and development by the MOD, but also the promotion of research and development by both the public and private sectors together. See Fig. IV-2-2-1 (Current Status of Research & Development See Expenditure) **Chapter** Thus, as a nation, strategically working on ways to ensure technological superiority and ensuring advanced technology base are important from the perspective of creating superior defense equipment and ensuring Japan’s security. Also, the - **❷ [Defense Technology Strategy and Related Documents]** For the purpose of ensuring Japan’s technological superiority, Guidelines (NDPG)[1], the MOD formulated the Defense Technology inventing as well as delivering advanced equipment in an effective Strategy in 2016, which presented the specifi c direction for various and effi cient manner, and dealing with various policy issues measures that should be addressed strategically. Based on this pertaining to defense and civilian technologies, taking account of the strategy, the MOD promotes various measures. National Security Strategy and the 2013 National Defense Program Fig. IV-2-2-1 Current Status of Research & Development Expenditure Changes in Defense-Related Research & Development Expenditure of Major Countries Changes in ratio of research & development expenditure to defense expenditure of major countries (100mn yen) （％） 70,000 10.0 60,000 8.0 50,000 3,000 4.0 2,000 2.0 1,000 0 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 U.S. U.K. France ROK Sweden Germany Japan Source: “OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators” Source: “OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators” “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database ©SIPRI 2020” (Note) For the calculation of Defense-Related Research & Development Expenditure of Major Countries, the ratio of research & development expenditure to defense expenditure of major countries from the “OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators” data was used. However Chinese data was not published. S P t II Ch t 3 S ti 2 ----- **1 Outline of Defense Technology Strategy** **2 Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook** The Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook presents an outlook of the technologies that can be applied to equipment expected to be established in roughly the next 20 years, and indicates technology fields that need to be developed in order to ensure Japan’s technological superiority. It is expected that making this Outlook public will facilitate the integration of superior civilian advanced technologies and the development of technologies outside of the MOD aimed at defense equipment applications. Review is now underway for taking a more strategic approach to important technologies, including technologies pertaining to new domains and other potentially game-changing technologies such as AI. **3 “Research and Development (R&D)Vision”** (1) MOD Technology Policy Objectives The following two objectives of the MOD technology policy are designed to strengthen the technical capabilities, which serve as the foundation of Japan’s defense capabilities, to make the foundation more robust: (i) Ensuring technical superiority (ii) Delivering superior defense equipment through effective and efficient research and development (2) Specific Measures to be Promoted The following three measures are promoted to achieve the objectives indicated in the previous paragraph. (i) Grasping Technological Information With regard to various scientific technologies that support defense technologies, the MOD grasps the current situation and trends both in and outside of Japan, including dual-use technology[2] in the public and private sectors and cutting-edge scientific technology. In addition, the MOD develops and publishes the Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook (see Paragraph 2 below) to identify advanced technology fields, which have the potential to become game changers. (ii) Development of Technologies The MOD will promote research and development based on the “Research and Development Vision” (see Paragraph 3 below) that was formulated to promote medium- to long-term research and development. At the same time, the MOD also promotes research and development that serve as the foundation of defense force building and “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security,” which puts into perspective the identification and development of advanced technology expected to be used for technology exchange with relevant domestic/overseas agencies and for defense purposes, and technical research for application of the results to equipment, etc. (iii) Protection of Technologies The MOD implements technology control for proper technology transfer to prevent situations in which Japan’s technology leaks without the country’s intention, which would undermine the maintenance of peace and security in the international community or the ensuring of Japan’s technological superiority. The MOD also establishes intellectual property management taking into account the transfer of defense equipment and promotes the utilization of intellectual property. 2 T h l th t b d f b th i ili d d f **Chapter** The “Research and Development (R&D) Vision” presents principles on R&D, technological challenges, and roadmaps on R&D of the technologies required for our future defense capability for the purpose of conducting advanced R&D systematically from a mid-to-long term viewpoint. The MOD publishes R&D Vision, and shares them with the defense industry, with the aim of increasing predictability for relevant companies, promoting prior investment, and realizing more effective and efficient research and development by maximally exploiting the investment. So far, the MOD published the “R&D Vision on the Future Fighter Aircraft” in 2010 and the “R&D Vision on Future Unmanned Equipment: Focusing on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” in 2016. In August 2019, the MOD published the “Research and Development (R&D) Vision—Toward Realization of MultiDomain Defense Force and Beyond” in order to contribute to the realization of Multi-Domain Defense Force and to achieve technological innovation necessary for further strengthening defense capability. The MOD will continue to promote research and development according to the roadmap of the R&D Vision while reviewing the R&D Vision, as well as establishing and publishing visions on new themes considering the direction of policy, operational needs, changes in technological trends and others. ----- **❸ [Initiatives for Research and Development]** Technological progress is about to fundamentally change how security should be managed, and major states endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge technologies. Against this backdrop, the MOD is promoting focused research in promising technical fi elds in order to ensure technological superiority in strategically important equipment and technology fi elds through focused investment in technologies in new domains, potentially game-changing cutting-edge technologies such as AI, and other important technologies. Specifi cally, for R&D of AI, the MOD included in the FY2020 budget the expense for research on radio image identifi cation technology using AI. The MOD also has been making efforts to greatly shorten the research and development periods of Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands, UUVs for longterm operation, standoff electronic warfare aircraft and other equipment through fl exible and active use of new methods for stage-by-stage R&D of equipment, such as block approach and modularization. Research projects on new technologies, including UAVs and lasers, will include demonstrations that enable users to imagine how these technologies will be used. For equipment which is expected to need mediumterm development, the ministry will develop a concrete image of future equipment by collecting and fully analyzing information on their technical feasibility from private companies and other parties at an early stage. Furthermore, the MOD effi ciently and effectively conducts research on UUVs, etc. using dual-use technologies based on the “Basic Policy on the Relocation of Governmental Organizations”[3] along with developing a new test and evaluation facility “Iwakuni Test Evaluation Facility (provisional name)” in Iwakuni City. The facility is also available for use by the civilian sector, including local institutions for higher education and research institutes. In addition, based on the MTDP, the MOD is working to actively leverage potentially dual-use advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as technology exchange 3 D id d t th Ad i C il Vit li i T P l d J b M h 22 2016 **Chapter** Standoff electronic warfare aircraft (conceptual drawing) with relevant domestic and overseas entities, enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies, and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strengthen and expand cooperation with countries who are making largescale investments in game-changing technologies, such as the U.S. and special strategic partner countries, and promote mutually complementary international joint R&D. The MOD/SDF is also conducting studies to reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze the latest foreign and domestic technological trends. For F-X to succeed the F-2 fi ghter aircraft, a development project starts in FY2020, and “F-X Development Division” was established in the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) in order to ensure effi cient development. Furthermore, for improving technical reliability and reducing the development cost, the MOD is pursuing the best approach to realize Japan led development with international cooperation in sight. See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology) ----- **Chapter** Column Development of F-X The Japan-led development of F-X to succeed the ASDF’s F-2 fi ghter is scheduled to start in FY2020. Over the years, Japan has built a fi ghter force structure comprising multiple types of fi ghter aircraft, as the MOD believes that deploying three types of fi ghter aircraft equipped with different combat systems makes it possible to effectively acquire and maintain air superiority. The MOD believes that it is necessary to ensure this structure into the future to acquire and maintain air superiority. While the F-2 is an important fi ghter that supports this fi ghter force structure, it is scheduled to start F-X (Conceptual image) retiring around 2035. In order to maintain the structure by introducing the successor aircraft by that time, it is necessary to start developing F-X to succeed the F-2 now. tems, administrative work related to budget implementation, F-X will always have to exercise fi rst-class capabilities information security, management of intellectual property, and against future threats. For the development of fi ghter aircraft collaboration with foreign countries. To implement these prowith such capabilities, the MOD places priority on the following cesses effi ciently, the “F-X Development Division” was estabthree objectives: lished at the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency Com(i) Acquiring freedom of modifi cation and upgrade when needed missioner’s Secretariat in April 2020, as a division dedicated to (ii) Domestically accumulating in-depth technological knowl- develop F-X in order to strengthen the organizational structure. edge and securing infrastructure for domestic maintenance The development of F-X is an extremely large project comand repairs with respect to aircraft systems and component pared to the MOD’s previous aircraft development projects . In systems. order to make this grand project a success, the MOD will proceed (iii) Reducing development cost and risks associated with devel- with the development while making maximum use of technologopment delays. ical and human resources possessed by domestic companies In order to achieve these objectives, Japan has been holding by further strengthening collaboration between the companies. dialogues with the United States and the United Kingdom and it is scheduled to determine the basic framework, including partner countries, for international collaboration by the end of 2020. Work processes associated with the development of F-X are wide-ranging, including a technical study on the aircraft sys **❹ [Active Utilization of Civilian Technology]** research and development is conducted. At the same time, in order to create excellent defense equipment through the utilization of advanced technologies and effectively and effi ciently conduct R&D, the MOD will ensure cross-sectoral and substantial coordination at the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (CSTI)[4] and other control tower meetings[5] based on the Integrated Innovation Strategy 2019 (Cabinet Decision on June 21, 2019). The ministry also actively participates in **1 Strengthening Technology Exchange with Relevant** Domestic and Overseas Entities and Collaboration with Relevant Ministries and Agencies The ATLA and domestic research institutions, such as universities and independent administrative institutions, proactively engage in research collaborations and technological information exchanges in order to ensure that advanced civilian technology is incorporated and effi cient One of the important policy meetings aimed at the planning and general coordination of comprehensive and basic science & technology innovation policies under the leadership of the Prime Minister and ministers in charge of Science &Technology policy, at a level higher than individual ministries. The IT Strategy Headquarters, the Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, the Headquarters for Healthcare Policy, the Space Development Strategy Headquarters, the Headquarters for O P li d th G ti l I f ti Utili ti P ti C itt i dditi t th CSTI ----- the Council for Integrated Innovation Strategy[6] established for its promotion in order to further enhance collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies, national research and development agencies, industry, universities, and other parties. Furthermore, the MOD will further strengthen human exchange with research institutes, etc. in order to understand trends of civilian technologies for complementary and synergistic improvement of technological capabilities. As international cooperative activities, the MOD will continue Japan-U.S. joint research and engineer exchanges, and continuously consider diverse possibilities through continued opinion exchange with other countries at various opportunities while closely observing their technology strategies, etc. **2 Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for** Security and Its Utilization At the Sensor Expo Japan 2019, exhibited the outcomes of the research utilizing the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security (September 2019) **Chapter** **2** Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the United States facilitated advances in science and technology as a whole including civilian technology, such as the development of the Internet and GPS. From this perspective, the MOD intends to promote relevant measures and strives to raise awareness of this program that contributes to ensuring the freedom of study and its sound development. In FY2015, the MOD launched a competitive research funding program called “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” to publicly seek and commission basic research on advanced civilian technologies, which are expected to contribute to future research and development in defense areas. A total of 74 research projects were awarded[7] by FY2019, and this program was expanded in FY2017 in order to enable the awarding of larger-scale and longer-term research projects. The program will continue to run on a similar scale in FY2020 (total budget of about 9.5 billion yen). In the basic research areas, free thinking of researchers leads to innovative and creative results. For this reason, it is necessary to assign maximum value to freedom of research when sponsoring research, so that, for example, researchers will be able to publish all of their research results to have a wide range of academic discussions. Hence, in this program, the MOD will neither restrict contractors’ publication of research results, nor designate research results as confidential, never providing any confidential data to researchers. In actuality, some research results have already been published through oral presentations, publications, etc. Active utilization of advanced civilian technology through such programs is not only essential for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people into the future, but is also beneficial for the development of Japan’s science, technology and innovation in non-defense areas as well, similar to how investment in innovative technology by the Fig. IV-2-2-2 (FY2019 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” Program) See Meeting of all ministers of state under the leadership of the Chief Cabinet Secretary for checking, sorting, and cross-sectoral and substantial coordination, and promotion of items that are included in the Integrated Innovation Strategy 2019 (Cabinet Decision on June 21, 2019) and that require coordination among the control towers related to innovation For the research projects awarded under the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security (a competitive research funding program), see the ATLA website (https://www.mod. j / tl /f di /k d i ht l) ----- **Fig. IV-2-2-2** FY2019 Awarded Research Projects for the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security Program **Chapter** |Col1|Research Title|Brief Summary|Representative Institution for the Project| |---|---|---|---| |Large-scale research projects (Type S): Eight projects|Clarification of the mechanism for relaxing impact resistance using high-strength CNT*1 as a base material and creation of super-impact resistant materials|This research aims to: scholarly elucidate the mechanism of relaxing impact resistance through calculation analysis of a destruction-buffering phenomenon, measurement analysis of a destruction phenomenon at an experimental nano level and synthesis of composite CNT materials; and create next-generation, carbon-based super-impact resistant materials.|University of Tsukuba| ||High throughput search for new solid-state lasers and characteristics by smart combinatorial lattice engineering technology|This research aims to establish a new R&D model which enables enhancement of the efficiency of exploration and prototype assessment through use of calculation-based estimation, combinatorial experimentation, and materials informatics to facilitate the search for laser materials and processes that are appropriate for lasing in specific wavelength bands.|SCT., Inc., Ltd.| ||Neurofeedback psychotherapy: new methods for learning and regulating latent brain dynamics|This research aims to: develop AI*2 technology that estimates latent brain dynamics to infer human’s mental states and thereby achieve transferring skills from human to robots; clarify the relationship between external factors and latent brain dynamics underlying mental states and symptoms; furthermore, develop and optimize the neurofeedback method that controls the latent brain dynamics.|Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International| ||Basic studies on development of a marine soundscape monitoring system in coastal area|This research aims to: examine technology for categorizing a variety of sound sources under the sea on a real-time basis and technology for long-distance underwater communications; and thereby establish a method for making information on the distribution of sound sources obtained by multipoint observations visible and drawing it on a real-time basis.|Japan Fisheries Science and Technology Association| ||Creation of highly-transparent and infrared reflectance members by controlling nanostructures|This research aims to: create resin with high durability and good reflection performance; and establish nano-layering technology for laminating multiple resin into hundreds of nanometer thickness layers in a highly precise thickness control with original layered layout design, thereby realizing components reflecting infrared rays over a wide range of bandwidths while keeping glass-like transparency.|Toray Industries, Inc.| ||Development of light-weight, non-volatile secondary batteries with high-energy density for ships|This research aims to: establish technology for extending the life of secondary batteries by making use of nonvolatile substances at lower risk of leaking toxic substances outside of the batteries; and clarify the feasibility of the technology in applying it to energy storage systems which contribute to enhancing the performance and safety of ships.|Hitachi, Ltd.| ||Research for miniaturization of large pulse power sources using high-performance SiC*3 power device|This research aims to conduct basic research on high-voltage switching devices using SiC with excellent characteristics in high dielectric breakdown field strength and high thermal conductivity to realize small and high-performance pulsed power supply.|Hitachi, Ltd.| ||Basic research for enhancing the stability of small clock oscillators based on quantum interference|This research aims to enhance the stability of palm-sized, small clock oscillators with less power consumption so that the performance is equivalent to that of the clock oscillators on board positioning satellites.|Micromachine Center| |Small-scale research projects (Type A/C): 13 projects|Detection of organophosphates by coordination polymers with extended pores|This research aims to find coordination polymers appropriate for detecting organophosphates. Spectral change of coordination polymers induced by exposure to organophosphates will be examined for three different spectroscopic methods. Each spectroscopic method will be validated as a new tool for detecting residual agricultural chemicals.|Osaka City University| ||Materials research on gradient index lens|This research focuses on germanium-silicon mixed-crystals whose refractive index distribution is controllable, which are expected to dramatically improve the degree of freedom in designing infrared lenses, and aims to reveal optical constants, e.g., refractive indices, in order to obtain basic optical properties of the optical crystals; and establish a new method for crystal growth that control the radial-direction indices.|Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (national research and development agency)| ||Development of super environment resistant high strength oxide ceramic composite material|This research aims to: establish basic processes for mass production of continuous zirconia fibers and coating technology appropriate for continuous zirconia fibers; realize composites with excellent material properties; and clarify the potential for application to jet engines via evaluation of high-temperature properties in simulated actual environment.|National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)| ||Basic research for the adhesion mechanism of insect legs and implementation of the mechanism to movable bodies|This research aims to: clarify the principle of insect legs that allow insects to walk on walls or in water and the structures of such legs; and thereby realize movable bodies capable of steadily moving on and staying at the surfaces of objects regardless of environmental changes.|National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)| ||Research for situation-adaptive swarm control taking advantage of machine learning and physics-based swarm intelligence|This research aims to: establish a swarm control technology in which many agents are able to cooperatively and appropriately take action even if situations are changing from hour to hour; and conduct basic research for optimization to minimize the gap between a real environment and a simulation environment as well as for machine-learning technology.|Cluster Dynamics Inc.| ||Research for underwater optical wireless communication technology that achieves BL product*4 of 1Gbps x 100m|This research aims to: measure impacts on communications caused by the characteristics of underwater light propagation, the fluctuation of seawater and other factors; and examine a underwater optical wireless communication system taking into consideration such influences, thereby demonstrating a long-distance, large-capacity undersea optical wireless communication system which is excellent in disturbance tolerance and capable of providing stable communications for a longer time.|Trimatiz Limited| ||Basic research for innovative underwater electricity transmission making use of self-excited bidirectional wireless power supply|This research aims to: clarify a principle of magnetic resonance systems in which an optimal oscillation condition is formed and wireless power supply is bidirectionally conducted at a highly efficient manner; and verify application of the principle to control of battery power sources.|Maxell, Ltd.| ||Clarification of a rotation mechanism of soft wheels that cells have and application of the mechanism to movable bodies|This research aims to: analyze rotation motions of a wheel-like structure in ameba cells, which was discovered recently; manufacture prototypes of soft robots imitating the structure and demonstrate them, thereby conducting basic research for imitation of living organisms having a soft, wheel-like structure.|Yamaguchi University| ||Development of a system for assessing collision frequency targeting ship traffic flows in ship- congested sea areas|This research aims to: establish a method for estimating the frequencies of multi-ship encounters by approximating ship traffic flows in ship-congested sea areas through a continuum approach and introducing computational grids into data on the target sea; and establish a system contributing to measures for forecasting frequencies of ship collisions and preventing ships from collision accidents.|National Institute of Maritime, Port and Aviation Technology (national research and development agency)| ||Clarification of an impact-mitigation mechanism of the dilatancy phenomenon by making use of ionic liquid|This research aims to: create transparent dilatant materials consisting of ionic liquid and particles whose inside structures are visible; clarify the principle of the dilatancy phenomenon, in which liquid changes to solid if force is externally applied; and conduct basic research for realizing safe and secure shock absorbers by taking advantage of the outstanding environmental stability of ionic liquid.|National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)| ||Basic research for surface modification of oxide semiconductor gas sensors|This research aims to: modify the surfaces of oxide semiconductor gas sensors; and thereby conduct basic research for adding new functions capable of detecting desired gases in a selective manner.|National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)| ||Research on high-value added casting processes for Ni-based heat resistant superalloys|This study conducts basic research on a high-value added casting process that could provide an improved oxidation resistance, by: examining a casting making use of platinum coated molds; and understanding the effect of interaction between coated materials and molten metal on the distribution of element concentration after casting.|National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)| ||Basic research for nanostructured interacting surfaces of novel polymer coating film having ultra- low friction property|This research aims to conduct basic research for clarifying a mechanism that develops coefficients of specific ultra-low friction by: analyzing nanostructured surfaces of polymer films dispersed with an ultra-low volume of carbon fibers having novel carbon crystalline structures.|GSI Creos Corporation| *1. CNT: Carbon NanoTube *2. AI: Artificial Intelligence *3. SiC: Silicon Carbide *4. BL product: Product of transmission speed (B: Bit-rate) by transmission distance (L: Length) ----- **❶ [Project Management throughout Equipment Life Cycle]** **Section** **3** **Optimizing Equipment Procurement** from the previous fi scal year, and thus reviews Acquisition Strategy. In August 2019, Analysis and Evaluation of the acquisition programs were implemented for 19 items for which the Acquisition Strategy, etc. had been developed. See Fig. IV-2-3-1 (Equipment for Project Management and See Equipment for Semi-Project Management) **1 Acquisition of Defense Equipment through Focused** Project Management As defense equipment is becoming more sophisticated and complex, its entire life cycle (concept study, research and development, mass production, deployment, operation and maintenance) cost has a tendency to increase in recent years. It has become extremely important to streamline acquisition throughout the life cycle of equipment and to establish a systematic management to realize the streamlining in order to effi ciently acquire equipment of assured quality at appropriate cost in a required timeline as planned. Therefore, since the establishment of ATLA in October 2015, the Department of Project Management in ATLA undertakes project management throughout the life cycle of equipment upon selecting important equipment, and promotes efforts to realize the optimized equipment acquisition. Specifi cally, the MOD has selected 18 items for major programs designated for project management and 6 items for semi-major programs for project management[1] as of the end of March 2020. The MOD designated Project Managers (PMs) dedicated to specifi c major programs. At the same time, the MOD established a systematic project management system by setting up the Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is composed of offi cials from relevant divisions within the MOD. So far (as of the end of March 2020), for 23 items that have been selected for major and semi-major programs, the MOD has formulated the Acquisition Strategy and the Acquisition Plan (hereinafter referred to as “Acquisition Strategy, etc.”), which specify the basic matters necessary to systematically implement project management, such as the purpose of the acquisition program, acquisition policy, and life cycle cost. The Acquisition Strategy, etc. shows strategic plans to realize optimized acquisitions of equipment. Furthermore, in principle, ATLA annually confi rms the project implementation status with each SDF service, and endeavors to promote appropriate project management refl ecting the latest situation by developing Analysis and Evaluation, which compile changes made in acquisition plans **Chapter** **2 Initiatives to Promote and Strengthen Project** Management (1) Past Initiatives The following initiatives have been implemented to promote and strengthen project management. a. Cost and Schedule Management Using WBS For certain kinds of equipment produced in Japan, the MOD promotes the introduction of a management method to visualize the progress of work and cost generated by component (Work Breakdown Structure [WBS])[2] and endeavors to manage cost and schedule to detect the signs of cost increase and schedule delay early so that swift measures can be taken. b. Method for More Accurate Cost Estimate Life cycle cost and other costs have been estimated based on actual cost data of similar equipment developed or introduced in the past. However, as a larger amount of cost data is needed for a more accurate estimate, the MOD promotes the establishment of a cost database by collecting cost data and accumulating them into a database. c. Accumulation and Development of Expertise through Strengthened Cooperation with Research and Educational Institutions, etc. For further improving the management skills of PMs and enhancing human resources among those who engage in project management, the MOD strengthens collaboration with research and educational institutions on project management and provides opportunities to study project management methods from overseas and the private sector on a regular basis. A semi-major project is an acquisition project of specifi c equipment with a limited application of project management without the designation of PM and IPT, focusing on risks in functions, performance, costs, schedules and other risk factors as in the case of equipment for project management. WBS is a hierarchical structure used to practice project management that systematically divides the project into manageable units, in which the schedule and cost of each deliverable ( t d i ) ll t d ----- Fig. IV-2-3-1 Equipment for Project Management and Equipment for Semi-Project Management |Col1|Fig. IV-2-3-1|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Procurement program of the|| |project management focused equipment, etc. (2017) FY2017 Submarine|project management focused equipment, etc. (2017)|| |Col1|Procurement program of the project|Col3| |---|---|---| |management focused equipment, etc. (2019) Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile|management focused equipment, etc. (2019)|| Procurement program of the project management focused equipment, etc. (2018) Land-based Aegis system Type-16 mobile combat vehicles Aerial refueling/transport aircraft Airborne early warning aircraft (Aegis Ashore) (KC-46A) (E-2D) **Chapter** |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Procurement program of the project management focused equipment, etc. (2015) SM-3 Block IIA Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile Unmanned aerial vehicle Amphibious vehicle New destroyer New multipurpose helicopter (Improved) (RQ-4B Global Hawk) (AAV7) (GSDF UH-X) Tilt-rotor aircraft New patrol helicopter Fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1) Transport aircraft (C-2) Fighter aircraft (F-35A) Future Fighter Aircraft (V-22) (SH-60K upgraded capability)|Procurement program of the project management focused equipment, etc. (2015)|| New ship-to-air missile missiles (Advanced) Space Situational Awareness New anti-ship missiles for the UUV with convertible Hypersonic weapons |Col1|Equipment for Semi-Project Management, etc. (201|7)| |---|---|---| |Type-12 surface-to-ship guided New ship-to-air missile missiles (Advanced) Space Situational Awareness New air-to-ship guided missiles (SSA) System for reconnaissance aircraft||| |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Equipment for Semi-Project Management, etc. (2019) New anti-ship missiles for the UUV with convertible Hypersonic weapons defense of remote islands mission module|Equi|pment for Semi-Pro|ject Management, etc. (2019)|| (2) Future Initiatives In order to further promote effective and effi cient equipment acquisition, the MOD needs to enhance the effectiveness and fl exibility of project management throughout equipment life cycles. To this end, under the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will take new initiatives, including undertakings that contribute to cost reduction at mass production stage as a requirement at the development stage, incorporating successful examples in the civilian sector into the manufacture of defense equipment, and actively adopting the competitive bidding method and other contracting methods that contribute to the utilization of private sector knowledge and expertise, and tightening cost controls. In this regard, the MOD will expand the items subject to project management and strive to adjust the standards for the specifi cations and the review of project plans with consideration of life cycle costs. Furthermore, for more effi cient acquisition, during the equipment selection phase, the MOD will implement thorough life cycle cost estimation, and analysis of alternatives, and secure binding obligations against company principals. **❷ [Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters]** **1 Reviewing Acquisition Systems** For the purpose of promoting acquisition reform, which is a prompt response to swiftly changing surroundings, the MOD has been holding meetings of the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee since 2007, in addition to the Contractual Systems Study Groups held since 2010 to review acquisition systems. Since FY2016, a special research offi cer system[3] has been adopted in order to surely bring the review results to fruition. **2 Long-Term Contracts, etc.** The production of defense equipment requires a signifi cant amount of time. Therefore, if a certain amount is to be procured in bulk, a contract for more than fi ve years is needed in many cases. With regard to defense equipment and services, economies of scale[4] tend not to work mainly due to the following reasons: (1) the MOD is the only customer; and (2) companies that provide such defense equipment, This is a system to conduct research, which contributes to the acquisition system of defense equipment, by inviting experts, such as associate professors from different universities specializing in the areas of concern, in order to review and reconsider an effective procurement system, based not only on the viewpoints of the MOD personnel but also on theories that have been proposed in the fi eld of business administration and economics. “E i f l ” f t th t d t th t i ith i d t t f d t F l t it b d d b b lk h f t i l ----- Fig. IV-2-3-2 Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect Bulk-procurement of fghter jet (F-15) component repair in the FY2020 budget Traditional procurement (image) |2020|2021|2022|2023|2024|2025|2026|2027|2028|2029|2030|2031| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||||||||| ||||||||||||| ||||||||||||| ||||||||||||| ||||arts ents||||||||| ||Procure Repair Repair o|ment of p of parts f compon|arts ents||||||||| ||||||||||||| ||||||||||||| Procurement based on long-term contracts (image) Total of approx. 30.7 billion yen **Chapter** |Reduction 5.3 billion yen (Re through bulk-|of approx. duction by 17.2%) procurement.| |---|---| ||| |2032|2033|2034|2035|2036|2037|2038| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Procur|ement an|d repair of|parts, an|d repair o|f compon|ents| |||||||| etc., are limited. In addition, it is difficult for companies to systematically move forward with their businesses with a high degree of predictability, which is peculiar to the defense industry. For these reasons, the upper limit of acts that incur national debt prescribed in the Public Finance Act as within five years in principle was changed to within ten years for specific equipment through the enactment of the Long-term Contract Act.[5] The introduction of this change regarding long-term contracts will make stable procurement possible, leading to the realization of the systematic improvement of defense capability. At the same time, for companies, given that the procurement amount will be assured, the systematic use of personnel and equipment, as well as cost reductions due to bulk orders, will be made possible. Total of approx. 25.4 billion yen the “project of development and operation of X-band satellite communications” in January 2013 and the “project of operation and management of private ships” in March 2016. In addition, regarding procurement of certain equipment with which little competitiveness can be expected due to its characteristics, and companies that work on cost reduction using the MOD’s programs, the MOD promotes limited tendering contracts while ensuring transparency and fairness as well as clarifying and putting the subject into patterns, from the perspective of the implementation of smooth and efficient procurement, and the enhancement of the company’s predictability. Specifically, as a new initiative, in acquiring new destroyers,[7]the MOD has adopted a procurement method to acquire the new destroyers efficiently equipped with the necessary functions and to maintain and strengthen the construction technology base since February 2017. This is done by selecting a party that has made the best proposal with respect to the MOD’s requirements as a procurement counterparty, with the runner-up also involved in designing and building facilities as a subcontractor. The MOD concluded a proposal agreement in April 2017 and decided on a procurement counterparty and a subcontractor in August 2017. See Fig. IV-2-3-2 (Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect) Part II, Chapter 4, Section 2-3 (Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement) In addition, by realizing longer-term multiple-year contracts utilizing the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Act,[6] the planned acquisition and execution of budgets is achieved through the standardization of investment amounts of the national expenditure, and certain benefits are obtained, such as cutting equipment procurement costs, by reducing risks for those taking orders and by promoting the entry of new suppliers. As projects using the PFI Act, the MOD launched “Special Measures Law Concerning the Term of Expenditure Based on the Obligatory Assurance of National Subsidization for Specific Defense Procurement” (enacted in April 2015. An act for its partial revision to extend the effective period by five years was enacted in March 2019.) Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative N d t th t bi i d lti i i biliti d t h ll ----- an incentive contract system in which the public and private sectors jointly carry out the management of contract implementation to minimize contractual risks, and in which a certain percentage will be given back to the companies if cost reduction has been performed. Since April 2020, a system to give an incentive for cost reduction has been in operation in order to fairly evaluate cost reduction efforts by companies. **3 Decrease Procurement Cost and Improve** Companies’ Incentives to Reduce Cost With regard to the procurement of defense equipment, the cost certain percentage will be given back to the companies if cost is tending to increase because a large variety of equipment reduction has been performed. has no market price. Based on those characteristics, it is Since April 2020, a system to give an incentive for cost necessary to achieve both the reduction of procurement cost reduction has been in operation in order to fairly evaluate and improvement of companies’ incentives to reduce cost cost reduction efforts by companies. simultaneously. Thus, in June 2019 the MOD introduced **❸ [Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement, and Other Related Initiatives]** efficiency of life cycle cost estimation for new equipment. **1 Effective and Efficient Maintenance and** Replenishment See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 2-3 (Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement) **Chapter** See With regard to periodic maintenance of defense equipment, the MOD has been working to improve efficiency by extending the maintenance interval, after making sufficient efforts to ensure safety. In addition, the MOD has been working on the introduction of Performance Based Logistics (PBL)[8] from the perspective of improving the equipment availability ratio and long-term cost reductions. In the FY2020 budget, the MOD pursues cost reduction and stable procurement through long-term contracts regarding repair of a certain quantity of fighter aircraft (F-15) components. **3 Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency** The MOD implements measures for making contracts more appropriate and strengthening checking functions to promote the enhancement of fairness and transparency in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials. As a part of the effort to “make public procurement more appropriate” across the whole government, the MOD continues to carry out the introduction and expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system[9] and make bidding procedures more efficient. In addition to these, based on reflection on the past, strengthening system investigation, reviewing penalties, ensuring the effectiveness of supervision and inspection, and other measures have steadily been carried out in order to prevent recurrence of such incidents as overcharging and falsified results of equipment testing by defense-related companies in 2012. Through these measures, the MOD strives to surely prevent recurrence of scandals, enhance fairness and transparency, and make contracts more appropriate. In addition, ATLA carries out multilayered checks through both internal and external checking systems and check-andbalance within the organization – namely, ATLA further enhances internal inspections by the inspection and audit department, and through deliberations in the Defense Procurement Council, consisting of external experts, and defense inspection conducted by the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Complaints. Moreover, ATLA has also improved its education department and strives to enhance compliance awareness by providing thorough education pertaining to compliance for ATLA personnel. See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 2-3 (Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement) Fig. IV-2-3-2 (Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect) **2 Achieving Further Efficiency in the Acquisition of** Defense Equipment When acquiring defense equipment, the MOD aims to reduce development, acquisition, and maintenance expenses through the development of product families, standardization of equipment specifications, joint procurement of equipment common to multiple SDF services, etc., in addition to a review of the contract system. In the FY2020 budget, cost reduction is expected by the development of a multipurpose surveillance radar that combines the four types of radar owned by the GSDF. In addition, the MOD has been facilitating the compilation of a database on the breakdown of procurement prices and actual price of major equipment in the past. The MOD expects this database to be utilized not only to verify the validity of procurement prices, but also to enhance the accuracy and PBL is a contract method that involves payment of compensation according to the level of equipment performance achieved in terms of availability ratio and stable stock. It has achieved positive outcomes upon application to the maintenance and servicing of equipment in Western countries. Unlike the automatic bid system, which focuses only on price, this is a system whereby the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation that includes both th i d th l t Thi th d i d t d h it i i t t t h d l ti th t h l i l l t ----- - **❹ [Promoting Initiative towards Streamlining of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement]** FMS is a form of U.S. security assistance authorized by the challenges over FMS procurement, four times since 2016. At Arms Export Control Act (AECA) etc. that may enable the the 4th SCCM in January 2020, as for late delivery and late U.S. allies and others to purchase defense equipment and ser- case closure, both agreed to monitor the status of delivery and vices from the U.S. government. The characteristics of FMS case closure on each item, as well as to make best efforts for include: (1) pricing is an estimate, (2) payments are made in addressing and eliminating causes of late delivery and late advance in principle and balanced out after fulfillment, and case closure. Also, as for transparency in FMS pricing, both (3) the delivery date is an estimate. This program allows Ja- agreed that DSCA oversees related agencies to provide necespan to procure equipment with a high level of confidentiality sary cost information. In addition, Japan called for discussion that cannot be generally purchased through Direct Commer- to make delivery procedures efficient at the meeting, for FMS cial Sales and highly capable equipment. Therefore, FMS is purchaser countries including Japan in 2019, and shares the critical to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities. points to be improved with the United States. The rationali Meanwhile, there are FMS-related challenges, such zation of FMS procurement is further promoted by setting up as delayed delivery and late case closures. As the FMS the Project Team for Promotion of Initiatives toward rational procurement amount is hovering at a high level in re- ization of FMS Procurement within the MOD in July 2019 in cent years, Japan and the U.S. governments have been order to develop a framework to promote various efforts across actively working together to make improvements in the organization, and establishing ‘the Group for Coordination these challenges. Specifically, the ATLA and Defense of FMS Procurement’ in the Procurement Planning Division of Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) held Security Co- the ATLA in order to coordinate with the U.S. government in operation Consultative Meeting (SCCM) to discuss the the United States in FY2020. **Chapter** ----- **Section** **Strengthening Defense Industrial Base** **4** Strong industrial base is essential for ensuring the production and a high operation rate of high-performance equipment. For this purpose, the MOD established the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases in June 2014 to maintain and strengthen the base. Based on the NDPG[1], etc., the ministry will make efforts towards making the defense industrial base more resilient, so that it can effectively respond to changing security environment. For example, since 2019, the MOD has arranged meetings to exchange views with the industry. - **❶ [Current Situation of Japan’s Defense Industrial Base]** The term “defense industrial base” refers to the human, Furthermore, unit costs and maintenance/sustainment costs physical, and technological bases that are essential for the tend to increase due to low-volume, high mix production and production, operation, sustainment, and maintenance of the sophistication and complication of defense equipment. defense equipment required for the MOD/SDF’s activities. In For this reason, Japan’s defense industrial base faces issues, Japan, most of the base is covered by companies (the defense such as diffi culties in maintaining and passing on skills industry) that manufacture defense equipment and associated and techniques, and withdrawal of some companies from items. Therefore, a broad range of companies[2] that possess defense business because work quantity is decreasing due to special and advanced skills and facilities are involved in the a decrease of procurement volume. defense production and technological bases. Meanwhile, In addition, as the realignment of the Western defense the degree of defense demand dependence (the ratio of industries and international joint development are making defense-related sales that account for all company sales) progress, Japan formulated the Three Principles on Transfer is approximately 5% on average, indicating that defense of Defense Equipment and Technology in April 2014. business is not the primary business in many companies.[3] However, improvement of international competitiveness has **Fig. IV-2-4-1** Changes in Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures for Equipment, etc. Maintenance and upgrade expendituresfor equipment, etc. (100 million yen) 12,000 **Chapter** 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 9,656 8,7508,5538,953 8,141 7,862 7,7947,612 7,3877,3527,199[7,4597,4317,5277,502] 6,422[6,5546,5086,6626,6866,6806,7956,993] 6,177[6,3656,6366,757] 5,730 5,333 4,763[4,902] 4,393 1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2020 Note: 1 “Maintenance and upgrade expenditures for equipment” refers to the budget for repair costs for equipment, consumable goods costs, and service costs with each service of the SDF (referring to the amount calculated by excluding repair costs for the extension of vessel life and modernization of aircraft from the repair costs of each SDF unit). 2 Since FY2019, expenditure for the Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster Prevention, Disaster Mitigation, and Building National Resilience are included. 3 The amounts represent contractual figures. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2. For example, it is said that approximately 1,100, 1,300 and 8,300 companies are involved in the manufacture of fighter aircraft, tanks and destroyers, respectively. According to the survey of defense demand dependence conducted on 73 defense-related companies based on their sales performance in FY2018. Although relatively small in scale, some companies possess important technologies for supporting the defense industry with over 50% of the defense demand dependence, in which case the scale of defense demand has a i ifi t i t th t f th i ----- become a challenge for Japan s defense industry, because it has developed based on the production of defense equipment only for the SDF. See Fig. IV-2-4-1 (Changes in Maintenance and Upgrade See Expenditures for Equipment, etc.) Section 5-1 of this Chapter (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) - **❷ [The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases]** strengthening international competitiveness; and (3) ensuring **1 Context of Formulation of the Strategy on Defense** consistency with effi cient and optimized acquisition of Production and Technological Bases, etc. defense equipment. For the purpose of maintaining and strengthening Japan’s defense production and technological bases, which is **(4) Defense Equipment Procurement Methods** an important and essential element supporting Japan’s With regard to defense equipment procurement, currently defense capability, the “Strategy on Defense Production and multiple methods, such as domestic development, Technological Bases” was formulated in June 2014. The international joint development and production, licensed Strategy responded to the National Security Strategy and domestic production, utilization of commercially produced the 2013 NDPG, replacing “Kokusankahoshin (guideline for goods, and imports, are adopted. These methods directly domestic development/production).”[4] affect the defense production and technological bases. According to the characteristics of defense equipment, the See Reference 1 (National Security Strategy [Outline]) MOD appropriately selects acquisition methods, including See international joint development and production, which have **2 Overview of Defense Production and Technological** become more agile and fl exible due to the Three Principles Bases on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. **Chapter** **(1) Signifi cance of Formulation of the Strategy on Defense** **Production and Technological Bases** “The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” has made the following three points clear: (1) the context of the formulation of the strategy on defense production and technological bases and where this strategy stands; (2) characteristics of defense production and technological bases; and (3) changes in the environment surrounding defense production and technological bases. **(2) Goals and Signifi cance of Maintaining and Strengthening** **Defense Production and Technological Bases** Through maintaining and strengthening defense production and technological bases, the MOD intends to (1) ensure sovereignty of security, (2) potentially contribute to increasing deterrence capability, and maintain and improve bargaining power, and (3) contribute to the sophistication of the domestic industry in Japan driven by cutting-edge technology. **(5) Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense** **Production and Technological Bases** In order to maintain and strengthen defense production and technological bases, the MOD will promote the following measures with a focus on variation and effi ciency, while considering Japan’s severe fi scal condition: (1) improvement in the contract system; (2) initiatives in research and development; (3) promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation; (4) initiatives for defense industrial organizations including the building of robust production and technological bases through understanding actual situations of the supply chain; (5) strengthening of the MOD’s functions through the establishment of ATLA,[5] etc.; and (6) collaboration with other relevant ministries and government agencies. **(6) Current Situation and Courses of Action for Each Defense** **Equipment Sector** With regard to the main defense equipment sectors (such as land equipment, supplies, etc., ships, aircraft, explosives, guided weapons, communications electronics and command control systems, unmanned equipment, space and cyber systems), the MOD will analyze the current situation of defense production and technological bases. At the same (3) Basic Viewpoints for Promoting Measures For the promotion of measures, the MOD takes into account the following basic viewpoints: (1) establishing long-term partnership between the private and public sectors; (2) The basic guideline for production and development of defense equipment, the development guideline for defense industry, and the stimulation guideline for R&D (Directive July 16, 1970) Th ATLA t bli h d O t b 1 2015 ----- time, based on the priority matters for developing the SDF s structure indicated in the 2013 NDPG, the MOD will present the future direction of the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases and the acquisition plan for each defense equipment sectors, and thereby, seek to increase predictability for companies. **❸ [Initiatives toward Strengthening of Defense Industrial Base]** and cost reduction, as well as giving appropriate incentives based on the evaluation result. **(2) Strengthening Risk Management of Supply Chain for** **Defense Equipment** The procurement of defense equipment involves not only prime companies that directly contract with the MOD but also supplier companies in a broad range of fields and sizes, which contract with the prime companies. The chains of these companies (supply chains) are the basis of Japan’s defense industry. However, these supply chains are confronted with risks, such as supply disruption due to withdrawing or bankruptcy of some manufacturing companies. In order to deal with the risks, the MOD is taking measures in order to maintain and strengthen the supply chains. Past supply chain surveys revealed the presence of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) that have a high dependency rate on defense equipment. In the supply chain survey conducted by the end of FY2019[6], key suppliers holding irreplaceable technologies were identified. Additionally, vulnerabilities became apparent, such as a concentration of orders to a certain supplier. Based on the survey results, the MOD will create a database of the results of the supply chain survey, and build a regular monitoring system for early identification of risks, such as supply disruption. Furthermore, the MOD will accurately deal with the vulnerabilities in the supply chain and strengthen the chain through initiatives such as identification of SMEs that have excellent technologies/ products, advancement of the technology base in order to manage supply disruption and other risks, a study of measures to support enterprises regarding transfer of business and evaluation of the possibility of application of innovative technologies represented by 3D printer and AI to defense equipment. **(3) Further Industrial Participation of Japan’s Defense** **Industry in Sustainment and Maintenance of Imported** **Equipment, etc.** Industrial participation in the sustainment and maintenance business of imported equipment is productive for the strengthening of Japan’s industrial base. For this purpose, it is important to pursue participation in the sustainment **1 Past Initiatives** Based on the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases, the MOD has implemented various measures contributing to the maintenance and strengthening of the defense industrial base, such as improving the contract system, including the enactment of the Long-term Contract Act, and the establishment of ATLA, which integrated the organizations involved in the defense equipment procurement. In addition, the following new measures are also taken in ATLA: (1) formulation of Defense Technology Strategy, etc. for ensuring the technological superiority, and implementation of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (see Section 2); (2) formulation of the Acquisition Strategic Plan for promoting project management, and improvement of contract systems (see Section 3); (3) grasping the supply chain in the defense industry and responses to risks in order to maintain and strengthen the defense industrial base (see Paragraph 2 below); and (4) participation of Japanese companies in the international F-35 program and defense equipment and technology cooperation involving joint research and development with other countries (see Section 5). **2 Initiatives Based on the NDPG** **Chapter** In order to strengthen Japan’s defense industrial base, which is essential to the production, operation, sustainment and maintenance of defense equipment, the MOD will work on the following initiatives based on the NDPG, etc., while considering the orientation of the defense production and technology strategy. **(1) Reforming the Existing Contract System towards Creating** **a Competitive Environment among Companies** Japan’s defense industry is in a less competitive environment as there are many defense equipment items that only one company can produce. To address this issue, the MOD will review the existing contract system towards creation of a competitive environment among companies by actively evaluating initiatives and results which contribute to strengthening the competitiveness of the defense industry B th d f FY2019 th MOD d t d l h i f 60 j d f i t it ----- and maintenance of F-35A, Osprey, and other imported equipment and benefits for domestic companies through further promotion of joint R&D of high-capability equipment with the United States and other countries.[7] (4) Promoting Appropriate Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology The government as a whole will work on necessary improvement in implementation of related rules for promoting appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment. At the same time, the MOD will strengthen intellectual property management, technology control and information security to prevent leakages of important technologies regarding defense equipment. a. Initiatives for Necessary Operational Improvement The MOD, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, will work on necessary improvement in implementation of related rules based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which are the operational standards for the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. As a result, the MOD will enhance predictability for the defense industry and will promote appropriate and smooth equipment transfer. Specifically, the ministry thinks it necessary to improve the implementation of relevant systems and procedures, which include rationalization of the handling of basic marketing information necessary for early business talks at international trade shows, etc.[8] in order to ensure the smooth provision of such information. b. Preventing Leakage of Key Technologies (a) Intellectual Property Management Through the application of more appropriate contract provisions regarding intellectual property, the MOD will accurately grasp intellectual property generated through R&D, etc. to promote the clarification of public or private belongings and prevention of leakages of key technologies to abroad. The ministry will also present options regarding the opening or closing of intellectual properties based on the characteristics of the technology and promotes appropriate management for each option. (b) Technology Control The MOD will strengthen technology control systems and functions for strengthening prevention measures of technology leakage such as ensuring prompt and proper assessment of technological sensitivity based on the importance and superiority of the technologies, which is needed in the examination of the propriety of overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology. Also, in order to prevent leakages of sensitive technologies, the MOD, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, promotes studies on reverse engineering countermeasure technologies, such as black box constitution. (c) Strengthening Information Security For Japan’s defense industry to participate in international businesses, it is necessary to respond to increasing threats of cyber attacks. With the aim of strengthening information security measures, the MOD will review the information security standard applicable to contractors handling the MOD’s information to be protected.[9] In order to further encourage companies to consider entry into defense procurement business and facilitate their business with defense-related companies in Japan and abroad, it is important to improve the predictability of the necessary security measures for the companies. For this purpose, the MOD will develop an information security guidebook that comprehensively defines security measures that will normally be required for concluding a contract, which involves the handling of information to be secured, with the MOD in advance. (5) Other Initiatives to Achieve Efficiency and Strength Other than the above-mentioned initiatives, the MOD/SDF will undertake measures such as making the equipment manufacturing process efficient and thoroughly reducing cost and will strive to make Japan’s defense industry base efficient and resilient while foreseeing possible realignment and consolidation of businesses that may occur as a result of these measures. **3 Cooperation/Collaboration with the Industry** **Chapter** The maintenance and strengthening of Japan’s technological and industrial base are essential for production, operation and maintenance of defense equipment. For the effort of “Reinforcing Technology Base” and “Strengthening Defense Industrial Base” that are provided in NDPG and MTDP, cooperation between the MOD and the industry is indispensable. In this context, in October 2019, Defense Minister SM-3 block IIA, jointly developed by Japan and the United States, is subject to FMS procurement, but Japanese companies have received contracts for manufacturing about half of the components, including those procured by the United States. In October 2018, the Q&A section of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry website made it clear that information on the performance of goods and other matters that is used in early stage business talks and that does not include “specific information necessary for design, manufacture or use,” such as design information and production technique, is not subject to regulation under the Foreign Exchange Act. At the request of companies, the MOD is currently confirming the range of information included in data created by a company that may be disclosed to the public and handled as publicly known technology available to an unspecified large number of people. I f ti bj t t “S iti ” “F Offi i l U O l ” i th MOD d i f ti t d i h i f ti ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** Defense Industry Supporting Build-Up of Defense Capability **SUMIYOSHI Kurata, Director,** “Izumo” and “Kaga.” At the end of FY2019, the Works delivered “Maya,” **Naval Ship Construction Department, Yokohama Shipyard,** Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) equipped with the latest Aegis system, **Japan Marine United Corporation (JMU)** planned in FY2015. JMU is a ship builder established by the merger of IHI Marine United Although “Maya” was the first Aegis-equipped destroyer to be and Universal Shipbuilding Corporation in January 2013. We have seven constructed in about 20 years, we made full-scale efforts, leveraging our shipyards and works for production in total across the country. Yokohama accumulated experience as well as introducing cutting-edge technologies. Shipyard Tsurumi and Isogo Works are in charge of building new ships Now we are building DDG “Haguro,” which was planned in FY2016 and is for Ministry of Defense (MOD). Maizuru Shipyard, Kure Shipyard and the second Maya-class ship. Innoshima Works, in addition to the above two works, offer repair service Our corporation has built many ships including destroyers, Auxiliary for MOD. Ice Breaker, Landing Ship Tank, Fast, Combat Support Ship and Mine At Tsurumi Works, “Etajima,” a large Mine Sweeper Ocean (MSO) made Sweeper Ocean. We will continue to be a part of naval vessel building/ of Fiber Reinforced Plastic (FRP) planned in FY2017, is under construction repairing base of Japan. toward completion at the end of FY2020. In recent years, Isogo Works constructed Large Helicopter Destroyers (DDH) including “Hyuga,” “Ise,” Launching of MSO “Etajima” Destroyer “Maya” during an official sea trial improvement measures regarding the defense industry and defense equipment policy has still continued at the working level. The MOD will continue the initiatives for strengthening public-private cooperation, including opinion exchange with the industry at each of the minister level, the commissioner level and working level. Kono and executives of the Japan Business Federation exchanged opinions on a wide range of themes, including international situations and defense policy in addition to defense equipment policy, and discussed the strengthening of public-private cooperation in general. In November of the same year, the commissioner of the ATLA had an opinion exchange with executives of the Japan Business Federation. From December onward, discussion on challenges and ----- **Section** **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** **5** Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of defense technological and industrial bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of our national security, peace and international cooperation. Japan will continue to realize effective defense equipment and technology cooperation through the strengthening of intelligence gathering such as the needs of its counterparts, cooperation including assistance for maintenance and repair of equipment, and strengthening of cooperative posture between the public and private sectors. **❶ [Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology]** **Chapter** Based on the National Security Strategy formulated in December 2013, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[1] and its implementation guidelines were formulated in April 2014 as clear principles adapted to the new security environment. Under the principles, the MOD will contribute to peace and international cooperation more than ever, while actively promoting measures necessary for maintaining the peace and stability of the region and fi rmly defending Japan through active defense cooperation with the United States, which is Japan’s ally, and other countries. An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security. Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan’s defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream. See Reference 57 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) **(2) Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted** **As Well As Strict Examination and Information Disclosure** **(the Second Principle)** The cases where transfers may be permitted are limited to (1) cases that contribute to the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, (2) cases that contribute to the security of Japan, or other cases. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and on the extent of the concerns that the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise for Japan’s security, whilst ensuring transparency. In addition, it has been decided that important cases would be deliberated at the National Security Council and along with this, information concerning the cases that were deliberated would be disclosed. **(3) Ensuring Appropriate Control regarding Extra-Purpose** **Use or Transfer to Third Parties (the Third Principle)** Overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured, and the Government will in principle oblige the government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate for the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, cases involving participation in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases where parts are delivered to a licenser, appropriate control may be ensured with the confi rmation of the control system at the destination. 1 Main Contents of the New Three Principles **(1) Clarifi cation of Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited (the** **First Principle)** The cases where overseas transfers of defense equipment are prohibited are clarifi ed as follows: (1) in the case of violating the obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded; (2) in the case of violating the obligations based on the Resolution of the United Nations Security Council; or (3) in the case of transferring to the countries in confl icts. See Reference 58 (The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited,” the Second Principle “Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted,” and the Third Principle “Ensuring Appropriate Control”) The term “defense equipment” is deemed appropriate for the title of “Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” since possible articles of overseas transfers help with peace contribution and international cooperation as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Si il l d t th f t th t th i i i f t h l i dditi t d th t “t f ” d t d th th “ t ” ----- - **❷ [Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation]** after, the MOD compared the unit price assuming the 1 Joint Research and Development, etc. participation of domestic companies in the production with the import price of completed aircraft. Since the latter was Since 1992, Japan has implemented 23 joint research projects lower, the Government decided to import completed F-35A and one joint development project with the United States. fighters in order to promptly procure the necessary number At present, four joint research projects ((1) Comparison of while at the same time efficiently strengthening Japan’s Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures, (2) Chemical Agent defense capabilities under the severe fiscal circumstances. Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader, (3) High-Temperature Later, however, as a result of cost reduction efforts by the Case Technologies, and (4) Next Generation Amphibious manufacturers, including improvement in the manufacturing Technologies) are in implementation. In addition, with process and reduction of person-hours through work skill regard to the transfer of parts for Patriot PAC-2, software and improvement, it was confirmed that the FACO by domestic parts, etc. for the Aegis System and F100 engine parts that companies would make the price lower than importing are installed in F-15s and F-16s from Japan to the United completed aircraft. For this reason, for the FY 2019 and States, Japan has affirmed since July 2014 that these overseas FY2020 procurement, the MOD decided to procure F-35A transfers fall under cases that may be permitted, based on fighters finally assembled and completed by domestic deliberations at the National Security Council. companies.[4] The continuing participation of domestic companies in See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2-2 (Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation) the manufacturing of F-35A fighters is meaningful in that See Reference 22 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development it ensures operational and maintenance bases as well as Projects) the sustainment, development and advancement of fighterrelated technology bases through working with cutting-edge **2 Production, Sustainment and Maintenance of Common** fighter technologies and knowhow, which will eventually Equipment between Japan and the United States contribute to strengthening of the defense technological and industrial bases. **(1) Participation of Japanese Industry in the Production of the** As global operation of F-35 fighter aircraft is anticipated, **F-35A and the Establishment of Regional Maintenance,** the U.S. Government plans to establish maintenance depot **Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Capability** (regional MRO&U Capability) mainly for airframes and In December 2011, Japan selected the F-35A fighter aircraft engines in the North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific as the next-generation fighter aircraft to be the successor to regions. In December 2014, with regard to regional MRO&U the F-4 fighter aircraft. At the same time, the Government in the Asia-Pacific region for the F-35, the U.S. Government decided to procure 42 aircraft from FY2012 onwards and to announced the following decisions: (1) Regional MRO&U have Japanese industries participate in its production, aside Capability for airframes will be provided by Japan and from several completed aircraft, which will be imported.[2] Australia with both capabilities required not later than early In light of this decision, the Japanese Government has been 2018;[5](2) with regard to the regional MRO&U Capability working to enable the involvement of Japanese industries in for engines, initial capability will be provided by Australia the manufacturing process in preparation for the acquisition by early 2018, with Japan providing additional capability at of F-35A fighter aircraft from FY2013 onwards. So far the least 3-5 years later.[6] Japanese companies have participated in the Final Assembly Currently the MOD is preparing regional MRO&U and Check Out (FACO) for airframe and engines, and the capability for airframes to handle maintenance requirements manufacture of some engine parts (19 items), radar parts beyond our field maintenance capability. In February (7 items), and Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System 2019, the U.S. government announced the assignment of (EODAS)[3] parts (3 items). MRO&U capability for avionics components to Japan. These For the procurement of F-35A fighters in FY2019 and component MRO&U will begin activating in 2025, with 2 In December 2018, the number of F-35A to be procured was changed from 42 to 147, of which 42 can be replaced by fighters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL). 3 EODAS; comprising six built-in cutting-edge infrared sensors per aircraft, realizes 360-degree spherical situational awareness, and enables missile detection and tracking. 4 In December 2019, for F-35A procurement in FY2019 and FY2020, it was decided to choose manufacturing arrangements involving domestic companies as it was confirmed to be more cost effective. 5 The regional MRO&U for airframes in Japan is scheduled to be located at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. (Komaki-minami factory in Aichi Prefecture). 6 Th i l MRO&U f i i J i h d l d t b l t d t IHI C ti (Mi h f t i T k ) **Chapter** ----- timing informed by regional demands for repair.[7] Establishing a maintenance depot for airframes, engines and others within Japan, and contributing to maintenance in the Asia-Pacific region are significant from the perspectives of securing the operational support system for F-35A fighter aircraft in Japan, maintaining the Japanese defense industrial base, strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and deepening equipment cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. **(2) Initiatives towards the Establishment of a Common** **Maintenance Base of the Japan-U.S. Osprey** As the Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys deployed at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma was scheduled to commence roughly in 2017, the U.S. Navy carried out a public tender to select a maintenance company. Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd.[8] was selected as the maintenance company for this purpose in October 2015. From February 2017, the PMI has been performed at GSDF Camp Kisarazu. Maintenance of the first aircraft was completed in March 2019 and the second in March 2020, and the aircraft were delivered to the U.S. Forces. The MOD intends to establish a common maintenance base for both Japan’s and the United States’ Osprey by allowing the maintenance company to use the hangar at GSDF Camp Kisarazu for aircraft maintenance of the U.S. Marine Corps Osprey and also to implement the future aircraft maintenance of the GSDF Osprey at the same camp from the following perspectives: (1) smooth introduction of the GSDF Osprey (V-22);[9](2) smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements; and (3) enhanced efficiency in maintenance. The establishment of a common maintenance base at GSDF Camp Kisarazu would be extremely significant in that it will contribute to mitigating the burden on Okinawa as well as the “Strengthening of the basis to repair and maintain common equipment” stated in the new Guidelines. **Chapter** **❸ [Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation]** Engines in February 2018, the Cooperative Research on the Feasibility of a Japan and Great Britain Universal Advanced RF System (JAGUAR) in March 2018, and the Japan-UK Cooperative Research Project on the Demonstration of a Joint New Air-to-air Missile in December 2018. The Cooperative Research on the Certification Process of Jet Engines was successfully completed in February 2020. Furthermore, the two countries are exchanging information regarding the fighter (F-X) and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS)[11] that are under study by Japan and the United Kingdom respectively, such as the Joint Preliminary Study on Potential Collaborative Opportunities for FCAS/ Future Fighter, and exchanging views on the potential for future collaboration between the governments of Japan and the United Kingdom with industries also involved. The meeting of the UK-Japan High-Level Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation Steering Panel was first held in July 2014, and it has been held regularly since then. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-5 (1) (The United Kingdom) **1 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation with** Major European Countries, etc. Defense equipment and technology cooperation with major European countries, which have competitive defense industries, will contribute to the strengthening of security and defense cooperation with these countries as well as the maintenance and strengthening of the defense industrial base in Japan. Therefore, Japan seeks to establish and deepen relationships with these countries. **(1) The United Kingdom** In July 2013, the Governments of Japan and the United Kingdom concluded a bilateral Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.[10] In the same month, the two countries also started the Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project, marking the first time that Japan had engaged in such research with a country other than the United States. The Cooperative Research resulted in success in July 2017. Also, the Cooperative Research on Personnel Vulnerability Evaluation was launched in July 2016, followed by the Cooperative Research on the Certification Process of Jet 7 The regional MRO&U for avionics components in Japan is planned to be developed by Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (Kamakura Works in Kanagawa Prefecture) 8 The company was renamed SUBARU Corporation on April 1, 2017. 9 GSDF will introduce 17 tilt-rotor aircraft (Osprey (V-22)) that can complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. As a temporary measure until completion of the maintenance facilities in Saga Airport, the aircraft will be temporarily deployed at Camp Kisarazu. 10 Official name: Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies Necessary to Implement Joint Research, Development and Production of Defence Equipment and Other Related Items 11 G i f th h l f t fi ht i ft t i th U it d Ki d ----- **(2) France** Japan and France established committees on cooperation in the field of defense equipment and on export control respectively in January 2014, and signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[12] in March 2015. Moreover, at the Fourth JapanFrance Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”) held in January 2018, the two countries confirmed their intention to quickly start the cooperative research on the Feasibility Study for Mine Countermeasure Technological Activities and started the cooperative research in the following June. In addition, in June 2017, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) P-1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft was displayed at the “Paris Air Show 2017,” and the ATLA set up an exhibition booth for P-1 aircraft for the first time at an international defense equipment exhibition. The MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft and the ASDF C-2 transport aircraft participated in the “Paris Air Show 2019” held in June 2019. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-5 (2) (France) expressed their interest and expectation regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation with Japan, the MOD proactively seeks to build relationships with these countries. **(1) Australia** With Australia, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[15] was signed in July 2014. Meanwhile, at the Japan-Australia Defence Ministerial Meeting held in October 2014, it was agreed to seek multifaceted cooperation, including the following: (1) exploration of potential cooperation opportunities in the F-35 program; (2) acquisition reform dialogue with the Defence Material Organisation of Australia; (3) at the request of the Australian side, exploration of the possibility of Japanese cooperation in the Australian Future Submarine Program; (4) defense technology exchanges with the Defence Science and Technology Organization of Australia (in the field of marine hydrodynamics and exchanges among engineers and scientists); and (5) talks between defense industries in both countries. Subsequently, joint research on Marine Hydrodynamics started in December 2015 and ended in November 2019. Japan demonstrated its technical strength through the participation of the ASDF C-2 transport aircraft in “Avalon International Airshow” held in Australia in February 2019. The second meeting of the Japan-Australia Steering Committee for Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation was held in June 2019. At the meeting, the participants deepened discussions on measures for further promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation between the countries in an effort to move ahead with the cooperation. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-1 (Australia) **Chapter** See **(3) Germany** Japan and Germany signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[13] in July 2017. Also, in April 2018, the MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft participated in the “Berlin Air Show 2018,” and the ATLA set up an exhibition booth related to P-1 aircraft. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-5 (6) (Other European Countries) **(4) Italy** In May 2017, Japan and Italy signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.[14] In January 2019, “Japan-Italy Defense Industry Forum” was held in Europe for the first time, and was followed by the establishment of a framework for director-level meetings on defense equipment/technology cooperation between the two countries. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-5 (6) (Other European Countries) **(2) India** Defense equipment and technology cooperation with India is considered an important field of cooperation based on the special strategic global partnership between Japan and India. At the Japan-India Summit Meeting in December 2015, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[16] was signed. To form the case of defense equipment and technology cooperation, including dual use technologies, the Joint **2 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation, etc.,** with Partner Countries in the Asia-Pacific Region As partner countries in the Asia-Pacific region have 12 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of France concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology 13 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology 14 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Italian Republic concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology 15 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology 16 Offi i l A t b t th G t f J d th G t f th R bli f I di i th T f f D f E i t d T h l ----- Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation have been held five times so far. At the JapanIndia Defence Ministerial Meeting held in September 2017, the ministers agreed to commence the discussions for research collaboration. In July 2018, the two countries launched the Cooperative Research on the Visual SLAM based GNSS Augmentation Technology for UGV[17]/Robotics. Progress has been made in discussions on defense equipment and technology cooperation between the two countries, including the second Japan-India Defence Industry Business Forum, which was held in February 2019. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-2 (India) See **(3) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Countries** Between Japan and ASEAN member states, exchanges of views have taken place regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation in non-traditional security sectors, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security, through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meetings and other occasions. Participating countries have expressed their expectation for Japan’s cooperation in effectively dealing with these issues. In the “Vientiane Vision” announced by Japan at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in November 2016, it is stated that Japan’s defense equipment and technology cooperation with ASEAN countries would be promoted with a focus on the following three points: (1) equipment and technology transfer, (2) human resources development, and (3) holding seminars on defense industries. As a specific initiative with the Philippines, an official agreement was made on the transfer of MSDF’s TC90 training aircraft to the Philippine Navy at the JapanPhilippines Summit Meeting in September 2016. Based on the agreement, two TC-90s were delivered to the Philippine Navy in March 2017, followed by the delivery of the remaining three TC-90s in March 2018. TC-90 pilot training was conducted for pilots from the Philippine Navy at the MSDF Tokushima Air Base from November 2016 to March 2018. Since April 2017, maintenance and repair assistance by dispatched personnel from a Japanese maintenance company has been provided. Regarding the transfer, it was confirmed at the Japan-Philippines Defence Ministerial Meeting in June 2018 that parts and maintenance equipment of the UH-1H utility helicopters that became unnecessary for the GSDF would also be granted to the Philippine Air Force. After the signing of an arrangement between the defense officials involved in the transfer in November 2018, delivery of some components to the Philippines started in March 2019 and was completed in September 2019. These two transfers were cases of the application of the provision of the SDF Act enforced in June 2017 that enables the MOD to grant or transfer the equipment which is decommissioned by the SDF to the governments of developing states for a lower price than the current price (See Paragraph 3 below). Further, in January 2019, a framework was established for regular consultations of the Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation. In November 2017, Japan and Thailand agreed to promote future defense equipment and technology cooperation, including early conclusion of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Between Japan and Vietnam, the Terms of Reference (TOR) for regular consultations concerning defense equipment and technological cooperation was signed during the Japan-Vietnam Defense Vice-Ministerial Level Meeting in November 2016. Concerning the specific fields of cooperation, the Memorandum on the Orientation of Promotion of Defense Industry Cooperation was signed during the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministers’ Meeting in May 2019. In addition, at the Japan-Vietnam Leaders’ Working Lunch held in July 2019, the leaders agreed on commencing official negotiations for the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Japan and Malaysia signed the Japan-Malaysia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[18] in April 2018. The MOD will continue to promote cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as the maritime security area through these initiatives. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (Association of South-East Asian Nations [ASEAN]) **Chapter** **(4) Middle East** In November 2019, the ASDF C-2 transport aircraft participated in the “Dubai Air Show 2019” held in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The static display and the flight demonstration of C-2 transport aircraft were held and viewed by His Highness Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Video：Defense cooperation with the Philippines for TC-90 URL：https://youtu.be/Qjf-mLvwVqA 17 “UGV” stands for “Unmanned Ground Vehicle.” 18 Offi i l A t b t th G t f J d th G t f M l i i th T f f D f E i t d T h ----- Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and other high-level government officials. Upon a request from His Majesty King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in August 2019, Japan lent a retired GSDF type-61 main battle tank without charge to Jordan for display at the Royal Tank Museum. Meanwhile, the King offered to donate an armored vehicle developed in Jordan to the Japanese GSDF, which the GSDF received in the same month. In October 2019, a ceremony for the lending and donation was held at the MOD. At the ceremony our Minister of Defense and Jordanian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Japan delivered speeches, and signed and exchanged letters. In November 2019, our ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Jordan and the Director of the Jordan Royal Tank Museum unveiled the loaned type-61 main battle tank at the museum and a panel for its explanation was set up. Israel and Japan signed a Memorandum on Protection of Information for the Exchange of Classified Information on Defense Equipment and Technology[19] in September 2019 for appropriate protection of such classified information provided between Japanese and Israeli defense officials. **3 Establishment of Regulations on Equipment Cooperation** with Developing Countries to develop a foundation that will serve as the basis for the international community to cooperate towards improving the security environment. Among these friendly nations, some have difficulties in acquiring an adequate level of defense equipment on their own because of their economic and fiscal situations. Some of these states are requesting to use SDF’s equipment which is no longer used. However, Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act[20] stipulates that the Government must receive reasonable consideration when transferring or leasing any governmental properties including the SDF’s equipment to other countries. Therefore, a grant or a transfer for lower price than the current price is not allowed unless otherwise provided. Under these circumstances, to respond to the needs of such friendly nations, a special provision to Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act was created in the SDF Act and put into force in June 2017. This provision enables the MOD to grant or transfer the SDF’s equipment which is no longer used to the governments of developing states for a lower price than the current price. Even in the case of granting or transferring equipment for a lower price than the current price pursuant to this provision, whether or not to transfer such equipment, and to which government such equipment to be transferred, will be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and other regulations. In addition, an international agreement must be concluded between the Governments of Japan and the recipient countries to prevent extra-purpose use and third party transfer of the transferred equipment without the prior consent of Japan.[21] **Chapter** Surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment, it has become even more important for Japan that the nations which have a cooperative and friendly relationship with Japan in terms of security and defense have appropriate capabilities. It is also critical Minister of Defense Kono and Ambassador Annab signing the letters 19 Official name: Memorandum on Protection of Information for the Exchange of Classified Information on Defense Equipment and Technologies between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel 20 Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act (Act No.34 of 1947)Governmental assets, unless otherwise provided, may not be exchanged and used as other means of payment, or transferred or leased without reasonable consideration. 21 As of April 2020, Japan has signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with the following countries: the United States; the United Kingdom; A t li I di th Phili i F It l G d M l i (S R f 31 [Sit ti C i th C l i f A t ]) ----- - **❹ [Adapting Defense Equipment for External Use]** With regard to aircraft involving many technological bases manufacturing the F7-10 engine, signed a contract for shared between the defense and the civilian sectors, the MOD the civilian use of the F7-10 engine for sales to the Japan has been considering the civilian use of aircraft developed Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) for the first time. by the MOD from the perspective that taking measures to The engine was delivered to JAXA in September 2019. contribute to the revitalization of the civilian sector will Considering that there have been inquiries about contribute to maintaining and activating the industrial equipment other than aircraft not only from the private sector bases of Japanese aircraft, and by extension, to maintaining but also from foreign governments since the establishment of and strengthening the defense industrial base in Japan. In the Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment August 2010, the MOD compiled a set of guidelines for and Technology, the term was changed from “Adapting the development of a concrete system for the civilian use Defense Equipment for Civilian Use” to “Adapting Defense of aircraft, while in 2011, it also developed an application Equipment for External Use,” and procedure rules were procedure for private companies interested in civilian use. prepared in August 2018 towards project formulation in So far, technical data related to the civilian use of the US-2 the future. In 2019, technical data, etc. for adapting defense amphibian rescue aircraft and the F7-10 engine that are equipment for external use concerning the automatic flight mounted on P-1 maritime patrol aircraft have been disclosed control computer processing unit for the improved SH-60K in response to requests from the implementing companies. In and Ship Landing Assist System for SH-60K were disclosed December 2016, the ATLA and IHI Corporation, a company upon applications from companies. - **❺ [Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions]** From the viewpoint of promoting defense equipment and Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown technology cooperation, the ATLA has participated in Prince of Abu Dhabi, as well as participants from private international defense equipment exhibitions to introduce companies, which contributed to the promotion of defense Japan’s defense equipment policies and advanced technology. equipment and technology cooperation. These initiatives help foreign government officials better In the domestic field, “Defence and Security Equipment understand Japan’s equipment policies and technology, and International Exhibition and Conference: DSEI Japan contribute to building bases for the promotion of defense 2019” was held in Makuhari Messe in November 2019. At equipment and technology cooperation. the exhibition, the ATLA exhibited real products, models In November 2019, Japan participated in “Dubai Air and panels to introduce equipment and technologies which Show 2019” in the UAE and held the static display and flight other countries showed interest in: e.g. land equipment such demonstration of C-2 transport aircraft, which Japan has as Type-16 mobile combat vehicles developed in Japan developed. During the show, MOD/SDF personnel exchanged and equipment for PKO and disaster relief activities; small opinions with many government officials, including His high-power engine technology; marine equipment related Crown Prince Mohammed visiting the Dubai Airshow to see ASDF's C-2 transport aircraft The Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency's booth at the “Defence and Security Equipment International Exhibition and Conference: DSEI Japan 2019” held in Makuhari Messe in November 2019 **Chapter** ----- to minesweeping; prototypes developed by the ATLA; and systems related to fighter jets. Also, five Japanese SMEs showcased their products and technologies there. Many domestic and overseas companies and government officials visited the ATLA booth during the show. The visitors and responsible MOD/SDF personnel vigorously exchanged opinions contributing to the promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation. - **❻ [Public-Private Collaboration for Appropriate Overseas Transfer of Defence Equipment]** The Public-Private Defense Industry Forum is held with the entations by each company on their products and technology. purpose of promoting defense equipment and technology co- Most recently, the forums were held with India in February operation with partner countries as a joint effort between the 2019, and with the Philippines in October 2019. public and private sectors. The aim of this forum is to deepen In FY2020, the MOD will conduct feasibility studies of understanding of the relevant parties and facilitate concrete possible candidates for defense equipment and technology defense equipment and technology cooperation in the fu- cooperation projects. The public and private sectors will ture through explanation of various systems surrounding the work together on information gathering and dissemination defense industry in Japan and each country as well as pres- toward the materialization of overseas equipment transfer. - **❼ [Preventing Leakage of Key Technologies for Defense Equipment]** In promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation key technologies for defense equipment. internationally, the MOD will work to strengthen (1) intellectual property management, (2) technology control, See Section 4-3-2 (4) b of this Chapter (Preventing Leakage of See Key Technologies) and (3) information security in order to prevent leakage of **Chapter** ----- **Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities** ###### 3 **❶ [Military Intelligence Collection]** For formulating defense policy accurately in response to the changes in the situation and for operating defense capabilities effectively in dealing with various situations, it is necessary to grasp medium- to long-term military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and to detect the indications of various situations promptly. To this end, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/ Self-Defense Forces (SDF) always makes efforts to collect information swiftly and accurately by using various methods. Examples of intelligence collection means used by the MOD/SDF include: (1) collecting, processing and analyzing military communications and signals emanating from electronic weapons in the air over Japan; (2) collecting, processing, and analyzing data from various imagery satellites (including Information Gathering Satellite (IGS));[1] (3) surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other assets; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection conducted by defense attachés and other offi cials. As for defense attachés, the defense attaché assigned to Malaysia took additional responsibility for Brunei in October 2019, and the defense attaché assigned to Belgium additionally for the Mission of Japan to the European Union in February 2020. As of April 2020, 70 defense attachés are dispatched to 83 embassies and 6 missions and delegations (including 46 embassies, 1 mission and 1 delegation where defense attachés are actually stationed). See Fig.VI-3-1 (Dispatched Defense Attachés [image]) **Chapter** See **Fig. IV-3-1** Dispatched Defense Attachés (image) Sweden Poland Kazakhstan Germany (2) Finland Mongolia Delegation of Japan to the Ukraine Conference on Disarmament (Geneva) Turkey Netherlands Belgium (2) Russia (3) United Kingdom (2) France (2) China (3) Austria Republic of Korea (3) United States (6) Permanent Mission of Permanent Mission of Italy Vietnam (2) Japan to the United Japan to the United Myanmar Nations (New York)Nations (New York) Morocco Philippines (2) Algeria Thailand Nigeria Malaysia (2) Egypt Singapore Lebanon Australia (3) Indonesia Israel Jordan Saudi Arabia India (3) Chile South Africa [Legend] Brazil Pakistan Kenya ■ Dispatch destination Afghanistan Ethiopia ■ Jointly administered country Iran Figures in parentheses indicate the number Djibouti of defense attachés dispatched. No figure indicates one dispatched defense attaché. United Arab Emirates As of April 1, 2020 (70 defense attachés dispatched to 83 embassies and 6 missions and Kuwait delegations of Japan; actually stationed at 46 embassies and 1 mission and 1 delegation) Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) of the Japanese government is operated by the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD, along with other ministries and agencies, utilizes the i i t lli id d b th IGS ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** Voice of Defense Attachés Colonel KANEKO Hiroyuki, Commander IGARASHI Naomi, assigned to Iran assigned to Malaysia As the only SDF Since March 2019, I personnel residing have been working in Iran, a distinctive as the fi rst ever country that has two defense attaché from armed forces (the JMSDF in Malaysia, regular force and a country situated the Revolutionary at a geopolitically Guards) and that is important position a center of situations connecting the Staff members of the Japanese Embassy in Malaysia Exchange of a group of military offi cers (party held at home; in the Middle Indian Ocean and and the author (the author is at the center) the author is the eighth from the right) East these days, the Pacifi c. In order I feel the security to facilitate defense cooperation and collect information relevant environment is constantly changing, which makes me feel the weight to national defense, I coordinate and exchange opinions with the of responsibility. I also realize that a good relationship between Japan Malaysian Ministry of Defence, including the Malaysian Navy and think and Iran serves as an important foundation for my job as a defense tanks, as well as military attachés from other countries on a daily attaché. Foreign military attachés in Iran have built a solid relationship basis. I feel deeply moved when I welcome JSDF vessels and aircraft in their groups. Daily interaction with these military offi cers, who take without any mishap after complicated and wide-ranging coordination. it for granted that they devote their lives for their countries in wartime, In addition, as I realize a feeling of trust in Japan throughout Malaysia, makes me mentally return to my starting point as a SDF personnel. For I would like to make greater efforts to bring the two countries even the remainder of my term, I continue to strive for the national interest closer in order to move such a good relationship one step forward. while looking at myself. Colonel DEGUCHI Arata, Lieutenant Colonel OCHIAI Takashi, assigned to Kazakhstan assigned to Morocco As a defense attaché to In Rabat, I have been Kazakhstan, which is called serving as a defense a leader of Central Asia, I pay attaché at the close attention to the military Japanese Embassy movements of Russia, China, in Morocco since July Western and other countries in 2017. this region. While it has strong Morocco is connections with Russia due to a constitutional its historical background since monarchy state that The author accompanying the inspection of the memorial the Russian Empire, Kazakhstan gained independence ship MIKASA by the Moroccan armed forces is driving for omnidirectional from France in (second from the left) [courtesy of MIKASA Preservation Society] diplomacy and is also passionate Together with Foreign military attachés at 1956. Since its about promoting defense a Reception (The author is the second independence, the country has maintained a good relationship with cooperation with Japan. I feel from the left) Japan, and received many military attachés from around the world greatly fulfi lled with what I can given its geographical characteristic as a military strategic chokepoint, do for the development of the Japan-Kazakhstan relationship. As situated at an entrance to the Mediterranean Sea. Kazakhstan is an army country with a vast extent, it receives many The defense cooperation/exchange between Japan and Morocco is army military attachés from various countries. Representing Japan limited for the moment. Meanwhile, an SDF workshop for 66 generals when interacting with them is a valuable experience which could not and other staff members of the Moroccan armed forces has been be obtained through other opportunities. realized for the fi rst time in Japan in April 2019. As a defense attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Morocco, I will continue to do my best for the development of the relationship between the two countries. ----- - **❷ [Initiatives towards Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities]** Under the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 latest information processing technology, promote all-source and beyond (NDPG), in order to provide timely and effective analysis by fusing a wide variety of information sources intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations, the together, and successfully develop and connect systems that MOD/SDF will promote initiatives to comprehensively enhance will promote information sharing. intelligence capabilities at all stages of intelligence, including In order to respond appropriately to increasingly diversified gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing of information. intelligence requirements, the MOD/SDF will promote the Specifically, the MOD/SDF will strengthen information securing and training of highly capable personnel handling gathering and analysis capabilities so that the MOD/SDF will information collection and analysis. Moreover, the MOD/ be fully capable of meeting various intelligence requirements SDF will take steady measures in various directions including including those related to new domains. This will be conducted recruitment, education, training, and personnel allocation to by strengthening gathering postures for SIGINT and IMINT strengthen comprehensive information collection and analysis through establishing and enhancing capabilities of information capabilities. collection facilities, utilizing IGS and commercial satellites, With regard to information security, the MOD/SDF will and diversifying means for information collection through new coordinate with relevant offices to make every effort by such equipment such as long-endurance Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles means as education in ensuring information sharing on a need (UAVs). Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will also strengthen the to-know basis, and in taking preventive measures against gathering posture of HUMINT through enhancing its defense information leakage. Also, the MOD/SDF will strengthen attaché system, reinforce the gathering posture of OSINT and counter-intelligence capability within the MOD/SDF by expand its cooperation with allied countries. promoting collaboration with relevant organizations. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will proactively utilize the - **❸ [Defense Intelligence Headquarters]** **Chapter** international military situations that change day by day from diverse perspectives, including military, political and economic factors, based on information from every possible source, including SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT and opinion exchange with relevant parties. Results of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters’ intelligence service are provided as analysis products to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, as well as GSDF, MSDF and ASDF units in a timely and appropriate manner to support policy decision and unit operation. The Defense Intelligence Headquarters also actively exchanges information with relevant ministries and agencies and foreign counterparts. 1 Mission of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters The Defense Intelligence Headquarters is the central intelligence agency of the MOD and the largest intelligence agency of Japan. It was established in 1997 in order to develop a framework for sophisticated and comprehensive information gathering and analysis in the increasingly complicated security environment following the cold war. The Headquarters collects SIGINT, IMINT, GEOINT, OSINT, etc. and analyzes international and military situations, and other matters related to Japan’s security. 2 Activities of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters The Defense Intelligence Headquarters is an organization consisting of Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) personnel, and administrative and technical officials (specialized in language, technology, administration or general office). SDF personnel use the knowledge based on their experience in their unit, whereas administrative/technical officials use their expert knowledge in language, technology, and other fields. They are working together for their mission. Specifically they conduct comprehensive analysis on ----- **Elements that Sustain Defense** **Capability** ###### 4 **Section** **SDF Training** **1** - **❶ [Training and Exercise by Each Self-Defense Forces (SDF)]** Training and exercise conducted by units in each service can implementation of joint training by the Ground Self-Defense be broadly divided into training for individual SDF personnel Force (GSDF) and Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to improve the necessary profi ciency for their respective in collaboration with U.S. Marines. The SDF will strive fi elds, and training and exercise for units to enhance their to enhance the effectiveness of the swift and continuous systematic capabilities. Training for individuals is conducted deployment of units and strengthen their presence on a one-on-one in stages based on the specialties and abilities steady-state basis by organically coordinating such training of individual personnel. Training and exercise for units is and exercises that utilize training environments in Japan and conducted depending on the size of unit, from small to large; abroad. meanwhile, large-scale comprehensive training including Also, seeking to respond to various situations with a coordination between units is also conducted. whole-of-government approach, coordination with relevant In order to effectively respond to various contingencies agencies including the National Police Agency, Fire and and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, based on the Mid- Disaster Management Agency, and Japan Coast Guard Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP), SDF’s will be reinforced. The SDF will also actively utilize the joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training opportunities presented by the joint training and exercises of and exercises are to be conducted in a tailored and visible way. the SDF and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises as While leveraging the lessons learned from these training and a way not only for developing and verifying plans for the exercises, the SDF is conducting regular studies and reviews actual SDF operations, but also for comprehensive issues of its plans to address contingencies.[1] The SDF also strives including civil protection. to further enhance amphibious operation capability by the **Chapter** **❷ [Training Environment]** SDF training has been planned and conducted under conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat situations, yet many restrictions remain. Therefore, the SDF will conduct effective training and exercises by expanding the establishment and utilization of the training areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere in Japan based on the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG). For example, the GSDF newly organized a Support Group for Training Assessment in March 2020 and started operations related to regiment-level fi eld counterattack exercise using a maneuvering ground in Hokkaido. Furthermore, the SDF will also facilitate expanded joint/ shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas with the SDF while accounting for relations with local communities. Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas, and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas, such as the U.S. and Australia, and introduce simulators actively. Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response Training, which are to prevent and repel direct threats to Japan. Other additional t i i i l d I t ti l P C ti E i hi h SDF’ i t ti l ti ti iti ----- Newly joined members of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF conducting basic training **❸ [Initiatives to Safety Management, etc.]** The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF constantly strive as one for safety management, such as by implementing the highest level of safety measures and precautions during routine training. Despite these efforts, in September 2019, during the maintenance of P-3C Patrol aircraft at MSDF Kanoya Air Base (Kagoshima Prefecture), an engine fell from the aircraft, and directly hit and killed one SDF personnel. The MOD/SDF is thoroughly implementing measures to prevent another such accident and expending all possible **Chapter** means to ensure safety. Any accident that can cause injury to the public, damage to its property, or the loss of life of SDF personnel, must be avoided at all costs. The MOD/SDF as a whole is making its utmost effort to prevent recurrence of such accidents by thoroughly investigating their causes and making sure each member has recognized the importance of safety management once again. ----- **Section** **2** **Enhancement of Medical Functions** For the SDF to perform its mission, SDF personnel must remain in good health through appropriate health management. Also, it is important for the SDF to make continued efforts to enhance and strengthen its capabilities in military medicine for protecting the lives of the personnel engaging in a variety of services as much as possible. Under the circumstances where the SDF’s missions are becoming more diverse and internationalized, it is important to appropriately and accurately carry out various medical activities, such as medical support in disaster relief and international peace keeping activities, and capacity building in the medical fi eld. The MOD/SDF, therefore, is enhancing and strengthening its medical capabilities so that they can appropriately respond to various emergency events and carry out its various missions in Japan and abroad. **❶ [Enhancing Seamless Medical Care and Evacuation Posture]** **Chapter** patient management after surgery, the whole body control of patients during transportation, and equipment for blood preservation. On this occasion, MOD/JSDF decides to strengthen the organization of the Joint Staff for control and coordination concerning SDF medical operation on a daily basis. **2** Enhancement of Medical Functions in the Southwestern Region **1** Enhancement of Medical Functions in Various Emergency Situations In order to respond to various emergency situations, the MOD/SDF will enhance a seamless medical care and evacuation posture from the frontline to the fi nal transport destination, while considering joint operation, in accordance with the MTDP. Specifi cally, for the purpose of providing maximum protection for the lives of personnel injured on the frontline, the MOD/SDF will enhance medical functions for seamless implementation of a series of medical care and transportation starting from emergency life support by Frontline Medics[1] and damage control surgery (DCS)[2] at a medical base equipped with a fi eld operation system[3] to safe and speedy transportation to a SDF hospital that is the fi nal destination for complete cure. Other measures necessary for the implementation of the above will be taken, including preparation of materials and equipment necessary for DCS, In the enhancement of seamless medical care and evacuation posture, in light of the geographical characteristics of Japan, with its vast sea area and large number of remote islands, the MTDP places a special focus on the enhancement of medical functions in the southwestern region. Specifi cally, the MOD/ SDF will develop maintenance and evacuation guidelines for medical bases in the region and improve the medical equipment reserve system in main island of Okinawa and smaller islands. **❷ [SDF Hospitals Serving as Hub Hospitals with Enhanced Functions]** The role of SDF hospitals is to admit and treat injured SDF personnel and other persons transported from their area of activity in various emergency situations, while in normal circumstances these hospitals provide medical care to SDF personnel and their families, etc. These hospitals also play the role of educational institutions that train medical personnel to maintain and enhance their skills. In accordance with the NDPG and the MTDP, the MOD will continue to concentrate human and medical resources on the consolidation of SDF hospitals with increased performance levels to establish an effi cient and high-quality medical care regime by improving their capacity as transfer “Frontline Medics” are, from among those who are certifi ed as Licensed Practical Nurses (Refer to the Assistant Nurse stipulated in Article 6 of the Act on Public Health Nurses, Midwives, and Nurses [Act No. 203 of 1948]) and Emergency Life-Saving Technicians (refer to the Emergency Life-Saving Technician stipulated in Section 2, Article 2 of the Emergency Life-saving Technicians Act [Act No. 36 of 1991]), those who have completed the training curriculum approved by the council stipulated in Article 4 of the Directives Relating to Emergency Life-Saving Actions (MOD Directive No. 60 of 2016). Hemostasis by pressing/placing gauze on damaged internal organs, suture, etc. and emergency operations to prevent contamination with intestinal tract contents. The purpose is to stabilize the patient’s condition to the level where transfer is possible. Mobile operating room sheltered in a large truck with one of the four functions necessary for operation (operation, operation preparation, sterilization and medical supply vehicles). Th t l t i t d th ti t lif b d t d ----- hospitals with a certain level of medical care in response to infections, gunshot wounds, and other trauma and injury caused by NBC weapons in addition to general practice. SDF hospitals have been also advancing regional medical care. Some SDF hospitals are designated as secondary emergency medical institutions by local municipalities to accept emergency patients. SDF Central Hospital, in particular, responded to about 6,600 ambulances in 2019. In response to the spread of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) infection, the MOD/SDF has been accepting COVID-19 patients at SDF hospitals and the National Defense Medical College Hospital (NDMC Hospital) since February 1, 2020. 430 COVID-19 patients in total (as of May 31) have been accepted by the SDF Central Hospital, SDF district hospitals in Sapporo, Yokosuka, Hanshin, Fukuoka and Kumamoto and the NDMC Hospital. See Part III Chapter 1 Section 4-3 (Activities at the SDF Hospital, etc.) Cutting-edge defense medical research project(the fi eld of war-related illness and injury study) necessary for handling COVID-19 and CT diagnosis vehicles and medical equipment that can be deployed to the fi eld for pneumonia diagnosis. **Chapter** See Part II Chapter 4 Section 2-1 (Overview of Defense-Related See Expenditures) In May 2019, SDF Central Hospital, with the participation of GSDF Eastern Army, GSDF Medical School, Japanese Red Cross Society, Japanese DMAT, Setagaya Medical Association and others, implemented a drill to accept a large number of injured people based on a scenario of a Tokyo Inland Earthquake. Through such drills, SDF Central Hospital strengthens collaboration with related organizations and improves its ability as a medical institution equivalent to a disaster base hospital. When CT scanners and other equipment of private hospitals in Koriyama City were covered with water due to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis), SDF Fuji Hospital dispatched a vehicle with CT scanner for disaster relief at the request of Fukushima Governor for the period from October 18 to November 5, 2019, and supported treatment of 230 patients. As disaster relief concerning community acquired infection of COVID-19, from May 2 to 14 the SDF Fuji Hospital sent a CT diagnosis vehicle to the cruise ship Costa Atlantica (with approximately 620 crews) where a mass infection occurred while the ship was moored to a pier in Nagasaki Prefecture. CT scan was conducted for 6 people. See The SDF Central Hospital and the NDMC Hospital are designated as medical institution for Category 1 Infectious Diseases[4] and have been implementing training for response to infectious diseases. For example, the SDF Central Hospital implements training to accept infectious disease patients on a regular basis in preparation for the occurrence of Category 1 Infectious Diseases[5] to establish cooperation with relevant institutions, which is necessary when such patients are identifi ed. The training was useful in the activities to respond to the spread of the COVID-19 infection. Using the lessons learned through the activities in response to the spread of the COVID-19 infection, the MOD/SDF will further strengthen its hygiene functions by implementing measures as follows in the fi rst and second 2020 supplementary budgets: preparation of medical equipment including respirators and negative pressure equipment to accept infected patients, ambulances necessary for transportation of infected people, protective clothing **❸ [Strengthening the Function of the NDMC ]** As the only educational institution of the MOD/SDF for the training of SDF personnel who are physicians (medical offi cers), SDF personnel who are public health and registered nurses (nursing offi cers) and technical offi cers, the NDMC plays the role to train and produce the primary medical staff for medical activities of the SDF as well as to maintain and improve their skills. In this context, the NDPG and the MTDP state that the MOD/SDF will improve operations of the NDMC and enhance its research functions, and endeavor to secure highquality talents. Specifi cally, the MOD/SDF will strengthen the system for training of excellent medical and nursing offi cers, and improve the conditions for providing high-quality medical Designated medical institutions for Category 1 Infectious Diseases are designated by the governor as medical institutions to hospitalize patients of Category 1 and Category 2 Infectious disease and the COVID-19 infection (Article 6, Act on the Prevention of Infectious Diseases and Medical Care for Patients with Infectious Diseases [Act No. 114 of 1998]). Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, smallpox, South American hemorrhagic fevers, plague, Marburg disease, and Lassa disease (Article 6, Act on the Prevention of I f ti Di d M di l C f P ti t ith I f ti Di [A t N 114 f 1998]) ----- care either equaling or surpassing other university hospitals. The MOD/SDF will also enhance research functions of the NDMC Research Institute and collaboration with medical care departments of the GSDF, MSDF, and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). Through these initiatives, the MOD/SDF will further enhance the education/ research conditions at the college. The NDMC Research Institute started advanced research of defense medicine in FY2015 and has been conducting research contributing to SDF troop operation, which includes research on explosion trauma and damage caused by shock waves. - **❹ [Enhancement of Education of Medical and Nursing Officers]** While greater abilities are required of personnel engaged in the sufficiency of medical officers and maintain and improve their medical care, such as medical officers, due to the diversification medical skills. In the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will continue efforts of missions, less than 90% of medical officer positions have been to improve the sufficiency of medical officers and further promote filled, although the rate has been improving year by year. Such the appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel who are physicians to low sufficiency is caused by medical officers leaving the SDF, handle missions that are expected to increase. one of the major reasons of which is the lack of opportunity to Similar measures are taken for nursing officers to maintain engage in medical training and practice. The MOD/SDF continues and improve their knowledge/skills through practice at to implement various measures with various career options to external hospitals, etc. prevent medical officers from leaving the SDF by enhancing Moreover, medical personnel and medical staff, such clinical education after graduation from the NDMC and other as radiological technologists, clinical technologists, and institutions, promoting various initiatives for ensuring more emergency life-saving technicians, are educated and trained opportunities for medical officers to engage in medical practice, at SDF hospitals, schools and other relevant institutions so helping them acquire and improve specialized knowledge that the SDF can perform diverse missions and missions and skills in areas such as infectious diseases and emergency under special circumstances, including international peace medicine, as well as increasing their motivation for work. cooperation activities and large-scale disasters. Through these measures, the MOD/SDF is working to improve - **❺ [Enhancement of Capabilities to Treat War Injury]** In order to improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and personnel who have completed this education and training damage control surgeries and treatment while transferring the curriculum have been designated as “Frontline Medics” and injured, the MOD/SDF has conducted research on relevant allocated to units. In FY2019 the SDF started education and initiatives taken by the U.S. Forces and others, carried out reviews training for Frontline Medics to maintain their knowledge for appropriate and accurate life-saving activities, and enhancing and skills necessary for relief treatment. education, training and research, including improvement of In addition to medical care on the frontline, based on the capabilities to treat combat injuries. MTDP, the SDF will enhance education and training tailored For the improvement of first aid capabilities on the to the characteristics of the units and equipment of the GSDF, frontline, since FY2017 the MOD has been providing MSDF, and ASDF, which include medical care on board specific education and training for SDF personnel who are ships or aircraft, while promoting development of a training certified as both Licensed Practical Nurses and Emergency system for medical care on aircraft and teaching materials Life-Saving Technicians to acquire necessary knowledge and for improvement of first aid capability. The SDF will also skills, so that the SDF personnel with these qualifications will promote development of medical training infrastructure be able to provide specialized relief treatments[6] on the spot to necessary for combat injury education and common to all SDF personnel who are injured on the frontline, prior to their SDFs. transfer to SDF hospitals and other medical facilities. SDF **Chapter** Video：Life of NDMC Students URL：https://youtu.be/dgZ8FQo_jq0 Fi t id t t t f th ith t h i b t ti d t i th d b i j i d th t t t h d i i t ti f l i f i li f ----- - **❻ [Developing Conditions Necessary for International Cooperation]** In light of the response to the Ebola virus disease outbreak in diseases in April 2017 and March 2019 respectively and have been West Africa in 2014, the MOD/SDF is accelerating training of working to improve capabilities to deal with infectious diseases. human resources with expertise to contribute to overseas activities SDF medical units engage in international cooperation against infectious diseases that could be a global threat and to including international disaster relief operations and capacity the development of a framework including the NDMC, while at building assistance for foreign military forces. They have the same time making various efforts to improve the capabilities provided medical care in overseas disaster-struck areas to respond to infectious diseases. Specifically, the MOD/SDF is and are actively assisting mostly the Asia-Pacific region currently improving the necessary facility equipment at units, with capacity building in such medical fields as underwater the NDMC Hospital and the SDF Central Hospital. The aims medicine, aeromedicine and disaster medicine, and of this improvement are to provide personnel training for the conducting joint training. enhancement of capabilities to deal with infectious diseases, For the future, the MOD/SDF will develop systems improve equipment to transport infectious disease patients and necessary for various international cooperation initiatives, develop readiness for offering medical treatment to patients which include the updating of mobile medical systems that affected by Category I infectious diseases which are classified are effective for overseas medical activities and dispatch of as the most dangerous category among known infectious SDF personnel to the medical departments of international diseases. The SDF Central Hospital and the NDMC Hospital organizations, the U.S. Forces and others. were designated as a medical institution for Category I infectious **Chapter** ----- **Interaction with Local Communities** **and Japanese Citizens** ###### 5 Various activities of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SelfDefense Forces (SDF) are hard to implement without the understanding and cooperation of each and every person **Section** **Collaboration with Local Communities** **1** The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) provides that, in recent years, activities, training and exercises of SDF and U.S. forces in Japan (USFJ) are becoming more diverse and defense equipment more sophisticated, and that, as a result, it is becoming all the more important to gain understanding among and secure cooperation from local governments and residents around defense facilities. and local governments. Therefore it is necessary to further deepen the trust between local communities and people, and the SDF. Therefore, the NDPG provides that the MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities, and that, upon fi elding units and equipment of SDF or USFJ and conducting training and exercises, the MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet the desires and conditions of local communities, while suffi ciently fulfi lling accountability. **Chapter** **❶ [Supporting Civilian Life]** The MOD/SDF conduct activities to support the lives of citizens in a range of fi elds, in response to requests from local governments and relevant organizations. Such activities contribute to further deepening the trust in the SDF, and provide SDF personnel with pride and confi dence. The GSDF handles the disposal of unexploded ordnance and other dangerous explosives found throughout Japan. In FY2019, there were 1,441 such cases (approx. 33 tons). In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for approx. 37% of the total cases. The MSDF clears and disposes of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives, but there was no such removal or disposal in FY2019. The SDF not only tries to have interactions with local residents by doing things like opening its camps and bases to the public to the extent that they do not interfere with unit activities, but also provides transportation and other assistance at a variety of athletic events. In addition, it supports regional medical treatment efforts by providing general medical care at some SDF hospitals as well as conducting urgent transport for emergency patients from isolated islands. Furthermore, based on national and other policies,[1] the MOD/SDF ensures opportunities for local small and medium sized enterprises to receive orders, while taking effi ciency into account, by such measures as the promotion of separated/divided ordering[2] and the securing of competition amongst companies within the same qualifi cation and grade divisions.[3] See Reference 59 (Activities in Civic Life) - **❷ [Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF]** (1) Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Cooperation organizations is vital to secure highly qualifi ed personnel and with Re-employment Support to support the re-employment of uniformed SDF personnel who retire at relatively young ages. Amid the harsh recruitment and employment situation, the cooperation from local governments and relevant 1 “The Contract Basic Policy of the Government regarding Small and Medium Enterprises in FY2018” (Cabinet decision on September 7, 2018) 2 For example, this is a method through which grouping of products, etc. takes place when putting up the order for general competitive bidding, and then a successful bidder for the groups is decided. 3 Thi th t t f th biddi ti i ti li ibilit t i d i t d A D th i titi b t d C D l hi h i tl ll d di t i ----- **Chapter** **Column** “Disposal of Unexploded Ordnance” Contributing to Safety and Security of People Even today, more than 70 years after World War II, unexploded For this reason, the 101st Ordnance Disposal Unit in the ordnance, mainly dropped before and during the war, are found GSDF Camp Naha goes into action day and night, sometimes across Japan from Hokkaido to Okinawa. Every time, the SDF more than fi ve times a day. The unit removes fuses by hand disposes the ordnance at the request of the local authority. and collects unexploded ordnance to make them safe, thereby In FY2019, the SDF disposed approximately 33 tons of contributing to the safety and security of people. ordnance in 1,441 operations. The number of ordnance found Ordnance disposal is a precarious mission, but ordnance in Okinawa Prefecture is prominent: approximately 18 tons of disposal units across the country will continue to carry out ordnance of 529 operations were disposed in the fiscal year. their mission for residents. They account for over one third of all ordnance found in Japan. Removing a fuse by hand Collecting neutralized ordnance Bringing to a storage for unexploded ordnance (2) Support for and Cooperation with SDF Activities The SDF camps and bases maintain close relations with local communities, and therefore, various forms of support and cooperation from the local community are indispensable for the SDF to conduct its diverse activities, including education and training, and disaster relief. Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international peace cooperation operations and other duties receive support and cooperation from the relevant organizations for the procedures involved. The MOD/SDF are further strengthening cooperation with relevant entities such as local governments, police and fi re services in order to ensure immediate and sure activities by the SDF in various contingencies. - **❸ [Activities for Securing Understanding and Cooperation of Municipal Governments and Local Residents]** Regional Defense Bureaus established in eight locations Also, the bureaus conducted liaison and coordination with nationwide make efforts to build cooperative relationships local governments in response to typhoon, heavy rain and with their respective local communities, through collaboration other disasters. They also implemented measures to promote with SDF units and Provincial Cooperation Offi ces. In understanding of the defense policy in general by holding 16 FY2019 the bureaus provided local communities with seminars on defense issues and providing all prefectures and explanations on a variety of training including Japan-U.S. municipalities with explanations on the defense white paper, joint training, development of SDF facilities on Mageshima, for example. and plan to deploy Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) See Fig. IV-5-1-1 (Work to Develop Regional Cooperation) V-22 Ospreys at KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT. - **❹ [Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas]** large volumes of land. In addition, as of January 1, 2020, **1** Features of Defense Facilities and Projects on Measures Aimed at the Areas Around Defense Facilities approx. 28% of the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the USFJ is jointly used by the SDF in Defense facilities are diverse in their use, and often require accordance with the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, ----- **Fig. IV-5-1-1** Work to Develop Regional Cooperation **1** Measures concerning coordination with local governments for smoothly implementing projects Coordination with local governments regarding the reorganization, etc. of SDF units and training, etc. of the U.S. Forces **2** Measures concerning responses to incidents and accidents wherein the SDF, etc. are involved Required cooperation in collaboration with the SDF, etc., such as information provision to local governments **3** Measures for the purpose of taking effective actions for various contingencies Required support for those such as SDF units and local governments under large-scale disasters or other events and participation in training **4** Measures with the aim of obtaining understanding of the defense policy in general Holding of sessions to explain the content of Defense of Japan and seminars on defense issues, targeting local governments and residents **Chapter** with the purpose to enhance the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises. Meanwhile, problems related to restricted establishment and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many of the defense facilities. Also, another problem is that frequent aircraft operations such as takeoffs and landings cause noise and other issues, impacting the living environment of local residential communities. With that being said, defense facilities, as the foundation that supports the defense capabilities of Japan and the JapanU.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable for our country’s security. Therefore, in order for the facilities to exert their full function, it is necessary to maintain conditions for constant and stable utilization by ensuring harmony between the defense facilities and the surrounding areas as well as obtaining the understanding and cooperation of the local residents. For that purpose, the MOD has taken measures to prevent, reduce or mitigate aircraft noise and other impacts caused by activities of the SDF or the U.S. Forces, or by the establishment/operation of airports and other defense facilities in the surrounding areas since 1974 based on the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Act). Taking into consideration the requests from the relevant local governments, the MOD partially revised the Living Environment Improvement Act in 2011, and conducted a review to enable the Specified Defense Facilities Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants to be applied to so-called soft projects, such as aid for medical expenses. In addition, the MOD added defense facilities to be eligible for these grants. Focused work is also underway to provide sound insulation at residences. Regarding the Specified Defense Facilities Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants, the MOD has implemented initiatives such as the PDCA Cycle process since April 2014, aiming to increase the effectiveness of these grants. In response to the requests by related local governments, the MOD continues to consider practical ways to achieve more effective and efficient measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the severe fiscal situation. See Fig. IV-5-1-2 (Status of SDF Facilities [Land Plots]) Fig. IV-5-1-3 (Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan [Exclusively Used Facilities]) Fig. IV-5-1-4 (Costs for Measures in Areas near Bases [Based on Contracts in FY2020]) **2 Efforts to Develop Understanding and Cooperation** Concerning the Stationing of the USFJ Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, maintaining the presence of the USFJ and its readiness is vitally important for ensuring the security of Japan. For stable stationing of the USFJ, it is essential to obtain understanding and cooperation of the local governments and residents in the vicinities of U.S. bases. The MOD will work to share this recognition with the United States at various levels including the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting. The ministry will also constantly take various measures, including coordination for unit operation of the USFJ with the local governments and other parties, provision of subsidies pertaining to the USFJ realignment, prompt information provision to the local government in a case of incident or accidents, and exchange promotion between the USFJ and local residents. ----- Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in **Fig. IV-5-1-3** Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities) **Fig. IV-5-1-2** Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots) Distribution by region Distribution by use Distribution by region Distribution by use **Chapter** 0 20 40 60 80 100 |Col1|(as of January 1, 2020)|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |n|Other regions 10% Approx. 112km2 Kanto region 5% Approx. 57km2 Kyushu region 12% Approx. 136km2 Tohoku region 13% Approx. 147km2 Chubu region 16% Approx. 178km2||||||||| ||Hokkaido region Approx. 460km|42% 2|||||||| ||otal area: Approx. (Accounting for approx. 0.3% of Japan’s land area) 1,091km2||||||||| |T|otal area: Approx. 1,091km2||||||||| |n|||||||||| ||Maneuver Areas 75% Approx. 813km2||||||||| ||Airfields 7% Approx. 81km2 Barracks 5% Approx. 55km2 Others 13% Approx. 141km2||||||||| （％） Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 0 20 40 60 80 100 |Col1|(As of January 1, 2020)|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Other regions 9% Approx. 22km2 Tohoku region 9% Approx. 24km2 Kanto region 12% Approx. 32km2|||||| ||Okinawa Prefecture 70% Approx. 185k||m2|||| ||otal area: Approx. (Accounting for approx. 0.07% of Japan’s land area) 263km2|||||| |T|otal area: A 263km|||||| ||Maneuver Areas 47% Approx. 123km2|||||| ||Airfields 23% Approx. 61km2 Warehouses 15% Approx. 40km2 Others 15% Approx. 40km2|||||| （％） Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding. Costs for Measures in Areas near Bases **Fig. IV-5-1-4** (Based on Contracts in FY2020) (1) Coordination for Unit Operation of the USFJ with the Local Governments, etc. The MOD is working to promote local understanding of the maintenance of USFJ facilities and unit operations through coordination, including prior explanation to the relevant local municipalities and residents at every occasion of USFJ realignment, training, unit deployment, new equipment deployment, etc. (2) Subsidy, etc. to Promote the USFJ Realignment During a period of time before and after the implementation of the USFJ realignment[4] (10 years in principle), realignment subsidies[5] will be granted to help to cover the expenses of projects[6] which contribute to improving the convenience of the lives of residents in local municipalities affected by the realignment, and to stimulating the local industries. For that purpose, they will be granted in accordance with progress made in the steps of the realignment, after the Defense Minister designates the specified defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment. As of April 2020, 14 municipalities for nine defense facilities are eligible to receive the subsidies. In order to promote the realignment, additional measures are taken with budgetary provision. |Col1|Col2|(Unit: 100 million yen)| |---|---|---| |Project|Mainland|Okinawa| |Disturbance prevention projects|92|17| |Noise prevention projects|565|189| |Measures related to relocati|ons 49|1| |Subsidized projects for stabilizing people’s lives|262|61| |Road improvement projects|62|15| |Environs Improvement Adjustment Gr|ants 194|34| |Other projects|14|3| (3) Ensuring Safety of Operations of the USFJ Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime importance in USFJ operations, and no accident or incident must occur. In the event of a crash, component fall/loss, precautionary landing on civilian airports,[7] etc. of U.S. Forces aircraft, the MOD urges the United States to make exhaustive measures for safety management and recurrence prevention as well as prompt information provision. The ministry also requests measures such as suspension of flying according to the individual case. The MOD promptly provides the relevant local governments, etc. with explanation of the obtained information and takes measures to ensure prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the incident or accident. See Reference 60 (Outline of Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas) Under the Realignment Special Measures Act, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels (replacement of the aircraft carrier, at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, with a nuclear aircraft carrier) that conduct operations integrally with U.S. air wings subject to realignment will be treated in the same way as the realignment of the USFJ. Approximately 5.7 billion yen in the FY2020 budget The specific scope of projects includes 14 projects identified by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan, including education, sports, and cultural projects. L di h th il t t d t t i f b lit i th i ft hil fl i ----- The MOD not only listens to the results of accident investigation and recurrence prevention measures of the United States but also uses expert knowledge of the SDF to determine their reasonableness. Furthermore, in July 2019, another effort was made by revising the guidelines concerning aircraft accidents in order to further refine the applicable policies and procedures in case of an accident caused by U.S. military aircraft accidents outside of U.S. Forces facilities and areas in Japan. Considering anxiety and concerns among local residents, Japan has been fully communicating its approach to the U.S. side including at the top and ministerial levels. The two countries closely cooperate to secure safe operation as the top priority. The MOD is also concerned about the increasing trend of accidents/incidents due to drinking caused by U.S. Forces military personnel and others and has requested the U.S. side on multiple occasions to reinforce official discipline and personnel education. The United States has also taken measures for its part, putting in place its guidelines for offduty action (liberty policy), including measures such as alcohol restrictions at nighttime as well as curfews applying to U.S. Forces personnel ranked below a certain rank. Both the countries will continue cooperation to prevent recurrence of incidents related to drinking. In addition, the Government of Japan prepared Crime Prevention Measures in Okinawa in June 2016 to deter crime in Okinawa Prefecture and ensure the safety and security of the people of Okinawa. Bolstering crime prevention patrol operations and establishing a safe and secure environment are the pillars of the Measures. The MOD is participating in the Okinawa Local Safety Patrol Corps established in the Okinawa General Bureau and will continue to cooperate with the relevant ministries and agencies to make it an effective crime-prevention effort. (4) Promoting Exchange between the USFJ and Local Residents based on laws (Article 105-1 of the Self-Defense Forces Law or Article 1 of the Act to Restrict the Operation of Fishing Boats) or a contract and compensates for losses incurred from the restriction. As an administrative measure to help people who suffered losses in their fishery operation due to the restriction or prohibition based on the provisions of the acts but cannot receive compensation under the provisions of the acts, the MOD provides relief money to people who satisfy certain requirements. (2) Base Subsidy, etc. The MOD provides cooperation by doing such things as providing various information also for the subsidy for municipalities where national defense facilities are located (“Base Subsidy”), and the Adjustment Grants for municipalities where defense facilities are located (“Adjustment Grants”), both of which are under the defense facilities-related subsidy system under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The base subsidy has been established considering that, among the facilities of the U.S. forces or the facilities used by the SDF, the land used for airports and maneuvering grounds covers a vast area that is a big part of the municipality area, which has a significant impact on municipal finance. The subsidy has a nature of substituting for fixed property tax and is granted to municipalities where national properties (land, building and structure) provided for use by the USFJ or the SDF are located. The Adjustment Grants have been established because the Base Subsidy is not granted to municipalities where properties constructed or set up by the U.S. forces (“USFJ properties”) are located despite their exemption from fixed asset tax, and also considering the tax-fiscal impact of the municipal tax exemption for U.S. Force personnel and civilian employees. The grant is provided to municipalities where the U.S. Force property is located. **3 Activities of the MOD for Coexistence with the** Environment and Society **Chapter** The MOD holds a Japan-U.S. exchange program to deepen mutual understanding between Japan and the United States with the understanding and cooperation of the local governments and USFJ. Under the program, residents living near USFJ facilities and areas together with USFJ personnel enjoy sports, music and cultural exchanges. The USFJ also has initiatives to deepen mutual understanding with people of the local communities, which include opening up of its bases (Friendship day) and information provision through websites and social media. (5) Other Measures (Including Measures Pertaining to the SDF) (1) Compensation for Fisheries The MOD defines the confined water for training, etc. carried out by the SDF or the USFJ using water surface A sense of crisis regarding the sustainability of the global environment has been mounting internationally. In 2015 countries around the world advanced initiatives, such as the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the United Nations and the Paris Agreement, which is an international framework concerning climate change. Marine plastic pollution and climate change were important topics at the G20 Summit held in Osaka in June 2019. Just before the ----- summit, the first Ministerial Meeting on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth was held with the attendance of relevant ministers of the participating countries. Japan also formulated the Fifth Basic Environment Plan at the cabinet in 2018 and has been working to realize a sustainable society. At the SDG Summit in September 2019, Prime Minister Abe expressed the intention to further accelerate initiatives in Japan and abroad by the next SDG Summit. In response to the acceleration of domestic and overseas initiatives, as a member of the government, the MOD also needs to contribute to solving environmental problems, while at the same time implementing measures with more focus on the coexistence of SDF/USFJ facilities and areas with surrounding areas. (1) Efforts Related to the MOD/SDF Facilities objective to ensure the health and safety of residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. Forces personnel, their families and other such parties, and made the “Joint Statement of Environmental Principles.”[9] To follow up on this announcement, Japan-U.S. consultations have been enhanced. The MOD has been working with relevant ministries and agencies to enhance cooperation for regular reviews of the JEGS compiled by the USFJ, exchange information on the environment, and deal with environmental pollution. Furthermore, on September 28, 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States signed and effectuated the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship relating to the USFJ, supplementary to the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the aim of strengthening environmental measures pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas. This supplementary agreement represents an international commitment with legal binding force and sets forth provisions concerning information sharing by the two countries, access to USFJ facilities and areas based on the report by the U.S. side at the time of an environmental accident and access to facilities and areas for investigation before their return. In April 2020, in order to address an aqueous filmforming foam spill incident that occurred at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, access to MCAS Futenma pursuant to the Supplementary Agreement by the Government of Japan and the relevant local governments has been realized for the first time. The MOD will continue to cooperate closely with the relevant ministries, local governments, and the U.S. Government to address the concerns of local residents. (2) Efforts to Save Utilities In USFJ facilities and areas, efforts are made to save utilities, which include changes to energy-efficient heating/ ventilation/air-conditioning equipment;installation of motion sensors for lights-out during absence; installation of solar panels; reduction of the period to use cooling/ heating equipment and review of the preset temperature; and control of lighting and lights-out for night lighting, for example. See Column (Addressing Issues of the PFOS and other compounds) **Chapter** (1) Banning the Use of Plastic Bags In order to take the initiative in the environmental measures of the government, the use of plastic bags was banned in Ichigaya District with the cooperation of shops, etc. on January 20, 2020. The MOD/SDF will ban the use of plastic bags also in other bases and camps where cooperation of shops is obtained to extend the ban across the country. (2) Review of Electric Power Procurement From the standpoint of the MOD/SDF, which has 250,000 members and operates facilities throughout the country, the problem of climate change is not an affair that concerns only other people. For procurement of electric power in FY2020, the MOD/SDF will review necessary electric power procurement in order to use renewable energy as much as possible after ensuring competitiveness, low price and stable supply, and plans to procure approx. 9,100 kWh electric power from renewable energy sources in the total of 151 facilities, etc. (on a contract basis) across the country. (2) Efforts on the USFJ Facilities and Areas (1) Efforts Related to Environmental Conservation For activities of the U.S. Forces in USFJ facilities and areas, the USFJ developed Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS),[8] which provides that generally the strictest regulation shall be adopted among environmental preservation regulations of Japan, the United States and international commitment. At the “2+2” Meeting in September 2000, based on the recognition that environmental conservation is important, the governments of both nations agreed to make it a common JEGS is the environmental standard compiled by the USFJ. In order to ensure that USFJ activities and installations protect human health and the natural environment and, it stipulates matters such as the handling and storage methods of environmental pollutants within the facilities and areas. C i ti f f it (1) i t l i t d d (2) i f ti h i d (3) t i t l t i ti d (4) i t l lt ti ----- **Chapter** Column Addressing Issues of perfl uorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and other organic fl uorine compounds PFOS, an organic fl uorine compound, has a property of blending U.S. Forces in Japan. water and oil. In the past, PFOS was widely used for surface Under such circumstances, the occurrence of a large-scale treatment agent in the semiconductor industry, aqueous fi lm- aqueous fi lm-forming foam spill incident at Marine Corps forming foam (AFFF) and other purposes. However, because Air Station (MCAS) Futenma in April 2020 was deplorable. it is hardly decomposed, and has a risk of negative effects The MOD conducted cleaning and surveyed the status of through accumulation in the human body and environment, it contamination at nearby daycare centers and rivers outside the was designated as a substance to be restricted by the POPs air station, and accessed MCAS Futenma under the Agreement Convention (*1) in 2009 and the Chemical Substances Control on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship for Law (*2) in 2010. Further, last year, perfl uorooctanoic acid the fi rst time upon an environmental accident. Access to MCAS (PFOA), another organic fl uorine compound, became regulated Futenma was conducted fi ve times in total to take samples of under the POPs Convention. The regulation of per- and water and soil. In this manner, the MOD addressed the incident polyfl uoroalkyl substances (PFAS), which is a generic name in collaboration with relevant ministries, local governments, of organic fl uorine compounds, is also under international and the U.S. Government. Based on all these initiatives in discussion. Japan and abroad, the MOD will continue efforts to eliminate In Japan, a high concentration of PFOS/PFOA is detected the concerns of local residents over the issues concerning in various rivers across the country. In response to increasing PFOS and other compounds in close coordination with relevant public anxiety, the government as a whole is taking measures. ministries, local governments, and the U.S. Government in Specifi cally, relevant ministries set provisional target values order to dispel public anxiety. for tap water and water environments. The MOD formulated *1 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants *2 Act on the Evaluation of Chemical Substances and Regulation of Their Manufacture, etc. a plan to accelerate the replacement and disposal of AFFF containing PFOS in February this year with the aim of promoting understanding and ensuring trust of the local communities, which are essential for the stable operation of the SDF. The plan intends to complete disposal by the end of the next fi scal year for SDF facilities, and by the end of FY2023 for SDF vessels, in principle. The United States Government is also studying the issue under numerous efforts, such as a report by a task force of the Department of Defense, which was issued in March this year. Under the initiative of Minister of Defense Kono and Secretary of Defense Esper, discussions at various levels are underway on Japan-U.S. cooperation, including actions concerning the Status of splitting soil samples **❺ [Participation in National Events]** The SDF presents ceremonies including guards of honor, lining up and gun salutes to the Emperor, state guests and others at national events. A guard of honor to state guests from foreign countries at their welcome reception is essential for diplomatic procedure. At the Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi (Ceremony of the Enthronement of His Majesty the Emperor at the Seiden [State Hall]), the GSDF fi red salutes in the Kita-no-maru area of the Outer Gardens of the Imperial Palace. At the celebration parade in November of the same year, the GSDF, Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), the National Defense Academy and National Defense Medical College conducted guards of honor, playing music and lining up. In addition to the members who were assigned to these duties, many other members participated in the event, including preparation for the implementation by the SDF. ----- **Chapter** **VOICE** Participating in a National Event (Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi, Ceremony of the Enthronement of His Majesty the Emperor at the Seiden [State Hall]) Captain KODAMA Yoshinobu, is most important to time the fi ring with consideration of the Company Commander, 1st Field Artillery Unit, sound propagation velocity. GSDF (Oshino Village, Minamitsuru County, Yamanashi Prefecture) The difficult mission required hard training. However, the I received an order to participate in the Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi members were enthusiastic about the training and dedicated as the salute company commander from the commander of all their time for this mission until the actual performance. I the 1st Field Artillery Unit (salute commander) in summer last think they were able to maintain this level of concentration, year. I felt almost inexpressible elation and a sense of tension not because of my leadership, but thanks to their sense of to be involved in the enthronement ceremony of His Majesty mission. This was a very significant mission that made me the Emperor. feel the power of pursuing one goal with a sense of mission. I A gun salute is not a simple firing of blank shots. It is an deeply appreciate the fact that I belonged to the 1st Field extremely difficult mission to synchronize the sound of the Artillery Unit with the salute mission in Camp Kitafuji and that fi ring of 21 salutes in Kitanomaru park with the banzai (hail) I was assigned to the mission. by the Prime Minister in the Imperial Palace about 850m away from the park, at fi ve-second intervals and with no misfi re. It The salute company carrying out blank shot fi ring in Kitanomaru Park The author commanding the salute company (third from the right) - **❻ [Activities for Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games]** Academy held up the placards of the participating countries. **1** Cooperation by the SDF in Past Olympic Games and Performance Twenty-one SDF athletes participated in the games. Among of SDF Athletes (since the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games) them MIYAKE Yoshinobu won the fi rst place in weight lifting and TSUBURAYA Kokichi became third in the marathon. At the opening ceremony of the 18th Olympic Games held Since then, the SDF has participated in Olympic Games, in Tokyo in 1964, Blue Impulse aircraft drew grand Olympic with SDF athletes winning eight gold medals, four silver rings in the sky of Tokyo, the SDF band played the Olympic medals and eight bronze medals in total. march and a fanfare, while students of the National Defense Video： Shukuga-Onretsu-no-gi (Imperial Procession by motorcar after the Enthronement Ceremony) URL：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AQYMP2kll8c ----- that SDF personnel would make full efforts for Japan s security and work for successful games with the spirit that all SDF members were participants. At the 12th committee meeting in December 2019, it was decided that the MOD/SDF would take security measures, including warning and surveillance of the sky and sea area of Japan, including the area around the venues, relief provisions for victims in an event of a large-scale terrorist attack, and response to cyber attacks. Regarding cooperation with game operations, including ceremonies, the MOD/SDF had been conducting coordination with the Tokyo Organising **2 Cooperation in Tokyo 2020 Olympic and** Paralympic Games With the aim of strengthening efforts for the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games (hereafter referred to as “Tokyo 2020 Games”), the MOD/SDF Special Action Committee on the 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympics and Paralympics led by the Minister of Defense was set up in September 2013. At the fi rst committee meeting, then Defense Minister Onodera explained the signifi cance of the cooperation and participation of the MOD/SDF and stated **Chapter** **VOICE** After the Ceremony to Receive the Olympic Flame Lieutenant Colonel FUKUDA Tetsuo, aircraft and pilot for each color of smoke. We seriously trained Commander, 11th Squadron, Flight Group, 4th Air Wing, pilots gathered from across the country so that all of them ASDF (Higashi Matsushima City, Miyagi Prefecture) could ensure perfect performance. On March 20, 2020, when the sacred fl ame of the Tokyo Olympic The pilot who drew the yellow ring was from Yamada Town Games arrived at Matsushima Airbase, Miyagi Prefecture, Blue of Iwate Prefecture, which was badly affected by the tsunami Impulse, an acrobatic fl ight team, drew fi ve-colored rings in of the Great East Japan Earthquake. With a determination to the sky above Tohoku. The strong wind that forced the Tohoku give a boost to the Olympic and Paralympic Games, a historic Shinkansen to suspend service blew away the Olympic symbol event that is a symbol of reconstruction, he fl ew in hopes that we drew, but the people of Tohoku who looked up at the sky could affected people would smile at the sight of the fi ve rings. clearly see fi ve rings. As the commander, I am proud that not only The games have been postponed for one year. If I am given pilots but also maintenance crew and others who supported the an opportunity to fl y again, I will demonstrate the regained fl ight worked together to do the perfect job at the moment when energy of Tohoku to the world and send the heartiest cheers Matsushima Airbase attracted worldwide attention. from the sky so that athletes can exert all their strength. Because we could not miss any of the fi ve-colored rings during the ceremony, it was necessary to prepare a stand-by Squadron Commander Lieutenant Colonel FUKUDA Prior training (photograph by KUROSAWA Eisuke) Video：Five-colored rings drawn by Blue Impulse at the Olympic Flame Arrival Ceremony URL：https://twitter.com/ModJapan_jp/status/1240843368835375104?s=09 ----- Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games on cooperation items (Olympic flame arrival ceremony, hoisting of national and other flags, medical services at the venue for shooting sports, marine rescue in sailing, control in and outside of venues, and operation of archery, shooting and modern pentathlon) and decided to implement the items at **❼ [Other Initiatives]** the official request of the organizing committee. In March 2020, the Tokyo 2020 Games was decided to be postponed and held in summer of 2021. The MOD/SDF will continue to cooperate with the organizing committee to prepare for the Games. - **2 Response to Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Mainly Drones** Flying over Defense Facilities and Surrounding Airspace **1 Response to Cases of Interference against SDF and U.S.** Forces Aircraft by Laser Irradiation and Kite Flying Cases of interference by laser irradiation and kite flying against the SDF and U.S. Forces aircraft in flight have been occurring frequently. These are extremely dangerous and malicious acts that may disrupt a pilot’s ability to operate aircraft and result in a catastrophe such as a crash. Therefore, the MOD disseminates information regarding the risks involved in these acts to local residents by putting up posters and requests their cooperation in reporting to the police while closely cooperating with relevant local governments. Additionally, the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Civil Aeronautics Act was revised in December 2016, making these interference acts subject to regulation as well as fines and other penalties. **Chapter** In recent years there have been terror attacks overseas (including attempted ones) using small drones, including commercial drones, some of which are targeted at military facilities. Given such a situation, there is a concern that drone terror attacks on the SDF/USFJ facilities and areas can also happen in Japan, and if these facilities are endangered, the function as foundations to defend our nation can be seriously affected. To address such a concern, the Act on Prohibition of Flight of UASs around and over Key Facilities commonly known as the “Drone Act” was enforced on June 13, 2019, to prohibit small drones from flying over the SDF/USFJ facilities and areas designated by the Minister of Defense. Currently 27 SDF facilities where major SDF Headquarters, etc. are located are designated for the prohibition. See Reference 61 (a list of the defense-related facilities designated under the Drone Act) ----- **Chapter** Column The Drone Act Based on the Drone Act, drone fl ights are prohibited over and - In either of the above cases, a prior notice to the relevant prefectural public safety within approximately 300 meters of the premises or areas of commissions is also necessary. The details of the procedures are available on the MOD the SDF/USFJ facilities and areas that are designated by the website. Minister of Defense. Illegal fl ights of drones may be subject to the following measures: See Reference 61 (a list of the defense-related facilities designated under the Drone Act) - Measures to secure safety, including interfering against fl ights and destroying devices, may be implemented when However, flights may be permitted when consent has been an instruction for the discontinuation of the fl ights issued by obtained from the administrator of the defense-related facilities police offi cers has not been followed. or in other cases cited below (*): - Offenders may be punished by imprisonment of up to one year, or a fi ne of up to 500,000 yen. - Flights over the designated defense-related facilities : When consent has been obtained from the administrators of the The advent of drones has made it possible for anyone to defense-related facilities. easily enjoy taking aerial video and photographs. However, - Flights over the surrounding areas within approximately contrary to their convenience, drones pose various potential 300 meters of the designated defense-related facilities: risks, and in order to reduce the risks, various rules have been When consent has been obtained from the administrators of set. Before flying drones, the users should check on the the defense-related facilities, when consent has been regulations under the Drone Act in addition to the Civil obtained from those who own or occupy the areas, or when Aeronautics Act. the fl ights are operated by the central or local governments for the purpose of performing public services. Scan this to access the website of the MOD. → ドローンの規制についてのお知らせ 小型無人機等飛行禁止法により指定されている 自衛隊施設／米軍施設その周辺地域（周囲約300ｍ） の上空におけるドローン等の飛行は、 原則として禁止されています。 これに違反した場合、次のような措置／罰則もあります。 - 警察官等による安全確保措置 - 最大懲役１年／罰金５０万円 D r o n e R e g u l a t i o n N o t i c e Drone flights are prohibited over and within approx. 300-meter radius of the designated Self-Defense Forces /U.S. Forces facilities under the Act on Prohibition of Flight of sUAS(Drones). If a person illegally flies drones, police officers, etc. may take necessary measures for security. The person may be punished by the Government of Japan by imprisonment of up to one year or a fine of up to 500,000 yen. 周囲おおむね３００ｍのの 自衛隊施設／米軍施設の自 地域の上空 敷地・区域の上空敷 （イエロー・ゾーン） （レッド・ゾーン）（ **約３００ｍ** ※ このほか、航空法上の無人航空機の飛行禁止空域においてドローン等を飛行させる場合、夜間に ドローン等を飛行させる場合等には、別途、国土交通大臣の許可又は承認を得る必要があります。 対象防衛関係施設および飛行をさせたい場合の手続の詳細については、防衛省ＨＰを ご参照ください。 https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/drone/index.html 防衛省・警察庁・外務省・国土交通省 A poster intended to raise public awareness about the regulation on drones. ----- **Section** **Public Relations Activities, Public Records and Archives** **2** **Management, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities** **❶ [Various Public Relations Activities]** As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out without the understanding and support of the Japanese people, it is important to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible public relations activities and to gain the trust and cooperation of the public. According to a “Public Opinion Survey on the SelfDefense Forces and Defense Issues” conducted by the Cabinet Offi ce (in January 2018), public expectations and evaluations towards the SDF have been increasing as the scope of MOD/SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally. In light of this result, the MOD/SDF will continue to conduct a variety of PR activities, thereby striving to ensure better understanding of the current status of the MOD/SDF. In addition, given that understanding and support from foreign countries are also of utmost importance for the SDF to conduct its missions successfully, it is essential that the MOD strengthens efforts to provide information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF initiatives, including about SDF activities abroad. has been striving to gain the understanding of people in other countries by publishing the monthly English magazine, “Japan Defense Focus (JDF), launching a Twitter account in English, and improving the contents of the MOD’s English website. It is proactively transmitting information to the international community through efforts such as providing international media with opportunities for press coverage, publishing English versions of the defense white paper and brochures, as well as producing PR videos. **2 Events and PR Facilities** **Chapter** The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise, cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and demonstration fl ights and boarding experiences on aircraft. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions and unit tours are held on occasions such as the anniversary of a unit’s foundation. In some instances, they also hold parades throughout the cities, with cooperation from the local communities. Furthermore, as part of the commemoration of the SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. In 2019 the festival was held in Gymnasium 1 of the National Yoyogi Stadium due to renovation of Nippon Budokan, and approximately 38,500 visitors in total came. Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, a troop review, a FY2019 SDF Marching Festival held at Yoyogi National Gymnasium 1 Reference 62 (“Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” [excerpt] [Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office]) See **1 Information Communication for Domestic and** International Audiences The MOD/SDF conducts PR activities using the Internet such as offi cial websites, video distribution, and social media (Social Networking Services)[1] as well as actively distributes information through various means including television broadcasting, large-sized billboards, and the showing of PR videos on trains. The MOD has also been making great efforts to provide accurate information in a more extensive and timely fashion, by creating brochures, PR videos, and “Guidebook to the Ministry of Defense,” as well as providing assistance in editing the PR magazine “MAMOR” and cooperation on media coverage. Furthermore, based on the increasing interest in the MOD/ SDF initiatives from the international community, the MOD dditi t F b k d th SNS t th GSDF d MSDF d I t t i J d O t b 2017 ti ----- fl eet review, and an air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF respectively. In 2019, the MSDF planned a fl eet review of the MSDF in Sagami Bay but cancelled the review in order to expend all possible means for disaster relief activities in response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) that hit Japan in October of the same year. The MOD/SDF also actively opens PR facilities to the public. For instance, the number of visitors on the facility tour at the PR facilities in the MOD at Ichigaya district (Ichigayadai Tour) reached 460,000 as of the end of March 2020. Each SDF service also has a large-scale PR facility in addition to PR facilities and archives at the SDF camps and bases open to the public. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF provides cooperation for shooting fi lms and TV programs. **3 Trial Enlistment Programs** The MOD/SDF offers SDF Life Experience Tours for **Chapter** SDF Life Experience Tour for Women Summer Tour for College Students **VOICE** Essay Competition: Impressions upon Reading Defense of Japan 2019 Following the publishing of Defense of Japan 2019, the MOD Comment from Mr. MORINAKA Seiki (recipient of the highest award) held an essay competition with the topic of impressions upon I learned of the essay competition with the topic of reading the book with the aim of having more citizens read the impressions upon reading Defense of Japan 2019 through a book to deepen their understanding of the country’s defense tweet by State Minister of Defense Yamamoto. I applied while obtaining valuable opinions for the development of future because I had been interested in the SDF and won the first issues involved in the preparation of Defense of Japan. award. I’m very happy because this is the fi rst time for me to After careful examination, the examination board chaired by receive an award in a competition. My current dream is to State Minister of Defense Yamamoto selected the work of Mr. become an ASDF fighter pilot. I think this award greatly MORINAKA Seiki for the highest award, three works for the encouraged my dream. I will keep this success in mind to award for excellence and three for the special award. The stimulate my efforts. works were published on the MOD website. Comment from State Minister of Defense Yamamoto The first essay competition since the launch of Defense of Japan was held last year to motivate people to read the book, which is also referred to as a guide book on defense policy. Feedback far larger than expected was received. For the 2020 issue, too, we are looking forward to a large number of applications including your impressions, ideas for defense policy and observations that are useful for the next issue. Dear reader, it’s your turn to compete! The examiners at the MOD are waiting for you. Recent photo of the author ----- **Essay Competition: Impressions upon Reading Defense of Japan 2020** Essay Competition: Impressions upon Reading Defense of Japan will be held just as last year. We are looking forward to receiving impressions upon reading the Defense of Japan from many people. Entry requirements are as below. Please see the website of the Ministry of Defense, too. **1. Book for the essay competition** Defense of Japan 2020 **2. Application method** (1) Postal application - Write only the text of your essay on up to 5 sheets of manuscript paper for 400 characters - Write the following on other paper (free style) ‐ title of your essay ‐ your address ‐ your name with furigana ‐ your occupation ‐ your age ‐ your phone number ‐ E-mail address - Send the two items above to the following address Section in charge of Defense of Japan Essay Competition, Policy Planning and Evaluation Division, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Defense 5-1 Ichigaya Honmuracho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-8801 (2) Application through the MOD website - Download the form and write the text of your essay (up to 2,000 characters). - Upload the text using the application form and send the text after entering necessary items. **3. Application deadline** December 31 (Thu) 2020 (postmark deadline for postal applications) **4. Award** Essays will be selected for the following awards and recognized during March 2021 at the Ministry of Defense ・First Award Honorable certificate and extra prize (two tickets to both Fuji Fire Power Exercise and SDF Marching Festival) ・Award for Excellence Honorable certificate and extra prize (two tickets to either Fuji Fire Power Exercise or SDF Marching Festival) **5. Notice** (1) Application is limited to essays written in Japanese (2) Limited to unpublished original work written by an individual person; only one essay per person (3) Entries will not be returned for any reason. (4) Copyright of the winning essays belongs to the Ministry of Defense (5) The winning essays, winners’ names and recognition ceremony will be made public on the MOD website, etc. Commendation ceremony for the essay competition Honorable certificate and extra prize for the first award winner **Chapter** ----- undergraduate and graduate students as well as women[2] and Enlistment Experience Programs for groups, companies and other organizations.[3] These programs are intended to promote participants’ understanding of the SDF by offering opportunities to experience the daily life and training of the SDF, as well as to have direct contact with SDF personnel. In FY2019, approximately 120 people participated in SDF Life Experience Tours. From the private sector, the SDF received approximately 1,500 requests for Enlistment Experience Programs, and approximately 20,000 employees experienced SDF life. **❷ [Initiatives for Public Document Management and Information Disclosure]** **1 Necessity of Proper Management of Public Records and Archives** and Proper Operation of the Information Disclosure System Democracy, which is the most important system of the country, is founded on the principle that the public has access to accurate information, thereby making appropriate judgment and exercise of sovereignty. Administrative documents held by the government are of the utmost importance for the public’s access to accurate information. For this reason it is an important responsibility for the government, including the MOD/SDF, to manage information in an appropriate manner and appropriately respond to the public’s information disclosure requests. **2 Promotion of Proper Management of Public Records and Archives,** and Proper Operation of the Information Disclosure System The MOD/SDF takes it seriously that the issues over daily reports in South Sudan and Iraq brought about the public’s distrust in the MOD/SDF. The MOD/SDF is making full efforts to prevent recurrence based on the “Measures for Ensuring Appropriate Management of Public Records” (Adopted by the Ministerial Council on the Management of Administrative Documents and Related Matters on July 20, 2018), which compiles measures necessary for proper management of public records and archives by the entire government. The MOD/SDF is also working for proper management and response to requests for information disclosure by reforming the awareness of personnel and the organization culture, enhancing the checking framework, for example. See Reference 63 (Record of Information Disclosure by the See Ministry of Defense (FY2019)) **Chapter** **❸ [Initiatives for Policy Evaluation]** **1 Engagement in Policy Evaluation** **3 Initiatives for the Personal Data Protection System** The MOD has been conducting the evaluation of various policies based on its policy evaluation system. In FY2019, the MOD conducted policy evaluations of research and development (R&D) programs and projects concerning Special Taxation Measures as well as the major policies and programs of the NDPG and the MTDP. **2 Promotion of Evidence-Based Policy Making (EBPM)** In light of respecting individual rights in line with the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs, the MOD takes measures to ensure the security of the personal information under its control, and discloses such information upon request. **4** Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower Protection System The MOD is promoting EBPM by establishing a structure for promotion of EBPM within the ministry, including the establishment of a new position, “Director-General for Evidence-based Policymaking” in FY2018. The MOD sets up a system to handle whistleblowing made by its officials, employees and outside workers, establishing internal and external contact desks to deal with whistleblowing and to protect whistleblowers. Information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, Ms. Parsley Tour (trial tour for women in their 20s); and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women, etc. is available on the MOD/SDF website. Tours to experience the everyday life in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. They are implemented upon request from private companies and other organizations through the Provincial Cooperation Offices. ----- **Reference** ----- **Contents** Reference 1 National Security Strategy (Outline)… ……………………… 474 Reference 2 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2019 and beyond… …477 (Annex Table)… …………………………………………… 484 Reference 3 Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019-FY 2023) December 18, 2018………………………………………… 484 (Annex Table)… …………………………………………… 492 Reference 4 Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned… ……………… 492 Reference 5 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications… … 493 Reference 6 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service… ……… 493 Reference 7 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)……………………………………… 494 Reference 8 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Initial Budget)……………………………………………… 495 Reference 9 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries…………… 496 Reference 10 Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces… …… 496 Reference 11 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan… ………… 500 Reference 12 Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (2019)… … 500 Reference 13 Efforts in Recent Years by the MOD on Cybersecurity………… 501 Reference 14 Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)…………………… 501 Reference 15 Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East…………………………………………… 501 Reference 16 United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (tentative translation)… …………………………………… 502 Reference 17 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (tentative translation) (April 27, 2012)… …………………… 504 Reference 18 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015) (tentative translation)… …………………………………… 504 Reference 19 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2017)… …… 509 Reference 20 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (tentative translation)… …………………………………… 513 Reference 21 Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises (FY2019)……… 515 Reference 22 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects… …… 517 Reference 23 Outline of 23 Issues………………………………………… 518 Reference 24 The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)………………… 519 The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report) (tentative translation)………………… 520 Reference 25 Progress of the SACO Final Report…………………………… 521 Reference 26 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility… ………… 523 Reference 27 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena… ………………………………………………… 525 Reference 28 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces………… 525 Reference 29 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan… ……… 526 Reference 30 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan……………………………………… 527 Reference 31 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements………… 528 Reference 32 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2019)………………………………………… 529 Reference 33 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)………………………………………………… 530 Reference 34 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)… …………………………………………………… 531 Reference 35 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN member states (Past Three Years)… ………………………………… 532 Reference 36 Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges (Past Three Years)………………………………………………… 535 Reference 37 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries, Canada and New Zealand (Past Three Years)… …… 536 Reference 38 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)… …………………………………………………… 539 Reference 39 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)………………………………………………… 539 Reference 40 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pacific Island Countries (Past Three Years)………………………………… 540 Reference 41 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Countries in the Middle East (Past Three Years)… …………………………… 540 Reference 42 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with South Asian Countries (Past Three Years)………………………………… 541 Reference 43 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years)…………………………………………… 542 Reference 44 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Indo-Pacific Region, Past Three Years)…………………………………… 542 Reference 45 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense…… 543 Reference 46 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues………………………… 544 Reference 47 Vientiane Vision 2.0… ……………………………………… 546 Reference 48 Participation in Multilateral Exercise (Past Three Years)… …… 547 Reference 49 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations… …………………………………………… 552 Reference 50 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities… …………………………………… 553 Reference 51 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities… … 553 Reference 52 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Changes in Them…………………………………………… 556 Reference 53 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2019)…………………………………………………… 557 Reference 54 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, etc.… ………… 558 Reference 55 Main Measures for Re-employment Support… ……………… 558 Reference 56 Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government… … 559 Reference 57 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology………560 Reference 58 The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited,” the Second Principle “Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted,” and the Third Principle “Ensuring Appropriate Control”……………… 561 Reference 59 Activities in Civic Life… …………………………………… 561 Reference 60 Outline of Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas… ………………………… 562 Reference 61 a list of the defense-related facilities designated under the Drone Act… …………………………………………… 562 Reference 62 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)…… 563 Reference 63 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2019)…………………………………………………… 563 Defense Chronology… …………………………………………………… 564 ----- **Reference 1 National Security Strategy (Outline)** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) **I. Purpose** ❍ As Japan’s security environment becomes ever more severe, Japan needs to identify its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should pursue in the international community, and adopt a whole-government approach for national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society. ❍ In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community. ❍ The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security. ❍ With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a whole-government approach. ❍ When implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy. ❍ The Strategy will guide Japan’s national security policy over the next decade. Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate manner. **II. Fundamental Principle of National Security** 1. Principles Japan Upholds ❍ Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benefiting from an open international economic system. In addition, Japan as a maritime state has pursued “Open and Stable Seas.” ❍ Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, and has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. ❍ Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.), as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries. Japan has also contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other countries. ❍ Complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities. Japan has also continuously participated in international peace cooperation activities. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize “a world free of nuclear weapons.” ❍ Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan should stand to hold. 2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives National Interests ❍ To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security and preserving its rich culture and tradition. ❍ To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security (to this end, it is essential that Japan strengthens the free trade regime and realizes an international environment that offers stability, transparency andpredictability). ❍ To maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. National Security Objectives ❍ To strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan’s peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage. ❍ To improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation. ❍ To improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions. **III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges** 1. Global Security Environment and Challenges (1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation ❍ The balance of power between nations is changing due to the rise of emerging countries (e.g., China and India). In particular, China is increasing its presence in the international community. The United States, which has the world’s largest power as a whole, has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. ❍ The rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation has increased the relative influence of non-state actors, and the threat of terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors is expanding. (2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials ❍ The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea, and the nuclear issue of Iran remain major threats to Japan and the international community. (3) Threat of International Terrorism ❍ International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms due to the advancement of globalization. ❍ Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international terrorism both at home and abroad. (4) Risks to Global Commons ❍ In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and become more serious. ❍ In the seas, in recent years, there have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion with respect to natural resources and the security of respective states. ❍ Due to these cases as well as piracy and other issues, there is a growing risk of the stability of sea lanes and freedom of navigation coming under threat. ❍ There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer space, including an increasing amount of space debris caused by satellite collisions amongst others. ❍ Risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to disrupt critical infrastructure and obstruct military systems are becoming more serious. (5) Challenges to Human Security ❍ Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country—namely, poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters—are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals. ❍ These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the international community. (6) The Global Economy and Its Risks ❍ The risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to the entire global economy is growing. ❍ Signs of protectionism and reluctance towards the creation of new trade rules are becoming apparent. ❍ The rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries as well as an intensified competition for the acquisition of energy and mineral resources by emerging countries are observed. 2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region ❍ The region has various political regimes and a host of countries with large-scale military forces including nuclear-weapon states. Yet a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized. (2) North Korea’s Military Buildup and Provocative Actions ❍ North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea has repeatedly taken provocative military actions including the use of provocative rhetoric against Japan and other countries, thereby ----- increasing the tension in the region. The threat to the security of Japan and of other countries is being substantially aggravated. ❍ As Kim Jong-un proceeds to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored. ❍ North Korea’s abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan’s sovereignty as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility. (3) China’s Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas ❍ There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues. ❍ China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas without sufficient transparency. ❍ China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea (e.g., intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, establishment of its own “Air Defense Identification Zone”). ❍ The cross-strait relationship has deepened economically. Meanwhile, the military balance has been changing. Thus, the relationship contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability. **IV. Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security** 1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles - To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to future developments. - Enhancing Japan’s resilience in national security, through reinforcing its diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community at large. - In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the JapanU.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote comprehensive policies. (1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment ❍ The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats. ❍ It is necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. ❍ It is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan’s position in the international community. ❍ By highlighting Japan’s attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft power that would benefit the international community. Japan also needs to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify the needs of Japanese nationals and firms to support their overseas activities. ❍ Japan will make even more proactive contributions to international organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of Japanese staff in such institutions. (2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan ❍ Amid the severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power, and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. ❍ Japan will advance coordination within the government and with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters. ❍ In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which plays a central role in these efforts, Japan will enhance its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective. ❍ With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. (3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan’s Territorial Integrity ❍ Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities. ❍ Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations. ❍ Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders, and from a national security viewpoint, review issues related to the use of land in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities. (4) Ensuring Maritime Security ❍ As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law, rather than by force. ❍ Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities in a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying attention to the establishment of international networks. ❍ Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan. (5) Strengthening Cyber Security ❍ Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts to defend cyberspace and strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to protect cyberspace from malicious activities; to ensure the free and safe use of cyberspace; and to guard Japan’s critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected. ❍ Japan will constantly strengthen public-private partnership, and will comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard to expanding the pool of human resources in the security field, etc. ❍ Japan will take measures at technical and operational levels to enhance international cooperation, and will promote cyber defense cooperation. (6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism ❍ Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. In order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as collecting and analyzing intelligence on the situation of international terrorism. (7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities ❍ Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence and open source intelligence. ❍ Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing capabilities including by developing experts, and will promote allsource analysis that makes use of the array of information-collecting means at the Government’s disposal. Materials and intelligence will be provided to the NSC in a timely manner, and they will be appropriately utilized in policy formulation. (8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation ❍ From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to contribute more proactively to peace and international cooperation including through utilizing defense equipment, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items. ❍ While giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer. (9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security Purposes ❍ Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of informationgathering satellites and in making effective use of satellites. Japan will also enhance a system for space situational awareness. ❍ Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to longterm, including the development of technologies. (10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities ❍ Japan should encourage the further promotion of technologies, including dual use technologies, thereby strengthening Japan’s technological capabilities. ❍ Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, and make effective use of technology in the area of security by combining the efforts of industries, academia, and the Government. ❍ Japan will proactively utilize its internationally outstanding ----- technologies in diplomacy. 2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance - Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their cooperation on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity of not only the two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacific region and the broader international community. - The U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, aspires to enhance its presence in the region and strengthen cooperation with its allies, including Japan and its partners. - In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the JapanU.S. security arrangements and realize a stronger Japan-U.S. Alliance. (1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas ❍ Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy. ❍ Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through working closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination on issues such as response to contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy, and strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad areas as BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyberspace and largescale disaster response operations. (2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces ❍ While taking measures such as Host Nation Support and increasing deterrence, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements, in order to reduce the impact on people in host communities including Okinawa. 3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community To improve the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with partners both within and outside the region through the following approaches. ❍ Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries in the AsiaPacific region with which it shares universal values and strategic interests. — ROK: Japan will strengthen the foundation for security cooperation. Japan, the U.S., and the ROK will work together closely in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues. — Australia: Japan will further strengthen the strategic partnership by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security cooperation. — ASEAN countries: Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years. Japan will also provide further assistance to ASEAN efforts towards maintaining and strengthening its unity. — India: Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership. ❍ Japan will strive to construct a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China from a broad, as well as a medium- to long-term perspective. Japan will encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, and Japan will respond firmly but in a calm manner to China’s recent attempts to change the status quo by coercion. ❍ Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and relevant Security Council resolutions. ❍ Japan will advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole. ❍ In promoting these efforts, Japan will actively utilize and engage in multilateral and trilateral cooperation frameworks. ❍ Japan will cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region towards ensuring the stability of the region. ❍ European countries are partners for Japan which together take a leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. Japan will further strengthen its relations with Europe, including cooperation with the EU, NATO, and OSCE. ❍ Japan will endeavor to further develop relations with emerging countries, not merely on a bilateral basis, but in cooperative efforts in tackling global challenges. ❍ Japan will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations with the Gulf States, encompassing political and security cooperation beyond natural resources and energy. In addition, Japan will play a proactive role in the resolution of major issues affecting the stability of the Middle East. ❍ Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process. 4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community As a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the international community. (1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations ❍ Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. ❍ Japan will continue to strive to achieve the U.N. Security Council reform, including through an expansion of both permanent and nonpermanent categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Council. (2) Strengthening the Rule of Law ❍ In order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning stage, so that Japan’s principles and positions are duly reflected. ❍ Japan will actively engage in realizing the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, as well as in assistance for the development of legal systems. (3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation ❍ Japan will carry out vigorous efforts in pursuit of “a world free of nuclear weapons.” ❍ Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and nonproliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development issues and Iran’s nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance. (4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation ❍ Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities. ❍ Japan will promote coordination between PKO and ODA projects, and make further strategic use of ODA and capacity building assistance. ❍ Japan will proactively train peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries in close consultation with countries or organizations concerned. (5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism ❍ Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation on international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation, as well as reinforcement of the international legal framework. ❍ Japan will actively extend assistance to developing countries, etc. 5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and stability of the international community. (1) Sharing Universal Values ❍ Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues. ❍ Japan will actively utilize its ODA and other schemes in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights. ❍ Japan will engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women. (2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security ❍ It is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts to address development issues as part of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. ❍ Japan will strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, and play a leading role in the formulation of the next international development goals. ❍ Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of human security in the international community. (3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing Countries ❍ Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing countries, including students and administrative officials, and provide them education and training. Japan will further promote human resource development in order to ensure that these personnel can contribute to development in their home countries. (4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System ❍ Japan will promote economic partnership efforts, including through ----- the TPP, the Japan-EU EPA, a Japan-China-ROK FTA, and the RCEP. Through these efforts, Japan will strengthen the vigor and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. (5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues ❍ Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools for efforts to achieve the stable supply of energy and other natural resources. ❍ In the area of climate change, Japan will implement a proactive strategy for countering global warming. (6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges ❍ Japan will expand two-way youth exchanges. ❍ Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture. 6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding - In order to fully ensure national security, it is vital to reinforce the domestic foundation for diplomatic power, defense force, and other capabilities to be effectively demonstrated. - It is important to seek a deeper understanding of Japan’s security policies both at home and abroad to ensure national security. (1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases ❍ Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production and technological bases, including through strengthening international competitiveness. (2) Boosting Communication Capabilities ❍ It is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its national security policy to the world and its people, deepen the understanding among the people of Japan, and build cooperative relations with other countries. ❍ With the Prime Minister’s Office serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages. ❍ Japan will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and think tanks, and in doing so, promote Japanese language education overseas and train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations efforts and other areas. ❍ By precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan’s position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate understanding in the form of international opinion. (3) Reinforcing the Social Base ❍ It is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare of humanity, as well as that they perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity. ❍ Japan will foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love for the country and region. ❍ Japan will advance measures that raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty, and that increase understanding of the activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan. (4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base ❍ Japan will seek to enhance education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education. ❍ Exchanges will be deepened between the Government and institutions of higher education, think tanks, etc. ❍ Japan will promote the fostering of private-sector experts and government officials. **Reference 2 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2019 and** **beyond** extremely high speeds. Changes in the balance of power in the international arena are accelerating and becoming more complex, and uncertainty over the existing order is increasing. In addition, rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in traditional, physical domains, which are land, sea and air. Even under these circumstances, Japan will vigorously march forward as a peace-loving nation. To do so, Japan, amid the dramatically changing security environment, needs to fundamentally strengthen its national defense architecture with which to protect, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence, thereby expanding roles Japan can fulfill. Today, no country can preserve its security by itself alone. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as security cooperation with other countries are critical to Japan’s national security, and this cannot be achieved without Japan's own efforts. The international community also expects Japan to play roles that are commensurate with its national power. In strengthening its defense capability, Japan must squarely face the aforementioned realities of national security and ensure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity so as to build a truly effective defense capability that does not lie on a linear extension of the past. In particular, it has become essential that Japan achieve superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. To build a new defense capability that combines strengths across all domains, Japan needs to engage in a transformation at a pace that is fundamentally different from the past, completely shedding the thinking that relies on traditional division among land, sea, and air. On the other hand, given the rapidly aging population with declining birthrates and severe fiscal situation, Japan cannot strengthen its defense capability without thorough rationalization that does not dwell on the past. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, together with Japan's own defense architecture, continues to be the cornerstone of Japan’s national security. As stated above, Japan's fulfillment of its foremost responsibility as a sovereign nation is the very way to fulfill its roles under the Japan-U.S. Alliance and further enhance the Alliance’s ability to deter and counter threats, and is a foundation upon which to strategically promote security cooperation in line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific. Based on the foregoing thoughts, the Government, in line with “On National Security Strategy” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013, and hereinafter referred to as “National Security Strategy”), hereby sets forth the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond” as the new guidelines regarding how Japan’s national defense ought to be to form the foundation of Japan’s future. **II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan** 1. Characteristics of current security environment In the international community, interdependency among countries further expands and deepens. On the other hand, thanks to further growth of national power of such countries as China, changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex, thereby increasing uncertainty over the existing order. Against such a backdrop, prominently emerging are inter-state competitions across the political, economic and military realms, in which states seek to shape global and regional order to their advantage as well as to increase their influence. These inter-state competitions occur on a continuous basis: In conducting inter-state competitions, states leverage various means such as undermining other country’s sovereignty using military and law-enforcement entities, and manipulating foreign country’s public opinion by exploiting social media. Also, the so-called gray-zone situations are becoming persistent over a long period of time, playing out as part of inter-state competitions. They may possibly further increase and expand. Such gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications. In addition, methods employed to alter the status quo, such as “hybrid warfare,” that intentionally blur the boundaries between the military and non-military realms are forcing affected actors to take complex measures not limited to military ones. Driven by rapid technological innovation in information & communications and other fields, military technologies are showing remarkable advances. Against the backdrop of such technological advances, contemporary warfare increasingly features capabilities combined across all domains: not only land, sea and air but also new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Aiming to improve overall military capability, states are seeking to gain superiority in technologies that undergird capabilities in new domains. Since space and cyber domains are widely used for civilian purposes, if stable use of these domains is impeded, it may entail serious consequences for the safety of state and its citizens. Due to advances in military technologies, a variety of threats can now easily penetrate national borders. States endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge, potentially game-changing technologies. They also engage in research of autonomous unmanned weapon systems equipped with artificial intelligence (AI). Further technological innovations hereafter are expected to make it difficult still to foresee future warfare. (December 18, 2018) **I. NDPG’s Objective** Japan since the end of World War II has consistently treaded the path of a peace- loving nation. This has been accomplished by the persistent efforts of our forerunners under the principle of maintaining peace. The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to maintain Japan’s peace and security, to ensure its survival and to defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property of its nationals and territorial land, waters and airspace. This is the foremost responsibility that Japan must fulfill as a sovereign nation. Carrying out this responsibility by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative is at the very heart of Japan’s national security. Japan’s defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of its security and the clear representation of the unwavering will and ability of Japan as a peace-loving nation. And maintaining Japan’s peace and security is an essential premise for its prosperity. At present, security environment surrounding Japan is changing at ----- In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. With respect to space and cyber domains, establishing international rules and norms has been a security agenda. In maritime domain, there have been cases where country unilaterally claims its entitlements or take actions based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. These have generated undue infringement upon freedom in high seas. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and ballistic missiles as well as worsening international terrorism remain grave challenges for the international community. Against such background, qualitatively and quantitatively superior military powers concentrate in Japan’s surroundings where clear trends are observed in further military build-up and increase in military activities. 2. Situations by country and region While remaining to possess the world’s largest comprehensive national power, the United States, with inter-state competitions in a range of areas prominently emerging, has acknowledged that particularly important challenge is strategic competition with China and Russia who attempt to alter global and regional order. To rebuild its military power, the United States is engaged in such efforts as maintaining military advantage in all domains through technological innovations, enhancing nuclear deterrent, and advancing missile defense capabilities. The United States upholds defense commitments to allies and partners and maintains forward force presence, while calling on them to share greater responsibility. The United States frames the Indo-Pacific as a priority region where it adopts a policy of strengthening alliances and partnerships. Member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) including the United States are reviewing their strategies to deal with coercive attempts to alter the status-quo as well as “hybrid warfare.” In view of changes in the security environment, NATO member states have been increasing their defense expenditures. With an aim to build “world-class forces” by the mid-21st century, China has sustained high-level growth of defense expenditures with continued lack of transparency. China has engaged in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In so doing, China attaches importance to ensuring superiority in new domains: it is rapidly advancing capabilities in cyber and electromagnetic domains with which to disrupt opponent’s command and control; and continues to enhance space domain capabilities through developing and experimenting anti-satellite weapons. China is also improving missile defense penetration capabilities and amphibious landing capabilities. Such capability enhancement serves to improve the so-called Anti-Access/Area Denial (“A2/AD”) capabilities—capabilities to deny access and deployment of foreign militaries to one’s surrounding areas and to disrupt their military operations therein—as well as to build capabilities with which to conduct military operations over greater distances. In addition, China is promoting civil-military integration policy in areas of national defense, science & technology and industry, and actively developing and acquiring cutting-edge technologies of potential military utility. Also, maritime law enforcement agencies and the military are improving their collaboration. China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. In the East China Sea and other waters, China is expanding and intensifying its military activities at sea and in the air. Around the Senkaku Islands, an inherent part of Japanese territory, Chinese government vessels continually violate Japanese territorial waters despite Japan’s strong protests while Chinese naval ships continuously operate in waters around the Islands. China is also expanding its military activities in the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. In particular, the Chinese military in recent years has frequently advanced to the Pacific, with its navigation routes and unit composition becoming more diverse. In the South China Sea, China has forcibly conducted large-scale, rapid reclamation of maritime features, which are being converted into military foothold. China in the South China Sea is also expanding and intensifying its maritime and air activities. Such Chinese military and other developments, coupled with the lack of transparency surrounding its defense policy and military power, represent a serious security concern for the region including Japan and for the international community. Japan needs to continue to pay utmost attention to these developments. China is eagerly expected to play active roles in a more cooperative manner in the region and the international community. North Korea in recent years has launched ballistic missiles at unprecedented frequency, rapidly improving its operational capabilities such as simultaneous launch and surprise attack. Given technological maturity obtained through a series of nuclear tests, North Korea is assessed to have already successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. Although North Korea expressed its intention for complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and blew up in public its nuclear test site, it has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner: There has been no essential change in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. North Korea is assessed to possess large-scale cyber units as part of its asymmetric military capabilities, engaging in theft of military secrets and developing capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of foreign countries. North Korea also retains large-scale special operation forces. Such military developments of North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security and significantly undermine peace and security of the region and the international community. Through United Nations Security Council resolutions, the international community also has made it clear that North Korea’s nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities constitute a clear threat to international peace and security. Russia is enhancing its military posture by continuing force modernization efforts with a focus on nuclear forces. Russia is in sharp confrontation with Europe and the United States over issues including situation in Ukraine. Russia’s military activities are trending upward in the Arctic Circle, Europe, areas around the United States and the Middle East, as well as in the Far East including Japan’s Northern Territories. Close attention therefore needs to be paid to its developments. 3. Characteristics of Japan Surrounded by sea on all sides and with long coastlines, Japan possesses numerous islands remote from the mainland and is blessed with vast Exclusive Economic Zones: spread widely therein are life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, as well as various resources, all of which Japan must defend to the end. For Japan, a maritime nation dependent on overseas trade for the bulk of energy resources and food supplies, fundamental to its peace and prosperity is to ensure the safety of maritime and air traffic by strengthening the order of “Open and Stable Oceans,” an order based on fundamental norms such as rule of law and freedom of navigation. Japan is prone to natural disasters that exact heavy damage. Industry, population and information infrastructure concentrate in Japan’s urban areas, and a large number of critical facilities such as nuclear power plants are located in coastal areas. In addition, Japan is undergoing population decline and ageing with dwindling birthrate at unprecedented pace. Severe fiscal conditions continue as well. 4. Summary In light of the foregoing, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between major countries, which was of concern during the Cold War era, remains low, Japan’s security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than expected when the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013 and hereinafter referred to as the “former Guidelines”) was formulated. To prevent threats to Japan from materializing to menace life and peaceful livelihood of its nationals, it behooves Japan to take measures that are in line with these realities. **III. Japan’s Basic Defense Policy** In line with the National Security Strategy and from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” Japan has enhanced its diplomatic strength and defense capability. Japan has also expanded and deepened cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being a cornerstone. In so doing, Japan under the Constitution has adhered to the basic precept of maintaining the exclusively defense- oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threat to other countries, ensured civilian control of the military, and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Japan under these precepts will ever not change the course it has taken as a peace- loving nation. Based on this premise, Japan, even amid the realities of security environment it has hitherto never faced, must strive to preserve national interests identified in the National Security Strategy—defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence. To that end, the Government will identify national defense objectives and the means to achieve them, and proactively and strategically promote measures with added variety. National defense objectives are: first, to create, on a steady-state basis, security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation’s disposal; second, to deter threat from reaching Japan by making opponent realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential; and finally, should threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage. Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan’s own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation. These efforts, including achieving superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, must be carried out swiftly and flexibly in order to deal with increasingly complex security environment that is changing at accelerating speeds. In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential: Japan will closely cooperate with the United States to maintain and enhance its credibility. To deal with the threat, Japan will also increase its own efforts including comprehensive air and missile defense as well as civil protection. At the same time, towards the long-term goal of bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons, Japan will ----- play an active and positive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. 1. Strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense (1) Building comprehensive architecture for national defense In order to squarely address the realities of security environment that it has hitherto never faced and to securely achieve national defense objectives, Japan will build national defense architecture that in all phases integrates the strengths at the nation’s disposal: this structure enables not only Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self-Defense Forces (SDF) efforts but also coherent, whole-of-government efforts; and enables cooperation with local governments and private entities. In particular, Japan will accelerate its efforts and cooperation in such fields as space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, ocean, and science & technology, and also promote measures concerning the formulation of international norms in fields such as space and cyberspace. Japan will further advance steady-state efforts such as strategic communications by systematically combining all available policy tools. In order to address a range of situations including armed contingencies and “gray- zone” situations, Japan has been strengthening its posture under the principle of civilian control of the military. Japan further needs to seamlessly deal with various situations in a coherent, whole-of-government manner by way of swift and pertinent decision-making under even stronger political leadership, which will be assisted by enhanced support mechanism. In view of protecting the life, person and property of its nationals, Japan will also continue to strengthen organization for disaster response and civil protection, and, in cooperation with local governments, work to secure evacuation facilities. Japan will build a posture fully prepared to evacuate Japanese nationals overseas during emergencies and ensure their safety. Japan will promote measures to protect infrastructure critical to people’s daily lives such as electricity and communication as well as to protect cyberspace. In addition to making aforementioned efforts, in order to ensure the effectiveness of various policies and measures, Japan will, on a steady-state basis, devise and review relevant plans while systematizing them; also, expand the use of simulations and comprehensive training and exercises to improve the effectiveness of emergency response posture. (2) Strengthening Japan’s defense capability a. Significance and necessity of defense capability Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s national security. Defense capability represents Japan’s will and ability to: deter threat from reaching Japan; and should threat reach Japan, eliminate the threat and, as a sovereign nation, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property as well as territorial land, waters and airspace. At the same time, defense capability is essential for Japan to play on its initiative its roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. Strengthening Japan’s defense capability to provide for national security is none other than strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Defense capability is essential also for advancing Japan’s efforts in security cooperation with other countries. Defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self- sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid security environment it has never faced before. Japan must strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative. b. Truly effective defense capability – Multi-domain Defense Force To be able to deter and counter qualitatively and quantitatively superior military threats in increasingly testing security environment, it has become vitally important to adapt to warfare that combines capabilities in new domains—space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum—and traditional domains—land, sea and air. Japan needs to develop, while qualitatively and quantitatively enhancing capabilities in individual domains, a defense capability that can execute cross-domain operations, which organically fuse capabilities in all domains to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished. In order to ensure national defense in increasingly uncertain security environment, it is also important for Japan to be able to seamlessly conduct activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. To date, Japan has endeavored to develop a defense capability that allows to engage in diverse activities in a swift and sustainable manner. In recent years, however, SDF has had to increase the scope and frequency of its steady-state activities such as maintaining presence, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities: This is exacting a chronic burden on its personnel and equipment, generating a concern that SDF may not be able to maintain proficiency and the volume of its activities. Japan needs to: improve quality and quantity of capabilities that support sustainability and resiliency of various activities; and develop a defense capability that enables sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities commensurate with the character of given situations. Further, Japan’s defense capability needs to be capable of strengthening the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats as well as promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation. In light of the foregoing, Japan will henceforth build a truly effective defense capability, Multi-Domain Defense Force, which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. The development of “Multi-Domain Defense Force” will be done while honing the attributes of “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” under the former Guidelines. (3) Roles that defense capability should play In order to create a security environment desirable for Japan and to deter and counter threats, Japan’s defense capability must be able to serve the roles specified below in a seamless and combined manner. In particular, in view of protecting the life and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals, it is all the more important for Japan’s defense capability to fulfill diverse roles on a steady-state basis. a. From peacetime to “gray-zone” situations SDF will enhance its presence on a steady-state basis by actively engaging in, among others, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises and overseas port visits, thereby demonstrating Japan’s will and capability. SDF will, in close integration with diplomacy, promote strategic communications including aforementioned activities by SDF units. SDF will leverage its capabilities in all domains to conduct wide-area, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter referred to as “persistent ISR”) activities around Japan. SDF will prevent occurrence or escalation of emergencies by employing flexible deterrent options and other measures. Leveraging posture in place for these activities, SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies, immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate Japan’s sovereignty including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters. SDF will provide persistent protection against incoming ballistic missiles and other threats, and minimize damage should it occur. b. Attack against Japan including its remote islands In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime and air superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures. Against airborne attack by missiles and aircraft, SDF will respond in a swift and sustained manner by applying optimal means and minimize damage to maintain SDF’s capabilities as well as the infrastructure upon which such capabilities are employed. In response to attack by guerrillas or special operations forces, SDF will protect critical facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy infiltrating forces. c. Space, cyber and electromagnetic domains during all phases In space, cyber and electromagnetic domains, to prevent any actions that impede its activities, SDF will conduct on a steady-state basis persistent monitoring as well as collection and analysis of relevant information. In case of such event, SDF will promptly identify incidents and take such measures as damage limitation and recovery. In case of armed attack against Japan, SDF will, on top of taking these actions, block and eliminate the attack by leveraging capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. In addition, in light of the society’s growing dependence on space and cyberspace, SDF will contribute to comprehensive, whole-of-government efforts concerning these domains under appropriate partnership and shared responsibility with relevant organizations. d. Large-scale disasters In case of large-scale disasters, to protect the life, person, and property of Japanese nationals, SDF will swiftly transport and deploy requisite units to take all necessary measures for initial response, and, as required, maintain its posture for disaster response for a longer term. SDF will carefully address the needs of affected citizens and local governments, and engage in life saving, temporary repair and livelihood support in appropriate partnership and cooperation with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector. e. Collaboration with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, in line with the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” Japan will effectively conduct activities described in 2. by playing on its initiative its own roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance. f. Promotion of security cooperation SDF will actively engage in efforts for enhanced security cooperation as stated in 3.: In accordance with policies that are tailored to individual regions and countries, SDF will strategically promote defense cooperation and exchanges such as: joint training and exercises, cooperation in defense equipment and technologies, capacity building assistance, and service-to-service exchange. 2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with ----- the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community. As inter-sate competitions prominently emerge, it has become all the more important for Japan’s national security to further strengthen relationship with the United States, with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. The United States also views that cooperation with its allies has become more important. While the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been reinforced through activities including those that were made possible by the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan needs to further enhance the Alliance through efforts under the “Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation” in order to achieve its national defense objective as security environment surrounding Japan becomes more testing and uncertain at remarkably fast speeds. In further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, it is an essential premise that Japan strengthen its own defense capability on its own accord and initiative. Fulfilling this premise, Japan needs to press ahead with efforts such as: bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats; enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas; and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan. (1) Strengthening ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as during disasters, Japan will enhance information sharing with the United States, conduct effective and smooth bilateral coordination involving all relevant organizations and take all necessary measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security. For these purposes, Japan will further deepen various operational cooperation and policy coordination with the United States. In particular, Japan will expand and deepen cooperation in: space and cyber domains; comprehensive air and missile defense; bilateral training and exercises; bilateral ISR operations; and bilateral flexible deterrent options. Japan will also promote formulation and renewal of bilateral plans and deepen the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In addition, Japan will even more actively conduct activities such as logistic support for U.S. force activities and protection of U.S. ships and aircraft. (2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas In order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will conduct bilateral activities such as capacity building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and counter-piracy. In order for Japan and the United States to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will enhance and expand cooperation with the United States in such areas as equipment, technology, facility, and intelligence as well as information security. In particular, Japan will promote standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral activities, and sharing of various networks. In order to support sustainable U.S. force activities around Japan as well as to ensure high operational availability of SDF equipment, Japan will build capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S.-made equipment. To efficiently improve Japanese and U.S. capabilities, while facilitating common understanding of respective priorities in defense capability enhancement, promote measures such as effective acquisition of advanced U.S equipment through optimized Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and JapanU.S. joint research and development. With respect to SDF facilities and U.S force facilities and areas including training facilities and areas, Japan will promote cooperation on joint/shared use and efforts for improved resiliency. (3) Steady implementation of measures concerning stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan Japan will provide stable support for smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures including Host Nation Support (HNS). Japan will also steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan to mitigate impact on local communities while maintaining deterrence provided by U.S. forces. Okinawa is located in areas critically important to Japan’s national security and U.S. force stationing in Okinawa greatly contributes to deterrent the Japan-U.S. Alliance provides: At the same time, facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Japan are highly concentrated in Okinawa. In light of this, Japan in recent years has been furthering its efforts to mitigate impact on Okinawa including returns of U.S. facilities and areas. Japan will continue to work to mitigate impact on Okinawa by steadily implementing such measures as realignment, consolidation and reduction of facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of impact on Okinawa. 3. Strengthening security cooperation In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account characteristics and situation specific to each region and country. As part of such efforts, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to work on defense cooperation and exchanges which include bilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interchanges among military branches. Furthermore, Japan will also contribute to address global security challenges. In implementing these initiatives, Japan will position the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone and will work closely with the countries that share universal values and security interests, through full coordination with its diplomatic policy. (1) Promoting defense cooperation and exchanges With Australia, to further improve interoperability and by utilizing frameworks such as Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), Japan will further promote bilateral training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation, and advance cooperative activities such as bilaterally-aligned capacity building assistance to third parties. Japan will also strengthen cooperative relations under trilateral framework among Japan, Australia and the United States, which share universal values and strategic interests. With India, in view of enhancing strategic partnership and by utilizing frameworks such as “2+2,” Japan will promote bilateral training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation in a broad range of areas including maritime security. Japan will also strengthen cooperation among Japan, India and the United States. With Southeast Asian countries, Japan will continue to support efforts for strengthening the centrality and unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is the key to regional cooperation, and promote practical bilateral and multilateral cooperation, including bilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and capacity building assistance. With the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan will promote defense cooperation in a broad range of fields and strive to establish the foundation for collaboration. Japan will also continue to strengthen trilateral cooperation among Japan, the ROK and the United States to maintain peace and stability in the region. With the United Kingdom and France, to contribute to the stability of maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will, while leveraging such frameworks as the “2+2,” promote efforts including more practical bilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation and bilateral collaboration on third-party engagement. Japan will strengthen cooperation with European countries as well as NATO and the European Union (EU). With Canada and New Zealand, Japan will promote efforts including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises as well as bilateral collaboration on third-party engagement. With China, in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust, Japan will promote multi-layered dialogues and exchange. In so doing, Japan will continue to encourage China to play responsible and constructive roles for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international norms of conduct, and improve transparency regarding military capability enhancement. In order to avoid unexpected situations between the two countries, Japan will utilize the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China” in a manner that contributes to building a trusting relationship between the two countries. Japan will calmly and firmly deal with Chinese activities at sea and in the air around Japan. With Russia, in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust, Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia including the “2+2,” high-level interactions and broad unit-to-unit exchanges, and deepen bilateral training and exercises. With island nations of the Pacific Ocean, Japan will promote port and airport visits by SDF as well as exchanges and cooperation that utilize capabilities and characteristics of each service of SDF. With countries in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, in order to build and strengthen cooperative relations Japan will promote exchanges at all levels, including high level, and cooperation in such fields as capacity building assistance related to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Regarding multilateral frameworks, Japan attaches importance to the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ MeetingPlus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that provide significant foundations for discussions, cooperation and exchanges related to security field in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Japan will contribute to strengthening cooperation and mutual trust among the countries in the region. (2) Responding to global issues From the viewpoint of securing the freedom and security of navigation and flight, Japan will promote cooperation to contribute to the improvement of capabilities pertaining to the maritime security of coastal states in the IndoPacific region, which include South Asian countries such as India and Sri Lanka, as well as Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, Japan will promote such activities as bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, unit-to-unit exchanges and active port visits at these occasions. Japan will also conduct activities such as anti-piracy efforts in cooperation with relevant countries and cooperation for strengthening capabilities of the Maritime Domain ----- Awareness (MDA). Regarding the use of space domain, Japan will promote partnership and cooperation in various fields including the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and mission assurance of the entire space system, through consultations and information sharing with relevant countries and active participation in multilateral exercises among others. Regarding the use of cyber domain, Japan will enhance its partnership and cooperation with relevant countries through measures such as sharing views on threat awareness, exchanging views on response to cyber attacks, and participating in multilateral exercises. In cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will promote non-proliferation efforts regarding: weapons of mass destruction and missiles which can serve as their delivery means; and goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use. Leveraging SDF’s knowledge and human resources, Japan will engage in various activities related to arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies, including the discussion on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host country. While making good use of past experiences to develop human resources, Japan will actively contribute through such efforts as sending embedded personnel to mission headquarters and capacity building assistance in areas that Japan excels. Regarding SDF operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti, which is used for anti-piracy efforts, Japan will work towards stable, long-term use of the facility for regional security cooperation and other activities. **IV. Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability** 1. Guiding thoughts In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. In view of aging population with declining birth rate and severe fiscal situation, it is essential that Japan use budget and personnel even more effectively. In strengthening defense capability, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible, allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation, and undertake necessary fundamental reforms. In taking these measures, SDF will further promote jointness of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces in all areas and, avoiding stove-piped approach, optimize their organizations and equipment. In particular, SDF will further promote jointness in a wide range of areas such as capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, comprehensive air and missile defense, damage recovery, transportation, maintenance, supply, security, education, medical service and research. With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, which were assumed primarily during the Cold War period, SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in situation in the future, and work further to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization. 2. Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations (1) Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum by focusing resources and leveraging Japan’s superb science and technology. In doing so, SDF will strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones. a. Capabilities in space domain Effective use of satellites for such purposes as information-gathering, communication and positioning is essential for realizing cross-domain operations. On the other hand, threats to the stable use of space are increasing. SDF therefore will further improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities. SDF will also build a structure to conduct persistent ground- and space-based space situation monitoring. To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will also work to strengthen capabilities including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information. In so doing, SDF will actively leverage civilian technologies and work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and with the United States and other relevant countries. SDF will also engage in organization building such as the creation of units specializing in space and dedicated career field, and develop human resources and accumulate knowledge and expertise in the space field. b. Capabilities in cyber domain Information and communications networks that leverage cyberspace are a foundation for SDF’s activities in various domains, and attack against them seriously disrupts organized activities of SDF. In order to prevent such attack, SDF will continue to strengthen capabilities for persistent monitoring of command and communications systems and networks as well as for damage limitation and recovery. In addition, SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack. In so doing, SDF will significantly expand its human resources with specialized expertise and skills, and take into consideration its contributions to whole-of-government efforts. c. Capabilities in electromagnetic domain Since the use of electromagnetic spectrum has expanded in range and purpose, it is now recognized as a major operational domain situated on the frontline of offense-defense dynamic in today’s warfare. Ensuring superiority in electromagnetic domain is also critical to realizing cross-domain operations. SDF will work to enhance information and communications capabilities as well as information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetics, and develop an information sharing posture. SDF will improve capabilities to minimize the effect of opponent’s electronic jamming. In addition, SDF will strengthen capabilities to neutralize radar and communications of opponent who intends to invade Japan. In order to smoothly perform these activities, SDF will enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum. (2) Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains SDF will enhance capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. a. Capabilities in maritime and air domains In order to effectively deal with armed attack against Japan, it is extremely important for Japan to establish and maintain maritime and air superiority. SDF will reinforce its posture for conducting persistent ISR at sea and in the air around Japan. SDF will also strengthen surface and underwater operational capabilities including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV). By taking measures such as developing a fighter force structure that features Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fighter aircraft which bring operational flexibility, SDF will improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. In so doing, as number of air bases that allow for take-off and landing of fighters is limited, Japan will take necessary measures to enable STOVL fighter aircraft to operate from existing SDF ships as required, in order to further improve flexibility in fighter operations while ensuring safety of SDF personnel. b. Stand-off defense capability As other countries make remarkable advances in early warning and control capabilities and the performance of various missiles, SDF needs to effectively intercept attack against Japan, while ensuring safety of its personnel. SDF will acquire stand-off firepower and other requisite capabilities to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan including remote islands from the outside of their threat envelopes. In addition, in order to appropriately leverage advances in military technologies, Japan will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive research and development of related technologies. c. Comprehensive air and missile defense capability Japan needs to effectively and efficiently counter increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft by optimum means and minimize damage. SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection and also enhancing capability to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. SDF will also study ways to counter future airborne threats. Based on basic role and mission sharing between Japan and the United States, in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, Japan will continue to study a potential form of response capability to address the means for missile launch and related facilities and will take necessary measures. d. Maneuver and deployment capability In order to effectively deal with various situations such as attack on remote islands, requisite SDF units need to conduct sustained, persistent activities in appropriate areas on a steady-state basis and to maneuver and deploy according to situation. SDF will strengthen amphibious operation and other capabilities. In addition, to enable swift and large-scale transport, SDF will strengthen joint transport capability including inter- and intra-theater transport capabilities tailored to the characteristics of remote island areas. SDF will also work to collaborate with commercial transport on a steady-state basis. (3) Strengthening sustainability and resiliency To be able to sustain a range of requisite activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support needs to be enhanced. ----- SDF will take necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure. In particular, while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, SDF will improve sustainability through safe and steady acquisition and stockpiling of ammunition and fuel. SDF will also improve resiliency in a multilayered way through efforts including dispersion, recovery, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. Further, SDF will work toward more effective and efficient equipment maintenance by reviewing existing maintenance methods, thereby ensuring high operational availability. 3. Priorities in strengthening core elements of defense capability (1) Reinforcing human resource base The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. Securing human resources for SDF personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an imminent challenge in the face of shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates. Also in light of sustainability and resilience of defense capability, SDF needs to work even further to reinforce human resource base that sustains SDF personnel. MOD/SDF will promote efforts, including those address institutional aspects, in order to secure diverse, high-quality talents from a wider range of people. These efforts include: various recruitment measures such as cooperation with local governments and other entities; diversifying applicant pool including college graduates; expanding women’s participation; appropriate extension of SDF personnel’s mandatory retirement ages; leveraging retired SDF personnel as well as reserve personnel; and measures for raising fulfillment rates. MOD/SDF will also promote manpower saving and automation by leveraging technological innovations such as artificial intelligence. To enable all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise their ability, MOD/SDF will improve living and work environment and promote work style reforms at MOD/SDF to ensure proper work-life balance. Through such efforts as enhancing joint education and research, MOD/ SDF will enrich education and research to improve SDF’s capabilities and foster its unity. MOD/SDF will enhance education for organization management skills. In addition, MOD/SDF will improve treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges, and allowance increase that reflects the special nature of SDF’s missions. MOD/SDF will also further improve re-employment support for SDF personnel in view of the fact that it is the responsibility of the Government to secure the livelihood of SDF personnel under the mandatory early retirement system. (2) Reviewing equipment structure MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure from joint operation perspective and build an optimized equipment structure. In so doing, while giving due considerations to capabilities each SDF service requires for its operations, MOD/SDF will: develop equipment with multiple functional variants; optimize and standardize specifications of equipment; and jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services; reduce types of aircraft; suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased; and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness. (3) Reinforcing technology base As character of warfare changes dramatically due to advances in military technologies, it is becoming all the more important to reinforce technological base that has bearing on defense equipment through whole-of-government approach by leveraging Japan’s superb science and technology. MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in important technologies including artificial intelligence and other potentially game- changing technologies. MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten research and development timelines by streamlining R&D processes and procedures. In doing so, MOD/SDF will encourage company’s prior investments and leverage its strength to full potential by actively using design proposal-based competition scheme and improving foreseeability through the formulation of R&D visions on capabilities required for Japan’s future national defense. In addition, MOD/SDF will work to actively leverage potentially dualuse, advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as: technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities; enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies; and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program. MOD/SDF will reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze latest foreign and domestic technological trends. (4) Optimizing equipment procurement In order to secure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of SDF equipment, MOD/SDF needs to acquire high-performance equipment at the most affordable prices possible. MOD/SDF also needs to do thorough cost management and reduction not only during budget development but also during budget implementation. MOD/SDF will actively use systematic acquisition methods including long-term contracts which facilitate efficient procurement, and streamline equipment maintenance. MOD/SDF will facilitate competition among domestic and foreign companies, and promote defense equipment development that eyes towards international joint development and production as well as overseas transfer. In order to efficiently procure U.S.-made high-performance equipment, MOD/SDF will promote rationalization of FMS procurement and work to align procurement timings and specifications with U.S. forces and other parties. In taking these steps, MOD/SDF will further strengthen efforts on project management throughout the entire life cycle of defense equipment. (5) Strengthening defense industrial base Japan’s defense industry is an essential foundation for the production, operation, and maintenance of defense equipment. For the production of highperformance equipment and to ensure their high operational availability, it is necessary to make defense industrial base more resilient by overcoming challenges such as high costs due to low- volume, high-mix production and lack of international competitiveness, thereby enabling it to effectively adapt to changing security environment. In addition to taking various measures concerning equipment structure, technological base, and equipment procurement, to create a competitive environment for companies, MOD/SDF will reform the existing contract system including affording incentives to companies. MOD/SDF will enhance supply-chain risk management and work to further expand Japanese defense industry’s participation in maintenance work of imported equipment. For whole-of-government efforts to promote appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which permits transfer of defense equipment in cases where the transfer contributes to Japan’s security, MOD/SDF will work to make necessary improvements in the Principles’ implementation. At the same time, MOD/SDF will strengthen intellectual property management, technology management and information security in order to prevent drain of important defense equipment-related technologies. Through abovementioned measures, MOD/SDF will work to reduce equipment costs and improve industrial competitiveness, thereby striving to build resilient defense industrial base. MOD/SDF will also examine further measures to that end. (6) Enhancing intelligence capabilities MOD/SDF will enhance intelligence capabilities to provide timely, effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations. MOD/SDF will strengthen capabilities for each stage of collection, processing, analysis, sharing, and protection so that SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to indications of various situations and also take requisite measures based on medium- to long-term military trends. In so doing, while giving due considerations to technological trends in information processing, MOD/SDF will strengthen capability and posture, including those related to new domains, for the collection of SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, OSINT and others. MOD/SDF will enhance collaboration with relevant domestic agencies including the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center which operates Information Gathering Satellites and with the ally as well as with other parties. MOD/SDF will work to hire, retain and train personnel for information collection and analysis and to acquire and connect informationsharing systems. MOD/SDF also will establish more robust information security regime and strengthen counter-intelligence capability. **V. Organization of Self-Defense Forces** In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will strengthen joint operations as described in 1 and develop organization of each SDF service as described in sections from 2 to 4. Organic structure of major units and specific quantities of major equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table. 1. Joint operation to realize cross-domain operations (1) In order to further promote joint-ness of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF in all areas, SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff Office’s posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift exercise of SDF’s capabilities. SDF will examine future framework for joint operation. SDF will also work to flexibly leverage personnel of each SDF service through such efforts as building posture for force protection and damage recovery with an eye on mutual cooperation among SDF services. (2) SDF will maintain an ASDF unit that specializes in space domain missions, and strengthen its posture for joint operations in order to conduct persistent monitoring of situations in space, and to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies through such means as mission assurance and disruption of opponent’s command, control, communications and information. (3) SDF will maintain a cyberspace defense unit as an integrated unit in order to conduct persistent monitoring of SDF’s information and communications networks as well as to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack. (4) SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff Office’s posture in order to ----- appropriately manage and coordinate, from joint operation perspective, the use of electromagnetic spectrum. SDF will strengthen each SDF service’s posture to enable SDF to collect and analyze information concerning electromagnetic domain and to neutralize radar, communications and others operated by opponent that intends to invade Japan. (5) In order to provide persistent nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats: GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units and ballistic missile defense units; MSDF will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers; ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units; and SDF will build comprehensive air and missile defense capability comprising these assets. (6) At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and deploy in joint operations. 2. Organization of GSDF (1) In order to be able to swiftly respond to various situations, GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. GSDF will also maintain mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions, in order to effectively perform operations such as: various missions in cyber and electromagnetic domains; airborne operations; amphibious operations; special operations; air transportation; defense against NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons; and security cooperation with foreign countries. In view of the excellent training environment it offers, GSDF will maintain half of rapidly deployable basic operational units in Hokkaido, on the premise that these units will deploy and move via joint transport capability. GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including: persistent steady-state maneuver such as coordinated activities between ships and Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and other mobile operating units as well as their various training and exercises; stationing of units in remote islands hitherto without SDF presence; and establishing networks with MSDF and ASDF. (2) To be able to counter invasion of remote islands, GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense. (3) With respect to basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones referred to in (1), GSDF will review their organization and equipment with focus on tanks, howitzers and rockets. With respect to units under the direct command of regional armies, GSDF will also review their organization and equipment related to aerial firepower. GSDF will thoroughly implement rationalization and streamlining of these units and appropriately position them to meet conditions and characteristics of each region. 3. Organization of MSDF (1) In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of maritime traffic through effective prosecution of persistent ISR, antisubmarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, and to be able to effectively engage in security cooperation with other countries, MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including destroyers with improved multi-mission capabilities, minesweeper units and embarked patrol helicopter units. MSDF will organize surface units composed of these destroyer units and minesweeper units. In addition, MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan. With respect to the destroyers equipped with improved multi-mission capabilities, MSDF will introduce multi-crew shiftwork and promote collaboration with patrol ships equipped with high ISR capability, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. (2) In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area underwater ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units. By introducing a test-bed submarine, MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. (3) In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will maintain fixed- wing patrol aircraft units. 4. Organization of ASDF (1) ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of groundbased warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units: ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting persistent surveillance in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting effective, sustained airborne warning, surveillance and control during “gray zone” and other situations with heightened tensions. (2) In order to be able to provide for air defense in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side with a comprehensive posture that brings together fighter aircraft and supporting functions, ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fighter aircraft. In order to enable fighter aircraft units and airborne warning units to sustainably conduct various operations in wide areas, ASDF will maintain reinforced aerial refueling and transport units. (3) In order to be able to effectively carry out activities such as maneuver and deployment of ground forces and security cooperation with foreign countries, ASDF will maintain air transport units. (4) In order to be able to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions, ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units. **VI. Elements Supporting Defense Capability** For Japan’s defense capability to demonstrate its true value, SDF needs to constantly maintain and improve its capabilities and foster broad understanding by Japanese nationals. 1. Training and exercises In order to maintain and improve its tactical skills, SDF will conduct more practical, effective and systematic training and exercises while, as necessary, work in partnership with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector. In so doing, in order to conduct more practical training, SDF will: develop and utilize domestic training ranges such as those in Hokkaido as well as fine training environment overseas; facilitate joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas; facilitate use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas; and more actively introduce training simulators and others. SDF will also actively utilize training and exercises to constantly examine and review various plans for emergencies. 2. Medical Care SDF needs to enhance its medical functions to keep SDF personnel’s vitality and enhance their ability to deal with various situations and engage in a diverse range of missions at home and abroad. In order to protect the lives of SDF personnel to the maxim extent possible, MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture for medical care and onward transfer of patients, seamlessly covering the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations. Taking into account conditions and characteristics of each region, SDF will focus on strengthening medical functions of SDF in Japan’s southwestern region. SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. In order to secure medical personnel in operation units, SDF will: improve the management of the National Defense Medical College; enrich and enhance education and research such as improving medical care capabilities for war injury. In addition, SDF will improve requisite posture for various international cooperation including capacity building assistance. 3. Collaboration with local communities Amid increasingly testing and uncertain security environment, activities, training and exercises of SDF and U.S. forces in Japan are becoming more diverse and defense equipment more sophisticated. As a result, it is becoming all the more important to gain understanding among and secure cooperation from local governments and residents around defense facilities. MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities. Upon fielding units and equipment of SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, MOD/ SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities, while sufficiently fulfilling accountability. At the same time, MOD/SDF will continue to promote various impact alleviation measures include noise mitigation. MOD/SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations including local governments, police and fire departments in order to enable SDF to swiftly and securely conduct its activities in response to various situations. In certain regions, presence of SDF units makes substantial contributions to maintenance and revitalization of local communities. There are also cases where SDF’s emergency patient transport is supporting community medicine. In light of this, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases. At the same time, in administering garrisons and bases, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to their contributions to local economies. 4. Intellectual Base In order to facilitate understanding of security and crisis management among the populace, MOD/SDF will work to promote security-related education at educational institutions. Within MOD/SDF, in order to achieve at high levels both academic research and policy-support by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), MOD/SDF will facilitate NIDS’ collaboration with the policy-making sector. MOD/SDF will further enhance its defense research regime with NIDS playing central roles. In so doing, MOD/SDF will promote ----- systematic collaboration on education and research with other research and educational institutions within the Government, as well as with universities and think-tanks of excellence both at home and abroad. **VII. Points of Attention** 1. Japan’s defense capability these Guidelines set forth envisions approximately 10 years. The National Security Council will conduct periodic, systematic evaluations throughout the course of implementation of various measures and programs. In order to build truly effective defense capability while firmly grasping changes in security environment, MOD/ SDF will conduct verifications regarding capabilities required for Japan's defense in the future. 2. When major changes in situation are anticipated during evaluation and verification processes, these Guidelines will be amended as necessary after examining current security environment and others. 3. Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development to curb costs. MOD/SDF will work to ensure that defense capability can smoothly and fully perform its functions while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government. |Annex Table|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Joint Units|Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units||1 squadron 1 group| |Ground Self- Defense Force|Authorized Number of Personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel||159,000 151,000 8,000| ||Major Units|Rapid Deployment Units|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Regional Deployment Units|5 divisions 2 brigades| |||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| |||Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands Units|2 battalions| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments| |||Ballistic Missile Defense Units|2 squadrons| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Major Units|Surface Vessel Units Destroyers Destroyer and minesweeper vessels Submarine Units Patrol aircraft Units|4 groups (8 divisions) 2 groups (13 divisions) 6 divisions 9 squadrons| ||Major Equipment|Destroyers （Aegis-Equipped Destroyers） Submarines Patrol Vessels Combat Aircraft|54 (8) 22 12 Approx. 190| |Air Self- Defense Force|Major Units|Air Warning & Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units Space Domain Mission Units Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 4 groups(24 fire squadrons) 1 squadron 1 squadron| ||Major Equipment|Combat Aircraft Fighters|Approx. 370 Approx. 290| Notes 1. The current numbers of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY 2018) are respectively approx. 600 and approx. 500, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future. 2. Fighter Aircraft Units (13 squadrons) includes STOVL Units. effectively by allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation. Furthermore, SDF will further promote joint-ness of the Ground, Maritime and Air SelfDefense Forces in all areas, avoid stove-piped approach and optimize their organizations and equipment. Given the guiding thoughts above, SDF will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense capability based on the following program guidelines: 1. In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum by focusing resources and leveraging Japan’s superb science and technology, and strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information (C4I) capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones. In addition, SDF will enhance capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability and maneuver and deployment capability to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. Furthermore, to be able to sustain a range of requisite activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies sustainability and resiliency of defense capability **Reference 3 Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019 - FY 2023)** December 18, 2018 **I. Program Guidelines** In the defense program for FY 2019 - FY 2023, with accordance to “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and Cabinet on December 18, 2018), Japan will significantly strengthen defense capability to build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi- Domain Defense Force,” which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. The development of “Multi-Domain Defense Force” will be done while honing the attributes of “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” under the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013). In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in security environment, Japan will strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. In view of aging population with declining birth rate and severe fiscal situation Japan will strengthen its defense capability ----- including logistics support will be enhanced. 2. In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high- performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, MOD/SDF will efficiently secure defense capability in necessary and sufficient “quality” and “quantity”. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. Moreover, MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in cutting-edge technologies. MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten research and development (R&D) timelines by streamlining its processes and procedures. 3. In the face of rapidly shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates, to ensure SDF’s strength, to strive to secure human resources for SDF personnel and to improve their ability and morale, who are the core element of defense capability, MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce human resource base such as securing diverse and high-quality talents including diversifying applicant pool, promoting women’s participation and leveraging reserve personnel, improving living and work environment, promoting work style reforms, and improving treatment. 4. In order to maintain and strengthen the commitment of the United States (U.S.) to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region and to secure Japan’s security, and based on the premise that Japan will strengthen its own capabilities, Japan will further promote a variety of cooperative activities and consultations with the U.S., in a wide range of areas under “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation”. Japan will also actively facilitate measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, to strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to promote defense cooperation and exchanges which include bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interchanges among military branches. 5. With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, which were assumed primarily during the Cold War period, SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in situation in the future, by achieving efficiency and rationalization. 6. Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government. **II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units** 1. In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations including new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff’s posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift exercise of SDF’s capabilities. For the future framework for joint operations, SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to conduct the operation of organizations in which the functions in the new domains are operated unitarily, and come to conclusions after considering how the integrated structure should be during steady-state to appropriately execute instructions from the Minister based on the posture of the strengthened Joint Staff. SDF will also work to flexibly leverage personnel of each SDF service through such efforts as building posture for force protection and damage recovery with an eye on mutual cooperation among SDF services. SDF will establish 1 squadron of ASDF space domain mission unit in order to conduct persistent monitoring of situations in space, and to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. SDF will establish 1 squadron of cyber defense unit as joint unit in order to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capabilities, including capability to disrupt, in the event of attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack as well as to conduct persistent monitoring of SDF’s information and communications networks. SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff’s posture in order to appropriately manage and coordinate, from joint operation perspective, the use of electromagnetic spectrum, and advance efforts to enhance defense capability related to the use of electromagnetic spectrum in each SDF service. In order to provide persistent nation-wide protection on a steadystate basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats, GSDF will establish 2 squadrons of ballistic missile defense (BMD) units. In addition, in order to operate units more efficiently including command and control in accordance with the enhancement of SDF’s ballistic missile response capabilities, ASDF will reorganize surface-to-air guided missile units from 6 fire groups to 4 groups while maintaining 24 fire squadrons. At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will establish 1 group of maritime transportation unit as Joint Unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and deploy in joint operations. 2. In order to strengthen operation capabilities in new domains, GSDF will establish cyberspace units and electromagnetic operation units as subordinate units of the Ground Component Command. In order to respond swiftly, and to deter and counter effectively and swiftly with various situations, GSDF will transform 1 division and 2 brigades respectively into 1 rapid deployment division and 2 rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats through conducting persistent steady-state maneuver such as coordinated activities with ships as well as various training and exercises. In addition, through continuing to establish area security units in charge of initial response activities, MOD will newly establish surface-to-air guided missile units and surface-to-ship guided missile units, GSDF will strengthen its defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region. Furthermore, to counter invasion of remote islands, GSDF will take necessary measures to establish hyper-velocity gliding projectile (HVGP) units for the defense of remote islands. From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations, while thoroughly facilitating efficiency and rationalizing preparations for invasion, such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, GSDF will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units equipped with mobile combat vehicles and disuse of tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. In addition, GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido into newly organized field artillery units under the direct command of the respective regional armies. Furthermore, GSDF will reduce its combat helicopter units under the direct command of the respective regional armies and consider the review of their deployment to operate them effectively and efficiently. 3. In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of maritime traffic through effective prosecution of persistent ISR, anti-submarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, to be able to effectively engage in security cooperation with other countries, MSDF will maintain 4 groups mainly consisting of 1 helicopter destroyer (DDH) and 2 Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and maintain 2 groups consisting of new type of destroyers (FFM) with improved multi- mission capabilities and minesweeping vessels. MSDF will newly establish surface units composed of these destroyer units and minesweeper units. In addition, MSDF will establish patrol vessel units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan. Furthermore, by introducing a test submarine, which the type will be changed from an existing submarine, MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. In order to effectively conduct underwater ISR and patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will continue to take measures necessary to increase the number of submarines. 4. In order to enhance the air defense posture and operate effectively in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side, ASDF will reorganize 8 warning groups and 20 warning squadrons to 28 warning squadrons and establish 1 airborne early warning (AEW) wing as part of air warning and control units, and take necessary measures to establish 1 squadron of fighter aircraft units. ASDF will disband 1 squadron of tactical reconnaissance unit with the retirement of its reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4), and will establish 1 squadron of aerial refueling/transport units to enhance its aerial refueling/transport function. In order to be able to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions, ASDF will establish 1 squadron of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit. 5. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY 2023 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number of active- duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY 2023 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY 2018. During the period of the program, SDF will promote initiatives to optimize organizations and missions such as reviewing the existing organizations and missions whose importance has declined and assigning personnel mainly to new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. **III. Major Programs regarding SDF’s Capabilities** 1. Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain ----- Operations (1) Acquiring and Strengthening Capabilities in Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Domains (A) Capabilities in Space Domain In order to secure the stable use of space, SDF will build a structure to conduct persistent space monitoring under an appropriate role-sharing with related ministries and agencies by such means as newly establishing space domain mission unit and establishing a space situational awareness (SSA) system and will also newly introduce space-based optical telescopes and SSA laser ranging devices. In order to further improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities, SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C4I capabilities by continuing to develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system. SDF will also strive to secure redundancy by such means as receiving multiple positioning satellite signals including those of Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) and utilizing information gathering satellites (IGS) and commercial satellites including micro ones. Additionally, in order to use these capabilities continuously, SDF will conduct necessary study and research, and newly introduce training devices to study and train responses to the vulnerabilities of Japanese satellites, and devices to grasp the state of electromagnetic interference against Japanese satellites. By this strengthening of the structure for grasping the situation, SDF will build the capability to disrupt C4I of opponents in collaboration with the electromagnetic domain. In this regard, in addition to efforts to establish new job categories and enhance education dedicated to the space domain, SDF will actively leverage civilian technologies and promote to enhance cooperation including the development of human resources, with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and with the U.S. and other relevant countries, given that cutting-edge technology and knowhow have been accumulated in these organizations. (B) Capabilities in Cyber Domain SDF aims to persistently ensure sufficient security against cyber attack and acquire capability to disrupt, opponent’s use of cyberspace in the event of attack against Japan. With consideration to enhancing joint functions and efficient resource allocations, SDF will establish the necessary environment by such measures as expanding the structure of cyber defense squadron and other units, enhancing the resiliency of the C4 systems of SDF, strengthening capabilities of information gathering, research and analysis, and developing a practical training environment that can test SDF’s cyber defense capability. In addition, SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest information including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks, bilateral/multilateral exercises and other opportunities with the ally and other parties. As the methods of cyber attack are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complicated, securing personnel with expertise on a continuing basis is essential. SDF plans to develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized education, increasing learning opportunities at institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and conducting personnel management that cultivates expertise. In addition, SDF will strengthen the cyber defense capability by utilizing superior outside expertise. In order to enable a comprehensive response through a whole-of-government approach in cyber domain, MOD/SDF seeks to enhance close coordination with relevant ministries and agencies, etc. by providing knowledge and MOD/SDF personnel on a steady-state basis, and enhance training and exercises. (C) Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain MOD/SDF will newly establish specialized sections in the internal bureau and the Joint Staff respectively in order to enhance the function to make policies pertaining to effective and efficient use of electromagnetic spectrum in MOD/SDF as well as to improve coordination with other ministries and agencies. In order to enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities concerning electromagnetic spectrum and develop an information sharing posture, SDF will promote the procurement of radio wave information gathering aircraft and ground-based SIGINT sensor, the upgrade of the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) system, the connection of each SDF service’s systems including the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and the improvement of each SDF service’s data links. In order to neutralize the radar and communications of opponent attempting to invade Japan, SDF will proceed with the procurement of fighters (F-35A) and network electronic warfare devices, and the upgrade of fighters (F-15) and utility aircraft (EP-3 and UP-3D). SDF will also swiftly proceed with studies and R&D aimed at the procurement of standoff electronic warfare aircraft, high-output electronic warfare equipment, high-output microwave equipment and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) ammunition. (2) Enhancing Capabilities in Traditional Domains (A) Capabilities in the Maritime and Air Domains (i) Strengthening a Posture of Persistent ISR In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas at sea and in the air around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side, and to detect any signs of significant development at an early stage, SDF will procure new type of destroyers with enhanced capabilities to respond to a wide range of missions (FFM), submarines, patrol vessels, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), patrol helicopters (SH- 60K/K (upgraded version)) and shipborne UAVs, conduct service-extension work on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J and SH-60K) and upgrade the capabilities of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1). In this respect, SDF will strengthen the posture of persistent ISR through increasing the number of the operating days by introducing rational shifts of multiple crews and coordination with patrol vessels to be newly introduced for the new type of destroyers (FFM), and through increasing the opportunities for operation of the submarine fleet on a steady-state basis by introducing the test submarine, which the type has been changed from existing submarines. In addition, SDF will maintain a fully-prepared ISR posture through procuring airborne early warning aircraft (E-2D) and a long-endurance UAV (Global Hawk), upgrading the capabilities of the existing airborne warning and control systems (E-767), development of a new fixed air defense radar, establishing 1 AEW wing as part of air warning and control units as stated in II4, preparing an operating base for mobile air defense radars on the islands on the Pacific side and strengthening over- the-horizon radar capabilities. (ii) Obtaining and Maintaining Air Superiority SDF will strive for the comprehensive enhancement of air defense capability in airspace around Japan including vast air space on the Pacific side. SDF will proceed replacing fighters that are not suitable for modernization (F-15) by increasing the number of fighters (F-35A) and will newly introduce fighters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (hereinafter referred to as “STOVL aircraft”) to enhance the flexibility of fighter operations, as the number of air bases that allow for conventional take-off and landing of fighters is limited. In this regard, SDF will refurbish MSDF’s multi-function helicopter carrier destroyers (Izumo class) after studying operation of STOVL aircraft so that the operation where necessary will be possible such as response to air attacks in time of emergency, ISR, training and disaster response, in order to further improve flexibility in fighter operations while ensuring safety of SDF personnel and to improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. These destroyers shall continue to engage as multi-function destroyers in a wide range of missions after refurbishment, such as the defense of Japan and the response to large- scale disasters. There will be no change in the existing Government opinion concerning equipment that cannot be possessed under the Constitution. In addition, SDF will upgrade the capabilities of modernized fighter aircraft (F-15) including the enhancement of electronic warfare capabilities, mounting stand-off missiles and increasing the number of mounted missiles. Furthermore, SDF will upgrade the capabilities of fighter aircraft (F-2) including the enhancement of network functions. With regard to future fighter, SDF will procure new fighters that are capable of playing a central role in future networked warfare before the retirement of the fighter aircraft (F-2). MOD/SDF will promote necessary research and launch a Japan-led development project at an early ----- timing with the possibility of international collaboration in sight. Along with continuing to procure middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles, SDF will continue to improve its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for ballistic missile defense (BMD). In addition, SDF will continue to procure aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-46A) and rescue helicopters (UH-60J). (iii) Obtaining and Maintaining Maritime Superiority In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the security of maritime traffic by effectively conducting various activities including holding persistent ISR, anti- submarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, SDF will procure equipment such as a new type of destroyers (FFM), conduct service-extension activities on equipment such as existing destroyers, and enhance the capabilities of equipment such as fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1) as stated in (i), and will procure minesweeping/ transport helicopters (MCH-101). In addition, SDF will continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean (MSO) vessels and amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and will establish the structure for enhancing tactical development and education and training capabilities. Furthermore, SDF will continue to procure surface-to-ship guided missiles and will introduce new surface-to-ship guided missiles and air-to-ship guided missiles with further extended ranges. In addition, SDF will take necessary measures after considering the introduction of long-endurance UAVs to strengthen surveillance capabilities in the water including on the vast Pacific side. Moreover, SDF will strive to steadily enhance C4I capabilities and will deploy unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) and proceed with R&D aiming at further enhancement of capabilities to utilize them for oceanic observation and ISR. (B) Stand-off Defense Capability In order to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan while ensuring safety of SDF personnel, SDF will procure stand-off missiles (JSM, JASSM and LRASM), which are capable of responding from the outside of their threat envelopes, and will proceed with R&D on HVGP intended for the defense of remote islands, new surface-to-ship missiles intended for the defense of remote islands and hypersonic weapons. In addition, in order to appropriately leverage advances in military technology, MOD/SDF will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive R&D of related technology. (C) Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability In order to effectively and efficiently counter increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats such as ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft by optimum means and minimize damage, SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. In this regard, SDF will strive to standardize and streamline the means for interception that each SDF service possesses including their maintenance and replenishment systems. For reinforcing its multi-layered and persistent defense posture for the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, SDF will procure its land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore), continue to upgrade the capabilities of its existing Aegis- equipped destroyers (DDG) and surface-toair guided missile PATRIOT system as stated in (A) (ii). SDF will also conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. bilateral BMD response posture. In order to effectively counter missile attacks, SDF will procure its interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 block IB and block IIA), interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3MSE), long-range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6) and midrange ground-to-air guided missiles. In order to reinforce the detecting and tracking capabilities for missiles and to unitarily command and control the various equipment that each SDF service possesses, SDF will proceed with initiatives such as upgrading its Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) and procuring its air defense command and control system (ADCCS), developing its new fixed air defense radar, adding cooperative engagement capability (CEC) to its E-2D, R&D on a network system that enables engage-on-remote launch of weapons by destroyers (DD) (FC network), and research on satellite-mounted dualwave-length infrared sensors and will also study ways to counter future airborne threats. Based on basic role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, Japan will continue to study a potential form of response capability to address the means for missile launch and related facilities and will take necessary measures. In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a missile attack, SDF will continue to procure a variety of surveillance/response equipment, mobile combat vehicles, transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and UAVs in order to improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities including nuclear power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units, and also enhance the ability to respond effectively and efficiently by proceeding with the networking of its troops and strengthening information sharing. In sensitive locations such as areas where many nuclear power plants are located, SDF will conduct training with relevant agencies to confirm coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after considering the basis for deployment in areas neighboring nuclear power plants. (D) Maneuver and Deployment Capability In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment operations for a wide variety of situations and improve effective deterrence and counter capabilities, SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to command and coordinate the transport capabilities of each SDF service unilaterally from a steadystate including the reinforcement of the transport coordination function of the Joint Staff. SDF will continue to procure transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and introduce new utility helicopters, and will also promote relevant initiatives in order to obtain the cooperation of related local governments and other entities in promptly deploying GSDF Ospreys (V-22). In developing such aerial transport capability, SDF will take necessary measures after considering the further enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness such as avoiding functional redundancy by clarifying the roles and assignments among the various means of transportation. In order to strengthen the transport function to remote islands, SDF will newly introduce logistics support vessels (LSV) and landing craft utilities (LCU), and consider new vessels necessary to smoothly implement amphibious and other operations in the future. SDF will also continue to actively utilize ships for which the funds and know- how of the privatesector have been utilized and consider further expansion in order to conduct large-scale transportation efficiently for coordination with the transport capabilities of SDF in light of the current situation in which they are being used effectively in dispatches to disasters and transporting its troops. SDF will equip mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift to its rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades) as stated in II- 2, and will establish rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will conduct persistent steadystate maneuver such as coordinated activities with ships as well as various training and exercises. SDF will also establish area security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region, as well as conduct maneuver training for prompt deployment to remote islands. (3) Strengthening Sustainability and Resiliency (A) Securing Continuous Operations In order to be able to operate units continuously at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will promote measures necessary for securing ammunition and fuel and protecting infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. With regard to securing ammunition, SDF will prioritize to procure anti-aircraft missiles that are necessary to secure air superiority, torpedoes that are necessary to secure maritime superiority, stand-off firepower that is necessary for countering from the outside of their threat envelopes and interceptor missiles for BMD while taking account of the needs of joint operation. With regard to securing fuel, SDF will secure the effective emergency procurement and promote necessary measures ----- such as newly introduction of tankers from the perspective of stabilizing fuel supply during emergencies. In order to minimize damage from various attacks and quickly recover functions, SDF will proceed with initiatives for the dispersion, recovery, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations while taking the perspective of protection from electromagnetic pulse attacks into consideration, and will construct a posture regarding patrol and damage recovery based on the perspective of mutual cooperation among each SDF service. In addition, SDF will also proceed with various measures to make it possible for SDF to immediately utilize private airports and ports in contingency situations. With regard to strengthening logistics foundations, for the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, SDF will store necessary ammunition and spare parts in locations most appropriate for operations and proceed with the establishment of the necessary facilities. SDF will also expand some arsenals and make it possible to have them used jointly by each SDF service and will study and take the measures necessary to optimize combat service support including logistics from the perspective of joint operations. SDF will steadily construct and maintain necessary living quarters surrounding SDF camps and bases and will also proceed with measures for facilities regarding their deterioration and earthquake resistance. From the perspective of enabling a sustained response posture over the long term, various measures supporting families of military personnel will be promoted. (B) Ensuring the Operational Availability of Equipment In order to swiftly and effectively respond to various situations, MOD/SDF will ensure high operational availability of procured equipment by securing the necessary and sufficient funds for sustainment and maintenance of equipment, expanding the use of umbrella contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance regarding sustainment and maintenance, sharing information on supply data between the public and private sectors, promoting the utilization of Additive Manufacturing (3D printers), which can form complex shapes with speed and precision and promoting the procurement of parts and components from international markets. 2. Priorities in Strengthening Core Elements of Defense Capability (1) Reinforcing Human Resource Base As equipment becomes more advanced and complex and missions become more varied and internationalized against the context of the rapidly shrinking and aging population with declining birth rate, MOD/SDF will strive to secure diverse, high- quality talents from a wider range of people and also promote initiatives on a priority base towards the establishment of an environment that enables all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise ability. (A) Enhancement of Recruitment Initiatives In order to steadily secure high-quality human resources into the future within the severe recruiting environment accompanying the rapidly aging population and declining birth rates, MOD/ SDF will proceed with measures towards expanding the recruitment of untenured troops and expanding the source for prospects including university graduates. MOD/SDF will also proceed with a wide range of solicitation measures including the enhancement of recruiting advertisement and recruiting systems and will also strengthen collaboration with local governments and related organizations, etc. Furthermore, in order to increase attractiveness at the point of recruiting, MOD/ SDF will improve living and working environment and strive to improve re-employment support for being rehired as public servants and matriculating at universities after completing tenure. (B) Effective Utilization of Human Resources In order to further increase the proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel, MOD/SDF will actively hire women, promote women’s participation and proceed with the establishment of the foundations for the education, living and work environment for female SDF personnel. In order to further utilize advanced-age human resources who have plenty of knowledge, skills and experience while keeping strength, MOD/SDF will raise the early retirement age for SDF personnel and promote the expansion of reenrollment and the utilization by units of the skills of retired SDF personnel in SDF fields requiring high levels of expertise. MOD/SDF will also secure personnel for units that are responsible for fields that require high levels of expertise by effectively utilizing human resources in the private sector. (C) Improving Living and Work Environment As the duration of the activities of the units becomes longer in response to the severe security environment, MOD/SDF will strive to improve the living and work environment, so that all the troop members who undertake the noble mission of protecting life and peaceful livelihood of Japanese national will be able to fully exercise their capabilities and fulfill their missions with high morale, by such means as steadily renewing aged daily life/workplace fixtures, steadily securing the necessary quantities of daily necessities and reducing the number of days on offshore duty per onboard person through the introduction of shifts by multiple crews, in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing and proceeding with measures against aging and earthquake resistance for facilities. (D) Promotion of Work Style Reforms As the number of SDF personnel under time and mobility constraints because of child rearing and nursing care increases due to the consequence of major changes in the social structure, MOD/SDF will promote work style reform at MOD/SDF such as correcting long working hours and promoting the use of holidays in order to ensure proper work-life balance so that all SDF personnel will be able to fully exercise their ability and play prominent roles. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will proceed with initiatives such as establishing workplace nurseries, and will also promote measures supporting families of military personnel such as providing temporary care for children of SDF personnel who must show up at the workplace for emergency operation, while strengthening our collaboration with local governments and other entities. (E) Enhancing Education At each SDF service and the National Defense Academy of Japan (NDAJ), MOD/SDF will strive to enhance the content and organizational structure of the education and training, including the academic knowledge and international sensibilities necessary to nurture broad perspectives concerning security. In addition, MOD/SDF will take necessary measures after considering whether adequate education and research regarding joint operations is possible with the existing organizations, in order to enhance the capabilities and the unity of the SDF and promote cross-sectoral operations, and strive to strengthen education concerning the organizational management capabilities of MOD/SDF. In order to further promote mutual reinforcement between each SDF service, MOD/SDF will strive to standardize the curriculum and will utilize cutting-edge technology in order to promote effective and efficient education. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strive to build up the network of students from overseas who graduated from NDAJ as a mean of support for strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges. In order to steadily implement education and training, MOD/SDF will take necessary measures after considering the procurement of new primary trainer aircraft as the successor to the existing primary trainer aircraft (T-7). (F) Improving Treatment and Re-Employment Support To enable SDF personnel to fulfill their missions with high moral and pride, MOD/SDF will promote improving treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges including the enhancement of the defensive meritorious badges and improving conditions including salaries that reflects the special nature of the missions and working environment and will strive to enhance welfare benefits including family support. In view of the fact that it is the responsibility of the Government to secure the livelihood of SDF personnel under the mandatory early retirement system, MOD/SDF will strive to further improve re-employment support by such means as promoting the further utilization of retired SDF personnel in the disaster prevention-related departments of local governments and related ministries and agencies while strengthening collaboration with local governments and related organizations from the perspective of utilizing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel in addition to expanding vocational training subjects and support for step-bystep acquisition of qualifications. (G) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, MOD/ SDF will promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broader areas and opportunities. In order to enhance the fulfillment of the ranks of SDF reserves, MOD/ SDF will also increase the number of enrollees as reserve candidates who are drawn from people without experience as SDF personnel, and promote the appointment of SDF reserves ----- who are former reserve candidates as reserve ready personnel. Furthermore, in order to make it easier for SDF reserves to respond to training summons, MOD/SDF will undertake the strengthening of the foundations for education and training and the revision of the content of the training, and will implement measures to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the employers. (2) Reviewing Equipment Structure MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure and strengthen the functions of the Joint Staff in order to build an effective and rational equipment structure from a joint operation perspective. MOD/SDF will also develop equipment with multiple functional variants, optimize and standardize specifications of equipment, jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services, reduce types of aircraft, suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness. In order to maximize defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to the utmost, MOD/SDF will actively promote initiatives towards automation through such means as the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) to data processing and decision makings regarding unit operation, the procurement of UAVs and R&D of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and UUVs. MOD/SDF will also actively promote initiatives to save manpower through such means as streamlining in design of new types of destroyers (FFM) and submarines and use of remote control for radar sites and other equipment. (3) Reinforcing Technology Base In order to ensure technological superiority in strategically important areas of equipment and technology by making focused investments in important technologies including artificial intelligence and other potentially game-changing technologies, MOD/SDF will revise Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook and newly formulate R&D visions on technologies that will be important for future joint operation, presenting the future direction of medium to long-term research and development from a strategic perspective. In order to significantly shorten R&D timelines by streamlining its process, MOD/SDF will adopt new methods such as block approach and modularization for R&D of HVGP for the defense of remote islands, new surface-to-ship missiles for the defense of remote islands, UUVs and hypersonic weapons. MOD/SDF will also provide the capabilities of future equipment promptly through analysis of alternatives by the technological demonstration at the initial stage of R&D. MOD/SDF will work actively to leverage potentially dualuse, advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as: technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities; enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies; and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strengthen and expand cooperation with the countries who are making large-scale investments in game-changing technologies such as the U.S., and promote mutually complementary international joint R&D. MOD/SDF will reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze latest foreign and domestic technological trends. (4) Optimizing Equipment Procurement In order to further promote effective and efficient equipment procurement, MOD/SDF will enhance the effectiveness and flexibility of project management throughout equipment lifecycles. To this end, MOD/SDF will take various initiatives including undertakings that contribute to cost reduction at mass production stage as a requirement at development stage, incorporating successful cases in the civilian sector to the manufacture of defense equipment, actively adopting contracting methods such as the competitive bidding method that contribute to the utilization of private sector knowledge and expertise and tightening cost controls. In this regard, MOD/SDF will expand the items subject to project management and strive to adjust the standards for the specifications and the review of project plans with consideration of life cycle costs, and apply them. Regarding the cost estimation of equipment without market prices, MOD/SDF will undertake more appropriate costs calculation by making the calculation of the processing costs required for the manufacture more precise and appropriate, and will also conduct the procurement of information systems at appropriate price levels. To implement these initiatives effectively, MOD/SDF will actively develop and allocate human resources by utilizing human resources with specialized expertise, skills and experiences in the private sector, and will also strive to construct the cost-database on component level of equipment based on the information compiled from the cost estimates/contract records. MOD/SDF will actively use systematic acquisition methods including long-term contracts which facilitate efficient procurement, and streamline equipment sustainment and maintenance including the expansion of PBL and other umbrella contracts. MOD/SDF will also facilitate competition among domestic and foreign companies regarding domestically procured equipment with low cost effectiveness by considering price reduction through imports and considering the deduction of unique specifications for domestic use. Furthermore, in light of the growing importance of the management of price, delivery time and other matters in procurement through Foreign Military Sales (hereinafter referred to as “FMS procurement”), MOD/SDF will collaborate closely with the U.S. Government and other organizations through JapanU.S. consultations and promote initiatives towards the streamlining of FMS procurement, such as striving to acquire equipment in coordination with U.S. forces regarding the timing of procurement and specifications, and to manage the status of implementation in a timely and appropriate manner. (5) Strengthening Defense Industrial Base In order to strengthen the resilience of Japan’s defense industry base, which is an essential foundation for the production, operation, and maintenance of defense equipment, Government will actively take measures such as introducing the competition principle to Japan’s defense industry, which is in a poor competitive environment, incorporating the knowledge, expertise, and technology of the civilian sector, and strengthen the supply chains of equipment. As part of these measures, MOD/SDF will review the contracting system with the aim of creating a competitive environment, including the introduction of the enterprise evaluation system that assesses how much a contractor company tries to contribute to strengthening of defense industry. MOD/SDF will also encourage the spin-off from defense technology to civilian purposes and the spin-on from cutting-edge technologies in the civilian sector to the defense industry including innovative manufacturing technologies. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strengthen risk management regarding the vulnerability of supply chains of equipment through research on the supply chains and also promote the participation of Japan’s defense industry in the sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment. The government as a whole will promote appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which permits transfer of defense equipment in cases such as the transfer contributes to Japan’s security. In order to do so, based on progress and other elements in defense cooperation with our partners, the Government will make necessary improvements in implementation or related rules, promote public-private partnership in information gathering and dissemination, strengthen technology control and intellectual property management in order to prevent leakage of key defense equipment-related technologies on the occasion of overseas transfer and develop defense equipment with an eye on overseas transfer. MOD/SDF will also strengthen information security measures that will be necessary for Japan’s defense industry to participate in international businesses, and develop an information security guidebook for Japan’s defense industry. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will actively promote international joint development and production with other countries utilizing Japan’s technological strengths. In addition, MOD/SDF will undertake measures such as making the equipment manufacturing process and thorough cost reduction and will strive to make Japan’s defense industry base efficient and resilient while foreseeing possible realignment and consolidation of businesses that may occur as a result of these measures. (6) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities In order to be able to provide timely and effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations, MOD/SDF will promote initiatives to comprehensively enhance intelligence capabilities at all stages of intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing of information. MOD/SDF will drastically strengthen information gathering and analysis capabilities so that MOD/SDF will be fully capable of meeting various intelligence requirements including those related to new domains. This will be conducted by strengthening gathering postures for SIGINT and IMINT through establishing and enhancing capabilities of information collection facilities, utilizing intelligence gathering satellites and commercial satellites, and diversifying means for information collection through new equipment such as long-endurance UAVs. Furthermore, MOD/ SDF will also strengthen the gathering posture of HUMINT through enhancing its defense attaché system, reinforce the gathering posture of OSINT and expand its cooperation with allied countries. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strive to achieve its even more effective and efficient posture by proactively utilizing the latest information processing technology, and will also promote ----- all-source analysis, which fuses a wide variety of information sources together. MOD/SDF will also strive to utilize information effectively by successfully developing and connecting systems that will promote information sharing. In order to respond appropriately to increasingly diversified intelligence requirements, MOD/SDF will promote securing and training of highly capable personnel handling information collection and analysis. Moreover, MOD/SDF will take steady measures in various directions including recruitment, education, training, and personnel allocation to strengthen comprehensive information collection and analysis capabilities. With regard to information security, MOD/SDF will coordinate with relevant offices to make every effort by such means as education in ensuring information sharing on a need-to-know basis, and in taking preventative measures against information leakage. Also, MOD/SDF will strengthen counter-intelligence capability within MOD/SDF by promoting collaboration with relevant organizations. 3. Large-Scale Disasters In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond to it by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units based on a joint operational approach, and also will promote measures to strengthen the response posture including the deployment of drones for disasters, a helicopter satellite communication system (HeliSat), lifesaving systems, and emergency power sources. With close coordination and cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, local governments and the private sector, the MOD will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basis for the SDF’s disaster and deployment operations is affected. 4. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance (1) Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation In order to ensure Japan’s national security and to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will further strengthen Japan-U.S. defense cooperation under the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” while strengthening Japan’s own capability as a premise for these efforts. Japan will continue to promote cooperation in space and cyber domains, comprehensive air and missile defense, bilateral training and exercises and joint ISR activities. Japan will also further deepen Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in various areas such as formulation and renewal of bilateral plans and the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In order for Japan and the U.S. to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will advance efforts for standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral activities, sharing of various networks, building capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S.-made equipment and initiatives for intelligence/information security. To efficiently improve Japanese and the U.S. capabilities, while facilitating common understanding of respective priorities in defense capability enhancement, promote measures such as effective acquisition of advanced U.S equipment through optimized FMS procurement and Japan-U.S. joint R&D. Furthermore, Japan will promote cooperation on joint/shared use of SDF and U.S force facilities, and efforts for improved resiliency. (2) Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan In order to make the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily secure Host Nation Support (HNS). 5. Strengthening Security Cooperation In line with the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan will further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges based on the understanding that realizing a security environment that is desirable for Japan is an extremely important and necessary undertaking that contributes to Japan’s defense itself and also relates to its basic fundamentals. In particular, in addition to high-level exchanges, policy dialogues and exchanges among military branches, in order to improve interoperability with relevant countries and to strengthen Japan’s presence, Japan will appropriately combine and strategically implement specific initiatives such as bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation and capacity building assistance, while taking characteristics and situation specific to each region and country into account. Based on this significance of defense cooperation and exchanges, in order to further collaborate mutually and conduct specific and thoroughgoing initiatives, Japan will proceed with the improvement of operation procedures, development of organizational systems and review of systems, and will further reflect needs concerning defense cooperation and exchanges in SDF operations. Japan will also strive to collaborate with relevant ministries and agencies as well as with other countries, non- governmental organizations and the private sector, and strategically disseminate information on Japan s initiatives. In this regard, Japan will focus on the following in particular. (1) Holding bilateral/multilateral Training and Exercises Japan will promote bilateral/multilateral training and exercises based on their significance as defense cooperation and exchanges. Through this, Japan will represents the will and ability to create a desirable security environment and will also seek to improve interoperability with relevant countries and strengthen cooperative relationships with other countries. (2) Equipment and Technology Cooperation Japan will strengthen initiatives for equipment and technology cooperation including overseas transfers of defense equipment, and strive to enhance our partners’ military capabilities and maintain/strengthen medium and long-term relationships with those countries. In particular, Japan will effectively promote these initiatives by combining other efforts such as training and exercises and capacity building assistance as necessary. (3) Capacity Building Assistance Japan will work with countries of the Indo-Pacific region to support advance capacity development efforts based on their voluntary ownership, so as to enable counterpart military organizations to contribute further towards international peace and regional stability, thus creating security environment that is desirable to Japan. In this regard, Japan will effectively utilize knowledge and expertise accumulated by SDF, coordinate thoroughly with diplomatic policy, and coordinate with partner countries such as the U.S. and Australia undertaking capacity building assistance, so as to maximize results by combing various measures efficiently. (4) Maritime Security Based on the understanding that open and stable seas are a foundation of the peace and prosperity of Japan as a maritime nation and in line with the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan will promote initiatives such as bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, information sharing and visits by ships and aircraft as warranted by the occasion, with foreign countries that share the understanding of maritime security. Through these, Japan will show the will and ability to stabilize maritime order in an active and visible manner. (5) International Peace Cooperation Activities In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host country. In particular, Japan will actively promote activities such as dispatch of embedded personnel to mission headquarters, dissemination of United Nations (UN) military engineer unit manuals and capacity building assistance in Japan’s field of expertise by making good use of accumulated experiences. While Japan will also proceed with education and training that match missions conducted on the basis of the Legislation for Peace and Security, GSDF will take the necessary measures towards newly establishing an International Activities Unit with high-level emergency response capabilities and high-level technology in areas such as facilities and the operation of UAVs by unifying the Central Readiness Regiment and the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit. The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand its curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds. Regarding SDF operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti, which is used for anti-piracy efforts, Japan will work towards stable, long-term use of the facility for regional security cooperation and other activities. (6) Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation In cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will promote non-proliferation efforts regarding: weapons of mass destruction and missiles which can serve as their delivery means; and goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use. Leveraging SDF’s knowledge and human resources, Japan will engage in various activities related to arms control and disarmament undertaken by the UN and other bodies, including the discussion on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). 6. Elements Supporting Defense Capability (1) Training and Exercises To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, SDF’s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises are to be conducted in a tailored and visible way while fully grasping the environment of the ----- surroundings of the training areas and making absolutely sure that safety is secured. Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, SDF will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. Along with these efforts, SDF will expand the establishment and utilization of the training areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere in Japan and conduct effective training and exercises. SDF will also facilitate to expand joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas with SDF while accounting for relations with local communities. Furthermore, SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas such as the U.S. and Australia, and introduce simulators actively. SDF will also strive to further enhance amphibious operation capability by the implementation of training by GSDF and MSDF in collaboration with U.S. Marines, SDF will strive to enhance the effectiveness of the swift and continuous deployment of units and strengthen their presence on a steady-state basis by organically coordinating such training and exercises that utilize training environments in Japan and abroad. Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-ofgovernment approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police, firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. SDF will also actively utilize the opportunities presented by the joint training and exercises of SDF and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises as a way not only for considering and verifying plans for the actual operations of SDF, but also for actively considering and verifying comprehensive issues including civil protection. (2) Medical Care SDF will enhance its medical functions to keep SDF personnel’s vitality and enhance their ability to deal with various situations and engage in a diverse range of missions at home and abroad. In order to respond to various situations, SDF will strive to enhance the capacity to rapidly deploy medical bases and conduct Damage Control Surgery (DCS) to stabilize the symptoms of patients, and the capacity to manage patients being sent back as part of strengthening the system to seamlessly cover the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations including the perspective of joint operations. In this regard, SDF will establish a system to jointly possess patient information from the frontline to final destinations. SDF will also strive to standardize medical supplies for the sake of interoperability and to stockpile necessary supplies. Furthermore, in order to transport patients safely, SDF will take necessary measures to introduce armored ambulances. Taking conditions and characteristics of each region into account, SDF will focus on strengthening medical functions of SDF in Japan’s southwestern region. In order to conduct the control and coordination regarding medical operations of SDF on a steady-state basis, SDF will strive to strengthen the organization of the Joint Staff. SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime through further endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. Furthermore, SDF will proceed to improve the management of the National Defense Medical College, enhance its research functions and strive to secure high-quality talents, as well as striving to enrich the clinical experience of medical officers to better secure the number of medical officers, and promoting the appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel (physicians). In addition, MOD/SDF will proceed with the establishment of hygienic education and training foundations common to each SDF service that are necessary to improve medical care capabilities for combat injuries and the requisite posture for various international cooperation including capacity building assistance. (3) Collaboration with Local Communities MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities. Upon fielding units and equipment of SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities, while sufficiently fulfilling accountability. At the same time, MOD/ SDF will continue to promote various impact alleviation measures including sound insulation projects at residences. MOD/SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations including local governments, police and fire departments in order to enable SDF to swiftly and securely conduct its activities in response to various situations. In certain regions, presence of SDF units makes substantial contributions to maintenance and revitalization of local communities. There are also cases where SDF’s emergency patient transport is supporting community medicine. In light of this, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases. MOD/SDF will also promote various measures that contribute to the local community by such means as striving to secure opportunities for local small and medium enterprises to receive contract orders based on the contracting policy of the nation, etc., concerning small and medium enterprises while also being mindful of efficiency. (4) Intellectual Base MOD/SDF will contribute to the promotion of national security education through such means as dispatching instructors to educational institutions and holding public symposiums. In addition, MOD/SDF will provide efficient and highly trustworthy information to increase public access to the research results regarding security. Moreover, MOD/SDF will promote various measures to improve the capabilities for providing information including that in foreign languages, the further utilization of increasingly diversified social networks, and MOD/SDF will also expand networks and institutional collaboration with research and education organizations, and think-tanks in Japan and abroad in order to further strengthen the research system of MOD/SDF with the National Institute for Defense Studies playing central roles. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will contribute to policy development through timely and appropriate supply of high-quality research results, based upon expertise and research capabilities, to the policy development departments. **IV. Quantities of Major Procurement** The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section III. **V. Expenditures** 1. The expenditure target for the implementation of the defense capability build-up described in this program amount to approximately ¥27,470 billion in FY 2018 prices. 2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, substantive funds will be secured by means of thoroughgoing greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development, suspending the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, reviewing or discontinuing projects of low cost-effectiveness, optimizing equipment procurement through cost management/ suppression and long-term contracts and securing other revenue. The annual defense budgets target for the implementation of this program is expected to be around approximately ¥25,500 billion over the next five years. In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. Moreover, to achieve rapid procurement of defense equipment, Japan must pursue flexible and swift project management, and the budgetary process for each fiscal year which will be conducted taking into account the economic and fiscal conditions among other budgets. 3. The amount of expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this program will be allocated within the ceiling of approximately ¥17,170 billion in FY 2018 prices (excluding the amount corresponding to payments outside of the program period for contracts that contribute to improving project efficiency such as maintenance), and the future obligation shall be managed appropriately. 4. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions. **VI. Other** While maintaining U.S. Forces deterrence, Japan will steadily implement specific measures stipulated in “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” and other SCC documents and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa. ----- |Annex Table|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Service|Equipment|Quantity| |Ground Self- Defense Force|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles New Utility Helicopters Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Land-based Aegis Systems (Aegis Ashore) Tanks Howitzers|134 29 34 3 3 companies 5 companies 2 30 40| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Destroyers Submarines Patrol Vessels Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K/K (Upgraded Capability)) Ship-Borne Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Minesweeping and Transport Helicopters (MCH-101)|10 5 4 4 23 (approx. 66,000t) 12 13 3 1| |Air Self-Defense Force|Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft (E-2D) Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Upgrade (F-15) Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft (KC-46A) Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Global Hawk)|9 45 20 4 5 4 groups (16 fire squadrons) 1| 1. Japan will basically pursue the establishment of 75 Patrol Helicopters and 20 Ship-borne UAVs at the completion of the “NDPG for FY 2019 and beyond”, but those exact numbers will be considered during the period of the “MTDP (FY 2019 - FY 2023).” 2. 18 aircraft out of 45 aircraft of Fighters (F-35A) would have STOVLs. **Reference 4 Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|(As of March 31, 2020)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Type|Recoilless Guns|Mortars|Field Artillery|Rocket Launchers, etc.|Anti-aircraft Machine Guns|Tanks|Armored Vehicles| |Approximate number owned|2,600|1,100|380|60|50|570|990| Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns. ----- **Reference 5 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|(As of March 31, 2020)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Service|Type|Model|Use|Number Owned|Maximum Speed (knots)|Crew (number)|Full Length (m)|Full Width (m)|Engine| |GSDF|Fixed- wing|LR-2|Liaison and Reconnaissance|7|300|2（8）|14|18|Turboprop, twin-engines| ||Rotary- wing|AH-1S|Anti-tank|52|120|2|14|3|Turboshaft| |||OH-6D|Observation|14|140|1（3）|7|2|Turboshaft| |||OH-1|Observation|37|140|2|12|3|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||UH-1J|Utility|124|120|2（11）|13|3|Turboshaft| |||CH-47J/JA|Transport|53|150/140|3（55）|16|4/5|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||UH-60JA|Utility|40|150|2（12）|16|3|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||AH-64D|Combat|12|150|2|18|6|Turboshaft, twin-engines| ||Tilt Rotor|V-22|Transport|3|280|3（24）|17|26|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |MSDF|Fixed- wing|P-1|Patrol|24|450|11|38|35|Turbofan, quadruple-engine| |||P-3C|Patrol|50|400|11|36|30|Turboprop, quadruple- engine| ||Rotary- wing|SH-60J|Patrol|18|150|4|20|16|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||SH-60K|Patrol|63|140|4|20|16|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||MCH-101|Minesweeping and transport|10|150|4|23|19|Turboshaft, triple engine| |ASDF|Fixed- wing|F-15J/DJ|Fighter|201|mach 2.5|1/2|19|13|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||F-4EJ/EJ (improved)|Fighter|26|mach 2.2|2|19|12|Turbojet, twin-engine| |||F-2A/B|Fighter|91|mach 2|1/2|16|11|Turbofan, single-engine| |||F-35A|Fighter|17|mach 1.6|1|16|11|Turbofan, single-engine| |||RF-4E/EJ|Reconnaissance|6|mach 2.2|2|19|12|Turbojet, twin-engine| |||C-1|Transport|11|mach 0.76|5（60）|29|31|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||C-2|Transport|11|mach 0.82|2～5（110）|44|44|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||C-130H|Transport|14|320|6（92）|30|40|Turboprop, quadruple-engine| |||KC-767|Aerial refueling transport|4|mach 0.84|4～8（200）|49|48|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||KC-130H|Aerial refueling transport|2|320|6（92）|30|40|Turboprop, quadruple-engine| |||E-2C|Early warning|13|320|5|18|25|Turboprop, twin-engines| |||E-2D|Early warning|1|350|5|18|25|Turboprop, twin-engines| |||E-767|Early warning and control|4|450|20|49|48|Turbofan, twin-engine| ||Rotary- wing|CH-47J|Transport|15|160|5（48）|16|5|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||UH-60J|Rescue|40|144|5|16|5|Turboshaft, twin-engines| Notes: 1. Parenthetical figures in the item “Crew” represents the number of people transported. 2. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2020. **Reference 6 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|(As of March 31, 2020)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Category|Destroyer|Submarine|Mine Warfare Ship|Patrol Combatant Craft|Amphibious Ship|Auxiliary Ship| |Number (vessels)|48|20|24|6|11|29| |Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)|266|57|23|1|28|128| Notes: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally. ----- **Reference 7 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)** (Unit: 100 million yen, %) |Item Fiscal Year|GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)|Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|General Annual Expenditures (C)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|Defense- Related Expenditures (D)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|Ratio of Defense- Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)|Ratio of Defense- Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/ B)|Ratio of Defense- related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |1955|75,590|9,915|△0.8|8,107|△2.8|1,349|△3.3|1.78|13.61|16.6| |1965|281,600|36,581|12.4|29,198|12.8|3,014|9.6|1.07|8.24|10.3| |1975|1,585,000|212,888|24.5|158,408|23.2|13,273|21.4|0.84|6.23|8.4| |1985|3,146,000|524,996|3.7|325,854|△0.0|31,371|6.9|0.997|5.98|9.6| |1995|4,928,000|709,871|△2.9|421,417|3.1|47,236|0.9|0.959|6.65|11.2| |2011|4,838,000|924,116|0.1|540,780|1.2|46,625 47,752|△ 0.4 △ 0.3|0.964 0.987|5.05 5.17|8.62 8.83| |2012|4,796,000|903,339|△2.2|512,450|△5.2|46,453 47,138|△ 0.4 △ 1.3|0.969 0.983|5.14 5.22|9.06 9.20| |2013|4,877,000|926,115|2.5|527,311|2.9|46,804 47,538|0.8 0.8|0.960 0.975|5.05 5.13|8.88 9.02| |2014|5,004,000|958,823|3.5|564,697|7.1|47,838 48,848|2.2 2.8|0.956 0.976|4.99 5.09|8.47 8.65| |2015|5,049,000|963,420|0.5|573,555|1.6|48,221 49,801|0.8 2.0|0.955 0.986|5.01 5.17|8.41 8.68| |2016|5,188,000|967,218|0.4|578,286|0.8|48,607 50,541|0.8 1.5|0.937 0.974|5.03 5.23|8.41 8.74| |2017|5,535,000|974,547|0.8|583,591|0.9|48,996 51,251|0.8 1.4|0.885 0.926|5.03 5.26|8.40 8.78| |2018|5,643,000|977,128|0.3|588,958|0.9|49,388 51,911|0.8 1.3|0.875 0.920|5.05 5.31|8.39 8.81| |2019|5,661,000|994,291 （1,014,571）|1.8|599,359 （619,639）|1.8|50,070 52,574|1.4 1.3|0.884 0.929|5.04 5.18|8.35 8.48| |2020|5,702,000|1,008,791 （1,026,580）|1.5|617,184 （634,972）|3.0|50,688 53,133|1.2 1.1|0.889 0.932|5.02 5.18|8.21 8.37| Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates. 2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY2011 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, 5.1 billion yen in FY2018, 25.6 billion yen in FY2019, and 13.8 billion yen in FY2020), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, 216.1 billion yen in FY2018, 167.9 billion yen in FY2019, and 179.9 billion yen in FY2020), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, 31.2 billion yen in FY2018, 6.2 billion yen in FY2019, and 0.03 billion yen in FY2020) as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen in FY2019 and 50.8 billion yen in FY2020), while the lower figures include them. 3. Annual expenditure on general account and the lower figures in parentheses in the general annual expenditures column for FY2019 and thereafter include temporary/special measures. ----- **Reference 8 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Initial Budget)** (Unit: 100 million yen, %) |FFYY IItteemm|2016|Col3|2017|Col5|2018|Col7|2019|Col9|2020|Col11| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio| |Personnel and provisions|21,473|44.2 42.5|21,662|44.2 42.3|21,850|44.2 42.1|21,831|43.6 41.5|21,426|42.3 40.3| |Materials|27,135 29,069|55.8 57.5|27,334 29,589|55.8 57.7|27,538 30,061|55.8 57.9|28,239 30,744|56.4 58.5|29,262 31,708|57.7 59.7| |Equipment acquisition|7,659|15.8 15.2|8,406|17.2 16.4|8,191|16.6 15.8|8,329|16.6 15.8|8,544|16.9 16.1| |R&D|1,055|2.2 2.1|1,217|2.5 2.4|1,034|2.1 2.0|1,283|2.6 2.4|1,273|2.5 2.4| |Facility improvement|1,461|3.0 2.9|1,571|3.2 3.1|1,752|3.5 3.4|1,407|2.8 2.7|1513|3.0 2.8| |Maintenance|11,707|24.1 23.2|10,888|22.2 21.2|11,343|23.0 21.9|12,027|24.0 22.9|12,610|24.9 23.7| |Base countermeasures|4,509|9.3 8.9|4,529|9.2 8.8|4,449|9.0 8.6|4,470|8.9 8.5|4,584|9.0 8.6| |The cost for SACO-related projects|28|0.1|28|0.1|51|0.1|256|0.5|138|0.3| |U.S. Forces realignment- related expenses (mitigation of the impact on local communities)|1,766|3.5|2,011|3.9|2,161|4.2|1,679|3.2|1,799|3.4| |Introduction of government aircraft|140|0.3|216|0.4|312|0.6|62|0.1|0.3|0.0| |National resilience-related expenses|－|－|－|－|－|－|508|1.0|508|1.0| |Others|744|1.5 1.5|723|1.5 1.4|768|1.6 1.5|723|1.4 1.4|739|1.5 1.4| |Total|48,607 50,541|100|48,996 51,251|100|49,388 51,911|100|50,070 52,574|100|50,688 53,133|100| Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures. 2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships. 3. R&D expenses include those of equipment. 4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfi elds and barracks. 5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training. 6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ. 7. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally. 8. The upper fi gures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, 5.1 billion yen in FY2018, 25.6 billion yen in FY2019, and 13.8 billion yen in FY2020), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities; 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, 216.1 billion yen in FY2018, 167.9 billion yen in FY2019, and 179.9 billion yen in FY2020), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, 31.2 billion yen in FY2018, 6.2 billion yen in FY2019, and 0.03 billion yen in FY2020), as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen in FY2019 and 50.8 billion yen in FY2020), while the lower fi gures include them. ----- **Reference 9 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries** |FY Country|2016|2017|2018|2019|2020| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan (100 million yen)|48,607 50,541 0.8% 1.5%|48,996 51,251 0.8% 1.4%|49,388 51,911 0.8% 1.3%|50,070 52,574 1.4% 1.3%|50,688 53,133 1.2% 1.1%| |U.S. (U.S. 1 million dollar)|565,370 0.5%|568,896 0.6%|600,683 5.6%|653,986 8.9%|689,590 5.4%| |China (100 million yuan)|9,544 7.6%|10,444 7.1%|11,070 8.3%|11,899 7.5%|12,680 6.6%| |Russia (100 million RR)|37,753 18.7%|28,523 △24.4％|28,270 △0.9%|29,974 6.0%|32,968 10.0%| |Republic of Korea (100 million won)|387,995 3.6%|403,347 4.0%|431,581 7.0%|466,971 8.2%|501,527 7.4%| |Australia (1 million Australian dollar)|32,882 0.6%|35,191 7.0%|36,231 3.0%|38,562 6.4%|― ―| |U.K. (1 million GBP)|35,000 △0.6％|35,500 1.4%|36,000 1.4%|37,800 5.0%|40,000 5.8%| |France (1 million euro)|39,689 1.9%|40,841 2.9%|42,741 4.7%|44,354 3.8%|― ―| |Germany (1 million euro)|34,288 4.0%|37,005 7.9%|38,520 4.1%|43,228 12.2%|45,390 5.0%| Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others. 2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year. 3. In Japan, the fi gures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (2.8 billion yen for FY2016, 2.8 billion yen for FY2017, 5.1 billion yen for FY2018, 25.6 billion yen for FY2019, and 13.8 billion yen fi r FY2020), the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (176.6 billion yen for FY2016, 201.1 billion yen for FY2017, 216.1 billion yen for FY2018, 167.9 billion yen for FY2019, and 179.9 billion yen for FY2020), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (14.0 billion yen for FY2016, 21.6 billion yen for FY2017, 31.2 billion yen for FY2018, 6.2 billion yen for FY2019, and 0.03 billion yen for FY2020), as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen for FY2019 and 50.8 billion yen in FY2020), while the fi gures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them. 4. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defi ned by the Historical Table. Figures for FY2020 are estimated values. 5. The fi gures for China are based on the initial budget in the Finance Budget Report to the National People’s Congress (only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure [a portion of the central government expenditure] was released; however, for FY2017, the fi gures are the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure as it was calculable.) The rate of growth over the previous year was calculated by comparing with the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure. The defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure for FY2017 was 1.0226 billion yuan. 6. Russia’s defense expenditures are based on the FY2016-2019 expenditures and the FY2020 initial budget amount in the Information on Execution of Budgets of the Russian Federation released by the Federal Treasury. 7. The fi gures for the Republic of Korea are based on the initial budget released on its Ministry of National Defense website. 8. The fi gures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence. The initial budget for FY2020 has not been released as of May 2020. 9. The fi gures for the United Kingdom are based on the initial budget in the budget message. 10. The fi gures for France are based on the initial budget in “Defence Key Figures” by the French Ministry for Armed Forces. The defense expenditure for FY2020 has not been released as of May 2020. 11. The fi gures for Germany are based on the initial budget released on its Federal Ministry of Defense website. **Reference 10 Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning** **Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces** |Operation|Applicable Situations, etc.|Conditions Required for Operations|Main provisions for authority| |---|---|---|---| |Defense operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 76)|(1) When there is a situation in which armed attack against Japan from outside occur or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of armed attack, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against these attacks. (2) When there is a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses an imminent and clear danger of Japan’s survival to be threatened and fundamentally overturns people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against such a situation.|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: required (prior approval required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required|m Use of force necessary to defend Japan, etc.| |Establishment of defense facilities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-2)|When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensif ied and the order for defense operations (only for armed attack situations) is likely to be issued|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)|m Establishment of positions and defense facilities in the intended deployment area [Use of weapons] m SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming existing danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| ----- |Operation|Applicable Situations, etc.|Conditions Required for Operations|Main provisions for authority| |---|---|---|---| |Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-3 and U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act)|When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation|(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services (2) Approval of the Diet: not required for supplies; required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) for services (3) Cabinet decision: not required for supplies; required (approval of the Prime Minister) for services|m Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on U.S. and others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act m Provision of services as a related measure [Use of weapons] m SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies of themselves, those of other the SDF personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Civil protection dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-4)|When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief (Prime Minister)|m Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents, emergent measures, traffic control, etc. pursuant to the provision of the Civil Protection Law m Partial application of the Police Duties Law weapons (Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) m Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, etc.) [Use of weapons] m Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including assistant cast guard officers, are not present.| |Public security operation by order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 78)|When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the law enforcement force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergencies|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order’s issuance) (3) Cabinet decision: required|m Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, etc.) m Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) m Control over the Japan Coast Guard [Use of weapons] m Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations. m SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.| |Information gathering before public security operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 79-2)|When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: consultation between the Minister of Defense and the National Public Safety Commission|[Use of weapons] m SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons within the limit judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Public security operation by request (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81)|When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission|m Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, etc.) m Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) [Use of weapons] m Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations. m SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.| |Guarding operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81-2)|When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor|m Partial application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning; Measures for Refuge; Entry (all only when police officers are not present); Prevention and Suppression of Crime) [Use of weapons] m Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations. m SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.| |Maritime security operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82)|When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)|m Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) [Use of weapons] m Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations. m Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.| ----- |Operation|Applicable Situations, etc.|Conditions Required for Operations|Main provisions for authority| |---|---|---|---| |Counter-piracy operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-2 and Piracy Countermeasures Act)|When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counterpiracy operation and when a mission has been completed) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister|m Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) [Use of weapons] m Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations. m If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counterpiracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.| |Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-3)|When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan’s territory from the damage caused by the missiles|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (after- the fact report required when measures taken) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister|[Use of weapons] m SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles flying headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.| |Disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83)|When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property in the event of natural calamities or other disasters|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)|m Partial application of the Police Duties Law (Refuge, entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) m Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) m Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (Designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; only when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)| |Action against violation of territorial airspace (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84)|When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required|m The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (issuing warnings, guiding intruders away, use of weapons, etc.)| |Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-2)|―|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required|m Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea| |Rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-3)|Emergency situations overseas|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: when a request is made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to conduct measures for rescue of Japanese nationals who are at risk for harm to their life or body, confirmation that the competent authorities of the country concerned are maintaining public safety and order at the time in the areas where the rescue measures are to be taken and that no act of combat will be conducted is required, and consent from the country concerned for the SDF’s rescue measures is required|[Use of weapons] m SDF personnel engaged in duties related to rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations when: (1) there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of Japanese nationals and others, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties stated above; (2) there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4)|Natural disasters, unrest, and other emergency situations overseas|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: as necessary (4) Additional requirements: when a request is made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened|[Use of weapons] m SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese nationals to be evacuated under the management of SDF personnel or of those granted permission to ride the same means of transport. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self- defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| ----- |Operation|Applicable Situations, etc.|Conditions Required for Operations|Main provisions for authority| |---|---|---|---| |Logistics support and other activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)|Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Approval of the Diet: required (prior to taking measures in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)|[Use of weapons] m SDF personnel ordered to provide services as logistics support activities or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code. m SDF personnel ordered to conduct ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Cooperation and support operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, International Peace Support Act, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)|Situations where the peace and security of the international community is threatened, where the international community is collectively addressing the situation to remove the threat in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and where Japan needs to make independent and proactive contributions to these activities as a member of the international community, and a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN is adopted|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Approval of the Diet: required (prior consent required with no exception) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)|[Use of weapons] m SDF personnel ordered to provide services as cooperation and support operations or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as those of foreign armed forces, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code. m SDF personnel ordered to conduct ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Disaster Relief Law)|In the case that a large-scale disaster has happened or is about to happen overseas, especially in developing countries/areas|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs|―| |International peace cooperation activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Peace Cooperation Act)|United Nations peacekeeping operations, internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, and international humanitarian assistance|(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF personnel dispatched individually) Minister of Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit) (2) Approval of the Diet: (when SDF units, etc. conduct so-called primary operations and “safety-ensuring” operations) required (prior consent required in principle); (other than so-called primary operations and “safety-ensuring” operations) not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of international peace cooperation operations and the draft implementation plan) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)|[Use of weapons] m SDF personnel engaged in duties in international peace cooperation operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, of International Peace Cooperation Corps, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as personnel of foreign armed forces’ units, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps; (3) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies or assets, or those of other individuals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties, in addition to (1) and (2) above; (4) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “kaketsuke-keigo (coming to protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request)” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, or those of other individuals involved in the operations whom they intend to protect, in addition to (1) and (2) above. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| ----- **Reference 11 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan** |1993|May 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that fell into the Sea of Japan| |---|---| |1995|Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense| |1998|August 31: North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system| |1999|Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles| |2002|Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD| |2003|The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started| |2005|Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (ballistic missile destruction measures) The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD| |2006|July 5: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, six of which fell into the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediate after the launch| |2007|The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started| |2009|March 27: First shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 5: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over the Tohoku region and passed through to the Pacific Ocean July 4: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan| |2012|March 30: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 13: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew a minute or longer, then separated into several parts and fell into the Yellow Sea December 7: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued December 12: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean| |2014|North Korea launched a total of 11 ballistic missiles in March, June, and July| |2015|March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan| |2016|North Korea launched 23 ballistic missiles including what it claimed to be a “satellite” in a single year February 3: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued December 22: At the Nine Ministers’ Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), it was decided that the ballistic missile defense enhanced-capability interceptor missile (SM-3 block IIA) would progress to the joint production and deployment stage| |2017|North Korea launched 17 ballistic missiles beginning in February June 22: Conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea December 19: NSC and the Cabinet meeting approved introducing two units of Aegis Ashore systems.| |2018|January 31: The U.S. conducted a test shot of the SM-3 block IIA June 1: The MOD announced candidate sites for the deployment of two units of Aegis Ashore (GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture). July 30: The MOD selected the components of Aegis Ashore (LMSSR). October 26: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA in waters. October 29: The MOD started surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore. December 11: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA.| |2019|North Korea launched a total of 25 ballistic missiles and other objects since May May 27 and 28: The MOD explained results of surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore and results of study by the MOD to the governors of Akita and Yamaguchi Prefectures. December 17: The MOD provided the heads of the relevant local governments in Yamaguchi Prefecture with explanations anew on the results of the resurvey on deployment of Aegis Ashore.| |2020|North Korea launched eight ballistic missiles in March June 15: The MOD announced suspension of Aegis Ashore deployment process| **Reference 12 Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (2019)** |Simulation exercise|Terrorism using explosives|February 6, 2020|Fukuoka Prefecture (7 times)| |---|---|---|---| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|February 7, 2020|Toyama Prefecture (10 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|February 10, 2020|Miyagi Prefecture (3 times)| Notes: Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2007. Implemented in 18 Prefectures in FY2008. Implemented in 14 Prefectures in FY2009. Implemented in 10 Prefectures in FY2010. Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2011. Implemented in 11 Prefectures in FY2012. Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2013. Implemented in 13 Prefectures in FY2014. Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2015. Implemented in 22 Prefectures in FY2016. Implemented in 28 Prefectures in FY2017. Implemented in 24 Prefectures in FY2018. Implemented in 20 Prefectures in FY2019. |Types of Exercise|Training content (estimated)|Date|Location (cumulative times)| |---|---|---|---| |Simulation and Field exercise|Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|July 11, 2019|Iwate Prefecture (7 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives|February 3, 2020|Tokushima Prefecture (13 times)| |Field exercise|Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|November 21, 2019|Yamanashi Prefecture (4 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|November 22, 2019|Gunma Prefecture (3 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|December 18, 2019|Shizuoka Prefecture (6 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives|January 22, 2020|Wakayama Prefecture (3 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|January 29, 2020|Chiba Prefecture (4 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|August 1, 2019|Kumamoto Prefecture (5 times)| ||Review meetings|November 5, 2019|Mie Prefecture (6 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|November 20, 2019|Oita Prefecture (6 times)| ||Review meetings|December 25, 2019|Shimane Prefecture (3 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incident|January 16, 2020|Yamagata Prefecture (8 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|January 17, 2020|Aichi Prefecture (6 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives|January 21, 2020|Hokkaido Prefecture (4 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|January 28, 2020|Fukui Prefecture (13 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incident|January 31, 2020|Akita Prefecture (4 times)| Terrorism using explosives, and a February 4 2020 Kagawa Prefecture ----- **Reference 13 Efforts in Recent Years by the MOD on Cybersecurity** |2012|April: Agreed in a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting to start a comprehensive dialogue on cybersecurity in order to strengthen the engagement of the governments as a whole June: CYber incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) established in the National Information Security Center (NISC) September: “Towards the Stable and Effective Utilization of Cyberspace by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces” formulated| |---|---| |2013|May: The First Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue was held in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting. July: The MOD and defense industry members deeply interested in cybersecurity established the Cyber Defense Council (CDC) August: Agreed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting to consider a new framework for cooperation between the defense authorities from the perspective of further promoting Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the cybersecurity area October: Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) established between the Japanese and U.S. defense authorities| |2014|March: Cyber Defense Group newly formed under the Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command November: The Basic Act on Cybersecurity enacted| |2015|January: Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters established under the Cabinet January: National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) established in the Cabinet Secretariat May: Joint statement issued by the CDPWG September: Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision| |2016|April: The MOD established Deputy Director-General for Cybersecurity and Information Technology| |2018|January: Japan was approved to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence located in Estonia. July: Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision December: Cyber Security Basic Act revised| |2019|March: Dispatch MOD personnel to NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Estonia April: Cybersecurity Council established April: Shared the view at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting on enhancing cooperation on cyber issues, and affirmed that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty December: Officially participated in “Cyber Coalition 2019,” a cyber defense exercise organized by NATO for the first time| **Reference 14 Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)** |FY|2015|2016|Kumamoto Earthquake (2016)|2017|Northern Kyushu torrential rains (2017)|2018|2018 July Heavy Rain (2018)|2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (2018)|2019|2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai)|2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Number of Dispatches|541|515|－|501|－|430|12|1|447|1|1| |Personnel|30,035|33,123|Approx. 814,200|23,838|Approx. 81,950|22,665|Approx. 957,000|Approx. 211,000|43,285|Personnel working in the feild Approx. 54,000 Overall personnel Approx. 96,000|Personnel working in the feild Approx. 84,000 Overall personnel Approx. 880,000| |Vehicles|5,170|5,824|－|3,340|Approx. 7,140|3,090|Approx. 49,500|Approx. 17,800|7,597|Approx. 19,000|Approx. 49,400| |Aircraft|888|725|2,618|792|169|644|340|230|707|Approx. 20|Approx. 1,610| |Vessels|2|11|300|39|0|11|150|20|9|Approx. 20|Approx. 100| - Kumamoto Earthquake, Northern Kyushu torrential rains, 2018 July Heavy Rain, 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake, 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) and 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) are excluded from the record of each fiscal year. - The number of overall personnel includes maintenance, communication, command, standby/backup and other rear-service personnel in addition to personnel working in the field. and Australia. France is participating in the initiative by European countries and has announced its intention to establish a command in the UAE. India is also carrying out activities using ships independently. In this manner, the international community is making all-out efforts to ensure safety, while gathering information for the safety of navigation by diverse means. In this context, Japan has decided to make government-wide efforts and implement comprehensive measures in collaboration among relevant ministries and agencies with regard to the following points as Japan’s independent initiative to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels: (1) further diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the Middle East and stabilize the situation; (2) thorough implementation of navigation safety measures, including close information sharing with relevant industries; and (3) better utilization of the SDF’s ships and aircraft to strengthen information gathering posture. In light of the significance of these measures, Japan will take actions as follows based on the Cabinet decision. - **1. Further diplomatic efforts** Japan has built good relations with countries involved in the stability of the Middle East, such as maintaining good relations with Iran for many years while being an ally of the United States. Taking advantage of these relations, Japan will make further diplomatic efforts, including reaching out to the countries concerned at various levels, to ease tensions and **Reference 15 Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related** **Vessels in the Middle East** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 27, 2019) Peace and stability in the Middle East are crucial to the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. In addition, it is very important to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels (meaning Japanese-flag ships and foreign-flag ships that Japanese nationals are on board, as well as foreignflag ships operated by Japanese shipping business operators or foreign-flag ships transporting Japanese cargoes that are important for stable economic activities of Japanese people; hereinafter the same) in the Middle East, which is the world’s major energy source. In the Middle East, amidst rising tensions, there were incidents of attacks on ships. In June 2019, Japan-related vessels suffered damage. Under these circumstances, each country is reinforcing measures to ensure the safety of navigation in the region by utilizing ships and aircraft. Under the International Maritime Security Construct, the United States is carrying out activities utilizing ships, etc. together with such countries as the United Kingdom ----- stabilize the situation in the Middle East. In addition, Japan will continue to seek cooperation from the coastal countries that play an important role in the safe navigation of vessels. As for SDF’s activities in the Middle East region, Japan has made efforts to gain the understanding of related countries in the region. Continued efforts will be made to gain the understanding of the countries concerned in the region regarding the SDF’s information gathering activities described in 3 below. **2. Thorough implementation of navigation safety measures** Japan will thoroughly implement its navigation safety measures, including meticulous information sharing with related industries. Specifically, a system of cooperation within the government and between the government and related industries will be established, which will also cover the sharing of information obtained through the SDF’s information gathering activities described in 3 below by related ministries and agencies. In addition, whenever information that suggests the existence of a risk to the safe navigation of vessels is obtained, the government will promptly share such information with related industries to call for vigilance in a timely manner, encouraging them to thoroughly implement navigation safety measures at their own initiative. **3. Information gathering activities by the SDF** Although there is no immediate need to implement protective measures for Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, given the rising tensions in the region, it is necessary to strengthen the information gathering system to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. Therefore, Japan has decided to have the SDF conduct information gathering activities, considering the distance from Japan to the Middle East region, the SDF’s experience in operating in the region, and the importance of cooperation with units and organizations from other countries. The SDF’s information gathering activities are part of the government’s navigation safety measures and are aimed at collecting information necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. The activities are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph (1), item (xviii) of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (Act No. 164 of 1954), as they would need smooth decision making and order issuance in relation to Maritime Security Operations as measures for unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, which are provided in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Act No. 165 of 1954) described in (4) below. Basic implementation policies are as follows. Details are to be provided in the Defense Minister’s order. (1) Information to Be Gathered The SDF will gather information that directly affects or is necessary for ensuring safe navigation in the waters described in (3) below. (2) Equipment After necessary adjustments, one destroyer will be newly dispatched. In addition, the SDF will also use fixed-wing patrol aircraft P-3C of the units currently engaged in the Counter-Piracy Operations (hereinafter referred to as “counter-piracy units”) under Article 7, paragraph (1) of the Acts of Punishment and Countermeasures against Piracy (Act No. 55 of 2009, hereinafter referred to as the “Piracy Countermeasures Act”). Information gathering activities by the counter-piracy units will be carried out to an extent that does not interfere with the counter-piracy operation. (3) Geographical Scope of Activities The geographical scope of the information gathering activities by destroyers and fixed-wing patrol aircraft described in (2) consists of three waters of high seas: the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states). For resupply, destroyers will call at a port facing the three seas. (4) Responding to Unforeseen Circumstances or Other Changes in the Situation In the event of unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, the relevant ministries and agencies will work together to understand the situation, share information closely and promptly with each other, and strengthen the government’s response. Then, if further measures by the SDF are deemed necessary in response to the situation in question, Maritime Security Operations will be ordered in accordance with Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. When issuing such an order, the MOD will make best efforts for prompt decision making. The measures that can be taken in the course of Maritime Security Operations will be based on international laws, including the flag state principle, and will vary depending on the circumstances, such as whether the protected vessel is a Japanese or foreign-flagged vessel and the type of infringement. (5) Ensuring the Safety of the SDF Units In conducting information gathering activities, the SDF units take all possible measures to ensure their own safety, including the collection of sufficient information on the situation in the areas of operation, the installation of equipment necessary to ensure safety, and appropriate prior education and training (6) Cooperation among Relevant Ministries and Agencies In order to ensure the effectiveness of information gathering activities and responses to changes in the situation including the rise of unforeseen circumstances, relevant ministries and agencies will work closely together to share understanding regarding such responses, improve response capabilities through training, and develop a system that allows for a prompt response to the situation. (7) Cooperation with Other Countries Although Japan does not participate in any specific framework related to the safety of navigation in the Middle East and the SDF’s information gathering activities are to be conducted at its own initiative, Japan will communicate and cooperate with other countries as necessary. (8) Duration of the SDF’s Activities The period during which the SDF should engage in the information gathering activities (including preparation and training periods) under the Cabinet decision is from December 27, 2019, to December 26, 2020. If it is deemed necessary to extend the SDF’s activities based on the Cabinet decision, another Cabinet decision or any changes to it will be made in that regard. If, prior to the expiration of the above period, the SDF’s activities are no longer deemed necessary in light of the necessity described in this paragraph, the SDF will terminate such activities at that point. If there is a noticeable change in the situation, the National Security Council will consider a response. **4. Report to the Diet** In view of the fact that matters pertaining to the SDF operations under the Piracy Countermeasures Act are reported to the Diet in accordance with Article 7, paragraph (3) of the Piracy Countermeasures Act, the Diet is to receive a report whenever a Cabinet decision or any changes to it is made and a report on the results of such activities upon termination. **Reference 16 United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment** **Implementation (tentative translation)** (Washington, DC, May 1, 2006) **Overview** On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.– Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document. **Finalization of Realignment Initiatives** The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan. The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities. **Key Implementation Details** 1. Realignment on Okinawa (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)  The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.  In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.  Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.  Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.  Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.  Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.  In principle the construction method for the FRF will be landfill -----  The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility. (b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam  Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.  The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.  The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.  Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road. (c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities  Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.  Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:  Camp Kuwae: Total return.  Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.  MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).  Makiminato Service Area: Total return.  aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).  Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.  All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.  While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.  Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.  ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities. (d) Relationships among Initiatives  Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.  Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.  The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam. 2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability  U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.  Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.  In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.  Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.  A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.  Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate. 3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace  ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.  A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.  The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.  Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.  Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.  Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.  Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.  The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.  The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dualuse must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.  Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian- military dual-use. 4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni  The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.  Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.  The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-l30 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.  U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.  Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.  A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent fieldcarrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.  Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni. 5. Missile Defense  As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.  The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006. -----  The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.  U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time. 6. Training Relocation  Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.  Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities— Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni — will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.  The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.  Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.  In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.  At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.  The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness. (Attached conceptual diagram omitted) **Reference 17 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee** **(2+2) (tentative translation)** Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 (iii) Areas eligible for return following Marine Corps’ relocation to locations outside of Japan: Portions of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area (2) The two countries will jointly develop a consolidation plan for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa by the end of 2012. **IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma** (1) The Ministers reconfirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution. (2) The two countries will contribute mutually to refurbishment projects necessary to safely operate MCAS Futenma until the FRF is fully operational and to protect the environment. (END) For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website. (http://www. mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20120427.html) **Reference 18 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** (April 27, 2015) **I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines** In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize: - seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses; - synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; - a whole-of-government Alliance approach; - cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and - the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on its national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the “National Security Strategy” and the “National Defense Program Guidelines.” The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combatready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”) provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conflict, secure the basis for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. **II. Basic Premises and Principles** The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles. A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged. B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant international agreements. C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures. **III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination** Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To (April 27, 2012) **Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline)** **Preamble** (1) The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap. (2) The Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility. (3) The Ministers affirmed that the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps, coupled with the enhancement of Japan’s defense posture and promotion of bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, would strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the overall U.S.-Japan Alliance. **I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa** (1) The United States will locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and establish rotational deployment in Australia. (2) Approximately 9,000 Marines will be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan. (3) The end-state for the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels in the Realignment Roadmap. (4) There will be approximately 5,000 Marines in Guam. (5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of Marines to Guam is $8.6 billion. Japan’s financial commitment will be the fiscal spending in the 2009 Guam International Agreement (up to $2.8 billion in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Other forms of financial support (investment or loan) will not be utilized. Any contributions under the cooperation in 2. (2) below will be a part of the aforementioned commitment. **II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and Prosperity** (1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The government of Japan will take various measures, including strategic use of ODA (ex: providing coastal states with patrol boats). (2) The two governments will consider cooperation for developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for shared-use by the two countries, and will identify areas of cooperation by the end of 2012. **III. Land Returns in Okinawa** (1) (i) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of procedures: Portions of Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Housing area and a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), portions of Makiminato Service Area (north access road, area near Gate 5) (ii) Areas eligible for return following relocation within Okinawa: Portions of Makiminato Service Area (including the preponderance of the storage area), portions of Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwae, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant ----- that end, the two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure seamless and effective wholeof-government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning. A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on the peace and security of Japan and the United States. In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises. The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime. B. Enhanced Operational Coordination Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued importance of collocating operational coordination functions to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective chains-of-command. C. Bilateral Planning The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make flexible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will exchange relevant information, including identifying operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be assisted by an appropriate subordinate body. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments. **IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security** Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan’s peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners. The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the wholeof-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to: - assess the situation; - share information; and - develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including flexible deterrent options, as well as actions aimed at de-escalation. To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially affect Japan’s peace and security. A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan’s peace and security, the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following: 1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats to Japan’s peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in intelligence gathering and analysis, the two governments will share and protect information and intelligence, while developing and maintaining common situational awareness. This will include enhancing coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan’s peace and security. 2. Air and Missile Defense The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities. 3. Maritime Security The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary. 4. Asset Protection The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises. 5. Training and Exercises The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, and modern. 6. Logistic Support Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic support for their respective forces in all phases. The SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related arrangements. 7. Use of Facilities In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/shared use and cooperate in ensuring the security of facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate. B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision-making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations. ----- In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below. 1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country’s capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to third-country noncombatants. The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to carry out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees, transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises. 2. Maritime Security Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law. 3. Measures to Deal with Refugees If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan’s peace and security while handling refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan. 4. Search and Rescue The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. 5. Protection of Facilities and Areas The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces. 6. Logistic Support The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. 7. Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas. C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation. When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to de- escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments also will take necessary measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV. 1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate the situation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/ shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan. 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs a. Principles for Coordinated Actions If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment of peace and security in the region. Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace and security. Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate these deployments. The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide defense of each other’s forces and facilities in response to an armed attack against Japan. b. Concept of Operations i. Operations to Defend Airspace The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of ----- communication. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack. The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant agencies. iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self- Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island. For this purpose, the SelfDefense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and repel airborne and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks in Japan, including those that involve infiltration. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. v. Cross-Domain Operations The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously. Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets. The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the SelfDefense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate. The two governments will cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral cooperation set out in Chapter VI. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces’ special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as appropriate. c. Operational Support Activities The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in support of bilateral operations. i. Communications and Electronics The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness. ii. Search and Rescue The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. iii. Logistic Support When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability. The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support. iv. Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas. v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring the mission capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan’s request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate. D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-ofgovernment Alliance Coordination Mechanism. Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack. The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people. Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below: 1. Asset Protection The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense. 2. Search and Rescue The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. 3. Maritime Operations The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate. 4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches. 5. Logistics Support When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability. The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support. ----- E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery from a large-scale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan’s peace and security and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. Such support may include search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate. To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces’ cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters. **V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security** In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have worked together to deliver effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world. When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries. A. Cooperation in International Activities The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable. The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share procedures and best practices, as appropriate, for smooth and effective cooperation. While the two governments will continue to cooperate on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly included in the Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two governments in regional and international activities will include: 1. Peacekeeping Operations When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate. 2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution. 3. Maritime Security When the two governments conduct activities for maritime security, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities. 4. Partner Capacity Building Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations. 5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals. 6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets. 7. Training and Exercises In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate, to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises to contribute to enhancing interoperability with the Alliance and the development of common tactics, techniques, and procedures. 8. Logistic support When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards. **VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation** A. Cooperation on Space Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads. To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational awareness; meteorological observation; command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities. B. Cooperation on Cyberspace To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information sharing with the private sector, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will: - maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems; - share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity; - ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission assurance; - contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and - conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies. In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against ----- critical infrastructure and services utilized by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond. **VII. Bilateral Enterprise** The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation: A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will: - cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services; - strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and readiness; - facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and - explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology. B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security **Reference 19 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2017)** - Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information sharing at all levels, including the national strategic level. - In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of classified information. - The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on information sharing. C. Educational and Research Exchanges Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the enduring foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation. **VIII. Processes for Review** The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the JapanU.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time. |Col1|Outline and Results| |---|---| |Feb. 4, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo Participants: Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Mattis|• Shared the view that China’s activities in the East and South China Seas pose security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region • Shared the view that advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile development constitute grave security threats to the stability of Japan and the United States and the region • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands • Agreed to strengthen engagement in the East China Sea • Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks • The Japanese side stated that it will strengthen its defense capabilities and expand Japan’s role in the Alliance • The U.S. side stated that it will remain committed to the defense of Japan, and underscored that the U.S. commitment to the region will be enhanced through its ongoing presence • Confirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the United States’ unwavering commitment to extended deterrence • Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking into account the Guidelines established in 2015 • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the steady progress of the realignment of the U.S. Forces Japan. The U.S. side stated that it seeks to advance the realignment through Japan-U.S. collaboration. • With regard to the relocation of MCAS Futenma, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan| |Jun. 3, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Singapore Participants: Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Mattis|• Shared the view that North Korea’s successive ballistic missile launches and other acts are flagrant provocations against the stability of Japan and the United States and the region and are absolutely intolerable, and that it is important to have close Japan-U.S.-ROK collaboration in addition to Japan-U.S. collaboration • The Japanese side highly praised the United States’ visible commitment to the peace and stability of the region, including the dispatch of its carrier strike group, and stated that it is important to strengthen pressure on North Korea • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands • Confirmed that Japan and the United States will deepen their cooperation on ensuring peace and stability in the East China Sea and regarding engagement in the South China Sea • Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and welcomed the bilateral training between the SDF and the carrier strike group being conducted in the Sea of Japan as an activity contributing to this end • Agreed that they will continue to coordinate for the prompt holding of a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting • Agreed to make steady progress on the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and the U.S. side announced its commitment to continue to promote close Japan-U.S. cooperation • Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan| Aug. 17, 2017 - Reaffirmed the two government’ commitment to bolster the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Alliance is the cornerstone of the Asia-Pacific region’s peace and security. Japan-U.S. Security - Reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. Consultative Committee - Condemned in the strongest terms North Korea’s development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and agreed on taking concrete actions to bolster the defense capabilities (“2+2”) Meeting / of the Alliance to deter threats of North Korea while closely coordinating between Japan and the U.S., and the two countries and the Republic of Korea. Washington, D.C. - Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands. - Reaffirmed the importance of working together to safeguard the peace and stability of the East China Sea. Participants: - Underlined the significance of continued engagement in the South China Sea, including through respective activities to support freedom of navigation. Minister of Defense - Confirmed their shared intent to develop specific measures and actions to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, including through reviewing roles, missions, and capabilities, Onodera to ensure seamless Alliance responses across a full spectrum of situations. Minister for Foreign - Japan intends to expand its role in the Alliance and augment its defense capabilities, with an eye on the next planning period for its Mid-Term Defense Program. Affairs Kono - The United States remains committed to deploying its most advanced capabilities to Japan. Secretary of Defense - Directed respective staffs to proceed with the policy making process based on the guidance given by the ministers. Mattis - Reaffirmed the two governments’ commitment to implementation of the 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Secretary of State - Welcomed important steps within the Alliance to operationalize mutual asset protection and to bring into force the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). Tillerson - Reaffirmed the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. - Confirmed their shared commitment to enhance and accelerate cooperation in such areas as bilateral planning, air and missile defense, non-combatant evacuation operations, defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security. - Affirmed their desire to expand bilateral cooperation in space and cyber, and called for deepening consultations for such cooperation. - Highlighted ongoing efforts to advance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation with other partners in the region. - Emphasized the need to enhance information-sharing and expand trilateral exercises between Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. - Affirmed their intention to further enhance capacity building programs and defense equipment and technology transfers to Southeast Asian nations. - Confirmed their shared commitment to launch a whole-of-government dialogue on maritime security capacity building. - Reaffirmed the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution. - Reaffirmed the two Governments’ commitment to implement the existing arrangements for the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan. - Reaffirmed the overall level of Host Nation Support. - Reaffirmed the two Governments would promote joint/shared use. - Stressed the importance of steadily implementing supplementary agreements to SOFA regarding environmental stewardship and the civilian component ----- |Col1|Outline and Results| |---|---| |Aug. 17, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis|• Agreed on the importance of establishing trust between defense leaders of Japan and the U.S., and working together to strengthen the Alliance. • Exchanged views on issues regarding North Korea. The Japanese side commented that now is the time to increase pressure on the regime and that Japan will take necessary measures to continue to coordinate with the U.S. Forces to fully respond to various contingencies. • Reaffirmed close communication and coordination between the two governments is vital in order to respond to issues regarding North Korea. Agreed on putting further pressure on North Korea and working on bolstering the defense capabilities to deter threats posed by North Korea. • In light of an increasingly severe security environment, shared their commitment to take initiatives to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines and to bolster the capabilities of the Alliance to deter and respond while both Japan and the U.S. work on improving their respective capabilities.| |Oct. 23, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / The Philippines Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis|• Shared information on the situation of and prospects for North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. • The Japanese side commented that North Korean nuclear and missile development is posing an unprecedentedly serious and immediate threat to the security of this region including Japan, and called for thorough discussion to ensure the Alliance can take an orchestrated response to any situation. The U.S. side shared this view and reaffirmed its commitment to the security of Japan including a commitment to extended deterrence. • Given the increased level of North Korean ballistic missile threat, the two governments agreed on ensuring a reliable defense posture. Also confirmed working together for the introduction of new BMD assets including the Aegis Ashore. Agreed on bringing even closer coordination to the operation of Japanese and U.S. assets including Aegis-equipped ships. • Welcomed the high level of communication through telephone meetings on continued provocations by North Korea, and reaffirmed to continue to share information between Japan and the U.S. • Confirmed the importance of continuously pressuring North Korea in a visible way and the importance of close coordination between Japan and the U.S. • Reaffirmed the two governments’ intention to promote close cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea. • Shared the position that Japan and the U.S. will work together for the peace and security of the East China Sea while keeping a close watch on the situations. • Agreed on the importance of engagement in the Southeast Asia region while keeping a close watch on the situations in the South China Sea, and welcomed progress in multilateral security cooperation as well as dialogues in the region through the framework of ADMM Plus. • The Japanese side mentioned its intention to take initiatives to help ASEAN with capacity building based on the “Vientiane Vision,” Japan’s defense cooperation initiatives with ASEAN. • Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will continue to cooperate closely to provide capacity building assistance to Southeast Asian partners. • The Japanese side requested the U.S. Forces to make efforts to operate safely as understanding from the local communities is vital in ensuring the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan.| |Apr. 20, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis|• The Ministers closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on the way ahead including the meeting between leaders of United States and North Korea, regarding the issue of North Korea. • Agreed on the need to keep a close watch on North Korea, given no concrete initiatives by North Korea to give up its nuclear development has been confirmed, despite the changes in the regime’s posture such as requesting for talks. • The Japanese side spoke about the necessity to put maximum pressure on North Korea in order to make it abolish its nuclear and missile development, and affirmed that the two governments will maintain pressure and sanctions on North Korea with the goal of having North Korea relinquish all weapons of mass destruction and all ballistic missile plans in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. • The U.S. side commended efforts by the MSDF to address the issue of illegal ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels, and showed its commitment to continue these efforts with Japan and other partner nations. • Affirmed the importance of cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea and other nations through trilateral/multilateral training and exercise. • Agreed on the importance of continuing close information-sharing to ensure the Alliance’s response capabilities to any situation. • Welcomed progress in cooperation between Japan and the U.S. under Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines such as the SDF protecting and providing supplies and services to the U.S. Forces, and reaffrimed the further promotion of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation through the steady enforcement of the Legislation and the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. • The Japanese side talked about moving forward on the review of the National Defense Program Guidelines towards the end of FY2018 and the study of setting forth a next Mid- Term Defense Program, and reaffirmed on sharing information between the ministers. • The Japanese side spoke about the need to introduce high-performance equipment including those used by the U.S. military to bolster Japan’s defense capabilities amid an increasingly severe security environment. The two ministers affirmed to work together to make it possible for Japan to smoothly and swiftly acquire equipment made in the U.S. including the Aegis Ashore by addressing the issues regarding FMS. • The Japanese side requested the securing of safe operations by the U.S. Forces, including the CV-22 to be deployed to Yokota Air Base and U.S. Forces aircraft in Okinawa, and the U.S. side acknowledged the importance of ensuring filght safety. • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on the local community of Okinawa and other places, and concurred that the U.S. will continue to cooperate with Japan on efforts to gain the understanding of the local community.| |May 29, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Hawaii Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis|• The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on future response against North Korea issues. • The Japanese side expressed its view that the meeting between the leaders of U.S. and North Korea should be an opportunity to advance outstanding issues of concern such as nuclear, missile and abductions issues. The Ministers confirmed that they will continue exerting pressure and sanctions, under the common principle of realizing abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles of all ranges in complete, verifiable and irreversible way. • In light of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods, the Ministers welcomed measures implemented by Japan in coordination with partner countries including United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and agreed that they will continue to take actions with the voluntary countries, and reaffirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea. • The U.S. side expressed renewed commitment to Japanese defense. The Ministers agreed that they will continue to maintain close communication to take concerted action as an alliance in response to any situations. • The Ministers exchanged opinions on regional challenges, and in light of China’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas, agreed that it is important for both countries to continue to closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, to cooperate for the peace and stability, and to be continuously engaged in the South China Sea. • The Ministers noted that China has enforced its military capability and intensified its activities in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and also agreed to reinforce the Alliance capability to deter and respond through enhancement of defense capability based on the close cooperation of Japan and U.S. for the peace and stability of the region. • The Ministers reconfirmed the importance of cooperating with the allied countries and various partners to assure the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and agreed that Japan and U.S. or Japan, U.S., and Australia proceed with coordination in the promotion of the basic principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation, and in capacity building. • The Japanese side requested efforts to ensure safe operations of U.S. Forces and cooperation in efforts to obtain consent from local communities including those in Okinawa.| |Jun. 29, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis|• The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on future response against North Korea issues. • The Ministers agreed that, complying with the UNSCRs, they will work together to realize CVID of all of its WMD including biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles of all ranges in coordination with the international community, and confirmed that Japan and U.S. continue to counter illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea in coordination with their partner countries. • The U.S. side explained the suspension of U.S.-ROK combined military exercises, and the Ministers reaffirmed that neither withdrawal nor reduction of the USFK has been considered, and reconfirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea. • The U.S. side expressed renewed U.S. commitments to defend Japan, and the Ministers agreed to proceed with the reinforcement of the alliance’s deterrence and response capability including conducting Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises steadily, as planned. • The Ministers exchanged their views based on the U.S. Secretary of Defense’s visit to China, and agreed that they will continue to maintain a close channel of communication to take concerted actions as an alliance in response to every situation. • The Ministers reconfirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands, and agreed to continue to closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, and to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability. • The Ministers also confirmed the importance to collaborate towards consolidating basic principles such as rule of law and freedom of navigation. • The Ministers welcomed the progress and improvements being made in challenges regarding Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and the Ministers also confirmed the U.S. will continue to work to help Japan achieve efficient procurement. • The Ministers agreed to closely work towards the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, and the Japanese side requested cooperation to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.| ----- |Col1|Outline and Results| |---|---| |Oct. 19, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Singapore Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Secretary of Defense Mattis|• The Ministers shared the understandings about the importance of the free and open Indo-Pacific, and confirmed the significance of cooperation between Japan and the United States and with various partners. • The Ministers welcomed the development of the regional multilateral security cooperation and dialogue under the framework of the ADMM-Plus, and agreed to strengthen the cooperation with partner countries in maintaining basic international principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation and in implementing measures for peace and stability such as capacity building assistance. • The Ministers, taking into account that China continues unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, confirmed that the two countries work together for the peace and stability of the East China Sea, and it is important for both countries to be engaged in the South China Sea. • The Ministers confirmed they continue to support full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • As part of efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the UN Security Council resolutions, the Ministers additionally confirmed the importance of working with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea, and welcomed the monitoring and surveillance activities taking place since September with the participation of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and agreed that the two countries conduct the operation in cooperation with like-minded countries. • The Ministers confirmed that U.S. Forces in ROK is a stabilizing force in the region, and that no change in U.S. Forces in ROK has been considered. • The Ministers also agreed to work together to reinforce the deterrence and response capability including conducting Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises steadily as planned. • The Ministers confirmed to work together to improve effciiency regarding Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Japan’s buying U.S-made defense assets. • The Japanese side explained the current status of the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines and the formulation of the Mid-Term Defense Program for the next term, and the Ministers concurred to continue to closely exchange information. • The Ministers reconfirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use. • The Ministers confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. • The Japanese side requested for cooperation with efforts to secure the understanding from the local communities, and to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.| |Jan. 16, 2019 Meeting with the U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan|• The U.S. side supported the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond (NDPG) and the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP), and welcomed that Japan expressed its strong resolve to enhance its defense architecture and to play a larger role in accordance with the NDPG and the MTDP. • In regards to the current security environment, both sides shared views that competition among states is becoming more apparent. They also agreed that gaining technological superiority in new domains such as space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is increasingly important. • Both sides also confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made pursuant to Japan’s NDPG and MTDP, and the United States’ National Defense Strategy (NDS) respectively, as well as to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond following the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. With the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific in mind, they agreed to work together to shape a desirable security environment with Japan-U.S. alliance being the cornerstone of cooperation with other nations. • Both sides confirmed to strengthen and expand cooperation in wide range of fields including the following: ○Promote Japan-U.S. cooperation in the “new domains,” including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. The United States welcomed Japan’s first participation in the Schriever Wargame. ○Closely coordinate in bilateral exercises and capacity building assistance, taking into account increasing both nations’ presence in the Indo-Pacific. ○Welcome and even make progress in the two countries’ cooperation in the operational field following Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines (e.g. U.S. Forces asset protection mission conducted by the SDF, provision of supplies and services). ○Make continued effort in streamlining FMS process, while welcoming the recent progress and improvements in issues related to FMS. Cooperate in ensuring cost transparency, improving late case closure, strengthening activities to realize and promote multi-year procurement. ○Continue cooperation to realize Japan’s smooth and prompt introduction, including cost management of U.S.-made advanced defense equipment such as Aegis Ashore, E-2D and F-35. ○Enhance cooperation in defense equipment and technology as well as promoting Japan-U.S. joint development and researches. • Both sides confirmed they continue to support full implementation of the UNSC resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • Both sides agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter North Korea’s illicit “ship-to-ship” transfers. • Both sides confirmed that deterrence through Japan-U.S. Alliance and U.S.-ROK Alliance is essential in maintaining the security of the region, and agreed that both countries will steadily implement Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises. • In regards to the East and South China Seas, both sides affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion, and that it is important to work together to make sure that Rule of Law and Freedom of Navigation are firmly established. • Both sides also reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States work together for the peace and stability of the East China Sea. • Both sides affirmed the recent progress in the construction project of Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), and reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use. The Japanese side requested for cooperation with efforts to mitigate impact on the local communities including Okinawa. Both sides confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives and training relocation. • Both sides also affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.| |Apr. 19, 2019 “2+2” Meeting / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan Secretary of State Pompeo|• The Ministers shared the view that the Japan-U.S. Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and that Japan and the United States will work together to realize a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” • The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will jointly increase their presence in the region, while collaborating with partners in the region through bilateral/ multilateral exercises, port calls, and other activities. • The Ministers welcomed the alignment of the strategic policy documents of both countries, including Japan’s NDPG. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will strengthen cooperation for cross-domain operations, including capability enhancement in new domains, such as space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. • The Ministers shared the view that they will seek to achieve North Korea’s abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, the Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue to work together in cooperation with other partner countries in fully implementing UN Security Council resolutions, including combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers. • The Ministers also reaffirmed that U.S. force stance in the region would remain robust, and shared the view on deepening consultation on ensuring deterrence and security in the region. The Ministers also shared the view that they will continue to engage in close cooperation between Japan and the United States as well as among Japan, the United States, and the ROK. • The Ministers shared the view on calling upon North Korea to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately. • Regarding the security environment in the Indo-Pacifci region, the Ministers expressed serious concern about, and strong opposition to, unilateral coercive attempts to alter the status quo in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS). • The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to work together to safeguard the peace and stability of the ECS, and reconfirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. • The Ministers confirmed that they will deepen cooperation on space capabilities, and shared the view on promoting cooperation for enhancing space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities through Japan’s development of a Deep Space Radar and hosting of U.S.-provided SSA payloads on Japan’s Quasi Zenith Satellite System. • The Ministers shared the view on enhancing cooperation on cyber issues. They affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. • The Ministers confirmed that it is important to develop defense capabilities efficiently and effectively in order to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan- U.S. Alliance. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will cooperate to introduce advanced weapon systems to Japan and to further streamline the FMS process. • The Ministers affirmed the importance of information security, and shared the view on the need for greater supply chain security, noting threats to the defense industrial base, national networks, and critical infrastructure required for mission assurance. • In order to improve Japan-U.S. Alliance readiness, the Ministers shared the view on further deepening operational cooperation, such as mutual asset protection, logistical support, and joint ISR operations. • The ministers shared the view that they will steadily implement the realignment of the USFJ, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. • The Ministers welcomed the significant progress on the construction of the FRF and reaffirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids its continued use. • Foreign Minister Kono conveyed to the U.S. side that it is important to mitigate the impact on the local people, including making progress, one by one, on the issues surrounding the operation of U.S. forces and the SOFA, while steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. forces. • Defense Minister Iwaya requested the U.S. side to minimize the impact of the operation of U.S. forces on local communities, including noise of transient aircraft. • The two ministers also requested the U.S. side to prevent incidents and accidents.| ----- |Col1|Outline and Results| |---|---| |Apr. 19, 2019 Meeting with Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan|• The Ministers welcomed the successful holding of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting and affirmed that the defense authorities of Japan and the United States will continue to closely cooperate with each other to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. • The Ministers affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea. • The Ministers also agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate with like-minded countries in combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea. • They affirmed the importance of deterrence based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the U.S.-ROK Alliance and agreed to steadily conduct Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises. • The Ministers agreed to promote Japan-U.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations and affirmed that the two countries will further promote cooperation in space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. • The Ministers affirmed that Japan and the United States will further streamline the FMS process and agreed to strengthen defense equipment and technology cooperation by promoting Japan-U.S. joint research and development. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will cooperate closely to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.| |Jun. 4, 2019 Meeting between Minister of Defense Iwaya and Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan / Tokyo Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan|• The two ministers affirmed that they will closely cooperate with each other in line with the policy confirmed at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting. • The Ministers affirmed the need to deepen Japan-U.S. cooperation with a sense of urgency with respect to new domains, such as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. They affirmed that they will promote Japan-U.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations. • Defense Minister Iwaya welcomed the Indo-Pacifci Strategy Report by the United States. Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation with the United States to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific as indicated in the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. The Ministers affirmed the importance of cooperating with diverse partners. • The Ministers discussed the regional situation and other matters in light of the discussions held at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue. • Regarding North Korea, they affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward the abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and they also confirmed that Japan-U.S. and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation will be maintained. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue close cooperation to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.| |Aug. 7, 2019 Meeting between Minister of Defense Iwaya and U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper / Tokyo Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper|• The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea. • The Ministers confirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea. • The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that the rule of law and the freedom of navigation are firmly established. • The Ministers reconfirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands, and agreed to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability in the East China Sea. • The Ministers confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made based on the strategy documents of both countries and to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond. • They confirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners, including conducting bilateral/multilateral exercises and capacity building assistance to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific with Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone. • The Ministers confirmed to make continued effort in streamlining FMS process. • The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. • The Japanese side requested for cooperation in the Government of Japan’s efforts to mitigate the impact on the local communities including Okinawa. The Ministers confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. • The Japanese side also requested the U.S. Forces to minimize its operational impact on the local communities and the Ministers affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.| |Nov. 18, 2019 Meeting between Minister of Defense Kono and U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper / Thailand Participants: Minister of Defense Kono U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper|• The Ministers confirmed that the recent series of ballistic missile launches by North Korea are a serious threat to regional security. • The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that the rule of law and freedom of navigation are firmly established. • The Ministers confirmed that they continue to closely work together to further strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond, including promotion of bilateral cooperation in new domains, in order to materialize aligned strategies of both countries. • The Ministers reaffirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners including conducting bilateral/multilateral exercises and capacity building to maintain and strengthen a Free and Open Indo-Pacific with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone. • The Ministers confirmed to make continued effort in streamlining FMS process. • The Ministers reaffirmed that it is important to sustain the operational readiness of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and Japan and the U.S. continue to work together with the shared recognition that understanding and cooperation from local communities is crucial for maintenance of the operational readiness. • The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. • The Japanese side requested for cooperation in the Government of Japan’s efforts to mitigate the impact on the local communities including Okinawa. The Ministers confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. • The Japanese side also requested the U.S. Forces to minimize its operational impact on the local communities and the Ministers affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.| |Jan. 14, 2020 Meeting between Minister of Defense Kono and U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Kono U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper|• The Ministers discussed the situation in the Middle East. • The Japanese side expressed its deep concern about the rising tensions in the Middle East. The Ministers confirmed that we have to avoid further escalation of the situation in the Middle East; • The Japanese side explained the cabinet decision to send the SDF to the Middle East. • The Ministers confirmed that repeated ballistic missile launches by North Korea are a serious challenge not only to Japan but also to the international community. • The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter illicit “ship-to-ship” transfers of goods by North Korea. • The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that the rule of law and the freedom of navigation are firmly established; • The Ministers welcomed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance has become stronger than ever before particularly when we celebrate the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. • The Ministers confirmed that they continue to closely work together to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond in order to materialize the aligned strategies of both countries; • The Ministers reaffirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners, including conducting bilateral/multilateral exercises and capacity building to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone; • The ministers welcomed the recent progress made by the Japanese Government in the acquisition of Mageshima, a candidate site for FCLP, and confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. • The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henokosaki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. • The Japanese side requested for cooperation in the Government of Japan’s efforts to mitigate the impact on the local communities including Okinawa. • The Ministers discussed the bilateral cooperation in addressing the issue of PFOS and confirmed to advance comprehensive studies. • The Ministers reaffirmed that it is important to sustain the operational readiness of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and that Japan and the United States continue to work together with the shared recognition that understanding and cooperation from the local communities is crucial for the maintenance of the operational readiness. • Both sides also affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.| ----- remain robust and grounded in a clear-eyed assessment of threats, and they determined to deepen consultation on ensuring deterrence and security in the region. The Ministers also highlighted the importance of cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, and committed to work together to promote trilateral security cooperation and exercises. The Ministers expressed serious concern about, and strong opposition to, unilateral coercive attempts to alter the status quo in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS). The Ministers renewed their determination to work together to safeguard the peace and stability of the ECS, and reconfirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. The Ministers renewed their commitment to work both together and multilaterally to further support a free and open Indo-Pacific, including through joint exercises and port calls with partners in the region, capacity building in such areas as maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, and promotion of sustainable economic development and connectivity through quality infrastructure. The Ministers also recognized the crucial role of the U.S.-Japan Security arrangements in facilitating the greater presence of U.S. forces in the region. To enable the United States to continue to maintain forward deployed forces in Japan, the Ministers reaffirmed the two Governments’ commitment to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces. The Ministers also welcomed the significant progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and reconfirmed that the plan to construct the FRF at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. The Ministers underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion as soon as possible. In recognition of the depth and breadth of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the Ministers agreed to release a fact sheet detailing additional areas of bilateral cooperation. **U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee 2019 Fact Sheet** Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan, Foreign Minister Taro Kono, and Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya met in Washington, DC on April 19, 2019. Building upon their joint statement, the Ministers discussed the following shared priorities and initiatives through which the people of the United States and Japan will work together to strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance and build a free and open Indo-Pacific: **I. Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation** **Cooperation for Cross-Domain Operations**  Emphasizing the integral role of space in full spectrum cross-domain operations, the Ministers stressed the importance of deepening cooperation on space capabilities to strengthen mission assurance, interoperability, and operational cooperation. Both sides recognized the benefits of cooperation on space situational awareness (SSA) and highlighted Japan's development of a Deep Space Radar and the opportunity to host U.S.-provided SSA payloads on Japan's Quasi Zenith Satellite System planned for launch in 2023. The Ministers also underscored their interest in identifying ways to support alliance needs by leveraging emerging, innovative space concepts.  The Ministers determined to bolster capability and enhance their respective integrated defense for both air and missile threats, including through the timely and smooth deployment of Japan’s Aegis Ashore. The Ministers also shared their concerns about the proliferation of intermediate-range missiles worldwide and committed to working together to address this growing threat. **Enhancing the Alliance’s Capabilities**  The Ministers reiterated the importance of modernizing and adapting the Alliance’s capabilities to meet both current and future needs, including through the introduction of advanced weapon systems to Japan such as F-35, E-2D, V-22, stand-off missiles, and Aegis Ashore. The United States welcomed Japan’s decision to utilize a multi-year budgeting process to purchase nine E-2D aircraft. The Ministers recognized the importance of utilizing multi-year budgeting, and ensuring cost transparency as well as early and effective case closures to further streamline the foreign military sales process.  To enhance interoperability, the Ministers reaffirmed the intent to promote the standardization of defense equipment, sharing of defense networks, and cooperation on emerging technologies. The Ministers welcomed progress on the SM-3 Block IIA and its anticipated shift to the production phase, as well as the expedited cooperative research process for amphibious operational technologies.  Cognizant of the fact that the Alliance’s technological advantage must be safeguarded from our adversaries at all times, the Ministers committed to strengthen and enhance information security practices across the whole of government to protect classified information, maintain technological superiority, and preserve our shared economic and defense advantages in the face of evolving threats to the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Ministers emphasized the need for greater supply chain security, noting threats to the defense industrial base, national networks, and critical infrastructure required for mission assurance. **Reference 20 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee** **(2+2) (tentative translation)** (April 19, 2019) **Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee** On April 19, 2019, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee convened in Washington, DC, with the participation of Secretary of State Pompeo, Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan, Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono, and Minister of Defense Iwaya. During the meeting, the Ministers affirmed their strong commitment to realize a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a shared vision for a region in which all nations are sovereign, strong, and prosperous. Decades after the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed, the U.S.-Japan Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and remains ironclad amid an increasingly complex security environment. The Alliance will continue to play an indispensable role in upholding a rules-based international order and promoting the shared values of the American and Japanese people. The Ministers welcomed the alignment of the strategic policy documents of both countries, namely the United States’ National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, and Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines. These strategies show that the U.S.-Japan security partnership continues to adapt to be stronger, more advanced, and more effective, consistent with the objectives of the bilateral 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The Ministers acknowledged their shared concern that geopolitical competition and coercive attempts to undermine international rules, norms, and institutions present challenges to the Alliance and to the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Ministers highlighted the need for an increasingly networked structure of alliances and partnerships, anchored by the U.S.-Japan Alliance, to counter these challenges. The Ministers also expressed concern about rapidly evolving technological advancement in new domains, including space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. The Ministers highlighted the need to address these challenges jointly to ensure the Alliance’s superiority in a contingency and to safeguard our institutions and rules-based order during peacetime. The Ministers affirmed that their two nations’ strong bilateral security relationship continues to be the foundation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. As such, the Ministers decided that cooperation in cross- domain operations, enhancing the Alliance’s capabilities, and increasing operational readiness and cooperation should be core objectives to advance our defense relationship. The United States welcomed Japan’s proactive steps to strengthen its defensive capabilities, with the Ministers confirming that both nations need to constantly re-evaluate their roles, missions, and capabilities. Acknowledging the changing dynamics of warfare, the Ministers highlighted the importance of developing capabilities and increasing operational cooperation in both conventional and non- conventional domains. The Ministers highlighted space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum as priority areas to better prepare the Alliance for cross-domain operations. On cyberspace issues, the Ministers recognized that malicious cyber activity presents an increasing threat to the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan. To address this threat, the Ministers committed to enhance cooperation on cyber issues, including deterrence and response capabilities, but as a matter of priority, emphasized that each nation is responsible for developing the relevant capabilities to protect their national networks and critical infrastructure. The Ministers affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The Ministers also affirmed that a decision as to when a cyber attack would constitute an armed attack under Article V would be made on a case-by-case basis, and through close consultations between Japan and the United States, as would be the case for any other threat. The Ministers recognized the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan, as well as the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The United States reiterated its commitment to the defense of Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including conventional and nuclear. The Ministers reiterated the importance of the international community’s ongoing commitment to achieving North Korea’s abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and related programs and facilities in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The Ministers welcomed the United States’ diplomatic efforts to achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, including through the U.S.-North Korea Summits. The Ministers affirmed their commitment to lead international efforts in UNSCR implementation, particularly in combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers, and the Ministers committed to strengthen and enhance cooperation with other partner countries participating in UNSCR implementation. The Ministers also recognized the successful efforts to bring back U.S. nationals held in North Korea, and called upon North Korea to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately. Th Mi i t ffi d th t U S f t i th i ld ----- **Operational Readiness and Cooperation**  The Ministers committed to deepen operational cooperation as a means to improve Alliance readiness, interoperability, and deterrence, which are critical components for both peacetime and contingency operations. As a result, the Ministers welcomed the steady implementation of mutual asset protection; bilateral presence and joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance operations; increased scope of logistical support under the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement; and ongoing exchange of liaison officers.  The Ministers also reaffirmed that the two Governments would promote joint/shared use of the facilities of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and U.S. Forces, in addition to operational training areas, to enhance interoperability, deterrence, and response capability, and to build a stronger relationship with local communities. The Ministers welcomed steady progress in both bilateral planning and cooperation on noncombatant evacuation operations. **II. U.S. Forces in Japan**  The Ministers reaffirmed the two Governments’ commitment to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in order to improve operational readiness and deterrent capabilities, while continuing efforts to mitigate the impact on local communities. The Ministers welcomed initiatives to build and strengthen U.S. forces’ community relations programs.  The Ministers welcomed the progress on facility improvements of Nyutabaru Air Base and Tsuiki Air Base of the Air Self-Defense Force for contingency use of aircraft.  The Ministers welcomed the relocation of the carrier air wing squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni last year. The United States also expressed appreciation for the Government of Japan’s continued efforts to acquire Mageshima for a new SDF facility. This facility will support operations such as large-scale disaster response as well as regular exercises and other activities, including as a permanent field carrier landing practice (FCLP) site for use by U.S. forces. The United States reiterated that a permanent FCLP facility will greatly contribute to the safe operation and training of U.S. forces. The Ministers expressed their intention to work closely in order to complete the development of the permanent facility at the earliest possible date.  The Ministers welcomed progress in the steady implementation of the Guam International Agreement, and the planned relocation of approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan. They reconfirmed the plan to begin the relocation to Guam in the first half of the 2020s.  The Ministers recognized the importance of aviation safety and addressing public concerns related to this issue. The Ministers committed to facilitate prompt exchanges of information, and to continue a regular bilateral dialogue regarding aviation safety. Both sides recognized the necessity of all training, including aviation training, to maintain the highest levels of readiness and capabilities for the Alliance. **III. Working with Partners for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific**  The Ministers reiterated their support for ASEAN centrality and unity and their commitment to multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia, including through joint training and exercises, capacity building, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and support for ASEAN-related architecture, including the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus. To support the autonomous and sustainable development of countries in the Mekong region, the Ministers committed to work closely in support of regional countries to address shared transboundary challenges, including transnational crime and trafficking, regional connectivity, energy security, and enhanced energy system integration.  The Ministers welcomed continued cooperation and high-level consultation among the United States, Japan, and Australia, including through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, and noted the importance of trilateral joint exercises and capacity building in Southeast Asian and Pacific island countries. The Ministers also noted with satisfaction the first Japan-U.S.-India trilateral summit meeting in 2018 and highlighted significant joint exercises, such as Malabar 2018 and Cope India 2018. Building upon these various trilateral efforts, the Ministers welcomed the regularization of quadrilateral engagement among Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. The Ministers also welcomed the increasing regional presence of the United Kingdom and France, and called for further cooperation in areas including activities in support of freedom of navigation, port calls, and countering illicit ship-to-ship transfers.  The Ministers called for full respect for freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and reiterated the importance of activities that support those principles. The Ministers urged all parties to pursue demilitarization of disputed features in the SCS, resolve all maritime disputes peacefully without resorting to the threat or use of force, clarify their maritime claims in accordance with the international law of the sea as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and fully respect legal and diplomatic processes.  The Ministers underscored the importance of the July 2016 PhilippinesChina Arbitral Tribunal’s Award for the two parties. The Ministers also emphasized the importance of a Code of Conduct in the SCS that is in full accordance with international law and upholds the right of ASEAN member states to partner with countries and foreign entities of their choosing, including with respect to hydrocarbon development and military exercises. **IV. Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games**  The Ministers confirmed that the two Governments intend to continue to work closely together through a whole-of-government effort toward a successful Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. ----- **Reference 21 Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2019** |Joint Staff|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)| |Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercise (command post exercise) (Keen Edge 2020)|Jan.24-31, 2020|Ichigaya District (Ministry of Defense), home stations of the units participating in the exercise, U.S. Yokota Air Base, and Hawaii (the United States)|[JSDF] Internal Bureau, each Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (GSDF) Ground Component Command, respective Regional Armies (MSDF) Self-Defense Fleet, respective Regional Districts (ASDF) Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. (Joint Units) Intelligence Security Command, Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command|－|－| |Japan-U.S. joint air defense/ missile defense exercise|Feb. 24-28, 2020|GSDF Camp Matsudo, Camp Shimoshizu, Camp Aonogahara, Camp Iizuka, Camp Takematsu and Vice-Camp Yaese; MSDF Yokosuka District; ASDF Misawa, Yokota, Tsuiki, Kasuga, Nyutabaru and Naha Air Bases; and U.S. Yokosuka Naval Base|[JSDF] Joint Staff, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, Middle Army, Western Army, JGSDF Air Defense School, Self-Defense Fleet and Air Defense Command [U.S. Forces] U.S. 7th Fleet HQs, several vessels, etc.|－|－| |Ground Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)| |Field training with U.S. Army in the United States (Arctic Aurora)|May 22-Jun. 28, 2019|Joint Base Elmendorf- Richardson and surrounding training area (Alaska, the United States), Donnelly Training Area, and Eielson Air Force Base and Husky Drop Zone|[JSDF] Major units of 1st Infantry Battalion, 1st Airborne Brigade [U.S. Forces] 1-501 Infantry Battalion, 4-25 Brigade Combat Team (Airborne)|Totaling approximately 110 personnel|Totaling approximately 140 personnel| |Field Training with U.S. Forces in Australia (Talisman Sabre 19)|Jun. 3-Aug. 20, 2019|Shoalwater Bay Training Area (Queensland, Australia) and its surrounding area|[JSDF] (GSDF) Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade (MSDF) Destroyer JS “Ise,” Landing Ship JS “Kunisaki” [U.S. Forces] U.S. Marines and Navy|2 vessels (GSDF) Totaling approximately 330 personnel (MSDF) Totaling approximately 500 personnel|－| |Parachute drop training from U.S. aircraft in Japan|Jul. 16-17, 2019|Hijudai Maneuver Area, ASDF Tsuiki Air Base and U.S. Yokota Air Base|[JSDF] 1st Airborne Brigade, Ground Component Command [U.S. Forces] 374th Airlift Wing, 5th Air Force|Totaling approximately 100 personnel|C-130J ×2| |Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (the United States) (YS-76)|Jul. 17-30, 2019|Fort Shafter Army Base (Hawaii, the United States)|[JSDF] Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, Western Army, Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, etc. [U.S. Forces] Pacific Command, U.S. Army Japan, I Corps, etc.|Totaling approximately 150 personnel|Totaling approximately 150 personnel| |Field training with U.S. Army in the United States (Rising Thunder)|Aug. 22-Sep. 21, 2019|Yakima Training Center (Washington, the United States)|[JSDF] One company of the 25th Infantry Regiment [U.S. Forces] 2 Infantry Battalion, 33 Brigade Combat Team|Totaling approximately 120 personnel|Totaling approximately 380 personnel| |Field training with U.S. Army in Japan (Orient Shield 19)|Aug. 26-Sep. 23, 2019|Camp Kengun, Oyanohara Maneuver Area, Vice-Camp Takayubaru, Camp Amami, Yausubetsu Maneuver Area|[JSDF] 16th Infantry Regiment, 4th Division, 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, Western Field Artillery Unit [U.S. Forces] 2-106 Cavalry, 33 Brigade Combat Team; 17th Fires Brigade; U.S. Army Aviation Battalion Japan; 1-1 Air Defense Artillery Battalion|Totaling approximately 950 personnel|Totaling approximately 950 personnel| |Parachute drop training from U.S. aircraft in Japan|Nov. 12-13, 2019|Hijudai Maneuver Area and ASDF Tsuiki Air Base|[JSDF] 1st Airborne Brigade, Ground Component Command [U.S. Forces] 374th Airlift Wing, 5th Air Force|Totaling approximately 120 personnel|C-130J × 2| |Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan (Forest Light (MA))|Dec. 1-13, 2019|Aibano Maneuver Area, Kokubudai Maneuver Area, Nihonbara Maneuver Area, Camp Imazu and Camp Akeno|[JSDF] Major units of 8th Infantry Regiment, 13th Division [U.S. Forces] Major units of 1-25 Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division; VMM-262, Marine Aircraft Group 36, 1st Marine Air Wing|Totaling approximately 450 personnel|Totaling approximately 300 personnel| |Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (Japan) (YS-77)|Dec. 3-16, 2019|Camp Asaka, Camp Kengun, Camp Courtney, etc.|[JSDF] Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, Western Army, Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, Joint Staff, MSDF, ASDF, etc. [U.S. Forces] Pacific Command HQs, U.S. Army Japan HQs, I Corps, 40th Infantry Division, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, etc.|Totaling approximately 5,000 personnel|Totaling approximately 1,600 personnel| ----- |Exercise Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Field training with U.S. Army in the United States (Combat Training Center 20)|Jan. 2-Feb. 7, 2020|Fort Polk (Louisiana, the United States) (Joint Readiness Training Center)|[JSDF] Major units of 39th Infantry Regiment, 9th Division [U.S. Forces] 4-25 Brigade Combat Team, U.S. Army Alaska|－|－| |Field training with U.S. Army in the United States (Iron Fist 2020)|Jan. 5-Feb. 27, 2020|Camp Pendleton (California, the United States), San Clemente Island, and their surrounding waters and airspace|[JSDF] Major units of 2nd Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade [U.S. Forces] 1st Marine Expeditionary Unit HQs; 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit; Amphibious Squadron, 3rd Fleet, etc.|－|－| |Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan (Forest Light (WA))|Jan. 18-30, 2020|Oyanohara Maneuver Area, Kirishima Maneuver Area and Vice-Camp Takayubaru|[JSDF] 12th Infantry Regiment, 8th Division; 8th Fighter Squadron; Western Army Aviation Group, etc. [U.S. Forces] Major units of Brigade Landing Team, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit|－|－| |Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan (Northern Viper)|Jan. 22-Feb. 8, 2020|Hokkaido-Dai Maneuver Area, Yausubetsu Maneuver Area, Camp Obihiro and ASDF Chitose Air Base|[JSDF] 4th Infantry Regiment, 5th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Anti-Tank Helicopter Unit, etc. [U.S. Forces] 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division; 3rd Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment; Marine Aircraft Group 36, etc.|－|－| |Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan|Jan. 25-Feb. 13, 2020|Okinawa Prefecture and its surrounding waters|[JSDF] Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade [U.S. Forces] U.S. Marine Corps (31st Marine Expeditionary Unit), U.S. Navy (Amphibious Squadron 11)|－|－| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)| |Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise|May 29, 2019|Waters and airspace around Guam|Destroyers JS “Ariake,” and JS “Asahi”|2 vessels|Destroyer USS “Curtis Wilbur”| |Field Training with U.S. Forces in Australia (Talisman Sabre 19)|Jun. 3-Aug. 21, 2019|Shoalwater Bay Training Area (Queensland, Australia) and its surrounding waters|[JSDF] (GSDF) Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade (MSDF) Destroyer JS “Ise,” Landing Ship JS “Kunisaki” [U.S. Forces] U.S. Marines and Navy|2 vessels (GSDF) Totaling approximately 330 personnel (MSDF) Totaling approximately 500 personnel|－| |Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise|Jun. 10-12, 2019|South China Sea|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” JS “Murasame,” and JS “Akebono”|3 vessels|Carrier USS “Ronald Reagan” Several vessels| |Minesweeping special training (Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise)|Jun. 15-24, 2019|Waters around Iwo-to Island|Minesweeper Tender JS “Uraga,” Minesweeper Oceans JS “Awaji,” and JS “Hirado,” Minesweeper Coastals JS “Hatsushima,” JS “Tsunoshima,” JS “Naoshima,” JS “Toyoshima,” and JS “Aoshima”|8 vessels Totaling approximately 500 personnel|6 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel| |Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise|Jun. 19-20, 2019|South China Sea|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” JS “Murasame,” and JS “Akebono”|3 vessels|Carrier USS “Ronald Reagan” Several vessels| |Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise|Aug. 13-24, 2019|Waters and airspace around Bashi Channel through south of Kanto|Destroyer JS “Myoko”|1 vessel|Carrier USS “Ronald Reagan” Several vessels| |MSDF training (simulation training [Japan-U.S. bilateral training])|Sep. 4-9, 2019|JMSDF Staff College (Meguro) and other locations of the units participating in the training|Each Self-Defense Fleet HQs, each District HQs, Communications Command, MSDF Maritime Materiel Command, etc.|Totaling approximately 3,200 personnel|－| |Medical special training|Sep. 20, 2019|Heliport of the HQs Yokosuka District, Itsumi pier, and U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka|[JSDF] HQs Yokosuka District, Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Base Service Activity Yokosuka, Medical Service Unit Yokosuka [U.S. Forces] U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka|Totaling approximately 125 personnel|Totaling approximately 250 personnel| |Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise (aircraft)|Oct. 8-10, 2019|East China Sea|Fleet Air Force|EP-3 × 1 OP-3C × 1|EP-3E × 1| |Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise|Oct. 24-Nov. 2, 2019|Waters and airspace south of Okinawa through south of Kanto|Destroyer JS “Fuyuzuki”|1 vessel|Carrier USS “Ronald Reagan” Several vessels| |MSDF training (field training [Japan-U.S. bilateral training])|Nov. 4-21, 2019|Waters and airspace around Japan|Self-Defense Fleet|Approximately 20 vessels Approximately 40 aircraft|Approximately 5 vessels| |Minesweeping special training|Feb. 1-10, 2020|Ise Bay|Minesweeper Tender, Minesweeper Ocean, Minesweeping Controller, Landing Ship|20 vessels MCH-101 × 2|Approx. 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel| |Anti-submarine special training|Feb. 17-21, 2020|Off the coast of Shikoku|Submarine, destroyer, aircraft|6 vessels|Submarine| |Japan-U.S. joint command post exercise (deployment exercise to the United States)|Feb. 24-Mar. 5, 2020|U.S. Naval War College (Newport, Rhode Island, the United States)|[JSDF] Maritime Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet HQs, Command and Staff College, etc. [U.S. Forces] U.S. 7th Fleet HQs, U.S. Naval Japan HQs, U.S. Pacific Fleet HQs, U.S. Naval War College, etc.|Totaling approximately 40 personnel|Totaling approximately 50 personnel| ----- |Air Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)| |U.S. Air Force exercise (RED FLAG-Alaska)|Jun. 7-22, 2019|Eielson Air Force Base (Alaska, the United States) Joint base Elmendof- Richardson, and their surrounding airspace|3rd Air Wing, Air Defense Command; Airborne Early Warning Group; 1st Tactical Airlift Group, Air Support Command|F-2A/B × 6 E-767 × 1 C-130H × 2 Totaling approximately 280 personnel|－| |Airfield damage repair training|Aug. 20-23, 2019|Damage repair training area, Yokota Air Base|Central Air Civil Engineering Group HQs, Western Air Defense Force 5th Air Wing Western Aircraft Control & Warning Wing Western Air Civil Engineering Group|Totaling approximately 50 personnel|Totaling approximately 20 personnel| |Airfield damage repair training|Aug. 26-30, 2019|Damage repair training area, Naha Air Base|9th Air Wing Southwestern Air Civil Engineering Group|Totaling approximately 50 personnel|Totaling approximately 50 personnel| |Fighter combat training (Aviation training relocation as a part of realignment initiatives from Misawa Air Base to Komatsu Air Base)|Oct. 1-4, 2019|Airspace off the coast of Komatsu|[JSDF] 6th Air Wing, Central Aircraft Control & Warning Wing [U.S. Forces] 35th Fighter Wing|F-15 × 4|F-16 × 6 Totaling approximately 100 personnel| |Fighter combat training and air-to-ground training (Aviation training relocation as a part of realignment initiatives from MCAS Iwakuni to Misawa Air Base)|Oct. 10-Nov. 4, 2019|Airspace east of Misawa and west of Akita, and Misawa Air-to-Ground Range|[JSDF] 3rd Air Wing, 2nd Air Wing, Northern Aircraft Control & Warning Wing [U.S. Forces] Marine Aircraft Group 12|F-2 × 4 F-15 × 4|F/A-18 × 12 Totaling approximately 170 personnel| (Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release **Reference 22 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects** |Item|Summary|Date of conclusion of intergovernmental agreement to implement joint research and development|Completion date| |---|---|---|---| |Ducted rocket engine, advanced steel technology, fighting vehicle propulsion technology using ceramic materials, eye-safe laser radar, ejection seat, advanced hybrid propulsion technology, shallow water acoustic technology, ballistic missile defense technology, low vulnerability gun propellant for field artillery, electronic device mounted on successor aircraft to P-3C, software radio, advanced hull material/structural technology, sea-based radar system, combat system for ship, palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, image gyro for airborne applications, hybrid electric drive, and High-Speed Multi-Hull Vessel Optimization||Completed|| |SM-3 Block IIA|Development of advanced missile interceptor|June 2006|March 2019 (moved to the joint produce/ deployment stage)| |Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures|Research on the combined effects of exposures to both jet fuel and noise on the risk of hearing loss for flight line personnel|November 2015|Ongoing| |Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader|Research on automatically interpreting the colorimetric response of the Chemical Agent Detector-kit|February 2017|Ongoing| |High-Temperature Case Technologies|Research on rocket motor case made of high-temperature CFRP* (CFRP: Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic)|July 2018|Ongoing| |Next Generation Amphibious Technologies|Research on the feasibility of the technology by simulations based on digital models of amphibious vehicles|May 2019|Ongoing| ----- **Reference 23 Outline of 23 Issues** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|(As of April 1, 2019）| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Facility|Scope|Area (ha)|Classification||||Remarks| ||||SCC|Gun-Ten- Kyo|Governor|U.S. Forces|| ||||||||| |Army POL Depots|1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City|4|||◎||Returned on December 31, 1990| |Camp Zukeran|2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)|0.1||◎|||Returned on September 30, 1991| ||20. Awase Meadows Golf Course|47|||◎||Returned on July 31, 2010| |Northern Training Area|3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district|480||◎|||Returned on March 31, 1993| ||4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line|(256)|◎||||| |Camp Schwab|5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)|1|◎||||Returned on March 31, 1993| |Makiminato Service Area Annex|6. In whole|0.1||||◎|Returned on March 31, 1993| |Naha Cold Storage|7. In whole|Building|◎||||Returned on March 31, 1993| |Sunabe Warehouse|8. In whole|0.3||||◎|Returned on June 30, 1993| |Yaedake Communication Site|9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)|19|◎||||Returned on November 30, 1994| |Onna Communication Site|10. In whole|62|||◎||Returned on September 30, 1995| ||11. Eastern part|(26)|◎||||| |Kadena Air Base|12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)|2||◎|||Returned on January 31, 1996| |Chibana Site|13. In whole|0.1||||◎|Returned on December 31, 1996| |Camp Hansen|14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)|3||◎|||Returned on December 31, 1996| ||23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)|162|◎||||Returned on June 30, 2014 (55ha) Returned on June 30, 2017 (107ha)| |Kadena Ammunition Storage Area|(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino–Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))|74|○||||Returned on March 25, 1999| ||15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)|3|◦|◎|||Returned on March 25, 1999| ||(22. Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities)|9|○||||Returned on March 31, 2005| ||(22. Continuing use area for GSDF)|58|○||||Returned on October 31, 2006| |Torii Communication Station|16. Kadena bypass|4||◎|||Returned on March 31, 1999| |Deputy Division Engineer Office|17. In whole|4|◎||||Returned on September 30, 2002| |Camp Kuwae|(19. Southern side of the eastern part)|2|○|○|||Returned on December 31, 1994| ||18. Northern part (Ihei)|38||◎|||Returned on March 31, 2003| ||(18. Along Route 58)|(5)|○||||| |MCAS Futenma|21. Lands along eastern side (Nakabaru - Ginowan)|4||◎|||Returned on July 31, 2017| ||17 facilities, 21 issues|977|7|8|3|3|| ||||||||| |Camp Kuwae|19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)|0.5|◎||||Change agreed on December 21, 2001| |Kadena Ammunition Storage Area|22. Old Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area|43|◎||||Release agreed on March 28, 1996| ||2 facilities, 2 issues|44|2|0|0|0|| |Total|17 facilities, 23 issues|1,021|9|8|3|3|| Notes: 1. For the “Area” column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above. 2. A single circle in the “Classification” column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue. 3. The numbers in the “Scope” column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues. 4. “SCC” in the “Classification” column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. “Gun-Ten-Kyo” indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of dezoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa’s governor. “Governor” indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. “U.S. Forces” indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa. ----- helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen. — Sobe Communication Site Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen. — Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated. — Camp Kuwae Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa. — Senaha Communication Station Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained. — Makiminato Service Area Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area. — Naha Port Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres). — Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran) Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.). **Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:** — Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997. — Parachute drop training Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield. — Conditioning hikes on public roads Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated. **Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:** — Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented. — Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed. — Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996. — Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998. — Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces. **Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:** — Accident reports Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces’ good neighbor policy every effort will be made to insure timely notification of **Reference 24 The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)** (December 2, 1996) The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan–U.S. alliance. The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year. The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996. The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report. Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned. Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary. The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee. The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject. In accordance with the April 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time. **Return Land:** — Futenma Air Station—See attached. — Northern Training Area Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/ 9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions: � Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean. � Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area. — Aha Training Area Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided. — Gimbaru Training Area Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the ----- appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces’ assets or facilities. — Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements. — Visits to U.S. facilities and areas Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996. — Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all nontactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997. — Supplemental automobile insurance Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997. — Payment for claims Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner: - Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible. - A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities. - In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount. — Quarantine procedures Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996. — Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States. — Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee **The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station** **(an integral part of the SACO Final Report) (tentative translation)** (Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996) 1. Introduction a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield’s critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF). b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary. c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work. 2. Decisions of the SCC a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station’s flying operations, including an Instrument Fli ht R l (IFR) bl ( i t l 1 300 t long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, qualityof-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations. b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions. c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base. d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available. e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational. 3. Guiding Principles a. Futenma Air Station’s critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities. b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station’s operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas. c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing. d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully selfsupporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations. e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision. f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation. 4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory Group” comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible. a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed. b. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater. c. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea. 5. The Next Steps a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection. b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility. c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility. ----- **Reference 25 Progress of the SACO Final Report** **[Return of Lands]** **1. Already returned facilities** |Name of Facility (Project)|State of Progress| |---|---| |Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)|• April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after seven HLZs are relocated, etc. • February 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on changes to the agreement of April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter) • December 2016: Major portion (approximately 4,010 ha) returned| |Aha Training Area (Return of total area)|• December 1998: Total return completed (release of joint use)| |Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)|• January 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen • July 2011: Total return completed (approximately 60 ha)| |Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)|• April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others are relocated to Camp Hansen • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned| |Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)|• October 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the Sobe Communication Site is relocated • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 191 ha) returned| |Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)|• March 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on return of most land after communication systems including the antenna facilities and others are relocated to Torii Communication Station • September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion) • October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station| **2. Facilities to be returned as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan** |Name of Facility (Project)|State of Progress| |---|---| |MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation • December 2015: Japan and the U.S. came to an agreement on partial early land return to be used for municipal roads.| ||[Already returned area] • May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 473m2) • September 1997: Partially returned (approx. 62m2) • July 2017: Partially returned (approx. 4ha) • March 2018: Partially returned (approx. 0.4ha)| |Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation • July 2002: Youth Center was furnished • January 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities. • December 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital. • February 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (helipad) • December 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (utility). • May 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (barracks for non-accompanied enlisted sailors) • October 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 1) • October 2010: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 2) • September 2011: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities (barracks for non-accompanied officers, blood storage facility, etc.) • February 2013: 13 buildings including the Naval Hospital were furnished • March 2013: The Naval Hospital opened • December 2013: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (preventive medical center, alcohol rehabilitation center, etc.) • December 2015: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.) were furnished| ||[Already returned Area] • March 2003: Northern side returned (approximately 38 ha)| |Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation • December 2015: the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on partial land return for the expansion of national highway • March 2018: Partially returned (approximately 3ha)| ||[Already returned area] • May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 38m2) • September 2001: Partially returned (approx. 1ha) • August 2013: Return of north access road (approx. 1 ha) • March 2018: Partially returned (approx. 3ha) • March 2019: Return of area near Gate 5 (approx. 2 ha)| |Naha Port Facility (Return of total area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| ||[Already returned area] June 2000: Partially returned (approx. 1ha)| ----- |Name of Facility (Project)|State of Progress| |---|---| |Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*|(Phase I: Golf Range Area) • April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • July 2002: Two high rises were furnished • July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II: Sada Area) • February 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished (Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area) • March 2004: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished (Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) • March 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Upper Plaza Area were furnished * May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation * April 2013: It was written in the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa that the OHC plan will be reassessed under SACO, and that 910 family housing (including alternatives for housing that are to be removed in consolidated areas) will be built in addition to 56 housing already agreed to build based on the request for family housing after the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.| ||[Already returned area] • March 1997: Partially returned (approx. 371m2) • May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 598m2) • June 1997: Partially returned (approx. 353m2) • December 1997: Partially returned (approx. 0.3ha) • March 1998: Partially returned (approx. 2ha) • February 2000: Partially returned (approx. 3ha) • December 2006: Partially returned (approx. 145m2) • March 2015: Return of West Futenma Housing Area (approx. 51ha) • March 2020: Partial return of the Facilities and Engineering Compound (approx. 11ha)| **[Adjustment in training or operation]** |Point|State of Progress| |---|---| |Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104|• Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997| |Parachute Drop Training|• Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000| **[Implementation of initiatives to reduce noise]** |1. Initiatives already taken|Col2| |---|---| |Point|State of Progress| |Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base|• June 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of rinse facility • September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished • February 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp • October 2010: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of area forming and the construction of ramp and taxiway. • April 2011: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of parking and utility. • February 2013: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of type II maintenance hangar. • July 2013: Ramp, etc. were furnished. • July 2014: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of hangars, etc. • December 2016: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the furnishing of maintenance hangar, etc. • January 2017: Relocation completed • February 2020: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the implementation of demolition of part of the existing facilities| |Installation of Noise Reduction Baffels at Kadena Air Base|• July 2000: Furnished| **2. Ongoing initiatives as the U.S. Forces realignment** |Point|State of Progress| |---|---| |Transfer of KC-130 aircraft*|* May 2006: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam.| ----- **Reference 26 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility** |Month & Year|Background| |---|---| |April 1996|Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.| |December 1996|SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).| |November 1999|Then Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use| |December 1999|Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF “Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma” (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab| |July 2002|“Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. “Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided| |November 2003|Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.| |August 2004|A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.| |October 2005|“2+2” Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)| |April 2006|“Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza. → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).| |May 2006|• “2+2” Joint Statement → Final adjustments made for the “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” V shape plan approved “Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. • “GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others” (Cabinet decision) → The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.| |August 2006|Establishment of “the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma”| |August 2007|The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.| |April 2009|Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.| |September 2009|Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People’s New Party. → Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.| |November 2009|Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan-U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.| |December 2009|Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.| |May 2010|“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas Cabinet approval of “immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010”| |August 2010|Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report| |June 2011|“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.| |December 2011- January 2012|The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.| |February 2012|The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.| |April 2012|“2+2” Joint Statement → The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfirmed to be the only viable solution. Agreement reached to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.| |December 2012|Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.| |March 2013|Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.| |April 2013|Release of “the consolidation plan of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa” → MCAS Futenma can be returned in FY2022 or later through relocation, etc.| |October 2013|“2+2” Joint Statement → Recognition was reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma| |December 2013|Governor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project| |July 2014|Started the construction of replacement facilities| |April 2015|“2+2” Joint Statement → Reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma| |October 2015|• Governor of Okinawa revoked the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project • The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the governor of Okinawa’s revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project, and requested the suspension of its execution • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the revocation of the landfill permit| |November 2015|• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting and Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Reconfirmed that constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed an administrative suit seeking a retraction of revocation of the landfill permit| |March 2016|• The government announced it would accept the court’s settlement recommendation • Landfill work was suspended • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a correction instruction to Okinawa Prefecture over its revocation of the landfill permit • Okinawa Prefecture applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council of the correction instruction issued by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism| ----- |Month & Year|Background| |---|---| |April 2016|• Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and that the Government decided to accept a court suggested settlement under the philosophy of ‘’haste makes waste,’’ and stated that it would like to realize the return of MCAS Futenma through the completion of the relocation to Henoko at the earliest possible time and will continue to make joint efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. stated that its understands the court-suggested settlement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko as Prime Minister Abe’s strategic decision, and said that the U.S. will continue its efforts through close cooperation.| |June 2016|• The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council notified the results of the review • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it fully understands the views of the Japanese Government and will continue to work closely with Japan.| |July 2016|• The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act| |September 2016|• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it will continue to work closely with Japan.| |December 2016|• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Governor of Okinawa in a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act (finalized victory of the national government) • Governor of Okinawa retracted the revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project • Resumed the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, that construction has resumed following the Supreme Court ruling, and that the Government will steadily move forward with the construction| |February 2017|• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution| |April 2017|Began construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation| |July 2017|Okinawa Prefectural Government filed a lawsuit against the central government arguing it is illegal to damage rock on the seabed without securing permission of the governor.| |August 2017|Joint statement of "2+2" → The four ministers reaffirmed that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma.| |March 2018|• Naha District Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture’s claim regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc.| |April 2018|• Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution| |August 2018|• Okinawa Prefecture revoked (withdrew) the landfill permit for public waters.| |October 2018|• The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review Okinawa Prefecture’s withdrawal of the landfill permit for public waters, and requested the suspension of its execution. • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit.| |November 2018|• Governor of Okinawa objected to the decision by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to suspend execution, and applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council.| |December 2018|• The Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court rejected an appeal by Okinawa Prefecture regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc. • Landfill work in Henoko side commenced| |January 2019|• Meeting between then Minister of Defense Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution| |February 2019|• The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the request for review by Governor of Okinawa.| |March 2019|• Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit to demand a revocation of the decision to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit. • Okinawa Prefecture withdrew a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc. (finalized victory of the central government).| |April 2019|• Regarding the request for review by the Okinawa Defense Bureau, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to revoke the withdrawal of the landfill permit by Okinawa Prefecture • Joint statement of "2+2" → The four ministers welcomed the significant progress on the construction of the FRF and affirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution. • Okinawa Prefecture withdrew its claim regarding the suit to revoke the decision to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit. • Governor of Okinawa objected to the decision by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council.| |June 2019|• Meeting between then Minister of Defense Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan → The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will cooperate closely to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces. • The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the request for review by Governor of Okinawa.| |July 2019|• Governor of Okinawa objected to the dismissal by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council and filed a lawsuit to demand a revocation of the Government decision.| |August 2019|• Governor of Okinawa objected to the decision by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and filed a lawsuit to demand a revocation of the decision. • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution| |October 2019|• The Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court dismissed the claim regarding the suit to revoke the decision by Governor of Okinawa. • Governor of Okinawa filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court regarding the suit to revoke the decision by Governor of Okinawa.| |January 2020|• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution| |March 2020|• The Supreme Court dismissed the claim regarding the suit to revoke the decision by Governor of Okinawa.| |April 2020|• An application for change of land-fill work related to the addition of the work to improve the soil foundation, etc., was submitted to Okinawa Prefecture.| ----- **Reference 27 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena** |Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) Returned (March 31, 2015) The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) Returned (August 31, 2013) Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) Returned (March 31, 2019) A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) Returned (March 31, 2020)1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|Returned (March 31, 2015)| ||The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|Returned (August 31, 2013)| ||Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|Returned (March 31, 2019)| ||A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|Returned (March 31, 2020)1| |Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement Facilities in Okinawa are Provided Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester) JFY2025 or later Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later2, 3 Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area JFY2025 or later Naha Port JFY2028 or later Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 JFY2022 or later Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma JFY2022 or later||| ||Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)|JFY2025 or later| ||Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later| ||A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later| ||The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later2, 3| ||Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area|JFY2025 or later| ||Naha Port|JFY2028 or later| ||Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1|JFY2022 or later| ||Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma|JFY2022 or later| |Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) — The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) JFY2024 or later4||| ||Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|—| ||The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|JFY2024 or later4| Notes: 1. Shirahi River area was returned at the same timing. 2. Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation. 3. Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing. 4. Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation. **Reference 28 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces** |June 6, 2011|The U.S. Department of Defense announced that the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma would be replaced with the MV-22 Osprey in the latter half of 2012.| |---|---| |June 13, 2012-|Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, etc. to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 29-|Host Nation Notification and U.S. Department of Defense press release regarding the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to Okinawa x Deployed a squadron in October 2012 (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in late July). x Deployed an additional squadron in summer 2013. x The results of the investigation of the crash accident were provided to the Government of Japan; the MV-22 Osprey did not conduct any flights in Japan until the safety of flight operations was reconfirmed.| |July 23|Off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.| |September 19|Released the report “MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa” (that safety was confirmed by the government). The Joint Committee agreed on matters related to the Osprey’s operations.| |October 6|Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.| |January 28, 2013|The Okinawa Citizens’ Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.| |April 30|The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).| |July 30|The second squadron off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.| |September 25|Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.| |May 11, 2015|The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would deploy the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.| |December 13, 2016|Emergency landing of an MV-22 Osprey off the coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture.| |February 1, 2017|Planned maintenance interval of the MV-22 Osprey was commenced at Camp Kisarazu.| |March 14|Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Department of Defense announced the postponement of the arrival of the CV-22 Osprey that were to be deployed at Yokota Air Base.| |August 5|Accident of a MV-22 attached to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Force (Futenma) off the east coast of Australia.| |April 3, 2018|U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed to Japan around summer of 2018, and that a total of ten Osprey would be deployed gradually over the next few years.| |August 22, 2018|Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed at Yokota Air Base on October 1, 2018, and that a total of ten CV-22 would be deployed at Yokota Air Base gradually by around 2024.| |October 1, 2018|Five CV-22 Osprey were deployed at Yokota Air Base.| ----- **Reference 29 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan** 1. Purpose It is critically important to realize the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ), in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in Japan and to mitigate the impact of defense facilities on surrounding residents by all of Japan. In this light, the purpose of this Act is to contribute to the smooth implementation of USFJ realignment by taking the following special measures, etc. 2. Special Measures, etc. (1) Realignment grants for municipalities incurring greater impacts  In connection with the realignment of USFJ, the national government designates defense facilities for which it is deemed that consideration must be paid to their increasing impacts on the stability of the lives of the residents in the surrounding areas. Realignment grants are awarded to municipalities in the area of such defense facilities, in order to cover the expenses of the projects that contribute to making the residents’ lives more convenient and to developing industries, if the grants are considered necessary to help carry out the USFJ realignment smoothly and infallibly.  The national government takes into consideration the extent that the stability of the lives of the residents is impacted, and awards the realignment grants based on both the progress of the measures for achieving realignment and the length of time that has passed since the measures were first implemented. (2) Public project special provisions for areas incurring particularly large impacts  Designate areas that include municipalities incurring particularly large impacts as Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and promote the development of these areas by establishing special provisions for cost sharing by local governments when developing roads, ports, and other infrastructure.  Set up at the MOD the Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces comprised of relevant ministers, and at the Council’s meetings discuss matters such as the designation of the Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and the establishment of the development plan for the area (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment). (3) Measures for USFJ local employees  Implement skills education and training that contribute to the continuous employment of USFJ local employees. 3. Expiration of the Law This Act expires on March 31, 2027; provided, however, that the realignment grants will be awarded until March 31, 2032 at the latest based on the situation of the realignment. Notes: 1. At the time of its enactment this Act was set to expire on March 31, 2017. However, the term of validity has been extended by 10 years to March 31, 2027 pursuantto the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017. 2. At the time of its enactment, this Act provided for the special measures, etc. under this Act in 2. (1) to (3) above, as well as for special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for the implementation of investments and loans for family housing and infrastructure development related to USFJ relocation to the United States of America (Guam) for the promotion of said relocation. However, the said provision was abolished pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017, after the 2+2 Joint Statement of April 2012 limited Japan’ s financial commitment for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam to direct cash contribution and it was confirmed that other forms of financial assistance (investments and loans) would not be utilized. ----- **Reference 30** **Agreement between the Government of Japan and the** **Government of the United States of America on** **Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices** **Relating to the Civilian Component of the United States** **Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement** **under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and** **Security between Japan and the United States of America,** **Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United** **States Armed Forces in Japan** (signed on January 16, 2017) The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the “United States Government”), hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”; Confirming that the United States armed forces in Japan (hereinafter referred to as the “United States armed forces”) under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”) and the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (hereinafter referred to as the “Status of Forces Agreement”), both signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, contribute to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East; Bearing in mind the “Japan-United States Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status, Including the Civilian Component” announced by the Parties on July 5, 2016, and its recognition of the spirit of Alliance cooperation and the mutual commitment of Japan and the United States to strengthen the Alliance further and to enhance deterrence in a complex regional and global security environment; Acknowledging the essential role of members of the civilian component defined in subparagraph (b) of Article I of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Civilian Component”) in fulfilling the United States’ obligations under the Treaty, as well as the importance of training and education processes for United States personnel with Status of Forces Agreement status; Wishing to strengthen cooperation between the Parties by establishing a framework, including this Agreement which supplements the Status of Forces Agreement, with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component; Affirming the continuing effectiveness of the Joint Committee provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Joint Committee”) as the means for consultation between the Parties on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement; and Convinced that enhanced cooperation with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component further contributes to achieving the objective of the Treaty and strengthening the Alliance; Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE 1 The purpose of this Agreement is to enhance cooperation between the Parties with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component. ARTICLE 2 The Parties shall establish a Working Group within the framework of the Joint Committee. Through the Working Group, the Parties shall retain the right to initiate consultations regarding implementation of this Agreement. ARTICLE 3 The Parties shall continue to cooperate fully, through the framework of the Joint Committee, to clarify the scope of the Civilian Component, which plays an essential role in fulfilling the United States’ obligations under the Treaty. 1. The United States Government will designate members of the Civilian Component consistent with the categories of persons that the Parties shall direct the Joint Committee to develop. 2. The Parties also shall direct the Joint Committee to develop criteria that the United States Government will use in evaluating contractor employee positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component. Such criteria are to be established so that those who are eligible to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component have skills or knowledge required for the accomplishment of mission requirements. ARTICLE 4 Through the framework of the Joint Committee, the Parties also shall cooperate to strengthen mechanisms and procedures to ensure that persons ordinarily resident in Japan are excluded from being members of the Civilian Component. ARTICLE 5 1. The Parties, through the framework of the Joint Committee, shall establish a procedure so that the Government of Japan is notified promptly ofcontractor employees who have been designated as members of the Civilian Component. The Parties shall consult in the Working Group upon the request of either Party regarding such notification. 2. Upon the development of criteria as directed in Article 3, the United States Government is to establish and maintain procedures for formalized, regular reviews of contractor employees who are designated as members of the Civilian Component to ensure that they are in fact eligible for such status. 3. The Parties, through the Working Group referred to in Article 2, shall establish procedures for regular reports regarding the Civilian Component. The United States Government is to provide such reports to the Government of Japan. ARTICLE 6 If any dispute arises between the Parties relating to the implementation of this Agreement, the Parties shall settle it in accordance with the procedures for resolving matters set out in Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement. ARTICLE 7 1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature. 2. This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the Status of Forces Agreement remains in force. 3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, either Party may terminate this Agreement by giving one year’s written notice through diplomatic channels to the other Party. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement. DONE in duplicate at Tokyo in the Japanese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic, this sixteenth day of January 2017. ----- **Reference 31 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements** |Col1|Col2|Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement|Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)|Information Security Agreement|Security and Defense Cooperation Documents| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |United States||Signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America in March 1954 and entered into force in May 1954 Established the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in November 1983 Established the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in June 2006|Signed in April 1996 and entered into force in October 1996 Signed in April 1998 and revised in September 1999 Signed in February 2004 and revised in July 2004 Signed in September 2016 and entered into force in April 2017|Signed and entered into force in August 2007|Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Signed in September 1951 and entered into force in April 1952 Signed in January 1960 and entered into force in June 1960 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Set forth in November 1978 Set forth in September 1997 Set forth in April 2015 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996| |Australia||Signed in July 2014 Entered into force in December 2014|Signed in May 2010 Entered into force in January 2013 Signed in January 2017 Entered into force in September 2017|Signed in May 2012 Entered into force in March 2013|Signed memorandum in September 2003 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security in March 2007 Revised memorandum in December 2008| |India||Signed in December 2015 Entered into force in March 2016|Agreed to begin negotiations for conclusion at the Japan-India Summit Meeting in October 2018|Signed and entered into force in December 2015|Japan-India Joint Declaration on Security in October 2008 Signed memorandum in September 2014| |Indonesia||Agreed to begin negotiations at the “2+2” Meeting in December 2015|―|―|Signed memorandum in March 2015| |The Philippines||Signed in February 2016 Entered into force in April 2016|―|―|Signed statement of intent in July 2012 Signed memorandum in January 2015| ||Thailand|―|―|―|Signed memorandum in November 2019| ||Laos|―|―|―|Signed memorandum in October 2019| |Malaysia||Signed and entered into force in April 2018|―|―|Signed memorandum in September 2018| |Republic of Korea||―|Agreed to move forward with opinion exchanges at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting in January 2011|Signed and entered into force in November 2016|Signed statement of intent in April 2009| |United Kingdom||Signed and entered into force in July 2013|Signed in January 2017 Entered into force in August 2017|Signed in July 2013 Entered into force in January 2014|Signed memorandum in January 2004 Revised memorandum in June 2012 Japan-U.K Joint Declaration on Security in August 2017| |France||Signed in March 2015 Entered into force in December 2016|Signed in July 20118 Entered into force in June 2019|Signed and entered into force in October 2011|Signed statement of intent in July 2014| |Canada||―|Signed in April 2018 Entered into force in July 2019|―|Japan-Canada Joint Declaration on Political, Peace and Security Cooperation in November 2010| |New Zealand||―|Agreed to consider at Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in July 2014|Shared the view that two countries will commence a joint study toward negotiations for an agreement on security information sharing at Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in September 2019|Signed memorandum in August 2013| |NATO||―|―|Signed and entered into force in June 2010|Announced: Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) between Japan and NATO in May 2014| |Germany||Signed and entered into force in July 2017|―|Aff irmed conclusion of an agreement in principle at Japan- Germany Summit Meeting in February 2019|―| |Italy||Signed in May 2017|―|Signed in March 2016 Entered into force in June 2016|Signed statement of intent in June 2012 Signed memorandum in May 2017| |Russia||―|―|―|Signed memorandum in August 1999 Revised memorandum in January 2006| |UAE||―|―|―|Signed memorandum in May 2018| Notes: Signed Memorandum with Singapore, Vietnam, Mongolia, Bahrain, Cambodia, Sweden, Spain, Qatar, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Colombia, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Czech, Finland, Ukraine, Oman and Israel; signed statement of intent with Turkey ----- **Reference 32 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2019)** (Number of students) |CCoouunnttrryy IIIIInnnnnssssstttttiiiiitttttuuuuutttttiiiiiooooonnnnn|United States|Australia|India|Indonesia|Vietnam|Singapore|The Philippines|Thailand|Myanmar|Laos|Cambodia|Timor- Leste|Republic of Korea|Mongolia|France|Canada|Germany|Italy|Spain|Jordan|Qatar|Sri Lanka|Pakistan|South Africa|Ethiopia|Mexico|Sub total| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |National Institute for Defense Studies|1|2|1|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|1|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|5| |National Defense Academy|8|1|－|3|9|－|2|5|－|2|3|3|4|3|8|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|51| |Ground Self-Defense Force (Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, etc.)|1|1|1|－|－|－|－|1|－|－|－|－|3|1|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|4|－|－|－|12| |Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|－|1|1|1|－|1|－|1|－|－|－|－|1|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|6| |Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|－|－|1|1|－|－|－|1|1|－|－|－|3|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|2|－|－|－|9| |Joint Staff College|－|1|2|－|－|－|－|2|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|1|2|1|1|1|1|2|3|1|2|1|21| |Total|10|6|6|5|9|1|2|10|1|2|3|3|11|5|8|1|2|1|1|1|1|2|9|1|2|1|104| ----- **Reference 33 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)**  |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Apr. 2017 Jun. 2017 Jul. 2017 Sep. 2017 Sep. 2017 Oct. 2017 Jan. 2018 Mar. 2018 Sep. 2018 Sep. 2018 Oct. 2018 Oct. 2018 Jan. 2019 Jan. 2019 Feb. 2019 Feb. 2019 Feb. 2019 Jun. 2019 Sep. 2019 Oct. 2019 Oct. 2019 Nov. 2019 Nov. 2019 Dec. 2019|Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (7th “2+2” Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army Visit to Australia by Vice-Defense Minister of Japan Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Air Force Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers Japan-Australian Defense Ministerial Meeting (The Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Japan by Australian Prime Minister (summit meeting, meeting with Japanese Defense Minister) Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers Visit to Australia by GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (8th “2+2” Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy Japan-Australian Defense Ministerial Meeting Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Australia by Chief of Staff, JS Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Australia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Yamada Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Air Force (meeting with ASDF Chief of Staff, etc.) Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers Japan-Australian Defence Ministerial Meeting ☆2019 Japan-Australia Defence Ministers Kono/Reynolds joint statement on advancing defence cooperation Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of the Defence Force (meeting with Chief of Staff, JS) Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers| |---|---|---| |Col1|Col2|(Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020）| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Jan. 2018 May 2019|Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultation (MM) Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultation (MM)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Aug. 2017 Oct. 2017 Nov. 2017 Dec. 2017 Feb.-Mar. 2019 Sep.-Oct. 2019 Nov. 2019 Jan. 2020|Visit to Australian Army 1st Division by Central Readiness Force Visit to Iruma Air Base by Australian C-130J and exchanges between airlift troops Dispatch of C-2 to Australia (overseas flight training) and unit-to-unit exchanges Unit-to-unit exchanges between Central Readiness Force and Australian Army 1st Division Dispatch of C-2 to Australia (overseas flight training and participation in AVALON Airshow) Visit to Komatsu Air Base by the Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A and a unit-to-unit exchange by refueling and transport aircraft units (sister squadron exchange) Visit to the Air Defense Command Headquarters by Australian Chief of Joint Operations Dispatch of ASDF C-130 to Australia (International Disaster Relief Activities)| |Japan-U.S.- Australia trilateral cooperation (See reference 50 for training and exercise)|Jun. 2017 Jun. 2017 May 2018 Jun. 2018 May 2019 Jun. 2019 Aug. 2019 Aug. 2019|5th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Japan) (GSDF Chief of Staff) Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue)) 6th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (Chief of Staff) 7th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior Leader Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff)| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Australia)| |Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi Gou Trident exercise)|Oct. 13-21, 2017|Waters and airspace south of Kanto|Destroyer JS “Yamagiri,” submarine|Two vessels P-1 × 1|(Navy) Frigates HMAS “Melbourne,” HMAS “Parramatta” (Air Force) AP-3C × 1| |Japan-Australia bilateral cruise training|Nov. 22, 2017|South China Sea|Destroyer JS “Onami”|One vessel|Frigate HMAS “Melbourne”| |Japan-Australia bilateral cruise training|Sep. 16-18, 2018|Waters north of Australia|Destroyer JS “Sazanami”|One vessel|Frigate HMAS “Newcastle”| |Japan-Australia bilateral cruise training|May 20-22, 2019|Waters south of Honshu through surrounding Guam|Destroyers JS “Ariake,” and JS “Asahi”|Two vessels|Frigates HMAS “Melbourne,” and HMAS “Parramatta”| |Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi Gou Trident exercise)|Sep. 17-29, 2019 Oct. 15-23, 2019|Waters and airspace south of Kanto through west of Kyushu via surrounding Okinawa|Destroyers JS “Harusame,” JS “Teruzuki,” JS “Asahi,” and JS “Atago,” Underway Replenishment Ship JS “Mashu,” submarine Patrol aircraft|Approximately 6 vessels Aircraft|Vessel and submarine| |Air Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Australia)| |Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Bushido Guardian 19)|Sep. 11-Oct. 8, 2019|Chitose Air Base, Misawa Air Base and their surrounding airspace|Air Defense Command|F-15 × 10 F-2 × 3|F/A-18A/B fighters × 7 KC-30 aerial tanker × 1 C-17 transport aircraft × 1 C-130J transport aircraft × 1 Totaling approximately 150 personnel| (Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release. ----- **Reference 34 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)**  [India] (Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020） Dec. 2019 Visit to Japan by Chief of the Army Staff of Indian Army |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Col2|Jan. 2020 Jan. 2020 Feb. 2020|Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Indian Defense Ministers Visit to India by Chief of Staff, JS (participated in the Raisina Dialogue) Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff| |---|---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities||Jun. 2018|5th “2+2” Vice-Ministerial dialogue, 6th Defence Policy Dialogue (Delhi)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.||Apr. 2017 Dec. 2017 Jul. 2018 Apr. 2019 Jun. 2019 Sep. 2019|3rd India-Japan Maritime Affairs Dialogue Unit-to-unit exchanges in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief with Indian Air Force helicopter units (India) 4th India-Japan Maritime Affairs Dialogue Exchange between fighter pilots (ASDF) Exchange between fighter pilots (ASDF) Exchange between the Indian Air Force and air defense- related units, etc. (ASDF)| |Japan-U.S.-India trilateral cooperation|Regular discussions between defense authorities|Apr. 2018|9th Japan-U.S.-India Meeting (Delhi)| Apr. 2017 Visit to India by GSDF Chief of Staff May 2017 Visit to Japan by Indian Defense Minister (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Indian Defense Minister (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Jan. 2018 Visit to India by Chief of Staff, JS (participated in the Raisina Dialogue) Mar. 2018 Visit to India by Chief of Staff Aug. 2018 Visit to India by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) (Delhi) Nov. 2018 Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff High-level talks between Dec. 2018 Visit to Japan by Chief of the Air Staff of Indian Air Force heads of state and defense Jan. 2019 Visit to India by Chief of Staff, JS (participated in the Raisina Dialogue) Feb. 2019 Visit to India by Commissioner of ATLA Sep. 2019 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Oct. 2019 Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Indian Defense Ministers Oct. 2019 Visit to India by GSDF Chief of Staff Nov. 2019 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Thailand (6th ADMM-Plus)) Nov. 2019 Visit to India by Minister of Defense (1st Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) |Joint Staff|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (India)| |Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with Indian Navy vessel|Sep. 27, 2018|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Ikazuchi”|One vessel|Frigate INS “TEG”| |Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with Indian Navy vessel|Nov. 17, 2018|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Ikazuchi”|One vessel|Patrol vessel INS “SUNAYNA”| |Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with Indian Navy vessel|Feb. 23, 2019|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Samidare”|One vessel|Frigate INS “TRIKAND”| |Ground Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (India)| |Bilateral exercise with the Indian Army in India (Dharma Guardian)|Oct. 27- Nov. 18, 2018|Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (Mizoram, India) and its surrounding area|Second Company, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Division (one major unit of platoon)|Totaling approximately 30 personnel|Totaling approximately 30 personnel| |Bilateral exercises with the Indian Army in India (Dharma Guardian 19)|Oct. 15- Nov. 5, 2019|Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (Mizoram, India) and its surrounding area|Fifth Company, 34th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division|Totaling approximately 30 personnel|Totaling approximately 30 personnel| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (India)| |Bilateral exercise with Indian Navy vessel|Jul. 30, 2017|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Teruzuki,” Escort Division 6|One vessel|Frigate INS “TABAR”| |Goodwill exercise with the Indian Navy|Sep. 11, 2017|Waters west of India|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Teruzuki,” Escort Division 6|One vessel|Patrol vessel INS “SUNAYNA”| |Japan-India bilateral exercise|Oct. 15, 2017|Waters west of Kyushu|Destroyer JS “Kirisame”|One vessel|Frigate INS “Satpura,” Corvette INS “Kadmat”| |Goodwill exercise with the Indian Navy|Oct. 30, 2017|Waters west of India|Air Patrol Squadron 2|P-3C × 1|P-8I × 1| |Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy|Jan. 18, 2018|Mumbai Port (India) and its surrounding waters|28th Deployment Surface Force for Counter- Piracy Enforcement, Destroyer JS “Amagiri,” Escort Division 2|One vessel|Frigate INS “TEG” 1 submarine| |Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy|May 5, 2018|Waters and airspace west of Goa (Indian Ocean)|―|P-1 × 1 or 2|P-8I × 1, Frigate INS “Triesle,” 1 submarine| |Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy|May 13-14, 2018|Visakhapatnam Port (India) and its surrounding waters|29th Deployment Surface Force for Counter- Piracy Enforcement, Destroyer JS “Setogiri,” Escort Division 7|One vessel|Destroyer INS “Ranjit,” submarine Several aircraft| |Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy|Oct. 7-15, 2018|Visakhapatnam Port (India) and waters and airspace of the Bay of Bengal (Indian Ocean)|Destroyers JS “Kaga,” and JS “Inazuma”|Two vessels|Missile Frigate INS “Sahyadri” Corvettes INS “Kirch,” and INS “Kadmat” Fleet Support Ship INS “Shakti” Submarine P-8I| |Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy|Mar. 31, 2019|Andaman Sea|33rd Deployment Surface Force for Counter- Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Asagiri”|One vessel|Patrol vessel INS “Kadmat”| |Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy|Apr. 24, 2019|Waters and airspace off the coast of Goa (India)|5th Air Patrol Squadron|P-3C × 1|1 submarine P-8I × 1| |Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy|Apr. 28, 2019|Visakhapatnam Port (India) and its surrounding waters|32nd Deployment Surface Force for Counter- Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Samidare,” Escort Division 4|One vessel|Destroyer INS “Rajput”| |Japan-India bilateral exercise|May 23-24, 2019|Waters and airspace north of Sumatera (Andaman Sea)|Destroyers JS “Izuo,” and JS “Murasame”|Two vessels|Frigate INS “Sahyadri”| |Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy|Dec. 23, 2019|Waters and airspace surrounding Mumbai Port (India)|34th Deployment Surface Force for Counter- Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Sazanami”|One vessel|Frigate INS “Tarkash,” submarine| ----- |Air Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (India)| |Japan-India bilateral exercise (Shinyuu Maitri 2018)|Dec. 1-8, 2018|Agra Air Force Station|3rd Tactical Airlift Wing|C-2 × 1 Totaling approximately 20 personnel|C-17 × 1, An-32 Transport Aircraft × 1, etc.| |Japan-India bilateral exercise (Shinyuu Maitri 2019)|Oct. 15-25, 2019|Arjan Singh Air Force Station, West Bengal, India|1st Tactical Airlift Wing|C-130H × 1 Totaling approximately 20 personnel|C-130J, etc.| (Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release. **Reference 35 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN member states (Past Three Years)**  [Indonesia] (Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020） |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Jul. 2017 Aug. 2019|3rd Japan-Indonesia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 8th Japan- Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo) 9th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Jakarta)| |---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense|Sep. 2018 Oct. 2019 Nov. 2019 Dec. 2019|Visit to Japan by Vice-Defense Minister of Indonesia (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Japan by Vice-Defense Minister of Indonesia (Tokyo (11th Japan- ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Thailand (6th ADMM- Plus)) Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)| |---|---|---| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Indonesia)| |Goodwill exercise with the Indonesian Navy|Sep. 22, 2018|Jakarta Port and its surrounding waters|Indo-Pacific Deployment 2018 Destroyers JS “Kaga,” JS “Inazuma,” and JS “Suzutsuki,” Escort Flotilla 4|Three vessels|Patrol boat KRI “Kurau”| |Goodwill exercise with the Indonesian Navy|May 10, 2019|Jakarta Port and its surrounding waters|32nd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Samidare,” Escort Division 4|One vessel|Corvette KRI “Bung Tomo”| [Vietnam] Oct. 2019 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) |exchanges between heads of state and defense|Nov. 2019 Dec. 2019 Feb. 2020 Mar. 2020|Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Vietnam by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Staff, JS| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Aug. 2017 Jul. 2018 Jun. 2019 Nov. 2019|5th Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Nha Trang) 6th Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo) 7th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Hanoi) 7th Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Hanoi)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Dec. 2017 Sep. 2018 Mar. 2019 Oct. 2019|Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Da Nang) (ASDF) Visit to Vietnam by a submarine (Cam Ranh) (MSDF) Dispatch of ASDF C-130H to Vietnam (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges) Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (ASDF)| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Vietnam)| |Goodwill exercise with the Vietnam People’s Navy|Jun. 17, 2019|Off the coast of Cam Ranh|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” and JS “Murasame”|Two vessels|Corvette HQ-381| Jun. 2019 Visit to Singapore by Chief of Staff, JS (18th Shangri-La Dialogue) Oct. 2019 Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense Regular discussions between defense authorities Unit-to-unit exchange, etc. Participating Units Destroyers JS “Izumo,” and JS “Murasame” High-level Jun. 2017 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Aug. 2017 Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Oct. 2017 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (The Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus)) High-level Jan. 2018 Visit to Vietnam by GSDF Chief of Staff exchanges Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Minister of Defence (Defense Ministerial between heads Meeting) of state and Jun. 2018 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangridefense La Dialogue)) Jul. 2018 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Jan. 2019 Visit to Vietnam by ASDF Chief of Staff Mar. 2019 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Chief of General Staff May 2019 Visit to Vietnam by Minister of Defense Maritime Self-Defense Force Training Designation Goodwill exercise with the Vietnam People’s Navy [Singapore] |exchanges between heads of state and defense|Oct. 2019 Nov. 2019 Feb. 2020|Visit to Japan by Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Thailand (6th ADMM- Plus)) Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Apr. 2017|15th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|May 2017 Oct. 2017 Nov. 2017 Jul. 2019|MSDF Participation in International Fleet Review hosted by the Singapore Navy (Singapore) (MSDF) Japan-Singapore unit-to-unit exchanges (Tokyo, etc.) (GSDF) Japan-Singapore unit-to-unit exchanges (Paya Lebar) (ASDF) Japan-Singapore unit-to-unit exchanges (Paya Lebar) (ASDF)| May 2017 Visit to Singapore by MSDF Chief of Staff Jun. 2017 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jun. 2017 Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Oct. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Singapore Army Feb. 2018 Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff High-level May 2018 Visit to Japan by Singaporean Minister of Defence (Defense Ministerial exchanges Meeting) between heads of state and Jun. 2018 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th defense Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jul. 2018 Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Oct. 2018 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (5th ADMM- Plus)) May 2019 Visit to Japan by Singaporean Minister of Defence May 2019 Visit to Singapore by MSDF Chief of Staff ----- Maritime Self Defense Force |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Singapore)| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise|Aug. 22, 2018|Waters south of Kanto|Destroyer JS “Murasame”|One vessel|Frigate RSS “Tenacious”| |Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise|Oct. 23, 2018|Waters and airspace around Changi Port (Singapore)|Indo-Pacific Deployment 2018 Destroyers JS “Kaga,” and JS “Inazuma,” Escort Flotilla 4|Two vessels|Corvette RSS “Valiant”| |Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise|Feb. 8, 2019|Waters west of Kyushu|Destroyer JS “Suzutsuki”|One vessel|Landing ships tank RSS “Endeavour”| [The Philippines] Nov. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Nov. 2018 Visit to Japan by Undersecretary for Finance and Materiel of the Philippine Department of National Defense Mar. 2019 Visit to Japan by Undersecretary for Finance and Materiel of the Philippine Department of National Defense and Commanding General of Philippine Air Force (Turnover ceremony for the parts, etc. of UH-1Hs) Mar. 2019 Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff Apr. 2019 Visit to Japan by Philippine Secretary of National Defense Jun. 2019 Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff Oct. 2019 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense |Col1|Nov. 2019 Nov. 2019 Dec. 2019|Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Thailand (6th ADMM- Plus)) Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Jun. 2019 Jun. 2019 Nov. 2019|8th Japan-Philippines Pollitico-Military Consultation (PM) (Tokyo) 8th Japan-Philippines Military-Military Consultation Japan-Philippines Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Manila)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Jul. 2018 Jul. 2019|Japan-Philippines unit-to-unit exchanges (Manila) (ASDF) Dispatch of ASDF C-1 to the Philippines (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges)| Apr. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs May 2017 Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Oct. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oct. 2017 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (The Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus)) High-level exchanges Nov. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by MSDF Chief of Staff between heads Mar. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense of state and Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy defense Apr. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Jun. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff Jun. 2018 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Sep. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Undersecretary for Finance and Materiel of the Philippine Department of National Defense |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (the Philippines)| |Goodwill exercise with the Philippine Navy|May 23, 2017|Waters west of Manila|Destroyer JS “Kirisame,” Escort Division 8|One vessel|Frigate BRP “RAJAH HUMABON”| |Goodwill exercise with the Philippine Navy|Jun. 8, 2017|Waters around the Philippines|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” and JS “Sazanami”|Two vessels|Frigate BRP “RAJAH HUMABON”| |Goodwill exercise with the Philippine Navy|Sep. 13-14, 2017|Waters and airspace around Palawan Island (the Philippines) (South China Sea and Sulu Sea)|Air Patrol Squadron 5|P-3C × 1|1 patrol vessel 1 patrol aircraft| |Goodwill exercise with the Philippine Navy|Nov. 28, 2017|Waters around the Philippines|Destroyer JS “Onami”|One vessel|Corvette BRP “MIGUEL MALVAR”| |Goodwill exercise with the Philippine Navy|Feb. 4, 2018|Manila (the Philippines) and its surrounding waters and airspace|28th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Amagiri,” Escort Division 2|One vessel|Frigate BRP “RAJAH HUMABON”| |Goodwill exercise with the Philippine Navy|May 8, 2018|Waters and airspace around Palawan Island (South China Sea and Sulu Sea)|―|P-1 × 1 or 2|1 patrol vessel C-90 × 1| |Bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy|Sep. 7, 2018|Waters and airspace around Palawan Island (Sulu Sea)|Destroyers JS “Kaga,” JS “Inazuma,” and JS “Suzutsuki”|Three vessels|C-90 × 1| |Bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy|Jan. 27, 2019 (phase 1) Jan. 31, 2019 (phase 2)|Manila (the Philippines) and its surrounding waters and airspace|31st Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Ikazuchi,” Escort Division 1|One vessel|Phase 1: C-90, patrol craft BRP “Nestor Reinoso” Phase 2: Corvette BRP “Emilio Jacinto”| |Bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy|May 15, 2019|Waters and airspace east of Palawan Island|32nd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Samidare,” Escort Division 4|One vessel|Submarine chaser BRP “Federico Martir” Islander 312 (fixed-wing)| |Bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy|Jun. 28, 2019|Waters and airspace around Palawan Island (Sulu Sea)|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” JS “Murasame,” and JS “Akebono”|Three vessels|Landing dock ship BRP “Davao del Sur”| |Bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy|Sep. 26, 2019|Port of Subic (the Philippines) and its surrounding waters and airspace|33rd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Asagiri”|One vessel|Corvette BRP “Emilio Jacinto”| ----- [Thailand] |High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense|Mar. 2020 Mar. 2020|Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Thailand by Chief of Staff, JS| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Sep. 2018|14th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Nov. 2017 Nov. 2017 Jan. 2018 Oct. 2018 Oct. 2018|Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (U-tapao) (ASDF) Participation in fleet review hosted by the Royal Thai Navy in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of ASEAN (Pattaya) (MSDF) Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Don Mueang) (ASDF) Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (GSDF) Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (ASDF)| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Thailand)| |Goodwill exercise with the Royal Thai Navy|Sep. 18, 2017|Waters west of Thailand|Destroyer JS “Teruzuki,” Escort Division 6|One vessel|Frigate HTMS “CHAO PHRAYA”| |Goodwill exercise with the Royal Thai Navy|Jan. 6, 2020|Phuket Port (Thailand) and its surrounding waters and airspace|34th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Sazanami”|One vessel|Patrol craft HTMS “Songkhla” S-76 Helicopter| May-Jun. 2017 Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander Nov. 2017 Visit to Thailand by State Minister of Defense Nov. 2017 Visit to Thailand by MSDF Chief of Staff Feb. 2018 Visit to Thailand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (to observe exercise) Mar. 2018 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs High-level Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defense Forces exchanges between heads of May 2018 Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander state and defense Sep. 2018 Visit to Thailand by ASDF Chief of Staff Apr. 2019 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Aug. 2019 Visit to Thailand by Chief of Staff, JS Sep. 2019 Visit to Thailand by GSDF Chief of Staff Nov. 2019 Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Thailand (6th ADMM-Plus)) ☆�Memorandum of Arrangement between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Thailand on Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense signed [Cambodia] Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting, Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense High-level (Vice-Ministerial level) (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial exchanges Forum)) between heads of state and defense Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice-Ministerial level) (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Jul. 2019 Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs [Myanmar] High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Jul. 2017 Dec. 2019|4th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation 5th Japan-Cambodia Military-Military Consultation (Phnom Penh) 5th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation 6th Japan-Cambodia Military-Military Consultation (Tokyo)| |---|---|---| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Nov. 2019|Japan-Myanmar unit-to-unit exchanges (Mingaladon) (ASDF)| |---|---|---| High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense Unit-to-unit exchange, etc. High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense Oct. 2019 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Feb. 2020 Visit to Cambodia by GSDF Chief of Staff Jul. 2017 4th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation 5th Japan-Cambodia Military-Military Consultation (Phnom Penh) Dec. 2019 5th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation 6th Japan-Cambodia Military-Military Consultation (Tokyo) Oct. 2019 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services of Myanmar (meeting with Chief of Joint Staff) Oct. 2019 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defense (Tokyo (11th JapanASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Nov. 2019 Japan-Myanmar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Thailand (6th ADMM-Plus)) Aug. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services of Myanmar High-level Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defense (Fukuoka (9th exchanges Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) between heads of Jan. 2018 Visit to Myanmar by GSDF Chief of Staff state and defense Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defense (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) [Laos] Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Defense of Laos (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) High-level Dec. 2018 Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs exchanges Oct. 2019 Visit to Japan by Minister of National Defense of Laos (Tokyo (11th Japanbetween heads of ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) state and defense ☆�Memorandum between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defence of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic on Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defence signed [Malaysia] Oct. 2019 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Defense of Laos (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Mar. 2020 Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Jul. 2017 Mar. 2020|2nd Japan-Laos Politico-Military Consultation (Vientiane) 3rd Japan-Laos Security Dialogue (Vientiane)| |---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense|Oct. 2019 Dec. 2019 Feb. 2020|Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (19th Doha Forum) Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Jun. 2017|6th Japan-Malaysia Military-Military Consultation (Kuala Lumpur)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Jul. 2018 Jan. 2019|Japan-Malaysia unit-to-unit exchanges (Kuala Lumpur) (ASDF) Japan-Malaysia unit-to-unit exchanges (Butterworth) (ASDF)| Jun. 2017 Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense vice-Ministerial Forum)) High-level Apr. 2018 ☆Agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies signed exchanges between heads of Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Malaysia (Defense Ministerial Meeting, state and defense Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Jun. 2019 Visit to Japan by Royal Malaysian Navy Chief Oct. 2019 Visit to Malaysia by ASDF Chief of Staff ----- Maritime Self Defense Force |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Malaysia)| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Goodwill exercise with the Malaysian Navy|May 12, 2017|Waters around Penang|Destroyer JS “Kirisame,” Escort Division 8|One vessel|Small frigate KD “JEBAT”| |Goodwill exercise with the Malaysian Navy|Jan. 27, 2018|Port Klang (Malaysia) and its surrounding waters|28th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Amagiri,” Escort Division 2|One vessel|Frigate KD “LEKIU”| |Goodwill exercise with the Malaysian Navy|Sep. 21, 2018|Kuantan Port (Malaysia) and its surrounding waters|30th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Akebono,” Escort Division 5|One vessel|Patrol vessel KD “Terengganu” Guided missile boat KD “Ganiyan”| |Goodwill exercise with the Malaysian Navy|Apr. 18, 2019|Iyonada|Training Support Ship JS “Kurobe”|One vessel|Frigate KD “LEKIU”| |Goodwill exercise with the Malaysian Navy|May 29, 2019|Waters and airspace off the coast of Port Klang (Malaysia)|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” and JS “Murasame”|Two vessels|Frigate KD “LEKIU”| |Goodwill exercise with the Malaysian Navy|Sep. 20, 2019|Kuantan Port (Malaysia) and its surrounding waters|33rd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Asagiri”|One vessel|Guided missile boats KD “Handaran,” KD “Ganyang,” and KD “Perdana”| [Brunei] High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense Mar. 2020 Visit to Brunei by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Jul. 2017|Japan-Brunei unit-to-unit exchanges (Bandar Seri Begawan) (ASDF)| |---|---|---| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Brunei)| |Goodwill exercise with the Royal Brunei Navy|May 18, 2017|Waters around Muara|Destroyer JS “Kirisame,” Escort Division 8|One vessel|Patrol vessel KDB “DARULAMAN”| |Bilateral exercise with the Royal Brunei Armed Forces|Apr. 26, 2019|Waters and airspace off the coast of Brunei|Air Patrol Squadron 5|P-3C × 1|1 aircraft (helicopter) (Air Force) One vessel (Navy)| |Goodwill exercise with the Royal Brunei Navy|Jun. 26, 2019|Waters and airspace off the coast of Muara|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” JS “Murasame,” and JS “Akebono”|Three vessels|Patrol vessel KDB “Daruttaqwa”| (Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020） Feb. 2018 Visit to Brunei by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs High-level Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei exchanges (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) between state and heads of Jan.-Feb. 2019 Visit to Brunei by MSDF Chief of Staff defense Oct. 2019 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting)) Maritime Self-Defense Force Training Designation Date Location Goodwill exercise with the Royal Brunei Navy May 18, 2017 Waters around Muara Bilateral exercise with the Royal Brunei Armed Forces Apr. 26, 2019 Waters and airspace off the coast of Brunei Goodwill exercise with the Royal Brunei Navy Jun. 26, 2019 Waters and airspace off the coast of Muara (Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release. **Reference 36 Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges (Past Three Years)**  |Japan-U.S.- ROK trilateral cooperation|Apr. 2017 May 2017 Jun. 2017 Jul. 2017 Aug. 2017 Sep. 2017 Oct. 2017 Oct. 2017 Dec. 2017 Mar. 2018 May 2018 Jun. 2018 Oct. 2018 Oct. 2018 May 2019 Jun. 2019 Oct. 2019 Nov. 2019 Nov. 2019|Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Tokyo) Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (The Philippines (4th ADMM- Plus)) Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Hawaii) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting (Washington D.C.) Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Hawaii) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (5th ADMM-Plus)) Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Washington D.C.) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting (Seoul) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Washington D.C.) Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Thailand (6th ADMM-Plus))| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of defense and others|May 2017 Jun. 2017 Jul. 2017 Sep. 2017 Sep. 2017 Oct. 2017 Apr. 2018 Jun. 2018 Oct. 2018 Oct. 2018 Nov. 2019|Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (The Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Japan by Chief of ROK Army Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to ROK by MSDF Chief of Staff (participation in Western Pacific Naval Symposium) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (5th ADMM-Plus)) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Thailand (6th ADMM-Plus))| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Mar. 2018|11th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Tokyo)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Oct. 2017 Dec. 2017 Sep. 2018 Nov. 2018|Port visit to Pyeongtaek by MSDF Training Squadron (MSDF) Port visit to Japan by the training squadron of the Korean navy (Yokosuka) (MSDF) Visit to the ROK by Western Army Commanding General (GSDF) Port visit to Japan by the training squadron of the Korean navy (Sasebo) (MSDF)| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (ROK)| |Japan-ROK bilateral search and rescue exercise|Dec. 15, 2017|Sagami Bay|Destroyer JS “Teruzuki”|One vessel|Destroyer ROKS “Kang Gamchan” Fast combat support ship ROKS “Hwacheon”| (Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release. ----- **Reference 37 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries, Canada and New Zealand (Past Three Years)**  [United Kingdom] (Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020） Sep. 2018 Visit to the U.K. by State Minister of Defense Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by U.K. Secretary of State for Defence |exchanges between heads of defense and others|Feb. 2019 Jul. 2018 Sep. 2018 Nov. 2019 Jan. 2020|Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of the General Staff, British Army Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by U.K. Parliamentary Under Secretary Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Nov. 2017 Feb. 2019|16th Japan-U.K. Politico-Military Consultation, 12th Japan-U.K. Military-Military Consultation (Tokyo) 17th Japan-U.K. Politico-Military Consultation, 13th Japan-U.K. Military-Military Consultation (London)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Jul. 2017 Jul. 2018|Dispatch of ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K. and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges Dispatch of ASDF C-2 to the United Kingdom (participation in RIAT and unit- to-unit exchange)| |Ground Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.K.)| |Field exercise with the U.K. Army in Japan (Vigilant Isles)|Sep. 30-Oct. 12, 2018|Fuji School, Kita Fuji Maneuver Area, Ojojihara Maneuver Area|[JSDF] Major units of Reconnaissance School Unit, Fuji School Brigade [British Armed Forces] Major units of Honourable Artillery Company, 1st Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade|Totaling approximately 60 personnel|Totaling approximately 50 personnel| |Field exercise with the U.K. Army in the United Kingdom (Vigilant Isles 19)|Sep. 29-Oct. 24, 2019|Garelochhead Training Camp, Strone Camp and area around the Loch Ewe (the U.K.)|[JSDF] Fuji School, etc. [British Armed Forces] Honourable Artillery Company, 1st Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade|Totaling approximately 20 personnel|Totaling approximately 30 personnel| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.K.)| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise|Apr. 27-28, 2018|Waters south of Kanto|Destroyer JS “Suzunami,” Underway Replenishment Ship JS “Tokiwa,” submarine|Three vessels P-3C × 1|Frigate HMS “Sutherland”| |Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise|Aug. 25, 2018|Waters south of Honshu|Landing Ship JS “Shimokita”|One vessel|Amphibious assault ship HMS “Albion”| |Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise|Sep. 26, 2018|Waters and Airspace west of Sumatra (Indian Ocean)|Destroyers JS “Kaga,” and JS “Inazuma”|Two vessels|Frigate HMS “Argyll”| |Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise|Oct. 18, 2019|Waters and airspace south of Kanto|Destroyer JS “Teruzuki”|One vessel|Survey vessel HMS “Enterprise”| Apr. 2019 Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the French Army High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others Regular discussions between defense authorities Unit-to-unit exchange, etc. [British Armed Forces] Fuji School, etc. [British Armed Forces] and Reconnaissance Brigade Participating Units Destroyer JS “Suzunami,” Underway Replenishment Ship JS High-level Apr. 2017 Visit to Japan by U.K. Minister of State for Defence Jul. 2017 Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff Aug. 2017 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Aug. 2017 Visit to Japan and tour of JS Izumo by U.K Prime Minister Sep. 2017 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation High-level Sep. 2017 Visit to the U.K. by Commissioner of ATLA exchanges Nov. 2017 Visit to the U.K. by GSDF Chief of Staff between heads of Dec. 2017 Visit to the U.K. by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defense Ministerial defense and Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) others Feb. 2018 Visit to the U.K. by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Feb. 2018 Visit to Japan by First Sea Lord Mar. 2018 Visit to the U.K. by Chief of Staff, JS Jun. 2018 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jul. 2018 Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff Ground Self-Defense Force Training Designation Field exercise with the U.K. Army in Japan (Vigilant Isles) Field exercise with the U.K. Army in the United Kingdom (Vigilant Isles 19) Maritime Self-Defense Force [France] |exchanges between heads of defense and others|Nov. 2019 Jan. 2020 Feb. 2020|Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bahrain (15th (Manama Dialogue)) Visit to France by ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany (56th Munich Security Conference))| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Dec. 2017 Dec. 2018|20th Japan-France Politico-Military Consultation, 18th Japan-France Military- Military Consultation (Tokyo) 21st Japan-France Politico-Military Consultation (Paris)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Jun. 2017 Jun. 2019 Jun. 2019|Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to France (participation in International Paris Air Show) Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to France (participation in International Paris Air Show) Dispatch of ASDF C-2 to France (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges, and participation in Paris Air Show)| |Joint Staff|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (France)| |Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the French Air Force|Jan. 27, 2020|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Harusame”|One vessel|Aircraft PUMA| |Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the French Navy|Feb. 21, 2020|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Harusame”|One vessel|Frigate FS “FORBIN”| |Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the French Navy|Mar. 18, 2020|Gulf of Aden|Destroyer JS “Harusame”|One vessel|Amphibious Assault Ship FS “Mistral”| Jun. 2017 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jun. 2017 Visit to France by State Minister of Defense (Paris Air Show) Jun. 2017 Visit to France by Commissioner of ATLA Sep. 2017 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation High-level Nov. 2017 Visit to France by GSDF Chief of Staff exchanges between Jan. 2018 Visit to Japan by Minister of Armed Forces (4th Foreign and Defense Ministerial heads of Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) defense and May 2018 Visit to France by MSDF Chief of Staff others Jun. 2018 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jul. 2018 ☆Japan-France Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed; entered into force in June 2019 Jan. 2019 Visit to France by Minister of Defense (5th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (France)| |Bilateral exercise with the French Navy|Feb. 12-13, 2018|Waters south of Kanto|Destroyer JS “Yugiri”|One vessel|Frigate FS “Vendémiaire”| |Bilateral exercise with the French Navy|Apr. 14, 2019|Waters and airspace west of Kyushu|Destroyer JS “Kirisame”|One vessel|Frigate FS “Vendémiaire”| ----- [Canada] |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Dec. 2017 Dec. 2019|10th Japan-Canada Politico-Military Consultation, 11th Japan-Canada Military- Military Consultation (Ottawa) 1 M1 ilt ih J rya p Ca on n- sC ua ltn aa td ioa P (o Tolit kic yoo )-Military Consultation, 12th Japan-Canada Military- ta n| |---|---|---| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Jul. 2017 Jul. 2017 May 2018 Jul. 2018 Jul. 2019|Japan-Canada unit-to-unit exchange (Komaki) (ASDF) Japan-Canada unit-to-unit exchange (Komox) (ASDF) Visit to CFB Bagotville by ASDF B-747 and unit-to-unit exchange Visit to CFB Greenwood by ASDF C-2 and unit-to-unit exchange Visit to Komaki Air Base by Canadian CC-177 and exchanges between inflight refueling and airlift troops| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Sep. 2017 Sep. 2017 Nov. 2017 Dec. 2017 Feb. 2018 Apr. 2018 Dec. 2018 Jun. 2019 Oct. 2019 Feb. 2020 Feb. 2020|Visit to Canada by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Canada by Chief of Staff, JS Visit to Canada by State Minister of Defense (UN PKO Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Commander, Royal Canadian Navy Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Armed Forces ☆ Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed Visit to Japan by Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence of Canada (4th Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”)) Visit to Japan by Minister for National Defence of Canada Visit to Canada by GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany (56th Munich Security Conference)) Visit to Japan by Commander, Royal Canadian Air Force| |---|---|---| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Canada)| |Bilateral exercise with the Royal Canadian Navy (KAEDEX)|Jul. 2-15, 2017|Waters around Kyushu through south of Kanto|Destroyers JS “Umigiri,” and JS “Abukuma,” Underway Replenishment Ship JS “Tokiwa”|Three vessels|Frigates HMCS “Winnipeg,” and HMCS “Ottawa”| |Bilateral exercise with the Royal Canadian Navy (KAEDEX)|Dec. 19, 2017|Waters south of Honshu|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” JS “Murasame,” JS “Ikazuchi,” and JS “Hatakaze”|Four vessels P-1 × 1|Submarine HMCS “Chicoutimi”| |Bilateral exercise with the Royal Canadian Navy (KAEDEX2018)|Nov. 24-29, 2018|Sasebo Port and waters and airspace west of Kyushu|Destroyer JS “Kirisame”|One vessel|Frigate HMCS “Calgary” Supply Ship HMCS “Asterix”| |Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX19-1)|Jun. 13-15, 2019|Waters and airspace off the coast of Vietnam (South China Sea)|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” JS “Murasame,” and JS “Akebono”|Three vessels|Frigate HMCS “Regina” Supply Ship HMCS “Asterix”| |Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX19-2)|Oct. 16-17, 2019|Waters and airspace south of Kanto|Destroyers JS “Shimakaze,” and JS “Chokai”|Two vessels|Frigate HMCS “Ottawa”| [New Zealand] May 2017 Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Jun. 2017 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La High-level Dialogue)) exchanges Jul. 2017 Visit to New Zealand by State Minister of Defense between Jul. 2017 Visit to Japan by New Zealand Chief of Defense Force heads of defense and May 2018 Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander others Feb. 2019 Visit to New Zealand by Chief of Staff, JS Jun. 2019 Visit to New Zealand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Sep. 2019 Visit to Japan by New Zealand Army Commander [NATO] High-level Nov. 2019 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Thailand (6th ADMM-Plus)) |exchanges between heads of defense and others|Nov. 2019|Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Dec. 2018 Sep. 2019|11th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo) 12th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Wellington)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Nov. 2017|Dispatch of C-2 aircraft to New Zealand (overseas flight training) and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|May 2017|15th Japan-NATO High-Level Consultation (Tokyo)| |---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Jun. 2017 Oct. 2017 Mar. 2018 Sep. 2018 Jun. 2019 Feb. 2020|Visit to Japan by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation NATO Visit to Japan by Secretary General of NATO (talks with Defense Minister) Visit to NATO by Chief of Staff, JS Visit to NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples by Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Meeting between Minister of Defense and NATO Secretary General (Germany [the 56th Munich Security Conference])| |---|---|---| |Joint Staff|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)| |NATO cyber defense exercise (Cyber Coalition 2019)|Dec. 2019|Estonia, Japan|Japan (Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command), NATO member countries, partner countries, and EU|Approximately 20 personnel| [Germany] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Oct. 2019 Nov. 2019 Feb. 2020|Visit to Japan by German Parliamentary State Secretary Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany (56th Munich Security Conference))| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Dec. 2018 Nov. 2019|Japan-Germany Political Director Level Politico-Military Consultation (Tokyo) Japan-Germany Political Director Level Politico-Military Consultation (Berlin)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Apr. 2018|Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to Germany (participation in Berlin International Aerospace Show)| Jul. 2017 Visit to Germany by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs (1st Japan-Germany Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue) Jul. 2017 ☆ Agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies signed High-level Sep. 2017 Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation exchanges Feb. 2018 Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference) between heads Apr. 2018 Visit to Germany by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Berlin of defense and International Aerospace Show) others May 2018 Visit to Germany by MSDF Chief of Staff Jun. 2018 Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Feb. 2019 Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference) [Italy] High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others Jan. 2019 Visit to Italy by Commissioner of ATLA Feb. 2019 Visit to Italy by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oct. 2019 Visit to Italy by MSDF Chief of Staff Jan. 2020 Visit to Italy by ASDF Chief of Staff |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Sep. 2017 Jan. 2019 Feb. 2020|4th Japan-Italy Military-Military Consultation (Rome) 5th Japan-Italy Military-Military Consultation (Rome) 6th Japan-Italy Military-Military Consultation (Rome)| |---|---|---| May 2017 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Italy (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ☆ Agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology signed High-level exchanges Sep. 2017 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation between heads Oct. 2017 Visit to Italy by MSDF Chief of Staff of defense and Feb. 2018 Document of exchange between National Institute of Defense Studies and others Italian defense research and education organizations signed Jul. 2018 Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy Sep. 2018 Visit to Italy by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ----- [Spain] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Jan. 2018 Jul. 2018|Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Spain (Defense Ministerial Meeting) 1st Japan-Spain vice-ministerial consultation (Barcelona)| |---|---|---| [The Netherlands] |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Jul. 2017 Jun. 2019|2nd Japan-Spain Military-Military Consultation (Tokyo) 3rd Japan-Spain Military-Military Consultation (Madrid)| |---|---|---| [Estonia] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|May 2018 Sep. 2018|Visit to Estonia by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Estonia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Oct. 2018 Sep. 2019|1st Japan-Ukraine Politico-Military Consultation (Tokyo) 1st Japan-Ukraine Military-Military Consutation (Kiev)| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Sep. 2017 Sep. 2019|2nd Japan-Finland Military-Military Consultation (Tokyo) 3rd Japan-Finland Military-Military Consultation (Helsinki)| |---|---|---| [Greece] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Sep. 2018|Visit to the Netherlands by Minister of Defense| |---|---|---| [Ukraine] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Aug. 2017 Oct. 2018 Feb. 2020|Visit to Ukraine by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Finland by Chief of Staff, JS ☆ Japan-Ukraine memorandum for defense exchange signed Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany (56th Munich Security Conference))| |---|---|---| [Finland] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|May 2018 Oct. 2018 Feb. 2019|Visit to Finland by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Finland by Chief of Staff, JS Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Finland (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ☆Japan-Finland memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and exchange signed| |---|---|---| [Denmark] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Oct. 2019|Japan-Denmark Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation| |---|---|---| [Sweden] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Jul. 2018|Visit to Greece by Commissioner of ATLA| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Oct. 2017 Feb. 2019|4th Japan-Sweden Military-Military Consultation (Tokyo) 5th Japan-Sweden Military-Military Consultation (Stockholm)| |---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Jan. 2018|Visit to Sweden by State Minister of Defense| |---|---|---| [Czech Republic] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Jun. 2017 Jul. 2017|Visit to Japan by Deputy Minister of Defense of the Czech Republic (exchanged opinions with Commissioner of ATLA) Visit to Czech Republic by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense ☆ Japan-Czech Republic memorandum for defense cooperation signed| |---|---|---| [Belgium] [Norway] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Apr. 2018 Apr. 2018|Visit to Japan by State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Norway Visit to Japan by Chief of the Navy of Norway| |---|---|---| [Latvia] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Mar. 2018|Visit to Belgium by Chief of Staff, JS| |---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Feb. 2018|Visit to Japan by Minister of Defense of Latvia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)| |---|---|---| [EU] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Feb. 2020|M (5e 6e thti n Mg b ne ictw e Se en uM rii tn yi s Cte or fo ef eD ne cfe en )se and EU High Representative (Germany u h c n r| |---|---|---| |Joint Staff|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (EU)| |Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the EU (German Navy) in the Gulf of Aden (Germany)|Dec. 1, 2017|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Air Patrol Squadron 1|P-3C × 2|P-3C × 1| |Joint exercise with the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) (Italy)|Jul. 11, 2018|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Akebono,” Escort Division 5|One vessel|Frigate ITS “CARLO MARGOTTINI”| |Joint exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)|Aug. 29, 2018|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Akebono,” Escort Division 5|One vessel|landing platform dock SPS “CASTILLA”| |Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)|Feb. 2, 2019|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Samidare,” Escort Division 4|One vessel|Patrol vessel ESPS “RELAMPAGO”| |Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)|Mar. 24, 2019|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Samidare,” Escort Division 4|One vessel|Frigate SPS “NAVARRA”| |Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)|Jan. 18, 2020|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Harusame”|One vessel|Frigate SPS “VICTORIA”| |Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)|Feb. 7-8 2020|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Harusame”|One vessel|Frigate SPS “VICTORIA”| ----- **Reference 38 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)**  authorities (Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020) Dec. 2018 1st Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism Annual and Experts Meeting Feb. 2019 16th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Beijing (Foreign Affairs and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting)) Jan. 2020 2nd Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism Annual and Experts Meeting |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Nov. 2018 Apr. 2019 Oct. 2019 Nov. 2019|Visit to Japan by delegate of the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army Visit to China by MSDF Chief of Staff and MSDF vessels (Qingdao (attend the International Fleet Review to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army Navy)) Visit to Japan by a People’s Liberation Army Navy vessel V Wis ei st tt eo nth Ae mEa ys Cte or mn mTh ae na dt ie nr C Go em nm era an l)d, etc., by delegate of the SDF (head: r r g| |---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (China)| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan-China goodwill exercise|Oct. 16, 2019|Waters and airspace south of Kanto|Destroyer JS “Samidare”|One vessel|Destroyer CNS “Taiyuan”| (Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020) May 2019 Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Russia (4th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2), Defense Ministerial Meeting) May 2019 Visit to Russia by GSDF Chief of Staff Nov. 2019 Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Navy |High-level talks between heads of defense and others|Oct. 2018 Jun. 2019 Dec. 2019|Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (5th ADMM-Plus)) Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to China by Minister of Defense (Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting)| |---|---|---| Oct. 2017 15th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Foreign Affairs and Defense ViceMinisterial Meeting) (Tokyo) discussions Apr. 2018 7th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication between Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Beijing) defense May 2018 ☆“Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities authorities of Japan and China” (Memorandum) signed Oct. 2018 3rd Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Beijing) High-level talks between heads of defense and others Regular discussions between defense authorities Maritime Self-Defense Force (Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release. **Reference 39 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)** |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Oct. 2017|Port visit to Vladivostok by MSDF Training Squadron| |---|---|---| High-level Nov. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Army talks between Dec. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Joint Staff, Russian Military heads of Jul. 2018 Visit to Russia by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defense Ministerial defense and Dialogue, Defense Ministerial Meeting) others Oct. 2018 Visit to Russia by Chief of Staff, JS High-level talks between heads of defense and others Unit-to-unit exchange, etc. |Joint Staff|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Russia)| |Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Russian Navy|Nov. 10, 2018|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Ikazuchi”|One vessel|Frigate RFS “SEVEROMORSK”| |Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Russian Navy|Jan. 20-21, 2020|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Harusame”|One vessel|Frigate RFS “YAROSLAV MUDRY,” replenishment ship RFS “YELNYA” Tug boat RFS “VICTOR KONETSKY”| Maritime Self-Defense Force |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Russia)| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise|Nov. 20-25, 2017|Port of Vladivostok and waters around Vladivostok|Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”|One vessel Totaling approximately 200 personnel|Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov” Several vessels| |Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise|Jul. 5-10, 2018|Maizuru Port and waters north of Wakasa Bay|Destroyer JS “Asagiri” Auxiliary Multipurpose Ship JS “Hiuchi”|Two vessels|Destroyers RFS “Admiral Tributs,” and RFS “Admiral Vinogradov” Replenishment Ship RFS “Pechenga”| |Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise|Jun. 10-15, 2019|Port of Vladivostok and waters and airspace around Vladivostok|Destroyer JS “Suzunami”|One vessel|Destroyer RFS “Admiral Panteleyev” Several vessels| (Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release. ----- **Reference 40 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pacific Island Countries (Past Three Years)** [Papua New Guinea] [Tonga] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Feb. 2020|Visit to Tonga by State Minister of Defense| |---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Mar. 2019 Feb. 2020|Visit to Papua New Guinea by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Papua New Guinea by State Minister of Defense| |---|---|---| [Fiji] |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Mar. 2019 Aug. 2019|Dispatch of ASDF C-2 to Fiji (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges) Port call by the MSDF Training Squadron (implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges)| |---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Mar. 2018 Mar. 2019 Sep. 2019 Jan. 2020|Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Republic of Fiji Military Force Visit to Japan by Chief of the Fijian Navy Visit to Japan by Chief of the Fijian Navy Visit to Fiji by State Minister of Defense| |---|---|---| **Reference 41 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Countries in the Middle East (Past Three Years)** （2017.4.1～2020.3.31） [UAE] May 2018 Visit to Japan by UAE Minister of State for Defence Affairs (signing authorities Dec. 2018 2nd Japan-UAE Military-Military Consulation (Tokyo) defense and others Unit-to-unit Nov. 2017 Dispatch of ASDF C-2 transport aircraft to UAE (overseas flight training |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Nov. 2017 Dec. 2018|1st Japan-UAE Military-Military Consulation (Abu Dhabi) 2nd Japan-UAE Military-Military Consulation (Tokyo)| |---|---|---| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Jul. 2017 Nov. 2017 Nov. 2019|Japan-UAE unit-to-unit exchange (Al Dhafra) (ASDF) Dispatch of ASDF C-2 transport aircraft to UAE (overseas flight training and participation in Dubai International Air and Space Show) (ASDF) Dispatch of ASDF C-2 transport aircraft to UAE (participation in Dubai International Air and Space Show)| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Nov. 2017 May 2018 Jul. 2018 Jun. 2019 Oct. 2019 Nov. 2019 Mar. 2020|Visit to UAE by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Dubai Air and Space Show) Visit to Japan by UAE Minister of State for Defence Affairs (signing ceremony for memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and exchange, Vice-Ministerial Meeting) Visit to UAE by Commissioner of ATLA Visit to UAE by Chief of Joint Staff Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Visit to UAE by ASDF Chief of Staff (Dubai Air and Space Show) Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation| |---|---|---| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (UAE)| |Goodwill exercise with the United Arab Emirates Navy|Apr. 26, 2017|Persian Gulf|Destroyer JS “Kirisame”|One vessel|Patrol boat “MUBARRAZ”| [Israel] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Jun. 2019|Visit to Israel by Chief of Joint Staff| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Oct. 2018|1st Japan-Israel Security Dialogue (Tel Aviv)| |---|---|---| [Iran] [Egypt] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Oct. 2019 Jan. 2020|Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation| |---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Aug. 2017 Sep. 2017 Jun. 2019|Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces Visit to Egypt by State Minister of Defense Visit to Egypt by Chief of Joint Staff| |---|---|---| [Oman] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Mar. 2019 Oct. 2019 Dec. 2019|Visit to Japan by Minister Responsible for Defence Affairs of Oman Japan-Oman Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Visit to Oman by Minister of Defence (Defense Ministerial Meeting)| |---|---|---| |Joint Staff|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Oman)| |Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman|May 2, 2019|Gulf of Aden|Deployment Surface Force for Counter- Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Asagiri”|One vessel|Patrol ship SNV “AL MABRUKAH”| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Oman)| |Goodwill exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman|May 2, 2018|Waters around Duqm Port (Oman)|29th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Setogiri,” Escort Division 7|One vessel|Frigate SNV “AL MUA’ZZAR”| |Goodwill exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman|Sep. 1, 2019|Muscat Port (Oman) and its surrounding waters|33rd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Asagiri”|One vessel|Patrol Vessel SNV “Al Seeb”| |Goodwill exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman|Dec. 21, 2019|Waters and airspace around Duqm Port (Oman)|34th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Sazanami”|One vessel|Corvet SNV “Al Shamikh”| [Saudi Arabia] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Oct. 2019 Dec. 2019|Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation| |---|---|---| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Saudi Arabia)| |Goodwill exercise with the Royal Saudi Naval Forces|Apr. 29, 2017|Persian Gulf (water around Dammam)|Destroyer JS “Kirisame,” Escort Division 8|One vessel|Patrol boat HMS “SIDDIQ”| ----- [Qatar] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|May 2019 Oct. 2019 Dec. 2019|Visit to Japan by Minister of State for Defense Affairs of Qatar Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Qatar (19th Doha Forum))| |---|---|---| [Turkey] |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Mar. 2018|3rd Japan-Qatar Security Dialogue (Tokyo)| |---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Jun. 2019 Jul. 2019|Visit to Japan by Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey Visit to Japan by Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Turkey| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Nov. 2017|3rd Japan-Turkey Military-Military Consultation (Ankara)| |---|---|---| [Bahrain] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|May 2017 Dec. 2017 Jun. 2018 Oct. 2019 Nov. 2019|Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Manama Dialogue) Visit to Bahrain by MSDF Chief of Staff Telephone conversation between Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force Meeting between Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force (Bahrain (15th Manama Dialogue))| |---|---|---| [Jordan] |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Nov. 2017 Jul. 2019|2nd Japan-Jordan Military-Military Consultation (Anman) 1st Japan-Jordan Politico-Military Consultation (Anman)| |---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Dec. 2019|Visit to Jordan by Minister of Defense (meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lieutenant General Yousef Huneiti)| |---|---|---| (Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release. **Reference 42 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with South Asian Countries (Past Three Years)** [Sri Lanka] High-level exchanges Aug. 2018 Visit to Sri Lanka by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) between heads Jul. 2019 Visit to Sri Lanka by State Minister of Defense of defense and others |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Mar. 2019|D ofi s up na itt -c th -o uf nA itS eD xF U ha-4 gto sS )ri Lanka (overseas flight training and implementation o c n e| |---|---|---| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Sri Lanka)| |Goodwill exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy|Apr. 2, 2017|Waters west of Sri Lanka|Destroyer JS “Teruzuki,” Escort Division 6|One vessel|Offshore Patrol Vessel SLNS “SAMUDURA”| |Goodwill exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy|Jul. 23, 2017|Waters around Sri Lanka|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” and JS “Sazanami”|Two vessels|Offshore Patrol Vessel SLNS “SAYURA” Fast Missile Vessel SLNS “NANDIMITHRA”| |Goodwill exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy|Aug. 22, 2017|Waters south of Sri Lanka|Destroyer JS “Amagiri,” Escort Division 2|One vessel|Offshore Patrol Vessel SLNS “SAMUDURA”| |Goodwill exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy|Dec. 22, 2017|Trincomalee Port (Sri Lanka) and its surrounding waters|29th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Setogiri,” Escort Division 7|One vessel|Offshore Patrol Vessel SLNS “SAYURA”| |Goodwill exercise with Sri Lanka Air Force|Aug. 5, 2018|Waters east of Sri Lanka|Air Patrol Squadron 2|P-3C × 1|One aircraft| |Goodwill exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy|Aug. 22, 2018|Trincomalee Port (Sri Lanka) and its surrounding waters|31st Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Ikazuchi,” Escort Division 1|One vessel|Fast Missile Vessel SLNS “Suranimila”| |Goodwill exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy|Oct. 4, 2018|Colombo Port (Sri Lanka) and its surrounding waters and airspace|Indo Southeast Asia Deployment 2018 Destroyers JS “Kaga,” and JS “Inazuma,” Escort Flotilla 4|Two vessels|Offshore Patrol Vessel “Sagara”| |Bilateral exercise with the Sri Lanka Armed Forces|Jan. 27, 2019|Waters and airspace off the coast of Hambantota (Sri Lanka)|Air Patrol Squadron 2|P-3C × 2|Two Navy’s vessels One Air Force’s aircraft| |Bilateral exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy|Jan. 21, 2020|Waters and airspace west of Sri Lanka|Air Patrol Squadron 2|P-3C × 2|Fast Missile Vessel SLNS “Suranimila” High-Speed Patrol Boat “FAC-21”| High-level Jul. 2017 Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense exchanges Nov. 2011 Visit to Japan by Sri Lankan State Minister of Defense between heads of defense and Mar. 2018 Visit to Sri Lanka by Chief of Staff others [Pakistan] |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|May 2017|Visit to ASDF units, etc. by Pakistan Air Force (Ichigaya, Hamamatsu)| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Apr. 2018 Jun. 2019|9th Japan-Pakistan Military-Military Consultation (Tokyo) 10th Japan-Pakistan Military-Military Consultation (Islamabad)| |---|---|---| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Pakistan)| |Bilateral exercise with the Pakistan Navy (Pre-AMAN)|Jan. 10, 2019|Karachi Port (Pakistan) and its surrounding waters and airspace|31st Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Ikazuchi,” Escort Division 1|One vessel|Destroyer PNS “Tariq”| |Bilateral exercise with the Pakistan Navy (Pre-AMAN)|Jan. 25, 2019|Waters and airspace off the coast of Karachi (Pakistani)|Air Patrol Squadron 2|P-3C × 2|Two vessels P-3C × 1| (Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release. ----- **Reference 43 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years)** [Kazakhstan] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Jul. 2017|Visit to Kazakhstan by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense ☆ Japan-Kazakhstan memorandum for defense exchange signed| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Jul. 2018|1st Japan-Kazakhstan Military-Military Consultation| |---|---|---| [Brazil] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Apr. 2018 Jul. 2019|Visit to Brazil by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Brazilian Army Commander| |---|---|---| [Mongolia] |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Dec. 2019|Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting| |---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense authorities|Aug. 2017 Apr. 2019|4th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 4th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense and security authorities (Ulaanbaatar) 5th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between foreign affairs, defense 5th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense and security authorities (Tokyo)| |---|---|---| [Others] |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Maldive)| |Goodwill exercise with the Maldives National Defence Force|Apr. 25, 2019|Port of Male (Maldives) and its surrounding waters|32nd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Samidare,” Escort Division 4|One vessel|Maldivian Coast Guard ship “Huravee”| |Goodwill exercise with the Maldives National Defence Force|Jul. 22, 2019|Waters and Airspace east of Maldives|Air Patrol Squadron 2|P-3C × 1|Maldivian Coast Guard ship “Shaheed Ali”| High-level May 2017 Visit to Djibouti by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense exchanges Jul. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commander of the Chief of the Army of Chili between heads Sep. 2017 Visit to Djibouti by State Minister of Defense of defense and Dec. 2017 Visit to Austria, Serbia Montenegro by Vice-Minister of Defense for International others Affairs Dec. 2018 Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by State Minister of Defense High-level Dec. 2018 Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of Staff (equivalent to commander of Army) of exchanges Djibouti between heads of defense and Dec. 2019 Visit to Japan by Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of Jamaica (Defense others Ministerial Meeting) Dec. 2019 Visit to Djibouti by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Participating Units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Bangladesh)| |Goodwill exercise with the Bangladesh Navy|Oct. 8, 2019|Chattogram (People’s Republic of Bangladesh) and its surrounding waters|Minesweeper Tender JS “Bungo,” Minesweeper Coastal JS “Takashima,” Minesweeper Division 3|Two vessels|Corvette BNS “Prottoy,” Patrol Craft BNS “Durjoy”| (Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release. **Reference 44 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Indo-Pacific Region, Past Three Years)** ||Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020)| |---|---|---|---| ||Dialogue||Date| |Participation in Security Dialogues in the Indo-Pacific Region|Intergovernmental|○ ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) ・Ministerial Meeting ・ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM-Plus) ・ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting Working Group (ADSOM-Plus WG) ・Experts’ Working Group (EWG) Counter-Terrorism EWG HA/DR-EWG Maritime Security EWG Military Medicine EWG Peacekeeping Operations EWG Humanitarian Mine Action EWG Cyber EWG ○ ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting ○ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ・Meeting among defense authorities|(Oct. 2017, Oct. 2018, Nov. 2019) (Apr. 2017, Jul. 2018, Apr. 2019) (Jan. 2018, Mar. 2019, Jan. 2020) (Jul. 2017, Aug. 2018, Jan. 2019, Apr. 2019, Jun. 2019, Sep. 2019, Oct. 2019, Dec. 2019) (May 2017, Sep. 2017, Feb. 2018, Apr. 2018, Jul. 2018, Sep. 2018, Mar. 2019, Apr. 2019, Jul. 2019, Oct. 2019) (Nov. 2017, May 2018, Nov. 2018, Feb. 2019, May 2019, Sep. 2019) (Dec. 2017, Feb. 2018, Dec. 2018, Feb. 2019, Mar. 2019, Oct. 2019) (May 2017, Oct. 2017, Apr. 2018, Nov. 2018, Mar. 2019, Sep. 2019) (May 2017, Oct. 2017, Apr. 2018, Oct. 2018, Mar. 2019, Sep. 2019, Dec. 2019) (Jul. 2017, Nov. 2017, May 2018, Nov. 2018, May 2019, Aug. 2019, Oct. 2019) (Oct. 2017, Oct. 2018, Nov. 2019) (May 2017, Jun. 2017, May 2018, Jun. 2018, May 2019)| ||Hosted by the private sector|○ IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) ○ ISSS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)|(Jun. 2017, Jun. 2018, May 2019) (Dec. 2017, Nov. 2019)| ||Hosted by the Government|○ Doha Forum|(Dec. 2019)| - Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum (Sep. 2017, Sep. 2018, Oct. 2019) - Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) (Mar. 2018, Mar. 2019) - International Conference of Cadets (Feb. 2018, Feb. 2019) ----- |Reference 45 Multilateral Security|Col2|Col3|Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Security Dialogue|||Outline|Recent Situations| |Hosted by Ministry of Defense|Internal Bureau and others|Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. Vice-ministerial level officials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.|In October 2019, the MOD held the eleventh Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum in Tokyo, in which vice-ministerial level officials from all ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat participated to exchange their frank and constructive views on three themes: Regional Security Situation; Visions for the Indo-Pacific: Towards the Free and Open Regional Order; and ASEAN’s Initiatives for Regional Defense Cooperation.| |||Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confidence building focusing on the defense field.|The 23rd Forum, held in March 2019, was attended by 27 countries (25 Asia-Pacific countries, France and the United Kingdom) as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, the EU and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The participants discussed a wide range of matters in the context of the themes of the Forum, “security issues in the Indo-Pacific region” and “changing security challenges and prospects.”| |Hosted by Ministry of Defense|GSDF|G5 Dialogue (G5D)|Hosted by the GSDF for the first time in 2017, this dialogue provides a platform for the army and other services of like-minded countries that has close ties with the GSDF to exchanges views on multilateral engagement in the Asia-Pacific region for the armies to actively contribute to regional peace and stability.|In February 2018, with the participation of five service branches from four countries to include the U.S. (including the Marines), Australia, the U.K. and France, group discussions under the theme of “Direction of defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region the army should aim for” and field trip to the GSDF Chemical School were carried out.| |||Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)|Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting officers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.|The 23rd Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) meeting was held in November 2019. The participants were working-level officers in charge of logistics sent from armies in 25 countries in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. Views were exchanged under the theme “Logistic in Urban Disaster Response (including Measures for the Olympic Games).”| ||MSDF|Asia Pacific Naval College Seminar (APNCS)|Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of naval college staff from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange and mutual understanding between participating countries.|The 22nd seminar was held in February 2019 with the participation of navy military personnel from 18 countries, and personnel from Keio University, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), IBC Consulting & Publishing Group, and Sasagawa Peace Foundation. Presentations by the participants and active opinion exchanges were conducted on the theme of “Cooperation among Navies in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” In addition, unit and cultural study tours were also held to deepen the understanding of the MSDF as well as Japanese culture and history.| |||Western Pacific Naval Symposium Short Term Exchange Program (WPNS STEP)|Hosted by the MSDF, this program has been held annually since 2011, with the participation of junior naval officers from the WPNS countries. The program is designed to provide them with opportunities to deepen their understanding of Japan’s security environment, defense policy and buildup, and culture and history.|With the participation of naval officers and other personnel from 27 countries, the 9th WPNS STEP was held in October 2019. Presentations and exchange of candid views were carried out with regard to new initiatives by each navy and future equipment under the theme of “Cooperation among Navies in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”| ||ASDF|Japan Air Self-Defense Force Air Staff College Seminar|Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2015, with the participation of officials related to air staff colleges mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer’s education. (From 1996 to 2014, this seminar was held as International Air Force Education Seminar.)|Air staff college personnel and researchers from five countries were invited in November 2019 to provide keynote speeches and presentations and to exchange their views on the theme of “How to Formulate Deterrent Strategies for Today.”| |||International Air Command and Staff Seminar|Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of students of air staff college students from the Asia-Pacific region. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.|With the participation of air staff college students from 18 countries, the 19th seminar was held in October 2019. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Future Directions Based on the Current Status and Challenges of Air Forces.”| |Hosted by Ministry of Defense|National Defense Academy|International Seminar on Defense Science|Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides opportunities to discuss international affairs and security by inviting military academy representatives from the Asia-Pacific regions.|The 21st International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2016, inviting 10 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Commitment to national cybersecurity by military academy and services in education and research.” This seminar ended in 2016.| |||International Cadets’ Conference|Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of cadets from each country. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.|In March 2019, the 22nd conference was held, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of “The Changing World and Consistent Belief.”| ||National Institute for Defense Studies|International Security Colloquium|Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues in addition to enhancing public awareness of security issues.|In December 2019, this symposium was held as the 21st international symposium by inviting recognized researchers and practitioners from such countries as the United States, Russia, and Australia, as well as from Japan. Participants exchanged opinions under the theme of “Belt and Road Initiative and the Future of the International Order.”| |||International Forum on War History|Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.|In September 2019, the 17th International Forum on War History was held by inviting recognized researchers and practitioners from such countries as the United States, and the United Kingdom, Australia, as well as from Japan. Participants exchanged opinions under the theme of “Unexpected Expansion of Conflicts.”| |||ASEAN Workshop|Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this workshop- style group study session has been held annually since 2010 to discuss emerging security issues that the Asia-Pacific region faces in common. Since 2018, participating regions are limited to ASEAN countries.|In February 2020, researchers from the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand were invited, and they exchanged opinions under the theme of “US-China Strategic Competition.”| ----- **Reference 46 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues** |Other Multilateral Security Dialogue|Col2|Col3|Overview| |---|---|---|---| |Hosted by the Government|Internal Bureau and others|ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)|Started in October 2010. It is the only defense ministerial meeting in the Asia-Pacific region hosted by governments, including Japan, which provides opportunities to exchange views on issues related to regional security. It was decided in the 4th ADMM-Plus held in October 2017 that this meeting will take place annually instead of biennially.| |||ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting|First held in 2014. It is a platform for defense ministers of all of the ASEAN nations and Japan to discuss a wide spectrum of security related issues, and to exchange views on concrete action plans to develop future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation.| |||ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum|A forum that started in 1994, designed to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region through political and security dialogue and cooperation. Currently 26 countries (10 ASEAN nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995), Myanmar (since 1996)), Japan, Australia, Canada, China, India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the ROK, Russia, the U.S., Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), Sri Lanka (since 2007)), and 1 organization (EU) are members of the forum. Authorities in charge of diplomacy and defense meet through various government-to-government meetings to discuss the current regional situation and security area.| |||Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (AMORS)|AMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated in the forum since the second meeting in 1993.| |||Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD)|This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacific and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has participated since the first meeting in 2012.| |||Doha Forum|Doha Forum is an international conference hosted by the Government of Qatar and participated in by ministers and government officials, intellectuals and personnel from international organizations specialized in diplomacy, security, global issues (climate change and emergence of global powers, etc.), and energy-related problems. Participants have unrestricted discussions. The Forum has been held every year since 2001, and the one in December 2019 was the 19th, in which Japan participated for the first time.| ||Joint Staff|Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)|CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.| |||Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)|PASOLS is a seminar hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan’s participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 47th Seminar was held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.| |||Raisina Dialogue|Raisina Dialogue is an international conference co-hosted by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and participated in by Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, etc. from over 100 countries worldwide. Participants discuss matters in diverse fields including the field of security. The MOD has participated in the Dialogue since its third session in 2018 (1st: Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; 2nd: Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs; 3rd: Chief of Joint Staff and Special Advisor to the Prime Minister; 4th and 5th: Chief of Joint Staff).| ||GSDF|Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)|PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.| |||Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)|PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has participated in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.| |||Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC)|LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA annually in Hawaii. Through panel discussions and consultations, high-level land force officials from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region exchange opinions on strategic issue in the region.| |||Chief of Army Land Forces Seminar|This seminar was called “Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX)” until 2016. It is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. The GSDF participated in CAEX for the first time in 2012. In September 2014, the GSDF Chief of Staff attended for the first time and delivered an address.| |||Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS)|This symposium was held for the first time in May 2015, hosted by the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, from the perspective of contributing to the amphibious operations capacities of friendly countries in the Asia-Pacific region and contributing to regional stability through strengthening relations with the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, and enhancing interoperability. It has been held annually since then. Japan has participated from the first meeting.| |||Annual Meeting of the Association of U.S. Army (AUSA)|Hosted annually by AUSA in Washington, D.C., the Chief and Vice-Chief of Staff of the GSDF participate in the meeting, exchange opinions among the General-class officers from the U.S. Army, and deliver speeches.| ||MSDF|International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)|ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy Chief of Staff of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.| |||Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)|WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS in not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.| |||International MCM Seminar|This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan’s MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.| |||Asia Pacific Submarine Conference|Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The MSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.| |||Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)|This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.| |||RAN Sea Power Conference (SPC)|Held biennially as part of the Pacific International Maritime Exposition. As many navies send their Chief of Staff or Admirals to this conference, the conference serves as a platform for bilateral and multilateral exchange.| |||Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS)|Biennially hosted by the Italian Navy. Mostly attended by Chief of Staff of Navy from NATO nations who gather to exchange views on common naval challenges. Japan has participated since the 7th symposium in 2008.| |||International Maritime Security Symposium (IMSS)|Hosted by the Indonesian Navy every other year. Navy Chief of Staff from mostly western Pacific nations exchange opinions on maritime security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2013.| |||Galle Dialogue|Hosted by the Sri Lankan Navy annually. Navy Chief of Staff from nations around the Indian Ocean exchange views on maritime security challenges. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2010.| ----- |Col1|Col2|Other Multilateral Security Dialogue|Overview| |---|---|---|---| |Hosted by the Government|ASDF|Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS)|PACS is a conference hosted by the United States every other year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.| |||Space Symposium|Space Symposium is hosted by the United States every year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the symposium since the 35th meeting in 2019.| |||PACRIM Airpower Symposium|This symposium is held every year and hosted jointly by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this symposium since the first event held in 1995| |||Air and Space Power Conference|Air and Space Power Conference hosted by the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom is held every year and Chiefs of Staff of Air Forces exchange views on issues in the aerospace field in line with themes set up for each year. Japan has participated in this conference eight times since its first participation in 2009 (also participated in the conference held in 2019).| |||Air Power Conference (APC)|APC is an international conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange views on air power. Japan has participated in this conference six times since 2000.| |||Air Force Symposium|Air Force Symposium is hosted by the Philippine Air Force annually to exchange opinions under the themes concerning security. Japan has participated in this symposium four times since 2015.| |||Aerospace Medicine Conference|Aerospace Medicine Conference is hosted by the Indian Air Force annually to exchange opinions concerning aerospace medicine. Japan participated in this conference for the first time in 2019.| |||Dubai International Air Chiefs Conference|Dubai International Air Chiefs Conference is hosted by the UAE Air Force biennially. Chiefs of Staff of Air Forces gather and exchange opinions on issues in line with themes set up for each year. Japan has participated in this conference four times since 2013 (also participated in the conference held in 2019).| |||Colombo Air Symposium|Colombo Air Symposium is hosted by the Sri Lankan Air Force annually to exchange opinions concerning air power and air strategy. Japan has participated in this symposium three times since 2016.| |||Military Flight Training International Conference|Military Flight Training International Conference is hosted by the PLA Air Force biennially to exchange opinions concerning flight training, etc. Japan has participated in this conference twice since 2016| |||Symposium hosted by the Air University’s China Aerospace Studies Institute|The symposium is hosted by the Air University’s CASI to exchange opinions concerning China’s aerospace activities. Japan participated in the symposium for the first time in 2018. (The symposium was not held in 2019 due to circumstances on the U.S. side.)| ||Defense Intelligence Headquarters|Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)|Hosted in turn by the United States Pacific Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of opinions among intelligence chiefs and other officials from the defense ministries of countries in the Asia Pacific region and other areas. Alongside exchanges of opinions on issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. It was hosted for the first time in February 2011 by the Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence, and was attended by 28 countries.| ||National Institute for Defense Studies|ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting|Defense universities and other educational institutions from the ARF member countries take turns and hold a meeting once a year. The host plays the central role in making a decision on the themes with respect to global security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of defense educational and research institutions, and the meeting takes place in the form of presentations and question- and-answer sessions based on certain themes. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending all of the meetings since the first meeting in 1997, and hosted the fifth meeting in Tokyo in 2001. In September 2018, the 22nd meeting was held in Tokyo for the first time in 17 years. Japan participated in the conference held in Singapore in November 2019.| |||NATO Defense College Conference of Commandants (CoC)|CoC is an annual international conference hosted by the NATO Defense College, defense educational institutions from NATO member countries and NATO partner countries in turns. During the meeting, the heads of participating educational institutions exchange opinions from the perspective of improving advanced defense education, while at the same time the meeting focuses on the promotion of educational exchange among the heads of the educational institutions, NATO member countries, and the dialogue partners in the Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean region. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending most of the conferences since FY2009 (no invitation in FY2013). Japan participated in the conference held in Italy in May 2019.| |Hosted by the Private Sector|IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)||Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. From Japan, the Minister of Defense has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002 (except for the 3rd and 11th conferences in 2004 and 2012; and the State Minister of Defence participated in the 11th conference).| ||IISS Fullerton Forum||A Sherpa meeting (preparation meeting) for the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by the IISS. Defense authorities (director / vice chief level) of the countries that attend the Shangri-La Dialogue exchange opinions on regional security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2013.| ||ISSS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)||Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official’s level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the State Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th, 12th and 13th Conferences in 2010, 2016, and 2017. The Defense Minister participated in the 15th Conference for the first time.| ||Munich Security Conference||This Conference was established in 1962. It is one of the most prestigious international conferences on security in Western countries. Foreign dignitaries such as Cabinet members, Diet/Parliament members, officers of defense authorities from Germany, which is the host country, NATO member countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc.), Russia, and central and eastern Europe countries attended. Japan participated for the first time in the 45th Conference in 2009, sending the Minister of Defense. The State Minister of Defense participated in the 52nd, 53rd, 54th and 55th Conferences in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. Defense Minister Kono participated in the 56th Conference in February 2020.| ||Halifax International Security Forum||Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each EU country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the first Conference in 2009.| ||The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)||Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California, San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants — private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, North Korea, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the United States) — to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993 (except in 2018).| ----- **Reference 47 Vientiane Vision 2.0** Key Elements - Reviewing our efforts over the past three years on defense cooperation with ASEAN under the Vientiane Vision announced in November 2016 - Redefining the vision in line with the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” - Presenting three principles for our defense cooperation with ASEAN and including enhancement of resilience as one of the ends Contents 1. Review of our efforts under the Vientiane Vision (1) Multilateral efforts: Ship Rider Cooperation Program, HA/DR Invitation Program and Professional Airmanship Program - Heart-to-heart cooperation: Japan has contributed not only to enhancing participants’ abilities by offering various practical programs, but also to creating a sense of unity among all ASEAN member state participants by offering opportunities to work together on common issues. (2) Bilateral efforts: Defense cooperation programs (e.g. maritime security, HA/DR and engineering), defense equipment and technology cooperation, human resource development and academic exchanges, etc. - Tailored and lasting cooperation: Aiming to establish a self-standing system in partner countries, Japan has implemented various projects based on elaborate multi-year plans with special emphasis on the transparency of process. (3) Having contributed to the enhancement of ASEAN’ s capabilities as a whole, especially in (i) Ensuring the rule of law, (ii) Strengthening maritime security, and (iii) Assisting ASEAN’ s autonomous responses to regional challenges, such as natural disasters and non-traditional threats. In so doing, we have also reaffirmed the importance of continuing and developing our efforts to uphold ASEAN’ s resilience, which is a basis for ASEAN centrality and unity. ⇒ Pursuing further practical cooperation to support ASEAN’ s resilience, and in turn, its centrality and unity 2. Redefining the Vientiane Vision in line with the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” (1) As the hinge connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, ASEAN is the key to regional cooperation. (2) ASEAN’ s principles outlined in the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” such as openness, transparency, inclusivity and a rules-based framework, share the same bases with those of Japan’ s vision for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” (3) Under its vision for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” and with full respect for the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” Japan will promote equal and open cooperation through partnership with ASEAN member states and all other countries that share the principles outlined above. 3. Three Principles for Japan’ s Defense Cooperation with ASEAN (1) Heart-to-heart Cooperation: Upholding ASEAN’ s principles, valuing people-to-people connections and listening sincerely to partners’ needs (2) Tailored and Lasting Cooperation: Pursuing sustainable outcomes through well-planned, transparent and ongoing engagement (3) Equal and Open Cooperation: Pursuing wide-ranging international collaboration that supports ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience I. Ends: With a view to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific that holds Southeast Asia as its hinge, the Japan Ministry of Defense aims to (i) enhance the Japan-ASEAN Strategic Partnership and (ii) contribute to ASEAN centrality and unity by supporting its resilience. II. Ways: On the basis of the above three principles, Japan aims to support ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience by taking the following approaches with special emphasis on the three key areas of cooperation. (i) Approaches based on the principles of ASEAN centrality and unity - With a view to upholding ASEAN centrality, Japan promotes international collaboration between ASEAN member states and countries outside ASEAN, with a central emphasis on ASEAN-led frameworks - With a view to upholding ASEAN unity, Japan promotes confidence-building and interoperability among ASEAN member states by enhancing connectivity and promoting shared norms and practices among defense authorities (ii) Key areas of cooperation with a view to upholding ASEAN’ s resilience - Ensuring the rule of law: Promoting the development and sharing of universal norms regarding the sea and air space - Strengthening maritime security: Promoting ASEAN’ s efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness capabilities, and supporting individual states’ efforts to enhance their national security, and in turn, regional peace and stability - Assisting ASEAN’ s organizational responses to regional challenges: Promoting ASEAN’ s efforts to enhance its capacity to deal with natural disasters and non-traditional threats III. Means: As part of a concerted whole of government effort, JMOD conducts practical cooperation by combining the following diverse mea- sures. (i) Promoting Shared Understanding of International Norms: Holding programs such as seminars with a view to share knowledge on international norms and practices (ii) Defense Cooperation Program: Assisting ASEAN’ s proactive efforts for enhancing its collective capabilities by sending JSDF personnel to Southeast Asia, and inviting ASEAN practitioners to Japan (iii) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation: Transferring equipment and technology, developing human resources, holding seminars on defense industries, etc. (iv) Joint Training and Exercises: Conducting bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, expanding forms of participation and inviting ASEAN observers to JSDF training (v) Human Resource Development and Academic Exchanges: Reinforcing human networks among students and trainees, inviting opinion leaders to Japan, etc. ----- **Reference 48 Participation in Multilateral Exercise (Past Three Years)**  (Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020) |Joint Staff|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Participating countries|Participating SDF units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)| |Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. Four-Country Training (Joint training in the United States in FY2017)|May 3-22, 2017|Waters and airspace around Japan; Guam (the U.S.) and its surrounding waters and airspace; Northern Mariana Islands and its surrounding waters and airspace|France, the U.K., the U.S.|Joint Staff, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Western Army, Signal Brigade, Central Transportation Management Command, Self-Defense Fleet, Yokosuka District, Landing Ship JS “Kunisaki”|1 vessel CH-47 × 1 Approximately 220 personnel|－| |Multilateral Exercise hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Equateur 2017)|Sep. 4-15, 2017|New Caledonia|France, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the U.S., the U.K.|Joint Staff College|1 personnel|－| |Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise hosted by Australia (Pacific Protector 17)|Sep. 6-9, 2017|Australia (Cairns and its surrounding waters and airspace)|Australia, the U.S., New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore and others (20 countries in total, including observer countries)|Joint Staff (participating in table-top exercises) MSDF (participating in field training)|(Table-top exercise) 1 personnel (Field training) P-3C × 1, approximately 20 personnel|－| |Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 18|Jan. 21-Feb. 23, 2018|Thailand|Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, the ROK, Malaysia, India, China|Joint Staff, etc., GSDF, MSDF, ASDF|C-130H × 1 Approximately 150 personnel|－| |Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise hosted by Japan (Pacific Shield 18)|Jul. 24-26, 2018|Yokosuka Port; waters and airspace off the coast of Boso Peninsula; airspace off the coast of Izu Peninsula|The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore and others (19 observer countries)|Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, GSDF Chemical School, Self-Defense Fleet, Yokosuka District|2 vessels 2 aircraft Approximately 280 personnel|－| |Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 19|Jan. 14- Feb.23, 2019|Thailand|Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, the ROK, Malaysia, India, China|Joint Staff, etc., GSDF, MSDF, ASDF|C-130H × 1 Approximately 170 personnel|－| |ADMM-Plus Military Medicine Field Training Exercise (MEDEX-2019)|Mar. 8-18, 2019|Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh (India)|India, Myanmar, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, China, New Zealand, the ROK, Russia, the U.S.|Joint Staff, Western Army and GSDF Chemical School|Approximately 15 personnel|－| |PSI Exercise hosted by the ROK (Eastern Endeavor 19)|Jul. 10-11, 2019|Busan|The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore and others (observer countries)|Joint Staff, GSDF Chemical School|3 personnel|－| |ADMM-Plus HA/DR Exercise (staff training and communication training)|Jul. 30-Aug. 1, 2019|Staff training: Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur) Communication training: Ichigaya|Malaysia, the U.S., Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, the ROK, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam|Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Headquarters|Approximately 5 personnel|－| |Multilateral Exercise hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Equateur 2019)|Sep. 21- Oct.5, 2019|New Caledonia|France, Australia, Canada, Fiji, Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Genia, Solomon Islands, Tonga, the U.K., the U.S., Vanuatu|Joint Staff, Joint Staff College|3 personnel|－| |NATO cyber defense exercise (Cyber Coalition 2019)|Dec. 2-6, 2019|Estonia, Japan|NATO member countries, NATO partner countries, EU|Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command|Approximately 20 personnel|－| |Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 20|Jan. 26-Mar. 9, 2020|Thailand|Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, the ROK, Malaysia, India, China|Joint Staff, etc., GSDF, MSDF, ASDF|C-130H × 1 Approximately 240 personnel|－| ----- |Ground Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Participating countries|Participating SDF units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)| |Australian Army-Hosted Shooting Convention|May 13-26, 2017|Puckapunyal training area (Victoria, Australia)|Australia, etc.|Fuji School, respective Regional Armies, Central Readiness Force|Approximately 20 personnel|－| |Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Southern Jackaroo)|May 17-28, 2017|Mount Bundy Training Area, etc. (Darwin, Australia)|The U.S., Australia|17th Infantry Regiment, 13th Brigade, Middle Army|Approximately 100 personnel|(Australian Army) Approximately 300 personnel (U.S. Army) Approximately 150 personnel (U.S. Marines) Approximately 150 personnel| |Multilateral Exercise Khaan Quest|Jul. 23-Aug. 5, 2017|Mongolia (Five Hills Training Area)|Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, China, Colombia, Fiji, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, the Philippines, Papua New Genia, the ROK, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, the U.K., the U.S., Vietnam|Central Readiness Force, Joint Staff, etc.|46 personnel|Totaling approximately 1,000 personnel| |U.S.-Philippines joint exercise (KAMANDAG 2017)|Sep. 13-Oct. 11, 2017|Luzon (the Philippines)|The U.S., the Philippines|Central Readiness Force|14 personnel|－| |Australian Army-Hosted Shooting Convention|Apr. 27-May 11, 2018|Puckapunyal training area (Victoria, Australia)|Australia, etc.|Ground Component Command, respective Regional Armies, Fuji School, etc.|Approximately 20 personnel|－| |Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Southern Jackaroo)|May 7-Jun. 8, 2018|Townsville Field Training Area (Queensland, Australia)|The U.S., Australia|2nd Infantry Regiment, 12th Brigade|Approximately 130 personnel|(Australian Army) Approximately 720 personnel (U.S. Army) Approximately 50 personnel (U.S. Marines) Approximately 180 personnel| |Multilateral Exercise Khaan Quest|Jun. 14-28, 2018|Mongolia (Five Hills Training Area)|Australia, Bangladesh. Belarus, Bhutan, Cambodia, Canada, China, Czech, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kirgiz, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Qatar, the ROK, Singapore, Tajikistan, Turkey, Russia, the U.K., the U.S.|Ground Component Command|Approximately 40 personnel|－| |Overseas deployment training (RIMPAC2018)|Jun. 15-Aug. 5, 2018|Hawaii, etc., (the U.S.)|The U.S., Australia, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Columbia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, the ROK, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, the U.K., Vietnam (prospective participating countries at the time of release)|Ground Component Command HQs; Western Army HQs; Western Field Artillery Unit; 5th Surface- to-Ship Missile Regiment; 2nd Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade; International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, etc.|Approximately 180 personnel|Approximately 780 personnel| |U.S.-Philippines joint exercise (KAMANDAG 18)|Sep. 8-Oct. 23, 2018|The Philippines|The U.S., the Philippines|Ground Component Command HQs, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, Central Readiness Regiment|80 personnel|－| |Australian Army-Hosted Shooting Convention|Mar. 23-Apr. 5, 2019|Puckapunyal training area (Victoria, Australia)|Australia, etc.|Ground Component Command, respective Regional Armies, Fuji School, etc.|Approximately 20 personnel|－| |Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Southern Jackaroo)|May 10-Jun. 14, 2019|Shoalwater Bay Training Area (Queensland, Australia)|The U.S., Australia|13th Infantry Regiment, 12th Brigade|Approximately 160 personnel|(Australian Army) Approximately 720 personnel (U.S. Marines) Approximately 250 personnel| |Multilateral Exercise Khaan Quest|Jun. 14-28, 2019|Mongolia (Five Hills Training Area)|Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, China, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, the ROK, Rwanda, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Togo, Turkey, the U.K., Ukraine, Uruguay, the U.S., Vietnam, Zambia|Ground Component Command, etc.|Approximately 60 personnel|－| |Field Training Exercise ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations|Sep. 8-22, 2019|Indonesian National Armed Forces Peacekeeping Mission Center|10 ASEAN countries, the U.S., Australia, China, India, New Zealand, the ROK, Russia|Ground Component Command, etc.|Approximately 20 personnel|－| |U.S.-Philippines joint exercise (KAMANDAG 19)|Oct. 6-23, 2019|The Philippines|The U.S., the Philippines|Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, etc.|Approximately 80 personnel|－| ----- Maritime Self Defense Force |Exercise|Period|Location|Participating countries|Participating SDF units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Training|Apr. 3-5, 2017|Waters west of Kyushu|The U.S., the ROK|Destroyer JS “Sawagiri”|1 vessel P-3C × 1|(U.S.) Several vessels, several aircraft (ROK) Several vessels, several aircraft| |Multilateral Counter- Piracy Training|Apr. 20, 2017|Gulf of Aden|The U.S., the U.K., the ROK|Destroyer JS “Teruzuki,” Escort Division 6 Air Patrol Squadron 1|1 vessel P-3C × 1|(U.S.) Landing ship USS “CARTER HALL” (U.K.) Frigate HMS “MONMOUTH” (ROK) Guided-missile destroyer “ROKS CHOI YOUNG”| |U.S.-Hosted International Maritime Exercise (command post exercise)|May 2-18, 2017|Bahrain|The U.S., Bahrain||A few personnel|－| |Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise|Jun. 5-16, 2017|Waters around Guam|The U.S., etc.|Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel, training controller|5 personnel|－| |Japan-U.S.-Australia- Canada multilateral cruise exercise|Jun. 9-10, 2017|South China Sea|The U.S., Australia, Canada|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” and JS “Sazanami”|2 vessels|(U.S.) Guided-missile destroyer USS “STERETT” (Australia) Frigate HMAS “BALLARAT” (Canada) Frigate HMCS “WINNIPEG”| |Japan-Canada- Singapore Trilateral Training (Exercise Pacific Guardian)|Jun. 15-18 2017|Waters south of Shikoku|Canada, New Zealand|Destroyer JS “Inazuma”|1 vessel|(Canada) Frigates HMCS “Winnipeg,” and HMCS “Ottawa” (NZ) Frigate HMNZS “Te Kaha”| |Japan-U.S.-India Trilateral Exercise (Malabar 2017)|Jul. 10-17 2017|Anchor phase: India (Chennai) On-the-sea phase: waters east of India|The U.S., India|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” and JS “Sazanami”|2 vessels Approximately 700 personnel|－| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training|Sep. 12-19, 2017|Waters south of Honshu|The U.S., Australia|Destroyer Submarine|8 vessels Approximately 30 aircraft|(U.S.) 1 submarine (Australia) 1 submarine| |Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Training|Oct. 24-25, 2017|Waters around Japan|The U.S., the ROK|Destroyers JS “Kirishima,” and JS “Myoko”|2 vessels|(U.S.) Several vessels (ROK) Several vessels| |Japan-U.S.-India Trilateral Exercise|Nov. 3-6, 2017|Sea of Japan|The U.S., India|Destroyer JS “Inazuma”|1 vessel|(U.S.) Carrier USS “Ronald Reagan,” Destroyer USS “Chafee” (India) Frigate INS “Satpura,” Corvette INS “Kadmatt”| |MSDF training (Japan-U.S.-Canada trilateral training)|Nov. 10-26, 2017|Waters around Japan|The U.S., Canada||Approximately 25 vessels Approximately 60 aircraft|(U.S.) Approximately 10 vessels (Canada) 1 vessel| |Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Training|Dec. 11-12, 2017|Waters around Japan|The U.S., the ROK|Destroyer JS “Chokai”|1 vessel|(U.S.) Several vessels (ROK) Several vessels| |Multilateral Naval Exercise hosted by the Indonesian Navy (KOMODO 2018)|Mat 5-9, 2018|Waters around Lombok (Indonesia)|Indonesia, the U.S., Australia, China, France, etc.|Landing Ship JS “Osumi,” Landing Ship Division 1|1 vessel Approximately 190 personnel|－| |Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise|May 7-18, 2018|HMAS Creswell of the Royal Australian Navy and waters around it|Australia, etc.|Diver|7 personnel|－| |Japan-U.S.-India Trilateral Exercise (Malabar 2018)|Jun. 8-16, 2018|Anchor phase: the U.S. (Guam) On-the-sea phase: waters and airspace around Guam|The U.S., India|Destroyers JS “Ise,” JS “Fuyuzuki,” and JS “Suzunami” Submarine JS “Soryu”|4 vessels P-1 × 2 Approximately 870 personnel|－| |RIMPAC 2018|Jun. 27-Aug. 2, 2018|Hawaiian Islands and its surrounding waters and airspace|The U.S., Australia, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Columbia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, the ROK, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, the U.K., Vietnam|Destroyer JS “Ise”|1 vessel P-3C × 2 Approximately 460 personnel|47 vessels, 5 submarines, approximately 200 aircraft Approximately 25,000 or more personnel (total participating strength at the time of release)| |Mine warfare training (Mutsu Bay) and minesweeping special training (Japan-U.S.- India trilateral exercise)|Jul. 18-30, 2018|Mutsu Bay|The U.S., India|Minesweeper Tender, Minesweeper Ocean, Minesweeper Coastal, Minesweeping Controller, diving tender|19 vessels MCH-101 × 3 P-3C × 4 P-1 × 1|(U.S.) 1 Minesweeper Ocean, MH-53E × 2, approximately 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel (India) approximately 4 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel| |Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise (Kakadu 2018)|Aug. 16-Oct. 10, 2018|Waters and airspace around Darwin (Australia)|The U.S., Australia, etc.|Destroyer JS “Sazanami” Air Patrol Squadron 2|1 vessel P-3C × 1 Approximately 210 personnel|－| |Japan-Australia-Canada- Singapore multilateral cruise exercise|Aug. 24-31, 2018|Waters and airspace of Guam (the U.S.) through Darwin (Australia)|Australia, Canada, New Zealand|Destroyer JS “Sazanami”|1 vessel|Australian Navy: HMAS “Melbourne;” Canadian Navy: HMCS “Calgary,” MV “Asterix;” NZ Navy: HMNZS “Te Mana”| Mine warfare training (Hyuga-nada Sea) and Minesweeper Tender, (U.S.) 1 Minesweeper Ocean, MH-53E minesweeping special Nov. 18-28, Minesweeper Ocean, 22 vessels × 2 , approximately 10 Explosive Hyuga-nada Sea The U.S., Australia training (Japan-U.S.- 2018 Minesweeper Coastal, MCH-101 × 2 or 3 Ordnance Disposal personnel Australia trilateral Minesweeping Controller (Australia) 2 Minesweeper Coastal ----- |Exercise|Period|Location|Participating countries|Participating SDF units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan-U.S.-U.K trilateral exercise|Dec. 22, 2018|Waters and airspace south of Honshu|The U.S., the U.K.|Destroyer JS “Izumo”|1 vessel P-1 × 1|(U.S.) P-8A, vessel (U.K.) Frigate HMS “Argyll”| |Japan-U.S.-U.K trilateral exercise|Mar. 14-15, 2019|Waters and airspace south of Honshu|The U.S., the U.K.|Destroyer JS “Murasame” Submarine|2 vessels P-1× 1|(U.S.) P-8A (U.K.) Frigate HMS “Montrose”| |Malaysian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise|Mar. 31, 2019|Langkawi (Malaysia) and its surrounding waters and airspace|Malaysia, etc.|Destroyer JS “Akagiri,” Escort Division 14|1 vessel Approximately 200 personnel|－| |Japan-U.S.-India- Philippines Four-Country Exercise|May 3-9, 2019|Waters west of Kyushu through the East China Sea|The U.S., India, the Philippines|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” and JS “Murasame”|2 vessels|(U.S) Guided-missile destroyer USS “William P. Lawrence” (India) Guided-missile destroyer INS “Kolkata,” Replenishment tanker INS “Shakti” (The Philippines) Frigate BRP “Andres Bonifacio”| |Japan-France-Australia- U.S. Four-Country Exercise (La Perouse)|May 19-22, 2019|Waters and Airspace west of Sumatra (Indian Ocean)|France, Australia, the U.S.|Destroyers JS “Izumo,” and JS “Murasame”|2 vessels|(France) Aircraft Carrier FS “Charles de Gaulle,” Guided-missile destroyer FS “Forbin,” Frigates FS “Provence,” and FS “Latouche Treville,” Replenishment tanker FS “Marne” (Australia) Frigate HMAS “Toowoomba,” submarine (U.S.) Guided-missile destroyer USS “William P. Lawrence”| |Japan-U.S.-Australia- ROK Four-Country Exercise (Pacific Vanguard 19-1)|May 23-28, 2019|Waters and airspace around Guam|The U.S., Australia, the ROK|Destroyers JS “Ariake,” and JS “Asahi”|2 vessels|(U.S.) Amphibious command ship USS “Blue Ridge,” Guided-missile cruiser USS “Antietam,” Destroyer USS “Curtis Wilbur,” Replenishment oilers USNS “Rappahannock,” and USNS “Richard E. Byrd,” P-8A, EA-18G (Australia) Frigates HMAS “Melbourne,” and HMAS “Parramatta,” Submarine HMAS “Farncomb” (ROK) Destroyer ROKS “Wang Geon”| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training|May 29, 2019|Waters and airspace around Guam|The U.S., Australia|Destroyers JS “Ariake,” and JS “Asahi”|2 vessels|(U.S.) Destroyer USS “Curtis Wilbur” (Australia) Submarine HMAS “Farncomb”| |Mine warfare training (Mutsu Bay) and minesweeping special training (Japan-U.S.- India trilateral exercise)|Jul. 18-30, 2019|Mutsu Bay|The U.S., India|Minesweeper Tender, Minesweeper Ocean, Minesweeper Coastal, Minesweeping Controller|18 vessels MCH-101 × 3 P-3C × 4 P-1 × 1|(U.S.) 1 Minesweeper Ocean, MH-53E × 2, approximately 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel (India) Approximately 4 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel| |Japan-U.S.-India Trilateral Exercise (Malabar 2019)|Sep. 26-Oct. 4, 2019|Anchor phase: Sasebo On-the-sea phase: waters and airspace of Sasebo through south of Kanto|The U.S., India|Destroyers JS “Samidare,” JS “Chokai,” and JS “Kaga” Underway Replenishment Ship JS “Omi”|4 vessels P-1 × 1|(U.S.) Destroyer USS “McCampbell,” P-8A, submarine (India) Frigate INS “Sahyadri,” Corvette INS “Kiltan,” P-8I| |U.S.-Hosted International Maritime Exercise|Oct. 28- Nov. 14, 2019|Waters around Bahrain|The U.S., Australia, countries in the Middle East, Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and South America, etc.|Minesweeper Tender JS “Bungo,” Minesweeper Division 3, Minesweeper Coastal JS “Takashima”|2 vessels Approximately 180 personnel|－| |U.S.-Philippines joint exercise (MTA Sama Sama 2019)|Oct. 14-19, 2019|Waters and airspace east of Palawan Island|The U.S., the Philippines|Air Patrol Squadron 5|P-3C × 2|(U.S.) P-8A × 1, 2 vessels, etc. (The Philippines) C-90 × 1, 1 vessel, etc.| |8th Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise (Pacific Reach 2019)|Nov. 4-15, 2019|On-the-sea exercise: waters west of Perth Land training and events: HMAS Stirling of Royal Australian Navy|The U.S., Australia, the ROK, Singapore, Malaysia (approximately 20 observer countries)|Submarine Rescue Ship JS “Chiyoda”|1 vessel Approximately 150 personnel|－| |MSDF training (field training [Japan-U.S.- Australia-Canada multilateral training])|Nov. 4-21, 2019|Waters and airspace around Japan|The U.S., Australia, Canada||Approximately 20 vessels Approximately 40 aircraft|(U.S.) Approximately 5 vessels (Australia) 2 vessels, 2 aircraft (Canada) 1 vessel| |Minesweeping special training (Japan-U.S.- Australia trilateral training)|Nov. 18-28, 2019|Hyuga-nada Sea|The U.S., Australia|Minesweeper Tender, Minesweeper Ocean, Minesweeper Coastal, Minesweeping Controller,|17 vessels MCH-101 × 2 or 3 Approximately 1,000 personnel|(U.S.) 1 mine countermeasures ship, MH-53E × 2, approximately 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel (Australia) 2 mine countermeasures ships| |FY2019 multilateral exercise for fixed-wing aircraft hosted by U.S. Navy (Sea Dragon 2020)|Jan. 20-31, 2020|Waters and airspace around Guam|The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the ROK|51st Fighter Squadron|P-3C × 1 Approximately 30 personnel|－| |Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise (Cope North 20)|Jan. 31-Mar. 6, 2020|Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.) and its surrounding waters and airspace|The U.S., Australia|71st Fighter Squadron|US-2 × 1 Approximately 30 personnel|－| ----- |Air Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Participating countries|Participating SDF units|Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)|Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)| |Silver Flag training|Dec. 5-14, 2017|Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.)|The U.S., Australia, etc.|－|31 personnel|－| |Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral HA/DR exercise in the Federated States of Micronesia, etc. (Christmas Drop)|Dec. 6-16, 2017|Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Micronesia, Palau and Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding airspace|The U.S., Australia|1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command|1 aircraft Approximately 25 personnel|(U.S.) C-130J × 3 (Australia) C-130J × 1| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)|Feb. 4-Mar. 11, 2018|Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Northern Mariana Islands, Saipan, Tinian Island, Rota and Farallon de Medinilla Target Range, and their surrounding airspace|The U.S., Australia|8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Early Warning Group, Air Defense Command 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command|Approximately 20 aircraft Totaling approximately 460 personnel|－| |Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral HA/DR exercise in the Federated States of Micronesia, etc. (Christmas Drop)|Dec. 5-17, 2018|Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Micronesia, Palau and Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding airspace|The U.S., Australia|1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command|1 aircraft Approximately 30 personnel|(U.S.) C-130J × 3 (Australia) C-130J × 1| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)|Feb. 7-Mar. 19, 2019|Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Northern Mariana Islands, Saipan, Tinian Island, Rota and Farallon de Medinilla Target Range, and their surrounding airspace|The U.S., Australia|8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Early Warning Group, Air Defense Command 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command|Approximately 20 aircraft Totaling approximately 450 personnel|－| |Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral HA/DR exercise in the Federated States of Micronesia, etc. (Christmas Drop)|Dec.4-16, 2019|Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Northern Mariana Islands (the U.S.), Palau and Micronesia, and their surrounding airspace|The U.S., Australia, New Zealand|1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command|1 aircraft Approximately 30 personnel|(U.S.) C-130J × 3 (Australia) C-130J × 1 (NZ) C-130J × 1| |Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise and Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral HA/DR exercise (Cope North 20)|Jan. 31-Mar. 8, 2020|Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Northern Mariana Islands, Tinian Island and Farallon de Medinilla Target Range, and their surrounding airspace|The U.S., Australia|8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Early Warning Group, Air Defense Command 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command|F-15J/DJ × 8 F-2A/B × 6 U-125A × 2 E-2C × 2 C-2 × 1 KC-767 × 1 Approximately 450 personnel|－| (Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release. ----- **Reference 49 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations**  (1) Dispatch of Personnel to United Nations Agencies (As of March 31, 2020) |Period of Dispatch|Position in the Dispatched Organization|Dispatched Personnel| |---|---|---| |Jun. 9, 1997 – Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004 – Jul. 31, 2007|Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major General)1| |Jun. 23, 1997 – Jun. 23, 2000|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF officer (Captain)| |Oct. 1, 2002 – Jun. 30, 2007|Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |Jul. 11, 2005 – Jul. 10, 2009|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major)| |Jan. 9, 2009 – Jan. 8, 2013|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major)| |Aug. 27, 2013 – Aug. 31, 2016|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF officer (Captain)| |Dec. 2, 2002 – Jun. 1, 2005|Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Nov. 28, 2005 – Nov. 27, 2008|Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Jan. 16, 2011 – Jan. 15, 2014|Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Sep. 18, 2013 – Sep. 17, 2016|Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Jun. 1, 2015 – Nov. 30, 2017|Senior Military Liaison Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |Mar. 1 - Aug. 31, 2016|Strategic Support Service, Logistics Support Division, Department of Field Support, United Nations (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)2| |Aug. 29, 2016 –|Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) (New York)3|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Feb. 11, 2017 -|Strategic Support Service, Logistics Division, Department of Operational Support, United Nations (New York)4|1 administrative official| |Apr. 1, 2018 -|Group of Experts, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (New York)|1 instructor| |Oct. 19, 2019 -|Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| Notes: 1. The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007. 2. Dispatched as an official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from “Department of Peacekeeping Operations” to “Department of Peace Operations.” 4. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from “Department of Field Support” to “Department of Operational Support.” (2) Dispatch of Instructors and Others to PKO Centers, etc. |Period of Dispatch|Position in the Dispatched Organization|Dispatched Personnel| |---|---|---| |November 21 – 30, 2008|Cairo Regional Center for Training on Confilct Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |May 22 – June 6, 2009|Cairo Regional Center for Training on Confilct Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)|1 GSDF personnel (Major General)| |August 28 – September 5, 2009|Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |April 10 – 17, 2010|Cairo Regional Center for Training on Confilct Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)1| |August 14 – 30, 2010|Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |November 15 – 20, 2011|Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |July 31 – August 5, 2012|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |December 15 – 19, 2012|Cairo Regional Center for Training on Confilct Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)|1 ASDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |March 9 – 14, 2013|South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |August 28 – September 1, 2013|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |October 5 – 9, 2013|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |March 8 – 13, 2014|South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |March 23 – May 25, 2014|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |August 12, 2014|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) (dispatched to give lecture in South Sudan)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |October 5 – 9, 2014|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |October 6 – 23, 2014|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |March 19 – April 1, 2015|UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |June 4 – July 1, 2015|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)2|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |September 5 – 20, 2015|South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |October 22 – November 7, 2015|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |March 21 – April 1, 2016|UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |May 31 – June 17, 2016|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |November 4 – 19, 2016|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |March 6 – 19, 2017|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |June 2 - 18, 2017|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |December 1 - 15, 2017|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Aug. 22 - 28, 2018|Indonesian National Defense Forces Peacekeeping Centre (Indonesia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Nov. 2 – 18, 2018|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Mar. 3 – 15, 2019|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Jun. 28 – Jul. 12, 2019|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Nov. 8-22, 2019|International Peace Support Training Institute (Ethiopia) 3|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Mar. 6-15, 2020|International Peace Support Training Institute (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Major)| Notes: 1. First dispatch of female SDF personnel. 2. In June 2015, the name changed from “International Peace Keeping Training Centre” to “Peace Support Training Centre.” 3. In October 2019, the name changed from “Peace Support Training Center” to “International Peace Support Training Institute.” ----- **Reference 50 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities** |Item|International Peace Support Act|International Peace Cooperation Act|Japan Disaster Relief Team Law|Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)|Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Purpose|○Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community|○Proactive contribution to U.N.- centered efforts towards international peace|○Contribution to promotion of international cooperation|○Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people towards the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ○Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq|○Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ○Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan| |Provisions in the SDF Law|○Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law|○Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law|○Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law|○Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law|○Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law| |Major Activities|○Cooperation and support activities1 ○Search and rescue activities1 ○Ship inspection operations3|○International peacekeeping activities ○Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security ○International humanitarian assistance ○International election monitoring activities ○Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned activities|○Rescue activities ○Medical treatment (including prevention of epidemics) ○Activities for disaster emergency response and disaster recovery ○Transportation of personnel or equipment/goods for the abovementioned activities|○Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ○Support activities for ensuring security|○Replenishment support activities| |Areas of Operation|○Territories of Japan ○Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration (in such countries) is required. ○High seas and the airspace above|○Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)|○Regions overseas, especially in less-developed regions|○Territories of Japan ○Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq)2 ○High seas and the airspace above2|○Territories of Japan ○Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required)2 ○High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above2| |Diet Approval|○Prior approval required without exception|○To be discussed in advance in the Diet in principle, only for cases where SDF units, etc. conduct so-called ceasefire monitoring and safety- ensuring operations4|N/A|○To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures4|(Note 5)| |Diet Report|○Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay|○Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay|N/A|○Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay|○Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay| Notes: 1. Limited to sites where combat is not taking place. 2. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan’s activities are being implemented. 3. Operations shall be conducted in waters where the activities can be clearly distinguished from ship inspection operations carried out by foreign countries. 4. In cases where the Diet is in recess, etc., an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session. 5. As prescribed by Law, (1) the category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) As the area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to reobtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to Diet approval. **Reference 51 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities** (1) Dispatch to the Persian Gulf for minesweeping (As of March 31, 2020) |Place of Dispatch|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Persian Gulf, etc.|Persian Gulf Minesweeping Dispatch Unit|Apr.-Oct. 1991|Approx. 510|Approx. 510|- Minesweeping and disposal in the Persian Gulf| (2) International Peace Cooperation Activities |Col1|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (PKO)|Ceasefire Monitors|Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993|8|16|- Monitor custody of weapons collected - Monitor observance of ceasefire| ||Engineer unit|Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993|600|1,200|- Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure - Supply fuel and water - Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities for work and medical care| |United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (PKO)|Headquarters staff|May 1993 - Jan. 1995|5|10|- Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations| ||Transport coordination unit|May 1993 - Jan. 1995|48|144|- Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport| |Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees (Humanitarian aid)|Rwandan refugee relief unit|Sep. - Dec. 1994|260|260|- Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies| ||Air transport unit|Sep. - Dec. 1994|118|118|- Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies - Air transport of personnel of international organizations, etc. and materials| |United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (PKO)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 1996 - Feb. 2009|1st-13th personnel: 2|38|- Create PR and budgets, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations| |||Feb. 2009 - Jan. 2013|14th-17th personnel: 3||| ||Transport unit|Feb. 1996 - Aug. 2012|1st-33rd personnel: 43|1,463|- Transport food and other supplies - Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance| |||Aug. 2012 - Jan. 2013|34th personnel: 44||| |Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste|Air transport unit|Nov. 1999 - Feb. 2000|113|113|- Air transport of relief supplies and UNHCR related personnel| ----- |Col1|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees|Air transport unit|Oct. 2001|138|138|- Air transport of relief supplies| |United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002) (PKO)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 2002 - Jun. 2004|1st rotation: 10 2nd rotation: 7|17|- Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations| ||Engineer unit|Mar. 2002 - Jun. 2004|1st and 2nd rotation: 680 3rd rotation: 522 4th rotation: 405|2,287|- Maintain and repair roads and bridges - Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations - Public welfare support operations| |Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees (Humanitarian aid)|Air transport unit|Mar. - Apr. 2003|50|50|- Air transport of relief supplies| |Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims (Humanitarian aid)|Air transport unit|Jul. - Aug. 2003|98|98|- Air transport of materials| |United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) (PKO)|Arms monitors|Mar. 2007 - Jan. 2011|6|24|- Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force| |United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (PKO)|Headquarters staff|Oct. 2008 - Sep. 2011|2|12|- Coordination in UNMISS concerning overall logistics of the military sector - Database management| |United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (PKO)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 2010 - Jan. 2013|2|12|- Coordination of facility-related duties and overall military logistics| ||Engineer unit|Feb. 2010 - Jan. 2013|1st rotation: 203 2nd rotation: 346 3rd and 4th rotation: 330 5th and 6th rotation: 317 7th rotation: 297 Withdrawal support unit: 44|2,184|- Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.| |United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (PKO)|Military liaison officer|Sep. 2010 - Sep. 2012|2|8|- Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste| |United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (PKO)|Headquarters staff|Nov. 2011 -|4|39|- Coordination regarding the demand of overall military logistics - Management of database - Planning and coordination of engineering duties - Planning and coordination of aircraft operation supports| ||Engineer Unit|Jan. 2012 - May 2017|1st rotation: 239 2nd - 4th rotation: 349 5th and 6th rotation: 401 7th - 10th rotation: 353 11th rotation: 354 Withdrawal support unit: 58 (Number of personnel for 1st to 4th rotations includes personnel at the local support coordination center)|3,912|- Development of infrastructure (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) - Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities - Coordination regarding logistics| ||Local support coordination center|Jan. 2012 - Dec. 2013|||- Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities - Coordination regarding logistics| |International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Sinai Peninsula (Internationally coordinated operation)|Headquarters staff|Apr. 2019 -|2|2|- Liaison and coordination between Egypt and Israel and the MFO| Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan). 2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort. (3) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF |Col1|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |International Disaster Relief Activities in Honduras (hurricane disaster)|Medical unit|Nov.–Dec. 1998|80|185|- Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics| ||Air transport unit||105||- Transportation of equipment for medical units, etc.| |Transportation of materials required for International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake disaster)|Maritime transport unit|Sep.–Nov. 1999|426|426|- Marine transportation of materials required for international disaster relief activities (e.g., temporary dwellings)| |International Disaster Relief Activities in India (earthquake disaster)|Material support unit|Feb. 2001|16|94|- Delivery of aid materials and technical instruction on aid materials| ||Air transport unit||78||- Air transport of aid materials and support units, etc.| |Transportation of materials required for International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake disaster)|Air transport unit|Dec. 2003–Jan. 2004|31|31|- Air transport of materials required for international disaster relief activities (tents, etc.)| |International Disaster Relief Activities in Thailand (earthquake/tsunami disaster)|Dispatched maritime unit|Dec. 2004–Jan. 2005|590|590|- Search and rescue activities for the disaster struck victims| |International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)|Joint liaison office|Jan.–Mar. 2005|22|925|- Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities| ||Medical/Air support unit||228||- Air transport of aid materials - Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics| ||Maritime transport unit||593||- Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams - Marine transportaion of aid materials| ||Air transport unit||82||- Air transport of aid materials| |International Disaster Relief Activities off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia (submarine accident)|Maritime transport unit|Aug. 2005|346|346|- Rescue of a Russian submarine| |International Disaster Relief Activities in response to an earthquake in Pakistan, etc. (earthquake disaster)|Air support unit|Oct.-Dec. 2005|147|261|- Air transport in connection with relief activities| ||Air transport unit||114||- Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Team| |International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster)|Medical support unit|May-Jun. 2006|149|234|- Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics| ||Air transport unit||85||- Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams| ----- |Col1|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake)|Joint liaison office|Oct. 2009|21|33|- Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities| ||Medical support unit||12||- Medical treatment| |International Disaster Relief Activities in Haiti (earthquake disaster)|Joint liaison office|Jan.–Feb. 2010|33|234|- Coordination with relevant Haitian organizations and others| ||Air transport unit||97||- Air transportation of International Disaster Relief Teams - Air transportation of victims from Haiti to the United States as part of international disaster relief activities on the return trips of said unit| ||Medical support unit||104||- Medical treatment| |International Disaster Relief Activities in response to floods in Pakistan (flood disaster)|Joint operations coordination center|Aug.–Nov. 2010|27|514|- Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities| ||Air support unit||184||- Air transport of materials, etc.| ||Marine convoy||154||- Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams| ||Air transport unit||149||- Air Transportat of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams| |Transportation of materials and personnel required for the implementation of International Disaster Relief Activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)|Air transport unit|Feb.–Mar. 2011|40|40|- Air transport of personnel engaging in international disaster relief activities and materials| |International Disaster Relief Activities in the Philippines (typhoon disaster)|Joint Operations Coordination Center|Nov.–Dec. 2013|Approx. 10|Approx. 1,100|-Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities| ||Joint Task Force||Approx. 1,080||- Medical treatment (examination/vaccination) - Prevention of epidemics - Transport of relief supplies, etc.| |International Disaster Relief Activities for the missing Malaysian airplane (searching)|Local operation support center|Mar.–Apr. 2014|Approx. 10|Approx. 140|- Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and others| ||International disaster relief squadron||Approx. 130||- Rescue operations including searching| |Transport of materials necessary for International Disaster Relief Activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)|Local coordination center|Nov.-Dec. 2014|4|14|- Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities| ||Air transport unit||10||- Air transport| |International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (airplane accident)|Local support coordination center|Dec. 2014 - Jan. 2015|3|Approx. 350|- Information gathering related to rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries| ||International disaster relief surface force||Approx. 350||- Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501| |International Disaster Relief Activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)|Epidemiological study support|Apr.– May 2015|1|1|- Support for WHO’s epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone| |International Disaster Relief Activities in Nepal (earthquake disaster)|Joint operations coordination center|Apr.– May 2015|4|Approx. 140|- Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and relevant countries| ||Medical support unit||Approx. 110||- Medical treatment| ||Air transport unit||Approx. 30||- Air transport of equipment and materials required for medical treatment| |International Disaster Relief Activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)|Air patrol unit|Nov. 2016|Approx. 30|Approx. 30|- Evaluation of damages| |International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake and tsunami disaster)|Local coordination center|Oct. 2018|Approx. 10|Approx. 60|- Information gathering concerning damages and operations in the affected areas - Coordination with relevant organizations of Indonesia and relevant countries| ||Air transport unit||Approx. 50||- Transportation of personnel/materials| |International Disaster Relief Activities in Djibouti (heavy rain/flood disaster)|Part of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement *|Nov.-Dec. 2019|Approx. 230|Approx. 230|- Drainage work and function recovery of public facilities (elementary and junior high schools), transport and distribution of emergency relief supplies| |International Disaster Relief Activities in Australia (bush fire disaster)|Local coordination center|Jan.-Feb. 2020|Approx. 10|Approx. 80|- Coordination with relevant organizations of the Commonwealth of Australia and relevant countries| ||Air transport unit||Approx. 70||- Air transport of materials and personnel required for firefighting and relief activities| - Units dispatched for a counter-piracy mission (see (7) Counter-Piracy Operations) carried out the activities (4) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law |Place of Dispatch|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Indian Ocean|Units carrying out replenishment support activities|Nov. 2001 - Nov. 2007|Approx. 320|Approx. 10,900|- Materials supplies for foreign vessels| |U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.|Units carrying out replenishment support activities||－|Approx. 2,900|- Transportation of materials| (5) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law |Place of Dispatch|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Indian Ocean|Replenishment support unit|Jan. 2008 - Feb. 2010|Approx. 330|Approx. 2,400|- Materials supplies for foreign vessels| ----- (6) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq |Place of Dispatch|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Southeast Iraq, etc.|Reconstruction assistance group (1st to 10th) Operation assistance unit (1st to 5th)|Jan. 2004 - Jul. 2006|Approx. 600|Approx. 5,600|- Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.| |Kuwait, etc.|Evacuation operation unit|Jun.– Sep. 2006|Approx. 100|Approx. 100|- Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others| |Persian Gulf, etc.|Maritime transport unit|Feb.- Apr. 2004|Approx. 330|Approx. 330|- Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF’s activities| |Kuwait, etc.|Air transportation unit (1st to 16th term)|Dec. 2003 - Dec. 2008|Approx. 210|Approx. 3,500|- Air transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance| |Kuwait, etc.|Withdrawal operation unit|Dec. 2008 – Feb. 2009|Approx. 130|Approx. 130|- Operation related to withdrawal| (7) Counter-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations) |Place of Dispatch|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden|Maritime Force|Mar. 2009 - Dec. 2016|Approx. 400|Approx. 10,000|Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.| |||Dec. 2016 -|Approx. 200|Approx. 2,000|Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.| |Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|Air Unit (MSDF)|May 2009 - Feb. 2011|Approx.100|Approx. 1,640|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.| |||Feb. 2011 - Jun. 2012|Approx.120||| |||Jun. 2012 - Jul. 2014|Approx.110||| |Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti||Jul. 2014 - Jul. 2015|Approx. 70|Approx. 210|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.| |Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti||Jul. 2015 -|Approx. 60*|Approx. 1,200*|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc. (Conduct information gathering activities in the Gulf of Aden, especially in the airspace of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor where counter-piracy operations are carried out, and within the area of the high seas to the west of the northern Arabian sea since January 2020)| |Djibouti|Support Unit (MSDF)|Jul. 2014 -|Approx. 30|Approx. 390|Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operation, etc.| |Bahrain, etc.|Combined Task Force 151 Command Unit|Aug. 2014 -|Under 20|Approx. 70|Communication and coordination with units of various countries participating in CTF151| |Djibouti|Local Coordination Center|Jul. 2012 - Jul. 2014|3|Approx. 12|Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operation| |Djibouti|Air Unit (GSDF)|May 2009 - Feb. 2011|Approx. 50|Approx. 970|Security of activity base and P-3C| |||Feb. 2011 - Jun. 2012|Approx. 60||| |||Jun. 2012 - Jul. 2014|Approx. 80||| |Djibouti|Support Unit (GSDF)|Jul. 2014 -|Approx. 80|Approx. 1,040|Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operation, etc.| (8) Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East |Place of Dispatch|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait|Maritime Force|Feb. 2020 -|Approx. 200|Approx. 200|Information gathering activities for ensuring the safety of Japan-related vessels| |Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|Air Unit (MSDF) (Conduct by the counter- piracy unit to the extent that it does not interfere with the counter-piracy operation)|Jan. 2020 -|Approx. 60|Approx. 60|Conduct information gathering activities in the Gulf of Aden, especially in the airspace of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, where counter-piracy operations are carried out, and within the area of the high seas to the west of the northern Arabian sea since January 2020.| - Activities by the Air Unit are those by utilizing the counter-piracy unit. The number and the total number of personnel are included in the respective number, with an asterisk, of (7) Counter-Piracy Operations. **Reference 52 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Changes in Them** ||Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|(As of March 31, 2020)| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Category|GSDF|MSDF|ASDF|Joint Staff etc.|Total| |Authorized|150,777|45,356|46,923|4,098|247,154| |Actual|138,060|42,850|42,828|3,704|227,442| |Staffing Rate (%)|91.6|94.5|91.3|90.4|92.0| |Category|Non-Fixed-Term Personnel|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Fixed-Term Personnel|Col11| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Officer||Warrant Officer||Enlisted (upper)||Enlisted (lower)|||| |Authorized|46,039||4,923||140,191||56,001|||| |Actual|42,495|（2,427）|4,777|（103）|137,071|（8,622）|21,735|（2,504）|21,364|（3,207）| |Staffing Rate (%)|92.3||97.0||97.8||77.0|||| Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value. 2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget. (As of March 31, 2020) ----- (Number of personnel) 260,000 240,000 Changes in Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel 220,000 200,000 |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|226,742|Col11|227,339|Col13|Col14|Col15|226,789|Col17|226,547|Col19|227,442| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||| 247,746 247,446 247,172 247,172 247,160 247,154 247,154 247,154 247,154 247,154 227,950 227,848 225,712 226,742 227,339 226,789 226,547 227,442 224,526 224,422 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 The number of authorized and actual Actual Authorized personnel is as of the end of each fiscal year. Actual Authorized **Reference 53 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2019)** |Classification|Col2|Col3|Col4|Number Applied|Number Recruited|Competition Ratios| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Officer candidates|||GSDF|1,874 （ 282 ）|205 （ 28 ）|9.1 （ 10.1 ）| ||||MSDF|1,000 （ 162 ）|75 （ 9 ）|13.3 （ 18.0 ）| ||||ASDF|1,130 （ 238 ）|68 （ 16 ）|16.6 （ 14.9 ）| ||||Total|4,004 （ 682 ）|348 （ 53 ）|11.5 （ 12.9 ）| |Non- commissioned officers|Technical Petty Officer||MSDF|91 （ 25 ）|12 （ 3 ）|7.6 （ 8.3 ）| ||Technical Sergeant||ASDF|7 （ 0 ）|2 （ 0 ）|3.5 （ ― ）| |Aviation Cadet|||MSDF|811 （ 96 ）|79 （ 5 ）|10.3 （ 19.2 ）| ||||ASDF|1,731 （ 195 ）|72 （ 4 ）|24.0 （ 48.8 ）| ||||Total|2,542 （ 291 ）|151 （ 9 ）|16.8 （ 32.3 ）| |Non-commissioned officer candidates|||GSDF|15,822 （ 2,980 ）|4,067 （ 324 ）|3.9 （ 9.2 ）| ||||MSDF|4,906 （ 977 ）|1,599 （ 227 ）|3.1 （ 4.3 ）| ||||ASDF|7,582 （ 1,508 ）|981 （ 266 ）|7.7 （ 5.7 ）| ||||Total|28,310 （ 5,465 ）|6,647 （ 817 ）|4.3 （ 6.7 ）| |Uniformed SDF personnel candidates (Privates)|||GSDF|18,097 （ 3,434 ）|4,779 （ 1,167 ）|3.8 （ 2.9 ）| ||||MSDF|4,441 （ 932 ）|771 （ 131 ）|5.8 （ 7.1 ）| ||||ASDF|6,306 （ 1,268 ）|1,809 （ 161 ）|3.5 （ 7.9 ）| ||||Total|28,844 （ 5,634 ）|7,359 （ 1,459 ）|3.9 （ 3.9 ）| |National Defense Academy Students||Recommended|Humanity and social science|151 （ 44 ）|26 （ 5 ）|5.8 （ 8.8 ）| ||||Science and engineering|277 （ 50 ）|112 （ 16 ）|2.5 （ 3.1 ）| ||||Total|428 （ 94 ）|138 （ 21 ）|3.1 （ 4.5 ）| |||Selective exam|Humanity and social science|130 （ 19 ）|14 （ 2 ）|9.3 （ 9.5 ）| ||||Science and engineering|172 （ 11 ）|41 （ 3 ）|4.2 （ 3.7 ）| ||||Total|302 （ 30 ）|55 （ 5 ）|5.5 （ 6.0 ）| |||General exam|Humanity and social science|5,492 （ 2,276 ）|74 （ 15 ）|74.2 （ 151.7 ）| ||||Science and engineering|7,150 （ 1,378 ）|216 （ 14 ）|33.1 （ 98.4 ）| ||||Total|12,642 （ 3,654 ）|290 （ 29 ）|43.6 （ 126.0 ）| |National Defense Medical College students||||5,800 （ 1,774 ）|81 （ 22 ）|71.6 （ 80.6 ）| |National Defense Medical College nursing students (SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students)||||1,956 （ 1,520 ）|74 （ 69 ）|26.4 （ 22.0 ）| |GSDF High Technical School Students||Recommended||196|79|2.5| |||General exam||1,843|268|6.9| |||Total||2,039|347|5.9| Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate numbers of females. 2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2019. ----- **Reference 54 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, etc.** ||Col2|Col3|(As of March 31, 2020)|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Special Service|||Regular Service|| |Minister of Defense State Minister of Defense Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2) Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to 3)|Authorized Strength|Non-Authorized Strength|Authorized Strength|Non-Authorized Strength| ||Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense||Administrative Officials, and others 27|Part-Time Officials| ||SDF Personnel|||| ||Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense|Candidates for SDF Personnel||| ||Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs|Reserve Personnel 47,900||| ||Director, Director General, and others 708|Ready Reserve Personnel 7,981||| ||Administrative Officials, and others 20,165|Candidates for Reserve Personnel 4,621||| ||Uniformed SDF Personnel 247,154|National Defense Academy students||| |||National Defense Medical College students||| |||GSDF High Technical School students||| |||Part-Time Officials||| Notes: 1. Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations (as for uniformed SDF Personnel, the number is the authorized number specified in the laws and regulations) 2. “Others” in the title includes Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense, and Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense **Reference 55 Main Measures for Re-employment Support** |Classification|Measures for re-employment support|Description| |---|---|---| |Measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel|Occupational aptitude testing|Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based on individual aptitudes| ||Technical training|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (large-sized vehicle operation, forklift operation, electrician, boiler engineer, regular-sized vehicle operation, heavy-duty vehicle operation, crane operators, hazardous material engineer, first-level training for nursing care workers, semi-medium-sized vehicle, and business continuity specialist [new in FY2020], emergency manager [new in FY2020], etc.)| ||Disaster prevention and risk management training|Provide uniformed SDF officer retiring at an early age with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan (attending lectures in this area are a prerequisite for receiving the Cabinet Office’s Regional Disaster Prevention Manager license)| ||Correspondence courses|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (hazardous materials engineer, electrician, financial planner, real estate transaction specialist, property administrator, fire defense equipment officer, certified administrative procedures legal specialist, labor and social security attorney, health manager, support to personnel who wish to go to university, etc.)| ||Business management training|Support uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide necessary knowledge to lead a stable life after reemployment and retirement| ||Career guidance|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with knowhow to choose new occupation and right mindset toward reemployment| ||Outsourcing career counseling, etc.|Outsource career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each retiring uniformed SDF personnel| ||Internship program|Implement internship programs for uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire in order to prevent early retirement due to re- employment mismatches as well as to expand places of re-employment| |Measures for internal support personnel|Training for support personnel|Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel| |Measures for promotion outside of SDF|Support for publicity aimed at to business owners|Publicizing to business owners, etc. the effectiveness of uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire| ||Inviting business owners on unit tours|Invite business owners to SDF units, etc. and provide them with tours, explanations of the re-employment support situation, etc.| ----- **Reference 56 Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government** ||(As of March 31, 2020 575 personnel)| |---|---| |Prefectural Government|Government employment situation| |Hokkaido|Hokkaido Prefectural Government (four persons), Sapporo City Government (two persons), Hakodate City Government (two persons), Asahikawa City Government, Muroran City Government, Kushiro City Government, Obihiro City Government (two persons), Iwamizawa City Government (two persons), Rumoi City Government, Tomakomai City Government, Wakkanai City Government, Bibai City Government, Ashibetsu City Government (two persons), Akabira City Government, Mombetsu City Government, Shibetsu City Government, Nayoro City Government, Chitose City Government (four persons), Takikawa City Government, Sunagawa City Government, Noboribetsu City Government, Eniwa City Government (two persons), Date City Government, Kitahiroshima City Government (two persons), Hokuto City Government, Matsumae Town Office, Nanae Town Office, Shikabe Town Offcie, Kuromatsunai Town Office, Rankoshi Town Office, Niseko Town Office, Kutchan Town Office, Yoichi Town Office, Kamisunagawa Town Office, Naganuma Town Office, Tsukigata Town Office, Shintotsukawa Town Offcie, Kamifurano Town Office, Nakafurano Town Office, Minamifurano Town Office, Toyotomi Town Office, Rebun Town Office, Bihoro Town Office, Engaru Town Office (two persons), Atsuma Town Office, Abira Town Office, Shinhidaka Town Office, Otofuke Town Office (two persons), Memuro Town Office, Ashoro Town Office, Shibecha Town Office, Teshikaga Town Office| |Aomori|Aomori Prefectural Government, Aomori City Government (five persons), Hirosaki City Government, Hachinohe City Government (three persons), Towada City Government, Misawa City Government, Ajigasawa Town Office, Fukaura Town Office, Oirase Town Office| |Iwate|Iwate Prefectural Government, Morioka City Government, Miyako City Government, Hanamaki City Government, Kamaishi City Government, Hachimantai City Government, Takizawa City Government, Shizukuishi Town Office, Otsuchi Town Offcie, Yamada Town Office (two persons)| |Miyagi|Miyagi Prefectural Government, Sendai City Government (two persons), Ishinomaki City Government, Natori City Government, Kakuda City Government, Tagajo City Government, Iwanuma City Government, Tome City Government, Kurihara City Government, Higashi Matsushima City Government, Shibata Town Office, Yamamoto Town Office, Rifu Town Office, Taiwa Town Office, Ohira Village Office, Minamisanriku Town Office| |Akita|Akita Prefectural Government (two persons), Akita City Government, Odate City Government, Oga City Government, Yuzawa City Government (two persons), Yurihonjo City Government, Daisen City Government| |Yamagata|Yamagata Prefectural Government, Yamagata City Government, Sakata City Government, Kaminoyama City Government, Nagai City Government, Tendo City Government, Higashine City Government| |Fukushima|Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government (two persons), Koriyama City Government, Iwaki City Government| |Ibaraki|Ibaraki Prefectural Government, Koga City Government, Ryugasaki City Government, Shimotsuma City Government, Joso City Government, Takahagi City Government, Ushiku City Government, Moriya City Government, Hitachi Omiya City Government, Kasumigaura City Government, Ami Town Office, Sakai Town Office (two persons)| |Tochigi|Tochigi Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government| |Gunma|Gunma Prefectural Government (two persons), Numata City Government, Shibukawa City Government, Nakanojo Town Office| |Saitama|Saitama Prefectural Government, Saitama City Government (two persons), Fukaya City Government, Asaka City Government, Wako City Government, Okegawa City Government, Fujimi City Government, Yoshikawa City Government, Ranzan Town Office| |Chiba|Chiba Prefectural Government, Chiba City Government, Ichikawa City Government, Funabashi City Government, Tateyama City Government (two persons), Kisarazu City Government, Matsudo City Government (two persons), Mobara City Government, Narita City Government, Narashino City Government, Kashiwa City Government, Katsuura City Government, Ichihara City Government, Nagareyama City Government, Yachiyo City Government, Kimitsu City Government, Urayasu City Government, Yotsukaido City Government, Inzai City Government, Tomisato City Government, Katori City Government, Sammu City Government, Isumi City Government, Oamishirasato City Government,| |Tokyo|Tokyo Metropolitan Government (nine persons), Shinagawa Ward Office (three persons), Ota Ward Office (two persons), Shibuya Ward Office (two persons), Toshima Ward Office, Arakawa Ward Office, Itabashi Ward Office (two persons), Adachi Ward Office, Hino City Government, Mizuho Town Office| |Kanagawa|Kanagawa Prefectural Government (three persons), Yokohama City Government (nine persons), Kawasaki City Government (two persons), Sagamihara City Government, Yokosuka City Government, Hiratsuka City Government, Kamakura City Government, Fujisawa City Government (three persons), Odawara City Government, Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Miura City Government, Ebina City Government (three persons), Zama City Government (two persons), Minamiashigara City Government, Ayase City Government, Hayama Town Office, Matsuda Town Office, Kaisei Town Office, Hakone Town Office, Yugawara Town Office| |Niigata|Niigata Prefectural Government, Niigata City Government, Murakami City Government, Tsubame City Government, Jouetsu City Government, Tainai City Government, Yahiko Village Office, Sekikawa Village Office| |Toyama|Toyama Prefectural Government, Tonami City Government| |Ishikawa|Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Wajima City Government, Nomi City Government| |Fukui|Fukui Prefectural Government (three persons), Awara City Government| |Yamanashi|Yamanashi Prefectural Government (three persons), Fujiyoshida City Government, Minami-Alps City Government, Minobu Town Office, Yamanakako Village Office, Fujikawaguchiko Town Office,| |Nagano|Nagano Prefectural Government (two persons), Nagano City Government, Matsumoto City Government, Chino City Government, Shiojiri City Government, Saku City Government, Azumino City Government| |Gifu|Gifu Prefectural Government (four persons), Gifu City Government, Mizunami City Government, Kakamigahara City Government, Hida City Government, Kaizu City Government, Ginan Town Office, Sakahogi Town Office| |Shizuoka|Shizuoka Prefectural Government (six persons), Shizuoka City Government, Hamamatsu City Government, Atami City Government, Ito City Government, Shimada City Government, Gotenba City Government (two persons), Shimoda City Government, Susono City Government, Izu City Government, Omaezaki City Government, Makinohara City Government, Kannami Town Office, Oyama Town Office (two persons)| |Aichi|Aichi Prefectural Government, Toyohashi City Government (two persons), Okazaki City Government, Handa City Government, Kasugai City Government, Kariya City Government, Toyota City Government, Nishio City Government, Komaki City Government, Inazawa City Government, Tokai City Government, Obu City Government, Chita City Government, Takahama City Government, Toyoake City Government, Kiyosu City Government, Kitanagoya City Government (two persons), Yatomi City Government, Miyoshi City Government (two persons), Ama City Government, Nagakute City Government, Toyoyama Town Office, Oharu Town Office, Kanie Town Office, Tobishima Village Offcie, Mihama Town Office, Taketoyo Town Office| |Mie|Mie Prefectural Government, Tsu City Government, Yokkaichi City Government, Ise City Government, Kuwana City Government, Nabari City Government, Owase City Government, Toba City Government, Shima City Government| |Shiga|Shiga Prefectural Government, Kusatsu City Government, Konan City Government (two persons)| |Kyoto|Kyoto Prefectural Government, Maizuru City Government, Joyo City Government, Yawata City Government (two persons), Kyotanabe City Government, Kizugawa City Government (two persons), Seika Town Office (three persons)| |Osaka|Osaka Prefectural Government, Osaka City Government (two persons), Sakai City Government, Kishiwada City Government, Ikeda City Government, Izumiotsu City Government, Kaizuka City Government, Hirakata City Government, Ibaraki City Government, Izumisano City Government, Tondabayashi City Government, Kawachinagano City Government, Daito City Government, Takaishi City Government, Shijonawate City Government, Osakasayama City Government, Toyono Town Office| |Hyogo|Hyogo Prefectural Government, Kobe City Government (two persons), Himeji City Government, Akashi City Government, Nishiwaki City Government, Kawanishi City Government| |Nara|Nara Prefectural Government (three persons), Nara City Government (four persons), Yamato Takada City Government, Gojo City Government (three persons), Gosho City Government, Ikoma City Government, Tawaramoto Town Offcie| |Wakayama|Wakayama Prefectural Government, Wakayama City Government, Hashimoto City Government, Shirahama Town Office| |Tottori|Tottori Prefectural Government (two persons), Tottori City Government, Yonago City Government, Sakaiminato City Government, Yurihama Town Office, Nanbu Town Office| |Shimane|Shimane Prefectural Government, Matsue City Government, Hamada City Government| |Okayama|Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government, Asakuchi City Government, Nagi Town Office| |Hiroshima|Hiroshima Prefectural Government (three persons), Hiroshima City Government, Kure City Government, Mihara City Government, Fuchu City Government, Miyoshi City Government, Higashihiroshima City Government, Hatsukaichi City Government, Kaita Town Office| |Yamaguchi|Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, Shimonoseki City Government, Yamaguchi City Government, Hagi City Government, Hofu City Government, Iwakuni City Government, Nagato City Government, Waki Town Office, Tabuse Town Offcie| |Tokushima|Tokushima Prefectural Government (five persons), Anan City Government, Yoshinogawa City Government (two persons), Awa City Government, Miyoshi City Government| |Kagawa|Kagawa Prefectural Government, Marugame City Government, Sakaide City Government, Zentsuji City Government, Sanuki City Government, Kotohira Town Office, Manno Town Office| |Ehime|Ehime Prefectural Government, Matsuyama City Government, Imabari City Government, Saijo City Government, AinanTown Office| |Kochi|Kochi Prefectural Government, Kochi City Government, Konan City Government| |Fukuoka|Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Kitakyushu City Government, Fukuoka City Government (two persons), Kurume City Government (two persons), Iizuka City Government (two persons), Chikugo City Government, Yukuhashi City Government, Nakama City Government, Ogori City Government, Kasuga City Government, Onojo City Government (two persons), Munakata City Government (two persons), Dazaifu City Government, Asakura City Government, Itoshima City Government, Nakagawa City Government, Kasuya Town Office, Tachiarai Town Office| |Saga|Saga Prefectural Government (three persons), Karatsu City Government, Takeo City Government, Genkai Town Office| |Nagasaki|Nagasaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Nagasaki City Government, Sasebo City Government (three persons), Shimabara City Government, Omura City Government, Matsuura City Government, Tsushima City Government, Iki City Government, Saikai City Government, Unzen City Government| |Kumamoto|Kumamoto Prefectural Government (five persons), Kumamoto City Government, Yashiro City Government, Arao City Government, Minamata City Government, Kikuchi City Government, Kamiamakusa City Government, Koshi City Government, Ozu Town Office, Yamato Town Office, Kuma Village Office| |Oita|Oita Prefectural Government (two persons), Oita City Government, Beppu City Government, Kitsuki City Government, Hiji Town Office| |Miyazaki|Miyazaki Prefectural Government (six persons), Miyazaki City Government, Miyakonojo City Government (three persons), Nobeoka City Government, Nichinan City Government, Kobayashi City Government (two persons), Kushima City Government, Saito City Government, Ebino City Government (two persons), Mimata Town Office, Takaharu Town Office, Takanabe Town Office, Shintomi Town Office, Tsuno Town Office, Kadogawa Town Office| |Kagoshima|Kagoshima Prefectural Government (four persons), Kagoshima City Government, Izumi City Government, Tarumizu City Government, Satsuma-Sendai City Government, Soo City Government, Kirishima City Government (two persons), Aira City Government, Toshima Village Office, Kinko Town Office, Minami Okuma Town Office| |Okinawa|Tomigusuku City Government, Tarama Village Office| Notes: Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2020 (part-time personnel included). ----- **1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited** Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when: 1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded, 2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or 3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack). **2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict** **examination and information disclosure** In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan’s security from the viewpoint of—implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as “the ally and partners”), —enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations. Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999) . **3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to** **third parties** In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licenser. Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision. For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology” refers to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and “military technologies” refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms. The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes. **Reference 57 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and** **Technology** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014) The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minster Eisaku Sato’s remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the Three Principles on Arms Exports”) and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peaceloving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the nonpermission of arms exports to communist bloc countries have increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government has repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations. Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three NonNuclear Principles. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become essential for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the AsiaPacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government’s existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which fit the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption measures. An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as “peace contribution and international cooperation”). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan’s defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs. On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized. In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peaceloving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology. ----- **Reference 58 The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited,” the Second Principle “Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted,”** **and the Third Principle “Ensuring Appropriate Control”** - The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited” |Situation|Specific example| |---|---| |(1) Violation of obligations under treaties concluded and other international arrangements|Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Arms Trade Treaty, etc.| |(2) Violation of obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions|Security Council Resolution 1718 (nuclear issue of North Korea), etc.| |(3) Transfer to a nation which is party to a conflict|Countries which are the target of measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack| - The Second Principle “Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted” |Situation|Specific example| |---|---| |(1) Cases that contribute to the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation|Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, only if the transfers have a positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation ●When the recipient is a foreign government ●When the recipient is: the United Nations (UN) System or organizations conducting the activities based on a UN resolution, an organization conducting the activities based on a request from international organizations, or an organization conducting the activities based on a request from countries to which the region in which the activities are conducted belongs and with support from any of the main organs of the UN| |(2) Cases that contribute to the security of Japan|Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have a positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s security ●Overseas transfers that are related to international joint development and production with countries cooperating with Japan in the security area including the U.S. ●Overseas transfers that contribute to enhancing security and defense cooperation with countries cooperating with Japan in the security area including the U.S., and of the following: ・overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology included in the provision of supplies and services implemented by the SDF in accordance with laws; ・provision of military technology as a part of mutual exchange of technology with the U.S.; ・provision of parts or services related to a licensed product of the U.S. or provision of repair services etc. to the U.S. armed forces; or ・overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology related to cooperation concerning rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance or minesweeping with countries cooperating with Japan in the security area. ●Overseas transfers that are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as “the SDF etc.”), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities etc. related to the activities of the SDF etc., or for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, and that are: ・temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the SDF etc., including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items; ・export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public officials or ・export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals operating in dangerous areas.| |(3) In cases where the influence is judged to be extremely limited from the perspective of the security of Japan|・Returning of misdirected items, export of sample items on the premise that they will be returned, re-export of equipment brought in by police officers of overseas government agencies, etc.| - The Third Principle “Ensuring Appropriate Control” In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. **Reference 59 Activities in Civic Life** |Items|Details of Activities and Their Past Records| |---|---| |Disposal of Unexploded Bombs (Supplementary provisions of the Self- Defense Forces Law)|○The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others. ○Disposal operations in FY2019: a total of 1,441 disposal operations (average of approximately 28 operations per week), weighing approximately 33.0 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 18.0 tons, (accounting for about 37% of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)| |Removal of Underwater Mines (Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law)|○The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II, as well as removes and disposes of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments and others. ○Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. ○Disposal operations in FY2019: a total 0 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 0 tons in total. (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)| |Medical Activities (Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others)|○Medical services are provided to the general public at the National Defense Medical College Hospital in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (seven out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo). ○The National Defense Medical College Hospital serves as an advanced treatment hospital (provision of advanced medical treatment, etc.) and a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services (acceptance of emergency patients in critical condition). ○In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs. ○The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively. ○The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on disaster and emergency medicine.| |Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings (Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.)|○At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services. ○The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.| |Exchanges with Local Communities|○Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.| ----- **Reference 60 Outline of Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas** |Category|Measures|Description of Measures|Examples of Covered Facilities and Projects| |---|---|---|---| |Act on Improvement of Living Environment of etc. Areas around Defense Facilities,*1|Subsidies to finance disturbance prevention projects|Subsidies are granted to local governments’ projects to prevent or mitigate disturbance caused by frequent use of armored vehicles and other heavy vehicles, and frequent shooting, bombing and use of other explosives by the SDF, etc.|- Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, community reception facilities for television broadcast| ||Subsidies to finance noise prevention projects|Subsidies are granted to local governments’ projects to prevent or mitigate significant noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc.|- Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as healthcare centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly| ||Subsidies to finance soundproofing works for housing|Subsidies are granted for soundproofing works by homeowners, etc. in areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas where disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc. is serious.|- Housing| ||Compensation for relocations|In areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas where disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc. is especially serious, compensation, etc. is provided for the loss ordinarily incurred by relocating buildings, etc. to other areas or by removing them.|- Compensation for relocating buildings - Land purchase - Development of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated| ||Improving green zones|Works such as the development of green zones are conducted on land in areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas necessary for preventing the occurrence of new disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc. and for improving the living environment in their vicinities.|- Planting trees, installing grass fields| ||Subsidies for developing facilities meant to stabilize people’s lives|In cases where installation or operations of a certain defense facility is found to disturb daily lives or business activities of the residents of the surrounding areas, subsidies are granted for local government’s facility development projects to mitigate such disturbance.|- Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes for the elderly, fire departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc. - Agricultural facilities, fishing facilities| ||Specified Defense Facilities Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants|In consideration of the level of the influence of the installation or operations of a certain defense facility on the living environment and regional development of the surrounding areas, grants are provided to municipalities affected by the specified defense facilities for their projects contributing to the development of public facilities, improvement of the living environment, or smooth implementation of regional development.|- Developing public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation facilities, and social welfare facilities - Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school buildings, etc.| |Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of etc. the United States Forces in Japan,*2|Realignment grants|In consideration of the increase of influence that the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan may exert on residents’ stable daily lives, grants are provided to the specified neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment for their projects contributing to the enhancement of residents’ convenient lives and promotion of the local industry when they are found necessary to promote smooth and steady realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan.|- Developing public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation facilities, and social welfare facilities - Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school buildings, etc.| ||Grants for realignment-related training relocations|Considering that the influence of aircraft noise, etc. on residents’ stable daily lives may continue even after the provision of the realignment grants ends in areas around the realignment-related specified defense facilities where training relocations are conducted, grants are provided for projects contributing to the enhancement of residents’ convenient lives and promotion of the local industry.|| ||Project to develop specified areas affected by the realignment|With the aim of promoting smooth realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, grants are provided to the prefectures that accomodate defense facilities, for which special attention needs to be paid with regard to the significant increase of influence on residents’ stable daily lives due to the realignment, for their projects contributing to the enhancement of residents’ convenient lives and promotion of the local industry that they implement from a broader point of view.|| ||Realignment promotion project|Grants are provided for the development of facilities conducted by the specified neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment, in light of the significance of promoting measures for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and properly and promptly implementing the realignment.|- Facilities similar to those meant to stabilize people’s lives| *1 Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas around Defense Facilities (Act No. 101 of 1974) *2 Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (Act No. 67 of 2007) **Reference 61 a list of the defense-related facilities designated under the Drone Act** |Facility|Location| |---|---| |Camp Okadama|161, Okadama-cho, Higashi-ku, Sapporo-shi, Hokkaido| |Camp Kasuminome|1-1-1, Kasuminome- Wakabayashi-ku, Sendai-shi, Miyagi| |Camp Tachikawa|5, Midori-cho, Tachikawa-shi, Tokyo| |Camp Yao|1-81, Kuko, Yao-shi, Osaka| |Camp Metabaru|7, Tateno, Yoshinogari-cho, Kanzaki-gun, Saga| |Camp Kengun Vice-Camp Takayubaru|1812, Oyatsu, Mashiki-machi, Kamimashiki-gun, Kumamoto| |Ominato Air Base|2, Hayasaki, Jogasawa, Mutsu-shi, Aomori| |Hachinohe Air Base|Takadate, Kawaragi, Hachinohe-shi, Aomori| |Tateyama Air Base|Mubanchi, Miyagi, Tateyama-shi, Chiba| |Maizuru Air Base|731-20, Nagahama, Maizuru-shi, Kyoto| |Komatsushima Air Base|4-3, Subana, Wadajima-cho, Komatsushima-shi, Tokushima| |Kanoya Air Base|3-11-2, Nishihara, Kanoya-shi, Kagoshima| |Iruma Air Base|2-3, Inariyama, Sayama-shi, Saitama| |Kasuga Air Base|3-1-1, Hara-machi, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka| |Facility|Location| |---|---| |Ichigaya building, Ministry of Defense|5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo| |Camp Sapporo|10, Minami-26-jonishi, Chuo-ku, Sapporo-shi, Hokkaido| |Camp Sendai|1-1, Minaminometate, Miyagino-ku, Sendai-shi, Miyagi| |Camp Asaka|Oizumigakuen-cho, Nerima-ku, Tokyo| |Camp Itami|7-1-1, Midorigaoka, Iami-shi, Hyogo| |Camp Kengun|1-1-1, Higashimachi, Higashi-ku, Kumamoto-shi, Kumamoto| |Funakoshi building, Headquarters Yokosuka District|7-73, Funakoshi-cho, Yokosuka-shi, Kanagawa| |Itsumi building, Headquarters Yokosuka District|Mubanchi, 1-chome, Nishi Hemi-cho, Yokosuka-shi, Kanagawa| |Area 1, Headquarters Maizuru District|1190, Amarubeshimo, Maizuru-shi, Kyoto| |Headquarters Ominato District|4-1, Ominato-machi, Mutsu-shi, Aomori| |Headquarters Sasebo District|18, Hirase-machi, Sasebo-shi, Nagasaki| |Headquarters Kure District|8-1, Saiwai-cho, Kure-shi, Hiroshima| |Fuchu Air Base|1-5-5, Sengen-cho, Fuchu-shi, Tokyo| ----- **Reference 62 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)** Outline of the survey period: January 11 - 21, 2018 For details, refer to 1 Interest in the Self Defense Forces Interested (subtotal) 67.8 Not Interested (subtotal) 31.4 Very Somewhat Not that Totally interested interested interested uninterested (Eligible number of people) Don’t know Total (1,671) 2 Impression toward the SDF Good impression Bad impression (subtotal) 89.8 (subtotal) 5.6 Good More of a More of Bad impression positive a negative impression impression impression (Eligible number of people) Don’t know Total (1,671) |36.7|53.0|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| 4.7 0.7 4.9 |14.9|52.9|25.9| |---|---|---| 0.8 5.5 3 Defense capabilities of the SDF 6 Role expected of the Self Defense Forces (multiple responses) （％） 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Disaster dispatches (relief activities, emergency patient transport, and other activities during disasters) Protecting national security (national response to attacks on islands, and others) Should be decreased Should be increased Current strength is sufficient Don’t know (Eligible number of people) Total (1,671) |29.1|60.1| |---|---| 6.2 4.5 4 Evaluation of overseas activities by the SDF Appreciate (Total) 87.3 Do not appreciate (Total) 7.4 Highly Appreciate to Do not appreciate Do not appreciated a certain degree very much appreciate (Eligible number at all of people) Don’t know Total (1,671) |36.7|50.6|Col3| |---|---|---| 6.2 Responding to ballistic missile attacks Participating in international peace cooperation activities (such as United Nations PKO and international emergency relief activities) Private-sector cooperation (civil engineering projects and National Sports Festival assistance, unexploded ordnance disposal, and others) Rescuing Japanese people in other countries Promoting defense cooperation and interaction (implementing meetings and discussions and joint training with defense agencies of other countries, defense equipment assistance, and others) Contributing to stable use of cyberspace (response to cyberattacks and others) Taking actions to deal with piracy (initiatives to protect private-sector vessels from piracy offshore near Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden Cooperating with arms control and disarmament and non-proliferation effects Assisting capability building (initiatives to improve capabilities of developing countries in national security and defense fields) 1.1 5 Efforts in international peace cooperation activities Should make Should maintain Should reduce Should not more efforts current the amount of efforts in engage in in engaging engagement engaging from such efforts proactively level current level (Eligible number Don’t know of people) Total (1,671) |20.6|66.8|Col3| |---|---|---| 1.7 Contributing to stable use of outer space Others Nothing in particular Unsure 79.2 60.9 49.8 40.2 34.8 26.0 21.0 20.8 18.2 17.3 14.8 13.2 7.5 0.1 2.2 1.7 Total (N = 1,671 people, M.T. = 407.7%) **Reference 63 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2019)** |Col1|Col2|Ministry of Defense Headquarters|Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches|Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency|Total| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |1 Number of disclosure requests||2,060|1466|155|3,681| |2 Number of decisions regarding disclosure Requests accepted Requests partially accepted Requests declined||2,524|1610|130|4,264| ||Requests accepted|1,248|649|62|1,959| ||Requests partially accepted|1,175|937|67|2,179| ||Requests declined|101|24|1|126| |3 Number of requests for review||9,136|0|0|9,136| |4 Number of lawsuits||3|0|0|3| ----- **Defense Chronology** |Year|Defense|Domestic|International| |---|---|---|---| Jan. 12 Japan-Estonia Summit (Tallinn) Jan. 13 Japan-Latvia Summit (Riga) Jan. 13 Japan-Lithuania Summit (Vilnius) Jan. 14 Japan-Bulgaria Summit (Sofia) Jan. 15 Japan-Serbia Summit (Belgrade) Jan. 16 Japan-Romania Summit (Bucharest) Jan. 18 Japan-Australia Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 02 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Feb. 06 Japan-Germany Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 07 U.S. Vice President Pence pays courtesy visit to Prime Minister Abe Feb. 09 Japan-ROK Summit (PyeongChang) Feb. 14 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Feb. 14 Japan-Norway Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 20 U.S. military aircraft throws away a fuel tank into Lake Ogawara in Tohoku Town, Kamikita Country, Aomori Prefecture Feb. 23 Japan-Chile Summit (Tokyo) Mar. 06 Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Conversation Mar. 09 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Mar. 13 Naha District Court renders judgement regarding the demand of an injunctive order for actions that crush the reef, etc. (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project) Mar. 14 Japan-Sri Lanka Summit (Tokyo) Mar. 15 Japan-Germany Summit Telephone Conversation Mar. 23 Okinawa Prefectural Government appeals against the judgement of the Naha District Court to the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project) Mar. 31 Return of the land at Makiminato Service Area adjacent to Route 58 Apr. 05 Japan-Iraq Summit (Tokyo) Apr. 11 Japan-Bhutan Summit (Tokyo) Apr. 12 Japan-Switzerland Summit (Tokyo) Apr. 17 Japan-U.S. Summit (Florida) Apr. 28 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Apr. 29 Japan-ROK summit telephone talk Apr. 30 Japan-UAE Summit (Abu Dhabi) May 01 Japan-Jordan Summit (Jordan) May 01 Japan-Palestine Summit (Palestine) May 02 Japan-Israel Summit (Israel) May 04 Japan-China Summit Telephone Conversation May 09 Japan-China-ROK Summit (Tokyo) May 10 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation May 15 Japan-Samoa Summit (Tokyo) May 16 Japan-Fiji Summit (Tokyo) May 18 Prime Minister Abe attends the 8th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (Fukushima) (through May 19) May 24 Prime Minister Abe visits Russia (through May 26) May 25 Japan-France Summit (St. Petersburg) May 26 Japan-Russia Summit (Moscow) May 28 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Jun. 07 Japan-U.S. Summit (Washington, D.C.) Jun. 08 Prime Minister Abe attends the G7 Summit in Charlevoix (through June 9) Jun. 08 Japan-Germany Summit (Charlevoix) Jun. 08 Japan-U.K. Summit (Charlevoix) Jun. 08 Japan-Italy Summit (Charlevoix) Jun. 08 Japan-Canada Summit (Charlevoix) Jun. 11 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Jun. 12 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Jul. 17 Japan-EU Summit (Tokyo) Aug. 01 Japan-Malta Summit (Tokyo) Aug. 07 Japan-Saint Vincent Summit (Tokyo) Aug. 22 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Sep. 05 Japan-Ecuador Summit (Tokyo) Sep. 10 Japan-Russia Summit (Vladivostok) Sep. 11 Japan-Mongolia Summit (Vladivostok) Sep. 12 Japan-China Summit (Vladivostok) Sep. 24 Japan-Turkey Summit (New York) Sep. 25 Japan-ROK Summit (New York) Sep. 26 Japan-Iran Summit (New York) Sep. 26 Japan-U.S. Summit (New York) Oct. 05 Japan-Tajikistan Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 08 Japan-Vietnam Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 08 Japan-Cambodia Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 08 Japan-Laos Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 08 Japan-Thailand Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 09 10th Japan-Mekong Summit Meeting (Tokyo) Oct. 09 Meeting with State Counsellor of Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi (Tokyo) Oct. 12 Japan-Lithuania Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 16 Japan-Spain Summit (Madrid) Oct. 17 Japan-France Summit (Paris) Oct. 18 12th ASEM Summit (Brussels) (through October 19) Oct. 18 2nd “V4 plus Japan” Summit Meeting (Brussels) Oct. 18 Japan-EU Summit (Brussels) Oct. 18 Japan-Germany Summit (Brussels) Oct. 19 Japan-Italy Summit (Brussels) Oct. 19 Japan-Singapore Summit (Brussels) Oct. 19 Japan-Australia Summit (Brussels) Oct. 26 Japan-China Summit (Beijing) Oct. 29 Japan-India Summit (Tokyo) Nov. 06 Japan-Malaysia Summit (Tokyo) Nov. 09 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Nov. 14 Japan-ASEAN Summit (Singapore) Nov. 14 Japan-Russia Summit (Singapore) Nov. 15 Japan-Singapore Summit (Singapore) Nov. 15 21st ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting (Singapore) Nov. 15 East Asia Summit (Singapore) Nov. 15 Japan-Indonesia Summit (Singapore) Nov. 15 Japan-New Zealand Summit (Singapore) Nov. 15 Japan-Philippines Summit (Singapore) Nov. 16 Japan-Australia Summit (Australia) Nov. 17 Japan-Papua New Guinea Summit (Port Moresby) Nov. 18 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (Port Moresby) Nov 18 Japan Chile Summit (Port Moresby) Jan. 09 North-South High Level Official’s Meeting Jan. 10 A Chinese submerged submarine enters Japan’s contiguous zone near Miyakojima Island and Taisho Island (through January 11) Jan. 11 A Chinese vessel enters Japan’s contiguous zone near Taisho Island Jan. 17 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (reported) Jan. 19 The U.S. National Defense Strategy is released Jan. 29 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea Jan. 29 A Chinese vessel sails Tsushima Strait northward and after advancing to the Sea of Japan temporarily, sails the strait southward Jan. 31 U.S. President Trump delivers the State of the Union address Feb. 02 The United States releases the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Feb. 05 Maldives declares a state of emergency Feb. 08 North Korea conducts a military parade Feb. 09 PyeongChang Olympics (through February 25) Feb. 10 Sri Lanka declares a state of emergency Feb. 14 South African President Zuma resigns Feb. 15 Ethiopian Prime Minister resigns Feb. 15 The United States and other countries denounce Russia for a large scale of damage caused by ransomware “Not Petya” in June 2017 Feb. 16 Ethiopia declares a state of emergency Feb. 23 U.S.-Australia Summit Feb. 26 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through February 28) Feb. 27 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft’s passage of Tsushima Strait Western Channel is confirmed for the first time Mar. 01 Russian President Putin introduces new weapons at the annual presidential address Mar. 05 1st session of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) (through March 20) Mar. 05 ROK special envoys visit North Korea and meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un Mar. 09 PyeongChang Paralympics (through March 18) Mar. 18 President Putin is re-elected as president (4th term) Mar. 18 The Turkish government announces taking control of Afrin, Syria Mar. 23 Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter turn around, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again and fly to the continent. At the same time, two fighter jets (probable) fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island from the East China Sea Mar. 23 Hostage siege in Trèbes, south of France Mar. 23 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (reported) Mar. 25 Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea visits China (through March 28) Mar. 26 China-North Korea Summit Mar. 26 Presidential election in Egypt Apr. 05 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean Apr. 10 An aircraft that appears to be a Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (BZK-005) files over the East China Sea (within Japan’s air defense identification zone) Apr. 12 China conducts a naval review on the South China Sea Apr. 14 The United States, United Kingdom and France conduct military operations against facilities related to chemical weapons in Syria Apr. 18 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and fly toward the Bashi Channel Apr. 19 Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter the two bombers, an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel Apr. 20 North Korea announces a halt to “nuclear test and intercontinental ballistic rocket test-fire” and abolishment of nuclear test sites Apr. 20 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and fly toward the Bashi Channel Apr. 20 A flight of carrier-based fighter jets (probable) of the Chinese aircraft carrier “Liaoning” over the Pacific Ocean is confirmed for the first time Apr. 21 Seven Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advance to the East China Sea Apr. 24 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through April 29) Apr. 26 Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. The two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again to fly toward the continent. The two bombers, an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel Apr. 27 The Inter-Korean Summit, Panmunjom Declaration agreement Apr. 28 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea May 08 China-North Korea Summit May 08 U.S. President Trump announces withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran May 11 Two Chinese bombers and two fighter jets (probable) pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter, the two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again to fly toward the continent. Two bombers fly toward the Bashi Channel. Two bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island from the Pacific Ocean in the direction of the Bashi Channel and move to the East China Sea May 12 Attack occurs near the Paris Opera House in the center of Paris, France May 13 Terror attacks by suicide bombers occur in churches in Subaraya, Indonesia May 13 China conducts the first sea trial of its first domestic aircraft carrier (through May 18) May 18 A Chinese bomber and other aircraft conduct a takeoff and landing training in the South China Sea (pointed out as Woody Island, the Paracel Islands) May 21 The United States releases a new Iran strategy May 25 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island through to the East China Sea May 26 The Inter-Korean Summit May 27 A U.S. naval destroyer and cruiser conduct the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported) Jun. 03 A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean Jun. 04 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and after flying toward the Bashi Channel, it turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again Jun. 04 A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and moves to the East China Sea Jun. 12 U.S.-North Korea Summit Jun. 17 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean Jun. 18 U.S. DoD announces suspension of the Freedom Guardian exercise Jun. 19 Chairman Kim Jong-Un visits China (through June 20) Jun. 19 China-North Korea Summit Jun. 22 U.S. DoD announces suspension of the Korean Marine Exchange Program Jun. 23 A Chinese vessel sails northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea Jun. 24 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through June 29) Jun. 24 Presidential election and general election in Turkey Jun. 27 Permanent ceasefire agreed in South Sudan Jun. 29 A Chinese hospital ship enters Japan’s contiguous zone north of Taisho Island, Senkaku Islands Jun. 29 Relocation of the Headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea from Seoul to Pyeongtaek Jun. 29 U.S. NBC reports that North Korea has increased its production of fuel for nuclear weapons Year Defense 2018 Jan. 09 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Jan. 09 FY2017 Japan-U.S. joint exercise (command post exercise) (through February 3) Jan. 21 Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 18 (through February 23) Jan .15 Japan-Spain Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jan. 26 Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo) Jan. 26 Deployment of the first F-35A at ASDF Misawa Air Base Jan. 27 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jan. 29 Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Sado City, Niigata Prefecture (through February 2) Jan. 30 Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Wajima City, Ishikawa Prefecture (through February 2) Feb. 06 Disaster relief in response to heavy snow in Fukui Prefecture (through February 10) Feb. 14 Cope North 2018 exercise program (through February 21) (Guam) Feb. 15 Disaster relief to help remove snow in Fukui City, Fukui Prefecture (through February 18) Feb. 16 State Minister of Defense Yamamoto attends the Munich Security Conference (through February 18) Feb. 16 Cabinet Decision on revision of the “Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)” Feb. 21 Disaster relief for collection of fuel, etc. in Tohoku Town, Kamikita Country, Aomori Prefecture (through March 7) Feb. 26 Japan-ASEAN HA/DR Invitation Program (Kanto Region) (through March 2) Mar. 26 Transfer of MSDF’s five TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippines completed Mar. 27 22nd Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia- Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) (Tokyo) (through March 28) Mar. 27 Establishment of the Ground Component Command and the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, and first reorganization to rapid deployment divisions/ brigades Apr. 06 Launch of X-band communications satellite “Kirameki1” Apr. 09 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Apr. 09 Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Oda City, Shimane Prefecture (through April 11) Apr. 11 Disaster relief for rescue operations in response to the landslide in Nakatsu City, Oita Prefecture (through April 23) Apr. 20 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.) Apr. 22 Signing of the Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Apr. 29 Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Irabujima, Miyakojima City, Okinawa Prefecture (through May 2) May 04 Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting May 06 Japan-Estonia Defense Ministerial Meeting May 09 Defense authorities of Japan and China sign the Memorandum on the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism May 10 Signing of the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the United Arab Emirates May 10 2nd Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program (Indonesia-Malaysia) (through May 15) May 15 Cabinet Decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy” May 18 Cabinet Decision on revision of the “Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)” May 21 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) May 22 Participation in the Pacific Partnership 2018 (through June 2) May 29 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii) Jun. 02 Defense Minister Onodera attends the 17th Shangri-La Dialogue (hosted by IISS) (through June 3) Jun. 02 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jun. 02 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jun. 02 Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jun. 02 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jun. 02 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jun. 03 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jun. 03 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jun. 03 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jun. 08 Launch of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China Jun. 14 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Jun. 18 Disaster relief in response to Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake (through June 26) Jun. 19 FY2018 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through June 22) Jun. 29 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jul. 06 Disaster relief in response to July 2018 Flooding Disaster (through August18) Jul. 11 Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel in response to July 2018 Flooding Disaster Jul. 11 Disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through July 31) Jul. 13 Signing of the Japan-France Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Jul. 31 Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Moscow) Jul. 31 Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Moscow) Aug. 06 Disaster relief to provide water and food in Tozawa Village, Mogami County, Yamagata Prefecture (through August 8) Aug. 10 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone ----- Year Defense Domestic International |Col1|Aug. 10 Aug. 20 Aug. 21 Sep. 01 Sep. 03 Sep. 06 Sep. 07 Sep. 07 Sep. 09 Sep. 11 Sep. 21 Oct. 02 Oct. 03 Oct. 10 Oct. 10 Oct. 13 Oct. 14 Oct. 19 Oct. 19 Oct. 19 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 24 Oct. 29 Dec. 06 Dec. 11 Dec. 20 Dec. 25 Dec. 26 Dec. 28|Disaster relief to search for missing aircraft near Mt. Kusatsu-Shirane, Gunma Prefecture (through August 11) Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi) Japan-Sri Lanka Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte) FY2018 Exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas (outside Japan) (through September 9) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Disaster relief in response to the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (through October 14) Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel in response to the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake Disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through September 24) Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum (Nagoya) Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Estonia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Minister of Defense Iwaya came into office International disaster relief activities in response to the earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia (through October 25) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sydney) Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Sydney) FY2018 Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX) Joint Disaster Response Exercise with U.S. Forces (through October 14) Troop review commemorating the SDF anniversary Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting (Singapore) 5th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (Singapore) Disaster relief to provide water supply support in Suo-oshima Town, Yamaguchi Prefecture (through November 7) Keen Sword19/30FTX (through November 8) Disaster relief for search and rescue of U.S. aircraft crew off the coast of Shikoku (through December 11) FY2018 Exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas (in Japan) (through December 14) Incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft occurs First disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Seki City, Gifu Prefecture (through December 27) 1st annual and experts’ meeting of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China (Beijing) Footage of the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft released|Nov. 19 Nov. 27 Nov. 30 Nov. 30 Nov. 30 Nov. 30 Nov. 30 Nov. 30 Dec. 01 Dec. 01 Dec. 01 Dec. 01 Dec. 02 Dec. 02 Dec. 05 Dec. 11 Dec. 13 Dec. 18 Dec. 18|Japan-Burkina Faso Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Jordan Summit (Tokyo) G20 Buenos Aires Summit (Buenos Aires) (through December 1) Japan-France Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-U.S. Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-India Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-China Summit (Buenos Aires) Tachikawa Branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement in 9th and 12th Yokota Air Base noise suits Japan-Russia Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-U.K. Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-Turkey Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-EU Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-Uruguay Summit (Montevideo) Japan-Paraguay Summit (Asuncion) Fukuoka High Court renders judgement on a demand for an injunctive order for actions that crush the reef, etc. (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project) Japan-Ghana Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Mongolia Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Zambia Summit (Tokyo) National Security Council and Cabinet Decisions on “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond,” and “Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023)”|Jul. 01 Jul. 07 Jul. 10 Jul. 12 Jul. 23 Jul. 27 Jul. 27 Aug. 03 Aug. 06 Aug. 08 Aug. 14 Aug. 28 Aug. 29 Aug. 29 Sep. 01 Sep. 01 Sep. 06 Sep. 09 Sep. 11 Sep. 12 Sep. 14 Sep. 18 Sep. 18 Sep. 18 Sep. 18 Sep. 19 Sep. 20 Sep. 24 Sep. 30 Sep. 30 Oct. 02 Oct. 02 Oct. 02 Oct. 04 Oct. 19 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 22 Oct. 22 Oct. 25 Oct. 25 Oct. 28 Oct. 29 Nov. 11 Nov. 17 Nov. 24 Nov. 25 Nov. 26 Nov. 26 Nov. 28 Dec. 01 Dec. 05 Dec. 06 Dec. 07 Dec. 08 Dec. 11 Dec. 12 Dec. 14 Dec. 14 Dec. 27 Dec. 27|China Coast Guard is integrated into the People’s Armed Police Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait ROK Government announces suspension of its independent “Ulchi exercise” in the summer of 2018, followed by suspension of U.S.-ROK joint exercises NATO Summit Brussels 2018 “38 North,” a website dedicated to analysis of North Korea, announces the start of dismantlement of the main facility on the satellite launch site in Dongchang-ri *The report on August 22 announces that no new dismantlement activity has been apparent since August 3 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan China announces a successful launch test of its new model of a hypersonic projectile Three Chinese vessels sail westbound from the Osumi Strait to the East China Sea Three Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean A car attack occurs in London, U.K. A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through August 29) A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again 14 Russian vessels sail through the Soya Strait and move to the Sea of Okhotsk (through August 30) Two Russian patrol aircraft fly and circle around Japan 28 Russian vessels sail through the Soya Strait and moved to the Sea of Japan (through September 2) U.S.-India Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) North Korea stages a military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of its foundation as a nation in Pyongyang, without ICBM or other ballistic missiles Russia starts the exercise phase of a large scale military exercise “Vostok 2018” (through September 17) Government of South Sudan and relevant parties including anti-government forces sign the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict Inter-Korean Liaison Office opens (Kaesong) U.S. DoD releases its Cyber Strategy President of the ROK Moon Jae-in visits North Korea (through September 20) The Inter-Korean Summit (through September 19) Syrian Army accidentally shoots down a Russian aircraft Three Russian aircraft, including a fighter, make a long-distance flight over the Sea of Japan (an Su-35 fighter is confirmed through scramble for the first time) U.S. DoD designates the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission of China as a subject to sanctions U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$330 million) A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of Gaven Reefs and Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands (reported) A Chinese naval destroyer approaches abnormally close to a U.S. vessel Three Chinese vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea Inauguration of a new government in Iraq A Saudi Arabian journalist dies in the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Turkey U.S. releases National Strategy for Counterterrorism U.S. and ROK Governments announce suspension of the Vigilant Ace exercise, a joint military exercise scheduled for December 2018 President Trump announces an intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty General election in Afghanistan (House of the People) Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait First ASEAN-China maritime exercise (Zhanjiang) (through October 28) Prime Minister Abe visits China (through October 27) Israel-Oman Summit A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through October 29) A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again Ceremony commemorating the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I (Paris) APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (Papua New Guinea) (through November 18) Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen resigns as chairperson of the Democratic Progressive Party after suffering a major defeat in the general election A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through November 26) A U.S. naval cruiser conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported) A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait U.S.-China Summit (Osaka) A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Peter the Great Gulf (reported) Yemen peace talks (through December 13) A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean A Chinese vessel sails westward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. After flying to off the coast of Amami Oshima Island, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. After flying to off the coast of Amami Oshima Island, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea UAE reopens its embassy in Syria A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| 2019 Jan. 11 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brest) Jan. 11 Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Brest) Jan. 14 Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 19 (through February 23) Jan. 17 Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Washington, D.C.) Jan. 21 FY2018 SDF Joint Exercises (command post exercise) (through January 26) Jan. 21 The MOD published its final statement regarding the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft Jan. 23 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jan. 23 Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Tokigawa Town, Hiki County, Saitama Prefecture (through January 25) Jan. 24 Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Tanabe City, Wakayama Prefecture (through January 26) Feb. 05 Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Feb. 05 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Aichi Prefecture, etc. (through February 9) Feb. 14 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture (through February 20) Jan. 08 Japan-Rwanda Summit (Tokyo) Jan. 09 Japan-Netherlands Summit (Rotterdam) Jan. 10 Japan-U.K. Summit (London) Jan. 22 Japan-Russia Summit (Moscow) Jan. 23 Japan-Brazil Summit (Davos) Jan. 29 Japan-Qatar Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 04 Japan-Germany Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 15 Japan-Australia Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 20 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Feb. 28 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Mar. 08 Japan-Palau Summit (Tokyo) Mar. 24 Replacement of government aircraft from B-747 to B-777 Mar. 31 Return of the land at Makiminato Service Area near Gate 5 Apr. 04 Japan-Panama Summit (Tokyo) Apr. 16 Naha Branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 3rd and 5th Futenma Air Station noise suits Apr. 23 Japan-France Summit (Paris) Apr. 24 Japan-Italy Summit (Rome) Apr. 24 Japan-Poland Summit (Bratislava) Apr. 25 Japan-Slovakia Summit (Bratislava) Apr 25 3rd “V4 plus Japan” Summit Meeting (Bratislava) Jan. 01 A U.S. Aegis destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” in the Paracel Islands Jan. 01 Chairman Kim Jong-un expresses his intention to neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them in his “New Year’s Address” in 2019 Jan. 07 Chairman Kim Jong-un visits China (through January 10) Jan. 07 A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles around the Paracel Islands Jan. 15 ROK releases Defense White Paper 2018 Jan. 17 United States releases the Missile Defense Review (MDR) Jan. 24 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait Jan. 24 Three Chinese vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea Feb. 02 U.S. provides Russia with formal notice to withdrawal from the INF Treaty Feb. 11 Two U.S. destroyers conduct the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Mischief Reef Feb. 16 Three Chinese vessels advance to the Sea of Japan (through February 24) Feb. 23 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around and flies to the East China Sea again Feb. 25 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait Feb. 27 2nd U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting (through February 28) Mar. 04 Russia notifies the U.S. of the suspension of Russia’s obligation under the INF Treaty Mar. 15 51 people are killed in a shooting incident in Christchurch, New Zealand Mar. 19 A flight by a Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft within Japan’s air defense identification zone in the East China Sea is confirmed for the first time Mar. 24 General election in Thailand (House of Representatives) Mar 24 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait ----- |Col1|Feb. 19 Feb. 20 Mar. 03 Mar. 08 Mar. 12 Mar. 12 Mar. 25 Mar. 26 Mar. 27 Mar. 28 Apr. 02 Apr. 05 Apr. 09 Apr. 10 Apr. 17 Apr. 17 Apr. 19 Apr. 19 Apr. 23|Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Mizunami City, Gifu Prefecture (through February 21) Air rescue in response to a radar losing track of an F-2 of Tsuiki Air Base Pacific Partnership 2019 (through May 19) ADMM-Plus Medicine Field Training Exercise (MEDEX 2019) (Lucknow) (through March 18) 23rd Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) (Tokyo) (through March 13) Turnover ceremony for the UH-1H parts, etc., grant of a portion of the parts, etc. Japan-Oman Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Establishment of Camp Amami and Camp Miyakojima Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Seto City, Aichi Prefecture (through March 30) Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture (through April 1) Cabinet Decision on the “Implementation Plan for International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Sinai Peninsula” Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Sakuho Town, Nagano Prefecture (through April 7) Air rescue in response to the crash of an F-35A fighter of Misawa Air Base Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Seto City, Aichi Prefecture (through April 13) Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Ena City, Gifu Prefecture (through April 19) Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Washington, D.C.) Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Washington, D.C.) Japan-Bulgaria State Defense Minister-Level Meeting|Apr. 25 Apr. 25 Apr. 26 Apr. 28 Apr. 30|Japan-Czech Summit (Bratislava) Japan-EU Summit (Brussels) Japan-U.S. Summit (Washington, D.C.) Japan-Canada Summit (Ottawa) Taiirei-Seiden-no-gi|Mar. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 30 Mar. 31 Apr. 01 Apr. 02 Apr. 02 Apr. 05 Apr. 05 Apr. 06 Apr. 09 Apr. 15 Apr. 15 Apr. 15 Apr. 17 Apr. 21 Apr. 24 Apr. 26 Apr. 28 Apr. 28 Apr. 29|U.S. President Trump recognizes Israel’s sovereign right over the Golan Heights Three Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft, and two presumed fighter jets fly from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and fly over the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter they turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again Two Chinese military aircraft cross over the “median line” of the Taiwan Strait A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft and two bombers fly from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and fly over the Pacific Ocean, they turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again Three Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait southward and move to the East China Sea Three Chinese vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea Three Chinese vessels sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island temporarily to the Pacific Ocean A Russian patrol aircraft flies from off the coast of Sanin through off the coast of the Noto Peninsula A French vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait General election in Israel A Chinese vessel sails between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island southeastward, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on the same day, the vessel sails between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island northwestward to the East China Sea Four Chinese bombers and an electronic warfare aircraft fly from the Bashi Channel, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and fly to the East China Sea U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$500 million) Presidential election in Indonesia Bomb attacks by Islamic extremists occur simultaneously in Colombo and other places, Sri Lanka Chairman Kim Jong-un visits Russia (through April 26) Five Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait Four Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan China-Russia joint naval exercise “Joint Sea 2019” (Qingdao) (through May 4)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| Year Defense Domestic International Feb. 19 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever Apr. 25 Japan-Czech Summit (Bratislava) Mar. 25 U.S. President Trump recognizes Israel’s sovereign right over the Golan Heights (CSF) outbreak in Mizunami City, Gifu Prefecture Apr. 25 Japan-EU Summit (Brussels) Mar. 28 Three Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean (through February 21) Apr. 26 Japan-U.S. Summit (Washington, D.C.) Mar. 30 Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft, and two presumed fighter jets fly from Feb. 20 Air rescue in response to a radar losing track of an F-of Tsuiki Air Base 2 Apr. 28 Japan-Canada Summit (Ottawa) the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and fly over the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter they turn around, and pass between the main island of Mar. 03 Pacific Partnership 2019 (through May 19) Apr. 30 Taiirei-Seiden-no-gi Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again Mar. 08 ADMM-Plus Medicine Field Training Exercise (MEDEX Mar. 31 Two Chinese military aircraft cross over the “median line” of the Taiwan Strait 2019) (Lucknow) (through March 18) Apr. 01 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft and two bombers fly from the East China Sea. After Mar. 12 23rd Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and fly over the Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) (Tokyo) (through March Ocean, they turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island 13) again Mar. 12 Turnover ceremony for the UH-1H parts, etc., grant of Apr. 02 Three Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait southward and move to the East a portion of the parts, etc. China Sea Mar. 25 Japan-Oman Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Apr. 02 Three Chinese vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Mar. 26 Establishment of Camp Amami and Camp Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea Mar. 27 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Seto City, Aichi Prefecture (through Apr. 05 Three Chinese vessels sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island temporarily to the Pacific Ocean March 30) Apr. 05 A Russian patrol aircraft flies from off the coast of Sanin through off the coast of the Noto Mar. 28 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever Peninsula (CSF) outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture (through Apr. 06 A French vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait April 1) Apr. 09 General election in Israel Apr. 02 Cabinet Decision on the “Implementation Plan for Apr. 15 A Chinese vessel sails between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island southeastward, International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Sinai and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on the same day, the vessel sails Peninsula” between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island northwestward to the East China Sea Apr. 05 Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Sakuho Apr. 15 Four Chinese bombers and an electronic warfare aircraft fly from the Bashi Channel, pass between Town, Nagano Prefecture (through April 7) the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and fly to the East China Sea Apr. 09 Air rescue in response to the crash of an F-35A fighter Apr. 15 U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$500 million) of Misawa Air Base Apr. 17 Presidential election in Indonesia Apr. 10 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever Apr. 21 Bomb attacks by Islamic extremists occur simultaneously in Colombo and other places, Sri Lanka (CSF) outbreak in Seto City, Aichi Prefecture (through April 13) Apr. 24 Chairman Kim Jong-un visits Russia (through April 26) Apr. 17 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Apr. 26 Five Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea Apr. 17 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever Apr. 28 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait (CSF) outbreak in Ena City, Gifu Prefecture (through Apr. 28 Four Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan April 19) Apr. 29 China-Russia joint naval exercise “Joint Sea 2019” (Qingdao) (through May 4) Apr. 19 Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Washington, D.C.) Apr. 19 Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Washington, D.C.) Apr. 23 Japan-Bulgaria State Defense Minister-Level Meeting 2019 May 02 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi) May 01 Kenji-to-Shokei-no-gi May 03 Two Russian patrol aircraft pass the Tsushima Strait from the Sea of Japan, and flies to the East May 17 Cabinet Decision on revision of the “Implementation May 01 Sokui-go-Choken-no-gi China Sea. Thereafter, it passes through the Tsushima Strait again, and flies to the Sea of Japan Plans for the International Peace Cooperation May 06 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation May 04 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)” May 17 Enactment of the revised Act on Prohibition of Flight of UASs around and over Key Facilities May 06 Two U.S. vessels conduct the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within Reefs and Johnson South Reef 12 nautical miles of Gaven May 17 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture. (through May 20) MayMay 2729 Japan-U.S. Summit (Tokyo)Japan-Bangladesh Summit (Tokyo) MayMay 0609 Five Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of JapanNorth Korea launches two ballistic missiles May 18 Disaster relief to rescue stranded residents due to May 30 Japan-Laos Summit (Tokyo) May 11 Three Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean heavy rain in Yakushiima Island, Kagoshima Prefecture May 30 Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Telephone Conversation May 19 Federal election in Australia (through May 20) May 31 Japan-UAE Summit Telephone Conversation May 19 A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of May 19 Disaster relief in response to water supply failure, etc. due to heavy rain in Kuchinoerabujima Island, May 31 Japan-Malaysia Summit (Tokyo) May 22 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan StraitScarborough Shoal in Zhongsha Islands Kagoshima Prefecture (through May 24) May 31 Japan-Cambodia Summit (Tokyo) May 23 Pakistan conducts a test launch of ballistic missiles May 21 FY242019) Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through May Jun.May 3106 Japan-Philippines Summit (Tokyo)Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 10th and May 26 A Chinese vessel sails southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on May 30, the vessel sails northward May 22 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) 11th Yokota Air Base noise suits between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea May 23 Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jun. 10 Japan-Switzerland Summit (Tokyo) May 27 Taiwan conducts a military field exercise “Han Kuang 35” (through May 31) May 27 Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Hinohara Jun. 12 Japan-Iran Summit (Teheran) May 29 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea. After passing between the Village, Tokyo (through May 29) Jun. 14 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flying over the Pacific Ocean, it turns around, May 27 Disaster relief to rescue missing persons due to ship Jun. 25 Japan-UAE Summit Telephone Conversation and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again. In addition, just collision off the coast of Inubosaki, Chiba Prefecture (through May 31) Jun. 26 Japan-France Summit (Tokyo) around the same time, a Chinese electronic warfare aircraft flies over the East China Sea to near the Tsushima Strait May 27 Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Oumu Town, Jun. 27 Japan-EU Summit (Osaka) May 30 Inauguration of 2nd Modi government of India Hokkaido (through June 4) Jun. 27 Japan-India Summit (Osaka) Jun. 01 U.S. DoD releases the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) May 30 Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jun. 27 Japan-Argentina Summit (Osaka) Jun. 07 A U.S Navy ship and a Russian Navy ship sail abnormally close to each other in the Philippine Sea May 30 Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting Jun. 27 Japan-Egypt Summit (Osaka) Jun. 08 Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Okhotsk (2+2) (Tokyo) Jun. 27 Japan-Australia Summit (Osaka) Jun. 08 Two Russian vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to Jun. 01 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting Jun. 27 Japan-China Summit (Osaka) the East China Sea (Singapore) Jun. 28 G20 Osaka Summit chaired by Prime Minister Abe Jun. 10 Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” sail southward between the main Jun. 01 Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) (through June 29) island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean Jun. 01 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting Jun. 28 Japan-U.S. Summit (Osaka) Jun. 12 Three Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait (Singapore) Jun. 28 Japan-U.S.-India Summit (Osaka) Jun. 13 Commercial vessels, including one related to Japan, are suffered near the Straits of Hormuz Jun. 01 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting Jun. 28 Japan-Germany Summit (Osaka) Jun. 14 China Coast Guard vessels sail in the Japanese contiguous zone around Senkaku Islands for the (Singapore) Jun. 28 Japan-U.K. Summit (Osaka) longest-ever period of 64 consecutive days Jun. 03 Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jun. 28 Japan-Thailand Summit (Osaka) Jun. 16 A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island Jun. 04 Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Tokyo) Jun. 29 Japan-South Africa Summit (Osaka) Jun. 16 to the East China SeaA Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea. After passing between the Jun. 05 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever Jun. 29 Japan-Brazil Summit (Osaka) main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flying over the Pacific Ocean, it turns around, (CSF) outbreak in Yamagata City, Gifu Prefecture, etc. Jun. 29 Japan-Russia Summit (Osaka) and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again (through June 8) Jun. 30 Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit (Osaka) Jun. 18 Two Canadian vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait Jun. 17 Establishment of Aegis Ashore Introduction Promotion Jul. 23 Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Telephone Conversation Jun. 20 Two Russian bombers fly around Japan, and intrude into Japan’s territorial airspace twice when Headquarters Jul. 23 Ministerial meeting on the TICAD7 (Tokyo) flying northward over the Pacific Ocean Jun. Jun.2125 Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Kitagawa Village, Aki County, Kochi Prefecture (through June Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation 22) Aug.Aug. 0224 November Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone ConversationG7 Summit 262019) in Biarritz (France) (through Jun.20Jun.-2120 Iran shoots down a U.S. drone over the Straits of HormuzPresident Xi Jinping visits North Korea (the first visit to North Korea by a Chinese president since the last visit by then President Hu Jintao for the first time in about 11 years since his last visit in 14 years earlier in 20082005 as Vice President). President Xi visits North Korea Jun. 26 Effectuation of the Japan-France Acquisition and Aug. 24 Japan-Germany Summit (Biarritz) Jun. 21 Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait Cross- Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Aug. 24 Japan-Canada Summit (Biarritz) Jun. 23 ASEAN Summit Meeting adopts “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP) Jun. 29 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Nishio City, Aichi Prefecture (through Aug.Aug. 2424 Japan-France Summit (Biarritz)Japan-U.S. Summit (Biarritz) Jun. 23 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait July 2) Aug. 24 Japan-Canada Summit (Biarritz) Jun. 30 Leaders of U.S. and North Korea meet at Panmunjom Jul. 03 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Ena City, Gifu Prefecture (through Aug. 25 Japan-U.S. Summit (Biarritz) Jul.Jul. 0102 14China conducts the first test launch of anti-ship ballistic missiles in the South China Sea from sailors were killed in a fire on a Russian submarine July 5) Aug. 25 Japan-Chile Summit (Biarritz) June through July (reported) Jul. 18 Effectuation of the Japan-Canada Acquisition and Aug. 26 Japan-U.K. Summit (Biarritz) Jul. 06 Two Chinese vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait Cross- Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Aug. 28 7th Tokyo International Conference on African Jul. 08 U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$2.2 billion) Jul. 24 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Inabe City, Mie Prefecture (through Aug. 28 Development (TICADJapan-Egypt Summit (Biarritz)7) (through August 30) Jul. 12 U.S. Force announces the outline of the National Military Strategy July 5) Aug. 28 Japan-South Africa Summit (Yokohama) Jul. 15 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait Jul. 25 Revision of the Guidelines Regarding Off-Base U.S. Military Aircraft Accidents in Japan Aug. 28 Japan-Algeria Summit (Yokohama) Jul. 22 A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on July 23, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East Aug. 07 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Aug. 28 Japan-Kenya Summit (Yokohama) China Sea Aug. 28 Japan-Mali Summit (Yokohama) Jul. 23 Two Chinese bombers and two Russian bombers pass through the Tsushima Strait and fly Aug. 28 Disaster relief in response to the flooding caused by heavy rain accompanying a front in August 2019 Aug. 28 Japan-Guinea Summit (Yokohama) southward over the East China Sea. Thereafter, the two Chinese bombers fly northwestward to the continent, while the two Russian bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and (through October 7) Aug. 28 Japan-Togo Summit (Yokohama) Miyakojima Island and fly over the Pacific Ocean. After turning around, the Russian bombers pass Sep. 02 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Aug. 29 Japan-Uganda Summit (Yokohama) between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again, fly northward over the East Sep. 10 Disaster relief in response to the 2019 Boso Peninsula Aug. 29 Japan-Mauritania Summit (Yokohama) China Sea, and pass through the Tsushima Strait again. In addition, an early warning and control Sep. 17 Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) (through October Disaster relief to search for a missing fishing boat eastern offshore of Cape Noshappu, Hokkaido7) Aug.Aug. 2929 Japan-Burkina Faso Summit (Yokohama)Japan-Ethiopia Summit (Yokohama) Jul. 24 aircraft A-airspace over Takeshima IslandA U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait50 that reportedly supports the Russian bombers intrudes into Japan’s territorial Sep. 21 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever Aug. 29 Japan-Djibouti Summit (Yokohama) Jul. 24 China releases the 10th Defense White Paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (for the (CSF) outbreak in Ena City, Gifu Prefecture (through Aug. 29 Japan-Uganda Summit (Yokohama) first time in about four years) September 24) Aug. 29 Japan-Angola Summit (Yokohama) Jul. 25 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait Sep. 21 Disaster relief to search for a missing person in Doshi Aug. 29 Japan-Guinea-Bissau Summit (Yokohama) Jul. 25 Four Chinese vessels sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island Village, Minamitsuru County, Yamanashi Prefecture Aug. 29 Japan-Cabo Verde Summit (Yokohama) to the Pacific Ocean Sep. 23 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Aug. 29 Japan-Rwanda Summit (Yokohama) Jul. 25 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Conversation Aug. 29 Japan-Mauritius Summit (Yokohama) Jul. 27 Two Chinese vessels sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to Sep. 25 Japan-U.S. Summit (New York) the Pacific Ocean Aug 29 Japan Central African Republic Summit (Yokohama) ----- Year Defense Domestic International Oct. 01 Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Aug. 29 Japan-Namibia Summit (Yokohama) Aug. 01 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait Oct. 03 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Aug. 29 Japan-Senegal Summit (Yokohama) Aug. 01 Six Chinese vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to Conversation Aug. 29 Japan-Niger Summit (Yokohama) the East China Sea Oct. 03 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Aug. 29 Japan-Sierra Leone Summit (Yokohama) Aug. 02 Russian Prime Minister Medvedev visits Etorofu Island Conversation Aug. 29 Japan-Sao Tome and Principe Summit (Yokohama) Aug. 02 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles (probable) Oct.Oct. 0309 Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Telephone ConversationJapan-Laos State Defense Minister-Level Meeting (Tokyo) Aug.Aug.Aug. 293030 Japan-Nigeria Summit (Yokohama)Japan-Zimbabwe Summit (Yokohama)Japan-Liberia Summit (Yokohama) Aug.Aug.Aug. 020608 Termination of the INF TreatyNorth Korea launches two ballistic missilesA Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait Oct. 09 Signing of the Memorandum between the Ministry of Aug. 30 Japan-Benin Summit (Yokohama) Aug. 08 Two Russian patrol aircraft pass the Tsushima Strait from the Sea of Japan, and fly to the East Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defence Aug. 30 Japan-Democratic Republic of the Congo Summit China Sea of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic on (Yokohama) Aug. 08 Several people including personnel of the Russian Ministry of Defence and a national Oct. 12 Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) (through November Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of DefenceDisaster relief in response to the 2019 East Japan 30) Aug.Aug. 3030 Japan-Zambia Summit (Yokohama)Japan-Madagascar Summit (Yokohama) Aug. 10 nuclear-related company are killed due to an explosion accompanying radiation leakage at a military facility near Arkhangelsk, northern RussiaNorth Korea launches two ballistic missiles Oct. 14 Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up orders for Aug. 31 Japan-Seychelles Summit (Tokyo) Aug. 15 Three Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel in Aug. 31 Japan-Eswatini Summit (Tokyo) Aug. 16 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Oct. 14 Hagibis)response to the Disaster relief call-up orders for Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel are issued (through 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Aug.Aug.Aug. 313131 Japan-Comoros Summit (Tokyo)Japan-Cote d’Ivoire Summit (Tokyo)Japan-Lesotho Summit (Tokyo) Aug.Aug.Aug. 161820 UN Security Council holds a closed-door on KashmirTwo Chinese vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima StraitU.S. Government notifies Congress of the sale of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$8 billion) November 9) Aug. 31 Japan-Tanzania Summit (Tokyo) Aug. 22 Two Chinese vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait Oct. 16 Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Telephone Aug. 31 Japan-Somalia Summit (Tokyo) Aug. 23 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait Conversation Aug. 31 Japan-Ghana Summit (Tokyo) Aug. 24 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Oct. 24 Telephone Conversation between Defense Minister Kono and Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force Sep.Sep. 0505 Japan-India Summit (Vladivostok)Japan-Mongolia Summit (Vladivostok) Aug.Aug. 2528 Seven Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya StraitA U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Oct. 24 Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Sep. 05 Japan-Russia Summit (Vladivostok) Cross Reef and Mischief Reef, the Spratly Islands Oct. 25 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Sep. 11 Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 5th Kadena Air Base noise suit Aug.Aug. 2929 A U.S military aircraft fly over the Taiwan StraitThe United States founds the Space Command as the 11th unified combatant command Oct. 28 Japan-Oman Defense Ministerial Telephone Sep. 13 Japan-Kosovo Summit (Tokyo) Sep. 02 First ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise (AUMX) (through September 6) Conversation Sep. 18 Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Conversation Sep. 05 A U.K. vessel sails around the Paracel Islands Oct. 29 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Sep. 19 Japan-New Zealand Summit (Tokyo) Sep. 07 U.S. President announces cancellation of peace talks with the Taliban Conversation Sep. 23 Attends the 74th Session of the United Nations Sep. 10 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Oct. 29 Japan-Denmark Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation General Assembly (New York) (through September26) Sep. 10 A Canadian vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait Nov. 08 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Telephone Sep. 23 Japan-Jordan Summit (New York) Sep. 11 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait Conversation Sep. 24 Japan-Iran Summit (New York) Sep. 11 Taiwan releases the 15th National Defense Report (for the first time in two years) Nov. 12 Cabinet Decision on Revision of the Implementation Sep. 25 Japan-U.S. Summit (New York) Sep. 13 A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” in the waters near the Paracel Plan for the International Peace Cooperation Assignments in Sinai Peninsula Sep. 25 Japan-EU Summit (New York) Sep. 14 IslandsAn oil facility in Saudi Arabia is attacked Nov. 12 Cabinet Decision on continuation of counter-piracy Sep. 25 Japan-EU Summit (Brussel) Sep. 16 SCO member countries including China participate in a large military exercise held in the Central mission Oct. 02 Japan-Samoa Summit (Tokyo) Military District in Russia (through September 21) Nov. 16 6th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus and 5th Oct. 17 Japan-Jordan Summit Telephone Conversation Sep. 16 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait Nov. 17 ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting (Thailand) (through November Announcement of “Vientiane Vision 18) 2.0” Oct.Oct. 2121 Japan-Maldives Summit (Tokyo)Meeting between Prime Minister Abe and State Counsellor of Myanmar (Tokyo) Sep.Sep. 1716 2“Tsentr nd General election in Israel2019,” a strategic command post exercise by Russia (through September 21) Nov. 17 Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok) Oct. 21 Japan-Palestine Summit (Tokyo) Sep. 17 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait Sep. 20 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait Nov. 17 Signing of the Memorandum of Arrangement between Oct. 21 Japan-Nepal Summit (Tokyo) the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Thailand on Cooperation Oct. 21 Japan-Slovakia Summit (Tokyo) Sep. 21 Solomon Islands establishes diplomatic relations with China (and severs its diplomatic relations with Taiwan [September 16]) and Exchanges ㏌ the Field of Defense Oct. 21 Japan-Serbia Summit (Tokyo) Sep. 26 A U.S military aircraft flies over the Taiwan Strait Nov. 17 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok) Oct. 21 Japan-Finland Summit (Tokyo) Sep. 27 Kiribati establishes diplomatic relations with China (and severs its diplomatic relations with Taiwan Nov. 17 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok) Oct. 21 Japan-Micronesia Summit (Tokyo) [September 20]) Nov. 17 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bankok) Oct. 21 Japan-Palau Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 01 China conducts a military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of its founding Oct. 21 Japan-Mongolia Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 01 Three Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait Nov. 17 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok) Oct. 21 Japan-Romania Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 02 North Korea launches an SLBM (fell into Japan’s exclusive economic zone [EEZ]) Nov. 17 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting Oct. 21 Japan-Ukraine Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 07 Three Russian vessels sail southwestward from the Tsushima Strait (Bangkok) Oct. 21 Japan-Kosovo Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 09 Turkey begins military operations in northern Syria Nov. 17 Japan-Myanmar Defense Ministerial Meeting Oct. 21 Japan-Lesotho Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 14 Russian Eastern Military District announces that it started a large military exercise in the Sakhalin (Bangkok) Oct. 21 Japan-Eswatini Summit (Tokyo) and Primorsky regions involving up to 8,000 personnel Nov.Nov. 1718 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok) Oct.Oct. 2121 Japan-Niger Summit (Tokyo)Japan-Cote d’Ivoire Summit (Tokyo) Oct.Oct. 2215 Two Russian bombers pass the Tsushima Strait from the Sea of Japan, and fly to the East China SeaGrom-2019, a Russian strategic nuclear forces exercise (through October 17) Nov. 18 Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting Oct. 22 Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi Oct. 25 Two Chinese vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait (Bangkok) Oct. 23 Japan-Slovenia Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 27 Two Russian bombers fly from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea Nov. 20 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Oct. 23 Japan-Singapore Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 27 Three Chinese vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island Nov. 20 2019 Japan-Australia Defence Ministers Kono/ Oct. 23 Japan-Pakistan Summit (Tokyo) to the East China Sea Reynolds Joint Statement on Advancing Defence Oct. 23 Japan-Thailand Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 29 Two Chinese vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait Cooperation Oct. 23 Japan-Afghanistan Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 29 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to Nov. 21 International disaster relief activities for heavy rains Oct. 23 Japan-Nauru Summit (Tokyo) reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around and flies to the East China Sea again and floods in the Republic of Djibouti (Djibouti) (through November 23) Oct. 23 Japan-Marshall Islands Summit (Tokyo) Oct. 31 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Nov. 23 15th IISS Regional Security Summit (Manama Oct. 23 Japan-Brazil Summit (Tokyo) Nov. 09 The command center of the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) opens in Bahrain Dialogue) (Bahrain) (through November 24) Oct. 23 Japan-Kyrgyz Summit (Tokyo) Nov. 12 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait Nov. 23 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bahrain) Oct. 23 Japan-Turkmenistan Summit (Tokyo) Nov. 17 A Chinese indigenous aircraft carrier transits through the Taiwan Strait for the first time Nov. 23 Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and Oct. 23 Japan-Kazakhstan Summit (Tokyo) Nov. 17 The United States and the ROK announce the postponement of a U.S.-ROK air exercise as an act Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force Oct. 23 Japan-Germany Summit (Tokyo) of goodwill to contribute to an environment conducive to diplomacy and the advancement of peace Nov. 27 (Bahrain)Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Oct.Oct. 2323 Japan-Montenegro Summit (Tokyo)Japan-Slovenia Summit (Tokyo) Nov.Nov. 2021 A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel IslandsReef, the Spratly Islands 12 nautical miles of Mischief Nov. 30 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi) Oct. 24 Meeting between Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister of the ROK (Tokyo) Nov. 27 Two Russian bombers fly from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea Nov. 30 Japan-India Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting Oct. 24 Japan-Armenia Summit (Tokyo) Nov. 27 Four Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Dec. 02 (through December (NATO cyber defense exercise Cyber Coalition 2+2) (Delhi) 6) 2019 Oct.Oct. 2424 Japan-Guatemala Summit (Tokyo)Japan-Albania Summit (Tokyo) Nov.Nov. 2828 North Korea launches two ballistic missilesA Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on November 29, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to Dec. 03 Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Oct. 24 Japan-Georgia Summit (Tokyo) the East China Sea Dec. 14 19th Doha Forum (Doha) Oct. 24 Japan-Panama Summit (Tokyo) Nov. 29 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to Dec. 14 Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Doha) Oct. 24 Japan-Bulgaria Summit (Tokyo) reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter, it turns around and flies to the East China Sea again Dec. 14 Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Doha) Oct.Oct. 2425 Japan-Czech Summit (Tokyo)Hiroshima High Court renders judgment in 1st, 2nd Dec.Dec. 0407 A Japanese doctor is killed in eastern Afghanistan by unidentified gunmenA U.K. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait Dec. 15 Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Jordan (Amman) Nov. 01 and Japan-Chile Summit Telephone Conversation3rd Iwakuni Air Base noise suits Dec. 08 North Korea announces that it conducted a “crucial test” at Sohae satellite launching station (Tongch’ang-ri ) on December 7 Dec. 18 Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Beijing) Nov. 03 ASEAN-related Summit Meetings (Bangkok) (through Dec. 10 Vietnam releases the 2019 National Defence White Paper November 5) Dec. 12 U.S. DoD announces that it conducted a flight test of a prototype of a conventionally-configured Dec. 19 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Nov. 04 Japan-Thailand Summit (Bangkok) ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of more than 500 km Dec. 20 Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Nov. 04 22Meeting (Bangkok)nd ASEAN Plus Three (Japan-China-ROK) Summit Dec. 14 North Korea announces that it conducted a “crucial test” at Sohae satellite launching station (Tongch’ang-ri ) on December 13 Dec. 21 Disaster relief to search for a fishing boat near Mikurajima Island (Izu Islands) Nov. 04 Japan-China Summit (Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China) (Bangkok) Dec. 16 Four Chinese vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea Dec.Dec.Dec. 252627 Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Telephone ConversationJapan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone ConversationCabinet Decision on the Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Nov.Nov.Nov.Nov.Nov. 0404040404 Japan-India Summit (Bangkok)Japan-Singapore Summit (Bangkok)14Japan-Philippines Summit (Bangkok)22th East Asia Summit (EAS) (Bangkok)nd Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting (Bangkok) Dec.Dec.Dec.Dec. 16172024 Three Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima StraitChina’s first indigenous aircraft carrier was named “Shandong” and commissioned in Sanya of Hainan IslandThe United States establishes the Space Force as the sixth branch of the militaryA Russian Su-57 5th generation fighter crashes during a test flight Middle East Nov. 04 3rd RCEP Summit (Bangkok) Dec. 26 Chinese aircraft carrier “Shandong” transits the Taiwan Strait Dec.Dec. 2829 Japan-Djibouti Defense Ministerial Meeting (Djibouti)Japan-Oman Defense Ministerial Meeting (Muscat) Nov.Nov. 0404 Japan-Indonesia Summit (Bangkok)Japan-Vietnam Summit (Bangkok) Dec. 26 the East China SeaA Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on December 27, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to Nov. 04 11th Japan-Mekong Summit Meeting (Bangkok) Dec. 27 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to Nov. 10 Shukuga-onretsu-no-gi reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around and flies to the East China Sea again Nov. 12 Attends Reception for Celebrating 25 Years of Dec. North Korea holds the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP Diplomatic Relations with Japan (Tokyo) 28-31 Nov. 14 Japan-Micronesia Summit (Tokyo) Dec. 30 Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodges a diplomatic protest over the illegal operation by Nov. 25 Meeting with His Holiness Pope Francis (Tokyo) Chinese fishing fleet escorted by China’s Coast Guard in Indonesia’s EEZ around the Natuna Nov. 29 Japan-El Salvador Summit (Tokyo) Islands Dec. 02 Japan-EU Summit Telephone Conversation Dec. 06 Japan-Hungary Summit (Tokyo) ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||Dec. 12 Dec. 19 Dec. 20 Dec. 21 Dec. 21 Dec. 23 Dec. 24 Dec. 24|Japan-Jamaica Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Uzbekistan Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Iran Summit (Tokyo) Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Conversation Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Japan-China Summit (China) 8th Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit (Chengdu) (through December 25) Japan-ROK Summit (Chengdu)||| |2020|Jan. 07 Jan. 08 Jan. 09 Jan. 09 Jan. 14 Jan. 15 Jan. 20 Jan. 26 Jan. 31 Feb. 02 Feb. 13 Feb. 13 Feb. 15 Feb. 15 Feb. 15 Feb. 15 Feb. 15 Feb. 15 Feb. 15 Feb. 18 Mar. 01 Mar. 02 Mar. 28 Apr. 17 Apr. 24 Apr. 24 Apr. 28 May 01 May 07 May 08 May 12 May 15 May 19 May 19 May 19 May 20 Jun. 01 Jun. 09 Jun. 16|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Uruma City and Okinawa City, Okinawa Prefecture (through January 20) Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.) International disaster relief activities in Australia (Australia) (through February 8) 2nd annual and experts’ meetings of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China (Tokyo) Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 20 (through March 9) Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of COVID-19 (through March 16) Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Okinawa City, Okinawa Prefecture (through February 4) Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up orders for Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel for prevention of the spread of COVID-19 Disaster relief call-up order for Reserve Personnel is issued (through March 16) 56th Munich Security Conference (Munich) Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich) Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich) Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich) Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich) Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and High Representative of EU Borrell (Munich) Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg (Munich) Disaster relief to search for persons in distress in Mt. Asahi, Hokkaido (through February 21) Disaster relief to search for and rescue crew members of a cargo ship sunk off the coast of Shimokita, Aomori Prefecture (through March 3) Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Disaster relief for reinforcement of border control against COVID-19 (through May 31) Japan-France Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference Japan-PNG Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation|Jan. 07 Jan. 11 Jan. 12 Jan. 13 Jan. 14 Jan. 21 Jan. 23 Feb. 10 Mar. 12 Mar. 13 Mar. 15|Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Conversation Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Conversation Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit (Riyadh) Japan-UAE Summit (Abu Dhabi) Japan-Oman Summit (Muscat) Japan-Poland Summit (Tokyo) Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 9th and 12th Yokota Air Base noise suits Japan-Estonia Summit (Tokyo) Kanazawa District Court renders judgment in the 5th and 6th Komatsu Air Base noise suits Japan-France Summit Telephone Conversation Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Conversation|Jan. 03 Jan. 08 Jan. 09 Jan. 11 Jan. 15 Jan. 16 Jan. 20 Jan. 21 Jan. 25 Jan. 31 Feb. 04 Feb. 06 Feb. 09 Feb. 10 Feb. 11 Feb. 12 Feb. 12 Feb. 15 Feb. 21 Feb. 27 Feb. 27 Feb. 29 Mar. 02 Mar. 09 Mar. 10 Mar. 18 Mar. 21 Mar. 24 Mar. 24 Mar. 25 Mar. 25 Mar. 26 Mar. 26 Mar. 29 Apr. 10 Apr. 10 Apr. 15 Apr. 18 Apr. 23 Apr. 28 Apr. 28 Apr. 29 Apr. 29 May 05 May 09 May 14 May 24 May 28 May 29|The U.S. military kills Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Islamic Revolu Guard Corps Iranian military forces shoot down a Ukrainian plane Iran carries out a ballistic missile attack on Iraqi bases hosting U.S. troops The Taiwanese presidential election is held, and incumbent President Tsai of the Democr Progressive Party is reelected Russian Prime Minister announces the resignation of the Cabinet A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait Malaysia releases its first defense white paper A new Russian Cabinet is launched A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around Fiery Cross Reef, Islands U.K. departs from the EU U.S. DoD announces the deployment of the low-yield nuclear warhead to be carried by S The United States announces the death of the leader of AQAP Four Chinese bombers fly from the Bashi Channel, pass between the main island of Okin Miyakojima Island, and fly to the East China Sea A Chinese military aircraft crosses over the “median line” of the Taiwan Strait The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines notifies the United States of the term the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) Two Russian vessels sail southwestward from the Tsushima Strait A U.S military aircraft flies over the Taiwan Strait A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait Parliamentary elections in Iran Two Russian fighter-bombers fly within Japan’s air defense identification zone in the Se Okhotsk (Su-34 fighter-bomber is confirmed through scramble for the first time) The United States and the ROK announce the postponement of U.S.-ROK joint exercises the spread of the novel coronavirus outbreak The United States signs a peace agreement with the Taliban North Korea launches two ballistic missiles North Korea launches two ballistic missiles A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel Island Four Chinese vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojim to the East China Sea North Korea launches two ballistic missiles A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of temporarily. However, on March 25, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strai East China Sea Two Russian bombers pass the Sea of Okhotsk from the Sea of Japan to reach the Pacif At the same time two fighters and two Russian aircraft (presumed) fly over the Sea of Ja A Chinese aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea Thereafter it turns around and flies to the East China Sea again A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait 18 Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait Two Russian vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” sail southward between the island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait The U.S. the Space Command announces that Russia conducted a launch test of a groun launched anti-satellite missile China announces establishment of the Xisha District and the Nansha District under the S City of Hainan Province A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” sail northward between the island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel Island A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Spratly Island Three Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miy Island to the Pacific Ocean Standoff between Chinese and Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) (bord Ladakh, India) Standoff between Chinese and Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) (bord Sikkim, India) A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait North Korea announces that it will hold the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Com the KWP A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel Island Three Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miy Island to the Pacific Ocean| Year Defense Domestic International Dec. 12 Japan-Jamaica Summit (Tokyo) Dec. 19 Japan-Uzbekistan Summit (Tokyo) Dec. 20 Japan-Iran Summit (Tokyo) Dec. 21 Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Conversation Dec. 21 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Conversation Dec. 23 Japan-China Summit (China) Dec. 24 8th Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit (Chengdu) (through December 25) Dec. 24 Japan-ROK Summit (Chengdu) 2020 Jan. 07 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Jan. 07 Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Conversation Jan. 03 The U.S. military kills Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Islamic Revolutionary Conversation Jan. 11 Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Conversation Guard Corps Jan. 08 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever Jan. 12 Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit (Riyadh) Jan. 08 Iranian military forces shoot down a Ukrainian plane (CSF) outbreak in Uruma City and Okinawa City, Okinawa Prefecture (through January 20) Jan. 13 Japan-UAE Summit (Abu Dhabi) Jan. 09 Iran carries out a ballistic missile attack on Iraqi bases hosting U.S. troops Jan. 09 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Jan. 14 Japan-Oman Summit (Muscat) Jan. 11 The Taiwanese presidential election is held, and incumbent President Tsai of the Democratic Progressive Party is reelected Conversation Jan. 21 Japan-Poland Summit (Tokyo) Jan. 15 Russian Prime Minister announces the resignation of the Cabinet Jan.Jan. 0914 Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Telephone ConversationJapan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.) Jan.Feb. 1023 Yokota Air Base noise suitsTokyo High Court renders judgement in Japan-Estonia Summit (Tokyo) 9th and 12th Jan.Jan. 1620 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan StraitMalaysia releases its first defense white paper Jan. 15 International disaster relief activities in Australia Mar. 12 Kanazawa District Court renders judgment in the 5th Jan. 21 A new Russian Cabinet is launched (Australia) (through February 8) and 6th Komatsu Air Base noise suits Jan. 25 A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around Fiery Cross Reef, the Spratly Jan. 20 2nd annual and experts’ meetings of the Maritime and Mar. 13 Japan-France Summit Telephone Conversation Islands Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Mar. 15 Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Conversation Jan. 31 U.K. departs from the EU Defense Authorities of Japan and China (Tokyo) Feb. 04 U.S. DoD announces the deployment of the low-yield nuclear warhead to be carried by SLBMs Jan. 26 Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 20 (through March 9) Feb. 06 The United States announces the death of the leader of AQAP Jan. 31 Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of Feb. 09 Four Chinese bombers fly from the Bashi Channel, pass between the main island of Okinawa and COVID-19 (through March 16) Miyakojima Island, and fly to the East China Sea Feb. 02 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever Feb. 10 A Chinese military aircraft crosses over the “median line” of the Taiwan Strait (CSF) outbreak in Okinawa City, Okinawa Prefecture (through February 4) Feb. 11 The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines notifies the United States of the termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) Feb. 13 Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up orders for Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel for Feb. 12 Two Russian vessels sail southwestward from the Tsushima Strait prevention of the spread of COVID-19 Feb. 12 A U.S military aircraft flies over the Taiwan Strait Feb. 13 Disaster relief call-up order for Reserve Personnel is Feb. 15 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait issued (through March 16) Feb. 21 Parliamentary elections in Iran Feb. 15 56th Munich Security Conference (Munich) Feb. 27 Two Russian fighter-bombers fly within Japan’s air defense identification zone in the Sea of Feb. 15 Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich) Okhotsk (Su-34 fighter-bomber is confirmed through scramble for the first time) Feb. 15 Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich) Feb. 27 The United States and the ROK announce the postponement of U.S.-ROK joint exercises to curb the spread of the novel coronavirus outbreak Feb. 15 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich) Feb. 29 The United States signs a peace agreement with the Taliban Feb. 15 Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich) Mar. 02 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Feb. 15 Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and High Mar. 09 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Representative of EU Borrell (Munich) Mar. 10 A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel Islands Feb. 15 Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg (Munich) Mar. 18 Four Chinese vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea Feb. 18 Disaster relief to search for persons in distress in Mt. Asahi, Hokkaido (through February 21) Mar. 21 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Mar. 01 Disaster relief to search for and rescue crew members Mar. 24 A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan of a cargo ship sunk off the coast of Shimokita, Aomori temporarily. However, on March 25, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Prefecture (through March 3) East China Sea Mar. 02 Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Mar. 24 Two Russian bombers pass the Sea of Okhotsk from the Sea of Japan to reach the Pacific Ocean. At the same time two fighters and two Russian aircraft (presumed) fly over the Sea of Japan Mar. 28 Disaster relief for reinforcement of border control against COVID-19 (through May 31) Mar. 25 A Chinese aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around and flies to the East China Sea again Apr. 17 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Mar. 25 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait Apr. 24 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Mar. 26 18 Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait Conversation Mar. 26 Two Russian vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait Apr. 24 Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Telephone Mar. 29 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Conversation Apr. 10 Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” sail southward between the main Apr. 28 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Telephone island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean Conversation Apr. 10 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait May 01 Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Telephone Apr. 15 The U.S. the Space Command announces that Russia conducted a launch test of a groundConversation launched anti-satellite missile May 07 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Apr. 18 China announces establishment of the Xisha District and the Nansha District under the Sansha Conversation City of Hainan Province May 08 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Apr. 23 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait Conversation Apr. 28 Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” sail northward between the main May 12 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Telephone island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea Conversation Apr. 28 A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel Islands May 15 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation Apr. 29 A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Spratly Islands May 19 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference Apr. 29 Three Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean May 19 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation May 05 Standoff between Chinese and Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) (border of Ladakh, India) May 19 Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation May 09 Standoff between Chinese and Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) (border of Sikkim, India) May 20 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Telephone May 14 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait Conversation May 24 North Korea announces that it will hold the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of Jun. 01 Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Video the KWP Teleconference May 28 A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel Islands Jun. 09 Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference May 29 Three Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Jun. 16 Japan-PNG Defense Ministerial Telephone Island to the Pacific Ocean Conversation th h l til 2017 htt // d j /j/ bli ti / / 2020/ df/R02 b df ----- -----